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LONDON: Printed for J. DODSLEY, in Pall Mall. M. DCC.LXXXI V. '4 1 feh ■■■HI ^^ l'>,' » I THOUGHTS O N THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. IT IS an undertaking of fome degree of de- licacy to examine into the caufe of public diforders. If a man happens not to fucceed in fuch an enquiry, he will be thought weak and vifionary ; if he touches the true grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to perfons of weight and confequence, who will rather be ex- afperated at the difcovery of their errors, than thankful for the occalion of corred:ing them. If he fhould be obliged to blame the favourites of the people, he will be confidered as the tool of power; if he cenfures thofe in power, he will B be i.ui i THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF lit be looked on as an inftrument of fadion. But in all exertions ofduty fomething is to be hazard- ed. In cafes of tumult and diforder, our law has inverted every man, in fome fort, with the authority of a magiftrate. When the affairs of the nation are diftradted, private people are, by the fpirit of that law, juftified in ftepping a little out of their ordinary fphere. They enjoy a privilege, of fomewhat more dignity and cfFedl, than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of their country. They may look Into them narrowly ; they may reafon upon them liberally ; and if they fliould be fo fortu- nate as to difcover the true fource of the mifchief, and to fuggeft any probable method of removing it, though they may difpleafe the rulers for the day, they are certainly of fervice to the caufe of Government. Government is deeply interefled in every thing which, even through the medium of fome temporary uneafinefs, may tend finally to compofe the minds of the fubjedt, and to conciliate their affedlions. I have nothing to do here with tiie abftradl value of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation, the moft precious poiTrflion of every individual, and as long as opinion, the great fupport of the State, depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be confidered as a thing of little confequence either to individuals or to Government. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws j lefs by violence. Whatever original energy may be fuppofed either in force or regulation ; the operation of both is, in truth, merely inftrumental. Nations are governed r 1 II THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 3 governed by the (lime methods, and on the fame principles, by which an individual witliout authority is often able to govern thofc who are his equals or his fuperiours ; by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it ; 1 mean, — when public affairs are fteadily and quietly conduded j not when Go- vernment is nothing but a continued fcuffle be- tween the magiftrate and the multitude ; in which fometimes the one and fometimes the other is uppermoft ; in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a feries of contemptible vidories, and fcandalous fubmiflions. The temper of the people amongft whom he prefides ought therefore to be the firft ftudy of a Statef- man. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means impoflible for him to attain, if he hhs not an intereft in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn* To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at tiie prefent poffeffors of power, to lament the paft, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, are the common difpofitions of the greateft part of mankind j indeed the neceffary effeds of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and humours have exifted in all times -, yet as all times have mt been alike, true political fagacity manifefts itfclf, in dif- tinguifliing that complaint which only cha- ra(5lerizes the general infirmity of human na- ture, from thofe which are fymptoms of the particular diftemperature of our own air and feafon. B 2 Nobodv, 4 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF Nobody, I believe, will confider it merely as the langu»ige of fpleen or difappointment, if 1 iiiy, that there is ibmethlng particularly alarm- ing in the prefent conjundture» There is hardly a man in or out of power who holds any other language. That Government is at once dreaded and contemned ; that the laws are defpoiled ot all their refpe(fted and falutary terrors,- that their ina6lion is a fubjefl of ridicule, and their ^ertion of abhorrence ; that rank, and office, and title, and all the folemn plaufibilities of the world, have loft their reverence and effe6l ; that our foreign politicks are as much deranged as our domeftic a'conomy ; that our dependencies are flackcned in their affcflion, and loofened from their obedience ; that we know neither how to yield nor how to inforce i that hardly any thing above or below, abroad or at home, is found and entire; but that difconnexion and confufion, in ofHccs, in parties, in families, in Parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the difordcrs of any former time : thefe are fadts univerfally admitted and lamented. This ftate of things is the more extraordinary, becaufc the great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be in a manner entirely diftblved. No great external calamity has vifited the nation; no peftilencc or faniinc. We do not labour at prefent under any fchcme of taxation new or oppreflive in the q'lantity or in the mode. Nor are we en- gaged in unfuccefsful war> in which, our mif- loi tunes might eafily pervert our judgement j and ; < / THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. $ and our minds, fore from the lot's of national glory, might feel every blow of Fortune as a crime in Government. It is impofiible that the caufe of this flrangc diftcmpcr (hould not fometimcs become a fub- je(il of difcourfe. It is a compliment due, and which I willingly pay, to thoie wiio adniinillef our affairs, to take notice in the firf: place of their fpeculation. Our Minifterb are of opinion, that the increafe of our trade and manufa(iturcs, that our growth by colonization and by con- queft, havt; concurred to accumulate immenfc wealth in the hands of fome individuals; and this again being difperfed amongft the people, has rendered them univerfally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable ; that the infolence of fome from their enormous wealth, and the boldnefs of others from a guilty poverty, have rendered them ca- pable of the moft atrocious attempts j fo that they have trampled upon all fubordination, and violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free Government; barriers too feeble againfl: the fury of a populace fo fierce and licentious as ours. They contend, that no adequate provo- cation has been given for fo fpreading a difcon- tent ; our affairs having been condudled through- out with remarkable temper and confummate wifdom. The wicked induftry of fome libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few difappointed po- liticians, have, in their opinion, been able to produce this unnatural ferment in the nation. Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the prefent convulfions of this country, if the B 3 above i f lii ii ;tl 6 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF above account be a true one. I confefs I Hiall aflent to it with great reluftance, and only on the compulfion of the cleareft and firmeft proofs; becaufe their account refolves itfelf into this (hort, but difcouraging propofition, ** That wc ** have a very good Miniftry, but that we are a '* very bad people ;" that we fet ourfelves to bite the hand that feeds us ; that with a malig- nant infanity wc oppofe the meafures, and un- gratefully vilify the perfons, of thofe whofe fole objed: is our own peace and profperity. If a few puny libellers, a6ling under a knot of fac- tious politicians, without virtue, parts, or cha- racter (fuch they are conftantly reprefented by thefe gentlemen), are fufHcient to excite this diflurbance, very perverfe muft be the difpofition of that people, amongft whom fuch a diflurbance can be excited by fuch means. It is befides no fmall aggravation of the public misfortune, that the difeafe, on this hypothefis, appears to be without remedy. If the wealth of the nation be the caufe of its turbulence, I imagine it is not propofed to introduce poverty, as a conftable to keep the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank luxuriance of fedition, it is not intended to cut them off in order to familh the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power, there is no de- {"ign, I hope, to call in the aid of defpotifm, to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, thefe things are not yet profejGTed. We feem therefore to be driven to abfolute d^'lpair i for we have no other materials to • ., work 1 1 THE PTIESENT DISCONTENTS. 7 work upon, but thofe out of which God has been pleafed to form the inhabitants of this tHand. If thefe be radically and eflentially vi- cious, all that can be faid is, that thofe men are very unhappy, to whofe fortune or duty it falls to adminifter the affairs of this untoward people I hear it indeed fometimes aflerted, that a Heady perfeverance in the prefent meafures, and a ri*- gorous punifhment oF thofe who oppolc them, will in courfe of time infallibly put an end to thefe diforders. But this, in my opinion, is faid without much obfervation of our prefent difpo- fition, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation is compofed be fo very fer- mentable as thefe gentlemen defcribe it, leavea never will be wanting to work it up, as long as difcontent, revenge, and ambition, have ex- iftence in the world. Particular punifhments are the cure for accidental diftempers in the State 5 they inflame rather than allay thofe heats which arife from the fettled mifmanagement of the Government, or from a natural ill difpolition in the people. It is of the utmoft moment not to make miftakes in the ufc of flrong meafures j and firmnefs is then only a virtue when it ac- companies the moft perfect wifdom. In truth, inconftancy is a fort of natural corredive of folly and ignorance. I am not one of thofe who think that the people are never in the w^rong. They have been fo, frequently and outrageoufly, both in other countfies and in this. But I do fay, that in all B 4 difputes 8 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF ll^ difputes between them and their rulers, the prefumption is at lead upon a par in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps juftify mc in going further. Where popular difcontencs have been very prevalent ; it may well be affirm- ed and fupportcd, that there has been generally lomething found amifs in the conftitution, or in the conduit of Government. The people have no intcreft in diforder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the State, it is far otherwife. They certainly may ad: ill by defign, as well as by miftake. ** Les revolutions qui arrivent darts les grands etats ne font point un cffeti du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples^ Rein ne revoke les grands d'un royaume comme un Gouvernement foible et derange. Pour la populace, ce nejl jamais par envie d'attaquer quelle fe fouleve, mais par impatience de fouff'rir */' Thefe are the words of a great man; of a Minifter of flate; and a zealous afTertor of Monarchy. They are applied to the Jyftem of F avoiiritifn which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful confequences it produced. What he fays of re- volutions, is equally true of all great difturbances. If this prefumption in favour of the fubjedts agalnll: the truftees of power be not the more probable, I am fure it is the more comfortable fpeculation , becaufe it is more eafy to change an adminirtration than to reform a people. <( (f tc tf €1 €t ti * Mem, ds Sully, vol. I. p. 133, Upon If ei.i THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 9 Upon a fuppofition, therefore, that in the opening of the caufe the prefumptions ftand equally balanced between the parties, there feems fufficient ground to entitle any perfon to a fair hearing, who attempts Tome other Icheme befide that eafy one which is fafhionable in fome fafhionable companies, to account for the pre- fent diCcontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, becaufe our grievances are not of the fame fort with thofe under which we laboured formerly ; not precifely thofe which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the filent lapfe of events as material alterations have been in- fenfibly brought about in the policy and cha- radler of governments and nations, as thofe which have been marked by the tumult of pub- lic revolutions. It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public mifcondudt; as rare to be right in their fpeculation upon the caufe of it. I have conttantly obferved, that the generality of people are fifty years, at leaft, behind-hand in their politicks. There are but very few, v/ho are capable of com- paring and digefting what paffes before their eyes at different times and occalions, fo as to form the whole into a diftindl fyftem. But in books every thing is fettled for them, with- out the exertion of any confiderable diligence or fagacity. For which reafon men are wife with but little reflexion, and good with little felf- denial. \ 10 1 ilOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF denial, in the bufinefs of all times except their own. We are very nncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the tranfadtions of pail ages; where no paflions deceive, and where the whole train of circumftances, from the trifling caufe to the tragical event, is fet in an orderly feries before us. Few are the partizans of departed tyranny ; and to be a Whig on the bufinefs of an hundred years ago, is very con- fiftent with every advantage of prefent fervility. This retrofpedive wifdom, and hiilorical pa- triotifm, are things of wonderful convenience; and ferve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between fpeculation and practice. Many a ftern republican, after gorging himfelf with a full fead: of admiration of the Grecian common- wealths and of our true Saxon conftitution, and difcharging all the fplendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, fits down perfedly fatisfied to the coarfeft work and homeliell job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no profeffed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the inftruments of the lall King James ; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth, was there, I dare fay, to be found a fingle advo- cate for the favourites of Richard the Second. No complaifance to our Court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be fo changed, but that public liberty will be among us, as among our anceftors, obnoxious to fome perfon or other ; and that opportunities will be fur- nifhed, for attempting at leaft, fome alteration to the prejudice of our conftitution. Thefe attempts // THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. n attcmptg will naturally vary in their mode ac- cording totinies and circumftances. For ambi- tion, though it has ever the fame general views, has not at all times the fame means, nor the fame particulj^r objedls. A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags ; the reft is entirely out of fafhion. Befides, there are few Statefmen fo very clumfy and awkward in their bufinefs, as to fall into the identical fnare which has proved fatal to their predeceflbrs. When an arbitrary irnpoiition is attempted upon the fubjed:, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of Ship- money, There is no clanger that an extenlion of the Forejl laws fliould be the chofen mode of oppreflion in this age. And when we hear any inftance of minifterial rapacity, to the pre- judice of the rights of private life, it will cer- tainly not be the exadion of two hundred pullets, from a woman of fafhion, for leave to lie with her own hufband *. Every age has its own manners, and its poli-p ticks dependent upon them ; and the fame at- tempts will not be made againft a conftitution fully formed and matured, that were ufed to deftroy it in the cradle, or to refift its growth during its infancy. Againft the being of Parliament, I am fatisfied, no defigns have ever been entertained lince the * " Uxor Hugonis de Nevill dat Domino Regi ducentas ** Galiinas, eo quod poflit jacere una nodte cum Domino " Aid Hugone de Nevill." Maddox, Hift. Exch. c. xiii, p. 3'-i6. Revolution. II I 12 TFIOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF Revolution. Every one muft perceive, that it is flrongly the intereft of the Court, to have fome iccond caufe interpofed between the Minifters and the people. The gentlemen of the Houfe of Commons have an intereft equally ftrong, in fuftaining the part of that intermediate caufe. However they may hire out the uJufruBoi their voices, they never will part with the fee and inheritance. Accordingly thofe who have been of the moft known devotion to the will and pleafure of a Court, have at the fame time been moft forward in aflerting an high authority in the Houfe of Commons. When they knew who were to ufe that authority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It muft be always the wifti of an unconftitutional Statefman, that an Houfe of Commons who are entirely dependent upon him, fhould have every right of the people entirely dependant upon their pleafure. It was foon difcovered, that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible. The power of the Crown, almoft dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more ftrength, and far lefs odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without noife and without violence ; an influence