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WHEREIN The Nature of the late Treaties are inquired into, and the Condua: of the M — i — y with Regard to iW— «— ctf, A—r—cay &c. is confidered 3 ' ' ( W I T if Some Remarks upon the Light in which thefe, and other Publick Affairs have been lately reprefented. k; X ' LONDON: t*rinte. 1 v^' *-» Srt» f*^: ■I'M-T'-^14 O- IriiS:.'!^ -t .*3 '. r i«. r I ht V4if>(i} 51S '?'3;tr:?'» t ' J --J* ■» / J 1g j^'tfr'i^-.H L'jjii* y ty *^ %l 1! r mSf6 ft iU jul^ii /I.,'«kT a Sr: i-^ «' At'ts/T ^C«i^ ff-.x w ' w f r fiA .xt;'tc.:j%, -ffiffjo h*!}, /•«••?»'? v3i;'3l,3*^':51 i-'» «. -JI ■ :K Oa VI O vi .IVvIjjGM l-S K#^'r?KJ :?:► ■^"^ "r: A P km dd3 s . PEAL T T H E I » • Senfefiif t^pFeople; "^ ,T a Time when fo much malevolent In< uftry is exerted, by Slander, by ^j , Libels, by Cabals, and by every evU Act, tp inflame the Paflions of the People, an Appeal to their Reafon, an Attempt to intro- duce a Moment's cool Reflexion, in Matters of fuch Importance as thofe we are now engaged in, and at a Time fo critical, cannot be im- proper, and will not, I hope, be inefFe^jjt i«. Zeal A--.^ ^ / .1 '^' ;-''«pS*«* :l [ 2 ] 2^cal we manifcft, for a Skn&. Enquiry into the Offence, and for punifhing the Offen- ders in a Manner adequate to their Offences, is not only jui% but it is highly commend- able. But there arc certain Inflrtiments con- ftantly at Work, who watch the Ebb and Flow of Affairs, and every little Change in the Minds of the People, that they may turn even our befl Difpofitions to the public J'rejudice. Indeed, this much, in juilice, muft be allowed them j though their Ar- guments are the weakeft imaginable, and their Defigns as bad as their Arguments arc weak, yet they underfland perfectly well the V{e of Conjundlures j they know how tp ime their Attacks in fuch a Manner, that the moft (hallow Cavillings (hall pafs for un- anfwerable Arguments} the moft ground- lefs Conjedtures for demonftrated Truths j and their own Malice and Difaffedtion for Patriotifm. Facilt civitate ad accipenda cre- dendaque omnia nova, cum trijiiafunt -, for at a time when People's Minds are funk by any Misfortune, ill News chimes in with that Pifpofition, and may be almoft faid to be yigreeabl^ to it. Better Accounts and a more "chearful Profpedt are a Sort of Difappoint- ments j and when we are foured with ill " . News, .'>#^ Kews, and cxafpcratcd againfl a partiCUlaf Pcrfon, it is not then difficult to pu(h the Point farther j to beget Sulpicions, to fow Rumours, to fprcaJ the Evil wide, and by Degrees to involve others in the Difgracc who arc entirely free from the Guilt, fa- voured by the Confufion which attends in- determinate Accufations, ahd the Pronenefs which Mankind, when enraged, naturally have to multiply the Objedts of their Anger. This is natural j and of this Time, and the Difpolition it produced, an Advantage, and that of a very dangerous kind was taken by the Enemies of the public Tranquillity j to weaken our Confidence in each other; to take away all Strength from the Government, and to abate in the mod Hiameful Manner* the Reverence which thirty Years of the mildeft p.nd wifeft Government had juftly given us for pur moft e^vdlent Sovereign. Thefe indeed were their Defigns all aldilgj but they are now fo dire;«,; .<«;!ar- : U Si thii t 4 1 ^"rVf *rhls may promife a fairer Hearing to the dirpaiTionate Examination of the Meafures which were taken for the general Good in this interefting Conjuncture j I iay, I hope, a fair Hearing, becaufe I am fare I propofe nothing but a fair Reprefentation of the Mea- fares which were purfued j and I mean no other Defence of them, than what fuch a plain Reprefentation of them (hall furni{h. My Intention i8 to (hew, in a plain and iimple manner, the whole Scheme of our Opera- tions, fo far as a private Man may be fuppofed to comprehend it. I flatter myfclf, that when the whole Plan is laid together, all the Ob- jedrons which have been raifed to the de- tached Parts, and which never could have been raifed were they not induftrioufly fepa- rated, lliewn out of their natural Order, and confounded with other Things wholly foreign to them, will vanilh of themfelves. The very Excellence of any general and comprehenlive Syftem may often be the Caufe of particular Failures j but a wife and Jkady Minifter, defpifmg the little Criticks who feed upon little Faults, will keep his End conftantly in View, and only regard what will be the capital Event on the Total of his Operations, without being difturbcd or throvv'n out of his Courfe, for any particular in- '!iSiiib&t&. . t s 1 independent Succcfles the Enemy aJbthi^d may have, or the Advantage which thti Enemy a*^ home may derive from them. Ill Succcfs in (bmc Inftances wc undoubt- edly have had s but I may confidently fay^ becaufe in its proper Place i can make, and ilia 11 make it appear, that they did not arife ' from the Plan which was purfued, and that we could not have taken any otiier Method to prevent it, befides the Method that was taken, without deviating from Principlei from which no Confideration fhould hav9 obliged us to depart. ,.— The Views for which we entered into this War are too generally underflood to need any particular Explanation here. They chiefly regarded our PofTeflions in America : But though die Gbje^ be confined, the Opera- tions neceiiary to attain it muil be of a far more comprehenftve Nature j which makes k necefTary to look towards our Situation in Europe, and to have an Eye on the Circu'^- ftances of which this Situation gives us a Profpe<5t. In confequence of both thefe, of ourDefignsin^;//^nVj,and of theEffeds they muft necefTarily have upon our European Connections, the firft Part of our Scheme, as I conceive, muft have been • - To ^ ^■tA<^\.i"^.