'^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) A ^ /. fA L<'^ t/j 1.0 I.I 1.25 |50 ™^ BS U u 1.4 1^ 1.6 V] <^/7 'el A ^ ^ NT v^ / / '/ /«^ ">t^ % l\ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions institut canadien de microreproductions historiques 1980 V- Technical Notes / Notes techniques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Physical features of this copy which may alter any of the images in the reproduction are checked below. L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a 6x6 possible de se procurer. Certains ddfauts susceptibles de nuire d la qualit6 de la reproduction sont notds ci-dessous. a D Coloured covers/ Couvertures de couleur Coloured maps/ Cartes gdographiques en couleur Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages ddcolordes, tachetdes ou piqudes Tight binding (may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin)/ Reliure serrd (peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge int6rieure) n Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur Coloured plates/ Planches en couleur Show through/ Transparence Pages damaged/ Pages endommagdes Th po of fill Th CO or ap Th fill in; M in up bo fo n Additional comments/ Commentaires suppldmentaires Bibliographic Notes / Notes bibliographiques D D D D Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Bound with other material/ Reli6 avec d'autres documents Cover title missing/ Le titre de oouverture manque Plates missing/ Des planches manquent □ D D Pagination incorrect/ Erreurs de pagination Pages missing/ Des pages manquent Maps missing/ Des cartes gdographiques manquent D Additional comments/ Commentaires suppldmentaires The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol -^(meaning CONTINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever app.ies. Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettetd de I'exemplaire film6, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de fiimage. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la der- nidre image de t:haque microifiche, selon le cas: le symbols — ■»- signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole V signifie "FIN". The original copy was borrowed from, and filmed with, the kind consent of the following institution: Library of the Public Archives of Canada Maps or plates too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom., as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: L'exemplaire film6 fut reproduit grdce d la g6ndrosit6 de I'dtablissement prdteur suivant : La bibliothdque des Archives publiques du Canada Les cartes ou les planches trop grandes pour dtre reproduites en un seul clichd sont film6es d partir de Tangle supdrieure gauche, de gauche d droite et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n^cessaire. Le diagramme suivant illustre la mdthode : 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 / :.:■ :.;.N E ■ ■ > . ll ^ ll jij ll l '!•■ MA^OR GENERAL n Philip Schuyler, AND THE ' BU RGOYNE CAMPAIGN IN THE SUMMER What build « Nation's bulwarks high and iLs fouijdatians form; What make it jnighty to defy the foes that round it swarm ; Not Gold but only Men can make a People great and strong; Mp.n, who for Truth anil Honor's sake, slafid/ast and suffer hmg: Bravo men who watch \<»iile others sleep, who fight whilfc others By 'J'hey plant a nation's pillars deep and lift them to the skv. v TH^ A^ K N U A^ L A D D B E: S S DELIVBHEK TUESDAY EYENlNG, zd JANUARY, 1877, BBFURB THE New York Historical Society. (lEN: JOHN WATTS de PEYSTER. NEW YORK : HoLT" Ukcwmers, Printersj 151 William Strekt. 1877. RMVnMWM- .^h,,mmm^i^ t MAJOR (lENERAL PHILIP SCHUYLER. AND THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN IN THE STAMMER OF 1777, " No lipud more , I exerted myself to portray to you the gi'eatest patriot, citizen and sohlier developed by tlie " Slaveholders' Rebellion," for the sal- vation of the national integrity. The paper for this evening will he an erjually earnest endeavor to present to you the character of the pm*es^ patriot, tlie most self-sacrificing citizen, and by far the ablest military commander l)elonging to the State of New York, who was brought to the front bv the American Revolution — tlie seven years' war — to ushei- into being and establish that which George II. Tliomas did so much to preserve. The great man now to be considered, was by birth and descent a real son of the Kmpire State, aiui his prescient sagacity dis- cerned the very system which gave it« pre-eminence. He was a true Ivnickorltockor iti the fullest setise of tlic vv(»r(1, Iji-cd juid trained on its liattle-Helds wliioh constituted this colony, as it has been apj)ro)»riat('ly styled, the '* Cock-pit of America." Yes, New