which converted the very antagonift, into the inftrument, of power; which contained in itfelf a perpetual principle of growth and renovation -, and which the diftreffes and the profperity of the country equally tended to aug- ment. and rith der lich \'f an nift, lined and the lug- lent« THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 13 ment, was an admirable fubftitute for a Prero- gative, that, being only the offspringof antiquated prejudices,^ had moulded in its original ftamina irrefiftible principles of decay and diflblution. X he Ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary fyftem ; the intereft of adlivt men in the State is a foundation perpetual and infal- lible. However, fome circumftances, arifing, it muft be confefled, in a great degree from accident, prevented the effedls of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any ferious apprehenfions. Although Government was ftrong and flouriflied exceedingly, the Court had drawn far lefs ad- vantage than one would imagine from this great fource of power. At the Revolution, the Crown", deprived, for the ends of the Revolution itfelf, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to flruggle againll all the difficulties which prefled fo new and unfettled a Government. The Court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of fuch intereft as could fupport, and of fuch fidelity as would adhere to, its efta- blifliment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the com- mon defence. This connexion, neceflary at firft, continued long after convenient ; and pro- perly conducted might indeed, in all fituations, be an ufeful inftrument of Government. At the fame time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and chara<5ler, the people pofl'efled a fecurity for their juft portion of im- portance r 14 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF portancc in the State. But as the title to the; Crown grew ftrongcr by long poflcffion, and by the conftant increafeof its influence, thefe helps have of late fecmed to certain perfons no better than incumbrances. The powerful managers fof Government were not fufficiently fubmifllve to the pleafiire of the poflelTors of immediate and perf nal favour, fometimes from a confidence in their own ftrength natural and acquired j fome- times from a fear of offending their friends* and wealcening that lead in the country, which gave them a confideration independent of the Court. Men adted as if the Court could re- ceive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of Governnrient, thus divided in ap- pearance between the Court and the leaders of parties, becan:e in many cafes an accelfion rather to the popular than to the royal fcale; and fome part of that influence which would otherwife have been poflefl'ed as in a fort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arofe, and cir- culated among the people. This method there- fore of governing, by men of great natural intereft or great acquired confideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of abfolute monarchy. It is the nature of defpotifm to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleafure j and to an- nihilate all intermediate fuuations between boundlefs ftrength on its own part, and total debilirv on the part of the people. To ( t f i I { f G t t] n To THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 15 To get rid of all this intermediate and inde- pendent importance, and to fccure to the Court the unlimited and itncontrouled uje of its own va/i influence t under the- file direBion of its own pri- vate favour^ has for fome years pall been the great objedl of policy. If this were compared, the influence of the Crown muft of courfe pro- duce all the eflefts which the moft fanguinc partizans of the Court could poflibly defire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower forts, A new projed: was therefore devifed, by a certain let of intriguing men, totally different from the fyllem of Adminillration which had prevailed fmce the acceflion of the Houfe of Brijnfwick. This projedl, I have heard, was lirft: conceived by fome perlbns in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales. The earlieft attempt in the execution of this dcfign was to fet up for Miniller, a perfon, in rank indeed refpedtable, and very ample ia fortune; but who., to the moment of this vaft and fudden elevation, was little known or con- fidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmilTion But whether it was for want of iirmnefs to bear up againfl the firft oppofition \ or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moft eligible; that idea was foon abandoned. The inftru- mental part of the projed was a little altered, 3 to i6 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF to accommodate it to the time, and to brings things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofcd. The firft part of the reformed plan was to draw a line icbkb JhouUfeparatc the Court from the Minijlry, Hitherto thefe names had been looked upon as fynonymous j but for the future. Court and Adminirtration were to be confidered as things totally diftinft. By this operation, two fyfteCns of Adminiftration were to be formed ; one which fhould be in the real fecret and confidence ; the other merely oftenfible, to perform the official and executory duties of Government. The latter were alone to be re- iJDonfiblci whilfl: the real advifers, who enjoyed all the power, were efFedtually removed from all the danger. Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the Court againjl the Minijlry: this party was to have a large fliare in the emo- luments of Government, and to hold it totally feparate from, and independent of, oftenfible Adminiftration. The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole fcheme ultimately depended, was to bring Farliajnent to an acquiejcence in this prcjedf. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the perfons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and cha- raifter, of the Minifters of the Crown. By means of a difcipline, on which I fliall fay more here- after, that body was to be habituated to the moft oppofite interefts, and the moft difcordant politicks. THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. xefs was this Light bns, ha- eans ere- the dant cks. politicks. All connexions and dependencies among fubje<5ls were to be entirely dillulved. As hitherto bufinefs had gone through tlic hands of leaders of Whigs or TTorics, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to he given to men of no fort «jf confideration or credit in the cjuntiy. Tliis want of natural Importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Parlia- ment were to be hardened into an infcnfibility to pride as well as to duty. Thofe high and haughty fentlments, which are the great fupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and preccfience were no more to be regarded in Parliamentary decorum, than ia a Turkilli army. It was to be avowed as a con- ilitutional maxim, that the King might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for iVlinifler; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the firft name for rank or wifdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the clolet and back-ftairs was fubftituted ifi the place of a national Admini- ilration. With fuch a degree of acquiefcence, any meafure of any Court might well be deemed thoroughly fecure. The capital objects, and by much the mofl flattering charadl:erl(ticks of arbi- trary power, would be obtained. Every thiiig would be drawn from its holdiny;s In the countrv to the perfonal favour and inclination of the , C Prince. \ * Sentiments of an honeft Man. C 4 politicians. p. a! '^' a4 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal! to charm every body, except ihofe few who are not: much plealld with profefTions of fupernaturaH virtue, who know of what ftuff fuch profefTions are made, for what purpofes they are defigned, and in what they are fure conllantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talk- ing profe all their lives without knowing any thing of the matter, began at laft to open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having been Lords of the Treafury and Lords of Trt.de many years before, merely to the prevalence of party, and to the Minifterial power, which had fruftrated the good intentions of the Court in favour of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the fealed fountain of Royal bounty, which had been infamoufly mor nopolized and huckftered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole people. The time was come, to reftore Royalty to its original fplendour. Mcttrc le Hoy hors dc page, became a fort of watch- word. And it was conftantly in the mouths of all the runners of the Court, that nothing could preferve the balance of the con- llitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a fad:it)n of the nobility, but to fi'ce the Sovereign effecftually from that Minifterial ty- ranny under which the Royal dignity had been oppreiled in the perfon of his Majefty's grand- lather. Thefe were fome of the i.iany artifices ufed to reconcile the people to the great change which was made in the perfons who compofed the I. THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. jj tlie Miniftry, and the ftill greater which was made and avowed in its conrtitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them ; in order lb thoroughly to difunite every party, and even every family, that 7io concert, order, or cffeEl, might appear in any future op- pojition. And in '■^is manner an Adminiftration without connexion with the people, or with one another, was firft put in poflcfilon of Govern- ment. What good confequenccs followed from it, wc have all i^^w ; whether with regard to vir- tue, public or private; to the e\fc and happinef'? of the Sovereign j or to the real rtrengt'n of Go- vernment. But as fo much ilrefs was then laid on the necefTity of this new projed, it will not be amifs to take a view of the effcvfts of this Royal fervitude and vile durance, which was fo deplored in the reign of the late Moivircli, and was fo carefully to be avoided in tb,c reign of his SuccelTor. The effeds were thefc. In times full of doubt and danger to his per- fon and family, George the Second maintained the dignity of his Crown conncded with tlv:: liberty of his people, not only unimp;iircd, but improved, for the (pace of thirty-three' years. He overcame a dangerous rcbcilion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms j and thereby dcftroyed the feeds of ail future rebellion that could anfe upon the fame principle. He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to an height unknown even to this renowned nation in iJic times of its greatefi profperiiy; and he left his fucceliion f'i H 16 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF fucceflion refting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatnefo; affccftion at home, reputation abroad, trufl: in allies, terror in rival nations. The moft ardent lover ©f his country cannot wi{h for Great Bri- tain an happier fate than to continue as flie was then left. A people emulous as we are in affec- tion to our prefent Sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to Heaven for a greater blefling upon his virtues, or an higher flate of fe- licity and glory, than that he fliould live, and fliould reign, and, when Providence ordains it, ihould die, exadtly like his illuftrious Prede- celTor. A great Prince may be obliged (though fuch a thing cannot happen very often) to facrifice his private inclination to his public intereft. A wife Prince will not think that fuch a reftraint implies a condition of fervility ; and truly, if fuch was the condition of the laft reign, and the efFe(5ts were alfo fuch as we have defcribed, we ought, no lefs for the fake of the Sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of flrong and recent ex* perience. One of the principal topicks which was then, and has been fince, much employed by that political * fchool, is an affeded terror of the growth of an ariftocratic power, prejudicial to * See the Pglitical Writings of the late Dr. Brqwn, and many others. , the Kmn'^ 'f<. THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 27 the rights of the Crown, and the balance of the conftitution. Any new powers exercifed in the Houfe of Lords, or in the Houfe of Commons, or by the Crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealoufy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented courfe of adtioa in the whole Legiflature, without great and evident reafon, may be a fubjedt of jufl un- cafinefs. I will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the Houfe of Lords a dilpofition to fome attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the fubjed:. If any fuch have really appeared, they have arifen, not from a power properly ariflocratic, but from the fame influence which is charged with having excited attempts of a fimilar nature in the Houfe of Commons j which Houfe, if it fliould have hjen betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its conftituents, and involved in a charge of the very fame nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repel fuch attempts in others, Thofe attempts in the Houfe of Lords can no more be called ariftocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Mid- dlefex in the Ploufe of Commons can with any fenfe be called democratical. It is true, that the Peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impoflible to prevent it, except by fuch means as mufl prevent all property from its natural operation ; an event not ealily to be compafled, while property is power; nor by any means to be v/iflied, 28 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF 1 I lii' wiflicd, while the leaft notion exifts of the method hy which the fpirit of liberty a(fls, and of the means by which it is preferved. If any particular Peers, by their uniform, upright, conflitutional coiidudt, by their public and their private virtues, have acquired an influence in the country ; the people, on whofe favour that influence depends, and from whom it arofe, will never be duped into an opinion, that fuch great-- nefs in a Peer is the defpotifm of an arillocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effed: and pledge of their own importance. 1 am no friend to ariftocracy, in the fenfe at leafl: in which that word is ufually underfl;God, If .: were not a bad habit to moot cafes on the fuppofed ruin of the conllitution, I Ihould be free to declare, that if it mufl; perifli, I would rather by far fee it refolved into any other form, than lofl in that nuftere andinfolent domination. But, whatever my diflikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The queftion, on the influence of a Court, and of a Peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the moft eligible, but which is the moft imminent. He is but a poor obferver, who has not feen, that tho generality of Peers, far from fupporting them- lelves in a ftate of independent greatnefs, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abjedt fervitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of our Peers were too much fpirit! It is worthy of fome obfervation, that thefe gentlemen, lb jealous gf ariftocracy, make no complaints '11!;' ..'.1..^ THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 20 complaints of the power of thoi'c Peers (nciilier few nor inconfiderable) who are rilways in the train of a Court, and whofe whole weight mud be coniidered as a portion of the fettled inHu- ence of the Crown. This is all fafe and right; but if fome Peers (I am very forry they are not as many as they ought to be) fet themfelves, in the great concern of Peers and Commons, againft a back-dairs influence and clandefline government, then the alarm begins j then the conftitution is in danger of being forced into an ariflocracy. : . I refl: a little the longeron this Court topick, becaufe it was much infilled upon at the time of the great change, and has been lince frequently revived by many of the agents of that party : for, whilft they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little fuccefs) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the Nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle of dif- union, of fowing jealoufies amongft the different orders of the State, and of disjointing the .natu- ral ftrength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of refifting the linifter defigns of wicksd men, who have engiofled the Royal power. Thus much of the topicks chofen by the Courtiers to recommend their fyftem; it will be neceliary To open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its fupport. Without this, the whole would have been :i:r I llh '!! 