4T3 
 
 INTERDEPENDENCE OF 
 THE EMPIRE 
 
 IN REGARD TO 
 
 NAVAL DEFENCE 
 
 BY 
 
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 t 
 
 it 
 
 1 .•■ ■ 
 
 J. BIDDLECOMBE, 
 
 
 V 
 
 ''"rV- \ 
 
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 ' 1'. 
 
 . Lieut. Victorian Navy. 
 
 . - ' ' *■ 
 
 • 
 
 '\ 1 ' 
 
 1* ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 • • to- 
 
 
 
 
 MBLBOURNB: 
 
 .; 'v;*' '■*■ 
 
 ♦ 
 
 MESSRS. 
 
 QEORQE ROBERTSON & CO., LITTLE 
 
 COLLINS 
 
 ST., 
 
 ECHO 
 
 PUBLISHINQ 
 
 COA\PANY, LTD., PRINTERS, 
 
 FLINDERS 
 
 LANE. 
 
 
 
 
 i8q7. 
 
 
 
nterdependence of the 
 
 Empire 
 
 IN REGARD TO 
 
 Naval Defence 
 
 BY 
 
 J. BIDDLECOMBE, 
 
 LIEUT. VICTORIAN NAVY. 
 
 • • ' , . • ., , 
 
 t ■ . rf 
 
 MELBOURNE; 
 
 MESSRS. GEORGE ROBERTSON & CO., LITTLE COLLINS ST.. 
 ECHO PUBLISHING COMPANY, LTD., PRINTERS, FLINDERS LANE, 
 
 16B7. 
 

 <. • ■ 
 
Interdependence of the Empire 
 
 I A^REGARD TO 
 
 >A\ 
 
 Naval Defence. 
 
 URING the last few years the minds of leadin;^ statesmen, The Problem. 
 thronf,diout the l)iitish ICmpire, liave been laif^cl)- e.\er- 
 cised over the difficult problem of General or Imperial 
 Defence. A moment's consideration of the scattered 
 positions of the larj^e and important parts of the I'^mpire, 
 shows the difficult}- of the problem : Great Britain has 
 an ari'a of 121,068 scpiare miles, and a population of 
 .).o,ooo,oo() (approximately). She has colonies and posses- 
 sions in all " the Seven Seas," reachinf^ from \'ictoria Land in 
 Canada to X'ictoria in Australia. In detiiil thev are: — ■ 
 
 
 No. 
 
 OK Col.. 
 
 .>IU 
 
 •;.\ IN SyLAKK 
 
 
 
 1 OR 
 
 I'OSS. 
 
 
 MlI.KS. 
 
 roi'ri.ATioN. 
 
 In l-.iiroik.' . . 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 .. I2.> .. 
 
 l(J.J,000 
 
 ,, Asia 
 
 
 to 
 
 
 i,r)87,o.So 
 
 . . 21)0, 25c), 000 
 
 ,, .Vfrica 
 
 
 / ■ * 
 
 
 2.Sr.,7o.S . . 
 
 4,092,000 
 
 ,, .\merica . . 
 
 
 1 > 
 
 
 },ri2r),=;j2 
 
 <),837,ooo 
 
 ,, .Vustralasia 
 
 
 () 
 
 
 j,236,>S,S7 . . 
 
 4,511,000 
 
 
 
 50 .. 
 
 .. .S,.S37,j2i ,. 
 
 • .r i,i^<)j,ooo 
 
 Great I^ritain, without her colonies and possessions, and with dimin- 
 ished trade, w(juld he in the same position as a minor state, whilst, 
 
 '■Statistics obtained from diO'erent cdloniesdiirinf,' iScjf). I'iiiisli'd I'Y-l).. iXqy. 
 
 52444 
 
In riCKDI'l'KNDKNCIC ()!• I'lIK ICmI'IKI-: 
 
 on thu other hand, the majority of these colonies and possessions are 
 not in a position to take their place in the world as recognised 
 powers. The Mnipire is like a large business : stop its communica- 
 tions and the business fails. There is a great need of a scheme by 
 which each portion of the Empire takes its responsibilities and does 
 its share towards keeping open these important communications. It 
 is to the interest of the whole British Empire that this should be 
 done. Sir John Colomb, in a pamphlet in 1867, wrote : " The 
 distribution of the forces for the protection of our commerce is a 
 most important, and, at the same time, a most difficult problem to 
 solve. The magnitude of this national requirement is only equalled 
 by the difficulty of meeting it with the means at our disposal. Like 
 everything else upon a gigantic scale, it can only be accomplished by 
 the proper application of general principles. Now, in all naval and 
 military operations, whether offensive or defensive, there is a golden 
 rule, to neglect which is certain ruin ; it is the fundamental law 
 which applies to all warfare, and is simply this — ^that the success of 
 all operations depends upon the dispositions of the forces in such a 
 manner as will best secure the base of operations, and ensure safety 
 and freedom of communication."' 
 
 Ignorance on this subject is quite excusable. Until the year 
 1889, when Captain Mahan published his book " The Influence of 
 Sea Power upon History," there were no works in untechnical 
 language from which the general public could acquire a knowledge of 
 the subject. The immense power which control of the Seas has had, 
 and (as history repeats itself) will have on the destiny of the British 
 Empire, can only be gathered from a consideration of the history of 
 Sea Power. Limiting ourselves to well-known facts of history, we 
 can readily see how impossible it is for an inefficient fleet to prevent 
 invasion.-^ The most recent instance is the Chinese-Japanese War in 
 
 'Also see " Essays on Naval Defence," by ^'ice- Admiral P. H. Colomb, 
 p. 23. 
 
 '■'William the Conqueror, lofifi. Crimean War, 1854. 
 Conquest of India, 1579-1800. Chinese-Japanese War, 1895. 
 
In Rkgari) to Navat. Dki-knck. 
 
 1895. On the other hand, when any nation has controlled the seas, 
 its commerce has extended and the security of the country has been 
 assured.^ The British Empire was made by the operation of the law 
 governing sea power. Commander Robinson writes : " In the march 
 of our progress, we came into conflict, first with the Spaniard, the 
 inheritor of the discoveries of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, whose 
 monopolies we were resolved to invade; then with the Dutchman, 
 who had become our commercial rival all over the world ; and lastly, 
 with the Frenchman, whom, after a long contested struggle, we 
 subdued."^ 
 
 The question may well be asked. How is the huge British 
 Empire, with its vast and widely separated provinces, to be main- 
 tained? It was made by the influence of the sea; it can only 
 be maintained by that power by which it was made. If the Nation's 
 Mercantile Marine should ever pass into the hands of the foreigner, 
 and the Navy cease to be strong enough to bear its enormous 
 responsibilities, then communications would stop, the outlying parts 
 of the Empire would be seized, and not even England itself would be 
 secure against foreign invasion. Nor does this losf of the outlying parts 
 imply that the colonies would be disloyal. It has been said that upon 
 the outbreak of war between England and a Continental power, 
 colonists would advocate a proclamation of political independence, 
 and the protection of the colonies themselves, by a declaration of 
 
 'Venice, 997-1450. Genoa, 1000- 1350. The Spanish Armada, 1588. 
 Napoleon at Boulogne, 1803-1805 — Mahan, " Influence of Sea Power 
 upon the French Revolution and Empire," \'ol. II., pp. 117, 118. 
 