York was to the Thirteen Colonies, that which Jielgimn or Fliinders or the old Netherlands had and has been for centuries in Kurope, iJie l)attle-field between France and England. During our end)ryo condition, New York was to France and England exactly wluit Sicily Ijecaine in tiie projdietic language of Pyrrhus, for Rome and for (Jarthage, the truinijig-ground for British and French soldiers and geiuM-als, their regulars, proviiutials, and Colonial militia. U\ a similar school to that of Schuvlcr, and amouir numv of the l)rincipal actors on the fields of 1776 and 1777, Washington pre- pared himself for his extraordinary station, aiul with such ex- perience, Schuyler made himself the eminently useful man lie turned out to be — suthciently practical to ruin so renowned Ji professional asBurgoyne, to whom all the world imputed genins. He was the second Major Cireneral nominated by the Colonial Congress, second only in f/ntdti to Washington, and second to no man in the virtues which constitute one of nature's nol)ility — second in nothing that is roipusite to complete and make up tin; Christian gentleman. To whom, of all our continental nuijor generals, excepting Washington, would such language as this be applicable uidess t(t Major General Philip Schuyler. To those present, who may not be intimately acquainted with the history of the American llevohition, such language may ap- ])ear like exaggeration. No one will esteem it so when he hears the following attest from the pen of one of our most truthful, judicious, learned and reliable men — the venerable (;hancellor James Kent: "Among the pati'iots of the American Kevolution who as- serted the rights of their country in council, and erpudly vindicated its cause in the field, the name of Philip Schuyler stands pre-eminent. In acuteness of intellect, profourul thought, indefatigable activity, exhaustless energy, pure patriotism, and persevering and intrepid public efforts, lu^ had no superior." Again, this distinguished man remarked in a discourse before this very Society in 1828: "If the military life of General Schuyler was inferior in brilliancy to that of some others of his countrymen, none of them ever surpassed him in iidelity, activity, and devotedness to the service. The characteristic of all hia d incasuros was utility. They bore the stamp and unerring pre- cision of practical science. There was notiiing complicated in his character. It was cliaste and severe simplicity ; and, take him for all in all, he was one of the wisest and most ctHcient men, both in military and civil life, that the State oi- the Nation hai produced." To do justice to this theme and to present a proper l)iograph- ical sketch of this great and good man would far exceed the liii;ited poi'tion of time which can be allotted to any one at this Annual Meeting. Conse(piently it is advisable, if not absolutely nect'ssary to confine the attention to tliat period of his career which, although often written, has never been presented so clearly ill a condensed form as it should have been to enable his fell<)w citiz'jns generally to know how uiuch he did accomplish — hew nnu'h h«' deserved — how, v/hen success was about to crown his offorrs, his laurels were partly tilched fnmi him by a vain-glorious, but (' uming intriguer not "native here and to tlic manner oorn" — partly wrenched from him by a body of politicians, like all asso- ciatioiis of political parties incapable of understanding a fraidc and loyal soldier, and of comprehending a disinterested self-sacri- ficing 'uan. This intriguer, Horatio Gates, was perfectly under- stood by the true men of the day, and by his clearer headed associates in arms. They saw through the boasting Englishman, who so unblushingly appropriated, and who wore so arrogantly the laurds which belonged to the son of New York. ITow significant the words of his fi-iend, Charles Lee, when inriatcd with his ])revious good luck. Gates set off to assume the (tomiiiiind in tlie Carolinas, conferred npon him by Congress, without (.'