IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) V /. '<° C^x A w- ^<5 1.0 I.I 1.25 !riil IIM |4£ IIII^O I- ,. — — ^— IIIW 1-4 IIIIII.6 V] <^ /a * o e^ ^i^^V a^A Photographic Sciences Corporation 33 WIST MAIN STRUT WEBSTER, NY. MS80 (716) 872-4503 CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques I QAft Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographicaily unique, which may alter any of £he images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked baiow. L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a ete possible de se procurer. 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Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que cortaines pages blanches ajoutAes lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque ceia itait possible, ces pages n'ont pas M film^es. D D D D D D D Pagus damaged/ Pages endommag^es Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurees et/ou pellicu'des Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages ddcolor^es, tachet^es ou piquees Pages detached/ Pages ddtachees Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of print varies/ Qualiti inigale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du mat. government ; and having been deliberately adop- ted and continued, will be considered as such, by the British and by posterity. The claim of Captain Bradley to domiftion within his buoyt^ is probatiy conformable to his idea of the doctrine maintained in the case of the Chesapeake ; Capttun Bradley insisting that a uati:nkno\vn vessels, attempting to escape from search, may stJll »lo mischief. A? little also is the Pvoclamation required as a measure of PoHce, for so Mr. Monroe calls it ; for the British iatcly have given little offence in port, having gone out of port to attack the Chesapeake, and having, while in port, surrender. «xi deserters to American ofJicers. The Proclamation then, instead of being a measure of precaution or of security, or of police, on the contrar)-, fir events atonement to the national honr our, and renders peace jmd every thing else uncertain. It is erroneous to say, that the l^resident lost no time, in ecnding to Mr, Monroe. He did lose time ; perhaps because he was digesting provisional measures with Turueau, a plan of which might have been forwarded to France, by the same vessel. In any event, Mr. Monroe learned all his first neilb . pr\ the svihj<;4 from Wv^ British government, in London. ^, The President affected to feel justified by the British j[)rc« cedents ; but incorrectly. He was not, like the British, con- tent with demands. He took active measures j and in this, de- parted from the British precedents, and lost all the benefit o{ the plea ; for the British never redressed their o-,vn wrongs iu whole or in part. He seema not io understand the theoiy of the cases, in consequence of omitting to distinguish between c government and its ( fficers ; and of forgetting the conduct ren- dered necessary, where the scene of an offence is distant, witU respect to either of the two governments concerned. Had he used his Proclamation as a precautionary measure, till the Brit- ish dispositions on the subject were seen, and had it, when these were found favourable, been recalled, even this would have been hardly correct ; but it would have been less wrong than persisting in the Proclamation, when atonement was promised, and a special messenger sent to give it The situation of the United States, with an ocean lying between them and the pow- ers of Europe, makes it indispensable, that the true doctrine of the law of nations, in these cases, should be kno^-'n - cur-* ily by those who guide our national affkirs. If on sr t!:e kind in question, we assume a right of self-r er temporary or permanent, so will the European questions as to wrongs offered, and the remedic.- wrongs will no longer be left between government and .i^.. .. mehty but will descend to the hands of individuals, and be de^ cided according to private passions or private interests. The concerns of Turk's Island, Nootka Sound, and Falkland's Isl- ands, mentioned by Mr. Madison, were each transactions con- summated abroad in all their fmrts ; and when the news of them arrived, Britain added to thero no new act of her o>vn j but made a raeie rfd-mcnrf, that every thing should be put into its ibririer condition ; a -'emand which was complied with. These were affairs of words, not of acts ; and Great Britain assumed no rjght, in the Jirat instance, of taking to herself redress, precau- Uon or security, or any thing of the kind. Consequently every case, cited from the British makes against us, and for th. Brit- isK. These, it may be added, a/(/ifcr settled point*, in Europ-? * »n-u are not so hprc, bqf;aai^ our gov<;nimeht h new. 3 of IrWf ! There is another reason ftgainst resorting to overt acts, be- fore negotiation has been tried, and it muchlsoncems the tran- quillity of nations that it should be generally and habitually ob- ferved. While tilings hold the shripe of discasion, consider- ations of prudence may operate on both sides, arguments uad pretensions canvassed in Cabinets being easily retracted ; but not so overt acts, which pledge the authors of them to their subjects, their antagonists and tlie worlr* at large, including posterity. The proposition for engaging the British government tb make the expeiiment of giving up the search of merchant ves- sels for their seamen, is expressed in terms of levity^ in which it 19. dangerous to indulge in a natibnal document. If Mr. Fox's admbistration, however, rt«:/y thought of temfr' Hzing tm. this head, other administrations in England are not likely to follow the example. The laws of modem maritime nations nniversally allow the search of merchant vessels, in