9u^^ 'V IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I U&M2A |2^ ta ^ 12.2 Sf lag ■" |2jO III 1.8 uo 11.25 IIIU I 1.6 Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. USM (71 A) •72-4503 ^ t^\ \ :\ \ 4 6^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHIVI/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Canadian institute for Historical IVIicroreproductions / Institut Canadian da microreproductions historiquas Technical and Bibliographic Notaa/Notas taehniquaa at bibliographiquaa Tha Inatltuta haa attamptad to obtain tha baat original copy avallabia for filming. Faaturaa of thia copy which may IM bibliographically uniqua, which may altar any of tha imagaa in the raproduction, or which may significantly changa tha usual mathod of filming, ara chackad balow. D D D D D Q Colourad covars/ Couvartura da coulaur I I Covars damagad/ Couvartura andommagAa Covars rastored and/or laminatad/ Couvartura rastaurAa at/ou pallicuMa I I Cover titia missing/ La titra da couvartura manque [~~1 Coloured maps/ Cartes gAographiquas en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) □ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur Bound with other material/ Relit avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along Interior margin/ La re liure serrde peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion la long de la marge inttrieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouttas lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans la texte, mais. lorsque cela Atait possible, ces pages n'ont pes iti fiirntes. Tha toti L'Inatitut a microfilmA la mailleur exemplaire qu'il lui a 4t4 possible de se procurer. Les details da cat exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du point de vue bibliographique. qui peuvent modifier une image raproduita. ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la mtthode normale de filmage sont indiquAs ci-dessous. r~~| Colourad pages/ D Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplAmentalres: Paget 119 to 226 art milling. Pages da couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommagtes Pages restored and/oi Pages restaurtes et/ou pelliculAes r~~| Pages damaged/ r~n Peges restored and/or laminated/ Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages dAcolortes, tacheties ou piquAes The posi ofti film Orig bagi tha sion othc first sion or ill Pages detached/ Pages dAtachies r~n Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of prir Quality in6gale de I'impression Includes supplementary materii Comprend du materiel suppltmentaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible |~~| Quality of print varies/ I I Includes supplementary materiel/ I — I Only edition available/ The shall TINI whU Map diff€ entii begi right requ metl Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc.. ont M fiimies di nouveau de fapon d obtenir la meilleure image possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est film* au taux de rMuction indiquA ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X J 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X re lAtails M du nodifier ir une ilmage The copy fllmvd h«r« hm bMn r«produc«d thanks to tha ganarosity of: Library of tha Public Archivas of Canada Tha imagas appearing hara ara tha bast quality possibia considaring tha condition and lagibility of tha original copy and in kaaping with tha filming contract spacifications. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated Impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies ere filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. BS L'exemplaire filmi fut reprodult grtce A la g4n4rosit4 de: La bibiiothAqua das Archivas publiques du Canada Las images suivantes ont At* reproduites avee le plus grand soin, compta tenu de la condition at de la nettet* de rexemplaire film«, et en conformity avac las conditions du contrat de filmege. Lea exemplaires orlginaux dont la couvarture an papier eat imprtmto sont filmte en commenpant par le premier plat at an terminant soit par la darnlAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impreasion ou d'illustration. soit par le second plat, salon le cas. Tous las autres exemplaires orlginaux sont filmAs en commenpant par la pramlAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impreasion ou d'illustration et en terminant par la darnlAre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain tha symbol — ^ (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or tha symbol Y (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Un des symboles suivants apparattra sur la darnlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbols ▼ signifie "FIN". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmod at different reduction ratios. Thoss too largs to be entirely included in one exposure ara filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left tv right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartas, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre filmte A des taux de rMuction diff Arents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre reproduit en un seul clich6, il est film* A partir da Tangle supArieur gauche, de gauche A droite, et de hSut en bas, en prenant la nombre d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrant la mAthoda. errata to I pelure. on d D 32X 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 6 6 CANADA — OUR FROZEN FRONTIBR. Thb probability of a war with the Northern ' Btatee of Araerica makes us anxioQS to inqntre what the condi- tion of oar coloQies in that qnarter of the globe a at present, and what as- dstance they may expect to receive from the mother country during the winter months. Having passed a portion of last aotamn in Nova Scotia, Prince Ed- ward Island, New Brunswick, and Oanada, we may perhaps be able to throw some light upon a subject which just now ia one of great national interest Early in September a conversa- tion took place in our hearing on board one of those excellent steam- ers which ply between the rapids of St Anns — the scene of Moore's " Oanadian Boat - song " — and the town of Ottawa, the new seat of Oovemment for the United Pro- vinces of Upper and Lower Can- ada. The party consisted of ti distin- guisheJ officer in the English army on full pay ; a merchant, resident at St John, New Brno&wick ; an English- man well " posted " in public affairs at home ; and a member of one of the Oo- lonial Legisldtures. These gentlemen we will for bre- vity call respectively — " Miles," " Mercator," " Oivis," and " Sen- ator." They were all proceeding to Ot- tawa, — Miles to make a report on certain Government works ; Merca- tor to see his partner, who was en- gaged in the lumber - trade ; Givif, for curiosity, information, and fish- ing ; Senator for the purpose of conferring with a contractor respect* ♦ Beport, I 260. f Resolutions, kc, p. 23, 1862.] Canada — Our Frozen Prowtier, 103 Pro- 3an- Btin- ^ OD St. ish- s at Oo- )re- CB," }en- Ot- OD rca- en- ivif, sh- of let- ^^' i ing the extenflion of railwajB in bis own proviDce. A brandv cocktail, after a anbetan- tial and well-coolced dinner, bad made tbem all just safiBciently commani- cati ve and tolerant to be botb pleasant talkers and good listeners. Oivis. — " How beaotifal tbis river is I When one looks at the gorgeous foliage on the banks, the settler dropping calmly but qaiokly down the stream in his canoe, and feels the soft, warm, clear air, one can hardly realise the fact that before three months are passed the broad rapid stream will be completely frozen over, the branches of the trees borne down with snow, and the inhabitants along the banks almost entirely with- out occupation." Mercator. — "Yes; the lumbering is nearly over for tbis year now, and very few rafts will start from Ottawa after the first week in Sep- tember." Civis. — "When do the steamers discoBtioue running?" Meroator. — " They knock off about the 20th of November, I am sorry to say, as I have shares in the company ; and grumble extremely at our property beiog idle for full four months every year." Senator. — "You will have more reason, I fear, to complain of your profits in the timber-trade falling off tbis year than your dividend in the steamboat company." Mercator.-—" Yes ; but our profits are pretty good most years, and we can afford to have a ba!d one in that trade now and then." Civis. — " Have the troubles in the States affected the timber-trade of Canada much?" Mercator. — '• Yes, sir, enor- mously ; and that is one of those things which you people in Eng- land forget when you tell us that we must take care of ourselves in matters of military defence. Peace with the States is essential for the prosperity of almost all trades in Canada, but especially the timber- trade. Anything that affects the quiet of the United States acts im- mediately upon our business, for I can show by books of our own that we export as much to the United States every year as to Europe." Civis. — " And what has been the falling 00" this year r Mercator.— "With the United States we have done nothing; trade there has been so paralysed, and prices have been so low, that we could not deal with tbem, except at a loss, and have therefore preferred to keep oar stock on band." Miles. — "How unfair, then, it is for England to suppose that Canada can defend herself in case of war between Great Britain and America. Her whole frontier must bear the brunt of the battle whenever it comes ; and, owing to her proximity to the foe, she must suffer in a far greater proportion than the mother country." Civis. — "Suppose a war were to take place between the two nations upon a subject which did not directly affect the interests of Canada, what view do you think the Canadians wonid be likely to take of it ?" Mercator. — " I not only think, but know, that both provinces are as loyal as the county of Middlesex. We are proud of our connection with the old country. We send our children there to be educated when we can ; we speak of it as < home ;' we cling to monarohioal principles. When the Prince of wales was here, he was received throughoGt the whole territory with on enthusiasm impossible to de- scribe or overrate, in spite of occa- sional maladroit advice and conse- quent arrangements devoid of tact and good judgment. In the Upper Province of Canada there are many subjects upon which men differ, and concerning which there are continually angry disputes in the Legislature. In the Lower, the land* tenure question being now settled, there can scarcely be said to be one matter of public importance upon which the public mind is at all agitated. Between the provinces the question of representation, of course, is one that divides parties, fills the newspapers with angry 104 Canada — Our Frozen Frontier. [Jan. argamentfl, and keeps ap tliat an- happy feelinff wiiich their anion was intendea to obliterate, and which, in a great measare, it has allayed. But the people of both proviDces believe that they have a better form of government than that which any foreign prince or president can offer them.'* Civis. — "You hardly answer my question. If England was obliged to embark in a war with the United States, for the cause of which the colonies could in no way be held responsible, and the casvs helli one that they were never asked their op'nion upon, and were totally in- dittierent to, do yoa not think that the feelings of the LegisLiure would be to throw off a connection which made them obnoxious to their friends, without giving them the means of protecting themselves from their enemies?" Mercatok. — " You almost sup- pose an impossibility. America is not likely to go to war for any cause arising out of European disputes. But if she were to quarrel with you upon a question which affected England's honour, no matter bow great our stake would be, or how little we had to do with the origin of the quarrel, we should prepare to de- fend our border with as much deter- mination as if it were a question in which Canada alone was consulted and concerned." Senator. — "I am rot so sure about that. I believe the whole of the North American colonies would, if possible, on such an occasion, act as Mercator has described ; but, in case of a sudden invasion in the winter season by a large army, they would very likely be driven to sur- render, and would be obliged to make the best bargain they could for them- ♦flelve?." Miles. — "I don't fear that any disaster of that kind could happen, even with the limited number of troops which we now have on the continent. We could, even with these, defend some of the strong places and positions, while our militia would in a few weeks be quite as numerous and well drilled as any soldiers that they would be likely to meet." Senator. — "The loyalty of the people was sufficiently shown dur- ing the Crimean war, by their con- tributions to the Patriotic Fund, and during the Indian mutiny, by the raising of the 100th regiment; and I believe nothing short of in- sult from the mother country will eradicate the feeling of devotion to England and England's honour, that universally pervades all classes in our colonies. At the same time, I hold it to be the plain duty of England, under existing circum- stances, to keep many more troops on this continent than she has hitherto done. Look at the frontier we have to defend. From Detroit to the River St. John is more than nine hundred miles, and thence to the Bay of Fundy is more than three hundred." Civis. — ** You don't propose that this should all be placed in a state of defence ?" Senator — " Certainly not ; such a thing would be impossible, of course ; but I mention it to show our vul- nerability. If a trouble were to arise suddenly, we could only do as Lord Seaton did in 1837 — concentrate our forces, form magazines, and organise our militia." CiviB. — "For my own part, I do not see that much ultimate harm would ensue if a lodgment were made in Canada during the winter months by a force from the United States. It would be impossible for them to penetrate far into the interior. The absence of road?, the nature of the country, and the severity of the climate, would prevent them from making any way." Senator. — " I hope that is not the opinion of English statesmen at home. It is true that the loyalty of the inhabitants of Canada would render it almost impossible for the hostile army to penetrate far; but the efforts made by the inhabitants, which alone would prevent a suc- cessful invasion, would be founded upon the conviction that they might .1 [Jan. drilled as 1 be likely r of the awn dnr- their con- lie Eand, utiny, by regiment ; )rt of in- inlry will ivotion to honoar, all claBsea lame time, I duty of circum- )re troops she has he frontier Detroit to nore than thence to than three opoee that a state of ot ; such a of course ; 7 our vul- ere to arise lo as Lord intrate our ,d organise part, I do nate harm were made ter months ted States. )r them to ;rior. The ure of the by of the hem from mt is not atesmen at he loyalty lada would )le for the far; but nhabitants, nt a sue- )e founded they might 1862.] Canada—Our Frozen Frontier. 105 4 "I i expect socconr from England before long, and that England is readv to protect our interests, and indeed to defend her own honoar, which would be for ever sacrificed if she were to regard with coldness an attack up- on our soil." Civia. — " You mistake me. I mean that the invasion of Canada would not be attended with ulti- mate success. We could, when the St. Lawrence opens, crowd the lakes with gunboats, cut off the enemy's basis of operations, and capture the whole of their invading force." Sknator. — " But eee what de- structiun would be effected in the mean time ! Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, totally unde- fended, would very probably fall. Batteries might be erected, which would render their recapture diffi- cult and expensive. Besides, if England does not think that it is of vital importance that our towns should be saved from pillage, the sooner we know it the better, in order that we may be able to take measures in time to save ourselves from such a calamity." Civis. — " If anything like the destruction of defenceless towns were to take place, we could have the most ample revenge by attack- ing and destroying the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and many others along the coast." Senator. — " An operation which would be nearly as injurious to your own merchants and countrymen as to the Yankees, putting humane notions aside." Miles. — "As we are at present, in case of an unexpected attack, the only thing to be done would be to seize a few strong positions, and hold them with the regular army, and leave the militia to account for the enetny when they crossed at other places ; but the rapid manner in which the Americans have de- veloped their railway system has altered the whole state of things in respect to the defence of Canada since 1837. Besides, that was only a rebellion, and danger was not actually felt beyond our own fron- tier. But supposing that we were at war with the States, they would threaten by railway our New Broos- wick frontier, from Bangor in the State of Maine. At Richmond they could, by sending troops from Portland, intercept our railway be* tween Montreal and Quebec, and from this point to Detroit, in the extreme west, they would have lines along every inch of their border, communicating with the great seats of industry and popula- tion — Boston, Lowell, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati — and the Atlantic coast." CaVIS. — " We could send you re- inforcements from England in a month." Miles. — " Suppose the difficulty were to take place in the winter. The St. Lawrence is practically closed by Christmas, and it woald be madness to attempt to land troops on the lower part of the river, even if ships could get into the centre of the stream. The snow- storms in the beginning of Decern* bar are fearful — perfectly blinding, and the navigation most danger- ous." Mercator. — " There can be no better proof of that statement, than that after the middle of November owners find it extremely difficult to effect insurances on the strongest ships." Miles. — **No wonder. The chan- nel is narrow and tortuous. The masses of ice floating about the river are sufficient to break the strongest paddle-wheels to pieces, and to dam- age the most powerful screw. The ropes of the ships become coated and stiff with ice, which prevents their running through the blocks. The ' bordage,' 'consisting of rough masses of frozen water, shifting, rushing, and grinding with the action of the tide and wind, and varying from a mile to two in width, would render the landing of troops a most perilous undertaking. No common sailors could be of the least use in overcoming the difficulties, or in managing the ice-boats necessary for a disembarkation. And I should 106 Canada — Our Frozen Frontier. [Jan. 1! I be very sorry to entrait any nam- ber of men to the charge of the most experienced < voyageurs,' won- derful as their daring and okiil is in getting throagh this inhospitable stuff. A very short time ago, the 1st regiment was wreclced at the mouth of the St. Lawrence The men were all saved; and as the winter had not set in, a steamer was sent down from Quebec, which took them off. Had it been later in the year, it is impossible to say what the conse- quences would have been, for there was no road to escape by, and no ship could have come near them. Then again, if we were to look for help from Halifax or St. John, I be- lieve the road from Fredericton to Biviere du Loop, the point where the Grand Trunk Railway termi- nates, is narrow and bad, and would offer many difficulties to an army in the winter." S)(!NATOR. — " From the Lake Teraiscouata to the St Lawrence it id new, and, I have heard, good ; at any rate it ought to be an excellent one, for it has cost the province a very large sum of money." Miles. — " Is it macadaiiiiied ?