(msulting Washington. " Beware," said Lee, " that your northern laurels do not change to southern willows." It did not recpiire either mnch time or opportunity to nn-eal Gates. lie showed himself at his full value at Camden, Avhen there was no self-forgetting Schuyler to prepare foi- him the way, and secure to him the victory. From the battle-field to wliich he hastened without a <»;enerars ])reparati()n, he was swept away amidst the first rout. Well might censure fall "very heavily on General Gates for the precipitation and distance of his i-etreat." His first stop was at Cbarlotte, ninety miles from the scene of action, and "he scaniely halted (or drew rein) until he reached Hillsborough," one hun- dred and eighty miles from Camden, It is said that "his hair white as lie Hew" wildly away from the scene of disastrous grew ^. defeat which he luul counted upon as the stage of aissiircd tnurnpli. From llillftborougli, lie wrote in the InnnblcHt wtyle to Wash- ington, deprecating a severe judgment on the part of tlie Com- mander-in-Chief, ami appealing to the generositv of the very man whom he had so wickedly labored to throw row of Gates, the wreath of victory placed there by the ignorant J*(ist, and restores it to its proper j^osition upon tiiat noble head, the shrine of a sagacity which, in spite of every obstacle, laade possible the surreiider of Burgoyne. This statement — all that is said here to-night — conies with double force and augmented emphasis from the lips of the speaker — a descendant, on every side, of families, who, with ccjual, if not of greater influence in the colony, were tlie political opponents of Scliu3der, through whose counsels all of them suf- fered, and at whose hands the sufferhigs of some of them were inflicted. Therefore, thus to exalt him, and thus to pronounce his eulogy, is a testimony of his deserving which should carry M'ith it a weight of conviction which might be withheld were these the utterances of a connection, an associate, a member of the same party, and consequently more or less a partisan. " riiilip Schuyler was a pure and devoted patriot, and although my enemy in his closing years," is the record of the noted Elka- nah Watson, written in 1792, "I freely accord my homage of admiration and gratitude.'" "In spite of personal difference and conflict of opinion, which produced coldness and alienation, the deep reverence of Mr. Wat- son for General Schuyler was never diminished." In his memoirs 1/ % I r ^ I he refers to liin I ill the foHowiiijj; liint^uage : " Generul Selmylor possessed the hijjjhest onler of talents, ♦ ♦ * » jj^ ^^j^g a profound nifithcniatician, and heUl a powerful pen ; his industry was unexampled ; liis business habits were accurate and system ati(!, acquired under the discipline of (general liradstreet, of the BritisJi army, who was a distin<;uishcd fi'iend of his family. Having extensively travelled and mintjjled with the first (iirdes of society, he was eminently refined in his sentiments and elegant in his address. "Had Providence blessed Piiilip Schuyler with the cJiuanimity of mind and self-contr(»l which distinguished Washington, he would have been his ecjual in all the elevated moral and military attributes of his character. America owed to S(!huyler a vast del)t of gratitude for his distinguished services, both in .the Cabinet and in the Field. » * ♦ "To the consummate strategic skill, and the wise Fabian pol- icy of Schuyler, we were indebted for the con(|uest of Burgoyne. At the moment in which he was about to reap the fruits of his sacrifices and labors he was superseded. When the laurels he had so well earnef' were almost within his grasp they were cruelly wrested from Jiun. He was sacrificed by a spirit of intrigue and insubordination in his army, cherished probably by the mutual animosity which existed between him and the men of New Fug- land, 'i'he idea generally prevailed in those states that Schuyler fostered a hereditary prejudice against them, while the stern and arbitrary measures which at times marked his military career, and had probably been imbibed in the discipline of tlie British army, did violence to their sentiments of etjuality and inde- pendence." If the anecdote which Mr. Watson relates to demonstrate the idea of discipline among the New England troops with whom he came in contact, was generally, and still prevalent in 1777, there is little woiuler that such as these and a real soldier could not agree. The narrator having been l)orn within riile shot of the 'Blarney Stone of New England," Plymouth's "consecrated rock," he can scarcely Ix; (diarged with prejudice against his brethren. "While passing through the camp" (at Cambridge), says lie, " I overheard a dialogue between a captain of the militia and one of his privates, which forcibly illustrated the character and condition of this army. ' Bill,' said the captain, ' go anngr her \vronp;K iij)on Kiijjliiiid. l']v('rvtliin<^ af — to see t]w arro'eneralH were tixed rather than upon the one in mil- itary costume, to whom thoy had to deliver u]» their side-arms. If Burgoyne could not t(?n(kn' his sword to^crhuyler in his modest citizen-suit, and if he could not surrender his army to him as to his DoviiiKil coiKjueror, he neverthele^^ conld still offer him his acknowledrsed by a French military critic, Lieut. Colonel M. Joly de St, \alier, who pub- lished his views more recently in 1803, 9 When he learned tliat General Burgoyne