IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. V 1.0 I.I JriM IIM I ^ IIM 1^ I4£ 12.0 11:25 i 1.4 1.8 1.6 V <^ /a ^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 4% .^•v v> ^ c.\ # ^ ,V Mp^ C/a CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibllographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. D D D D Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagde Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurde et/ou pelliculde Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque □ Coloured maps/ Cartes gdographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ I — I Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) □ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur D D D D Bound with other material/ Relid avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ Lareliure serrde peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intdrieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutdes lors d'une restauration apparaisserit dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont pas dt6 filmdes. Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppldmentaires; L'Institut a microfilmd le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a dt6 possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la mdthode normale de filmage sont indiquds ci-dessous. □ Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur n n D D Pages damaged/ Pages endommagdes Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurdes et/ou pelliculdes Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages d^colordes, tachetSes ou piqu^es Pages detached/ Pages d6tach6es Showthrough/ Transparence I I Quality of print varies/ Quality indgale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du materiel supplementaire Tl to Tf P< of fil Oi be th sit ot fir si( or Th sh Til wl Mi dif en bei rig rec mc Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuiilet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6x6 filmdes 6 nouveau de fa^on d obtenir la meilleure irr.age possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmd au taux de reduction indiqud ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X SOX V 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: Library of the Public Archives of Canada The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol —^(meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: L'exemplaire filmd fut reproduit grdce d la g6n6rosit6 de: La bibliothdque des Archives publiques du Canada Les images suivantes ont 6x6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettet6 de l'exemplaire film6, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimde sont film^s en commen^ant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon lis uas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont film6s an commenpant par la premidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la dernidre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole — ►signifie "A SUIVRE ", le symbole V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, plancheit, tableaux, etc., peuvent §tre filmds d des taux de reduction diff6rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, il est filmd A partir de Tangle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 CANADA PUBLIC ARCHIVES ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES i f '.■ l.^ CANDID REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT (As PUBLISHED BY Authority) O 1' T H E GENERAL-OFFICERS, Appointed by His Majesty's Warrant of the Firft of November la(t, to enquire into the Causes of the Failure of the late Expedi- tion to the Coafts of France. In a Letter to a Friend In the Country. Non^ ft qn'ul turh'ula Roma Elevt't^ aaedas^ examenve hnprobum in ilia, Cajliges trutina. PfiRs. The SECOND EDITION. LONDON: Printed for S. Hooper and A. Morley at Gay's- Head, near lieaufort-Buildings in the Strand, mdcclviii. v: . . •"'^0%. . v^ C^N 1 c J '/ o' ..xjN^iiMtai* 1 1 [ 3 ] CANDID REFLECTIONS ON THE Report of the General Officers. ■4 :S S I R, AFTER your having all along ex- prefled fo great a curiolity for know- ing what paded here, with rcfpedl to the confequences of the failure of our expe- dition, I cannot be furprifcd that, on re- ceiving the Enquiry thereon, publilhed by authority, you fliould defire to have fome further explanations, to clear up what may be ftill left obfcure, or whereon to ground your conjeftures of any ulterior proce- dure therein. Willing as I am to oblige, and at the fame time not to deceive you, I can only aflure you, that you may de- pend on nothing but the moll exadt truth in any communication of mine, fo far as I B - am : ,^M^flSiStid»SBli»>Utilamiim.