 '■'" The British Fleet," by Commander Robinson, pp. 49, 50. 
 
 For detailed accounts of the influence of sea power on — 
 
 The Fall of Canada — ^Mahan, " Influence of Sea Power upon History," 
 pp. 293-311. 
 
 The Conquest of India — Mahan, " Influence of Sea Power upon History," 
 PP- 293-311. 
 
 The Loss of the United States to England— Mahan, " Influence of Sea 
 Power upon History," pp. 341-348, and " Influence of Sea Power 
 upon the French Revolution and Empire," Vol. I., p. 3. 
 
Inti.ki)i;i'K\i>i;nci: oi- ihk ICmpiki; 
 
 neiitnility.' This is sufficiontly nef,'atived by the recent offers from 
 Canada, Australia, and South Africa. The advocates of such a 
 proclamation can only he a small minority; for many years to come 
 their views must be a neglij^'ible (juantity.'"' Not only so, but it 
 appears conclusively by the cablej^rams sent to the Home Govern- 
 ment by the Premiers of the principal colonies in times of trouble, 
 that the communities of Greater Britain fully recof,'nise the importance 
 of unity, and are willing to do all in their power to secure it." 
 
 The imminence of danger is not imaginary. During the last two 
 years the Venezuela difficulty, and the German Emperor's famous tele- 
 gram, made the people throughout the Empire remember that a quarri'l 
 with a first-class power could not always be easily avoided. The interest 
 shown by all parts of the Empire in the threatened dangers evidences 
 the conviction of the whole British community that the ICmpire must 
 maintain its present fortunate position in the world. Its so doing 
 aenerai affects the whole of her people. Therefore, the general policy should 
 
 'This was answered very ably by Principal Grant (The "National 
 Review," July 1896) in his reply to Mr. (ioldwin Sniitli. He writes from 
 Canada: "Last Christmas, when Mr. Cleveland's message threatened 
 invasion, in coi.nection with the Venezuela dispute, doubtless we could ha\e 
 arranged by negotiation for peace with the States, and have kept entirely out 
 of the quarrel. The thought did occur to one man, and he was (juietly 
 ignored. I know of only two newspapers ,-unong our thousands which adxocate 
 separation. The tone of those two was as stout and calm as all the others. 
 Like the Scots round the King at Flodden, no one failed the Old Mother. 
 Every man and woman accepted tlie necessity, and, without a word of 
 complaint, began to prepare for war. Homes in lingland were safe, and ours 
 in peril. What of tliat ! Britain had been threatened, and, therefore, we, as 
 part of the British Empire, accepted our responsibilities. Already the scare 
 has cost us tliree millions of dollars, and no one has uttered a murmur against 
 the expenditure." 
 
 '■'Washington, in 1796, said: "To secure respect to a neutral flag 
 requires a naval force organised and ready to vindicate it from insult on 
 aggression." This is equally true to-day. 
 
 " Lord Brassey, in his speech at the opening of Parliament in \'i^.toria on 23rd 
 June, 1896, mentions: " Recent eve.ns threatened to involve the Empire in war. 
 Happily they have had no result except to demonstrate the undoubted loyalty 
 of every portion of the Oueen's dominions, and a Force which a united people 
 hold in reserve, and which they are ready to exert when their spirit is aroused. 
 The suddenness with which tlie danger arose is a warning to Australians that 
 they must be prepared at all times for immediate and concerted action." What 
 Lord Brassey says of Australians is equally applicable to all British Provinces. 
 
In Kki^.akd to Navai. Dki'iaci:. 
 
 be, in the words of Captain Mahan, such that — " In peace, the 
 inrtuence of the Government should I)e felt in promoting by all means 
 a warmth of attachment and a unity of interest which will make the 
 welfare of one the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the (luarrel 
 of all ; and in war, or rather for war, by inducing such measures of 
 organisation and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair distribution 
 of a burden of which each reaps the benefit." ^ 
 
 Before considering a scheme of Naval Defence which would 
 satisfy Captain Mahan's requirements, let us shortly look at the chief 
 causes that make for the strength of a fleet and the limitations of Eiementa of 
 
 Atrenffth and 
 
 that strength: (i.) A well trained personnel is the first requisite if J||^"''""* '" " 
 an efficient navy is to be created. History has proved this over and 
 over again. Good men with poor ships are better than poor men 
 with the best material.^ (2.) No forts, acting alone, have been able 
 to stop ships, manned by determined men, from passing them, even in 
 
 '"The Influence of Sea Power upon History," p. H^. 
 
 ■^"The Influence of Sea Power upon History," 1660-1783, pp. 67, 82, S^. 
 
 a 
 
 
 a 
 o 
 
 ■j> 
 S 
 o 
 
 J3 
 
 
 The Battle of Lowestoft . . 
 The Battle of the Four Days 
 Condition of the Navy in . . 
 
 Condition of the English and 
 French Navies . . 
 
 The Battle off Toulon (Mat- 
 thews) 
 
 The revival of the French 
 Navy after 
 
 Maritime War in N. America 
 and W. Indies . . 
 
 Condition of French Navy in 
 
 Sea fights between single 
 ships and squadrons . . 
 
 French Revolution 
 
 French Fleet under Villaret 
 
 Battle of Cape St. Vincent 
 
 Battle of the Nile . . 
 
 The Trafalgar Campaign . . 
 
 The Action off Charleston 
 
 Farragut at Mobile Bay . . 
 
 Cruise of the Alabama 
 
 Battle of Lissa 
 
 The Civil War in Brazil . . 
 
 Chinese and Japanese War 
 Yalu 
 
 Datk. 
 
 . June 13, 1G65 .. 
 . June ii-i-(, 1666 . . 
 680 —Campbell's 
 Uves of Admirals" 
 
 1740 
 
 February, 1744 . . 
 
 1759 
 
 i77«-i7«i •• 
 1793 
 
 1795, 1796 
 
 1798 
 
 February 14, 1797 
 
 . August I, 1798 . 
 
 180J-5 
 
 1863 
 
 1864 
 
 1864 
 
 18O6 
 
 1894 
 
 1894 
 
 I'AflE. 
 108, 109 
 
 260 
 266-^67 
 
 iii. ii^, JJJ 
 Chap. X. 
 
 3G-46 
 
 59. 60 
 
 102 
 
 178 
 
 223-229 
 
 276,277 
 
 141, Vol. II. 
 
 100 
 
 133 
 
 159 and 1 65 
 213, 214, 249 
 51 
 
 125 
 
 Vol. I. 
 
