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Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmAs en commenpant par la premiAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaftra sur la dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols -^> signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbols ▼ signifie "FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre filmAs A des taux de rAduction diff Arents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre reproduit en un seul clichA, il est filmA A partir de Tangle supArieur gauche, de gauche A drolte, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nAcessaire. Les diagrsmmes suivants illustrent la mAthode. I « ■ 3 ■* - I t 4 5 6 .. ■■ ■ Ji;,. THE WESTMINSTER REVIEW, No. CL. FOR OCTOfiER, 1801 Art. 1. — Mr. Goldwin Smith on the Study OF History. 77t(? Study of History : Two Lectures de- livered by Goldwin Smith, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History in the Uni- versity of Oxford. Oxford and London : J. H. and J. Parker. 1861. Whether the facts of human nature and society are capable of scientific treatment is undoubtedly the question upon Avhich the course of all future thought must depend. Every fresh discovery, theory, or contro- versy gives a new importance to this cen- tral problem. Moral, social and religious discussions seem all to gravitate to this, and await the answer to the higher question in which they are involved. Debate now turns not simply on the soundness of the reasoning or the accuracy of observation, but upon the very nature of the reason- ing process employed, and the sphere of thought itself. No doubt this, like so many famous controversies, must be ulti- mately decided by the practical good sense of mankind. We believe there is only one conclusive reply to the opponents of the scientific method — solvitur amhulando. We doubt if it is possible, and indeed worth the trouble, to argue men into a belief of the existence of any science. But all those who feel an interest in this theory n^ust watch closely the manner, and still more the spirit, in which it is attacked. If we recur to this subject, it is with the purpose, not so much of answering objections as of protesting against the use of polemical invective in a scientific discussion. In a recent number we pointed out that the new doctrine had made such progress, VOL. LZXVI. 11 that at both the older Universities the Pro- fessors of Modern History had thought it necessary to anathematize it with the usual formulas. We then examined the argument of Mr. Kingsley. We pointed out his mis- conception of the theory in question, his original ideas about the common axioms of science, hi^ peculiar tenets upon the nature of "laws," and how thoroughly, after all, he conceded the propositions he began by refuting. In a word, when he made it " the business of his life henceforward to teach Modern History in a way that should give satisfaction to the rulers of his University," we thought he must be content with a se- lect rather than a numerous audience. Since we then wrote, Mr. Goldwin Smith has published two lectures upon the Study of History, in which the same position is maintained with much more vigour, and we fear much less candour. If it were the ob- ject of his ambition also to give satisfaction to the rulers of his University, he could hardly have done better than publish ad- dresses which seem better adapted for the pulpit of St. Mary's than the Chair of His- tory, and which, with sundry allusions to his special study, are chiefly a panegyrio of morality and religion. His lectures are no doubt very different from that of Mr. Kings- ley. A veteran critic — rude jam donatuH — is in the first place not likely to fall into the extravagances of a popular novelist. We are the very first to do justice to the many excellences this work possesses. Mr. Gold- win Smith is clearly master of a power of expression which has scarcely a rival amongst us. His language has a native strength and purity which rises not seldom into true poetry. He is, too, obviously possessed by real convictions, and a genu- 158 J/r. (lohhrin Smith en the StuiJt/ of //tutor i/. Oct. inc ciillnisidsm for iiinrjil greatness. Those ' imiit it (1 wo tllillli from tliat aid. That ca[>al)K'. of iiich, to say of tlifi most is n(lo[itcd ido and in- scs tlio Ox- tlieory as a nity. Thoso 5 ciuMTiies of , of all the In a pt-r- •oicc of tlic c, at least, ty, roligion, I, morality, loud against , a \)rother hard words, lis, for theiu ays to sec a .rnest. It is r a scientific ory, indeed ! :o bo a blade ethod of lea- ito a brute," )hysical dis- us old epi- ist," "Mate- iven an in- tion. he Jectnrcr loso painful liission. One had raised . he orthodox as if ho hud sneering re- lious Metho- to have all link it a pity l)ts ! Obvi- lable in the apparently Ide religious In and hard Itermined to ile to moral Intention of (belief, and Ihe age by a losophy. \\ antipathy \l — but what 18G1. J/r. Gohlioin Smith on the Stiufi/ vj Ilintori/. 169 the world calls the pro(Tr,.Hs of soicntifie idofiH. What iit-fornx was to Mr. (Jrokor — what the Uevulution is to M. Veuillot — that Materialism is to Mr. Goidwin Smith. It lurUs in our popular theories, and per- vades our ordinary phrases. The very words " developmcnf," " prowth," " organ- ization," and " law," • savour of it. Of course, such writers as Mr. !Mill, Mr. Spencer, Mr. J)arwin, or jMr. Buckle, are tho very high priests of abomination. M. Comte, of course, is a sort of Ariinancs, or Princi|)le of I'^vil. In accordance with this singular view, wo are told of "the prevail- ing passion for degrading humanity to mere clay ;" of men who desire to "repose under the tranquil reign of physical necessity, to become a part of the material world." Wc hear of nothing but the "physical school of philosophy," and the "physical theory of the universe," and " materialism," and "scientifii; atheism," and a "mad mysti- cism," and of our becoming; "a mere grain in the mass of being," whatever that may mean, and of the extuiction of all sympathy, self-exertion, and eflbrt, and all the other dreadful things with which tho metaphysi- cians of the last century and the theologians of every century threaten all who dispute their propositions. We are accustomed to all this from the pulpit. Vn\t is this a very enlightened tone for a philosophical discussion ? Now is this the languasie which thinking men use when they are arguing upon the logic of the moral sciences ? The doctrine of causation, or what he calls the physical theory as ap- plied to society, is maintained by no one more thoroughly than Mr. Mill. Is this the sort of style in which his system is ex- amined at Oxford ? W^e trow not. Is ail this a rational picture of contemporary thought ? Who is this that reproves our age for "the prevailing passion for degrading humanity to mere clay" 1 Seriously, is this much better than more academic l)f>mbast] One would suppose that he only was left as tho Pro|)het of the Lord amidst the priests of Bcval — an Abdiel amidst the rebel an- gels. For our part, we must say that we do not see around us these degrading pas- sions. VVe do not think that tite publie re- gards the scientific thinkers of the day as so utterly demoralizing. We recommend that serious systems of philosophy should be discussed without caricature ; and, on the whole, all this seems to us rather like tilt- ing at windmills. But there is one feature of the method here employed which strikes us as decidedly unfair. It is the way in which the most dif- ferent possible theories are confounded toge- ther. The view of a tnu* development briisi observable in history is common t<> a erowij of very oppo..itfl thinkers, and is held by many vrry ortiiodox believers. Yet men with very little else in common are all here con- signed to the limbo of Materialism. One would almost suppose that they are all — ex hijpnthesl — atheists, even if not cf)n- verts to the religion of M. Comte. Now, in the first place, we think no fair reasonor would, without explanation, make Positivism identical with Atheism seeing that Comte ex- pressly repudiates Atheism as "the most ir- rational form of theology." Bitt to let this pass, why is Mr. Buckle a positivist? He has told us how far he agrees with M. Comte, which it seems to us is very little. It is dif- ficult to say which of them would most strongly repudiate the title. But, after all, the application Of causation to society is adopted by men who have no other thitig in common with M. Comte even philosophi- cally. Of course his is a very unpopular name, and the convenient synonym for- his system tells with the public, especially with an eecksiastieal public. But we do not like attempts to put down philosophical theories by a sort of terrorism, and dispose of them by raising a cry of " Mad dog !" The con- stant use of tho sibilant reminds us too much of the way in which the Record croaks out "Jesuit" when it quarrels with a clergy- man. It reminds us too much of the ingeni- ous divine at Cambridge who urged his re- ligious principles upon a friend with a horse- whip. Theories of history must be examin- ed on their own merits, and not by pointing a sarcasm with the sacred name. Besides which, in philosophical discussions, we res- pect a really thoughtful discrimination be- tween the various theories discussed. The scientific vieVv of history is maintained frotn a multitude of ditferent points of view, k is not to be exploded by indiscriminate satrire or by a volley of bon-mots. Its lead- ing exponent in England is, as we have said, Mr. M ill. As applied to him, the language here used is an obvious extravagance. Men are not to be made responsible for all they have offered as well as for all they have maintained. Whilst we doubt whether the doctrine of development can be settled by a few jokes about the Positivist calendar, wo do not think M. Comte's vast philosophy of history will be demolished by small fun about Mr. Buckle's theory of food. Now there is one piece of advice which we wish to give to the Professor. It is this. When a man comes forward as a very vehe- ment defender of the faith, it would be be- coming to profess some decent respect for the orthodox system which he maintains. 