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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. errata I to t 9 pelure, on d n 32X 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 ^ ■■' L / - A STATE O F T H li; EXPEDITION FROM C ' A N A D A, A3 LAID EKrORC THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, B Y LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BU R^O Y N E, AND ^M': R I F I E D BY EVIDENCE; WITH A COLLECTION OF AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS, AND AX ADDITION OF MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE PREVENTED FROM APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE BY THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT. WRITTEN AND COLLECTED BY HIMSELF, JM.DTCATFP TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY HE COMMANDED. L O N D O N : raiNTro rn:< j. ai.mon, oppositk bl'rlinoton-::ot se^ r-JccADjLLV, ^/*v^. '^ T O MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS, AND THV, OTHER OFFICERS WHO SERVED IN THE ARMV COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE, UPON AN EXPEDITION FROM CANADA. Gentlf-men, A ROPRTETY and affctflion alike liKline me to infcrlbe to you the follow- lug undertaking!;. VVe are mutual and peculiar fulFercrs by the event of the campaign hi 1777. You were wkncilcs and judges of my adlions ; but I owed you an account of the principles which diret^ed them. Another motive for tills Addrefs Is to avail myfelf of a proper public op- portunity to repeat to you, what I have omitted no occafion of expreffing in Piirlianient, in correfpondencc, and in converfiition — the fuUeft approbation ■of your fcrvkes. My errors may have been numberlefs ; your conduft has been uniform — faithful, gallant and indefatigable. Debarred of the power of doing you juftlce before the King, thefe teftlmonies are the only means to which my eftcem and gratitude can refort. After vindicating myfelf as a commanding officer from any inattention to your Intcreft or fame, I next throw myfelf upon your judgment for my con- duS: as a friend. You will find by this publication, and fome others, which though not addrefled to you will probably engage your curiofity, that 1 have been accufed of ihrlnklng from the common captivity. A ? 1 have [ '- J 1 have Iccn fiipporti-d uiulcr lh;it nfpiifi jii by the confciDiirncrs I ilid not: {1i.'n*r\c it, aiul the conll'lrnci' lh.;t \ on (to whom chicily upon that e!ian',c 1 was rclpoi^nUlt.) woiikl not ailopt it. Afttr the tortuncs wc have run lo- ^'.cther, it is not luitly unwortliv ofhi'IIcf, that I (houIJ rather has e tlellrecl, than avo'iUd to partake the doling fecne : imiting- with a tliie fcnle of per- ional auachtnenls tlie prelervalion of niv military fortune, and a letreat: horn tlic dillr.iClion,-; of my country. 'J'hc defci-.ce of your honcnir and my own, at one I'me, and refiHance to an aiVront ''^ which my nature could not bciir, at another, alon:; detained me lierc. In rej^ard to my political tranficlions, I have Hated them, nnd I wifl-. ihcm to l)e confidered by my friends apart from my miltary condu:l. I hear very hii;h rcfpc*!:! to fonic eminent and ill-treated charai!:"ters in our pro- icHion, who in deference to the traiicjuility of .■government, have file ntly re- iif^ncd the ilitions which they could no longer hold with fecurlty to their honour, or betielit to the ftate. But the option is not left to ihofe, who lia- vlng a voice in Parliament are obliged to acl as clti/ens as well as foldiers. The number of officers altogether of the army and navy, who with known love to their country and profeilional fpirit ec^ually confpicuous, have vo- luntarily withdrawn thcmfelves from employment within theic two years, exceeds all precedent. I do not place my name in the lift with the fame pretenfions; but it is not arrogant to emulate where we cannot compare ; and I am defirous of toll )wing the high examples before me in no point more than in that of avoiding to diihirb the /cal of ihofe who are now em*- ployed. The oiiicers who hfivc held it their duty to take part in oppofitlon, have afied optn'y and diredly in iheir place in Parliament ; but they may * The pnrt: v: my trc.tincjit wliich I c;ill ^n ndVont up'.)n tliis ami olhcr occalluns, is tli.' ic- fulhl of my (trvici; in this countrv, even at the iiead of my own ici;iiiHiU, oi- .u a voluiuccr, •n the time of cxigcricy, ami when olhc;r oUiccis pyec'Llylnwyo-;.vitJuntit:(j>i\s^xc employee!. Vly connjjaini: of thi.i partialirv lias never been o!i;riaily imlwereJ ; it has only been evaded hv tions, and ot a nati'irc that could not lie r.lterwarcis luppcrted, were tried agamlt the J;uke ot Rutland's recomnicndation of t!iis excellent cliiccr : but the objedion of parole, though hilly known to be prcelfely the fame with that \,!\ich was Co peremptorily urged againft my preten- {l3n<;, was iKVCf mentioned, 3 defy dcfv iiKilicc to fticw .111 infliincc wherein tlicy have not cncoum^^cJ nrJonr in thtir profcfrioM. Tlicy contemplate with one and the f.nnc Icntiment tlie grc:it (iii>ply of luinoiirible men to oceiipy their plnccs. Vou, Gentlemen, {l;mcl lnj;li in th.it defcrlptlon ; your trials have mndi: you of flcrling \ aliic ; and pi.ih.ips it will he better difeerned by men in power, when no lon:;cr viewed t!n*ough the unfavourable medium of my fricndlhip. If my exhortations retain their former weight, let me be permit- t(.d cnrnel>ly to apply them upon this occafion. Tlie examples of {generals or admirals who decline employment, refpeft only fnnilar cafes ; your honour is iecure: look not at profelfional difappointments ; but point all your views to tlie true glory of your Ivino; and country, and trull for the reward. O foc'i'i (vcqiic cn'im igrtan (umiis ant a Malorum) O pofji graxiora : Jalnt Deus hh rjnoquc jlnem. Tills pnlTigc will bring to the remembrance of fome among you a hard hour when we before quoted it together., and not without fume cheer of m'lnJ. ~ IMay tlie end of your enduring be near ! And with t\t':Y other wlfli and^ (entimcnt tliat e:ui denote eflce:n, 1 have the honour to be, Gentlemen, Your moft faithful and moll obedient IJcvtforJ-S.trccfy Jan. I, 1 rSo, humble fcrvant, J. BURGOYNE, INTRO- INTRODUCTION, W II EN It becomes ncccfl'irv for men wlio have aflcd critical pnrts iii public ftntlons to make im appeal to tlic world in their own juflification, there :ire many pnuknti:.'.! coniiclerations which mij;ht lead them to commit the care of it to friends, or, which is in many rcfpeds the fame thing, to defend themfelves nndir an afiumed charader. 'riu- charge of vanity iifiially made on (Totifm h thus iliuUd : a fuller fcopc tuny be given to felf-love and parti- cular rercnlmciit ; even tin; lower vexations which attend an author are to a- great digrce avoided : the ill-nature of criticifm ij ieldom awakened by :;'ionymous writings, and the venal pens of party lofe half their gall when the ebjeCl ot" it is not perfi)nal!y and direilly in qtielVion. But tl ere are fituati ms, in which, not only general artent feems to juflify a man in ("peaking of him^'f, luji in which alfo no little eonfideration ought to be admitted to tlie tnind. Such will be the cafe, if 1 am not deceived, when the inlerefls of the public arc blended with thofe of the individual ; and u hen his very errors may fcrveas inflruflion toothers. Misfortunes » hich awaken ILnfibility will be a further, and a pcrfuafive call, upon the <,\767///t)« of t!ie public ; and it will amount to a claim upon theiry//y?/V^, if lie can fhew tluit he has been injurioufly treated. L'pon maturely weighing thefe and feveral other clrcumftances, after I had been denied a profelilonal examination of my conducl, and difappointed of a parliamentary one, 1 determined to lay before the public a ftate of the expe- tlltion from Canada, in 1777, in tiiy ov.'n name. And my iirft defign was to do it under the title, and with the latitude of Memoirs ; as a mode by which I could beft open the principles of my a^ilions, and introduce, with moi\ prrpricty, collateral charaflers, incidents, and difcuifions, as they might ovcafionallv tend to illuflrate the main fubjeft. However, in the lal\ fefRon of Parliament, the enquiry which had not been agreed to the year beft)re, took place. 1 had pred'ed it, and I entered iiito it under all the diladvautages which attend a flrugglc with power, and the I [ VJII ] ihc prijiiilicc ih.tt power can ralfc a<',;iinn llu; |xrfon, ii nHMi\> to clilirov. 'Mic iitinoU ihal power coiiKl do was cIdik' ; tlic Paliaincnt wa-; prorogtud pi iiding tlic piTH ceilings. I'ut ihoiij;!) by this contrivance, a final and for- mil ndiuiru:iiinii In that aiip^uft allunbly was avr/uled, tlitir minutes Itand a lacred riiord oltnith and juflice, and the moll fatisf.Kflory rdiaiKc to which niy wiHir;, could alpirc, in oflcring my actions to tlie judgment of my country iit large. From th.il tinjc, tlicreforc, I refolveJ to publifli, inflead of Minioirs, the Proceedings precifcly as they paflcd in Parliament, and to conliiuic my de- fence by iukh Ohl'ervations and Comments upon the Evidence, a> 1 (hould iiavc had a right, and was prepared to make, had the proceedingi in the iuuie continued.* Pofilhiy in tliis latter part rome colour of my original dcfign may rcmaui. The fcenes I liave 'oecn engaged in arc uncommon, and it is a ni'.Uual dciire lo place them in a full light. The intereils concerned make that delire more urgent; and I dare believe they will be bcft guarded by bei)ig molt ex- plained. '''• TIic order in wliitli tlic committee in tlic Hemic of Common? procccJcJ wn-;, to licar Sir William II owes Naiintiw, rdi)i.t^\iiirr Ins conduiSl wiiilfl in commanv! in An iciKi, anj )^!c!t fvidcncc as lie tlimi;,;lit projKT to bring; in iVpport of it. 'I'lu-y next Iican! my NaiTativc ami !i.vuknce, rci'ptitinL; the conduifl ol' llic e\)>rdition iVom Cana('ii. Lord Giort;i' ( icrmain then opened a defence on his j'art, ami I'limmoned u itntfl'is to fujiport ir. According to the arranc^c- ment made by the committee, Sir William Howe and myCelf were afterwards lo be hcaicriii nply ; l>iit 'I'L' procecdin;;,s wcie ended by the jMorogation of ParHan.enl before the examina- tion of Lord Cieorgc's fecond witncfs, M'r, (.jallo\vay,\\as clofed, and tiicre were lixtccn or ei"h- re- tf I n more iijiijii his lift. The order in which the following j>apers are pKicet! is — lO. 'I'hc \ faiiirv Speech, ?.d. The Narrative. y\. Minn'es i)f the verbal evidaice. 4ih. Review of the evidence, v.iih Rcinarl.s and L>:planations,v\c. 5th. An Appendix, conlwininj the wiitten evi- dence. TI IC B Mil. I-.l( a lit that I n chieitiati I llial principa take eon incxciilj rion ofi deration. Upon liipprefs when, c( was calle rate the c I purfued fupprclUe authority; of the hoi public ca ceivcd, tl induce th had been fiir as in tl opinion o An can alfo dlflii: been dllc prejudice the priva' ift Janua I'lie nc the parcel i r t 1 The SrEEcn of Licutciiant General Bl'Rgovnf, prefatory to his Nakrativl. Mr. Montagu, BI'.l'OKl'"- I enter upon the narrative, v/lii -h tlu- pirccdcnt of your late ;iroc(.c.!ii'.gs autliorifes me to lay before you, 1 think it a duty to the conmiittie, to promif- that I Hull troul^Ie them with little other matter than fucli as ni;iy be nccoiriry to elucidate the tranfadions of the campaign 1777, in that quarttrr where I comnuuuU'd. I Ihall keep in mini!, that to e:(plain the caufes of the difuRer at Saratoga is the principal point to which all my evidence ought to lead : but at the fame time, I fivdl take confidence in the julticc and benevolence of my hearers, that where argument • in exculpation of the commander can aptly be combined with a faithfid rcprclcnta tionoffads, they will not be deemed foreign to tiic main objedt under ihcirconfi- deration. Upon thefe ideas, thougli fome introduiT-ory explanations are tcquifice, I fliall fiipprcfs the inclination I at firll conceiveii, of (taring my condudl from tlie tiiuc, wjien, conjointly with my honourable frienil who took the lead in this enquiry/' I was called ro r'lc unfolicited and unwelcome fcrvice in America: nor v/ill I eiuime- rate the complicated circumllanccs of private nfisfortune and ill health under wiiicli I purfucd it. Prudence, as well as other propriety, is, I confefs, confulced in tliis fui)pre(rion ; for were it feen, that an officer had blended with the refpcc^t due to authority, warm, thougli difinterefled perfonal attachments ; that under a perkialion of the honour and integrity of the king's fervants, he had united to his zeal for the public caufe an interell in their private cret'it and ambition-, would it not be con- ceived, that his guilt mud have been atrocious, beyond all cxcufe or palliation, to induce the very men to whom his endeavours, and his faculties, fuch as they were, , had been thus devoted, not only completely to defert him, but to preclude him, as far as in them lay, from every means of defence, and ifpoffible, to ruin him in the opinion of the king, the army, and the country ? An carneft defire to fave, as much as poflible, the time of tlie committee, would alfo difiiiade me from recurring to any points previous to my inllruftions which ha/c been diicuffed upon former occafious ; but I find that great itrefs is dill laid to my prejudice upon a paper which found its way to the houfe during my abfence : I mean the priva'e letter to the noble lord, fecretary for the American ilcpartment, dated ifl January, 1777.* The noble Lord has frequently dated that letter to have flipped inadvertently into the parcel dcflined for the houfe, and I give credit in that particular to hisaHcrtion ; 1^ becaufe, * Sir WiUi.im Howe, No. 1. 1 2 P R E !• A r R Y S P E E C il. Sec Appendix No. 11. * No. III> bccaufe, whatever other iinprelTions he might have found it his interell to make le- fpcfting me, hp certainly would not have thought that the imputation on me which that letter tended to fix; ^ proper one for bim to put forward : it is a notorious {d£t, or I would not mention it, tiiat it has been held a reflcdion upon my charader (by the pajt of the public with vvhoni the noble lord is unpopular) that I addrefled him as a patron and friend. This is an imputation to which I muft plead guilty •, for at the time I wrote tliat letter, I certainly did hold tiu^t noble lord as my friend, and 1 had aded to defervc be fliould be fo. The next ill tendency of that paper was, as the noble lord wtll knows, to imprefs the public with an opinion, that I was endeavouring to fupplant Sir Guy Carleton in the command of the northern army — an adlion abhorrent to the honour of an offictr and the liberality of a gentleman •, and of which, thank God, I can prove the faKehood, by i-rcfragable evidence upon your tabic, and in a very linall coriipafs. I leed only rtfcr to the difpatches to Sir Guy Carleton by his aid de-camp, dated 22d Auguft, 1776,* four r.ionths before I came home, to fliew tiiat it was at that time determined, th.n Sir Guy Carleton fliould remain in Canada ; and that determination was made, as I have been informed, not only vipon the political reafoning wliich appears in that difpatch, but alfo, upon great law opuiions, iliat he could not, under the commifllon he then held under the great feai, pafs the frontiers of his province. Sir, this confutation was urged by me laft year j and were collateral proof neceflary to my juftification upon this fub- jeft, 1 could bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen, who had imbibed imprefTions not very favourable to the military proceedings of Sir Guy Carleton in the campaign^ of 1776 : I could Hiew that I feized numberlefs, indeed I feized every ponible oc- cafion to vindicate the judgment, the alTiduity, the adlivity of that highly rcfpeftable officer, carelefs how ill I paid my court, earnefl to meet every attack againft his fame. I beg leave alfo to call the attention of the committee very particularly to one other paper, the date of which is previous to my departure from England : ic is en- titled, " Thoughts for conducing the War from the Side of Canada, by Liejtenanc " General Burgoync."* Sir, it will bt in the recollection of the committee, whe- ther, when the conduft of rhe war was under confi 'cration lad year in my abfcnce,- it was not undcrftood, that the plan of the northern expedition was formed upon that paper as produced upon your table ? If fo, I mull allv the noble lord, why he fuffer- ed that error to prevail ? Tlie noble lord I.new, (and it was peculiarly his duty to declare it) that the two propofals, the firll of turning the expedition eventually to- wards Conne6ticut *, and the lecond, of embarking the army in the river St. Law- rence, in order to efFedt a jundlion with Sir William Howe by fea, in cafe theat^tempc by land appeared " impradlicable, or too hazardous," were crafed while the paper was in his lordfhip's hands. From . PREFATORY SPEEC II. :i aftiou , and of )on your Sir Guy e I carne n fliould ned, not fo, upon inder tlie jrged by [his fub- cfTiOns impaign dIc oc- jedlable s fixme, to one is eii- I tenant whc- bfence, 5on tliat fuffer- duty to ally to- . Law- t^tempc '. paper From From thstpr»perj as it appeared without erafures, naturally arofc the conclufion, that the plan I had to execute was completely my own; upon that paper were founded, as naturallvj ^he doubts which have been entertained upon the peremptory tenor of my inftructions. I muft again afk the noble lord, upon what principle of juflice he fuf- fcred thofe imprefllons to exift in this houfe? Why, in a debate in which he took a part, did he conceal, that the circumftances in reality were totally different fron\ thofe upon which gcnti°men rcafoned; that the difcretion referred in the paper be- fore the houfe was taken .^way, and confequently, that my orders were rendered ab- folute in the ftritfleft fenfe by his cv/n alterations ? Let any gentleman who has fuppofed I had an implied latitude for my condu(fb, now compare this circumftance with the wording of the letter to Sir Guy Carleton, dated March 26, 1777, with a copy of which I was furniflied, and extrads from which were afterwards the only orders I hnd to aft upon. * I (hall take no particular .notice of what is called the faving claufe, in the latter part of the orders, except to give the flatteft: contradiction to the fuppofition that I didated it — a fuppofition that I know is not yet abandoned by the men who firft fug- gefted it. I have fpoke to it very fully upon a former occafion ;t and I do not wifli, when it can be avoided, to enforce or reiterate the charges of duplicity and treachcrv which mufl: enfue, if that claufe could be fuppofed to have reference to any conduct previous to my arrival at Albany. The circumftance of forbidding me the latitude in the two particulars I had propofed in my plan, and many other circumftances, clearly indicating the decided intentions and expeftations of the minifters, rendered tJie fenfe of the whole order taken together clear and diflinct, and fliewed that the claufe which is pretended to hav- left me a difcretion as to my main objcd, had no fort of relation to that objeft. That claufe evidently related not to my forcing my. way, or not forcing it, to Albany, the place of my deftination, but to fuch collateral and eventual operations as might be advifeable in the courfe of my march. It related to the making impreflion upon the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, in fuch manner as exigencies might require, and in my judgment might feem moft proper, previous to receiving orders from Sir William Howe, " of my junftion with whom I was never to lofe view." Notwithflanding there has been fo much difcufTion in debate and print upon the interpretation of abfolute orders, the committee, I am confident, will abfolve me, though, at the expencc of a few moments more, I fliould continue a lubjea; upon which the merit or blame of the future proceedings in great mcafure refts. I do not admit the poficion, that there can be no cafe in which an officer ading at a diftance is bound at every hazard to purfue orders, that appear abfolute and ihcifrve. B 2 It t The dcb-itc upon Mr. Vj ner'i nintlon, Mny iS, 1778; the fpccch was publiaicd. See'Nppcnc'.ix No. JV. P R E I A r C) 11 Y S P E i: C 1 1. It is cni> to conceive circumiKinres, \vhich miglit in.'liiV a ftatc in hazarding an army, for the fake of facilitatinf; great and dccifive objccLs. Cjcntleinen, converlant in military hiftory, will recoiled many examples of this principle: upon a former occafion, I ftatcd a Aippofed cafei"' and I now entreat have to add a real example of peremptory orders, which happened in the coiirle of my own icrvice. I have ever re- tained the impreflion, that the circiimftance I am going to relate, made upon my mind at the time-, and to thofe few who may (till think, that in any part of my conducl, I raflily rifked my peace, my interrft or my fame, to forwarti the wilhes of others, this prepofieflion may in fomc meafure account for, and excule my imprudence. In the campaign of 176:, in Portugal, the Count La Lippe, a name, which, if it finds a due hiftorian, will Hand among the firfl in military fame, was placed at the head of about 6000 Britifli troops, and a Portuguefe army, the greater part of which was little better than nominal, to defend an cxtenfive frontier againfl: the »vho]e force ot Spain, and a large body of the veteran trooj)s of France, 'l"he fa'vation of Por- tugal depended folely on the capacity of that great man, which united the deejeft political reafoning with exquifite military addrefs. I had the honour to be entruftcd with the defence of the mod important pafs upon the Tagus, and my orders were peremptory to maintain it againfl any numbers, and to the lall man. A feledl corps of tiie enemy, greatly fuperior to mine, were encamped within figliL on the other fide the river, and our advanced polls were within half mufquet fhot. In this fituation, I received intelligence from Count L,a Lippe, of a defign of the enemy to pafs the Tagus in force, about fix miles above mc, and to take poflelTion of the open country in my rear, wieh a large corps of cavalry, by which means all com- munication, fupply, or fafe retreat, would be cut ofi". Together with this intelligence, the Count's letter cxprcficd, " That every delay " to the enemy in getting poirelfion of the pafs I guarded, was fo material to his " other plans and operations, that it jufliified u deviation fromfyflematic rules; that, " therefore, after taking timely precautions to fecure the retreat of my cavalry, I " mull abide the confequence witii the inHtntry, that at the lafl: extremity, I mufl " abandon my cannon, camp, ficc. and with fuch provifion as the men Qould carry ■" The cafe niluded to was put in a former debate, as follows; fuppofe the Britilli army that invaded Britany in i7i;8, h.id j^air d r coniplttc victory over the Duke D'Aimiillon ; to have marched rapidly towards Pais, ahandoDin^^ tlie communicatian with the lieet, cxp fing the arn.y pollibly to great want of provifion a.'id to the impr;u'"tir.ibility of retreat, woi'lJ certainly have been a meafure confummately def- ptrate and unjuftlfi.ible, ir tried upon military fyftem : yet, will any man fay, that if that meafure mult evidently have produced fiuh alarm and coiifulion in the heart ot Fnmce, as to have compelled the recall of her whole force from Germany, or fuch part of ir, as would have given uncontrouied fcope to the armies under the King of I'rufiia and Prince l"erdii;:-.nd, that the ininiller of England would not have been judicious, though at the palpable rifk of the army, ;,s tar as laptuie was concerned, in ordering the jje- ntral to proceed by the moft vigcrous extrtiom^ and to forte liis way to I'.uis ^ " upon Ai f PREFATORY SPEECH, carding an converfant n a former example of ve ever rc- n my mind conducV, I )thers, this hich, if ic accd at the ' ' i rt of which i vhole force '! on of f or- % che dee jeft > orrant pafs ;{' ^ numbers. Within fighl *t fhot. ign of the )irefrion of s all corn- 1 very delay rial to his ! .lies J that. \ cavalry, I y, I mufl X )uld carry !■: that invaded :hed rapidly rreat want of i nmately del- 1 neafure muil sd the recall I'cope to the 3t have been :iing the };o- " upon their backs, throw myfelf into the mountains upon my lefr, and cndca- " voiir, by fmall and difperfed parties, to gain a rendezvous at the northern part " of the province." I mufl: obferve, that when thefe peremi)tory orders were given, the commander was at a diftancc that made all timt / communication of cir- ^ cumftances as impoflible, as if the Atlantic had been between us; and 1 cannot clnfe the example without mentioning the concluding part of Count Lz Lippe's letter. ^ " He participated," he faid, " in the feelings with which an officer wo^ild be ftruck « for his reputation, in differing himfcJf to be cut, and reduced to facrifice his camp, *' his baggage, and twenty pieces of cannon. But le at e^/e," continued that great and generous man, " / zvil/ take the meajurc entirely upon myfelf^ perfevere as I hare^ " clirefted, and be confident of my defence and proteHiion." 1 nis was a faving claufe of a -a nature very different from thole it is the praftice in the prefent day to p^n ; and if ' any man doubts tlie quotation, I can bring pofuive evidence to the truth of it ver- batim. Thus much. Sir, I thouglit it incumbent upon me to fl:ate In argument againft the pofition tiiat has been infilled upon, that no orders can be worded fo perempto- rily at a diftance, as not to admit of an implied latitude, in cafe of unforefeen and inlurmountable difficulties: but to prevent all future cavil, upon this fubjedV, I re- quefl the committee to recollect, what I have again and again repeated; that I by no means put my defence, in paffing the lludfon's River, folely upon this reafoning. On the contrary, fuppofing for the argument's lake, I fliould concede (v/Iii. i I never have done, nor mean to do) to the noble Lord, and to every other gentleman, all they can defire to alfume upon implied latitude in given cafes, I fliould equally prove that no fuch cafe did exifV, as would havejuflified me upon their own principle, in de-, parting from the letter of the orders under which I a(5led. Having thus cleared my way to the time of my leaving England, to take upoii me the command of tlie Northern expedition; I fliall now lay before the committee a narrative of its progrefs, in as concife and fimple terms, as the nature of the fubjecl will allow, endeavouring to imitate the perfpicuity of the honourable gentle- man who took the lead in this bufinefs, and not without hope of my endeavours pro- ducing the fame effcft; and that, in the opinion of the houfe, nv language, as has been expreffed of his, will be deemed the language of truth. N A R. upon NARRATIVE. NARRATIVE. NVR)i.\- 1^ is my intention, for the more ready comprcnenfion of the whole lubjeiSl:, toclivitle '^i^E. X, It into tliree periods. The firfb, from my appointment to the command, to the end of my purfuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga •, the ftcond, from that time to the pafllige of tlie Hudlbn's|jy/er ; and the third to the (igning the convention. I left London on the 27tlf of March, and upon my dcpartuie from Plymouth, finding the Albion man of war ready to fail for New-York, I wrote to Sir W. Howe by that conveyance, upon the fubject of my expedition, and the nature of my orders. I arrived at Quebec the 6th of M.iy. Sir Guy Carleton immediately put under my command the troops dcftined for the expedition, and committed to my management the preparatory arrangements. From thence I wrote a fecond letter to Sir William Howe, wherein I repeated that I was entrufted with the command of the army dellined to march from Canada, and that my orders were to force a jundion with his excellency. 1 exprelTed alfo my widies, " that a latitude had been left me for a divcrfion to- " wards Connefticut, but tliat iuch an idea being out of queftion, by my orders " being precife to force the jundlion, it was only mentioned to introduce the idea *' ftill reding upon my mind ; viz. to give the change to the enemy if I could, and " by every feint in my power to eftablifli a fufpicion, that I ftill pointed towards *' Connedicut." " But," I repeated, " that under the prefent precifion of my orders, I fhould really " have no view but that of joining him, nor think myfelf juftified by any tcmp- " tation to delay the moft expeditious means I could find to efFedl that purpofe." I proceeded to Montreal on the 12th, and as my letters, lately laid before the houfe * from that place,* and from Quebec, will fhew the (late of things, I (hould not reft a b-e^ pponcix r^Q,-pgpt upon this period, were it not to add one more public teftimony, to thofe I am not confcious of having omitted upon any occafion, of the affiduous and cordial manner in which the different fervices were forwarded by Sir Guy Carleton. I fliould think it as diflionourable to feek, as 1 know it would be impoiTible to find excufc for any fault of mine in any failure on the part of Sir Guy Carleton, or of any per- fons who aifled under him, in any matter refpedting the expedition. Had that officer been aCling for himfelf, or for his brother, he could not have fhewn more indefatigable zeal than he did, to comply with and expedite my requifitions and defires. Certain m T C. C Wl ni'. t. C(V CO- «f NARRATIVE. toclivit'.c d, to tlie ,t time to tion. lymouth, V. Howe ly orders, -inder my lagement William the army lion with L'rfion to- ny orders the idea uld, and towards d really y tcmp- pofe." \c houfe lot rell a lofe I am 1 cordial I mould d exculb any pcr- -lad that /n more ons and Certain Certain parts of the expelled force, neverthelefs, fell fliort. The Canadian t )j)s, dated in the plan at 2000, confilled only of three companies, intended to be 0. too men each, but in reality not amounting to more than 150 upon the whole-, nor cmkl ihey be augmented. The corvtcs , which are detachments of provincials witnor.'L arms, to repair roads, convey provifions, or any other temporary employ- mciirs ibr the Icing's fervice, could not be obtained in fufficient number, nor Uept to t.ieir employments, although Sir Guy Carleton ufed every polTible exertion and en- courrigc ment for the purpofe. Drivers for the provifion carts, and other carriages, coiikl not be fully ibpplied by the contratlor, thou«^o expence was fpared ; a circumllance which occafioned much inconvenience aftenrorUs. To I hefe unavoidable difappoinrments were added the difficulties occafioned by bad weariier, which rendered tiie roads almolt impradicable at the carrying places, and conlequencly thepalfage of the batteaux, artillery, and baggage exceedingly dilatory : we had bcfides a great deal of contrary wind. Notwithftandingall impediments the army alfembled between the 17th and 20th of June, at Cumberland Point, upon Lake Champlain. On the 2ifl: I held a conference with the Iroquois, Algonciiins, Abenekies, and Outawas, Indians, in all about four hundred. This conference appears in your papers*. Lthought at the time that the cordiality of the Indians over the whole continent might be depended upon, and their firft operations tended to perfuade me into a belief of their utility. The priefl' to v/lion'j they fecmed devoted, and the Britifli oflicers employed to conduct them, and to whofe controul they engaged to fubmir, gained advantages, and fpread terror without bar- barity. The firll party fent out made feveral of the enemy prifoners in t!ie heat of action, and treated them with European humanity. ■ During the movement of the different corps to this general rendezvous, I wrote z tliird letter to Sir William Howe. The chief purport of it was to give iiim " intelii- " gence of my fituation at the time, andof my expetlation of being beforcTicondcroiia " between the 20th and 25Lh inllant ; that I did not apprehend tlie effevftive (Irength '* of the army would amount to above 650D men ; tliat I meant to ajiply to Sir. " Guy Carleton to fend a garrifon to Ticonderoga v/hen it fliould be reduced, bur *' that I was apprehenfive he would not think himfelf authorifed by the King's orders " to comply-, that whenever, therefore, I might be able to eftedi; the junction. Sir *< William would not expeft me to bring near the original number. I repeated my " perfeverance in the idea of giving jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut, and at the " lame time my aflurances, that I fliould.make no manoeuvre that could procraftiaate " the great objeft of a junftion." I Hate thele different letters to Sir William Howe merely to fliev/ that my concep- tion of tlie precifion of my orders was not upon after-thouglit, and taken up as an excufe Sv'cAppfmlix No. VI. 8 N A U R A T I V E. Sf .'Apix'Hilix Nu. \ll. rscuic when I found the eNp':dition had failed ; but a fixed decided fentimciit coeval with my knowledge of my command. l-'oi- a furilier proof of the fame flift, I beg leave to ftate an cxtrafl from my orders to t.'ic army at Crown Point, Ju -30th. The words were thcfc. " Thcar;ny embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy. Tlie ferviccs required " of this particular expedition are critical and confpicuous. During our progrels oc- " cafions may occur, in which, nor difficulty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded. " This army muil not retreat." Were it nereflfary, I could bring abundant collateral proof to the fame elfeci, and fliew that the idea of forcing a way to Albany by vi- gorous exertions againd any oppofition we miglu meet, was general and fi\t through the whole army. My proceedings from the time of aflTembling the army as before defcribed, to the date of my public dil'patch from Skenefborough, comprehending the manccuvres which forced tiu- enemy from Ticondcroga, and the adions at Skenefborough, IIu- berton, and Fort Anne, are related at full in that difpatch.* It is tlielcfs ncceflary to give the Committee further trouble upon this fubjecV, be- caufe I believe no enemy can be found to arraign my conduct in tholl' days of fuc- cefs ; or if there were one, he could not deprive me of the confolation, that I had his Majelly's full approbation and applaufe, of which it is known to many, I had a very honourable and diftinguiflied proof. All ti.eref '•c that is necelTary before I quit thisfirfl period of the campaign, is to give a precile Itate of tlie efi'etlive fVrengthof the army, at the time it alTcmbk'd. On the ift July, the day we encamped before Ticonderoga, the troops confifted of Britilli rank and file German ditto Canadians and Provincials, about Indians about 3724 3016 6740 regulars, exclufiveof artillery-men. 250 - 400 650 In regard to the artillery, I think this the proper place to redlify the mifreprefenta- tions that have prevailed refpecling the quantity employed. It has been ftated as far beyond tlie necelTary proportion for the number of troops, an incumbrance to their mcvcments, and onecaufe of what lias been called the flow progrefs of 1 he expedition. In order to juftify this charge, a view of the whole mafs has been prcfented to the public without any explanation of its dillindl allotments ; and many have been led to believe, that the whole was attached to the army throughout the campaign, and J fell i1 ncnt coeval 1 my orders cs required M'ogrt'ls oc- e regarded, it collattr.d )any by vi- ixt throvu'h betl, to tlie nanc'iivres aiigh, I lu- ll bjecV, be- ays of fiic- it I had Ills had a very aign, is to rcniblc'd. ronfifted of llerv-men. ■eprefenta- ated as fixr :e to their xpedition. ited to the e been led aign, and fell NARRATIVE. fell into the enemy's hands at lafl — The intention of this rcprcfcntation is obvious: the allegation is falfe. The fads, as I fliall prove them to the committee, areas follow. The whole origi- nal train furniflied by Sir Guy Carleton confiftcd of fixteen heavy twenty-four poun- ders; ten heavy twelve-pounders j eight medium twelve-pounders ; two light twenty- four pounders i one light twelve-pounder; twenty-fix light fix pounders; I'cvcntcen light three-pounder';; fix eight-inch howitzers; fix five and a half inch howitzers; two thirteen-inch mortars ; two ten-inch mortars ; fix eight-inch mortars ; twelve five and a half inch mortars ; and twenty-four four and two fiCth-inch mortars. Of thelc t vo heavy twenty-four pounders were fent on board a fiiip for the defence of Lake Champlain, and the other fourteen were fent back to St. John's. Of tlie heavy twelve- pounders, fix were left atTiconderoga, four ditto in the Royal George ; four medium twelve-pounders at Fort George; one ligiit twelve-pounder at Ticonderoga; two light fix-pounders at Fort George; four light fix-pounders at St. John's-, four light three-pounders at Ticonderoga ; five light three-pounders at St. John's-, two eight • inch howitzers at Fort George ; two ditto at St. John's ; two five and a half inch ho- witzers at Fort George; two thirteen-inch mortars in the Royal George; two ten-inch mortars in ditto ; four eight-inch mortars in ditto; four five and a half inch mortars at Ticonderoga; four royal mortars in the Royal George; twelve cohorns at Ticon- deroga ; and eight cohorns in the Royal George. The field-train therefore that proceeded with the army confided of four medium. twelve-poundcis; two light twenty-four pounders ; eighteen light fix-pounders; fix light three-pounders; two eight-inch howitzers; four five and a half-inch howitzers; two eight-inch mortars, and four royals. The carrying the twenty-four pounders (though they were but two) has been fpoken of as an error, and it is necefllliry therefore to inform the committee that they were of a conftrudbion lighter by 800 weight than medium twelves, and to all intents and purpofes field artillery. This artillery was diflributed as follows. Frafer's corps, eflimated at three battalions. Ten pieces, viz. Four light fix-pounders. Four light three-pounders, conftruifted for being occafionally carried on horfeback. Two royal howitzers. German referve, under Colonel Breyman, eflimated at two battalions. Two light fix-pounders. Two light tiiree-pounders, and ferved by the Hefi:*e Hanau artillerymen. The line of Britifli, four battalions C Germans, \i> NARRATIVE. Germans, five battalions. Total, nine battalions. Thrfc brigades of artillery, of four fix-pounders each ; viz. one brigade for each ■wing, and one for the center. From hence it .appears that to fourteen battalions there were allotted twenty-fix pieces of light artillery. '^Ihecudomary allotment is two pieces per battalion, con- fequcntly the proportion of artillery was Icfs than upon common ferviccs. The forming artillery into brigades, in preferenccto detaching two guns to each bat- talion, has been confl^antly pratliled in mofl: fcrvices during lalb war under the ablell UK n, and it is produ^^ive of many advantages, as the brigades by that means, either lingly or united, fall under the command of a piaportionablc number of officers, riie fervlce is carried on with greater regularity, and the efieft of the fire becomes much more formidable than when fcattered along the front of the line. This mode of i'ervice was recominended by Major-general Phillips, and adopted without hefitation by me, my own judgment being confirmed by an officer of his great Ikill and experience. The park artillery confuted of ten pieces, viz. 2 light twenty-four pounders. 4 medium twelve-pounders. 2 eight -inch howitzers. 2 royai howitzers. I underftood this proportion of field artillery to be the fame as that propofed by Sir Guy Carleton had he commanded; it was the proportion recommended by General Phillips, and I formed my opinion conforniably to the fentiments of thole refpeftable ofiicers upon the following reafons, viz. that artillery was extremely for- midable to raw troops ; that in a country of ports it was eflentially necefliliry againll the beft troops; that it was yet more applicable to the enemy we were to combat, becaufe the mode of defence they invariably adopted, and at which they were be- yond all other nations expert, was that of entrenchment covered with ftrong abbatis, againft which the cannon, of the nature of the heaviefl: above defcribed, and howit- zers might often be effedlual, when to diflodge them by any other means might be attended with continued and important lofi^es. In thefe general ideas of the ufe of artillery againft the rebel forces, I have the happmefs to obferve, from the papers before you, the concurrence of Sir William Howe, who ftates fimilar ideas very fully in one of his requifitions to the fecretarv of ftate: buffurther reafons for not diminifhing the proportion of guns of fuperior calibre to fix-pounders in this train, were, firft, their ufe againft block-houfes (a fpecies of fortification peculiar to America) j fecondly, a probability that gun-boats might be requifite for the fecurity of the water tranfport, on fome parts of the 3 riudfor's NARRATIVE. Jlmlfon's River-, but principally the intention of fortifying a cair.p r.t /Albany, in cafe I fliould reach that place, fhoiild meet widi a fufBciency ofprovilion there, (as I was led to expcft) and fliuukl find It expedient to pafs the winter there, withour communication with New- York. With rtfpcd to the cjuantity of ammunition attached to this artillery, it is to bo obferved, tliat the number of rounds accompanyinc; the li^ht piec. s, and which were carried in llnall carts, were not more tlian I'ufHcient lor a day's a^ttion. Light fix-poundcrs — 1 24 rounds each. Light three-pounders — 300 rounds. Royal howitzers — 90 rounds. The dilTerent reftrves of ammunition were chiefly conveyed by watei in fcows and batteaux •, it certainly would not have been advifable, alter a comniunica- tion with Canatui was at an end, to depend upon precarious fupplies from the Ibutii- ward, and therefore it became ncccflary (as far as the fervice would allow) to carry forward fuch (lores, as there was every appearance of an abfolute want of, during the courfe of an adtive campaign. Had the enemy eftablifhed themfelves in force upon the iflands at the mouth of the Mohawk river, or on other ground equally advantageous, to have difputed the paflfage of that, or of the Hudfon's River, or had they even waited an aflault in their works at Still- Water, it is probable, that recourfe muft have been had to artillery of the heavier nature -, in the latter cafe efpecially they mufl: have been ufed in order to derive any advantage from our feizing a pod upon their left flank : I have fince known, that they had iron twelve and nine-pounders mounted upon thofe works, which were in other refpeds very formidable. The Britifli artillery-men, rank and file, were — — 24.1^ Recruits, under command of Lieutenant Nutt, of the 33d regiment, at- tached to the fervice of the artillery — J -Q Hefilan artillery-men, rank and file -— — 73 II /.J Add thefe numbers to the former ftate of the army, and it will be found, that the regular ftrengthwhen at the greatefl: confided of 7213. I come now to the fecond period of the campaign, comprehending the tranfadions from the time the purfuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga ceafed, and the corps of Brigadier-general Frafer, and the 9th regiment, rejoined the army, after ti)e refpec- tive aflioiis of Huberton and Fort Anne, to the time when the army pafledthe Hud- fon's river to attack the enemy near Still-Water. It had proved impofiible immediately to follow the quick retreat of the enemy farther, from the nature of the country, and the necefllty of waiting a frelh fupply of N A R U A r I V F. of proviflnn",. IhsL it appeared evident to inc, that could a r.ij)id progrcfs towards Albany be cni'i^ed, during their dilpcrliun and panic, it would be decifive on the ilicccfs of the expedition. QMedion has been made by thole wIjo began at this period to arraign iny military contlu-^t, wiiether it would not have been more expedient for the purpofc of rapidity, to have fallen back to Ticonderopa, in order to take the convenient route by Lake George, than to have perfevcrcd in the laborious ami diiricult courfe by land to I'ort I'tlwartl ? My motives for preferring the latter were thefe : I confidered not only the general imprelHons which a retrograde notion is apt to make upon the minds both of enemies and friends, but alia, that the natural conduifL of the enemy in that cafe would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not then be cut off, in order to oblige me to open trenches, and confequcntly to delay me, and ia the mean time they would have dcflroyed the road from Fort Gtorge to Fort Fd- ward. On the other haml, by perfilling to penetrate by the fliort cut from Fore Anne, of which I was then mailer, to Fort Fdward, thougli it was attended witli great labour, and many alert fituations, the troops were improved in the very efl'en- tial point of wood fervice; I efleclually diflodgetl the enemy from Fort George v/ithout a blow J and feeing me mafler of one communication, they did not think it worth while to deftroy the other. The great number of boats alio, which mufl: neceffarily have been employed for the tranfport of the troops over Lake George, were by this courfe iparcd for the tranfport of the provifion, artillery, and ammunition. The fuccefs anfwered this reafoning in every point ; for by the vigilance of Gene- neral Phillips, to whom I had committed the important part of forwarding all thene- ccflfaries from Ticonderoga, a great en^barkation arrived at Fort George on July 29th. I took pofTeffion of the country near Fort Isdward on the fame day, and independently of other adrantages, I found myfelf much more forward in point of time than I could pofTibly have been by the other route. Another material motive, which could not be known by flrangers who have rea- foned upon this movement, was, that during the time that my army was employed in clearing Wood-Creek and cutting roads, and the corps under Major-general Phillips working to pafs the tranfports over Lake George, I was enabled to detach a large corps to my left^ under Major-general ReidefeJ, and thereby affill my pur- pole of giving jealoufy to Connefticut, and keeping in check the whole country called the Hampfliire Grants. It was at this time Major-general Reidefel conceived the purpofe of mounting his regiment of dragoons. In t!ie country he traverfed during his detached command, he found the people frightened and lubmiflive. He was induftrious and expert in procuring NARRATIVE. >3 t>roct.irlng intelligence in parrs of the country more remote th.in Bennington, ami entertained no iloubt of fucccfs, were an expedition formed under the coirini;uul of Lirutcn.int cohincl Raum. On thcan-ival of the army at Fort F.ilvvard, the great obied of attention was tho traiifports from Fort George. The dillancc was about fixteen miles, the roads wantinff great repair, the weather unfavourable> tlie cattle and carriages fcarcc . part of the latter inconvenience was occafioned by the number of lioth that were iieccfTarily detained at Tieonderoga, for the purpole of dragging the boats and the provifions over the i-arrying places, between Lake Champlain and Lake George j another part of the inconvenience was caufed by the unavoidable delays, in bringing the diflerent divifions of horfes as they were collefled in Canada through the defart, for fuch moft of the country is between St. Joiui's and Ticondcroga. It was foon found, that in the fituation of the tranfport fcrvice at tliat time, the army could barely be viiitualled from day to day, and that there was no prolpecl of cflabliHiing a magazine in due time for purfuing prefent advantages. '1 b.e iiiea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this ilifHculty, combined with the in- telligence reported by General Reidefel, and with all I had otherwlfe received. I knew that Bennington was the great dcpofit of corn, Hour, antl (lore cattle; that it was guarded only by militia-, ami every day's account tended to confu-m the pcrfuafion of the loyalty of one defcription of tiie inhabitants and the panic of the other. Thofe who knew the country bell were the 'iioft fanguine in this pcr- fuafion. ria'd my intelligence been worfe founded, I fliould not have hefitatcd to try this ex- pedition with fuch troops, and under fuch indrudlions as I gave to the commanding officer, for fo great a purpofe as that of a fupply fufficient to enable the army to follow at the heels of a broken and difconcerted enemy. Tke German troops employed were of the bed I had of that nation. The number of Britifli was fmall; but it was the I'eleft light corps of the army, compofcd of chofen men from all the regiments, and commanded by Captain Frafer, one of the moll dillinguiflied olHcers in his line of fer- vicethat ever! met with. The inllrudlions recommended theutmoil caution refpc^^l- ing polls and fccurity of retreat, attention againfl: expofing the I'olid part of the detacli- ment to affront, or committing it in any inllancc, without a moral certainty of fuccefs. I touch with tendernefs and with great reluitance points that relate to the dead. Aly defence compels me to fay, my cautions were not obferved, nor the reinforcement ad- vanced with the alacrity I had a right to expert. l"he men v.'ho commanded in both Inftances were brave and experienced otficers. I have ever imputed their failure partly to delufion in refpeCl to the enemy, and partly to furprife and confequent confufion in the troops. For fuithd' explanation of my motives, and the clrcuraftances attending the con- ti duel •4 S'C \p,<"ivliT No. \ l[I. N A R K A r I y r.. • ilikl oftlK' cvjK' I'ltlon, I hcr^ leave to refer the committee to the Utter laid l)efi)rc the hoiilir l.id yc.ir, .iiul hidio particularly to the private letter laid before tlie lioiile lately." The I, line letter will ijnw th'.- only refoiirce that remaiiieil for proceeilmp; towanls Albaiiy, iifter th'-- clifappoiiinninr of this expedition, viz. to prefs forward a necellary ltij''ply of provifioii, and otiier in'lifpeiillhlc artiiles, from l-'ort (ieori',e. I lliall bring proof to your bar to this point, :iiid I trull I Ihall Ilicw beyoni! ailuul)t, that no p>>l- lUile exertion was omitrcd. It is not uneommon for (gentlemen, unaic|uainted with the peculiarities of the country to which I am alhuling, to calculate the tranlport of nngazinis, by mealiirini"; the dillance upon a map, and thei. applying.; the relburcesof carria^^e, as pradilcd in other countries. I rcnuell pcrmillion to fliew their millake. The lirlt ltat!;e ftom I-'ort (icor<;e to I'ort I'llvvard is by land. 'I'he dillaiueand tlie roails were defcril)ed before. At h'ort L'",ilwaril the lluillbn's River becomes navigable for a certain extent, and it is the conllant pradice in all tranfports to rcfiime tlie watt r carri.i[^e. Were it not, new impediments wouKl arile from hills, worft- roatis, and liich an incrcafed dillance, as would prevent the cittle returning to I'ort George the fame day. About fix miles below I-'ort ]'"dward lie the falls of Fort Miller, where there is another carrying-jilace, whicli, though of no confiderable length, makes it necedary to unload the boats, to place the contents in carts, and to replace tlieni in frcHi boats, at the place the river again admits of navigation. The boats unlo.ided, return to I'ort Fdwaril againll a rapid ilream. Upon this fliort ilate of fa(fts, gentlemen /ill judge of our cmbarrafl'ments. In the Hrll place,- it ..as necellary to bring (or rd to Fort Edvvanl fourlcore or a hun- dred boats, as mere carrLige-velfels for the ^ '.ovifions, each boat made a hard day's work for fix or more horfes, including the return of the Iwrfes. At the next carry- ing-place, as above deicribed, it was neceflary to place a confiderable relay of horfes to draw over, Hrll, a portion of carriage boats, and afterwards the provifion, as ic arrived. I have not mentioned the great number of other boats necelFary to be brought forward, to form bridges, to carry baggage and ammunition, and the num- ber of carriages framed to tranlport the boats themfelves at the enfuing carrying- places, as we fhould proceed to Albany. This will be fliewn in detail at the bar, if the committee chufe to hear it; and I pledge myfelf, it will appear, that the dili- gence in this fcrvice was extreme; that it was performed in the molt expeditious manner poflible, regard being had to our refources, and that no dehiy was occafioned by the artillery, becaufe the horfes appropriated to it were fupernumerary to thofefor which we had carts, and the artillery, not already with the army, at laft was all brought up by its own horfes in two days. On the 13th of September, the flore of provifion, amounting to about thirty day's confumption, was completed. I have dated, in my letter to the fecretary of ftate, my reafons .igainft proceeding with Icfs quantity. And it is now time to enter upon th« the confide executive p Two err( are fiippofei delay, the efiurt at Be Hated, afier my private tliin!';s at th at large in 1 one hand, 1 was coHclIc from Fort On the oth and more and eager 1 lowe reiiK upon my 11 'J the fecretai ration, coul turn to my I thougiir, ;i Clinton wa: not know Si might be tl tion from b fon, was to time to afiiil copioully (h believe for : And I an pearances, i faved me fn own breaft, I will cor to fupjiort I live, that n ported, nor the Hudfon I 4 N \ R R A 1' 1 V I'. the confidcr.ition of that objtifl, which is htUI l)v fomc to be conclulivc u[u)n the executive part of tlic camp :iit!;n, rhf palTagc ot tlie 1 Imhon's River. Two errors, rflj)etfliiii^ this paira;',e, thoiij^h ofoppolitc aiul iiH'()tn[)atihlc natures, are liijipollil ro have: coiiuibuteil to the ill luccefb ih.it en fiieci \ tlic one, the error of cleliiy, the other, th.it of preripitati )n. In ilcfcnre af;ain(l the firll, I refer to n\y L'flbrt at Hennin[';ton to procure lupphes, ami to the impediments, I have jiiil no// ilated, after that etlbrt failed. Againll the latter, I refer to the realbns laid ilown in my private letter to the lecrctary ol' (hue, dated 2oth of Augulh * The (late of thins^s at this important crifis, and my realbninji; upon it, are expren'eil Hill more at large in my difpatch from Albany •, I will now only touch them fliortly. On the one hand, my communications were at an end ; my retreat was infecure ; the enemy was colkvled in force-, they were Urongly ported ; Colonel St. Leger was retiring from b'ort Stanwix. 'I'lufe were diUlcultics, but none of them inlurmountable. On the other hand, 1 had dillotlged the enemy repeatedly, when before in fuice, and more (lron[ny polletl ; my army was confcious of having the fuperiority, and eager to advance; I expedled co-operation} no letters from Sir William llowc removed that expedlation ; that to Sir Guy Carleton had never weiglied upon my mind, becaufe it was dated early in April, and conlecjucntly long before the fecretary of date's inllrutftions, wiiich I mull have fuppofed to relate to co-ope- ration, could be receivcil. The lei r of 17th July,* mentioned that General's re- turn to my alliltance, rtiouUl Wallii ton turn his force towards me; intlicated, as I thougiit, an expe*ltation of my arri at Albany •, and informed me, that Sir Henry Clinton was left at New-York, and would adt as occurrences might direift. I tlicl »o/ know Sir Henry Clinton's force. I diii know, that confiderable reinforcement miglit be then expedled at New- York from England. After all, fliould co-opera- tion from below fail, the whole force of Colonel St. Leger, and Sir \\'illiam John- fon, was to be expcfted from above, in time to facilitate a retreat, though not in time toaOllt my ailvancc. Under thefe different fuggeflions, and tiiofe that are more copioully dated in the difpatch, to which I have referred, I read again my orders (I believe for an hundredth time) and I was decided. And I am dill convinced, that no proof that could have been brought from ap- pearances, intelligence or reafoning, could have julliried me to my country, have favcd me from the condemnation of my profelTion, or produced pardon within my own bread, had I not advanced, and tried a battle with the enemy. I will conclude this fubjedl, with again aflcrting upon my honour, wliat I hope to fupport by evidence, though it is impolTible to bring pofitive proof to a nega- tive, that neither General Frafer, nor General Phillips, ever offered, as has been re- ported, nor can be fuppofed to have conceived any objeiStion againd the paffjge of the Hudfon's River. This »5 No. IX. No. X. fl K A R R A T I V E. This rciolutio!! being taken, I tniR-, tlie m;inner of approaching the enemy, ulicn cxphxincd by w itnclits, will not be dirgiMccful to me as a Ibklicr. The aftion, wh'.c'i tnlued on the 19th of September, verified my opinion of the valour of my army; aiid I mull, in truth, acknowledge, a very relpeiilable fliare of diat c]uality in the army of the enemy. I'o the general defcription given in my difpatch, it will be fie to add, by evidence, the peculiar merits of the troops in that adion. The iio- nour of tiuee Britifn regiments, in continual and clofe fire for four hours, all of them i'uffering confiderable lofs, and one remaining with lefs than fixty men, and four or five oincers, ought not to loic its due appkiufe, becaufe it is faid, their opponents were irregulars and militia. A viclory was at hill obtained, but the clofe of day unavoidably prevented any immedi'ite advantages. On the day following, it was known from prilbners and de- Icrters, that the enemy were in a poll llrongly fortified ; but from the thicknef^ of the wood, it was impollible to catch a view of any part of their pofition. All tiiat could be done, therefore, was to take up ground as near them, as the nature of the country would admit with regard to military arrangement. It appears from tiie dil- patch already alluded to, that tlie .arir.y remained in this pofition till the 9th of Odlo- ber, when the feeond action enfued, employed in fortifying their camp, and watch- ing the enemy, whole numbers it was now known, had been greatly fuperior to ours in the action. Ic rnay here be aficed, why, as foon as it became palpable that no ufe could be made of the vidlory, I did not retreat ? It will be fliewn, that on the fecojid day after the aiflion, I received intelligence from Sir Henry Clinton, of his intention to attack the highlands about that time, and I was hourly in expeelation, I thought a juftly founded one, of thatmeafure operating to difiodge Mr. Gates entirely, or to oblige him to detacii a large portion of his force. I'.ithcr of thefe cafes would probably have opened my way to Albany. In thefe circumilances, could the preference upon thefe alternatives admit of .i mo- ment's refie^lion ? To wait fo fair a profpe^ll of effefting at lad the great purpofc of the campaign, or to put a vidorious army, under all the difadvantagts of a beat- en one, by a difficult and difgraceful retreat; relinquilbing the long cxpedled co- operation, in the very hour of its promife, and leaving Sir Henry Clinton's army, and probably Sir William Howe's, expofed, with fo much of the feafon of the cam- paign to run, to the whole force of Mr. Gates, after he Ihould have feen me on the other fide of Hudfon's Kiver. Some of the (i\me confiderations, and other concomitant circumdances, will, in parr, ferve to account for my not attacking the enemy during this interval ; for in this fituationj as in former ones, my coadud has been arraigned upon oppofite princijilcs. The NARRATIVE. ^7 enemy, wheii aftion, wliit'i. of my army ; quality iu the :h, it will be jn. The iio- rs, all of tlicm 1, and four or cir opponents prevented any "oners and dc- le thicknefi of ion. All that nature of tlie 1 from the dil- 2 9th of Odo- p, and watch- perior to ours ufe could be d intelliG-ence lit that time, that mcafure large portion ly to Albany. mit of ,\ mo- reat purpofc jts of a be.it- cxpe(5led co- nton's army, 1 of the cam- n mc on the ces, will, in 1 ; for in this :e princijiles. The it. The committee will obferve, that after receiving intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton's defign, different meningers were difpatched by different routes, to inform that officer of my fituationj and of the time I thought I could continue in it. To have hazarded arepulfe, under fo reafonable an expectation of a powerful diverfion, would, in my opinion, have been very unjuilitiable ; but when 1 add, that from the backwardncfs, or defection, of tlie few Indians that remained, the numbers of ride-men, and other irregulars employed on the enemy's out-pofts, and the Itrength and darknels of the furrounding woods, it had not yet been prafticablc to gain any competent knowledge of their pofition, I truft every man will go with me in the fentiment, ihat all theic circumftances confidered, an attack would have been confummate rafiincfs. Another very pov;erfui rcafon, that operated on the fide of delay, was the ftate of my fick and wounded. Numbers of tiie la'.ter were recovering fait ; many excellent officers in particular ; and the more I delayed the (tronger I grew. The time alfo en- titled mc to cxpe6t Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger'r corps would be arrived at Ticon- deroga, and fecret means had been long concerted to enable him to make an effort ts join me, with probability of fuccefs. Upon mature confideration of thefe and other circumftances attending this period, come to my knowledge fince, I am clearly of opinion, that had the reinforcements from England arrived in time, to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have effcded the ilrokc he afterwards fo gallantly made in the highlands,, any time between the two adtions, I fliould have made my way. The diipatch alluded to, proceeds to ftate the reafon that induced mc to make the movement on the 7th Ocflober. 1 fliall only add, to obviate a fuppofcd error, in not advancing my whole line, that the part remaining in my camp, operated as effectually to keep the enemy's right wing in check, from fupporting their left, as if it had moved, with this additional advantage, that it pre/entcd the danger of their ad- vancing by the plain, near the river, and falling upon my rear. I have reafon to believe my difappointment on liiat day proceeded from an uncom- mon circumltance in the conduCtof the enemy. Mr. Gates, as I have been informed, had determined to receive the attack in his lines •, Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, forfecing the danger of being turned, advanced without confultation with his ge- neral, and gave, inftead of receiving battle. The ftroke might h?ve been fatal on his part had he failed. But conlident I am, upon minute examination of the ground fince, that had the other idea been purfued, I fliould in a few hours have j^ained a po- fu'')n, that in fpite of the enemy's numbers, would have put them In my power. Difagreeable as is the ncceffity, I muft here again, in juftice to my own army, recur to tiie vigour and obftinacy with which they were fought by the enemy. A more deter- mined pcrfeverancc than they fliewed in the attack upon the lines, though they were D. f\nal!v 18 N A R n A T I V F/ finally rejnillal by the corps under Lord Balcarr.iS, I believe, is not in nny o/Jiccr'a cxpeiicnce. It will be the buliiiers of cviucnce to prove, that in the part, where Co- lonel Brcym;m was killcil, and the enemy penetrated, the niirduef could not be re- paired, nor under it the camp be longer tenable. The tranfi',i5Vions of thecniliing n!