 Vol. I. 
 
 Vol. II. 
 
 Book. 
 
 u . 
 73- . 
 ".« >, 
 
 O •- 
 
 i2 
 
 ■J 33 
 
 : s 
 
 i ^' J3 - 
 
 "S " s >■ 
 
 ™ u O rt 
 
 e.S 
 ' ^ " d 
 
 > i-2 
 
 X- < 
 
Intkrukpendenck of the Empire 
 
 confined waters.^ (3,) But of course, when ships, alone, are pitted ajjainst 
 forts, the forts with their communications still open should come off best 
 in the fight ; and, at the present day, no admiral would be justified in 
 risking his fleet in a well sustained action against forts without 
 being driven to take that course by some grave necessity.^ 
 
 But admitting the truth of the three positions stated above, the 
 success or failure of a navy absolutely depends on the distribution of 
 ships during peace, and also during war. As this question of the 
 distribution of ships has been much canvassed, especially by Australians, 
 it may be as well to see what so eminent an authority as Captain 
 Nj.v»i Policy. Mahan says about it. Writing concerning the Naval Policy in the 
 West Indies 1793-1810, he says, "Great Britain had undisputed naval 
 supremacy in the W'est Indies, and the question before her was, not 
 
 Date. 
 
 Page. 
 
 ei 
 Ji 
 V 
 
 .a 
 o 
 
 tr, 
 
 c 
 c 
 
 (T, 
 
 s 
 
 ft) 
 
 c 
 
 
 The Influence of Sea Power upon History 
 Pall of Canada 
 
 Parragut up the Mississippi 
 
 Passing numerous forts 
 
 Capture o; .New Orleans .. 
 
 The opening of the Mississippi . . 
 
 •Parragut at Mobile Bay . . 
 
 War between Brazil and Paraguay 
 
 Brazilians passing several forts on River Para- 
 guay 
 
 The Prench in China — Mingan Channel 
 
 *The Civil War in Brazil — the numerous times 
 armed ships passed in and out Rio Harbour 
 
 Chinese and Japanese War — Port Arthur and 
 Wei-hei-wei 
 
 1 5 
 
 1660-1783 
 
 .. 14 .. 
 
 
 1760 
 
 . . 2(J4 . . 
 
 r'. 
 
 IS62 
 
 37-60 I 
 
 J2 
 
 I8CI-63 
 
 61-85 ' " ; 
 
 
 
 c 
 
 
 
 1864 
 
 1 14-134 , , 
 
 u 
 
 
 ^ ; 
 
 ; 
 
 1865-66 
 
 259-264 
 
 son, 
 n." 
 
 1884 
 
 II, 12 1 
 
 — .2 
 
 i8Q3 
 
 ( 38. 39. ' S 
 
 1 40. 51 • -; 
 
 
 1895 
 
 ' 127-134-1 > 
 1 136 ) '^ 
 
 fim 
 
 'Sydney, Melbourne or Montreal run the same risk as Rio or Mobile ran. See also: "The 
 Relations between local fortifications and a moving Navy," by Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb. 
 
 The opening of the Mississippi 
 Actions off Charleston 
 Parragut at Mobile Bay 
 Bombardment of Callao by Spain 
 Pranco German War 
 •Bombardment of Alexandria 
 Japanese Pleet in Chinese Waters 
 
 Date. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1863-64 
 
 83. 84. 85 
 
 1863 
 
 96, 97 
 
 1864-65 
 
 133. 134 
 
 1866 
 
 225-256 
 
 1870 
 
 284 
 
 18S2 
 
 34« 1 
 
 1895 
 
 134 (Vol. II) i 
 
 Book. 
 
 H.W.Wilson, "Iron- 
 clads in Action." 
 
 * Could this operation have been successful (n) against forts armed with modern artillery, 
 and manned by determined and skilled soldiers : or {h) if there had been an enemy's fleet ready 
 to swoop down immediately after the bombardment ? 
 
In Rkgard to Naval Defenck. 
 
 to beat the enemy's Heet, but to secure her own commercial routes. 
 To this end it was necessary to disseminate, not concentrate, her ships, 
 and to provide them with convenient centres of refuf^e and supply 
 along the routes. The case was analogous to the police arrangements 
 of a city. In ordinary quiet times the police are distributed to cope 
 with individual offenders ; when a mob gathers and threatens the peace 
 they are concentrated in large bodies." * 
 
 If the plan here sketched is that which ought to be adopted, 
 then many colonial naval arrangements are glaringly faulty. In 
 Australia the opposite course to that advised by Captain Mahan is 
 pursued. Each of four important colonies in that large Continent 
 has a Governor and responsible Ministers, one of whom is a Minister 
 of Defence ; and profes<-os to have a naval organisation for the 
 defence of its own ports. Until Federation unites the colonies wc 
 shall have no central authority controlling the Naval Forces of the 
 whole. It is obvious that the material of these local sciuadrons is, 
 under these circumstances, as useless as the police force of a city 
 would be if its members were fixed to their beats and could not be 
 concentrated in force at a point at which the danger threatened. 
 The illustration of the policeman is very complete if we consider him 
 as placed in a protected position and armed, to represent a fort, and 
 offenders, to represent ships ; a fort can no more readily deal with a 
 ship than the policeman can catch the passing thief. Again, if a 
 fort's communications are cut, it is just as much at the mercy (^f 
 ships as the policeman would be at the mercy of offenders out of his 
 reach. Whilst, on the other hand, should a ship be rash enough to 
 tight a duel with a fort, it would have no better chance than an 
 offender would have with the protected and armed policeman. The 
 impossibility of concentrating the forts upon any part of the ocean in 
 which a fleet might assemble, as much destroys their usefulness as 
 wcjuld the stationary position of the policemaii, his, in the event of 
 the gathering together of a mob. Indeed, a force so situated could 
 not follow the well-known example of the Nation's Naval heroes — e.g.. 
 Nelson concentrating his Mediterranean Fleet off Toulon ; Cornwallis 
 
 '"The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Kevolution and Empire," 
 by ("aptain Mahan, \'ol. I., p. 112. 
 
lo Intkrdependench oi" the Empire 
 
 with his command off Brest ; Pellew off Ferrol ; and ColHngwood's 
 Fleet off Rochefort, during the years preceding Trafalgar. These, 
 cutting the communications between the units of the French naval 
 strength in those ports, stopped their concentration and their power 
 to control the English Channel, which was necessary to enable 
 Napoleon with his army of i}o,ooo men, read}' at that time on 
 the heights above Boulogne, to descend upon England. Obviously, 
 had the English been without the power of a central authoritj- to 
 collect the outlying forces, this great operation would have failed. 
 Probably enough has been written to show that a large expenditure 
 on stationary forts to the detriment of moving forts is wasteful and 
 comparatively useless.^ 
 
 The present system of the Naval Defence of portions of Greater 
 Britain is defective and inefficient. From a national point of view 
 the system is also objectionable, in that it tends first to isolation 
 and then to separation. 
 