100 Mr, (ioUhmn Smith on (he Sttithj of IHstory. Oct- Plenty of invpctive ngniiiHt nnbt'liuvors in jjeneriil, we have, and much also aliout the mdraiity of the Gospel, but not onw wnrfl about doctrines, creeds, or Hibl»*. We have no wish whatever to scrutinize any man's re- ligions belief, but we can only reinai k, that in this vehement attack upon unbelief, Christianity is uniformly regarded as n I " iDoral system," and not as a '• scheme of redemption." For all that we read hero, the lecturer might not hold a single doctrine of the Church, though, of courNC, with his official position, ho does hold them all. Yet the way in which he talks about " churches ; passing away," and the i(nportance of dog- mas and formulas, would make orthodoxy uneasy. We are not sure that his language even about "the Founder of Christianity," and the "Christian Typo," and the "Christ- ian Example," is strictly evangelical. He tells us " we must put ourselves in the posi- tion of listeners to the Sermon on the Mount, and regard the religion in its ori- ginal es-sence as a new principle of action and a new source of spiritual life." Why this is exactly that proposal of those with whom the orthodox world is so indignant. We hope the lecturer has no hard words for them, or he must be a perfect Bedouin of the- ology. JJut the orthodox do not now take up this position. They set to work to prove the verbal inspiration, and the Mosaic cosmog. ony, and the doctrine of Atonement. The Professor must be aware that what the dis- pute has turned on, is the authority of the Iiible| the miracles, the doctrines of original sin, vicarious sacrifice, and eternal damna- tion. What he makes of these we cannot say ; but he tells us in a third lecture about a Christendom which is approaching, " strip- ped indeed of much that is essential to reli- gion in the eyes of polemical theologians." We are far from objecting to all this. We re- spect this purpose, and believe it to be sincere. But we think the man who uses this language should be more sparing in attack, and should remove from it every trace of bitterness. The world, we think, will pass its judgment on one who, in the heat of his attack upon scepticism, throws over dogmas and churches, says bitter things about the pure morality of the Gospel, which was never denied, and, abandoning all the outworks of the faith, falls back foaming with wrath upon a reli- gion of lovo. We can assure the lecturer that we have no intention of entering upon any religious discussions. We honour the Christian vir- tues as much as he does, and regard them as part of civilization itself. But the question at issue between us is a scientific, not a reli- gious one. We may say at once, that we are neither Atheists, F'anlheists, Positivistjt, nor Materialists ; yet wo do adopt the scien- tific theory of history : and wo think that the opinion, that huiiuin afftirs proceed on intelligible methods is not likely to bo ex- ploded by appeals to cling to the morality of the Sermon on tho'Mtumt. We now proceed to point out instances of the spirit of which we complain, and we commence with one which seems to combine nearly all the Professor's faults at once. We find in the second page the following remark. " It has been said that Christianity must be retrograde, because instead of look- ing forward it looks back to Christ. It is not easy to sec why it is more retrograde to look back to the Source of a higher ■spirit- ual life in Christ, than it is to look back to the source of all life in Mr. Darwin's mo- nad." Now we cannot see the meaning of this strange religious squib. What has the theory of history to do with Mr. Darwin's monad 1 We cojifess we can see neither analogy nor argument. Does any school, any human being, look back to Mr. Dar- win's monad ? Does any one worship it as a type for our imitation as the Giver of life, as an object of love, prayer, or obedience ? Where Is the analogy between the scientific hypothesis and the second Person of the Trinity 1 Really, all this seems to us very foolish and not very reverent. We can hardly understand the state of mind of a man who can suppose that religion can be advanced by so miserable a joke. We can only imagine that the object is to place op- ponents in a repulsive light. It would cer- tainly be very retrograde in physiology to hold up the monad as a type of the animal organism. We are not aware that it is supposed to awaken religious emotion in any sect whatever. So far as Positivism, indeed, is concerned, M. Comte repudiates' " the cloudy discussions, on the origin of animals." The whole passage, in short, is without meaning, or candour, or even wit. It turns solely on a sort of pun on the dou- ble sense of the word ' source,' firstly as the 'author' and then as the 'germ.' We think we once saw this same idea in a journal, together with some fireworks about a 'church of animality' and 'African apes,' and * monads,' and ' starch,' and so forth, which were some how supposed to es- tablish the truth of Christianity, If we re- member rightly, the pious writer succeeded in turning the words of Christ himself into an epigram, flavoured Gospel-truth with per- sonalities, and insisted upon "a religion of love" with considerable force of sarcasm. The bit of wit before us might be in place in some academic Charivari. We (jan fancy the thi^ on niu! fess this un Wt is ( "y»t Oct- , I*ositivi8l«, pt the. seien- 3 tliiiik thiit proceed on ]y to bo ex- the morality lUt instances )lftin, and we s to combine Its at once, he following t Christianity tead of look- 'hrist. It is retrograde to higher '^pirit- l(»ok biick to )arwin's mo- B meaning of What has the Mr. Darwin's I see neither J any sehool, to Mr. Dar- rorship it as a Griver of life, r obedience ] the scientific erson of the IS to us very li. We can f mind of a igion can be ke. We can to place op- t would cer- )hysiology to i)f the animal ■e that it is emotion in Is Positivism, |e repudiates' |he origin of in short, is )r even wit. on the dou- I firstly as the lame idea in fireworks land 'African rch,' and so [posed to es- If we re- br succeeded Ihimself into ^th with per- rel igion of |of sarcasm, be in place '^e can fancy 1801. Mr. Goldwin Smith on the Stiufi/ nf IIi»tor\i. 101 the common rooms being rpiite tickled with this last new religious thei)r^ —the Sermon on the ^[ount done into bon-niots ; but we must say we hardly expected to find a Pro- fessor prefacing a Phihtsophy of History by this strange fun. We must say that with us it pr«'judiccs every word that follows. We rather doubt after this that the writer is capable of seriously grappling with any system of philosophy, much less of criticis- ing the theory of the inconceivable. It suunds to us too much like the smart things which they say in the newspapers. If this w^re a solitary specimen of his method of arguing, we should say less ; l>ui it is only the first of a series. The Professor undertakes to demolish the famous doctrine of M. Oomto — the law of the three stages, the successive phases of the human intellect. For this purpose he repeats the old objec- tion that the stages are not successive but simultaneous, and that the same minds are found using all together. Now surely, Conite invariably insists that the three stages have actually co-existed in nearly all minds. His theory never was that the mind, as a whole, passed through three stages, but that each separate conception and branch of know- ledge did, and that in the order of the.com- plication of the subject-matter. Indeed, he states his theory in nearly the same words in which the lecturer states the objection which is to destroy it ; for he says, that a man takes a theological view of one subject, a metaphysical of another, and a positive of a third ; nor did he ever pretend that one of these methods rigidly excluded the other. Most minds, he says, retain traces of all three, oven in the same subject-matter; but qualiiioutions of this kind cannot affect the law or the tendency. Beside which, the terms ought to be properly explained, which is not done here. By the Theological he does not mean the belief in God, because he includes in it Fetichism and Atheism. For the same reason, by the Positive he does not mean Atheistical. These termS, in fact, have been abundantly explained by their author. He stys he means, by the Theological me- thod, the explanation of facts by a spontan- eous tiction of the imagination ; by the Met- aphysical, their explanation by a crude theory, or unverified hypothesis ; by the Positive, the truly scientific explanation with a systematic verification. Of course, these methods flow into one another and are very rarely absolutely distinct. What an objector has really to show is this, that men use other methods of thought, or that they do not in the main use these successively in the order stated, and that in proportion to the complication of the subject-matter. This the lecturer has not done. Nor will it avail him to show that no epoch exuetly corre- sponds wiih any of these three methods. It was never pretended that it was so. The theory was simply, that in successive ages one or other of these methods is seen to predominate. Can he disprove this ] Ttie fact is, that a theory like this, involving the aggregate of all the reasoning powers, is not to be disposed of by puttuig special con- structions on the terms in which it is ex- pressed, lie asks why the Positive is the last — that is, why scientific reas(»ning is the most complete. We wish he would suggest a fourth method — that is, some opinion which is n.either npimtancous imagination, mere hypothesis, nor positive knowledge. The scientific state of the intellect is thought to be the last, because there is no instance on record of any mind, in any subject, passing out of that into a distinct and superior pro- cess of reasoning. We know there are pro- cesses thought to be superior, as indeed these lectures remind us ; but we think these processes so far from passing out of the Scientific have not yet passed into it — and are, in fact, the Metaphysical., The lecturer tells us that the same system makes " the scientific faculties and tenden- cies predominate in man." Really, this is too bad. Every one who has read anything of Comte's works, especially the ^ater, knows that it is the very foundation of all his method to give the predominance to the moral faculties. It is useless to quote, be- cause every line he has written would prove it. He regards it as the characteristic of his system. We can fancy a very careless reader of his first work being n:isle(l by his state- ment that the history o . ^-nety must be ex- plained chiefly by the ii'^Uory of human mind. But in the "Politique" this appa- rent anomaly is elaborately discussed. He there shows that the intellectual, though subordinate to the moral qualities, must be studied mainly in history, because they show a more complex and regular development. " Of the human capacities," he says, " the strongest (the moral) show no distinct law of evolution — the feeblest (the intellectual) are the ones of which it is most essential to ascertain the progress." And yet, after this, this Professor deliberately tells us that Comte makes the intellectual predominate over the moral qualities. Having thus mis- stated his theory, let us see how he over- throws it. " Which view of science," he asks, " was it that predominated in Attila and Timourl" And this in reply to a theory that the civilization of an age or people is to be directly attributed to its general intel- lectual condition, or, ia the language of Mr. IG2 Ml', (inljiritt Smith on the Stnrhj of Iliittonf. Oct. Mill, '' timt tho ordiT «if |>ro;;rcs.