-»' ..lW..u&U.jib^w.ti " t 6 1 *T6 bind dbwn the Arms of France ori the Continent, by a Chain of judicious Al-> lianccst Secondly t To cut off the Refources of tour fencmy, by deftroying their Trade and feiz* ing their Seamen. 'ict't ^.< Thirdly, To {ccurc ourfelves frdm an In-* vaiion by a powerful Squadron in our own Ports } and at the fame time to block up the French Navy in their Ports^ to prevent more -effccSlually their Dcfigns either on Ireland or America. . , .^ ... ,, . . Fourthly s To fend fuch a Force into Afne^ flea as might conclulively turn the Balance in that Part of the World in our x* avour. Thefe, I conceive, wei'e the Grounds upon which our Adminiftration intended to form the whole Fabric of their Defigns ; and if, as I fuppofe, very litde can rationally be ob- jed:ed to the Ground- work, the Superftruc- ture will appear well built j ano the whole taken together will make one entire well imagined Piece, n^ < • r^^. ::r<.' v^ Convinced that the State oi Europe is fuch, that all its Parts are fo interwoven by Com-* merce. M. nm ( 7 J mercc, by Alliances, by Marriages, by com**' mon Intcrefh, and by mutual Jealoufies, that England and France can never be engaged in a War without engagtn? the mod con* fidcrable Part of the reft ot Europe inciden- tally ; that no fuch thing as a partial War can be now expeded, nor perphaps detired by us — Our Miniftry adted in Conformity to this Face of Things. ' They examined early the Situation of E«* rope } they enquired into the Strength, th« Connections, the Inclinations, and the Cha- racter of the feveral Powers. To the Northward they had evidently but two Choices j — either to confirm our ancient Alliances with Ruffta^ or to project a new Alliance with Sweden, 4 j? I ; With regard to the latter, the Work, had we undertaken it, would have been attended with infinite Difficulty ; and if h could have been accomplifhed, would have been pro- ductive of nothing but Emharraffmcnt and Confufion : To detach Sweden entirely from a French Intereft would confefledly be a Work of Time, and much Trouble in the Management j and of much Uncertainty in tthe Event. Whether or no the Connexion with wmmmmmm ■■Mipiiieii iM P |i tvrtb jFr»»^ be the real Intcrcft of that King- dom may be decided by fpeculative Politicians it their Leisure: But theic long ,wd ahnoft hcraditaiy Attaghments to the Interefl of France^ the £dat which thi^ Alliance for- IBfidy had, an4 the generaliPf ejudicc which Imift huve Htisn from (hjs, would throw li)n«$^ ^furpiauBtafele Bsri^il^^ Way of a Negotiation with that Stale : Sut grant that we could pcrfedlly have fucceedcd in ^ Qbj«^ of liich a Negotiajdon, aad that Sinedfib vwmsoJ^c^Tc heaitUy in mxv Far 4wliJ, ^hat ;Could we ^xpeiSt froiii an Ally, of a Fidelity un^ried^uid unexperienced^ but of Force lately tried and experienced to be miy 'weak and idejlie^ual ; of a Form of Go- ivei^nment fttfeje( Aich Seeds of the Fire of Fadtion and Seditiqn> that ^ waited biit the lead Spark of Opportunity to make it Mtap otJt, arfd but the ieail Breath of £n^ •CQwragemcfiC tp rifi^jto fuch a Flame as muil; .fievDW ali due Goc>d we could have expected •iBrofn thdr ^erj^ft and heartieA Concur- frcncc hnihsnmsxi':iai^.d ■ . ■ -m . ji0 ■f^is^^nb £ ^The o!hc!r Sldtftherofofe was taken; and c>rte ftreated with jR^Si?, our ancient and ki- fdeed natural My, of whofe great Strength rwre had mtiht leaft Realoa tp^ doubt. Whc^ this M ,i*5ay- ,v\ lat King- politicians id ahno^ itcreft of mce for- ioe which Id tbtow |.Way of {ut grant leeded in smdthat wOur Fa-- an All^f [Ked, but :cd to be tn of Go- rtainty of 'the Fire LDted biit malce it I of En- as muik expelled Concur'- Len; and ; and in* Strength 1^ Whc^ this I 9 ] this Alliance was formed, it was very natu- ral to cxpedt that a Counter-alliance mufl cither have been formed or renewed againft us. This, I fay, was expeded j but it was guarded againit too ; and the Miniftry was confcious, that having fecured Ru^a on our Side, all the Efforts made on the other muft only add to that Security, muft provoke, though infufficient to alarm the Empire of the Mufcovite j which is of itfblf, but be- yond all Doubt by oiir Af?iftance is more than fufficient to overawe both Sweden and Den- mark. Powers that for very obvious Rea- fons, can hardly ever be cordially united j and if they fhould ynite, it muft be by Ties weak and precarious, whilft Jealoufy from within, and a formidable Power from with- out, by fome promifed Advantages, and by the Terrbr of its Arms, would be always ready to diflblve the feeble Bands of fuch a Confederacy ; or if it fhould fail of that, at leaft to take away all Power of its operating to our Prejudice:. . ^. Affairs are fo circumftanced in that Part of the World, that a clofe Alliance with one Party, naturally draws theDifguftof the other; and in this Cafe, what reafonable Man would hefitate a Moment which Party to em- brace ? We did not in the leaft hefitate to C ally v ' \ i-j . \ )• ; til *" ''^■'''^EH^Sac^T I ' "■>''""""'«°""^>">«"i^iHvaBinHnH|iHliililli 4 I lo ] ally with Ruffia, forefeeing indeed the Con- fequences that would probably refult from it in Counter-alliances j but fecuring ourfclves againft them by the Power of the Party we clpoufed, and by the Meafures which were wifely and effedually taken to embarrafs fome other Powers, and to find them Em- ployment at home j convinced at the fame time that nothing amongft ourfelves could be objedied to this Treaty, but fuch Cavils as would have the very fameForce, provided we left any one confiderable State of Europe out of our Confederacy. ^^ ?.u- ^ - ,. Whilft wx looked towards the North, wc had nothing to fear from this Treaty 5 but we had other, and farther Views, wherein we had rcafon to hope from it no fmall Ad- vantages. The Confequences of one pru- dent Step are never confined to the imme- diate ones. . ,.