^mll^im■■' T 4 1 itxn capable of attain' ng or comprehending *it. No (\iiniocd of i'a.0: or inference will you find, that may be a reproach to my pro- teflion of candor, however it may be one to my judgment or information ; for neither of which I can pretend to anfwer. 1 need not tell you with what eagcrnefa and fatisfa(!:iion the pubhc received his ma- jefly's mofb gracious declaration of his in- tentions, that a fliithful enquiry ihould be made into the caufes of a failure of aa expedition, prepared with fo much oftenta- tion of force, whilft its dellination was kept fo proiounJ a fecret, and on whicli the per- haps ovcr-raifcd expectation of many feemed to reil the very iliue of the war. But though the fpecific place on which the {form was deligned to burfl: was not known, at leall to the pubhc here ; yet it was long enough beforehand pretty clear, from many indications, that whatever it was, it mull lie on the weifern coall: of France, from Calais to Bayonne inclufively. This foreknowledge then, would doubtlefs induce the French to eive orders .^V.r oruardin^, in the bell manner that could be, the whole extent of the threatened country, and each pardcular place of it liable to infult in a ieiicr or greater degree, according to the apprchcnfions reafonable to be rcfpedtively entertained for it, Ta t T 5 ] To fay the truth, Rochcfort, the very place wliich, from its fituation, fccmcd the Icafi: to invite an attack, was confccjuently the mod :ie'j;lcdlcd hy thxC French in their plan of defence, and therefore bid the lair- efl: for fuccefs again fl it, in cafe of its being pra6lical>le to penetrate v/ith a body of troops, fo far as to get before it j whiht the diipcrfion of their forces, Rationed either in the places judged more obvious to infult, or within reach to fuccour them, fhould give our's the fairer play for carrying it by furprize. Confidering however its impor- tance, efpecially in point of its being one of the principal port? v.f equipment, implying in courfe its containing docks, flores, arfe- nals, nnd (hipping, the deftroying of which would be cutting the very fmev/s of their marine-force, which muil make it the more a national objed: for us to attempt j it can- not, reconcileably to common (cnie, be ima- gined they would intirely leave it out of their general plan of defence. They might not indeed do all that would have been done to put it into a condition of not fearing an infult, if they had feared one ; but they un- doubtedly made fomc difpofitions againft a contingency, which if net probable, was not however impoflible J or, no doubt, the great wifdom of nur government would not have pitch.ed upon it for its object. Befidcs, jMusttmittsetnintmmiMiisimi^Mmi t 6 ] Befides, that in all enterprlzes, efpccially meant for bold ones, all the objedUons, which it is fo right to weigh and eonfider, are not, for all that, to be flighted, on fuffi- cient motives to out-balance them ; amongft which not the Icail is that axiom of marshal Turenne's in war, That one is not always to fuppofe an enemy will do all that he might do. The point is to weigh relblutions ma- turely ; but when taken, to execute them with conflancy and intrepidity. Whether then the expedition, now under confidera- tion, was dctedtive in the projei^tion or in the execution, ftood the matter of a fair enquiry. But as the decifion on the execution, by fuch an enquiry, naturally and ultimately in- cludes the judgment to be formed on the projection of the enterprize, the fliilure of it was not without propriety, made by his majcfly's orders, fpecilically the objedl of examination. But before I take notice to you of the re- port of the commiflioners on that enquiry, I fliall obferve to you the ftate of the public opinion on the difgraceful return of fo pow- erful an armament, without effecfting any thing anfwerable to the hopes or defigns of its outfct. The greater part of the nation, with the befl: of meanings to its honour and interefl, in the heat of its refentment for difappointed expeda- I Hi :ially [ions, fider, fuffi- mgfh nia- [ 7 ] cxpccflatlons, took the rcatllcft nbjedts to vent It en, tlic conimai'dcrr. on this luiiuc- ccfbful expedition. Another part, and by far the Icail nuincious one, though equally well-nieaning, reni« unted