>.l(in in all respects will iiiuiiily d»'|H'iitand M. Conite marked two names, those of Juli- an and Napoleon, us wortby of general con- demnation, lie soon regretted and expunged this very mild imitation of the ( ommination Service, and his " Calendar " has since inva- riably appeared without it. Next he tells us, that the same system being guided by success, " consigns to infamy the memory of men who, though they fell, fell struggling in a noble cause, and have left a great and re- generating example to mankind." Now, if he is tliinking of JJrutus and Cassius, opinions will difl'er about the regenerating example of assassination ; but we think it fair to point out that, so far from worshipping success, the " hagiology " contained the names of men like Demosthenes, Hannibal, the Grac- chi, Coligny, and Koskiusko, who all fell and failed, and JVI, Comte is full of enthusiasm for many a great but unsuccessful cause. It is indeed an error to talk of his using an "historical ;iiorality." If ho says " man is to be studied historically," he means the human faculties can only be exhaustively treated by watching them in action. To assert that his meaning is, that " whatever has been is right " is contradicted by every line he has written. If he speaks of i ccess at all, is it only that sort of success which falls in with and promotes the great cause of human progress] Now, as we have said, we have no right to speak on behalf of Posi- tivists. They must speak for themselves. We are not concerned to defend the religious system of M. Comte. Its recognised adhe- rents must do that. We, perhaps, need not state that we do not keep for purposes of private devotion either "a monad" or an " African ape," but we are very much con- cerned to have philosophical theory dispas- sionately and fairly examined. In the same way, we must protest against the manner in which Mr. Buckle is similarly treated, whose views, however, we do not intend to endorse. '' Other writers," we are told, " erect some one physical influence, the influence of racp, of cli- mate, of food, into asort of destiny of nations." Mr. Huckle, indeed, who if not named is al- luded to, may hav« exai»gerated", espceinlly in his first volume, these influences ; but he ex- pressly states his belief to lie, that the human influences far overpower the physical and tend more and more to do so. Mr. liucklo may h>i \\\ error, but at least he has devoted his lift! to conscientious labours. We have n<» wish to see philosophers disposed of by petulant epigrams, and we think a candid mind could see something in his work beside " tho prevailing psssion for degrading hu- manity to mere clay." There is, however, one instance of mis- representation which touchi's us so nearly, that we are bound to state it. In a lecture subscfiuently published with which wo are not dealing, the IVofessor alluding t«> an article in this lieview, says "we have been told that Christianity almost stifled the poli- tical genius of Cromwell." Now we were speaking not of Christianity but of .ludaism. We were pointing out the influence which some of the darker features of the Hebrew character exercised upon modern religion. We were contrasting the respective influence of tha Old and New Testament, and were showing how largely the former had aflected the Protestant mind, and as an instance we pointed out that it had given a tinge of fanaticism even to tho mind of Cromwell. Every word in the passage and paragraph refers expressly to Judaism as contrasted with Christianity. And yet our critic can tell us in the same passage, that Cromwell's Christianity was tainted with Judaism, which is precisely what we were saying. We con- sider this a plain case of misquotation. We well know that Mr. Goldwin Smith is utter- ly incapable of conscious misstatement. This serves only to show into what want of care controversy can draw an honourable man. The above are a few specimens of the misrepresentations which have led us to criti- cize these Lectures. There is so much with wh ch we heartily agree, and that with which we disagree may be so easily left to itself, that we should hardly have noticed it but for the tendency it exhibits to deal with questions in an oiThand spirit. We object to see such genuine force of conviction and such extraordinary powers of statement made use of with so little care and modera- tion. We are far from thinking this temper incompatible with very serious purpose and even an honest love for truth, and very noble sympathies ; but the handling of philosophi- cal questions requires more patience, more reflection, and more candour. We should like seriously to ask the lecturer whether TT Oct. f r«c<", of clU Mifnntions." niiriitMl i<« aU CHpecifllly in ; but he ex- it the hiiinnn )hvsi(>al and Mr. liiukle huH devoted We hiive posed of by ik H candid work beside •{^radiiig hu- mce of inis- s so iieiiriy, 111 n lecture hieh wo are uding to an 3 have been (led the poll- ow we were of .liidftism. hience which the Hebrew ;rn religion, ive influence fit, and were had afleeted instance we a tinge of f Cromwell, paragraph contrasted critic can Dromwell's uism, which We con- tation. We th U utter- inent. This 'ant of care able man. lens of the us to criti- muoh with with which ft to itself, iced it but deal with We object viction and statement nd modera- this temper urpoae and very noble philosophi- ence, more We should er whether 1861. Mr. fioUhrin Smith on titc Stmhf of ffi.ifnn/. 1M he diMibts. upon rellt'otion, that the principal objeelt of his critioisiii are men juntas honcit ill the pursuit of truth an himself, wiib Just t\>* sincere a love fnr moral preutness; whether ho has thoriiii)tlily weighed and thorinighly understood their respective nys- teiiirt as a whole, and whellier ho supposes philosophy or religion can bo benefited by speaking of them invariably in the terms most certain to be odious? We are the more anxious to protest against this spirit, because it occasionally bears slight truces of resemblance to a style very prevalent now-a-days, which seems to us to be doing some harm. There flourishes a species of literature (if we may be par- doned for A mere digvcssion) which seems to regard nil things in heaven and earth as mere raw material for epigrams. Accord- ing to this school, art consists in pitching on some funny point on the surface of the sub- ject, which is made a peg for a string of wit- ticisms. The favourite "mot" is worked and twisted inside out, until little intelligible meaning remains. A man who starts a dis- cussion on the logic of the moral sciences, will at once find himself pelted with "Afri- can apes," and "Darwinian monads," and " I'ositivist grandmothers," until he ;night suppose himself in the midst of a sort of literary grinning-match. The process is sim- ple enough. The art consists in grinning down your opponent. You select that point which seems to you most easily made ludi- crous, and then you have to place it in an odiodi light. You may be a very good fel- low yourself, but you have to represent yourself as a perfect cynic, and incapable of A gentle feeling. You must be particularly gruff with women. It shows that you are superior to cant. Parallels are useful : they show scholarship. You should compare the statesmen of the day to Wat Tyler and Titus Gates, and foreign monarchs to At:.iia and Heliogabalus. With religion you need not trouble yourself: it will suffice to be gene- rally pungent and funny. If you think a man a baboon, say so. If you differ from an opitaon, call it execrable. If you speak of a man, do so a» if he had done you a deadly wrong. It gives brilliancy to the style. Personalities are permissible, if you are master of Greek. Should you know a bit of gossip, out with it : it will certainly amuse ; besides, it might give pain. In a word, you will assume that whatever you disagree with, which will naturally include most things, is utterly grotesque and foul, and of course if you think so you must say so in plain terms. We must say that we are rather tired of this sort of thing. It is quite Americanising our literature. It is so leterimlly smart. Jesting, like other things, grows spasmodic; annu«'rn»'H«, Htrrtchfd hi* j rcfiiJiition to n point \vht'(« it Iu'coith'm ilHcU i ridiculous? 'Ihi' writiT who in lliij* ooun- ■ try hiis niont powerfully ninintiiint'd this thi'ory is Mr. Mill. It is the [irincipnl Wn turn of his ^rincip.'il work. I-i Nfr. Mill then, of all writers, the oik! who nvNternati- oally degrades the human eharacter ? l)oe» | he place man below the brutes, the victim of a dark tlite f Is the author of the woik on | " Liberty " this prophet of blank apathy 1 ! Does he teach the hopelessness of eirirf,the extinction of all character, and surrender u\' I all moral (bgnity ? Or to take another in- jttiince : a recent, though we think far frftm I safe, exponent of the name theory is Mr. Huokle, the object of a singular antipiithy on the part of the I'rofessor. I-i his view of history and society utterly devoid of sym- pathy with character? is it a mere catalogue of material laws? docs it show nothing but j a dreary fatalism? Mr. f causation in human affairs see with satisfac- tion an Oxford I'rofessor attacking it with nil the extravagance of despair, still more hopeful must they feel when they observe the method of his attack. That theory is being established by an immense induction of facts, by countless separate testimtmies, and the whole current of modern thought, as seen in every popular idea and phrase. From this ground the Professor withdraws, and takes his last stand on a metaphysical puzzle. All the thousand examples of ac- tual laws observed in society, and the in- stinctive bent of all speculation, arouiiV us, to push these observations still further, are to give way to a mere bit of abstract logic. We are asked to reject the conclusions of the principal thinkers of our time, to con- tradict the evidence of mankind, by a few of the old dilemmas of the controversies of the last century. The whole argument of the Professor rests upon his theory of free will. This is the doudland into which a keen practical rcasoner has been forced to withdraw. There, indeed, we decline to fol- low him. Our readers will hardly expect that we are about to stir the deep dust that buries the tomes upon free will and neces- sity. We are not about to dispute his doc- trine of free will by contending for that of necessity. We thought that the two dogmas had mutually slain each other, and lay side by side in an honourable grave. We hardly expected to find them dragged forth into the light in this age and for this purpose. But the Professor seems to us to ignore the whole history of this famous controversy. He actually seems to think that the puzzle of ages is at last solved, or at least may be I I I by wit Itii* mill futi too. saiK b« maj pU'n Oct 1R0I. Vy. iiolflwin Smith on the StuJi/ of lli»tory. IM ^>lnto hlm- ify of iiJijus Hut of hII <> prepunte- ^lliNh«•<« nil »!