(?;lit, the day of the ciglith, and the whole progrefs of the retreat lo Saratoga, will be laid before the committee minutely in the courleof my evidence, as well as every circunillanco, from the time the army arriv'cd there to the figning the convention. 1 ha\e only to premife, that, I trufl, I fliall be able to prove, to the fatisfa(5i:ion of the committee, that even in this fituation, I had the chance of a f ivourable e\'cnt. The enemy had intended to attack by the plain of Saratoga. On the morning of the iirh, a conHderable column had aftually paflcd tiie Filh Kill foP 'thax purpofe during the fog, which at that feafon was regular till fomctime after fun rife. The intention was prevented taking place, by intelligence one of their generals 'received from a deferter, that I had a line formed behind the brufh-wood, to fupport the pod of artillery, which was their immediate objedt of attack. The general in- flantly 'etrcated his column, and prevented a general aftion, which my pofition, com- pared witli the propofed one of the enemy, gave me reafon to hope would have been to my advantage. I have likewiie a fatisfad:ory confidence, that I fliall demonftrate that the intelligence I flated to the councils of war, refpefting the ftrengch of the enemy, did not fall Ihorc in any part, and in fome parts much exceeded my own belief, particularly on the only poHible routes of my retreat; and that thole pods were not taken up during my flay at Sarato"-a, as lias been reported, but fome of them previous to the adlion of the 7th, and the refl immediately after it. I Ihall clofe the whole of this by delivering at your table, from the hands of my fecre- tary, an authenticated return of the force of General Gates, figned by himfelf, and the truth of it will be fupported from ocular teftimony, by every ofBcer of the Britifli army. Many of them are now in England, and after what has been infinuated, not to fiy charged in this Houfe, it becomes the duty of the accufers, not only to examine clofely the officers I have called, but to produce any other witneffes, that in their thoughts may be qualified to fpeak to tiie good or bad order of the rebel troops, when they marched by in their prefencc, and to their behaviour, when oppofed to out troops in aftion. I cannot clofe this long trefpafs upon the patience of the committee, without ex- prefTing one humble hope, that in forming a judgment upon the whole, or any diftinfl part of ihefc tranfaftions, they will be confidered as they mufl have appeared at the time J for, I believe, where war is concerned, few men in comaiand would ftand ac- quittedj 1 I I ]W Ui any O/Ticcr'a :, wlic'ic Co- J not be rc- lole prf\grers :he courlcot" there to the )le to prove, chance of a atoga. On ilh Kill i'oe le after fun leir generals to fupporC general in- rition, com- ave been to NARRATIVE. quitted, 'f any after-knowledge of fa(fls and circumftances were brought in aro-ument againft decifions of the moment, and apparent exigencies of tlic occ; fion. I fubmit all I have laid, feme of ir, I fear, not fufficiently prepared or arranged, with true refpei5l to tiie committee. 1 fhall not mention all the difadvantao-es, under which I have preiTed this bufincfs upon tlieir attention. I have caufe to rctrret the .ab- f^nce of a mod confidential friend in Major General Phillips ; zealous advocates, I trull, in Major General Reidefel and Brigadier Hamilton. Much of my vindication is in the grave with General Frafer; much with Colonel Ackland your late member. I truft my :eal, in promoting this enquiry, as I have done, will be one mark of tlu; fenfe I bear of the general charafter of this houfe ; thai however men may be biaflld by political attachments upon common occafions, when the iionour of an individual is committed to their hands, they will alone be guided by truth and jullice. And the nexc inference I fhould wilh to be drawn, from my earneHinefs for a public appeal, is this ; that however others may impute errors to my conduct, I am myfelf confcious of diC: rectitude of my intentions. intelligence >t fall fhorc 3n the only ig my flay ion of the F my fecre- If, and the he Britidi , not to lay ine clofely thoughts vhen they troops in chout ex- y diftinfl ed at the Hand ac- quitted), D ^ EVI. EVIDENCE. yovis 20' die Maij, 1779. Committee io confulcr of the IVvcul P;ipcrs which were prcfcntcd to tlic Houfc by Mr. Dc Grey, upon the 19th Day of March hift, purfuniit to their Addrcfs to his Mnjclly. Mr. I*". M()nt;ip;vi in the Ch:\ii-. Sir Guy Cahi.f.tosi was calleil in and cxainineil by General Burgoync as follows : I. Q^ T^^^ y*^^' recolloet havin;^ nccivcxl a letter iVom tlie fccretary of Hate, nicntion- \^ ing the lealons that made it expedient for yovi to remain in the province ot Qnebee ? A. Yes, verv well. 8. Q.. Wiuit was the date of it ? A." I think the rith of Augull, 1776 — I am fore it was in Aiigufl. 7i' 0:. ^^ iis "ot the Jate of that letter lon. A. I rcmcmbcT my aniwcr was an anlwcr ot approhatio-i. CX Do you know of any circumllancc of (uncral Hurgoync's military conduit, i i, while luulcr your commaml, that you dilapprovcd ? A. I had no rcalon to di('ai)provc of any part of his contkiLl while under my oiii- niand. [UaUnx'. yfgain called in, and examined by other Members I'f the Committee. f;^ Whether, when you propofed to take that train of artillery witli you that you ••'• have mentioned, it was with a view to the retlut'lion of the forts at Ticonderoga ; or whether you propofed to have taken with you the fame train of arlillery in cale y(ju had marched foiwanl in die country towaril /Mbaiiy ? A. It was with an intention to reiluce the forts and lines at Ticonderoga -, the train of artillery was calculated for that fervice. (^ Whether you know what proportion of artillery was carried forward by the ar- m,. ?•/ CJen, biiig- operations a copy of tL-rms, bu" i 15. my luidcr Cieneral IJurgoync's coinmanti after the reiluction ol I iconder n ? A. I don't lecolled. (^ Would you not, in cafe you had reduced 'I'iconderoga and marched forwards 14 towards Albany, have carried with you a train of field aitillery ? A. I probably Ihould have taken artillery with me. Q^ Had you forcfecn a necefllty of fortifying a camp at Albany, would you not have carried fome guns of tlic calibre of twelve pounders and light twenty-fours ? A. It is really a very dillicult matter off hand to run into all the minute operations of a campaign •, every meai'ure of that fort mud have been a matter of conlideration and deliberation, and there are a thoufand circumrtances that might have determined me upon the fpot — I don't wiOi to conceal from this lloule any thing that 1 would luive done — but I hope they will confider, that every gentleman may have dincrciit ideas of the (late and fituation of the army, as cxprefled by the tpielVion afl-icd, and the leail inaccviracy of exprcdion on my part may convey ideas very different from wjiat: 1 could wifli — In general, lo confid'rable a corps as that was, very feKlom moves without artillery, but the prccife number inull depend on a variety of (ircumllanecs, which thedifcretion and judgment of the officer who commands mu(t determine. Q. \\'ere not the orders you received from government pofitlve, for General Bur- goync to march to Albany ? A. The orders have been piiblilhed I underftand — I.'. very gentleman in tliis Ilrjufe mult be a judge of thofe orders whether they were pofiiive or not. Q^. Did you not receive a letter, dated the 5th of April, from Sir William Ilowe, informing you that he could not lend any fore to alfid the op: rations of (iener.d Jkirgoynt's army ? A. 1 received a letter from Sir William I lowe relative to iii which was fent to General Uuri^oyne — I think it was not juil in tiu. ropy of th.e letter is on the tabl:-. oync. 16, / • ^^WheJ.cr 22 EVIDENCE. [Sir G. Carlcton. 18. 20. 22. 23. 24. 25- 2b, 23. Q^ Whether on that information, you cii'.fiilercd that you had any dircrctionary power to detain General L'urgoync nficr ih.ic information ? A. CciTLiinly nor. Qj_ \\ hcihcr in cafe o{ anv dilliciiky that General FiUrgovnc might meet with on his march, thcie ^vas any latitude given to him (General Burgoyne) to retreat ? A. I faid before, that the orders were before the Houfe, who arc competent to judge on that point. Q^Did \'ou yourfelf underftand thofc orders tc General Burgoync to be pofitive ? A. 'Ihat is giving an opinion upon what perhaps may be a quefJion in the I loufc ; whereas I have already faid, thj iloufe are as competent tu judge as I am. Q^ Is the Committee to undcrftand from that anfwer, that you have any objection of giving your opinion on that (]ueftion ? A. I have an objedlion to give an opinion on ahnofl all points. Q^ Did you give it in orders to General Burgoyne, ip cafe he met with any diffi- culties during his march in Canada, under your command, not to proceed ? A. I fhould have taken care that General Burgoyne met with no difficulties in his march in Canada ; nor do I well fee how he could. Q^ Where do the boundaries of the province of Canada end ? A. Between the Illinois and Point au Fer. Q^ Is the fortrefs of Ticonderoga in Canada ? A. No. Q. Did your commiffion, as commander in chief of the troops in the northern divifion, extend beyond the boundaries of Canada to Ticonderoga ? A. That commiflion as commander in chief, I underflood, did extend fo far ; hut by the orders already alluded to, or by thofe which General Burgoyne brought out: in the fpring 1777, I underftood that my command was retrained to the limits of the jnovince, and that General Burgoync was entirely from under my command, as foon as he pafled the limits of the province. Q;^ Did you apply to the fecrctary of flate for a reinforcement of 4000 men, as neceffary for the campaign of 1777 ? A. I recolletl: when General Burgoyne was coming home in the fall of 1776, as I was perfctc's Jlrnt/di'rs ? A. I had no particular meaning ; they are words I fliould have ufed on any expedi- tion of importance. Q^If General Burgoyne had met with very confiderable difficulties to impede his ^t. progrcfs within the province of Canat.la, would you have thought yourlelf juftili- able in giving any orders to General Burgoyne, different from thofe tranfmicted to General P)urgoyne, through you, from the fecretary of flate ? A. Had there been any difficulties m Canada, I would not have given him up the command, Q^ Having given up the command to General Burgoyne, and having ordered all jz, the troops to obey him, only re[iorting their proceedings to you, would you after that, have thought yourfelf jufliliable to change the order to General Burgoyne, upon his meeting with great difficulties on the frontiers of the neighbouring pro- vinces ? A. I really did not mean to evade the queflion in the lead. It did not appear to mc poffible that there could be any difficulties. I don't mean to fay there could not, from the nature of the country, be difficulties in the march that might occafion delay, but by the nature of the queftion I underllood dilhcultics from the enemy. In that cafe I fliould not have thought myfelf juftifiable in giving up the command. Q^If you had heard, that on the frontiers, and within the province of Canada, 3^. there was the greateft reafon to think, that the refiflance of General Burgoyne's army was fo great as to make it, in your opinion, exceedingly difficult for that General to force his' way to Albany, would you think yourfclf jullifiable in giving different or- ders to General Burgoyne, from thofe given by the fecretary of flate ; or would you have thought the fecretary of Hate's orders for General Burgoyne's army fo peremp- tory that it would not be proper for you to interfere ? A. If I underftood the (piellion as it now (lands, it is what 1 would have done, had the province been invaded, or clofe orij^llLpoint of being invaded, and the enemy entering the province. ^B* ' Q^ The queition does not mean an inviming army, but a refiftance from the enemy 34. to the progrcfs of General Burgoyne's army, in the cafe flated in the lalt quef tion ? A. In «v E V I D r. N C E. f Sit G. Cailctoit. A. In that I'.ifi', (I'.u :rn ciu'iny IIkhiUI lio ftuiiul (wiiliin (Iio limits of my com- l>i;i!ul^ I IliiniKl luive orilcn-d nil the ti(j(>i>s (Iclliiicil (or tlu- lidciKX' ol the proviiK-f, '.(» ha\o iiuiiu'iliati-ly ioincil tlidto dclVuK-il lor (lonoral Hiirgoyno, ami have rcalllim- n\ the i(iiuni;'.iul ot" all, uiiiil thofc oblliiK^iioiis had liccii loniovcd, within the limits (if m\' ;uiih(Mit\-. «r. (^ SiipporL- no I'ncmv wiiliin ilu* iirovincc of Canada, Init polled in fvich a manner upon the lino ol communication with Albany, as to make it cxccfiling diilicult for Gonoial r)m'i';oviu' to ohc\' the orders r;iven to him, would ycKi think yomiell juili- liablo in i!,iviiig dillcrenr ordois to (Kiicial lUiigoyno, irom thole given by ihc fo- iTet.uv of date ; or would, you have thouo;hi the fceretary of Hate's orders for (fcner.d Hur^ovnc's army To peremptory time it woulil not be proper for you to interfere ? A. 1 eoulil not change Cjeneral Hurp;oyne's orders one little, that was my opinion ; he received his orders from the lame innver that gave me niv a'.iihority ; when once he palled the limits of my command, 1 neither could give liim orders, nor would he be jullitieil in obe\ ing them. 36. Q^ Do you mean the latter part of that anfwer as an anAver to a (picllion wliich fuppofes General Rurgoyne within the litnits of the province of Canaila ? A. No : while he was within the limits of the province o\' Canada, I would have given General liurgovne »)rders in all cafes of dillkultv and tlanger, Ther* being no fuch cafe when (ieneral Hurgoyne arrived in Canaila, in 1777, nor a pof- fibility of an event of that fort, I pvit the troops and all things under his com- mand, which coiucrncd his expedition, that he might arrange and combine their motions according to his own plan (^f o|K"ration for the cam|iaign, that no time might be loll by any uniiccellhry applications to nie, which the Ibict forms of my command n^.ight otheiuife reciuire, [JVithdrczc. J^ain called i;i. .•> / Q. Shovild you, if vou had been in (ieneral Uurgoync's fituation, and acling un- der the orders which vou know ho received, have thought )Ourfelf bountl to purine tl'.cin iniplicitlv, or at libeity to deviate from them ? A. 1 riu)Uid certainlv have thought mvielf bound to have obeyed them to the ut- moll oi tnv pou or ; but, to fav as a military man, thy': in all cafes jiolllble, I niiill li.i.e gone ou. is a verv nice thing to fay indeed ; it mull have thrown me, and I lnpp..>'e every oilicor, into a moll uiiplcalaii: ami anxious fituation, to have de- bilcd within hiinl'oli, whotlior he was or uas not to }';o on. Every man mull dcc'dc tor liin-.'t'ir. V\ hat 1 would have done, I really tlon'i know ; the particular iituation, .\:\d A nnin's ov, n pavticular feelings, mult determine the point. If I might bo indul- ged. I would beg k"avc to fiv, that T ilid not mean to evavle any qucnivin ; I meant to anfwer diiccllv ; vet queltions mav bo put to me, of !>. deliearo a natiue, and perhaps no man in the world is in a more delicate fituation, with rrfpe<^l to the prefcnt cale in i^uelbon, and the bufinefs of this Committee, than 1 am ; when fuch quclVions are put to me, I ;ha!! pra\- the indu!i;cnce of the Committee, tobcexcufcd anfwcring ^ thcui G. Carlctoit. of my com- hc proviiuo, avc rcaH'iim- , within tlic ch a manner ; di Hi cult (or our If 11 julli- 1 by the (c- 's orilcrs for • lor you to opinion ; he hen once he or would ho cllion which I? l;i, 1 would gov. There , nor a pol- .-r his coni- )mbine their ) time might: ly commar.il Sir (i. Carlclon.] K V I 1) K N C v.. 2il lu'Vinp; un- bound to to the ut- polliblc, I ,11 m^, and ) have ilc- inull dcc'de ;ir iiiuation, t bo inilul- T meant to nd pcvha^is "ent cafe in cliions arc anfwering them thirn, bur I will not evade them. As I now undcrlland tin- nv aninf'; of ihc ri;dii liondniaiile member in the former cpiclUons to be, VN'hcther I Ihoiild have taken iijion me to biiH-ilcde the King's orders, fuppoling I knew of any uiilurniountable ditlkulties in the way, as that I had information of 20,000 men at I'iconderoga, belorc (Jeneral Kurgoyne left the province of Canada, 1 Ihouhl have told (icneral lUngovnc my inlormacion ? 15ut it was General Ihirgoync who was to carry the orders into execution, anil not mc, and thcrefoir it was njion his own judg.tnent he was 10 determine ; I Ihotdd have given him my opinion, but 1 tlunk I had ni) right to give him ordirs inuler thofe circumHanccs. (^ V\ ho was it that made the arrangement and dillribution of the troops that ^^, \\c\v to be left for the defence of Canada, independent of thofe under il.c command of (ieneral Ihngoyne ? A. The orders 'hat arc before the I lovifc arc very full, and I thought very clear. The Committee ^vill fee in ihofe orders the troops that were dellined for General Ihirgoync's ex[)edition, ami the troops that were to remain for the defence of the province. C^ Who made that difliibuiion ? 3<;. A. It came t' mc from the fecrctary of (late. Q^ Did not the orders from the fecrctary of (late go to thq detail of the fmalkft 40, pods within the ))rovincc ? A. The letter is before the Committee. Quetbon re[)eated. A. I fliould beg for the letter to be read ; I don't wifli to avoid any (lucllion, but 4r. I w ilh to be accurate. Q^ Was the diftribution of the troops prcfcribed to you by the fecrctary of flalc, or 42, left to your difcretion ? A. In mentioning the number of troops which were to remain in that province, it w\as there laid that thofe troops would be fufficient for garrifoning fuch and fuch places, particularizing them. Q. Did you ever know an inftancc, in your military life, of a miniller making a ^j, didribution of troops for the defence of a province, without taking the opinion or leaving a great deal to the difcretion of the governor of that province, that governor being an ading military officer of very high rank ? A. I never had the honour to correfpond with a fecrctary of ftate till I was ap- pointed to the command of that province. Q^ Whether you uas confulted upon the pradlirability of penetrating from the 44. frontiers of Canada to Albany by force, with the ftrcngth allotted to General Bur- go) nc for that purpofe ? A. No ; I was nor. (^ Are you acquainted with the paffagc from New York to Canada by the Hud- 45. fon's River. A. I have o-one that wav. Qj_ Have you obli^rved it with a view to military operations ? ^$, A. No; I never made the tour liaving any militarv operations in view. }\ ' (^ Are 4i te \>. \" I I) i: N ( i:. ['•^ir G. CiiiU-rnn, 4V'- Q^ All- veil , Till' i'mi>il w iili ihi' r.tiii', w Iiii h Sn Willi. im If'^wlm.! iin.Iri Ins iiu luJi U' » iMnm.iiul .11 .uul .iIh'ViI N. v\ Voik, iiii ilic i yili ol |iil\ , ijyj - A. I WW ii'it, 48* <>^ Sii;'H(>rin!\ Sli WiHi.nn I Iovm" Ii.i.l i;,r 1 ill^ilivf nun, Idiilis ;i riiHuiciit foi»\' Iclpcil 111 Now N'di k, SlMti'M IiIiiikI, .uul I oii|', lll.iiul. 111 iKlcuJ iluiii ,if.',,iiiill In-nd-il \\';i(liiii!\t(>n\ .iiniv, ruppuliii', ( ii luuil W'lilliiiifMiurs ;imi\ ni tlu- Injiis, lu ar <.hiil>Mv" I «i\\ ii,,iiul ihat Sii \\'illi;nn I low*- luiil n'voivi tl aiiiuiiiis nl v ii'iHiiiin\ii|'i)\ lu 's liiiii'ls al I u .'luioioj'^.i, aiul \\a'. ,u « jiiainu il wiih ilu' ouli is iiiukr w liich ( i("ni"i,il l?ni:M)\iu" aClivl ; \s it \ lUir t>|'inii'n ilial the Ixil iiii)\i'innu Sii William llowi- i' >uM Ikwc lu.uk" lor llu' piiipolt* (il Ini \vartliii|i; llu- cxri iiliiMi ol tlu' oulrr'*, niuKc \v liiih (jiMU-ial H»tr!',o\ IK* ;u li'»l, \\ oiiKJ liau" l>ivii to li;\\ i' laiK'il wilhliis aiiin Imm Now York 10 riu'i.i|>calv I'.u - ,\. I hul f hul rlu- honoiii to luuo (.•oinMuiiuJoil on thai li»K', I ilo noi know what I tluniKl h.ivi' done nn kit. 4<). Q^ AftiT viHi roicival tlu* Umit iVinn Sii William I lowc, inlorminp; \'o\i ol lii- inliMu!(.\l i'X|>i"ilition 10 tiu* louihw.iiil, uIumIkt voii ilul i'\j>i-i'l iluii Sii VNilliain I I(n\f's ainiy louKKii o[Hrato i>n ir.c I liuiron*'. Rivi-r \\ itii ilic noitluTii ainiv iliai Ic.ilon ' A. I ilon'i know. .V\ (.^^ Wlu'llu-r \(ni tlunis'Jit, nftor llu" nwipt of lii.il U'IUT, th;il it w;iH proIiaMc (hoio woiiKl ho a 00 o|'Oiaiion iVoin iho lonilicin nrnu' ' A. 1 look it loi «.\r;iiUo»l, tluit Sir William llowo knew wluit lu- was about, a;nl w oiiKI i!o w li.u lu' llio\ii>jit In-tl toi tlu- piihlic Icrviio. 1 nallv was to little in- (ornu <1 ot .ill ilu- p.iilii.ul.u' ciieiimlhuues ol his (ini.iiion ;uul ot^ the proviiucs iiiuifi his lomniatul. ili.it 1 eovilil (orni 110 iuilL\ineiu ot ihc j)i-o|iiict) 01 iin|Moiuiot}' ul his eo luliiOl . 01 (>l lIu' I'iVi'Cls o{ his nu-.ilnies. (>^ Piii vouf inlornu»ri(Mi U.ul \oii t(^ heliovt?, r!\:U the inh;ihit;nits lufw^cn S;ir;i- i«>i',a ;nul .Aih.mv, woic l"o well ;illi\ie»,l [o his Majelh' ;uul (Jieat liiitain, as that t'u're woviKl he imuh ;ii,lvanla;',e ilenvevl liiun iheii aliill.inee to tiu* Kiiii^'s army in tile prole.'iition ot (teneral Tiin ;',«nne's expedition ? A. 1 ii.ui iioinient aeeotints li\)mihat pait ol the eo\intrv, tliat there wrrc miinbofs lo.ulv ro take avnis an^l join the Kind's trot)ps il thev ihouhl penetrate lo far. (). Po \vni mean, l>\ \iuti,i:i:.' 10 f,n\, to ;\lban\, or lo the leiiuih the army .'.or ; A. Thf w h >]e exienr o}' t!ie inhabiievl eo'.mtr)-, aeeijrdinp; to the inl'orniaiion bro\ii;ht to me. ,v;. Q. 11.1.1 \ou no intoi-maiion that a fomudablc militia mi'iht be railed in that euiiu.v to oppi^iO his M. nelly's arms? A. ^ e>. ; 1 luul lueh int'oim.uion. ,.^_ (^ OkI wni thnik that ilv ("orec which C-rencral Hiirgoync cariied with him from 1 ie>>iulerOi;a towards v\lban\- w as liitiieient to oppofo Inch force ? .•\. kiealh iiiulMieg leave to be excviled aniwering that cpicllion. a;. Q^ It \ ovi had been conl'ulted relpcdfting Cieneral Hiirgoyne's expedition, knowiiljf the nature ot' th.ii eooniry, aiu! the lorcc Gciieial lUngoyno had, would you or V 1 >th iw>t nave aUMiea aicli aiicnurpn/e A. If 1", 111 of H.ilrarrnv") ;r V I n r, N c i*.. A. II I Irul liml ilir honour r-t (•'•nimiiul in ilint {-iimp;ii|',ti ns 1 li;ul ill llicfornin, 1 (lon'i piciililv know wli.ii I (lioiild Imvc «lnn<' iii\lrlf. i). Did \(in |',iv<' iinv stilviic lor (■niplovinf; ihc l.i\ ;i|'/ i f f/). 'C I ilon'l moll, CI llial 1 Ian! an)' lliin|; iilioiif tliciii. [H'tll'Jir'i, yrwi.s 27" ilie Maiiy I 779. ICaui, f)f nAiCARHAi Called in and cxainimd I»y (k-ncial \\\u\\(>y\\c (2- IN what lUition tlid your Lordlhiii fcrve in the: cainpaijjns in Atncrita, in i'f}'', i. iind 1777 ? A. 1 loininandcd ilu* I'rilini li^'Jif infantry. (^^Wastlic Hritifli ii^lit infantry continuaily yUatlucl to the- cor^i initlcr flic a. coniniaiul ol lJri[;adicr (jcntral Iralcr -* A. Yes. (^i, 1 lad yovi fHxafion fo oljfcrvc that General I'urgoyne and f »encr,il rVafcr lived j. togetlier in triendlliij) and conlidcnce ? A. Yes, 1 had. C^ 1 lad you reafon to believe that General Frafcr was confiiltcd by frennral Rvir- 4. goync in all material operations f" A. I hail reafon to believe that General Frafer was confultcd in many material <)])erations, (^ Does your I.ordfliip know or believe that the proportion of artillery, at- 5. tached lo Crcneral Kraler's eoips through the whole campaign, was according to his re(|ui(itions and defircs ? A. I underllood from General Krafer, that the proportion of artillery allotted to him was agreeable to his own retiuifitions. Q^ Do yon recoiled the number of killed and wcnmded in General Krafer's cor[)S, ^« at the alT.iir of Muberton > A. I don't recollcdt exactly ; I tjiink it was about 150. ^Xl. ^^ 'i'*t was your opinion of the behaviour of thf enemy on that day ' y. A. Ciicimiflanccd as ihc enemy was, as an army very hard prclled in their retreat, ihcy certainly behaved with great gallantry. Q^ Was it pradiicable, the nature of the country, the fatigue of the King's troops, ?,, the care of the wounded, and other oircumllances confidcrcd, to have purfucd the enemy farther after that aftion ? A. It was n(jt f V 2 Q^ Do 30 EVIDENCE. [ICail of Balcarra*. ic. It, I?- 14. f,. 16, 22. Q. Do von recoiled on what ilay General Fiafci's cor[>5 njoiiKil the aimy at Ski.iKlhi)rouf.;h ^ A. ( )ii the yth of July ; J thiui; thar ir v.ms on tlut l^^y, Q,^ Oi) what clav was the aCtu)M at I luboiton ? A. On the 71 h of Julv. (^. I) ) \()ii iccolkv-t the dillicuUics uf removing the wounded from Huberton to the hor[)it.iI ;it 'ricondcroga ? A. I'Voni the chihmce and badnefsof the ro.uls, the ditlleiihies attending the re- moving"!; of tli'j holpiral nuilf h:ive l)een very great. Q^ Was it prai-Hcablc, imlcls the wounded had been left c.\i)oled to the enemy, to liave rejoineil the aimy founer ? A. It was not. C^ Docs your LordHiip rocolleprehen(J dilloilgc • [[^) c rebels m 'as it not M itrcnch- i nd? f thoiit a . / r Ik, A. General Frafer's tcmjier was warm, open, aad communicatiw, but rdcrvcd in matter* of confidence. Q. Did you ever hear General Frafcr cspref* difapprobation of the mcafiire of paf- 2j, fiiig Hudlon's River ? A. 1 never did. Q. Was not » bridge con(lru(5\ed of rafis, and (ome boats thrown owv that 24, river, a little before ilie time of the attack on Hennington ? A. The re was. Q^ Did not (General Frafer's corps pafs the river by that bridge, and take pofl; on ^i. the hei[!,hts of Saratoga ? A. It did. Q. Do you remember that bridge being carried away by the rorrenrs and bid zO, weat.'ier, whereby the communication was cut oil" between that corps and the main botly nf the army ? A. I do. Q. Was General Frafer's corps recalled after that adion, and obliged to rcpafs jy, the river in boats and fcowls ? A. It u as. (^ Do you remember General Frafer cxprefilng his forrow for being obliged to re- 28.- turn back over the Hudfon's River ? A. I remember General Fraltr mentioning it with regret. Q^Had the rear guard of General Frafer's corps been attacked during that paf- 29.. fage over the river, would not a powerful fire of artillery from the oppofitc Ihore have been of great ufe, if not the only means of protecting them ? A. If the enemy had attacked General Frafer, they wouUl have found him in a very bad polUire ; it was imjionible to take a bitter, and, as they could not be fup- ported by the line, the only means of fafety mult have been to get under cover of the fire of our artillery. Q^ Was there not an expcdation and imiutience o( the troops in general to pafs 30. Hudfon's River, and advance on the cneni}' .'' A. There was. Q. Was there not a general confidence and alacrity on the occafion ? 3'* A. There was. Q. From thefc circumftanccs, and your other knowledge of the armj'', do you not J2, believe that to have made no further attempt en the enemy would have caufcd dif appointment and dejection in the troops, and icfledlions on the general - A. The troops were in the highelV fpirits, and wiflied to be led on. Q^ Does your Lorddiip recoiled the march up to the enemy on the morning of ^^, the 1 9th of September? A. I do. Q^ Was the combination of the march fuch, as, that notwithlhmding the paf- o |^. fage of the ravines and the thicknefs of the woods, the column of General Frafer's march, and that of the Britifii line, led by General Burgoyne, were in a fituation to fupport each other, and fpeedily to form in line of battle, at the time the enemy be- gan the attack ? l\ A. Afrcv ^'^ EVIDENCE. [Earl of Balcarra?, 39- 40. 41. 42. 43- 44. 46. enemy's pofi- ind what were 7t' It Odtober? the fituation of the enemy's out-pods. A. After the cokimns had palled the ravines, they arrived at tlielr vefpeftivc pnlb with r^reat prccinon in point of time, and every fortunate circumllance attend- ed the forming of the line. ."^' ^X^ Mow long did that adlion laft ? A. The Briiilli were attacked partially about one o'clock. The aflion was gene- ral at three, and ended at feven o'clock. j6. Q:, P'rom the nature of the country, was it podiblc to difccrn t tion or movements, to form any judgment what attacks were in forci. feints ? A. I think not. Q^ Did we remain mailers of the field of battle ? A. Wc did Q^"Had the field of battle been '\ell difputed by the enemy ? A. The enemv behaved with f^reat obftinacv and couraQ;c. Q^ Was it too dark t(i purfue with efledl at the time the attion ended ? A. It was. Q. Did the King's troops take up ground nearer to the enemy, the morning after the aftion ? A. It was rather nearer to the enemy, Q. How near were the out- polls of General Frafer's corps to the out-poHs of the enemy from that time to the aftion of r'-.o 7t' / A. I fliould imagine within half • mile. Q^ From the nature of the count i\, an was it poflible to reconnoitre their pofition ? A. From the nature of the country, the difficulties attending reconnoitering mufl have been very great. Q^ Were not the riflemen, and o'her irregulars, employed by the enemy at out-pofts and on fcouts, an overmatch for the Indian or provincial troops that were with the army at that time ? A. They were. Q^ Was not General Frafer's cori)S continually at work during the interval above- mentioned, in fecuring their own polls, and opening the front to oppofe the enemy ? A. They were. Q^ After General Frafer received his wound, on the 7th of Oftober, on whom did the command of his corps devolve ,? A. On me. Q^ Was you in a fituation on that day, to obferve the general difpofition of the army, made by General Burgoync, previous to the adlion ? A. I remember two redoubts having been eredled on the left, to cover the boats and provifions to enable General fiurgoyne to make a detachment from his army. 47. Q^ Was you in a fituation to obferve the difpofition made immediately before the attack by the enemy ? A. I only recoiled the fU'.arijn of the two battalions of the advanced corps. <^ After ^arl of Balcarra?, their refpe|ic general's table. ') :, Q. Conleiiuendy niuft not iliat baitery !i:iv.' commanded the ford over the Hudfon's River? A. I believe I I'dd, I did not reeolleft fron\ v.j;:.t direction the fliot came, but they had a b.itrciy vvliich connnaivJied tliar ford. '\^- Q^ Do )OLj recoileclon what day you was called, with other commanders of corps, to tlie Hrll eouni.il of war ? A. On t lie 13th of October. 64. Q^ Was there a fpot in the whole polltion to be found for liolding that council, which was not expofed to cannon or rinc-Oiot ? A. We were not lb fortunate as to find one. f'C. C>^ Do you recollect tiiat General Burgoyne, after dating to the council the difficul- ties of the lituation, declare, that nothing fliould induce him to propole terms to the enemy without the general concurrence of the generals and field officers of the army, and that he was ready to take the lead in any meafure that they fliould think for the honour of the Britiffi arms, or words to tiiateifed: ? A. I remember words to that cffeft. 66. Q. Was the concurrence unanimous for treating on honourable terms ? A. I hope I fliall ftand judified with the members of that council, when I have the honour to declare to this Houfe, thai our fituation appeared to them fo decided as not to admit of one diflenting voice. ^7' Q^ When Colonel Kingfton brought back the firft propofition, wherein it was fpe- cified by Major General Gates, that the army fliould lay down their arms in their entrenchments and furrender prifoners of war, does your Lordfliip remember, that General Burgoyne, when he read them to the council, declared, he would not fet his hand to thofe conditions, or words to that effisel ? A. I think the words of the propofal from General Gates were, That tlie Britifli army fliould be ordered, by word of command from their adjutant general, to lay down their arms in the entrenchments. It was rejected with difdain by General Bur- gene, and the council concurred in his indignation. 68. Q. Were the counter propofals, penned by General Burgoyne, unanimoufly ap- proved .'' A. They were. ^9* Q:^ When thofe propofals had been agreed to by General Gates, but copies not figned by either party, do you remember General Burgoyne informing the council of intelligence he had received from a fpy in the night, and lubmitting to their confidera- tion, uhether it was confiftent with public faith, and if fo, expedient to fufpend the execution of the treaty and trull to events ? A. I do remember it. 70* Q. Does your Lordfliip recolkfl what was the refult of thai confidcration ? 3 A. The 1 of Ralcarras. I on IS at that >ver the table ring a cannon the Hudfon's I me, but they Icrs of corps, that council. the difficul- terms to the 3f the army, hink for the n I have the :ided as not I it was fpe- rms in their lember, that not let his the Britifli leraJ, to lay eneral Bur- moufly ap- copies not council of ' confidera- ufpend the A. The ■If Earlof B.ilcarras.3 EVIDENCE. f . /'• 7i- It' 6, A. The determination of th." council, on the qutftion being put, was, that t!ie pu- blic faith was bona fide pligiitcJ. Q^ Though that vas the opinion of the majority, was there not a difference of opi- nion in the council ? A. There was. Q^ Were tlie opinions of the Icvcral commanding officers aflvcd rcfpcftin.'^ the con- dition of their refpeclive corps, and what might b^ expected from tliem feverally in deiptrrate cafes ? A. It was. Q^ Was tliere not on that queflion alf) diflercnce of opinion ? A. There was. Q. After the Convention took place, did your Lordfliip fi.e the army of General Gates pafs in review before General Burgovne and General Phillips ? A. Idid. Q. From th.e manner and filence of their march, t];e order obferved in kecpin;; theii divifions, and an apparent attention to their officers, did that army a]>pear difciplined ? A. They marched in good order and were filent, and feemed to pay attention to their officers. Thefe are eflential points of difcipline, but I law nothing farther of ir. Q^ From the general behaviour of the rebel troops in the different actions in which you was preferit in the courfe of the campaign, did you think them difciplined and refpe6>able troops ? A. When I anfwcred the lad queftion, I fpoLe to the manoeuvre I faw upon tlie f, ot. At all times when I was oppofed to the rebels, they fouglit with great courage and obllinacy. Q. Judging by your eye, and the time the rebel army was marching in review, did you form any judgment of tlieir number ? A. It recjuires great experience to make a computation of numbers by feeing them pafs : as far as I could judge on the occafion, they leenied to me to amount to thir- teen or fourteen ihoul'and rank and file under arms. Q^ Has your Lordiliip reafon to know or believe, that the troops that paffed in re- view were cxclufive of thofe corps that had been polled on the other fide of the Hud- fon's River ? A. 'IT.cy were exclufivc of tliofe corps. Examined by other Members of the Committee iiud hy General Bnygoyne occaficr.ally. Q. What was the general opinion of the an-'y of General Burgoyne's behaviour in aClidn and in difficulty ? A. It appeared to me, that General Burgoyne always poffefled himfelf in every f tuation of danger and difficulty, and, I may venture to fiy, it appeared fo to the arm}'. (^ Had (reneral Burgoyne the confidence of the army ? A. He had. Q. After the arrival of the troops at Cambridge, were the cHlccrs and fokliers of 81. 77- 79. ■o. 33 tht; E V I D F. N r E. [Earl of Balcarras, , 84, S3. 86. 87, 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. ;io( I wirh the general's elTorts to contribute to tlicir comfort, and redrcfs the arniy fitis; their gricvamx's ? A. They W'.'re. Q^ \V;is t!ie army latislied with the general's behaviour at the court martial held on Colonel Henlr\ ? A. lie can led on that profccution in perfon, and as fuch they were fatisfied with him. Q^ Did your Lordfliip ever Iiear any officer or foldier of that army exprefs any diflli- tisfaclion at tlie <-entri;rs returning; to En-jland ? A. I did nor. Q^Does your Lordfliip think that the officers of that army wifli to have their rc- fpcdtive merits Hated to their Sovereign, by the general in perfon who had the honour of commanding them ? A. It was the wifliof that army that General Burgoyne Ihould go to Europe, to juftify nor only his own conduJV, but the conducV of the army he commanded. Q^ Docs your Eordfhip apprehend, that the return of General Burgoyne to that army, under perfonal dilgrace, and without any diltribution of preferment among the didinguiflied officers of that army, would be any fort of conlolation to the troops under captivity ? A. General Burgoyne, at all times, fhared the dangers and affliflions of that army in common wirh every foldier ; as fuch they looked on him as their friend, and cer- tainly would have received him in perfon, or any accounts of him, with every mark of affedlion. Q^ Your Lordfhip having faid that if the rebels had maintained their poft, at the afcent from the Low Countries to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne ro Fore Edward, artillery would have been of great ufe to diflodge them ; will your Lordffiip fay what kind of artillery, of what calibre, would have been neceffary for tliat purpofe ? A. Any of the artillery officers now under the order of the Houfc can give a much more fatisfaftory anfwer to that qucftion than I poflibly can. Q^ Did you fee that poft ? A. I think I faid I did fee ir. Q^ With what kind of work was that poll fortified ? A. I fpoke of it :nere!y from its fituation, Q^ Were there then any works or none ? A. i don't recolleft there were any workj. Q^ If the army, after taking Ticonderoga, had been embarked, and proceeded diredly to South Bay, would there have been any occafion to have attacked the poft at Pitch Pine Plains at all ? A. The army did proceed by South Bay, excepting a detachment of General Frafer's corps, and Ibme Germans to fupport him -, and the army aflcmbled at Skenefborough on the 9th or 1 cth of July. (^ Was it neceffary to go to the poft at Pitch Pine Plains, in order to go to South Bay ? A. The/ had no fort of connexion with each other. (^ Might not the army have proceeded to Fort Edwand, and omitted the attack of that pals, fuppofing it had been meant to be defended ? A. There i :ui of Balcarras, irt, and redrcls lartial held on ^ fatisfied with refs any difla- have their rc- d the honour to Europe, to mded. goyne to that nt among the :o the troops of that army ;nd, and ccr- h every marie r poft, at the n Fort Anne 1 ; will your iieceflary for give a much Earl of Balcarras J EVIDENCE. 35 i proceeded d the pofl: at eral Frafer's ^nefborough go to South le attack of A, There A. There were two routes to Fort Edward, General Burgoyne itiisht ftill go the fame route without any necefTity of attact;ing that poft, as there might have been many different ways of diflodging the enemy from that pod without attacking it, Q^ In how many inllances do you reinember the rebels defending tlieir entrench- 93. ments after they had made them ? A. Wc never got a view of any of their entrenchments but fuch as they liad voluntarily abandoned. Q. Is it then to be undcrftood that they never defended any entrenchments ? 94. A, They never did. Q^ Did you ever hear General Frafcr exprefs his approbation of the palTing of the 95* Hudlbn's River ? A. I never did. Qi Did you ever hear General Frafer exprefs his approbation of the Bennington 96. expedition ? A. That detachment was made, and the bufinefs concluded, before I ever iicard of the projeft or execution. Q^ Have you occafion to know, when the firO- detachment was fent out under Co- tj^. lonelBaume, where they were ordered to rejoin General Burgoyne, after tliey had per- formed the fervice they were fent on ? A. I don't know. Q^ "Whether, in your Lordfliip's opinion, after the lofs the rebels had fuftained over q3. night, in theaftionof the 19th of September, if they had been attacked brifkly at break of day, the next day, there was a probability that they could have flood their ground ? A. I have not hefitated to give an opinion upon fuppofed matters, which muft have been attended with evident and demonftrable confequences ; but I beg the indulgence of the Houfe in declining to give any opinion upon any queftion relative to fpeculation or judgment. Had any general officer of that army under General Burgoyne been prefent in this country, I fliould have confined myfelf merely to the manoeuvres of the corps I commanded. As there is no general officer here, I wifli to give this Houfe every information confident with my rank in the army. Q^ Had yon any information that might indicate to you that the rebels were pre- gn, pared to decamp after the afcion of the 1 9th of September ? A. I was ignorant of any fuch intelligence being received. Q^ Had you any information of their baggage being packed up ? 100. A. I have already anfwered, that I had no information at all about ir. Q. In the aftion of the 7th of Odober, on which fide did the rebels force our lines loi. and make a lodgement ? A. The lines to the right were ftormed and carried. Q^ Were the lines attacked to the left ? io2. A. To the left of that pod they were, but not to the left of the army. Q^Did not the pofl^efiion of Fort Edward, and the country thereabouts, cut off 103. the retreat of any garrifon that might have been in Fort George ? A. It undoubtedly did. C^Had the army proceeded to Fort George by Ticondcroga and Lake Gcor^-c, 104. might not the enemy iiave remained at Fort George till the trenches were opened, and have dill had their retreat fecure ? F2 A. That r: \- I D E N c p.. fl^arl of B.ilcariMS. 105. 106. lo: loP. 109. J 10. I II. 112. 113- 114. /. 7'hat is ,1 matter ofopinion up-nn fiiccuLuion. (^^ 1^ ) yci) nui: r!u;ik thai; diC Diitilli army, bciiio; will proviucd with arLiIlcry, was a prob.iblL' ivalun I'ur their not dcfcn :'in_L>, cntrL-nchircntJ ? A. I'hc rcafon iluy ciid not ci-t'cml their ciiticiiclimonis was, tliat they al.vays marched out of them and attacked us. Q. Docs your Lordlhip think it would have been advifcable, in point of prudence, or jult to brave troops, who hadfufilred levere lois, to attack an enemy the morninL^ after that lofs, polled wiiiiiu entrci-icliments, v^iiich it was imiKjfl'.ble to recon- noitre'? A, That attem]^t was tried on the 7tli of (3--'iobcr, and did not fuccced. Q_. Were not liie enemy reinforced bctv.Lja t!ve 19th of September and tlie 7th of Oclober ? A. I think it k likely they were. Q., Were tl-.cy likely to be ia better fjiirits to repel an attack the day after they iiad been rcpulied with great lofs, or when tliey had been reinforced^ and feen an army li^; three weeks in;'.Llive in their c:'.;r,p ? A. I do not jud;^e of tlie fpirit of t!ie cnem;, but when I was oppofed to them myfelf. Q_^ On tliC firll day of the action, when the enemy was repulfed on the 19th of September, had not our army fulfered very confiderably ? A. 'lT:cy iiirfered very conliJ^rable lol':;. Q^ Was not tlie army recruked, and in better order, on tlie 7th of OcT;obcr, than they were on t!;c 20th of September ? A. Numbers of the men who had been wounded and difabled in the aclion of the 19th, joined their corps on the 7th of Oclober. Q^ Was the behaviour of the enemy, oppofed to your Lordfnip, in the a(5lions you have teen, fuch as to make tliem contemptible in the eye of a foldier ? A. I have already mentioned, that they fouglit at all times with courage and ob- ftinacy. Q^ Whether the behaviour of tlie cneniy was fuch as to make advantages obtained by them over his Majelly's troops more hutifdiating and difgraceful to the Britifli arms than the fime advantages obtained by an etiual number of any other troops ? A. I myfelf felt more humiliation until 1 confidcrcd that thofe advantages proceeded from the nature of tlie country, and not from the \\ ant of zeal or bravery in the Bri- tifli troops. Q. Whether the enemy's troops were fuch bad troops as to make it more difgraceful to have an advantage obtained by them over tlie King's troops than by the like number of any otiier enemy over a like number of his iVIajefly's troops in the fame circum- llances of country ? A. The advantages gained by the rebels over the Britifh troops proceeded from their local fituation, and not from the want of courage in the Britilh troops. We were taught by experience that neither their attacks nor refiftance was to be de- fpifed. Q^ Dill you ever ferve againfl: any other troops : A. I con:imenccd my fcrvice in America. Q. Whether m # 1 of Balcarras. ■ i artillery, was i : tlicy al.vays • t of prudence, / the morninif bio to recon- i md the yth of '< iftcr they had -n an anny lie ofed to them n the 1 9th of )(51;obcr, than aclion of the e aftions you irage and ob- iges obtained Britifli arms es proceeded y in the Bri- e difgraceful Hke number imc circum- . ceeded from roops. We /as to be dc- F,ri-I cf ralcurp.-;.] EVIDENCE. 37 Q ■^A'];etlier the army under General Burgoyne, in general, expe^red co-operation 115. }'\ i.Iu-ir clForts to go to Albany, from the army under the command of Sir William I bw ■ : .'■.. General Rurp;oyne cave it out in general orders, that he liad cverv rcafon to bci! ve tli;:t |)o\vrriul armies were ading in co-operation with the army he had tj-.e I'.on'vir to command. <■ ). Do you know at what time tliat order was given out ? 1 1"- i'lT'/ho acijutant g.nu-al's books will Hiew it: I think it v.'as about tl.e 3d of OAober. Q. Does your Lordflrip believe that if the army und.cr Genf/al Howe h;)d eo- u;. operated U]^ Lie i\oi-di Itiver with ilie ar;r,y under Cjencnd Ikirgoyne, that the armv under Gener.d I'urcpyne would have bien oblir^-ed to have made the convenlion it did ? A. That is a matter cf judgment. The army Icohed K.rwnrd to tliat co-operation, v.hieh they were led to underlland, by the orders Geiieral liurgoyne had given our, witli plcafvire. Q^ VVliat was the general opinion of the ofikers of the army in which you fervcd, nS. on that fubjefl of co-operation ? A. 1 do not think my rank in the army entitles me to give my opinion on that fub- je6l ; I flrall Hill Ids preilime to give that of oil.ers. [_fFitJ:Jrczv. Tlien lie was called in again, and feveral parts of the examination, particularly that which immediately follows the place where it is laid that his I,onUhi|> was examined by otiier members of the Committee, were read, and tlien the laft queltion which was put to his Lordfliip immediately before he withdrew, was repeated, with this addition, *' To the bell of your recoUedion and information." I ip^ A. I have already declined anfwering that quellion. ''* Q^ When did you firtt know that there was to be no co-operation from General 120. Howe's army, and that Sir William Howe had carried his army to Chefapeak Bav ? A. I did not know that we were to expeft no co-operation, until after the con- vention was figned. (!^ When did yc;u firft hear that Sir William llowc was gone to the fouth- j^i. ward ? A. It was reported i'o in the army about the beginning of tlie campaign, before we eroded the river. Q^ When was that report firfl: confirmed fo as to make it a matter of belief ? A. I never knew it was confirmed at all. Q^ Whei-er you yourfelt was not furprifed or difappointcd, or both, when you firft underllood that there was not to be any co-operation frc'.-,i Sir William Howe, but that Sir William Howe's army was gone to Chefapeak Uav f [JVithdyezv. 12: ijj. [^. Wliether izam 3« E V I D E N C r.. [F.arl of Balcarras. /^ahi called in. H^ 12^:. 126. 12" 128. 129. 130. By General Burgoync. (^Whether you yourfelf was Curprifcd or difappolntcd, or both, when you liirt heard that Sir William Howe's army was gont; to Chcfapcak Bay ? A. I neither knew the object ot' the cami)aign nor its cxpedlations, and there- fore cannot fpcak to any manoeuvre of which I (.(mid not know the tendency. Q^ Did the army in general cxprcfs themfelvcs [jjcafed at the news of Sir Wil- liam Howe's being gone to Chclapeak Bav ? A. '1 he anfwer to the lail (jucdion, as it relates to mc in particular, relates to them in general. C^. ^^'hether j'our Lordfliip, as a matter of fadt, in the confulcration you had in the arm\', on the news of Sir William Howe's being gone to Chcfapeak }>ay, heard thole you convcrled with exprefs themfelves pleafed, or talk of that expedi- tion to Chefapeak, as a powerful co-operation with General Burgoyne ? A. I think that qucllion is fully anfwered in the two preceding ones. Q^ Whether you did not think General Howe's fighting General Wafliington's grand army, at the battle of Brandywine, ^vas a very capital co-operation with the army under General Burgoyne ? A. I was not at Brandywine. Q;^ Whether you was not furprifed when you returned home to this country, to learn that the fecretary of (late for the American department, had information from General Howe, of his intentions of going to the fouthward, before General Burgoyne departed from this country, and never communicated that information to General Burgoyne before his departure for Canada ? A. I have the honour to Hand before this Houfe as a military man, and not as a politician, and cannot anfvver any quellion but thofe relative to my own profeflion. Q^ What was your Lordfhip's opinion of the fpirit of your own corps ? A. The opinion I gave in the council of war, relative to the fpirit of the corps I commanded was, that they were willing and zealous to undertake any enterprife that General Burgoyne would pleafe to employ them upon. Q^ When advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, did you apprehend the treaty of convention had gone fo far that it could not be broken ? A. My opinion was, with refpeft to that qucftion, that all military negotiations were fair and juftifiable, to make delays and to gain time ; I therefore thought and declared my fentiments, that General Burgoyne was at full liberty to break otT that treaty in the ftage it then was : and I could not conceive that the public faith was engaged, until the treaty .. aftually figned and exchanged. Q^ Whether the opinion of General Burgoyne, of General Phillips, of Brigadier Hamilton, and feveral other officers, did not coincide with your opinion in all the matters comprifed in the laft queftion .'' A. As General Burgoyne feems defirous th-ii I iliould anfvver that queftion, I de- clare his fentiments were the fame with thofe I have now delivered. I hope that 3 the. 1 1 ofBalcarras. . and thcro- cncy. of Sir Wil- 1", relates to Captain Money.] EVIDENCE. 39 the other members of that council, will foon be in a fituafion to (land forward and to declare the opinion they gave on that and every other (juenion. CX When the queflion relative to the point of public faith was decided, by the 13-2. majority of the council, was not the concurrence for figning the convention una- l?y General \ liurgoync. nimous ? * ' A. It was. CX What day was it firft known that Sir Henry Clinton had taken the highlands, * and was coming up the North River ? A. In the night of the i6th of Odlober. \_inthdrezv. 33- 1 you had in fapciik })ay, that expedi- t^afliington's •n with the Captain Money called in and examined by General Burgoyne. country, to information ore General information man, and o my own the corps I ' enterprife the North It it could egotiations ought and break off the public Brigadier in all the on, I de- biope that the Q^ WAS not you deputy quarter mafter general of the army under General Bur- i. goyne, in 1777 ? A. I was. Q^ After Lieutenant Colonel Carleton returned to Canada, was you the fuperior 2. officer in that department ? A. I was. Q^ As fuch, did you make it your bufinefs from the beginning of the campaign j. to get a know ledge of the country ? A. Whenever there was any occafion to obtain the knowledge of any particular part of the country, a party was always fent with me for that purpofe, but the woods were (o thick that it was impoflible to go without a party. Q^ Was you well acquainted with the country between Skenelborough and Fort a, Edward ? A. I was. Q. How long was the army employed in making the roads prafticable between c. Skencfbonnigh and Fort Edward? A. About fix or feven days io making the road between Skenelborough and Fort Anne, and between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. I do not believe the army was delayed an hour on that account ; there was a very good road made by the rebels the year before, between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, in which road the rebels had cut down fome few trees which took the provincials in our army fome few hours to clear. Q^ Does not the poffeffion of the country in the neighbourhood of Fort Ed- 6. ward, neceflarily prevent the rtueat of a garrifon that might be in Fort George ? A. It < 40 1 V I n r. N c I A. I' pri'v.-nii il.' }H';i!iijr olV any luiilU-rv or II 1)1' [Ciptain Moi cy. uf a |':iiiir,Mi mi '1)1 jrfi tliri)U,.''i iIk' U"i)ils in r.il'o wo wck- in ilio poiKili iii i.l tlii' -mc iiii I in ih n('i;\llli()lll liDOJ ol' i'lilt I'', I'AMul. (J. bl'i tl.T lii' !«. '"i^'Vtot I'lMt (t.'nvi i!ic 1, ini' •> I I'l "/s |i'\, iiil I'liri I'.ilw .ii'u ;<.' cv.K'iiatc ilic loiL m'on tlic :i['[)r()ach ol' .\. 1 .\\t\ ; II; V till •i ; I w as nui 11. .11 ciiDiii'h to 1. (j^ I 1.1 J l!u' iiniiv tiikiMi I'lrir i.aito hy SouiU ll.iy, TiviiuIv-rOi',;!, nn.l l/.\! (I>ii|.>,-, \\.\w ui;.n.' ImK'.iii\ il.) vui iin,t;'inc it wouM li.uc taken to i.uiy t! 1iv))|>s I'' 'i\ ov.'i' 1 , '.Iv.' ( i^Di;';;', i\t lulivc 111 jnox iliDns aiul lii'iws " 10 .A. 1 ll liin'v lu'iut* 1) thwv* .iiul liHir liiiM'IipJ, ulrnh lialiair; mull liavo 1 icon car- ti. VIM (i|i! ( )|' I ,ak(.' ( 'luiiDplaiii Id I .ako ( . W ,1,11 T'lK' WduKl il il iw lak.n, as vmi iniiM'ino, to have drawn iliolo 1 M- ictiu owf ilir kiiiil, i).i\V(.ii) Lake Chanipkiiii ami 1 .aUc (ic'ui;;(.', wiili ilic IioiIch iluii ai 'J 1 I'lMdlldf 1 A. 1 I'lippiih' a lortnii>,ht — Inhii- luiiuIrcJ I'atoaux. I ". <.K I liiiii!',!) tiKii- wcic 11') tiDoj s \\\i\['i\ o\or l.ako Ciooi-j.u', liow \o\yj^ did it take "v 1(110 I ll. .... lirll t .iiil|iMrr (>l inovuiDiis an ivcd ai I*'oi t (ioorj\o ' A. I oan'L r..\i)lloi.l prooitch-. A. I can L i-'ti^lka pi"ooi(cl\-. 11. (.Jj C'onlidoi"in!', tho loii!;th cf timo it t'mk to tranfport tlu' proviflons, wiilunit tl'.o irooj)';, owr 1 ,ako Ciooii'o, was nor i!\o arin\ lorwaiilor in iluir wavio All:a- n\-, in i)oiiit ot tiino, 1)\' tiio ronio tlu'v took, than tlioy could li:i\o l>.cn li\' tlio rout." ot' 'rioondoi();\a :\m\ Liko CJoortfc ? A. 1 havo alr^a.lv laid, ili.ii it would t iko a icMiii|.',lil to tr.inl'port tin' .jcj lia- tcau\ iiom 1 .ako Chaniplain to I .ako Cnori;o ; it thcioloio would have dolavod tlio aiiu\' a l"oitni!\hi lon!.!;cr than thov \wic ditavcd to havo ivtiirnod lioni Skonoil)orour,h bv 'I'ioondoroL'.a, and iM)iio aoiDJs I,ak.' (ioorj\r. I.'. Q^ NN'as )iiu Okiiumiii.iry oi" lujiio, as wJl as di.-['.uty (juaiUT mallor goncral ' A. It was. i ,\ (^ What is t!'iO nature oi' thai depart nionl - A. It was to take charpx* of all tlio liorlos fmnillu-d 1 \- con;raC-l: for (leniral I'vivpovne's armv, bv anv Liur ol iiillruil:tions iVom Cionoial |-)Ur;'o\ iu\ I am tli- reCtod lo I'ivf proper orders and diredions to the drivers, t'urniili.-d by that con- tract, ior tlie puniol'o ol tranfponing [^rovilions and llorcs brovipju to I'ort Gooi|v^, tor the ul'e ol the arniv. 14. I <• or the ule ol the arniv. Q^ Did you report iroin time to time to M.ijor (General Phillips, and lake o from him, as well as from General ]5uij,dyno .'' A. Yes. C^ \\ ere not the orders from bo;h the rdevs I I'.ipt.iiii Moi oy. r/iiiifoii mi;!ii ;■." I'll I in I'lic h\:\, :ii„I r, •.)•.{' " '*' i.iliy i'\c Imvo 1)ccmi i;ir- 'lic liuiic-i then '"g cliil ii take n'lvs, wiiiiniii w.iv to AIIm- Ivcii l)v the *-' y thai coii- J'Olt (JCOIJW d lake oitL'rs uul prcHing, iillv anfwcr 'hi. Ic woids ; iv'ili(/i) train, he carr\'in;r ivl incunvc- t IK) cart or any (ifficcr, accu!ciual!y Captain Money."] 1-, V I n T. N C !■. •' ai-i'ulcntally comiiifT to any partinil,ag{;age, politively torlnil till the tranlpoit o( provifion (lioiiK) 1).* over ? A. There was fin h an order, and a feizurc made of two iiarrcls of Madeira, anil two barrels of rinn, which were ordered to the Imtpital. Q^ Do voii reeollitt (Jcncral Hiir};oyne's cxpreninj-;, at feveral times, paiilcidai anxiety on the fdhjedt of cxpeditin|f the tranfport of provifmns ? A. I do reniemher once to have luaril General l>iiij;oyne exprefs his concern at onr not lieinji; able to l)rin}>; forward a }:;rcat'jr rpianiity "f provifion to enable liiin to proieeil with the army. — I do reeolleitt lo have heard him fay wiiii vciy fjrrrat earned nels to (ieneral IMiillijis and Colonil Cailcton, that one month's pr..vifi'tn at that i)articiilar time (it was about the latter end of Aiip,ull) would be worth J 00,001)1. to (Ireat l?ritain. C^ Do you think that tiie commifl'ary of the waf^pons, and other carriagfs, was authoriled lo buy or hire ox-ieams wherever they could be had, and ihat all draught cattle taken, were ippropriated to the tranfport ? A. I fe received fuch directions. Q^ How many carts and ox teams could l)e muftcred at any one rime ? A. I tiiink only i Ho carts could at any one time be inuilcred ; the number of ox- carts I really fbrjj^ct, but I believe between 20 and 30. (!.i^ About how many tiays provifion for the troops, and all other pcrfons fed from rlie King's llorcs, could that number of carriages convey ? A. There never was any trial made, but if I may prefumc to judge from tiic proportion brought forward, over and above the daily confumiJtion of the army, Ihould fuppofe all thofc carriages would not carry more than four days provifions at moll. I am f])eaking at random, as no trial was made. Q^ Did it not fometimcs happen, from accidents of weather, and roads, and the tired ftatc of the cattle, that not more than one day's provifion could be brought forward in a day ? A. It did. Q. How many hours did it take, one hour with another, to draw a bateau from Fort George to Fort Edward ? A. In general about fix. Q^ Was not the unloading the carts at Fort Edward, and embarking tiie contents in bateaux, unloading the bateaux at the upper falls of Fort Miller, and a feconti time unloading them at the lower falls, dilatory as it was, a more expeditious metlioil than it would iiavc been to ha\ ; carried the provifions the whole way in carts ? A. I do apprehend it was not pofiible, in the feeble ftate I found thchorfes fur- niflu-d by confaft, to have brought forward the daily confumption of provifions for that army down to Fort Miller. In the month of Auguft, in the latter enti of that month, at whieli time I was appointed a commilliiry general of horfc, I made, on ir,. lU. 19. 20. 21. 22. ^-3- 4%" G the « 1. V I I) 1 N C F. rijpt.iiii Mimfy* \hr liill v( S(;>t .lul^ri, n |Tihi.i1 innllii, .ml UnmA ;o \\^^\^'^ tiiilci vucililr, fVmn f.iti<)ki(' iiiul luul l.ihoiM. J.). v|^ W'.is ilu" iranlport o( iMoxilinns ,it any time iinpnlal hy il\r l»iiM|Mn|r t'oiwaiil thr .millcrv fioin I-dh tnoijM' T A. I'lii- artillt IV h.ul .1 l( I'.d.itc ((MUia' I Un hoil.i. wiili wliu li ilius. I ilnn'i n-iolKi'l ihai any pan ol tlu- provili.tii train wi u* cvn' tmpl. nc. I in hiini\inf\ l()i\vai»l ailillcn oi amlltiv IIhi-h. *5* *i- ^^ ii"' II p«'lliI'K', vMili ilu- iiu Mils wr havl, lo v i>lUi'l a inoiuli's lime nl' pnuiliom looiur tlian it was iolU\lftl ' :\. I b( lit vf not, withoiii tlu iincr luiiiol ilir lioi li s liii mllicvl liy «oiiiiad Idi iIh" put poll' i>l ii.inlpoiiinji (lou K. .0. *^ Was \.Hi piili-nt III tlii.uMiuii i>l ilu' i.jili ol S( picmlui f A. I w.is. )•', {}. Mill the rncmy ililpvitc tlic lu-ll that ilav wiili ()!>iliiiat v P ;\. I licv Jul, aiul iIu- liu- w as imu h lu a\ u i than ivii I law it anv wlicic. iinlcrs at tiio allaii ot r.)ii Amic. 28. (i;^ iKi \i)ii know lunv I.mi;', tlu' nyjinnits i>l ilic Hiiiilli line wiir iiiuKrilial liir r A. The iliKv Hiuit1\ ii-<<,iiU(.nts i^ijir ;>mIi, nil, aiul (^xA) wciv onoafOil iVnm tliicc oVKkIv in tlic aliviiun»n till kvcii in ilu- cvcnini', ; aii«l wliilll I was a piiloiu i 1 In, ml the rebel iHiaiivi-!nalUTj»,nuMal lav, iluy luul nine iliUdvm ivj»inu-ius in ilic liiKI, op p<»l(\I to tlu- time l^iiilli I have namc>l. i^. (.^ Pi) \ou ki\a\v the lots ilu thi\e Miiiilh lej'.iments liillaiiuJ ? A. 1 liin't lav. .v\ ^^ 1^*^ y*>ii lenuiulvr the llien[»,lh i)t'lhe(»2il re{',imnii when ihey i anic out of the aOlioii ? A. I ean't Ipeak to the paitieiilai llienk;th i»r the re.',inunt when ihev eaiiic oiii ol yviion; Init 1 heaivl tiiat they were not to-- rank .iiul lile. ■< I ^i:. ' l*'\\ niain ollieeis weie Ult in (hat re^vnient at the emlot" the ac'lion ? A. I ean'i anlwcr that quellion. ji. ^.^ 1 r>Mn the general llate ol the three Hmilli reinments, lio v.ni ijunk that they \sovilJ have In-en in a puppet voiuhtion to hav;- attaeki\i the enemy the iK\t nioiimnj ? A. Ct'it.nnlv not i nor to j-o on anv l('iviL(' w haie\< 1. '^ ?. Q^ About wliat time ol the Jay itui the cnemv lin.\lly i>,ivc way ? A. 'I'luy (i;.\e wav \i\\ oti^n ; linally about levcn in the evenin(i;. ;.^. ^^ \^ .!< :i praCluable, at that tinuot tlie eveniiij.',, .md in that kuul oreoiintiy, to have piniucJ ? A. I llKHil.i think not. ,•.-.. Q^ ^^ •'■■ \''" "^'t ^'<"-ii eniploveil, bctwccfi the d.iy ot' iluu adioii .iiul liic ai'^lioii uf the ;-ih*i Ociobci, to iv-n>nnoitie .-* .A. I wa;;. 36. ^^ "^^ -i^ )''»' -ible to obtain a view of the enemy's poCiiion ? A. I obtair.ed a vicu ot ilic polition ot' the right ot the ixbel enticnelinicnrs. .•;7- *^ WKit was the i.aiure ol' then polition to the lii'Jit, with re^^ard lo c:Urencl> nicnis : A. Ihey "nptain Monrv. kfiicahlr, Iroin np.ini', rorwiUil lii(Mii'jii lor II .nil \\( i«' I'ViT ' ol |iii)vilii)iii onii.ul loi ilic icir, unlcis at vr iiiuhr ili.it i\l linin (line lloilCI I llCllil Ik- litUI, o|i. ic oui ol' the I .mir oiii ol nk ll\.it ilicv niDiiiitur ? nniiuiy, ro lie atflion of rs. curcncl.* A. Tluy 4 C'nPf-mar.nev.l I'' V I D I' N C V. \ ri\iv N\nr |>m|1mI on !i liill ili.i' < .nnr \. i v urn ilwnvii. < )m \\\> i<\i mI iIw loll \\,r. .1 lliMi.|. liK .ill woiK, ;il ill- i""' iiii ^il'l»iii . (>. I )iil It ii|>|'r,n fi» ynn iliiii ill ii sviM)' ol till i nniiv w,i, .ni i I iM ' ^^ A. li r. .1 iiiii'llion iliiit !'• I< 'ii' ' Iv III inv ln'c ol |i i vi i i<. unlv < i . t>'it At iIm ir .nc no iM III mI olIiMi'i, nor oM.i oIImm', ilini ni\lll, wlio I i \ i d lunh i < i. nu il lln I'oviic, I li.ii -mi iI' i jj,|,|,.,'| I ,|o ilimk lli.it we loiiltl ii'ii li ivi .III M kill ijir iijilii \v ilii» o| iln iil»| « liliriii liliii 111'- v\ illn'ii' nil. tM|', till lol.ol llii wli'il. .iiiiiy, JM'I vMili liilli |)i J i.il hIii ,• , (il liun !