* Oivis. — "Oh dear, nol It is a common clay road, with ruts in places two feet deep, many of which are capacious enough to inter a file of grenadiers. " Tlie country is covered by dense forests, only thinly populated, and buried in ice and snow for at least four months in the year." Mercator. — "In peace we have a ready access to Canada through Portland, in the State of Maine, over a railway to Quebec, which is leased to the Grand Trunk Railway Com- pany, and worked by them. This of course would be closed to us in war, and we should therefore be confined during tho winter to one route — namely, that throagh New Brunswick, which Civis seems to have lately seen." Civis. — " I shall not forgi it in a hurry. About a fortnight ago I passed over it all with a friend, ID travelling from St John to Que- bec." Miles. — "Then, as we are speak- ing of the defences of Canada, wilt yoo give a description of your journey, for there is nothing so im-' portant connected with that subject as the means of transport through New Brunswick ?" Civis. — "We left St John one morning about the end of August, in one of the steamers which ply daily during the summer and autumn between there and Fredericton, the town which, for some good cause, I have no doubt, is the seat of government rather than St John, the commercial capital of the pro- vince, and the most flourishing place between Quebec and the 'hungry' Gal way. The passengers on board the steamer gave one a fair notion of what the travelling population is. One or two settlers, intelligent and hardy Scotchmen, returning to their farms after 'making arrangements at St. John with merchants there, about sending down their corn for exportation ; lumberers returning to their clearings ; a few timber- merchants running up to get a peep at their various saw-mills and depots along the river ; and three or four copper-coloured parties, at- tired like dilapidated inhabitants of Monmouth Street, whose long, black, straight - matted hair, dark, narrow, long eyes, high cheek- bones, flattish nose, wide mouth, bad teeth, and Tartar -like expres- sion, made our first impression of the ' red man ' anything but ro- mantic. A few of them are here generally seen in every steamer, Ijring lazily on the cargo near the engine, or crowded with their squaws and children In some snug corner of the vessel. "They are dreadfully poor and indolent, and defy the exertions of all settlers to make them work. Nothing will induce them either to dig the ground or hew the timber, and they seem perfectly incapable of learning any trade which might keep them in competence. They live in wretched villages of wooden huts, and support life by hunting and fishing, while the women make arison to him. They are per- ectly harmless ; and although liv- ing completely apart from Euro- peans, freely mix with them in the towns, solicit (their alms, sell them game, and accompany Englishmen as guides in all sporting expeditions. " For the first ten miles after leav- ing St. John, the river spreads out into a series of lake?, each of which varies in breadth from two to four miles. Hills of considerable height, clothed with pine and oak from the top to the water's edge, fall precipit- ously to the shore ; and rocky cliSs occasionally jut out into the stream, which in many places is so deep that the steamers can run up close to the trees that hang along the banks. Where the Kennel^casis joins the St. John, the traveller may think that he has arrived at some great inland lake ; for, in looking into its broad mouth, the watery horizon is only slightly varied by the mirage floating under the clear sky. " The stoppages at regular stations along the Bt. John are not frequent, but many boats push from shore to take otf and bring back passengers. This does not in each case occupy more than two minutesi. The veirovion absolutely necessary. Seve- ral surveys have proved that a rail- way would be perfectly practicable the whole way. Indeed, in North America the expense of making a railway bears by no means the ex- cessive proportion to that of a com- mon road that it does in Europe. It appears to be a general opinion in the United States that the severe snows and frosts of that continent very slightly impede, and do not prevent, the travelling on railroads; and if I am rightly informed, the Utica Railroad, in the northern part of the State of New York, is used throughout the winter. If this opinion be correct, the formation of a railroad from Halifax to Que- bec would entirely avoid some of the leading characteristics of the Canadas. Instead of being shut out from all direct intercourse with England during half of the year, they would possess a far more cer- tain and Fpeedy communication throughout the winter than they now possess in summer. The pas- sage from Ireland to Quebec would be a matter of ten or twelve days, and Halifax would be the great port by which a large portion of the trade, and all the conveyance of passengers, to the whole of Brit- ish North America would be car- ried on." In 1843, the project of a military road was entertained by the Gov- ernment of Sir Robert Peel, but was abandoned in consequence of the survey which was then made by Sir James Alexander and C )lonel Siminonds, proving how much more advisable it would be to spend the money upon a railroad. And in 1846 a second survey took place, under the auspices of Major Robinson and Captain Henderson, and two reports were consequently made and presented to Parliament. A line was recommended to be [Jao. in bis report, of any satis- ion between would in fact veen the pro- ider a general lessary. Seve- red that a rail- tly practicable leed, in North of making a means the ex- that of a com- oes in Europe, general opinion that the severe that continent , and do not ^ on railroads; r informed, the e northern part V York, is used Qter. If this the formatioa lalifax to Qae- avoid some of eristics of the )f being shut intercourse with ' of the year, i far more cer- communication ter than they ner. The pas- ) Quebec would or twelve days, be the great irge portion of the conveyance whole of Brit- would be car- et of a military i by the Gov- ibert Peel, but consequence of then made by and C )Ionel low much more )e to spend the 1. And in 1846 )k place, under r Robinson and and two reports de and presented nmendcd to be 1862] Canada — Our Frozen Frontier. 115 constructed doirn the right bank of ti)e St. Lawrence, on to the Bay of Obaleur, then, near Nortlfumber- lund Straits, across the Miramichi river, and so on to Shediac, Truro, and Halifax, with a branch from Shediac to St. John. In these able papers, it was shown most plainly that the railway could be constructed at a much less expense than those in the States. Tlie enormous ad- vantages of tbe line, in a military and mercantile point of view, were pointed out with great minuteness ; and the benefit which would re- sult to our fisheries along the Bay of Chaleur and Northumberland Straits was fully considered and demonstrated. Major Robinson and Captain Henderson considered that " it was the one great means by which alone the power of the mother country can be brought to bear on this side of the Atlantic, and restore the balance of power fast turning to the side of the United States. Every rew line of railway adds to their power, enabling them to con- centrate the>r forces almost wher- ever they please ; and by the lines, of which there are already some, and there will soon be more, reach- ing to their northern frontier, they can choose at their own time any point of attack on the long extend- ed Canadian frontier, and direct their whole strength against it. The provinces, therefore, and the empire, having such interest in the formation of the Halifax and Que- bec line, it should be undertaken by them in common, as a great public work for the public weal." The subject was taken up with warmth by the Government which succeeded that of Sir Robert Peel ; and in 1848 Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, in expressing his^ belief that great advantages would result not only to the territory chiefly in- terested in the work, but to the empire at large, requested the Gov- ernors of the several provinces to bring tbe matter before their re- spective Legislatures, in order that the Government might know the degree of importance attached to the enterprise by them before re- commending the Imperial Parlia- ment to afford the necessary assist- ance. The view whic. the Provincial Governments took of the project was, that no other measure could be conceived that would so surely con- solidate the colonies and perpetuate the connection with Great Britain. The Parliament of Canada passed an Act declaring, " That if her Majesty's Government shall under- take the construction of the said railway either directly, or through the instrumentality of a private company, it shall be lawful for the Governor in Council, on behalf of this province, to undertake to pay yearly, in proportion as the works advance, a sum not exceeding £20,000 sterling towards making good the deficiency (if any) in the income from the railway, to meet the interest of the sum expended upon it, and to place at the disposal of the Imperial Government all the nngranted lands within the pro vince lying in the line of railway, to the extent of ten miles on each side thereof; and to undertake to obtain, pay for, and place at the disposal of the Imperial Govern- ment all the land required within the province for the line of railway, and for pro[)er stations and ter- mini." The provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in effect, did the same thing. In 1850 the Hon. Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia was sent to England with the view of inducing the Govern- ment to take active measures to- wards giving effect to the resolu- tions of the different Legislatures, and on the 10 th of March the deci« sion of the Government was con- veyed to Mr. Howe. The credit of England was to be employed to enable the provinces to raise upon advantageous terras the funds ne- cessary for the works. This assist- ance was only to be given in case of provision being made for a com- plete line between Halifax and Quebec; but that of Major Robin- son and Captain Henderson was 116 Canada — Our Frozen Frontier. [Jan. ii m I , not iDBistecl upon as a sine quA non, although any deviation from it was to be enbject to the approval of her Majesty's Government. Sab- sequently, the valley of St John was agr^ upon by Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia as the proper route ; but this being so great a deviation from the proposed line of Major Robinson, another application to the home authorities was necessary. At this time a change of ministry took place in England, and the Oolonial Secre- tary did not conceive that the Government would be justified in carrying out the pledge of assist- ance to the project, now that it was so much changed from the original plan. Then came the Russian war, followed by the Indian mutiny, which had the effect of hanging up the matt t till 1857, when delegates from Canada and Nova Scotia were again sent to England, and once more the subject was pressed upon the Government, the same argu- ments being used and similar offers made by the provinces. The follow- ing year both branches of the Legis- lature of Nova Scotia and Canada addressed the Grown, praying — " That arrangements may be ma- tured for the early commencement and the completion of this work by the united e£r()rts of the three provinces of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, with such co-operation and aid from your Majesty's Impe- rial Government as a^ay be com- mensurate with the greatness of the object, and the magnitude of the national interests which it promotes." Public meetings were held, reso- lutions passed, and the Colonial Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were again waited on, when it was pointed out that Pro- vincial Lejtislatures, having passed the acts affording assistance to the scheme so far back as 1849, might consider that these acts hud fulleo into desuetude, and that, as the ar- rangements hud not been carried out, the provinces might think them- selves absolved from the pledges given ten jeara previously. A Doble lord! whs then deputed to visit British North America and ascertain how far the colonies would be disposed to ratify the engage- ments of 1849. He reported that the majority of the people in the three provinces were desirous of seeing the work undertaken, and that the acts of 1849 were con- sidered to be in full force. Dele- gates from Canada, New Bruns- wick, and Nova Scotia, were again sent to England for the purpose of pressing the subject on the Imperial Government. They addressed Sir Edward Litton and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the autumn of 1868, but a change of Government occurred before any action was taken by the home authorities. We believe that gentlemen have this year come over to England in hopes of inducing the Colonial Office aind the Treasury at last to grant them the same assistance promised by Lord Grey in 1851, and which, by a series of untoward circumstances, for which the colonies are not to blame, has never been afforded to them. Since the negotiations commenced in 1849, a line has been opened from Quebec to Riviere du Loup in Canada, from St. Juiin to Sbediac in New Brunswick, and from Halifax to Truro in Nova Scotia. These are all portions of the great Halifax and Quebec route, to complete which a junc- tion must be made between Truro and Shediac, and between Frede- ricton and Rividre du Loup, or a length of nearly three hundred and seventy miles of new railway, which it is estimated will cost about £3,000,000. We believe that the proposal made to the present Government is that the three provinces will each charge their revenues with the pay- ment of £20,000, to meet the interest of capital expended in case the line is not remunerative ; that the Brit- ish Government should guarantee a minimum dividend at 4 per cent on the whole amount, which would amount to £120,000 per annum. For previoQsly. A len deputed to h America and be colonies would Lify the engage- le reported that 16 people in the ere desirous of nndertakeD, and 1849 were con- all force. Dele- ft, New BruDS- ;otia, were again T the purpose of b on the Imperial y addressed Sir d the Chancellor n the autumn of e of Government any action was authorities. We lemen have this England in hopes olonial Office and ist to grant them ice promised by 1, and which, by ird circumstances, lonies are not to r been afforded the negotiations 9, a line has been ec to BiviSre da from St. John to Brunswick, and Truro in Nova are all portions ifax and Quebec e which a junc- de between Truro between Frede- ire da Loup, or 'ly three hundred I of new railway, ,ted will cost about 1862.] Canada^ Our Frozen Frontier. 117 this she would have the guarantee of the Provincial Governments for £G0,000, and the security of the land for ten miles on each side of the line. As to the other £60,000, we should have the payment in our own hands, for we now pay the United States £25,000 for the trans- mission of mails to Oanada, a ser- vice which would be transferred to the projected line. We should save £25,000 a-year on the Cunard con- tract, by Halifax being more than five hundred miles nearer our shores than New York, and we should re- ceive from the United States at least £20,000 per annum for the trans- mission of their mails by the rail- way ; 80 that, provided the Provin- cial Governments meet their engage- ment, which there can be no reason to doubt their ability or willingness to do, the mother country would be ten thousand a-year richer for this guarantee upon their hands than without it, even if the railway were never to pay a cent beyond its working expenses. A golden opportunity now offers itself of completmg this great work ; [)oblio attention is drawn to the ocality. The whole nation must feel the necessity for it ; the anxiety which pervades us all as to the safe arrival of the army that has jast left our shores, and which we are told is supplied with every appli- ance that can make it formidable to our enemies, would be considerably allayed if we were certain that it could with ease, and without risk, reach its destination. At any rate, let the work be begun. We think we have shown that it can be ac- complished without cost to this country ; and we believe that, inde- pendently of military considerations, it would tend more to establish our supremacy on the American conti- nent, than anything that a bountiful Providence has hitherto given us the means of accomplisbicg. .■ I ^;'- iV- ■. - < -.,«-... hi: ' '•"";, <-' ;:;.. i * t. 'm 118 TTie Convuisiont of America. [Jan. THB CONVULSIONS OP AMERICA. !ii 'i-i EvKRTBODT ^ho hss tboiigbt, talked, and read mnch aboat Ame- ioa of late, must feel that EDglish opinions on the subject, as reodered by the tone of oar press, have been qualided by the medium that trane- mits them. Nobody in private life talks about "oar Transatlantic kins- men," — nobody desires to claim peculiar ties with the performers in the absurd and barbarous dances which the American nation executes round it:; idols of the hour, any more than with the worshippers of Mum- bo Jumbo. ^Oar conversation on the topic is not silly or sentimental. We do not speak of the least san- guinary of civil wars as " the ter- rible and fratricidal struggle which is drenching America with blood." It is not a fact, as is sometimes as- serted in print and public speeches, that every Englishman worthy of the name deplores the separation between North and South. The view commonly taken by English- men, who do not on that account consider themselves unworthy of the. name, is, that every day tends to justify the judgment and policy of the Sooth in withdrawing from a system, the results of which are what we contemptuously witness. We do not desire above all things that the straggle should be at once concluded, no matter how ; because a conclusion which would leave the South at the mercy of a vindic- tive, unfdir, and ungenerous enemy, would gratify nobody. We do not lament over the unexampled display of weakness made by the great Re- public, because we knew that such weakness existed, and it was not for the interest of truth nor of the world that it should any longer be dis- guised, or allowed' to vaunt itself as matchless force. ■ Nor do we, as a people, desire to accept any slight, shifty pretence'' of reparation for the recent, ruffiaifly outrage, which may be held by some among us, to whom honour is but a fantastic name, to absolve us from the necessity of war ; for previous insults from the same quarter still remain unatoned for: and now that we bave^at enor- mous cost, and with patient and self-denying efforts, amassed an armament which adequately repre- sents the power of /England, we should have no objection to employ it in administering ai sharp chastise- ment to the vainglorious pet^ple who have BO often cheaply defied ns. Sentiments, conciliatory even to poltroonery, and pacific even to disgrace, are frequently ascribed to us ; yet they have no real origin in the heart of the nation. It would be impossible for the national vanity of America, hungry as it is, to ex- tract any nourishment from what is expressed on the subject in the con- versation of intelligent Englishmen. When they read the speeches of American public men, and the arti- cles of American newspapers, they fiiel only scorn for the blind fol- lowers to whom such blind guides are possible. They are unable to see anything peculiarly tragical in tlie fact that balf-a-million of men have been brought together in arms to hurl big words at each other across a river. Nor do we see any- thing in the circumstance that Ame- rica was first colonised from our own shores, to induce ns to treat with extraordinary indulgence the com- posite population with whose man- ners, customs, and character, we have so little in common. What truth can there be in the plea of relationship as an inducement to conceal our real sentiments, when we so loudly derided our own fellow-subjects of the Irish Brigade, who went forth from among us to make tbemselves ridiculous? And why should we conceal our contempt when absurdi- ties ftir more mischievous, and on an immensely extended scale, are committed by those whom twad- dling sentimentalists term " our American cousins"? '5 4 4 h. ;i. f [Jan. 1662.] be neceasity of Dsults from the imaia UDutoned B have, at enor* Ih patient aod ataaesed an eqaately repre- if / EDgiand, we ition to employ sharp chastise- ions people who iply dtfied as. tory even to laciQo even to itly ascribed to I real origin in ID. It would be national vanity as it is, to ex- it from what is ijeot in the con- ent Englishmen, he speeches of D, and the arti- ewspapers, they the blind fol- 5h blind guides are unable to irly tragical in ■million of men ogether in arms at each other do we see any- tan ce that A me- ld from our own to treat with ence the com- th whose roan- aracter, we have What truth can of relationship ;o conceal our we so loudly illow-subjects of ?ho went forth nake themselves ?hy should we when ebsurdi- ievous, and on ded scale, are ! whom twad- term " our / The Origin of Language. If afiked these hard things to explain, ^ I own I am wholly unable ; ) And hold the attempt the more vain. When I think of the Building of ijabel. The primitive world to lay bare, Philologists try, but I doubt it : As none of them chanced to be there, It's clear they know nothing about it. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll. What Adam in Eden might jrpeak, Could not be the tongue (jf his mother ; It may have been Gaelic oy Greek; It must have been something or other. It may have been Sinscrit or Zend, Ohaldaic, Assyrian, Arabic: • It may have had joints without end, Or it may have been monosyllabic. Toroddk*,; toroddle, toroll. But why should wo puzzle our brains With Etymological folly ? The prize wouldn*t prove worth the pains, Or help us a bit to be jolly. For if we in twenty strange tongnes Oould call for a beef-steak and bottle, By dint of niefe learning and lungs, They wouldn't be nearer our tlirottlo. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll. I've ranged, without drinking a drop, The realms of the dry Mithridates: I've studied Grimm, Burnouf, and Bopp, Till pa^ence cried " Ohejam satity lifax Miillcr completed my plan. And, leave of the suV»ject now taking. As wise as when first I began, I end with a head tliat is aching. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll. The speech of Old England for me, Which serves ns on every occasion 1 Henceforth, like our soil, let it be Exempted from foreign invasion. I^'answers for friendship and love, ' And ail sorts of feeling and thinking; And, lastly, all doubt to remove — It answers for singing and drinking. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll. 227 228 T%e D^ence of Canada. [Feb. TIIK DEFENCE OF CANADA. The storm which lately threaten- ed U9 from the fur West, has blown , over. We are not poing to liave war witli Ainorlca about the ques- tion of the Trent. But the question of the Trent never would have arisen, had not the feelings of the Atnerican people and Government been very hostile to England, and there is nothing to show that the American Government and people are at all reconciled to fts by the manner of its solution. The evi- dence, on the contrary, is all the oth^r way. The Americans have been coerced into an act of justice, which they performed with the wt)rst possible grace; and we are frankly assured that the time is com- ing, when they mean to take ample vengeance for present humiliations. It appear?!, then, that a war with the Federal States of America is only deferred. If not imminent, it is pretty sure to come sooner or later. The point, therefore, for ns to deter- mine, in the meanwhile, is— How shall we prepare for such a contin- gency, and conduct the war when it comes? There are two modes of carrying on war with America — one aggres- sive, the other defensive. We shall probably adopt both. We shall assail their* harbours, burn their fleets, destroy their connnerce, and keep their whole seaboard in a state of constant alarm ; and we shall give emi)loyment by these means to no inconsiderable portion of the half million of men whom they boast to have under arms. But we shall have a defensive war like- wise to provide for, on the side of Canada. How shall we best effect that purpose? This is a question which caimoi be rightly answered unless we possess some knowledge of what has occurred in that part of the world already ; for it is not loss true of wars in America than of wars elsewhere, that, making due allowance for change of tmie and circumstances, they almost al'vays repeat themselves. We propose, there- fore, in the pr.sent paper, to preface our suggestions, in regard to tae fu- ture, with a brief sketch of the vari- ous contests which have already taken place, in and for the mastery of Oanadii. Before the breaking out ' of the seven years' war, which occurred in if 54-5, the American provinces which now acknowledge the sway of Queen Victoria were, with one or two exceptions, dependent upon France. Cape Breton, with the whole of what is now called New Brunswick, formed their extreme limits on the east; and they sti-.^t(>hed away westward by Lake Champlain, through Lake Ontario to Niagara, whence they held out their hands by the Ohio river towards New Orleans. In contradistinction to this arrangetiient, Nova Scotin, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl- vania, Maryland, and Virginia, were Englisli settlements; of which both the dignity, and, as it was assumed, the material interests, were endan- gered by this bold attempt on the part of their rivals to hem them in, by connecting Lake Erie with the Mississippi. There had been little amity be- tween the English and French settlers at any time, and now the en- croachments of the latter upon their hunting-grounds, stirred the in- dignation of the former to a high de- gree. Frequent skirmishes went on between them, till at last the Cabinet of St. James's determined to bring matters to an issue, and to strike in tliat quarter with all the force of the Empire. Accordingly, Gene- ral Braddock, carrying with liim 2000 regular troops, sailed from England, and in February 1755 arrived in America. General Braddock called together the provincial governors at Alex- andria in Virginia, and arranged with them a plan of campaign. It 1862.] The Defence of Canada. 220 k called together wns settled that the enomy should ho assailed on four distinct lines at the same time. First, that Brad- dock hiinaulf, with 2U00 of the Inst of tlio troops, provincial as well as reguliir, should niarcli against Fort Du Qncsiio on the Ohio; second, that two regimcnta should he de- tached by the Hudson and Moliawk rivers, and by Lake Oneida to Os- wego, a British post on Lake Onta- rio, whence tliey wore to fall on the newIy-L'tected French fort at Nia- gara; third, that a corps of provin- cials should blockade Crown Point on Lake Clu'uiplain ; and, lastly, that tiio di.^M)sahle troops from Nova Scotia and Massachusetts?, about 2000 in number, should attack tlio French stttlenients in the Bay of Fundy, particularly Foi-t Beau Sejour, on the istliinus connecting the peninsula of Nova Scotia with the continent, where Fort Cumber- land now stands. It is not our intention to depcrihe the oporations which followed. General Jiraddock, as is well known, failed. Ho had 220 miles to tra- verse through the i)rimeval forest, in which a full nuinth, all but two days, was expended ; and heing attacked at disadvantage, just as Fort Du Quesne became vi>ible, he was defeated and killed. The oper- ation against Fort Niagara came to nothing, and the blockade of Crown Point, though vigorously attempted, broke down. On the side of the Bay of Fundy alone success attend- ed the British arms. There Fort Beau St^jour fell after a brief bom- bardment, and the French were removed from every point whence tL«y could seriously annoy, or even threaten, the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. We shall be glad, however, if our readers can bear in mind how this campaign was cmtlucted, in order that, when the jiroper time comes, they may be able to follow such reasoiung as tlie circumstances of the case seem to suggest. The year 1756 was not remark- able on the side of the English for plans more wisely arranged or more vigorously carried into effect. Ke- infbrccmontu of troops were Indeed sent from Europe, and in the month of July Lord Lowdon ar- rived to connnand them. But his ar- rangements for the campaign seemed to be pretty much what those of his predecessors liad been, only on a more limitecT scale. He deter- mined to act upon two instead of upon four lines ; to resume Avith one cnr|)s the (>baudont'd attack on Furt Niagara, and to establish the supremacy of the English on Lake Ontario; while with the other ho possessed himself of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, both of them on Lake Champlain. The total strength of the army assembled for these purposes at Albany was 16,000 men, of which 6000 were allotted to the attack on Fort Niagaro, the remain- der to the operations on Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Early made aware of the danger which threatened, tlie French gene- « ral took vigorous steps to avert it. Ho strengthened his works at Nia- gara and Crown Point, and formed an intrenched camp at Ticonderoga. Not content with this, ho equipped a flotilla on Lake Ontario, and de- termineil to anticipate the English by assuming the initiative. Lord Lowdon had made choice of Oswego as the point where the depot for the left column of his army should be established. It could bo reached with comparative facility from Al- bany by the Moliawk river and Lake" Oneida, and by the river Onondaga, which flows out of Lake Oneida into Lake Ontario. Indeed, there was safe water-car- riage almost all the way, a distance of 160 nules, both for troops and stores. From Oswego, however, Niagara could be approached only by navigating the broad waters of Lake Ontario, for which purpose vessels of a larger size than mere bateaux would be required. Hence, before putting his columns in mo- tion. Lord Lowdon sent forward a body of artificers under the escort of 1400 troops, with directions to strengthen the works at Oswego, to afford protection to the stores 280 The Defence of Canada. [Feb. i:ili!|i| I'll '' II 08 they came in, and to build, witli ns little delay as possible, such a flotilla as might bo trusted on the lake at all seasons. It is never safe in war to select a base which shall lie between your own headquarters .and the artny of the enemy. The Marquia de Mont- calm, 'Governor-General of Canada, saw that Lord Ijowdon had com- mitted thia mistake, and took ad- vantage of it. At Froiitignac, now called Toronto, he embarked .1000 excellent troops, and on the lOtb of August appeared off Oswego, his lighter vessels being protected by two slooiw, Olio of sixteen, the other of twelve guns. To land and invest the place was the work of a few hours, and on the 14th it Kur- rendercd. There was an immediate end to the campaign. The vessels of war and of transport, which the English were building, fell into the enemy's hands ; so did all the pro- visions and stores which during the summer had been accumulated. Lord Lowdon, therefore, despaired of sHcoess against either Niagira or Crown Point, and, leaving garrisons in his own advanced p^sts at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, he withdrew into winter quarters in and about Albany. It will be seen that in both of these campaigns Canada was threat- ened after precisely the same fashion. The object of the in- vaders was to gain the command of Lake Ontario, while at the same time they moved upon Montreal by the route of Lakes George and Champ- lain. In 1757 a new scheme was deviso(\ Lord Lowdon received in- structions from home to act every- where else on the deft-nsive, while, with all tlie force which he could collect, he endeavoured to reduco Cape Breton. Sixteen line-of-battlo ships and eight frigates acconiingly assembled at Halifax, for the pur- pose of tran>porting to Cape Bre- ton an army of 10,000 men. But, before the expedition could sail, intelligence was received of the arrival at Louisburg of a supe- rior French fleet; and at the Fame time such an oooonnt was given of the strength and prepara- tions of the garrison, that Lord Lowdon dcHj)aircd, with the force at his dispoHal, of being able to reduce it. The projected invasion of Capo Breton was therefore aban- doned, and the army again broke up. lUit the camr)aign was not abortive merely. The enemy, tak- ing ail vantage of tho exposed con- dition of the frontier, moved upon Fort Williani Henry. It was gal- lantly defended for a while, but sur- rendered on tho 9th of August "by capitulation ; after which Mont- Ciilm, made aware of Lord Lowdon's return to Albany, blew up the works, and fell back again to Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Dissatistiod, as they had every reason to be, with the mismanage- ment exldbited in these proceed- ings, the British Government super- seded L')rd Lowdon, and gave the command t;f the army, already on the spot, to Major-General Aber- cromliie. Ho was directed, with 15,000 men, of whom (5500 were regular troops, to resume the at- tack on Crown Point and Ticon- deroga ; while a second corps, 7000 stiong, and entirely composed of l)rovincials, should move, as General Braddock had done, on Fort Du- Ciuesne. At the same time, a third division fntin England, having Ge- neral Aiiihei-st at its hear-General Aber- H directed, Avith vhoni 0500 were resume the at- uint and Ticon- cond corps, 7000 ;lv composed of liiove, as General ne, on Fort Du- me time, a third and, having Ge- its head, was to n, asjiisted in that lit of twtnty-two id fifteen frigates, ons seem to have in 1758. But emotion in those I id or water by took months lo s which are now eks. As, there- former occasions, several corps was )U8 — as, indeed, ioration was ex- ^ident with, or at ry to, success in iiral Abercrombio '8, the latter com- e which was di- 1802] The Defence of Canada. 231 reeled against Fort T)u Qnosne, be- gan to move till (lenoral Amlier-t reaclu'd the fictiio of a(Mioii. Tlii.s ho aiipears to have done alumt the mid- dle ot May. He >>roii);ht with him 11,(100 jifooil troops, and siiiliin; rnmi HnliliiN' on tlie 28tli, he anchored on tlm 2d t)f Juno in Gabarus Hay, Capo Breton. General Ami. erst carried all be- fore him. Wolt'f, who cominundfd the [(rij^aile wliioli first made good its landing', soon elt'ected the in- vestment of Louishnrg. More than one hundred boats were indeed lost while conveying troops and stores to the hIioi'o, and a gnrrisoii of .'5000 men, supported by 2500 sea- men, offered a stont rcsistiuic.- ; Iml on the 26; h of July the [)lacn ca|>i- tulated. The capitulation included, not tho wliolo of Oiipe Ureton only, but Trince PMward Island into the l)argain, and both hnvo continued ever since dependent upon the [{rit- i.-^li Crown. Neither were Gentr.il Abercrombie's efforts, though foiled in their main object, altogether fruitless. Ho passed his corps on the 5th of .luly down Lake George in 1035 l)oats, which he had assem- bled at the point where Fort Wil- liam Henry formerly stood, and, driving in the enemy's jnckets, madtt preparations to carry Ticuii- deroga by assault. Il was a strong jtosition on tho neck of land lying between the waters (.f Lake George mid the river, which in its course opens out to form I^iike Cliamplain, and was covered by intrenchments, having a line of abattis laid down in front of them. Just where the waters meet, stood a small square fort with liastions, serving the pur- poses of a keep to the other works. \Vithont, as it would appear, having jiaused to reconnoitre these in- trenchments, General Abercrombie sent his troops against them in six columns of attack, of" which the consequonco was, that his people got into confusion, and were repulsed with the loss of nearly 2000 mer He immediately withdrew to the htad of Lake George, where, amid the ruins of what had once been Fort William Henry, he began to intrench iiimself. But ho did not remain entirely (m the defensive. Intrusting JiOOO men to Colonel liradstroit, an enterprising and able ofiicer, he sent them to execute a pliin which the Colonel had devised, riicy pa>*Hed by the Mohawk river and Lake Oneida to Os\irego, wliitice, having ]»rovided them- selves with a sufficiency of boats and canoes, they crossed the lake mioliscrvud, and landed on the 25th of August clos \ to Fort Frontignao. Tins iliey iiimediately invested, and on the 27th made themselves masters of th^ place. It was, however, too much in advance of the English lines to be permanently retained ; and so Bradstroet, after loading with stores all the vessels which he could find, of which not fewer than nine earrieil from eighteen to eight guns respectively, partially mined the for- tificaiions, and recrossed the lake to Oswego. Alariuod and disappointed by the failure before Ticonderoga, General Atr'herst left sufficient garrisons at Loiiisi)nig and Halifax, and set off Avith five of his most effective bat- talions to join General Abercrom- bie. 11.1(1 lie proceeded by sea to New York, there might yet have been time, before winter eet in to retrieve the disaster; but, distrust- ing the winds which had kept him a fori night between Cape Breton and Boston, he made up his mind to disembark at the latter place. The dist Mico from Boston to Albany is only 165 miles; but not only were there in those days no roads tfirough tho forest, but it does not appear that the cuintry hjid ever been sur- veyed, (leneral Amherst accord- ingly found that he had undertaken a very diflicalt task. He made his Avay slowly, with muoli labour and fatigue to his men, and reached Fort William Henry only on the 5th of October, to(» late in the sea- son to commence operations wilh any hope of bringing them t6 a successful issue. Ho left his battalions with Gene- ral Abercrombie, and returned to S82 Th« Defence of Canada. [Fob. . Albany, where iti and her American settlements. No French fleet could longer find shelter in the Bay of Fundy, and the St. Lawrence was as completely closed against naviga- tion then as it is now, except in seasons uimaturally mild, from the middle of December up to the mid- dle of May. Nor was tliis all. There was no reason why the tide of con- quest should stop at Fort Beau Sc- jour. The whole of New Bruns- wick lay open to invasion, and through it, when overrun, a ruad might be constructed, which should lead an invading force to the Lower St. Lawrence. It does not a[)pear, indeed, that the value of the con- quest presented itself in this point of view to the authorities either at home or abroad; bat they equally Hftw that ft good base was CHtahlish- cd f«)r a combined operation of tho l!iot and nrmy in Lower Canada; and tho (rovertmient made its pru- pfirationH during winter to turn it to account. The plan of campaign for iTflft was formed u|)on n grand soale. It was settled that upon four ceparalo lines tho enemy should he a.»MHiled. Away upon tho oxtremo left, a force was to assemble at Fort Du Quesno for the reduction of all the posts which tho French had establishod in order to k«n'p open tho commu- nications between Lako Erie and the Ohio. Tho ex[»edition which had been arranged in 1755 against Nia- gara was to bo renewed. Oiico more Tieonderoga and Crcjwn Point wero to bo assailed trom Albany, and an attempt mado to penetrate by Lake Chaniplain to the St. Law- rence, whilo a powerful armament, despatched from England, should make its way up that river, and endeavour to take possession of Q'.iebec itself. Once more we must ask our reaie, besides contributing to establish for the English tho command of the navigation of Lako Ontario. No doubt tho command of Lake Ontario, and of all tho lakes, must have fallen as a matter of Course to the power which, being already mistress of the provinces to 11 1862. Th$ Dt/enee of Canada. 