- ,;. V .. - ^ V>.-. The Alliance with RuJJta was a fertile Alli- ance. What was the Refult ? Not what fome prophetick Patriots, in the Entbujiafm of their Policyy had fo confidently foretold. It did not force Prujjia into the Arms of France, Quite contrary was the EfFed ; it influenced the Prudence of that great and wife Prince to detach himfelf entirely from France, and ( enter I k |e Con« trom it irfclves irty we \.h were ibarrais Em- iame could Cavils Tovided Europe Tth, we ty; but wherein all Ad- ne pru- : imme- ileAIIi- lat fome of their It did France, ucnced Prince '^, and enter * t " 1 enter into a ftri(fl Alliance wftK our Court. If thcfe Gentlemen indeed had advifed him, he migfit probably have a^ted as they fore- told J but providentially they were neither his nor our Counfellors. His Prujian Majefty has on Foot one o'' the moft numerous, and by far the beft dif- ciplined Army upon Earth : But it is the Man, it is the Charader of the Prince him- felf, which is the great Gain we have in this Alliahce j a Prince of the moft penetrating Genius, of the moft extenfive Views, and of the moft a w me'^kmriiiWrkd by, tW Court of Berlf'ni burt of Beri/ft $ itidir &f iiyfe tod (UMbMti 6f ihc Cbiift m\K^rk%^t cbiiiia^t^tieb; v^ich ativ'd^ mi^^Mmmi^^^^ had m Ki^ mmmi^i^ H<&&% with Fr^, b 4rbfAA i^ciMately ifi[^<^(^ fkUcn oh Phn^ Uh miik Wii'^m th6;#^kte(t A^viinta^, «li^ aS' h'efm ^ iNfah^ s ^hlr^ |tM, i& We ii^ivs li^d ]' Mtti6m M4 the : £ofe tmiiiHhm ik^ riifatiablc Cuiph ; ^ bitf i!8*^ ^ *h/^(^ h^ no l>rt:ntcnte fe? 2 fteltillties upon that Side, Ifhe fean only a<3i: ' In GeHTtOffy Of ii'j/^fV Countries in which? th^ riiuft ftfugklc With infinite Difficulties, ^ ^id which hjlve provied fatal to the FrmB [ Armd liS sdtxi&ft dll Ages. - D After I fsm *t'; ''h ■Jll ♦■■»•►•• m^m mm r. h . p After all, whfU^ mighty Advantages can France promife Kerfelf from thcDifcontent of thcQueen^or theMcaTures which thatPiicon? tent gave Birch to? France has gained^ it mu(| be granted, an Ally of great Pcjwcr ; but aa Ally which is altogether as heartily di&>red to promote the Interefl of the Houfc 9^ Jpourhn^ as the Houfe of Bourbon is diifpofed to labouif feriouflv for the Aggrandifemcot of the Hou{q ti Ati/tria, The only Way, in which this Alliance is like to be very la|UQg,ax}dJincer^ is, that both Parties ihould be veryjow ; for it is impoflible, with Interefts ib'vcty jarring as theirs, that their SuccefTes (ho^ild not be a great Caufe of mutual Jealouiies. Where there is fo much. Ambition on bpth Sidesj and fuch a Rivaljdilp as naturally fubHils be^ tween thefe Powers, however ,particulsu: £^^ igencief may unite them, they; can never b(p rnuch,in Earneft in throvving a great i^> I ^5 ] .^^ .4-*; So that !h whatever - *■» ■ FdWcf Of Dctnj; mov Light we cohnacr pur Treaties, they carry evident Matki of Wifdom ; they arc the plain ReAilt of one welt, digefted Plan -, all of whqie Parts co-operate io one uniform JDcfi^n: They- produce, and they fupport eacii ot&cri They are not foroned of Parties mutually jealous, nor of Intereds incompa- tible } they are the judicious Effedtsof Choice^ and not the bunding Patch-work of Nc« ceflitv ' * ' ' " ' 0t • r As a Contrail to this, it is not unpleafant to take a View of the Conduct of thofe who oppofe and vilify thefe Treaties at home. Firft, contrary to all Reafon, th^ oppofed all Alliances on the Continent as Durtnenfome and ufelefs to uS} and now, in a Manner as contrary to fife plain Fa(e o/'Fadts, they complain, as a great Lofs, that we have driven all the powerful States of Eurofe from our Alliance ; and this they do in the fame Breath with which they cavil at the Stipula- tions, which were made in our Treaties with foch States as Mufcovy and Pruffia, It is true, that inferior ufeful Alliances were cul- tivated at the fame Time, and furely with great Judgment. The Alliance with Hejfe^ and the Succours of Hanover are no mean Da Re* ' ■'"':*"^*!**M^^'"" ■''^^' ^r ^ - —f-'-- t a? ) ^einforcemen^i iior «t all inQQndiUnt widb }te Sjiftem of Q^r <^cr Ennf^wtt^tf i mi vpry nccciury to our Safpty h«r«. A8t9 the OT^ry GentlcniMm who lias oqa^ s^ ^t ^ous Defence pf tjic Miniftry* if w? allojl ^im to have Wit, it U, I fupppfp, alt be wilf defire of u8 : Byt if wc dp allpw lum tluf property, mud wy not at th^y^e Timfs re? intnd bijn, th»t in Tioie w pul>lic Dan^j- the Patriot would exert his ^90^) Seofei npt his Wit ? He would not attempt to make hi^ Countrymen laugh at their Misfortunes, but ''ortunc, unanimoul ponmv< Haying; thvi^phpfen Allies, wbofe Powec pight ipajfc them eni^ve, ^nd wKofe com? kgilnterpft jjiight kf ep t^qfft ftpady in our . . ., ' Caurci . <-':-*■•■ Ci dicil othl pf pipl ihbi mi^l .wf they h^ave given out through mere .Vffcarincfs, and failing of the great Purpofe$ W^llch they fought in the Field, have been goi^e^ v)r4h over-reaciiing each other in fmallef •"^ I a ] * fonidlcr MittCR' by the Finches of Ncgotia- tion. .V Seniible of this, bur gr^at Point was to make aln early and vigorous Stroke at the very Heart of jiffairs \ riot by fome tranficnt Succefs in the Field, riot even by feizing fome important Fortrefs j for thefe in the' End aro not decifive : But fuch a Stroke as ihould cut off the RefSurces of France i'zxid, which muft in the End difable her from paying Ar- mies, or maintdining Fortreffes, 0^' by any Means coming into Competition with us in Point of naval Strength. For this Piirpofe we have entirely bf-dke their Trade, we have interrupted their Communicatior^ • vith their Colonies, and we have fecured up- wards of Eight Thoufand of their real a<^ing Seamen, and Five Hundred of their Ships in" our Ports. If this fhould appear but a flight Advantage to js, and no material Pre- judice to the Enemy, as with other curious Paradoxes has be^n advanced lately, ,. f3»*.i '»»l^ >.