order to detect enemy's property and men ; and for a still stronger reason may they search them to detect their own men, and above all, their own deserters. All seamen, it must also be remem- bered, by universal consent, are considered ar military men ; these and a few marines making the whole crews of vessels of war, consequently the search after seamen is not a branch of munidtml law, Ss Mr. Madison asserts ; but of belUgerent and general law. All foreign nations act Upon this rule, both for seamen and for deserters ; and so will America for deserters^ at least, in cases of war occurring en her side. On the whole, it is a very dangerous experiment cO attempt a course of ac- tion against the usual laws of nations, in matters respectmg a state of war. A wantonness of legislation in this respect, with- out regard to established practice, even for introducing pacif- ick maxims, may lead to war, before we are aware of it. Our President may propose new laws at 1 me, which liis Congress may adopt ; but abroad, we must, for the present, follow the laws observed by others. It is not necessarily true, that in the final adjustmimt "S^ a daspute, every thing is to be given up to the party 7fr,f injur. ed. If self-reparation hfts been attempted in the Interim, and assumed in too high a tone and measure, deduction ir.ay be claimed for this. Ber ides, as far as regards the Chesupeake, the first offence lay in harbourh-g deserters , next in denying their being on board ; and lastly in going to sea with a part of them, in face of tlic very squadron, from which they were ob- tained. This might be enforced by observing, that Britain, on the other side, expresses " sorrow" and « regret" at the issue ; disavows the act of h-i^r offi.:er ; gives fixed orders as to the future ; directs a delicate conduct in searching merchantmen, on the personal responsibility of the Captain ; and sends a special minister of apology to America, without obtaining a single stipulation on her side beforehand. The first thing whicA she asked, namely a separation of questions, was for a time refused ; and the second proposition for a recall of the Proclamation, was rejected, unless upon conditions. It must not be said that there were other grievances to be complained of to this special minister ; for Mr. Monroe had agreed to lay aside the mention of any, except the two ques- tions as to the Chesapeak* and as to the search j and Mr. Mc-aison had abandoned the question as to the search also, say- ing that « sefiaration (that is of the question} was fully accom- plished." Mr, Madison, however, perpetually referred Mr. Rose to other matters. He also asserted that the grievance was even now continUea, b*^cau9e the men taken were not re- turned J though as the men had been demanded by Mr. Mon- roe, and no objection was made on the subject; tb? surrender v/as of cours?, as to the three men still living. Still less is it to be said, because Britain talks so much of the Proclamation, that she only sent a messenger to get theii Proclamation withdra^\'n. For Mr. Rose refuses to obtain its recall by sacrificing what we call punctiio, as being contrary to his orders. Thus the Biitish government prefers sentiment to interest ; and thinks (as she thought of old, and as Mr. Madison commends htr for thinking) that « reparation would lose its value by being conditional." Nor ought we to wonder at the afftur breaking off upon a point of honour, for wh«t is ft AG tiiu whole affair of the Chesapeake, on one side as well as the other, but afioint of ho7iour. The clanger of allowing a 'power of self-reparation to operate, has been mentioned ; and it is repeated tnat it is tiine that the people of this country should become sensible to this danger. Self-reparation was made in the case ( f Captahi Whitby's squadron, without mn'^.h incon- venience, ■because the conpern was small ; but even then, the measure ought to have been accompanied with an apology for using it ; but when the measure is made genera)., and when from the dis:tance of the two governments, it must last for aia- ny months, the case is widely changed. Thus, the general Proclamation, which was imposed in July 1307, has lasted nearly twelve months ; while nothing has. been done to shut out the French or Spanish navies from our ports, notwithstand- ing all their enormities. Mr. Madison asserts tliat Mr. Canning's letter of Septem* bcr 23d, 1807, had in it " pregnant indications that other ques- tions and conditions may liave been contemplated, which would be fbuiid utterly irreconcileable with the sentiments of the Am- Giican nation.'' This certainly ought not to allude to any ol the following observations by Mr, Canning; which yet seem all to which it can allude ; the rest having been repeated on other occusiona, during the ncgoUation, without material com- i^icnt. ,/,.., «,rir,5t ;«-~Ii. is afiirmed by Mr. Canning, tha: the reason fur itii}uiry{n\:4.Q August 8th imi) asto the Produination, wj,^\o uaeertaiu the umaunt gf reparation still due, if retaliation had occurred ; a!id tljc rather, as tlw enemy's vesiicln of war still entered Jjig American port;i, from wluch those of the British Averc cKcluded. Secoiully ^— It was also asked whether the Proclainatii^^ would be withth-awn on tlxc disavowal of the act uf Admit-Ill U^ikley ; Uic Biitish always distinguish bg be- tween Ihp rtvtianvition, as the J/ufncan reriedy assumed for tjiii act, and the concessions to accom/iany thin dinavoiual^ as tl»c Brltinh rcnitdy offered for it. Thirdly ;--It is also fuithcr *^ed, wliat WA^ intciule'l by saying that Admiral Berkley had « naod, aa if Iju hud power to niiike war and decide the cai:B- cs of war ; for this being complained of by the Presidelii, it indicated the supposition of further