■*• (). I onM yoti nl't.iin a vii w ol ilu lili wine o( iIirMimv' .!')■ A. I lu'vi I l.iw ilic Icli Willi', u| till ( III my'', i mo ii' Ihih m, nil I \\ m l.il 'ii piil'i < i an.l (iinilni lf,li tliiir woik'.. (^. ( )ii ll r /ill ol ( )i lol CI w.ii \MM III .1 lilil.itioii to Id the CM (iiy ,iMv,iii( |P|', '•• 'I'' f all.lik ol voni ll ll ? / A. V.v / < .). Dhl till V .idv.im (• iiimIi r .1 will ki vi J lnr of |.r,ipr Ijioi Imkh oni ,iiiill"i y * I ' A. I V.MS III .1 liln.iliuii lliiit I'.ivi MIC .III M|ip(p| iMMil V ol |, (iii|> ilif till' (lion . ol llw ir'cl.' I nliiiiiiis 1 anil I w.is \ ilinn liinkr ili'"'' '^^^'^ hear, in converfation with the rebel officers, that General Ar- nold, fortfeeing tl)at inconvenience, had marciicd out of his lines, and attacked, Vvirhout orders from General Gates ? A, I ilid hear that General Arnold had marched out on the 7th of Oiflober, without orders from C?ciicral Gu'-es. I did alfo hear that he advifed the going out to meet Gene- ral Burgoyne on his marcl., and engaging him before he approached their lines j and the realbn he gave was this : If General Burgoyne fliould ever come near enough their lines to be able to make ufe of his artillery, that he would certainly poffefs himfelf of ti.eircamp-, that tiicir troops in that cale would never (land any where-, but if, on t!ic other hand, the 'cbels fliould be defeated in the woods, the troops would, after that, have confidence in their works, for which reafon Arnold advifed rilking an adtion in the ^voods before General Burgoyne came near enough to fee th^lr works. Examined hy other Memb,./s of the Committee, and by General Burgoyne occaftonally. 0* 5i. •52. 53- 54- Q. Did not your fituation, as deputy quarter mafter general, lead you to mix very much with the different offic"'''! of the army ? t A. It did. Q. What do you apprehend to have been the general opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne's conduft, as well in action as in the many trying occafions which have been dated by you at the bar ? A. They entertained a very high opinion of General Burgoyne's conduct. Q^ Had General Burgoyne the full confidence of the army under his command to th» hft moment ? A. He certainly had. Q^ What was the army's opinion of the rebels after their retreat from Ticonde- roga ? A. The army in general did not think, after they had evacuated Ticonderoga, that they would make a Itand any where. Q^ What was the reafon given in your army for the expedition to Bennington ? A. I believe I cannot anfwer that queftion better than by reading an abftrad of the General's orders the day after that aiftion. Augujl .Captain Money, commanding it ? commanded tiiac ercft batteries ol' nliladed ? le whole of the I do not believe diat General Ar- and attacked, )flober, without It to meet Gene- ;ir lines ; and the ear enough their ollefs himltflfof lere-, but if, on ps would, after ifed riiking an hJA' works. r occaftonally. io\x to mix very f the officers of occafions which duft. lis command to from Ticondc- onderoga, tliat inington ? I abftrad of the Ca^jtain Money.] EVIDENCE. 45 " Aiiiuft " Augv.fl 1 7, Duer Camp. " It was endeavoured, amcng other objcfts, by the expedition which marched to *' the lefr, to iirovide fuch a fupply of cattle as would have enabled the army to proceed *•• v.'ithout waicino- the arrival of the magazines. That attempt having failed of fucceis, " throui'h the chances of war, the troops mull neceflarily halt fua.e days for bringing *' forward the tranfports." (y Why did the army remain from th-j i6th of Au.fTufb to the 13th of September, ^j. before they eroded the Hudfon's River to engage the rebels as Stillwater ? Q. To bring forward a fufficicnt 'Quantity of provifions and artillery, to enable the general to give up his communicr.tion. Q^ What v/as the opinion of the Cirmy on their crofTing the Hudfjji's River ? ^G A. They did think it was their indifpcnfible duty to proceed forw.u-d and fight the rebels, which we heard were then ;.♦■ Stillwater, Q^Did you ever forage to the right of General Frafer's camp, before the 7th of 57. Auguft ? A. We never foraged to the right of the camp at Freeman's Farm, at any one time; on the 7th of 0>?tober, while the troops were in the fich!, General Frafer ordered all the batmen and drivers, belonging to his brigade, to come and forage in the rear of the troops. Q^ Do you know what was General Frafer's opinion on your foraging to the cS, right ? A. I do know that General Frafer mentioned to me, on the 5th of October, that there was forage on the right of his camp ; but at that time the ground on which that forage was to be met with was in polleflion of the rebels' advanced pofl:. Q^ Do you think your army would have been loft, if even the expedition from 59. New York had taken place a few days fooner ? A. If the troops had arrived at New York loon enough to have enabled Sir rienry Clinton to have made his expedition up the North llivcr a week fooner, I do conceive that our army would not have been loft. Q^What was the opinion of the rebels on Sir William Howe's going to the 60. fouthward. A. I was not acquainted enough with the rebel leaders, to hear their opinion on that queftion. I do not think that the peafants of the country were judges of the propriety of Sir William Howe's condud". Q^What was the opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne's army, after it 61. was loft, relative to the crofting Hudfon's River. A. They did think that the alternative of retreating with their army to Ca- nada, or proceeding to Stillwater, under the neceflity of giving up his commu- nication, to be an unfortunate fituation ; but I never heard any officers lay that they thought General Burgoyne had done wrong ; many faid, that if they had re- treated without rifking an adiop, at the time Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he ever have forgiven himfelf. Q;^ Was you at New York after the lofs of General Burgoyne's array ? (z. A, Yes. 46 EVIDENCE. [Captain Money. ^^2- 64. (>5 66. 67. 68. 69. A. Yes. Q^ What was the opinion or the language of the military at that place, relative to Sir William Howe's expedition to PenTylvania ? A. NVhatever opinion was formed of Sii William Howe's expedition to PenfyU vania, or is formed previous to this encjuiry, fuch an opinion mull have been ill- founded, as Sir Williani Howe's reafons were not known, nor his inftrudtions com- municated to the public. Q^ Fro'.Ti your hifl: anfwer, is the committee to iinderftand that the opinions 'thai* were formed rcfpocling Sir William Howe's expedition to Philadelphia, before this enquiry, wore not in favour of that expedition ? Queltion objcdcd to, \JJ'"it':drczi\ ( ^Y, J^ain called in. ifs ou have faid that the army thought it their indifpcnfible duty to pils over Hi'.'iKMi's River — Why did they think that that mcafure was particularly the. r in- dil'penfible duty ? A. If the Hudlbn's River had not been there, the army would have thought it their indir()en(ible duty to have gone and rifked an acticm before they returned to Canada. If I recollect right, I faid, that if the army h.;-^ returned to Canatla, without fighting, that the army would never have forg'. en the general, nor the general have forgiven himfelf. Q. Do you know the nature of the countrv, between the place where we pafTed the Huilfon's River and Albany, on the eatt fide of the river ? A. Yes, I do. Q^ Could the army have taken that route, in order to pafs the river oppofite or near to Albany ? A. The army could not have taken that route, as part of the way was a fwamp, and on the right of the rebel entrenchments was a mountain very rugged, and not palfablc nearer than two miles from the river Q^ Was it not a r.ecefTary confequence then, that the boats mufl have been aban- doned, if the army had taken that route ? A. I think I have faid the army could not take that route ; if the armv had marched on the eart of the Hudlbn's River, they could not have marched near enough to have covered thair provKion bateaux from the rebel force, on the weft fide of the river. Q^ Did the army under General Burgoyne, on their approach to Albany, ex- pe a fwamp, , and not ?en aban- armv had :hed near the weft lany, ex- c North oher the V in cn- s ample, c Kini^'s ores /or " thole Captain Money.] EVIDENCE. 47 " thofe purpofes; the ration of bread or flour is, for the prefent, fixed at one « pound." Q^ Are you acquainted with the North River, from New York to Al- bany ? A. I am not. Q. How many days march from Fort Edward to Albany, if no interruption from an enemy ? A. I cannot rnfwer that queftion, unlefs I am to fiippofe that a bridge was ready formed for the troops to pafs over, on fome parr of Hudfon's River, between Batten Kill and Fort lidward, or that there were vefl'eis ready to tranfport the troops over Hudfon's River. Q^ Is the diftance fo great between Fort Edward and Albany, that the army could not carry provifions with them to fupport them during the march ? A. Certainly Albany is not at fo great a diftance from Fort Edward, but that a corps of troops might certainly carry provifions fufFicient for the march to Albany. Q^ Was it not underftood, iliat if you had rrived at Albany, that the army would find plenty of provifions there ? A. It was generally believed, and I believe it myfelf firmly, that if the army had got to Albany, we fliould have found a number of loyal fubjcdts, that would have joined and done every thing in their power to have eftablilhed the army at that place. Q^ Muft not the army, to march from Fort Edward to Albany, have -lecefla- rily carried a number of boats to form a bridge to pafs the river ? A. There was no pafling the river well without a bridge of boats, and there were not I'couls enough on that river, to make a bridge. Q^ Would not the neceli'ary delay, arifing from carrying forward thofe boats, and throwing a brids^e, fit to pais an army, have confumed more time than it was poflible for that army to fubfift with fuch provifion as they could carry with them ? A. I fliould think it would. Q^ You will give the committee what information you can, refpedtin?^ a road from Fort Edward to Albany, on the left fide of the river. A. I have anlwered that fully. Q^ Whether by taking a pretty large circuit, the army would have reached Al- bany, and avoided the fwamps you mentioned ? A. Certainly not oa the eall fide of the river, becaufe the enemy being on the op- pofite Ihore, would certainly have oppofed General Burgoyne's armv croifing the Hudlbn's River at Albany, the river being three times the width it is at Sara- toga. [inthdre:t\ ro. •I. 72. 73- 74» IS- 76. 77' Mariis 48 EVIDENCE, [Earl of Harrington. Mart is V die Junii, 1779. Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair. 6. Earl of Harrington called in and examined by General Burgoyne. Q. IN \\hat capacity did your Lordfliip ferve in America in the campaign ^777 ? . . A. I was captain in the 29th regiment of foot, and went on the expedition with General Burgoyne, with the command of the grenadier company ; 1 was after- wards appointed I'upernumcrary aid du camp to the general. Q^ While adling as captain of the grenadier company, was you at the afllun of Huberton ? A. I was. Q^ What was tlie behaviour of the enemy on that day ? A. They behaved in the beginning of the aiiion, with a great deal of fpirit; but on the Britifh troops rufliing on them with their bayonets, they gave way in great confufion. Q^ From the nature of the country, was it prafticablc to purfue the enemy fur- ther than they were purfued on that occafion ? A. Certainly not. — I think we ran fome rifque even in purfuing them fo far. Q^ At what time of the campaign was it that General Burgoyne rcquefled your Lordlhip to adt as his aid du camp ? A. I think about the lith of July. Q^ Was you prefent a few days after that time, at a council held with the Indi- ans of the remote nations, then juft arrived, under the condudl of Major Camp- bell and Mr. St. Luc ? A. Yes. Q^ Was you prefent at a former council of the Indians held at Lake Champlain ? A. Yes. Q. What was the tenor of General Burgoyne's fpeeches and injundlions at both thofe councils refpecfling the reftraint of barbarities ? A. He abfoluteiy forbid their fcalping, except their dead prifoners, which they infilled on doing, and he held out rewards to them for bringing in prifoners, and enjoined them to treat them well. Q^Do )f Harrington. Earl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 49 irgoyne. the campaign cpcdition with ; I was aftcr- at the afliun of fpirit*, but way in great he enemy fur- Liing them fo rcqucfled your ivith the Indi- Major Camp- leld at Lake dlions at both , which they irilbners, and 10. and take li- U- 14. D' Q^Do Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoync, foon after the laft council, 9. upon a vifit to an out port near Fort Anne ? A. I pcrfcftly recoiled: it. Q^ ll:ul General Hurgoyne a confulerable cfcort of Indians with him ? A. He had. Q. Did part of that cfcort, on a fcout from that pod, fall in with a part of the enemy, who were laid in ambulli for the purpofe of killing or taking the general, and thofc who were with him ? A, They did. (^ What were the fcntiments of the captain taken on that occafiun rcfpeding 12. his treatment from the Indians ? A. He faid he was treated with much humanity, and I pcrfedly remember that priloners brought in on many other occafions by the Indians, declared that they had been ufed with the fame degree of humanity. Q. Does your Lordihip remember General Burgoyne's receiving at Fort Anne, the news of the murder of Mifs M'Rea ? A. I do. Q^ Did General Burgoyne repair immediately to the Indian camp, and caf "-hem to council, aflirted by Brigadier General Frafer ? A. He did. Q^ What pafTed at that council ? A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with death, infixed that he fhouUl be delivered up-, and there were trjany gentlemen of the army, and I own I was one of the number, who feared that he would put that threat in execution. Mo- tives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it ; and if he had not pardoned the man, which he did, I believe the total defedion of the Indians would have cn- fued, and the confequcnces, on their return through Canada, might have been dreadful ; not to fpeak of the weight they would have thrown into the op- pofite fcale, had they gone over to the enemy, which I rather imagine would have been the cafe. Q^ Do you remember General Burgoyne's retraining the Indinn parties from 16. going out without a Britifli ofiiccr ur proper condudor, who were to be refpon- fible for their behaviour ? A. I do. Q^ Do you remember Mr. St. Luc's reporting difcontents amongft the Indians, 17. foon after our arrival at Fort Edward ? A. I do. Q^ How long was that after enforcing the reftraints above mentioned ? !?>. A. I can't exadly lay ; I fliould imagine about three weeks or a monrh. Q^Does your Lonllbip recoiled (jeneral Burgoyne's telling Mr. St. Luc, that 19. he had rather lofc every Indian, than connive at their cnonuiclei, or uiing lan- guage to that cfied ? A, I do. _ Q^ Does your Lordfliip remcn\ber \shat palled in council with the Indians at 20. Fort Edward ? H A. 'i) -,e E V I r. N C F. [Earl of Harrington, 22. -J" 25. i6. 17. r8. 29. .^0' 3^ 32. A. To the bcfl of my rccollcdion, nun! t!ic Umc exborfation to ad: with huma- nltv, antl nmch tb.e f.^nv rcwa-'ds were otl-rcd lor liiviuii; their priibncrs, Q, Do you !(:coll(.'i.-l the ciriuinllan -e ot the liuHans dcliring to return home at ihar tinu- ? A. I do, perfccllv well. (^ Do you lemcinbcr tliat nianv qniitcd tlu; army without leave? A. I i\o, imm(.'ili:itely alicr the coiiiicil, and tlie next '■norning. (>^ W'.is it not tlie L';enoral opinion that the defeiflion of the Indians, then and aU'v'i wartlsj was caul'cd by the rcllraint upon their cruelties and habits of plun- lUv .- A. It was. (^ Had you rcan)n to believe that the cxpc(Htion to Bennington was mucli dcfn-ed by General Reidcl'el, and that it was iiis widi to have it conducted by Lieu- tenant Colonel ]5aunie ? A. It Avas always imagined in the army, that it was his wifli, and that Colonel Baumc was ajipointcd to the command of it in compliment to him. Q^ Did vou know the corps of Biitifh, commanded by Captain Frafer, which made part o{ thaf expedition ? A. They were volunteers from the BritllTi regiments, and alfo flood very high in the opinion of the army, from their gallant behaviour on all occafions. Q^ Do you remember General Rurgoyne's vifiting the detachment after it was ailirmliled, and conferring with Colonel Baumc ? A. I do, Q. Did Colonel Baume appear fatisfied with the llrength of his corps ? A. I converted with Colonel Baumc, ainl with feveral olllcers under his command, antl they appeared perfectly fati^tied, at lca(t I heard no complaint from them ; the only anxiety they cxprelled was, kit the deltination of that corps fliould become known to the enemy. Q^ Does your Lordfliip remember General Burgoync's receiving, in the night, a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Baume, cxprelling he found the enemy in greater force than he cxpeded ? A. I do. Q^ Do )ou remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Burgoync's aid du camji, being fent with orders to Colonel Breyman to march immediately to fujipovt hini !* A. I do. Q^ Did you communicate the fame order to General Reidsfcl at the fame time ? A. I did. Q. Was Colonel Breyman the neareft corps for the purpofe of that fupport ? A. It was. C^Did Brigadier General Frafer at all times treat your Lordfhip with great confidence .^ . 4 A. I was m in th o I of Harrington. a<^ null huma- icrs. return home at Karl of Hiirrlngton.] EVIDENCE. 5» dians, then and habits of plua- !;ton was miicli iintted by Licu- wifli, and that com])linient to 1 Frafer, which nd alfo flood ;haviour on all nt after it was rps ? ccrs under his no complaint i nation of that n the night, a my in greater yne's aid du mmcdiately to I at the fame at fupport ? ip with great A. I was 34. 25- 6. 37- A. I was often with General Frafer, and he frequently talkcil without rcfcrve upon matters which he was not particularly bouml to conceal. I'hcre were certain matters of intelligence which it would have been improjier for him to mei. ion to any bocK'. In thir cafe I cannot boad fo much of his confidence, as to fu[ipole that he would have opened his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed from the rell of his iricnds. Q. Have you not freciucntly been prefent when General Rurgoync and General 33 Frafer difculVed the objei^ of the campaign, and converfcd freely on the circumltanccs of the time ? A. I have. Q^ Did your Lordfiiip ever, in prefence or abfcncc of General Rurgoyne, hear Ge- neral Frafer expreis a dil'apprubation of padlng the Hudfon's River ? A. I never diil ? Q^ Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our way to Albany was pre- valent throughout the army ? A. In every convrrfation I had with different officers of the army, I never remem- ber once to have heard it doubted, but that we were to force our way. Q. Did the army pafs the Mudfon's River with alacrity? A. Ic is impoffible for any army to have been in higher f[/irits than they were at that titne, or more defirous of corning to an engagement with th*; enemy. Q^Do you not conceive, that to have remained polled behind the Mudfon's River, at the time the army palled it and advanced, would have call a damp on the fpirits of that army and a relledlion on their General ? A. From the eagernefs of the arrny to advance and the great imeaflncfs that was diiccrnible through it on every dela)-, I aj^prehended that it ''outd not have been otherwife ; and I think that General Rurgoyne's character would not have flood very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy, had he halted at Fort Edward. Q. Do you recollc«5l the march up to the enemy on the 19th of Septem- 3?. ber? A. I do, Q^ Will you pleafe to dcfcribe it ? ' 39" A. The army marched in three divifions ; the German line flanking, the artillery and baggage purfued the courfe of the river through the meadows, and formed the left hand divifion ; the Rritifli line marched parallel to it at i'omc dillance through the woods, and formed the centre divifion 1 General Frafer's corps, with the grena- diers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour through the noods, and formed the right hand divifion or cokmin. Reyond this, on the right, there were, as I underltand, flanking parties of light infantry and I'ruvin- cials ? Q. Was the country, over which the army pafled, intcrfc6led with a deep 40. ravine ? A. It was one of the dccpeft I ever law. Q. Which colurnn was firfl attacked ? A. The advanced party, conlifting of the picquets of the centre .olumn, being fent 11 2 forwartls, 4'- .o. E V I D E N C £. [Earl of Harrington. forsvnrcis, under the eonimand of M.iinr Forbes, to cx'olorc tl'C \vay by wb'cb thtit CMliinin waste) [nifs, Icll in with a conliilecablc bi-)ily of ih;' rebels, jiorted in a hdufc ami bw'himi t'cnccs, which ihcy nrrncked, and atter a j:;rcat deal of fire, the dctach- iiK-nt nearly drc.vc in the botly of rebels; but on ilnding th;it tlie woods ([uitc roun.l ihem were filled with the c:ieni\-, ihe\' were oblij^ed to )ctire to the main [Wv. 4:. Q. Was the march (n performed that when Cleneral Ijiirgoyne formed the line of the iiritilli infantry, General Frafer's corps were ready upon their right to Uipport them ? A. General Frafor, on hcnrinj.^ tlie fire of \Tjii)r Forbos's parry, dctaelicd two com- panies to hipport them, which came up jult aficr th.u engagement was over; and on their appearance the enemy finding that our troops were in rtrcngth, (piitted the poll they had before occuried, antl, immediatelv after this, the whole line was formed wiih the utmofl: regularity. I would explain, that when I fpeak of the line, I do not include the left hand column which was comjwfed of Germans, and which did not come into the line or intoadion till late in the day. 41. Q^ How long did the adtion lalt ? A. Frfim three o'clock, I think, till very near eight. 44. Q^ How long were the 20th, a ill, and 62d regiments engaged ? A. During the greateft j)art of that time, ^r. Q^ Was the adtion well dilputed by the enemy ? A. It was, very obllinately. 46. Q^ Was your Lordihii) near the j>erfon of General Ikirgoync during that adtion, except \\ hen vuu were employetl to carry orders ? A. Yes. 47- Q.- ^V'crc not different attempts made by the General's orders to charge the enemy with bayonets, and did not thofc attempts fail by the heavinefs of the enemy's fire and tlncki'.cfs of the woods ? A. There were manv attempts made for that purpofe, and they all failed except the laft, when the Britifh troops finally drove them out of the ficUl. 48. Q; When part of the German troops did get into adlion that day under General Reidefel, how did they behave ? A. I heard their behaviour fpoke of in the hiohcft terms ; they marched up to the enemy with great coolncfs and fteadinefs, and gave them, as I was told, three vollies by word of command from their officers. Q^Can your Lordlhip fpeak to the lofs fultaincd by the three Britilh regiments, the bid in [^articular? A. The lofs was verv confidcrable ; but I don't recolledl the numbers. -Q_ Q; Were thofe three Britifli regiments in a condition to have attacked the enemy the next niorning ? A. Their numbers were fo reduced, that I apprehend they were not. 5t. Q- From the lofs of killed and wounded, particularly of officers, would it have been dcfirable to have brought thofe three regiments into adtion for the next ten days ^ A. In lefs than ten days the (late of thofe regiments certainly would not have been 49. 4 rv-l i^r\ of Harrington, ay by wlrdi that polled in a houfc file, the detach- the woods ([iiiie ictirc to the maiu formed the line of !■ rk'Jn ti) llipport ctaclicd two com- it was over; and ngth, fiuittcd the c line was formed the line, I do not ind which did not Earl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. ;.ti i:i Jiiiig that aarion, charge the enemy f the enemy's fire all failed except ay under General -' marched up to was told, three 3ritiih regiments, bers. acked the enemy ot. , would it h:ivc for the next ten would not have been 52. C3' been much mended ; I rlierefore aiiprc-hond, that if they were nt !i n rr,nclitlop. m be I I -u.';ht into action ilie next morning, tlcir inabiliry Wsjuld have liiil continued fjr t;io e ten days. ■ r , Q. I Ind the army nrule a movement to gain the Ictt of the enemy's entrench- menrs before the red )uli:s were conlb-ucted thar commanded the plain near rheiiwr, would not all the bateaux, (lores, and holpiials liavc been expoled to attack ? A. It certainly would have been lb. ^ii, D-) you rc'colki'^ the fcarciiy of forage on the weft-fide of the rivci ? A. I ilo peifeClly. O. V\'ould not the bridge of boats, confl:ru6led for the purpnfe of foraginfi; to 54. the eiul fide, have alio been expoled before the redoubts, above mentioned, were railed ? A. I'hey certainly would, had it not been for thofe redoubts and a work called the '■7''.'te da pout, which was railed for the protei^^ion of the bridge. f^ Do you iocollei!:f how long it took to raife thole redoubts, to throw the bridge, 55. and laife the T.'/f du pout f* A. If 1 rccoUeL^t right, the bridge itfelf was finiflied in one night; the making and compleating the other works took fome days. O- Do^s your Lordfliip remember General Burgoyne mentiop-'-'g to you in ^6, conlTdence, the receipt of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, and h.s hourly ex- pei'^ation of his attacking the Highlands, and his opinion that his fuccefs there mull diilodge the enemy without attacking their entrenchments ? A. I perfe^lly recolle£l the General's mentioning all this to me. Q^Was you near General Buigoyne in the action of the 7th of Odlober?- A. I was. Q^ Do you recolleiJl what orders vou carried ? A. I do. Q^ What were they ? A. The firfl: orders I recolledl to have carried, were to poll fifty men under the command of a captain of the 20th regiment, to the left of the detachment of the armv, in order, in fome meafure, ro join them to the advanced works of General Frafer's camp, and, in cafe of any accident, to protcA the detachment, (hould they find it neceflarv, to retire thither. The next orders I carried were to Major General Phillips, at the end of the aftion, acciuainting him, that as that detachment feemed much difordered from the enemy having rurncd both their flanks, that it was ncceffary to draw it as foon as polfible back to the camp, which feemed menaced with an attack; the care of this General Burgoyne committed to General Phillips, while he himfelf returned to the camp, in order to take proper meafures for its defence. On our return thither the works of the camp were adlually attacked as General Burgoyne had forefeen, and I was then em- ployed to coUeft what troops I Ihould meet, and to order them to thofe parts where they were mod wanted. Soon after this, the enemy having got round the right of our camp, we expefted an attack upon our rear, and I then was difpatched with orders from General Burgoyne to Brigadier General Hamilton, for all the works iu 3 . the SI- 58- S9- S4 1. V I J) !•: N C E. ( r.irl of narrin|.',ion, Ol. t2. €4. 66. 67. f..r tlir rear of t lie c.\miv \yWn\\ luiJ lircii pix-viouflv ooiiOnKlcvl, to lie manned with l\Kh lolilicrs as he cimM ipaio fVuni tlio (IdVMUo ol'iho fiuiit. (^I)oi's\()iir l.oidili'ip know what orders Sir Fiancii Ciarkc was charged with, at the rime he reccivn.! liis \s omul ? A I nu't Sir I'ranc'.s Clark" ai I w.is lVarchin!>; for (iciicral rhiilips, and ac- quainted hiin with my onlers, telling him at tlu' lame time, that as the thiek- nelsotthe wood might [Mweni my fmding (General IMiillips diict:;tlv, I ^vilheil he would allill mo, in order thiu no time might he loll in ilelivering thole onlers ; that ^vas the I ill tune I law Sn- I'.aiu's Clarke, and I believe thai loon afterwards he re- ceived tho wouiui of which he ilied ? (4:^ *>\'as it ilark before Ciencral lUirgoync had a certainty that Col. IJieyman was kill.d, anil liis poll (..u'lied by the enenn ^ A. It was lb liark thi't »!ie ollieer, who I believe iiill brovi!>,hr the inlellij-vnee of it, feeing a number of men roiuul the fires of ihat camp, io'>k them for (iermans, :md was not convinced of his error till he was fi.cd \\[n)n by them, as they i)roved to be a party of the enemy who had foieed the wji ks. Q^ Did (iencial Hurgovnc ufe any cllorfs to rally th^ Germans who were reiumi'ig from the action, and to perfiiadc theni lu recover Colonel llreyman's A. I le certainlv did his utmoll endeavnirs for that pm-pofe, which however were inetleClual fiom the ilarknefs of the night, ai'd the entire conli,lio!i in which they A\ ere 0^. (^. Were "".y other troops at hand that eoiiUl have been fpared for that pur- pole .'' A. There certainly were not; every regiment was occupied u\ defence of its own lines w hich were not certainly overmanned. Q^ In the hear of the adion i\o )ou reeollec'V feeing General Reidefel about the time that the Germans, on the left of the britifh artiller\', were giving way ? A. I do. Q^ \\"as not General Reidefel exerting himlllf to rellorc order in his troops? A. General !CMCC of it [iormuns, y provcul 1^ lu) were •re\' man's ver were ieh tliey hat pur- ' its o\\ a )oiit the Karl of narriiii^ton.] E V I O U N C I'. 55 1S 11 every er, u!ul xpcda. lat (lav, aJmolb ernoon icavily who tended ntren»lcd the corpfe on its way thither, which I fup|ir>rc was accidental, and pro- ceeded iVoin the enemy's lirinj"; a niimlnTof pe()|»le toneiiier. Q. \\ ju) were tiiechitf peilDiis wl»() aiiciuleil th.it funeral ? Or), A. All the pcnerals of the army, their aid ihi eaiiips and I believe all thofc who were not attached to any partii ul.ir pw(l, which at tliat rime were vcy lew. Q. Was the retreat ol' the army <'ii the nij'Jit of the bill, .ind t-n liie day and pait 70. of the ni|dit of th" ytli, made in jHKid order ? A. It was made in perit (Jt good onler. Q. What was thi- weather on the day of the 9th? yt. A. 1' >:e(cdiiu', wet. 7 I. (.1^ What was the ilatc of the troops, in point of faii[^ue, wlien tiiey arrived at Saratoga ? A. 1 hey certainly mu(l have been imirh fatigtied, from the len(r,th of time they liad been under arms, and more particularly fo from the liadiiels of ihe roads, occa- fioneii by the rains. (^ Wlun it was daylight the next morning, did you fee any part of the enemy 73. upon the plain at Saratoga, on the ground where our artillery was aflcrwardi polled ? A. I ilon't recoiled-. Q; Dots your l.oi.'lhip recoiled feeing a corps of the enemy on the other fide the 74. I III lion's Kivcroppolite to Saratoga ? A. IVrfecHly well ; anil they leemed in force. Q^ Do yon remi luber the circumllaiice of a battery opening from that corps ? 7 j, A. I lio pertetlly well. I'he general, General Phillips, and ieveral ot.ier gentle- men were at diiiiier, VVe were all obliged to remove, from finding ourlelves m chc range of' that battery. Q. VVc being in the range of that battery, mufl. ic not neceflarily have com- 76. inandcil the tord on the bludlon's l'»iver ? A. It certainly did command that ford. Q^ Do you recoiled Lieut. Col. Sutherland being Tent wirh a detachment of -ly, regulirs and provincials from Saratoga, to cover a party of workmen employed to repair bridges, and render the road practicable? A. I perfedly recoiled it. Q_ Do you -ecolled for what reafon Colonel Sutherland and the rc,'^ulars were re- 'jp called? ^ ' A. I umierdood it was on the apprehenfion of an adion. (^ Does your Lordfliip recollect different fcouts bringing reports of the enemy's -o. being m poirellion of the country between Saratoga and Fort Edward, on both fides ^ of the river ? A. I do. Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's mentioning, in confidence to you, dif- ^^ ferent ideas of forcing the ford over lludfon's Uiverj of cutting away by tlie ene- my's right, and attempting a rapid march to Albany j or by a nr^ht march to gain the lords above Fort Edward ? '€' A. I do perfedly remember that he mentioned to me all ihofc ideas. (,1 Did 5« fti. 84. 85. 86. 87. H8. S9. I* V I n r. N c r. [F.arl of Harrington. Q^ DiJ you over hoar of an olilr made by General I'hillips to make his way to TirDiuhioj^a wiili a Ixnly ol iroops ? A. No. (^. In tlic intimacy in wliich you lived witli M.ijor (kmh-imI riilllips, inyli.'ir, an ! tin- olliiirs in Cn-ncral I'luliips's tanii!}', do you not think yuu lliould have hcud ot" liuli an oiler lud it been made? A. I appieh^iui that I llioiilJ have heard of it. (j^ Did your Lordllup hear of General rhilHps olVcnni.!; to attempt an cfi ajie through the woods with one or two iMiidcs, for the purpofe of puttinj>; himlelf at thi; head ot" t!ic troops at Tieondenii.';.!, for the I'uture defence of that phice ? A. I heard it mentioned linec I came to J'',n|i,hinii, in iome conimon eonverla- tion i but 1 never lu'.ird ii hinted at wliile I was in i\nierica. (^ J lie day before the couneil of the generals and lield ollktrs was calleil, can your I.ordlhip Ipeak of the Hare of thinp,s in general at Saratoga ? A. 1 lie (late of our army was certainly as bail as pollible. Their numbers were few, their provilions lliort, and their polition not a good one, owing to the nature of tlie eountry, which role to the dillanee of fome miles, one hill overtojiping that whicli was next to ir. (^ IJo you know any officer of that army '.vho, in that fituation, thought we Iiau a right to more tlian honourable terms ? A. Our fituation, in the apprehcnfion of every one there with whom I eonverfed, did not entitle us to more. {). Did the army in general look on the terms obtaineii, namely, the power ol" ferving their country in other places, to be advantageous as well as honourable, and more than they had a right to expect ? A. I believe they certainly did \ and that few perlbiis in the army expelled fo good terms as thole which were granted. Examined h^ other Members oj the Committee^ and hy General Burgoyne occafionally . Q^ Did the Indians leave the army till after the battle of Bennington ? A. Great numbers did, and at many dillerent times. Q^ Were not fome Indians on the expedition to Benningto'i ? A. There were. Q^ Was the expedition originally fent out to Bennington ? A. My fituation in the army not entitling me to be in tiie courcil cir war, ^\v\ not beinrr employed on that expedition, I was of courle not entrulled with the orders that were given to Col. Baume. CX Have ycu real()n to fuppofe that General Reidelel or Colonel Baumc had a par- ticular knowledge of tiiat part of the country, fo as to make it particularly proper to give Colonel Baume the command of that expedition } A. I believe there was no officer in that army of fufficient rank to have com- manded fuch an expedition, who ever had been in that particular part of the •country. Q^ I he tarl x\. <^ A. c. cerics A. doinii A. I::arl of I lanin^ton.] K V I I) i: N c i:. 57 The O. 'riicinrentionorthecxprdition bii.i|r, ns appears l)y tlie papers on thtMaMc, 9«- toloMiul the clHioliii.M of ihc people of th;it country, was that part ol iho coun- liy iHoplal with (icnnans, as many other parts of the country are? A I can't cxadly (peak to the ileftripiioii ol the people ot that cnuntry, as [ wis'tifvcr there thvlelt'-, Init there utrc cniplnyal on tliat cxpeilm.n miinlKihol provinuals, many of whom were of that veiy country, ami I apprchen,! that lil'J c )ir.inon loldiirs of a r.y.ul.ir army are not the imnKdiito people who aic t.-pcCUa I ) 1 iiin.l the miiuls of any country to which ihcy are lent. (\ As your l.ordlhip mentioned the alacrity with which the army palled the ,,:. J luTTon's Kiver, did the army in general ihinl; themlclves at that time hiaJcquatc to the purpole of forcing their way to Albany ? .,,.,,. A. 'I'he opinions of an army, wlio cannot he acquainted with the intclli-rnce that h ■,-■, bjcn receivctl, are oftni erroneous. 'I he army was in h\{i}\ Ipints, and did noi, J b.lieve, doubt of reaching Albany. ()^ Did the General then' doubt of reaching Albany ? 93. A. I really don'c know. (^ Were the rebels' entrenchments completed on the i^;tli of Septeivber . 54. A. I Miver faw t!ie entrenchments at all. Q^ How was our army employed between tlic i^ilx of September and ihc yih of 95. Oaober? A. 'ihc armv ilfelf was employed in ftrennjthening its pofition. Cj^ Did it take the army eighteen days to itrcn^iheu its poiition before it made any 96. nioviir.ent ? A. I can't exatflly fay. They were working all the time. O^ What works were executed in that time ? _ 9 *. aT There were numbers ot redou'.jts ereited i the tcte-dii-pont -, linos Ih'Hm-c the c..n,'i- (jjLWJiks to the li:'ics, in which guards and [)icquets were placed; and bat- teries. Q. F low many redoubts v/ere erc< (^ Was 6o EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington. J J.. ■r- ■^P. I2i I :;. I :^0. K^^- 13- ^^3' 1 '' ' 135- 1 -^6. I v: A. I apprehend the cannon arc felJom abandoned, but through abfolute nc- ccfTirv. (^ Whether in gcnci;il y^u can inform Lhe committee, whether the army hud a cusifnlcnce in the pp-ieral .' A. Thev certainly ''.ul a confidence in the general, and I do not believe that the\ have altered tlu'.r opinion. (}^ Did th? armv then in jToneral, and the oflicers in partiiMlnr, entertain a favourable opinion of the general's condudl, ct^pacity, and attachment to them in the various fcenes in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very trvinr occafions ? A. I don't rccolleft that anv office-, with whom I have had converfation, has ever cxprelled liimlclf in different terms, and I believe there never was an army more dciervcdiv pleafed with tlie conduct of their general. Q^ ^Vhcthcr the army exprelled any dililitisfaiftion at the general's return home; that IS, whether they thcnight he came with any purpofes not friendly to them, or loolvcd en thcmfelves as dcfertcd bv hini ? A. I was not with the army wl-cn CJeneral Burgoyne came away ; but I have converfed wiih many odicers who have come from it, and thev exprcis no dil- fatistaCtion on that head, much lefs looked on or confidercd General Burgoync's intcn'iors as inimical to them. Q^\Vhat WIS the liate of the Ameri.-an artillerv, and how was it ferved ? A. lA'cept on a i'cw occafions, I do not remember their having made much ufe of their cannon ; I thought on thole occafions that they ferved them flowly, out not ill. Q^ Whether all circumflanccs confidercd at the time of the affair of Saratoga, the retreat of the army was jiraclicable, either with or without: artillery ? A. I thought it was impracticable. Q^ Whether after the convention at Saratoga you went to Albanv ? A. Yes. Q^ \\'hether \-ou had any opportunity of obferving the nature of the country, if ir wis rtrong or woodv, clear or open ? A. Very llrong and woody, and a great number of hills. Q^ ^^'hat was the dirtance ? A. I don't exaftly recoUedl ; about thirtv-two miles. Q^ Was the lituation of Albany u Ib-ong fituation, or was it commanded by hills round it ^ A. The utuation of Albany was in a bottom very much commanded. (^ If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence might they have drawn their fubfillence, if tlic country had been againlf them ? 13^- A. I don'r know enough of the country to anfwer that qucQion, (>^ Mull they nf)t have drawn the'r liibfillence iVom New York ? A. I apprehend fo, if they were not mailers of the Mohawk country, ^39' f^ Had vou any opportunity of obferving the extent of clear or cultivated coun- tr\' lountl Albany ? A. I can't very judly dcfcribe it, not having gone out of the town of Albany, froni the time I came into ir, till I embarked for New ^ ork. I m i Qi Do of Harrington, h abfoliite nc- r the army had lot bch'evc that »r, entertain a meiit to them :ularly on very nvcrfation, has r was an army return home; nelly to thciii, ; I'ur I have ^\iyci's no dii- ial iiurgoync's it fervccl ? : made much them flowly, of Saratoo;a, erv ? ? f the country. mmandcd hy :d. have diawn y. tivatcd coi;n- \lbany, from Q. Do Major Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 6i Q. ^^M'"" ^'^"''''^ ^'^^*'' circumflanced as the army was after the engagement of 140. the 19th ot September, it would have been more advantageous to have returned than to have rtayed and fortified the camp ? A. As matters have turned out, it certainly might ; but I believe no one thought fo at that time. [_ll\ihd)ecv. Major Forbes called in and examined by General Eurgoyne. Q^ WA? vou mnjor of the 9th rcg'mcnt, and preftnt with that regiment in i. the adicn near Fort Anno ? A. I was. Q^ What was the behaviour of the enemy on that nccafion ? 2. A. At half patt ten in the nK)rning, they r.ttaeked us in front with a heavy and wcll-diredled fire ; a lari^e body o'i ihem pafled the creek on the left, fired frcm a thick wood acrofs the creek on the left fl ink of the regiment ; they then began to re-ciol"s the creek, and attack us in the rear: we then found it ncccHary to chai.ge our ground, to prevent the regiments being furrounded ; we took poll on the top of a higii hill to our right. As foon as we had taken j)oft, the enemy made a very vigc^rous atrack, which continued for upwards of two b.ours ; ami t!iey cer- rainly would have forced us, had it not been for foir.e Indians that arrived and gave the Indian whoop, which we anfwcied with three cheers; the rebels loon af- ter that gave w av. Q. What command 1 A. I commantle d th e niC( juets )n tlie loth of of the Uritifh. :ptcr Q^Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree of vigour r* q. A. I was attacked with great vigour from behind railed fences, and a houfe, by a body or riflemen and light infan^rv. (.^ Was you wounded in that affair ? c, A. Very early in the dav. Q^Do you remember General Eurgoyne bringing up the Britifli lino to fup- 6. port you, and furming at the firll opening of the wood ? A. I do. Q. Did General rnder's corps arrive prccifely in time to occupy the heights on 7. the right of the Hritilli line when the artion began .? A. It did, and two companies of light infantry came to my fupport, C^. Where did General Burgoyne poll the 9th ix'gimcnt ^ S. 2 ' A. Ai '•51 !'•■ -il (>i E V I ]) E N C E. [Major Forbc% to. 12. ^3- 14. IS- 16. j8. A. As loon as llicy came nut of the wood, they filed off to the right, ami were drawn oil' ui a fiTiall difVance from the left of General Frafer's corps, with crJcrs to occupy two houfjs, one company in each, and defend them to the hiit extremity. C)^ Had you ar, opportunity in that fituation to obfcrve the ftrefs of the uv5)ion ? A. I had while we remained in that pofition. C^. What was the progrcfs of it ? A. The twenty-firlt and fixty-fecond regiments were drawn up on our Icfr, .and were attacked about three o'clock on the fame ground where the picqucts had been attacked. About that time 1 heard a great deal of firing to my right Avith the advanced corps ; an ofHcer came up to General Bnrgoyne, and acquainted him that the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the fixty-fecond regi- ment, on which he difpatched an aid-dc-camp with orders to the twentieth regi- ment to form on the left of the fixfy-fecond ; immediately after, fome compa- nies of the light infantry came to occupy the ground the ninth were drawn up on ; the ninth were then ordered behind a deep ravine, to form a corps-de- rcferve I fiuv nothinc; of the adlion after that. Q^ What was the rtrength of the ninth regiment on that day before they fuftain- cd anv )ofs ? A. On the 15th of the rnonth th.c weekly return was given in, and, to the bell of my recollecfUon, they were two hundred and fifty and odd rank and file fit for duty. Q^ What was the ftrength of the other regiments in the Britilh line ? A. I cannot f[ieak with any certainty, as I did not fee the returns ; but on talking with different commanding officers : the four Rritifh regiments were about one thoufand one hundred, and the advanced corps about one ihoufand two hun- dred. Q. Where was the twenty-fourth regiment ? A. With the advanced corps. Q. Where was the forty-feventh regiment ? A. Six companies of the forty-fevcnth regiment that were with that army, were employed as a guard to the bateaux and provifionr-, and two with the advanced corps. Q^ Where were the other two companies of that regiment left ? A. One at Fort George, and another on an ifland in Lake George, (^Of the eleven hundred which compofcd the line on that day, do you know how many were lofl: and difabled in the inftion ? A. I have heard the furgeon of the hofpital fay, that there were more than five hundred of the whole in the hofpital, but I can't ipeak to how many of the line. Q: Can you fay how many were killed? A. I can't. Q^ Can you fay how many officirs were killed and wounded ? A. I can't immediately, Q^ Were vliijor Foibci. le right-, and corps, wirh -m to the lait ftrcfs of the 311 our Icfr, the picqucts to my right J acqiiaiiuett fccond regi- ^nticth regi- >me compa- : chawn up a corps-dc- :hcy fuftain- md, to the nk and file le? 5 ; but on were about d two hun- rmy^ were : advanced :ou know lore than many of Major Forbes.] / evidence; 0^ Were Q. Were the Britirti troops in a condition to have attacked an enemy in In- trcnchments after the a;!lion ? A. After* the aftion ol the 19th, I went to the hofpiral to get my wounds dreffcd, and did not join the regiment till the 8th of Oftobcr ; I can't there- fore rive an opinion of my own : but I have heard fcvoral otnccrs fay, the/ did not think it would have been prudent or right from the lofs they had fuflainetl the day before. (X 13id the regiments begin to be encreafed in th/..- ftrcnprh from the recovered men to any confiderable cit^gice in lefs than eight or ten days ? A. Nut that 1 Know of. I was at the hofpital at the time. Q. lleing in the hofpital, had you occafion to know that the regiments were flronger from the receipt of their recovered men on the 7th of Odtober, than they were at any time between the 19^1 of September and that day ? A. I know that feveral men were difcharged from the hofpltals fo far recover- ed as to enable them to do their duty. Qj^ Al \\ hat t'.me did the troops arrive at Saratoga ? A. About eight o'clock at night on the 9th. Q^ Do )ou know how long the troops had then been under arms, and without repolc or regular refrefliment ? A. From the 7th in the morning. Q^ Had they been in attion^ or in continual expectation of atftion, during that whole time ? A. I uas in the front of the army, and I heard a great deal of firing In the rear, and we conftantly expefted and looked for an attack. Q. Did the battery of the enemy on the other fide of the river at Saratoga com- mand the foit on that river ? A. It did. (^ Was the ground fuch on our fide as would have enabled our artillery to have fileuced that battery ? A. It did not appear to me that it could. Q^ H:ui the pallage of the fcrd been etfedVed, and the army have proceeded to- wards Fort Edward, on the eaft fide of the river, muil they not neceli'arily have pafied Batten Hill ? A. Undoubtedly. Q. Do you remember the ford at Batten-Hill ? A. Yes. Q; Would it have been poflible for the army to have pafl!ed that ford without artillery to covet them, and the enemy ported on the other fide ? A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of feeing the twentieth regiment pafs that ford without an enemy to oppofe them, and they took a confiderable time, owing to the depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, and the (tones being remarkable flijipery, fo that feveral of them fell into the river. Q^ Was you prefent at all the councils of war to which the field ofiicers of the army were called at Saratoga ? A. I was. Q^Do 19. 21. ^-3- 2^ 26. 2^. 30. 0^ *Jf 6+ .y\- i: V I D E N C E. [Mnjor Forbes, f. He* yovi rciv.cinlxT wlietlicr General Biirp;oyiio fliited tlie difnciilties of the un\-, .in i i!iji Ik- incinioiuc his rcatliiitls to undci'iiiLc any mcafurc they llioukl think for the hiMi'.iuv of the lliitini arms ? A. I do ic'incmb'T ir. (>. \V,is the loviiiLii unaiiimous tu tivat sviili the enemy on honourable terms ? .A. '1 hey were. '" J by (i.-noral Gates were read to thcin, were they unar.uiH'Us to njuel tlieiM ? A. 'i'iu'v wire. (^. After it \v,r. dceiikvl bv a majoriiy of liie cooixil that the treaty could not be lulpeiided v.iiho'.it bleach of fuilh, were not the council then unanimous to lign it on that day ? A. As the m.ijoritv of ilic council had rW^^n ir as their opinion that the public faitli was pleti^v d, the council i!ioue,iit that tii'.rc was no lime to be loll, and that it ought to be iiiincd immediately. Lx.vnhicd hy otbcr ATtiuht-rs of the Com»nt:cc and ly General Bw^v\i:e arafivHiiU)'. .-I/' 3^. 59- 40. I. Q^ Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was completely entrenched on tlie \<~)\\\ of September • A. I don't know. (V I lad you any reafon to believe from inforniation tliat they completed tiuir en- trenihmcnts ;-.fcerware!b ' A. I underllood diey had — I don't fpeak from authority. Q. I lad you reafon to think that the rebels received confiderablc reinforcements between the 19th of September and the ^tii of (October? A. I did not hear chattiiey iiad. Q. Swppofmg the rebels to have received reinforcements, could any accrfiion of Areniith to our anny from the recovery of any number you can I'uppofe of the qco that were in the liolpital, be C(|ual to a reinforcctiitnt of even 500 men received by tiio enemy ? A. I cannot take upon me to fay. Q^ From being in the hofpital yourfelf, how many of the 500 do you judge joined tiie army ? A. I can't pretend to fay. Q. Do you judge in your own opl'iion, putting all the circumftances you can torte- tlier, whether the enemy were more likely to be forced on the 20th of September or a day or two after, th.m on the 7th of Odobcr ? A. It is impollible for me to judge — I did not know their flrength on the 19th of September, or what reinforcements they received before the 7th of Odober. Q^ Did you apprehend the army mi^ht have made tlicir retreat good to Canada jni:r.cdiatcly aUer the aclion of the r^th of Sej)tcmber ? A. Ihat Major Forbes.] EVIDENCE, ^6 A. That depended entirely on circumftances. (^Judging from the circuinftanccs you then knew, what is your opinion ? A. I was not more acquainted with the ciicumllanccs of the 1 9ih of September than with thofe of the 7th of Oeliober, Q^ If the army had had three weeks more provifions when thty began their retreat, would not that have been a material circumftancc to them towards making good their retreat ? A. The army could have defended thcmfclvcs longer in their entrenclimcnts at Sa- ratoga if they had had more provifions. Q. tiad you known, immediately after the acflion of tlic 19th of September, thai a letter had been received from Sir Henry Clinton, mentioning his intention to attack the highlands about that time, would you have thought citlicr a retreat or an immediate attack on the enemy advifeable ? A. Certainly not. Q^Do you know whether a council of war was called on the ioth of September, or immedi.itely after the engagement of tlie lyth of September ? A. I don't know that there was. Q^Did the army in which you ferved, in its approacli to Albany, expect a co-ope- ration from Sir William Howe on tlie North River ? A. We did. Q^ Do you believe if the army under Sir William Howe, inflead o*^ by lea up the Chefapeak to Philadelphia, had operated upon the North to effc6t a junction with General Biirgoyne's army, confiderinn; alfo the 42. 43. 44- l!y CIoniTal liurgoyin;. 45- Hy other gomg Rivet 46. 47- panic tliat prevailed after the taking of Ticondcroga, that the army under Cieneral Burgoyne would have been made prifoners ? A. 1 fliould think not. Q. Did you expert any great oppofition from the rebel army after the taking 4H. Ticonderoga ? A. I did not. Q^ Upcn what grounds did you fo pofitivcly expcifl a co-operation with Sir Wi!- 49. liam Hov.e's army ? A. From General Burgoyne's orders. Q. iJid you ever fee General Burgoyne's orders ? 5°* A. Every day during the campaign. Q. By what orders of General Burgoyne did you expcfl a co-operation ? 51. A. Early in Odober General Burgoyne gave it out in orders that there were po- werful armies of the King's then co-operating with ours. Q^ Did not thole orders give fpirits to General Burgoyne's army ? 52. A. Situated as our army was, every profped of reinforcement mud certainly give us fpirits. Q^ Did you ever hear of any co-operation before thofe orders of General Burgoyne's ^3. in Odober ? A. It was generally talked of in the army, but not by authority. Q^ Whether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River had taken 54 place in time, it would not have been looked on as a very advantageous ro-opiration with General Burgoyne's army ? K A. Ir I «f if n's ilreiiptl), ')r his orders, nor the force ilic enemy iiad to oppo.c him. it u^ impollible for me to anlwer that qud- iion. 59- ^ NVhat elVecl had it on the Ipirits of General Burgoyne's army when they found r.iere was to be no co-operation be'.wcen that army and the army of Sir William Howe ? A. We never knew but that there was to be a co-operation. Captain Bloomfield, of the Artillery, called in, and examined by General Burgoyne. X. Q^ IN what capacity did you ferve in tlie campaign in America in 1776 and A. I was maj'ir of brigade of the roynl artillery. 1. (^ Was you em]doyed by General Phillips, on your return to England, after the campaign of i7/6, to lolicit a further lupply of artillery for tlic iervice of the enfuing campaign ? A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John's, in the mont!\ of November, .1776, I v.as clurged with a Icuer to bir Guy Carleton, wherein he recommended 4 It -'Mw* Capr. BloomficUl.] E V 1 D F, N C F. ncral I'hillips's rank ar.d the enemy evacuated Ti- the army by the way of ic to make a demand of a further fupply of artillery ,v.^^ flnvcs for the C'.n- plete equipment of an ailditional number ol' pun-boats for the l<'iv\\. df Lai.e Champlain in the enluin^; eampaip,n, anil likLwit'e for the boats tlicmfi.lve'. to be fcnt out in frame-work. Sir (iuy Carleton, on jierufin^^ the letter, illiiip- proved of the boats bcinj' fent our, but approved of the demand (<\ \\u: lorts juul anillcry agreeable to Cieiicral I'hillijis's rc([Utll, and lliey \seie mt. iin^^ly lent out in the beginning of the ye.ir 1777. Q^ At wliat time did you join the army in the eamp. 11:^1 of \'y;y '■ A. I joinetl the army at 1 ieonderoga on the ? y.\ of July. (^ iJid you live in the family of General Phillips, and had you oecafun to know his lentimenrs relpeding the artillery department ? A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequent oceafion to know his fentiments on the lubjeft of the artillery in the courle of my iluty as brigade- major. Q^ Dill you know, or had you reafon to believe, that the proportion of ar- tillery emi)loyed that campaign was accoriling to the opinion and recommenda-- tion of General Phillips ? A, I can have no doubt but that an officer i extenfive experience mull have determined that 'oinr. (^W'hat was the diilribution of the artillt.^ uti. eonderofj,u. ? A. 'I'iie light brigade of artillery proceeded , .ih Skeneiborougii j the park brigade and Itores were conveyetl acrois Lake (ieorge in bateavix. Q. Was not a confiderable portion of artuieiy of th.e heaviell kind eidier left at St. John's, fent back from Ticonderoga, or difpoied of in veflels ? A. It was : there were left at Ticonderoga fix heavy twelve-pounders, one light twelve-pounder, four light thrce-poiniders, four royal mortars and twelve eo- horns. Left on board the Royal George, two heavy twent\ -four pounder^ two thirteen inch mortars, two ten-inch mortars, four eijjht-inch mortars, tour royal mortars and eight cohorns. Sent back to St. John's in the Kadau, fourttea heavy twenty-four-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort George, four medium twelve-pounders, two light fix-pounders, two light-inch howitzers, two royal howitzers. With Colonel St. Leger's expedition to i''ort Stanwix were fent two light fi.c-pounders, two light three -pounders, four cohorns. Left ;.t Sr. John's, four light lixrpounders, five li^dit thrce-poundcrs, four cf)horn mortars : that was the diilribution of artillery tiiat remained after the army had g !■: VII) !•: N c E. [Capt. Blooiufickl. 0. c bripavlt'il artillery, wliicli WIS .itt.i> I-.al u) i!ic lii.c aikl u) the .iil\jiKcd corps, allotiul to the lame nuin- Inr t>r troops ? A. i he proportion of fuKl artillery ccr.ainly HKnild vary both in qiiantitjT and nature .Kiordinfi; to the \ arii ty ot circunUl.inc'S under wliich tlic army is to iit't ; the iiliial allotJncnt of liglit field pieces are two to each battalion ; and troni a calculation of tl.c number and llren[^',th of General lUirgoync's army, I do noi cnne( ive t!\at our li<;hl fielil artillery ixeeeded that proportion. 10 Q^ \\'hat do you apprehend was the propoled ulc ot artillery in the country in wliiih we were to act? A. To dillod^^e tlic enemy from fueh ports as every where prefent themfelves in that part of the country, and from which it may be impollible to dillodgc them without arrillcry of a more (oiiftderablc calibre than light fix-poumlers. II. <)^ Do you remember the pofition which tlic enemy evacuated at Schuyler's Ifiand ? A. I do pcrficllr. 13. Qj"" I lad that pofitioii been maintained, woultl not artillery of the heavicll n.it\)re we liad have b<'c'n particularly ferviceable ? A. Provided the poll could not have been turned, and tlie cnemv had mailc ule of every advant;igc which the ground gave them, I have no doubt but the park artillery would have been ablolutely neceflary. ^3- Q^ Mad the pallage of the Iludfon's River, or of Batten Kill been difputed, would artillery of that nature have been lerviceable .'' A. Doubtlefs it would. M- Q^ Had the cntmy taken a pofuion at the Forks of the Mohawk River, would artillery of that nature have been I'erviceablc .' A. l-rom the imperfec'l: manner in which I law that ground, it appeareil ca- pable of being made extremely defenfible, and, of courfe, thac fort of artillery would have been ferviceable. I ^. Q^IIad the army reached Albany, and it had been found expedient to for- tify a camp there for the winter, would artillery of that nature have becu necefTary !" A- There can l->e no doubt of it. J 6. Q;_ What do you apprehend to be the chief ufe of howitzers and fmall mortars In the field. A. I apprehend they are of infinite fervice againfl; all kinds of log work, ab- 'iatie5, and againll entrenchments. The fmall mortars are particularly ufeful againit redoubts and other works where die enemy are confined within a fmall fpacc. 17. Q;_ Are not log works a fpecies Oi fortification peculiar to that country ? A. I never faw any elfcwhere. 18. Q^ Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake George to the place where the army crofled the Hudfon's River any impediment to the tranfport of pro- vifions ? A. The tranfport of our artillery and ftores were conftantly made by horfcs attached Capr. BIoomfK'Id.J EVIDENCE. attacht'il to our ilcpartmont, a' ' therefore I do not connive it clij in any man- ner int. rtoic with tlie triinfporr or provilions — I m.-an to confine niyl't-lf in tiiis anl'wi'r to tlic tranfport troni Fort Cicorgo to the Hudion's lliverv tur attcr cruf. fing the river v.e had Ibnic oxen and horfes attached to tlie lervicc of the ar- tillery, which I believe were before employeii in bringing forward provifions and bateau V. (^ What time diil it take to bring forward the park artillery from Fort Gc-orgp irj, to ilie l)riilgc of boats over the Huilion's I^iver ? A. Tiie light bri._;ade and the artillery of the park, with tirir proper propor- tion of ll(>re^ and ;unmunition, had their horles, carriages, and drivers conllainly attached to them ; it therefore requiretl no more time to carry thole flores than \\;\'s necelVary for the carriages themlelves to pals from Fort CJeorge to the 1 luvllon's River; but with refpuft to the relcrve which was altersvards tianf- ported by water in bateaux, 1 believe two days with all our carriages would ealily l»ave conveyed them to the Mudfon's Kiver. Q. Do you reniembcr the jx lition of the King's troops from tiic time of the 20 attack on tiie ij^h of ir'epteniber to the attack on the 7ih of October? A. Yes. 0^1 lad the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy's en- 21. trcnciiineius without prcviouily ccnllrucling redotbts on the hciglns that voiv- mandod the plain, would not the bateaux, provifuni and huipital have been Lft op.-n to an attack from the enemy's right ? A. They woidd Iiave been left expoled undoubtedly. Q. Were not the largelb guns vse had tiie propeiell pieces of artillery for thoCe 22 redoubts ? A. I think it was a Rrvicc that was cxnftaly adapted to tlicm. Q. Do you remember the difpolition made by General Burgoyne on tlic 7th of Ck^lobcr ? A. I do. (^ At what time was you wounded in that attack ? A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it conimencec'. Q^ What circiirnllance of the aftion did you obferve before you was wound- ed, particularly rtfpedling ..le artillery and the enemy's aiivancing under the fire of the artillery, and wiiat happened to the troops potted immediately on the left of the artillery ? A. The ground on which the artillery was pofted was a clear fpot, in a great n"^eafurc lurrounded by wood<;, the fkirts of which on our left wa5 diltant about two hundred yards where the attack firfl began. The two medium twelve- pounders were polletl on a fmall eminence, nearly in the center of this cleared fpot between the German pic([uets and a detachment of the 1 UlTe Hannu regi- ment. On the enemy's column approaching, the fire of t!ie tv/elve-pounders and. the four fixes was immediately direded towards the enemy's column, notwith- ftanding which, tlicy drew up along the fkirts of the wood behind trees, and after driving in t!;e Germans, kept a pretty warm fire of nuifketry on the guns and the troops polled about them ; foon after this I heanl a tiring on the riglic 24. 25- I'O \ towards xV I 7« E \' I D E N c r:. [Capt. IMoomficUI. towards a cV.uv'l fpnr, fcpAiMtcil from us by a wooii on v/hich the licht infan- try wcie jiolliilon very conunaiuliiig f^rouml. On tlKir rfiivatinp;, :is alii) the twciuy- Jnurth rci^iincnt who was drawn up in the wootl on our li^Iit, the enemy mailc their appc-uiaiicc on an eminence on our rii.'Jir, and cut oft' the retreat of tlie ar- tillery — i\t tiiis iiK'.nent I received my wound, and therefore can give no tarthcr accuuiit of tlie ciiciinlLinces of thnt d.ay's atlit.'n. r.wnHinci! hy other Mtinkrs of the Counnlttce, 26. Q- What wa^ the number of horfes in general eir.ployjd for the artillery af- ter the march from 'iieonderoLVi ^ A. The whole luirnhcr of hmles ik'Mthed with the IJiitifli artillery, previous to the palTiii}.'; the I ludloii's I'iver, w .is about four hundred. 