* lllJlt llM will, or dc- ntid nioral mterouH to ,o tho riiftte- iicnpuhlo of lis own des- I ofphiloRo- I nympathy id clFiirt, a rr", li loftier race ? Vet whose sys- )f innn, tiiid f a pIlHIlttlii'- e theory of ilh siiiisfnc- (ing it with -, still niore [ley observe t theory U io Induction testimonies, rn thought, and phnisc. withdraws, letnphysical iiples of ac- and the in- nrountl us, further, are stract logic. iclusions of le, to con- I, by a i^'iT oviTsies of gunuMit of ory of free to which a n forced to clino to fol- dly expect !p dust that and necea- ite his doo- for that of ogmaa had ly side by iVe hardly th into the se. But ignore the ntroversy. the puzzle St may be by a ftfw vi((orouH oj>i){rHnis. lie tells \\*\ with triumph thiit tiht Ncii>ii(t< nf hi'«tory '\*\ l>iiN«'il upon the '* ijiiick^and " <>f freu will, Hiul xeeiiiN tpiitM to forget that his whole re- fiitiitioti i.H t>aMe«l upon thu Naine (piickK'Hid loo, If tlio theory i>f frt'U will is u ipiick- Niiiul, UH wt! vi-rily believe it to be, it iiiUHt| 1)1) i>i|ually trencheroiiM to both sidet). He limy niiiiiilrtiii any thi'ory of freu wilt he pleasfM, but he will hardly pretend that it iti gt'iierally received. The fact is, that his theory of history Is built upon the a88uni|)tion of a powtulate which has been denied by tho greatest in- t<>lh>ct<4, and by ages of metaphysicians, iiioralintN, and theologians. And this is not u branch of his argument, but it is tho very root and substance of it. Nut merely is it Imscd upon a metaphysic.;! dogma, but upon the most contested and misty of all the dogmas in metaphysics. If there is one tjueslion upon which less certainty reigns than another, it is this ; and it is pre(;isely this dogma upon which the I'rofessor bases his whole philosophy of history, lie may assume his own view to be true, but he must be aware that upon all who reject it, and they*are tho bulk of the thinking, as well as (if the religious, world, his argument is totally lost. If the question of tho appli- cation of science to history is to await the solution of the great metaphysical problem, it may have another fourteen centuries of interminablo debute before it. He may think that the scientitic view of history accepts the other horn of the dilemma — the doctrine of necessity. It does nothing of the sort. It stands upon its own proof. • It leaves tho antagonistic dogi^ias of meta- physics in their internecine struggle. It accepts and adopts the practical co.iclusions uf both parties. The common sense of mankind seems to have assumed that the will possesses an immense power of subdu- ing circumstances, forming character, and regulating action. All that has been said of its force, of its efforts, struggles, and inde- pendence, is taken in its practical sense as beyond question: as a fact, all admit that man has his destiny in his own keeping. On the other hand, it is no less universally assumed that this will works by intelligible methods, consistently follows motives, is therefore a fit subject for methodical obser- vation, systematic calculation, and scientific reasoning, and is compatible with (at least) Divine prevision. Now both of these two points of view are absolutely necessary to the scientific view of history. No theory can insist more strongly upon the power of the will. None more distinctly reconciles it with the possibility of prevision. Jlow thi'ne two ore reivmcilcd may still roninin an insoluble problem in tho cvch of MH'laph^nicians, but it has now cpiiscd to pus- *i»* any interest or umc. The pradicitl imtuu ii«, that none believe tho will to be the viiv tim of circumHiaiico, and none believe it to traiHcend the sphere of knowledge. In tho system of a great meta|)hysician I'ree-will and NeceHsity are two contradictories, either • if which is inconceivable. With our facul- ties, he say!', it is equally impos>iblu tt> con- ceive choice combined with certainty, as it is to conceive volition without a cause. It is quite true that there have been wri- ters who have literally taught a doctrine of fatalism, and others who have taught what we certainly call muterialism. To ignore or to disparage the power of tho will to modi- fy its own character — iho innate cafnicity of every man to bo in the main what he wills to be, to act as he wills to act — in short, to form hisilifo by the free exercise of his fa- culties, is no doubt a pernicious error which has been ages ago very vigorously tauyht. Much of tho language of Ilobbes and Spi- noza is, perhaps, open to this criticism. To exaggerate the influence of tin ' xternal world upon man, to attribute to his circum- stances or his fellows the exclusive control over character or action, is no doubt a -very fatal error which has also been maintained. Montesquieu and his school, or such men as Priestley, Goodwin, or Owen, may be fairly open to such a charge as this. We are ready to join in vigorous repudiation of any such view. Anything which tends to deny to man the fullest power to develope his own faculties, to control his own life, and form his future, we are ready to condemn. Against such disputants the language of these lectures about man being the puppet of circumstances, the victim of a physical necessity, the plaything of a phantasmago- ria of fate, may have some meaning. And if any one held such opinions, this language might have an object. But no one in this day holds any such theory, least of all those who adopt the scientifio theory of history. All its principal exponents have most care- fully guarded against such an assumption. And to tell us tliat the historical theories of men like M. Comte and Mr. Mill are rank fatalism, degrade man to clay, and annul human effort, is nothing, we think, but a piece of barren mystification. But to proceed to the arguments upon which this theory is conducted. The Pro- fessor starts with telling us that " whatever there is in action will be everywhere present in history, and the founders of the new phy- sical science of history have to lay the foundations of their science in what seems 168 Mr. Gohhrin Smith on the Study of irmory. Oct. k the f[aiek9fiiid of free will." Now here at I Next we are told that unlosa we aoccpt the outset \vc must protest nfraiiist tile term I this Freedom, or uiinccoimlability of the "scicnce-of history." The Professor tells will, we must believe in Necessity ; and if us that thouj^h there is no science, there is ■ necessity does not mean the connexion be- a philosophy of history. We are not aware j twoen cause and elVeet, what is it to mean ] that any supporters of the theory he is at- The word has a very distinct mcaninsj. tacking have ever sj)oken of !. science of; From Locke downwards metaphysicians history. So far as AI. C^oriite is eoncerned, j have shown that it means, in ordinary Ian- he always calls his work the •' Philosophy ofj ^ungo, compulsion from without overcoming liistory." Besides, why physical ? This i resistance from within. Now wo assert is a mere begging the (juesi ion. The point ' nothing of this kind respecting the will, contended for is, that the inductive method ! We think it a misuse of langua;^e to apply is applicable not only to the physical but to I this term, except metaphorically, to thenor- tho moral sciences. If ho means that the i mal exercise of the faculties. Why force term science is only applicable to things i upon us a term which expresses an idea we physical, why does ho himself talk of eco- never suggest? At any rate, find some noniical and mental seiences? If he admits that an inductive system is possible in the moral as well as the physie:il world, how does its introduction in history constitute a physical science % Jn trulh, wc fear the term is used merely to raise a prejudice and in- sinuate materialism. But to proceed ; the ibunders of a scientific theory of history do most certainly not lay its foundation in the quicksand of free will. They meet a meta- physical objection on its own ground. But their theory is no more based upon any theory of necessity than it is on any theory of the oriuin of evil. other word which expresses compulsion overcoming resistance. The will is free, and is only free when it can work under the conditions of its nature ; that is, when no necessity exists to constrain it. If none exists, it will infallibly follow ♦'■oso condi- tions. We call man free wlii^n lie can fairly develop his natural fiiculties. It seems a misuse of language to say that in doing so ho is constrained by his natural faculties. His various powers work freely when they follow mutual relathms. Is freedom impos- sible unless they are independent of rela- tions % In a word, the will is free when it We will, however, follow the argument j can act according to the constitution of our when fiirly launched into the quicksands of[ moral nature, and it would be under neces- sity if it could not. We are favoured with an answer to the old objection, that an absolute belief in Free will — that is, the unaccountability of the will — conflicts with the belief in the omni- science of the Creator ; that if free will is incompatible with the certainty of science, it must be no less incompatible with the certainty or foreknowledge of God. We cannot but think the answer which he gives us is a strange one. " The real answer," he says, " seems to be this — that the words om- niscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, though positive in form, are negative in meaning. They mean only that we know not the bounds of the knowledge, power, or ]>re- sence of God." This, we must say, seems to us rather like evasion. It sounds like that theory of the Inconceivable which, he fells us later, sweeps away " morality, truth, God." Is Providence, then (which is omni- science and omnipotence combined), negative in meaning] Does the whole mean that men are not sure what lie knows or does not know ? They cannot say but that lie knows this or that. But how, if this is or- thodox theology, does it meet the argument — which is this : " What you are about to do, free as you are, is certain. It must be certain, because it is known to God. For free will. Our knowledge of it, it seems, is dedn(;ed from consciousness, and then we are asked, from what source those who re- pudiate its existence derive the knowledge of their own existence. Surely the school which denies to consciousness the authority to establish any absolute freedom of the will, rejects its authority for any other ab- solute doctrine whatever. They would say that consciousness can only prove that we feel that we exist, and in the same way may prove that we feel that we are free : upon which we all agree. Consciousness cannot tell us anything about the process by which we exist, or came into existence, or the pro- cess by which we will. Besides, what is it we learn from consciousness % That we are not under Necessity ; that our will does not struggle against something it resists, it might tell us. But necessity is not alleged. What is lleged is, that our wills are deter- mined by our characters and our circum- stances. Can consciousness tell us they are not? IIow can consciousness tell us that the will is unaceountable, and works upon methods which the reasoning fiiculties can- not deal with ? That is the real point which it is called in to prove. We might almost as soon expect it to satisfy us about the anatomy of the body. A says J we ] chiir; the there of w is to habit Oct. 1801. Mr. Gohhrin Smith on the Stmlt/ of History, 107 3 \vc accept ilily of tlie sity ; and if nnexion be- lt to moan ] ;t mcaiiiiiE;. tupliysiciana rdinary lan- overconiiiig ' wo assert ig the will. '^e to apply ^, to the nor- Why force 9 an idea we , find some conipiilsioii A'ill is free, rk under the is, when no it. If none ♦'•oso condi- lie can fairly It seems a in doing so ral faculties. y when they edom impos- dent of rela- free wlien it tution of our under neees- iswer to