circumstances existing, not ye* known to the British ministr)'. Fourthly ;—Thougii it is allowed that Admiral BerkI y was in every event wrong, yet it is said, that if there were deserters in the case, the employ- ment and the detention of British seamen, against consent, would be wrong, though a national American vessel were con- cerned in it ; and would have become & mutter between gov- ernment and government (a phrase afterwards repesrted) as be- ing an act of hostility in itself, and- as affecting the quantum of reparation. Fifthly ;— -If the question was to be goveiired by popular fceKngs, %Yhich are much rcfeiTcd to'liy Mr. Monroe, it is intimated that the American government, by referring so- much to those feelings, would make itself responsible for various papular measures, "which there was no desire of attributing to' it." Sixthly ; — As to tlie main question, it is obsei ved^ that the w y to it was smoothed by the disavowals already voliintar-' ily given ; nothing more remaining, but to ascertain the facts ot the case, and fn'o/wrrion the reparation to the wrong. Sev- rnthly ; — At the same time an unqjialified refusal is given to All attempts to couple the question of search with that of the Ches- apeake, the British refusing to pay a price for an amicable ad- justment, and to make conditions for being admitted to a rep- aration. Kighthly ;— When the special mission is armounced, tt is said, that a treaty on the «pOt would be preferred ; but that a special minister would not be allowed to treat as to the search of mtrchnnt vessels. It I'emains to be shewn how these particulai-s justify Mr. Madison's assevtioRB ; or by what oth<*- jiarts of Mr. Canning's letter they will be justiHed. LiBKRrv otf THE Skas Is cWefly valued, as including libef»i ty of attending to commerce by scd t but what is this, if liberty to cor.imerce is refused by land 9 Our customers d6 tint five upon the scaB, but on bhore, and within land ; and Bonaparte 'hecks commerce, not only by seb, but in ports, and within ev- T=i^ F- 7pran territory, which he can appriiwrh. « He does not iMi merely check commeroe to Britain, or in British comr,iodities> but • he checks Amrrici.n cummrrce, thouph dii>pctcd to the ports -of liis own allies, as at Leghorn, Hamburg, and otlier places, where our property has suffered so much by his orders. But liberty of the seas is only a question during loavy and will vary in eyery war. In Russia it varies with every new sovereign, and with every new fancy of each sovereign. It is there that armed neutralities have sprung up, in defence of the commerce of the seas ; though the Russians, comparatively, have no merchant vessels. Of course, it has been with Rus- sia a mere political pretext, adopted and rejected as suited her paiticular views, at the momtnt— the Russians laughing at the nations which were made dupes by it. They resemble tlie Virgiraans, who slight our navigation in theory, and hate it in reality, yet are the hottest for quarreling about it. After it had been maintained by us, with great zeal, that free vessete made free goods, Mr. Jefferson, while secretary of state, was obliged to abandon the doctrine, on the part of the United States. France, like Russia and America, under different circum- stances, will also equally vary the doctrine. Let France be at war witli a weaker maritime power, and France will directly plead against the liberty of the seas ; just as she has plead for civil liberty, during the first moments of her revolution, then acted against it, and now openly reprobates it, even in ^ords. It costs France noUiing to pretend, to abandon, to as- sert and to deny. Lastly, we ourselves, who now plead for the liberty of the seas, because it would benefit us, as carriers and adventurers, when we become concerned in war, may then be as wai-m against it, as we are now for it. Should the English, en the other hand, now be forced to give up the point, because of their weakness, they would necessarily return to it again, when they were arong, and again in a state of war, as every powerful maritime state will always do. If therefore, we go to war for this principle, it would be in connection witli allies, who might change hides during the course of it, or wIk) might make peace between themselves, as soon as we had beconie u partner in the war ; or else the United States might, for the trioment, ol>tain the acknowledgment of the principle, tmd by ■ \ 13 the time the next war came, might see it abandoned by the very parties, wlio fought for it, or we ourselves might abandon it among the rest. One may as well be fighting for the shape of a cloud, or for the course of the wind j for neither of these is more variable than some of these pretended principles, as to neutrals, in time of war. In tlie course of our recent controversies with Britain, the character of our administration and its influence ou the temper of the countiy, has been distinctly marked by the manner in which both have been affected by the Berlin Decree and the re- taliating orders ; the first interdicting all our commerce with the British Isles and the second with the European ports under the power of France. For a considerable time after the promulgation of the former, it was uncertain liow the French government would interpret its owu decree, which seemed to have been composed with a studied ambiguity ; — the imputietice of the Emperour, however, disclosed in Septemb:r last, his determination to subject Neu- trals to all the rigours which the terms of the decree imported. There was fiom that time no re*8onable doubt that our ships would be liable to the penalties of disfranchisement and forfeit- ure for violating a blockade, which could exist only by a Procla- mation — Under these circumstances, the