988 wo wns cstftblish- oponilUm of the Lowir Cmmdft; mt miulo Its pro- iiitor to tuin it to itn|>i\i>?» for 1'^^" n j^raiiil hcuIo. It [Htn lour ^olll^^l^to houM 1)0 a.»HHile(l. jctiTino l«'ft, u t'orco It Fort Du QiK'Hno of all tho |)()flt!» h liiul t'stublirthod oHfii tlio C(Miimu- Liiko Erio luul tlio •dilion which hail 1755 a^minst Nia- I renewed. Onco , and Crown Point iled troin Albany, iiiudo to peiietralo in to tho St. Lftw- loworful arinanicnt, , England, Khoiild ip that river, and idio possession of )iico nioro we imist to stop and consider Indency of these »r- ) oi)eration3 from I were rather locol they sought no iiin to clear away nests which trou- trappers, and kept onists of Maryland uneasy. Tho rest aimed at tho con- [!h Auurica; and .ircuHistances which^ ; most romoto of directed against regarded as super- this CMso thero was a definite end to turo of Fort Nia- Luned, would isolato enemy's settlementa besides contrihuting the Englisli tho navigation of Lako oubt tho command o, and of all tho fallen as a matter power which, being of the provinces to tho louth of th« Rt. TAwrehoe, alioald hare reduced to ■uhje'ction those lying to the north of the same line. Kilt we are writing about timeii when strategy wan not bo well un- demtood as it in now; and to threaten an enemy on many points at once was considered more artistic than to strike boldly and in force at his capital. Hence the expedi- tion agsinst Niagara, though io point of fact a mistake, had some show of reason in its favour ; which reanon, curiously enough, has operat- ed ever since, and may perhaps ope- rate again, whenever the Federal States shall make up their minds to go in for the conquest of Oanada. It is nut necessary to narrate in detail the progress of these several enterprineM. That on the extreme left succeeded with scarcely any lo.xp. The French evacuated all their posts up to Detroit, and concentrated thereby a respectable field force, with which they endeavoured to interrupt the siege of Niagara. But Niagard, which bad been approach- ed as before by the Mohawk river. Lake Ooeida, and across Lake On- tario from Odwego, was already in- vested as early as the 4th of July, and on the 24th the army whicli advanced to its relief sustained a defeat. Next day the place, with its gnrriaon of COO men, surrender- ed, and the immediate object of the enterprise was achieved. ITet no results conducive to the final suc- cess of the campaign appear to have followed. The enemy, masters of Frontignac, now Toronto, were still masters of the navigation of Lake Ontario. They even attempted from that post to surprise Oswego, and jihe troops which had l)ven left there to guard the depdts of the Nia- gara column. Though repulsed, they made good their retreat, and continued to be formidable. Thus two corps of the invading army wasted their strength on isolated en- terprises, leaving the tbira to break itself against natural obstacles, which it never ought to have en- countered, and which it proved quite incapable of overcoming. VOL. xci. General Amherst cnndaoted in KTBOO the corps of which we have st spoken. At the head of 11.000 men, he followed the same routd which all who served before him in that part of the country had taken, and landed on the 22d of Julv, where Abercrombie bnd formerly done, within a mile or two of the position of Ticonderoga. The French, whose total force did not exceed 3500 men, withdrew from their lines in the night, leaving a garrison of 400 good troops in the keep. But these were too valuable to be thrown away, so on the 26th the keep was likewise abandoned. Even Crown Point the Mar(iuis de Montcalm did not consider defen- sible, and on the 4th of August it likewise fell. There, however, General Amherst's triumphs ended. He was inferior on the lake ia armed vessels to the enemy. He applied himself to building such vessels, and strengthening the works at Crown Point, which gave him full occupation till the middle of October ; when the weather broke, and a succession of adverse winds hindered him from following np his successes. The consequence was, that, after being baffled in two at- tempts to retfbh Isle aa Noix, he brought the campaign to a close by quartering his troops at Crown Point, Fort William Henry, Fort Edward, and Albany ; and return- ed himself to New York, where he arrived on the 11th of December. Meanwhile the expedition from England, of which General Wolfe was at the head, was playing its part in the great game. It quitted England as early as the middle of February, and arrived off Louisburg on the 2d of April ; but finding the harbour still frozen, the fleet bore away, and took shelter in Halifax. There it waited till the navigation was everywhere clear, when twenty- twor sail of line • of - battle ships, thirty -five frigates, and a multitude of transports, having on board 8000 troops, went round to the month of the St. Lawrence to strike at Quebec. 16 fw 234 The Defence of Canada. [Feb. Look now for a moment at the dis- positioiia which the Marqnia de Montcalm had made, and the force at bis dis-pofal wherewith to meet the threaieued danger. His whole army iDcluding militia, did not exceed 20.000 men. With about 2000 he held what we shotild now call Toronto ; with 3500 he observed Lake Champlain ; 1500 occnpied Montreal ; and 2000 posted them- selves on the north of the St. Law- rence, about twenty miles above Quebec, between the Jacques Oartier river and the Pointe aux Trembles. As to Niagara, he left it with its ordinary small garrison, scarcely perliaps expecting that it would be attacked, and little concerned as to the issues. Ten thousand he kept with himself for the protection of Q'lebt'C, which could not, »s he cal- culated, after such a distribution of his force, be approached with safety to the invaders except from be'ow. We need not go over the particu- lars of the operations which fol- lowed. Wolfe, thwarted in his en- deavour to pass the Moutmorenci river, appears to have been at his wits' end, till a fortunate accident brought to his knowledge the un- guarded state of a pass above the town, by which the heights of Abraham could be reached. How he landed his troops and marched them up the south bank of the river, while a portion of the fleet sailed past the enemy's batteries — hnw he re-embarked, and fell down the stream again in boats, landing in Wolfe's Cove, and scaling the steep bank — history has recorded. It was an enterprise wliich ought to have resulted in his total destruc- tion. Hj i Montcalm kept within his lines lill the corps from Jacques Cartie? river showed itself in rear of the English, nothing coiild have saved them. But Montcalm's im- petuosity overcame his prudence- He engaged his adversary in a battle of musketry, and was defeated, his own life and that of Wolfe being sacrificed at the call of duty. In consequence of this defeat, the French army broke up into two bodies : the stronger of the two, chiefly proviociala, joined the corps in the neighbourhood of the Jacques Carrier river, which thus became formidable ; while 1000 men, all of them regulars, withdrew into Quebec. The battle was fought on the L3t,h of September, and on the I8lh the city, with its garrison, surrendered on capitulation. Thus ended the campaign of 1759, the fifth since the commence- ment of the war ; in every one of which, except the last, the same plans of attack had been followed, without any results proportionate to the losses sustained. No doubt the fate of Ticonderoga and Crown Point deprived the French of two valuable outposts, and the capture of Niagara left the head of Lake Ontario free, besides supplying the captors with a building - yard, in which a flotilla might be fitted out. But both the lake and the river were as yet untouched, and as long as these remained in the bauds of the French Canadians, Canada it- self might be considered tolerably safe. The fall of Quebec, however, proved a heavy blow ; it entirely changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy's position was turnt-d on its left flank, and a new and readier means of penetrating into the coun- try was opened to the assailants. Indeed, the fate of Canada may be said to have been decided by the fight on the heights of Abraham, assuming always that the French should prove unable to retrieve the disaster from Europe. Q'his, as wo need scarcely stop to observe, they failed to do; and so, in 1700, Mont- real surrendered, and the entire province submitted to the British Crown. If we had space at our disposal," and it were worth while to dwell at any length upon afiairs of such old date, nothing could be more easy than to point out the exceeding uu- skilfulness with which, on both siiies, the campaign of 17G0 was conducted. To bring up from Que- bec to Montreal every disposable man, was indeed a proceeding dic- tated by all the rules of war ; but General Amherst's eccentric mov£- [Feb. joined the corps id of the Jacques ch thus became 1000 men, all withdrew into e was fought on nber, and on the ith its garrison, ulation. )e campaign of le the commence- in every one of I last, the same id been followed, Us proportionate lined. No doubt eroRft and Crown B French of two and the capture he head of Lake its supplying the building - yard, in ight be fitted out. ke and the river ched, and as long 1 in the bauds of idians, Canada it- )n9idered tolerably Quebec, however, blow ; it entirely 3t of affairs. The was turntd on its new and readier ing into the coun- to the assailants. »f Canada may be m decided by the ghts of Abraham, that the French )le to retrieve the ■ope. This, as we ) to observe, they so, in 17C0, Moiit- and the entire id to the British ce at our disposal," while to dwell at affairs of such old lid be more easy the exceeding uu- which, on both ign of 1700 was ring up from Qiie- every disposable a proceeding die- rules of war; but s eccentric movje- 18«2.] The Defence of Canada. 335 ment with the main body of his army, first from Albany, to Oswego, thf'n from Oswego across Lake Oa- tario, then down the rapids of the St. Lawrence, by Long Sault and liake St. Louis, ought to have ended in his destruction. It ^as not only as uncalled for as it was perilous, but it necessarily retarded, even when successful, the attainment of the object which it was meant to Bul^serve. In the then state of the war, a direct movement by Lake Cliaiiiplain was ail that could be nece^•eary in eonuectiun with tie ascent from Quebec. The roite from thence to Montreal was far shorter and more direct ; the natural obstacles to be overcome were much less formidable, and to 14,000 men whom he had ^at his disposal the enemy could have opposed scarcely 4000 ; whereas, by carrying 10,000 men round by Like Ontario, he not only exposed them to the danger of 230 miles of difficult navigation, but laid them open to be attacked in iiank while struggling in the rapids, and their commuuications to be cut off' both from above and from be- low. Fortune favoured him, how- ever, and his only loss was occa- sioned by the upsetting of sixty boats between Lake Irancis and Lake St. Louis ; while bis subsidi- ary column, under Colonel Haviland, tliough barely 3200 strong, made its way from Lake Cham plain by the Isle au Noix to Fort St. John. The enemy evacuated both works as Colonel Haviland approached. They had vainly endeavoured to arrest the progress of the flotilla from Quebec : they now came in both from the Three Rivers and from Sorel, two points, of which they hud been especially jealous — the former, because it crossed tho line of march from Quebec ; the latter, because it guarded the Richelieu river and Lake Champlain — and, shutting themselves up in the Island of Montreal, awaited their doom. It could not be averted, and they laid down their arms. Once more we must ask our readers to observe by what process, and along what lines, Canada was in those old days invaded. It was next to impossible to remove troops and stores to any distance inland, except by water, the country being destitute of roads, and overspread by primeval forests. Indians, and men as little encumbered as Indi- ans, could alone pass through them till, by prodigious labour, paths had been cleartnl and depots estab- linhed, which it was foimd always difficult, and often impossible, to defend. Hence the object of both belligerents was to keep and retain the command of the Lakes, and especially of Lake Champlain, which formed at once the advanced cover- ing and the weakness of Montreal. No doubt the English, bad they earlier succeeded in establishing a superiority there and on Luke On- tario, would have still found the St. Lawrence, with its strong current and many rapids, a serious obstacle ; but from the day in which they made themselves masters of Que- bec, rapids and current, looking to the fact that the sea was open to them, ceased to be of importance. It was not, therefore,- by the vigour and skill of their front-attacks that they made themselves masters of Canada ; and a glance at the con- tests which have since taken place in that part of the world, will show that front-attacks upon Canada from the south have never led to any but impel feet and temporary successes. Fifteen years elapsed, after Ca- nada became a British province, before the possibility of defending it against an enemy who should approach from what are now called the United States, was put to the proof. In 1775, soon after the first American Congress met, the insur- gent government determined to take advantage of the favourable posi- tion of its afftiis, and to carry the war into Canada. The province was then destitute of troops. Only one weak battalion held it, and the militia no one as yet thought of calling out. While, therefore, Gv^ne- ral Oage suffered a state of block- ade in Boston, two expeditions were secretly fitted out, one of 'vhich was to fall upon Montreal oy tie 236 The Defence of Canada. [Feb. ii W ' I i 'i ! MS ' I old route of Lake OhainplaiD, while the other, passing by sea to the moutli of the Keoebeo river, was to cross the ridge between New Eng- land aod CaDada, and to descend the Sohaudiere river, which runs into the St. Lawrence nearly oppo- site to Quebec The American corps to be em- ployed against Monfeal amounted to about 3000 men. It was led by General Montgomery, and did its work well. Sir Guy Carleton, who commanded on the ct'ier side, bad small means at his disposal, and he appears not to have managed them very judiciously. Instead of keeping his regular troops, in num- ber about 500, as a nucleus round which the militia might gather, lie pushed them to the front, and lost them almost entirely in the unim- portant post of Fort St. John and Chambly, which he was nnwise enough to defend. Thwarted in an attempt to relieve the former, he threw a garrison of militiamen into Fort Sorel, but the garrison dis- persed as the enemy drew on, and the fort was occupied. There speed- ily followed upon this the surrender of Montreal itself, and of eleven British vessels which had taken shelter there, General Carleton escaping with difficalty in a boat by night, and passing the American batteries with muffled oars. Mean- while General Arnold, at the head of 1200 men, passed, as was pro- posed, to the mouth of the Kene- bec, and there embarked upon an enterprise such as no other armed body ever undertook before, or has ever undertaken since. For six weeks he and his men were in the swampy forest ; for four they never saw a hut nor encountered a human being. The Kenebec, which they asctnded, is rapid and full of shoals ; the Scbaudiere, which they had to descend, wab even more rapid and rocky. Two -thirds of Arnold's people refused to go on, and with less than 400 he arrived at last on the 3d of November in eight of the St Lawrence. He touched the stream at Point Levi, found or col- lected there boats enough to con- vey his troops, and crossed immedi- ately. The regular garrison of Que- bec consisted at that moment of only one company of infantry, but the marines and seamen of a sloop of war lying in the river strength- ened it, and the inhabitants like- wise taking np arms, Sir Guy Carle- ton found himself at the bead of 1500 or 1600 men. Though the arrival of Arnold, therefore, greatly surprised him, be never lost heart, but made preparations to defend the town to the last extremity. While this was going on, General Montgomery established garrisons in Montreal and Fort St John ; after which he descended the St Law- rence with the remainder of his corps, in order to unite himself with Arnold. The junction took place on the 5th of December ; and with such means as they could com- mand, amounting to six field-guns and five small mortars, the American generals pressed the siege. It made^ no progress ; and the season of the* year rendering a continuous opera- tion next to impossible, they deter- mined to try the effect of an escal- ade. Two false attacks on the fronts facing the heights of Abra- ham were intended to draw off the attention of the garrison from the lower town, which was to be en- tered, by Arnold and the columa under his. orders, between the St. Charles and the heights — by Mont- gomery and his division, between the St Lawrence and the precipices of Cape Diamond. We cannot ac- count for this selection of the points of real attack, inasmuch as the oc- cupation of the lower town does not necessarily imply the fall of the upper, whereas he who is master of the upper town has the lower at his mercy. But whatever the hopes of the assailants might be, and on whatever data founded, they came to nothing. Both aseaults were repulsed ; General Montgom- ery being killed while cheering on the one, General Arnold being dis- abled by a severe wound while con- ducting the other. The Americans were not pre- pared for a regular ca'npaign. They [Feb. crossed imroedi- [arrisoD of Que- at moment of f infantry, bat men of a sloop river strengtb- nbabitants like- Sir Gay Carle- &t tbe bead of Thongb tbe berefore, greatly sver lost heart, ions to defend xtremity. ►ing on, General ished garrisons i St John ; after i the St. Law- mainder of his lite himself with Uon took place mber ; and with ley could com- ;o six field-guns rs, the American siege. It made, ;he season of tbe iontinuous opera- sible, they deter- feot of an escal- attacks on tbe leightfl of Abra- d to draw off 16 garrison from cb was to be en- and the columa between tbe St. ights — by Mont- division, between nd tbe precipices We cannot ac- tion of tlie points jcQUcb as the oc- >wer town does )Iy the fall of le who is master bos the lower ut whatever the lilants might be, lata founded, they Both aseaults eneral Montgom- vbile cheering on Arnold being dis- wound while con- were not pre- ca'npaign. They 1862.] The Defence of Canada. 