the iclief in Free )iiity of the in the omni- free will is T of science, * ble with the God. We hich he fiives answer," ho le words om- sence, though in meaning, low not the wer, or ju-e- 3t say, seems sounds like lie which, he )rality, truth, hich is onmi- led), negative mean that ows or does but that He if this is or- he argument are about to It must be o God. For We shall hear next, that God's to Ilim all things are known." And then comes the answer : " No : when we say all things are known to Hiin, we mean wo do not knf)Wthe Ixiundaof His knowledge — we do not know in what sense lie knows it." This is the way in which the question, " Does lie know the thing you are about to do?" is answered. We might reply in his own words, "A rooted contradiction in our minds is not to 1)0 removed mere'? by denying us the use of the term in which the contradic- tion is expressed." We are sure that this is not strictly logical, and we think not strictly orthodox. This particular objection, indeed, is one we rather like. It seems to us a mode in which metaphysicians may be answered according to their metaphysics. The dilemma is strictly inextricable. No sophistry can solve it. If man is absolutely free to choose, and this absolute freedom makes any certain prevision impossible, God himself cannot know what he will choose ; and the Professor in hardly sure that He does. No refining about the meaning of omniscience will alter the mattter. " O n- niscience, omnipotence, and omnipresci negative in meaning," indeed ! almost expect to mercy, justice, and truth, nay, creation and Creator, are ideas negative in meaning. After all, there is nothing like putting this argument in a concrete form, where metaphysical riddles are impossible. You say, — God knows what will take place a thousand years hence, that He knows it all certainly, that He knows it all minutely. If He does not, if you doubt it for an in- stant, if you only mean negatively that Ho does, then what do you mean by Provid- ence 1 Providence has a positive meaning — that He has actually foreseen and pro- vided for the (Smallest incident. Then it follows that the world's future to Him at least is certain. If so, the freedom of man's will to choose is compatible with a pre-de- termined result. In other words, our con- sciousness of the freedom of the will can offer no objection to a science of human so- ciety which it does not offer to the founda- tion of theology. Having in one paragraph undermined all natural religion, in the next the Professor upsets every recognized theory of the form- ation of character. It will not avail, he says, to cite the moral certainty with which we predict conduct resulting from settled chiiracter. For this settled character was the result of action which was free, and therefore retains the uncertain element out of which it was formed. Now, surely this is to overthrow the established theory of habit, at least as old as Aristotle, — that cases occur in which acts within our control lean by constant repetition to a cliaracter from which flow (until the character is al- tered, or the circumstances wholly changed, which are obviously within our observation) acts which have passed out of ouf control. Are we oertaln that a man of perfect honour will not commit an act of treachery ? No, says the Professor, certainly not ; for the character of honour was formed by a lon<^ course of action, of each step of which wo could not be certain. Therelbre the uncer- tain element remains. 15ut It seems to us, that to take this as a universal rule is far more than can be established. Why does the existence of a certain element in each action by which character is formed, require the existence of the same element in the character when formed 1 There was, for instance, a struggle in the action ; will tluTo be any In the character? Besides, it is here admitted that there is a moral certainty by which we predict the future conduct of nations and men. We may say that, as wo do not want certainly to predict acts but tendencies, we need no more. Let us ex- amine, too, what this moral certainty Im- plies. Does It not imply that if our belief falls short of absolute or scientific certainty. It is merely that we have not got all the ne- cessary facts to observe 1 Certainly not that there is an inherent uncertainty about that which we have observed. How could we feel moral certainty about action is, whilst we really believed that the entire nature of the action was such as possessed no luiifofmity? How feel moral certainty, without a single certain rule at any step of a long reasoning process ? It seems to us that the Professor is here putting the un- accountabllity of the human will far higher than was ever attempted by metaphysicians. Few, we think, have contended for more than that the individual acts by which wo form our characters are inscrutable. None, we think, deny the certainty of fixed cha- racters, and the strict relation they bear to their consequent acts. Then settling deeper in the "quicksand" of Free will, the argument continues. Action, he says, is a choice between motives. It follows a motive, but how are we to tell which motive it will follow 1 The only ground we have for calling one motive the strongest, is that it has prevailed before ; but this is set aside in every great change of conduct by an effort of the will for which some other antecedent must be found. Why, of course, a new motive. Does the Professor suppose that a man who habitually follows a certain motive will cease to do so, whilst all the circumstances, including his 168 Mr. Gohhcin Smith on the Stuilt/ of History. Oot. own sta; ■ of mind, arc absolutely unclfangcd \ (iiiul a cliange in cither is a new motive) \ if so, men would cease to he responsible i for their aotionn. "Action is a choice be- i tween iiiotives." Then, if so, the choice (Ictcrinines the motive, and not the motive i tiui choice. If the mind is ihdined ante-] cedent ly to the inducement (and to clioosc , a motive, it must be aniecedently inclined), ; what is the use of the motive ? !Man can i act without motive, if volition precedes the , motive. Why does ho need the inducnce , of any inducement, if he is free to choose | under which influence lie will fall ? The ; fact is, the Professor is here simply con- ; founding motives with courses of action. Action is no doubt a choice between several j)ossible courses in ind of any person, and all the motives infliiencino the mind, with their relative degrees of force, the resulting act could be predictCLi.' It is no objection to say that those data are impossible to pro- cure. The only point we have to prove is, that action is invarial)ly determined by the manner in which definite ends allect the moral nature. To make a science of socie , possible, it is only necessary to add to this, that on a great scale, and to establish only general tendencies, the necessary informa- tion can be obtained. But, proceeds the Professor, " When the action is done, tlip comiexion between it and its motive becomes necessary and certain ; and we may argue backwards from action to motive with all the accuracy of science." Then what is the objection to a science of history ? \n history we have the actions given us; then why may we not from them argue back to the motives — il; ' is, show their necessary connexion with human fucuK ties and circumstancep, and that with all the accuracy of science ] Besides, how can the cnnnexion between action and its nudive be neccssnry and certain, if each does not imply the other ] Where necessary connexion ex- ists, antecedent or conKetive" mis- leads him. Ilis instance is peculiarly unfor- tunate. "Finding at Rome a law to en- courage tyrannicide, we are certain that there had been tyrants at Rome." We are certain of nothing of the kind. Tliere might have been tyrants at Greece, from whence the law may have been copied, or there might have been no tyrants at all, and the Romans may have thought prevention better than cure ; or the law ndght have arisen out of a mis- conception of a tradition, or may have been a mere whim. In short, it may have arisen in fifty different v/ays. The Professor for- gets that, as there may be dilFerent motives each leading to different acts, there nuiy be different motives all leading to one act. If it is impossible to know with certainty which motive a man will choose, why is it so easy to know certainly which motive he has chosen ] lie next asks how, upon the Necessarian theory of action, we can account for the facts of our feeling free to act, of our approving or blaming our own acts by conscience, and of our approving or bhuiung the acts of others. So long as this assumption of ne- cessity is forced into the question, it is im- possible to argue it. If we could not help our acts, of course none of ''.ese things would be rational. But the causal theory never pretended that we cannot help our acts. To do so is Asiatic fatalism. (>n the contrary, that theory insists that our acts are caused maiidy by our own characters, which are formed mainly by our own efforts. No analysis of the pjocess by which this is done can aff*ect the true freedom of the action, nor can the fact that it has a process at all. The truth is, the answer to all these three objec- tions is the same. We feel free from exter- nal compulsion, and what that consciousness can prove to us is a question we have al- ready examined. That the causal theory of action extinguishes praise and blume, con- '*• ; 1861. Mr. Golilwin Smith on th> Sfudi/ of llhtory. 169 '■:^^: science, sympftthy, and effort, is repeated in these lectures in every variety of form. Now that theory merely requires that every action has a regular antecedent, such antecedent being mainly the disposition >*" ;he agent, and partially the circumstance which he is placed. Praise and blame < dimply the judgment we pass upon the t.xcrclae of the moral qualities — that is, the disposition of the agent. How then does a theory which simply establishes a strict relation between the disposition and the act interfere with praise and blame — our moral judgment upon the disposition 1 On the contrary, it much strengthens it. Tho more certain we are that the act was caused by a certain dispo- sition, the more sure we feel in judging the disposition from the act. In our own case we generally do this with complete confi- dence. The less means we have of connect- ing a certain act with a certain disposition, the less able are we to judge. Indeed, when very uncertain, as in cases of mania, we cease to judge at all. "If the will is guided by motives, why do we praise or blame?" It might be sufficient to answer, that praise and blame form part, and a very essential part, of the motives. We find in practice that praise and blame lead to certain results. The more certain we are that they will be followed by those results, the more certain shotild we be to use tRem as the means. If the theory of acts having regular antece- dents went on to trace those antecedents wholly to something outside the agent, which is the Necessarian theory, we should no doubt cease, strictly speaking, to praise or blame ; but it does not. It traces them up to the moral qualities. " Why do we