27. ^ ' '''^^ many would have been neetHiiry lor the field pieces att^'ched to the battalions onlv ? A. J'ighteen iix- pounders at four lunies each ; fix threc-pounders at three horles each, and two royal howitzers at three hortes eaeli : the remainder were for park artillery, ammunition, and llorcs of ail kinds to accommodate the army oil its march. ,^S. Q- W'ls t'l^" foraf;e for thcfe hories procuretl in the country on their march, or brought from a dillancc? A. A quantity of oats was brought forward fi(^m Canada, but with refpecl to other forage thev were und.er the neceflity of cuUc.'iin'!; it in the neighbourhood of the encanipment. Q. How many watij^ons might the bringing on that (juantity 'of oats employ ? A. I believe the quantity of oats after pallini.^ Fort I'.dward was fo trifling that I don't believe it loaded one waggon. Q^ After the army arrived at Fort lulward, did any tlelay or not arile to its forwaid progreis from bringing on the jKirk artillery, waiting tor horfes and dri- vers for tliat purnoie, or to provide forage ? A. The p.uk artillery remained at Fort l-'.dward no longer than was ncceflary during the time the .Tmy remained in that neighbourhood : I do not know of any delay what.ver from the want of horfes and drivers. Mad the park artillery moved forwards looner, no end could have been aniwered by it, betore tiie bridge was thrown over tlie Hudlon's River. 51. Q^ Were there any gun-b)ats fent out to Qui-bec for the campaign 1776 ? A. Tl'.ere were. 32. Q^ Wore there ar^fficicnt number fent out, in youroj^inion .' A. It appcarcil that the naval force was fuperior to that of the rrbHs, from the event of that engagement ; and therefore I conclude, that for the ufes of that cam- jviign there were a liiiii^iont number. ■jI- Qi ^^''1 ^''''-i apprehend, before the event of the acliou on the lakes, that the num-- her w.is hililcienr, and went out in time .' A. We -9- .^^- Capt. nioomfioKl.] E V I D K N C F. A. Wc had received very cxngger.\tc(l nccovmts of the rchil force on tho I;ik"s, and tlicrc'foic uncommon cxcrtinns ucic iil'-d to rcntUT our fmcc .>s lonnicLiIlL- .11 polTil)lc ; and probaUly Ionic tiiiK" was lull, and die campai|Mi in funic ilcj^rce rcrardcd, tiom that circiimllance. Q^ W'ovild the e;impai[',n hive been retarded fo Ion'; it a griMter numlicr ofgiiii- loaishad I icon lent out ? A. Ceiiiinly not, (T \\ hat iiiimber of artificers were font ro Canada for the campaign in 177C ? A. I don't initneiHatelv recollect the cxa(it number ; l)ut I think Colonel Chrillie encaged about two hundred. I kimw of luj others being lent out. Q^ Uo yovi know of more being afkcd for by the artillery or engineers, as necelliiry for the campaign ? A. 1 did hear of fome fuch intcniicin ; but at this ililbnce of time I cannot parti- cularly anfwer that (pielbon. Q^ Whether the number of artificers fcnt out for that campaign were, in any dcgiee, fiillicicnt for the purpofe of canning it on ? A. Certainly nor. We were under the necefilry of collci^ing all the artifiv-crs that C( V.' ' be met with in Canada for the armament of St. J ihn's on'/, molt of the bateaux being built by private contraiit. Q^ Were not the operations of that campaign confiderably retar.lcd, for want of tlie nvHiiber of artiliecrb that were afkevi for and not grantcil r A. Hatl the number of artificers been greater, there can be no tloubt but the work would have gone on much fafter. With relpcd: to the artiiicers being de- manded, I have already fiid 1 do not recollcdl the number. Q^ Were there not horfes neceflary for conveying the rtores and ammunition necellary for the field train ; and h(jw many ? A. '1 he belt anfucr ro that (pic(lic;n will, I apprehend, be a Itate of the number of horfes ailually attached to the feveral brie, .ides of aitillcry, fiiice the allotment of ftores and ammunition were exactly proportioned to the number of pieces which thcv accompanicil. [I he brigade attached to the advanced corps of light artillery conHflcd of eighty-tivc ] Q^ I low many horfes might have been fpued, if the heavy park of artillery had not attended the army ? A. It would have made a dilVerence of two hunilred and thirty-feven horfes. Q^ Was the army turnilhcd wiih carts to have employed tliofe two hundred and thirty-feven hurfcs ? Al, 1 really cannot anfwer that (jucllion of my own knowledge. {JFitbJrrw. 7» 36. 37- !». 29- i Anf\v(r ifi- tcriu|)tcil {join inro tlic li:t;ul. 40. 4r. Jovis •V 1 7' EVIDENCE. Liait. Col. Kin2,ftoii.J Jcvis 2 '^'^^ yunii, 1779. 1. 2. Lieutenant Colomel Kingston called in, and examined by General Burgoyne. Ct._ IN what capacity did you adl in the campaign of 1777 ? A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of (^ebec ; I adcd as adjutant general of the army under General Burgoyne, and aifo as fccretary to General Bur- goyiie. Q^ Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with wliich General Rurgoyne treated you, lead you to the knowledge of the material circumllances attending that campaign ? A. I looked on myfelf to be in rhe entire confidence of the gnieral. Q^ Did General Burgoyne give any oniers for the augmentation of artilleiy de- ftined for this expedition, after his arrival in Canada ? A. There was no fuch order went through mci nor did I hear of any fuch order being given. Qj^ Have you reafon to believe that the proportion of artillery employed was ac- cording to the opinion and recommendation of Major General Phillips ? A. I believe General Burgoyne had the grcatel!: conliucnee in General Phillips's knowledge and abilities-, and I believe the proportion of artillery to have been arranged between (reneral Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, becaufe I don't know of any directions given by General Burgoyne upo;i that head. Q^ What were the orders given, at the opening of the campaign, refpecling the incumbrances of baggage i* [^The ivitncjs refers to the orderly book, ivbieb be bad -j-itb him. Read the orders. They are the original orders, written by royfelf at the time. l^Readf.'] *' Extiatfls from orders ifTucd by Lieutenant General Burgoyne at Montreal, dated 30th Mav, 1777. " The regiments deftined for the expedition under General Burgoyne are to " leave in their rclpci-'^tive ftorcs their blanket coats, legging, and sll bap-ragc '* that can be fpared during tlic fummer months ; the ofTicers are depended on " not to encumber the ferviee with more baggage than fliall be aUluluiely ne- *' cefTiry for a r- ;)aign \\ here the movements may be ex[>c«ftcil to be fudilcii " and alert ; the poition ot bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on thofe " princijiks" Q. Were thofe orders afterwards enforced ^ A. Orders I.icut. Col. Kingfion] E V I D v. N c r*. A. Orders were ilfuecl agnin to the funic purport, dated Skcnefl)orough Hdvirc, Julv 12. [Rc'.iils.l " It is obfcrvcd rhnr the injunvnion ;j;ivfn, before the armv ti.ok the fieUI, " iclative to the bagoage of oliicers, has not been com[vlied with ; and that the rcfi;i- " mcnis in general are cneunibcred with much more ba^gay;c th;\n they ean p.)flil)ly be •' ri'pplicd wiih nicans ol' conveying, when they (juit the lake and rivers ; warnin;^ is theictorc again given to the oirici.'rs, to convey by the bateaux, which viillUxMi return to 'I'lconclcroga, the b;»ggage th:\t is not indifpenliblv ncceilaiy to them ; or ui)on tlie firft Uulden movtmont, it mull incvita!)lv be left U|v«n thc>.i<'und. Such gentlemen as ferved in America the lall war may remember taat the oHicers " took up witli foKliers' tents, and often confmed their bag^nge to a knapfack lor " months toia'thcr." Q. Have vou a letter from General Burgoyne to General Reidcfel, on the fubjcfl S. of the incumbrance of baggage ^ A. I have an extrad of it, taken from the original letter in the letter- book. It is as follows : E.\/mJI cf a Letter from L'wut. Cm. Ii:'ii^:}i:c to M-ijor Cc-uerj! RciJtyl, dated Head i^tiirtCiS lit 8ke)ieJhoitugb, the \'hb Jitfy, 1777. " Je vous fupplie de faire en forte, cjue rei'prit de I'ordre par rappoit ** a le renvoyo des baggages des ollleiers a I'ieontleroga aye lieu. " L-es baggages iles otjiciers Hritanniciues lout deji renvo\ c'<, et il n'en *' relle a plulieurs (ju'une petite tente, ct kw\ valil'e. Cell rceiement pour *• rintcrelt de rollicier a la fin, (juc je fuis ij portc a cet article." TRANSLATION. " I rcqueft you to take meafurcs that the fpirit of the order refjiecling •' the f'-niiing back officers' ba<.^gage to Ticonderoga may have due force. '• The baggage of the Briiilh oliicers is already gone, and nianyof ihem *' haveonly retained afmall tent and one cloak bug. It is rcallv for the in- ** tercll of the^officers, in the c\'\L]y that i am lb prefling upon this fubiedl." Q^ When the contrad was made for horfes and carts at Montreal, was it tlie 9. general opinion of the perfons of bed intelligence confulted, that the number was more or lefs than necellary for the fervice on which we were gouig ? A. In general converfation on that fiibie<;t I remember to have hcan! it faid, t!^it though ''ey were infullicient, we might expeit to find adilitional fiip[ilies in the country. I have extrads of letters here that palled between General iiurgoyne and ^, General Phillips on that fubjcifl. They arc e.xtraded from the original letter copy- ,,[j^ ' ''^"■' book. Q^ Have you the returns, or extrafts of the returns, of the ilrcngih of the .iriny u. at all the diifcrcnt periods of the campaign ? L A. I . I 74 EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Klngfton. A. I have extratfls from the returns. ji_ Q^What was the ftrciiLnh of tlie rcjTuiar troops, at the highcfl:, at the opening of the campaiizn, rank and file, fit for duty ? A. I'iic Hrll returns I received on the firll of July, 'I'hc r.ritifliwerc ^f^'jG fit for duty. Gcinians 2919 do. 6489 I \]Hi\k lolclyoi the a'/niy under I.icut. Cjoncral Burgoyne. »;. Q^ What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps under Lieutenant Nutt^ attached to the fervicc of the artillery ? Uritifli artillery 257 (Tcrmans 100 Hccruits under Lieut. Nutt 154 ( )^ Were there .nny other troops in the anny that could be called regulars ? A. There were Canadians, I'rcvincials, and Indians j but I never confidered tlicm as regulars, beeaufe they were not difeiplincd. Q^ Can you flate about w hat was the nuir.ber of the Canadians ? A. The Canadians were 140 the highell nun-'/i.-r. Q. The Provincials ? A. I w oi.dd be underllood to fpeak to the opening of the campaign the firll of July. They were low then, and cncreaied afterwards. They uerc then S3. Q^ The Indians, ? A. Between three and four liundred. It was very difHcult to colltfl what their number was exadly. Q^ Was tlie army e\er fo high in numbers. Provincials and Indians excepted, as at that periotl ? A. [believe it never was. On tl.c -jd of September, additional companies joined tlie Hrltilh, to the amount of about 300 men •, but from killed and wounded, and the gariifon left at Ticonderuga, the ariiy was at no lime e(|ual to its tirll number. iS. C^ What was the force left at Ticonderoga ? A. '1 he full garriton confiileil of 462 Hritidi, rink and Hie, 448 Germans, ranlc ajid file ; making 910 in the whole. If), (^. Do you remember the dilllculties vvliich attended moving tlie wounded to 'i'iconderoga, aftei the at^ion nt 1 Ii.berton ? A, I reme.r ber to Iiave heard they were very great. Different propofuions were tnadc for tiio removing them, fuch as biers and hand-barrows, which were fo very ini'omtnodious, that I remen^.ber to have been toKl that the wounded w.iuld rather be i eft where they were ihun move in tlic then Hate of tlieir wounds by fuch con- ve\Mncfs. -". (^ f)o you know wl-.at V ere General Burgoyne's motives for detaching Genernl J'vidcl'.l v.iih a lar:e corps of troops to the cuuntrv i;i the neighbourhood of Caf- lUtrni' A, I don't riMT.emhtr to Iia-.c Iiccn prcfent when (»eneral Rcidcfel received his or.iers or ir.llructiuns ; but I underlloovl it was to create an alarm tov.anis the Con- neiflicur, to give encouragement to the loyal inhabitants, if ;my luch there were, .ind to protect tho' • that wen: wounded at I lubcrton or thtieabouts. (^Was 14. 15- 16. '7- Lieut. Col. King don.] r-: \' I T) r, n c i". V5 I . Q^ Was tlie removal of thole wounded tfTcded long before General Utidekl '.v.: recalled from Caftleton ? A. 1 believe not ; for I am not (luite trrtnin tliat tli<' v.\u.\<: were moved wlu'n G^-- reral lieidefel returned to the army at Skenen)oruvii.'h, a liay or two before the full divifion of the arniy moved towartls Vort Anne. Q. Have you any pa]ier.s written by (ieneral Burjroyne between tlie time he was -:? nt Montreal and the tniK' he left Skenelboroiigh, expla'^atory ot the mocivcs on which he a^led ? Si A. I have. They are exfafts from the original letter-book. ■ *li»i. (^ Are you acquainted with any fai'ts that will aleertain whether, an t!)C army'; ' ]. arriving at l-'ort L.dward, it was forwarder iii its proij^rels towards Albany, in \) nwi of time, than it would have been had it taken tiie route by 'I'leonderoga and Lake (rcorge ? A. In anfwcr to that queflion I have to fav, the army, by taking that route, wai a-head of the tranfport of provilions, which, for the greater [lart, went from 'I'icon- deroga by the route of Lake George. Q^ At our full arrival at Fort li^dward, and previous to the roads being mended, j j. in what proportion did provilions arrive at our camp ? A. Very little more than for the immediate conlumprion. Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francis Clarke ? ?S- A. Yes. Q^ Do you know them to be iiis iiand-writing ? 26. A. I am fully convinced of it, havinjj lt;en him enter many of the articles in thefe books. Q^ Has there been any alteration or addition fince vou had them ? ^7 A. None. Q^ What was the character of Sir Francis Clarke relpc>5ting his accuracy ? 28. A. I never law an oHiccr more attentive to the duties of his llation il.an Sir Francis Clarke, and always ibund liim exceedingly accurate in the remarks he made. Q. Aie there .any memorandums rclpccling the arrival^ ol" provilions ai that 2(). time ? A. There are feveral. Q^ You will read two or three ? ^O. A. (/^frtij.] —" Fifth Augull. Vidlualling of the army out this day. and from " difficulties of the roads and tranlports, no jirovifion came in tliis night." " Sixth Augutl. — At ten o'clock this morning, not quite enough provifions arrived " for the confumption of two days." Q^ Was it in general underilood, from the combined intelligence ivceiviil by ^r. General Rcidefel, while he was detached to CaRletowii, and that received bv (Je- neral Burgoyne from the Provincials in his camp, that there were miny well aifiLled inhabitants towards Bennington, who would Ihew tiiemlelves on tlie ;ipproach of troops i and that there was deje.'.iion and i'ubmifTion among the party attac!\cd to the congrels in tiiat country ? A. I did hear Icveral reports to tliat purpofj. L z <^ 1 lave A;^p-ri- 11 1 76 EVIDENCE. [I/icut. Col. Kingfton. « ;:. (^ 1 fave you tlic original roiif>Ii draft of tlic expedition to Bennington, as prcfentcJ to(n'!icr.l Burooync fio.n G> noral RciwlciLl-, with General Burgoync's alteratiois and additions ? A. I have t!icor';;;nal roug!i ilraft of the propofals for the expedition to Benning- ton •, but not I'ein.j: \n\ font ai the linic, I can't fay whether thole propofals were dcli- vercd by General Riideiel or not ; but 1 kncnv of alter .tions made in thole propofals by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge of his hand-writing. v'^ceAppcn- Kc/:, ihe witn.fa delivered in to the Committee the original rough draft of the '^' Inllrudtions, with a fair copy. 33- ji- 37- Q;^ Whether you have reafon to know that all the erafures and alterations in that plan were made bciore the expedition took jilate ? A. I believe they v.erc, from the reading of it. (^ Do you remember taking this plan to General Phillips the day General Bur- goyne went to I'ort George to infpr^^l the tranfport ot provifions ? A. I i\o remember it very well -, it v/as the rou;.!;h draft I took. Q^ What were Genera] i-'iiiliins's fentiments u[)on it ? A. I remember General I'hiUips and i had a long converfation on the flownefa of the arrival of the tranfport of provilions ; and he faid he looked on this as a very good itlea •, that he (aw no objection, and aiked me if I knew ot any. Q^ Du you remeinber Ihewing tlie plan to General Fralirr ? A. I do very well. (^. What ciid h.e exprtfs on the fubjec^ ? A. He defired me to leave it with him till the afternoon for his coniidern lOi,. He came liimfelf to my tent the next morning early i he cxprellf-d himi; ii co me in a manner that convened r. difapprobation of the (iermans being en.] Ic d in it. I think I oblcrved to him th.it iinci; the honour gaineil by he adva>H-ta -ps at Hu- berton, I believed General Kcidefel was ilefirous ot" having t'" ■ ' "muns i mp!;^yed, I mentioned to (jeneral Fralcr mv ideas of provifions ijeincr obtau.ed by that expedi- tion, and the ;.rmy thjieby enabled to <■;'"" quicker on to Al'iany than vvjitinp, tor the fljw tranfport fiom Vort George. Genti.^' I'.afer fiid fomethmg about Germans, wLiih 1 don't rccoIle(:-t ; whicli brought this rcm.irk fr ■'i me. I deiired (icncral I-'raier, from the friendfiiip he hail fur *" neral Hurgovr, if lie faw any real ob)ec^i.^n to this plan, to exprefs himfelf fuliy and i.'.t!' to General Burgoyne himlelf- llut the fcouts of the army and the guides were attachetl to liis the advanced corps, and he miglit, tlirouL'h them, perhajis know uiore of ihe nature of r.he cotuury than 1 divl ; ami therefore I preilcd liim to niention his objections, if he had a."y, to (jeneral Burgoyne. I think he faid, but am not (piite certain, " the Germans a^i; *' not a very acHiivc people ; but it may ilo." I pielled him at parting to go to General Bbrgoyne, if lie thought it v/ould not tL:. lie laid No, and went olT. (^. Were not many ot' the i-'rovincials in the arniy of tne country about Beniiing- tnn, and towards the Ctjnnccticut ? A. I can't pretend to lay ihey were from t!iat country i but I iinJerllood many of v/ie;n wire well accpuuiited witli that tountrv. CLDo Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. 77 Q^ Do you remember Captain Sherwood in particular ? jcj. A. I do very well. Q^ Was he of that country ? 40. A. I undci i^oud he was of that neigjhbourhood, Q; Did you ever hear Colonel Skecne, or any other Provincial, confultcd on an 41. expedition into that country, exprcfs any apprchcnlion of its rncccls ? A. I nev':r did. Sir i''rai\tis Clarke told nic he h.id received favoural)le account', from Colonel Skecne j and 1 beheve alter part of the expedition luid tah^u place. Q, Are there any memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke's, efpedin!^ the cxpedi- ^i:. tion to Bennington .? A. Ves. (^ Is there any that marks the diftancc between Batten Kill and Bennington ? 43. A. Yes-, it is his hand-writing. [K'-ads.^ " From the mouth of Batten Kill, Kafl, for two miles ; tlien (trikc ofl" " South Eaft tor about fifteen miles to Cambridjj^e j and lb on about twelve auks " to Benningron." 44. Q. Have you the original letters, written from Colonel B.iumc to G'n.ral Biir- goyne, while he was on the expedition ? t;^. tj,g .,^ A. They are here. [ffe dtHvered them in /. the Conmiittcc. penJix. Q;_ Is there any mcrnorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's marking uu time when 4^. Colonel Breyman was ordered to march to (upport Colonel Baume ? A. [/CW.V.] " 1 5th Augud. Kxprefs arrived from Sancoick ; at five in the morn- " ing ; corps ile refervc ordered to march. •* i6th AugulT. During the night, cx[)rcrs arrived from Sancoick with an account " of the repulle this evening ot a deraehinent dI ours on ww cxjKviition. *' Sunday, 17th Auguft. The gcneial went up to the twentieth rc^imcrt, ad- *' vanccd on the road 10 Sancoick, and met ilic corps de rel'ervj, cl-.c men ol that •* cx[)cdition returning all day." Q^ Do you recollect \vl;.)t time of the day it w;is General Burg, yiie ract Colo- nel li.eyman on his return on the 17th .' A. I think it wis foinctimc hii'.veen one and rhrt_ o'ehick. Q. Have you t!ic iullruCtions given by Geneial Burgoync to r.^Linel Skeene on that expedition ? A. Hero is a copy .of them. Q^ h there anv menvirandum of Sh' Francis f" kc's, of any intelliger'.c. received from Ciloncl St. l.egi'r about this tin'e? A. There is of the i ith of Augult. [A'lW.s-.J " This morning received intciligcr of an aftion near Fort Sranwix." Q^ After the taiUire t)t the cxpediiiun to B .mington, can you fpeak to the ef- 40. forts made lor forvvtirding prcvilioiis ? A. 1 know t!.at very great efloits were n . ■ both bofiM'c and aiter. I imdcr- ftood that General Bi.rguyne ami (jeneral lMiuli,>s hail been both ar ciiti'eront time'. at I'ort Geoige to tor\saril the |;roviru)ns, and I believe lubfeiiuent to t!ie ill news The (luarter-m.iller-^cneral f_I me;;n Captain Moiiey) wcs fcut bv 4^1. \u ■ Si-c r'-.c A, pCtKllX. from Bennington s % I r' EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Ki;;gilon. m 5 J. See the .\]-. I)enclix. 5'' 5-- .53- 54- r^ »^ • ?'cc t!ic Ap- 57' 59- Co. [)\ Ck-nciMl Riii-iroyne to Fort F.ilwari.!, and I believe to Fort George, to collnl ail horlcs aiul teams jminhle, :iiul to make every exertion to briiu^ loru;inl il.e [)rovirions. Q^ M.ive you the calculation, made by the comminhrv general, of the carriages and h'^'rlei ncccllarv for ditlerent given ([unntities uf provifions .'' A. It is here. I believe it is the ovigin;il. Q^ Dill the march of the artillery from Fort Georpc to the bridge of boats over PIudl'>n's kiver, intcrfore v/ith th: tranl'pwrt of jndvifions ? A. I h.\ve lud maiiv eon\cM lutions with (iciier.il Phillips and the ^ Was there any coniider.d le alteration in the ftrength of the army between the return o( the lit oi September, ami the adion on the 19111 ? A. There was a ikirmilh or two, but the lol's was not material in that in- terval. Q. In the courfc of the fervice, did you ever know any inftance of a day of adticn, where tiierc was not f )me (!edu6ti;-n'; from t!ie cffeCllve nrenii,th upon i)a- per, tor baggage guards, bat-men, care of th.' fick, arvU other indilpenfible regimen- tal contingencies ? A. I apprehend there nujfl always be dedu*5^ions of that fcit. Q;_ In the k'rvicc ot our cunpaign, was there i-.i't a a"»nfiileral)lc additional deduction lor the care ami defence nf the bateaux and movible magazines ? A. It muft of courle make an achlicional drain from the armv. (^ Was not all v. e hiul of the forty-kventh regiment appropriated to that par- tial!. ir f^rvice ? A. Ir gcner.iliv was ; I believe dways fo. Q^ l hefc deduiflions confidcied, a'.iout what number do you compute the Bri- tidi line tu hive confided of en the i.\AV of the aClion of the 19th. 4 ' A. I Lieut. Col. Kingllon.] EVIDENCE. 79 6j. A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that day amounted to lit- tle more than one ihouhmd one hundred men on the fpot vmdcr arms in the ac- tion. Q^ What lofs did the Britifli fuftain in that adlion ? A. Killed, wounded, and piifoncrs, rather more than Icfs than five hundred. Q^ Can yoi' fpeak 'larticuiarly to the lofs of the line ? A. I believe about fcventy-fix killed rank and file, and between two hundred and forty and two hundred and fifty wounded, and about twenty-eight or thirty mifling and prifoners. Q. Oo you recoiled the ftrength of the 20th rcgimcBt when they made their 63. lad cKixge on the enemy ? A. I do very well. I was by General Phillips when the orders were given for that charge ; he was then in the front of the line : the ranks appeared to be very thin, the regiment were much fatigued with the length of the adtion, but moved on to the charge with fpirit. Q^ Do you remcmhor General Burgnyne going up to the fixty-fecond regiment 64. immediately after the fiimg eealed, and the report that was maile to hun by the commanding officer ol the llate of that regiment ? A. I remember it, and the olFicer re[)orting the great lofs they had fuflain- ed in the attion ; 1 faw them, and they appeared to be very conliderably reduced in nu.i.bcr. Q. Do you remember the ofliccr mentioning that they had not above fifty or fixty 65, men in the re;;miciit '' A. I can't fpeak pofitivcly to that; bu: '.n my own judgment they did not cx- ceeii ch;.i number. Q^ Were not bdth the field-officers wounded ' A. Colonel AnlbuthiT ami Major Haiiiage were both wounded, and a great many other officers were killeii and wounded, and the regiment iufi'crcd greatly. Q^To what degree did the men of the artillery fuller in that adion ? A. I think, but am nnt (juite certain, that the number that were with four guns amounted to forty-ci^l-.t. I faw Ciprain J ines, who was a very ga'.lLun man, and commanded thofe four gims, killed, and fomc other oilicers bounded, and I be- lieve about thirty fix of the men were killed and wounded. 1 fliould in jullicc to the artillery fay, that I think it is not in the power of men to keep a bet- ter fire, both of round and grape-fiiot, than was fueceiTively maintained for feveral hours that dav. Q^ From your experience in the fervice, do you conceive it would have nc- 6?. currcil to nnv imBccp, to engage troops, if he could podibly avoid it, in the hciia- tioh in which the liiililh line was the day after that adion ? A. The experience of an officer of my inferior rank dots not lead to mneh ; but I Ihould have been forry to have given orders to thofe tegimuus, aiicr iho gallant fuHerings of that day, to have attacked an army rep(Hteil, borh from our Ipies and our priloners, to be very near if nor more than tour limes the num. l;cr of our whole force : add to this, the country was a very thick wood, and the 66, 6-j, I i '' So r, V T D r, N c E. [l^lcur. Col.Kinp.rton, tlu' (iMiatioii of tb.c re -cl c;im;>, I believe, coiiKl not by any means be rccoa- mitrecl v, irhin that Ipice of time. ('Q. (^ 0'^ yi)U remoiulicr General R'.iv^oync ivocivinp; a letter from Sir Henry Clinton the cla\' but one alter that n^lion, informing liini, that he mtemleii about that time an uttack on T'ort M()nr;i;\ilhout cither attacking or retreating ? A. Ncithi.i lliol\ or at any time while I rcinained in America, and of courfe r.ot linee. C^. From ^()ur converfation with the tlUtf engineer, and from other circum* fiances, have you reafun to know, that every poffible means were uleil after the action of the i«>th, to obtain a knowledge of the ground on the enemy's left 5 A .1 Lieut. Col. Klngflon.j E V I D V\ N C E. 9i 70. 77. 79- 00. A. I h:ul frcfiucni: converfai-:.>ns with the chief engineer on that rii!)icif>. I l) wound 01. ^3- 8tu! from information, I bc-Hcve from tkfcrtcrs, or from tlirir own fk;ovjt<, rli.ir n\ir army was exceed iiigly \vcll jMepavcd lo receive ihcm, th.u tlu-y wcinlii be vciy much, expofcil when rhcy came on the plain to our ariilUry, he not only re- frciitcd with his conimanH, but lent ^^onl to another poncral ulliccr to retrc.it alio. The other general (^flicfr wns his (Viiior ; hut he had taken that upon him, fiom the fear of the conlc(]ucnces of Inch an attack, of which he knt word to General Gates, who approved and contirmcd his onler. Q^ Previous to the Kumcil of war to which ihc field ((filccrs were called, do ci. you remember if being determined in the council of the generals, to try a ni^ht march, aliandoninjr tl c carriages and l)aj«;gaj>;e, and c^rdcis bciiig ^ivcu for the delivery of as much provifjoiu as the men could carry ? A. I i\o remember fucli a (ict'-Mminalion vliv well. Q^ W'liai prevented the execution of it ? A. I undcrllood there were fuch diHlcidiies in p.cttinp out the prculfions, that the delivery of the rcccllury piovifions could nor be accompiilhed, Q. I lad we intelligence the next day from dilTi rent fcmrs, that the cr.rmv was in pollcfliun of the cou;itry in force, on buth fides the iliuUbnS River, lieuvceii u'. and Flirt I'-dwanl ? A. I underdood, from f./me of tlic feouts that we had been ac-viflomcd mcrt to de])cnd on, that the enemy were fo polled. Q. Have you reafon to know that t!ic intcllif^cnce General Ikirg(j\'nc ftatcd to the (^4, cuuncil of war on tiiis fubjci^t was true ? A. I was allured by one of the general oflicers who condu(f>cd i:s towards lioll: )n that troops ot theirs were in the pofition that c)ur Icuuts had given ut, ii.form.uion of. Q^ Did you learn at the fame time at what j)eri(\l thofe ports wrro taken u[> by 05. the enemy, w hether before or after our arrival at Suratoga ? A. I have cxirads of minutes made at that time, from the mouth of the gc- • neral oiiiccr I mentioncil. [J'it\;cis.] — " \\'hcn tlie king's army wns returning to Sarnroga, a brigade of- *' tifrecn hundred men were poltcd on the cart tide ot the i ludfon's Iliver, t^' difpiuc " the ford, and two thoufand men more were piHcd between us and i-'ort l'd\s;ird, '* on the fame fide of the river." — Fourteen hundred more alio were ptilled tjppofite to Saratoj^a, a linle above the other party I mentioned before, to prevent our jial- fing the Hudlon's River. Fifteen hundred of thole I have mentioned ^\e'.•e polled on or before the 5th ol Oc'lober. The others, I remember very well now to have heard, were poQed previous to the 7 th of Odtober. (^ Have you an extradt of the laft council of war at which the field olliccrs 06, aflitled ? A. The extraft is true, excepting the names of the officers, and the votes they gave. I have the original paper, with the names of the officers that compofed the SceAfpen* council ; and I believe their opinions. [T/t CKtra'l pioilnced. vJix. Q^ Did you ever hear of a propofal made by General Phillips, to make away y/- from Saratoga to licondcroga with a botly of troops ? Mi Never IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // '<>!% ■ ^> .^""^^ j/^ 1.0 I.I It I^S 1 2.0 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 •• 6" ► Photographic Sciences Corporation ^v .1*\ .^>/<* ?[? 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 84 EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Kingfton. 98. A. Never with a body of troops ; but I remember to have heard Genejal Phillips make an ofler, which I thought a very fpirited one, to rifk his life in attempting, with one or two of our biit guides, to find a pafTage to Ticonderoga, and do his utmoft for the defence of that garrifon, as an artillery officer, fhould the enemy attack, that fortrcfs after the convention fliouldtake place. Q. Have you the return of General Gates's army, figned by himfelf ? A. I have ; but I have forgot to bring the original. I have the extradt. ' giiKil return, fee the Ap- pendix, No, XVI. rftftheori- ^Rciids.'] "Copy from General Gates's return, from his camp at Saratoga; 16th Odtuber, 1777. *•' Brigadiers — — la *' Colonels — . — 44 '•' lieutenant Colonels — — 45 *' Majors — — 49 " Captains — — 344 " Firil Lieutenants — .33a *' Second Lieutenants — . — 326 ♦< Enfigns — — .345 " Chaplains — — 5 " Adjutants — — 4a " Quarter-m afters — — 44 " Paymafters — — 30 *' Surgeons — — ^7 •* Mates — — 43 *' Serjeants — — 1392- " Drummers — — 636 " Prefent fit for duty — 13,216."^ I underftand thefe laft are rank and file, becaufe the others are mentioned before. " Sick prefeni — — 622 «« c: ickabfent ** On command ** On furlow 731 3«75 180." 99. I believe that the men on command were explained to me by General Gates to have been detached from his army, in the rear and upon the flanks of the king's troops, previous to the convention. Q^ Do you apprehend that that return includes the corps that were on the other fide of the Hudibn's River, immediately oppofite to Saratoga ? A. I do recoUedt the name of one of the general officers who was on the Other fide of the Hudfon's River, included in Mr. Gates's return, and therefore I imagine the men under his command are included alio. When I fay one, I do not mean to have underftood that the other two general officers, the one who was ftationcd with a party oppofite to Saratoga, and the one who was ftationed on the fame fide of the water, between us and Fort Edward, are not aUb included in General Gates's return. 4 QcDo Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. »5 Q^ Do the returns to which you referred of our army ftatc the eflfedive flrength, at the time of figning the convention ? A. 1 hey do ftate the rough number, colledled at that time, of men prefcnt and under arms. State the numbers. The Britifh appeared to have been 1 905 Germans — I594 I can't be anfwerable for the corredlnefs of thofe numbers, us they were taken in a great hurry. Q. Can there poffibly be a miftake of many hundreds ? A. I can Itate from a monthly return of the firlt of November, fit for duty, Britifh — — 20S6 1 r> , , ^, r- , < Rank and file. Oermans — — 1633 J There might be people recovered from iheir wounds who were difchargcd from the hofpital, and had joined the corps ; or there might have been a miltake in the* return, juft before the convention, in the confufion of the army at that time. Q^ Do you remember what pafled refpedting the military cheft, while the treaty of Saratoga was depending ? A. I do remember that it v,ras ilrongly recommended to the commanding; officers of corps to take fumsof money from the paymafter general, on account of fubfilience then due to their regiments ; and I believe a great deal of money was fo diftributed, and regularly accounted for to the paymalter general on the fiibfequent fettlement of the pay of the army. Q. What became of the reft of the money in the military chefl: ? A. It was taken by the paymafter general to Alban) . Q^ Did any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy ? A. Not a (hilling that I ever heard of. Qi, Was any proportion of it loft, embezzled, or fecreted ? A. If any fuch thing had happened, I think the paymafter geseral would have applied to me immediately. Never having heard, then or at any time after, of any lofs having been fuftained, I do not believe there was any lofs fuffered in the retreat or after it. Q^ Was the fecret fervice account, during the campaign, kept by you ? A. It was. Q. Could you produce the feveral articles of that account, if called on for it? A. I have either a copy of it at home of my own, or from the paymafter general. Q^ Did General Burgoyne ever appropriate any part of that expenditure to tke extraordinaries of his own expences, or to any other purpofe for his own ufe ? A. Never that I know of. Qi Muft not you have known it if it had been fo ? A. Certainly. Qj^ Were there not occafiwis where General Burgoyne paid, from his own purfe, expences that, in the opinion of others, he might have been juftified in placing to the public account ? A. I 100. lor. 102. 10 104. lOf!. [06. 10- 108. 109. 110. III. 5 -^ M B6 EVIDENCE. Lieut. Col. Kingflon.] A. I rcmcmlicr r ) li;ivc been told by other gentlemen, that expences of that fort General Ikiriniyno h:ul been ar, ought to have been charged in that manner. X I 2. t^ What was the nature of tholb cxpences ? A. Tiicy were prcfcnts to people wUo had dilVinguifhed themfelves, and in adj of charity to women who had lolt their hulbands, and other occafions which it was very proper for a gcrcral olHccr to give, and very proper to put into a public account, in. Qi ^^'^^^ """^ General Burgoyne, from his fituation, all the expences attending a Commander in Chief? A. lie certainly had, from being obliged to keep a public table for the entertain- ment and refreihment of officers and others coming to head tjuarters, on duty or bufmcls ; and I know thofe cxpences to have been very great, from the exceeding high price of all the articles of life in that part ot the world. Q^ Did General Burgoyne ever receive more than the appoinLment of a lieutenant general ? A. Never. Q^ Was there not a board of general officers appointed at Cambridge, to infpccl all the accounts of the campaign ; and did not General Burgoyne regulate the pay- ment of the battalions by the report of that board ? A. There was fuch a board, and tlie j)aymcnts were regulated according to the report of that board. 11 6. Q^ Upon the whole of what you know of General Burgoyne's receipts and cxpences, do you believe he was, in his own purfe, a gainer or a fuFcrer in the campaign 1777 ? A. I really believe his appointments were not equal to his expences in that campaign. 114. 115. Examined hy other Mcmhrs of the Omm'uiee and hy General Burgoyne occajionally,. 117. 118. 119. lao. Q^ What were the numbers of .the effc6llve Britifli, at the opening of the cam- paign 1777, including officers and non-commiflioned officers ? A. I have not thofe returns j but they were fcnt to the Commander in Chief, and my extrai^s are for the rank and file. Q^ Can you anfwer that queftion with refpeft to the Germans ? A. My extrads are the fame both for the Britiihand the Germans. Q;_ What was the greateft: number of Provincials in the army at anytime in the campaign } A. I believe the only queftion that has been alked refpedting them was at the be- ginning of the campaign ; they were then eighty-three. On the firft of September they amounted to about fix hundred and eig.hty, wMch was the greateft number they ever amounted to. Q. What do you me^ by Provincials .^ A. I Lieut. Col. Klngfton.] EVIDENCE. 87 A. I nnderftand them to be inhabitanrs of that country, aflcmLletl under officers who were to have had different commiflions, provided they had ever amounted to certain numbers. Q^ Do you include Canadians undei ihe name of Provincials ? A. I believe, in the former part of my evidence, the Canadians were dated to be one hundred and forty-eight, anddiftinguiHicd from the Provincials. Q^ Was General Burgoync's fecond order of the twelfth of July, relating to the baggage, ftridtly complied with ? A. I conceive it was the duty of the commanding officers of regiments to enforce an obfervance and obedience to the general orders. Q^ Was it aftually enforced in fuch a manner to the degree you thought itfhould have been ? A. I am not quite pofitive whether there was not another order ilfued after- wards. [^ejlion repeat ed.'\ A. I never had any report made to me by a commanding officer of any corps, of that order not being complied with. Q.. What was your own ocular obfcrvation of the quantity of baggage carried with the army ; and did it appear to you that that order could have been fairly com- plied with ? A. I own I don't recollc<5l, not hearing any complaint nor attending to it. The quarter mafler general of the army mud naturally know more of the baggage thau the adjutant general. Q^ Do you know what allowance of waggons was made to a regiment ? A. I don't recolleft any waggons that we had to allow, Q^ Was none of the baggage brought down in wheeled (Carriages ? A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and carts of the country people for their own ufe ; but I do not remember any of the king's carts or waggons being appropriated to the carriage of officers' baggage. It might be, bat I don't recollect it. Q^Can you fay, in a general way, how many horfes wight be employed in car- rying the baggage of the army, including officers' hoi-fes ? A. I never had any information upon that fubjcdt ; it did not belong to iny de- partment, and I had much bulinefs on my hands. Q^ How was the regimental baggage carried ? A. I believe chiefly in bateaux. Q^ How was it carried when there uras no water-carriage ? A. I can't fpeak to that point, having had no information on that fubjeft ; and •when I fpeak of bateaux, I fpeak generally, having had no information on the fubje1 awiiiaiN ov tolciahlo j^iicl's. 1 havi.- loni tho idininil' 1.-.r\ of pio\ iiii>ns u-nn n. ;u;.l I think (he iuuuIk'V ol Wonu'U i\'Iuiiuh1, as vi(!:tiiallcil (ii>ni tho lloivs. \\oi\' v<,M\ Nciv lew. <)^ p.) v.>u tliink that ;v vo\[^s cl (.liaj^oons inovmu'd w 'UiKl have been of }>;reat li'.o to \',\o amn : A. 1 i>\\ii, 1 \.i\ iiuivh wlHu-.l thol'c: lew iha;v><^ns wo had eoviKI hiwc licon tnoviiiicvl, bovavur;, ihvnu;h lU that pait ol' AnuMii:a thai 1 law ihov ini^\ht iiof have lv>'n nciMlaiv or viloliil to have iwido a ihavi\o, I think ihol'c light. Jiagooiis mirju bo .;lwa\s api^lioil to vor\ vilolul t'eiviees. ^.V 1 low main luul \ on of th.>lo iliap,oons r A. r',K\ aio inohiilod in the llroin-ih ol liie (lonuans, aiul T le.illv ilo not fc- nuMniicr their pavtioul;n nuinhoi. C^. It none or lels vUtho paik o( aitillerv had been bnnip;ht foiwaiJ, woviUl there not lia\e boon hi)iles to have inonnteil thnto tiragoons - A. I believe there might have been horles enovigh taken \\o\\\ tho artillery, or tivMii the provilion train, to have movntoil thole dragoons, it' ir had boon ihoiijvht niore e\povUeiM \o havo emplovcd the horles in that manner ; but thev were hired or eontrav\ed lor, \oy the ipeeial |nn[HMesiil earr\ ing jMOvilions, and bringing on the aviilteiv. and never meant bv the perlons who tmnilhed the eontiaCl lor tiie dra- gO('>n lorvivO. } :^. tj^ \( a Tmaller cen eariied, might not the olliecrs have ij^arovi lome c^t their baggag-e hiMtes lor movint'ng the ihagoons ? A. I never mor with an oliieer who had horles to iparo. 1 know Sir Franeis v."laik(' aiid nivloll" wilhovl to buy horles to carrv vnir own lervants ; eared very iiitlo what c\[Hiue we were at, and vet I eouUl not obtain any. ". ;S. Qj P*> NvHi know ol" anv corns or nartv linding their v\av back to Ca- \. I rover hoard ot" anx oi>rns ilndimv iis wav there ; and I uiulerllood tVom the grades who were with tis, pievious to the convention's taking plaee, that it that was attempted, we mull break into Imall parlies, and go by what is called Indian paths. I ;o. Q^ Snppollng there was a tmall partv that found its wav to Canada by In- v'ian paths, do \ ou think it would have been polVible for an ariity to have i^\onc the iarnc - A. Mv idea of that mull be founded upon the report of thole guides who had fcrved us verv f.uthtuUv as leouts upon former ooeafions, and who inlorm- od roe th.;t wo mull break into verv fn\A.ll parties, to have any chance of mak- io;; ^ v.r way tluough tlie woods to Canada ; and I remember tliar when (iencral r.ii'.l.ps oficrcd to attempt to lind his way to lieonderoga, it was talked of and IvXikovl on ro be as dofperate as gallant. 1^- t^. It an- partv did make its wav to Cana^la, d( adtrwiiiils ? A. I rcmrmbcr Conic were rrpoitivl lo have run away who were makinj.'; roadi, and it is likely to have been thai party. Q. When v<^" mentioned the hifdicll nunihcr of provincial, did you mean i.|t. thai ihev were all armed ? A. 1 know that they were nf)t all armed. We had not arms ff)r them, (^ Of thofi" that were aimed, Come reCpeitahle pcrfons excepted, were they H^- niiicli ii> l>e depended upon ? A. A very great part ol ihcn\ were Cuth as I fliould have placed very little de- jHMuleiue upon. (^ Uclore the itrniy left Canada, was there not a (Irii^t order, that not more than' i4j, tiuic women a i()mi)any Ihould he lullered to end)aikr' A. I do know there was Inch an order idued, and I never heard any cfun- plaint of its liiivinfT; lurn l)roI;e throujdi. I don'r ricolledt the (hue oi thai or- (Ici , or I would hiive turned lo niv hook, and II itcd to the houlc, upon the fird Is M not the ( udom in all armies vi(fhialled Croin the kinpN llores, to pro- I44«- hibit tl delivery ol provifion'i to any women over and above the number allowed by okK I ? A. It was cuftomary in all places where I Cervcd in the lad war, and very flroni*, and pi-remi)tory orilers were given on that fubjett to the commidarics in uui army. Q^ Uo you not then believe, that all women who followed your army were 145. fed Irom the ration of the men they followed, or fovmd their provifion in the country ? A. I remember, upon afkiu}j!; the commifliirics how there came to be Co few women in the provincial returns, I was toUl, it was the cultom for them to be fupplied our of the men's rations. (^ Were the women conveyed on baggage carts or horfos, or did they walk 14C. a foot ? A. I never heard of the women's being conveyed on baggage carts or the king's horCes. CX If the women neither- emplovctl the king's horfes, nor confumed his |)ro. 147.. vifions, do you ihiirk they were more of imptdimeiit, or of comfort to the king's troops ? A. I never underlTood from my cnnverfation with the commanding olTicers, or others, that the women were any impediment. Q^ If after the taking of I iconderog.i there was any doubt in the army in which 148. you lerved, of their being able to reach Albany ? A. I don't remember to ha\o licaid any doubts exprcffcd upon that fubjecl, mean- ing foon aft'*r tlie taking Ticonderoga. Q; Was it generally underltood in the .irmv,. that it was was well fupplied with i^yn, all the neccirarics, appointments for war, and articles proper for forwarding the expedition to Albany ? N, A. I I E V I n E N c v.. [Lieut. Col. Kii\p,(lon, m J.vr i34- ^55' 156. A. I always untlornoHl that the aimv h.ul h^fn very wt\\ fiipplicd with cwry tin 111';. 150. Q- I^^"> y<^u believe, H the fecrerarv <>f Ihife h:\il ortleieil the army under Ge- neral [lowe 10 eo-dpciatc uitli the arnu' utuler (ieiKTal l5iiip;oyne for the N.*rth River, with a view to have formed t!ic |uiu'Vi"n of the two armies, that the dil. liter which helil CktierMl Uiui'/'yiie's ;\i niy e(>\il>ll.,'ve hapixMied ? A. It u jiiiKiUon couKI have hcen formal, I Hioidtl .<|>jirehnul that Mr. Gates's army ini(>;lu have been dillodj^eil, ami that the misforiuue at oarai.('p,a avouKI not have hii|ijieiK'd. This is only nv.'Mor of ojiinioii. '5'- ^i;^ I^*' you apprehend, that if ilie arr.iv under Sir William ITowe had ope- rated on the Noith River, with a view lo liieCl a iunvMion, ih.ii luch a junc- tion would have taken place ' A. I had an >>pinion while in Au'jeiiea, that if the cxpciiiiion which came up the lUidfoil's River under Cienera' Vsuf.han, could have have been there about ihc time of our adion of the ipih of September, that Mr. Gates would have found it ilillienlt t(> have kept his aiinv t-n\el'ier, it he had not eroded over the lludii)n".s River towards New England. But this is mere matter of private opinion. 15'- Q;;, 1' y<^u r.re of opinion, that the troops under Cereral Vaiv'i.hnn wnvild have had lo powerful an elVed, even fo Inrc as September, what etleOA ilo vou think Sir William Ijowc's armv, alli'led by all the ilect and craft, would have had as eaily as the besrinniniv oi' bilv, immediately affM" the inurefnon which took place amonp; the cnemv alter the defeat at Tieonuerv)i,',a ? A. I did not kniwv what force there w as under the command of General Vaughan, nor do I even now know ; but I ihould think molt certainly, that a great army upon the I ludfon's River near Albany, would have contributed very much to our m diino; our wav to Albanv. \_ Mavc you ever eonfidcred what were the caufes of the failure of the ex- viition under General Hurgoyne, and to what do vou impute it ? A. I looked upon our force not to be ccjual to the forcing our way to Al- banv without fome co-operation. Q^ Where tlien did you expei^V that co-operation ? A. I haccn diverted, would it not have impeded, or ibtppcd the progrefs of any army *ip the Hudfon's River. A. I don't know the flrenti;th of General Walhington's army, nor the nature of the country b'.;tween Albain' and New York j and therefore 1 cannot form any judgment of w hat would have happened. Q. Are you not of opinion that there are .very ftrong palVes or polls on that river T A. I found them very ftrong between Ticondcroga ami Albany, and from re- ports of military men of high reputation in the fervicc, 1 have underltood there were many very rtrong pMls between New York antl Albany. T57. Qi From whence is the account of the rtrcngth of Mr. Gates's army taken? 4 A. From Lieut. Col. Kingnon."! r, V I D F, N C F.. :eti ? From A. I'loiii .1 return voluiiimilv pivcn by (ii'ncr.il (Jalcs tit n-.c for my own f.iiis- fiKMioii wlu'M at All);\iiy, :iml tlial rcruiii was lij^nccl l>y (n-iicial (jaitos. C^^ I lave you iliat return ? A. I fvivc ir fo Cicncral Himnivno ; T law it todny ; lie Ini it. (^ W'.n it l)y tonlont of Ciijncral (iatcs that tlic loltUcrs alter ilic convention rc- taini-ii tlu'ir can ouch-boxes ? A. They retained tli'-ir belts, and I really don't rorolKft wlieilirr their car- toiuh boxes were in p;eneral retained or not: bur iali. '55- \ Al- 1 - 11 have that REMARKS tm re- thcre 1 m K.\l>lafhitif)ff^. '■'■ •^ I 1 1 lllil i|i' I III il WMn I'l w I ill II' villi inr n|.'iii f Im'i m I < .1 (ion ii.i'i. (M n \fU',>\ n liiM, il' I'Mvnl (Mr III (III li'Milii iiliii»|.|y, |.i(i|.( ily l'» » ;ill''fl, li'mnlr ||f Ii ri lil|t I'lMiiily Imi lirrii ii'/nl»(| liy \ui' in mmh/ pioiliii I )»: ' ii'i III ^, • / fli'-, WiMi v/"ri fn HI II'I 'iiiiiii'.rn jiii'l (!,' |,iil,|„ ^ f, ll,l\r lnMlii llniu llim luMir |l ill lli< |l " .|i m l||(,|,- |(l| .» t' I -j. \t\\\v.\<\ i A t||,,r tl I iMil, 111 iipi Miiin, lilt liilijrilq to will- Il III- |iiii|,/i|. i| ti, »,i|| ,y I' h'llil/- I'I'ri'f, tf. V \\ I' ;i fl lli|lJlllV 11(11111 till Im nil II »ll iIk I li'||i|| V Ml wllli II V/c ;irr (I Ifli' ',, til liiMilly liiivi liiii||(»Jil lliiir Inlilillnl i i|il|iiiic lirlw'n in. f li^ | /,f'lfl iinllnii)' ill II I li;\vi' ;illi l;-' d n Ip,''! in;. Im i fitidin'l fit iii/ fj'^n ; )„ (I U'-l I III, line iicmiill ini , v\ir\,\ |,r tii'Mtil. ii'i Im li tli/- n^\>^,u/' ,,\ \ ■\ f. i.ififf/f '//Mil I H|» ' '>\\UM\i/\fl\ (l.tn I r n wliiiii III iiiiililinl Willi (lie (|iitliM " /,it,i|," tniij |ir'.n'.iiii(r I u, I. jIii- iiil>l(i|iHMl inii;|(tillilir=!. Mr |.;i||ri| riifiirjy nvr i i||r n ,,,(, '!'» ( II ' MM »' niiitifff/,n ill'' I ,|l|fr l,\' ;,|| '' 'I'wr; ;if ',,\,-.\ri,y^ Ol Iniiy (.Iliiir; m mote. lir|()ii|Mii|', f«» ilir ( •otiVfiilioii tfooj.q, il,,,, ,,1 \\u\t};iu'\ (inly Wil"! pin|Mil(i) ti» !•(• (.illril nil |ii^ [ ,01 (llliip'r; |,,ift, 7.;.. f UW. ifiifrfi.irir ( ',\',][t\ MUlinl.nnl, ol llir ,|;||i ir|.iii„i,i, ,,|,oti |„itolr (toin il,r ( onfrtcfs ;H,r| \(.i\nu with a ioi|.m.rilir I'Viu il)Ir Mm in Noitli I'.niain . Iiut, ii|.oti fiirrlirr nfIr/(K,f,^ |,,., ; ll\ll> tluMI|'lll |i|(<|vr lO (lll|.(|||r Willi llic ;ill((|i!;|li(r of tin, (,\ 'if 'I' ' I 1 ;iiifl ti)/- ■»viliirl'< tiiiilf I onln o( (Ik* I louli w.i-i Mr. .Skmr. N( !)'■ or,!/ ' "I'T' W,r. l.rtf.T f|iMllf.r,| f j-.ivr an iiMouni ».! ilic proi c, ,|ii,,r; .u IJi imin^ron > afid I heartily hiinonf. t jnihlic is drprivrd ol Ins Klliinony. 't rit ti/: lUit idlh(>vi|z,h I am ihin Idi in pf.flMfion of the cvid iiulilr 1,01(1, I av.'iil inylcK" of my njdii (,(' (\i,{'i\>'.r^ \\ lollowinp, purpolc-s : liill, to (ollr/l from tlir riiimitc^ (whirl rnrr, llllron^rovf■r^^fl ],-/ t\ '" < '"•('•, \',T \lv. {f,\ I, in ;in '-r.r^ywry of thi ii.itnic, arc unavoidably prolix and diLirrani-cd; the fcatrriTfl p,-|^r"^, nnd app! to l.u'ts, nndrr tlilliiu'l and Icpararc heads. Net, ro cxaminr whether the faOs / ppi/ rri'"m Ili.r./'vnc to rii'lf';. Iroin the lilcnce of tlir nol)lc Lord, f am to .ifH rrlpa'l invalidatal I)y the c rofs cxamin.ii iinr 31 admitted by him^ arf; 'vfiich, y.ry.r. .,fpr<-;. 1:1 an / ''■': ;' .n '. ion of ihc; v/itncllc, by otlicr t/entlfjmcn. Ari ^^ .VMWy., I \ '■:{l 94 REVIEW OF TflE EVIDENCE. M Infimiation ot li'uiiii; :utcil iiiit.iir" ly by S'w (.im Curlctun, ovcrtliiowrj !)>• his ouu e\i(lcncc, Sfc Sir Guy Cailcton's evidence, qii. '• 2s 3' Afperfion from the pri« per, No. 111. rcfiifcd. laftly, to cxpl.iin fuel) circiiinflnnccs, and anfwer fiKluicw and collateral objefliorn, as li;uc been j)ointcd a^ in the fame crols e.xaniination, and were omitted, or only llighily noticed in my opcnin[!,, bccaulc they did notexill, or were not deemed pofTiblc objcfts of blame or cavil. In [nirfuing iliclc purpofcs, I fhall confider the proofs precilcly in the order of the f.iiU to which they are produced. Though ilie [\\[\ circumltance I took notice of in my opening, viz. my condufb refpc(f\inj.>; Sir Guy Carleton, was rather an infmuation than an allegation againft mc, I thought it right that it fliould be tlie liril overthrown by evidence -, for while ic remained in any degree of force, it gave a general tinge, as it was meant to do, to my whole caufc. I could not but cxpedt even the virtuous prejudices of the human heart co be againft me, whilft it was pofiible to be conceived that in abfencc of the commander in chief, to whom I had adtcd fecond •, uhofe attention I had conftantly experienced i and with whole confidence I was then honoured i I had pracftifcd un- manly and adulatory intrigue to fuperfcde him in a favourite objedl of command.— There are few worfe modes of betraying a fuperior oflicer to be found upon the records of dilhonour •, and whoever reflects upon the degree of odium with which the moft: palliated adls of that fpecies have been r.'ccived by mankind, will not wonder at or condemn my impatience, in applying my firft quertions to Sir Guy Carleton to that particular objcft. Clear as my jullification ftood by the letter formerly referred to, (No. II.) I fliall be forgiven for obtaining, though with fome redundancy, a full and fatisfadory confirmation of my innocence, from the verbal teftimony of the party whom I wasfuppofed to have injured. It may be proper here to obferve, that the abovementioned afperfion, to which I have fo often adverted, and at which I have ftrove in vain for due terms to exprefs my indignation, was not the only one caft upon me refpefling Sir Guy Carleton. When impartial and candid men revolted at the infinuation of my treachery, my prefumption and infulence (a lefilrbut ftill a calumnious charge) was pointed out in that part of the paper (No. III.) that treats of the force to be left in Canada, and the difpofition of it. 1 am pleafed with the queftions in the crofs examination of Sir Guy Carleton, marking the preicribcd dillribucion of the troops, ^c. (38, ^^y 40, 41, 42, 43.) becaufe that enquiry affords me an opportunity of juftifying myfelf in a point which I have not taken notice of before. The polls, and the troops which I imagined would be ne- cclTiry to occupy them, were fpecified merely to Ihew that the number of 3000 was indifpenfibly requifitc for the defence of the province. The whole of that detail con- curred with General Carleton's rcquifitions for reinforcement, and with my reafonina upon thofe rcquifitions •, and when I aflert, as I now do, that I never prefumed to fug^^clt the necefiity or propriety of foiming a detail of polls, (thus given for informa- tion) REVIEW or THE r. v i d e n c e. 91 information) into prccifc orJcrs for tlie general upon the fpnt, 1 nm fiiro the fcorctary of llato \v » more contradid that allbrtiun than he has done any other I have mailf. When in the fame paper I confuicntially communieated my rcafons for preferring certain corps to others, I was iK^luated by the fame prlneiple of olleiinj^^ every oi'i- nion that could conduce to make the intended fervice cfl'edual. 1 thou'.'.ht it a ;ull claim in an arduous undertaking, to have my own choice of the troo[is ; and I am perfuadcd Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of me, cither that claim, or a fubfeciuci.C one in the fame pajjcr, of being held free from any imputation of delay, till I llu)ii!d be clear of the province of Quebec. With an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carle- ton, I thought it a precaution fully juHinablc, to fecure myfelf aj^ainll others, in the numerous and complicated departments under him, who might be found lei's equi- table than he is. I know I have before complained of the produflion of thcfe fccret corrimunica- tions ; but after fo many precedents as the lafl; Seflion furniflied, of withholding parts of corrcfpondcnces from Pailiament, upon the plea that they might atfeft in- dividuals, the noble Lord's fdcnce upon tholii complaints, gives me a right {till to comment upon the finifter purpofes that are to be afcribed to the produdlion of that paper at length, rather than by cxtrad:. Thofe purpofes were various ; but it muft be contelTed one, and only one, good cffedt may refult from a review of them, viz. It may ferve as a falutary caution to any olTiccr, who fhall for the future be ad- mitted into confultation with the fame minifler, how he commits himfelf by an opi- nion of men and things. The next point that I entered upon previoufly to my narrative, was the tenor of my orders, and I believe it was generally cxpedled that the noble Lord would have taken fome notice of the fadt I alledged, that every difcretionary latitude zvhich I bad propojed was erafed, while the plan was in his hand. As his Lordfhip had fo much com- mented upon the nature of peremptory orders, as a general queftion, in my abfence, it would have been fair in him to have reafoned upon them after that important and decifive circumflance was laid open. The general idea of forcing a way to Jlbany^ which the army at its outfet con- ceived, by reafoning upon the apparent principles of the campaign, without partici- pation of the letter of the orders .j clear, from the general tenor of the evidence. I wilhed, it is true, to have heard more copioully the fentiments of Sir Guy Carleton becaufe he had full participation of the orders. From the temper and judgment that always diredt his condu V r 1 1 1- r v t t> r. n r r:. V\ idt'-lMV <>\ fi.*),!. (Voir, <)inM>. 4. ro o. Thf iifrt of ir. v.'aptarA MoniffcM fwTiqncfiTort 1 o ro ! - . Lor<] Fslfsr- to lO. ^•xrimihat'^n. <,iK-l! aOA. Rerhn- <^f tic f}J Vtricd. t'flmi>ait>,ii, \\(\r, iiiMD til. iv i):ini'r. \i< l'»- i (1 iMt(l\. .H'v ^viiiten (pflinnMw ; jnul ilic p.-ipevs, ?\''.\ \1!.:mv', \UI '\'\ \1\, \pjM\i.ll\, \\<-ii» nilMctl d> »Ii(((p IvfniP pimhi. iT'l 1'>< p\M;'(''(i ; l\.i (lie \< inn's r< tlir tuM>|"t, No. XI. flvc iniMrovi'v fl\i- {hi- avtill.'w , Iv 'he M:\;oi o< l nr.M^ 'ibe Imtn, is alio lonfnuud rtll ilvif I atlvamTil icrprcMiii}* ilu' opinu'*i> nnd r«n 'MinMti^ili^iiiM^ o< M;\i.m (ioneval Pliilips. {o\ ihe pvuportion itf aitillc- v\ emplvnul ; <>> ilu iiiotU^-are q\iftnntv <'( ii. ioi\ip;M;itivrlv nih i|\o priiuipio* rtml ]^^,1^.'lilx■ .M oiht'v fcvviif^, :xni1 )U'vo1\ fpo \ilrtii\T, ihc imvllif>vinr of tlu- jiprUMn (hmii wliv^m tluy c:xni<\\>mUn>avo given ihcm lul^cieni a\iilvMiiv. H»n fortimatcly tliry :vv vcviiic^^ o\ 1V, thciv rntiYnehments, either to ivtvoat, ov light ttpiMi grovmiJ whoio they fnppnkil * Artillerv oniftl l>c leaft ellv^Svially ompU>\-evl. 1 am to thaiOt the honomahle ntemlior, whaffvcf ki$ tnrentions iv.ight have Ween, who In h\s oiofs cxaminativin placed the jJkpov vicar a view. The en^ *;fmflining fav\ «>f the lirfl pe»^io«l to w huh vothal evii enec is ap|>H- •ofti^^'^'/ '^^ !'''^'"'^'*"'V**'''^f^^^*"*^''^^^''*P« '^^*^ enemx (nither than t'%y \\c\c (ollow- 00 m theiv pi-ccpitarc retreat from T\oontkvv\ga, is etlaMttho*! hx ' '^'^l HaUanas, and bv lA-rd Harvrngron^ ^•• . BtxutX cf tl( ,i\ii>id Vcriod. h 1 '.^»r Mnmn Iiii|niff'(| in \^^r |ins li""]! ocrnfi.Min,! I,y j^jfypp^^. f'tlhlllMll mw |i' I ! .|iq \, h It'll'. I iiliiv Is It Id ''!',• mv !v hfiiis pnd hy (irr. Mm liuMi inil1;il ' ■! 'ii ilii' pen^»rii|ihv nl ilif.- (mintiy liy (||m(c tn wlimn iriy nr'tinns were liiilVci'lTli uimI. Mv iIip (■'•iir (ninici MM.'; •,iiii| il mill' |i;ivi- !• 1) 't (i n |iiilf' ( ' i t ||p rii'|irH(ii4 t'l rnnl tliat l' J- i"nii- nlii'li ilu\ ufi" ill' liiv ■! (■> !t|.jiiMVc, \x n<^ |ir"'i|(lv llinl win; Ii t|if- m;iifi Ir.'I/ ul ilio aiiiiv I'll'!: mill I nti in jtriluii, and wiili Iih li 'dl'-'H, ;!•! tn ''imr iiii U'irh Hi'; rc;ir "f 'h'^ rnonn I diive iIhmii frnm llieir fnriifi(() |i'.n !it Skcnrfboronjj;!!, with the lol HI lluii jKiM nl live armrd vellfls ^nd all ilie rcif (if rlicir water ' r;iff. Htii il mav hv liiid, ihiq pail nf ih^ , rc.fn cxaminafi'in, tlifui^li in(oiniir'h''ririfil" in linini (il frcMgiMpliv, Hill applied in llir qiudliitn taken noiicp nf in my narrnfive, vi/. Iirllur it UMuld mil Imve licrn nKif' cxprdiciil in ftiirn In Tirrmd'Tfmri, ^k) 91 Mif-llc'^"! jr| f;-";;r,T|iti/. 1 ■ Ml f:i|. ir- I ■-, 'I'l'.-I*.')-). '.l;jcni';ri 'J' , w •* takrilir iMiiir I'v Lake George, than to prncecd, as F did, l»y tlir I'itf h I'ine Plaina " to Fort F.dwaid r^" I (liall luii ii'f Mpiudflie tlir variovm iTintives I have before (lilted in fiipport of tliai prcfoience, haviii}!; jniMi(. kly in my fjivoor ihe opinion of ;in olFi'^r To rnli^fitr'n''fl in iniliiary fcience, and lo well aifpiaintcd wiih the roimiry as Sir (niy Cnrlcton ;* and nr\ ♦ I'-n. ■It f ',\\-i { 'ir. \c\ havinfj; hr;ird rtdiflrrenre of opini'Mi ii> noy otIjfT ofli' ►r nf a likr defcrii to re n nun li mote upon n l"nl'i''(''1 fn rii[ipoitrd hy reafoninji; ;nu| l.y fvuf er nf fv,nr,.rrnMft |Tflininp, eonflderaltle time hy alloitinj!; tin- v/holc fervicc of ili° water craft to the ft'r.c. g^ma-l ''7 the army r iWinjj rhp r'-'itp try Port tain Money and 1/ievitcnnnt Cnlnnel Kingflnn : the r.'h.-r, that tn have reached Fort l-^l. '^^ Itanfpoit of provifion and flores over I,ake (icorp;e, inflead of cmployin«; great part of it for ihe Iranlport of the troops is intontc (laldy prf»vei| l>y thn evidence of (Jan- r,d ward with the troops for.iKM iIim tiie /^th of foly (the day th^t the firtf e m- liarkaiion nf provifions arrived at Fort (fori/e) wouUf ivit on IV Iv'ive been n I fel-fc ronps ir I'lirt Kdward, i.e- ri( en l>roir'iii ■/ and rarnap;e \v1k-), on ' tho r ontrary, Inn alfo highly impolitic ; hfcaiil' the ful.tillciH e of rli'' J'orc die arrival of that embarkation, mnlf ha-, throvip,h miuh dillicult road all the way f-^om f'ort Anne^ by remaining in the nrifrhboiirhood of SkC'ieft)orniin;h till the paffatrr of f,HkcGeorp;e was cflci^cd, cxchifively of th" confiderations of ( ivcrinp; the rcmnv?! r,f the ho- fpital (»f Fliibcrton, and ahirminti; theCnnnccticiit by the pnfirion of General FJcide- fd'a corps, the army was commodioTiflv roppHed by water- carnage. . * licc alio the i\\\[) of (oiuitry. The ' ip^ 111 VTo. nry, ')ii( il. 4. to fjicll. I r. f.ieuf. Col. Kinw/fon, f [lie It. ?}. 99 \\\ \ \v \\ o 1 V 11 F. 1 \ 1 n FN e' r,. anii\ Thr !"rv( (iii\i, (liiiiiMci r\.\i,^in:nii>n, ni i hi il\nj» to (lie oi d. r t>( the N;ni;ilivf». is ihr nwiMj-'M I i'( i!w ini'Vii/inc^ hI pii'\ iIimiis, .^r. (\imu I'on ( ti'nrf>,c ; iiiiil ii is lu;:\hl\ \niu;\'l'> im Ui^.-mi IV'' M ll)' w the ililih lilii. i^ nl \\\M (\(l:\Mr, il Mu>ll Iv' Hi K now Inlnod nnc <>< (Iv pi iniipiil }\i o\imh tipnn \\ liii It I \ ui.'i. lu- i!'(- pi. in (i( ilii cxp' ilii ion lo Hi'iiiiinjMini will (;n1 iiu\ U\n I ;i,n pi lUi \ilr.!, (\«i\ I :\nili.l fviiininrr \\ ill 111 11 inilulp,o lIUMn u llioi t pnnlf. II wil! lvM< I ollit), il, I'v.u ihi^ i-> ihr onh p;ni ol ihc- > ;\nipiii^ii \ipon u hii h llir nn- Mi' 1 oil! I\i<; 1;M(1 Iiis linjVM , ii"; iiiilinnfj ii pioihu't i\ c o( the liiMiMnu'nt rvcnl''. I lio » rolv-rvAMun ii \^'\\ h.u] ;ili(;iil\ lirrn pu lit li upon iln' l.iiuo idnm. .Siu li \v;ini \)f kmnv lo(ifj,x' o( ilu- n;vuii' oi ii;inlp(Mi in th;ii »oiin;i\ Iv.is In-cn InMcivrd ; |o nun li pup"l- It i^ion o< vinnoriHiuA ilrl.ns liii; uppnuil; liu h ttuphiilis o( tpirilion lius nili'iult'd »v.