higher, to the plan ot projedtion itlclt*; and doing juilice to theo-oodncls of its inten;ions, doubted at leaft ot" the:e having been fuflieient grounds )f knowled: librinatiun to hav :no\v ranted the undertaking. bonic, merely guiilcd by private attacli- ments, or prejudices in favour of the pro- jedlors, or at kail of the principal promoter of this attempt, extolled it to the fkies, ad- mired the activity of the new m — n — r, that made fo glorious a contrail for him to the pall indolence and inadtion of his pre- deceilbrs j not without throwing out flirewd hints of the envy of fome who had oppofcd his rife to pov/er, having been carried to fuch treafonaMe lengths, as fccretly to have thwarted and countermined his operations. On the other hand, others, perhaps influ- enced by conhderations of tiie like private nature, by pique, prejudice, or even that envy of whicii they were accufed, treated, or afFeclcd to treat, tlie v/hcle plan as chi- merical, crude, and indigelled, both in the projedion and appointment of the execution, from which no better nor other fucccfs could be exjjecled than what bcfel it ; that the I whole m [ « ] whole of it was the fchcme of a man, who wanted to vaUic hiiiiicli' upon what lie did not undcrfl.uul, and rather than do nothing, with which he had Tooften reproached others;, wcjuld do I'ornething that, he could have no jull real-Mi to imagine, would not be inftnitely worlcthnn nothiiii^ Tor wliieh ol theie two opinioiiS was the leaH: unjuil, I not only reFer you to the ladLs and teltirnunials that appear in the eourfe vi' liu* enrpiiry, but to tluit kno\vledi>e ot' the local poiiiion of tiiini'^s, where the llttlck^^•l^ Icveljcd, which vou cither have, or may fo cafily come at. It is alio not unvv orlhy rf remarl: to you, and what you will cafily believe, that the loudcil deelaimers ac'ainft the commaiiders of the expedition on their return, lor their tendernels to their pei Ions, their declinin;.' of d inger, and the timidity of their councils, were to be found nrccifeh^ anion": the ranked cowards, or at leaft the moll reafonably to be fufpeded fuch. You miglit have hoard in coltec-houfes, public aiTemblies, not exclud- ing: the hi^hell: ncrfons, who liad never {i:cn the face cf dany:er, nor moil probably ever defircd to fee it, the iiercefi: in thecoiidemr.a- tion of the gentlemen employed j ridiculous and ccnteniptiblc however ao this divifion of judges may be, they are rdwayr too numerous, and ferve to fill the cry. On (he other hand, the moll truly brave and ncble, who ever judge |Ui 'th 1 ■IBMIMI |n, wdo iic (lid Otllijio; [lavc no iriiiitcly |ci"c two ily rcJ-'cT to tihit -h vou tf> yoii, lat the T rJieir liii;.' of Lincils, ankcfl ' to be ard in ^'clud- :■ fccn ^ ever :mnii- :ulous on of ;rous, land, ever Uu^e r 9 1 iiid'^e the hcil, were not alliamcd to own, tlicy tliuiiglu tlu' non-protellation and con- iimcncc of a llawkc, a Knovvlcs, and a Jirodcrick, (to lay nothing of the military of- ficers, as being widi e(]iially iinaitaitited tha- raeiers iDore perlonahy huwevcr coiuerneil) vve\' ivoui were a [^reat prejiuiiec in lavour ol* the refo- lution ot' returninu^, on taking it for granted, tliat nothing: could be done. I fliall here lay nothitu!^ to you of tbiofc over-rclincd pohticians, who pretend to dif- cover in the conibination of conjinK^Uires, a tenderncfs for II — n — r, or at leall a con- nexion with the convention of Stade, which mic^ht either occafion an arnianKUt to be fent out, by way of amufement-, on an enter- prifc, where it was fore-known nothing could be done that niiidu too much exalbcratc France to reprilals on II r, or an intima- tion to be properly given, that nothing being: done, would not be the moll ililpleafmcr thlnir irnao;inable. Such conic<^tares however coun- tenanced by the iillie itfelf, or by fortuitous circumftances, cannot be penetrated, at lead. by the public ; and, without proof, it is moll; certainly not only unfair, but even trealbnable to infinuate them. In one point however all ranks of people united, and that was a general diiratii;fad:ion, at this enterprife having either been lb w^eakly projeded, as not to fulibr even attempt to ex- ec ntc pi [ K ccute it, or at tlic defcdl of the execution It~ fclf : it is plain tiie fault lay fbmcwhere, and it was natural to wifli the afcertainment of, where the blame was to be imputed for amif- carriage, which, not to merition tlic interells of the nation, affeiccd by the great charge to which