 Doubtless the reader is aware that the strength of the personnel 
 of the Navy is sufficient for its purposes in times of peace. It is not 
 sufficient to man all ships l3'ing in reserve, which would be required 
 for active service in times of war. To keep all these ships in com- 
 The Royal mission would be alt(jgether too expensive. Hence the creation of 
 Reserve, the Royal Naval Reserve, a body composed of officers and men, in 
 times of peace emplo3ed in the Mercantile Marine, and whose services 
 in times of war the Admiralty commands. It is generally thought 
 that when war comes, the responsible positions in all ships will be 
 filled by men belonging to the Royal Navy, whilst the Royal Navy 
 Reserve men will occupy positions, for which a knowledge of seaman- 
 ship and gunnery is indispensable.'^ The training of the Naval 
 
 'Also see "Essays on Na\al Defence," by \'ice-Admiral P. H. Colomb, 
 pp. 14-30, 137-143, 167, 191. 
 
 " Influence of Sea Power upon Frencli Revolution and Empire," by 
 Captain Mahan, \'ol. I., p. 11?. 
 
 - " No country lias maintained afloat in peace the number required in 
 actual war. Sucli a policy would involve enormous expenditure not only in 
 pay, provisions and pensions, but in maintaining tiie ships to give the practice 
 at sea which is essential. If men remain too long in harl)our they lose their sea 
 habits." (Lord Brassey at Melbourne, June ist, 1896.) 
 
In Regard to Naval Dki-knck. ii 
 
 Reserve is of vital importance. Considering the little time spent on 
 yearly drill it is in most cases difficult — if not impossible — to attain 
 the highest degree of efficiency.' 
 
 The distribution of Naval Reserve men in time of war is also of oithe^.N^k. 
 very great importance. They ought to be all over the world when 
 war is declared, so that they may be readily distributed equally 
 amongst the various naval ships on the different naval stations."'^ A 
 small number of them will be so distributed, for they will be in mer- 
 chant ships at different ports and on the high seas at that time. 
 
 ' \'ice-Adiniral the Hon. Sir Edward Freemantle, sums up the require- 
 ments for a modern man-of-war's man as follows (Feb., 1892) : — 
 (i) Habit of a sea life, sea legs, sea stomach, etc. 
 
 (2) Physique, activity, hardness, power to stand considerable changes of 
 
 climate, and of enduring prolonged spells of exceptionally iiard 
 work. 
 
 (3) Efficiency in boat work, anchor work, and general seamanlike knowl- 
 
 edge of the day. 
 
 (4) Efficiency in gunnery and torpedo work of all descriptions. 
 
 (5) Education, intelligence, trustworthiness. 
 
 (6) Alertness, readiness of resource, quickness of decision ; in fact, the 
 
 many qualities which are included in the expressive word " smart- 
 ness." 
 
 (7) Knowledge of stoking and work in the engine room. 
 
 ^ Commander Honner, in his prize essay at the Royal United Service 
 Institute this year, says : " What, on the outbreak of war, is the plan for 
 manning the fleet ? Supposing that it were possible to distribute the Naval 
 Reserve throughout the whole fleet, three-fourths of the seamen element of a 
 crew would compose of Regular Service men, and one-fourth Naval Reserve ; 
 but such a distribution and re-arrangement of crews would be difficult, if not 
 impossible, to carry out in the face of impending and probably (for recent events 
 show tliat hostilities may take place before a declaration of war is made) actual 
 hostilities. And it must be borne in mind that such a break up of the crew of 
 a connnissioned ship would be most demoralising to her efficiency, heart- 
 breaking and discouraging to the captain and officers, who would see all their 
 previous work in preparing the ship for the crucial test of battle upset at the 
 advent of the trial. It is difficult to imagine such a policy of changing iiorses 
 whilst crossing a stream can be contemplated, yet, if this is not so, what is the 
 alternative ? It can only be that the ships in commission will retain their 
 crews, and those put in commission on the outbreak of hostilities will have a 
 large proportion of Naval Reserves. Would this be a satisfactory state of 
 things ? or, in other words, do the Naval Reserve sufficiently meet the require- 
 ments of men-of-war's men to justify their forming such a large proportion of 
 the seamen element of the crew as would be required ? 
 
 " No definite answer can be given to this question, for it must be 
 reinend)ered that as far as actual experience in the sea-going fleet goes, the 
 Naval Reserve must be considered an untried force." 
 
12 
 
 Interdependknci; oh the Empire 
 
 The extension 
 of the R.N.R. 
 
 Further, the numbers are being increased as more ships are beinjj 
 built. The manner of obtaining these additional men may be the 
 subject of differences of opinion. One way suggests itself to the 
 writer as worthy of adoption — namely, that of training the men in the 
 British colonies in which they happen to be. In Canada, Newfound- 
 land, Australasia, and South Africa, the population is 11,510,000,^ — 
 more than one-fourth of the population of the British Isles. Now the 
 United Kingdom, with a population of nearly 40,000,000, employs as a 
 peace establishment in the Navy 72,000.-^ It encourages, by every 
 means in its power, proper men to volunteer for both the Royal Navy 
 and Royal Naval Reserve; yet, with the exception of a few com- 
 missions to sons of colonial gentlemen, no great encouragement has 
 been given on the part of the Hom.e authorities to the 11,500,000 
 inhabitants of these portions of Greater Britain to volunteer for 
 service in the Royal Navy; nor has a system of Naval Reserve been 
 devised by which these men— scattered as they are all over the 
 world — might be utilised for war purposes at a time when their 
 services would be of vital importance to the Empire. It is 
 admitted by experts that the extension of the Naval Reserve is 
 a necessity in the face of the increase of ships and of the impossibility 
 of maintaining them on a war footing in peace time. Hostilities 
 might commence before war was declared, and the small numbers 
 of Royal Naval Reserve at Home would be fully required for manning 
 the ships in Home waters — the ships lying in Reserve out of 
 commission, and those being hurriedly built. This leads to the 
 conclusion that the adoption of the suggestion to use colonial personnel, 
 on the spot, ought to be taken into consideration. Incidentally, 
 
 ' ESTIMATED 
 
 POP I 
 
 LATION 1)1 
 
 •:CKMnER 
 
 1895 
 
 
 Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 Newfoundland 
 
 
 
 
 
 198,000 
 
 Nc- South Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,277,870 
 
 Victoria 
 
 
 
 
 
 i,i8i,70<j 
 
 New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
 698,700 
 
 Queensland 
 
 
 
 
 
 460,550 
 
 South Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 i57-\°5 
 
 Tasmania . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 160,834 
 
 Western Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 101,235 
 
 South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 2,074,000 
 
 
 
 11,510,369 
 
 Captain S. M. Kardley-W'ilinot, R. N. 2ncl Prize Essay, 
 
In Rkgard to Naval Defence. 13 
 
 a great national Service would result, by the strengthening of the 
 bonds which at present exist between England and her colonies. 
 