237 t had made a raita at Oanada, hoping to surprise it. They were destitute of means for a prolonged contest, even if no reinforcements should be sent from England. General Ar- nold, indeed, continued the blockade of Quebec throughout the winter, and early in the spring had his num- bers reised to 3000 men. Montreal, St. John, and Chambly were at the same time occupied by 4000, and strenuous efforts were made to en- list the inhabitants, French as well as English, oa the side of the Re- volution. But in this the Ameri- cans failed; and the arrival on the 6th of May of a squadron of Eng- lish men-of-war in the St Lawrence, and of three brigades of infantry, with artillery, at once decided their line of action. Arnold withdrew from before Quebec. Montreal, Ohambly and Fort St. John were evacuated, and Oanada became again, what it has ever since continued to be, a loyal British province. It is a fact curious in itself, and strongly illustrative of the peculiar temperament of the American peo- ple, that they have never been able to divest themselves of the persua- sion that they have only to raise the banner of the stars and etripes in Canada, in order to insure the co- operation in their favour of at least a large majority of its inhabitants. Strong in this conviction, they sent Montgomery and Arnold to add the provinces north of the St Lawrence to those which, in the south, had declared themselves independent And the same fatuity led them, in 1812, to count upon the subjection of Canada as the necessary result of its invasion. It would appear, too, as if they had carefully studied the operations of the English gene- rals half a century earlier, and done their best to repeat them, even to their blunders. But before we pro- ceen to sketch with a rapid pen the Erogress of a war of which the true istory is yet to be written, it may be well if we endeavour to convey to the mind of the reader some- thing like a distinct idea of the locale upon which it was waged. The boundary - line between the United States and British North America, though clearly settled by the treaty of severance, seems in 1812 to have become a good deal obscured. On the east and south- eat!t, Natnre has sufficiently sketched her own map ; but the waving line which now passes from St Andrew's Bay to the Grand Falls of the St John, and from the Grand Falls southward, and thence w€ ward at a right angle to Lake St Francis in tbe St Lawrence, had then no ex- istence. Men knew that the State of Massachusetts belonged to the Union, but where Lower Canada began, and Massachusetts or Maine ended, was by no means so certain. Lake Champlain, however, was un- deniably a State lake, except on its northern shore, and there Eng- land had a post a few miles distant from the American St Albans, while the St. Lawrence was in all its coarse English, from its exit out of Lake Ontario to its mouth. Above this outfnll the limits of the two com- monwealths were plain enough. The great lakes Ontario, Erie, Hu- ron, and Superior they shared be- tween them ; and the rivers which connect these, the Niagara between Tike Erie and Lake Ontario, the St. Clair between Lake Huron and Lake Erie, were, as well as the St Mary, which flows out of Lake So* perior into Lake Huron, their well- defined frontiers, far up into the west Any good map will show where, upon these lakes and rivers, such places as Ticonderog«, Crown Point, Flattsburg, Sacketts Harbour, Sandy Point, Oswego, Fort Nia- gara, and Buffalo stand, on one side ; and Jo3e|>h's Point, Michilimack- inac, Amherstburg, Sandwich, Long Point, York (now called Toronto), Kingston, and many more, on tbe other. Having mastered these, as well as the names ef other places and positions on either bank of tbe St Lawrence, from the Lake of a Thou- sand Isles downward to Montreal, the intelligent observer will not, we think, find it very difficult to fol- low the thread of our story. Though little concerned in the pre- sent paper with the causes in which MM 288 TTit Defence of Canada. [Feb. the rnpture between Great Britain and America originated in 1812, we mny perhaps be allowed to ntate that, throughout the long Btrnggle of this country with revolutionary France, Amt'rica gave all her nympathiea to the latter power. She carried on, at the same time, a brisk trade between France and her colonies — as long as France retained any colo- nies; and was not always careful to confine her imports to harralefs colo- nial produce. This neceBsarily f-ob- jected American vepsels to eearch, and from time to time, when con- traband of war was found in them, to peizure. The cons', quence thence arising became aggravated a hun- dred - fold, when Napoleon, by his Berlin and Milan Decrees, tempted England to make reprisals, and to prohibit all intercourse between neu- tral vessels and French ports. Tbf>r« accompanied this a rather free-and- easy custom of taking out of Ameri- can ships men whom the visiting offiL-ers l)elieved to be deserters from the English navy. Remonstrances and complaints ensued, to which no attention was paid, and America in the end declared war. It is past dispnte that she anticipated at that time the speedy dissolution of the British Empire, which she re- solved to help forward by taking possession of Canada. The plan of campaign, arranged at Washington long before the decla- ration of wftr was issued, embraced three objects — the subjugation of Amhcrstburg at the head of Lake Erie, the occupation of the Niagara district, and the capture of Mont- real. Under the pretext of watch- ing some hostile Indians, 2500 men had been thrown forward to the neighbourhood of Amherstbut earlj' in the summer ; about 63u0 were put in motion towards the Niagara frontier as soon as circumstances would allow ; while 7000 received orders to assemble ftt Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, which they did later in the season. Of Briiifih regular troops there were at this time in the provinces not more thnn 4.')00, of whom 3000 garrisoned Quebec p.nd Montreal, while 1600 were ppread over Up- per Cannda. These latter, divided among Kingston, Toronto or York, the Niagara frontier, and Amherst- burg, could show but a feeble front anywhere; and they were further weakened by having a detachment stationed in Joseph's Island, at the head of Lake Huron. The naval preparations on both sides were inconsiderable enough. On Luke Ontario the Americana had one brig, the English one ship of 300 tor,s, with three smaller vessels. On Lake Eric the Americans had one armed brig and three schooners ; the English had nothing. Notwithstanding the advantages in preparation enjoyed by the Ame- ricans, the English were the first in this war to strike a blow. The officer in command at Isle Joseph no sooner heard of the declaration of hostilities, than he embarked his detachment in open boats, passed over to the island of Michilimack- inae, a distance of forty miles, and, assiated by some Canadian voya- geurs and Indians, compelled the American garrison, numbering sixty men, to lay down its arras. The conquest was not unimportant, be- cause Michilinmckinac stood directly in the way of a brisk trade which the Americans carried on through Lake Huron from Detroit; and the English arms acquired, over and above, the prestige of an opening triumph. Meanwhile tha American corps destined for the invasion of Am- hcrstburg took the field. It had assembled at Detroit, on the river of the same name, as early as the 5th of July; and on the'l2ih it crossed to Sandwich, and moved upon Amherstborg town. The gar- rison of that place consisted of 4.50 men, of whom 300 were militia. It was further strengthened by the presence of 1.50 Indians, and bad its advanced posts at the river Aux- canards, a small stream which inter- poses betweej Sandwich and Am- hcrstburg, and falls into the De- troit. This stream the Americans never succeeded in passing. They skirmished with the English from ^* 1862.] The D^ence of Canada. 239 their own bank, and odco or twice approached the bridge, without ven- turing upon it ; while the Eaglislt, detaching their Indians, some mili- tia, and a few regular troops, fell upon the enemj^'s communications, and cut them off! Alarmed as well as inconvenienced by the Moppage of their provisions, the Americans retreattd on the 7ih of August, and, contenting themselves with send- ing 50U men to act against the Eng- lish detachment, returoed with their main body to Detroit Meanwhile General Brock, who commandid in Upper Oanada, em- barked 300 men, of whom 2G0 were militia, at Long Point on Lake Erie. He had previously forwarded two weak parties, numbering between them IGO men, and be arrived at Amherstburg with the others while these operations were yet in pro- gress. He immediately assumed the offensive, and establishing a battery at Sandwich, which fired across the river at Detroit, he pass- ed the stream with 300 regular in- fantry, 400 militia, 600 Indians, and 80 artillerymen, and invested the place on the opposite front. He had completed his preparations for as- saulting the fort, when the Ameri- can general hung out a white fliigr. The place surrendered, and 2500 troops and 30 pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors. Leaving a garrison in Detroit, he hastened back to the Niagara fron- tier, where he arrived on the 24th of August. His purpose was to at- tack, from Fort George, Fort Niagara on the American side of the river; but he was prevented from carrying the project into effect ; for, just as his plans were completed, intelli- gence arrived of the establichment of an armistice. Sir George Pre- vost, it appeared, had been made aware of the repeal of their Orders in Council by the British Govern- ment ; and as the injustice of tliese Orders sttmd foremost in the list of grievances of which the Americans complained, he naturally concluded that the Washington Cabinet, when informed that the grievance had ceased, would willingly suspend hoB- tilities, which both sides affected to deplore. He accordingly arranged an armistice along the entire fron- tier, till reference should be made to Washington ; and General Brock, greatly to his own disgust, found himself included in it. At the same time, it is fair to add that Brock's projected enterprise against Fort Niagara was bold even to rashness. lie bad under his orders barely 1200 men, of whom less than one -half were regular troops. The Ameri- cans faced him witli C500 ; and suc- cess itself, had he even succeeded against such odds, must have crip- pled him. He could not have re- tained Ft rt Niagara after it fell, except by shutting up within its walls 300 or 400 men, and with the handful which remained he could have done nothing. Though he chafed, therefore, and though his friends complained, the conduct of Sir George Prevost was not in t' : instance open to censure. Delay la everything in a war purely defen>ive, especially in this instance, where there were levies to be called out and drilled ; nor was the force at Brock's disposal such as to warrant his converting defensive into offensive operations. While the armistice lasted, and for a week or two after its close, the English and Americans looked at one another from opposite sides of the Niaaara river. Of tlie Ame- ricans, 1100 were at Fort Niagara, 3J00 at Louistown, and 2000 be- tween Black Rock and Buffalo. The British troops occupied Forts Erie and George, at opposite extremities of their Hue, keeping four companies (two of the 49th regiments, two of the militia) at Queenstown, in observa- tion of L'luistown. The ibinet at Washington hav- ing rejected Sir George Prevost'a advances, hostilities recommenced ; and in the night of the 11th of Oc- tober the Americans made a move. They pushed 250 men from Louis- town across the river, which was there about a quarter of a mile in width, and immediately sent back f.he boats to bring up a second divi- sioQ. The officer in command at ■MM 240 Th€ Defence of Canada. [Feb. m ,: V QueeDBtown liad two companies, with two pieces of caonon, oo the brow of a hill which overlooks the town, and coDimands the river. The other two companies he had placed in the town itself, and these became immediately engaged with the Ame- ricans on the beach. The sound of firing was heard at Fort George, and General Brock galloped off to the point of danger. Just as he arrived, a second American division touched the shore, and fearing lest the two companies in the town sLoald be overpowered, he caused those on the hill to descend to their assistance. It was an unfortunate movement, for tlie enemy had already landed 600 men higher up the stream, who, observing that the hill was bare, ran forward and seized it. General Brock instantly put himself at the head of a portion of his people, and endeavoured to retake the hiil, but was killed in the attempt. The British troops fell back to the edge of the ridge, where one detachment after another from Fort Erie ar- rived to support them ; and General Sheaffe, on whom the command had devolved, led them forward to the charge. The Americans broke and fled; 71 oiHcers and 858 non-commis- sioned officers and men laid down their arms ; the remainder escaped in the boats. The superiority of British over Ame- rican troops was marked throughout this affair. The assailants were de- feated, and many of their boata sunk, chiefly, as the American gene- ral reported, because he could not, by threats or entreaties, prevail upon the 2000 men who looked on from the further bank to cross the Niagara, and come to the assistance of their comrades. One more attempt was made by the Americans to penetrate into the Niagara district above the Falls. Four thousand men from Louis- town, Bluck Rock, and Buffalo, were employed on this service, but they accomplished nothing. Their ad- vanced-guard, which, on the night of the 28lh of November, embarked in ten boats, was attacked and over- powered at a landing-place called' Red House. The fugitives escaped, leaving thirty prisoners behind them, and the army forthwith broke up, and retired into winter-quarters. Nothing could be more feeble or oat of place than these two attempts. They were ill - arranged, and worse executed. Indeed, it is hard to say what objects they could be intended to serve, unless it were, that, by drawing away the bulk of the troops from Lower Canada, they might ren- der more easy the proposed occu- pation of Montreal. But on that enterprise the enemy never ven- tured. Their corps of 7000 men lay idle at Plattsburg till the 15th of November, and made no attempt, when it did move, to penetrate beyond the village of Champlain. Threatened there by a British bri- gade of 900 men, and having a patrol, which had felt its way as far as the bridge over the Lacolle, driven in by a picket of Canadian voya- geurs and militia, the Americans precipitately retired, and st)on after- wards went into winter-quarters. It is worthy of remark, that all this while the regular broops and provincials in Canada, waged, so to speak, a war with America on their own account. In London a seri- ous rupture with the United States seems scarcely to have been contem- plated, till tidings arrived of the rejection of the proposed armistice at Washington ; nor was any formal declaration of war issued by Eng- land till the beginning of 1813. No preparations bad, therefore, been made to meet the invasion when it came. The inland waters were left unguarded, the oidinary peace gar- risons occupied the principal posts on shore ; yet these peace garrisons, supported by gallant and loyal mi- litia, repelled the invaders at every point. The Americans, on the other hand, long bent upon a particular purpose, got such a start of Eugland upon the lakes, as England was never afterwards able to overtuke. Hostilities were scarcely begun, when Commodore Cbauncey arrived at Sacketls Harbour, where, in the course of the summer, he either built, or fitted for war purposes, six ■B [Feb. itives escaped, i behind them, ith broke up, quarters, nore feeble or I two attempts, ed, and worse is hard to say d be iatended ivere, that, by ( of tlie troops hey might ren- »roposed oocn- But on that never ven- 7000 men lay 1 the 15th of I DO attempt, to penetrate )f Ghamplaio. a British bri- and having a its way as far Lacolle, driven lauadian voya> he Americans nd st)on afier- ■quarters. mark, that all ar broops and waged, so to nerica on their andon a seri- United States I been contem- rrived of the osed armistice iras any formal isued by Eng- of 1813. No lierefore, been ^asion when it iters were l^ft iry peace gar- trincipal posts eace garrisons, and loyal mi- Biders at every I, on the other 1 a particular irt of England England was to overtHke. ircely begun, luncey arrived where, in the er, he either ' purposes, six 1862.] 77m Defence of Oanada. 241 soboonere. These, added to the brig, rais'^'' the American naval force to more «han an equalitv with that of their riv&is, who could still count on only one ship and three smaller vessels. At the same time, a navy yard was es^tablishedj at Presqu'ile, on Lake Erie, whence two brigs were in due time turned out, to re- inforce the squadron which already dominated there. Immense advan- tages these, had the enemy known bow to turn them to account ! But, happily for England, the absence of military knowledge, on the part of the Americans, more than compen- sated for their superior activity and skill in uaval affairs. Hence the camp'-Jgn of 1813 proved as little decisive against Canada as that of 1811*, though it opened with a greater show of energy, and brought increased numbers into the field on both sides. :. The Americans proposed to act ' this year upon three, or, .to speak more correctly, upon four lines. ' Assembling one corps at Sandusky, :^ 'at the western end of Lake Erie, they were to employ it in the re- > taking of Detroit and the reduction of Amherstburg. A second, col- , I lected at Sacketts Harbour, was in If the first instance to occupy Kings- ton and Toronto, after which it was to proceed against Forts George and Erie in the Niagara district, in co- operation with a subsidiary force which should assemble at BuSUlo. The third operation was to be di- rected from Lake Champlain against Montreal, being aided by the de- scent of the victorious troops from Lake Ontario by the St. Lawrence. The total number of men to be en- ployed in these various enterprises was reckoned at 30,000, though it scarcely appears that anything ap- proachiog to that number ever came under fire. Operations b^gan very early in the direction of the Am- herstburg district. The English headquarters were then in Detroit, and they had a post at Frenchtowu, forty -five miles in advance of it. On the 18ih of January the Ameri- cans advanced against that picket, which retired to a place called Brownstown. Here Colonel Proc- tor, who commanded in this quar- ter, joined at the head of 500 men, chiefly militia, and 450 Indians. He attacked the Americans on the 22d, who gave way and tied, leaving 500 prisoners in his hands. The total loss to the EogMsb was 152 killed and wounded. Though snocessfnl in this affair, Colonel Proctor did not consider himself strong enough to hold his ground. He fell back, therefore, to Detroit, and ultimately to Sand- wich. He was nc*. very vigorously pursued ; indeed, the enemy con- tented themselves with removing their headquarters from Sandusky to the river Miamis, on the banks of which they erected a fort for the protection of their stores. Colonel Proctor was tempted to strike a blow at that fort, by embarking 1000 men at Amherstburg, and directing 1200 Indians to join him by land. He succeeded in ascend- ing the Miamis unopposed ; he was joined by the Indians within a mile and a half of the fort, but he missed his object entirely through lack of nkill in the management of details. He unwisely divided his little army, throwing himself astride upon the Miamis, and had thus two distinct operations to carry on at the same time. He was attacked simultane- ously on both sides, and, though victorious in the battle, found him- self at its close under the necessity of abandoning his enterprise. He returned to Sandwich, where he remained till the 1st of August, when he made a fresh attempt on an American post gt the mouth of the Sandusky river. This time be met with a decided check. Repulsed in an attempt to escalade the works, he retreated again to Sandwich, hav- ing lost in killed and wounded ninety- six men. It WU3 an unfortunate enterprise altogether. It cost some valuable lives, and wasted precious time ; for it interfered with a plan which had already been matured for an attack from Long Point on Prepqu'ile, and upon the two brigs which were iu process of construction there, in ■iff*'" S4» The U^fenee of Canada. [Feb. Ill , ll yrhich a detachment from Amheret- burg WM8 to huve joined. The bn^a got to eea before the Amheratburg division recovered itself, and the difficulties of communicating with Amherstburg from below wtre in- creased fourfold. The consequence was, that when, by the junction of the corps from I/)ng Point, the force at Amherstburg was raiseil to 1000 British and 3500 irregular troops, the verj strength of the garrison, straitened both for provisions and ammunition, became its weak- ness, lor at the period of which we are writing, the Amherstburg district, tliinly peopled and desti- tute of roads, carried on its inter- course with the lower settlements, and bron^ht in all ltd supplies, by water. The appearance of the ene- mj'a squadron, therefore, off the harbour, struck Proctor and hid people with dismay. They pressed forward the completion of a ship of war which had long been on the stocks, and sent her out, manned by a few seamen and 150 soldiers, to raise the blockade. She engaged the Americans, who were in every respect superior, and, together witli one or two smaller vessels, fell into their hands. The complete command of the lake being thus acquired, the Ame- ricans were in a condition to bring up their troops by the Sandusky and Miamia rivers to the neighbour- hood of the town of Amherstburg. They greatly exceeded Proctor's corps iu numbers, and could boast, among other things, of a mounted regiment 1200 strong. There re- mained, therefore, for Proctor no other resource than to evacuate both Detroit and Amherstburg, and to retire up the valley of the Thames in the direction of the Moravi in Bcttlement, and of Ancas- ter. The valley of the Thames is now comparatively a flourishing district ; it was then little better than a wilderness, without houses, without cultivation, without roads. The few stores which the English possessed — their provisions, bag- gage, and ^pare ammunition — they conveyed by boat up the stream, and their column, which marched along the woody banks, became weaker and weaker every day. On the 4th of October the Americans overtook the boats, and captured them. On the 5th, Colonel Proctor, with not quite 500 troops, and as many Indians, determined to make a stand. lie was attacked by 5000 Americans, overpowered and driven oir. Ue retreated to Ancaster, which he reached on the I7tb, with only 204 rank and file, all that remained to him of his original force. Thus far success attended the invaders. They were masters of the forts at Detroit and Amherst- burg, and of the Amherstburg ter- ritory as far as the head of the valley of the Thames. But they were not brought thereby nearer to the subjugation of Canada ; that must be ettected by operations farther to the east ; and in the month of April, when the naviga- tion of Lake Ontario becomes free, these operations began. Six thou- sand men were collected at Sacketts Harbour, with a squadron, consist- ing 6f a ship, a brig, and eleven schooners. The object of this ar- mament was to seize Toronto and Kingston, while yet the frozen state of the St. Lawrence prevented their being reinforced from below ; and it was partially effected. On the 25th, 20U0 men landed close to Toronto, which the English gar- rison, 300 regular troops, as many militiamen, and forty Indians, did not consider themselves in suffi- cient force to defend. They retired, therefore, towards Kingston, after a short contest, in which they lost 180 killed and wounded ; though not till they had burnt a ship up- on the stocks, with which it was intended to reinforce the English squadron on the lake. The Ameri- cans likewise had suifered severely, and did not venture to pursue : on the contrary, they changed their plan, took ship on the 8tb of May, and arrived the same evening otf the Four-mile Creek, close to the mouth of the Niagara river. The troops ^being landed, the Qotilia re- m % .:i| 1862.] The Defence of Canada. 