British government issued their orders of Council to retaliate on their enemy the measures he had adopted against tliem, and thus the commerce of neutrals, with each of tfciose powers, is proscribed by the other. I6 is important here to remark the singular complacency we have manife"t'»d under the Berlin decree, as if we had reserved all our indignation for the British orders ;-^ut these opposite sentiments, so plainly misplaced, are not more cxtiaordinary thim the reasons by which they are sometimes vindicated. It is urged as an apology for the French, that they cannot per- petrate on the sea, all the violence they thrcatcn> while the Bri- tish orders may he executed in a nianner that leavci little- or no foom for escape. It is stated, that a^jainst capture by French cfuiaers, ot our vessels bound to or from an F.ngUsh port, insuianre f,':- 4i! Ml might be effected for five per cent, while bn the bther hand, those bound :to or from a French port, could not be injured against EngUsh cruisers for fifty per cent^These facts being, admitted, let them be applied to the known principles of publick law ',^hat la^^ nakkh, when: 4t sanctions the practice of block- adc, takes care to confine its rights and firivUegea strictly to those -who actually make an investment 6y such A naval force as can five- vfnt or fiuniih transgres6ion...r,ii amiai\4£mtM ' i»fo£i..if . But enough is sfud on this point to prove, that the Berlin de- eree cannot be jusfified or even .palliated on ordinary principlesiy there has, however, been a pretended excuse for it, set up in the plea tliat the Btltish ruU of ir5€ tvas such a neno ar^d eact^^va- rant doctrine, us would authorize the French to stop all trade with Great Britam.-Oneof the Edinburgh Reviewers has ad- vanced something like this in October 1807, and it has been re- peated by a senator of the United States in a publick letter. As the former writer had discussed the general principle w?th no common ability in April, 1806, and the latter must have had opportunity to examine it fully and to profit by the lights of oth- ers, it may be thought exti-aordinary that such a groundless plea fehould be so pertinaciously maintained. Both these writers ought to have known that by the maritime code of France, pronmlgated ih the beginning of the last centu- ry, and its essential principles sanctioned anew, in 1744 it is de- clared, that all property laden in the port of an enemy by a neu- tral, and bound .to any count.y whatsoever, except the country v[ the suKl neuti ,1, is good prize, ulthoujvh the property should bona fide belong to the neutral ;-4ind that evety article, the growth or manufacture of an enemy, found going from n neu- tral to an ehcmy'3 port is also good prize ; which, with otlw r declarations and provisions of a similur spirit, and some still more severe toward neutrals, are vindicated on the ground of a right, thus to injure the comme,-ce of an cnemv. It is not proi)osed here, to examine the merits or demerits of these varii- oua' dnims of l>clligcrent9, n.ir to show what is or oucht tn h^ ronsKlej-cfl a« tl,^ law of nations, in regard to the conflictinjt claims of neutrals and b- Higerents, hxit to shew that tte *^h«t#f . 15 against Great Britain, of having set up new and extravajvaut doc- triiies, is not supported by the history of facts. The right of a bel- ligerent to prevent a trade not open to neutrals in peace/, no^ a «e«, ^«zm ; and although it is difficult to enforce it in some cases, without encroaching on^ the acknowledged rights of neutrals to carry on their accustomed trade ; therefore its 'exercise ought to be limited. Yet, it is certain, that in ©ne important branch of trade, the right of prohibition is allowed to the bellig- ent. The Russian treaty of 1801, admits that the trade of an enemy colony wuix its parent state, may be lawfully interdicted by the belligerent. Whoever, wiUi tliis fact, will recollect the circumstances of the times, and the chivali-ous spirit with which Russia han for thirty years offered herself as the champion of neutral rights, must be convinced that this point could have been yielded by Russia, only to a demonstration of its propriety. It is well known that Bonaparte had formed a precise plan for distressing Britain, which he caused his European dependent allies to adopt, and the state in which we now are, seems to put us fairly in a class with those allies. We have passed laws to prevent the introduction of the commodities of Britain ; we Tch\^t the supply of her Colonies in American, English and even neu- tral Vessels, imd by land as well as by sea ; we deny the use of our ports and even common hospitality to her Ships, while our harbours are opentotlie Ships ofovefy other nation. Now all this is little short of what is done in Europe. It is much more however than the people of die United States would have been willing to do, if they had not been deceived, and in some sort, taken by surprise ; or if what is done hud been proposed at once, instead of being the effects of several measures, the motives ot which were not imdcrstood. Such is the agreement of our conduct with French wishes, as to trade and intercourse with the British. But Bonaparte has demanded tribute in addition : and he has got tribute from us» S4s he has got it from many nations in Europe ; but this, like ev- ei7 thing else obtained of us by him, he has got undtr false names. - Fi^uice""- says Mr. Madison, «' wants money and luuathaveit"; for Mr. Mudisun has perfect imelligence of what Ei-ancc wants, though the intelligence is refused to Congress mi 16. In addition to the list before given of the measures adopted by our government to injure England, let us now enumerate those which have furnished Bonaparte with tribute. Thirteen millions balance of the payment for Louisi^ma ;— two millions more for secret purposes ; and three quarters of a million reported to be due, for Besumarchais's claim ; besides a surrender of all claims of indemnity for spoliations.