-iv liivun^t^uui' (>i ni\ »oii(Uu'( -M ihis )>.Mioil, ijcu 1 llnvll ll.mil lUipiiiiiil o( pio li\iM . i< ! piiLur ilu' ni''pln.; oi iti,' Inlihipirni cviilnivo Iw :\ nioir lompn li w- Sr.}\-(y Mhif \ oi ihr diliiniliu 5 awA ;ui\ioiii's ol ni\ lini;\tion lli;in 1 tlvMpJil '^ '":•"''■'•' v..^^nv-vTli;uvlv!o^r. 1 !'u- oMiil ^ uiion ol an 'inoviivn; (oi r ll;iii-(l lo Tordinji iTir li.'vo o\(vp, livl;invl ; for lonv^ pui oi \\k (vippU tlpnulol ii|aii d in i^iai vo»um\, jUAonlinjJ to ni\ vivpiHitiiMj Iict'oic \ london. -.Wa] Iv^.i noi rou lu-\ilhcls .J ilio n.nij>aiion ivow (^iiclv\- lo iluMWomh ol tho S.^irl wccA not bo a^j,niii tlniiil'>o.L riu- IV VI rml>;\vrA1\ whivh iMnto irom Montreal, and whivh wai nnuh tlic groatrH, witUovit "inioviovinfi wuh iho tianlpovi w liuli wiih i\;n;d ncvclliiv \\as (o he expedited vip the Sr.nt 1 awivn Y to 1 ake V.)!>tavio, lov the leiviocof OMonel St. 1 cgcr's cxpcilitinti, and \V.c iiinienlv^ \\\y,-cs ([hew neoel^aiilv \ipon the luove allo'^ lot the winter itiaiit- rcnaiwoi ihe\ippei Ovmntw. Fo thelo ni\j>,ht be added a Idl oi ehanee« atid incon- vci>ieiH\''s, ireivloiit t'O thecait\ing )>huTs betwcei^ t.haiMMt e ami Saii\t john^ ; the nnocitai;">rain!\ afrovuards oi the palVage vnei Lake ^■hatn[>lain, at\d Lake Gecngc ; the laKv.ious find llow operations o( drawiiig the hvwts over the itUiDivis whieh di- vklcs the <\\o l.ake«. liieie ror.cthei niaki a tvtKiiA oi entbarfaiVivieiifs and dilaju fKiinM^ionts hanllv robe vvnoeivod bv t'vMc who have not experienced thetn. But aiihiX^eh t-c wholcot this anangement (the tvnnilhinj; the \ipper Cvuintrv e\- vv^vov^) was msdc under m\ di"<^'lion, 1 hare been vontent to date tn dilHenliics troni tht" Iv^g-emcnt ot the lupplies at Fort (reonre; aiui 1 i.ue touehed thcDther paiTj onlx to iTicw more ivrlpieuoutly the untairncts of ludgini; of at\ An\erican cani- X^kip' r.jvin F.virojvan ideas. How 7e?.kmflv loever a g,r Ir fluill fi:J^I I if ff'ffy, hr inii/f ,i/l''f ::rri'ty fn ,i>iitii;r /■(',-(• tn frni if. riic hrhiwiitur ol the (mlians is a ( in iiinllatirr too tn.itrtial to lie pad' 1 over in a ii\ low o| tlic aiixittirs ill lliis part of tlir canip^'ifyi. I hail (hicrrnrd lie caprirr, the InpcrHilion, the (ilK-inirrclUthirrn of tlie liuhan ( hararUr Irom my fiill inter((nir(c, rv;n wiih tliolo iiationi which are liippofal tf» have made the (.',"'''*'" progrcl'; f.-vard^ nvih/atioii : I inraii with thole lalh-il thr ddinit ihated nation"; ir ar Montreal. I fi d been taught to look upon the reniotr trilies wlio j(;inrd nir at Skene ninroiif^^, as mom warlike ; Imii a vrrv liiilr titne proved that, with eipial depravity in frnc ral principle, till II only pre eminciHc ( onlilh'd in feroeiiy. The hope^ f had phued n their wild honour, aiitl in ihc ( oiilrotil of their eondn/lor-;, u hieh, as I Hated before, at firfl had been promilinc, \vcre (ooii at an end; and their ill humour and mutinous dirpr»fifion were m iniiell loon alter my arrival at h'ort Ivhvard. The apparent ( aufes of their t hanp,e of tem|H'r were the relentment I had lliewn upon the murder of Mils Ma( rra, suul the rellraiius I had laid on their tlilpofition to commit other enormities ; but F never dotibted thai tlu ir evil pallions were fomented, and their defec'lion completed by the cabals oi the Canadian interpreters. Capacity, fdf-inicn (1, and prefumption are the charaiHcrillics of ihefe men, with fiinic few exceptions. 'lUr ac(|ui(ition of tfic Indian laiifrna^e has ulually becti .1 certain fortune to a /nan with an artful head and a convenient conli ience. Tochrik ilie old pra(?liers of peculation in thcfc meti, Sir Guy Carleton, w-^h great j\ul(\ment, had n.ivcn the fuperinteinlency of the Indian department to Major (.'arnphell and ("aplain I .a/er, p;entlemen of the hipjiefl intefoity. The Hritifh officers employed folely in the military condud of tliHt department, were alio lelected with equal pro- jMicty. The interpreters had from the (iril rcpartled with a jealous eye a fyftctn which t«)(»k otit oi their hands the dilfributioii of Indian neceflaries and [)rpfents ; but when iluy found the plunder of the coinitry, as well as that of the frovernment, wascontrouled, the prolbgate policy of many was ctiipluycd to promote difTcntion, revolt, and dcfertion. 1 take this occadon to acquit Monficur St. T.vic of any fufpicion of his being con- cerned in thcle faaions; but I believe he difcerncd them. He certaitdy knew that the Indians pined alter a renewid of their acculh)med horrors ; and that they were f^e- come as impatient of his controui as of all other, though the pride and intereft of authority, and tlie .dledion he liore to his old afT')ciates, induced hirn to cover the real caufcs under various trivolous pretences of dilcontent, witl) which I was daily tor- nicnted, but to which 1 conllantly attended : and though I differed totally with Saint Luc in opinion UiK»n tlie tlficacy of thele allies, I invariably took his advice in the management 97 [If li T, I'l'ir ';f fill; fnditiu. for^l FT.r riDj/fon from ((iie(t/> to I }. St. Luc. !i' t too I' ^ ijii. lail rc- liricd to. Lord H^r- riin.;. n's iji;. la'i i-cti.:'ivii to. & il\ qu. S;, REVIEW OF T HE E V I D r: N C E. nnnnp;eiTicnt of tlioin, even to an inckilj',fn(:c of tiKir mod capricious fancies, when tlic-y liivl not involve the ilillionoiir of ilic Kinf;'.s lcivi.ce and the difgrace of huma- nity. I'he couni^il of tlie 4th of Auguil was hold at his prcffing inllancc\ and in that council, to my groat allonilhmcnt {t'or he had given me no intimation of the de- fign) the tribes with which he was moll parricularly connecT.ed, and for whom he in- terpreted, declarctl ihcir ir.tention vi' returning liome, and ('"inanded my concurrence and aliillance. 'Jlu- cnibarrallircnt of tins event was extreme. By accjuieicing, I voluntary relinquilhcd pa;t of my I'orce that had been obtained with immenfe char«:';e to government, that had created high expctflation at home and abroad, and tliat in- deed my own army was by no means in condition to difpenfe with ; becaufe, depend- ing upon the fu[^ipolcd allitlance oi' this n)uch over-valued race for fcouts and out- polts, and all tlie leiVer, but neccHary fei vices, for giving due rcpofe to the camp, the Britilh light-infantry had been trained to higher pur|)ofes : they v.-ere deilined to lead in the general and decilivc combats I expc»I;ted in the woods, and could not be fparcd, or rilked, or harraffed, without palj^able confequcnces of the molt dilhgree- able kind. On the contrary, I was convinced a cor.lial reconciliation with the Indians was only to be eilcifled by a renunciation of' all my lormcr prohibitions and an induh^ence in blood and rapine : I had not a friend in the department in whom I could confide except Major Campbell, Cainain Frazer, and the 01 her Rritilh officers : their ignorance of the languages, and the very probity of their characlcrs, rendered them of no weight in Indian councils. An anfwcr, neverthelefs, was to be made upon the moment ; and the part I took was to give a firm refufal to their propofition, and to adhere to the coiurouls I had berore ejlablillied ; but, with a temperate reprefentation of the ties of faith, of generofity, and honour, to join every other argument confillenr with tliofe principles which I could devifc, to perfuadc and encourage them to continue tlieir fervices. . i • Tliis fpeecli appeared to have the defired efieft. The tribes neareft home afleded to fepiuate from the others, and only prelled for permillion to return in parties to gather in their harvell", propofing to relieve each other ; which was granted. Some of the remote tril-Kfs alio fecmed to retiacl their projiofitions, and profelled a zeal for tlie ic-rvice •, but the dcfcrtion took place the next day by I'cures, loaded with fuch plunder as they had collcded ; and it continued from day to day, till fcarce a man tnat had joined at Skenciborough remained. This whole tranfadion, I aver, was before the plan of Bennington was formed. It appears \o from the evidence produced upon the crofs examination by the gentiemeii to wliom I am obliged upon fo many occafions, for elucidating different fubjecls ; and the prccifc date could have been further R E V I i: W O ¥ l' M E E V I ]) l", N C E. loi fortlicr fupported by a memorandum of Sir Francis Gierke j but I thouolu that refe- rence ruperllii(>us in a inaiter fo notoiiovis. That Moiifieur Sr. I ue, niixiovis for tli? cie'lir of iiis favourite troop'?, ,;nd invired by the propenfity he ibund in the miinlU'r to liileii to any whifperetl intellim'iice, in contradiction tot liat lie received from i!ie (Jeivral himlelf •, that, imtler [\v[r icmjita- tions, that wily parii/an flioiild inifplate d.ites, aiu! coiifoimd cuifcs, neitl.er furprifes nor olVends ir,e. With this expofition of fatl, I leave him in full ponillion of his petulancy refpeding my military tuleiU'^ ; and am concerned at no cdcLl of his com- ments or communications, in the miniiUr's clofet or in the news-papers,* except as they may have tended to fup[)orC the general lyllein of deception wliicli ii.v; lo Jons]; and [o fatally inllucnced his Ma'ully's advifers. Tlie Indian i)rinciple of w.-,:- i-; at once odious and unavailing-, and if eneouragei!, I will venture to pronounce, its co:;- fequences will be ieverely repented by tlie jMefcnt age, and univcrfilly ab'vjned by pollerity. But to proceed to the furvey of otiier dinicuhics of the time. Great atlentioti \\ .\z clue to the manay,ement of the German troops. The mode of war in which they were engaged was entiiely new to thein •, teiupij.- tions to defert were in themfelvcs grear, and had been enlianeed and cir^'jlateJ among tliem by cmiflarics of the enetny vviiii much art and indullry. JealoulV ( f [nrdilvdticjii in the allotment of polls and feparate commaiuls ever fublilts among trcojjs of (.iillererst dates-, and a folid preference of judgment in the commander in cliief often appears i narrow national partiality. I confels I was much afTiftcd in maintaining cordiality in an army thus compofe 1, by the frank, fpiritcd, and Iionourable ciiarader I had to deal with in Major Generril Reidefel -, — a charaftcr which was very early imprefild upon my niiiul, and which no trials of intricacy, danger, and ililtrefs, has fi nee effaced -, but addreis was fciil requifite to fecond his zeal, and to diffufe it tlirough the Geiman ranks; and I ftudied to throw them into fituations that might give them confidence in them- felves, credit with their prince, and alacrity in the purfuit of an cnterprife, which, when its difficulties were confidercd, in facl required cntluifiafm. Other parts of tliC alliance, though not liable to fui'picion of treachcr\-, like the Indians, nor of coniequence to be fo much attended to as the Gernvms, PievertliC- lefs had their perplexities. The Canadians, were orHcered by gentlemen of gic.it' * One of thoic comments Lord George Germain thoii,^!r proper to ilitc, in ;i fpeeeli in tiic Ilonfe of Commons. His Lorcllhip gave me a characlcr in the words lil'jd by Mi-. St. Luc, in a converiaii')ri lictwecn ilicm. — " 11 ell brave, mais loiuil comme un Ailemand." The letter .lUuded to was addieiled to me tVom Ciuiada, at'tcr Mr. St. L'lc's voyage from Fn;' md. 1 do notkno'.v towln^n the d' plicate was nddrclied, hut he certainly \v is a porion oi' diligence ; lor it appeared in the nc.\ .--papers the lame day I recei'.rtl thcoiigiud. I* con- C.r u)^n C. --avflT of .M.e.. K.aIc- f':l. Tiii (' .aa- u':;n I. >.o.iJ. 3 102 %m Provincial tor,' J. Other c it\al finliurr,il»- li.en 5. REVIEW or Till': EVIDENCE. condition in tlieir country, but were not to be dopcnded upon. Inftead of the entcr- prifing and daring fpirit wliich diflinguiflud the charader of that people under the French govcrnnncnr, was fubftitutcd a longing after home, the effe6t of difiife of arms and long habits of domcllic enjoyments j and this difcafe ("wal etc foyz) is carried in them to a greater proverbial extreme than in any other people to whom the term is more commonly applied. It was neither cafy to keep tlicfc people together, nor to fupport the ideas ofre- fpcvfl which the enemy entertained of them from the remembrance of the former war. The only manner of effefking the latter purpole was to flicw them occafionally at a didance, but rarely to commit them upon parties where they were likely to fall in with the befl: cladcs of the Rangers oppofed to us: perhaps there are few better in Uie world than the corps of Virginia Riflemen, which a6ted under Colonel Morgan. The Provincial Corps, of which I had two in embryo, and feveral detached par- ties, were yet a heavier tax upon time and patience. They were compofed ofpro- fedtd Loyalifts, many of whom had taken refuge in Canada the preceding winter, and others had joined as we advanced. Tlie various interefls which influenced their actions rendered all arrangement of them imprafticable. One man's views went to the profit which he was to enjoy when his corps fhould be complete -, another's, to the proteftion of the diftritft in which he refidedi a third was wholly intent upon revenge againfl: hisperfonal enemies ; and all of them were repugnant even to an idea of fubordin.ition. Hence th-' fettkment who fliould act as a private man, and who as an officer, or in whofe coips either fhould be, was feldom fatisfadlorily made among themfelvcs ; and as furely as it failed, fucceeded a reference to the Com- m.ander in Chief, which could not be put by, or delegated to another hand, with- out dillarisfa^tion, encreafe of confufion, and generally a lofs of fuch fervices as they were really fit for, •vs'i'z. fearching for cattle, afcertaining the prafticability of routes, clearing roads, and guiding detachments or columns upon the march.* Such were riie embarraffments of my mind, added to tiie many neccffary avoca- t-ions of command purely military. It will likewile be remembered that J^ieutenant Colonel St. Leger vais, at this tinie, before Fort Stanwix : every hour was pregnant with critical events. J'he candid and unprejudiced, relieving upon fuch a fitua. tion, will cl'.eck the readinefs of their cenfure : far be it from me to contend that I did not commit many errors : I only hope to have proved, that they are not thofe * 1 \vo\iKl not he iinde'-dood to iafer, th.it none of tlie Provincials with me were finccre in their loyally i perl-i.ps nir.ny were la. A tew were of" dilUnjjuiflied braxery, among which it wouki I)e unjiill not to partiri-.hirize Mr. Fillar, who i'ell at Bennington, and Capt. Sherwood, who was forward in fvery fcrv.cj c.f danger to the t-nd of tl:c campaign. 1 only maintain that the interelh and tiie palTions of the revolted Ameiicans concenter in the caule of the Congvcfs ; and thofe of the Loyalilh break and fiibdividc itito various purfuits, with which the eaiife of the King has little or nothing to do. which REVIEW O F T ri E E V I D ]•: N C I'. i03 ExTilI ion t ' H uninj;. ton. N\ liich have yet been fpecifically pointed at, and whatever blame may be imputable to nie in other inftances, my late examiners are not jiiftly intitled to triuinpli on Tiny ot their dilcoveries. And now for the expedition to Bennington as it (lands upon evidence. The queftions upon the crofs examination are lb explanatory of the hints v,'hich fell from the noble Lord afterwards, that one would almoft imagine the hints were originally defigncd to precede. It will be regular for me, thcreforr, to confider them in that manner, and, from the whole I am to collect, that tlie faults meant FauU? Hip- to be cflabliihed are, that I employeii Germans to found the difpoiltion of a coun- ^ " "■' ' try in which ^o Germans reluled : that the mounting dragoons was unnecell'ary : that the range given to the expedition was too great : that it was not originally defigncd for Bennington : that the force was inadequate. In regard to tlie firft of thefe charges, relative to the employment of Germans, l^'>'lt iTi-m. it would be wafte of time to add to the full anfwer given by Lord Harrington. Co- 1^,',?,"'' i or'i lonel Kingfton has anfwcred the queflion refpeding the mounting the dragoons; H-u-ringuui, and moreover it will be remembered, that the colleding horfes was by no means 'i jeiit.V'o!.'' confined to that Icrvice. They were requifitc for carrying the baggage of the armv, '•^'"gi^"". '!• as expreflecl in the inftjfuftions to Colonel Baume, to the amount of i 500. This "^ circuniflance may have ftruck fome gentlemen, as confirming the idea that tlie bag- gagr attending the a-miy was of enormous bulk. I requeft a fufpcnce of judgment upon this article, till I come to the proper place of explanation ; and I revert to the part of the charge which feems of mod: importance, viz. the extent of the march, ^ e _\hi as defcribed in thelnftrudions, compared with the ftrength of the detachment, &:c. and all other It can hardly efcape obfervation, what llrength to my defence upon this point l'^!"-"''s •■••- ui-irj 1 aj -If u- r- ipeainc/ Ben- may be derived from advocates who were not expected to appear in my behalf. I'or ninguin. I take fupport from the noble Lord himfelf, and all who have believed in his late -^'^'- ^^^* affertions, or adhered to his favourite dodrines, by pleading that I undertook the expedition to Bennington upon report, ftrengthened by the fuggeftion of perfois of Icng experience and rcfidence in America \ ivho had been prejetit on the/pot when the rebel- lion broke out ; and whofe information had been much refpedled by the adminiftration in England ; that the friends to the BritiJJj caufe ivere as five to one, and that they ivanted only the appearance of a prote5ling force to Jhew thein/elve^. Some criticifers upon the adequacy of the force I employed, may delert the caufe of the noble Lord •, but will He maintain, that a recruit of force from the enemy's country was The grouiui a wild cxpetflation, when the recruiters, provincial colonels, governors, land pro- 41';,^^""^'^'^* prietors, and popular leaders of the party who glory in the delignation of Tory, Rrn iu^t.-n were upon the fpot, and perfonally iniercltcd in the levies ? Ik mud furcly (land the doa'rine'' forth my advocate in this point, or entirely forget the reafoning he held to Sir Wil- «*' ''";>' ^- ,, ,. Ccirain. 1 I ham I m if^ai'^l < ::' 104 l.icnt. Col. KingUon's R E V 1 ]•: w o 1 r 1 1 1", I'. \' F n K N c v:. )i.)in IIowc, when wirlunu the lulv.int.n'cs df rmh recruiters i ngainll the belief ol the (.iencr.il lunileU'} unprcp.ueii ro rcp.iir tl>c iIil'4ppoiiun)cnf, if (Hfippoint- inent cnliici.l, in a nu'.iliire of I'o iiuuh inure in,i:;iiiuul(', ;iik1 fo imich lefs real en- C(Hir;igrmeiit, Jh- referred to th.\t c.qirilient (if rcc riiiiiiv!; from the enemy, \vhat he had not lhen(!,ih to i'upjily fi(»ni the national troops.* Tliis 1 nuill infill is an un.inlwcraMe ilctenc'c, with reljieil to the noblr l.onl, and thofe who think with iuio ; l<>i it is \\i;d and poliiivt- eoinciden>"e wiih ihcirnjii- iiions, pad and pretent — and if 1 l.-.ul it will he lo with ih.ile to conu', ni\' pri^i'lu ev' would be aiithori'/.cd bv tlie (onvivtion and iiinniph whiJi Mr. iialway's cviiK-nec, fffpctlini; the loyalty ol the Amenean';, lleioed to pri)dn>.e in the jMrties to whom 1 allude.' But in due refp^cl to oth.cr iudj',er., it is ineuiulient upon nic to (late a more fc- rious defiine. As l.ieutonant Colonel Kinfdlon cannot jMove iuridieally that tlic roun;h ilraft of the dtfipn wluch ended the affair of Bennington was the fanie wjiich was (.Iclivcr- ed by General l^eidell'l, and I am tuuvdling upon memory to ineur a pollibility of millakc, e\ >'n in an immaterial circuinllanee il-i;u refpei.'T;s an ablent friend, I -m ee)ntent it Ihould be eonlidered as an uncertaintainty, and 1 dro[> all ul'c that couUl be drawn from the ori<},inal eompofition. It will fully anlwer my jnu'iiole to adhere to the bare nflertion which I am fure will never be eontradicietl, that Major Gene- ral Ueidefcl eriginallv conceived an expedition ibr the purjiofc o(" mounting his dragoons, ami l"u[iplyinp; the troops in ;',eneral with baggage-horfes; tjiat I thougiit his idea might be extended to much greater wCc, and that the plan was confidered, amended, and enlarged, in concert witii him. Therefore upon the abilraCt ground and reafoii c\' the mcafure, I might urge, that it was fu[iported by naked military principle, accoj-ding to the lentiments of a general of great natural talents, znd long lervice under the tirll mailers of the age. It is proved, that the fame fen- timents were ratified by the full ajiprobation of Major Cieneral Phillips, an officer of fimilar defcription, to whom the plan was comminiieatetl ; and if a (ingle part of the fame plan, mentioned to be at tirll dilapproved by Brigadier General Frazcr, continued to bo lb after explanation, that dilapprobation did nor appear. In- deed the utmofl that can be drawn from the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel * \n akttcr iVi'in Lonl (tcoi^-c Gcrmnin to Sir \Villi;ini Howe, tlaicil M;iy 28, 1777, .it'tcr ackiiow- JciU^nii; thu llie toivc tor ilic ciiniirigr. would be lliort of \.hc Gcniral's rc(iuilitious, is the tollowiiifr " Itwc iv;:iy ciodit the .".cooiints whiili arrive from all (inartcr?, ulatiw to the gooii inclinations of " t!;c inhabitant:-, there is e\er,' reafon to expo^'t that your fiiceefs in I'eiif^lv.inia will enable you to " raifc from aiviont,' ihotri inch a force as may I e liilKeicnt for the interior defence of the province, " and leave the :\vn;\ at libeiiy to ])roicetl to oifenfuc operation?." Tl-.c whole of the letter, fuim which the ab'.ve is an cxtrad, i^ vurioiu, ai\d may be fecn in the r '• "v Rcr-.'aer, No, CS. King- RKVIKW OF THE K V I D T, N C F,. lOJ Kinffflon, or any other wit lu-ls, amount!) to no more than an implied wifli in the FinMilicr t(. have C(Muiu''lfi.l the cxpcilition at the head of his didindt corps. It was the fact. Devoted to \.\U)ry and prodif^al of life ; earned for the freneral fuccefs of the campaif'.n, and parncuhirly anxious for every phui adopted l>y the man he loved, he I'rudj'ied a dan};er or cue in olhcr hands th;ui hi;, own. It. was not envy or dif- liar.i^^cmcnt of the (Jcrm.ni iiocps, hut zeal and impatience for employment, that inlUienced his preilileilion for the I'ritilii. 1 iionoincd the principle, while I re- ilraineil it; and I rclervcd his ardour and jud[^ment for a iccoiid movement, which recjuired iIkjIc (puililics nuich more than the expcilition t > lienninj'.lon did, aecordiiij!: to any intclli{:^cntc or appearance of thin,";s at the time. It will be oh- ferved from the cviilence, that the v^holc of liri-^^adier Frafcr's corps was thiown over the river, and ai^Uially pc.cd at the openinp; of the plain near :virat(>ga, when Col. Haume marched ; and the defij.';!! was, upon the firll news of P)aiMne's fuccefs, to have puflieil that corps to take polVenion of the heif^hts near Stillwater, and to have intrenched, there, till the army and the proviiion could have joined, hy vvhi( Ii means the whole country on the weft fide the river, to the banks of , the Mohawk, would have been o\fitin{!;, and iT(]tiitin'^ h's iiutlioriry to piihlilli tin* unlwir, wlurh 1 obt.iincJ, and lUcy ,nc IS lolKnvs : <>^ !)i) you know aiA' i iiviiin!lanro idprci itit^ an uncxpi-'i'lcd rcintorcimiciu rc- tvivi'il hy the iflxls iir IV'Miuiv^ton ru*ar tlic tiincot the ftLlKin ? A. " y\ tew ci.ivs alter I was piiloiKT in the rebel camp, tonu" o(" tlieir oflii ers " told ine, tliar tt was a provid'-mial rirciimflance, that lieneral Staiks was comin;; " thtoiipyi BcnniiKi;roi\ with i : x^ militia of the New-1 lampfliire Urarus, t.> join " then main army near Al'oany, tor ilie <\v:\\d cu the provilioii at Ueniungton did " ivn amount to :v,oie than 400 men •, and th..; on his hearin;; ol a deiaehment ot' " our army beiiii^ only tour or tivc miles iVom him, he with tlie {^uard, and what " nvditia eould Ih' eolle.-U'tl in tlu' neii^hhonrhood, attacked and dd'cated the de- " taehmciu, as well as ihc reinCorcement tliat were on tiieir march to join them. •• riu- rebel otVu'crs alio informed me, and I have fcen accounts that agree with •' wlia: I then heard, ti.at iluiin;^ the action Ciineral Starks was ' luckily' joined '■ bv Colonel \\'arn«r with a conliderablc body ot inen. 1 have frequently heard " (Hir ollucrs iw thai were ia titis a«.ti<)n, that had Colonel Baume reticated lour •' mllc^, andii\;oiHd iliC r:v T lie palled the (.lay lufore, and t.d-ien poll there, " when he IouikI by intormation he eonld not proceed, and had wrote for a rcin- " foi cement, he would ha\e met C ih'ncl Brcimaii coming to his allillance, and " would not have nfiiuod tl^c loli; of his corps, wluch by his inllruotions weie fo " lUoih^,ly recommended, as not even to rifque a confulerable lots. This, Sir, is *' as nearly as pollible tlu- anlwer 1 ilunild ha\ e given had tiic queilion been alked " iv.e in the Houfe of Commons. — J. Money." '1 his piece of evidence will krve to iliew that it was not the fuccefs of the rebels at Iknningtcui that animated the militia to ailenible, and m.irch in t!ie cauie of the Congrcfs -, and he muil be ot ileady faith indeed in American loyalty who can lii[->pole much of it really exilled in the country of the llairj Ihire Grants (howloever ir had been aHlcUd and prolefiird) when he retlecls, not only that General Starks and Colonel Warner were not oppofed in collerting tlieir men, though my army, then in a tide of fuccefs, were near at hand i but alfo that not a loyalill was found carncn: enouL'h to convey me inrelligence. It will likewife appear, from this piece of evidence, when compared with tl-,e mp of the country and the difpofition of the troops, tliat had not tlie accidental pafiao-e ot the detachments under Starks and Warner been exceedingly critical, it could not I'.avo availed. — Forty-eight hours Iboncr, tliey would have joined General Gates ; and he \, upon that wliieh was manileil ; bvit furcly there is nothing new or improba!)lc in the idea, that a }',encral Ihould difguife his real intentions at the outlet of an cxp/Ctli- tion, even from ilic ollicer whom he appointed to execute them, provided a commu- incation with that otllccr was certain and not remote. 'J his review of the aflair of Bennington, tho' long, I trufl will not be deemed mif- placod ; anil from the diflerent parts of if, 1 think, will clearly becftablillied tlic few following affcrtions. ifl'. That the defign upon Bennington was juftiHed by the circumftanccs of the time. 2d. That there was no rcafon to foppofe the force of the enemy there greater than what the detachment was adequate to defeat. 3d. That when the torce was difcovered to be greater, the ill conlVquences would h.nve been avoided iiad not Colonel Baume deviated from his intlrudions, by comrnit- Ciofs ex«. init)jti(ii) uf I.or^l I lir- riii(jtoii, 4. 89. ■v Y i 1 m ^ ! i ting I» ti>'^ 15 I V I I'. W () V T \\ V. V \ I I) i: N c v.. tiii|i;liis rcpulai loiTC in ilio woods inilciul ot' Jortilyinp; a poll in i\\r oprn nnintryr, niui cxploriiii^ ihf wooils only with tlic Iiuluns, C'iui;itli.in% and I'lovincials, iu|ip(titcil l\ ('.i|t.iin IV.ilii's (orps win were lompl u- lu.illcrsof loch bnliiu-rs. 4'.1\. Vh-M iit'fcr ( oloiicl lluiiiv- luiil coMiniiiii'd iliar ciror, it would have been rc- tiitAod hid C'<>Ionfl niuinan's rcmrortfiunit acconipliilicd tluir inarih in ilic time thfv ought to have iloi.c. ,.;tli. I'hat the fbcnj^th ot* the rncmy was tneirl^- accidctiral. And, as a Inial oblVrvation, I will add, that wlicii a i.iinillcr Hates a rnmmnn acci- dent of war, indcpcMulnu ot any r;cnnal adion, iinattcndcd witli any lols that could aiVcd the main ilron^'jth of the army, and little more than tlic nurcarria{T(: nf a foraf^ inp partv, to have been tat,;! to a whole ca;iipai|vi, of whiiih he had direaed the pro- prcls and apportioneil the force, he makes but an ill compliment to his own iudgmeni. The next clals ot' iMOots in vCj^^vdar pron, and the authentic memorandums of Sir l-'raticis Clarke, that early in the month of v\u!^ull it was no caly talk to iupply the daily conliimption of the army. Our powers were afterwards, in fome liepree, encrealcd by the arriv.U oi more coniracl Ivories acquifuions of more ox-tcatns froni the country, and the p,ieat vi^Jlanee excired in tlie departments of the (piarier-maller-gencral and iiilj)ecior, wliole adiilaius Ii.ul been augmented. A minute invcllie;ation of this operation I am fcnfiMe will bo thovight dry, ami perhaps unnccelliuy, by general rcsiiers — they will pafs it over — but there are thole u!io have laid much llrefs upon a walte of time, anil who take delii!;ht in tracing the fmall parts of a fubie \vas the moll that could be conveyed at once. cflorrs ufcd 'po biinQ: this to an average I will aHumeonlv two days for aceidonis of weather, i-c the lame 1 /■ ■ r 1 1 1 ■ r • 11 i-/ • . «vidnu-ctrom ri^'T-s, f.v,.;;ueot cattle, bvcaking ot carnages, and other c(5mmon ililappomtments : q. j::o::. rhis is much Icfs time than according to the evidence might be allowed, and upon This computation it would take ten davs to convey the magazine to Fort iAhvard onlv. Ospt. Mo. R r, V I r. w o 1' T n r i . v i r) i; u c v.. 10) The n,ij',c from tliciuT to the ciu;»m|>mcin ami intontIr(ltlrp()ni;\ry luull iv t l.i" con'pvitc.l i)v clilliiuo l)Ut Ity impctliincnts. I iie iii|)itU d ilic river aiul thv ditrou'iu cunyin^- |t|.u:i's have l)ccn ilcfirilKul by ilic widicdcN, ami it rcliilis iliat iliii ll t;'.c was imu h longer in point of time tlian the t'onncr dih*. Iv was ivif iiniUhK- to knp iho ti,iiilpori< j'/iinp; at both lKi^!;fs toj/cthcr tor the tciul.iys metiiioncd, bccaufe tljcre Wi-ic not Uoan ill the river fiilliiient for more than theilaily llipply; nortouM they have been conveviil there in that tinu'by any pollibic means, for thcfc rcal'ons \ the boat carriagci, v\ hit h were of" a conlhvivllion lliiiilar to timber larrin^'c-i tiled in iMiglaiuI, weie only twclv:' In nnmlicr, and oai:li e.U!i.i|»e cmplo\cd lix horlesor lour oxen to draw it ; ;iiul touhl any other means t)f dralt (or boats over hind have been contrived, or cattle have b ■• ii I'lippliod from the artillery, or any other department, all woiilil have been uillels •, be- cmle the boats themfelves, to a L^reatcr amount than thole nbovc Ipeeified, wen* wanting till after the whole ol the pr(*vilioii triinlport between 'ricondero^ra aiul Fort Cieorp;e, iijion which they were cm[)loyed, was ftnilhed, audit hail barely kept pace Ions to Ivipply the land tranfport between Tort tJeorpe and I'uM I'duaid. I deliic only an allowance ol lilicen ilays for the carria^^c over the Iceond n.ip;f, and It will thus take, in the whole, twenty five ilays to form the ma[.',aziiie alone. I claim no additional allowance of lime for conveviiij^ one'hundreil boats, at leal', thiough the dillicvilties of lanil a:vl water, in the two lla<;es, but comprile that la!)()i;r anion}; the rcll of the lall lii'teen davs. It nuilt be neverthelels oblerved, that tvni this number , was Ihort of what was wanting, ami, to la\e lime, all the artificeis were employed in bviililing fcouls (lourtccn of which Were flnilhed iluring the tranf- port) to make water craft, in the whole fufficient to carry the magazine forward, afrer the communication fliould be at an end. The new caulking the boats, though indifiicn- fibly necellary to great part of them, after pafluig the lakes loadeil, and afterwards being (liakcn and damageil by land carriage, is another work which I throw into ihc lall til'ieen days of the tran!'port, or into the fubreciucni four days, whieh muft at the Icall be allotted for loading the magazine, and arranging the order of its proceeding both in rcfped to navig-uion and ilelcnce. '1 his was commltled to very ex[)ert naval officers, and was matter of no trivial concern, or eafy execution. The whole bufmefs, according to the above rcprcfcntatinn and calcula'ion, both which are founded tipon evidence, would h:ive taken twenty-nine da) s ; twcnty- fcven only were employed, viz. from Aii;';u(l tlic i6ih to Scpti:nU)cr the i;i\h. 'J'lic exertions in faft, outwent the calculation ; and I challenge the nvjll minirc fjiccula- tills, to tiy tlie tiuie and the i>oweis we poilelled, by every ixjiiihie dillrilmtion e>f carriages and cattle, iliflercnt from that which was praLUlbd, and I will venture to fay none will be found Icls dilatory. It appears clearly in proof, that no impediment to tl.!'. tranfport vvp.s occafioncd by ilio interference of the arnllcry ; but it has been implied by fonie (piclVions in rlic crofs Q^ exumiiia- ■' y 1 ■.■ Mi* J (O REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. IV examinations, that if the artillery did not interfere with the tranfport, the tranfport ought to have interfered with the artillery, and that by appropriating their horfes tO the provifion train, much time might have been flived. Il might be a lolficicnt anfwer, that the artillery, for the reafons I have before aligned uas not to be difpenfed with, and confequcntly the horfes were to be prclerved : but I befulcs have fliewn, that they could not have been of ufe to the tranfport of the boats ; and to fatisfy every fcruple, and to {liew how miftaken they arc w^ho fuppuie an advantage was to be obtained by the employment of artillery horfes to convey pro- viiions, I now offer to their rcfle*flion the additional fadl, that they could havj been of no avail, bccaufe we had neither carts nor pack-faddles, more than were in ule already. Lleui. Cul. That the baggage of the army was an impediment fo the tranfport, is another ac- KincftoD, q. cufation clearly confuted by the united evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton and ? to 8 inclu- •' ■' *=• Captain Money.* Having thus fbewn that the tranfport of provifion and other flores, for about thirty days, was cffe(5l:d in the Ihorteft time poffible, it now becomes necelTary to examine the live, and from 122 to * In jiiltice to tlic ofliccrt who nrc fiippolcd to have difohcycd ortlcrs, in refpeo 100 Total for the regiments of the regulars 936 S T A F I- Two ujajor generals , . . Four brigadiers .... Britifli (piarter mailer general, and his afiillants ( icniian ditto .... 'I'hc holpital . . - Twtul of llaft' • . » 12 16 12 12 30 82 I R R li G U. tranfport horfes to re alligned rved : but lort of the 10 luppofe mvey pro- ould ii;\vj n were in nother ac- ,iG;ilon and bout thirty :o examine the ulk of it, it TiakinfT that fpeciiic \ifc. clcl cfiicers 270 216 3;o 100 936 16 12 12 ^0 82 . R E G U. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. the queftion, which has bopn very much canvalTed in print, and by the crofs exami- nation, appears to have made impreflion upon fome gentlemen ; wl, ether this prepara- tion might not have been dilpcnfcd with, and the army have reached Albany by a ra- pid march, the foldiers carrying upon their backs a fufiiciency of provifion to fuppoi t them during the rime. It is very natural for men of all defcriptions, to npply the idea of a rapid march 'o a diftancc of fifty r^les, for it is not more meafiu-ing in a Itrcight line from Fort Ed- ward to Albany, and it wi)l be proper lo confidcr the jirinciple and pradlibiliiy of fuch march, with rcfpedt to two diltinit periods, the one before, the other after the at- tempt upon Bennington. With refpedt to the firfl, it will be remeinbercd, that in the ftate the roads thea ■were, and with the refources then to be employed, no provifion bcforc-hand was attainable. Therefore, to have brought the plan of a rapid advance within the compafs of a poffibility, the operation mufl: l».i'/e begun by marching the whok- rapidly backward, in order to load the men with their packs of provifions. 1 low the troops, zealous as they were, would have reliflbed a ftcp fo uncommon in its nature, and productive of fo much unexpefted fatigue, particularly how the Ger- mans would have been fo pcrfuaded of the neccfiity as to have undertaken it with good will, cannot be afcertained. But thefe doubts apart, it remains to beconfidercd, how the troops were to paJi f\vo very large rivers, the Hudfon and the Mohawk, without previous provifion for a bridge, or v/ater-craft for conveying large bodies at once. Every concefiion a fanguine projector can defire fliall be made upon this point alfo ; the contrivance of rafts, bound together by twigs and firips of bark, as in fa6l was praftifed at this very period for the paflfiige of Frafer's corps over Hudfon's River, fiiall be admitted equally prafticablc for the whole army i and in argument be it truOed to chance to pafs the Mohawk in the fame way ; or fliould it fail, let recourf^; be had to the ford, which is known to be pradticable, cxcepi after heavy raiiiJ, near Schenectady, about fifteen miles from the mouth of the river. Thele concelllons granted, we will ilippofe the army on the bank of the Iludfon's River, wlure they afterwards paflfed it. The idea of a rapid march will of courfe be exempt from all thoiiglit of pcrfonal Incumbrances (provifion exempted) and the foldier will Hand reprefented in J,e imagination, trim and nimble as he is 'iatn at ;."n exerci*^: iii an Engiilli encaiiii;- \ 11 (^;i( iVicii iiijcic, whf- llicr llio .11 r.i) miglu liot liavc ]ii(n.c'i it ■ ct) ti) Alb. Hi)' \\ itliolit IdcTol ami '"^ marclj. I W R K (; U I. A R S. Caiiiuliiins Iiuli;.ns, aiul rro\iiicials . . . Aititicoii ..... Total of iiTcj'iilais 7.ZO -•o. Rccapimliitioii vi tlrj ■..liulc Jirwilnuion i :< 'i Q 2 mcnt — I 12 R E V I r: w OF THE e v i d e n c e. ment — Tndcfd it is nereflaiy he fliould be cnnruicrcd in that form ; for nothing can be more rcpii'Tinnt to a jirojeci-t of" rapiility, tlian the Ibkiier's load, were he to carry all the articles bclor.niiu^ to him in a c,iiiipai'i;n.*"' But it mxy be faid, and with truth, that troops are iifually relieved from a con- fiderable part of this burthen, and many examples of this relief may be brought i'Jom the "eneral cullom of fervice, and from many movements of General Howe's army in particular — nay more, it was a frequent praftice of the very army in qucf- tiun, to march free from knapfacks and camp equi[)age. The Wigwam, or hut conllrufted of boughs, may be made a very wholfome fabflitute for a tent ; aiul when vicUial can be cooked before-hand, even the camp kettle for an expeditious march may be laid afide. All thefe eyamplcs arc admitted : but th.ey all imply convcniencies for the fcvcral articles to follow, and to be brouglit up in due time. In our cafe they mud have been loll irrecoverably. Will it be argued, that ibme medium might have been devifed ? And although it were impollible, confillciuly with the idea of rapidity, to carry firward more J rovifion than for bare i'ullenance during the march, yet carts might have been found fuflicient to carry the men's knaplacks, and camp kettles, and other indifjicn- fible articles? This llippofition would betray a great ignorance of the country. From Saratoga to Albany there is only one road pratflicable for wheel carriage. There arc many places where by dellroying the bridges over deep gullies which dil- charge themfclvcs into the main river, a paflagc would be rendered impolTible, not only for a wheel carriage, but a horfe. There are others where the road is bounded by the river on one fide, and by almod: perpendicular afcents covered with wood on the other. Here the very fliort work of felling a few trees would Hop all paflage. The expence of time to remove thefe obflruftions, or to make new roads, would have brought famine. All notion, therefore, of conveying any articles more than could be carried upon men's Ihoulders muft ceafe. The notion of artillery, even the fmal- leli pieces, mufl: alfo ceafe of courfe, not even a little ammunition-tumbril could have found its way. — An eafy ficrince to the theorifts, who have maintained the inutility of artillery : but any officer who has feen the ground of this fuppofed march, would point out a dozen pafles, not to fpeak of the palTage of the Mohawk, v;Iiere, frrengther.ed with abattis and fuch other works as the rebels are expert in making in a very few liours, five iiundred militia would llop for a time, ten times t JL'lr number of the boil troops in the world who had not artillery to alTill them.. * Tliey co",!";;^ of n knapi'ick, containino; his bodily iiccclTiuics, a blanket, a havcrfack witb provifions, .. c.iiiccn, 1 li.'.tchct, anil a fit'tli (liaie of the general cair ji cquijiatjc belonging to bis tent. Thcio nrti- eies ; rcckoiiin;^ the proriiinn to be t'ur lonr (iays) adclcii to liis accoutrements, arms, and (ixty tounils C'f a.imniniti'.in, make u balk to: i!Iy incompatible '.vith combat, and a weight of about fixty pounds. Having % REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. Having ftated thefc objcclions to the principle of a rapid march, let us now, from the knowledge that has been fince obtained of circumftances, confider what would have been tlie certain confcquences of the attempt. Thofe who are a'.\iiiainted with the capricious workings of the tempers of men, will not wonder at the ditliculty of prevailing upon a common fuldier m any exi- gency to hufl)and his provifir.r.s. In a fettled camp, the young Ibldicr has very fliort fare on the fourth day after delivery : but upon a march in bad weather niui b.id roads, wlien the weary foot Hips back at every flep, and a general curfe iv provoked at the weight that caufes the retardment, he mud be a patient veteran, and of much experience in fcarcity, who is not tempted to throw the whole con- tents of the haverfack into tlie mire. He feels the prcfent incuinbrance grievous — Want is a day rciTK)te. — *' Let the General find a fupply : it is the King's caufc and the General's inLcrrft — lie v/ill never let the foldier be ftarvcd." This is common reafoning in the ranks. I ftatc it for thofe who have not Qcn fatiguing Icrvice, and may iiave a judgment to form u[)on it. It need not be ap- plied to the prefent confideration ; for had the march taken place at the time it ought to have done, upon the principle of the defenders of that fcheme, the time that Frafer's corps firll p:i(l the river upon the bridge of rafts, wafte would only have confpired to accomplifh in three days a ruin that with the- bed hufliandry would have been inevitable \v\fix: for the fame fall of rain wuich it has been fhewn in evidence atlually carried away the bridge a very few days after it was conflrudtcd, ncceiTarily made the ford of the Mohawk for an advance, and every ford of the Hudfon's Hivcr for a return, imj affable. It hardly need be noticed, that a flood mufb have made any ufe of rafts, could tliey have been timely obtained, equally impradicable. The army, therefore, would have become victims to famine, without a blov/, or a finglr. effort of the enemy. Saratoga muft have been the anticipated' icene of furrender, without other conditions than the mercy of fuftenance -, the whole force of Mr. Gates would have been loofe to co-operate with Mr. Wafliington, with the fined feafon of the camjiaign before them j and the General of the northerii army, with- out a fliadovv of jM'ofefTional defence, and precluded from the plea ufually fo ptr-- fuafive, that he fought hard before he failed, mufl: have m.et the cenfure of lus So- vereign and a jutlly ofiended country, with none to fuppojt him but the prtfcnt advocates of a rapid march. Could his dependence have been fure even upon them ? Would they not rather have adhered to their oppofitc and original fyftcm (for ilrange as it is, the fame men have fupported both) and have aderted, that it v.as extreme raflincfi; to crols the Hudfon's River at all ? If what I have laid in objeftion to the principle and prafticability of a rapid marcii to Albany, previous to the attempt upon Bennington, iuis weight, very little need be added on the fubject afterwards, becaufe every objedlon will multiply up- 4 on "3 '{ 114 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. Col. St. Le- xer's letter. No. V. on the mind of the mod curfory obfcrver. I fliall only call the attention to a very few eflcntial circumftanccs. The enemy was in force ; a proof of his bt-ing fo is, th;;t Mr. (jiitcs quitted his pofition behind the Mohawk, which was his flrongcit, and advanced to Stillwater. The force found at Bc-nnington upon the niarcli froiii the llampfliire Grants to the main army, proved the vigour and ala- crity of the enemy in th,it country. Tlie circumllanccs of the adlion at Benning- ton eftablidied a yet more melanclioly conviftion of the fallacy of any dependence upon fuppofed friends. The noble Lord has faid, that " I never defpaired of the campaign before the affair of Bennington ; that I had no doubt of gaining Albany in as fliort a time as the army (in due condition of fupply) could accompliih the march." I acknowledge the truth of the afiertions in their fulled extent ; all my letters at the rime flicvv it. I will go further, and in one fenfe apply with the noble Lord the epithet "Altai" to the affair of Bennington. The knowledge I acquired of the profellbrs of loyalty was " fatal," and put an end to every expedtation from enterprize unfuflained by dint of force. It would have been excefs of fren- zy to have trulled for fuilenance to the plentiful region of Albany. Had the march thither been prafticable in all refpefts, and even unoppofcd, (which nobody will think would have been the cafe) the enemy finding the Britiih army unfupplicd, would only have had to compel the Tories to drive the cattle and deftroy the corn or the corn mills, and the convention of Albany inflead of Saratoga mull have fol- lowed. Would the Tories have rifcn ? Why did they not rife round Albany and below it, at the time they found Mr. Gates's army increafing by feparate and di- llincl parties from remote didances? They were better qualified by their fituation to catch tlie favourable moment than I was to advife it. Why did they not rife in that populous and as fuppofed well affedted diftridl, the German Flats, at the time St. Leger was before Fort vStanwix? A critical infurreftion from any one point of the compafs within diilance to create divcrfion, would probably have fecured the fuccefs of the campaign. But to revert to the encreafe of reafons again (l a rapid march after the affair of Bennington. Ic was then alfo known, that by the falfe intelligence refpefting the flrength of Fort Stanwix, tlie infiimous behaviour of the Indians, and tl^ want of the promifed co-operation of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. St. Leger iiad been obliged to retreat. The firfl: plaufible motive in favour of hazardous Iiade, the fd- cilitating his defcent of the Mohawk, was thus at an end. The profpetfl of finding the enemy difpcrfed it has before been fliewn was over. The impoffibility of preferving a communication was alfo evident. Was the ar- my to have proceeded to aiflion without hofpital ftores, as well as without victual? The general who carries troops into fire without precautions to alleviate the certain confequences, takes a fure ftep to alienate the affeftions, iuk] dellroy the ardour of ; the REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE, ( I of IC of pen 111 )f the foldier — he exacts more than human fpirit can furniflT. Men need not be ha- bituated to fields of battle to be convinced of this truth. I.ct the mind rcll for ;i moment on the objects which will rife within it after the mtintion ofaftion, and then rcflcsft, there is not a mattrafs for broken bones, nor a cordial for a^^ony and faint- nefs. I'hey who talk of thcfe rapid marches, fuppofe nooppofuion, or no fuIlVrin;.^ in confequence of oppofition. The hundreds of wounded men to be cruelly aban- doned (if the red could be prevailed upon to abandon thofc whofc cafe niight the next day be their own) make no part of the conuderation of thcfe gentlemen of precipitate imaginations. But officers who are refponfible to God and their coun- try for the armies they conduifl, cannot lb eafily overlook fuch objeds •, and muft be patient at leafl till a few hundred beds, and a proper proportion of medicine and chirurgical materials, can be brought up for troops that are to fight as well as to march. The confideration of rapid movement has run into much length : the fi^refs laid upon it in the crofs-examination, was the caufe. I beg leave very fliortly to reca- pitulate the principal points, and fliall then difmifs it to the public judgment, with- out great apprehenfion of having it renewed even in fpcculation. Had a proper ftore of live cattle been obtained by the expedition to Benningto ; (and by the bye it will be remembered, that had the loyalifts of the country been really of the number and defcription reprefented, that acquifition might have been made without an aflion) all the carriages might have been appropriated folely to the conveyance of flour, hofpital accommodations, entrenching tools, and other abfolute necefi"aries; and a rapid march to Albany miglit have been hazarded. After the expedition to Bennington had failed of that great purpofe, had a gar- rifon for Ticonderoga been attainable from Canada, and the force then at Ticon deroga been brought forward, to eftablidi a pod of communication, and fecure a paflage of the river by a fortified bridge, and redouI:)ts upon the heights which every where command the river, on one ihore or the other, a forced march might ftill have been juftifiable, becaufc a retreat was fecure: but, diverted of both thefc refources, a rapid movement muft inevitably have led to rapid riiin. Having gone through all the material points previous to the ijtli of September, and fliewn, I trufl-, by diftincfi: evidence, as well as realbning, the expediency of the march from SkeneA:)orough to Fort Edv/ard •, the principle of the expedition to Bennington; the caufe of its failure; the efforts ufed to bring forwards the provi- fion and nccefTary flores, and the impradicability of proceeding without thofe ftores; the attention of the reader will now be carried to s review of the meailirc of pafTing the Iludfon's River on that day. I entered pretty fully, in my Narrative, into the principles which then actuated me; and I fliall not enlarge upon them. 1 have only to requed every man who h.i& Review olrl'.r nu'ii'uri. ut pulling rliti; lluJlon'-s Ki>.\.M. *)» M ivum* ii6 U E V 1 E VV O F T H E E V I D E N C E. u: '■ Lord Br.lcar- liis's qiiclh 1, and 4, :• [ to ;S, ;o to 3-'. l.oid Mar- to '^7. r.ipt. Mo- II fv, ;6, 61, r.iid 6; to 611. Brit;;.ilicr I'lMli'l's fcu- timeiits. rto:;refs of the ralic- )U)()d,^jii-o]ia- ii.is been led to dovibt wiictlicr I was required by duty, fituation, the voice of thr army, aird ihe voice of reafoji, to advance and li^jht, to follow the confideracion of thofe jjrinciples, v.itli a revifal of the applicable part of the verbal evidence, and I will then venture furihcr to appeal to their judgment, whether, inftead of being required, I was not compelleil, by the Hate of things, to ad as I did; even inde- pendently of the peremptory tenor of my orders, which, confident in the ftrength ofmycafi-, I have purpofely omitted, upon this occafion, to reconfider. In regard to the point fo much agitated in tiiis country, though with no founda- tion whatever from any thing tiiat happened in America, Brigadier I'rafer's fenti- ments upon this meafure of paiTuig tlie lludfon's River, it would be trifling witli the patience of the reader to recapitulate and paint tlic 'evidence to a matter which I do not believe there is a man fo prejudiced as now to difpute, viz. tiiat thatoflicer joined in opinion and impatience with the rell: of the army. But though the falfe- hoods fo grofsly and fo long impofed upon the public, refpeding this matter, are no more, it may not be unworthy curiofity to explore their origin and trace their progrcls. It is not difTicult to dilcern that the fuf[n.ion of difference of opinion in the army, upon the nuafure of palling the Hudfon's River, arofe from the paragraph in my public letter from Albany to the Secretary of State, wlierein I fay that I had called no council upon that llibjeifl, but had acted upon my own judgment of the peremp- tory tenor of my orders. That a man, chief in authority, fhould take entirely upon himfelf a meafure of doubtful confequence, and upon mere principle preclude himfelf from any future means of fliifcing or dividing the blame that might enfue, appeared ina-edible at A^Miitehall : the greater part of that political fchool concluded the profeflion of fuch candour nnifl: be a finefle, and that, in fad, the General had not communicated with his officers, becaufe he knew opinions would have been againil him. When little minds think they have got a clue of littlenefs it is wonderful with what leal and dexterity they purfue and improve it. Correfpondence and intelligence were not wanting; difappointed jobbers, difcarded fervants, dilTatisncd fugitives of every lort, fples, tale-bearers, and fycophants, whom it is to the honour of a Gene- ral to have his enemies, and a difgrace to Office to encourage, abounded in town; and the primary idea once given, it was carried forward by very ready affiftance, and ever, logical dedudion. As thus : The General declares in his difpatcii, he called no man into council upon the nneafure of paffing the Hudfon's River.: There/ore, his officers differed in opinion \ipon the expediency of advancing. To differ in opinion upon that expediency, they muftconftrue his orders not to be ^ereniptory : I'hercfore, he (lands fingle in the interpretation he put upon his orders. If R E V 1 E W O F T H E E V I D E N C E. If his orticcrs faw that he was unadvifcdly and tlcfparattly loading his army to death, thfy would certiiniy rcmonftratc : ■TI.Krcfore, thty rcMiiondratcd. The remonllrance would naturally be ur.wlv. to him by fupciior oBiccrs : Ihcrrfon', tlic; conclufiuii follows; Major (icncral Phillips and Bri^^adicr General Frafcr iictu- aljy made a remonftrancc iigainfl; palung the Iludlbn's River. General Reidelcl, who was next in ranlv to General Phillips, fecms to have been forgotten. He was probably overlooked in the eagernefs to get at General Frafer, on whofe name the important Ilrefs was laid, and for two palpable rcalbns ; the one, that his name flood high in the public eflimation, and greatly as it dcferved fo to Hand, perhaps it acquired, upon this intended ufe, morejullice from Ibme quarters than it would otherwife have received. The fecond and more prevalent rcaibn was, tiiat Brigadier General Frafer was dead. Thus then flood the alTertion when I arrived in England : " Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Frafer remonftrated againjl faffing the IJudJcn's River, which movement ivas the eaiij'e of all the fubfequent misfcrtunes." And having traced this falfehood to its maturity, it now may be equally curious to follow its decline. After my arrival in England, the fricndllup, and general conformity of fentimcnc between General Phillips and mc became more known. He was alive, and might pofTibly fbon return. His name was therefore withdrawn from the remonflrance, and referved, in cafe he did not return, to give colour to a fecond falfehood,* then kept back, but fincc produced as one of the lall eflorts of malignity in the courfe of the late enquiry. The firll public occafion that offered was feized by me to pledge my honour upon the whole flory of difagreemcnt of opinion being falfe; and I dared any man to produce a letter or a fentence, from Brigadier Frafer or any other officer, to authorife a fufpicion of its being true. Lieutenant General F"ralcr, upon tlie fame occafion in the Floufe of Commons, voluntarily and gcneroully entered into my juftification, upon the authority of his correfpondence with his late relation, and the knowledge of his general fentiments. The fltlfeliood was immediately fo far weakened, that the word Remonf ranee was changed into Opinion. " Brigadier I'rcfer's opinion was a^ainfr paj/ing the Iliu'Jon's River;'" and thus it remained, now and then aifilled and cherillied, when it was very languid, by a v.'Iiilper, " that there were fill letters to be produced,"' till the late enquiry took place ; and the evidence of Lord Balcarras, Lord Harrington, ««7 * That General Pliillips offered to coikIikT: r. p.nrt of the army from Saratoga to Ticonderogn. See this falfehood refuted, in ihc ev.( esce of L( rd IJidcarra.-, Col.'Ki gllon, &:c. R Colonel ii8 REVIEW OF TIIi: EVIDENCE. The com- ments of an interior ofli- ccr no pro- per teft of a Aiperior's fondiut. Comparative view ot tlic (•an.paif'ns in 1759 and '777' Colonrl Kii\';fli)n, kc. [Tavc tlic cU-nth blow to the lad ft niggling cfTorts of that cildiniiy. I'hc radincfs of pafling the lludfon's River was obliterated ; every com- ment upon ih.a/ii'd/ Ih-p was lucMcnly dropt, as if the river had funk under ground ; the cliargo, with the full accomiianiincnt of General Erafer's difapprobntion, re- inonflraiii'-, iki:. ivo. was fliifu-d ; the minifter was as nimble as his confederates, and exclainicd upon the fiU a I ify of the expedition to Bennington. And Iicrc I Hiall finally tell the fup[)ort 1 have been fo anxious to dcive from that grave which has been ranfacked by my adverfaries for evidence againll nie. As a loKlitr I avow a pride in having poircifed Brigadier Fraler's elleem. As a de- fendant I am I'ei'.'ililc 1 have dwelt upon it to .1 fault. I'he precedent of a Chief in Command fullering tiic comments of an inferior to be a tell of his adions, requires an apology to my profcHion. It lies in tiie eminence of my fi-iend's cha- rader. His approbation gave a grace to my defence, and I was impat'enc to confute the calumny that would have robbed me of it ; but to admit that it v/as neceffluy for my acquittal would be to countenance and forward the mofl: pernicious and pre- pollerous dodlrine that ever was pradifed to miilcad the public, and to betray the it r vice. When a minifter or his confederates lean upon private report, table talk, and half fentences, to depreciate an oilicer they dare not themfelves accufe, it is a feeblenefs of vengeance that, in its firfl: afped^, is contemptible in the extreme; but it calls for our indignation when we extend our view to its principle and effcfts. They operate to the very inverfion of due patronage, and the abfolute extindlion of every idea upon which command ought to be bcftoweil, or can efficacioufly be exer- cifed ; they tend to encourage officers to be fpies and informers; to render cainps and fleets, properly the refidencc of harmony and honour, the feats of fuipicion, difcord, faftion, treachery, and mutiny. The divcrfity and importance of the matter brought to review in the period of the campaign I am now clofing, has led to greater length than I was aware of; but I cannot difmifs it without one reference, addrefled to fuch of the examiners of my condu(fb as have infifted upon the tardinefs of the northern army. The reference I would plead is to a campaign in tiie fame country, memorable for having been condu«fled by an officer whofe example mull be acknowledged, at this junfture, to be of fplendid and peculiar authority ; I mean the campaign of Lord Amherft, m the year 1759. The great points of the war in America that year were to divide the enemy's force, and at the fanie time to dired the feveral operations with fuch concurrence, thar, though feparate and remote, they fliould affift each other. The firft objefts of the 4 army U !• VIEW O i' T II K r. V I D E N C E. 119 ts of that cry corn- ground ; tion, rc- fctlcrutes, 'ive from jiiinrt me. As a dc- a Chief s adions, :nd's cha- confute neceffluy 5 and pre- ctray the talk, and L', it is a extreme ; d efFcfts. inftion of 1 be exer- er camps fulpicion, period of ofi but ers of my orable for \, at this of Lord ly's force, Kc, that, :fts of the army army to which I allude were to reduce Ticondernga and Crov/n Point, and tlu' ulti mate and moll important one was toefted ajun6lion with Mr. Wolfe before f^ielnT. Thus far there is great fimilarity between the plans of the two campaif'^ns, cvcopi that the points from which the armies marched, and to which they were iKAincd, were exactly reverfed. In the Spring, 1759, the army, then aflcmbled at Albany, took the Held as early as the feafon would admit : but fuch were the natural impediments of the country, that though iiipported by the unanimous zeal of the inhabitants, and furniflied with abundant fupplies of draft cattle, carriages, water-craft, and every other neccfUuy ; tlie feveral departments well directed, and no enemy to oppofe the march, the Gc neral (Eord Amherll) was not able to commence the attack of Ticonderoga till th 7th of July, when the enemy abandoned that poll, and retreated to Crown Point, The diilance from Albany ".o Fort George is between llxty and fcventy miles, the paflage over Lake George to Ticonderoga about forty miles. The General had reafon to believe that Crown Point would be given up at his approach as precipitately as Ticonderoga had been, lie did not, however, reach ir, a diilance of thirteen miler,, and water-carriage at will, till the 14th of Augull. Was it at that time afl:ed by the minider or his adherents, what was the army doing not to purfue a flying enemy ? Not to purfue when the whole country behind was their own, and magazines, bagn^agc, holpitals, and every other necelTary, iiiight follow at kifure, ami infccurity ! When it was forefecn an encieafe of fleer was to be confl:rui5ted at Crown Point, to obtain the fuperiority over the enemy upon Lake Champlain, and confecjuently that every day's delay, in becoming mailer of that poll, rilkcd the campaign I Although thefe enquiries were not then fuggcfl:cd to the public, an anfvvcr to them has been given, greatly to the honour of the General, in a very impartial hi- Ilory of that time. "The army was employed in repairing the fortifications at *' Ticonderoga; and the General took his meafurcs with the fame care as if he ex- " peeled an obllinate defence, and attempt to furprife him on his march," Tiie enemy aftually did abandon Crown Point on the approach of the General, the 14th of Augull; and, as fjon as in pofleirion of that poll, he fet about fortify- ing it as he had done Ticonderoga. The time confumed in rliat operation, and in building new vefftls, brought it to the middle of Odobtr betore the General could embark upon the Lake. A iufpence, undoubtedly, of great anxiety ; for the great eni of the campaign, the junftion of the two armies, upon which the reduc- tion of all Canada was thought to depend, was unattained. But did the ininifter or his adherents then cavil at the urdinefs of that army ? — Enterprifmg, iiinguine, and impetuous, as was the character of tliat miniftcr's R 2 coun- vB \l w I? > K 1 V I 1 w o I 111 I I \ I n I N r r I' Kit'. 