>'! ■yr. \ t »» *^I defire every candid Perfon to confider, what we, who have fomuch a greater Number of Seanien, and fo much a more extenfive Trade, muft have fufFered if we had fuch a Lofs, and at fuch a Time : If we do not firfd It % ' eafy ■« ■« . .^K*-- v. ^mmmmmm gotia- vzs to 2f the inlicnt ^fome nd ato ihould which ng Ar- )y any us in *urpofe ie, we r. ' vith ed iip- l aiding Ships but a ial Prc- cutlous jnfider, Jumber Ktenfive fuch a )t fiitd it eafy eafy tojr^Iie^Supplies.iiow, what DbSiculties ihould we hay e to fupport tHea ? If dow we are. pujQied toyman our Navy properly, what a S^truggle ihould we liave then ? K a ^War in wbuchffew Captures haivp been xna4e> none indleed worth mentioning,- has thrown fonae Dai^p on Credftsipd^ on, Trade, wha( a Stagnation ofBufine^,^ and:!dmoA uniyer- ial Bankruptcy would h^yt been produced gmpng US;? If >a Fadtion,, and the Libellers y\rho mpportity have tal^en fuch Advantages to fow I>If^d anipng jus on account of the Lofsol ^imrca^ what had they npt laid and done in fuch a Cpnjpndure to throw us into littq: Confufion ?;, Lrtuo^ 3vj;a' 5luov/ : To knpw thoroughly how Matters itand^ put yourfelf into the Enemies Condition, and luppofe him in yours, and then form your Judgment.-r-rlndeed the LofTes on the one Side will bear no Sort of Comparifon with thqfe, pn the other. In lofing Minorca^ it is true, we loft a very convenient Port, fituate4 in fuch a Manner as to aiford us fignal Ad<> vantages in the Mediterranean; nor, do I mean to extenuate our Misfortunes. It was a confiderable one, an^Ayithout Doubt much to be lamented; ^^;^3;"^(j . ,;. If.^^ ' - \^ ^Ji ^ \i^ tii^.'J ./ -^Jll i3iil?»-tv. (J V^v. fiut -iV ■ -m M »" « r <*g- *-• *•*■- ' ** • . \ \% K t4 } iijfttHJbfc tto'iil3f«dWtt- had been ahm^ t^eidiigirii^ td f^u^^^^ MHd tfiflt Wbli^ 4)*i /i'>'ih'tJiefeightl iifei^ ^icWed-itl t^rould have found a' f^mPmi^efl ^ Burlefque and Ridicule, in the Barreni^efs and Affignificantie' 6f • tiii Hkhtf j. fl«^f t^buld hive eifirndted its^'Phiidutei fli«^ WbiHd ha^ aibtifetcd ft» R«^^t was C5ipended iri the Adcjuffitaon. *' •''If they hadiitotaftedthtis/ tif^^iti^^ the Hearers of their Specchesj ana the Read* €r$ of their Pamphlets, whether they would *' not <.,.-.. i BPPP W Vc^ ;,7 .^l^it f^'"-' ft '^5 1 ^iot ihtirdjr lh(^Vfe altcitd their Mca^ui^^/ ahd proceeded in a Spfrit Avfiolly different! fi^om Aat whidi has bctii employed to ex-^ pjper^ Dur PafTions and J)et^ert our Judg- htems for thi$ Tvrelvcrtionth pa(l. ii . • ■ • • ;J Sttting til6rt flic Matter between />*j«f^ ^dlis: The Lofe of M/TTorca though great Js not decifivej nor can it «>iuch affedl thd Iflue of the War upon the whole. But Milt Frhnt^ has fufterid, as it fiiHs di- Stdtty upon her Trade, muft deeply affeifi ihc vci^ Iflbe i As the War Gontinafcs the fexpences cncr^afe, whllft from the great Ltmts they have had, and thofe which they hive Reafon yet t6 apprehend, the Means of fupplying them tnaft dittiinilh In Proportion. A lamed Revenue, a fhat- tcrfcd Gdmmcrce, a People dvCr-taxtd, with an intfertjal Grumblings Diftonteftti and Pe-* mry, are Things mortal to a State, in the Co.urfc of a .Warp/ any Continuance. ' it is tilt too natural for Mankind to un- tiervalue the Advantages of which they ara in PoiTeflion, and to over-rate thofe that fall to the Share of their Rivals and Enemies. But in our Cafe, nobody, I imagine, could be deceived, unlefs great Management were E ufed ( *6 J ,.<*f „^iiii ,»■■ ufcd, to carry on the Impofition. Whilft the Trade of France^ and the Revenue, which mufl draw its chief Subfiftance from that Source, is yet in a more wretched Plight than I have rcprefented it, our Ships have failed in a Manner unmolcfted through every Part of the Ocean, and reaped as rich a commercial Harved as in the fereneO: Seafons. <■ .■J . * Even fmce the Declaration of War, now upwards of three Months, our Trade in all its Fulneis, has fcarce had any Lofs : And even the little we have fufFered, is far more than repaid by the Prizes we ftill take from that of France, drained and exhaufted as it already is. The trading Part of the Natiou inethinks ought to underftand, and to (hew a proper Senfe of it. If a Trade unmo- lelied, a Revenue flourifliing, and confe- quently Refources abundant, ought to be reckoned as BlefTings in the Midft c^ a War, or the Proof of well laid Defigns, which Time, that Friend to all wife Contrivances, will more and more illuftrate every Day, if our own Difcontent, Impatience, and Rafli- nels, with the Arts of ill-defigning Men, do not make us turn our Backs upon thefc Prof. f^^V'-Mt/h-..' ':*^ ^3t-,.