moved on Lake Chaniphiiu and occupied the post of Tic-onderoga, he remarked : " I then thought the English had perceived their mistake, and tliat their army was about to occupy the only post which was proper, and when I learned the arrival of Burgoyne at Ticondero- ga, 1 believed the Americans to be lost without remedy." But the short space of time allotted to this address compels the relincpiishment of criticism and an immediate consideration of the facts of the sunnner campaign of 1777. On the 22nd May, General Schuyler was assigned to the conmiand of the whole northern department. To the north, the extreme important point was Ticonderoga, 95 miles N. by E. of Albany; to tlie west. Fort Stanwix, on the site of the present city of Rome, 109 miles W. N. W. of the State capital. He roaclied Albany from Philadelphia on the Jkl June. Gates, with his usual inth July, and which Schuyler now had to encounter, and this same after it had been depleted mor.i tluHi one-ludf by battles, privations, desertions, labors and diseases within the next four months, when Gates appeared : like- wise between tlie force wliich Schuyler gathered up to arrest the victorious Burgoyne, and the gradiudly aggregated army whicli, when ready to crush the enemy, he was comj)elled through envy, ])rejudice, enmity, and other ba>?er passions, to turn over to Gates, nom'nmlhj to exercise command and actually to reap an unearned reward. Noin'mnUy is not an improper nor an unjust term, since even with his vast ])repouderance of numbers Gates would liave acc(jmj)lished little or nothing, had it not been foi- the superlative 10 Intrepidity, intelligence, energy and ability of Arnold, for wlioni Schuyler had applied in the first instance, and the experienced Morgan with his unerring sharp-shooters, themselves in influenplied with everything necessary to render them as effective for display as efticient for service. History sounds like romance in descril)ing the magnificent spectacle as it moved over this beauti- ful sheet of water, in the full brightness of one of the cloudless summer days which renders ordinary scenes glorious with its glovving golden sunliglit. Besides all the regular appliances for the immediate campaign, no army of the period was ever more admirably e(jui]>ped, a'nd in proportion to its numbers and to tlieir expected service, its train of artillery was complete. Out of its eight or nine thousand combatants, over seven thousand were either veterans or picked troops, under leaders of great experience. Its commander-in-chief stood very hig^i in his pro- fession, and he had made a brilliant record on the baidvs of tlie Tagus for dash, as well as judgment, under the eyes of a master in the art of war, the famous (.ount Schaumburg-ljippe, or Lippe- ]3uckeburg, who had been selected by Frederic the Great, or the Second Frederic, Prince Ferattle cries of savage allies, decked in the highest barl>aric ornament in whicli these revel on the war-path. In opposition, Schuyler was not able for weeks to colleirt over four thousand Continentals and militia. The latter were not only destitute of proper weapons, but of necessary ecpiipments and of adequate clothing. There were not suflicient bayonets among them for one-third of the nmskets, and many of the patriotic frontiersmen who responded to the despairing vv\ of the nation's birth-throes were so illy clad, that in the reports of the 11 day tlicy were justly (jualified as "naked." This, too, at a searton of very umisnal rain, in a region of forest and marsh-fog, wliere warm clothing is an absolute necessity for health at night, even in the dog days. When Hushed with victory and easy triumph, with the unre- sisted occupation of a fortress, esteemed ])v laymen a Gibraltar to close the rouie between Montreal and Albany, the British army concieutrated at Skenesborough, anton ; vet the anxious care of Congress concentred itself there. On the first of August, it relieved Schuyler from com- mand by an almost unanimous vote, and on the fourth, eleven states elected Gates his successor. Before he assumed the com- numd, Fort Stanwix was safe and the victory oi J>ennington achieved; yet it liastened to vote him all the powers and all the aid whicii Schuyler in liis moods of despondeiKry had entreated. Touched by the ringinjj ai)peals of Washington, thousamis of the men of Massachusetts, even innn the counties of Middlesex and Essex, were in motion towards Saratoga. Congress, overriding Washington's advice, gave Schuyler's successor plenary power to make requisitions for additional numlters of militia on New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Washingt any army ; Congress directed them to be sent innnediately assist Gates against the