 Let us look at the policy which at present governs the Naval J^i'pJ'^**"* 
 Defence of Greater Britain. In the first place, the authorities con- ^■'^■^/*''*''" 
 sider — and it is conceded — that any armed force that is not under the 
 direct control of the Home authorities may become a source of 
 weakness to the British Empire; the recent trouble in South Africa 
 has been principally attributed to the absence of that control to which 
 Jamieson's Force would have been subject had it been governed from 
 the War Office. Whilst this is so with regard to the Army, the 
 principle of a control from a strong central head applies with a much 
 greater force to the Navy. Trained local forces may serve a purpose 
 in their respective colonies without its being necessary to remove 
 them from the countries in which they are raised. But a naval force 
 can only serve its highest purpose by those rapid combinations which 
 are effected through a central command. Further, any one local 
 government, having a naval force subject to its command, may do 
 infinite mischief by employing its naval forces in a manner tending 
 to frustrate some cherished design of the British Government. This 
 raises the question of how most simply and cheaply to concentrate the 
 command. One plan is for each part of the Empire to subscribe in 
 proportion to its population to the Imperial Naval Defence Funds — a 
 course which is now being pursued by the colonies of Australasia: — 
 
 New South Wales contr 
 
 ibutes yearly 
 
 
 £i7<9^9 
 
 Victoria , 
 
 t II 
 
 
 J5.132 
 
 New Zealand 
 
 ,, 
 
 
 20,772 
 
 Queensland 
 
 1 1 1 
 
 
 13,691 
 
 South Australia 
 
 1 1 1 
 
 . . 
 
 10,625 
 
 Tasmania 
 
 ,, 
 
 . . 
 
 4,781 
 
 Western Australia 
 
 ■■ 
 
 Making a total of 
 
 3,010 1 
 
 
 ^126,000 
 
 Neither Canada nor South Africa contributes to any Imperial Naval De- 
 fence Fund. From the circumstance that this system is adopted by the 
 Australian Colonies, we may conclude that their governments approve 
 of it, or, at least, that hitherto no better system has been pointed out. 
 
 'Compiled on 2gth February, 1896; subject to slight revision when 
 returns are finally examined. 
 
14 iNTERDEHENDENCJi OV THE EmPIRE 
 
 fhV*"contrib.' ^^^ cluef advantages of the system of each separate part of the 
 
 Bystem. Empire contributing to the General Naval Fund are: — (i) All forces 
 
 being under the direct control of one authority. (2) The work would 
 be effectively done by the great diplomatists and warriors of the Nation, 
 who have at their command recognised channels of knowledge and 
 perfect naval organisation. It cannot be pretended that isolated local 
 bodies could be equally effective. It must be remembered that with 
 responsible government in each colony, there would be continual 
 changes of policy.^ (3) It is also the least expensive, having those 
 advantages which a large, well arranged business has, in buying, 
 manufacturing, and administering. 
 of'th'e^""coif** Some of the disadvantages of each part of the Empire separately 
 
 aystem?*' ' Contributing are: — (i) Recognising that the personnel of the Navy is 
 a vital element of success, an immense waste of some of the best 
 men results from an absence of encouragement to the younger 
 members of Greater Britain, forming part of the Empire. Although 
 they help to make England what she is, they are not so educated as 
 to be of any appreciable assistance to her, away from their own 
 homes, when the inevitable war comes, (2) The younger inhabitants 
 of Greater Britain have not been by training brought face to face with 
 the hardships, both in body and pocket, which their forefathers endured, 
 and upon which the peaceful retention of their distant homes depend. 
 
 'Commander Honner, in his prize essay, published April, 1896, writes: — 
 " It is conceivable that in a time like the present, when public opinion 
 is alive to the wants of the Naval Service, that money would be granted 
 to raise the number of men to the amount necessary to meet the require- 
 ments of the Fleet. It must not be forgotten, however, that history repeats 
 itself, and that public opinion is a very variable quality, subject to enthusiastic 
 heights to be succeeded by hollows of apathy ; to be safe with this shifting 
 (juality, it is better to take a mean course, and not trust alone to the crest 
 of the wave of enthusiasm, without taking mto account tlie hollow of apathy. 
 Lulled into apathy by the postponement of the inevitable war, public opinion 
 will in course of time become indifferent to the needs of the Navy ; and the 
 Go\ernment of the day, finding itself burdened with an increasing non-effective 
 \'ote, will try to reimburse itself by reducing the numbers on the effective list. 
 If any are inclined to doubt on this point, and to consider the view taken to 
 be pessimistic, let them look into the state of affairs prevailing in the period 
 preceding the Naval Defence Act." 
 
 Let them also look at the state of affairs at present prevailing in some of 
 the Colonial Naval Forces. 
 
In Regard to Xavai. Dki-knck. 
 
 In relation to this, the reader maj- remember what Mr. Wilson, 
 Secretary to the Navy League, in writing to the " Army and Navy 
 Gazette" concerning the celebration of Trafalgar Day on October 21st 
 last year, says: — "The importance of Trafalgar is greater to-day than 
 when Lord Nelson died. The Empire has had time for peaceful 
 expansion. But for Trafalgar, India and the Colonies would now be 
 ruled by other hands, and Her Majesty the Queen would have been 
 the Sovereign of a small State instead of the head of a vast Empire, 
 in which all races and creeds and opinions are as free as in England 
 herself. . . . The danger that prolonged peace and prosperity 
 may cause men to forget that omnipotence of our national existence, is 
 an unanswerable reason why the Queen's subjects should remembir 
 Trafalgar Day and the lessons that it taught us."' Exactly so: and if 
 this applies to England, it does so with more force to Greater Britain, 
 where, in the absence of contact with kith and kin in any permanent 
 armed force, the tendenc}- is to believe that the Navy and the Army 
 are simply expensive, out-of-date playthings — a heavy expense on the 
 exchequer of a young and struggling colon)- ; and to forget that if 
 there are not enough volunteers or money for the Navy and the Army, 
 conscription must come. (3) Ii^i the money contributing system there 
 is no provision for efficiently manning and keeping manned ships on 
 the different foreign stations^ during hostilities (which might commence 
 before war was declared) without drawing from the supply at home 
 every man of whom will be wanted for the ships there — those in 
 Reserve and those being hurriedly built. 
 
 Now, leaving the (juestion of contribution, we may look at what cofonra* 
 a portion of Greater Britain does for herself in actual Naval Defence '^***""*- 
 works. Whilst it is clear that the colonies must be prepared to deal 
 with attacks, so small in force that they might elude reasonable diligence 
 and forethought on the part of the Admiralty, it is no doubt true, as 
 stated by the Duke of Devonshire, that the Admiralty has accepted 
 the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against 
 organised invasion from the sea. This position is fully recognised bv 
 
 'Australian Station last year. H.M.S. " Tauranga " ) 
 
 H.M.S. "Mildura" Examples. 
 