30 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF been no better than a vifionary amufement, like; , the fcheme of Harrington's political club, and not a bufinefs in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful pjirty, and a party conftruded on a new principle, it is a very in- viting ohjcd of curioiity. It muTl be remembered, that fince the Revo- lution, until the period we are fpeaking of, the influence of the Crown had been always em- ployed in fupporting the Minifters of State, and in carrying on the public bufinefs according to their opinions. But the party now in quelHon is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour. protedUon and confidence of the Crown in the pafTage to its MiniOers ; it is to come between tbem and their importance in Parliament j it is to feparate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies ; it is intended as the controul, not the fupport, of Adminillration. The machinery of this fyflem is perplexed in its movements, and falfe in its principle. It is formed on a fuppofition that the King is fomething external to his govern* ment; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and difgrace. The plan proceeds exprefsly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the State in order to flrengthen the Court. The fcheme depending entirely on diftruft, on difconnexioni on mutability by principle, on fyftematic wealft- nefs in every particular member 3 it is impoflible that ill hii A THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 31 that the total refult rtiould be fubftantial flrcngth of any kind. As a foundation of their fcheme, the Cabal have eftabliflied a fort of Rota in the Court. All forts of parties, by this means, have been brought into Adminiftration, from whence few have had the good fortune to efcape without difgrace; none at all without confiderablc lofTcs. In the beginning of each arrangement 110 pro- feflions of confidence and fupport are wanting, to induce the leading men to cngnge. But while the Minifters of the day appear iji all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas fpread out to the wind, and every fail filled with the fair and profperous gale of Royal favour, in a (hort time they find, they know not how, a current, which fets diredly againft them ; which prevents all progrefs ; and even drives them backwards. They grow afliamed and mortified in a fituation, which, by its vicinity to power, only ferves to remind them the more ftrongly of their infignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to fee themfelves oppofed by the natural inftruments of their office. With the lofs of their dignity they lofe their temper. In their turn they grow troublefome to that Cabal which, whether it fupports or oppofes, equally difgraces and equally betrays them. It is foon found neceffary to get rid of the heads of Ad- miniftration ; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belong- ing to the bed connexions, it is not hard to per- 9 fuade '» V t, ) I I 31 TIIOtGII rS ON THE CAUSE OF ^ ruade fcvcral to cotitinuc in ofHcc without their Icadcis. Hy this nicaiis the party goes out much thinner than it c.une in ; and is only reduced in Ibcngth hy its temporary poireflion of power. BcTides, il by accident, or in courfe of changes^ that power (hould he recovered, the Junto have thrown up a rctrencliment of thelc carcafes, • which may fcrve to cover themfelvcs in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwifely, that fuch rotten members will become the firft objecJls of dilgud and refentment to their antient connex- ions. They contrive to form in the outward Admi- nidration two parties at the leaft j which, whilll they are tearing one another to pieces, arc both competitors for the favour and pro- tcdion of the Cabal -, and, by their emulation, contribute to throw every thing more and more into the hands of the interi(jr managers. A Minifter of State will fometimes keep him- felf totally eft ranged from all his collegues ; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverfc, and publicly oppofe, their meafures. He will, however, continue in his employment. Inftead of fuffering any mark of difpleafure, he will be diflinguiflied by an unbounded profulion of Court rewards and carciles ; becaufe he does what is tx}: eCled, and all that is expedted, from men in ofiice. He helps to keep fome form of Adminiflration in being, and keeps it at the fame time as weak and divided as pofllble. However, we mut^ take care not to be mlllakcn, or to imagine that fuch perfons have any '!■' THE PRESEKT DISCONTENTS. 33 vmy weight in their oppofition. when, by them, Adminillration is convinced of its infiguilicancy, they arc foon to be convinced of their own. I'hcy never arc fufFered to fiiccrcd in their oppofition. They and the world arc to be fatislicd, that, neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloqucficc, counfel, fkill, or union, are of the leail importance, but that the mere influence of tiie Court, naked of all fupport, and deftitute of all management, is abundantly fufticient for all its own purpofes. When any adverfe connexion is to be dedroy- cd, the Cabal feldom appear in the work them- felves. They find out fome perfon of whom the party entertains an high opinion. Such a perfon they endeavour to delude with various pretences. They teach him fird to dillrufi:, and then to quarrel with his friends ; among whom, by the fame arts, they excite a fimilar ditfidencc of him ; fo that, in this mutual fear and diilrufl-, he may fu^er hlmfelf to be employed as the inftrument in tiie change which is brought about. Afterwards they are fure to dcftroy him in his turn ; by fetting up in his place fome per- fon in whom he had himfelf repofed the greatefl confidence, and who ferves to carry off a con- fiderable part of his aiherents. When fuch a perfon has broke in this manner with his connexions, he is fooii compelled to commit fome flagrant ad: of iniquitous perfonal hoftility againft fome of ihem (fuch as an attempt to (Irip a particular friend of his fa- roily e{i'dit)y by which the Cabal hope to D render , 11 Mi I 2$ THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF fender the parties utterly irreconclleable. In truth, they have fo contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the fubordinate inilru- ments than to the principal movers. •• ' ' As in deftroying their enemies they make ufe of inriruments not immediately belonging to their corps, fo in advancing their own friends they purfue exactly the fame method. To promote any of them to confiderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation fliall pafs through the hands of the oftenfibie Miniflry : fuch a recommendation might hov/ever appear to the world, as fome proof of the credit of Minilters, and fome means of increafing their flrength. To prevent this, the perfons fo advanced are directed, in all companies, induftrioufly to declare, that they are under no obligations whatfoever to Admi- niftration ; that they have received their office from another quarter j that they are totally free and independent. When the Fadion has any job of lucr'* to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their wiy is, to feledt, for the execution, thofe very perfons to whofe habits, friend(hips, principles, and declarations, fuch proceedings are publicly known to be the moft ;:.dverfe ; at once to render the inftruments the more odious, and there- fore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever rcpofing r conhdence in any appearance of private friendship, or pubhc prin- ciple. If Mi THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 3J If the Adminifl-ration feem now and then, from remifTnefs, or from fear of making tiicm- felves difagreeable, to fuffer any popular ex- cefTes to go unpunirtied, the Cabal immediately fets up fome creature of theirs to raife a cla- mour againft the Ministers, as having fliamefully betrayed the dignity of Government. Then they compel the Miniflry to become adive in conferring rewards and nonours on the peribns who have been the inftruments of their difgracej rnd, after having firft ^alified them with the higher orders for fuffering the laws to lleep over the licer.tioufnefs of the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inadivity) to fome ad: of atrocious vio- lence, which renders them completely abhor- red by the people. They who remember the riots which attended the Middlefex Eledion; the opening of the prefent Parliament; and the tranfadions relative to Saint George's Fields, v/ill not be at a x')fs for an application of thefe remarks. -^ ■ That this body may be enabled to compafs all the ends of its inflitution, its members are fcareely ever to aim at the high and refponlibls oriices of the State. They are diilributed with art and judgement through all the fecondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the houfeholds of all the branches of the Royal Family : fo as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the Throne j and on the other to forward or fruflrate the execution of any mea- fure, according to their own interefts. For Da with i '■ I 36 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF with the credit and fuppoft which they arc known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excufe for falaryt they poflefs all the influence of the higheft ports J and they didtate publicly in almoil: every thing, even with a parade of fuperlority. When- ever they diflent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the Senate, inftindively in the fecret, is fure to follow them; provided the leaders, fenfible of their fituation, do not of themfelves ttcede in time from their moft declared opinions. This latter is generally the cafe. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not feen it, what pleafure is taken by the Cabal in rendering thefe heads '^- '^ice thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous. And ivhen they are become fo, they have then the beft chrnce for being well fupported. The members of the Court Faftion are fully indemnified for not holding places on the flip- pery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but alfo by the perfeft fecurity in which they enjoy lefs confpicuous, but very advantageous fituations. Their places are, in exprefs legal tenure, or in effe<^, all of them for life. Whilft the firrt and moft refpe(ftablc perfons in the kingdom are tofled about Vikz tennis balls, the fport of a blind and infolent capriccj no Minifter dares even to cart an oblique glance at the loweft of their body. If an attempt be made upon one of this corps, immediately he ^ies to fanduary, and pretends to the moft in- iolable of all promifes. No conveniency of public* THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 37 public arrangement is available to remove any one of them from the fpecific fituation he holds ; and the flighteft attempt upon one of them, by the moft powerful Minifter, is a certain preli- minary to his own deftrudion. Confcious of their independence, they bear themfelves with a lofty air to the exterior JVIi- niftcrs. Like Janiflaries, they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their fervi- tude. They may ad: juft as they pleafe ; pro- vided they are true to the great ruling principle of their inftitution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people fliould be fo delirous of adding themfelves to that body, in which they may poflefs and reconcile fatisfadions the moft alluring, and feemingly the mod: contradidory ; enjoying at once all the fpirited pieafure of inde- pendence, and all the grofs lucre and fat emo- luments of fervitude. Here is a ilcetch, though a flight one, of the conftitution, laws, and policy, of this new Court corporation. The name by which they chufe to diflinguifli themfelves, is that of King's meriy or the Kings friends, by an invidious exclufioa of therell of his Majefty's mod loyal and affec- tionate fubje<5ts. The whole fyftem, compre- hending the exterior and interior Adminiftra- tions, is commonly called in the technical lan- guage of the Court, Double Cabinet i in French or Englifh, as you chufe to pronounce it. Whether all this be a vifion of a diftraded brain, or the invention of a malicious heart, or a real Fadion in the country, mull be judged D 3 by ' :.■ 36 THOUGHTS ON TJIE CAUSE OP by the appearances which things have worn for eight years part. Thus far I am certain, that theiv^ is not a fingle public man, in or out of office, who has not, at fome time or other, borne teilimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no pe'-fons have been more ftrong in their aflertions, and louder iind more indecent in their complaints, than thofe who compofe all the exterior part of the prefent Adminiilration ; in whofe time that FatStion has arrived at fuch an height of power, and of holdnefs in the ule of it, as mav, in the «='nd, perhaps bring about its total deflru^^tion. "' :: is true, that about four years ago, during tile adminiftration of the Marquis of Rocking- ham, an attempt was made to carry on Govern- ment without their concurrence. However, this was only a tranfient cloud; they were hid but for a moment; and their conftellation blazed out with greater brightnefs, and a far more vi- gorous intiuence, fome time after it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of profcription) to break their corps, to difcountenance their dodtrines, to re- vive connexions of a different kind, to reftore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to re- animate the caufe of Liberty by Miniflerial countenance ; and then for the firft time were men feen attached in office to every principle they had mair.tained in oppofition. No one will doubt, that fuch men were abhorred and violently oppofed by the Court Faction, and that fuch a lyflem could have but a fliort duration. It =1 THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 39 It may appear fomewhat afFedled, that in (o much difcourfe upon this extraordinary Party, I fhould fay Co little of the Earl of Bute, who is the fuppofed head of it. But this was neither owing to affevftation nor inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introdudion of perfonal reflexions of any kind. Much the greater part of the topicks which have been ufed to blacken this Nobleman, are either unjuft or frivolous. At beft, they have a tendency to give the re-^ fentment of this bitter calamity a wrong di- rection, and to turn a public grievance into a mean perfonal, or a dangerous national, quarrel. Where there is a regular fcheme of operations carried on, it is the fyftem, and not any individual perfon who ads in it, that is truly dangerous. This fyftem has not rifen folely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumftances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the conftitution which had been for fome time growing among our gentry. We fliould have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never exifted ; and ic will want neither a contriving head nor adive members, when the Earl of Bute exifls no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody againft this Court Party and its prac- tices, which can afford us any prolped of relief in our prefent condition. Another motive induces me to put the per- fonal confideration of Lord Bute, wholly out of the queflion. He communicates very little in a dired manner with the greater part of oar men D 4 . of Il if:' 40 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF of bufinefs. This has never been his cuftom. It is enough for him that he furrounds them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excufe for doing all the work of this Faction, when they have no per- fonal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an Adminiftration, compofed of infulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an Adminiftration conftitutionally impotent, becaufe fupp .rted by no party in the nation ; he who contributes to deftroy the connexions of men and theii truft in one another, or in any fort to throw the de- pendence of public counfels upon private will and favour, pofTibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular perfon. B* ^et him be who or what he will, he abets a action that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is fapping the founda- tion of its liberty, difturbing the fources of its domcftic tranquillity, weakening its govern- ment over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the fyftem of Europe. It is this unnatural infufion of a fyftem of Favouritifm into a Government which in a great part of its conftitution is popular, that has raifed the prefent ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its efFeds, in much violence, in a great fpirit of innovation, and a gtiicral diforder in all the functions of Government. I keep my eye folely on this fyftem ; THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. ^i (yftem ; if I fpeak of thofe meafures which have arifen from it, it will be fo far only as they illuftrate the general fcheme. This is the fountain of all thofe bitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burft. The dif- cretionary power of the Crown in the forma- tion of Miniftry, abufed by bad or weak men, has given rife to a fyftem, which, without di- redly violating the letter of any law, operates againfl the fpirit of the whole conftitution. A plan of Favouritifm for our executory Government is eflentially at variance with the plan of our Legiflature. One great er^ un- doubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, compofed of Monarchy, and of controuls, oa the part of the higher peoplfj and the lower, is that the Prince fiiall not be able to violate the laws. This is ufeful indeed and funda- mental. But this, even at firft view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenfive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the difcretionary powers which are necejfarily vefiedin the Monarchy whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magifiracy and office, or for con^ dueling the affairs of peace and war, or for ' ordering the revenue, Jhould all be exercifed upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a Court, This, I faid, is equal in importance to the fecuring a Government ac- cording to law. The laws reach but a very little i.'