— These are the sacrifices we make to propitiate Bonaparte. But the Embargo is a new subject to explain the temper and character of Mr. Jefferson. It has long been wished by some to have the trade between the United States and the rest of the world,, at all times. Carried on in foreign vessels, that all the quarrels attendant upon navigation might rest with foreigners, Mr. Jefferson sa>is " perhaps to remove, as much as possible, the " occasion of making war, it might be better for us to abandon " the ocean alto^ther ; that being the element whereon we shall " be piincipally exposed to jostle with other nations': to leave " to others to bring what we shall want, and to carry what we " can spare. This would make us invulnerable to Euro/ie, by " offering none of our property to their prize, and would turn all " our citizens to the cultivation of the soil ; and I repeat it again, " cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous and independent " citizens." But let us now look back to Mr. Jefferson's practice, compared with his theory, that we may judge of his consistency and sin- cerity. He excludes foreign vessels from American ports ; puts jm end to the exchange of home commodities for foreign ; and would create manufacturers in America* But say the Presi- dent's friends, by shutting .mt foi-cign merchant vessels, he de- signs to bring such distress on the nations at war, in Europe, that they will restore to us our neutral irade ; the interruption of neutral trade being, in effect, the constant subject of his com- plaint. Thus Mr. Jefferson wishes the United states to carry on all the trade of the worlds in nuar time ; a tdme when tradt is known to be so dangerous ; while he makes light of the trade "U, uiui v.'iVicn iiii^nt icauiiy pass, io ob- tain a temporary possession of the most precarious of all tradi^s. ir Ki would TOtotarily abantethc'Jiest, and o-en annihilate fl,.t . T,^.' r. '■ "' ■"^"f^'o"-. " home, Which i, never ac- comphshedbut upon the most permanent basis, and after great sucnnceSi ,^^!;,^m, .v ^^ live^I-/t'""r '"'^'*" '^' '"'*»»<'■"«" and m^A^ckmm snlr , ^i T' "" ""= ''"""""-"g te-Pest in Europe hi spent ..self. Dm does not Mr. Jeffers^ know that .11 experi- • 2li%^^T "T'"" "' n«»».6e.ures in a count., not p«. MalufiLL' ' ' *«""'"i"«'-»d poverty ofitsIabouL. M^ufacture, are u,ua„y confined .„ p„pn,ou, countries, pos- :rl S.T ' ::;' "'""P"""™"- f- staining raw maL. and after Jt ha« been conunued many yearc. So true is it tha hatm^ufacturers6a„„otingeneralbeim^ortcd,fi.omothercoun. mes.„,o Amenca and employed as such with any lasting success. Mr. Jeffers„h,ho.vever,mus. not pretend that foreign articles are bou^l.. ^together with the product, of ,^„w,„.„ ,h,„ ^^ ^^ m Mr. GuUaUu s Reports, and daily experience, that navigation. TZ: TTT' »1'""'^«™" «">-='•!". '-".bcr, pitch and U, , potash and other modes of paying foreigner, are employed, m add,..on. Amer,ca, however, warns arUdes, .hlch Zclcl ^.anufacures cannot furnUH, as not being of the natu,^ of man- facuresor a, coming from abroad. The tropical fruits .nd produc s as colTec, sugar, and many other articles required in the mu die and northern states come from foreign countries. So do the raw matenals of many of our impo,tant n.anufeetures ; as a pmcpal part of our iron and copper a.,d .11 our tin. If ,re enter ...to a war with Europe, while the United State, remain scantily prov.ded with roads and canals, and have few rivers run ».n^ north and south, the southern state, eanno, easily , end thc,r cotton, r.ce, tobacco and indigo to the north ; nor can 4, .".«u,c autes e„„iy disfibute their flour to the res. ; nor will the northern state, return woolens, even U.ough they shouH 1? iBut before the new arraigenients take effect, what ia to suj^ fciy i? wants of this great people, occasioned by the interrup- tion of ail intercourse with other countries ? wha^is to become of live immense pf operty devoted to the pursuit of the old system j as^sfiipping, warehouses, wharves, and the pi'Ofessionai habits of «{«neti, fishermen, merchants, storekeepers, clerks, Sec. And i^ivsii things shall return to their channel, after the demoralizing tempest in Europe is over, who is to pay for the abandoned loom ajid \yorkshop, and for the time lost in learning new trades, and Uie ' clumsy work then on hand, which will have lost its mar- Read, too, what Mr. JefFerson says of the virtues of the hus- bandman, and the.vices of the manufacturer, and see how far it agrees with his praises of his new system. " Those who la- « hour in the earth (says he) are the chosen people of God, i? « if ever he had a chosen /icc/ile*** Dependence on manufactures «< begets subservience and venality ; suffocates the germ of vir- f- tue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition. While K we have land to labour then, let us never wish to see our citi- « zens occupied at a AVork bench, or twirling a distaff. Carpen- « ters, masons and smiths are/ wantirii^ ii) husbandry : but for <' the pcneral operations of manufacture, let our workshops << remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and mnte- " rials to workmen there, than to bring them to the provisions ♦^ and materials, and with them, their manneis and principle^ '< The loss of the trayifsjiortutwnoi coimnodities across the atlantick *' will be made up in happiness and permanence of government." (For these passages see Mr. Jefferson's notes on Vii-ginia.) There is one w^y only of making all these contradictions consistent; Avliich is to suppose it