948 bich inarcbed banks, became every day. Oo the Americans and captured olonel Proctor, troops, and as nined to make tacked by 5000 red and driveo to Ancaster, the I7tb, with file, all that )f his origiDal attended the ere mHSters of ; and Amherst- .mherstburg ter- le head of the jes. But they lereby nearer to Canada ; that by operations t ; and in tlie hen the naviga- io becomes free, f&n. Six thou- jcted at Sucketts :|uadroD, consist- 3rig, and eleven »ject of this ar- ize Toronto and . the frozen state e prevented their om below ; and fected. On the landed close to te English gar- troopR, as many rty Indians, did iselves in suffi* id. They retired, Kingston, after a which they lost ounded ; though Durnt a ship up- :h which it was rce the English ike. The Ameri- sufiFered severely, •e to pursue : on t changed their the 8ih of May, same evening otf ek, close to the jgara river. The d, the flotilla re- turned to Sacketts Harbour, between which place and Niagara it con- tinned to ply till the 2r>th, when the whole corps was brought up. Two schooners only reniaint-d below to cruise off Kingston, and to ob- serve the movements of the Eng- lish. The Niagara frontier was held at this time by 1800 regnlnr Briiish troopp, 500 militia: and forty In- dians. Of these, 1000 regular troops, 300 of the militia, and all the Indians, were in and about Fort George; so that there remained for the defence of the rest of the line, including the garrison of Fort Erie, only 800 regulars and 200 militia. The enemy's force conaiated of 7000 men, divided into three brigades ; and on the 27th of May the whole were ferried across the river, under cover of the fire from Fort Niagara, and from their own flotilla mounting fifty-six guns. General Vincent, who commanded in this quarter, offered a stout resistance to their disembarkation, but was forced to retreat with the lo?8 of 4.50 men. He fell back by Queenstown and Beaver Dam to Burlington Heights, at the head of Luke Ontario, call- ing in at the same time his detach- ments from Fort Erie and the Ohipfieway. The junction of these raised hia available strength to 1600 bayonets; but his condition was extremely critical. In his front lay a superior force, well supplied and flushed with success. He hud no reserves on which to retire, nor any hope of support from Toronto, of the fate of which he was aware. There needed but common hardi- hood and a little judgment on the part of the invaders to secure his destruction ; but these were want- ing. The American general, in- stead of falling upon Vincent with his entire corps, was content to detach two brigades of infantry, his light guns, and a regiment of cavalry in pursuit, while, with the remaining brigade, he halted to take possession of the various defensible posts which the English had aban- doned. There was in General Vin- cent's little army a gallant soldier, Colonel Sir John Harvey, who pro- P'Sed that, instead of waiting to receive an attack on Burlington Height^, the English should make a night attack upon the enemy. 'I'his was done on the night of the 5ih June at Stony Creek, to which the Americans had adviinced ; and so complete was the success of the enterprise, that both of the Ameri- can brigadiers, with 123 oQicers and men, and four pieces of cannon, feU into the hands of the assailantf. The remainder fled in confusion, making no halt till they reacht^d For- ty-mile Creek, eleven miles from the scene of action. The enormous extent of the American lakes never comes before us more strikingly than when we read of the military operations that were carried on along their shores, atid over the surface of their watere. Though the superiority of the enemy on Like Ontario was at this time decided, we find an English squadron sailing from Kingston with 280 troops ou bourd, and arriving unmolested at Forty-mile Creek, three days after the Ameri- can fugitives had established them- selves there. The gnnbodts and armed schooners which escorted the bateaux opened fire upon the enemy, and drove them from their encampment. Immediately ttie troops landed. They joined General Vin- cent's column, and the whole set out ia pursuit of the Americans, who fell back upon Fort George. There they made a stand with a view to call in the detachments which they had established at Fort Erie and along the Chippeway. But all courage seemed to have de- serted them. They made no aggres- sive movement. They permitted the English, whom the arrival of a fresh regiment from Ljwer- Canada had greatly encouraged, to close in npon them, and to straiten their supplies ; and at last, on the Ist of October, they took ship aiid sailed away. About 1500 militia from the State of New York were left to garrison Fort George and Fort Niagara ; the rest, amounting to 6000 of all arms, proceeded first 344 Tht D^mu of Canada. [Feb. 1:1 to Oflwego, and bj-and by to Saoketts Harbour. Meanwhile the corpg which had assembled on Lalce GnampiaiD tuck the field. It coDsisted of 7000 in- fantry, 250 cavalry, and 10 fi^uns; and It adranced acrosa the lake by Flattaburg to Ctiateaugay • Four- corners, where it arrived on the 8tb of October. It waa evident from this arrangement that the Ameri- can general intended to move by the mouth of the Ghateaugay river, and to attempt the passage of the St. Lawrence above the Ghioe rapids at Lake St. Louis. This was a i'udicioua plan— too much dependent, lowever, on the success of the col- umn from Lake Ontario, which, be it remembered, was to descend the St. Liiwrence from the lake, and to co-operate in the projected attack on Montreal. But it was feebly carried into effect. A small force, coneistiDg entirely of Provincials (it did not exceed 1000 muskets, including 170 In^ianp), took post about twenty-four miles from the Four-corners, on the road by which the enemy must advance ; and the enemy, although thev attacked it with all their strength on the 26th, made no ioitpressioo. Immediately the American general lost heart. He retired to the Four-corners, where he halted only to take breath, and on the 11th of November with- drew to Plattsburg. He there broke up his army, and put it into winter quarters. While this was going on, the Eng- lish from the Niagara frontier, and the Americans from Sacketts Har- bour, both put themselves in mo- tion. The former, apprehensive for the safety of Kingston, sent down two weak regiments to reinforce the garrison ; the latter took ship and steered for the British waters. They appear to have hesitated in their course of action, whether to delay the descent of tho St. Law- rence till they shoe Id have pos- sessed themselves of Kingston, or to leave Kias^stoa behind and descend the St. Lawrence at once. They finally decided upon the latter course ; and, on the 5th of Novem- ber, 8000 men approached the source of the river. They estab- lished their de[)dt of stores and pro- visions on the American side, where also the troops landed, leaving the boats to pass Fort Wellington empty. Fort Wellington stands upon the English bank, and commands the navigation ; but by muffling their oars the boatmen managed, under cover of night, to elude observa- tion, and on the 8th the troops re- embarked at Ogdensburg. It waa a wild project, taken up, as it ap- pears to OS, in imitation of General Amherst's luck^ hazard in 1780, and it ended in complete failure. The rapids proved too dangerous to be faced with loaded boats : the troops landed and re-embarked re- peatedly. About 800 men of the garrison of Kingston hung upon their rear, and 00 the 11th over- took and engaged two brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and six guns. The battle waa fought at the head of the Long E'ault, at^ a place called Ghrysalis Farm, and ended in the discomQ- tare of the Americans. The Eng- lish lost 180 officers and men — the Americans 339, besides 100 taken prisoners. They retired to their boats during the night, and, de- scending the river four miles, were landed un the American side. From that moment all hope of success abandoned them. They continued the descent of the St. Lawrence till they reached the mouth of the Sstl- mon river, which falls into the St. Lawrence on the right bank. Up that stream, for about seven miles, they pushed their flotilla, when they finally disembarked, and, atter remain- ing idle till February 1814, burnt their boats and retreated to Platts- burg and Burlington. We must now cast our eyes back for a moment to the Amberstburg district, and take account of the effect |)roduced along the Niagara frontier by the tidings which came in of the disasters there sustained. Apprehensive of an attack in the rear, and anxious to save the wreck of Proctor's corps, the Niagara di- vision fell back from Fort George afl re| tic Vi eel edl PH col [F^b. 1662.] Tht Df/ence qf Canada. U$ after the departnre of the American regular army, and resumed its pnei- tion on Burlington Heights. Here Proctor joined it ; and early in De- cember the EogliHh agnin approach- ed Fort George. The American pickfcia being driven in, the garrison, consisting entirely of militia, did not consider itself competent > to hold the fort. It retreated across the Niagara, though not till the little town of Newark, with all the farm-houses and buildings near, had been wantonly burnt down. This was a cruel act in the dead of a Canadian winter, and it was ter- ribly avenged. Lieu tenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond, who hud assumed the command in Upper Canada, passed the Niagara in two columns, and, falling at night on the fort of the same name, entered it by a gate which bad been left open for the relief of the sentries, ile made himself master of the pi nee with the loss of only 11 men killed and wounded ; his prisoners amount- ed to 400, and he took 27 pieces of cannon. At the same time a body of Indians broke into Louistown ^and set it on fire; while a few davs subsequently — viz., on the 30th and Slst of December — Black Bock and Buffalo were likewise burnt down. These were sharp reprisals, but they had their efiiect; after which the army went into canton- ments at Fort Niagara, St. David's, Burlington Heights, and Toronto. Thus ended the campaign of 1813, as little to the pt-rmanent ad- vantage of the invaders as that which preceded it. With the excep- tion of the passage of the Niagara in May, and the defeat in Octo- ber of Proctor's feeble corps in the Amhertjtburg territory, the Americans executed no single move- ment with vigour ; and the little which they gained by the former of these operations, their subsequent blundering threw away. The night- action at Stony Creek saved the Niagara district, and the retreat cf the enemy from Fort George en- abled the English to establish a footing for themselves across the river. Lower down, disaster and defeat attended the enemy through- out. Their march from Champlain by Four-corners, to the mouth of the Chateaugay river, was judici- ous. They avoided thereby the oh- Btrnotions of Fort St. John and the Isle Hux Noix, while at the mouth of Chateaugay they secured a har- bour for the boats which were to convey them across the St. Law- rence. But their inabilitv to over- come the opposition of a mere handful of Provincials between Four-corners and the Chateaugay, besides proving how deficient they still were in discipline, entirely de- ranged a plan which depended for its execution on the timely arrival of the column from Lake Ontario. As to that movement, it was from first to last a false movement. It was undertaken without proper un- derstanding with the Lalke Cham- >Iain corps; it began too late, and ay exposed — a fatal error — to be : mpeded by attacks in the rear. On the whole, the generalship of the Americans was as contemptible as the want of steadiness, not to say of courage, was conspicuous in their men. On the other hand, the mis- takes committed by the English were numerous enough. They per- mitted the enemy to establish a superiority over them, both on Lake Erie and on Lake Ontario. Thev fought actions on these waters with ships ill-manned and ill-equipped, and were defeated ; and they mis- managed an attack upon Sacketts Harbour from Kingston, which, had it been vigorously pushed, could have hardly failed of succe.^s. The best excuse to be made for them is this, that they bad an enormous frontier to defend with very inade- quate means, and that the mother country was too busy with its great war in Europe to pay the neces- sary attention to its little war in America. But a change in this re- spect was at hand. We come now to the campaign of 1814, which was entered upon by the American Government with views less pretentious than had heretofore been entertained. Ex- perience seems to have taught them T r ! I . I. ' 1 T ' ■ i| 1 I Ths DfftnM qf Canada. [Feb. that, amonf; the population of tlie CunuduB, llicy bad oo allict, and that, without «otne aa»iatance from within, tlie eubjugatioo of the coun- try wa« bfyond th«ir nn-ana. They dettrmined, tbereforf. to limit their exeriioin to thrco ohjectn — to retain their hold upon Amb> ratburn; ; to re- take the igland of MichilimackinHC, Ro important to their trade on Lakes Erie und Michigan ; and to capture and destroy Kingston. With u view to faciliiatu the aucomplit-hmeut of these purposep, they considered it necessary to make a feint on the Niugura territory, and to threaten Montreal ; whiuli they did afver a fashion, and with bucIi result?, aa it shull be our bugiuesa presently to describe. In the Amherslburg district no hostilities occurred. The Am-jri- cuna ri-n-.ained in quiet posscsoion, without uny attempt on the part of the Kiigll^h to disturb them. It was not 80 on Isle Michilimackinac. In spite of the enemy's superiority on both lakes, Co soldiers and 2.') Ecomen, with a supply of provisions and ammunition, were conveyed from Toronto to Lake Siraeoe, and from Lake Simcoe to Nottawussaga Creek, on Lake Huron. Thence they crossed in open boatn. After a voyage of twenty- five days, they reached the island on the 18tb of May ; and on the 4tb of August 900 American troops from Detroit arrived, to accept, aa was imagined, the surrender of the garrieoj. But the garriaon, instead of laying down its arms, attacked and defeated the invading force, and followed the fu- gitives 80 sharply, that they boarded a couple of scboonera before the ancbois could be raised, and took them. Meanwhile, on the Niagara fron- tier, two brigades of American troops crossed from BuS'alo and Black Eock, and landed, the one about a mile above, the other about the same distance below. Fort Erie. To ihe extreme astoaishwent of all concerned, the fort made no de- fence, though it had been suffi- ciently provided to hold out till the force allotted for the defence of the district should have time to «s- B2()() men, with iieven iinns ; tbft Americans showed bttween 7000 and 8000, and were greatly »-u|MTior in artillery. The loi^s was >retly equal OD both side^, though leaviest on that of the victors, who lad 876 (itTlcers and men placed liort de eomhil, as agaiuHt H.Vli ou tlie part of the vanquislied. It was evident, moreover, from the bold- ness of their advance, and tty the resolute manner in which tb«y met the charge of the Knglinh, that the AmcricuiiM were beginning to as- sume the character of ftood troops. And this was agaia evinced on two 8ul)sb, and to alarm them for Montreal. It ad- vanced as far as Cham plain town on the Chaizie close to the frontier, and was opposed on the lelt by the British garrison of Isle aux Noix, by a fortified mill on the Lucolle river in the centre, and by a strong picket on the Burtouville road on the right. On the 12tb of March the enemy endeavored to take tlie mill, but without success, sacrificing l.o4 olTicers and men, while the loss of the English did not exceed G4. Satisfied with this demonstration, the Americans moved ott' from the Montreal frontier towards Sacketts Harbour. They left garrisons at Plattsimrg, Burlington, and Ver- nes — three posts in which a flotil- la was constructed for the delcnce 248 ITie Drfence of Canada. [Feb. of Lake Charoplain. Bat partly be- cause vrhat was intended for a feint on Niagara had taken a eerions turn, partly because England, re- lieved from her war with France, was pouring her Peninsular regi ments into Canada, the projected attack on Kingston never took place. On the contrary the garri- son at Kingston began to act on the offensive. On the 4th of May, 1000 soldiers, supported by 200 seamen, took ship, and landed on the Gib, under the guns of Oswego. The place was stormed and taken, and such stores as had been col- lected there were destroyed. But the American loss in this respeqt was not heavy, for they had very prudently formed their principal magazine on Lake Oneida. The expedition cannot be said, however, to have been entirely abortive, be- cause it contributed to divert the attention of the enemy from mea- sures of offence to those of defence merely. But, in truth, the tide was by this time turning strong in favour of Canada, which, with a little more of prudence on the part of her naval, and of hardihood and judgment in her military, com- mander-in-chier, might, and ought to, have come out of the struggle everywhere triumphant. Great exertions had of late been made by both parties to increase their squadrons on Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain. On all the other lake?, Erie, Michigan, and Huron, the Americans had a de- cided superiority ; but on Ontario, the belligerent forces were by thia time equalised, and the enemy natu- rally conceived that the English would be induced, by their supe- rior military efficiency, to strike at the source of the naval strength of America by destroying Sacketts Har- bour. With a view to protect that point, troops were called in from all quart(TP, nnd Lake Champlain was left, as has just been explained, to be defentled by weak garrisons at Plattsburg and other posts. The American squadron on liake Cbam- plaio consisted of one ship, one brig, one sloop, one schooner, and ten gunboat?, carrying among them eighty-six heavy guns, and manned by 988 first • rate seamen. The launching of a new vessel on the 26 (h of August at Isle aux Noix raised the British squadron to one ship, one brig, two sloops, and twelve gunboats. The whole were superior in numbers of cannon to the enemy, for they carried among them 91 ; but their crews were the offscourings both of the Royal Navy and of the transport service, supplemented by French Canadians and soldiers. The uew ship, more- over, the Confiance, was abso- lutely in the builder's hands, and her powder carried in lighters alongside when she quitted the stocks to go into action ; and her commander, the commodore of the little fleet, seems to have been en- tirely wanting in that calm thought which ia even more necessary than courage to direct a great battle either by land or sea. Having despatched one of the brigades, which reached him from the Garonne, to secure