** f y t §:^i I I 4% THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF little way. Conftitute Government how yon pleafe, infinitely the greater part of it muft depend upon the exercife of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightnefs of Miniflers of State. Even all the ufe and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no better than a fcheme upon paper; and not a living, afting, effedive conftltution. It is pof- fihlc, that through negligence, or ignorance, or defign artfully conducted, Miniflers may fuffer one part of Government to languifli, another to be perverted from its purpofes, and every va-^ luable intertfl of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without pollibility of fixing any iingle adt on which a criminal profecution can be juflly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the a(flive part of the State, far from being foreign to the purpofes of a wife Go-* vernment, ought to be among its very firft and deareft objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new fyflem tell us, that between them and their oppofers there is nothing but a ilruggle for power, and that therefore we are Bo-ways concerned iru it ; we muft tell thofe who have the impudence to infult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the moft concerned, who and what fort of men they are, that hold the truft of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what mu(l either render us totally defperate, or foothe us iiito the fecurity of ideots. Wc mull foften into THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 43 into a credulity below the milkinefs of infancy, to think all men virtuous. We mud be tainted with a malignity truly .diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, fome good, fome evil. The elevation of the one, and the depreffion of the other, are the fir ft objcd:s of iall true policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its dircd: inftitutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the moft truft-worthy hands, but has left its whole executory fyftem to be difpolcd of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleafure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defedlive not only in that member, but confequentially erroneous in every part of it. In arbitrary Governments, the conftitution of the Miniftry follows the conftitution of the Legiflature. Both the Law and the Magiftratc are the creatures of Will. It muft be fo. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable coniideration of this matter, than that every fort of Government ought to have its Adminiftration correjpondent to its LegiJJature* If it ftiould be otherwife, things muft fall into an hideous diforder. The people of a free Commonwealth, who have taken fuch care that their laws Ihould be the refult of general con- fent, cannot be fo fenfelefs as to fufFer their executory fyftem to be compofed of perfons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recom- V ■1, m 44 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF recommended to thofe powers, upon the ufe of which the very being of the State depends. The popular election of magiftrates, and po- pular difpofition of rewards and honours, is one of the firft advantages of a free State. Without it, or fomething equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot lung enjoy the fub- ftance of freedoii ; certainly none of the vivify- ing energy of good Govcrnnicnt. The frame of our Com'.rjonwealth did not admit of fuch an adual elecftion : but it provided as well, and (while the fpirit of the conllilution is prefcrved) better for all the effedls of it than by the method of fufFrage in any democratic State whatfoever. It had always, until of late, been held the firft duty of Parliament, to reftife tofupport Govern^ menty until po^'^ocr was in the hands ofperfons who were acceptable to the people ^ or while faBions predominated in the Court in which the nation had no confidence. Thus all the good effecfls of po- pular eledtion were fuppofed to be fecured to us, without the mifchiefs attonding on perpetual intrigue, and a diftindt canvafs for every parti- cular office throughout the body of the people. This was the moft noble and refined part of our conftitution. The people, by their reprefenta- tives and grandees, were intruded with a de- liberative power in making laws j the King with the controul of his negative. The King was in- truded with the deliberative choice and the election to office j the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refufal to fupport. Formerly this powe" of controul was what kept Miniftcrs ia awe THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 45 tv/c of ParliAments, and Parliaments in reve- rence with the people. If the ufc of this power of controul on the fyflem and perfons of Admi- iiiftration is gone, every thing is loft, Parliament and all. We may aflure ourfelves, that if Par- liament will tamely fee evil men take pofTeflion of all the ftrong-holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify them- fclves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of difcovering, whether they will not be reformed by power, and whe- ther their mcafures will not be better than their morals; fuch a Parliament will give countenance to their meafures alfo, whatever that Parlia- ment may pretend, and whatever thofe mca- fures may be. Every good political inftitution muft have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from Government, and not to truft for the fafety of the State to fubfequent punilhment alone . punirhment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain ; and which, when power is fufFered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal. Before men are put forward into the great trufts of the State, they ought by their conduft to have obtained fuch a degree of eftimation ia their country, as may be fome fort of pledge and fecurity to the publick, that they will not abufe thofe trufts. It is no mean fecurity for a proper ufe of power, that a man has {hewn bv the general tenor of his a(5tions, that the afFeiiion, the Itn 46 THOUGHTS ON TFIE CAUSE OF the good opinion, the confulcncc, of his fellow citizens have been among the principal objects of his life ; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a fettled contempt, or occafional forfeiture of their cfleem. That man who before he comes Into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to defert his friends, or who lofing it has no friends to fympaihize with him; he who has no fway among any part of the landed or commercial intercft, but whofe whole importance has begun with his office, and is fure to end with it; is a pcrfon who ought never to be IbfFered by a controuling Parliament to continue in any of thofe fituations which confer the lead and diredlion of all our public affai-*:; becaufe fuch a man Las no connexion ivitb t ntereji of the people, Thofe knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly without any public principle, in order to fell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore univerfally odious, ought never to be fuffered to domineer in the State J becaufe they have no connexion with the fentiments and opinions of the people^ Thefe are conlidcrations which in my opinion enforce the neceflity of having fome better rea- fon, in a free country, and a free Parliament, for fupporting the Minifters of the Crown, than that fliort one, ^hat ihe King has thought proper to appoint them. There is fomething very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all forts the THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 4; forts of mifchicf, in a conflitution like ours, to turn the views of adivc men from the country to the Court. Wliatevcr be the road to power, that is the road which wUl be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no ufe as a mcanj of power or confidcrution, the qualities which ufually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a State io popular in its conftitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to truft all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of Kings and Miniftcrs, and public men, mud be fubmitted to the judgement and good fenfe of the people of England. -. Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without diredlly controverting the principle, to raife objedions fri.m the difficulty under which the Sovereign labours, to diitinguilli the genuine voice and fentimcnts of his people, from the clamour of a fadlion, by which it is fo eafily counterfeited. The nation, they fay» is generally divided into parties, with viev/s and paflions utterly irreconcileable. If the King fliould put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is fure to difguft the reft ; if he feledt particular men from among them all, it is an hazard that he difgufts them all." Thofe who are left out, however divided before, will fooa run into a body of oppofition ; which, being a collecftion of many difcontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and Violent enough. Faction will make its cries refound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar,, ,7 whtii ^ % i m: I I nisi •1^ 4$ THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE Of when by far the majority, and much the better part, will feem for a while as it were annihilated by the quiet in which their virtue and mode- ration incline them to enjoy the bleffings of Government. Befides that the opinion of the meer vulgar is a miferable rule even with regard to themfelves, on account of their violence and inftabiiity. So that if you were to gratify them in their humour to-day, that very gratification would be a ground of their difTattsfadion on the next. Now as all thefe rules of public opinion arc to be collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the efFeft, what better can a Pi.ing of England do, than to employ fuch men as he finds to have views and inclinations moft conformable to his own } who sre leaft infedted with pride and felf-will, and who are leaft moved by fuch popular humours as are perpetually traverfing his defigns, and difturbing his fervice j trafting that, when he means no ill to his people, he will be fupported in his appointments, ^vhether he chooieG to keep or io change, as his private judgement or his pleafure leads him ? He will find a fure refource in the real weight and in- fluence of the Crown, when it is not fufFered to become an inftrumeni; in the hands of a faction. I will not pretend to fay that there is nothing at all in this mode of reafoning; becaufe I v/ili rot aflert, that there is no difficulty in the art of Government. Undoubtedly the very beft Adminiflration muft encounter a great deal of •ppofition ', and the very worfl will find more fupport i>>n THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 49 fupport than it defervcs. Sufficient appearances will never b^ wanting to thofe who have a mind to deceive themielves. It is a fallacy in conftant ufe with thofe who would level all things, and confound right with v/rong, to infift upon the inconveniencies which are attached to every choice, without taking into confideratioa the different weight and conkquence of thofe inconveniencies. The queliion u not concern- ing abfohte difcontent or perfeSt latisfadion in Government; neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any fyftem. The controverfy is about that degree of good- humour in the people, which may poffibly be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. While fome politicians may be waiting to know whether the ^twit. of every individual be againft them, accurately diftinguifhing the vulgar from the better fort, drawing lines between the en- terprizes of a faction and the efforts of a people, they may chance to fee the Government, which they are fo nicely weighing, and dividing, and diflin£;uifhing, tumble to the ground in the midit of their wife deliberation. Prudent men, when fo great an objeft as the fecurity of Government, or evei its peace, is at ftake, will not run the rifque of a decifion which may be fatal to it. They who can read the political iky will fee an hurricane in a cloud no bigger than an hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the firfl harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wifdom. They aic a matter incapable of exac^ definition. E But, 1 1 h 50 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF But, though no man can draw a ftroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darknefs are upon the whole tolerably diftin- guifhable. Nor will it be impoflible for a Prince to find nut fuch a mode of Government^ and fuch perfons to adminifter it, as will give a great degree of content to his people; without any curious and anxious refearch for that ab- ftrad:, univerfal, perfedl harmony, which while he is feeking, he abandons thofe means of ordi- nary tranquillity which are in his power without any refearch at all. It is not more the duty than it is the interefl of a Prince, to aim at giving tranquillity to his Government. But thofe who advife him may have an intereft in diforder and confufion. If the opinion of the people is againfl: them, they will naturally widi that it fliould have no pre- valence. Here it is that the people muft on their part (hew themfelves fenfible of their own value. Their whole importance, in the firfl inflancc^ and afterv/ards their whole freedom, is at flake. Their freedom cannot long furvive their importance. Here it is that the natural llrength of the kingdom, the great peers, the kdding landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufasflurers, the fubftantial yeomanry^ muflinterpofc, to refcue their Prince, themfelves, and their pofterity. We are at prefent at iiTue upon this point. We are in the great crifis of this contention; and the part which men take one way or other, will ferve to difcriminate their characters and th?ir prin- ciples ». THE I*RESENT DISCONTENTS. 51 ciples. Until the matter is decided, the country will remain in its prefent confufion. For while a iyftemof Adminiftration is attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of the people, and not conformable to the plan of their Government, every thing muft neccffarily be difordered for a time, until this fyfterrl dellroys the conftitu~ tion, or the conftitution gets the better of this iy ftcm. There is, in my opinion, a peculiar venom and malignity in this political diitemper beyond any that I have heard or read of. In former times the projedors of arbitrary Government attacked only the liberties of their country ; a defign furcly mifchievous enough to have fatis- lied a mind of the moil unruly ambition. But a fyftem unfavourable to freedom may be fo formed, as confiderably to exalt the grandeur of the State : and men may find in the pride and fplendor of that profperity fome fort of confb- lation forthelofs of their folid privileges. Indeed the increafe of the -^ovver of the State has often been urged by artiul men, as a pretext for fome abridgement of the public liberty. But the fcheme of the junto under confidera'ion, not only ftrikes a pally into every nerve of our free conftitution, but in the fame degree bcn..mbs and ftnpifies the whole executive po' en render- ing Government in all its grand operations lan- guid, uncertain, ineffedtive J making M'nifters fearful of attempting, and incapable of ' ecuting, any ufeful plan of domeftic arrangement, or of foreign politicks. It tends to produce neither E 2 the 1^1: W. vj 52 THOtTGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF the fecurity of a free Government, nor the energy of a Monarchy that is abfolute. Ac- cordingly the Crown has dwindled away, in proportion to the uniiatural and turgid growth of this excrefcence on the Court. The interior Miniftry are fenfible, that war is a fituation which fets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people ; and they well know, that the beginning of the importance of the people muft be the end of theirs. For this rea- fon they difcover upon all occafions the utmoft fear of every thing, which by poffibility may lead to fuch an event. I do not mean that they manifeft any of that pious fear which is back- ward to commit the fafety of the country to the dubious experiment of war. Such a fear, being the tender fenfation of virtue, excited, as it is regulated, by realbn, frequently (hews itfelf in a feafonable boldnefs, which keeps danger at a diftancc, by feeming to defpife it. Their fear betrays to the iirft glance of the eye, its true caufe, and its real objed:. Foreign powers, con- fident in the knowledge of their charafter, have not fcrupled to violate the moft folemn treaties ; ■find, in defiance of them, to make conquefts in the midfl of a general peace, and in the heart of Europe. Such was the conqueft of Corfica, by the profefltd enemies of the freedom of mankind, in defiance of thofe who were former- ly its profefled defenders. We have had juft claims upon the fame powers ; rights which ought to have been facred to them as well as to us, as they had their origin in our lenity and generofity THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 53 generofity towards France and Spain in the day of their great humiliation. Such I call the ran- fom of Manilla, and the demand on France for the Eaft India prifoners. But thefe powers put a juft confidence in their iefource of the double Cabinet, Thefe demands (one of them at leaft) are haftening faft towards an acquittal by pre- fcription. Oblivion begins to fpread her cob- webs over all our fpirited remonftrances. Some of the mofl: valuable branches of our trade are alfo on the point of perilhing from the fame caufe. I do not mean .thofe branches which bear without the hand of the vine-drefler; I mean thofe which the policy of treaties had formerly fecured to us ; I mean to mark and dif- tinguifh the trade of Portugal, the lofs of which, and the power of the Cabal, have one and the fame xra. If, by any chance, the Minifters who ftand before the curtain poiTefs or affed: any fpirit, it makes little or no imprelfion. Foreign Courts and Minifters, who were among the firft to dif- cover and to profit by this invention of the double Cabinet^ attend very little to their re- monftrances. They know that thofe fliadows of Minifters have nothing to do in the ultimate difpofal of things. Jealoufies and animolities are feduloufly nourifhed in the outward Admi- niftration, and have been even coniidered as a caiifa Jine qua non in its conftitution : thence foreign Courts have a certainty, that nothing can be done by common counfel in this nation. If one of thofe Minifters ofticially takes up a E 3 bufinefs ■ 1* li 54 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF bufinefs with fpirit, it ferves only the better to f]gnalize the meannefs of the reft, and the dif- cord of them all. His collegues in office are ia hafte to fhake him off, and to difclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of this nature was that aflonifhing tranfadion, in which Lord Rochford, our Ambaffador at Paris, remon- ftrated againft the attempt upon Corfica, in confequence of a dire(5t authority from Lord Shelburne. This remonftrance the French Minifler treated with the contempt that was j'^-'.tural ; as he was affured, from the Ambaffa- dor of his Court to ours, that thefe orders of Lord Shelburne were not fupported by the reft of the (I had like to have faid BritiQi) Admi- niffraiion. Lord Rochford, a man of fpirit, could not endure this fituation. The confe- quences were, however, curious. He returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger. Lord Shelburne, who gave the orders, is oblig-r ed to give up the feals. Lord Rochford, who obeyed thefe orders, receives them. He goes, hovx^ever, into another department of the fame office, that he might not be obliged officially to acquiefce in one fituation under what he had officially remonftrated againft in another. At Paris, the Duke of Choifeul confidered this office arrangement as a compliment to him : here it was fpoke of as an attention to the de- licacy of Lord Rochford. But whether the compliment was to one or both, to this nation it was the fame. By this tranfci6i:ion the con- dition of our Court lay expofed in all its naked- 10 nefs, THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 55 nefs. Our office correfpondence has lofl all pretence to authenticity ; Britifh policy is brought into derifion in thofe nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilft they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmnefs, and candour, which flione in all our negotiations. I reprefent this matter ex- ax^ly in the light in which it has been univer- fally received. Such his been the afpcdlof our foreign poli- ticks, under the influence of a double Cabinet, With fuch an arrangement at Court, it is im- poffible it (liould have been otherwife. Nor is it pollible that this Icheme ihould have a better eiFcdl: upon the government of our depen- dencies, the firft, the dearcft, and moft delicate objeds, of the interior policy of this empire. The Colonies know, tliat Adminiftration is fe- parated from the Court, divided within itfelf, and detefted bv the nation. The doubic Cabinet has, in both the parts of it, fliewn the moft ma- lignant difpofitions towards them, without be- ing able to do them the fmalleft mifchief. They are convinced, by fufficient experience, that no plan, either of lenity or rigour, can be purfued with unifonrxity and pf.rfeverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great Britain, where they have neither depen- dence on friendfliip, nor appreheniion from en- mity. They look to themfelves, and their own arrangements. They grow every day into alie- nation from this country j and whilft they are becoming difconneded with our Government, . - . E 4 we m m I'? ill m 56 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF we have not the confolation to find, that they are even friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal the futility, the weaknefs, the raOinefs, the timidity, the perpetual con- tradidlion, in the management of our affairs in that part of the world. A volume might be written on this melancholy fubje<5t ; but it were better to leave it entirely to the reflexions of the reader himfelf than not to treat it in the extent it deferves. h* In what manner our domeftic oeccnomy is affected by this fyftem, it is needlefs to ex- plain. It is the perpetual fubjedt of their own complaints. The Court Party refolve the whole into faction. Having faid fomething before upon this fubjeft, I (hall only obferve here, that when they give this account of the preva- lence of fadlion, they prefent no very favourable afpe6l of the confidence of the people in their own Government. They may be aflTured, that however they amufe themfelves with a variety of projedis for fubftituting fomething elfe in the place of that great and only' foundation of Government, the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their condition worfe. When men imagine that their food is only a cover for poifon, and when they neither love nor truft the hand that ferves it, it is not the name of the roaft beef of Old England, that will perfuade them to fit down to the table that is fpread for them. When the people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular aflemblies. -.i-iJp' • "iffv , THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 57 aflemblies, are perverted from the ends of their inftitution, they find in thofe names of degene- rated eftablifhments only new motives to dif- content. Thofe bodies, which, whfn full of life and beauty, lay in their arms, and were their joy and comfort, when dead and putrid, become but the more loathfomc from remem- brance of former endear..ients. A fullen gloom, and furious diforder, prevail by fitsj the nation lofes its relifh for peace and profperity, as it did in that feafon of fullnefs which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the Firft. A fpecies of men to whom a ftate of order would become a fentence of obfcurity, are nourifbed into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of in- tellinc difturbances ; and it is no wonder that, by a fort of finifter piety, they cherifh, in their turn, the diforders which are the parents of all their confequence. Superficial obfervers confider fuch perfons as the caufe of the public uneafi- nefs, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the efff^ n I It THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF enjoyments differing only in the fcale upon which they are formed. Suppofe then we were to afk, whether the King has been richer than his predeccffors in accumulated wealth, fince the cftablifliment of the plan of Favouritifm ? I believe it will be found that the pidure of royal indigence which our Court has prefented until this year, has been truly humiliating. Nor has it been relieved from this unfcemly diftrcfs, but by means which have hazarded the affcdtion of the people, and fliaken their confidence in Parliament. If th« public treafures had been exhaufted in magni- ficciice and fplendour, this diftrefs would have been accounted for, and in fome meafure jufti- fied. Nothing would be more unworthy of this nation, than with a mean and mechanical rule, to mete out the fplendour of the Crown. Indeed I have found very few perfons difpo^ed to fo ungenerous a procedure. But the gene- rality of people, it muft be confefled, do feel a good deal mortified, when they compare the wants of the Court with its expences. They do not behold the caufe of this diftrefs in any part of the apparatus of Royal magnificence. In all this, they fee nothing but the operations of par- fimony, attended with all the confequences of profufion. Nothing expended, nothing faved. Their wonder is increafed by their knowledge, that befides the revenue fettled on his Majefty's Civil Lift to the amount of 800,000/. a year, he has a farther aid, from a large penfion lift, near 90,000/. a year, in Ireland ; from the pro- duce THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 6t * diice of the Dutchy of Lancaftcr (which we arc told has been ^jrat\y improved) ; from the revenue of the Dutchy of Cornwall j from the American quit-rents ; from the four and a half pfr cent, duty in the Leeward Iflands j this laft worth to be fure confidcrably more than 40,000/. a year. The wlioie is certainly not much (hort of a million annually. Thefe are revenues within the knowledge and cognizance of our national Councils. We have no dircdl right to examine into the receipts from his Majeily's German Dominions, and the Bifhoprick of Ofnabrug. This is unqueftion- ably true. But that which is not within the pro- vince of Parliament, is yet within the fphere of every man's own reflexion. If a foreign Prince refided amongft us, the ftate of his revenues could not fail of becoming the fubjedt of our fpeculation. Filled with an anxious concern for whatever regards the welfare of our So- vereign, it is impofTible, in confidering the miferable circumftances into which he has been brought, that this obvious topick fhould be entirely pafled over. There is an opinion univerfal, that thefe revenues produce fomethirhg not inconfiderable, clear of all charges and efta- blifliments. This produce the people do not believe to be hoarded, nor perceive to be fpent. It is accounted for in the only manner it can, by fuppofing that it is drawn away, for the fup- port of that Court Faction, which, whilft it dif- trefles the nation, impoverilhes the Prince in every one of his refources. I once more caatton the ■;,l?i ■%■:■ 1 i W |, I, I is 62 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF the reader, that I do not urge this confideration concerning the foreign revenue, as if I fuppofed we had a dire(St right to examine into the ex- penditure of any part of it ; hut folely for the purpofe of (hewing how little this fyftem of Favouritifm has been advantageous to the Monarch himfelfj which, without magnifi- cence, has funk him into a ffate of unnatural pov-:ty ; at the fame time that he polTcfled every means of affluence, from ample revenues, both in this country, and in other parts of his domi- nions. Has this iyftcm provided better for the treat- ment becoming his high and facred chara(fter, and fecured the Kino from thofe dif<2;ufl:s at- tached to the necelTity of employing men who are not perfonally agreeable ? This is a topick upon which for many realbns I could vvifli to be filent; bat the pretence of fccuring againft fuch caufes of uneafi.iefs, is the corner-ftone of the Court Party. It has however i'o happened, that if I were to fix upon any one point, in which this fyftem has been more particularly and fhamefully blameable, the efi^edts which it has produced would juftify me in choofing for that point its tendency to degrade the perional dig- nity of the Sovereign, and to expofe him to a thoufand contradi(3:ions and mortifications. It is but too evident in what manner thefe pro- jedtors of Royal greatnefs have fulfilled all their magnificent promifes. Without recapitulating all the circumftances of the reign, every one of which IS more or lefs a melanchol) proof of the truth :h ne a It :o- eir of the ith THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 63 truth of what I have advanced, let us confider the language of the Court but a few years ago, concerning mod of the perfons now in the ex- ternal Adminiftration : let me aflc, whether any enemy to the perfonal feelings of the Sovereign, could poffibly contrive a keener inftrument of mortification, and degradation of all dignity, than almofl; every part and member of the pre- fent arrangement ? nor, in the whole courfe of our hiftory, hat' any compliance with the will of the people ever been known to extort from nny Prince a greater contradidlion to all his own declared affections and diflikes than that which is now adopted, in diredl oppofition to every thing the people approve and deiire. An opinion prevails, that greatnefs has been more than once advifed to fubmit to certain condefcenfions towards individuals, which have been denied to the entreaties of a nation. For the meaneft and mod dependent inftrument of this fyftem knows, that there are hours when its exigence may depend upon his adherence to it; and he takes his advantage accordingly. Indeed it is a law of nature, that whoever is ne- cefTary to what we have made our objed:, is fure in fome way, or in fome time or other, to be- come our mafter. All this however is fub- mitted to, in order to avoid that monftrous evil of governing in concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it feems to be laid down as a maxim, that a King has fome fort of in- tereft in giving unealinefs to his fubjedls : that all who are pleafing to them, are to be of courfe difagreeable i I ri ' 64 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OP difagreeable to him : that as foon as the per- fons who are odious at Court are known to be odious to the people, it is fnatched at as a lucky occafion of (howering down upon them all kinds of emoluments and honours. None are con- (idered as well-wifliers to the Crown, but thofe who advife to fome unpopular courfe of a<5tion ; none capable of ferving it, but thofe who are obliged to call at every inftant upon all its power for the fafety of their lives. None are fuppofed to be fit priefts in the temple of Go- vernment, but the perfons who are compelled to fly into it for fandtuary. Such is the effedt of this refined projedt ; fuch is ever the refult of all the contrivances which are ufed to free men from the fervitude of their reafon, and from the neceflity of ordering their affairs according to their evident interefts. Thefe contrivances ob- lige them to run into a real and ruinous fervi- tude, in order to avoid a fuppofed reftraint that might be attended with advantage. If therefore this fyflem has fo ill anfwered its own grand pretence of faving the King from the neceffity of employing perfons difagreeable to him, has it given more peace and tranquillity to his Majefty's private hours? No, moft certainly. The father of his people cannot pofiibly enjoy repofe, while his family is in fuch a ftate of diflradtion. Then what has the Crown or the King profited by all this fine-wrought fcheme ? Is he more rich, or more fplendid, or more powerful, or more at his eafe, by fo many labours and coritrivanccs ? Have they not beg- gared THE PRESZNT DISCONTENTS. 6i gared his Exchequer, tarniflied the fpletidor of his Court, funk his dignity, galled his feeJings, difcompofed the whole order and happinefs of his private life ) It will be very hard, I believe, to ftate ia what refpedt the King has profited by that Fac- tion which prefumptuoufly choofe to call them- felves his friends, Jf particular men had grown into an attach- ment, by the diftinguiflied honour of the fociety of their Sovereign ; and, by being the partakers of his amufements, came fometimes to prefer the gratification of his perfonal inclinations to the fupport of his high charadler, the thing would be very natural, and it would be excufable enough. But the pleafant part of the flory is, that thefe Kings friends have no more ground for ufurping fuch a title, than a refident free- holder in Cumberland or in Cornwall. They are only known to their Sovereign by kifling his hand, for the offices, penfions, and grants, into which they have deceived his benignity. May no ftorm ever come, which will put the firmnefs of their attachment to the proof; and which, in the mldft of confufions, and terrors, and fuffer- ings, may demonftrate the eternal difference be- tween a true and fevere friend to the Monarchy, and a flippery fycophant of the Court ! ^antum infido four r CSS dijiabit amicus. So far I have confidered the effe<5l of the Court fyftem, chiefly as it operates upon the executive Government, on the temper of the people, and on the happinefs of the Sovereign. It remains, F that m 66 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE O^ I Jit' 1^ : I : that we (liould confidcr, with a little attention^ its operation upon Parliament. Parliament was indeed the great objedt of all .