- Profpcdb, and hinder us from"' acquiring thofe valuable Ob^effcs we have in View. -^v- • What I cdnfidfcr as a third Part of the Plan of this War, was to provide effedhially for our Security at home. How much aa Inyaiion would : have dilconcerted, all our Pn^edts, to &y no worfe, oixuil be obvious ; and how much the Accdrnplidiment of all our Deiigns abroad mufl* have depended upon our Security at home, mofl be no l^fs obvious. In a Country without Forti- fications, where obr Capital, our All is but a few Days March from a defencelefs Sea- coaft^; and where the Lofs of one Battle in the Country would have been nearly deci- five againft us, an Invafion of all things was what we ought moil to have dreaded, and bed to have provided ag^nft, whilil France had fuchian immenfe Force hover- ing oyer us. We ought not to have fuf- fered, ourfelves to be laughed out of Appre- henfions fo juft. Great Caufcwehadto apprehend an Attemptof this Nature j and indeed the flighted Caufes of Apprehenfion ought not to have been defpifed when fo much was at Stake j. and I might venture to fay, that nothing but the wife and ef- fc<^ual Precautions that were taken, hin^ .-! ' \ E 2 dercd i'^"' '4P ' ^'p» ■ tm» I iMtf — »» f Vl* I* ' t. D!oxiiioiQns in .Ei^r«5^p one of tha* ^ mbfb hgzaodoiisr Undeitakii^s imftginabie.' ■ But the: I}Qniiiflion& of Gtiot Britain are' diEJDinted/andidtfperfedx In'dtefe Sba$ thqy> cpnfift of LwOi Countries, divided^ by th«' Sea;} of which Great' Br;tam'ixCis\fh n6-»^' thing, fa. compadi? aS' Jerauct^ its internal ■ ." •'. :> H Force »^?*:'-4. I, KT«;?:ir?^ til I H ) ^ ». > <•-' i ^i\ 9i)tPt^0}ir European Uotmnhh Ikes at fh«' fbttthcrn Biftremity of Sjpaini and a^thind- at an imfnenie DUlancts from Engtarkt^ m thtL m^Mferraneoft Stai 'Bat Ff^tke has- pot'onTy d'efeii^e' AdVaint^gcs wllicl} W<^ hvK fft^r, btit hec bfl[lA(iv^ onels diro ^^iy^ great againft all her Neighbours, aiftl ag*»w us m particular i for (he, as it were., lies bdtWeeti' biir l!)omink»Hsy and- Ibok^ aV^o^ce into thofp 4iftant Seas in -which toy- 4ieP 3he is at |iand to attack us in either, whilft owe'tam'k y^tf fet<^'r§hi6ve^d' fiibftii the J5fcfertce>ofon8 Piart : Minorca is not abbvft^ three Efeys Sail- from Touiorti it h twenty at- Ji^aft fi -r ^i'^i"-Jxi *-- ii/d vv' . tTjf'l ' HldJP'^Gdnfider^Johs will enabfcf^tt* die' bcttep- tb' j^dge-, what we had to do when France made great Preparations ^ Touhn- for a naval Equipment, and the Tranfport- atibtt" d^a ?9<^y o^ Troops, at the fame time thkt Aid ^epared another Squadron in the Hafbour of Breji, and hovered ovfer oUr^ Goaft with a formidable Army, which over-* fpread all the Shores of PrV^r^, Normandy y atid Brefagne. At this Time our extenfivc Trade employed a great Part of our numc- ' '" rous (1 ■1 \h ..~.J— ^v...l«l If mm I r( V I SP j rouS'Fleet to defend it in that perfei^^ Secu- rity which by that means it has enjoyed ; another Fart was abroad, in purfuapce of the Scheme to deiboy that of the Enemy» vhi^h rtpycr ought to fcavp been rclincjuilh- edjland Ml which it. a^ed fo e|!e£tQadly 3 and Othtrfr were fiatlprned where particular Exigeqpi^s h^ be^c : required tneni) too dajant for a fudden R^a}, 1 rSquadron might fail to Norti> America^ pVj to thtWeft Mi^s, and .:^UJi ' attain WW" 111 p. attain a great and dangerous Superiority in thofc intercfting Parts ; !■■ I 3» 1 ihd from which wt had erery ruinous Coti^ fequence to Qppreiftfiid, to our lAyes, ovtt Properties, our Liberties, our Religion, every Thing f Hoiv IkeiiaMylc hitA th^MinHlry been, if, contrary to Kit juft Mftxhns of Po- licy, they in this Cafe had negle^led the Cafttt Rfrum f . •-••^.^ .....vi--^^— ^»*i.> ^^^f . - ;An Error df ihil ICittrf fftigfct'ft'^ {itt- f)robably have been our Itfft, and htvc left ittle Difference between the Accufers and Accufed, before a French TrJbunsrl. t\fnf * Should we then fl:rip England (A thoffe wooden Walls, the only Defence which we have been fo often told ou^t even to bd attempted, rather than defer tne Relief trf" Mahone for one Moment after the firft Ru-* mour that France defigned to attack it ? ' .j>il>J Jt ,»»!( If we had followed the fecond Method j arid in confequence of it, the Brefi Squa- dron had failed with a great Body of Land Forces to America, the Cry had been loi^d,- univerfal i and what would have given it more Force than its Loudnefs or Univerfa-* lity, it had been juftin the higheft Degree ; and no Complaints had been too bitter, no Satires too fevere, if the Adminiftttrtion had - ^ ne* ■ UlJWJiliWi HI t 33 1 licgle^W that moft material Part, (he very O^cd of the War ? As for the third MetWa, it Is too ofevfi oufly weak to fupppfe any Perfons whatever could have fallen into it. , ^^^^^ , ^ ^^^^ What then was left to be chofcn but ttit fourth ? For another Choice, I do not fup* toofe was left, and the three firft were clearly bad. The fourth then was adopted — No Part of the principal Defign was ielinqui(hed by this ; no Advantage was given the Ene-^ my, either on our own Coa '^ . in j4mericai and yet a Force ftrong enough was fcnt, and at a Time early enough > indeed as early as pofliblci confiftent with our Ability^ with Safety, Honour, or Prudence j a Force that, in the Opinion of all, would have fecured u9 the Place, had not the Difobedience of one Officer (on whom I do not purpofe to lean, lince by proper Authority he has fufFered foi* it) or the much ftranger Conduct of another^ thrown thofe Advantages, with which the Vi- gour and Prudence of the Adminiftration had armed him, entirely out of our Hands. If we knew, as d fimple View of the Plan might have made Us know, that Forf St. Philip's was a Place hardly fecond to any in Europe for Strength, and fortified by every Advantage of Nature, and every Con- F trivanct • I sr ^p t 34 J Uivance of Art ; if wc know the Nature of the Country of Minorca, which laid the Befiegcrs under innumerable Difficulties j if