 H.M.S. "Boomerang" j 
 
1 6 
 
 Interdkpkndknck ok thk Empire 
 
 some of the colonies. In addition to spending vast sums on immovable 
 forts, the following amounts are being annually spent on Permanent 
 Naval Defence Forces in : — 
 
 'New South Wales 
 
 Victoria 
 '■^ Queensland 
 
 South Australia 
 
 Tasmania 
 
 26,530 
 
 5,000 
 
 4.225 
 
 31 
 
 These forces are supplemented in time of war by Naval Reserves, in ; 
 
 SuKflrested 
 improve- 
 ments. 
 
 Colony. 
 
 Force. 
 
 No. OF Men. 
 
 Cost 1'kk 
 Annum. 
 
 New South Wales . . 
 
 Queensland . . 
 \'ictoria 
 South Australia 
 
 )i t, • • • • 
 
 . . Naval Brigade 
 Artillery 
 Brigade 
 Brigade 
 Reserve 
 ,, Volunteers . . 
 
 1 
 
 •• 335 •• 
 
 206 
 300 
 
 .. 151 .. 
 
 . . 150 . . 
 
 15 .. 
 
 .. 4,t5l3 
 .. 2,178 
 . . 2,000 
 .. 1,500 
 .. 1,500 
 150 
 
 
 . . Making a total of . . 
 
 .. 1. 137 •• 
 
 .. ii,94> 
 
 The Cape of Good Hope has no Naval Reserve, but a Commission 
 is at present sitting to report what provision it is desirable to 
 make in respect to Coast Defence generally.'' The Dominion of Canada 
 also has no local Naval Defence Force. 
 
 It will be gathered from what has preceded that England has 
 fleets all over the world to protect British interests, but that these 
 fleets on the outbreak of war will be found difficult to man, and 
 almost impossible to keep manned : and that some of the chief 
 colonies are creating a local Defence Force — each under a separate 
 authority — the disadvantages of which have already been pointed out. 
 
 As a mode of bettering the present state of things, all the small 
 colonial bodies, at present under various names {e.g., Naval Brigade, 
 Naval Volunteers, Naval Artillery), might be amalgamated with the 
 
 'Also ;^6,2oo on Royal Naval House. 
 
 -^7,000 more if the Guyundah is in commission. 
 
 ■'Cape of Good Hope, Government Notice, No. 858, 3/9/96. 
 
In Rix.aki) to Navai, Dki-knck. 
 
 Royal Naval Reserve under one general policy. The importance of a 
 body of Royal Naval Reserve so constituted, with its cspHt dc corps, its 
 unity of interests, and its bases all over the woild, would be very great. 
 The uncertainty of the future which local government engenders — b\' 
 changes in management — makes greatly against the efficiency of any 
 force. The R.N.R. could be augmented by men from the coastal and 
 fishing trades of the colonies, to whom at present there is no encour- 
 agement given to join any Naval Defence Force. In i8gi, the 
 provinces of Canada had 27,079 fishermen and 13,928 men trained as 
 sailors. This does not include Newfoundland, which has (as near as 
 can be judged) 5000 men employed in coasting and fishing.^ 
 
 Some of the principal Australian local shipping lines are : — 
 
 Company. 
 
 Union Steam Shipping Co. 
 
 A. U. S. N. Co 
 
 Adelaide S. S. Co. . . 
 Howard Smith & Sons 
 Huddart Parker & Co. 
 Mcllvvraith, McEacharn & Co. 
 
 Deck Hands, not count- 
 ing Officers. 
 
 Kngine Room Staff, not 
 
 COUNTING EngINEEKS. 
 
 636 
 i(j7 
 T42 
 106 
 
 49 
 
 m: 
 
 
 • 507 • 
 
 
 
 • 230 . 
 
 
 
 . 158 . 
 
 
 
 . 132 . 
 
 
 
 • 44 • 
 
 
 •• 55 • 
 
 
 
 1.135- 
 
 
 Assuming that it has been satisfactorily shown that a general 
 Naval Policy need not fail for want of men, it still has to be consid- 
 ered how these men can be drilled, mobilised, etc. If we take 
 Australia as an example, we find that an Imperial Act provides " for 
 the equipping, manning, and maintaining at the joint cost of the 
 Imperial and Colonial Funds, a Naval Force, consisting of five cruisers 
 and two torpedo gunboats, which have the same status as H. M. 
 ships of war. The officers and men are changed triennially, and the 
 limits where they are to be employed in times of peace or war are 
 fixed with the boundaries of the Australian Station. It is provided 
 that no reduction of the Imperial squadron shall be made in conse- 
 quence of the equipment of this naval force. The Australasian 
 
 * From lecture by the Hon. T. A. Brassey at Melbourne, Oct. 25, 1846. 
 ^ This does not include cooks or stewards employed. 
 
i8 
 
 I\ti;kdki'K\I)k\ck or thk Empikk 
 
 colonies contribute 5 per cent, of the cost of these vessels — not to 
 exceed ;jrj5,ooo per annum — and the actual charge of their main- 
 tenance."' The agreement is for ten years. The ships mentioned 
 were launched in 1889 and 1890, and the scheme has not met with 
 general satisfaction,^ nor does it encourage, to any appreciable extent, 
 men from the four and a half millions of inhabitants forming a portion 
 of Greater Britain, to help personally in the Naval Defence of the 
 lunpire. It appears to foster the old, fatal idea of levying a colonial 
 tribute : taxation without representation.'' 
 Thecompie. So much progress has been made in Colonial Defence, under 
 
 work"aiready great difficulties, that it would be unwise to destroy what has been 
 commenced. |)i,jit ^p ^^j great cost of time and money. Any changes to be made 
 should come only in the form of improvements and modifications to 
 bring the work to completion. For instance, the Australian colonies 
 could institute a Federal Defence Committee, having a Naval Director 
 who would be responsible to the Admiralty for the Naval Defences of 
 the colonies in the same manner as Captain Hext, R.N., of the Indian 
 Marine is in India. Again, the present Australian Auxiliary Squadron 
 (or such ships as the Admiralty should select) might be placed under 
 the control of the director, subject to conditions similar to those of 
 the Cci'bcnis in Victoria.'* They would make good " Guard Ships " at 
 different ports in the colonies. Great Britain is already so provided, 
 and as far as England is concerned, in peace time they would be 
 more useful in this capacity than the Taimiii^a, Mildura, and 
 
 ' See Coghlan's Statistics for New South Wales. 
 
 ^ See Australian daily papers on the reports of the meeting of the British 
 iimpire League, December 3, 1896. 
 
 ■'Since this paper was written. Lord Charles Beresford, R.N., appears to 
 have expressed a strong opinion tliat the Colonial contributions to the Defence of 
 the Empire ought to consist entirely in the establisinnent of local naval bases. 
 See "Age" and "Argus" of 19th July, 1897. 
 