not praise and blame the material world ?" it is asked. Because it has not moral qualities. To ask why we praise or blame the exercise of moral qualities, is like asking why we love or hate. The only new feature now intro- duced into the analysis of the moral qualities is the theoretic possibility of predicting their action. How does certainty, regularity, or rationality in action, limit the liability to praise or blame? The more certain we are of future conduct, the more strongly do we praise and'blame the character. If we are certain that a man will cheat, the more un- reserved is our blame ; if we are certain that he will not lie, the more complete our praise. Praise and blame vary directly, not inverse- ly, with certainty. In the extremes, perfect uncertainty, as in mania, makes both impos- sible ; the highest character we know is one in which we feel moral certainty. Yet, whilst moral certainty is the highest praise we can give, it is here pretended that the theoretic possibility of scientific certainty extinguishes praise and blame, and puts an end to charac- ter. "IIow can we feel love or gratitude to- wards the necessary organ of a human pro- gress?" the lecturer asks. Now that is a question which, since he adopts the doctrine of Progress, we should like to ask him. We suppose he means by the doctrine, that he is sure that the world will progress. Then why does He feel lovo or gratitude towards those who contribute to an end of which he is sure? He will say he does not mean a necessary progress. Neither do we. We do not mean a progress that the agents are forced into, but one which they are sure to adopt. "How can we feel gratitude to them more than to a fertilizing river?" he asks. We admit that this is a good epigram ; in fact, the lecturer thinks it so good that he has indulged in it twice. But does it advance the argument? We feel gratitude towards a certain active disposition, a feeling which moves a person to do good to us or our kind. We do not perceive this feeling in fertilizing rivers. If they have it, they keep it to themselves. Now how does our cer- tainty that this feeling will operate interfere with the sincerest gratitude? We are cer- tain of the affection of a parent ; we may be- lieve in a given case that it is impossible that it should cease to exist, yet we are not less grateful. Men are certain of the provi- dence of God : they call it a necessity of His existence, meaning that they cannot conceive Him otherwise ; yet they do not cease to feel grateful. Now surely all this is only a revival of a few old metaphysical dilemmas. Every one of these arguments may be found in any of the old discussions about Free will, urged, we think, with far greater subtlety, though not perhaps quite so tersely. We remem- ber, indeed, almost the same logic, nearly in the same words, used in the controversy witii Jonathan Edwards by the now forgot- ten Mr. Chubb. Had Mr. Chubb lived in this railroad age, he would have learned, no doubt, to d'spose of the controversy in half a dozen smart sentences. He might have spared his learning, his ingenuity, and his la- bour. It is a strange instance of the dis- credit into which pure metaphysics have fallen, that an Oxford professor argues this question absolutely de novo, as though these ponderous discussions had never existed. It is quite right that they should be forgotten ; but we must remember that the labour of so many lives will not be compressed into a few paragraphs. Having seen how the Professor deals with metaphysics, let us see how he succeeds with science. And hero we find it necessary to 170 Mr. G'oldirlii Smith on the Stmly of IIts(or>/. Oct. (|iiole ft pnsHnge wliich seems to us almost uiiiinie : — "(Srcat fl(rp'!9 is liiiil by the Necessarians on what art! rnllcd moral Ptalisticn. ItFcftms that feel as trcf us we may. our will is hound by a law compelliDi? tho same number of men to commit the funw number of crimes within u certain cycle. The eyelf. curiously enounh. coincides with the pcsriixl of a year, which iH naturally selected by the li<)jristrHr(Jeneral for his IliportB. Hut, lirsl. the statistics tendered ore not mural, but lepal. I'liey tell us only the outward act, not its inward moral character. They set down alike under mur- der the act of a Rush or a I'almer, and the act of an Othello. Secondly, we are to draw tome mo- mentous inference from the uniformity of the re- turns. How far are they uniform? M. (iuetelet gives the number of convictions in France for the years 1820, ]8'27, 1828, 182!). severally as 4318, ATiiCt, A:>i)l, 4475. The similnrify is easily ac- counted for by that general uniformity of human nature which we all admit. How is the differ- ence, amounting to more than .SOO between one year and the next, to be accounted for e.xcepl by free will? 13ut, thirdly, it will be lound that these statistics are unconsciously, but ell'cetually, garbled. To prove the law of tiie nuiforinity of crime, periods are selected when crime was uni- form. Instead of four years of the lle-itoration. in which we know very well there was no great outburst of wickedness, give us a table inchidinii the civil war between the Hurgundians and the Armugiiacs, the til. Bartholomew, the lieign recisely the same proportion diminish the crime. '• Th«! cycle, i curiously enough, coincides with the period' of a year." Truly, a rare bit of wit. Does I the J'rofessor suppose tho law — i.e. the re- lation — is less true of a period of ten years I or six months? Some limit ft>r the ob- ! servation must biv taken, we suppose! Why ; not tell us that the observation, curiously enough, coincides with the political division called France — or, curiously enough, ap- i plies only to murder or suicide ] Surely ' this trick of jestinrj may become quite a i monomania. Again, these statistics '*tell us I only the outward act." Did they ever pro- ' fess to tell us more? 8.) far as history is j concerned, that is all that is required. As > applied to character, they only firofess to be I rough notes and indications of tendencies. I Next he asks, *' How is the difference, amounting to mor^ than three hundred, between one year and the next, to be ac- counted for, except by free will ? " Why, by altered characters mainly, and varied conditions partially. How can the similari- ty be accounted for by free will in 'the Pro- fessor's sense, that is, the absence <.)f inva- riable relation between character and act? Let us examine what these returns imply. They tell us that 40,000,000 wills, with an iiiliiiite change of disposition, variety of temptations, opportunitico, and conditions existing every minute throughout an entire year, issue in acts which year after year vary only as one in fifteen. Let us imagine the myriads of possible conqilications which these conditions afford, and then try, if we can, to doubt that if the entire character and disposition, and all the motives and circum- stances of action, be known, tho resulting act can be ascertained. Let us suppose, for instance, that the circumstances of one vear were to be repeated in the next — that the ' same men, with characters absolutely unal- ! tered, with every condition and circum- : stance identical — every purse as temptingly j placed, every knife as ready, every instinct, I passion, and pain as keen — can we doubt j that precisely the same acts would be re- I peated, and tho whole events of one year j exactly correspond with those of tho last? > 1861. Mr. GoUhrin Smith on the tStiidt/ of History. in And this ifl all that in meant when it in snid that human uflUira ur» the subject of uauaa- tion. But he tells us " to prove the law of the uniformity of crime, periods are -selected when crime is uniform" — the law of the uniformity of crime I Truly, this is the Nemesis of jesting. The only uniformity is the uniformity of the relation between crime and its cause. (liven certain charac- ters and conditions, there follow certain acts. Vary the characters and conditions, and you vary the acts. Very different characters and conditions are followed by very different results. The only thing uniform or constant in the whole process is the relation. " Pe- riods are selected when crime is uniform." Certainly, periods are selected when the characters and conditions are known to be very similar, as successive years in a very calm epoch, and the argument shows that these similar conditions are followed by very similar results. Iteigns of Terror are not selected simply because the dispositions are so inflamed, and the conditions are so abnormal, and the data so intricate that all comparison becomes hopeless or useless. But the crime of a Reign of Terror bears precisely the same fixed relation to the cha- racters of the men and the conditions pro- ducing it as does the crime of any period of stagnation. If the crimes are then im- mensely multiplied, it is because the cause of crime — the vices of character and the condi- tions which lead to it — are multiplied in an equal degree. In comparing the vital sta- tistics of one country and another, we should not select years of pestilence or civil war, simply because the data are obscure ; certainly not because we doubt the certain connexion between death and the causes of death. Social statistics, he tells us, are valuable because " they are not fixed by Necessity, but variable." Does he seriously pretend that any man ever proposed social statistics except with a view of showing how intimate was the connexion between man and his acts, and how impossible it is to effect the acts, unless by influencing the character 1 " Necessarians exhort governments to re- form themselves, instead of showing how their goodness or badness necessarily arises from the climate or the food." This is the old sneer at Mr. Buckle, who at least, if he has exaggerated the influence of external na- ture on national character has hardly less exageratod that of institutions. " If statis- tics were fixed by necessity, to collect them would be a mere indulgence of curiosity." Who (except as a burlesque) ever supposed a statistician to mean that the actual figures of his returns were uniform, or to collect them with any other view than that of ulti- mately altering the proportion? Mortover, when statistics are fixed by necessity — /.c, we suppose, by physical causation — are they not often perft'ctly variable by man, and va- luable for that reason 1 Sanitary statistics drawn from the physical laws of health are perfectly necessary in the Professor's sense, yet the collecting them is not found to be the mere indulgence of curiosity. On the contrary, we can vary them almost at pleas- ure by altering the conditions. Agricultural statistics drawn from the physical laws which govern the cultivation of the soil are fixed by necessity, yet they are studied in order that we may change them. Even when the statistics are not variable by num, as astronomical or meteorological statistics, the collecting them is anything but the in- dulgence of curiosity. On the contrary, where we cannot make use of the physical laws, we can at any rate withdraw ourselves and our property from their influence. In short, the subject of all physical science is, as the Professor would say, fixed by neces- sity or physical causation ; and it is precisely this knowledge which enables us to obtain so complete a mastery over the phenomena of nature. Why, then, does the discovery of causation diminish our power over those of society 1 It would seem that the Pro- fessor's system reduces all science whatever to a mere indulgence of curiosity. We wish he would not be so hard upon this pardon- able weakness. A little further on he tells us that " it is worth remarking that an average is not a law : not only so, but the taking an average rather implies that no law is known." If we were giving a lecture upon History, we might perhaps reply that it is just as well worth remarking that a policeman is not a law; not only so, but sending fo' a police- man implies that the law has been broken. The connexion is quite as close, i.e. it is verbal. " An average is not a law." Why we always thought an average was nothing but the mean of an aggregate of obiervu- tions. A lavlr is the relation between cause and efllect, antecedent and consequent, Wliat have these in common 1 The taking on average implies nothing about a law, one way or the other. We might take the average height of the police force quite ir- respective of any cause or law whatever. When wo compare a variety of caiises with a variety of effects, we often compare the average of the causes with the average of eff*ects. We might expect next year's crop to conf'irm to the average, but only on the assumption of the average of fine weather. 