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W () I' I 111', r V T T) V, N (' V, lit ilimv, lurinliiiir llir ,ii I lull u( llif I (ill 'i( 'i' |il' lull' I , c, m iti il'i' jil;UC tlf" 'ili|' 'I III lllllilT--" /\ |i|r|| V I MinllitlltMllM (ll I IiIhIIIII'I ;UH I ( I< | >I i V I i If IiIM I I || (I|i'i(| 1 1 11 ' Al " li.inv, Hill vt I V III (ill II ( i.l/t III " III i, I'll I 'ill III)',' 1,1)'/ I I" In vr iii'id |.» 1 1 iii'i liivr liiiinl, v.liM ll ivr ( MiiV'i It i| wit ll I lii l I' I ,l|r| III |Ml t M 'lilt , III ' 11 l( I • cx.k'I III till' pill III III I mil III vvliM 1 1 It Wii<4 ( X pi 'III III I In y llionM ,n 1 1 vc .ml i'li in. I II pt'ivi' lliill I III , 111,11 1 ll w;n iKil (cnij k'iJ ,11 A 1 1 1,1 II V, I |i I' t t" ll VI i ll •,'/if|i' (!'"., lull p III M ill.ll Iv III I III I' .11 I i>l II II I ni|',l III. I li'l lit It, It Mill, ,1', III/ .It' I 'I' ( .11 1 in, J»,IVi III ll .1 p,i IIM ll I, ir iwll ')"' III ,1 III' iVi III III , I ll.ll III dlil' ' t ''illpl'iyc'l III til'- ' K' ' II f /,!»( I! I, 1 1,111 III ,1 liii;',|i p,ii I III It I iiiil'l ii'it ll I v ,1' ipiii' 'I It v/ill lie I 'iiili'li'i' 'Miy .ill v/|iii ' > 'I " it. !4. kiinw till ipiiliiii 'i fil my ii'ilili III' ii'l, .IS v( ly li'iii'iiii ,iM' to iIk dilp'/lil iki,'. of ili.il M ij, (',f|,»«, ll IV, ill II llicy .III Id I III iiiiili.iiHi.illy |i l,iiii' i| in I'l dill iiifiiillniiu, ,i miri'l , and f'.i } ' '\ i\" ^' my iiwii p.n I , I i ,iiiii'ii i 'iniiiitl (Ik m I'miiiIii,ii y |iid|',iiii iii itti'li r ,i Ik t ti i tr ii'l. th in i mi^' ,ii'< .1 III'. 'I'l' iK ($< tf I ic ;|( ( III .11 y III III', ill li Mill li»tl. , , • fi, t III lull /< . I III ill ii'ii iliii'lnic d'liiiii ill! Kiil'f nil ind ml lone/ i (I'mi ,i fnlij'/l |f» w'iir|,y I. I'i .11 Kill Mill, ,i'i I 111 cvuImm ( K lp( I'l nil', llic Ik ii.ivi'Hii of ilic ii'iop , ui rlc: (:n( rvcni'. Ill ill ll il,iy. iini''; I fw 111' I I'lir, 1 1 ivc Iktii ( Ii,ir.'l(lrn/''d hy iii'if olill in,i' / in ,if f i' !■. '.r d' f' w '■. 'I 'i'lfi ' III ll I III li.iyiiiK I w,i'; ll pi III illy ti m'iI iim II' ' I n illy . I' I'' veil Iniii'li'd lit i' idi I'lldicri, li'ili ll in I li( !'• I M ll'., li'iM' nil (ii.iiil Ini fioiii ,1 In' ' ('(fi'in 'if (n (li f r'»'( ,il)'ivr a lliird of fli"ir iri nb' r-; "'''' '*'i' (.iiid III iiiii ol ilir If I'liiK III-; .iliovi- I wi I Ini d',^ !■ ii ( ( d I li'' i nfniy ;it 111'. (>f a d'-- f/,r(|Ff:ii 1,11 111 1 1! Ill III .1 I ipt nil ,11 id (mi I V (I)',! 1 1 .11 1 illri y in' n, I lie ( ^'pt.nn ,ind f liirry fix w f "'I'/.f'"''^ .iljcil 111 U'linp li 'I in ll (.1(1 .IK iiini'd Ky ,1 ' on' iiri'-nf '• ol ''/m jciif '• tii.tr r,o ^t^]',: ,uf. " K'fN x"] *f> 111 111 will dilpiitc 'I lie tiib'iic ()( pi, nil- dn'' to lo' li froopi v/ill not I)'; v/ uit- I '•(.•'i [!,i' '- Ill", III lliis j'.ciH'Kin', ll 11,1111', .iii'l it voll ,is ( (It inily he m c oinpinifl wi:li ;i \ii'\ por- <::y^)t.\1 lion 111 (ll.ll I II I'l ihnlc v.'ii ) li.ivc (l,iird f'( d'pic' i,it(: or 1 1 illy v/,iloiir fo ronfpif iioir, — ll''/, / > 'll yrj. Iii> li.ivi' ill! II (' 11. op n only to tlic pi' |ii(li( '• o( Aincfif.m ' o-./.irdM ' ^ and haviri?^ M-tj. F>>r;,',i % ft. Iiccti alw,iy', loud lip-miliit (oniily l"J'i'"i fi ill'' tli'j (dmy f>t tlicir f ountiyoi' n ro /jV-r '(,"'.1 illilllil nil ,1 li.ili ( 'll ' Mciir y, Ktn;;'";n, It Will he oMi I -s/.n-lr from tlic ac oiiiit<; oflli' l.ill-'l jikI v/OMn'Ji;'!, that t!i': iof'. ol ollicds in all tiio .M'tioiir; u{ the caiiipai;^!! v/.i'i \)U)\ ",r loi tioii.il;ly iniKli jo'c.'itr-r ('..m tliai ol ilic |)iiv.irc iikm: and as this oLiltrvation apjjlics particniarly to the aCvioii wc ;iic I (iiilidiTiii;;, il in.iy rif>t Lc in'propcr to .icrourit for it in thr. pi.if r. ^ I2t K L \ 1 1 W 1' THE E V I D E N C E. m r Rcaiiinof ilio (lilpidlior- (toil 1)1 killed .111(1 uinanl- oi. The ciu-my li.id with their army great numbers of maikfmcn, armed with ritV- barrel pieces: thel'c, during an enciagcincnt, hovered upon the Hanks in fmall de- tachments, and were very expert in lieurinp; theml'elves, and in lluftinf; their f!;roui-.d. In this amnion, many phiccvl themlllves in hiyh trees in the rear of their own bne, anil there was i'cUlom a minute's interval of Imoke in any pan of out lint N\iihoui ollk'crs being taken oO' by fi ngle (hot. * It will natur;tjly be rup[)()lei.l, that ilie Indians would be of great ufe againll this mode of fighting. I'he example at' thole that remaineil alter the great ileler- lion proved the contrary, for not a man of them was to be brought within the lound ct a rille lliot. '1 he Canadians were formtrly very expert in lerviee of this nature; but befuies the change in their military charadlcr, whicli I noticed before, their bed oriicer was killed early in the adion, which event call a general damp vi^on the corps. A few of the Provincials were ferviceablc : but the belt men I had to oppofe as marklliien, were the (ierman chafTeurs, though their number was fo fmall, as not to be one lo twenty of the enemy. The crofs-cxamination upon the proceedings of tiic army after this adion will fl:ew the folly there would be in bringing a military caufe to a parliamentary cncjui- ry, upon the prefumption that any parts of it would be left unexamined. The veiy want of pradical knowledge in the enquirers renders them more inquilitive, and ruich more tenacious of doubts and furmifes, than they would otherwife be : for in- (lance J I do not believe that with an army exhauded by a long and fevere adion, and deprived of an unconnnon portion of officers, the qucltion of attacking the ras.qiKthijS enemy next morning would have occurred to any man of profellional judgment : Di'tocll.oid ^'^''^^ enemy too in a pofition of which no further knowledge could be obtained than that it was covered by an intrenchment and abattis, and the approach to be matie through a thick wood, without any avenue cut, or a fingle poll foriiried to fecurc a retreat, or to cover the magazine, which afi'orded the only poHible means of fub- fiflence. Equally remote would be the thoughts of military men fi .i. attacking a few days after, when it appeared I had received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, informing me of a diverfion lb powerful as an attack upon Fort Montgomery to be undertaken as at that very time. riie qucftions relating to the enemy having their baggage packed, if that circum- 11 incc was meant as an indication that they meant to retreat, is another proof hov/ ^Ciipt. ;ii ■.}~i'.\\ Sopt. to ^•ijt Oct. T.orJ Halcar- j.is ^6, Siic. .L.,.:ii.ir-" 'V;. 1, lit. Ci.i. (.' i|)t. Mo- ney, 3 ; t J4.8 Six- a'.li Plan V. REVIEW OE T/IE EVIDENCE. Jions from Ticondcroga : fo far nir. I from conceiving the pa'.l delay blameable, that I acknov.'k'dge the meafure of the 7th of Odcbcr was precipitated by I'ome da\s, by tlie i>)i\-ii:;',; being become io fcarce, that a fiipply couM only be obtained by a move- men: of tl-e army. If any perfons have fuppofed, that v.liat hixs heon called the inaLti\c (late of the army at this period was a ilatc of rcil, they are as much millaken as they would be if tiiey fuppofed it in any other rirriiinrtancc comfortable. Erom the 20th of I:^epten'iber to the ydi of October, the .u-mics were lb near, iliat not a night palfed without f.rin .■", and lomctimes concertrd atta,i T.oici R;ilc,ir- Lord ihw- riiii^tnn, 66. ri:iii,N'o.Vl. Strito of thinL;s l\ ol \]u Sfh. to I 1 S, on the 9tiu TIu \ wlio \\( rcioniM.iiu \'\.\\ p'u,\i\ Ii,\il lu'i n rci|ni lied, niinjii (oiillrHr ;i iiot'Jti'l W'c ro\iM ncitlKM ( n.ldir iN.ii \rlii(iinn, nm miliol iclhnin (i\ir (i,Unr;il pnii ciiritv to pn (Mil I.ill .I'll ill ' M\ Id hi' ic inmiv. I he i n. innll mh i s (li:il ciilucil < iinni'i I'cIkMci ii( li mIm-iI ihin il\i \ ln\r I'lrn l'\- ilil'inni w ii in lli '..* I'lir' iik i lliinl (:mnitiiuli: ilniinj) tin I'll inim\ -, ilic iK.uK' iHnniJc .uui un. iltii.ti vdji r \viil\ v liii li ilu iImji l.un ollii i.i'cil. lihM'i'.li !iii|n(nil\ (.uiicd vvuhdnll, w hh li ilic llvn iliir^v \i|< t>n ill iu'n<;ot liini ; (Ih nuu' h\ii ( vpu lliv . nuMnirol IcnlilMJU.v :unl imlinji.Minn upon ( vt i \- t»)vi(iu~n;\iu<' : ilulc ohi.t'l'. will iciii.iin ii> liu' 1 ill ft liK" \ipon ilir iniiuls ol tvciy jn.in \\!>»> w.r- pull III. Tih- jiow IM;- (Hi iKinrls .hlilcil 1(1 t!i(- |iciur\-, iiiiij t!ii' whole mmkal n vliaiiu'iv! o\ tli.it iinu'iurc ih.ii Wiuild in.ikr oi'c ol tin' liiull liih|(i'h (iir tlu- p nil l a iiu>ro inipoitiiu Iniloiian, p.allahi liiciul' I (.onli;.;!! thy mcniorv. 'riuTC tna\ thv t.ilcnt"^, tliv iiianly viruics ''nir projKN ami nuir pciiiHl, (iiul ilur tlilliiiv^lioii ; aul loii;!, may tli.y fuiAiWi long alui' the liail tcioiil oi iny pen ih.ill Iv rorjX(M(ciU rhr w (Vvluins aiiii.iit i"ioin thrlc li cncs p.avc plavT to the pcrpUxiiics of tl'r nipju. A vU'ioatv\i arniv was to ivttcat Iv-mu an cnt-iny llulluil with liu (.i is, imu li lu'jHiioi in iVoni, atul ocinpviii.r llroiiir polls in tlio ntuniry hcliiiul. W'c wcrr rqvialK liahK' irptMi that iiiai\ h to Ik aiiai ki'il in front, in llink, of tear. I'luMlii- pvM'.'ii^i^ v'i niaii h havl l\vn nMUi-itcvl as nuu h as iiiiimillamcs woiiM ailniii ; and 11 was rxcxuud l>\- the olliicts aiul the tioops in (;< iicral wiili a pn-i liion tliat rxpc- vu'iux~in vi;ii»al luviations can onh tt:uh. 'I'hr ba!',i;af,<\ whuli kiiiKI only niovt.' in oiu' ^(ihiiun, ami in a nairow roa>i. ii.il iino ihc eonUiruui whkh u is impodililt- (oi eaiition til jiiiard asMinll m the liaik, iHraule a liiipje aei iilciit ol an oxcriurn or a bfokon whchiU1 have been verv ilelirable to receive the enemy. A halt was neeefVarv to tvtivlh the ti\.|r,l In v ry |rvr(r vvcm • In ami llir()i!}>Ji rxrcfilin^ Imil mini''. nMc ("ni a lirriimnniH '■()(■ private dinicl'; \' irfcrciH c to my fulii'v'^, tn (lii'wwiial tlk' luMirirs wi'ic with wliii li Cas flic \vn[\<\ li^s lif ii t.i'ijdif Ut Ii'Ikvc; flic army uas cm uitdicrcd ; what wrrr tlic- ai roiiimoditions picj'ar'(l for t\\i- (wo ihoufdiul -in/jifit/i that air f^fiavclv luppolcd, in the ( rols (-xaminati'Mi, to Invr- fol- ( " r •nii\i (i r ■ ')' • I ; I'-ii'- nt jiti- .Uf (Ii!'m-I . lowrd Willi tlv" I'l'l-'IIV'P,' liccii a filler liiliici'l for dcrifion than r Ai) idea fo prepod'Tons, as well as falle, \\')\ild fia f ■ -If. C',\. IVf Tutat lOII. 1)11 t fliaf it wa? niali( i'nifly jMt''n'l'(l iini, I aiinoiilideiit, hy the rm-itdjer who alli'vl the fpief}i(nis, liiit l>y the |(crf'»ri'; who impolcd upon iiim, t(» rll -I'l hy preiudiec what they (iefpaircd of cff'.c'fini^ |,y fart. — Not ronlent with cavilling'; at. our prcrcnfioiis of haviiij.^ fought harri, rli''/ would not allow the army even the claim upon the ^ood-naturc of the natifyii, of liavinjT ftved\vAX(\ for iti fcrviec. I fhall however toiifider part of this (Tory as fo far iiiu onneffied with the immediar/* Imfinefs I was iijion (purfuin^ the line oFcvitlcnce np'tn the retreat to Saratoga) as to jMve it ill the marj^in. It may well flaiid hy iffelf ; and I venture to think 'hat thi> (■lie cxamjile of patience, lufrciiii'';, and fortitude, will be permitted tf; pafs without tenluie or ohhxjuy. * Wh en * f ,iilv Ifiirii't A' Uiiiid li;\'I iU ( 'imj):mir"l licr liiifb;trul t'l r.in;i(l:i in dir I»'-ginrn'ig ')f rhf! yr;ir f;-h. In tilt- I'Miilr I't th.ii ( ini|i;nj;ri 111' li.i'l oivi il('l ;i Viili (nnrc 'f coiinriv, in diffficrit cx'if.rr.i'ic, of K.ili'ti, .111(1 \'iili (lilli( iiliic! ill. It Mil l'.iii'i|ii :;ii tiMVtlicr wii! n')f calily (oiueivr, to atrcnd, m a fKior lull .It (.'li.iinlil '( , iijKiii liit liilv Ixd. In llif (i|)(iiiiijM>l tin ' ,ini|(,ii^ii of 1 7/ y file V. ;is nftr.nnrd froin 'ifT'iiruj \ujMi '(> :i fliircofrhc f.iiif^nc anil lii^md txpin ted hi teic 'li' oiidcrojjn, hy flm polifr.p (njunnion^ '.t li-^r hufh i:i(i. 'I'lie ti.'y .iticr iIk' ( oiiijiitfl of tliif phu (,-, Ik; \v;is liadly •.M»!in(l''(l, ;iri(' llir ( r')(I((l the f ..(kc ChaiTiplaai to loiii liiin. As ((Kill ;is li( ici-ovcuil, L;i(ly If.iirKl procrcUd to foil',-." (in foi fiirif < t!ir'. iij)i the c.impMi^n, ^11(1 ll I'lil l'(i.\,ii(l, (M .It the next c, imp, (lie .if (piiicd a t\vo--.v)i(,cl fMnihnI, •.vfii' ii had bren coii- fliuil((l IiviIk; ai tili( (IS ot ilii: ai I ill'Ty, ioiiittliini; fimiiar to die ( irriajjr nl'd for the mail upon the jji'Mi Kinds 'd' I' iiidand. Major A(klaiKl (oinn. an. I'-d tlir IJii'illi gi< nadiers, 'Ahich ".crc »tta< Iicfl to < ifiinal rialcr':. eoips ; and cordcfpicnilv acic ulAay.n fho tni ft advaiueii p'.it ot" tlie army. 'Jhtir iiui uions '.', ( re ijftfii fu iil(.r , flint ii') pcil(jri ticpt out ol fhcit (!•) id.i. In i:jc of 'h .!c .'"{tuati'm- i *rr\t. h 1 k u V. V 1 V. w () I' r 1 1 1: i: \' i d e n c e. When the ariTU' was upon the \w\u\ of niovinp; afuT the Iialt dofcrihcil, I re- roivcil a iuelV.i;;c iVoin L.Kly li.unct, lul)iuiumg to my iloii'ioii ii propol.il (-iiul expiTinng an ive was linall nuleed ; 1 liad not e\en a cnptif wine to dliVr her; but 1 was told liir had found, lu)m lome kinil nd lortunate hand, a little rum iuul d.utv water. Ail ' could furniili to her was an open boat and a K w lines, written upon viirty and w(t paper, to deneral Ciaies, reeomnuMiduip; her to his piouOlion. rent, in oi irroiia vllCI; W III .1 l,..vK- Il.iiiKt woic allrr]\ liulilonU took five. An onlcrly fcrjcnnt 11 Inll. .i;\o)i iliiu-i'cti on' ill. .nl) )( iloii lie ».. 'lit hoKI ol. It piovcil lo lie ilic lu.Mor. li iirtj'pviuil, thai in t'no i:iiv.r inlKuit the li nl, iinktio^^ nij; u hai (lie (ilil, imti p^Mli;ip< iioi pnli\ liy a'\.\U\ |irle iici iieape. h\ erri'|nng under llie n tlic ' " «in ill ,\ alls of b.iek |»;irt iu 1 o; without the ni.iior being \crv (evercly bnnuil in both. K\crv tliiiis; thee h.ul wiili iheiii m ilie lent was eoiiliniecl neli o( her, his laee ,iiu he 1 .1 ilill c leiieaiit :i,Mm iieni [M ts o ft ic the riiK aeeideiit li.ip|iene>.l a liiiletiiu reioiution !ioi- tlu eheaihiliiels ot" l.nlv Haniei; am e bei Mv the aroiv palled the 'liuli.-.u's River. It nciiliei alicreil Mi'inned her pro>,Mvls, a jiai taker of l.'l 'oi.l tilde Wiis ol a di'ieieiit nafitii J nil the fatiijiie- o( the advaneed eorps, Tlic next eall upon 1 inorcdnlreisf^il. as of loiii^i r Impeiite. On the niueh oi ihe i>)ih, the trieiiadieis bcii •u'Hon at c\ery iKp, (lie had Iven ili,reOK-d hv ihe niaior to follow the rone of die anillery .iiul baij. hahli- to }ja$;e, whieh was not expo led. At t :ie ti.uv ih e iU vv licre the ah the tion Ivtrin (lie lonr.d herf. If near a imali miinlia. ih btted hv fviijjeons ot the wounded. Thus was t!i W'liiii it was found wietilion was bet'oinin;; eeiieral aiul .K •>init;'l til lOS I, ilUiiion «if I ho (anie | I >LK e A', the moll eon\e'i lent (or tlu lii \\ ilie e of d\ >ii licaiiii': ol one eoiilii uied ot eannoii d melketiy, for nir hours tej^cther, wiih the pretnmptioii, iVom the poll of her hnlbmd at ilic head of the grena- liiei-s, that he was i:i the moil exiviled part of tjie a.'lton. >he hul tluve (emale eonip:inion«, the i^ M-.t I id's of Reiiletel and I he wives of two I'ritidi oliieers, Mii.ie ll;irnavjc and laen'ciitmt Re\ ne !i the event their preUne. icrvcd bnt little tor eomfort. M.lor Maiiia<-o was toon bioiu'hl to ;.c f.irccons, \erv 1) viiv wo.,iuicd ; and a little time after en i;i!( llip-.-ive that I ieuteiumt ReyiicU ■ (hot dealt. Itnagi:uttivMi will want no helps to figure tlie (Ki.<' '''( tlie v\h )k* groii] F;o;n the date i',f that .u'lion to the ;th ol \\'lolvr, T.ady Harrie', ni 1 her iidi d ferenitv, flood cii toy lit > trials -d t<^ aiu t!ic he. .1 it was her lot th.U tiieir fcveriiv crieieiti.! w itli their noml'er.';. ,shi v< I- .^.i;; a e\p< it.i-Mrt'.v.ie, nJM J with the ns: of '.lie whole ."-eli(>ti. and al (all iveei ,\ed the P.ioek of her individual .^rkland, iL-fperately \v .Min in . ,!ed. ec ef the general ciliniity, the troops were debated, and Major a piiloner. The •Li}- oj" she Sth w.;s pifVed by l.idy M.irri. t niid her c.nnipanions in eomiiion ,nn\iety, not a tent, n r a (lied I eini,' ft.-.n.'inij. except what bc!oii<^od to the Ilofpita!, their rcftifjc was among the u ouadci ail J the d\ Mr. K E V I E W O F T II I'. E V I D F. N C E. 127 Mr. Bnidcncll, the chaplain to the artillery (the lanu' gcntlcinaii who liad ofli- ci.ucil li) li[>;iially at General Frafer's funeral) reatlily iiiulcrtook to accoinjjany lirr, anil with one female fcrvant, and the major's valet-dc-cliambrc (who had a hall wlm h he had reicivcd in the lateaiHion then in his fljonldrr) llie rowed down the river to meet the enemy. But her dillrelles wric not yet to cnil. 'J he iii[;lil was advanced before the boat reachcil the enemy's out polls, and the cenrMicl v, )uld not let it pafs, nor even come on (liore. In v.iin Mi. IJrudencl! oniied llic lliij; of iruce, and repreli^ntcil the ll.itc of ilie extraordinary p.illi iifrer. The guard, a[)preheM(iv(; of treachery, and punddious to their orders, ihreireiied ro lire into the Ijoat if it ilirrcd before ihiy lii'Ji'- I '"t anxiety and fun'rin;; were thus prjtr.ided thrcigh fc- ven or eight dark i;; J cold hom's ; and her rcilr 'lions upon ih.il full reteplion (.oitld not I'^ive her very ( "n ourainnf^ uh as <>( ihe ireaimeni llie was afieivvards to e,\pcct'. T>u\ it i.s <.\uc to Jul ' it the i lof 1' ihis adventure to (ay, tli.it llie was received and aecommod If. (I liv ■ a.nei.il d'aiis with all the hiniianity .ui-J rel['cel that her rank, her merits an! r Ioiimhi s delerved. l,et fuch ;f 11'" tifet'i' I l)v theie circumil.uices ot akirni, hartiniij) and danger, recolkct, iii.ii i.ie luon' I oi 1 1;' m was a woman ; of the niofl temlcr and delicate frame; oi ih gentle!! maiuiers , lial)itu,iieJ t * all the l(>fi eh-j-atuies, anti refined cnjoymeius, that attei.d lii.^,i lurui and fortune-, ami far advaiucd in a flatc in which the tender cares, always due to the fex, become indifpenfibly neceffary. Iler niinil alone was formed lor fmh in.;is. I now return to the armv, v;hicli arrived in the i;i,",ht at Saratogi, in fuch a flate of fatigue, that the men lor the moll; pail ha.l not llrtn.'^fh or iiulination to cut •wood and make fires, but rather loiiglit flccp in their wet cloiliis upon the wet ground u'vler the continuing rain, and it was not nil after day-liglit tliat the artil- lery and the lall of the irc/op-i pill the I'llh Kill, and took a pofition upon the heights and in the redoubts loimerly conflruded. The interval between taking that pofition, and the conclufion of tlic treaty, is the folcmn crifis in wliicli I coiilider myf.ll as peculiarly accountable to 11, y coun- try. Ami if all the circimitlances mentionctl by me, in my own vindicatujii, in my Letters, or my Narrative, are not ellablinied, anrl many of them flrengthened by pofirive proof v if every furmife of a furrender on my part, wiulc there was a pollibiliiy of avoiding it by fight, by n^anccuvre, or by retreat, is nut done av/ay i if even in the lall exiremity, it does not appear I was reaily and forward to prefer death to ililhonour; if the evidence I have adduced is not clear, diltinct, and direift ro thefe poinrs, the public odium, piercingly as it affcds a fenfible bread, would be far fliottof the puriifliment I deierve. 1 cannot but confider it as one encouragenncnt under this appeal, and it is no fm.tll one, that though very few parts of my preceding conduct have efcaped the fcrutiny f-i crofs Arrivnl of fhf ,ir[ny at. SarMto^a. I. Mid Uar- riii(;t(.n, -J I, f.'ii'l fSiilcnr- r.is, 5;, &C-. fnfiTv 1 i,c- tv.ccri the nrrivjil at Sa- rntnyn arid i'lKninj; the convciuicn. n ».^ U 1 V I I W O I 111 1 \ \ I II 1' N i !■ 1 ,M,i n>. ii\); ii>n, ^('. [\l.Mi I il .\i . I Iv '', It (\ I ii> til :i|Mi m1 111 \\\i 1 1 ml )i I Mils \i|'Mn v\ hii I\ I ii l\ , W r. lM•^^lli IM ll\r > \li|. Hi r I 'I till I' II 1 I 'I I In n Ml 1 1 III lllij ( nl'm I Is IMP ||. Ill, \]\.\: I ir I n. iin w i ■ |'iM|i J o \ (hi- I ( I iiiii . * i>l. K iniilliMi, I h II in i .mh . ii \\ n h Sw i!\.- p in. thf I), n, 1,(1 ,\i!i, r . n \v IS ,1. Ill niiiii il 111 1 1 \ ,» ni^'hi ni.n i h mi i lir i ill li'l i 1 iriH, \ II I I V c I , kin-.loo, 0' ;>'v>n(|.MUi ;>. ilu Imim-,\i, ; ivi'lih.n thi .iiiiMU'i WIS I'll V . nil li l>\ il; Itili " ipiiniiniii V ii,. 1 II l> Hitinp 1 'U »ii I \ 1 I \ iM 111 1 . II 11 \ pi ii\ III' Ml Mil nun \\ II III I , jMii ', iMi to Ihi \\ • I (h,- ill li\ 1 I \ 1> t Il.ll thi •■< M '1 l\ n V .< . « \ nil III , th,\l III \\iM(l(\ (lill li.\\> (.\;liii, (iM w 1 then IiimviiI mirll ,Mi. il n .lllriiipi i; ' I II I 1 'I I II'- > III in\ I I inn |iic I. •<•'!'. I'.il. \iontl\ m yr'.W ii.'n, in IiMi r, ol il\r i oiini i \' imi I'mi Ii Inli . i hi 1 1\ i i Im i w i m n- .iinl l\>ii I'llw \r\l * \\ h,K tlh- ;\i in\ \\i>Uin'>(lu iml ivlii upniiihin ;nnr., " in .iiimhiis liii|i('i.| " In. 1 ,M\i \<\'\\\ oiM li'iiivl-. iM .\s ihi' nrvi ili in iMr i 'ti'i i I ii ii-n, ;ni Mitiik linin f\injfin"i<,vi CI, O V . 1 ic\il , V i (MUM oImci \ ino Ii.mii i hi l.niir « \ nji m t ( i li ii I'liiln K nv\(il^|•'.^ hiM\ i.» Mi ( h i.ul V Vl'ii'i .»'. liMl w is I'l IMP ;li 1 iMllpllllli .1 I I W .i||M |ir ||)| lM^^j^: (•< pi ,^'l^^nM^ >" pi-rii\.l\ wli.u WiMihl h;i\ > Ivcn tin ill'iir I'lii I iiinicll the S i>l m\ n\ln,\i\ ivMiiii; ii> «hi- pi, in <<( ilii ;;U>i'.;i\ ol tiUitl'-. Ihi itilpoliuon i>^lr;Miis, ,unl u< lU.UvtM !\(ii jmi .\i > (li m upon i be pl,\in. ilir\ unijl li;)vr fornvvl 11 iv';.; il'.i- tiiv' «M .u\ >Mn p.uk .uiilKiv, wiihin irnh el p,i ip< llii'i, .\ uiifs i'wc u «!\v- ,\iiillv'i\ ,iiu' nnilkrnv o( the niHcii. hiil voips \ip,i|\ ihr hill, ;)ii,l iIk- nMi')v<"(i\' «M (I\i' -.Mh iicinvn!. whu ih \v,\s .\\ c.\\\ »l;ll.\n>r ti> I'r lupporiril l»v ihr l^vi ai.u-,v, m JroiU ; ;»vl»lrvi (>> ihis >\>1 Wv' W- \C\ ]\m\ ww.wn^'A, o( ;» (I\;M>\r \i|>iMi .\\\ rp( n |'l.iin. I :iin prnu.uK.i ihr >\v nv i .il Mivlonn-m will p,,i wnh nir when I l.niicnt the ,\i i hlriil th;M |Mr\ -i.' n ! vi 1 i V Vl I lU V c.'.n s »KMi>.",n ^whvii 1v> i.ii .ul.,\n>i»' inn. .is iiiln.ilU i,> h,i\c p iHi J the r" '1 \v :i!i vW «\>luiui0 .IN o;io v^l tlu" iiioil ;ulv(-it(~ ilmUrv i>l liMUinc iii the whole o.iiv.p.^ _>:iv Vhc Hmc t>1 th'.nj^ .ViiVr (Ins vlil.ippoininiriU is pjvon b\ the l.ul o\ I l.iii inj'Jdii : ■'^sT'^ '^°' " '* ^•'■'' ^^ ''''•'^"'^ .IN poiiihlc . t\\c nuiuhds of tlu- maw wvic lew. ilu ir provilions 1 .-v.;.^ M \.o:\'. SsloR" «■' rtv^^{, their poiiti<>n luM .\ jVO(>k1 one. owmv", to ilu ii.it'.'tc ol the » oniitiv r IIS t'^ :hf cr\A ;.ue >^uol\v,,^^\i in '.he e\ uleiue ol the !■ ul ul H.ile.in.is ;iiul M.iioi I'orlirs. Msv ^.^:;v-. w ;h (ho ;»v'vV,! ',v>:"s.il eiiviinM^^neo, th.-it tlirie w.ts not ■\ tpot tv^ l>e (oviiul u\ ilie wlmle rrt r,Y I .^,■d Baka;-- jV.'.^'vV. V hie'i WAS n\>5 e\pv^\\l so e.uinvMi oi nile Ihot. * 1; xts? alv in o t^MW a \\a\ Im. V t.> AllMnv, h.id (lirrncMiv in 'he diJliilMifion nl" Th'ii iWi>!- »csVcrtr\-i the r nj;h;, lo .-»» t.' hr,\viu.uW llic \ iVoii pomhlo. .Sa Loul n..uingiv>ii's cm jj.-nre. t IcUer !ivv.- .Mlv.nv tv^ the ;ocrc:-;v ^^! ia; lie I< \ V I I. W () I III I. I'. V I {) 1. M L I I ; ' 'III! mlll4llf I In III ;W V » iiii'l II I'. [H'lVf i' liv •'"' ' vi'Iciii '■ 'p( f 'ihiii< I K ifijid'ifi, i liii tli'' I'lf ' f ,..,,, i .,\ ,,l till I II' iMV win mhiillv (',•'"'' > i"i'l ili'if |i'ilii nn (Iimh"' t, di m tli' iiif- llij// ii' <■ KintjO-ifi, 'jf I ll;li| II I ( IVmI illl'l Idiil li' (>i|< I I If ( I II I mil «il \', ;ll l< |it' (' lit' 'I t 1 1' III tl i't piMVMl l»V til'" dill' ll <\mI(M''', iIiii ill' I' nil. lull [p|'p|r'i|f d liy f lir ' h' idy Mm. ( '.d.M. WlM' III Hmiii Iv Mii'l HMMiiiiii'iiidv i( |( ('I' 'I liy tin ( 'iiifi' ll 'i( 7/ ii ,i'; difli'iii'i'ii ,ilp|' /: .Hi il'l M ll' ;ir- riif l;iiMr MM.iiiiinilv III ij'liiMvmf; til' If t HIS I |ii'»[")l' 'I ,iii'l 'iI'Miii' 'I, r. »f|'iilly '".''<;' iiii null IhiMv ( ll.iMillii fl. Anil ImIIIv, l\vf> jin|ifto air |iif(f|i|f fl, iiirl iiutliriif if .if'! li'V'ifrl ;» p'lffildlify of A(i;.ti( ilif I, ill roiin' i III.', ill, It r veil lii|i|"iM I'll iis I w:r; liy I ll'- iiimiiiiihi y 'il i lif ffdiii' t ' ouii' lU, in i)\ii n iii(' :iiii| MiMiliii'l m|', llic ti'iilv, I w,m if'|iiii',ii.iiii t'( til' (i|riiiii^»; of If, njion .! flitdif ■'■fi\i'>1'r\ liii|'t' ( iit''(i.iiMf i| fi( I I' iiifitf n ll' ( ( I li'ip' ;iiiliii(' (iMiii f'liiK iiii'llii'/ h' '• r'''iv''i III til' iii|'.lil o( Sii I Iriii •>' ( Imt'iii''; iii'iviiif', ii|i ill'- N'liili K IV' I ^ ,ui'l t', IV "1/ V'lK f ' '. '• .i(',iiiiill !i in;i|niily ii( i < ii (I in(',ly ; tliit I ,it I. ill tli'Mii'lit myl' If ('iim[i'II'(| to y,'\'\ In llir inrt|ot ily upon " tli' iiiif ci l.iinty of ili' int' llijrrnf c, an'j tli'- improliilnlif / " «»f ( itMirtMl ( 'liiitfiii"s miti'iir; liciiij', flin'tiMl if fiiir j iip'Mi fli' 'l'»iil'fs ' ritrrtaiDcd " III (i)inf' p.iii of ill'- tiof >p'), if ill* n' ("It in I' 111 'll til'' It' If y ( ' iff'l, ,111' i of a i'jf.itrr " pnit (oivv.uit o( li')i|ily llifiii'ili, ll (|'(p'i,ilr 'iif'fpti/f', w(if t') ll' ift'-f •// u'h " mulcfl.il.ni ; iimll.illly, up'ni ili' o II' 'li'tii iliii ;i miff iiri i;'/ of Iik h * n^rprif's " iiiilM !>»' liil.il (o ihr vvli'ilc ;ltiiiy, iii'! t li if ':V( ii .1 vi' ''ir y ' 'dil'l r,ot f.iy c," 'I'o lliis nulls of rviili IK f, .ippfilitf ;ii|'l fill' ' I to ' v r y f,i' t f(f' iif i i| fo irr/|'iff,fi (iltioii, I Il'l', li'.iv*' tit ;i'M ill' 'ppini'iii of til'- juiny, tli.if fli'' f riiiS ol*r-nii''l '//'T': ' "''' ^■' lutlri iliiin till" lilii.UHiM 'pf liiiiij's f'.ivf IIS ;i I icjif fo f K[(f I'l'. f f>r ,i {iroof fhiit f'K li I r,r'', H. was lli'iidpmifiii, I iifii ff( ilif tf II iiiif)iiy 'll Lord l};ilf af ra=;. ofijjr'in. ir- A l.iii pi(lfj;mttit upon fc'iif rvcnts is li iidly fo l)p rK\>r{\rf\, ffpp''ially v/lulf Ri.fi»-/ ti'.n* many pM huIkcs arc aliv. It will l)f allr»w('l \ur foafriiiri'", wliaf no on'' has rvcr ''* vcniii'cd to (Iniy, tliat ilicir \\\.v/ he a ( fMiil)ifiafion (if f ire iirnlLincrs tindir^r wiiic fi an aiiny may l)C jullilicd in firafiiif^ with an cnnriy. 'Ifiar tlic army under rny foin- maiul was iiiidrr liitli ( ik mndaturs ar .Sarafof',;i is alfo j/'tk rally af kno'wl'dt'if':! : bur what IS not dnnnl tfi me fioin my f;wfi fiftiafifm, is attcmpfed to \>f ••f/\thhe\<], by (oMif, ()na((()Uiit of the ipiility of rlir rnrm/. 'I'liry Uiyyri} rbar. rfifrf fhouid l>c nn licify with rchcts. It is unncfrffary in arifwfr to liavf; rf'/nirfi^ f< hiftory. I will not take drfrnc- fiom treaties herween ^pain, thr lianrdiri'ff pov/er of the worUI, and the arch rehcl the f;reat I'riiur of Orange; nor hTwffn Charles the I'irll and the arch-rehcls the liipjifh Parliament, (for fucfi in f>oti'i inflancfs the/ were called) I need only refer to the exarn[»Ies exiftin^r at that time in Arr.crica, 2 ar.d '.■> ■;>': f '■)n7''riti''.>n, that the treaty was expedient, and the terms honotu-ablc, if I had delivered them up ro certain deilruclion, or even to be prifoners at tlifcraion. If the informed and'difpairionare pari of mankind Ihoiild agree in ientiment with the unanimous voice of the army, u[)on the convention of Saratoga, Ibrely to impute to it the final lols of the army i:s toi' palpal^le an injuilice long to remain upon the minds of the moll prejuiliced. I'he convention exprel.sly preferved the army for tlie fcrvice ol'the (late. According to that convention a truce was made iluring tlie war, between that army and the enemy, in America, and it now mi!;hi have been afting againlt tlie 1 loufe of Bourbon in any other pai r of tiie world. Tlie army was loll by the non-compliance with the treaty on the part of the Congrefs; and that violation of faith no man will ever be found to julVify. I will not decide how far it was encouraged in America, by the pci fiiafion that the minillry of IJritain hail neither power nor fpiric to redrefs the wroiig , and that they had funk the nation fo low, in point of refpedl, that tlic world wouid over- look, where flie was concerned, an adion that would have excited, in any other cafe, univerfal cenllire and indignation. Lut whatever moiives the Congrefs may have had, the tamenefs and filence with which the liritilh miniders have borne this outrage, is allonilhing. That men (o conftant and fo prodigal in their anger againft the Congrefs, as never before to have failed in cxprefTwig it, even in cafes where it bordered upon being ridiculous, Jhould on a fudden becoine cold anil mute, and dead to feeling, in a cafe where refentment was juitly founded, can h.ardly be accounted for, except upon the principle that it was better to fupprefs ilie juilell cenfure upon a power they detefteif *han that even a particle of unme- rited odium fliould be wanting to load the man Wiiom they were refolved to deprefs. A P P E N- :, W'itll th* th Cicncr.il , tFic Kiii{^ the one a J t fat ivill: liiiolt every er by what ly country, veil, iipou r, and the even to be inieiit with iUrely to to remiiiii tl the army ulc chiring li^hi have rlci. The Congrcfli ; .ilid.M ihat mJ that (.1 o ver- ily other cfb may c borne -ir annrer in cafes -"old and c'd, can fupprefs iinme- deprefs. PEN- CONCLUSION. 1 AM not aware that in the preceding Review of F.videncc I have negleded any pirt ell'ential to my defence. 1 do not reckon as fiich, that part which applies to the management of the public purie. The calumny defitrned to wound me u[)()ii that heail was too grofs to liicceed : it peridud in its birtli, and Icorn is the only fentiment excited by the remembrance of its momentary exillence. In regard to the more plaufible objedions pointed againll my conduct, I have not only endca- vcured to meet them in the urofs-examination, but have fearched for them in eveiy jilace where I could fuppofe tiiem to originate or be entertained. If fome have efcapcd, I fliali Hand cxcufed, when it is rrTolJedVed how they have grown and changed from one fliape to another, and it has never been my fortune to be confronted with an avowed and regul.u .icculer — I defpair of ever being lo : but J delire it to be underllood, that although I am carneft in this mode of defence, I am fofar from declining another, that 1 fliall think it one very happy circumlhuice of the pall enijuiry, if any thing contained in it Ihould have effect iiereafter to pro- duce an enquiry by court-martial. It would not be an ungrateful tafl< to follow the defence of the campaign with a detail of the occurrences which happened between the time of figning the conven- tion and my leaving America. Many of them would be found curious ; and the cares and perplexities in whicji I bore a principal and mod: painful part, would create a new intereft in the mintis of my friends: but I d( not think myfelf at liberty, upon the plan I laid down at my outfet, to enter into matter where no blane is imputed or implied. If my proceedings during that interval deferve any credit, I ain content with that teftiiuony of it, which 1 may alTume from the filence of my enemies. I have not the fame rcafons forpafTing over the tranfactions in which I have been engaged fince my return to England, bccaufe blame, and of a very atrocious na- ture, has been imputed to me. Hut as the principal of thclc tranfaftions arc already before the public, I fhall mention them very briefly; and merely to introduce con neii:tedly fuch further thouglits upon them as could not with propriety be flatcd upon any former occafion. Immediately after my arrival, a board of general ofHcers wa-; .ippoir.ted to en- quire into the caufes of tiic failure earing at court. The board reported, that they could not take cognizance of mc bcin:; uiidcr parole — the prohibition from the King's prefence ncverthelcfs ilill remained in force. * S I had ll T3^ CONCLUSION. I: r» I had reconrrero parliament forencjiiiry •, and openly, and repeatedly, and Hrenu- oudy called \i;n)n the niinillers to join idlie with nic before that tribunal. Objec- fion v:is taken a;!;aiiitl iniincdiate enquiry, becaufe Generals Sir Guy Carleton and Sir William 1 lowe w!io iiii{'!ic be parties were abfent; but it was evidently the dil- jjofition of the houfe, that an enquiry fliould be inllituted the enibing felVion. I pledged mj felf zealoufly to profecutc that ineafure i I accufed minilers of inju- rious treatiucat towards inyfelf j and it becanie my duty, upon occafions with which my own affairs had no conneiftion, to exprefs deeper refentments of their conduct towards th<.' public. In this Ihue of things parliament was prorogued on the 3^ ofjinie. On the ^tb nfjt::ic, I received the lir.l order to repair to Bollon as foon as I had tried the Bath waters. The order and my anfwer, reprelenting the harddiip of being fent back Viiilieard, and t!ic Iccoiid conditional order, with entire flight of my reprefentations, are too well known to require repetition : but there are two circumrtanccs attending tiie dates of thcfe orders witii which I was not acquainted till long after, and which have never yet been taken notice of. The one is, that at the very time I was told that my prcfence was materialy and (as the fecond letter from the fecretary at war exprelfed) of/o tnuch importance to the troops detained prijoiiers in Nciv England, that it muft not bedifpenfed with — at that very time, it was determined to ratify the convention, according to the requifition of the Congrefs ; and to tranfmit the ratification through other hands, and without any participation with me, or employment of me, in carrying it to a conclufion. It was very polfible, the troops might have been failed for England before I hail reached America, had I even complied as early as the condition of either order could pollibly be conftrued to prefcribe. But at all events, the circumftance could not but ferve to mark to me the true intent and meaning of the order beyond a pofTi- bility of miftake — that it was an order of vinditlive ptoiijhment ; and my prefence with tiie troops, if I reached America in time, was material and important to mark to tbeni the degree of difgrace to which I was reduced. The terms are a mockery, and an infult upon common fenfe, if applied, in the fituation in which I was placed, to the ferviceof the King, or the confolation of the troops. Such a difplay of ven- geance might indeed be intended to apply to their prudence, and to a6l as a cau- tion and warning how at their return they fliould fupport a General under the extre- mity of the King's difpleafure.* The other circumilance attending thefe dates is not lefs remarkable, viz. * In times when the maintenance of the conrtitution in its purity is the ruling principle of an admi- niflration, the King's name is introduced by office only to denote an a6t of the executive part of the Hate. In times when an adniiniftration mean to rule by the influence of monarchy, the language of oflice is to conncft tiie royal pcrfon with the art, and to give him attributes of paffion and difpleafure, from which in his political charadL'rhe i; held exempt. 1 difclaim language and ideas fo unconftitu- tional and dilVelpettl'ul, and never mean to allude to my Sovereign perfonally, but in at^s of juftice and mercy. The C O N C I- U S I O N. •J.? The determination of changing tlic nature of the war, as aftcrWiiul; ileclarcd by the comminioncrs in America, niiill have been taken at tliis lime. I am very much difinclinetl to believe, that the confukration of my pcrfon as i proper vidim upon that occafion was evir regularly and formally debated in the cabinet: but I cannot think it uncharitable to the individual advifcrof the Crown, whoever he was, who could projedt fuch an order, to fupjiofe, that if upon the firlt cxercife of the extroues of tvar on tliO one lide, and in the arthnir of ret.iliation on the other, it had fo happened, that an objetft fo well to be fpared as an obnoxious and difgraced Licuteiiant General, had opportunely prefented itfcif to the enemy's rigour, and had been detained in their prifoiis, the order for the voyage would not have been thought, by that individual, quite thrown away. Detention, with or without the troops, of a troublefome and bold complainant, could not be imiijate- rial or unimportant to fuch a pcrfon, and the order was of an import " — To make aflfurance double furc — " And take a bond of fate — " That he might tell pale-hearted Fear it lied." The living prefencc of an injured man is, perhaps, more ofTenfivc and infup- portable to the fight of a mean injurer, that the fpeclre of him would be after death. But to return to the fai^ls I was recapitulating. I remained under the conditional order in England, The enfuing feirion, the parliamentary enquiry now laid before the public took place. It ended, as has been ftated, in July, 1779. In September, I received a fevere reprimand, a denial of a court-martial, and a prohibition of fervingmy country in its exigence, though other officers precifely in my fituarion were employed — I refigned. The blame laid upon me for the part I took in theft tranfaftions is, that intem- perately and flidioufly I engaged in oppofition ; that I was guilty of difobediencc to the King's orders; and it has been added in a late publication, that even my de- fence of my condudl is a libel upon the King's government. I think I have perceived, that the firfl part of thcfc charges, a ralla engagement in oppofuion, is not combated by fome who wilh me well fo ftrenuouOy as other imputations have been. It may pofilbly have appeared to friendly and prudential obfervers, as a palliating plea for a rcftitution to favour upon fome future occafion, to have to fay, that I had adted upon ,:he fudden impulfe of paJfion ; and the fequel might be, that I had repented, and would offend no more. Without doubting the kindnefs which fuggefl:s thefe excufes, I have been im- pelled by princi])les too forcible, and have taken my part tod decidedly, to look for a refource in thofe or any other fubterfuges. It would be inconfitlent nnd dif- honourable in me to withhold a public declaration upon this occafion, in addition * S 2 to ,v "» i> i 136 It I CONCLUSION. to thofe I have made upon others, that I engaged in refinance to the mcarures of the court upon mature rcllcxnion ; that after collctfling in my mind all the liglu* upon men and tlun[^i,s which my experience and oblervation could furnilh, I bc- lit'veti that the conlUtiition of l.-'ngland way betrayed : and neither blaming or llifpeJting any men who conceived diilerent opinions, and aded upon them, I thought it a point of time in which a man believing as I did was called upon to facrificc to his country. The left of this motive, it is true, muft reft between God and my confcience: but let it not be fuppofed that I adled blindly — the path of intercft, a broatl and beaten track, lay clearly before mc from the time I arrived in England. Supple joints, and an attentive eye, always giving way to power, on one fide, and fometimes pulhing my friends into the dirt on the other, would have carrietl mc fafely through. I even believe, that the advifer of the letters I Intely alludctl to would rather have iX-cn me in tliat track, than in the other which he prc- icribetl for me acroi's the Atlantic. As little would I be fuppofed to want tlifcernment of the path T took : for the barefaced preferences, rewards and piuiilhinents held forth for parliamentary conduft, were among the moft glaring parts of the fyftem I had contcmplatetl. And ic was irnpoffible to doubt, that as a delinquent //.u'/e, I fliould be preflld both by art and vengeance to the end the enemies I had provoked forcfaw — the lofs of my profellion and the impoverifliment of my fortune. I truil it will be an inno- cent revenge on my parr, to fliew them I can bear my condition firmly ; antl that I am incapable of redeeming what I liave loft, were it ever in my option, by the difavowal of a fingle principle I have profeflcd. I come now to the fccond charge, difobedience of orders ; and in a point that fo nearly touches tiie very cftence of military charader, I truft I fliall not tref- pafs upon the patience of the reader, if I treat it a little more at large than 1 have done in my correfpondence with the fecretary at war. 1 admit that fubordination and implicit obedience, as applied to the operation of arms, are primary principles in the military fyftem. An army is a mere name without thcrn. The ollicer who hefitates to meet certain death upon conimand, dtferves to receive it from the hand of the executioner. But there are poftible exceptions to thefe general principles, efpecially out of the field, in the moft abfolute fervices ; and in the Britifli fervice they are known and marked, and co-cxiftent with the military eftablilhment itfelf, in tl;e mutiny afV, v.hich confines obedience to legal commands. An aruiv muft ajz-ain be ^arbled like the army of Cromwell (which God avert !) before an order cou'd be executed, like that of Cromwell, for garbling the parliament. A high fpirit will contract the limits of obedience ftill more; with illegal, he will rejeft dilhonoumble commands ; and he will follow the rcafoning I have al- ready premifed, and ftate it as a maxim thus: /c' vA'o obex's at tbc espcu-c of fcr- CONCLUSION. 137 tun:, tune, comfort f health and life, is a foldier j he who obeys at the expcnce of honour is a Jlave. But I may be arkcd by fomc difciplinarians, who is to be the jndgc in thefe nice definitions of obedience? It is uncommon military dp^^trinc, I may be toKl, to rca- fon upon tlie K.in{»'s orders — I confcfs it is lb. Since the reign of James the Second, in tiic IJiitidi fervice ic never has been neccfTary. Wc have been iifi-d in this a^e, to fee the King's name give wings and inlpiration to cUity. Dilcipline, in this country, has been raifed upon perfonal lionour — a firmer baiis than fear or fervility ever furniflied : and the minifler who firit Ihakes that happy confidence } who turns military commaml xo political craft •, who dares to ufe his gracious Sovereign's name ai an engine of Hate, to glut his own anger, or to remove his ov/n fears, he is amongit the worll enemies to that Sovereign. But fhould his purpofes go further (a confideration of far greater magnitude to the public) and fliouid it be \'{:(:n that tlie ro'- ! name was brought foith fcjr the d'//i//;//;/(? of parliament, the minilter fo ufing it would be not only an enemy to his Sovereign, but a traitor to the conllitu- tion of c!ie ftate. I will clofe the defence of my principles refpefiing military fubordination by re- ference to an anecdote well authenticated and not very remote.. An ofTicer in a neighbouring nation, for fome error he had committed in a day of battle, received a blow from his prince who commanded in perfon. The ofiicer drew a pillol, and his fli.i movement was to point it at his mailer j but the next (and it was inllantaneous) was to turn the mu'.:zle, and difchargc the ball into his own heart. Though my cafe dilTcrs both in the provocation and the eonfequenee, in many circumllances my conduc'l may iultly be I'upported upon the fame princi- ple. I receive an arn{)nt that a liberal fpirit cannot endure ; and in a name, againfl which no perfcjnal relentment can be purfued, nor indeed entertained : but a I'uicide of my profefTional exigence (if I may be allowed the phrafe) is preferable to the llatc in which the affront placed mc. Inone indance only I renounce the parallel — God forbid I fhould be thought, even in a butfl: of pafTion, to have pointed at my Sovereign ! It was not from his hand I received the blow. I fliall folicit the reader's attention very little further : but I feel the neccffity of repeating my application to the candour of the public, both as a writer and an appellant. Defence, and imputation of blame toothers, are naturally interwoven in my caufe: it required a more dirtine^ conception, and an abler haiul than mine^ to keep them alv/ays apart, and open to feparatc view. In fomc parts my defence may be weakened by this deficiency of flcill : but I have no right to oiTer the fame excufe for fuB'ering any blame to reft upon others bc) und what I thought myfclf juftifitd to fupport. Upon this principle, I think it juft, at taking leave of the fccretary of ftate for the Am.srican department, briefly to enumerate the only iifii and piopofitions re- 3. fpeain^qr i 1^3 CONCLUSION. mm fpcLling the plan of the expedition from Canada, that I think clearly maintainable again A him. I'irfl fact. It is clear that the plan of a junftion of the greater part of the forces in Canada with tjie army of Sir William Howe, was formed in the year 1776, when Sir Wiiliani Howe was in full fuccefs ; when his whole force was in the neiglibourhood of New York, or in the Jerfies, and Mr. Walliington was beaten, and at the wcakelh Second fit!:. This plan of ajundlion was continued (and uponjuft reafoning) in the clofe of the year 1776, when Sir William Howe's firlt propofal of operations for the enfuing campaign arrived. Thofc propolals were made upon the datum of a number of" troops, fufRcient to furnifli, befides the main army, an offenfive army of 10,000 men, rank and file, to adtonthc fide of Rhode Ifiand, by taking pofTeflion of Providence, and penetrating from thence into the country towards Bofton ; and another f^^///?zv army, not lefo L!->an io,coo, to move up the North River to Alba- ny, exclulive of 50C0 for the defence of New York. In either of the above cafes, the plan of junftion could hardly have failed of fuccefs. Third fid. On the 23d of February, Sir William Howe's alteration of the firll plan was received, and he then propofed to adl with the greater part of his force on the fide of Philadelphia, at the opening of the campaign, and to enable him fo to do, to defer the offenftve plan from Rhode JJland till the reinforcements Jhould arrh., and to defline only 3000 men to a>i^ defenfively upon tiie lower part of the Hudfon's River. Fourth fad-. On the 3d of March, the fccretary of ftate fignified his Majcfly's entire approbation of this deviation from the plan firft fuggefled. From thefe fa6ls arifes my firft propofition, that at the time the change of plan for Sir William Howe's operations was adopicd, by whi;h no ofix^nhve force was to remain upon the Hudfon's River, nor a diverfion probably to take place from Rhode Ifland, the plan of my operations, the fuccefs of which would probably de- pend in a great degree upon co-operation and diverfion, ought to have been changed likewife : inftead of that, it was enforced and made pofitive by the refufal of the latitude I had propofed of adting upon the Conneeticut, or, in cafe of exigency, embarking the troops and eflx^fting the junction by fea, Fifth fad. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir William Howe, by the fecre- tary of (tatc, acquainting him, that a brigade of Britifli and fome companies of bri- gadiers and light infintry had been withdrawn from Rhode Ifland, which made the force left there merely defenfive. The fame letter mentions the profpeds the ene- my had of bringing 50,000 men into the field. Sixth fad. I did not leave Fngland till the beginning of April, by which time the fecretary of ftate mult have known, or ought to have known, that no depen- dance could be placed upon reinforcements from Fngland arriving at New York in time for Sir William Howe to refume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diverfion A from CONCLUSION. 1S9 from Rhode Idand, or of making the force upon the Hudfon's River adequate to offenfiv*" operation. Hence arifes my fecond propofition, that the latitude I had propofed, or other expedients of precaution, ought then at lead to have been adopted : inflread of which, I was fuffered to fail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements deltined for him. The con- fcquence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his deftination for Penfylvania, removed my '.'xpeftation of co-operation, becaufc I was to fuppofe, that fubfequent to the datcf, of cither of thofe letters, he would re- ceive orders from the fecretary of ftate rcfpeCling the junftion, and alfo a tinuly reinforcement. Seventh faft. The fecretary of flate makes no mention of the northern expedi- tion in any of his difpatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fadt, that I am perfuaded will not be contefted, that he did not mention any orders or recommenda- tions relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aid-de-camp, or any other confidential perfon who failed about that time. The firfl: mention made of the neceflity of co-operation was in the fecretary of ftate's letter of the iSib of May, wherein his Lordlhip " Trufs (bat whatever he \_Sir William Hozve"] may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada!' The propofition clearly juftified by thefe fafls is, that if the fecretary of ftate had thought proper to fignify the King's erpeftation of a co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in confiftency he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir W^illiam Howe embarked his army,, and in time for him to have made a new difpofition ; but inftead of that, this very material injunftion was not difpatched till it v.'as almoft phyfically impofllble it fliould have any efFeft. And fo indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the i6th of Auguft, at a diftance from Hudfon's River too great for any de- tachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been Ipared j and the reinforcement from lingland, upon which Sir W'illiam Howe depended to ftrengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later dill — too late (as it has been flicwn) to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any efFedlual fupporr. Indeed the conduft of the fecretary of ftate, in infcrting this paragraph, in his letter of the i8th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly it would have been timely, feems fo prepofterous, that it can only be explained l)y one fadt. It tranfpired about that time, that Sir William Howe's army was deftincd for Penfylvania, and people who had confidered the force of the enemy to be collcifl- ed from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known (rhou b" ••1 140 CONCLUSION. im W ^ (though I cinnot afccrtaln the date) tint an officer of very great ability, and a pcr- fcdl knowledge in tlie country through which 1 was to pafs, as loon as he heard no difpofition was made for a fupport from New York, foretold to the fecretary of (late, or his near friends, the fdl of tnyarmy. Under this apprchenfion it might appear to tlie fecretary of Hate a proper caution, that an expectation of co-operation ftiould cxill under liis hand. If plans fo inconfiRcntly formed, and managed by the fecretary of (late with fo much iecining confidence, as to miflead his generals, and lb much real referve as to dellroy them, fliould be defended by that infatuated belief then entertained of the inability of tlie enemy to refifl-, I fliould beg leave to flate, as one propofition more, that after the experience of their adions at Trenton, and many other places, and the intelligence of their new levies received from vSir William Howe, fuch con- fidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more pernicious one than any I have ftated. Thus much for the noble Lord in his public capacity. What fliare of the perfe- cution I have fuftained (more than I have directly expreffed in different parts of my defence) are imputable to his private councils, is not within my knowledge : buc if in fpeaking of my perfecutors in general, I may be thought fonuimes to have iifed ftrong terms, I have only to fay, that having advanced no fadl -/'hlrh I am not able and refolved to maintain, I have not felt myfelf called upon, in applying thofe fafts for any further attention, than to preferve the language of a gentleman, which is an attention due to myfelf as vrell as to the public. It is open and manly enmity alone that unites rcfpeft witli refentment. I wifli I could as eauly apologife for all the other faults with which this under- taking abounds as a compofition. At a time when fo many pens are employed, I mull not expedl to be fpared. I fliall treat with fi'tnt refped any comments tl'.ac are fairly founded and delivered with liberality; and with contempt, equally fllenf-, the common invedlives of the political prefs. This appeal is not to rc(l upon li- terary criticifm, or party dif])Utation, but upon the broad equity of m.y country. I know that prejudice and malice will vanifli before the man who daies to fubmi*- his aftions to that reft — If acquitted /bcrey I feel I am not degraded ; and I have not a fenfation within my breaft which does not at the fame time affure m/:, I cm- not be unhappy. J. B U R G O Y N E. A r P E N- \ a pcr- eard no of date, appear I (hould with fo ve as to lined of tpofition [ places, ich con- y I have le perfe- cs of my Ige : but , to have I am not applying ntleman, d manly undcr- nployec), :nts that |ly fikns upon li- jcountry- fubnii'' d I have L 1 can- E. PEN- E N D I X. Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated No, L Hertford-Street, i/ January, 1777. My Loud J IVj. Y phyfician has prefled me to go to Bath for a fhort time, and I find it requi- fite to my health and fpirits to follow his advice: but I think it a previous duty to afTureyour Lordlliip, that fliould my attendance in town become neceffary, rela- tively to information upon the allairs of Canada, I (hall be ready to obey your fummons upon one day's notice. Your Lordlhip being out of town, I fubmitted the above intentions a few days ago perlbnally to his Majefly in his clofct ; and I added, " That as the arrange- ments for the next campaign might pofllbly come und v his royal contemplation before my return, I humbly laid myfclf at his Majefty's feet for fuch aftive em« ploymenc as he might think me worthy of" This was the fubllance of my audience, on my part. I undertook it, and I now report it to your Lordlliip in the hope of your patronage in this purfuit; a hope, my Lord, founded not only upon a juft fenfe of the honour your Lordlhip's friend- fliip mud refleft upon me, but alfo upon a feeling that I dcferve it, in as much as a folid refpectand fincere perfonal attachment can conftitute fuch a claim. I leave in the hands of Mr. D'Oyley fuch of the memorandums confided to me by General Carleton as require difpatch, (hould your Lordlhip think proper to carry them into execution. I alfo leave in that gentleman's hands the copy of an application relative to boats for the artillery, and which I take the liberty to fubmit to your Lordftiip as well worthy of confideration, upon the fuppofition that the enemy fliould arm upon Lake George, and that any operation fliould be advifeable by that route. I likewife leave t!ie difpofition of winter quarters, which I received by the iaft (hip from Canada. I find no difpatch is come to your Lord(hip by that occafion, and 1 conceived thole papers might be of ufc. I have the honour to be. My Lord, &c. J. BURCOVNE. Extract cf a Letter from Lord George Germain -o 5?r Guy Carleton, J.?/i'^ White- No. 11. hall, 22r/Aiigufl., 1776. THK rapid fuccefs of his Majcfly's arms, in driving the rebels out of Canada, does great honour to your condud, and 1 hope foon to hear that you have been able to iiurfiie thcin acrofs the lakes, an.l to poficfb thole pofl:s upon the frontiers n'hicli may ellV(fl'iall\- fuurc ',0^"" province from any future iniiilr, 1 His I"! m n A r I' i: N I) I n:. His M.inlly, ill nppt^jiiting you coiniu.uulcr in cliicf of his forces in C.inid.i, was |iK ilrcl to txtiMul Noiir coininillioii to tlio (Voiiticis of his piovini'cs bonlciiii;' tlicitupon, wiulv fort'll-cMiip;, ih.ii it niipju be nccfllliry for iho conipUaiiii^ your pi. Ill rl ('ptT.itn)iis, ih.n \cM tlioiilil march your aiiny In-yoiul ihc iMiiils of" your own j;ov(inuu'nt. I tnitl, In lore tliis letter readies you, ihir you will, by yom Ipirir aiul acUvnv, h.ive eleaieil the fVoiitit-rs of" Caiia'.la ol all ilie rebel Cones, ami will have taken the proper niealurcs for keeping poll'eliion of the lakes. 'I'hrit ierviie bemp, perionneii, his Ma|elly comiuaiuls uie ta impiaint you, that there lUns aiiotiier pan ol your tiuiy to be uiuieriaken, which will reciuire rein ihU all your abilitii lotiiei pail Ol your ouiy to ue uiuieriaKen, wnun win recn ani (lie llricfell applieation, the telloiiiip; ]H\iee, aiul the enablilli 1 np, p;ood oiJer ami \(.-ij:.\\ i^overmnent in C'anaila. It is an objet'-i: of" the j';reatell iniport.'.nee to this eoutitry, the ditfieuUies atteiKJiii,*:; it are iminenrei but his Majclly depeiuis upon your zeal, and ujioii vour experit iier, for ( airyiii(<; it into execution. His Majelly, ever aiiMous for the ha|)pinels of his fubjciHs, coni- inands ine to infonn vou, th.it no tinje flv.iuld be loll in bep,inninp, li) iinj)ortant a woik, anil tli.'t vou ilo tlicretore return ti> ()j^ieb(.e, iletaihiiij; 1 .ieutenaiuCieneral Hurgovne, or fiu ii other ollieer as you lliill think moll proper, with iliat p.iit of your forces which c.in be Ipanxl Irom the iniinedi.ite ih fence of your province, to ca;;\' on lucli opci itioiis as lliall be nuill conducive to the fuccels ol the army atiiii;!; on the fulc »)t New York ; and th.ir xoii diiccH the olficer fo detached tocominu- nicate with and put himlell, as liion as pollible, vnnler the comm.uul of (icncral Htnve, you will older fuch ariillerv as )ou lliall judj^e necelfiirv to proceed with this detachment; ap.d as a great quantity of he. ivy (.union and military lloies were fint, upon the luppvifuion tii.it (>ucbcc might have been in the haiuis of tlu; rebels, you will, upon requifttiiMi from luiieral Ilowc, fupply him witli Inch cannon aiul II ori's as mav noi be wanted for the protedion o fC .inada. ^•o. III. Tbcu'^hts fcr cciKiuL'ir.g tl\' ll'in fiol, iipnii a proj^rls to Skciifflxtiotiyji. JljonKl tlir (ilijci't ;i|i|)(Mr WDitliy, ii is (o W Iiopi-il irlbiiurs mifjil lit" toiiiul -, in I'l.it t.ilc it wonUl be .ulvilc.iblc to foitity witli one or two llroiij'; mlouhis tlu* Iicijflits oppolitc to I'li.iilcs I'owM, aiul cIl.iMilh polls ol lavaj-os u|)om tlic p.ill'.ii'.c I'roin iirixulcro^Ta to thole 'iri{;lits, to pr( li'ivi- tlir coininnimatioii, ami ui tlu* limic time picvciit: any attcmpr (roiu tlio loiiiitty above Charles I'own, wliiili is very impulous, Iroiii molillini' ihc rear or iiitcrnipimj^ rho convovs ol liipiily, while the aniv/ proireilet-l «!i)wn the C'onneitietit. SoiiUl the jiiiuhon between the Canada ain.1 UlxtJe III iikI aiiiues beelH\'Uii u|>on the (.'oniu\M icur, it is not too ran|',uine an cxpeLlation thai all the New !■ ii);laiul pii)viiucs will be reiliueil by tin ir operations. I'o avoul breakini', in upon other matter, 1 omiiteil in the bep,innin;^ ol" ihefe papers to llate the iilea of .\n expeilition at the cutlet otlhe eanipaijvn by the 1 -akc i)iuaiio anil i.)rwt'{\o to the Mohawk Kiver, which, as a iliveilioii to lacili;ate cvcjy piopoliril operation, woiiKI be highly ilelirable, pioviileil the army ihoiiUl be rcin- loiecd rmfieiently to allbril it. It may at til ll a]>pear, from a view of the preleiu llrenj^th ot" the army, that if m ly bear the lort o(" iletaehment pro|>oleil by mylell lall year lor this pin pole i but It IS to be lonrulereil that at that time the utmoll objei-l of the campaip,n, Irom the ailvaiueil le.ilon ami unavoiilable vlelay of preparation (or the lakes, beiii,'>; the rciUKiion o( Crown I'oint anil 'I'ieoiuleroga, unlels the lueeels ol my expetlitioii hail opencii the roail to Albany, no j>reater luimbers were neeell'ary than for thole firll ojH-rations. The cafe in the piefent year iliMers ; beeaule the lealon of the year alioriling a prolpeCl of" very exteniive ojuration, and confcipiently the ella- blilhment of' many polls, ])atroles, i\'e. will beeome iieeeirary. 1 he army ou<';ht: to be in a ftate of numbers to bear thole drains, and flill remain f'uHieieiu to attack any thing that ptvbably can be oi»poled to it. Nor, to argue from probability, is fi) much force necefVary (or tiiis diverfion this year, as was rcquiieil for the lall j beeaule we then knew that ( iciieral Schuyler %vith athoufanii men, was fortified upow the Mohawk. When the dillercnt lini- ations of things arc eonfidcred, vi/. the progreis of (Jeneral llowe, the early invafion from Canada, the threatening of the C^)iinei'licut from Rhode lllaiul, ivc. it is not to be imagined that anv detachment offuch force as that of vScluilyer can be lupplied by the enemy for the Mohawk. 1 would not therefore projiofe it of more (M\d I have great liitlidence whetiu'r f(> much can be prudenil;' aflorded) than Sir John Johnfon's corps, an hundred liritifh from the fecond brigade, and an Iniiulrcd more from the 8th regiment, with four pieces of the lightell artillery, and a body of lavages ; Sir John lolinlbn to be with a detachment in peri'on, and an able field otRcer to commatiil it. 1 Ihould wifh Lieutenant Colonel St. L.eger lor that em- ployment. 1 particularize the fecond brigade, beeaule the lirll is pronofcd to be dimininied by the ^ lit regiment remaining in Can.aiia, and the red ot the regiment drafted for the expedition being made alfo part of the Canada force, the two brigades will be e.xadly I'quared. SiiouKi it appear, upon examination ofthercallv cflcftive numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not futHcient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a f.uf profped of fucccls, the alternative remains of embarking the arniy at Quebec, la order to efi'ccl a jumftion with General Howe by lea, or to be employed Icpa- rately A P 1' I'. N I) I X. vii lafrly to ( o-oprr.irc witli the m.iin jK ri[';ii"i, hy (iich niciiiis as (lionld be widiin tlirii |Iicii|mIi ii|)()ii (iiluT parts of ilic ((miiiicni. AtuI tlion/rli tli<: army, ii|)()ii cxainma- tioii III iIk tiiimhtrs lioiii tlic irimns liriT, iinil the rciiiforcnnrnfs (lclii>nrd, flioulil appear ailt«|uaic, ir is lunnhly rnhmii t(.ni in thai c.ile ii mnll be (onlnhied that more fort c would l)c retpincd lo be ltd behiiul for ilie liiinity ofC'ajiad.i, tiian is Inppoled to be neccUiuy when an army is beyond the lakes ; and I tio not ( ()iu:eivc any expedition from the lea tan be lb f'niinid.ible to the enemy, or lb ef1"r tht expedition to the Mohawk 4<5o Battalion companies of the 29th and 3ilb rcgimenw — — 896 Battalion companies of the 34tli> deducing loo for the expedition to the Mohawk — — — 348 Eleven additional companies from Great Britain — — 616 Detachments from the two brigades — — goo Detachments fro\n the German troops — — 650 Royal Highland emigrants — — 500 You will naturally conclude that this allotment for Canada has not been made without prcp^riy weighing the feveral duties which are likely to be required. His Majefty has not. only confidered the feveral garrifons and polls which probably it may be neceflary for you to take, viz. Quebec, Chaudiere, the difaftcclcd pariflies of Point Levi, Montreal, and polls between that town and Ofwegatchc, Trois Rivieres, St. John's, Scle aux Noix, La Prairie, Vergere, and fome other towns upon the fouth Ihore of St. Lawrence, oppofite the ifle of Montreal, with polls of communi- cation to St. Jolin's, but he hath alfo refle(5led that the feveral operations which will be carrying on in different parts of America mull neceflarily confine the attention of the rebels to the refpeftive fcenes of aftion, and fecure Canada from external at- tacks, and that the internal quiet which at prefent prevails is not likely to be in- terrupted, or if interrupted, will foon be rellored by your influence over the inha- bitants ; he therefare trulls that 3000 men will be quite fuflicient to anfwer every polTible demand. It IS likewife his Majelly's plealure that you put under the command of Lieute- nant General Burgoyne The grenadie'-s and light infantry of the army (except of the 8th regiment and the 24t!i regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier General Frafer — — 1^68 Firll brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21II, and 47th regiments, de- ducing a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada 1 194 Second brigade, baii;alion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 6 2d regiments, de- dufting 50 from each corps to remain as above — 1 1 94 Carried over 395^ y in know oin to ap. dcr takings, 'lat the in- n in iuch a It with yon iiioft con- ated every It you will 'ly's plcM. ri le .1770 ■cn made N. His «y it may iri flies of Rivieres, upon the immuni. hich will ittentioii ernal at- o be in- 'le inha- er every Lieute- nd ier le- 1563 1194 1 194 395^ APPENDIX. Brouf^ht over 395(5 All the German troops, except the Ilanau chafle'irs, and a detachment of 650, 3217 'J he artillery, except fuch parts as rtiuU be neccflary for the defence of Canada. 