we \verc convinced of the Honour and Ca- pacity of the Governor, what Error was committed in not dripping our own Coaft, to fend Mr. Bing'% Fleet before the middle of Marcby for fo foon was he appointed to the Command, when the French Fleet did not yi// till the 12th of Aprils did not land before the 18th, nor opened the Trenches, to be afterwards carried on with infinite Difficulty, before the 25th ? It is agreed upon all Hands, that Mr. Bing, notwith- ftanding his Delay here till the 9th of April, might have reached Minorca on the 5th of May with great Eafej now what Scheme was ever yet accufed of Delay, which was calculated to relieve a Place of the moft immenfe Strength, attacked under fo many Difadvantages, ten Days after the Trenches were opened before it ? Or fup- pofing, as the Fad was, that the Relief did not arrive even for fourteen Days after thi* Time ; and that this was forefeen, which no human Prudence could forefee, who could blame a Relief as delayed, which fub- jeded a Place of fuch firft-rate Strength, and at beft but of fccondary Confideration, to a Siege of Twenty-four Days ; to fecure ' . the f 3J J tlic very Being of a Nation, and the mod valuable Ot^cSs of the War ? But in reality the Place held out Thirty Days longer than this furtheft unforefeen Period of its Relief:, And fuppofing the Relief fo contrived as to arrive no earlier than this Period, is it a very extraordinary Prefumption to reckon upon fuch a Place's holding out only half the Time it was actually maintained ? And lon- ger the Fleet even under this Commander could not have been delayed : But that the Fleet performed no efFedual Service ; that the Place was not relieved, and that the Ad- miral did not a(5t conformably to his Coun- try's Expedlations, is but too true. But what had this to do with the Original De- lign ? Certainly nothing. Ji *i^ <: i: But why, fay they, fliould this Man at all have been employed ? Let me in my Turn aik, why he mould n'^t hav^v* been employed ? Who, of all thofe Gentlemen' who are now grown fo wife by the Event of Things, then objected to him ? Why fhould not he have been employed, who was bred from his Infancy to maritime Af- fairs, had a Skill undifputed, a Courage \m- queftioned, and an Honour untainted, till that fatal Day ? Who had his own Reputa-' tion, the Example of an heroic Father, and ' • F 3 the 1 i 1 01C .Honour of a noble FaniHy before hii ]Byes to excite him to his Duty, in a Com« inand which he hiipfclf had foUidtcd ? Had his SoUicitation been rejected ; had this Com-t m^nd been given to another, and had hq unhappily failedy-as lijis Man hajs, theXid^ of Declamation had run more violently th^ pthfer Way j and thefc proraifing ,Circum-» Ranees, which feqmed to mark him out for playing a noble Part on a Theatre, where f ij. FaSaer had oi^ed/p glorioijfly. ,had been fcunded every 'whercf to the Pag)cace of 4 Miniftry which had the Btindnefs to ne-p gledt fach an apparent Defignation, But Obje^lions of the weakeft JCbd are admit-* ipii againft Expeditions which want Suc-r cefs } fuch is that ci Mr, Bittg'i not having had a fafficient Force; But it muft never be allowed, that we ought not to reckon, on Mr. Edgeciimlfes Squadron as next; to cer- tain; for we muft always reckon that an Officer will do his Duty, as Mr. Edgecumhe did his ; and that therefore he- would in aU probability quit Mahone as early as poffiblc^ to join the Squadron, he muft haVe ex-» pc<&ed, and <-id exped to fail to its Relief? But if ten of the ableft^ beft appointed Ships, that ever failed out of Britain^ with this Reinforcement, are not able to engage Vrith Affurancc of ^Succcfs, twelve French^ %.h ". J foul m^f mFwmwmmmm mmi ■■^iP t 37 1 ^al and but iildifirrently equipped, I db not know what Mein can depend upon : It very rarely happens that Matters can be fo circumftanCed as to afilire us of nocking the Enemy when we are two to one; an Equality, or a fmaU Superiorityi is all that ought reaTonably to be expeded ; and truly othef-Wife all the gr^at add noble Adtions that ever were performed, and that we havs been ufed to admire, muft be accufed of jFolly Ind Itnprudence j Bravery mu/f be ferfifed JFooIifhnefs, Cowardice mpfl be called PrudetiCei.' bMm fiu-RJ '/-il ibiri ^< Uf\} x-i^i ;7 Tho^ I am coAvinced, and I hope it ap- peal's very fatisfaoi!ld make a Babel of the whole of our foreign Schemes, ftagger our Allies, by the Inflability of our Meaiures, and confound every internal Arrangement ; in fuch a Cafe, no Man can anfwer for the Event, let the firll Difpoiitions have been ever fo judicioufly concerted. . .:: '^^ Scarce is the Clamour on. the Subjed of Mnbone movt violent or more unreafonable, than that which has been raifed concerning the Condud of our Affairs in America, If That our firft Efforts there have not been attended with all that Succefs, which from the general Plan of Operations in that Coun- tiy,. we might have promifed ourfelves, I am not at all furprized. ; - ;„; ..,,„- • » A The French have gained over to their Friendfhip and Alliance mod of the favage Nations j and this not owing more to their own Art, and the inconflant Difpofition of that Sort of People, than to the ill Condudt and unwife Meafures purfued by our Coun- trymen there ; at once defpifing and pro- voking the Savages, and thereby forcing them, as it were, into the Arms of Fr/7»r^, hiyojU who v> ■„■,>..« *- -.a.,..