it was put on this occafion, gave in the eyes of our enemies, and indeed of all Europe ; a kind of ridicule to our arms and councils, to which, moft certainly, there be- fore needed no addidon. The citv, whofc power of example has fuch an influence over the other towns and corporations of the kingdom, was beginning the motion, for an enquiry, which would probably have been univerlally followed. But to this a flop was put by an extraordinary, but mofl gracious prevendve mellage of aiTu- rance from the throne, delivered by a kind of fubfecretary, importing, that there was no occafion for its being addrcffed for fuch a meafure, which was already determined, without the trouble of fuch an application. Many were charm'd with this unufual ftraiii of condefcenfion, in the court's being pleafed to take notice of what was tranfacfting in a city-alTembly, and ever, preventing thofe de- fires, the formal exprelHon of which would probably have been the refult of its delibera- tion. Some indeed, thought the Hep rather irregular, and that fuch an interference in mat- ol til ill 4 -cution h- ^ere, and iment of, ^oramif- intcrcib 'hargc to gave in ed of all inis and lere be- nple has vns and ginning would ed. But dinaiy, 'ofafTu- kind of vas no fuch a mined, :ion. 1 ftraiii 'leafed : in a fe de- void d bera- ather ce ill mat- ( II ) matters only undei* confidcration, could not on any pretext whatever, be eitiier accep- table, or llridly conformable to privilege* But, waving that qiicilion as foreign to my prelent purpofe, 1 f lall go on to obierve, that the prorniicd enquiry was fet on foot, in manner and form as you will have feeii by the account publillied by autliorlty. You will naturally too have concludcc, that tlie three great perfjnagcs appointed for the examination of io important a matter, on fo folemn an occafion, as giving tho natioa at leall a preparator-' fitisfac^Hon, were fuch as were ac the head oi the military prolcl- fion, confumir.ated in the art of wat, and had fecn a j^reat deal of fervicf.-, or at leaft enou-jfi of it to i2l\c abundant weisht to ^ . - "^' . their decifion. In fo conchuiinii;, vou will have been in the right: to none is il: un- known, how much thcv were io. Yet, however andv-.-ritatively, be"'orid fiif- putc "ivarrantcd this board of enquiry Vva^., as no accufation was fcrmed, no charge laid ; the commander of the expedition., whom the enquiry principaHy affeded, thought himfclf at liberty to call it, " A proceeding jiot qwl'j *' common!' lEnq. p. 59.) To fay the truth., I am not lavvyer, or verfed enough in tiic courfc of practice on the like occalions, to determine whether he was in the rirht or wrong ^K}': making fuch an objcvllioii. Nci- C dicr s2l ; H ( 12 ) then do I pretend to give a proper name to the procedure founded upon the royal war- rant : it has indeed the air of a military in- quefl, proceeded upon by a grand-jury of general oliicers. But even before a grand- jury, there mult be a bill, with fpecification of the party charged, found for a return of Ignor^mzis or Bi/ia 'vera j and furely a trial it could lefs be called, as there was neither arraignment of party, nor fentence, nor any thing but a bare opinion palfed, which has nothing of judicial in it, hov\^ever gready in- llru6live it may be 3 of which more hereafter. Should, however, the refultof this enquiry operate in the nature of a h'/Ia vcraofs. grand- jury, widiout the formality of a particular charge having been included in it; certain it is, that though the commander of the expe- dition ouii^ht to, and probably does wilh for nothing fo ardently, as a regular trial proceed- ing upon the foundation of the report; lie will, however, be under this difad vantage, that he will have had tv/ice to anfwer one and the fame matter : and, that his defence will have been fbaled by fuch a pre-examinadon. Now, I doubt not, Sir, but you will have perufed the Enquiry with all that candor and impartiality which alone can give you a right to judge of it; audit is in that confidence Surely drat I olTcr you fuch remarks as have occurred to me on it. It ■I' name to oyal war- iiitary in- il-jury of ^ grand- cification return of h a trial s neither nor any ^lich has 'catly in- ercafter. enquiry a grand- irticular ertain it le expe- mih for I'oceed- oi'ti iie ^e, that md the 11 have 1 have 5r and I right dence have It '( 13 ) Itcannotin thcfirflplacc have eicapcd you, that all the uthceis of land or fea, whether witncfibs or within the contingency