Indians, and Washington obeyed ao ]>romptly, that the order may seem to have been his own." Notwithstanding Gates had such a preponderating tV>rce in hand, some 10 to 1;{,U0() men, ( omparatively well organized and e({uipi)ed,with asnuuiymore hastening forward to re-enforce him, he was evidently nervous at Stillwater and as unwilling to engage 12 as was charged upon Sclinylcr, when the hitter had only 1 ,500 troops, imperfectly armed and found, at P'ort Edward. Ncverthe- lesB, all this time Gates was availinj; liiniselt" of Schuyler's plans without acknowledgment, while consulting Schuyler's friends and previous subordinates, so as to avoid the necessity of crediting any advice or assistance to its real suggestor and originator. More- over, if Arnold had not compelled him to tight, and had not fought, and had not thus precipitated events, a few days would have justified the remark of the French observer, viz : " Tliat Burgoyne's troops would eventually have been (obliged to beg Gates to accept their surrender, and accord them the means of prolonging life." Such was the condition of affairs for which Schuyler had prepared before the inti'iguing Gates arrived to profit by the desperate sitnation of the enemy. Schuyler, harassed and battled, the British full and feasting ; Gates, or rather his troops, fought them fasting or starving, both as regards ammunition for their guns and supplies for their mouths. Schuyler received intelligence of the evacuation of a position impregnable in the opinion of the masses, either at his home at Saratoga, or on his way to Fort Edward. Could any experienced ofhcer have believed tliat St. (-lair would abandon a strong-hold like Ticonderoga, almost without firing a shot ? Far be it from the speaker's intentioii to throw another stone at this unfortunatt^ otHcer, bnt he was indeed, in every respect an nnlucky man. John Adams, when he heard the news, was almost justified in saying, " We shall never be able to defend a post until we shoot a general." This hard rule, but an effective one, would have produced ailmirable results if it liad been applied in the Union army, during tlie "Slave-holders Rebellion." Turenne, a master professor of the ai't of war, said that ''in military matters the two most important factors were time and fortune; time was inestimable, l>ut that adverse fortune was irresistible or invin(;ible." St. Clair was no favorite of fortune, and his concluding scene, his crushing defeat by the Mianiis, 4th Nov., 1791, fourteen years afterwards, showed that he was not the man for emergencjes. Ticonderojra ouirlit to have arrested Burgoyne, at all events for a time. Still there was a silver lining to the black cloud of its abandonment. Had tliis fortress, which had stopped more than one English and Frencii army, arrested Burgoyne, his line of retreat thence was still 13 f. secure, whereas there was no chance of escajic from Saratoga. Pretty niiieh the whole blame of the loss of Ticonderoga fell upon the very man who had predicted the insuthciency of the garrison and its appointments, and had exhausted himself in vain appeals for the necessary reinforcements. Washington never l)lanied him, and subsequently he was fully exonerated by the goverimient and by the people. Burgoyne next destroj^ed the American naval force upon Lake Champlain, and advanced to Skenesborougli, now Whitehall, at the head of the lake. Tims far everything had been lovely with him ; all had been plain sailing. Here he began to encounter the obstacles prepared l)y Schuyler's engineering. One best posted in the details of American history, a luirsh judge, a severe criti(5, merciless often, said that already at Skenes- l)orough, Burgoyne's plans had all been traversed by Schuyler's preparations, not of troops — these he could not obtain — l)ut of engineering work which his mind could conceive as well as com- pel the execution. While at Skenesl)orough Burgoyne already saw defeat rise up like a spectre before him. He felt it. It can be discerned in his letters, in his utterances. This assertion, that, already at Skenesborough, Burgoyne felt some strong premonitions that he had lost his game, is almost admitted ^' / implication l>y Stedman, and by Gordon, the most reliable writers on the Revolutionary War. On the 9th or 10th of July, the day following the affair at Fort Anne, General Schuy- ler played the same trick upon his opponent that Frederic the Great tried after Liegnitz, with even more success, seventeen years previously, on the Ifith August, 1760, on the Russian Chernicheff. By this means Frederic sent the Muscovites wliirling in hot haste back across tlie Oder, and S(^huyler so perplexed Burgoyne, that the British general, victorious in four engagements, was