^hefe politicks, the end at which they aimed, as well as the inftrument by which they were to operate. But, before Parliament could be made fubfervient to a fyftem, by which it was to be degraded from the dignity of a national council, into a mere member of the Court, it muft be greatly changed from its original charadler. in fpeaking of this body, I have my eye chiefly on the Houfe of Commons, I hope I fhall be indulged in a few obfervations on the nature and charad:er of that ailembly j not with regard to its legal form aJid power, but to its fpirit, and to the purpofes it is meant to anfwer in the conftitution. The Houfe of Commons was fuppofed origi- nally to be no part of the jlanding Go'uermnent of this country. It was conlidered as a controul^ ilTuing immediately from the people, and fpeedily to be refolved into the mafs from whence it arofe. In this refped: it was in the higher part of Government what juries are in the lower. The capacity of a magistrate being tranlitory, and that of a citizen permanent, the latter ca- pacity it was hoped would of courfe preponderate in all difcufTions, not only between the people and the (landing authority of the Crown, but between the people and the fleeting authority of the Houfe of Commons itfclf. It was hoped that, being of a middle nature between fubjecft and Government, they would feel with a more tender aiid a nearer interefl THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 67 intereft every thing that concerned the people, than the other remoter and more permanent parts t)f Legiflature. Whatever alterations time and the nece/Taiy accommodation of bulinefs may have introduced, this character can never be fudaincd, unlefs the Koufe of Commons fhall be made to bear fome ftamp of the a6lual difpofition of the people at large. It would (aqiong public misfortunes) be an evil more natural and tolerable, that the Houfe of Commons fliould be infed:cd with every epidemical phrenfy of the people, as this would indicate fome confanguinity, fome Sym- pathy of nature with their conflituents, than that they fhould in all cafes be wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out of doors. By this want of fympathy they would fceafe to be an Houfe of Commons. For it is not the derivation of the power of that Houfe from the people, which makes it in a diftind: fenfe their reprefentative. The King is the re- preferitative of the people ; fo are the Lords ; fo are thejudges. They all are truflees for the people, as well as the Commons 5 becaufe no power is given for the fole fake of the holder ; and al- though Government certainly is an inftitution of Divine authority, yet its forms, and the perfons who adminifler it, all originate from the people. A popular origin cannot therefore be the cha- raderifticaldiftinftion of a popular reprefentative. This belongs equally to all parts of Government, and in all forms. The virtue, fpirit, and eflence bf a Houfe of Commons confifts in its being the F 2 '■ - exprefs m'i ■ f m 68 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF exprefs image of the feelings of the nation. It was not inftituted to be a controul upon the people, as of late it has been taught, by a do<5trinc of the moft: pernicious tendency. It was defigned as a controul for the people. Other inftitutions have been formed for the purpofe of checking popular cxcefles ; and they are, I apprehend, fully adequate to their obje(ft. If not, they ought to be made fo. The Houfe of Com- mons, as it was never intended for the fupport of peace and fubordination, is miferably appointed for that fervice ; having no (Ironger weapon than its Mace, and no better officer than its Serjeant at Arms, which it can commind of its own pro- per authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magiftracy ; an anxious care of public money, an opennefs, approach- ing towards facility, to public complaint : thefe fcctn to be the true charadteriftics of an Houfe "pf Commons. But an addrefling Houfe of 'Commons, and a petitioning nation ; an Houfe of Commons full of confidence, when the nation is plunged in defpair -, in the utmofl: harmony with Minifters, whom the people regard with the utmoft abhorrence ; who vote thanks, when the publicopinion calls upon them for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account -, who, in all difputes between the people and Adminiftration, prefume againd the people; who punifli their diforders,but refufe even to enquire into the provocations to them ; this is an unnatural, a monftrous ftate of things in this conltitution. Such an Aflembly may be a great. I- hi 1 "ll THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 69 « great, wife, awefiil vSenate ; but it is not to any popular purpole an Houie of Commons. This change from an immediate ftate of procuration and delegation to a courfe of a(5ling as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magiftracies in the world have he^n perverted from their purpofes. It is indeed theiir greateft andfometimes their incurable corruption. For there is a material diftindion between that corruption by which particular points are carried againft reafon, (this is a thing which cannot be prevented by human wifdom, and is of lefs con- fequence) and the corruption of the principle itfelf. For then the evil is not accidental, but fet- tled. The diflemper becomes the natural habit. For my part, I (hall be compelled to conclude the principle of Parliament to be totally cor- rupted, and therefore its ends entirely defeated, when I fee two fymptoms : firft, a rule of indif- criminate fupport to all Minifters ; becaufe this deftroys the very end of Parliament as a controul, and is a general previous fandlion to mifgovern- ment : and fecondly, the fetting up any claims .adverfe to the right of free eledlion ; for this tends to fubvert the legal authority by which the Houfe of Commons fits. I know that, fmce the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many ufeful powers of Go- vernment have been weakened. It is abfolute- ly neceflary to have frequent recourfe to the Legiflature. Parliaments muft therefore fit every year, and for great part of the year. The dreadful diforders of frequent eledions have alfo F 3 necefhtated 70 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF necefTuated a feptennial inftead of a triennlAl duration. Thefe circumftances, I nican the conflant habit of authority, and the unfrcqucncy of eletflions, have tended very much to draw the Houfe cf Commons towards the charadter of a (landing Senate. It is a diforder which has arifen from the cure of greater diforders ; it has arifen from the extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchical Government, with external ftrcngth and with internal tranquil- lity. It is very clear that we cannot free ourfelves entirely from this great inconvenience ; but I would not increafe an evil, becaufe I was not able to remove it; and becaufe it was not in my power to keep the Houfe of Commons reli- gioufly true to its firft principles, I would not ;irgue for carrying it to a total oblivion of them. I'his has been the great fcheme of power in our time. They who will not conform their condud: to the public good, and cannot fupport it by the prerogative of the Crown, have adopted a new plan. They have totally abandoned the fliattered and old-fafhioncd fortrefs of prerogative, and made a lodgement in the flrong-hold of Parlia- ment itfelf. If they have any evil defign to which there is no ordinary legal power com- menfurate, they bring it into Parliament. In Parliament the whole is executed from the be- ginning to the end. In Parliament the power of obtaining their objecfl is abfolute -, and the fafety in the proceeding perfedl; no rules to confine, no after reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. ^t cannot with any ^rcat propriety punifli others, for things in whicli they thcmfclvcs have heca accomplices. Thus the controul of Parliament upon the executory power is loft ; becaufc Par- liaiiient is made to partake in every conddcrable ad; of Government, hnpeacbment^ that great guardian of the purity of the Conjiitutiaii, is in danger of being hji, even to the idea of it. By this plan fev'eral important ends are anfwer- ed to the Cabal. If the authority of Parliament •fupports itfelf, the credit of every acl of Govern- jiient which they contrive, is faved ; but if the adl be fo very odious that the whole ftrength of Parliament is infufRcient to recommend it, then Parliament is itfelf difcredited; and this difcredit increafes more and more that indifference to the conftitution, which it is the conftant aim of its enemies, by their abufe of Parliamentary powers, to render general among the people. Whenever Parliament is perfuaded to alfume the offices of executive Government, it will lofe all the coni- iidencc, love, and veneration, which it has ever .enjoyed whilft it was fuppofed the cor revive and fiontroid of the ading powers of the State. This would be the event, though its condud: in fuch a perverfion of its fundions ftiould be tolerably juft and moderate; but if it fliould be iniqui- tous, violent, full of paifion, and full of fadion, it would be confidered as the moft intolerable of all the modes of tyranny. For a confiderable time this feparation of the reprefentatives from their conftituents went on with a lilent progrefs ; and had thofe, who con- F 4 duded r it 71 THOUGFITS ON THE CAUSE OF du6\cd the plan for their total feparation, hecr^ pcrfons of temper and abilities any way equal to the magnitude of their dcfign, the fuccefs wouM have been infallible : but by their precipitancy they have laid it open in all its nakedqcfii ; the nation is alarmed at it : and the event may not be pleafant to the contrivers of the fcheme. In the lall fcflion, the corps called the Kin^s friends made an hardy attempt all at once, to alter the right ofeleBion itfelf', to put it into the power of the Iloufc of Commons to difable any perfon difagrecable to them from fitting in Parliament, without any other rule than their own pleafure ; to make incapacities, either general for defcrip- tions of men, or pnrMcular for individuals; and to take into their i dy, perfons who avowedly had lifver been chofen by the majority of legal elec- tors, nor agreeably to any known rule of law. The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated, are not my buiinefs here. Never has a fubjedt been more amply and more learnedly handled, nor upon one lide in my opinion more fitisfadorily ; they who are not convinced by what is already written would not receive conv\&.\ov\ though one arofefrom the dead, . I too have thought on this fubjecl : but my purpofc here, is only to confider it as a part of the favourite proje(5l of Government; to obferve on the motives which led to it; and to trace its political confequences, A violent rage for the punifhment of Mr. Wilkes was the pretence of the whole. This gentleman, by fetting himfelf ftrongly in oppo- fition THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 7^ fition to the Court Cabal, had become at once an obje(ft of their perfccut'on, and of the popular favour. The hatred ox' the Court Party purfu- ing, and the countenance of the people protcdling him, it very foon became not at all a qucflioa on the man, but a trial of (Irength between the two parties. The advantage of the vidory in this particular contefl was the prefent, but not the only, nor by any means the principal, objecft. Its operation upon the chara:(? laws. No ; we do not contend for this power. We only declare law ; and, as we are a tribunal both competent and fupreme, what we declare to be law becomes law, altb^ ^^b. it (hould not have been fo before. Thustiic" :umftanceof havino* no appeal ixQXw their jur. a , Ition is made Xo imply that they have no rule in the exercifc of it j the judgement does not derive its validity from its conformity to the law ; but prepofteroufly the law is made to attend on the judgement; and the rule of the judgement is no other than the eccajional will of the Houje, An arbitrary difcre^ tion leads, legality follows ; which is juft die "very nature and defcription of a legillative a6.. This claim in their hands was no barren theory. It was purfued into its utmoft confequeaces; and ..■'*■ Q a dangerous 9% THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF I a dangerous principle has begot a correfpondent practice. A fyAematic Ipirit has been fhewn upon both fides. The elecftors of Middlcfex chofe a perfon whom the Houfe of Commons had voted incapable ; and the Houfe of Commons has taken in a member whom the cled:ors of Middlefex had not chofen. By a conftrudion on that legiflative power which had been aiTum- ed, they declared that the true legal fenfe of the county was contained in the minority, on that occafion ; and might, on a refiftance to a vote of incapacity, be contained in any minority. When any conftrucflion of law goes againft the fpirit of the privilege it was meant to fupport, it is a vicious conflrudtion. It is material to us to be rcprefented really and dona Jide^ and not in forms, in types, and fhadows, and fictions of law. The right of eledlion was not eftablifhed merely as a matter of form ^ to fatisfy fome method and rule of technical reafoning j it was not a principle which might fubftitute a 'Titim or a MacvhiSt a Jo/jn Doe or Richard Roe, in the place of a man fpecially chofen ; not a prin- ciple which was juft as well fatisfied with one man as with another. It is a ricrht, the effed of which is to give to the people, thai man, and that man only, whom by their voices, a(5tually, not c\>nfl:ruclively given, they declare that they know, eflccni, love, and trull. This right is a mutter within their own power of judging and f<,"cling; not an ens rat'ionis and creature of law : nor can thofe devices, by which any thing eife is fuhllitutcd in the place of luch an a(^^ual choice, anfwer THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. Sj anfwer in the lead degree the end of reprefenta- tion. I know that the courts of law have made as flrained confl:ru6tions in other cafes. Such is the conftru(5tion in common recoveries. The method of conft:ru(flion which in that cafe gives to the perfons in remainder, for their fecurity and re- prefentative, the door-keeper, cryer, or fwecper of the Court, or fome other fliadovvy being without fubftance or effedl, is a fi6lion of a very coarfe texture. This was however fuffered, by the acquiefcence of the whole kingdom, for ages; becaufe the evafion of the old flatute of Wefl- minfter, which authorifed perpetuities, had more fenfe and utility than the law which was evaded. But an attempt to turn the right of eledlion into fuch a farce and mockery as a fi(5litious fine and recovery, will, 1 hope, have anotlier fate; becaufe the laws which give it are infinitely dear to us, and the evafion is infinitely contemptible. The people indeed liave been told, that this power of difcretionary difqualification is vefted in hands that they may trufl, and whowillbefure not to abufe it to their prejudice. Until I find fomethiug in this argument differing from that on which every mode ot defpotifm has been defend- ed, I Oiall not be inclined to pay it any great comphment. The people are fatisfied to trufl themfelves with the exercife of their own privi- leges, and do not dehre this kind intervention of the Houfe of Commons to free them from the burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought not to truft the Houfe of Commons with a G 2 power >i )N : *l i ■ki 84 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF power over their franchifes : becaufe the confti- tution, which placed two other co-ordinate powers to controul it, repofed no fuch confidence in that body. It were a folly well deferving fervitude for its punishment, to be full of confi- dence where the laws are full of diOiruftj anil to give to an Houfe of Commons, arrogating to its fole refolution the moft harfh and odious part of legiflative authority, that degree of fubmiffion which is due only to the Legiflature itfelf. When the Houfe of Commons, in an endeavour to obtain new advantages at the expcnce of the other orders of the State, for the benefit of the Commons at large y have purfued ftrong meafiires; if it were not jufi, it was at lead natural, that the confliiucnts Hiould connive at all their pro- ceedings J becaufe we were ourfelves ultimately to profit. But when this fubmifTion is urged to us, in a conted between the reprefcntatives and ourfelves, and where nothing can beputinto their fcale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to be cbildicn when they tell us they are our re- prefentatives, our own flefh and blood, and that all the ftripes they give us are for our good. The very defire of that body to have fuch a trufl contrary to law repofed in them, fliews that they are not worthy of it. They certainly will abufe it j becaufe all men pofTefTed of an • uncontrouled difcretionary power leading to the .aggrandifement and profit of their own body have always abulcd it : and I fee no particular fandity in our times, that is at all likely, by a miraculous , « ly in ir a IS THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 85 miraculous operation, to overrule the courfe of nature. - , But wc mud purpofely fluit our eyes, if we confidcr this matter merely as a contcft between the Houfe of Commons and the Electors. The true conteft is between the Eledlors of the king- dom and the Crown ; the Crown ading by an inftrumental Houfe of Commons. It is precifely the fame, whether the Minifters of the Crown can difqualify by a dependent Houfe of Com- mons, or by a dependent court of Star Chamber, or by a dependent court of King's Bench. If once Members of Parliament can be pra(ftically convinced, that they do not depend on the af- fedlion or opinion of the people for their political being, they will give themfelves over, without even an appearance of referve, to the influence of the Court. Indeed, a Parliament unconneded with the people, is efTential to a Miniflry unconnected with the people ; and therefore thofe who faw through what mighty difficulties the interior Miniflry waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this bufinefs, will conceive of what prodigi- ous importance, the new corps of Kings men held this principle of occafional and perlonal in- capacitation, to the whole body of their dclign. When the Houfe of Commons was thus made to confider itfelf as the mader of its conflituents, there wanted but one thing to fccure that Houfe againfl: all poffible future deviation towards po- pularity; an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleaUire of the Court. C3 To It' Ivl 86 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF To complete the fcheme of bringing ourCourt toarcfemblance to the neighbouring Monarchies, it was necL'iT.iry, in efic(f>, to deftroy thofe ap- propriations of revenue, which fcem to Hmit the property, as the other la'.vs hatl done the powers, of the Crown. An opportunity for this pur- jxjfc was taken, upon an application to Parlia- inciU for paynunt of the dttbts of the Civil Lift: ; which in 1769 had amounted to 513,000/. Such application had been made upon former occa- lions; but to do it in tlie former manner would by no means anfwer the prpfcnt purpofc. Whenever the Crown had come to the Com- mons to defire a I'upply for the difcharging of dc!)ts due on the Civil Lift: ; it was always aftced and granted with one of the three following qua- lifications ; fonictimes with all of them. Either it was ftated, that the revenue had been diverted from its purpofcs by Parliament: cr that thofe duties had fallen (hort of the fum for which they were given by Parliament, and that the intention of the Legillature had not been fulhded : or that the money required to difchargc the Civil Lift: debt, was to be raifed chargeable on the Civil Lift: duties. In the reign of Queen Anne, the Crown was found in debt. The leftening and granting away fome part of her revenue by Parliament was alledged as the caufeof that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground, fuch it certainly was, for difcharging it. It does not appear that the duties which were then applied to the ordinary Govern- ment produced clear above 580,000/. a year ; becaule, when they were afterwards granted to George ./ THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 87 George the Firft, 120,000 /. was added, to com- plete the whole to 700,000 /. a year. Indeed it was then ailerted, and, 1 have no doubt, truly, that for many years the net produce lid not amount to above 550,000/. The Queen's ex- traordinary charges were befides very confider- able ; eqial, at leaft, to any we have known in our time. The application to Parliament was not for an abfolutc grant of money ; but to em- power the Queen to raife it by borrowing upon the Civil Lift funds. The Civil Lift debt was twice paid in the reign of George the Firft. The money was granted upon the fame plan which had been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The Civil Lift revenues were then mortgaged for the fum to be raifed, and ftood charged with the ranfom of their own deliverance. George the Second received an addition to his Civil Lift. Duties were granted for the pur- pofe o< raifing 800,000 /. a year. It was not until ■ had reigned nineteen years, and after the la(t i -bellioh, that he called upon Parliament for a di rdiargc of the Civil Lift debt. The ex- traordinary chaigcb brought on by the rebellion, accoui t fully for the nccellities of the Crown. However, the extraordii\ary charges of Govern- ment were not thought a ground fit to be relied on. A dcfiriency of the Civil Lift ditties for fevcral jrears before, was dauA as the principal, if not the iole, ground on which an application to Pn*- liament could be juilified. About this time t ^ G 4 producj II ■r.