to be a settled plan with Mr, Jefferson, that Great Britain is to be injured ; though in doing it, a smaller injury should ari^e.to France and 5j>pain,anda still greater one to our own country. In this way wc con explain tftie several inconsistencies, of undervaluing commerce and nav- Igadott on one hand, and struggling for an undue share of them on the other; of coimplaining of interruptions to trade by sea i thrm needlfcfisly multiplying ihoie interruptions by sea, ai\d add- 19 ing those by land' also ; of pretendifig ~fo \vislLT6r pea^^^ all the world, by a modest, inoffensive conduct, aCnd then thVow^ jrig obstacles in the way of settling a mere point of hoitour, with Great-Britain ; of punishing upon that devoted nation the disa- vowed act of an individual, and of confouiiding the two ylky4^M ^repairing the Wrong, and after talcing the worst of th6 tW way^, Xthat of self-repai^tion) -'jjectmg the offer of rejf)arriti6ft' offer^ t>y Great Britain herself. Here is ttie secret then of prtthil»t- ihg British ithportsand exports, and shutting tiieli^*nfett'*f 'war but of our harbours j and here tot) is the set:ref;«T paying trlbtil^ inoiiey t6 Francef '^ ■'"''*' ''^- -^P^- »«s bi^Uxmm^ sx m t^* li \H are asked, whence arises this enmity to Great !BfitSyS, 'the reply is easy. It pdxtly depends on old prejudiees^^opertfl:- ing with the President agafaist England, and in favoti^t>r*Ffance^ partly from his belief in the speedy downfaj of Englaha'j 'and partly on liis design to hold Loui'sixma, withoiut aqiia^reP.* ^^^^; Mr.' Jefferson's prejudices against Great Britain,^ s^d^hfiCit' tachment to France, witli ' the caiuses bf eacft^ are ibd nbibrnkfik to be dwelt upon. He Certainly would never have rgpaii*^' the Bfer9eau for England^ and he hever would hav« desisted the apologies of "Mr. Crmning and Mr. fiose, had" they cojSd from France. He would hear of the ruin of Engltind ■^fBi ^trt^ipla- cency, and be overwhelmed with the downftiH of^FrcnfcKt^Wer. Thi^ deference for Fi'an'iie is'fhdulfedj vfitho'lit an^ ' 'WixtdVcs of pinidence or decency. Airf c^ess of poiJir^Tj in PrhrA^e oii^. to prevent measures calcoW^iJ'to weake'ri'i&t5'^ij'lieiKfe*rfy reiriaifiihg bpponem; aiid a' fear of Fraiice onght-lotfrtxhtls'at every poini. ''ftut we" neither i^iit^^ct ifengland nor oiii-aefh^s, im this occasion. TJic ^Wissflst talumnies and' the ihiSti hcJitid , imprecatjoris} i& fal^^ aiid foolish as they ai¥'ft)ul, wpi to every body. The messages of th^ Presiident to Qpngress ag^st Spain will pot be forgotten j the suj^Uea to Saint Domingo, before and since the prohibitory act ; the victories over the Insurgent and Ber^eau j the c^uarrels betweeivour citizeiisand the Frfsnch ^nd Spaniards at New Or- leans and al x>f spreading sedition among her subjects. She re- members how near Aaron Burr was to succeeding, which shew that there is danger, even from the individmh of ourcountry But a new and considerable alarm b oftered by the discoVeiy that some of the southern parts of Louisiana may be made into a colony for raising sugar, rum and other tropical productions ; a colony wh'ch the British cannot easily attack j which will never went pro^dsion8, lumber or ships, either in peace or in war; which may be cultivated to any extent and must outstrip the West Indies ; a cQlony» in short, of whicK^ Mr. JefTerson fondly but weakly sung the dangerous praises. The whole Xuropean system of colonization, under a. mother country is. in- deed put into jeopardy, by a nation established in tljenew worW, on independent and republican principles, and which threatenf! equally by its power or its example to detach the dependent col- onies from their relationship to Europe. This is a jealousy tp which a man like Bonaparte must be particularly sensible;; his plan being to subjugate the worlds and particularly America, be- cause this Continent, in all itS parts, has always been considered, among th,e Princes of Euro^y asa mere appendage W the European- governments. ' . Birtl to take the matter in a ytt larger point of view ; a man with the haughty passi(Mis of Bon^arte will not befirtosee aney republican nation^ calling -itself the second commercial pf op}#, ^d leaving /ranee to name herself the third. Can he see sixiy 'thousand seamen attached to » confederated government, and placed in a condition so commanding as that ofthe United States, «nd bold and skilful enough to beat his own ships ?.t sea, in equal c6Jnbat$ ; and not wish at least to divide it ? When he knows th^t they double their numbers in twenty five years, ar4 have a passion for sea aflFairs, will he not wish, not metely tf> divide, but to( crush such a nation ? Why has he sueh an enmi^ tioB a^t«Vi>t)^er(u^ uvi xn^t^ne ^i^tFranGe} and ,th(rtw«Q; ^2 a rival to >'waice in poiftt$ so fcsfeeiitial to general aominioii, as til* world nour- stands constituted ? Of course, these ai^uments ^ppljr with still greater effect to a new and growing nation. These is something in RepublickS, also, peculiarl^^gfferisive to a tyrant: tJiey ca;i have the cncirgy of despotism, with mvch more permanence and resource. Republicks, by preferring "to look to the people, are a reproach to men, who never think' of mj but^ themselves. The United States, in a word, must have cause of apprehensiorf from Bonaparte, for Bonaparte has cause of appreheasion from the United States. But Bonapdrte ■hi.s uses for all our resources, as he has uses for all his dependents. Americans, if cdnq\iei-ed, wilU be calTeid up(!ni to inan his rfavy ; to furnish him with tinmsports to convby his troops to places the most distant ; to yield him provisions ; to give supplies to his colonies ; to aid him with recruiifi and horses for his armies, and to pay him taxes. Yes, the nation whieh fi^ught Great Britain for a stsmp Act, must be called upon to pay military taxes, of a magnitude which will deprive them of theif veiy capitals. Portugal, after paying tribute and shutting her ports, was not the less called upon to abandon to France its pUblick govemmf^nt, as well as the fortune of all its individ- uals.