Kingston and the Niagara frontier. Sir George Frevost, the commander-in-chief in British North America, moved from the camp which he bad formed near Montreal. He began his march with 11,000 men on the 1st of September, and on the 3d, after driving in the etomy's outposts, took possession of the town of Champlain on the Chaizie. The American general, Macomb, had but a single brigade of regular troops under his orders. With these he fell back to Plattsburg, the heights above which were already surmounted with a few field-works, all of them incapable of a protracted defence. Unfortunately Sir George Prevost had arrived at the opinion that a 'victory by land would serve no purpose, unless the American flotilla should in the first instance be destroyed. He was so far cor- rect, that, though victorious over the troofis encamped at Plattsburg, he would have found it impossible to cross the lake and to advance upon Sacketts Jiarbour, the Ameri- cana retaihing their superiority on 1862] Ihe Defence o) Canada 249 the waters ; but he was entire ,j wrong in assuming that an action on shore would be profitless till the American flotilla was defeated ; and still more mistaken if he conceived that a victory at sea was to any ex- tent necessary in order to insure a victory on shore. Nothing could have prevented him from driving the American general out of his works had he moved up, as he might have done, on the 5tn. But he did not arrive in sight of these works till the 6tb, and then he halted. Re- peated messages were sent after this to Captain Downie, demand- ing when he would be in a condi- tion to advance from lele aux Noix. The enemy's squadron lay about two miles from Plattsburg, in com- munication with their army. Could not Captain Downie hurry his pre- parations, and sweep the American flotilla aside, while the trooptfi, un- der Sir George Prevost, stormed the heights ? Downie suffered himself to be chafed, and hurried his pre- parations. Indeed, he did more : he took advantage of a fair wind on the lltb, and, rushing on with the ConQance, which far outsailed her consorts, engaged the whole American fleet single-handed. The results are well known. One by one, as the British vessels came up, they were disabled, and the com- mand of the lake, which it was an- ticipated they would establish, re- mained moro decidedly than ever with the Americans. Sir George Prevost has been ge- nerally blamed as the sole cause of this disaster. Wo have no inten- tion to become his advocates ; but the truth is, that he was the cause of it only in part. It is a mistake to assume that the American flotilla could not have engaged the English successfully, bad the British army been in possession of the heights. Not a gun from the heights could reach the anchorage where the flo- tilla lay. The success of Sir George Prevost could therefore have bad no influence, except a moral influ- ence, favourable to Captain Downie. But Captain Downie's defeat cn- VOL. xci. deniably frustrated the whole plan of the campaign. For the snke of eflect, &ir George ought, even on the lltb, to have stormed the enemy's works; for the sake of eflect, he ought to have achieved that easy conquest long before the sails of the British squadron became visible in the distance; but he could have done no more. He managed, however, to tarnish the honour of troops which had never till then sufl^ered disgrace. He btopped his columns on the 11th when moving to the attack, broke up his position before the enemy, and retreated harassed by their riflemen through the woods. No more was attempted that year. The victors of the Peninsula, out of humour with their commander, went into quarters at Isle aux Noix, Chambly, and Laprairie, and be- fore an opportunity could be af- forded them of wiping off their shame, prelimioaries of peace were signed between Great Britain and America. It will be seen from this plain statempi.t of facts, that the war into which she ungenerously en- tered in 1812 brought to America neither profit nor honour. In al- most all the encounters which oc- curred between her troops and those of England on the Canadian frontiers, the Americans were beat- en. . They established themselves, no doubt, in 1813, in the Amherst- burg district, and kept it till the end of the war ; but to counter- balance this, they lost Fort Niagara and the ieland of Michilimackinac, which were not given op till hosti- lities ceased. More curious still, as sliowing how weary they had become of the contest, not one of the wrongs complained of as the cause of the quarrel was so much as taken into consideration when the quarrel ended. The claims of neutrals to free navigation, immu- nity from search at sea, the right of affording an asylum to deserters — these points were all left pre- cisely where they stood when the war began. Had it not been, in- 17 'I I 1^ I- 250 Vie De/niee of Canada. [Feb. deed, for Sir George Prevosi's blun- dering, and Ihe disastrous issues of the New Orleans expedition, the Americans themselves mast have been forced to acknowledge that a war with England is the least hopeful game that the United States can play. The defeat at New Oi- leana was indeed a fair defeat: wa owe it to the rash impetuoeity of Sir Edward Fakenham, who died like a gallant soldier in the fleld ; and to the incapacity of Sir John Keane, who lived many years afterwards, and contrived to flounder into a peerage. But Sir George Prevpst's mishap was an outrage on Briti.sh honour, as uncalled for as ever be- fell. Had he attacked Plattsburg on the Gth or 7th, there is no tell- ing what the eSect might have been ; and having failed to do tbi!>, at least he ought to have carried it on the lltb. His refusal to uo so, und still more bis precipitate re- treat, probably saved a few hun- dred lives at the time, but it sacri- ficed, what would have been cheaply purchased at the expense of five thousand lives, the halo of victory which up to that moment had Bur- rounded the Eoglisb cofours, and amid the full radiance of which it was especially desirable that this xVmerican war should end. Ou the other hand, there is no denying that, in the naval struggle for the command of the lakes, the Au.ericana bad the advantage throughout. England could make no head against them on Lakes Erie and Huron. On Lake Cham- plain she suffered a defeat ; and on Ontario, no more can be said than that by great exertion she managed to bring up Iter own strength at last to a level with that of the enemy, lliis is not to be wondered at. The Canadian shores of the U pper Lakes were very thinly inhabited half a century ago. Even the Amherstburg district between Lake Erie and Lake Iluron, had scarcely begun to bo cleared ; and to establish navy-yarda whero there are neither towns nor road?, nor the means of fetiing workmen, is simply impossible. Bo likewise in regard to Lake Ontario : there was no position along its northern shore, not even Kingston, wbi>. could compare balf a century ago in point of convenience with Sac- ketts Harbour. With respect to Lake Ohamplain, it was throughout an American lake, and afforded faci- lities for building and equipping fleets which were denied to a power possessing but a single harbour, that of Isle aux Noix, at its extre- mity. Besides, the Americans bad everything on the spot — timber, iron, artificers, gun?, stores — the latter secured on Lake Oneida, whence they could easily be trans- ported to other lakes aa required ; wlieress England, when she took seriously to ship -building, was obliged to send out all, even the frames of the vessels themselves, piecemeal from Europe. The mar- vel, therefore, is, not that the United States sbould have achieved an ascendancy on these inland waters, but that the ascendancy should have been so far from decided, and that so little should have been made of it in promoting the great objects of the war. Canada was never conquered, nor in any danger of being conquered. How would the case stand now? How would it have stood had the Federal Gov- ernment refused to do jiistice in the matter of the Trent ? Between Decrmber 1814, when the prelimioarir J of peace were signed at Ghent, and December IbCl, when the ultimatum of the British Government reached Wash- ington, forty-seven years had run their course. During that extend- ed interval, the friendly relations of ^reat Britain with the United States, though more than once en- dangered, were never absolutely in- terrupted. We permitted ourselves to be wronged on the boundary question, and took no notice of the deceit practised upon us when it was discovered. We forbore from demanding redress for the outrages of American sympathisers in 18^; and even the gross violation of law and right, in the seizure of Isle St. Juan, we refrained from chaslising. from 1862] The Defence of Canada. 251 This continaed forbecrance on onr part was probably a mistake, bat it sufficed in the meanwhile to keep the peace ; and peace brought im> mense physical aavantages, both to Oanada and the United States. With respect to Canada, there is now a belt on both sides of the St. Lawrence, and along the shores of the lakes, which has long ceased, to the extent of 1000 miles, to be the wilderness which it. was in 1812. The forest has largely disappeared from the Amherstbnrg territory. The Niagara district exhibits an extensive breadth of cnltivatioa ; and Toronto, though it has ceased to be the capital of a province, tioarishes. Kingston likewise has become a respectable town, and can boast of an excellent harbour. Aa to Lower Canada, crowds of emi- grants, both from Great Britain and Ireland, have poured into it; till now, the British settlers as far exceed the French habitants in number as they surpass them in industry and strength of character. The population of Montreal alone, chiefly English and Irish, has grown to 100,000 ; and that of both Ca- nadaa reaches well nigh to 3,000,000. Neither has the prosecution of use- ful public works been neglected. In order to surmuunt the difficul- ties in navigation presented by the St. Lawrence, various canals have been dug. The first, as we pro- ceed upwards from Qaebec, passes through the soathern extremity of the island of Montreal, and is about two miles in length. It carries vessels clear of the rapids of La Chine, and brings them out again into the quiet waters of the river above these rapids. The next is much longer, and has unfortunate- ly been cot on the right or American bank of the river, at a distance of less than fifteen miles from the frontier. It clears the cascades and the Cidars, and, extending from Beauharnais to Hungry Bay, is called the Beanharnaia Canal. A third, the Cornwall Canal, stretches fntm Cornwall to Dickenson's Land- ing, and avoids, thereby the Long Sault. Beyond this are short de- tached canal;*, at -Farrand's Point, the Platte, Iroquois, and the Ga- lopa Rapids. After these the navi- gation is safe through the Thousand Islands into Lake Ontario, with capacity enough to float anything which shall not exceed 136 feet in length, 44 in beam, and 9 feet draught. Now, though works like these tend greatly to develop the resources of the districts through which they pass, and to facilitate the commerce of the Far West with Canada and with Europe, we must not, when considering the military position of Canada itself, count too much upon them. It has been as- sumed, and doubtless correctly, that they present a channel through which gun - bi 2ts, and even small- class frigates, might pass. Indeed, we have heard it gravely argued, that from this time forth no spe- cial preparation will be necessary in order to insure to England the command of the lakes ; because, in the event of war, her squadrons which blockade the American coasts can detach force enough to sweep from these inland waters every hos- tile pennant. But they who reason thus, forget that no dependence can be placed upon a series of canals, any one of which runs within fifteen miles of an enemy's frontier. A few bags of gun- powder judiciously applied h a dark night, a few hours' work with pick and spade by men who have won a brief command of the situation by guile or violence, would break up the whole channel. Nor can we derive much comfort from turning our eyes towards the Rideau Canal, much as it was at one time counted upon. It forms a safe and ready communication between King- Guoa ! id the town of Ottawa; out vessels seeking to ascend from Mon- treal to Ottawa must follow the course of the Ottawa river, which, besides being both circuitous and rapid, is here and there beset by shallows, such as the merchant steamers plying between the Atlan- tic and Lake Ontario find it im- possible, for the most part, to sur- mount. Indeed, it was this defect in i i ■ t i i\' 1 1 mmseii. 252 The Dtfence qf Canada. [Feb. ff vtbe Ridean Canalr renderiDg it ooin> paratively useless for parposes of trade, which led to the coDStruciion of the canals jast enumerated. It would never do, therefore, to trust to navigation of this sort, assuming the command of the lakes tc be as important now to the defence of Canada as it was half a century ago. In like manner the railways which have been constructed on the same principle as the canals will scarcely suffice, in Lower Canada, to multiply our military resources by lacilitat- ing the movement of troops. The Grand Trunk, which runs all the way from Riviere du Loups tc Lake Huron, is carried as far as Montreal on the right bank of the St. Law- rence, never ke^, ^ng farther than sixty, and approaching where it is nearest withm ten miles of the frontier. How are you to defend a line thus exposed, throughout an extent, as the bird flies, of 250 miles — and how coold you, being unable to defend, venture to make use of it, after hostilities began, for the transport of troops and stores from the coast to the interior ? Again, the effect of the Ashburton Treaty lias been to render a thou- sand times more difficult than it ought to be military communica- tion between Canada and the mother country, and between one portion of British America and an- other. From the month of Decem- ber, when the navigation of the St. Lawrence closes, till the month of May, when it opens again, the only ports in North America accessible to English men-of-war, and trans- ports, are Halifax in Nova Scotia, and St. John in New Brunswick. Now, such is the position of these ports relatively to Quebec, that though, as the bird flies, the nearest of them is within 300 miles of that city, you could net construct ia railroad between them, which would be at all safe, except on a detour of upwards of COO miles ; and even thien you must arrive at last on e point where your line shall con- nect itself with the Grand Trunk, and thus be brought within ten miles of the frontier. This never ought to have been, and never would have been, had not Sir Robert Peel sent to negotiate with our slippery cousins a nobleman, dis- posed, if not by personal interests, without doubt by timidity, to sacri- fice everything in the future to pre- sent peace. The State of Maine, of which the north boundary was marked on the map accepted by Franklin in 1785 at the 44th degree olf latitude, was stretched down in a tongue by Lord Ashburton to the 45th degree, and the State now in- terposes for sixty geographical miles between two portions of British territory, wellnigh isolating both. Meanwhile the United States, free from all apprehension of ag- gressive war on our parts, have gone on spreading cultivation north- wards, and connecting by many lines of rail their great commercial towns with Lakes Erie and Ontario, and with the Canadian frontier. They have lines from Portland, Boston, Rhode Island, London, and New York — all of which join the Canadian Grand Trunk, or, to speak more correctly, are joined by it at a place called Mooer, about three miles within their own frontier. Tbey have a line of their own which communicates with these, skirting the frontier as far as Og- densburg, and whibh at Champlain is not more than 30 miles distant from Montreal. And more vexa- tious still, they have got possession, by "•'irtue of the Ashburton Treaty, of the fort at Rouse's Point, which we built as on our own territory, be- fore railways existed, in order to command the approaches to Mon- treal by Lake Champlain. It will be seen that their facilities of attack, in the event of a new war, are by these means greatly increased since 1814, for any number of troops may be moved by these various lines ; and so long as the lines con- tinue open, an army operating in front of them can be supplied as well and almost as speedily from Boston and New \ 'rk as from magazines formed, iw of old, at Plattsburg and Oawe^go. We confess that the prospect of 1862.] Ike Defence of Canada, 253 war in December last did not seri- ously alarm us. Men enough, we doubt not, the Americana could have got together. Indeed, there was a rumour in circulation, to which, however, we gave little cre- dence, that they had collected as many aa 20,000 close to the frontier. But to collect men and to move them are two ditferent things, and to feed and provide for them, after they are fairly launched into a cam- paign, is a third matter, which inex- perienced persons will find it easier to talk about than to settle. Still, if the Federals should by chance suc- ceed, either in conquering the Con- federates or in separating from them amicably, then w« have every rea- son to expect that the Washington Cabinet will find it necessary to seek employment for its enormous army somewhere away from home. Nor is it difficult, if we may judge from the tone of the American news- papers, to guess in what direction General M'Lellan and his troops will be turned. Assume then, that a new quarrel is likely to be fastened upon England, and that the long - cherished idea of annexing Canada is resumed. How is it pro- bable that the attack will be made, and by what means may we, while time and opportunity are afforded, best provide against the emergency ? We take it for granted that the Federal Government will for many reasons direct against Canada the largest amount of its disposable force which it can command. Less than 200,000 men would not suQice for so grave an undertaking ; and if there really be, when hostilities begin, half a million under arms, there is no reason why 300,000 should not enter on the campaign.*^ The probabilities are likewise, that as far as the altered condition of both countries may allow, the as- sailants will advance by the same lines as in 1813. They will push forward three, perhaps four colunins, one from Washington to Detroit, at the top of Lake Erie; another from New York to Buffalo, at the bottom of the same lake ; possibly a third to Sacketts Harbour, with a view to the reduction of Kingston ; and a fourth from Boston to Rouse's Point, at the bottom of Lake Ghamplain. This last we may safely put down at not less than 100,000 men, while the other three may number 25,000 respectively. Previously to all this, strenuous exertions will have been made to build and launch cuch a number of war vessels as shall give them the command of Lake Ontario — an object which, unless we be be- forehand with them, there is no- thing to prevent them from effect- ing. Grant all this to be done, and well done, what follows? While Amherstburg and Niagara are both invaded, and Kingston invested, the larger army at Rouse's Point sepa- rates into two masses, one of which will threaten, and, if the opportun- ity serve, attack Montreal in front ; while the other crosses the St. Law- rence opposite to Cornwall, and takes the city in reverse. We assume that the officer who shall direct these operations has acquired in his contests with the Confederates some knowledge of the art of war. He will have learned, for example, that it is necessary, ia conducting offensive operations, to keep open the communications of his own army with its rear, and having 25,000 men to spare, he will doubtless employ them on this ser- vice. They will watch No /a Scotia and New Brunswick from their own portion of the valley of St. John, and be ready, as occasion shall arise, either to repel an aggressive move- ment, or to make one. All this may not come to pass, nor even a portion of it, but a 1 is undoubtedly upon the cards. What is Eoglani required to do in anticipation of it 7 There may be both justice and wisdom in the theory, that colonies, !