-w , iVi».:»^«^i»^ •-H«.»5^*fcOl,^»»r»«»u-<»1N|-*Y^ ,» , * • ' T 5, ir c • t 39 1 who has reaped all thofe Advantages which rcfult from a perfedb Knowledge of the Country, from a Readinefs in harrafling a Frontier, from Secrecy in marauding Ex- peditions, and that Dexterity at Surprizes which is the diftinguifhing Charaderiftic of every favage Nation. They have therefore all the Benefits arifine from a fuperior Know- ledge of an irregular Warfare j thefe arc ever of a more glaring than folid Nature ; they confound at firft by their Novelty : The Unwary are furprized : But their Succeffes never difcompofe or di{hearten a wife Man j for Novelty foon wears ofFj whereas tht Advantages of Difcipline continue and ftrengthen daily : Every Succefs which Ir- regulars of this Sort meet with, is a Preju- dice to them in their future Expeditions $ they put the Enemy upon their Guard, they familiarize him to fuch Attacks, and teach him no longer to dread them ; while they are themfelves put off their Guard by a Confidence which Succefs without Difcip- line never fails to infpire. '^h' f.' u. Our Troops are by Degrees habituated to ?he Country, and to the Nature and Manner J the War ; our Refources are large in that Country, and we are taught how to make the beft Ufc of them. The Strength of th« \ "•^-Vt^^v**"..- ■P np 1.: I < \ 1 1 M! •'I' I 40 1 the Prencb is merely in the Savages, whbfil Friendfhip any remarkabk ill Succefs on their Side will be fure to ihake. They have a Country not populous enough to re* cruit Armies, nor fruitful enough to fubM them for any conliderablc Time j and their Suppliesfrom JEttrc/f are precarious of them- felves, by Means of a long, troublefome, and dangerous Navigation, and furely litde to b« depended on while our Fleets are fuperior* > Onr Colonies in North Athericd confcf^ fed!) * I. a great Superiority over thofe of France, hether we confider the Number of People, the Greatnefs of the Scttlenjent^j the Impiovement of the Soil, or the Ex^ tent of the Trade j but there arc Circum- ftances too, in which we are much inferior to them. In what relates to carrying on a War with Advantage, in which an Uni^ formity in Command, in AfFedions and in Counfels, is of the greateft Moment. To this Uniformity, from the very ConAitution of our Colonies, we were a long Time Strangers. Hence urofe fome Failures and Delays, fome EmbarrafTements in the Con- trivance, and more in the Execution of our Schemes of Operation. -- «-, ' , ,, >; ; His Majefty « American Dominions con- . I fift u. ■-*,*.: -^ , ll| PMI I 4i 1 ffilof'a vaft Trata of Land, divided inta i'Vaiicty of diftin are iii much'moro comfortable Situations \ but, as it muft be allowed he is an ingenious Man, we cannot fuppoTe him in Earncft in this Sort of Ob-i jection. His Irony is very nice and bor-* dering on thcObfcure; and People are fometimes apt to miftake him : but I will" anfwcr for it, that a moderate Pienfion would induce him to own all he has writ-o ten .to be in that Strain ; and I expedt» when the Jeft is difcovered fo happily, that he will allow me fomething out of it, for the H«- tachment to Truth ; and that he ought t6 take Care that the good Pctwie of England, to whom he addrcflesi hinifelf in the Stile ■pf a Tutor tiid Guardian, (hould pay very little Regard to a Man, who is either very tajify sn^fed on biinJeJf, or very wlUng t$ impofe Qfi others* .i • ' But Criticifms of this Sort, without knowing or deiirhfig to be informed of the real Nature of the Subjed we criticiib, are either not ferious at all, or they are Things fftsj fericus indeed. Vt- '^ . h- How exadlly do thefc Gentlemen agree with our Enemies the French m their Judg- fhent upon our Affairs I The Defeat of General Braddack is always in their Mouths, -and exaggerated by every Figure which their Stock of Malice and Rhetoric can fupply ■them ; but the taking the Forts on St. yohn*5 Rivery that Part in which France /eels a Wound moft feverely, and the ra- ther as this difablcs her in a good Meafure from applying a Remedy to thofe (lie may ireceive elfewhere ; the driving the French from Baufejour, where they held us befieged as it were in the Peninfulaj the more me- -::-'.:-:3- -:.:u-.---j|^ •-'■:--■' morablc i:-i , J I 48 3 tfTidrabIc Vidtory'of Johnftm^ attctidold with tbc Circumftance of making the French •General Prifoncr : Thcfc are Things they a6fe£l to flight f the Merit ofi the two Utter .fiervices, is-attiibut^d wholly to the- People of New England 'y blit thb MisfortUne of theformer, is charged Wholly'on the Minif- try. though it is vyreft known th^ all the Operations, thofe which fuoceeded, as well as thofe that failed, are Parts of one and the '(ame.Phfii J "ahd'iconfcquchtly not to be; divided,, whether we confider them witlx Ccnfure-or Applaufo» to 'rm-'.v. i . .i But in whatever Light wc Tiew our owA Mcafures, the Succels the French have had is amplified beyond all Troth and Rcafon, What one Step have thejr advanced, or what material Advantage have' they made of the Defeat of Brad Jock ? Are they pof- feffed of any one Place in which they were not cftablifhed before that Event?' Have they fuch an Army in the Field 'as will ena- ble them to aft ipon the ofFenfive ? And dp not even tlie Incurfions of .tht' Indians, Things far enough from dccifive, grow every Day lefs and lefs frequent ? Are thefe the Signs of a People who have gained a great and undoubted Superiority ? And on our Side, ate t|iey Marks .of a People ne- ^Idmm ""■■"■^ — _^-- : -*-^- gie^cd ^» h cb r 49 1 . g!e6led and abandoned by their Miniflry ? It is we in Fadb that have made the mod material Advantages, and removed the falfe Land- marks with which the Ambi- tion of France had bounded us, even long before the War : we have (topped their moft certain -Communication with their Co-; Ionics, and we