 'In the arrangements made between Mr. Verdon in 1866 (then Treasurer 
 of the colony of \'ictoria) and the Home Governmi^nt re the Cerbents, it was 
 stipulated : " The colony will bear the cost of manning and maintaining her, in 
 time of peace of using her as a training ship for a loc;d Na\al Force." . . . 
 Then about the Nelson and the Cerberus: " If either of these shall cease to be 
 maintained and used for the purposes for which it is given, the property in 
 it will revert to her Majesty's Government, discharged of all the abo\e 
 stipulations." 
 
In REGARn ro Navai. Dki-enck. k.) 
 
 lioomcrang are at the present time.^ Also, the Federal Defence Com- 
 mittee niiffht undertake to keep the Guard Ships manned by, say, 
 two-thirds permanent men, and one-third Naval Reserve, ready to 
 embark at any moment. Their use would be to protect the, floatinj,' 
 trade in Australasian waters. So far as Australia is concerned, this 
 scheme could be carried out without any additional financial btu'den 
 to the colonists. The £"126,000 before shown to be contributed by 
 the colonies to the General Naval Defences, together with the £sj,757 
 spent on permanent Naval Forces by some of the colonies, make a 
 total annual expenditure of £"16,5,757. This sum is sufficient to pay 
 the cost of maintaining the ships and of manning them all the year 
 round with two-thirds of their full complement ; the monc}' for the 
 other one-third would be supplied by the £"11,941 before shown to be 
 annually spent on Naval Reserves. If, therefore, these suggestions 
 be worth considering, they need not be rejected on the score of 
 expense, so far as Australia is concerned. As to other outlying 
 countries, taxation for Naval Defence purposes is fair and inevitable 
 and if carrj-ing out these suggestions would impose taxation on them, 
 that taxation will be less by their falling into a general scheme than 
 by separately dealing with their own defences. If more money should be 
 required as these extensions are made, the colonists, having to bear the 
 taxation, would be concerned to mquire into the use made of their moiuy: 
 and then they would see that stationary forts on th(! sea coast are not 
 substitutes for a moving navy; then, probably, the money spent on 
 stationary forts and on moving forts will be differently apportioned.- 
 
 Obviously, the outcome of such an unification of the nation's The result of 
 distant sea-forces as that suggested would be to place the whole of provemeftts?"' 
 the British Empire in the same position as the British Islands are at 
 the present time — with respect to "Guard Ships" around their coasts, 
 — that is : At the chief sea-port towns modern sea-going ships would 
 be stationed during the greater part of the year, always in commis- 
 sion. They would be used as recruiting ships for the Royal Navy 
 
 ^ These are, at the present time (June, 1896), lying up in Sydney Harbour, 
 " in reserve." 
 
 •^ Not that land forts are unnecessary ; this has been very clearly argued by 
 Vice- Admiral P. H. Colomb in numerous lectures given at the Royal United 
 Service Institution in London. 
 
20 Interdependence ov the Empire 
 
 and for the Koyal Naval Reserve, and as training ships for both 
 forces. The ships could be mobilised once a year for manoeuvres 
 (following the practice already adopted by the Adiniralty with regard 
 to England). They would in war time be ready to protect the floating 
 commerce in the waters of the dependencies at which they are stationed, 
 — the equivalent of the policeman left behind in the quiet parts of the 
 town whilst the police force as a whole was dispersing the mob. 
 Further, it would follow that a most important body of men, trained 
 in the latest mode of naval warfare, and actually familiar with the 
 ships in which they would be required to serve (a not unimportant 
 matter) would be raised. They would be distributed all over the world 
 when hostilities commence. The importance of a well drilled Reserve, 
 and a scheme of mobilising them in an efficient manner, cannot be 
 over-estimated. Further, the Empire would be strengthened by 
 obtaining in time of war the actual services of her people residing 
 in Greater Britain, instead of taking their money to pay for the 
 services of other members of the nation for their protection. 
 Financial To anyone interested in this, it is gratifying to know that the 
 
 Resources. 
 
 public mind is becoming alive to the importance of the subject. It 
 may not be uninteresting to look at some views which have already been 
 voiced. H. O. Arnold-Forster, Esq., M.P., writes: "The commerce 
 of the Empire protected by the Royal Navy amounts to no less than 
 ;f930, 000,000, and of this total the commerce of the self-governing 
 colonies alone represents no less than £143,000,000, or one-seventh 
 of the whole. For the protection of this commerce, a sum of 
 £'20,000,000 sterling is to be spent this year. Towards this the self- 
 governing colonies contribute ;f 269,000, or one-severity -fifth part of the 
 whole! The balance, of seventy-four seventy -fifths, is paid by the tax 
 payers of the United Kingdom ! Now, it may be said that the 
 colonies are young communities, poor and struggling for existence. 
 In view of the magnificent pictures of Colonial wealth and prosperity 
 which are painted for our edification every time a fresh Colonial loan 
 is being financed, it seems scarcely necessary to dwell on this branch 
 of the subject. The wealth, the resources, the energy, and the 
 boundless prospect of the self-governing colonies have been dinned 
 
In Hi.caki) |() N\v\i. |)i;i-knck. 
 
 ai 
 
 into our ears with such persistent repetition of late that it would be 
 churlish on our part not to accept such statements as representing 
 solid facts."' 
 
 Another view is put by Sir Kawson W. Rawson, K.C.M.G., C.B., 
 who, writinf? on the Maritime Trade of the United Kinj^dom (i.S6g- 
 1889) remarks: "I will conclude this series of letters with a state- 
 ment of the import and export trade with Australasia, and of the 
 loans raised in ICngland by that group of colonies in each year. 
 There appears to be no immediate connection between the columns 
 of exports and loans, but it can scarcely admit of a doubt that such 
 large sums loaned annually must have greatly stimulated the trade 
 between the two countries, greatly to the advantage of both, especially 
 the export trade /mm the United Kiii^ulmii ; and this may be traced in the 
 Quinquennial Abstract which follows it, and which will enable the 
 reader to realise the actual growth of the trade, import and export, 
 the great increase of the loans in the last ten years, and the very 
 large proportion which the amount of loans bears to the amount of 
 exports. It must be noted, however, that the Annual Table shows a 
 decreased proportion in the last three years, but still amounting to 
 30 per cent. 
 
 Tkadk ok Unitki) Ki\(; 
 
 Loans Raiseii 
 
 Tuadf. 
 
 of IInitfi) Kingpo.m 
 
 Loans Raised 
 
 noM 
 
 WITH AUSTKAL.^.SIA. 
 
 in i'.nc.i.and by 
 Australasia. 
 / Millions. 
 
 8.9* 
 
 \VI 
 
 rii .\l'stkalasia. 
 
 IN Lnulam) by 
 
 
 £ Millions. 
 
 
 £ Millions. 
 
 Australasia. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 £ MlLLIf)NS. 
 
 -- 
 
 Imports. 
 
 Exports. 
 
 •44 
 
 i 
 1 
 
 Imports. 
 