in doubt whether to advance or to retreat. By so doing, our Knickorl)o(*ker leader proved that he was not deiicient eitluu- in the stratagem which made Hannibal so famous, or in the strategy of Fahius, or in the practical-strategy of Ber- wick, so greatly praised by the noted military critic. Decker. Schuyler's every movement ami action was consonant witli his wliole predetermined course of action. The day after Burgoyne cut loose from Lake Champlain, he wrote to the Albany Connnittee <' should it be asked what line of conduct I mean to hold amid this variety of difficulties and dis- tress, I wouhl answer, to dispute every inch of ground with 14 General Bur^oyiie, and retard his descent into the eonntry ass long as possible." lie kept his promise to the letter, and he so retarded General Jinrgoyne, that without counting eixteen days which tlie latter lost at Skenesborough, (some call it three weeks, but must include the delay a<- Fort Anne), it took hin. eight weeks more to overcome the distKUce, forty-one miles, which intervened between that place and Bo'inus Heights or Stillwater, the fartliest point soutli to which \n' ]H'netrated, about twenty-live miles north of Albany. The trick alluded t«» amounts to this : ISchuvler took out from a canteen, which had a false bottom, a letter written in the interest of the Colonists to General iSullivan by one Mr. Levins, and substituted an answer intentionally worded so as to deceive and perplex Burgoyne, and leave him in doubt what course it was best for him to follow. Having comnumicated the contents to several gentlemen alxmt him, lie signed it '' Canteen" and sent it forward l)y a messenger upon whom the iardton, on the 7th July, and Fort Anne, on the 8th. In both of these, as fur IK Hi* moral oi^eot was roiicoriiod, tlio Americ^ans Wero, to a lar»>;o extent, siutceHsful. The Earl of J^alcarraa, who commanded the British liij;ht infantry, testified before the Burgoyne Court of In(|niry, that " circnmstanced as the enemy (that is, tlie Americans), was; as an army very hard pi'cssed in their retreat, tliey certainly l)eha\eB with iirreat gallantry." Tie added, siiiets^ to stand their ground against regulars well provided with this weapon of close condjat and practi(;ed in its use. Moreover, the cartridge boxes, as well as the stoma(!hs of our people were empty ; in other words, their nmskets were no better tlian clubs in weak hands. Finally, at the critical moment, (leneral Riedesel arrived witli his Brunswickers' singing tlieir enthusiastic battle-songs, to Hank tlK^ almost exhausted Americans, who were set down, even by the British, at not more than two thousand men. Fraser had at least eight hundred and fifty picked men, and Reidesel likewise brought up tlie I'lite of Ids Gernuuis. So much for Hubbardton. In regard to Fort Anne, Deputy Quartermaster-Genei-al Monev savs that tlie Americans' fire was heavier at Fort Amu' than on any other occasion during the campaign, except in the action of the 19th Septend)er (known as the 1st Stillwater), that they continued a vigorous attack on a very strong position for upwards of two hours, and would have carried it had it not l)een for the Indians. Major Forbes testified that the Americans would have "forced" the British had it not been for the arrival of Indians, whose fearful " whoops " induced the Americans to believe that they were surrounded l)y savages. 16 Lieutenant (yolonel Hill, who conunanded the Britisli 9th Iteg- inient, had five hundred and fortv-two veteranw, and occupied a strong position. He certainly did not retain possession of the battle-ti Id, despite the arrival of the Indians, and the knowledge that Major General Phillips with the iiOth Regiment, five hundred and twenty-eight men, and two pieces of artilhsry, was pressing forward to his assistance. It is somewhat curious, that, at h'> rt Anne, the English aban- doned a wounded officer of great merit, likewise a surgeon and other prisoners, when, to use theii* language, they " changed grouiul." This scan^ely reads like a victory. It is a great fashion to decry popular levies for not engaging regular troops when the latter are perfectly well armed, and the former mostinadequately. Asarule (and agreatirumy distinguished generals have horiu' witness to tlie fact), young ti'oops tight bet- ter than old troops on the aggressive when they are new to lire and its perils. Diu-ing the Hurgoyne campaign, charges have been reiterated ngainst our men, of want of gallantry. It is only necessary to ap])eal t(» the enemy for their vindication. When the Earl of Balcarras was asked if the Americans abandoned their works on account of their fear of the British artillery, he answered, " The reason they did not defend their