■=! i * It will be seen that we look at this matter from a purely American point of view. That tJie Federal States will have 600,000 men, or anythinf? like that force, to draw on when their present troubles cease, we entirely disbelieve. But it is best to prepare for the worst, and the measures which we recommend are just aa necessary against 100,000 invaders as against •^00,00a 294 The Defence of Canada. [Feb. as eooEi as they acquire the rights of Eelf - governnient, should be called apoD to provide for their own de- fence in war. Like other general rules, however, this adraits of ex- ceptions, and the case of British North Anaerica must to a certain extent be regarded as exceptional. Perhaps Eogland should not be taxed to keep soldiers continually at the Cfipe of Good Hope, in the Australasiun (xroup, or even in the "West India Islands. Every one of these colonies is rich enough to maintain such armed force as it re- quires in time of peace, because they are all sufficiently guarded by dis- tance, or by the naval supremacy of the mother country, from the sud- den attacks of regular armies. But British North America is ditFer- ently circumstanced. It stands face to tace with a power which, in the appliances of modern science and in the courage and endurance of its people, ia a match for the most military of European nations. An American army, when it first takes the field, may be little better than a rabble ; but give it the experience of a year ur two, and it becomes able to hold its own against the best troops in the world. So our people found half a century ago, and so, if the storm which we are now contemplating do not burst till 18G3, our people may find again. Under these circumstances, it ap- pears to us that the Imperial Gov- ernment is bound to garrison British North America in time of peace, and to render it all the support which can be spared when war arises. The Imperial Government may likewise, in our opinion, be expected to share in the expense of constructing such permanent works as prudence may suggest, and for this reason, that there are ten chances to one that war with the Federal States, when it occurs, will arise not out of colonial but out of Imperial questions. On the other hand, British North America can- not expect — we are sure that she does not expect — to be defended al- together by the mother country. She must oat of her own resources sup- plement the regular garrison, which the mother country (supplies, wHh a numerous, stout, and well • disoiplin- ' ed militia. She has all the machi- nery ready, though for lack of use it has got out of gear : and she must restore it to working order, no matter what inconvenience the effort may occasion. We believe that a militia in Canada alone could be raised to the amount of 150,000 men, without any serious drain upon the industry of the country. Of this mass, 50,000 might easily be called out at a time, and kept under arms for three months. At the end of three months a second batch, to the like extent, should take their places, and thus in the course of a single summer we should be able to show a force of 100,000 disciplined soldiers in case of need. In winter all might drill, as our own Volunteers drill at home, at odd hourd, in halls and under shods, by Equads and companies. With 150,000 provin- cials thus prepared, and J 0,000 or 15,000 British troops behind them, Canada might safely, according to our view of the subject, defy the world in arms. The same rule which we apply to Canada we should apply to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is not exacting too much from these provinces to require that they shall each supply 10,000 or 15,000 efiec- tive militia, which, supported by 5000 regular troops, will render them competent to play their parts in any game to which they may be called. The American colonies will na- turally look to the mother country for arras and stores. We do not think that they ought to accept these things as free gifts. They are rich enough to purchase their own mate- riel, as well as to clothe, pay, and feed their own troops when em- bodied. But if unable to bear the heavy expense of a first equipment, it seems to ua that they cannot scruple to share it with the mother country, or at all events to take upon themselves the burden of keeping up the stock when it has once been supplied. In like man- 1862.] The Defence of Canada. 255 ner they will be expected, if not to defray, certainly to share the cost of all such public works as shall serve the double purpose of commercial and military communication. The railway from Quebec to Montreal, for example, is oo the "vrong side of the river. In time of peace it may be convenient enough ; in the event of war it would become useless. If a second line cu the left bank be considered indispensable, the Cana- dian Governments should be requir- ed to provide a fair proportion of the funds necessary to make it. And still more, should competent autho- rities arrive at the conclusion that England's readiest mode of obtain- ing and keeping command of the lakes is to construct a new canal, which, embracing and enlarging the first of those now in use, shall pass thence into the Ottawa Canal, and from the Ottawa Canal to Kingston harbour, then must Canada, as well as the motlicr country, be taxed for the completion of it, though [)03si- bly the heavier portion of the expense may fall upon England. Such a work, executed sufficiently in rear of the St. Lawrence to prevent the possi- bility of molestation from the other side, would for all military as well as commercial purposes throw the inland waters of America and the Atlantic into one. It would then be eoay for Great Britain to crowd into Lake Ontario such a fleet as must render competition on the part of the United States hopeless. For, in spite of all their skill, the Americans could never build as fast as our gunboats and frigates could ascend from the seaboard, while the door would always be open to them to return for the blockade of the enemy's coasts, as soon as they should have destroyed the enemy's harbours and captured their flotilla ^on the lakes. It is obvious that the sort of canal of which we are now speaking, must be rendered more capacious in every respect than the most convenient of those now in use ; though for an unrea- sonable depth there can be no need, because stores and guns can be floated on rafls or barges in rear of the larger frigates when they come in- to smooth water. It has been suggested to add to these a line of railway, which shall connect Halifax and St. John with Quebec. For reasons elsewhere as- signed, we consider this project as of doubtful value. Not that we are disposed to make much of the physical obstacles preserited else- where than through the valley of the St. John by the face of the country in New Brunswick. Of whatever nature these may be, skill, industry, and capital can overcome them ; but your railway, when con- structed, must either end at Riviere du Loups, whence it will run for thirty miles within ten miles of the frontier, or it will carry you to some point lower down the St. Lawrence, where the river is wide, and in win- ter generally impassable. Moreover, in reaching the opposite bank, you will tind no railway to take yon up, but the prospect of a march of two hundred miles over a country inter- sected with torrents, and otherwise difficult. On the whole, we incline to think that, till our line of frontier is rectified, the construction of a railway between the St. John and the St. Lawrence would, so far as military operations are concerned, be )ney thrown away. We must be content, therefore, for a while, to consider New Brunswick and N^-va Scotia as a flanking bastion or rave- lin thrown out from Canada, which, though it be cut off' from ready com- munication with the body of the place, is not therefore useless. We come now to another point, which is equally worthy of atten- tion. Should any new fortiQcations be thrown up in Canria? and if thrown up, where shall we place them? We confess ourselves little friendly to a system of defence which depends to any great extent upon fortified places. Here and there, as in the Austrian Quadrila- teral, these may be of the utmost importance; but a country like Ca- nada will never be defended at all, unless it be defended by armies in the field. Indeed, the atteini)t to cover the frontier, or even the most !■! M!l 256 Tiie Defenct of Canada. [Feb. exposed points in it, by forts, or other enclosed worlis, must lead only to discomfitnre. You could not garrison a dozen or two of such places except by weakening too much your field force, while each, as the enemy passed it by, would be lost to yen. The best army in the world, however, if it is to act in separate corps, and over an extend- ed area, requires here and there a place d'armes, round which its levies may gather, and on which, in case of disaster, its fragments may retire. This rule, which holds good everywhere, is especially ap- plicable to the state of a country with a frontier so extensive and ex- posed as that of Canada. If it be the use of history to read the future in the past, then the plan of campaign which we sketched out for the Americans in 1863 is that which they will probably fol- low. Canada will be invaded again, as she has been repeatedly invaded before, by Amherstburg, Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal : we must provide, therefore, for every possible contingency in each of these direc- tions. Possibly Quebec itself may be threatened, even at the com- mencement of the war ; but we certainly do not consider the con- tingency probable. For though it be indisputable that the power which holds Quebec holds the gate of Canada against all comers, no Federal leader, even if he could command the passage of the river, would throw himself in these days upon Quebec, till he should have barred out the population of Canada West from coming to its relief. For our present purpose, therefore, it will suffice to look to the old lines of attack, and see if we can render them safe to ourselves and dilBcult of emprise to the enemy. It may well appear at first sight impossible to provide effectually for the defence of Montreal. We admit the difficulty of the scheme, but deny its impossibility. Montreal is too extensive, and lies too much in a hollow, to be enclosed within walls and ditches ; but you may render the approaches to it ex- tremely ditfioult by detached works judiciously placed, especially by the construction of a strong tete-de-pont on the right bank of the river, and by planting on the hill which over- looks the town on the left a redoubt or citadel. But you must do more than tbi9. On the first tidings of war, an attempt must be mode to take possession of the fort at House's roint. The occupation of this, and of the forts at lale aux Noix, St. John, and Cbambly, would block the way long enough to try the patience of the assailants ; and when these places fall, if fall they must, you have still your tetede- pont to maintain, with the broad and rapid St. Lawrence behind it. It is possible that, even by these means, you will n(»t be able to save Montreal from bombardment ; but, assuming your military canal to have been completed, or that yon have ships enough on Lake Ontario to hinder the descent of bateaux from Sackett's Harbour, we really do not see bow the enenay are to cross the St. Lawrence in the face of a few batteries judiciously plant- ed. Everything will of course de- pend upon vour power to prevent the laying of a bridge. Should the canals be still where they now are, and Lake Ontario in the enemy's possession, Montreal can hardly be saved, unless you be in force enough to fight a genera! action, and defeat the enemy under its walls. AVith respect again to Kingston, as the approaches to the harbour are already fortified, nothing more seems necessary than to strengthen the existing works, and, perhaps, to enlarge them. We are aware of the obstacles presented to this by the surrender, some time ago, of all crown lands to the local govern- ment, and by the encroachments subsequently made upon the line r fire by private dwellings. But* i) it be considered too expensive to rvmove these dwellings, their owners must be prepared, on an emergency, to destroy them; while fresh bat- teries are erected wherever their action seems to be required. Be- yond this, however, it seems un- 1862. J Tlie Defence of Canada. m eir 10- necessary to go. Kingeton cannot he attacked, except by water, till Upper Canada eball have fallen ; and if yon so distribute its defences us to render a landing difiicult and dangerous, you have done all in this quarter which circnmstaneeB admit of. The case is different both in Amherstburg and Niagara. There such places as Sandwich and Fort Dalhousie would simply be in the way. They might tempt a general to throw a few men into thera whom he would certainly lose. But in the rear both of Amherst- burg and the Niagara there are positions which, if taken up and ren- dered as strong as the skill of man can make them, would render the subjuga- tion of these districtc, if not impossi- ble, at all events very tedious and very difficult Looking first to the Amherstburg territory, we find that the only re- treat left open to Colonel Proctor in the last war was up the valley of the Thames. The same line would certainly be chosen now by an army worsted on the frontier ; for the Grand Trunk BHilway runs from Amherstburg to London, and from London by Hamilton to Tor- onto and Kingston. London itself thus becomes an important strategi- cal point, being at once sufficiently removed from the border to serve as a place of muster for the militia of the district, and sufficiently near to afford security to the corps which might have engaged and been over- come by an invading army in Essex county. It is important, likewise, as holding the key to the only door of rapid communication between the extreme west of what may be called the settled portions of Canada and the Atlantic. It appears to us, therefore, that the Imperial Oovern- ment will do well to take possession of as much land in this quarter as may enable our engineers to construct, without delay, an intrenched ramp capable of being defended by 5000 men. With such a camp interpos- ing between them and a march down the country, it is not probable that the American column, even if suc- cessful in the first instance, will ever venture more than a few miles from its place of landing. For the same reasons, and because the material facilities of the ground are even more striking, we would suggest the construction of a second intrenched camp of similar dimen- sions on Burlington Heights. These heights, it will be remembered, con- stituted the point iV appui on which, during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, the troops told off for the protection of the Niagara district always rallied after some temporary reverse. The town of Hamilton is now connected with them, and they command both its harbour, which is good, and the Grand Trunk Railway. Five thousand men thrown into an intrenched camp in this position would hold at bay any number of invaders, till time should have been afforded to call out the whole strength of the province. We have alluded elsewhere to the possibility of an attempt by coxip- de-main on Quebec. Not that we consider such an occurrence at ail likely to happen. An American general would scarcely venture, with New Brunswick on his flank, to march by the uncleared portions of Maine, only that he ir.ght fight bis way up to a broad river, through a district so well peopled and so war- like as St. Francis. But in war even possibilities must be guarded against. Quebec is strong already ; its strength will be increased by surrounding the detached towers which now crown the Heights of Abraham with solid earthworks ; and by looking to that exposed corner of the lower town, by which, during the war of the Revolution, Arnold had wellnigh entered. This being done, and care taken to have the magazines and arsenals well filled, we need not entertain the smallest ap- prehension for Quebec ; and so long as Quebec remains in possession of Bri- tish troops, the permanent conquest of Canada by the Americans will remain to be effected. Having thus provided points at which the local militia may collect, and places of strength to which corps, worsted in a first encounter^ , ! M I J •mm 258 Ths D^ence of Canada. [Feb. may retire, the military ADthorities OD the eput mast select BOioe posi- tion where the grand army, which they propose to employ in active operations shall assemble. Such a position ought to be central, ho that support may be conveniently sent from it to either flank, without, however, too much weakening the force which is kept in hand, to act wherever the enemy may show him- self in greatest strength. It is not for us to indicate where the posi- tion should be. Enough is done when we point out that it ought not to be tuo distant either from Montreal or from Quebec, and that it should be chosen with a special eye to the railways, canals, roads, and other lines of communication which, when manoeuvring begins, can be made available. This plan of ours may, perhaps, be objected to as implying the abfinduament of all those valuable counties which lie on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, and, still more, of the Grand Trunk Railway between Quebec and Montreal. Why not en- deavour, in the first instance, to re- tain your hold upon these counties? and if that be impossible, why give up the railway without a struggle ? Our answer is, that it would be im- prudent at the opening of a cam- paign to commit a young army to a general action with such a river as the St. Lawrence in its rear ; and that, in order to nurse such an army, and render it eflfective, you must leave many outlying provinces to take care of themselves. With re- to the Grand Trunk has elsewhere been with an enterprising enemy in our front, it becomes use- less to us as soon us hostilities begin. A chain, be its length what it may, is only as strong as its weakest link ; and a railway which runs for thirty miles within ten. miles of a hostile frontier, can scarcely be made use of in war for the conveyance of troops. As to patrolling these thirty miles, either on foot or by detached cars, that expedient could serve no possible purpose. The first effort made by the enemy will be to pos- spect, again, Railway, it shown that. sesa themselves of the line, and destroy it ; and unless you are prepared to Hupport your patrols with an army, the patrols can offer no resistance which shall bo effectual against supe- rior numbers. But though we may withdraw our divisions for a time from the dia- trictH to the South of the St. Law- rence, it does not therefoia follow that they are abandoned. Each county baa its own local militia — these will all turn out ; and bhould the enemy be so ill advised as to weaken himself in order to put them down, they will show good fight for their hearths and homes against his detachments. But this is not all. The armies of New Brunswick and of Nova Scotia will not be idle. Leaving a sufficient number, say 2000 regular troops and 8000 or 10,000 militia, to guard the provinces, the remainder will act upon the enemy's communica- tions, eluding or fighting the corps of observation which watches them, and breaking up every line of rail to which they can gain access. If BuccesBful here, ouccess will soon attend the British arms elsewhere. The heavy columns in front of Mont- real will find it necessary to retire. The British army will cross the St, Lawrence in pursuit, and the camp:iiga is just as likely to end by establishing a new frontier for Canada, with Port- land on one fiank, and -Lake Ontario on the other, as by leaving the enemy in permanent possession of a mile of Canadian territory. We give these speculations for what they are worth. The results of a war so waged must, of course, depend upon the military genius of the leaders on either side, and the bravery of the troops. But assum- ing these to be equal, we think the odds are in favour of our own coun- trymen. Indeed, if the proposed canal be completed in time, from the sea- board to Lake Ontario, and the flying corps, which is to harass the Ameri- can coasts, do its duty, the war with England of 1863 will probably teach the Federals a lesson which they are not likely to forget for many years afterwards. -i:i^Vi-;:iimamMM[^