- • '■ - .'■,.;• ■ ■ .-,. ; ,., .■ ■y- C^ any thing of ♦his kind b©;e3.piBcted or feared from Eng- land ? England, some y>:ars since, did her utmost, aad was ex pellod from our tenitory. It ia; indeed certain that England «afl never affect our safetf, tfcough!. she may our eo^Viefiience. EftgfcSnd, except in India, has never assumed tlie tone attd habits ure the ob- jects of tyrants. A tyrant has nothing in vie\^ but dominioh and glory. Dominion is offered by America ; and the gloiy of Bonaparte will seem interested in acquiring that ^dominion. Principles of honor towai-ds America are utterly oiit of the que*- ^00. , It will be matter of cruel jeBt and sarcasm to Bonaparte to state how America has been duped, and what sums slie hft:* paid ; and that by paying back a part of her own tribute to ve- U&\ writers, i power has been obtained to levy fresh tribute mon-» ^*;t, Xo have deceived America will be called a stroke of poli- cy, and Bonaparte will boast of it, as a rake boasts of the seduc- ^iont, of credulous mnocence, or the warrior ollii» stratagems, and l^e politician of his intrigues. Perhaps there can be nothing more in point, thsm a cas^ Vr'luch ought to be well known to Mr. J. Q. Adams, as havinj^; been American minister at Berlin — ^that of the king of Prusda, We need not be stopped by .the remark, that the several king;s of Prussia have been petty Bonapartes, in their way ; and that jKVeral kings of Prussia have uniformly conquetsed or deceived others ; fortlie present king of Prussia never conquered nor de- ceived Bonaparte ; and his subjects were tljet victims, not the companions of bifi own malepracticcs. Conaeqiientiy Bonaparte had no excuse for 'hatiie did against Prussia* By a Manifes- to, which will descend to posterity, when party writings shall be forgotten ; by a Mt^iifesto almost unrivaled >n history for its ma- terials and its talents,: BjSfoapacte's honour was appealed to : and wh*t wa* Bwiapartei'flj aosTTiCr ? My brother of Prussia never u atri hav,. re.i that long paper of his minister ; its writer doc. not understand Fr.nch. Does Mr. Jefferson write shorter man- ifestos, or better understand French ; or has he a better eause, as bet^veen man and man ? He was not earlier to acknowledge the sovereignty of-Bonaparte than the king of Prussia, nor more faithful a. an ally ; yet Prussia was first entangled with her al- ^es, by the policy of Bonaparte ; then surrounded by troops and drxven into war ; and some of her generals and ministers being a)rt-upted, the wai was soon terminated by immense concessions. But the neace was as M'eacherous as the war ; the king is not allowed to govern the reru^unt of his dominions, nor even to re- n T 'I- ""^^' ' ""''' '^" '^"^'^"^ ^ ^"^ ^°"^^- °f his king, dom, dreading the still further losses of liberty and life. This is the usual consequence of hunting with lions. Holland, Swit- zerland the Italian governments, Rome, Portugal and Spain, have all followed or are following the same course, by rapid step.. And Mr. Jeiferson hopes to escape ! Bonaparte would conceive It an affront upon his understanding, to 1 ..ve it suppos- ed possible that we can escape. Mr. Jefferson presides over liU^tnf '""""''' "' "^ '' ""''^^'' -dh- country J^ZT"" •""' '' '' "''"' ^' ^ontradtction to those wh'o -) diftcu txcs in our trade are in consequence of the British Orders of Councih The J:n:,ar,o was laid before the ord tof Ttl' r" '""" ' "'' ^'^ --/--'•- - w.s pass be fore they were eontempluted. Thus the stoppage of American^ trade, .W.. ana ou..,ar,., had .othinn to do ;ith tCe ord2 against which there is so much ccnipUunt ; and much as th<.se orders are^omploin^d of, they arc less objectionable than the df> crecsof tl>e French, which are re-.trict^.vc, retrospective, and in- sultmg, m a degree, never »^fore examplod. The famous or- «lers of the British at the beginning of the French revolutiott •we.e issued under circumstances which strongly indicated a disposition in the .people of the '.nited States, to take a paw in the war, on the side of Ki«nce ; but aiter the pacificfc determina- t ^n oi our government was fairly knm*„, they w^a-e sooft dr- parted ff:>mi and the isgmica undo* tfeem, in son.e measuit 3-3 atonedi But there is this further difference betWden the former British orders and the fireaent French decrees ; namely, that at first, the French were considered by European nations as rebels ayidinsurgents^ and as not entitled to the common usages of war ; just as this free country consents to consider the negroes in Saint Domingo as insurgents, from whom supplies may be law* fully withheld, by an act of Congress. . - The dispute respecting neutrals will be best seen in a ifamiljar point of view. When nations go to war, the principle of des- troying each other* property, comforts and persons, is usually limited by certain rules ; and the writers on the law of nation* collect these rules from the great facts wliich pass in tlic world, and from the theories which these facts will bear to have con- nected with them. For those rules, however, to be valid in any given case, it is clear that they must be observed on both sides ; and that if one side departs from them, an equivalent, coimter-« vailing departure is authorized on the other. It is then that the interests of a third party come into view, namely, those of a neu- tral power. The neutral powers have a right to say, that if possible, matters ought to be so adjusted, as that their trade shall