have driven them from Forts of which they had been long in Poffcflion ; besides that the Advantages of France are paflingaway, whereas ours are daily encrcat- ing. Our Colonics united, their Diffentions quieted, and their prefent Concord confirm-* cd and made efFtftive by a good Body of Troops, headed by an unexceptionable' Commander, and every Part of o i mili- tary Operations under a Superintendance' which promifcs us every Thing. A Peo- ple lefs fanguine than we are, might enter- tain the grcateft Hopes, if they faw their Troops, under fuch a Direction, from a' State of great Rudenefs become as famous for the Stritftnefs of their Difcipline as they always were for their Courage. If they faw the Vigilance of an old Commander united to the lively and adive Spirit of Youth J and if they faw the ftrifteft and moft indefatigable Study in the Art of War, per- fcdling a Genius, which our Enemies fear and confefs : I fay a Ocnius, bccaufe Ex- H periencc ^*^, ■f' A'- ! f jjteri^ce and* Habit, with a mpcjer^te Dc% grec of Attention, may make a Man, with- out any uncommon Capacity, walk with, great, Credit iii the ;beaten Track of the mi-. Htaty Profefljpn i but Genius is the only- Star which guides us in the pathlefs Wilder-? nefs of an unfrequented World. It was a. Sagacity of no vulgar Kind which could r penetrate at once nto the Secret of that^ new Species of Warfare, to comprehend] its peculiar and diftinguilhing Character, . at the firft Glance, to enter into the pecu-'* liar Difficulties which attended it, and to, point out the Rock in this unnavigated' Qc and not found it Ho eafy to ridicule^ aswouldhavehappened to him inhisveryfel** ting out ;ibr fmartas he may be on theWorda beUer Orders ^1 will take it on me to fay,> that however the French may have tranf-« lated the Letter they fog nd,. and this Wri- ter have taken it from the French , yd I. fay in the original Engli/h there is nothifig to juftify it. And having thus, in his fet- ting out, deteded this Writer, it would be paying him too great a Compliment to fol- low him all through a Piece, wherein, if there was one hundredth Paic lb much Wit as there is fcnfelefs lU-Natufe, I would re- commend it very heartily to the Reading and Rereading of evej-y^Manlhatdoes.re^, ..^'->- 'rr: When the People are dlfpirited, there are never wanting Men of this Kind to make every trivial ill Succefs of the worfk Confequencejby impregnating it with Seeds of Difcord and Confulion. Thus every Advantage gained by the Enemy is doubled by the Diffenfion it caufes at home : A People wanting in a good Opinion of theni- felvcs, and a Confidence in their Rulers, are inca^^able of any thing great or ufeful. Thofo i "^m W dicm for Empift, tiiough full of that high Spirit, which, as k made ill Succefs unufuai; to their Arms, rendered it almoft infup* portable to their Minds, yet in fuch a Cafe always grew more enamoured of their Country j awd, quitting their Connexions with their Party, attached themfelvcs with ilrider Bonds than ever, clofcly to the Or- ders of the State. This they knew was not a Time for Change, bccaufe they were fen- fible,, that all beginning Adminiftrations, efpecially thofe whioh owe their Birth to Fadion, have two capital Faults ; that they are violent, and that they arc weak ; they were convinced that New Men fpctid that Time in feardiing for Tools, >yhich ought to be employed at Work } and that thofc who come in upon theDeftrudion of others, hating the Meafurcs for the Sake of the Men, fail not to difturb the moft falutary Regulations made by their Predeceffors ; and that at a critical Seafon in Politicks, as Ml Medicine, almoft every thing depends upon not difturbing the Order and Method of Affairs.' f '^'^'^-'^^ "'■''■''" •^^*'' s;?-ir^^':"ir • Thefe, as it is well known, were Prin- ciples from which the Remans were never kifown to depart ; and it is to thofe they ;»ica A ov/ed lili i S3 1 owed their Grandeur principally, bccauft the weaker they were abroad, the ftronger and more united they became at home, and Men were encouraged to fcrvc their G5\in- try with Chearfulnefs,' becaufe with Secu^ rity, bqthift Peace and in War. * Very different was the Condudt of thofe giddy N ations whom Providence fecmed to have marked out for a ihamefdi Ruin, and which fpme Patriots wonld advife us to imitate. Incapable of judging but by Events, and impatient of their Condition, but with-* out knowing how to better it, they turned their Backs to the Enemy, and their Arms upon one another. Without confidering the Situation of Affairs, they expedted Im-» poflibilities from their Minifters j they changed them when they were fruflratcd in thofe Expe^ations, and chofe new ones, who flattered them with Hopes yet more extravagant, only to deceive them in a Man- ner yet more fatal, and to make Way for fuch new Changes as a fickle People never want Pretences to make. , i Vl*.#i*A " Such were the Manners of the Athenians in the bafe and degenerate Times of that Commonwealth ; fuch was' the Condition of France, when wc conquered it j and fuch i •; ^' % ^ .- i i ![ 54 i « • ' •*.,.-.., ^.. ^ .|. ,.f . . , fuch is the Spirit fomfe Men woula nuTe in England, wlich Withfe is ready to inyade u$. .'ii-Biit a Mlriilffi^/ jftrengthipncd l^y thc.Fa^ vottf of their P^^,^ and X4w^f^§ ^7 *^ Confidence * oiP ^the ' unfeduced ariJt better Part of hi^ Si^^edis, hayinff -,4onejpKcry thing, Prudence could fuggeffjih a Time pf Danger, having Aicceedeo^^Tn Bni^^nvpf the Obgcifts of their Care,' and having laid jud^- Cioiis Plans for fucceeding in &e reft, caii tmtv be diilii^Sedlyy a Qainpiiir^rpund