 Exports. 
 
 
 . .. 18.J* 
 
 18C9 
 
 12. 1 
 
 1880 
 
 
 25-7 
 
 18.7 
 
 
 1870 
 
 14.0 
 
 10.7 
 
 2.5 
 
 1881 
 
 
 20.9 
 
 239 
 
 
 tI 
 
 1871 
 
 145 
 
 II. I 
 
 1.7 
 
 1882 
 
 
 25.2 
 
 28.4 
 
 
 3 3 
 
 1872 
 
 15.6 
 
 15-5 
 
 1.9 
 
 1883 
 
 
 25-9 
 
 26.8 
 
 
 . .. 14.8 
 
 1873 
 
 17-3 
 
 19.2 
 
 •5 
 
 1884 
 
 
 28.3 
 
 2r).8 
 
 
 . . 1 f . 6 
 
 1874 
 
 18.5 
 
 20.7 
 
 2.1 
 
 1885 
 
 
 23 J 
 
 28.1 
 
 
 .. 21.S 
 
 r87.'5 
 
 20.5 
 
 21.2 
 
 4.2 
 
 l88f, 
 
 
 20.9 
 
 25.0 
 
 
 •■ 12.5 
 
 1876 
 
 21.9 
 
 195 
 
 5 3 
 
 1887 
 
 
 233 
 
 22.3 
 
 
 . . . r,.4 
 
 1877 
 
 21.7 
 
 21.5 
 
 2.5 
 
 188S 
 
 
 255 
 
 28.0 
 
 
 9-7 
 
 1878 
 
 20.8 
 
 215 
 
 0. 1 
 
 1889 
 
 
 26.8 
 
 255 
 
 
 7.2 
 
 1879 
 
 21.9 
 
 17.9 
 
 10.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • Part oJ t\ 
 
 lese sums were di 
 
 stributed 
 
 
 
 ver subseq 
 
 lent years. 
 
 
 
 'The Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee. 
 Colonies," by H, O. Arnold-Forster, M.P. 
 
 -" The Navy and the 
 
22 
 
 Tnthki)i:i'hni)i:nck nv tmk Kmpikk 
 
 gUINQUKNNIAL AHSTKACT ()!■ I-()RKCU)ING TAliLE. 
 
 I'KKions. 
 
 I MI'ONTS. 
 
 £ Millions. 
 
 .. 14.7 .. 
 . . 20.7 . . 
 .. 25.1 .. 
 .. 24.3 .. 
 . . 26.8 . . 
 
 l"..\l'OUTS. 
 
 £ Millions. 
 
 Loans. 
 £ Millions 
 
 Proportion of Loans 
 to IC.N ports l'i:k Cj;nt. 
 
 1869 to 1875 
 
 1874 „ 1878 .. 
 1879 ,, 1883 .. 
 1884 ,, 1888 
 
 Year l88y 
 
 . . 14.2 . . 
 . . 20. 9 . . 
 . . 23.2 . . 
 .. 26.1 .. 
 . 25.5 .. 
 
 .. 3.1 .. 
 
 .. 4,0 . . 
 .. 105 .. 
 
 • • 13 ^ ■ 
 
 .. 7.2 .. 
 
 . . 
 
 22.1 
 20.0 
 45-2 
 
 51-2 
 
 28.3 
 
 Th 
 
 "This table, and an examination of similar returns of trade with 
 other countries which have been large borrowers in the London 
 Money Market, suf^^gest the enciuiry whether the rate of caimimption of 
 British goods in siteh countries, Colonial and foreign alike, is not in a 
 great measure dependent upon the means provided by England herself." 
 (August 7th, 1890.) 
 
 The weekly and dailj- papers, without touching upon statistics, 
 ".spenker." speak with no uncertain voice on the subject. "The Speaker,"' 
 London, September 1895, writes: — "We desire to see local supple- 
 mentary navies owned by the colonies, and manned and officered by 
 the colonists. Such a squadron would be a help in war time, and in 
 peace would train the colonists in the duties of self defence— (^/////V.s 
 which no body of Englishmen would depute. We do not care to sen^ the 
 colonists, as it were, hiring British ships, at so much per ton per 
 annum, to guard their shores." 
 
 The "Age," N[elbourne, in a leading article on December 9th, 
 1896, writes: — " But there is not the smallest prospect of the colonies 
 agreeing to merge the Auxiliary Scjuadron in the British Na\y and 
 continue the payments as a subsidy to the Ihitish Admiralty. The 
 popular idea here at the time of the original agreement was that the 
 Squadron was to be the nucleus of a I'ederal Fleet." 
 
 The " Argus," Melbourne, in a leading article on the Duke of 
 Devonshire's speech on Imperial Defence, December 3rd, 1896, written 
 on January 7th, 1897:— "In the reference to the agreement which 
 called the Australian Auxiliary Squadron into existence — an arrange- 
 ment which will shortly come up for review — two points are especially 
 noticeable. Firstly, the speaker emphasised the value which (ireat 
 Britain set upon this agreement, not onK- on account of tlu; increase 
 
 The " Aife. 
 
 The "Argus. 
 
Tn Rkgard ro Naval I)ki-i;nch. 23 
 
 to liur N . A Forces involved, but because it was the first practical 
 step taken towards Federation for Itnperial Defence. Secondly, he 
 made it clear that while the Government attaches great importance to 
 the renewal 'in some form' of the arrangement, its terms are open to 
 revision. ... If the account is to be fairly adjusted, both the 
 debtor and the creditor sides must be considered." The Duke of 
 Devonshire in the same speech said "he hoped that a conference 
 would assemble shortly in London to discuss the whole question." 
 
 The Cape of Good Hope has Encjuiry Commissioners already Conclusion. 
 dealing with the subject ; and the different colonies forming Austra- 
 lasia, having passed the Federal Enabling Bill,' are once more talking 
 about Federation, in relation to which the amalgamation of the 
 Defence Forces is one of the first things to be considered. The time 
 to form a glorious scheme of mutual protection appears to have 
 arrived, and it behoves all persons having the interest of the nation 
 at heart to strain every nerve to bring about the desired change. 
 The great, but, it is hoped, not insurmountable, rock ahead presents 
 itself in the difficulty of getting the politicians in the self-governing 
 colonies to come into accord. But surely they will see, as all must, 
 that to neglect to seize the opportunity which now presents itself of 
 bringing into accord and understanding the scattered Naval Forces 
 of the Empire — a proceeding which would effectually defeat any 
 endeavour of an enemy to deal with those forces in detail — would be 
 unwise in the extreme. We should la\- to heart the lessens which 
 bronght about the North German CcMifederation in i(S6G. If the 
 people of Greater 15ritain were fairly approached, they would be 
 perfectly ready to face the questit)n in a common-sense, honourable, 
 and patriotic spirit. 
 
 • • • < 
 > • • • 
 
 • , • • . 
 
 • • « 
 
 ' Except (.)u(jensiaii(l.