entrenchments was, that they always marched out of them, and attacked us^ Let us now resume the direct consideration of Burgoyne's sit- uation, in order to discover why lie lingered so long at Skenes- borough. His orders at that point are dated 7th until 23d July. On the 2r)th, he had only accomplished 13 to 13 miles and reached Fort Anne, where he remained until the 28th. On the 29th he was at Pitch-pine Plains, just south of it, and on the 30th, at Fort p]dward, where he remained until the 13th August. In other words, he had only gained about f^venty-five miles in advaiure in tliirty-eight days. At Skenesborough he recognized that he had in front of him a comparative wilderness of about twenty -five miles, travei'sed by few wood-roads or tracks and bridle-paths. These were almost impassible in such an exceptionally wet season as the summer of 1777, and moreover led through dense forests whicli Schuyler had converted into vast abatis. Hundreds of sturdy woodsmen, if they could not stand up in arms before regulars and shoot them down in line of battle, could fell trees by thousands. To quote the bnguage of a contem]>orary, " Sclmyler converted these woods ) 17 !■ 1» into ondlcHB Hlusliitigs, impeiujtrable with their iiittM-laced brunch- 68." IIo likewiso not only so completely obstnicted the Wood- creek, which flows by Fort Anne northward into Lake Champlain, by i()llin<>; iuiniense rocks into its channel, that he thereby ren- l_v soimd. Apply tliin ruK- of jndjrjiKMit to Sclmvlcr, iiiid tlioii, find only then, can the offcct f»f his stTviccs ho iipprc'ciatcd. The delnv he iiu])oHed upon liurgoyne wiiis equiva- lent to more than one bloody vietoi-y. Marcelluh, the " Sword of Home," never gained an nuthenti- eated HuceesH over Hannibal, whereas Fabius, the •'Delayer" or " Shield," not only nearly I'uined the greatent military loader the world has ever known, but eventually saved his country. Scihuyler was a eonsunnnate practi(^al-strate<^ist, anatis to their field-works. This shows that thev had some one at their head who knew as nnich in the l)eHtioii. Otlic'i'wiHC we h1i(mi1»I never luivt! IuuI the proverb of " The tirft hh>w 1h Imlf the huttle." This whs imiil)te(lly the ease at Koiiteiioy, where the initiative voUoy of the English guards did hucIi exeention, as to nc^tnaliy 8tnn or paralyze the French infantry 'Heapahility of resiHtani^e. Or rather to present the ease in a simple manner, wlii(th will make it clear withont reflection, n thrnnt or nhot, by wonnding u large blood- vcHHol, nuiy deterrtiine a conflict, althongh the wonnded party shonld be abHoliitely ignorant of the injury he has nnffered, and (rontimu'H, after its I'eceipt, to tight on long and bravely. Again, prestige h 2>on'ei\ and the viorale of the Mexican army was com- pletely shattered at Buena Vista, and thus, with the prestige of the Aztec generals and of their old troo])s the hope of nltimate success may almost be said to have abandoned their camp and their standard. Considering the facta and results, the victory of Saratoga is a misnomer, and applied to it, the simile of a wounded blood- vessel is most appropriate. The destruction of linrgoyne was the result of a succession of severe wounds, not one of which can be attributed with justice to the science or sagacity, the power or patriotism of Gates. The deadly blows were inflicted by Schuy- ler. One of his weapons was Harkheimer or Herckheimor at Oriskamj ; the other. Stark, at Bennington. As Oriskany is iirst in order of time, there is much to justify, according to Mr. Creasy's method of deciding, the opinion that it was the turning point of the canij)aign, and of the utter failure of the British at the North. For instance, the affair of Oriskany took place August 6th, that of Bennington August l()th. The first occurred on the ex- treme right wing, by which Burgoyne maintained his connection with Upper Canada. The second was on the extreme left of the British line of operations, which were, so to speak, " in air." The tirst battle of Stillwater was fought Sept. 19 ; the second at the same place, Oct. 7th, in the centre. The last skirmish was the 10th. Every one of these last three were checks, rather than triumphs. Yet, nevertheless, the four together, of which the tirst two constituted the points on which the campaign turned, certain- ly the mere turning point, occasioned the surrender at Saratoga on the 17th of October. Logistics had more to do with the accomplishment of this important result than Tactics, or even perhaps than Strategy. Wliat is more, the hardest logistic 32 blows (if we may presume to use n nonn as an adjective) were devised and delivered l)y Seluiyler, long before Gates assumed the conunatid, and were executed anywlier" hut