172 Mr. Goldirin Smith on the Studif of Jfistor}/. Oct. JiHt SO, an average stntc of education is followed hy an avt-riige state of crime, lint this is a more artifice of calculation. The law is the relation (roughly tiiken) between one average and another. They have abso- lutely nothing more in common than the rule of subtraction and the rule of three. We may use one without the other, or use one to assist the other. We think it hardly coiii|)lim('ntary to the understanding of the undergraduates, that the Professor should warn them against so inoredible a blunder. Yet, indeed, we remember a similar warning in the inanijural address of the Regius Pro- fessor at Cambridge. But he proceeds to explain more fully his theory of science, " We may pronounce at once that a complete induction from the facts of history is impossible. History can- not furnish its own inductive law. An in- diK'li an astronomer ho would say, " IIow can you be absolutely certain that the sun will continue to rise V You can only tell us that it has done so for a few centuries — a mere segment of eternity ! Why may not some higher law intervene to alter its course? Is there not in the celestial system an erratic force, a number of wild comets, many of which, you confess, baflle your calculations? Why may not one of these dash right into the earth, or sweep it away in its tail ?" To a physicist he would say, "The whole §arth, you say, is cooling and changing witlin and without; you tell us of electric currents which are quite mysterious. IIow can you, in this perpetual flux, tell us what the con- ditions of the earth may be 1000 years hence; and, if so, how talk about invariable laws of matter? Your observations may relfcr only to a mere phase of its transfurma- tions. You talk of laws of the tides : are there not infinite perturbations which aflect them? — can you calculate these? You talk of laws of storms and weather. Have yon all the facts before you act\ially or virtually? Predict if the sun will shine at noon next Thursday week," He might go to the physiologist and say, "Your pretended science, which tells us of perpetual compo- sition and decomposition, conflicts with my consciousness of personal identity. Show me how I am the same man this year that I was the last. Besides, prove to me that matter exists, and is not a subjective crea- tion. If not, your science is based upon a quicksand, and may be the study of mere phantasms. You talk of a science of physi- ology, but can you explain all the lusus natiircc? Do you administer a single drug with absolute certainty of its effects? Are there not mysterious diseases, the least knowledge of which is above you ? Do you Bee laws in them ? Is there not in the human constitution a powerful element of confu- sion? Do you not yourself tell us of the chnnges'whieh seem to arise in the very con- ditions of the huiiinn fi anie, and of new mala- dies which aflect it? Such is the basis upon which ycnir pretended science of medicine must be based." And what answer would he receive? "Truly," the man of science would reply, not interrufiting his experi- ment, "there are perturbations, and sorely do they try us. Much of that, with which you threaten us is possible. Much of that which you ask of us is impossible. Scitnce is as imperfect as the human faculties. Hut, such as it is, with niany failure.s, it produces some practical results. It is all that we know. We Have no choice. It is this, or none." In fact, throcghout these lectures a notion of the material universe is implied which is quite unwarranted by science. Physical science does not teach us anything about ne- ces>ity, or matter bound in chains, or an ir- resistible fate. "Why should science talk of universal laws, or even of laws at all ?" asks the Professor. Why, indeed? No man of science ever does imagine that they possess any objective reality. Law is, no doubt, a far from satisfactory term ; but it is too late now to change it. Laws in any science mean, after all, nothing but the methods in which we observe things to ac- company or succeed one another. Persons have been even supposed to worship laws. This form of idolatry must be something like worshipping the binomial theorem. It has been proposed with much reason to sub- stitute the term " methods" for '' laws." But if laws — if regularity imply a sort of fatality imposed on matter, into what strange difficulties must this theory conduct us! These laws of matter must be as irreconcila- ble with the will of God as laws of action arc with the will of man. Does science im- ply that God Himself is under necessity ? The lecturer warns us against supposing that nature acts under some primeval command without the sustaining hand of a Creator. If He is not working still in nature, he says, we have a strange idea of Providence. Then His will must continue to maintain regular laws. If he does, is He, too, absorbed into this chain of fate? Is His will sunk in a physical necessity? No, they will tell us. He works regularly because it is His nature to act by law. Then why is it so degrading to suppose that this is man's nature also? After all, let us consider what " law " means, and what "science" means. There is nothing mysterious about either. Law does not imply fatality, any more than " science " implies exactness. Laws are only the generalizations of our experience : science is only the systematising of our gene- *) -, 1801. Mr. Qolihn/ffi Smith on the S/ml^ of History. 1 i>> V nilizrtlions. Imporfiicl gciiuralizatioiis al wiiys exist b»-f(iro tli.;}' aro, as it were, codifuid into laws. Munv laws aro ricojjiiised long boforo they aro ; itcted and Imrnioiiizcd into a science. V» l:at,tlicn,ia tlicrcal nature of tlio proposal to establish a science of society 1 Nothing but to deveiope our cur rent generalizations, and ascertain others as distinct laws, and to give those laws a new connexion, incaniog, and value by arranging them into a strict logical method. And this is all that causes such an outcry ! This it is which is to suflbcato human nature, and reduce us to brutes. This is to extinguish all human character, sympathy and cfibrt. Why, this objection, if sound, should have been taken long ago. It strikes at the basis of all calculation about- human affairs at all. The objection ought to have been raised wlien morals, practical maxims, historical or political speculations first began. They all proceed on the assumption which is hero so violently attacked, that men do and will act intelligibly, and regularly follow motives. No doubt the assumption of the true uni- formity of laws is now consciously expressed, and with very important consequences. Wo now know that no generalizations possess any high value unless so fur as we have CifrefuUy verified them by the appropriate logical process. But the reasoning process here involved is identical with that used in less systematic generalizations. So long as man has reflected on man, he has done so on the assumption that human actions have an intelligible cause, and that human motives will result in action. This is the foundation of all morals, of all politics, of all prudence, and of all education. What- ever knowledge we have reached respecting man, has gone simply on the ground that the human characteracted on regular methods, and was a fit subject for systematic observa- tion. Where we could not feel this, we cease to reason at all. A thoroughly capri- cious character, i.e. one in which the motives are too complex to estimate, we cease to study. Exactly as the character rises in steadiness is it a subject for forethought. Now, what is the assumption involved in all these processes ? That those motives of action we can ascertain operate in a uniform manner. There is always more or less uncertainty in the result. But why ? Is it because we have insufficient data, or because we doubt the uniformity of those we have] If we find a man acting differently to what we expected from our knowledge of his character and motives, we seek for some unforeseen motive, or suppose some motive to operate Avith an unforeseen force. It is a condition of our mental powers, to imagine some fresh cause whieh we do nni diseern ; wo never accjuieseo in the belief that it is from some mysterious ipiality in those causes which we know. If we see a man unilbrmly act in a certain way, wo assume that, whilst his character is unaltered and his ciroum- stances identical, he will continue to do so. If he does not, wo seek for a reason — that is, a new motive, — or else wo aflirm a change in his character. It would not, in a grave case, satisfy our reason to say ho clioso differently. Why did he choose, wo seek to know ■, and this is the foundation of all edu- cation. If a motive does not operate, wo add to its force. If it still fails, wo seek for the counter-motive, and seek to affect that. If all fails, we attribute it to a definite character. We never assume that motives act differently at different times, except we suppose a change in the disposition they affect. If over and above our limited insight into dispositions, and our very partial knowledge of circumstances, there were added an inherent uncertainty about their mi'tual relation, anything like regular fore- cast would bo impossible, and not oidy moral certainty, but even general rules hopeless. In short, the moment we begin methodically to calculate antecedents, with a view to pre- dict with confidence results, that moment we are assuming, however unconsciously, the relation of cause and effect. W^e have said that, we consider the lecturer himself very largely to adopt the theory of history which we have maintained. We will now briefly examine these cases. The first words