not be hurt. But if it so happens, that one of the belligerent powers goes to such extremities, that the other party cannot in- flict equivalent restraints, without injuring n utrals, neutral* must suffer ; but then they must be made only to suffer in a maimer, which shall shew that, not only tlie first, but the sole intention of every restriction is to hurt the enemy and not tho neutral. Active neutrals, in general, may reasonably expect to enjoy as much trade as before the war ; but if they are not con- tent with enjoying as much trade in kind as before the war, and much more in guanttfy, but ask to be admitted to enjoy new branches qf trader with one party, (such as the colony trade) which will destroy the balance between the belligerents, then tho other party may interfere to check this. Nor is it any thing im- reasonable for tlie party which checks the colonial trade ol its c - my under a neutnJ fij»g, to open its own ports to the same flag , II w for while this is a convenience to the belligerent, it is a like conven- ience to the neutral ; as is proved by neutrals availing themselves of the licence given for this puipose. If the antagonist attempts to prevent this, it is the affair of the neutral to determine wheth- er it will pursue the trade under this risk, or abandon it. Thus it appearB that the pompous reference to books, to the rules of 1756, to armed neutralities, and to the prior conduct of either of the belligerents, is made upon a false principle. When wars depart from common principles, the true rule to go by is the mode in which one of the belligerents treats the other, where it docs not invade the laws of humanity and justice, in points ■which are paramount even to the rights of man. To make things still more obvious, suppose that 1 have a pccuniaiy claim on a shop-keeper, whose trade is necessary to a large tract of country. "Will not the law of every nation permit me to seize his goods, and shut up his shop, even if the operation is distres- sing to all the neighbourhood ? Shall a belligerent then be sub- ject to every possible reproach and inconvenience from a neu- tral, because the neutral power does not gain all she wishes ? If we look at the tables of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Blodgett, at the increase of the revenue, capital and navigation, and at the low rate of our insurances, w^c shall see whether, in tact, we have suffered by this war, and whether that nation, which could have easily destroyed our commerce, has done it. It is so far other- ■"visc, that iL has been in the mouth of too many of our citizens, that it Avould be well for the United States, if Europe would al- ways remain at war ! Look at the lead too, which Bonaparte has always taken in refitrictioris, and the insulting language in which he has ahvnys imposed them. Remember, that if he confined himself for a time, to little more than menaces, it was because he hud not na\al force enough to do as much mischief as he then threatened. His undisguised language however is, thet he made the dccifc in November, 180G; and as ho knew no limits in favour (^f neutrals, nvhot he made it in 1806, so he known no limits ua tu its cxtentio!\,. The pcr.iuns in France, who had ar pretended to suppose that the decree had limits, were not thft proper persons to pronounce upon it. ' Let Mr JefFerson ans\yer these arguments. Let him shew that he has even remonstrated against French and Spanish vio*. lences on neutrals. Still more ; let him shew that he has retal- iated on account of them as he has retaliated against England. He well knows that he neither prohibits the entry of French goods, nor the entry of French vessels of war ; and if the Embargo is made a general one, it should be remem- bered, that it would be useles against England, were it oth- erwise ; because England, in case of open trade, would get the supplies she might need, in defiance of our opposition, either under the name of sMfimenta to the French, or as real or collu- bive prizes to her cruizers, or on the well known principle of forcible preemption. The French in the west Indies, according- ly, Avell understand the trick, and in a publick decree, call the Embargo a new firoof of the friendaMfi of the United States. When Mr. Armstrong foretold an Embargo, he was a prophet of the safe kind ; foretelling that which he probably knew ; for he might have known, if it were so, that the Embar- go was settled with those, whose will would govern. Thus, w hether France wants money or wants an Embargo, France must have it. . Our numerous writers on tlie law of nations ought to recol- lect, that if the United States are ever to take a lead in mari-- time aflairs, they will require the use of the same principles now asserted by England, because the only mode in which a countiy with many seamen and a small regular army can at- tack its enemies, will be by distressing their trade. And let it be added, that when they look to commercial firecedcnta as a rule fur the present day, tliey ought to say, when they have ff)und in history, that all the kingdoms of Europe have been \initcd agahist one. A world then divided into two parts, with an impetuous chief ut the head of one of the parta, is a nc^> case, which rcluscs to be tried strictly by old rules. And ii they are paiiticiani as well aa jtiriats^ let them s-ecollcfet how fat it has been political in this mighty struggle of one state against many, that a republican adminisii-ation, at the head of a federa- tion of seventeen republicks, should take the part of the many governed, by a single despot, and should have made her com- mercial regujations and commercial treaties subservient to the subjugation ofthe last state in Europe, which rerasins possess^ «4 of aSLV G«Vfi»«MBNT. ITXN 18.