* i<\ \?ll ^9Bfl .^.^T-^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 11.25 Ul 12.5 K ■ 2.2 mm IMli4 V] 0% /. W '>> ^1^ ^ '/ /A Hicbieiaphic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^- ^ <^^'^ ^l ^% produce of thefe duties had fallen pretty low; and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced 800,000/. a year clear to the Treafury. That Prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new demands were made ; but with fo much good order were his revenues and ex- pences regulated, that, although many parts of the eilablifhnicnt of theCourt were upon a larger and more liberal fcale than they have been fince, lliere was a confiderable fum in hand, on his dcceafc, amounting to about 170,000/. appli- cable to the (ervice of the Civil Lift of his prefent Majefty. So that, if this Reign commenced with a greater charge than ufual, there was enough, and more than enough, abundantly to fupply all the extraordinary expence. That the Civil Lift ihould have been exceeded in the two former reigns, efpecially in the reign of George theFirft, was not at all furprizing. His revenue was but 700,000/. annually; if it ever produced fo much clear. The prodigious and dangerous difaftedlion to the very being of the eftablilhment, and the caufe of a Pretender then powerfully abetted from abroad, produced many demands of an ex- traordinary nature both abroad and at home. Much management and great expences were neceHary. But the throne of no Prince has ftood upon more unfliaken foundations than that of his prefent Majefty. To have exceeded the fum given for the Civil Lift, and to have incurred a debt without fpecial authority of Parliaiwent, Wixs^ jftrmajacicf a cri- minal w I THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 89 minal a6t : as fuch, Miniflers ought naturally rather to have withdrawn it from the infpecTtion, than to have expofed it to the fcrutiny, of Par- liament. Certainly they ought, of themfelves, officioufly to have come armed with every fort of argument, which, by explaining, could ex- cufe, a matter in itfelf of prefumptivc guilt. But the terrors of the Houle of Commons are no longer for Minifters. On the other hand, the peculiar character of the Houfe of Commons, as trufteeof the public purfe, would have led them to call with a pun(5lilious folicitude for every public account, and to have examined into them with the mofl rigorous accuracy. The capital ufe of an account is, that the reality c^ the charge, the reafon of incurring it, and the juftice and neceffity of difcharging it, (hould all appear antecedent to the payment. No man ever pays firft, and calls for his account afterwards ; becaufe he would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and indeed only effc6lual, means of compelling a full and fair one. But, in national bufinefs, there is an additional reafon for a pre- vious produdion of every account. It is a check, perhaps the only one, upon a corrupt and pro- digal ufe of public money. An account after payment is to no rational purpofe an account. However, the Houfe of Commons thought all ihefe to be antiquated principles j they were of opinion, that the moft Parliamentary way of proceeding was, to pay firft what the Court thought proper to demand, and to take its chance for i:t 90 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF for an examination into accounts at fome time of greater ieifure. The nation had fettled 800,000/. a year on the Crown, as fufhclcnt for the fupport of its dignity, upon the eflimate of its own Minifters. When Miniftcrs came to Parliament, and faid that this allowance had not heen fufficient for the purpofc, and that they had incurred a debt of 500,000/. would it not have been natural for Parliament firft to have afked, how, and by what means, their appropriated allowance came to be infufhcient ? Would it not have favoured of fome attention to juftice, to have feen in what periods of Adminiftration this debt had been originally incurred; that they might difcover, and, if need were, animadvert on the perfons who were found the moft culpable ? To put their hands upon fuch articles of expenditure as they thought improper or exceilive, and to fecure, in future, againft fuch mifapplication or exceeding ? Accounts for any other purpofes are but a mat- ter of curiofity, and no genuine Parliamentary objed:. All the accounts which could anfwer any Parliamentary end were refufed, or poflponed by previous queflions. Every idea of prevention was rejeded, as conveying an improper fufpicion of the Minillers of the Crown. When every leading account had been refufed, many others were granted with fufficient facility. But with great candour alfo, the Houfe was informed, that hardly any of them could be ready until the next feffion ; fome of them perhaps not fo loon. But, in order firmly to eftablifli the precedent THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 91 precedent oi payment previous to account, and to form it into a fettled rule of the Houfe, the god in the machine was brought down, nothing Icfs than the wonder-working Law of Parliament, It was alledged, that it is the law of Parliament, when any demand comes from the Crown, that the Houfe muft go immediately into the Com- mittee of Supply J in which Committee it was allowed, that the produdion and examination of accounts would be quite proper and regular. It was therefore carried, that they fhould go into the Committee without delay, and without ac- counts, in order to examine with great order and regularity things that could not poffibly come before them. After this ftroke of orderly and Parliamentary wit and humour, they went into the Committee; and very generoufly voted the payment. There was a circumftance in that debate too remarkable to be overlooked. This debt of the Civil Lift was all along argued upon the fame footing as a debt of the State, contracted upon national authority. Its payment was urged as equally preflingupon the publicfaith andhonour ; and when the whole year's account was ftated, ift what is called The Budget , the Miniftry valued themfelves on the payment of fo much public debt, juft as if they had difcharged 500,000/. of navy or exchequer bills. Though, in truth, their payment, from the Sinking Fund, of debt which w^as never contraded by Parliamentary authority, was, to all intents and purpofes, fo much debt incurred. But fuch is the prefent notion of public credit^ 92 THOUGH! S ON THE CAUSE OF credit, and payment of debt. No wonder that it p oduces fuch effects. Nor was the Houfe at all more attentive to a provident fccurity againft future, than ithadbeen to a vindidtive rctrofped: to paft, mifmanagements. I fliould have thought indeed that a Miniftecial promife, during their own continuance in office, might have been given, though this would have been but a poor fecurity for the publick. Mr. Pclham gave fuch an affurance, and he kept his word. But nothing was capable of extorting from our Minifters any thing which had the lead re- femblance to a promife of confining the expences of the Civil Lift within the limits which had been fettled by Parliament. This referve of theirs I look upon to be equivalent to the cleared: declaration, that they were refolved upon a contrary courfe. However, to put the matter beyond all doubt, in the Speech from the Throne, after thanking Parliament for the reiief fo liberally granted, the Minifters inform the two Houfes, that they will endeavour to confine the expences of the Civil Government — within what limits, think you ? thofe which the law had prefcribed ? Not in the leaft— " fuch limits as the honour of the Crown ** can poffibly admit." Thus they eftabliflied an arbitrary ftandard for that dignity which Parliament had defined and limited to a legal ftandard. They gave them- felves, under the lax and indeterminate idea of the honour of the Crown , a full loofe for all manner cf diftipation,and all manner of corruption. This arbitrary ftandard they were not afraid to hold out THE PRESENT DiSCONTENTS. gj out to both Floufes j while an idle and unopera- tive A6t of Parliament, eftimating the dignity of the Crown at 800,000/. and confining it to that fum, adds to the number of obfolete flatiitcs which load the (helves of libraries without any fort of advantage to the people. After this proceeding, I fiippofe that no man can be fo weak as to think that the Crown is limited to any fettled allowance whatfoever. For iftheMiniftryhas 800,000/. a year by the law of the land ; and if by the law of Parliament all the debts which exceed it are to be paid previous to the produdion of any account; Iprefume that this is equivalent to an income with no other limits than the abilities of the fubjeft and the modera- tion of the Court ; that is to fliy, it is fuch aa income as is pofTelTed by every abfoUite Monarch in Europe. It amounts, as a perfon of great abi- lity faid in the debate, to an unlimited power of drawing upon the Sinking Fund. Its effed: on the public credit of this kingdom mufl be obvi- ous; for in vain is the Sinking Fund the great buttrefs of all the reft, if it be in the power of the Miniftry to refort to it for the payment of any debts which they may choofe to incur, under the name of the Civil Lift, and through the medium of a Committee, which thinks itfelf obliged by law to vote fupplies without any other account than that of the mere exiftence of the debt. Five hundred thoufp.nd pounds is aferious fum. But it is nothing to the prolific principle upon which the fum was voted 5 a principle that may be well called, the fruitful jmther of an hundred 3 77iore^ 94 TFrOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF more. Neither is the damage to public credit of very great confequence, when compared with that which refults to public morals and to the fafety of the conftitution, from the exhaufilefs mine of corruption opened by the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle, of the late pay- ment of the debts of the Civil Lift. The power of difcretionary difqualification by one law of Parliament, and the neceflity of paying every debt of the Civil Lift by another law of Parliament, if fuffered to pafs unnoticed, muft eflablifti fuch a fund of rewards and terrors as will make Parlia- ment the heft appendage and fupport of arbitrary power that ever was invented by the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun between the Reprefentatives and the People. The Court Faction have at length committed them. In fuch a ftrait the wifeft may well be per- plexed, and the boldeft ftaggered. The circum- ftances are in a great meafure new. We have hardly any Ir.nd-marks from the wifdom of our anceftors, to guide us. At heft we can only follow the fpirit of their proceeding in other cafes. I know the diligence with which my obfervations on our public diforders have been made ; I am very fure of the integrity of the motives on which they are publiflied : I cannot be equally confi- dent in any plan for the abfolute cure of thofe diforders, or for their certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter into more public difcuffion. Let thefagacity of others work upon it. It is not uncommon for medical writers to defcribe THE PRESENT DISCONTKNTS. qj defcribe hiftories of difeafcs very accurately, on whofe cure they can fay but very little. The firft: ideas which generally fuggefl: them- felvcs, for the cure of Parliamentary diforders, are, to (horten the duration of Parliaments; and to difqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a feat in the Houfe of Commons. What- ever efficacy there may be in thofe remedies, I am fure in the prefent Itate of things it is impof- fible to apply them. A reftoration of the right of free eleftion is a preliminary indifpenfable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the conftitution, is a matter of deep and difficult refearch. If I wrote merely to pleafe the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troubleibme to mc as to another, to extol thefe remedies, fo famous in fpeculation, but to which their greatefl: ad- mirers have never attempted fcrioufly to refort in pradtice. I confefs then, that I have no fort of reliance upon either a Triennial Parliament, or a Place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps it might rather fe* ve to counteract, than to promote the ends that are propofed by it. To fay nothing of the horrible diforders among the people attend- ing frequent elections, Ilhould be fearful ot com- mitting, every three years, the independentgentle- men of the country into a contefl with the Trea- fury. It is eafy to fee which of the contending parties would be ruined firfl:. Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, fo as to endeavour to ground his fpeculations on his ex- perience, muft have obferved how prodigioufly greater 96 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF greater the power of Miniftry If in tlidirH: and lafi feflion oFa Parliament, than it is In the itUcrnudi'ti: period, when Members fit a little firm on their feats. The perfons of thegreatefl Parliatrx jitary experience, with whom I have convcrfcd, did conftantly, in canvafling the fate of qu^'i'Iions, allow fomething to the Coiirt-lule, upcn account of theele<51:ionsdependingor imminent. Tjic evil complained of, if it exifts in the prefent date of things, would hardly be removed by a triennial Parliament : for, unlefs the influence Oi Govern- ment in ele6lions can be entirely taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will harrafs private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the fettled fyf- tematic intercfl: of Goverimient, and to the re- fources of a boundlefs Civil Lifl:. Certainly Tome- thing may be done, and ought to be done, towards leflening that influence in eled:ions ; and this will be necefiary upon a plan either of longer or ihortcr duration of Parliament. But nothing can fo perfectly remove the evil, as not to render fuch contentions, too frequently re- peated, utterly ruinous, flift to independence of fortune, and then to independence of foirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an adverfe line, I hope I may be excufed in another obfervation. With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this fubjedt with any man much converfant with public bufinefs, who confidered (hort Parliaments as a real improvement of the eonftitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular viufc. THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 97 caufe, are ready enough to attribute all the decla- rations of fuch pcrfons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnilhes it, on the other, with the means of better information. 