upon tlie field where the ignorant masses inuigine that the hoasting Anghj-Ainci'if'ati ii'athered his hiurels. One incident remains to be rehited whi(di has always appeared to the speaker as the finest exemplification of Schuyler's self- relian(re, amid such distressing difficulties, moral and physical, as surromided him. It has been related in different ways, but you shall hear it as it was first represented maiiy years ago to the individual who addresses you. Schuyler was well aware of th(! importan(^e of Fort Stanwix, and although apparently he could not spare a single man, he des- j)atched from eight hundred to one thousand men to save it, if still it could be saved; to redeem it, if it had already been lost. Already ke up the siege of Fort Stanwix, aI)andoned his artillery and stores and fled. " Thus was Burgoyne's right arm witliercd (or lopped off at Fort Stanwix), and the left, which he had stretched (nearly) as far as Hennington, was ari'ested (or amputated, on the Iloosick, by otu' old friend. Stark, of l>uidct of the precision S 24 of the American sharp-sliootei-H' lire, was tlie fatal wounding of Sir Francis Clarke, Burgoyne's first or chief aide-de-camp, at the very moment when he was conveying a most important order to Lieutenant Colonel Kingston, in regard to tlie disposition of the British artillery. What was Gates doing at tlie crisis of this battle — the con- quering Gates — whose fame, based on Schuyler's sacrilices, watchings and labors, was to fill the whole land i To avoid a charge of misrepresentation the speaker will (juote in reply from the noted liistorian Lossing, who introduces this statement not only into his "Field Book of the Revolution," but repeats it in liis biography of Schuyler. (11, 369). " Wlule Arnold was wielding the fierce sickle of war without, and reaping golden slieaves for Gates' garnei-, as Schuyler had intimated that he was likely to do, the commander (according to Wilkinson) was within his camp, more intent upon discussing the merits of the struggle with Sir Francis Clarke (Burgoyne's aide- de-camp, who had been wounded and taken a prisoner, and was lying upon Gates' bed at headquarters), than upon winning a battle which was all-important to the ultimate triumph of those principles for which he professed so warm an attachment. When Wilkinson came to him from the battle-field for orders, he found Gates very angry because Sii* Francis would not allow tlie force of his argument. lie left the room, and calling liis aide after him, asked, as they went out: ' Did you ever hear so impudent a son of a ? ' Poor Sir Francis died that night upon the bed of his coarse and vulgar antagonist." The last fighting or skirmisliing wliicli occurred ou the '.Uh, 10th Oct., was lighted up by the flames of Schuyler's devastated mansion; l)arns, mills, store houses, granaries, and other buihl- injrs on the south sliores of the Fishkill, such as to-day would cost $150,000. A few weeks previous, Mrs. Schuyler had burned lier crops to prevent them from profiting the enemy, 'in«l now, al- most the last act of the invader was to lay her happy home in ashes. Burgoyne had now become convinced that his army could no longer tight, maintain itself, retreat in a body, or even escape in detachments. The Americans would not hazard an engagement, although they were from ten to fifteen thousand strong in eiiec- tives, and the British had only three thousand five hundred figlit- ing men left. Every portion of Burgoyne's position could be " searched out," not only with artillery, but witli small arms, especially rifles. What is more, every American who had even I V 'V \^\ 1 of I rms, 'veii 25 a fowling-piece, luid become as valuable as a regular soldier. If he could not b.and up like a professional in line of battle, and augment a volley, or cross bayonets, he could bushwhack like a frontiersnum or an Indian. From behind a tree, a practised stripling might pick off the bravest soldier or the most capable otttcer, either, a nnu^h larger target than the partridge or scpiii-rel lie was accustomelit exiimple best instruets the heart; Then i<)oi< on Fabius, let his coiidiiot show, From active life what various blessings flow. In him a just ambition stands confessed; It warms, but 7wt inflames his equal lireast. See him in senates act the patriot's part, Truth on his lips, the public at his heart, There neither fears can awe, nor hojies control The honest purpose of his steady soul. No mean attacliments e'er seduced his tongue To gild the cause his heart suspected wrong; But, deaf to envy, faction, spleen, his voice Joins here or there, as reason guides his choice. To one great point his faithful labors tend, 'And all his toil in ' Freedom's' interest end."