7 '7.1 'I'D-^cther with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought nr ccHTary for this fcrvicej and after having furniflied him in the fullclt and con^plcatcfl: manner with .arrillery, ftores, provifions, and every other article necelfary for his expedition, and fecured to him every alTiftance which it is in your power to alford and j^rocure, you are to give him orders to pals Lake Champlain, and from thence, by tl:e mod vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with ail expedition to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir William Howe. From the King's knowledge of the great preparations made by you lafl year to fccure tlie command of the lakes, and your attention to this part of the fcrviceth.- r (ig the winter, his Majefty is led to expect that every thing will be ready for Ge- neral Burgoyne's palling the lakes by the time you and he Ihall have adjufted the plan of the expedition. It is the King's further pleafurc that you put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, Detachment from the 8th regiment — — 100 Detachment from the 34th regiment — — — 100 Sir John Johnfon's regiment of New York — — i^j llanau chaflcurs — «— ■— ^^^ ^75 Together with a fufficient number of Canadians and Indians j and after having fur- nilhed him wth proper artillery, ftores, provifions, and every other neceflliry arti- cle for his expedition, and fecured to him every alTiftunce in your power to afford and procure, you arc to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the P-lo- hawk River to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir William Howe. I fhall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the firft packet -, but you will neverthelcl's endeavour to give him the earlieft intelligence of this meafure, and alfo dircdt Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, to negledt no opportunity of doing the fame, that they may receive inftrudtions from Sir William Howe. You will at the fame time inform them, that, until they Ihall have received orders from Sir William Howe, it is his Majefly's pleafure that they aft as exigencies may require, and in fuch manner as they Ihall judge moft proper for mak- ino; an impreflion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience •, but that in fo doing, they muft never loie view of their intended jundions with Sir William Howe as their principal objedls. In cafe Lieutenant General Burgoyne or Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger Ihould hap- pen to die, or be rendered, through illnefs, incapable of executing thofe great trufis, you are to nominate to their refpcflive commands, fuch officer or officers as you fiiall think beft qualified to fupply the place of thofe whom his Majefty has in hi§ wifdom at prefcnt appointed to condud thefe expeditions. I ( V Coj>j APPENDIX. \P m No. V. C\/J- c/ a Letltr/rom l.icutounit Cfiifru! Riirpoync to I.cvd ticor^c (jcriuain, daltd t^iclia, M.iy 1^, \yj. [IVivrttc] My T.orm, I l Akl'". il»c opportiiniry of ;» vpHM ililpatrhcil l)y Sir (»iiv ("arlcion to iMirJaml, to inf«)nu your 1 .uiilllupol luvaniv.il lure tlicTth ii\ll.uu. Ami though my picli-iu I'ltuation, as iu'tm|» iiiulci a liipiiior ii|i()n the Ipor, m.iv make an oll'u i.il corrclpoii- ilciuc imm'icll.ii V, lianiiot piiliiailc myldl I lliall iiol appear guiliy of improprietv in atlumiuft tlie hv)nourora private aiul couliilcmial oiu", relatively to ilic objeCls of \\\y ilellitiauon. Iroiu my piel'ent information, I have rcafon to cx|ietH the preparations (or open- ing; the eampai}!,n to he very torwarJ on our part. Due exertions were uleil in the courlo of the wniter, arul the iineommon nuKlnels of the weather jireatly favoured them, to eonvey provilions t() Chamble and St, jwhn's. One lari^; the enemy, eon- clnihnjf that Sir (iny Carleton will tranlinit the material part of if, and in a mannrr more full than in my power to do. I iiiulerll and they have laboured hard to (Irenj^then Tit onderoga, and threaten a vij^orous rclillaiKC there, and that they have huilt fomc vcHels on Lake Gcorp,r, as your Lordfliip may rcmcmhcr I had forelecn. Copy of a Letter from Licuteunut General Biirgoync to Lord Gcorj^c Germain, dated Montreal, May 19, 1777. Mv Lord, I HAD the honour to write to your I.orddiip the day I left Quebec, having rca- fon to imagine this letter may reach that niace in time to be ililpatched with my former one, I eannot omit the occalion to inform your Lordlhip, that the ho|)es I exprelFed of being al)le to«p«it the troops in motion without waitin/j the arrival of the fleets from I'.nj^laiul and Ireland, are confirmed. The only delay is occafioncd by the impr.aiticability of the roads, owing to Jatc extraordinary heavy rains, and this ilifliculty will be fpeedily removed, by (rxerting the I'ervices of the pariflics as loon as the weather clears. In the mean tiipx, I am employing every means tiiat water carriage will admit for drawing the trooj , and (lores towards their point. I trufl, 1 ftiall have vcfTcIs fufTicient to move the army and llores together, and in that cafe, will take pod at once, within fight of licon- deroga, and only tnake ufe of Crown Point for my hofpital and magazine. A continuation of intelligence from different fpics and dcferters, confirms the dc- fit^n of the enemy to difpute Ticonderoga vigoroufly. They are a!fo building bow- gallies at Fort George, for tiic defence of that Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to Skenefborough. It is configned to the New England colonies, to furnilh fupplies of men and pro- vifion to oppofc the progrefsof my army, and they have undertaken tiie talk, upon condition of being exempt from fupplying Mr. Wafhington's main army. It is my defign, while advancing to Ticonderago, and during the fiege of tliat poll, for a fiege I api>rehenil it mull be, to give all poiribie jealoufy on the fide of Connefticut. if I can by manoeuvre lead the enemy to fufpeJt, that after the reduc- tion of Ticonderago, my views are pointed that way, the Connedlicut forces will be U 2 veiy No. V. i •^i; ff 'i 'Till APPENDIX. very cautious of leaving tiieir own frontier, and I may gain a ftart that may much expedite and facilitate my jirogrcfs to Albany. Your Lordfhip may reft aflured, that, whatever demonftration I may endeavour to impofe on the enemy, I fliall rtw/Zy make no movement that can procraftinate the great objeft of my orders. I iiavc the honour to be, &c. J. BuRGOVNE. No. VI, Siiljiance of the Speech of Llcutcnant-Gncrd Burgoyne to the Indians h Con^refs, at the Camp upon the River Bouquet, June 21, 1777, and their Anfzver, tranJlauuL [In LieutefiiVit-GeneralJjUTgoync's, June 22, 1777.] Chiefs and Warriors, THE p;reatKing, our common father, aiid the patron of all who feek and defcrve his protcdlion, has confidered with fatisfa(5tion the general condudt of the Indian tribes from the beginning of the troubles in America. Too fagacious and too faithful to be deluded or corrupted, they have obfcrved the violated rights of the parental power they love, and burned to vindicate them. A few individuals alone, the refufe of a fmall tribe, at the firft were led aftray, and the mifreprefemations, the fpecious al- lurements, the infidious promifes and diverfified plots, in which the rebels are exer- cifed, and all of which they employed for that cfll'd, have ferved only in the end to enhance the honour of the tribes in general, by demonftrating to the world, how few and how contemptible are the apoftates. It is a truth known to you all, that thefe pitiful examples excepted, and vhey probably have before this day hid their faces in Ihame, the colkdlive voices and hands of the Indian tribes over this vaft con- tinent, are on the fule of juftice, of law, and of the King. The reftraint you have put upon your refeiitment in waiting the King your father's call to irms, the hardeft proof, I am perfuaded, to which your afledtion could have been put, is another manifeft and affected mark of your adherence to that i)rinci[)le of connexion to which you were always fond to allude, and which it is mutually the joy and the duty of the parent to chcrilh. The clemency of your father has been abufed, the offers of his mercy have been defpifed, and his farther patience would, in his eyes, become culpable, in as niuch as it ^vould withold redrefs from the mod {grievous oppreflionsin the provinces thatevcr dif- graced the hiftory of mankind. It therefore remains for me, the General of one of h'.i Majefty's armies, and in this council his reprefentative, to releafe you from thofc bonds which your obediencr impofed. — Warriors, you arc free — Go forth in might of your valour and your caufe ; ftrike at the common enemies of Great-Britain and America — difturbers of public order, peace, and happinefs — deftroyers of commerce, parricides of the ftate. The circle round you, the chiefs of his Majefty's European forces, and of the Prir.ces his allies, efteem you as brothers in the war ; emulous in glory and in frieml- fliip, we will endeavour reciprocally to give and to receive examples ; we know how to value, and we will ftrive to imitate your perfeverance in enterprize, and 3'our conftancy to refift hunger, wcarinefs, and pain. Be itourtaft:, from the didates of our ;i A P P K N D I X. Xlit lat may much ;s ; wc know our religion, the laws of our warefure, ami the principles :\va] inrcrcfl: of onr poHrr, to regulate your paffions when they overbear, to point i-ut wtrc it is nobler to tj-.are than to revenge, to difcrirainate degrees of guilt, to fufpcnd the iip-liltcd Aroke, to challifc, and not to deft roy. This -war to you, my friends, is new ; upon all former occafions in takinp; tl;c field you held yourfelves authorized to ilellroy wlicrever you came, bccaufc every u here you found an enemy. Tlie cafe is now very dificrenr. The King has many faithful fubjcds dif[icrfed in the provinces, conrof]uentl)' you have many brothers there ; and tlicfe i)eople are the more to be ])itiLil, tiuii thev are perfecutcd, or imprifoncd, wherever tlicv are difovcrcd, or fulptcud, and to ill- limbic, is, to a generous mind, a yet more grievous punilhment. Perfuaded that your magnanimity of clnirav!:l-cr, joined to vour principles of affec- tion to the King, will give me fuller controul over vour minds, than liie militarv lank with which I am invelled, 1 enjoin your moll lericuis attention to the rules wliieh i hereby proclaim for your invariable obfcrvalion during the campaign. I pofitiveiy forbid bloodlhcd, when yen are not (■»i)poi'ed in arms. Aged men, women, children, and priloncrs, mult be held fatred from the knife or hatchet, eveniii the time of a(fUial conllicf. You Ihail receive compenlation for the prilbners you take-, but you fliall I e called to account for i"cal[)s. In conformity and indulgence to your cufloms, which have affixed an idea of ho- nour to fuch b.ulges of vii; be too deeply impreffed, that the great efloniial reward, worthy fervicc of your a ii- ance, the fincerity of your zeal to the King ^■our father, and never-failing protiL'.or, will be examined, and judged upon the tell onb- of your fleady and unifor.ii adhe- rence to the orders and counfels of thofe to whom his Majelly has intrullcd ihc uiiec- tion and the honour of his arms. jinfzvcr from cin old Chief of the Iroquois. I fland up in the name of all the nations prelent, to afl'ure our father, that we have attentively lillened to his difcourie, We receive you as our father, becaule when yu;i fpcak, we hear the voice of our great father beyond the great lake. We rejoice in the apjirobation you have cxjireHed of our behaviour. We have been tried and tempted by the Bollonians ; but we have loved our f.ith.cr^ and our hatchets have been llvarpcncd upon our aflcdttons. In I* > XIV ft M. i No. \'II. 30th June. iftjuly. APPENDIX. In proof of the finccrity of our profefTions, our whole villages able to go to war, arc come forth. The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone remain at home. With one common aflent we promlfc a conftant obedience to all you have ordered, and all you Ihall order ; and may the Father of Days give you many and fuccefs. Copy of a Letter from General Burg ; ne to Lord George Germain, dated Skenefborough, July iith, 1777. 1 HAVE the honour to inform your l.ordfhip, that the enemy, diflogcd from Ti- conderoga and Mount Indcpcndant, on tlic 6th inliant, and were driven, on the fame day, beyond Skenelborough on the right, and to Humcrton on the left, with the lot's of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed vefltls and batcsux, the greateft part of their baggage and ammunition, provifion, and military (lores, to a very large amount. This fuccefs has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid. I fubjoin fuch a detail of circumllanccs as the time will permit ; an.l for his Majefty's further information, I beg leave to refer your Lordfliip to Captain Gardner, my aid de camp, whom I thought it necellary to difpatch with news fo important to the King's fervice and fo honourable to the troops under my command. Journal cf the late priiuipal Proceedings of the Army. Having remained at Crown-Point three days to bring up the rear of the army, to eftablifh the magazines and the hofpital, and to obtain intelligence of the enemy, on the I ordered the advanced corps, confiding of the Britifli light infantry and grenadiers, the 24th regiment, fome Canadians and Savages, and ten pieces of light artillery, vmder the command of Brigadier General Frafer, to move from Putnam Creek, where they had been encamped fome days, up the weft (hore of the lake to Four- Mile-Hoint, To called from being within that dillance oft' the fort of Ticoderoga. The German relcrve, conlifting of the Brunfwick chafleurs, light infantry and gre- nadiers under Lieutenant Colonel Bieyman were moved at the fame time to Pvichard- fon's farm, on the call fliore, oppofite to Putnam Creek. The whole army made a movement forward. Brigadier Frafer's corps occupied the ftrong poft calkd Three-Milc-Point, on the weft fliore ; the German rcferve the eaft-ftiore oppofite : the army encamped in two lines, the right wing at the Four- Mile-Point, the left wing nearly oppofite, on the eaft ftiore. The Royal George, and Inlle.\iblc frigates, with the gun-boats, were anchored at this time juft without the reach of tnc enemy's batteries, and covered the lake from the weft to the eaft fhores. The reft of the fleet had been fome time without guns, ill order to aflift in carrying provifions over Lake Champlain. The enemy appeared to be pofted as follows. A brigade occupied the old French lines on the height to the north of the fort of Ticondcroga. Thcle lines were in good rejiair, and had feveral intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the .iiorih- welt flank, and were further fuftained by a block-houle. They had, farther to a their APPENDIX. IV their left, a port at the faw-mills, which arc at the foot of the carrying- place to Lake George, and a block-hoiift: upon an eminence above the mills, and a block- houfc and hofpitalat the entrance of the lake. Upon the right of the lines and between them 'and the oM fort, there were two . new block-houfcs anti a confulcrable battery dole to the \vareredgc. Itfcemcd that the enemy had employed tlieir chief indiiftry, and were in the grca- tefl: force upon Mount Independence, which is high and circular , and upon the lum- niir, which is Table Land, was a ftar fort, made of pickets, and well fupplied \vith artillery, and a large Iquarc of barracks within it. The foot of the hill, on the fide which projeds into the lake, was intrenched and had a itrong abbattis clofe to the water. This intrenchment was lined with heavy artillery, pointed do.vn the lake flankitvg the water battery, above dcfcribed, and fuftained by another battery about half way up the hill. On the weft fide the hill runs the main river, and in its paftage is joined by the water which comes down from Lake George. The enemy had. here abridge of communication, which could not at this time be reconnoitred. On the eaft fide of the hill the water forms a fmall bay, into which falls a rivulet after having cncirculei! in its courfc part of the hill to the fouth eaft. The fide to the fouth could not he feen, but was defcribed as inacceffible. About nine in the morning a fmoke was obferved towards Lake George, and the July a; Savages brought in a report that the enemy had fctfire to the further block-houfe and had abandoned the faw-mills, and that a confidciablc body were advancing from the lines towards a bridge upon the road which led from the faw-mills towards the right of the Britirti camp. A detachment of the advanced corps was immediately put in march, under the command of Brigadier Prafcr, fupported by the fecond brigade and fome light artillery, under the command of Major General Phillips, with orders to proceed to Mount Hope, which is to the north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy's j)ofition, ana to take advantage of any poft they might abandon or be driven from. The Indians under Captain Frafer, fupported by his company of markfmen, were direfted to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Frafcr's line of march, and rndea- vour to cut off the retreat of the enemy to their lines ; but this dcfign mifcarried through the impetuofity of the Indians, who attacked too foon, and in front; and the enemy were thereby able to retire w ith the lofs of one officer and a few men killed, and one officer wounded. Major General Phillips took polTeflion of the very advanta- geous poft of Mount Hope this night, and the enemy were thereby entirely cut ofT from all communication with Lake George. Mount Hope was occupied in force by General Frafcr's whole corps. The fir ft July 3. Britilh brigade, and two entire brigades of artillery. The fecond brigade, Britifh, encamped upon the left of the firft, and the brigade of Gall, having been drawn from the eall fliore to occupy the ground where Frafcr's corps had originally been ; the line became compleat, extending from Three-Mile-Point to the weftermoft part of Mount Hope ; on the fame day. Major General Rcidefel encamped on the eaft fhore in a parallel line with Three-Mile-Point, having pufhed the referve forward near the rivulet v^hich encircles Mount Independence. The enemy cannonaded the camps of Mount Hope and of the German referve c'jring moft part of this day, but without effca. The army worked hard at their communications and got up the artillery, tents,- July 4. baggage and provifions ; the enemy at intervals continued the cannonade upon the camps, which was not in ai.y inftancc returned. The ,J- N\ I APT V. N D 1 X. it V '> J"'v Til" rin.\ lr*T TV\ l-'^'iJ 11' •I V l.uiiiviniM I'vils til ' > M ivmdino >'iv necr, w,is onlciril to irconnoiirc Sut^ir Hi!. 0'\ tln'r.>uih IkIc olrlu' co.iMUiMion 'roin L;ik(* ( Jco ,oc into I .;ik<' Ch.Mnplim, xvhu'it \\:\\ hern iviiL-ilod in the niijiu l>v i pinv ol lifj,li' ml iiitrv. It a[)(ic;»iril al Hrll to In* a viv v .tll, .in. I i. is nmv known iit tli<' cnrmy liaM a coun- cil loim* time a,q;o upon tlio cviH'duMU'y of po'lcUiin; it; m ilu' \Ac.\ was icjccHcJ, \!;v>n till' lupp liiiion ih;it i; w,is impo'Iilm- r)r a j-orps » lio t IliiblillicJ tlicrc in ) M.\\ I .u'nton.ini Iwils imported thus lull to luvc c intiic commiind ol' t'u' works ami hiiiKliogs both ot rir'>!ulcroi^.\ ami Mvni u liuliptMulcncc, nt tlio H ll,iO(V ol jiliout 1 ^ \^ vanis tVoni t!ic {"onncr, ami 15.011 in the latter; tliat tin; fV'>'>"^'l luij'ju b\Jo\(ll»\l To as tor.ioivc cannon, and tl the road to convey ti>eiu, lhoit!»;h ditiit u!r, niipjit be made pra^luMlile in tweiivdbnr hours. This lull alii) eoninmvi'd, in rewn'e, the bridf>e of c(>minunivatio>i ; law the exai'l (itu flt'vMi o; their \ .mIil'Is ; nor eonld th.' eiuntv, du,l^^^ ilie ilay, make anv iiuienal niovciiAent or preparation, without beinij dilcovcred, ami ..veil haviiu^ their mini- Ivrs eountfd, It was dctcnnincd that a bartcty Hiould be railed on Sii,. a. id tue!\c teet wide, dronglv tailened tojv'ther by ch.'.-ns ami rivets, and alio tailened to the lunken purs. lU'lorc this bridge was :t buoai, nude oi verv 1W A r I' !•: N I) I X. XVII l;»r[t;r piece? of tiinl)rr, rinciud fowctllcr l)y livctteil bolis nnd douMr ( li;jiiis, inndr ol iron an ii\( li and an hall l(|iiar('. I'Ih- piiri-hoals wnv mil iniiy moved f IVIointt lii i^ pM, (Iciue, with thei()r|is, Hicvman, and part o( the lilt win<^. I l< v.■.\^ diK-'d •■n proceed hv land, to liillaiii l{ri|',adKr I'raler, or to acl more to ilie left, il he l.iw n e\pi dienr lo to do. Ihe ^d ref^iment Miitilli, and the I'tiiniwif l< repini'-nt of I'riiuc l'icderi(l., were Uationed at I itoiuhiof^a and Mount liidt pendeiK e, in the pi i* r o( the painis oll'ialer's lnii^aJe, whn li had hieii kit in podeHion »•(' the arfiil'i v and (l(»r' s ami the nil ol the army was ordcrid to follow up the liver as ih'y eonld he ( ol Uiled, wiihoiii icjjaid to tin plate in the line. yVhoiit ihiee in the adeinoon I arrived with the Koyal ( ivnum nnd Fnllexii>lc . and the hell lailiiif^ gun boats a South Hay, within three miles of ^^keiK fbor(»nidi, ai wliirh latter plaec the enemy were polled in a Hot I;aded lort, and their arm', d p,allies in the (alls below. I'lie r«»tcmoll regiments, vi/.. the 9th, /■-■th, and yiH, were immediately dd eniharketl, and aleendeil the mountains with the intention of f^ettin^ l)cliiiid thr fort, ami rnttinp, off the retreat of the riiemv ; but thnr preripitate fli/^ht renden d tliis manti iivre inelleftiial. 'Ihe f^nn boats and frip.ates ( ontimied their e(»iirle to Skenefboroiioffed. ( aptain Carter, with part of his l)ri(,^ailc of giitj boats, immediately attacked, and with fo inu' h fpiiit, that two of the vellels very loon flnifk, the other thnr were blown op, and the enemy liaving previoiifly prepared ( fimluiflible materials, let fire fo the fort, mills, lb»rehotiles, bateaux, &c. and retireil with the detadiment Icff for that purpole, the main body having gone oil" when the trof)ps were ;if( ( iidinfi; the nionntain. A gicu cpiantitv of provifions and fomr arms were here ( onhimed, and mod of their oflirers' b.iggagc was burnt, liink, or t.iken. Their lofs is not known i about yj prilbners were made, among which were two wounded offir( r$ During thel'e oper.itions upon the right, Brigadier General I-'rafer ( ftntiniied his purluit to Callleiown till one oMot k, having man lied in a very hot d.iy from four oVlock in the monting till that time. .Some Ifragglers of the enemy were pickfvl up, from whom the Hrigadier learned that their rear guard was eompoled rifr liolen men, ami commanded by Colonel l-'rancis, one of their bed (>ffu(rs. During the tunc that the men were refrefhing, Majt'r (ieneral Keidefel ramr up, and arrange- ments for continuing the purluit havnifr been concerted, Brigadier I'rafer irioved forward again, ami during the lught lay upon his arms, in an atlvanragcfdjs firu- ation, three miles nearer the enemy. At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about fivf his advanced yth July. f(()Uts dilc«)vered the enemy's (entries, who fired their [lieces and joined the main hody. 'ihe Brigadier obltrving a (ommanding ground to the lefi: of his light uifantry, immediately ordered it to be jiofli-fTtd by that corps; and t confid^rahic- body of the enemy attempting the fame, they mtt. Ihe enemy v. ere tiriv'a ba( k A ro XVllJ p E N D I x; I! Silijiily. ngi I to prevent th': left, where nc and after beinc their original pod ; the advanced guard under Major Grant gaged, and thv grenadiers were advanced to fuftain them, ar It flank from be ng turned. The Brigadier remained on th ( nciiiy long defended themfeivcs by the aid of logs and trees, „ ^^ repulfed, and prevented getting to the Caftletown road by the grenadiers, they rallied, and renewed the aftion -, and upon a fecond repulfe, attempted their retreat by Pitsford Mountain. Tl.^ grenadiers fcrambled up a part of that afccnr, .appearing alnioft inaccelTiblc, and gained the fummit before them, which threw them into confufion ; they were ftul greatly fuperior in numbers, and confequently in extent, and the brigadier, in momentary expedtation of the Brunfwickers, had latterally dr'^wn from his left to fuppo. t his righ:. At this critical moment General Reidelel, who had prefled on, upon hearing the firing, arrived with the foremoll of his columns, viz. the chafTeurs company and eighty grenadiers and light infantry. His judgment immediately pointed to him ine courfe to take; he extended upon Brigadier Frafer's left flank. The challeurs got into adion with great gallantry, under Major Earner. They fled on all fides, leaving dead upon the field Colonel Francis and many other officers, with upwards of 200 men -, above 600 were wounded, mofl: of whom perilhed in the woods, attempting to get off", and one colonel, fevcn captains, ten fubalterns, and 210 men were made prifoners j above 200 ftand of arms were alfo taken. The number of the enemy before the engagement amounted to 2000 men. Ihe Britifli detachment under Brigadier General Frafer (the parties left the day before at Ticonderoga not having been able to join) confifl:ed only of 850 fighting men. The bare relation of fo fignal an adtion is fufficient for its praife. Should the attack againil fuch Inequality of numbers, before the German brigade came up, feem to require explanation, it is to be confidercd that the enemy might have cl'caped by delay ; that the advanced guard on a fudden found thcmfelves too near the enemy to avoid adlion without retreating; and that Brigadier Frafer had fuppofed the German troops to be very near. The diff^erence of time in their arrival was merely accidental. The Germans pufhed for a fliare in the glory, and they arrived in time to obtain it. 1 have only to add, that the exertions of Briga- dier Frafer on this day were but a continuance of that uniform intelligence, a<5livity and bravery, which difl:inguifli his charafter upon all occafions, and entitle him to be recommended, in the mod particular manner, to his Majefl:y's favour. The officers and foldiers of this brigade have prevented any diftindlions of indi- viduals by a general and equal difplay of fpirit. The country people about Skene(borough having reported that part of the enemy were ftill retreating, the 9th regiment was detached, with orders to take pofl: near Fort Anne, and obfcrve the enemy's motions. This was elfedted, but with great difficulty, as the roads were almoft imprafticable, and the bridges broken. The other troops were employed all that day and night in dragging fifty bateaux over the carrying place at Wood Creek, to facilitate the movement of the reltofthe firfl: brigade to Fort Anne, to dillodge the enemy. A report w;is received from Lieutenant Colonel Hill (9th regiment) that the enemy had been reinforced in the night by a confiderable body of frefli men; that he could not retire with his regiment before them, but he woukl maintain his ground. The two remaining regiments of the firfl: brigade were ordered to quicken their APPENDIX. XIX their march, and upon fecond intelligence of the enemy, and firing being hc-ard, the zoth reginaent was ordered forward with two pieces of artillery, and Major General Phillips was fent to take the command. A violent florm of rain, widch laded the whole day, prevented the troops from getting to Fort Anne I'o fooii as was intended ; but the delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of dilV.nguifli- ing themfelves, by Handing and repulfing an attack of Ilx times iheir number. The enemy finding the pofuion not to be forced in fr-^nt, endeavourc.l to turn it j and from the fuperiority of their numbers that inconvenience w 's to be appre- hended j and Lieutenant Colonel Mill found it neceflary to change iiis pofitioa in the height of -^ftion : fo critical an order was executeil by tlie regiment with tlie utmoft ileudine/. and bravery. The eneitiy, after an attack of three hours, wen* totally repulfed, and fled towards Fort Edward, letting Hre to Port Anne, but leaving a faw-mill and a block-houfe in good repair, which were afterwards pol- fefTed by the king's troops. The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedition, about tiiirty prifoners, fome (lores and baggage, and colours of the 2d Hamplhire regiment. One unlucky accident happened, to counterbalance, in fome degree, this fuc- cefs. Captain IVIontgomery, an officer of great merit, was wounded early in the aftion, and was in the adt of being drefTed by the furgeon when the regiment changed ground ; being unable to help himfelf, he and the furgeon were taken prifoners. I fmce hear he has been well treated, and is in a fair way of recovery at Albany. The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their provifions 9th and for two days, almoll the whole their tents and baggage) aflcmbied in their prefent loth July. pofition. The right wing occupies the heights of Skenclborough in two lines ; the right flank to the mountains, covered by the regiment of Reidefel's dragoons, tnpotence-y the left to the Wood Creek. The Brunfwick troops under Major General Keidcfel upon Callletown River, with Breyman's corps upon the communication of roads leading to Putney and Rutland) the regiment of Heffe Manau are ported at the head of Eaft Creek, to preferve the communication with the camp at CaO.letown River, and fccurc the bateaux. Brigadier Frafer's corps is in the centre, ready to move on either wing of the army. The fcattered remains of the enemy are at Fort Edward, on the Hudfon's River, where they have been joined, as 1 am informed, by Ciencral Putnam, with a confiderable corps of frefli troops. Roads are opening for the army to march to them by Fort Anne, and the Wood Creek is clearing of fallen trees, funken ftones, and other obftacles, to give paflage to bateaux for carrying artillery, (lores, provifions and camp equipage. Thclt- are laborious works; but the fpirit and zeal of the troops are fufFicient to iurmount them. Some little time mufl alfo be allowed for the fupplies of provifions to overtake us. In the mean time all pofTible diligence is ufing at Ticonderoga to get the gun-boats, provifion ve(rels, and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route, which will afterwards be the route for the magazines; and a junction of the whole is in- tended at Fort lulward. X 3 - I trail r lil'JI I ^ T hi XX No. Mil. /v i» 1' r. N I) I X. I fr.u»iinii to vom I.onllhip lutcwitli rct\iins of the kilK'ii aiul wo\iiulcil, ami liiVs ofliuli p.iits ol piovilions .irul llwrt'*, taken from tl»c enemy, as coiiKl be collci-Mtd II) lo Ihort a time. 1 have I he honour to be, will) the i^rcateft relpcd. Your I ordlbips, iScc. Cc/^y of ii Lt'tlofioni I.'uutcntiut Cnirtal livii};oynr to /.ro , l'AVlN(i j^ivcn vour I.onlflilp a ilclail, in my piiblie letter of this flate, f>f llic late tranlaiHions, I now ilo ni\K't th • honmu- to llatetoyour I ,orilflii[), fuch circui))- llann'sas uppoar toino ., re ■ , cr trr a private eoinnmnieation. Ml. IVters ;inii Mr. Jt (iiij>, vim eanie over to ("anatia I all aiitiinin, ami propoled to lailc battalions, one t; ivn fhr • ighboviihood of Alban\ . the other Ironi Charlotte tiuiiifv, :iie eonfiilrnt of fvi is »% *'• army aclvamcs. Their battalions are now in cmbiyo, but very promilin^j; ; thcv has ' loiight, ami with f|>irit. Sir (iiiv Carleton hai i»iven me blank eommillions !or the oHieers, to fill up oceahonally, ami the agrce- nient with them is, that the lommillions are not to be fo efVedUve, till two thirtls o| ■ he battalions arc raileil. Some lumiheds of men, a tliiril part of them with arms, have jviinctl me lince I have penerated this plaee, profelline themfelves loyalills, and wifhing \o ferve, fome to the end of the war, fome for tnc eampaign. Though I am without inrtruC\ions upon this fubjec'l, I have not hefttated to reeeive them, and as (all as Cv)mpanies ean be forn)ed, ' Ihall poll the oflicers till a dccilioij ean be ntade upon themealurebv ttiv luperiors. I mean to employ them particularly upon detach- ments, lor keeping the eountrv in awe, and procuring cattle ; their real ule I cxpeCV will be great in the pioforvation of the national troops : but the impreflion which will be cauled upon public o[>inion, Ihould piovincials be leen ading vigoroully in the caufev'tf the King, will be yet more advantageous, and, I trull, fully jvllity the ex- pence. The manifello, of which I encloCed vour I ,ordfl)ip a copy In my lall dil'patchcs, and herewith fend a duplicate, has great clVe»il where the country is not in the power of the rebels ; w here it is, the committees turn all their ellorts to c»)unteraj^t it. 'They watch or impnibn all fufpeiflcd jKTlons, compel the people in general to take arms, and to drive the cattle, and to burn the corn, under penalty of immediate death. Great numl>ets have Uvn hanged. Should thefe w)ctchcs iuccecd to make a defcrt of the country, by fire anvl n\allacre, it will at lead be a pleafing rclledion, that while advantages are rcajvd from the cleuKnt part of the manifello, they, and not the King's troops, are the executioners of its threats. Your 1 Awdlhip will have obfcrved, I have tiudc no mention of the Indians, in the puiUiit from Ticonderoga. It i« not pollible to draw them in many refpeils from the plunder of that place, and I confidentiallv acknowledge this is not the only inllance in which I have found little more than a name. If, under the management of their comluCfofs, tliey arc indulged, for intercrted rcalbns, in all the caprices and humours of fpoilcd children, like them they grow more umcafonablc and importunate upo.) a every ••♦ APPENDIX. XXI every new fiivoiir ; wore ilicy left to tlitmfclvr^, rnormiriis foolumid to tliink ol VNonid ruliii', iV'il'y '"'t' iiiiKitciU, woimn ami infants, would Wc « ((•iDmnn prey. This is the chaiin.Mi.r of tl)c lowir Ciinadian Indians, whn alone have l)rrn witli the iinny hiiherto. I am infornied the Outawas, and otiici remote nations, who ar'' within tuftdays inarch of joiiiinji; inc, aic more brave and moie lra^td)le ; that tli(y profels war, not pillage. They aie under the directions of a M. St. Iak, a Caiiadi.. i gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the !»e(t parti/ans the I'rctu h had I. fl -a, Hiul of one Linp.hnlc, the very man who projei'.tcd and executed witli thdc veiy i, tions the defeat of Oencral P»rad«li'( k. My firft intention was to turn this w, !r corps to the Connecticut immediately, to forie a fvi|)}»ly of provifiotis, to interrrpt reinforcements, and to confirm the jealouly I have in many ways rndeavoiircd to ex- cite in the New Knpjaiul provinces ; Imt findini/, that the enemy are labouring to re move their maga/.itus from Forts (reor};;c and Kdward, and every where dellroyinf^ the roads, ar.r' preparing to drive and burn the country towards Alliany, I have de- termined to emj)loy them, fo prevent, if pofTildc. by their terrr)r, the cfmtinuaiuc of thofe operations. And after arriving at Albany, they may be cm(doycd to renew tlie alarm towanls C'onnec'licvit and Bolton. Your I,ordfhip will pardon me if I a little lament thr -ny orders do not jove m'" the lafihide I ventured to propofc in my original projeCi or r cam[)aign, to make a real clli)rt inflead of a feint upon New England. As ■ ^'iigs vc turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my Icf*, (le.r.i of my right, I fhould have little doubt of fubduing before winter the pr- , ct A-herc the rebellion origi- ginated. If mv late letters reach Mr. Howe, I f>ill ho|>e t' Is plan may be adoptefl from Al- bany ; in the mean while my utmort exertions fl. i rowtinue, according to my in- IhuCtions, to force a junction. I l.avc lent fome Indians through the woods, in the hope of their reaching Sr. J-cger, with the account of my [irogrefs ; now is tlie critical time for his pulh upon the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all the country round Fort Stanwix is in alarm : but I imagine it proceeds from the appearance of fome Savages detached by Colonel Butler, not apprehending St. Lcgcr uau be got (juitc (o forward. I • ': Camp near Saratoga^ Augujt 20, '777. To Lord George Germainc. Mv I.ORt), IN my lafl difpatch (.1 duplicate of which will be inclofed herewith) I had the honour to inform your Lorddiip of the proceedings of the army vmdcr my command to the 30th of July. From that period to the ir;th of Augufl every pofTible meafure wa'> employed to bring forward bateaux, provifions, and ammunition from Fort fieorge to the firft navigable part of I ludfon's River, a diflance of eighteen miles, the roads in fome parts deep, and in others wanting great repair. ()f the horfcs furnifhcd by contra t in Canada not more than a third part was yet arrived. I he delay was not imi>utablc .''.efon iirf\1r»'}, hill lo il>o n.\t\n,»l luuilciui ntfi'Milin}* lo l<»ni^ niul inniciii' ^ (omMmuInn v\ \.\\\\\ .(Mil »\.ii.i (;uii.ii*r. I ;li\ ii',\m <M'I1, wlmli ImiI Itim inllii'litl m llw iiMinivv llinnifit w hii l\ I lud m.inlyol, wnc ail.lcil in allill llu- irnnlpmi ■. hut llirU- IX lorn » s ti>ji\(h( r wcn' loniiil l;ir inadciniiit. lo the imipoIrM nl lrriliM|\ llu' iiiiny, iv\>l t<>iiliii\i\ A mM|>.i7mP HI ilii' lime nnu' l'^iirilm(» lifiivy i.iins luijnnciiifil ilu* iivp»\linU'nis. li w .ts olitii hiiill.nv lo riiiplov li i\ «>) i wrlvr nvcii \iniiii ;i Iimi'Ip l^iii.wiv ;iMi| rtlii'i il\r \iin\oil iMMtions lorilw liliii n il,i\i nhnvf Hun il, llinc wrrc iu>( .ihiui'l 'Ml il.ns pi.nilion l^^•l^|(• h.dul, noi abivi im Imic.uix iiiilic liver. Inn lli^'i'iu r l\,iil it.it lic.l nu' tint I unti nint rdlnml St. I rj'ci \v;i'» Iniori' I'Hil ^l.iinviv, \\l\ul> \v,is (l»(iMUiCil. I l\i- miiin .www nl ll\i' (•miuv unpnlnl In inr \V;n rtl .Siillw.iu I, a pl.ii V' Iviwn'ii Siii.ilOf\^» uihl \\\r ino\iih n< il\«' Mnh.nvk. A i.»|nt iuo\(nui\i (orxvniil jippoiiifd lo Iv ni ilu* \itmoll i (inU'uncm c ;ii lliis jvi:>>(i. I he «in'm\ lOiiM not U.wc |nr«!Ml \ip llw Mnh.nvU wiilimil |Miiiiiip, 1,'k mil I\is Ihi\\»(i1 Iv\<» Iii\>>. in t illr i'oloinl St. I .Cjiii llii'dlil ]\,\\r liuiiiilnl; illul ill boll Ivinji viii oil' Im \\w iinin lioni .\ll>,in\. I licv imill ntlicr thi'n'ti)iv Imve II.vhI an iWion, Iiavi- l.«llcn hav k lowaidH Almnv, ni luivc pallid ilic 1 ImllonN Ui\(i, in ovvli I lolainv a rtliv.ii m Nrw I'ji|-,l4nil, hii'liri up Wliuli rvri ol liicli' nK.iUiixs tlio\ liavl talvon, loihai ilu* Kiiij\'s ainw i\.ul In-rmiialilnl loailvmuc. Coin I Si. I(j.>\i'v opl iIu' w hole V ^^unn\ nt il M oh.wvk op. nci I. I (« inainiini tlic roinniit nil anon \\ii!\ I'ort (icv>i(\c iliinno, hull a mowmoni, lo as id l>r Inppli'il I'y ilailv ilcgixxs at a il'llaiuo, roniiiuiallv iiurfalinc,, \va.'< nii oUvimis impolliUilitv. I'iitJ anuy w ,is nnu II too wi-ak lo U.wk- iillouidj « > Ii.iin ol p«tl It oris (or o\ii V ^n rair tranlpt>rt uoiilvl haw hern a llill « uaifr il:.im ; iu>r nuiKI any Imvr l"' llitiiif^ as to <\nff iluir wav iliitnifji hu h politUMis as tlif riuniv mijiju lakt in oik? nifihi's niauh tu'-ni ilio W Imr I. i(-t k, wluit ilu\ liul a luimcroiis nnlilia. Mail the cncniv iv;iia\nt\l lojMnt*, ilut)iii\h !> at or w.mi ol * oinpnlu luliiig It) paliniMf an ad- i: I'C amastf, ilio pinliial iiiipi)llil)tlitv ot Ixmiij; liipplioil l>y ilcj'ixcs lioin roii Cirorj ^^.ls ll\H in U)\y\\ bccaulc a new ncallitv t>( lanil v.iiria}»,o lt>i- miu' ntili's anlt's ui Siill- \>atcr; aiul in iho pn>poiti<>n that caiiiaj^s luui I>iyi\ hiouj'Jit (tnwaul to that platf, tlio iK\;ilp ''vf nuill li.vvo coatt'il holiintl. The .\\:c\\\\\\\c ih. vcitMo w .\s lluMt I (^iilioi 111 u'linqviilh the I'avoviialtlo tippoiliini- t\ tM a.'\ aixinv', iiptMt the «icni\ , oi tti atU'mpi oilui irloviucs ol liipply, It was woll known that the cncnn 's liipplit's in live catilo. i\ t»iii a larpv tiac fl of vvuntrv. pa',U-il h\ the unite t>l Maiulutter, Ailinp.ttin, ami (»ther pails ol the H.iniplline (.iiams, ui Henninjittin, in t>nler tt* lie oeealii'iiallv amveyed Irom thence to the niain arm\ . A laige viept>(ii o\ vtMn and t>l \\ lu\I eamap^cs was alii) loinieulvl eeitainlv ha\. enaMed the ainiv tt) leave tluii dillant ma j;ai.iiies, and rt> have avHcd with cnci^y aiui ililpatcli : liiccels would allt) haye anlwcr- Ctl .1 n-, any uvoivlaiv jniiptMc l.ier.t. C\>l. B.uime, an officer well t'jualiticd lor the tuulcrfakiu'^, was fixed upon to command. He havl uniier him 2^0 dilmoiintedih actions of the r peilcily knew ihc t.()vintrv. icn liuliaiis, and tw\i light pieces t>i ear.ntMi ^ the w h»'le tlet.uhntenr amounted it» aho vit .',00 nien. Ihc mrtrvitlluins were p^ litive to keep the legvdar corps potleU whUe thel ight troops leir 4. their A i» r V. N !) I :<. »4 |iiill( d :iiid fin :ifii|if d m Sat,iMi)»,i. 1 .iriiKIMliI ('nldlirl Itlc VMi:lli'l ( iiiirl. I lis d( (i^/ri Wiis Ix liiiyrd ; llic turn wlin had lukni tlu- fmilis wrrr llif lirll Mi fie- upon liirii ; he v. ;is nttackcil on hII (idrs. I U: llicwrd |i;rcat pcilonal courap/-, Imt wa» ovrrjKjvvrrcd l>/ niiiiiliris, Diiiiny; lli'n liiiir l/ipiilcnniit (Vilomd lircyiiMii w.is upon \\\r m:\nh ifiroup^fi a h'-^. vy rnin ; nnd Imh were flic ollirr irnpcdiiiiciils (l.ifrd in ihat. fidiccr'n rtporr, of liad roads, liicd hoiirs, ddlK iillics in padin/i; ailillciy, i arnapcs, Nr. fliaf lie was fronr rif'hl Millie iiioinin|ro| flu- ijiji lu Intir in tlic adciti'KMi ol ilic (ollowinp, day makinj^ aliont lucniy (our miles. lie cnp,ap,ed, (oiijr|it (^nllanlly, and drove the cnctny from three fevcral fifijififs ; lull was Ion late toduioui ( 'oloiiel I'auiiir, who was made prifoner, and a (oiifidrra- l)le paitol his dra)f(Mins wen killed oi taken. The (ailure <)( ainniiinifif(n, from fh'' accidental bieakiii}'; in pie( es ol a fumlml, imfortuna'cly oMip/"d l.ioutrnant C.nlonrl Hreyiuaii to retire i oiii|iicrm(r, troops, and to leave Ik hind two pieces ol (annrwi, !)'•- lides two whii h had l»een loll l»y Lieutenant (lolonel i'laumc. The Indians trjid'? pond their iilreal (mm the (ill) allair, as did C api.iin I'raler, with part oi his c iiy, and many ol the Provincials and Canadians. The lo(s, as at prelent appears, amounts to ahoiit /[(•') men, killed and taken in f/otfi at'lions, and fuciiiy-lix ol(i(ers, inollly priloners ; liuf men who were (ii(j>er(er| m the woods (hop in daily. A torre(::t return (hall he tianfrmfted to your I/>rdlhip rlic orripa lii 1) oppoiUiniiy. This, my Lord, is a true flafe of the event. I have not dwit iij)on errors, },''- caulc ill many inllaiucs they were countcrhalanced hy Ipirit. 'I he enemy will of touilc fiinl malti-r of parade in the ac(|mfitioii of If/ur pieces of cannon; l»ur that apart, they have Imall eaufe of cxultarion ; their lofs in killed and wounded heing more than douhlc to ours, hy the confeflKjn of their prifoncrs and deferrer'*, and ot many inhabitants who were v/itnclfts to the burial (A their dead. The ehici lubjet't of ref!;ret en our fide, after that which any lofs of gallant merv naturally occafmns, is the dilappointment of not obtaining live catfk, and the lofs of time in brin[^iiig forward the magazines. Thlt cr I: xxiv APPENDIX. '! liis licavv work is now nearly comnlotcil, aiul a new briilgc of hoan ii thrown over tho Ihullon's Kivor, opporito to S.ir WMliam Muue. 1 have the honour to be, with j^reat rclpeCl, Your l,unilhip's moll obeilient ami moll humble ffvanr, (Signed.) J. HuuGowE.* \No.IX. Copy of a Letter f)om I.initrutwt Geveral llurpoync to LnrJ George Germain, idiird C\iwp, );<■«;;• Saratoga, Augiill 20, 1777. [Private.] Mv I.OIM>, T Nl'J'.l) n(»( enlarge \^wn the concern I have in communicating any finirter events. I am peilliadcd your f.ordlhip will give me credit tor partaking every lentirnent th.it vour Lordfliip, or any other man warmed with principle and /.eal in this contelV, can fed. In regard to the alVair of" Saintcoick, I have only ro add to the public account, that if ever there was a fituation to jullify enterpri/.e and exertion, out of the beaten track wf military fcrvicc, it was that in which I found myfelt. Had I fuccccdcd, I fliould have eiVeded a jundion with St. I.cgcr, and been now before Albany. And I Hatter myfelf, I need only mention thofe views, to fhcw that in hazarding this cx|)edition I had the foundert principles of military reafoning on my fide, viz. that the advantages to be cxjMrdled from fuccefs were in a great degree lupcrior to the evils that could at- tend mifcarriage. The fccondary purpofcs, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the affe^ions of the country ; to complete the Provincial corps, many re- cruits for which were unable to efcape from their villages without a force to encou- rage and j^rotcd them ; and to diftrad the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jcaloufy towards New England. M.\ior General Rei'lffcl has prefll-d upon mc rcjieatcdly the mounting his dragoon«i, the men were animated vith the famedcfire, and I conceived it a mort favourable oc- cafion to give into their iu?as and folicitations, bccaulc in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favourite purjH)fe, they necclfarily would effeil the greater purpofe of my own. The rell of the troops were feledled from fuch as would leafi weaken the folid llrengtU of the armv, in cafe of ill fuccels ; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occafion for them in more impor- tant anions. The original detachment could not have been made larger without opening roads, >i:ul other preparations of time, nor (houlJ I have thought it juftifiable to cxpol'c the bell troops to lofs upon a collateral adlion. Had mv inftruftions been followed, or could Mr. Brcyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twelve hours out of the two and thirty, fuccefs would probably have enlued, misfortune ^vould certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the prefent crifis, to mark thelc circumftances to the public lb Ilrongly as I do in confidence to vour Lord- * The Icitcr that fuUous, No. 9, is alfo materially rcfcrrabic to No. 8. A 1' r r, N n I x. I.oi\liliip J luit I rtrlv, anil I will vciuurc to f.iv I cxpr(^, Ijecaufc I think junice will waiTu.u tlic c\|)'.*.latioii,tluit w l»;Ic, lor tlu.' I'ako of pulilii harinony, that iicirH'.nyprin- iil>lc lor c-oiuliicHiij.', nice and l.ihoi inus I'crviii.-, 1 tolDur the faults ot the cxct in ion, VDiir l.-()ri:lhi|) w ill, in your gouilncl'i, bo my advocat'- H) the Kinj.r, aiul to ilic worlil, ill vindication of the phtn. 'I'hc ( otileciiicnccs of this all'.iir, jnv Lord, have lii'le cfledY -..pon the flrenf^jh nr fpirits (4 thi;iiiny; luit the pr<)lp(.\i of the c unpaij.'jn in ollii-r lefpecls, is far lelii proi'pcrovf. than wluii I wrote I'll, In Ipie of Su I..e};rr's vii'Hory, Kurt Stanwix hoKIs our ohllinatdy. I anj afraid the txpciitations ot Sir J. Johid'on greatly fail in the rilin:; ot the coimti v. On this tide I lind daily rcafon to ih/Vihi tin- (inoi'iny of the rc- fiihirion ofihe [)r(ife;iii!(!; loyalills. I have ahour 400, luir. not half of them aimed, \vh 1 may he dei)eiitk\l llpoI^ ; the icll aic trimmers, merely acluaied hy intereft. The great hulk ol the country is undoii'.itcdly with the Conj'rel's, in j)riiH:iple and in /.eal ; and their mealuies are executed with alecrecy and ilifpateh that are not to hecipiallcd. \\'iicicvcrtheKin!','s forces point, ntilitia, totheamovnit of threforfoiirthoufandallc-mblc in twenty-four hoi,is ; tliey bring with them their fubfulence, &c. and, the alarm ovci, thcv return to their farms, 'i'hc I Iami>(liire Ciranfs in paiticular, a country utipcoph i ami ahnoil unktv.nvn in the lall war, now abmind-j in the moll aCtive and mull re- bellious race of the contineiu, anil hanj»s like a gathering llovm upon my left. In ali parts the iiulullry and niaiiagment in driving cattle, and removing corn, ■ r.* iiulcfa'.i- j;able and certain ; and it becomes impracticable to move without poiiable n i/n. zincs. An ilier moll: cmbarralllng circundlance, is the want of communicati((n with Sir William 111 iwe ; of the meircngcrs I have fenr, I knr)\v of twc) being hanged, and am ignorant whether any ot the rell arrived. The fame fate has pro- bably attended thole difpatchcd by Sir William 1 lowe ; for only one letter is come to hand, inlormin;?; me that his intention is for I'eiilylvania ; that W'uthington has de- tached Sullivan, with 2500 men to Albany j that Puttiam is in the I lighlands, with 4000 men. Thar after m\ arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy inufl guide mine ; but thm the Oatc, would alterwanls In- confummatcly dcfpcratc. I mc.io my Lortl, that hy moving foon, thought fliould meet with infurmountable difrieul- ties to m) progrefs, 1 Ihall at Icall have the chance of lighting my way back to Ticon dcroga, but the fcafon a little further advanced, the dillance encreafed, and the march unavoidably tardy, bccaufc furroundcd by enemies, a retreat might be iliut by im- penetrable bars or the elements, and at the fame time no poHible means of cxillence remain in the country. When I wrote more confidently, I little forcfaw that I was to be \cft to purfuc my way through liich a trad of CDuntry, and lioOs of foes, without any co-operation from New- York ; nor did I then think the garrifon of Ticondcroga wouki fall to my Iharc alone, a dangerous cxjieriment would it be to leave that poll in weaknefs, and too heavy a drain it is ui)on the lifc-l^looil of my force to give it due llrength. I yet do not ilofpond.— -Should I Ibccceil in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a Hate to fubfill my army, I lhall think no mure of a retreat, but at the worll fortify there and aw ait Sir W. 1 lowe's operations. Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I fubmit my anions to the bread of tl;e King, and to the candid judgment of my profelJion, when all the motives become public -, and I rell in the confidence, that wliatever dccifion may be palleil upon my conduifl, my good intent uill not bcqucllioned. 1 cannot cioft fofcrious a letter without expri fling my fulleft fatisfaiflion in the be- haviour and countenance of the troops, and my compleat confidence that in all trials they will do whatever can be cxpeClcd from men devoted to their King and country. I have the honour to be, 5cd, will In future prevent miniftcrs from pietcnding to iliredt o|)erations of war, in a country at three thoufand miles di- Ibmec, of which they have fo little knowledge as not to be ablctodiftinguifli between good, bad, or intcrcltcd advices, or togivc pofitive orders in matters, which from their nature, are ever upon the change ; fo that the expedience or propriety of a mea- fure at one moment, may be totally inexi^edient or improper in the next. 1 laving given over all hopes of l)eing relieved this fall. I detcrmineil upon femling home Capt;'.in Foy, to furnifli his Majefty's confidential fervants, and my fucceflbr, with the bell information in mv power, of the llaie of alVairs in this province, that they nLiy form the better judgment of what they have to do. I am, &c. Second No. X. (J ird from the j^rmy from Canada mder IJcutcnant Gtiieral Burg( Carried over 4067 • Tliislcttci, which was never printed before, only rccarJ* the view of the cvlJcncc, page t)6, Ya ::->i^- xxmt APPENDIX. ^Wiir \ I'roiiglu over 4067 Left in Chftaila out of the above 343 Hritini. Total Gormans, ill July Left in CaiuKl.i 3 7 •■'7 7" K"r the campniiMi, Germans Kc[;iilar troo;is, total — (janildP 'ci't out t)l the above at 'J'ieoiulcroga. r>riiilh rank ami file 462 Gtiinaii rank ami tile ^ \.(i J. 724 6,740 910 To foicv a |ia(T;i|i;c to Albany ^,^ ^o III Jul), Hritilh aitillcry — 757 German artiUerv — 1 00 Bat men, fervani ,, tVe. in the above. KeLiuits uniler Lieut. Nvitt — 154 Canailians — — i4{j Inilians never more than 500 Before Scptemb. fell offto 90 Provincials ; mod — 6Sz 1 11 Oiitolicr, no more than 456 In September the aMitional com- j>anies joined mar Foir Miller, in all — — 300 R .'gulars killeil. wounded, and prifoners in th.ccampai{.!;n, 1777. Biiilfli O/Tlcers .urioaiits 1): ummcrs K. .VImIc Ocrmans. Oniccrs fcrjcants Drumnieis U. & File Tj . , a •u c .-i 3 ^ n :i CL 2() 47 '9 T' i?3 >4 ■^ .> 5 h 207 r,4g 449 Tot:.I ■Is 10 16 12 i aK 14' .i25 29 59 iH 57 ;> 941 Noi XII. J-'itJl application fiom Major Cm f) til VhWWp'i rehil he fo Ho r/is. DafcJ Montreal, June 4, 1777. S I R, I T AKL the liberty of inf^rniinc; vnur F.\-ec!lenc\', thit thi-'ic ha^ vet been no arran.-^c- mcnt made for marehinc; the lielil artillery by land, flu)uld the corps of troops upon .in expedition under vour command in the courl'e of the campaij^'^n (piit the lakes Champlain ami (>eori;e, and the livers. I have, upon the 111 ideft intormntion which could be procured, realm to believe, that neither carriages nor horfes will be to be had nearer tl.an Albanv, Ihould tlie route of your art-.iv be that way, and even in tliat country, it will neei.(li>iily reijui.e a lon- fiderable time before any can be qot ; all which mvill neeellarih delay tlie operations of the campaign, alter the rcdudion of Ticoni!eroi2;a, I tiieiefore fubmit tf) your Excellency's confuleration \vhether horles ami fiieh a;r,inuniiinii-earriagcs as may be wanted Ihould not be j^rocured tor the lerviee f)t the v iiiipai<;ii, for the tield triilkry attached to the corps of trooj)s \()ur I'',xi.ellciiey is to coi:'.maiul this campair,:! ? I have the honour to be Sir, With the g-c- Extrtiils of Letters from Major General Phillips, ^c, Exlracl of ti Let/a from Major General Phillips /o Lieutenant General Burgoync, Montreal, June f,, 1777- I IIAVF, the honour of your Excellency's letter to mc of yeilerday, in aiil\v(.i to one I wrote on the fubjciflof the fRldartillery being fupplicd with horles, &c. &cc. You :ire I'lealed, Sir, to order mc to give an o, union u[)()n tlie mode of procurintj; horfes and cairi.iges from this eounti)', ecjuibining the confult:ration of difpatch, fullicieney, and (Conumy towards govcrnnu :it. Tlier'. ate but two modes of protuiing lioifv.s for the ferviee, fupjvifing the country is not ! < iurnilh them upon Corvccs, the one is by purchafing of horles upon the account of goveinmer.t, the ollv. r by Cvjntrudt. I'hc firlt of thel'e modes has always appear ■ 1 to me diflicult, uncertain, ai>d full of OMi'iiii'.gs for every fpecies of inipofRi./ii, and tlic expeme uiKcrtain. — (Jcwernment mull trult various pople io buy holies, and in this coiintrv it w ill not be polfible to procure any perfons who will not immediately puiluc ihi: views of gaining money to thenlelves with a conlitleration for the King's fcrvice. Ad! to this, that it will be- come futh a charge, that many coiinnifrarics mult be ap/|/,-inteil, and various other officers of that lort, 8*.c, which being a 'r/ixture of iiilp.-Ctors into the purchales of liorfcs, and necefTurily alio at times the being purchalers, it will be diilicult ever to afcertaiii the price, and fcKlom that the goodnels of horfes can be dei)jnde(lon. 1 have leen in my ferviccthis moiic attempted, but it h.is to my knowledge failed. I mull allow, that could it be carried ino «xecuiiun com[iletc, it \\f)uld be the cheapclt for government: but taking intoconfnieration the various impofitions which will arile, and that the leering out on a plan of ihij nature will rcqu''- a very large fum of mo- ney. \ vx A I' r 1", N i^ I \ nrv, pi'i li.ips fiom ? . \' ! lo ;>, .■>-,] m Iv inimlli il mt.i v,ii i'Mi, h.iihl'-, llnily } n > II .IS m\ I 'I Ml' MM I h.u n i. imi .1 |t i li tM pi. in ) In i .tin 1 n I iiu' \m ,1 1 1 1 i.iin nmu Ix I 111 Imi li ', .11 .1 li> 1 .1 pi ;« 1 I II ilir liiir I", (I IV h >lui 1 . iln w inli- in .1 \ i i\ lim; li , rtn«l ihcHHvi- jvm i.iUv .1 1 fi 1 ,1111 pl.m. It Jip. ii.l'. in ilir I' iiiii;- niii. In ni.ikni:', ,r, « !nMp, as r.iii. .liiil |Ul! .1 I>,ii)',.i\ii nn lIu" p.m n\ |»i)Vi-iiii\i. in .is « .m lie. .\i).| Im ini'_ to in,«.! '. ill, ii ill. niiliiii\ iiul I i\ il >>llu ( iv <|.i till II ilmv, Im .mm \lmii, in ilir u » civimii ol !nii '«•< i.n|\ .IS ilirv .lie liiimj', loi l»-rvh«". 1 lif t oiiii.u hn | .r, Insiiiiiull jnili ivi'llv itmnn It'll v\ nil lullilliiii), ju't «nnii.u'l, as iipnii (iiiun n «r.i)cs, iImi Ii,* will CM'ii all inc. ins loiloit, aiul ilii- i au' dI }^^Hivnnin« nl will In' iliii 11 he (loiic liniicilly and I oMiplcnlv. 1 liivi'iluisi hi'V(\l \(>ur I' \i'i-IInu'y's oiilt IS, ,\[u\ |n\ni .111 npiniun wliii li I lul) nil (luiicl) 10 ynur luiiruU latit)!). Aa//..',',' /;/",; /r//Vr /i Nuliiinn I Pay, /'/y. Cd/nturffrtty dfiitf.i/, L'Si i/.j/c',/ Mmiticil, ji,fir.\fi<, 17,/. 1 ni't 1 t'u' (avoui of v«>M to I alt nine wliai n.iinl)ii ol Imilr'! .mil raninp/n (luppo liiil', ill' lU lilt l\ as aic in ioniinon iilr in (. an.i(l.i) will Uc lliliii uni toi 1 oiiv< v ii|r liy laiwl tinny ti.i\s pinv ilioii toi io,<'>'0 men, lo^'/ilui' witli altoiu loot) ['.(lions ul lUiu, and voii will |>lci»lc itiinakc im* \<)ii» i\'pon as loon as po(lil»l<'. E\fta,'f ,if ,i 1. 1 tiff to Sit Guy Citli'tim. Mciitrf.ti, f ,tt« ;, I" 77. 1 lA\'lNti had il>o lionoi tt» ropiclcnt to ymir Ifxvclliiu y t!u in i dlu ; 01 lMiii|» proviiictl will* a irn.ii.. miMtlvr ol lioilcs ant! caiii.»t;cs (or tlir artiHcty, •»-•' liial, aiitl v>iliidin.iiy iiii ihtuis t)( ituvtV, 4ri.l tJi.H U ; ropoJid \Mtlunu conipviUii^n vipon iln- 1 oviiitiv tlv cMlvl wi)uKl he jM'oc.ifiiHi'i, »li' toiy, .iiid cxponl'iTc ; 1 havi" tli' ln)iit'.ur now to 1.,., <<;;»rf vour I'.xa'llcni y propni.ils lt>i t>its. 1 .IIU tt>o n»,iit>iant ol tiu* prices oi the ((iM-"/ !•> otVer any )tuUfni<'nt upon tlr rcalonablt luls ol tlulc propolals ; nor h.jve I any lonp, .u.piaintante with M.. Ionian, or other motive lor wllhinj; hiin the prelerciuc, it olliei peilons e.in Ix' looiui ', ipiallv cipalilc, tTflptMifihle, ami expcilitioiis. I have only thus tar interlireil, upon ,\ « <.n- viilion, alter eonlitUrinj!, the loute the Kinj^'s orders liirtVl, ami takinir all po'liUlc iuoiIkkIs ot intt'rniation iipt)n the liipph tt) Iv exprt'leil as we proteeil, that to «l(- pciul iiiit)n the tountrv altogether wouKI l>r toha'/anl the expettiiion. ^ our Kxccllcney will ohKrve, that in otder to lave the piiMii txpeiue as much as pollible, 1 have trvi\jceil this iei|Uirition tmuli below what woiiltl be adecpiilr tculie Icrvioe, and I \\\cm\ to trull to the rert>urccs ot" the exreilition lor the idl , mum. iris «^ '.1 l>Airl) varry lourtccn daysiprovirions at a time, and Major Ciciieral riiillip.s iiuans a to ■I ■ iiiiii nnin M I V Inn; li , ill'l In III;', | ll I liil) nit A I' V I N I X. t«» ilcm.iiiil ,is f'rw linilc a". |)«iflil>'r, liilii'VI In wliiil'vri liitiirr ini)',mrnf .Uioti'i Jnfurr 1(1 vn f. iiijiy K (Mine ; tlir |i!( lent tiiimliri w;iiilr•, luinitic Ii'IkIk i.il tn flu- [hiMk Irrvii r. It lli.ill ii'-vf Ic: flii|'lnvitl lull In tuiiviv ImiiIi;, In tin pilli'i in (.k'I, iiiiij [irijniis, iii'l 'n |c( iiii- null If in tlir I (piiiimi.i'K (• nl ,111 ( IU( III In v.ilii.iliic iri iiic ,i; yours .it'^.iinn ,i('|'-.iMfr » 4 aiiil iiiili'r|ir( l( iiiatiniri. Iliivr- rcjlnii In he rv<Jy l.ilM,ri(i| wiili nil tjiiif li;i'; U-rii done, ,iii'l witli rrioff lliinj;. ili.it an- doling : cxcriiniis have l)(i 11 itiadc tjiiiini', thr wiiilrr, win ii was irm.itk. alily favovii.ihlc, hi all tlir di|Milmcni'i, iind |>k paMrion'; .ire v ry f(»rw.ird , ilmlc XJIXI tlial \\.\\t' \ni M I o iimiiiicd to llif diMi'lioici of v»iiin,i| |'liilli|is l> ivr lu.<-n rx((uffd nil a dili|',ni(c, pMulinii, ;ind ton liidii, lli.ii Mitiilc li.iu lo tlir folki^ prailc. 'lit*; w troiMis aic It) a fl.ilc ol li'.ilili .iIimoH nii|ii('( ( drntrd, aritl t iiii|ii()vriiKnt aic "iiially o hjl ( is " I I'riat pliMlkMc and [iromi ll' ir (j Ic 'I o ll 'irirs and y\ n»*r,i| Hi api f'.iliW' |ii(l|iiMf (■< ifi adil, that Sir (jiiy ( atUton has rr(«-ivrd trw and the oidcis I l>rou;dii in a iiiaiinii ili.il, in my (>^>tnion, doi >; inliiiil>- jiononr to lir: jiiilili' and |iiivati' ( liatarli i . J li,M he IIkmiIiI Ii ivc willi'd fur ilic Ic.iil iti ai'livc arid nM(i( ii.y lunds, wir.h all t>)f /cai \\c KJVild have •■inplnycd had lliry r'jtivl iii liii fiwii. My inrciirion is, duinijr my ativanic to I i',ond«TO(ri, and fi^c/' of that poO. ff.f a licjM- I apiinhcnd it n nil he, to \nvr all polliKI* |'al(Mily nn .n' (i I' of ( f.ufi'^' i'. n: If I tanliy inaiKruiviT mal^c tlif-m lolpc't ilut att< r the rrdiinirai A 'Iv oiu^'^ti ^n ni/ \ lews art- nr)int(-d th.ii way, it m,r/ mil;< the ( onnfY'tK nr for«« s very (..auti'in. of Ir.iviii)' t'lcir own frniiiK rs, .>nl mu' li f k iliiao- n.y profi tr> /\ll).iny. J M.-nrsofi tins intdKion only ic I .on! ( •(.•orj'r and ypiiriflf, aiid Id' 'It from imy int(ii(.M.(\ of my motions tfiat may tca'ii l'.ni.dand indirectly, it llioi, he fiippol«(l I li-ivc (urfer- td niyltlt to Im divcit'd from tlie mam ol>|fo travel acrols a map very fall, and are very free in their comments, when '.);i:ers, wh»> h.'.ve tui liir-cj their '-'nowledj/e and refources, do not anfwer their predictions ami expec^tat.ons. 1 have beei> exceedingly uillrclVeil in re:;aril to the brigadiers of this army. Sir Guy Carlets.n, the duy 1 took leave of him, j)Ut into my h.invls an extract of a letter from the Svvret ;y at War, a[)proviiig ihe appoinimrnt ot ihore nentleme'i, but oblerving, that whe.iever any of them ihouid le.