1 he authority of fuch perfons will always have fomc weight. It may Hand upon a par with the fpecu- lations of thofe who are lefs pradtifed in bufincfs; and who, with perhaps purer intentions, have not fo effedual means of judging. It is, beiides, an effed: of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine, that every Statefman is of courfe corrupt ; and that his opinion, upon every conftitutional point, is folely formed upon fome finifter intereft. The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The fame principle guides in both ; I mean, the opinion which is entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public diflcmpers. Without being as unrea- fonably doubtful as many are unwifely confident, I will only fay, that this alfo is a matter very well worthy of ferious and mature reflexion. It is not eafy to forefee, what the effedt would be, of dif- conned:ing with Parliament, the greateft part of thofe who hold civil employments, and of fuch mighty and important bodies as the military and naval efl:abli(hments. It were better, perhaps, that they fliould have a corrupt intereft in the forms of the conftitution, than that they (hould have none at all. This is a queftion altogether different from the difqualification of a particular defcription of Revenue Ofiicers from feats in Parliament 5 or, perhaps, of all the lower forts H of :.!li 98 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF of them from votes in elc'henever it £hall appear, by fome flagrant and notorious a(5t, by fo-ne capital innovation, that thefe Repre- fentatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This interpofition is a moft unpleafant remedy. But, if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on fome occalion to be ufed.; to be ufed then only, when it is evident that nothing elfe can hold the con- ftitution to its true principles. The diftempers of Monarchy were the great fubjeds of apprehenfion and redrefs, in the lad century J in this, the diftempers of Parliament. It is not in Parliament alone that the remedy for Parliamentary diforders can be compleated -, hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a con- fidence in Government is re-eftablifhed, the people ought to be excited to a more ftrift and detailed attention to the conduclof their Repre- fentatives, Standards, for judging more fyfte- matically upon their condud:, ought to be fettled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and corred lifts of the voters in all important queftions ought to be procured. By \ m THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. loi By fuch means fomething may be done. By fuch means it may appear who thofe are, that, by an indifcriminate fupport of all Adminiftra- tions, have totally banifhed all integrity and confidence out of public proceedings ; have con- founded the beft men with the worft ; and weakened and diflblved, inftead of ftrength- ening and comparing, the general frame of Government. If any perfon is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country ; even he is equally concerned to put an end to this courfe of inHifcriminate fupport. It is this blind and undiftinguifhing fupport, that feeds the fpring of thofe very dif- orders, by which he is frighted into the arms of the fadtion which contains in itfelf the fource of all diforders, by enfeebling all the vifibleand re- gular authority of the State. The diftemper is increafed by his injudicious and prepofterous en- deavours, or pretences, for the cure of it. An exterior Adminiftration, chofen for its impotency, or after it is chofen purpofely ren- dered impotent, in order to be rendered fub- fervient, wijl not be obeyed. The laws them- felves will not be refpedted, when thofe who execute them are defpifed ; and they will be defpifed, when their power is not immediate from the Crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never *vverc Minifters better fupported in Pai- L'ament. Parliamentary fupport comes and goes v;ith office, totally rcgardlels of the man, or the merit. Is Government (Irengthened ? It grows * weaker and weaker. The popular torrent gains H 3 upon t^?»*. 102 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF upon it every hour. Let us learn from our ex- perience. It is not fupport that is wanting to Government, but reformation. When Miniftry refls upon public opinion, it is not indeed built upon a rock of adamant i it has, however, fome {lability. But when it ftands upon private humour, its flrudlure is of ftubble, and its foun- dation is on quickfand. I repeat it again — He that fupports every Adminiftration, fubverts all Government. The reafon is this : The whole bufinefs in which a Court ufually takes an intereft goes on at prefent equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wife or foolifb, fcandalous or reputable ; there is nothing there- fore to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one confiftent fcheme of politicks. Nothing interpofes, to prevent the full opera- lion of all the caprices and all the paffions of a Court upon the fervants of the publick. The fyftem of Adminiftration is open to continual Shocks and changes, upon the principles of the meaneft cabal, and the moft contemptible in- trigue. Nothing can be folid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horrour from fuch fervice. Men of rank and ability, with the fpirit which ought to animate fuch men in a free ftatCi while they decline the jurif- didtion of dark cabal on their a I find it impoflible to conceive, that any one believes in his own poli- ticks, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refufes to adopt the means of having them re- duced into pradlice. It is the bufinefs of the fpeculative philofopher to mark the proper ends of Government. It is the bufinefs of the poli- tician, who is the philofopher in adtion, to find out proper means tovv^ards thofe ends, and to employ them with effedl. Therefore every ho- nourable connexion will avow it is their firft pur- pofe, to purfue evt ry juft method to put the men who hold their opinions into fuch a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of ity of THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS, m of the State. As this power Is attached to certain fituations, it is their duty to contc nd For ihcfc fituations. Without a prolcription cf others, they are bound to give to their own party the picfei- ence in all things ; and by no means, lor private confiderations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included ; nor to fuffer themfclves to be led, or to be controulcil, or to be over-balanced, in olHcc or in council, by thofe who contradi6l the very iundamental principles on which their p.irty is fornn^d, and even thofe upon which every fair cjnncxion muft ftand. Such a generous coiteniion for power, on fuch manly and honourable maxims, will eafily be diftinguiflied from the mean and interefted ftruggle for place and emolument. The very ftile of fuch pcrfuns will fcrvc to dil- criminate them from thofe numberlefs iinpof- tors, who have deluded the ignoraiU with pro- fefTions incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incenfed them by pradiccs be- low the level of vulgar reditudc. It is an advantage to all narrow wifdorn and narrow morals, that their maxims have a plaufible air; and, on a curfory view, appear equal to fir(t principles. They are light an \ portable. They are as current as copper coin; and about as valu- able. They ferve equally the firft capacities and the lowefl: ; and they are, at leaft, as ufeful to the word men ifs the beO:, 01" this {lamp is the cant of Not meriy but meafures ; a fort of charm, by which many people get loofe from every ho^ nourablc engagement. When I fee a man adting v;'. .i;-:.v ' this III TMOUGMTS ON THE CAUSE OF thii defultory and difconncdlcd part, with as much dctritnciit to his own fortune as prejudice to the caulc of any party, I am not pci fuadcd that he is right; b:.i I am ready to bchcve he is in carncil. I refpedl virtue in all its fitua- tions J even when it is found in the unfuitahle company of weaknefs. I lament to fee qualities, rare ana v.duahle, IquancLicd away without any puhlic utility. Bat when a gentleman wiili great vifible emolumentc abandons the party in which he has long aded, and tells you, it is becaufc lie proceeds upon his own judgement ; that headts on the merits of the leveral mcafures as they arife ; and that he is obliged to follow his own confciencc, and not that of others ; he gives rea- fons which it is impofTible to controvert, and difcovers a charader which it is impoflible to miflake. What fhall we think of him who never differed from a certain fet of men until the moment they loll their power, and who never agreed with them in a fmglc inflance after- wards ? Would not fnch a coincidence of interefl and opinion be rather fortunate ? Would it not be an extraordinary cart upon the dice, that a man's connexions rtiould degenerate into fadlion, prccifely at the critical moment when they lofe their power, or he accepts a place? When people defert their connexions, the defertion is a manifeft y^/(^, upon which a diredt fimple iifuc lies, triable by plain men. Whether a meafure of Governtiient be right or wrong, is no matter of faB, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they do, difpute and wrangle • » THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 113 wrangle without end. But whether the indiv*- dual t^inh the nieafurc right or wrong, is a point at ftill .1 greater diftancc from the reach c)f all human dccifion. It is therefore very convenient to polilici'ns, not to put the judge- ment of their condud on n;crt-c.6b, cognizable in .iny ordinary court, but upon fuch matter aa can be triable only in that fccrct tribunal, where they are fure of being heard with favour, or where at worft the fentence will be only private whipping. .^ I believe the reader would widi to find no fubflancc in a dodlrine which has a tendency to deftroy all ted of character as deduced from condudl. He will therefore excufc my adding fomcthing more, towards the further clearing up a point, which the great convenience of obfcu- rity to difhoncfty has been able to cover with fome degree of darknefs and doubt. In order to throw an odium on political con- nexion, thefe politicians fuppotc it a neceflary incident to it, that you are blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in diredt oppo- fition to your own clear ideas > a degree of fervi- tude that no worthy man could bear the thought of fubmitting to; and fuch as, I believe, no cgri-' nexions (except fome Court Fadlions) ev^r could be fo fenfelefsly tyrannical as to impofe. Men thinking freely, will, in particqlar inftances, think differently. But ftill, as the greater part of the mcafures which arife in the courfc of public bufinefs are related to, or dependent on, ibme great leacHng general principles in Govern^ \ ment^ K\ i J if w 114 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF fnent, a man muft be peculiarly unfortunate in rhe choice of his political company if he does not agree with them at leaft nine times in ten. If he docs not concur in thefe general prin- ciples upon which the party is founded, and which neccffarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from the beginning to have chofen fome other, more conformable to Lis opinions. When the queftion is in its nature doubtful, or not very material, the mc lefty which becomes an individual, and (in fpite of our Court moralifts) that partiality which becomes a well-chofcn friendrfiip, will frequently bring on an acquiefcence in the general fentiment. Thus the difagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough o in- dulge freedom, without violating concord, or difturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was required for a charadler of the greateft uniformity and fteadinefs in connexion. How men can proceed without any coiinexion at all, is to me utterly incomprchenfible. Of what fort of materials muft that man be made, how rnuft he be tempered and put together, who can lit whole years in Parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his fellow citizens, amidft the ftorm of fuch tempeftuous paffions, in the fharp con- fii(ft of fo many wits, and tempers, and charac- ters, in the agitation of fuch mighty queftions, in the difcuffion of fuch vaft and ponderous interefts, without feeing any one fort of men, whofe charadler, conduct, or difpolition, would lead him to allbciate himfelf with them, to aid I . and ■*■'?•)• THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 115 and be aided, in any one fyftem of public utility? • '^i^'" '^-^'li :. ^- "f I remember an old fcholaftic aphorifm, which fays, ** that the man who lives wholly detached ** from others, mufl: be either an angel or a '* devil." When I fee in any of thefe detached gentlemen of our times the angelic purity, power, and beneficence, I fhall admit them to be angels. In the mean time we are born only to be men. We (hall do enough if we form ourfclves to be good ones. It is therefore our bufinefs carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the moft perfect vigour and maturity, every fort of gene- rous and honeft feeling that belongs to our na- ture. To bring the difpofitions that are lovely in private life into the fervice and condud: of the commonwealth ; fo to be patriots, as not lo forget we are gentlemen. To cultivate friend- ih'ips, and to incur enmities. To have both ftrong, but both- feledted : in the one, to be placable ; in the other, immoveable. To model our principles to our duties and our fituation. To be fully perfuaded, that all virtue which is impracticable is fpurious j and father to run the rilque of falling into faults in a courfe which leads us to adt with effedt and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame, and without ufe. Public life is a fituation of power and energy ; he trefpafles againft his duty who fleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the enemy. , ,^ ,..-,.. . There is, however,' a time for all things. It is n^'^ every conjuncture which calls with equal - , ' I 2 force % 116 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF force upon the aiStivity of honeft men ; but critical exigencies now and then arife j and I am miftaken, if this be not one of them. Men will fee the neceflity of honeft combination j but they may fee it when it is too late. They may fcmbody, when it will be ruinous to themielves> and of no advantage to the country j when, for want of fuch a timely union as may enable them to oppofe in favour of the laws, with th6 laws on their fide, they may, at length, find themfelves under the neceflity of conlpiring, inftead of confulting. The law, for which they fland, may become a weapon in the hands of its bittereft enemies j and they will be caft, at length, into that miferable alternative, between flavery and civil confufion, which no good man can look upon without horror; an alternative in which it is impoffible he fliould take either part, with a confcience perfed:ly at repofe. To keep that fituation of guilt and remorfe at the utmofl: diftance, is, therefore, our firft obliga- tion. Early activity may prevent late and fruit- lefs violence. As yet we work in the light* The fcheme of the enemies of public tranquillity has difarfanged, it has not deftroyed us. ' If the reader bc)ievcs that there really exifta fuch a Faction as I have defcribed ; a Fa(5lion ruling by the private inclinations of a Court, againft the general fenfe of the people ; and that this Fadion, whilft it purfues a fcheme for undermining all the foundations of our freedom, weakens (for the prefcnt at leaft) all the powers of executory Government, rendering us abroad '. :t,t '■ i. contemptible, I. THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 117 contemptible, and at home diftra(5ted; he will be- lieve alfo, that nothing but a firm combinatioQ of public men againft this body, and that, too* fupported by the hearty concurrence of the people at large, can poflibly get the better of it. The people will fee the neceflity of reftoring public ipcn to an atte»'tion to the public opinion, and of reftoring the conftitution to its original prin- ciples. Above all, they will endeavour to keep the Houfe of Commons from afluming a charac- ter which does not belong to it. They will endea- vour to keep that Houfe, for its exiftence, for its powers, and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent upon themfelves, as poflible. This fervitude is to an Houfe of Commons (like obedience to the Divine law) ** perfedt freedom." For if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience^ having deferted the only proper foundation of their power, they muft feek a fupport in an abjedt and unnatural dependence fomewhere elfe. When, through the medium of this juft connexion with their conftituents, the genuine dignity of the Houfe of Commons is reftored, "♦• will begin to think of cafting from it, with fcorn, as badges of fervility, all the falfe ornaments of illegal power, with which it has been, for fome time, difgraced. It will begin to think of its old office of CoNTROUL. It will not fuffer, that lad of evils, to predominate in the country ; men without popular confidence, public opinion, natural connexion, or mutual truft, invefled with all the powers of Govenment. Wh^a 4 118 THOUGriTS ON THE CAUSE, i^c. , - When they have learned this lefTon themfel vcs, they will be willing and able to teach the Court, that it is the true interefl of the Prince to have but one Adminiftration ; and that one com- pofed of thofe who recommend themfelves to their Sovereign through the opinion of their country, and not by their obfequioufnefs to a favourite. Such men will ferve their Sovereign with affedion and fidelity; becaufc his choice of them, upon filch principles, is a compliment to their virtue. They will be able to ferve him efFedually ; becaufe they will add the weight of the country to the force of the executory power. They will be able to ferve their King with dig- nity; becaufe they will never abufe his name to the gratification of their private fpleen or avarice. This, with allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general charadler of a Miniftry, which thinks itlelf accountable to the Houfe of Commons; when the Houfe of Commons thinks itfelf accountable to its conftituents. If other ideas fhould prevail, things mi^il remain in their prefent confufion ; until they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence; or until they link into the dead repofe of defpotifm. ~^. ; \ ' - / T H E END." ^-^ ; % , -i .i " ■ . , rrr»^i:;>r. . ' Jl ■ ■ Itii)!; '■ . . -t ,1,..,.-^ tittX ■ J \ Hms:^