of the Professor tell us that "the theory of history adopted in theso lectures is in accordance with the doctrine of progress." Progress is afterwards ex- plained, "that the'nistory of the race, or at least the principal portion of it, exhibits a course of moral, intellectual, and material progress." With the increase of the mincrial arts of life " the aggregate powers and sympathies of the race increase." " He has advanced in knowledge, and still advances, and that in the accelerating ratio of his augmented knowledge added to his powers ;" and "the character of the race advances through history." " Effort is the law, if law it is to be called, of history." Now with al 1 this we heartily agree. We call this a law of society. We want nothing more. In the first place, the objections hero urged against laws of society all apply to this. This theory can only mean that a uniform tendency has been observed in man to advance his various powers, which bear definite relations to each other, and even advance at definite rates or ratios. Their comparative force I and rapidity are also ascertained : there is, I 170 Mr. O'ol'Mn Smith on the Sfiu?i/m>f /Jintor'/- Oct. thorofttro, miifnrniify in viiriety. Thrre nre 0()nHtnritr('lntii>iiH,thWi : ' 178 J/r. linlhtiu Switlt on the Stwhj of History, Oct. frofn tlu'io Irr-liirf^s, \»irnli sccfn to ii«, !ii tho' main, cxctllfnt i-xampkH of the iiicthuil wo ^ coiitcinl for. " Two ^rrat Bttomiits havn bren made in the < hintory ot tlio woi'ld to rruoh tli« DHtinntility ofj litr^c ^riMipH of imtioriD, Torniinf; the civilized pur- { tldti )>l tint k'o''*'- ' I^(! "''"t *'*" iiiudu by the miliiiiry limne of anti(|iii(y ; the second, of a (jiiiililhd kind, wqk tnudi^ by the ercli-tiiaRticHi ildinc of tlic middle iigcfl, rmrlly hy priently wHipotiH, (larlly l>y the snord of devout king^ i The leHiilt wan univerHul corruption, politieul and Kor.-iul in the tirRt cuhc, eccltRiustical in thesecund. ' in both caDCR aid wuh Itrouf^ht, and the furtunesl of huniuiiily were restored by a power from with- 1 nut, iiut for wliioli it would neeni {he conui'tion v'liilil flare hctn hiii»'lrs'i. In the first caso the warlike tribes of the North shivered the joke of Jiome, and after an nj^nny of six cenlurieR re- stored the nationF. In the second case, Ctreece rose from the dead with the New Testament [? Jiih/e] in her >)aud, and breathed into tlio kin- tired FpiritH of the great Teutonic races such love of free irKjuiry and of liberty, Ihat they rose and rent the bonds of Home and her Celtic vassals — rent them, but at the cost of a convulsion which tilled the world with blood, and has made mutual hatred almost the law of Oliristendom from that hour to this. (!) Without the help of Oreece [i. e. intellect] it does not appear that the gate of the tomb in which Europe lay would ever have been forced buck. She might have been put up in it forever, like the doomed spirits in Uante, when the lid of their sepulehren is closed at the last day. Wieklifl'o and John IIuss spent their force against it in vain. The tyranny might have been diflferently shared between the different pow- ers of the universal Church, between Tope end Council, between Pope and King : but this change would have done little for liberty or truth. Na- tionality is not a virtue, but it is an ordinance oj nature, and a nutural bond : it does much good ; in itself it prevents none ; and the experience of history condemns every attempt to crush it, when It has once been really formed," Or nsain — •' If the doctrines of any Kstablisued Church are not absolute and final truth, its corporate in- terests are apt to come ultimately into oollisioD with the moral instincts of man pressing on- wards, in obedience to his conscience, towards the further knowledge of religious truth [i, e. moral progress, though superior, \ :■ guided by in- tellectual progress]. Then arises a terrible con fliot. To save their threatened domiuior. the 'de- fenders of ecclesiastical interests use, while *hey can, the civil sword, and wage with that wee ".n contests which fill the world with worse tl ^: blood. They massacre, they burn, they toriuie they drag human nature into depths of delibe- rate cruelty, which without their leacl'i^^ it could never have known ; they train men, ard not only men but women, to look on with pious joy while frames broken with the rack are borne from the dungeon of the Inquisition to its pile. Unit- ing intri{!ue with force, they creep info the ear of kings, of courtiers, of royal concubines ; ttiey con- iM>nt, a* the price of protect ion, to hlesn and wno- tify defpotiim in it* fonleat form; they excite blomiy wars of opinion against nations strugitlinf; to be free. Still the day goes against tliem ; hu- manily ussirti its pmter ; executioners fail ; sove- reigns discover that it little avails the king to rule the people if the Magian ']<* to rule the k ng ; public ojiinion sways the world [i. e. intellx f*inl convictions], and the hour of Philip II., of l'<^re la (.'haise, of Madame de Msintenon, is gone never to return [a positive prediction .']. Then follows a hopeless struggle for the last relics of religious protection, fur exclusive political privileges, and fur testa ; a struggle in which religion is made to appear in the eyes of the people the constant en- emy of improvement and justice— religion frotn whom %\\ true improvement and all true justice spring. This struggle, too, approaches its inevi- tiilile close. Then recourse is had, in the last re- sort, to intellectual intrigue, and the power of sophistry is invoked to place man in. the dilemma between submission to an authority which baa lost hii* allegiance, and the utter abandonnuiit of his belief in God — a desperate policy ; for, placed between falsehood and the abyss, humanity hiis always bad grace to choose the ahyrs, conscious us it is that to fly from falsehood, through whatever clouds and darkness, ia to fly to the God of truth." Or again — " In the passionate desire to reach individnal perfection, and in the conviction {N. H. move- ment determined by conviction) that the claims of society were opposed to that desire, men have iled from society and embraced the monastic life. The contemplative and ascetic type of character alone seemed clear of all those \.f culiar flaws at:d de- formities to which each if the worldly types is liable. The experiment has been tried on a large scale, and under various conditions ; by the Budd- hist ascetics ; in a higher form by the Christian monks of the Eastern Church ; and in a higher still by those of the West In each case the re> suit has been decisive {the physical method of con- comitant variations .']. The monks of the West long kept avenging nature at bay by uniting ac- tion of varioDB kinds with asceticism and contem- plation, but, among them, too, corruption nt last set in, and proved that this hypothesis of life and character was not the true one, and that humanity must relinquish the uniform and perfect type which formed the dream jf a Benedict or a Francis, and descend again to variety and imper fection." We quote these passages with the greater pleasure, becaivse we think them excellent specimens of the manly eloqtiencc and the enthusiasm for the nobler instincts with •, hicl' these ]r tares are full. Yet these p3«; -^es seerr to us strictly based upon a Tnicbod which i».iay not be the scientific, but i'/ singularly like it. This reads very like the use of scientific reasoning. We have something very like the method of ngree- ment and of difforence, and unquestionably the method of concomitant variations. We 0) * \ 1801. Mr. (iohUein J^inith on the Study of lJUUtr\i, 170 0| htivo, tmdoiibtcilly, tho iiso of iii<' .lioti froin ihu uxptTifiicc uf hmtory ; wo hnvu a theory ol'duvelcipnu'iit in a« iDHtiliiUoii ; we havn tfiKli!iicif!ii estiibliNlit'd to hu irruttiat- lltli', uiiiti)rin, and tvrtaiii — in Hliort, law. \V'»; luivi) all llio terms " law," " etmdiiiong,' " experinict'' " " hypothusJB," " iuevitabU*," "decisive i alt." It ih poitHihlo to tallt i««i- eiice all one's life without knowing it. It is Burely inipossihle to cull all this metaphor. lb is hero distinctly UHsumed that wiia has happened in the past will continue in the (\itiiro ; that on u largo scale setH of events will follow in un inteHi<^ible order; that a multitude of wills all conform to a ^eiH.'ral end ; that their action in the mass is pcrfietly certun ; tluiL It is limited by dis- tinct cond't'-ii:' i I hat wills and characters will be be' w .. 'h' .fbiences around them ; that lliere is a geuernl consensus ot wills ni^iiinr' w'" 'i individual wills cannot atrug- |/kt with liiumiito success; that the whole pr< ;;res8 throughout its course has n uniform lOL'thod; that each element of the progress acts and * ;aot8 in a highly complex and subtle launnor. This may not be physical, but it is, unquestionably, scientifio develop- ment. This we believe to be tho germ of a scien- tific view of histury. Could all this very elaborate reasoning have proceeded on an assumption that result bears to antecedent, not indeed the known relation of sequence, but some relation not capable of being de- fined in words? What more is needed to make it complete? There is only needed that this method should be extended and re- duced to a system. In the first place we need a general knowledge of the lending instincts and capacities of man. For this wo require, at least, some of tho laws of human life and of the human organization which involve some general science and a basis of logical belief. We need also a knowledge of the natural and necessary in- stitutions of human society, and of the par- atnount In, ^vs of human development. Hav- :.g these wo need a truly complete survey of history, especially of its earliest and simplest phases. We need to regard all his- tory us a whole, and to connect it with the rest of our knowledge. Lastly, we need to study it with a purpose, and value it for the use to which we can turn it. it is obvious that the passages we have quoted tall far short of this in degree, but they do not difier in kind. We believe, indeed, that all we sketched as a scientific view of history is possible, without involving one single as- sumption that is not implied in uvery line that we have quoted. After all, social science must establish itself by visililo results. The proof of it* puDxibility rehtM, we think, not upon mrta- phyMicttl or even logical reaHoning, but upon iactx. It is being day by day built up liy the commrin tendency of public opinion, by the practice of all who write or teach hiii- lory at all, and most of all by the neces>ity (til fe«l f »r niliomil methods of (dxervatioii, ati ' 8on>o ( in| ruUi'nsivo theory which will render inily cxstemutic and practicd a vmt body of ii iiinected thoujiht. If wo have s[)oktiri "ur iitind freely to fho lecturer, it is because we complain of tli'* coiitcui[ Uious iiiqiatience with which he treats men and s^sUms h») dislikes. We see in these lectures nothing to justify stieli a tone, unless it bo » renin kuble >?itt ol" ex- pression. Iiiit mo arc imt inseriNi.iiu to the line quulitiesr'"*-»'!' >■■".■• Oct. ..:*k,rftt.wsi9iiasnrwB*- Jorni^^'^^sf-^f'-r