-ii. .heir brigades ctt of tie provme of Canada, in order to join the troops undr General lUwe, there would be a necelfuy for their comniand eealing as bri^Mdiers, ^c. W'eretlii^ to be put in executnin, accf^ding to the letter of the order, and the geo- graphical limits of Canada^ and luppofmg Major General I'hiHips at t!tc fame time to be einployed ible! v in the artillery, 1 fliouUI tin.! m;. felt at the head of an army to iHK.trtakc a liege, ■.•.\-)\\ after sards purluo olijects of in-.poitanee, and pofllblv ot" time, vvitivjut a fuigl- iiuermediate Britilh otHcer brtwe^r. uic Lieutenant General, com- maniling/)/(9 /t'';//)(7r(» in chief, and a Lieutenant CoKk.cK It would be pie^iollerous and in-ipcrtment m me to f.iy one vvonl more to you a ;« ^ officer, vi[)on the impoliibi- lit\ of methodizing or conduc^ting luch an arniy with lueh a total ileficiency of ItalF. 11.1 i Lord Harrington condefcended to haxr communicated iiis intentions to nic in J.cwidon, I tliink 1 could have convinced him of the imi)ro^rici\'. As it i<, I mull conckkie that the fpini; of the order goes only to prevent thole genLle;r,en bearinji; a higher rank ..ntl pay than lenior lieutenant colonels lerving in the Tame army; and •that therefore there can be no fault in keeping it dormant till the junction takes [jlace. 3n otlier words, I look ujion mine ""o be the Canada auny till fuch ti.ne as I am in rommur.ication with General Howe, \o as to make part of iiis force, and confeiiuently wiiiiouc APPENDIX. XXXIU cms, whether without meafuring degrees north and fouth, that the arrangements made in Canada, and approved of by the King, remain in force till that time. I am pcrfuaded, my dear General, you will fupport me in this liberty, if fuch it is to be called, not only as the ablblute order and method of the lervice depends upon it, but alio to avoid to thefc gentlemen, who have really great merit, the vexation and the ridicule of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour of that very lervice, with a view to which their appointment was origin^dly made. I think I can anfwer, tiiat the jundion made, and the rcafons for reverting to their former ranks, become obvious, they will fubmit to his Majcfty's plcalure without a murmur. Extras of a Letter from Ueutenant General Burgoync to General Harvey. Head f^iartcrs, Skenejl'orougby July \iy 1777. THE mere compliment of fcrvice I have given to the troops in orders, and in ijie relation defigned for th: Gazette, is not doing them fufficient jtillice. It is a duty in me further, through you, and I know I fliall impofe a plcafing tafk on you, to afiurethe King that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp as in action. After what I have publicly mentioned of Frafer 1 am fure I need not prels you in his favour. I cannot but feel confident in the hope that his Majeily's grace will find its way through all obllacles to prevent fo difcouraging a circumllance as the return of this gallant officer to the mere duty of lieutenant colonel, at the head of one batta- lion, atier iiaving given alcendancy to the King's troops, and done honour to iiis profeffion, by the moft fpirited adions in critical periods of two iuccellivc cam- paigns. You will obferve. Sir, both in the public Icttf - vl in the order of battle, which Captain Gardner will put into your hands, that IV; ;.• General Phillips is occafionally employed feparately from the ftrift line of his department. This does not proceed from inattention to tlie explanation of his Majclly's pleafure two years ago-, but fro;u abfolutc neceffity. I'he Itafi" being compofed without any Briiilli major general, Bri- gadier Fraler being polled where he is of infinite u^^:., at the head of the advanced corps, the fervice would fufi'er in the moft material degree if the talents of (kiieral Philiijis were not fufi'ered to extend beyond the limits of the artillery, and I hold mylelt fully Jultided in continuing the great ufe of his afliltance under this ex'enlion, by what I underftand to be the fignification of the King's pleafure to irir Guy Carkton, viz. That this weijfure mtijl not be made a precedent, but not forbidding it during che prefent exigency. I flatter mylelf the King will be fatisfied with the diligence ufed in taking the field, as well as with the fublequent operations •, if not, my dilappoiniment can only proceed from my own deficiency in Ihiting the embarrafliiients I found, noiwithilanding pie- vious preparations and cordial afliltancts. Remote fituations of the troops, curreius, winds, roads, want of materials for caulking the velfels, inadivity a.nl delertion of the Canadian corvees, were all againll me. A great dilficulty lay in providing horlcs and carriages for the bare iranfport of provifions and tents, when we ihould arrive at lore (ieorge, or any other place wiure the army fliould have no relouree of water carriage. I found an ac^tive, and I thin«c a vcaljnable contractor, who fuppiied this ntcelFity at a much theater rate than it could liave been done anv other way. Z 1 in- XXXiY APPENDIX. "J.. m I inclofc a copy of the contraft to the trcafury, to which I ref'ir you. You will ob- fcrvc that I have limited the number to the mere indifpenfible purpofes of provifions and tents, triifling to the country for the further aflillance of officers baggage and the other attirail of an army. Jlxpcrience already fliews me that Ijuilgcd right in not trullin};; to tlie country for niorcj lor had this precaution been omitted, I Ih.ould be bound fad to the ("pot where I am, or obliged to return by water to Ticonderoga. I avow aifo to you my advice to General Carleton to grant eommifliona to two pro- vincial battalions, to be railed frotn Albany and Charlotte County, l)y a Mr. Jtlfup and a Mr. Pttt-rs, upon condition that the commilTions fliould not take place till two thirds of the corps lliuuld be elVcctive, provincial corps, afling zcaloufly m the King's caufe, nnill have great imprelFion upon public opinion, and will, befides, in fait he of fmgular ufe to the eafe and prefervation of the regular troops. l^pon this principle, ihcicforc, I juvc nor hefitarcd further to receive and to pay Aich loyalilh as have come in w ith their arms fince the luccels of Ticonderoga, and ^vi^\ to be employed. Though I have not power to grant coinmidions, I poll the ofhcck and fortn them into companies till the tncafure can be decided by thole who ha\ e more authority. I hope all thcieartick's of expencc will meet witli the fupport of your opinion j and have only to add, tliat as no job lliall be done myfclf, io will I ulc all efforts to pre- vent luch bi-iny i'. (1) upon the Contieflicut Rner, (z) /fnJ mujl be proceeded upon with caution, as you ivill have the dtfle of the mountains behind you, ivhich might make a retreat difficult j you muji ihoefore en- deavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy's militia in the neighbouring coun- try. Should you find it may with prudence be effciled. (3) ivbile the Indians and light troops arc detuJ:ed up the river. (^) together zcith asmavy, (j) Ihe v.umbcr of horfes reqtti/t'e, Ic- fidei thrfc necejlary for mouKting th'- regi- ment of dragoons, ought to be 1 ^,00. If you can bring more fc^ the ufe of the army it I'.'ill bcfo much the b Vfr. ■. I xxxvi APPENDIX. rants. Regular receipts, in the form hereto fubjoiiicci, are to be given in all places where any of the abovenicntioncd articles arc taken, to fiich perfons as liave remained in their habitations, and other- wile complied with the terms of General Burgoync's manififto ; but no receipts to be given to fuch as are known to be aiHing in the fervice of the rebels. (6). Amendments by General Burgoync. (6.) /Is you ivi'/l have with you perfons perfet'lly acquaintud ivitb tbi u hi lilies cf ihs country y it may perhaps he advijeaLle to tax the Jeveral diJhiSIs -with the portions of ibe/everal artiiles, and limit the I. uos for their delivery \ and jhould you find it iieeef' ceffary to move he/ore fuch delivery can be viade, hnjlages of the mojl reipettahle people Jhould be taken, to jccure their folloivin^ you the enfuing day. /Ill poffible means at e to be ufed to prevent plundering;. /Is it is probable that Captain Sher- wood, ivho is already detached to thefoutb- ward, andtvi/ljoin you at /frlington, will drive in a conjiderable quantity of cattle and herjes to you, you will therefore fend in this cattle to the army, with a proper detachment from Peters's corpSy to cover them, in order to difencumber yourfelf -, but you mufl always keep the regiments of dra- goons compatl. The dragoons themfehes mufi ride, and take care of the horfes of the regiment. Thofe borfes which are deflined for the ufe cf the army muft be tied together by firings cf ten each, in order that one man may lead ten borfes. Tou will give the unarmed men cf Peters^ s corps to conduSl them, and inha- bitants whom you can trufi. 2~ou mufl al- ways take your camps in good pofition -, but at the fame time where there is paflure, and you mufi have a chain of centinels round your cattle and borfes when grazing. Colonel Skeene will be with you as much AS poffible, in order to afjifl you with his advice, to help you to diflingidfh the good JubjeSis from the bad, to procure you the bejl intelligence of the enemy, and to chufe thoje people who are to bring me the accounts of your progrefs andfuccefs. When you find it neceffary to halt for a day or two, you mufl always entrench the camp of the regiment of dragoons , in order never to rifk an attack or affront from the tnemy. As APPENDIX. XXJCViii You will life all pnnihlo nu'ins to make the country bdit-vc t!ut the troops iindrr your coiiiinatul ate theadvanctil corps of the arniv, aritl that it is iiUfnii- cd ro palb the Cotuuxtiiiit on tJK r'nul to Bolton. Vou will likewifc have it inftuuaied (7) that the main army (rom yMbany is to bo joined ac .'^prin<;lield by a corj)!) of troops from Rhoilc liland. Tou ivill J'ciJ off occijhtiaily cattle or carricges, to pwvc'iit k'tnv; too much iiuujii- lend \ and will give me as fre~iucnl intelli- gence ofyourjiliialion ns pojjiltle. It is highly probable that the corpi under Mr. Warner, now fuppolcd tf) be at Manchefler, will retreat before you ^ but fliould they, contrary to cxpeda- tion, be able to colle(f't in great forcty and pofl thenifelves advantageouily, it is left to your difcrction to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any conlkie- rable lofs be hazarded on this occalion. Should any corps be moved from Mr. Arnold's main army, in order to inter- cept your retreat, you arc to take as flrong a poll as the country will afford, and fend the quickeft intelligence to me, and you may depend on my making fuch a movement as (hall put the enemy be- tween two fires, or othcrwifc efFc6tually fuftain you. It is imagined the progrefs of the whole of this expedition may be efFefted in about a fortnight, but every move- ment of it muft depend upon your fuccefs in obtaining fuch fupply of provifions as will enable you to fubftft for your return to the army, in cafe you can get no more. (8) All perfons afting in committees, or any officers afting under the dircftions ©fCongrefs, either civil or military, arc to be made prifoners. Ainendincnts by General Borjoync. yls you "^iiill return with the t\'gimc)it of dm^cons inou'ited, you nu/il a.^.ys lunc it deluihtnent of l.f.flitin hrnjers or Pete :'s corps in fio>h oj loc cclumii, and the /<.;//(• in the rear, incrJa to prevent y cur faiUi:/^ ii.ta an ambitjcade ixben yiii march thidu^hthe woods. {]) infinuate (8) And (hoiild not the army he able to reach Albany before your expedition Jhtuld be compleated, I will find means to fend you notice of it) and give your route another di- re£lion, 2, Batten IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) ^ ^ /. ^ A i/.x fe I.U I" '■■ I.! ,5« |3.2 7A 2.2 !r lis I ^ ill 1-8 1.25 i.4 1.6 -^ 6" - ► Photographic Sciences Corporation S v ^ <^ ^9) V ^\ #^\ »^ •s^ 33 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14S80 (716) 872-4503 I xxxviii APPENDIX. Sir, Batten Kill, iithjuguj^, ^777- 1 HAD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, by a man lent yefterday evening by Colonel S!:eene to head-quarters, of the leveral corps under my com- mand being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next morning at five o'clock ; the corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when I leceived a letter from Brigadier General Frafer, fignifying your Excellency's order to pud the corps advantageoufly on Batten Kill, till I fliould receive frefli inftrudions from your Excellency ; the corps is now encamped at that place, and wait your Excellency's orders. I will not trouble you. Sir, with the various re- ports v/hich fpread, as they feem rather to be founded on the different interefts and feelings of the people who occafion them. I have the honour to be, moH ref^edfully, Your Excellency's moft obedient and humble fervant, ¥. Baume. The remforccment of fifty chafTeurs, which your Excellency was pleafed to order, joined me lafl: night at eleven o'clock. Cenernl Burgoyne. "I Sir, Cmnhridge^ 13th Aiigujl, ^D'l- IN confequence of your Excellency's orders I moved this mor-iing at four o'tfock, with the corps under my command j and after a march of fixteen miles arrivfd at Cambridge at four in the evening. On the road 1 received intelligence of forty or fifty of the rebels being left to guard fome cattle. I immediately ordered thirty of the provincials and fifty favages to quicken their march, in hopes to fur- prize them. They took five prifoncrs in arms, who declared themfelves to be in the fervice of the Congrefs ; yet the enemy received advice of our approach, and abandoned the houfe they were polled in. The provuicials and favages continued their march about a mile, when they fell in witli a party of fifteen men, who fired upon our people, and immediately took to the woods with the greateil precipita- tion. The fire was quick on our fide, but I cannot learn if the enemy fuftained ^ny lofs. A private of Captain Sherwood's company was t'e only one who was nightly wounded in the thigh. From the many people who came from Benning- ton they agree that the number of the enemy amounted to 1800. 1 will be particu- Ju'Iy careful, on my approach at that place, to be fully informed of their llrcngth and fituation, and take the precautions neceflary to fulfil both the orders and inftruftions of your Excellency. I cannot afcertain the number of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they have not been as yet colledled. A few horfes have been alfo brought in, but am forry to acquaint your Excellency that the favages cither deftroy or drive away what is not jtaid for with ready money. If your l£xcellency would allow me to purchafe the horfes from the favages, ftipulating the price, I think they might be procured cheap, otl.irwife they ruin all they meet with, their officers and interpre- ters not having it in their power to controul them. Your Excellency may depend i on APPENDIX. on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my fuccefs there : praying my re- fpectful compliments to General Reidefel, I am, moft refpedlfully. Sir, Your molt obedient and humble fervant, F. Baume. P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as follows. George Duncan, John Bell, David Slarrovv, Matt. Bell. Samuel Bell, Hugh More, a noted rebel furrendcred himfelf ycfterday evening. The exprefs left Cambridge at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of Auguft, Sir, Sancoick, i^th Augujiy 1777, 9 o'clock. I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I arrived here at eight in the morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in pofleffion of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their ufual way fired from the bufhes, and rook their road to Bennington ; a lavage was llightly v/ounded ; they broke down the bridge which has retarded our march above an hour, they left in the mill about feventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bufliels of wheat, 20 barrels of lalt, and about loool. worth pearl and pot alh. I have ordered thirty pro- vincials and an officer to guard the provifion and the pafs of the bridge. By five pri- foners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are fuj^- pofed to leave it on our approach ; I will proceed lb far to-day as to fall on the the enemy to-morrow early, and make fuch difpofition as I think neceflary from the intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed;, the favages cannot be controuled, they ruin and take every thing they pleafe* I am. Your excellency's mofl obedient, humble fervant, F. Baume^ Beg your excellency to pardon the hurry of this letter, it is wrote on the head of a barrel. General Burgojne* xxxxix Sir, InJiruElms to Colonel Skeene, upon the expedition to Bennington, I requefl: the favour of you to proceed with Lieutenant Colonel Baumc, upon an. expedition of which he has the command, and which will march this evening, or to-morrow morning. The objefts of his orders are to try the affedlions of the country ; to difconcert the councils of the enemy; to mount the regiment of Keidefel dragoons ; to com pleat Lieutenant Colonel Peters's corps, and to procure a large fupply of horfes for the ufe of the troops, together with cattle and carriages. The xl APPENDIX. The route marUed for this expedition is to Arlington and Mnnchcftcr, and in cafe it iho uld be found that the enemy is not in too great force upon the Connedlicut river, it is intended to pafs the mountains to Rockingham, and dcfcend the river from thence to B. attlebury. Some hours before the corps marches for Arlington, Colonel Peters with all his men are to fet forward for Bennington, and afterwards are to join at Arlington. Receijits are ordered to be given for all horfes and cattle taken from the country. Lieutenant Colonel Baume is dircdtcd to communicate to you the reft of his in- ftiuclions, and to confult with you upon all matters of intelligence, negotiation with the inhabitants, roads, and other means depending upon a knowledge of the country for carrying his inftru^lions into execution. I rely upon your zeal and adivity for the fullefl: afliftance, particularly in having it underrtood in all the country through which you pals, that the corps of Lieutenant Colonel Baume is the full detachment of the advanced guards and that the whole army is proceeding to Bolton, expecting to be joined upon the route by the army from Rhode IHand. I need not recommend to you to continue the requifites of the fervice with every principle of humanity in the mode of obtaining them ; and it may be proper to in- form the country that the means to prevent their cattle and horfes being taken for the future, will be to refift the enemy when they fhall prefumc to force them, and drive then voluntarily to my camp. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. J. BuRGOYNE. CALCULATION ;rgoyne. tD Ph u o (73 'A O u u 1 ~ ro fO oo CO 1 P. 1 l^ I- o o c~o CO i-H o >. M ri 1 <^ o o 'o fl O 'O Cl t>4 n O ro Po (O CO CO r lO ^ 1 i-^ CO o CO to CO "O -i- V.J CO r, vj.:) ON CO CO o ^1 "■o u 'i CO CO nO •t- CO CO so CJ> CO o lO o •o , -, p 1 '^■ C^ 1 Lp i CO 1 O 1 '-o CI C-. -a ^4- o Cl CI CO >o CO 11 On CO C( -K O cl "1 o CO Cl d Q CO CO o 1 CO 60 lo 1 « " 1 - 1^ ON CO O Cl oo CO ON l-t lO CO Cl O CO lO CO CO o o o CO o O (1 ON „ 1 - o i CO [ o CO c-l CO o ON CO I-. -t c-l CO »-4 o CN OO MS >o CO d d . '■ ! CO ^ C- CO G ! ON J- CO CO ON O "1 o NO to o C'> OO CO 1-^ CO Cl d o f ■ LO 1^ CO CO o CO CO Cl lO CO -+ CO CO CN in "^ 1 oo 't C4 bO ct O ;s u u CJ f^ (N o O o (1 f< o o CO A a o o o r< O o xlll APPENDIX, m Exlrdi, of a I.ettn- from Liculevant General E\\\gc)\x\Q, to Sir Guy Ciirlclon, dated Ikad-i^uirters, at Skenejhoroiigh Ilciife, nth July, 1777. I REQUEST your Excellency to take into confideratlon the expediency of fjpply- ing from Canada, a garrifoii for Ticonderoga. My communication will widen fo much as I proceed, the drain upon the army for pofts will be {o confulerable, not to fpcak of detachments and fafc-guards to protcft and to awe the country, that if that fnil diminuiicn is not: replaced, my cfteclivc flrength may become inadequate to the fervices intended. My prefenr intelligence is that Putnam is collefting an army to oppofe me at Saratoga. Fort Edward is alfo talked of to fuftaia a fiege. Your excellency will, I am fure, agree with me that 'I'iconderoga, or fome other fortified poll on the South part of Eake Champlain, ought to be confidered on the frontiers of the province of Canada. I am aware of the difficulties that arife from the manner in which the Secretary of State's orders are penned ; but I fubmit to your Excellency, whether, under the principle laid down in the beginning ot the order, and afterwards repeated, that 3000 men tvere hcldfnjficient for the defence of that province, you would not be jultified in fparing for the purpofe of this garrifon, the overplus of the 3000 that may remain after compleating my army. And notvvithflanding the corps for the Canada fervice are precilcly named by the Secretary of Stare, I would further fubmit whether, upon my preffing requifition, the garrifon might not jullifiably be furnifhed by detachment, even though there was no overplus, under the following words of the order ; after baviugfecured to him, (Lieutenant General Burgoyne) every affiflance ivhich it is in your power to afford and procure. Your Excellency's zeal for the fervice and favour towards me, will be better interpreters for the latitude I propofe, than any thing I can further fuggeft ; my prefent purpofe, Sir, is to get a fuiiicient number of gun-boats upon the Lake George to fcour that lake as expeditioufly as poflible, to fupport them with a proper force to attack Fort George on that fide, while with the main of the army as foon as re* freflied and fupplied, I attack Fort Edward from hence, and therebycut off' the com- munication from Albany to Fort George, and confequently prevent the fuccour or retreat of that garrifon. Extras of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Sir Guy Carlctonj Heai- ^larters, near Fort Anne, July i^th 1777. THE conflru<^ion your excellency puts upon the orders of the Secretary of State, is too full and decifive for me to prefume to trouble you further upon the fubjed of a garrifon for Ticonderoga from Canada, 1 mufl: do as well as I can, but I am fure your Excellency, as a foldier, will think my fituation a little difficult. A breach into my communication mull either ruin my army entirely, or oblige me to return in force to rellore, which might be the lofs of the campaign. To prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and Fort George mull: be in very refpedable flrength, and I muft befides have pofts at Fort Edw ard and other carrying-places. Thefe drains added to common accidents and lolles of fervice,, will ncceflarily render me very inferior in point APPENDIX. xliii Ciirlclon, dated point of numbers to the enemy, whom I muft cxpedl always to find f^rongly pofteJ. I afk pardon for dwelling fo much upon this fubjedt, and have only to add my re- qucft to your Excellency to forward the additional companies as cxpcdiiioufly as may be. Copy of Liiittenant-Getieral Burgoyne's Letter to Co/offt'/Baumc. iW/ir Saratoga, Augufl: 14, 1777. Seven at Nigh/. SIR, THE accounts you have fcnt me are very fatisfaftory, and I have no doubt of every part of your proceeding continuing to be the fame. I beg the favour of you to report whether the road you have pafTed is practicable, and if fo, if it is convenient for a conliderable corps with cannon. Should you find the enemy too ftrongly polled at Bennington, and maintaining fuch a countenance as may make an attack imprudent, I wifli you to take a poll where you can maintain yourfelf till you receive an anfwer from me, and I will either iupport you in force, or withdraw you. You will pleafe to fend olFto my camp, as foon as you can, waggons, and draft cattle, and likewifc fuch other cattle as are not neceflary for your fubfillence. Let the waggons and carts bring off all the flour and wheat they can that you do not retain for the fame purpofe. This tranfport mull be under the charge of a com- miifion officer. I will write you at full to-morrow in regard to getting horfcs out of the hands of the fa V ages. In the mean time any you can colled from them, fit to mount the regiments, at a low price, Ihall be allowed. I am with great eflcem, Sir, Your molt obedient humble fervant. J. BURGOYNE. Carlcton. Head- Colonel St. Lcgcr's Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix. No A MINUTE detail of every operation fince my leaving La Chine, with the de- tachment entrufled to my care, your Excellency will permit me to referve to a time of lefs hurry and mortification than the prefent, while I enter into the interefling fccne before Fort Stanwix, which I invelled the 3d of Augull, having previoully piiilied forward Lieutenant Bird of the King's reigment, with thirty of the King's troops and two hundred Indians, under the direftion of Captains Hare and VViUbn, and the chiefs Jofeph and Bull, to feize fad hold of the lower landing-place, and there- by cutoff the enemy's communication with the lower country. — This was done with great addrefs by the lieutenant, though not attended with the effect I hud promiied myfelf, occafioned by the llacknefsof the Meffafagoes. The brigade of provifion and ammunition boats I had intelligence of, beiny; arrived and dil'embarked before this party had taken pofl. A a a The U t Ixlv A P P E N I X. The fonvth nnd fifth were employed in making arranr^cmcnts for opening Wond Creek (which the ciicmy, %vith the indefatigable labour of one hundred and fit'ty men, for fonrrccn days, had molt ellxhially choaked ;i[)) and the making a tempo- rary road f.oin Pip-c Ridges upon Filh Creek, iixrcen miles fnmi the fort, for a jircl'cnt fupiily of provifion and the tiiiiifport of our artillery : the full was cll'edcd by the d!li;rd's p-olf, to facilitate tliC entrance of the relieving corps, or bring on a general en- gagement, v/ith every advantage they could wifh. Captain Hoyes was iminediately detached to cut in upon their rear, while they <'pgaged the lieutenant. Irnniediately upon the departure of Captain Hoyes, h;;ving h'arr.t d that Lieutenant liird, inilied by tiic information of a cowardly Indiar;, th.i: '6u Jchi v/a.^ prelled, h^id quitted his pofb to march to iiis alliflancc, 1 marched the APPENDIX, Ixvil fhctlctaoliment of the King's regiment, in fupport of Captain Hoyes, by a road ir\ figlit of tile gariifon, which, witii executive Hre from liis party, immediately di-ovQ the enemy into tlie fort, without any further advantage than frightening fouic fquaws and pilfering the packs of the warriors which tliey kft behind tliem. After tl'.is affaii was over, orders were immediately given to com)deat a t\.o-gun battery, and mortar beds, with tluee llrong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in cafe of another attempt, to relieve the garrifon by their regimented trjops, to march out a larger body or the King's troops. Captain l,ernor.lt was fent with no men to the lower landing place, where he tflablillicd iumfclf with great judgment and ftrength, having an enclofcd battery of a ihree-poundcr oppofcd to any fully from the fort, ai.d another to the fide of the country, where a relief mull approach; and the body of his camp de(. ply en- trenched and abbatifed. WhiCn by the unabating labour of officers and men (the fmallnefs of our num- bers never admitting of a relief, or above three hours ceflacion for fleep or cooking) the batteries and redoubts weie finifned, and new cheeks and axle-tiees made for the fix-pounders, thole that were fent being reported rotten and unferviceable. It was found that our cannon had not tlie leail efi'ed' upon the fod-v.ork of the forr, and that our royals had only tlic power of teizing, as a fix-inch plank was a fuiTicicnt fecurity for their powder magazine, as wc learnt from the deltrters. At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to a£l as r.lTifiant engineer, propofed a converfion of the royals (if I may ufe the exprefiion) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feal'ability of this meafure ilriking me very llrongly, the bufinefs was fet about immediately, . and foon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating with the defired efFeft but the diftance, their chambers being too fmall to hold a fufficiency of pov.'der. There was nothing now to be done but to approach the town by fiip to iuch a diftance that the ram- part might be brought within their portice, at the fame umc all materials were preparing to run a mine under their mofl: formidable baftion. In the midit of thefe operations intelligence was brought in by our fcoui.., of a fccond corps of looomen being on their march. The fame zeal no longer animated the Indians ; they complained of our thinnefs of troops and their former lofles. 1 immediately called a council of the chiefs ; encouraged them as much as I could; promifed to lead them on myfelf, and bring into the field ■^oo of the beft troops. They lilknetl to this, and promifed to follow me, and agreed that I fliould recon- noitre the ground propereft for the field of battle the next morning, accompanied by fome cf their chief warriors, to fettle the plan of oj)erations. When upon the ground ajipoinred for the field of battle, fcouts came in with the account of the firfb number fwellcd to 2cco j immediately after a third, that General Burgoyne'sarmy wjs cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches, with 30C0 men. It was at this mon;ent I began to fufpecTt cowardice in fome, and trealon in oihcs ; however I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the af- fillance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnfon, and the influence of the fuper- intending colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them ro meet the enemy. A council, accordinf; to their cullom, was called, to know their refolutions, before the breaking up of v\liiclr I learned .that ;co were already decamped. In about an hour they ™I xlvi APPENDIX". u\ tlicy infidcd that I nioukl retreat, or they wouUl be obliged to abandon me. 1 had no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who coiilct do nothing without them, to yield to their relblves ; antl tlierefore [iropofed i > retire at ni^^iit, lending on before my fick, wounded, artdleiy, eve. down the V, ood Creek, co- vering them by our line of march. This did not fall in witli their views, which were no lels than treacheroufly com- mitting ravage upon their friends, as tlicy had lott the opportunity of doing ic upon their eninii'js. To elfect this they artfully caulld mellen^vTs to I'Oinc in, one after the other, with accounts of t!ie ne.iru- approaches of the rebels i one ;uul the lafi: affirmed that they were within two miles of ("a[->tain I.eriioult's ; oih Not giving entire credit to this, aiUl keeping to my refolution of rciirinf, by niyht, they grew furious and abmdonetl ; lei/.etl u[)i)n the otiicers' liquor ;:!ul eloaths, in Ipite of theefForts ol' their fervants; and became more formid ible than the enemy we h.id to ex|)ect. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernonli's pofb, rcii/iiig witli the troops in camp to tiie ruined fort called V,''lliam, in liie front of the garrifon, notonly to wait the enemy, if they tliought p: :}'vr t) faliy, but to ]'ro- ted the boats from the fury of the lavages, having fcnt t.-rward C :iptain 1 b yes, with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the j^lace v.heie Jiull l''orc llood, to receive the troops who waited the arrival of Ca[U.)in I.ernoult. Mcll of the boats wereefcorted that night beyond Canath Cie(-k, wliere no danger v/as to be apprehended from the enemy. The creek at tliis place bending from the road, has a deej> ceil.ir fwamp between. F-vcry attention v,as now turneil to the mouth of the creek, wliich the enemy might Iia/e podelled themfelves of by a rapid march by the Oneyda Catlle. Atthi.s place the whole of the little army arrived by twelve o'clock at night, and took polt in I'uch a manner as to have no fears of any thing the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o'clock next morning, when tlic boats which could come up the Creek arrived, or rather that the rafcally part of all nations of the Indians would fufler to come up; and proceeded acrola L,ake One\da to the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learnt that fomc boats were Hill labouring down the creek, after being lightened of the bell part of their freight by the Meiraiagoes. Captain I ernoult propoled, with a boat full of armed men, to repafs the lake tliat night, to relieve them from their labour, and fiipply thein with rovilinn. 'I'his traiUaclion does as rnuch honour to tiie humanity as to the gallantry of this valuable oiHcer. On itly arrival at the Onondago Falls I received an anfwcr to my letter from your Fxcellencr, whicli Ibewed, in the cleared light, tlie Irenes of treachery that had ueen jMM^tifcd upon nie. The irji (fengcr had her 1 indeed on his way that they were collecting the fame kind of i\:bble as before, bur that there was not an enemy v.-ithin forty miles of Fort Stainvix. Soon after my arrival here I was joined by Captain Lernoult, with the men and btuats he hud been in fearch of. I nit .n im!'. .(^diately tj fend olF, for the ui'c of the upper garrifon, all the overplus pi-oviCioii 1 lli ill have, after keeping a futliciency to carry my detachment down, which i mciii to do v/ith every expedition in my power the moment this bufinefs is tircded, for which juirpole I have ordered here the Inow. I'he llcop is ahead}- gone from this \\ ith her lull lading. Officers I APPENDIX. Ofiiccrs finm .ach corj^s arc fcnt to Montreal to procure ncccftlnlcs for the men, \vlu) iirc in a mod (IcpI'Mahlc fituation from the pUimlcr ut ihc rava[.',cs, that no time iiiiiy be lott to join your army. 1 hiivc the honour to be, with the grcatcft rcri)C(fV, Sir, your Excellency's moil obedient-, OJu'cgOy/Jiig. i-j^ '777' and molHaitliful Cervant, Bakry 5:t. LECiiiR. His Excellency General BurgoyNe, xlvii Copy of a Letter from Lievlenant-Ccneral Durpoync to Lord George Germain, dated No. XIV. «/ Albany, 2L/^X)(^tober, 1777. My Loin, NO j)jnii)ilicy of communication with your Lordfliij) havinf; exifled fince the be|.Mnninf^ oj-' September, ;u winch time iny lail difpatch was lent away, I have to re- por^ to your Lordllii[) the procc-ediii^;,s of the ar ny under n\y command from that p.Tiod : a llries of liaid toil, inculTant eflbrt, llubborn action; till difabled in the collateral hranciies of the army by die total del'ection of the Indians; the defertion or timitiit^ oi the Canadians aiid IVovincials, tome individuals excepted ; difappointed in ^^ the lad lu-pe of .iny tnnely eo-operatijn from other armies ; the regular troops re- duced by lolles iVoiii the bi.il part to 3500 lighting men, not 2000 of whicii were Britifli •, only three days proviliv is upon Ihort allowance in llore •, invellcd by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all the generals, fi; Id officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major General Gates. Your Lordihip will fee, by the papers tranfmitied herewith, the difagreeable pro- fpedl which attended the firft overtures -, and when the terms concluded are compared, I trull that the fpirit ot the councils 1 have mentioned, which under fuch circum- Itances di(5lated initeadof fubmittinii, will not be refuled a (hare of" credit. Before I enter upon the detail of thefe events, 1 tliink it a duty of jullicc, my Lord, to take upon mylclf the meafure of having palled the Hudfon's River, in order to force a pallage to Albany. I did not think myfelf authoril'ed to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the fcafon of the year admitted no alternative. Provifions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the oth.er necelTary ftorcs prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army palled the Mudfon's River on the 13th and 14th ot September, and incamped on the heights, and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater. The whole army made a movement forward, and incamped in a good polition in a 15th; place called Dovacote. It being found that there were feveral bridges to repair, that work was begun under i6th. cover of ftrong detachments, and the fame opportunity w as taken to reconnoitre ti.e country. The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon ad- 17th. vantageous ground about four miles from the enemy. The enemy appeared in confiderable force to obltrudt the further repair of bridge^ 1 8th, and with a view, as it was conceived, to draw on an at^ion where artillery could not 4 be *!■ VI i>' k\ \ lit A I' r I. N i> 1 X. |M I, \\' r:il|'l.»V'N' w.r. ( lUvl..'. A fn.ill l"l-, w.i'. I'lill.iincil III (I iimMliinr. ''»'» ilicwiil. ni'ilir liii'Vi 'II !«• p.Ul i;\i'i (>| .1 I'll' It I i\ I'u*. ,111(1 oilii'i fi', Ills liiw.ii>l'. llic riu-nn, liiiviii|^» Itcru 111 iMIHOllli'.l, lln-.Uiin .^^Iv.l;^l . .1 111 (111* lollnWlll;', ortlt'i, Hii|\,uli T * M-'ii i.il I'l.il. I's « >Mi' ., (iiU.iii'ol h\ I .null II. III! ('dldiicl I'm vm.in''-. ( nipi, n Mill 11 lilt II n , in .>i.l. !• Ill I Mil I In' ; i\ iiu' 1 omiiiiidiniillv, \v 11 limit «|iiiiliii •, ilu" Itcirjil •, .iHil .iliii w.ii.l . i,< ii>\ii til'" 111 I. 'i I'l ilic line ii> iiic ih'lil. Hull" loiii'. mnvcilm lilli« \ i' I'liiilh Inu" Ii-<1 In' iiu' ii\ |'i'iIiM\ p.ilUil llif i,i\iiii' in .\ dinil Im. i>>iiili, .iiul I, I iiu\| in nwK I I' \v,ii(< .1 to iM\«- iini>' to I I lU r l».itilf ifi r.ill .r. tlirv j',.iinctl llic limiiiiii, wlirw ili. y >M |\i III iii.ilvc till" 1 III nil, .111(1 ii> rii.iMi' lite Kli will' {uul amlliMv, s'liuli, t!!ul»"i tlu- < imihu.iiuK i>i M,i|of (initi.il riiilli|''., .ml Mi-, i t»ni. i.ll KciJcKl, Iv. yi the |\ltMI iv>i>l .in. I iiii.iilows iii .if t'lc inti in tvvo mliiiims, .!ii I li.ul Imii',\cj to uiMii, lo lu'iiinally iv.i*lv lo pioitcJ. I lu' i7ll» irjMiutiil ^',ii;iiili'.| ihc IviUiMIV. riu' lij'it.il I'.ntv;, wtiu I\ Ii.ul Wc\} pi<'v!.Mi(1v IritKil lO|;ivc iidtin* ol.ill tin' » (ihimMi Iviiij; ir.tJv to ,iil\ ,;nvc, li.U'iHj', l<(A"n tiuii Ix'i Willi our .iti.l tvvo o\ loi k, llirm.iiili »'oi\tiinirvl. Ilir tiinits .iMil ll.inkc-i \ o| tin- i ohimn ol tlu' r.,uilli Iiik- unr jo m tin il H \ipoM trom liii.iU p.ii tics l>\n with iiorllivM. Alin ,»l'i>iil .in lioiii's m.iu li, tlir pu ouiV';, .iti.ii kill in loit I', .iiul ol'lii'i it I,,. I xxaik I\ tn.ulo tlu* .u1\ .iiufvl . piiMiiii', Imii tlu'v loi>i\ t.illi(.l .iiui wnc luil.iiiu'il. ("^n \]\c liill opoiiinp, ol tlii'\\v>o»l I loi nu-.l tin' lioops. i\ tcu iMnnon Ihot dii- l\ tlu' liilpolitton ot Hi v'.ivluf In'iuM-.il li.iUi, ioviiili.i- r.i.uvhcv!, m oivUt toilitrvi ilu-u j\ir.it v-lU" t lo tlio 1^ It ol tlu- Hiitilli. Kt\Mu t!iv' n.tuiu' o( till- lomurv. niovi-nic-ius ol this loit, lunw'vcr nctr, m i\ I'C ctVvvK'vi wuaoiit A poilibiliiv v^t thoir i\'Uh\ iliKovon-vi. in in- .1 \(i\ \u\o,,>vis .utiilv >• ' ilu' Hi itillt liiif, 'llic rii>'i'iv I'l 1 iiuiiui.illv \houi ihiVv'o'ikHk the .1 liion IV b .ind ctihutnu-vl with »ii\-.U olntii'..Kv till .ittv-r Umut. n^ w th tuih nwps, tlic tlic-ls l.tv u,\mi t!u- -ot!!. :iil, .uul 0:1! i- p.irts vMwIi'.vh w(ir c-ii!;.i(',rvl tu-.ir lovir hoviis Witliovit initraullion ; ihc oixirncxi v'.?rlv m \\w J.»v to toriu iii rilci\c. nt-;, moll 'Vhc p.i-i'Mavl.ds aiul .'4(11 tx';?,iim'iu wore loitic \\\n ot'tho titni' bi'ovipju i ^ ..lion, :c p.ift Ot'thr lipjit intantrv, .inJ. .ill tiu'li- >-orps i-h.iriTi'ii with ihnr vilu. > ii. i> \Vv The r;:io;nfn, atvl oivxv p .It ts ol H;v\ nvan's corps, w\-tc' .i.lo ot li-rvu' vK t'.vn t'U\-.a'^t .UlViUbiC to iV.K-VKUO tiio lK-ii:hts wJKtv Hri-vulicr C.u-;icial !• It W.IS . was po'.^Al ctl'.ciw.'i- th.'tn pavti.iUy a!ui occallotuliy. cv.lt any M.-VT (.K^ivral I'hillirs uivn tint tu-atiiiir tlu' tuiiis:!; tbinvl his wav (hfous'li .. 'lilii- V'.p with iiir,', M.iior ^N'riluuiis p.r.tot thrweovl to the Icc'iu'ct .u'lion, aiul b;vni;;ht v.j !txnir p!C ih liiu'. liHi.iUv -, moil I Iwii a. Hon, •l.lt. It W.IS . was .\ (liHi- 'lilMtllS IIV. .iiul ■iiv ;fu: .Uli. 10 Mnjo^-Gfnfral Rii«iltril nrrrrcd himfrlf to bring up a part of the left wing, ard ■riivr,' 'imc tii chmiv tlir rriciny with rrpiilaiiiv ind lu.ivrry. lull .. ,, l.j'.lit (li)l(il, the riicmy f',n\«.' I'lonnd on all liiiri, unil Irfr us com- l)lti(ly iDal.cin ol tin- licld of Itattlf, with tlic Joli of nhoiil live huiiiircJ men on ilicir lii|i') .iiiil, .1. Iii|i|)()|i'tl, tliiitT liiai iiuinbci WMtindi'd. I'hr il.iikiu lik |)iTvniiin^ a puilint, ijic |ird(>ncis wrre (rw. Tlic Ixjiavinui i>ii ilu 11 arms the nifjit of ihr Kith, .md the next day took i poliiion luai Iv « iilHii ( .iniioii Ihiit ol thcc.Kniy, foriiryini; th( ir iijdii, iiiidtxten- tliiijf their leli lotJK lihiw ol lilt hri|-|its, lo as lotovtr the iruadows ihroo/'ji wliK h the I'jeai nvi i iiiis, and wlnie tin ir hairaux and holpitals were |)li(:ed. 'I'lir I'/th icj'.iiiK lit, li.e icjoimnt of Hi'lle I Ian ui, and a eoi [» . ol I'roviiK.ial". in- (.iiiiped in the ine.ulows as a liiiilici le( iiiiiy. It was loon found ihit nolViiiis, hononr cxecptcd, were attainril hv fhc preecdin/; viitorv, the eneinv \\dikiii|>; with n doiiUki! .irdor to Ilicn^Mlien thcii hit: their iipjit wa'' already iinatiai kahle. On our lide it htc ime expedient to erei'^l llroiif^ redoubts for the protec'lion ofthc niaf^a/inrs and holpital, not only ayaiiill a ludch n attat k, but alio lo; their Iciunry 111 tali" ol aiiiaieli lo tinntlie enemy's Hank. A medeni'.er aiiiveil liom Sir I lany Clinton with a Inter in r ypher, informin,^' .September." UK" ol his intention to attack I'ort Mont<.!;oinery in about t( n days from the date '^i' ol his leiter, whiih was the r:th inllant. 'i his was the only iiieHcnfUT (d many that I appichend were dil'patehetl by Sir William I lowe, and him that had reached my camp liiue the bejMnnin;>; ol Auf',ull, I le was lent back the lame ni;.';ht to in- form Sir I larryol my liruaiioii, aiul of the nccelliiy ol a iliverlion tooblij^c (ieneral irites to detat h tVom his army, and my intention to wait favourable events in that: polition, if poHible, to the i .;th of October. In theeouifc of the two followinj^ ilays, two officers in dif^niife, and other confi- dential perlbns, were difpatched by dilTerent routes with verbal meflTaf^es to the lame elVci'-f, anil I continued fortifying iny camp and watchinj^ the enemy, whole numbers increaleii every tlay. Itlioui'Jit it adviliibic on the ^d of Odober to diminifli the fbldiers' ration irx ortler to len}';then out the provifions, to which meafurr the army fubmi'.ted with the vitinoll chearfulnefs. 'I'he dillicuhics of an treat to Canada were clearly forefeen, as was the dilemma, lliould the retreat be efledieil, of leaving at liberty fuch an army as Cicneral Gates's to operate againit Sir William Howe. Ihis confiileration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long a» polliblc, and I realbneil thus. 'I'he expedition 1 commanded was eviilcntly me:nc at lirll to be ha^aiited. Circumflances might require it fliould be devoted. A critical jundiou of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Wafliingcon might pofTibly decide the fate B b of \\ \ , / Vi jor APPENDIX. lit oi' the war J the fiiilure of my junftion with Sir Harry Clinton, or the lofs of my retreat to Canada could only be a partial misfortune. In this fituation thing's continued till the feventh, when no intelligence haring been received of the cxpedled co-operation, and four or five days for our limited ll;iy in the camp only remair.ed, it was judged advifable to make a movement to the enemy's kft, not only to difcover '.vhether there were tny poiiible means of forcing a pafTagc fliould ir be necefiary to advance, or of diflodging him for the convenience of a retre-rt, bur alfo to cover a forage of the army which was in tiic gtcateft diftrefson nccouut of the fcarcity. A dctichment of fifteen hundred regular troops with two twelve pounders, two hovvitzeni, and fix lix-pounders, were ordered to move, and were commanded by myfclf, h.J.ving with me Major-Gener.d Piiillips, Major- General Reidefel, and Brigadier-General Frafer. 'i i;e guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadier-General Hamilton and Specht, the redoubts and tlie plain to Brigadier General Gall ; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front confifted of more than double their num- bers, it was not polTible to augment the corps that marched, beyond the numbers above flared. I formed the troops within three-quarters cf a nii^e of the enemv's left, and Captain Frafer's ranger.i, with Indians and rrovincials, had orders to go by fecret })aths in the woods to gain the enemy's rear, and by ihcvving theivilelves there to keep them in a check. 1 he further operations intended, were prevented by a very fudden and rapid attack of the enemy on our iefr, where the Britifli grenadiers were pofled to fupport the left wing of ihe line. Major Acland at the head of them fullained the attack with great refolution ; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a fecond line to the fiank, where the ftrefs of the fire lay. Tiie right was at this time en- gaged, but it was foon obferved that the enemy were marching a large corps round their flank to endeavour cutting off tneir retreat. The light infantry and part of the a.fth regiment which were at that poft were therefore ordered to form a fecond line, and to fecure the return of the troops into camp. While this movement was pro- ceeding the enemy pufhed afrefh and flrong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which, overpowered by a great fuperiority, gave way. and the light in- fantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick movement to five that poinc from being entirely carried,, in doing v^hich, Brigadier-Geueral /rafer was mortally wounded. The danger to which the lines v*cre expofed becoming nt this moment of the mofl ferious nature, orders were given to Major- General i'liillips and Keidefel to cover the retreat, while flicii tic:;ps as were mofl r' ady for the purpofe, returned for the defence of them. The t. oops retreated hard prefled, but in good order; they were obliged to leave fix pieces of cannon, all thi horfes having been kill ed and moil of the artillery-men, who had behaved r.s ufual with tlie utmoft bravery under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded. The troops had fcarcely entered the camp when it was flornied with great fury, the enemy rulhmg to the lines under a fevcrc fire of ^rape-Jliot and fmall arms. 4 Tiie ■ iwT«r»*i'r'>.fT« ^ " •mam )fs of &^y e haring limited cmeiit to means of n for the as in the CIS, two landct! by = rtl, and lamilton tilt force |eir niim- number* left, and by fecrcc there to 3id attack pport rhc tack with ninutes to L'ly on the 2 a fecond time en- rps round art of the :ond line, was pro- tion upon ■ light in- hat point mortally It of the eidefel to returned >d order ; n killed, t bravery reat fury, lall arms. The APPENDIX. The port of the light infantry under Lord Balcarras afTided by fome of the line, which threw tl^emfelves by order into the intrenchmcnts, was cl-jfi-nded with grea: Ipirit, and the meniy led on by General Arnold was finally repulfed, and the General wounded •, but uhuappily the intrenchmentsof the German referve, commanded by Liciitenant-Colonel Breymann, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be recovered, they never were fo, and the enemy by t!iat misfortune gain ,'d an opening on cur right and rear. The nighc put an end to the aClion. Ui der the difadvantages thus apparent in our fituation, the army vas ordered to quit the prelent polition during the night and take poll upon the heights above the hf^lpital. Thus by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new difpofition. This movement was efFedled ii. great order and without lofs, thougii all the artillery and camp were removed at the fame time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy in their new pofition the whole day of the Hth. Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right, and no means could prevent that mcafure but retiring towards Saratoga. The army began to move at nine o'clock at night, Major-General Reidefel commanding the van-guard, and Major-General Phillips the rear. This retreat, though v/ithin mul'quet-fliot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of tiie army, was made without tofs, but a very heavy rain and the difficulties of guarding the bateaux which contained all the provificns, occafioned delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga till the night of the 9th, and the artillery could not pafs the fords of the Filh-kill till the morning of the loth. At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, between five and fix hundred, were difcovered throwing up intrenchmcnts on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudfon's River at our approach, and joined a body polled to oppofe our paflage there. It was judged proper to fend a Jetachment of artificers under a ftrong efcort to re- pair the bridges and open a road to 1 ore-Edward on the welt fide of the river. The 47th regiment. Captain Frafer'smarkfinen, and Mackoy's Provincials, were ordered for that fervice, but the enemy appearing .)n the heights of the Fifli-kill in great force, and making a difpofition to p.^fs and give us battle : the 47th regiment and Frafer's markfmen were recalled ; the i:'rovincials left to cover the workmen at the firft bridge run away upon a very flight attack of a I'mall party of the enemy, and left the artificers to efcape as they could, wiihout apolllbility of their performing any work. During thefe different mcvcfuents the bateaux with provifions were frequently fired upon from the oppofite fide of the rive., and fome of them were lofl, and feveral men were killed and wounded in thole -.vhich remained. The attacks upon the bateaux were continued, feveral were taken and retaken, Oftober but their fituation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it 1 1 . was found impolTible to fecure the provifions any otherv/ife tiian by landing them and carrying them upon thi hill : this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty. The pofnble means of further retreat were now confidereil In councils of war, compofed of the general officers, minutes of which will be tranfmitted to your Lordfhip. B b 2 Th-^ li Hi r APPENDIX. The only one that fcemcd at all praftic.iblc was, by a night march to g.iiii Forr- FAiwaid with iho troops carrying thfir provilion upon their backs •, the imnonibility of repairing briilinion, upon a near infpcdion, of the rebel tioo[)s. The (landing corps which f have leen, are ditciplincd. I do not hazard the term, but apply ir to the great funda- mental points oi military inllitution, fobriety, fubordination, regularity and courage. J'he militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot lefs ferviceablc in woods. My conjedures were very different after the allair of Ticondcrago, but lam convinced they were dclufive ; and it is a duty to the Hate to confels it. Tlie panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of Ihort duration ; the cnthufialim it extenfive and permanent. It is a jvillicc to Major General Phillips, to inform your Lordfliip, that when thecrifij of ovir fuuation at Saratoga arriveil, he very handfomely offered to hazard his pcrlbn by making a circuit through the woods, and attempt to throw himlelf into 'I'icondcia- go, to ilefend that place, Jhould it be the object of the enemy to endeavour the re- raking it. In regard to mylelf, I am funk in mind and body, but while I have a faculty of 'ithcr, it Ihall be exerted for the King's fervicc. I fhall wait in the neighbourhood of liollon, the orders of Sir William Howe. I have the honour to be, Sec, J. BURCOYNI", Miniilf.' A p p r. N n I X. iy Minutes of a Cotiticil of fr and upon the return of fcouts, who had been fent forward to examine by what route the army could probably move the tirft four miles undifcovered, whether the plan fliould take place on tliat day, or on the morrow. The fcouis on their return reported, that the enemy's pofition on the right was fuch, and they had fo many fmall parties out, that it would be impoITibleto move without our march being immediately difcovered. Minutes end Frccced. r[s of a Council of JFar, ctJi0it!g of dl the general Officers and bicld Officers^ and Captains commanding Corps, oh the Heights of Saratoga, Odober 13. T H E 1 -ieutenant-General having explained the fituation of affairs, as in the pre- ceding council, with the additional intelligence, that the enemy was intrenched at the fords of Fort Kdward, and iikewife occupied the ftrong pofition on the Pine- plains between Fort George and Fort F.dward, expreffed his readinefs to undertake at their head any enterprifc of difficulty or hazard that fliould appear to them within the compafs of rheir (Irength or i'pirit. He added, that he had reafon to believe a capitulation had been in the contemplation of fome, perhaps of all, who knew the real fituation of things ; that upon a circumflance of fuch confequcncc to national and perfonal honour, he thought it a duty to his country, and to himfelf, to extend his council beyond the ufual limits ; that the aflcmbly preient might jultly be efleemed a full reprefentation of the army ; and that he fliould think himfelf uniufl:i- tiable in taking any ftep in fo ferious a matter, without fuch a concurrence of fenti- nients as ibould make a treaty the a<5l of the army, as well as that of the general. The fird queftion therefore he defired them to decide was, Whether an army of r^^oo fighting men, and well provided with artillery, were jufliifiable, upon the principles of national dignity and military honour, in capitulating in anypoflible fituation ? Refolvcd, ..»;1»*J|1J»I(>»I 1 I" "n, to march APPENDIX. Refolved, nem, con. in the affirmative. Quellion 2. Is the prefent fituation of that nature ? Kdblved, nem. con. That the prdl-nt fituation jultifies a capitulation upon ho- nqurable terms. The Licutcnant-General then drew up the meflTagc, marked No. 2, and laid it before the council. It was unanimoully approved, and upon that fountlation tlic treaty opened. October 14. Major Kingfton having delivered themeflage marked No. 2. return- ed with the propoliils marked No. 3, and the council of war being aflembled again, the Lieutenant-General laid the propofals before them, when it wafc refolved unani- moufiy to reject the 6th article, and not to admit of it in any extremity whatever. The Lieutenant-General then laid before the council the anfwers to Major-General Gates's propof is, as marked in the fame paper, together with his own preliminary propofals, which were unanimoufly approved of. Odober 15. The council being alfembled again, Major-General Gates's anfwers to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's propofals were laid before them, whereupon it was refolved, that they were fatisfadtory^ and a fufficicnt ground for proceeding to a definitive treaty. hiil No. 2. Mdjof Kingfton delivered the following Mejfage to Major-General Gates^ Oftober 14. AFTER having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited feme days, in his prefent pofition, determined to try a third confiid againft any force you could bring to attack him. Heisapprifed of the fuperiority of your numbers, and the difpofition of your troops to impede his fupplies, and render his retreat a fcene of carnage on both fides. In this fituation he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himfelf juftifiable by cft:abliflied principles and precedents of fl:ate,. and of war, to fpare the lives of brave men upon honourable terms. Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea. General Burgoyne would propofe a ceffation of arms during the time necelfary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in any extre- mity, he and his army mean to abide. No. 3. Major-GineralQdXt^^iProfofals; together ivitb Lieutenant-General Burgoynt'^ Jjifwers, I. General Burgoyne's army being exceedingly reduced by repeated defeats, by defertion, ficknefs, &c. their provifions exhauftied, their military horfes, tents, and baggage, taken or deftroyed, their retreat cut ofi^, and their camp invefted, they can only be allowed to furrender prifoners of war. Anfwer. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's army, however reduced, will never admit that their retreat is cut ofi^, while they have arms in their hands. II. The officers and foldiers may keep the baggage belonging to them. The generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged, C c 1 Iviii APPENDIX. III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conduced by the moft convenient route to New England, marching by eafy marches, and fuf- /iciently provided for by the way. Anfwer. This article is anfwered by General Burgoyne's firfl: propofal, which is here annexed. IV. The officers will be admitted on parole ; may wear their fide-arms, and will be treated with the liberality cullomary in Europe, fo long as they, by proper behaviour, continue to defervc it j but thole who are apprehended having broke their parole, as fomc Britifli officers have done, mud expetSl to be clofc confined. Anfwer. There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under the defcription of breai*« C rt ,5 so ^ ^ V"/"^ 00 QO O CO •J- o N QO o 00 o o O vD CO 1- o (> o •yS"/»('/-4 to CO CO in uo f| ly, en 1 Ut'llllV l^g in H- C^ «^ 00 (■I 1 f) 1^ tn -*- •■- ""1 •/ui/j.k/ .;■' I,' s (-4 "i o no n O in •.(/«f7 ^(j/" /y /«y/'<^/ CO 'i- M M o f 1 O 00 CH ^0 •t CO CO CO T M n •j.j//_.y /''(■w lui/i.iQ in •* CO cr o CO I^ 1^ t<^ 1- -»• 1^ j 'I- , ^ ft CC •[/rii'jf^i.ii^ ■ O w O 00 " w j 2 «?■ o ON o CO m >0 in O ri vO •.,.;,;,; " to "u^ " ■■l- .n, -^'1 .n " -" f. " -^ ~ tn " f. '•?! •i7.' \'!^.l/l<^ •+ rn rt '♦• '" " •* r. 1 fn >-• fn " "• en ° •■■•V/'Vl' '^' .-/ 4 ""Jn" rn tnT 4 " 1 -en J" -^- -fn ft - " »H ° O 1 'ni •r.i.i//i>/\r jJf.inn'}:; ■^ m T*- ^ ."' •'■.iivinC;'!' fn fn ^ N -^ " K, f, M « ft ■ U ■ : '"* ^ " - 1 O ° ° ° - ° O ° o o O "^; -1- CO o l'. o sO M "+ un O CO in o o o tn 'wSif.rj f\ n tn + fl f*-, r- •+ 1^ J^ wi l>i O •i/uviiJunr [ yiioJ.'i; N n N n <■( »^ O vO *^ fn vD fn M vn vO M •s/UPu.'injrj ift;.^ w M '\6 o 00 -I- 'siirr/^pj N n rn N M f* n « n f* M ~«^' --.- ~"tn" ff. •s.iofv/,]r ^; * r»% 'i- •^ ^ tn 'l- •'•p'/nw-f l!lf}l.<,K •,■ j ^-|-.n X*- tn + " -^ '^ M 1 " M •+ •■■'- ■•■v; fr." " •*-| m j ^ , in fn -^ tn N ■«»- o o -o •sx.uyr'isi.i^l ■< " -» I •- M H. ^^ ' - M M .<" •Ji U3 U3 %n ^ en s 1 i u a u u *>> a. U] c S u U 2 o. C r: ^ TO J3 r^ o B *w > H 4 "rt u *_»■ C Oh ^ o (1^ ^ CO p: m ^ 1) <• |> •^ a a> ^' ■ d ..cS_ 'J3 i1 c: u =3 rt .a ^ o its o I) J3 I)x. C/3 < o "3 .3 u t-t 5 -^ rt • c u • •"• <-« M C] <4 u > f o n ^ i) rt S a> "5 .^ re C £ , C U 3 c S PQ u APPENDIX. No. X\ri, Ext rails from the Minutes of tJttlaJl Council of War, exceptiug the mmcs of the offters, /ind the notes ihey gave. Qi^ESTION. General Gates having, in a-nfvvcr to General Biirgoj'nc's mcirage, given a folcmi) affirmation on iiis honour, that no detachment has been made {ro\w his army durint^ the negociation of the treaty, is the treaty, in ir^refcnt fituation, binding on this army, or is the prneral's honour engagetl tor the figning it ? [Here follow the names of the officers as vhey voted.] The lieutenant general's opinion being clear, that he is not bound by what has pafTed, he would not execute the treaty ujion the fole co-fideration of t^- point of honour, notwithftanding the rcrpc(flable maj Tity againll him. He is likewife far from being convinced that this army, by great exertions and by great enduring in point of provifions, might not yet be relieved ; but he is com- pelled to yield on the following confiderations. 'I he treaty was g'!i'crally thought a moll: advantageous one before the intelligence arrived. ']1iat intelligence is refuted, and ocular demonflration of its falfity pledged as far as relates to General Gates's force ; the other parts arc only founded on hearfay, and not to be depended upon. Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the dirtance is fuch as to render any relief from him improbable during the time our provifions could be made to lait. ... declaies his poll untenable, and fays, if this convention is not figned, he apprehends there will be confiderable defertion. ---_■>. fays he thinks the 47th regiment not to be depended on. __.---. is of the lame opinion. -._-_.. thinks the SiA regiment is dilheartcned by the fituation of their pofb, ^nd not equal to their former exertions. Several officers think the m,en in general feem to have got the convention in their Jieads as defirable. Many of the bell officers are abfent by ficknefs and wounds from all the corps. Though the other officers at the head of the Britifh corp? think they can unfwer for the fpirit of their men, i| attacked on their prefent ground, it is evident the molt ^ fonguine do not think any part of the army in that elevation and alacrity of fpirit ne- cefTary for undertaking dcfperate cnterprizes. To break ofi'the treaty now renders a future renewal of it hopelefs, as our condi- tion muft every hour grow worfe. A defeat is fatal to ihe army. A vidlory docs not fave it, as they have neither provifions to afivance nor retreat againft an enemy who by experience we know are ■capable of rallying at every advantageous polT. And that the life and property of every provincial and dependant of this army deperids upon the execution of this treaty. POSTSCRIPT f of the ojjifers. APPENDIX. POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX. [Thougli the following Letters arc not ref-rred to in any Part of the Defence, it is hopejjpihey will not be deemed fuperfluous,] hi as our condi- ^OSTSCRIPT EstraSl of a LetUr from Major G^vw^/ Phillips, to Lieutenant General 'Qurgoyn'', v IVJ'''iulen Oiarinti m^^ ]X 1= ^ ;.*. .# ..% «■ 1» L .\ ]V ./ l/i, ,' i <" Tl02\r ,tf^ V II E liT <> N /■iiJnTiRKiAinKR rf4(/ /'// MaJOK Gk. a • 'JlKlHESKI. , /•JiK/ri/wJ /tvVP"V;i don . [rTjrr- Biiiiwiiimiiiwiimiin Sc.iLK Of' too J'art\f to nn Inrfi . ■u 'ii'tJ .foo doo lioo .JBHEIMIM iniif .Timmmimm m mimimiiimn ^ IIIIUHIIIIIIIIII ^ Feh.^ I f 1711(1. Ar /VJ-'iu/fn Oiarint) Ov/.Jt- . r~-T I i I - I. M ^, — ^ III A* * • T A J . » 5 J, i * ■ , ^* « ».ji' . } ! i * 5.* (9 ^ 11' »•!. uo tD 1.(1 »*» 4 a la I "* 1 ,0 4 V .\.*.tk a. 1^ • i\ % Position oihu. dktaiiimkn r N> A KM STOCK lUNir UkN N I N(". TON W»f .i *- 1„ *V/ t/l, lO' '.\l„o;,.„ ijj^ . Druuii /', Lieut'. Diirnloptl Kn^iHnr. ^ Knjvnivoil l>_v \V." K„l».n |7H<). ft.; : .« .'. 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