of being parties either to a future charge, or to the blame only, unanimoufiy agreed on fupport- ing the expediency of returning without fur- ther attempt. Not one of them give fo much as the leafi: reafon to imagine there could have been any thing done againft Rochefort, cir- cumilanced as things were, except indeed fomcthingof a tendency to fuch an infmuation may he gcit/jereci irom the examination of col. W— Cl— on whom it was more immediately a perfonal incumbence, to fupport the honor which the information he had given in, of the ftate of Rochefort at the time he faw it, that is to fay, three years before the expedi- tion took place, had met with, in that the re- foiution of having that place attacked feems to have been principally founded upon it. But before I enter upon a difcufiion of the motives for or againft attempting a defcent, it may not be fupertluous to ftate to you fome material differences between the account:, given in or believed here, and thofe which were circulated in Holland and other neutral parts of the continent. You will fee, efpecially (Enq.p. 69.)inthe Memorial of the actual force of France by land, &c. the fum of icS regular troops to be under two hundred thoufand : and there C 2 (cctm i^ '^ , ,- ) ■ C '4 ) Iccnis at Icall: to be ibme exadneis in the cakulationi as well as in the account of their dclliiiati'oii. I am iar then from calling the truth ot this account in queftion 3 but fo much is ccrtaiii, that the French king is more generally judged to have upwards of three hundred thoufand regulars in pay : and if this lall: flate ot his force is exaggerated, at Icalc, it is very eafy to know whether it is fo or not. Tlie military lifts are in France open enough to examination, not to make it inexcufable the taking any falfe meafures by any mifreprefentation ofthem. As to the militia, and efpecially the guar- dccotcs, as they are called, ftationed along the weftern coaft from Calais to Bayonne inclufivc: vou may have known it currently received here, that there were not above thirty tlioulhnd men fprcad along that vafl extent of countiy, which nuifl but thinly indeed line the coall; of it. Whereas it is much more near to probability, if not to truth, what not alone the French themfelves give out, but what mariy oilicrs acquainted with the flate of th?.t country aver, that there are above one hundred thoufand militia men kept upincon- fiant traininp-, and have been fo ever iince the y-.ar 1 686, nov/ about feventy-one years, fpe- cirically along the weflern coaft. The reafons tooix>r keeping up fuch a militia are obvious; 2 being 1 neis in the nu- of their calling the 11 3 but fo "g is more of three ly : and if ici-ncd, at lether it is in France o make it -afures by the guar- led along Bayonne currently 3ve thirty ift extent Jeed hne ch more vhat not 3ut, but ^he flate 3ove one pincon- incc the ars, fpe- reafons bvious; being ( '5 ) belngdefigncd not only as an ocpafional guard agaiuft any invallon, but as a nuiiery ot (ol- dicrs ever ready to recruit their armies , the draughts for which tervicc are immediately replaced b)' the generalities, according toalct- tlcd repartition, which is feverely obferved. 1 have the more infilled on this article of tlie milida, bccaufc it leems contradifted by a paragraph in colonel CI— 's letter (Enq. p. 67) in wb.ich are the following very remark- able words. " Bv tlic expedition to Port L'Orient in 1746, it appeared to me, that the country- people in arms are very little l^cti'cr than cur ovvUj and th.it an Oihccv who Jwjfe//cs himfelf, irii'^ht- n:>arch iafelv from one end of a province to another, with ordy five conipanies of grenadiers, where there are no regufu- trt^ops. They imagine at iirft, that they can fight, and their inten- tions are good, till it coirie:, to tlic point, when every body gives way almofl before •' the firing of a platoon." Now, whether that gentleman means by country people inarms^ only a fudden colledli- tious rabble of peafants. or the militia of the country, I can not poffiblv think thcpi in either of thcfe conlfrudions even fo good as ours. Jn bravery I am fure, the common country- people of England are at lead, equal to the fame clafs amongft the French, and in bodily flrength tt (C (( cc (; <{ ■'j*\ 1 i [ i6 ] ilrcngth greatly their fuperiors; and difciplin'^ is here out of the queilion : lb that I grant him towards his argument for placing the French in a dcfpicable light, even more than he afks. Nor am I in the leaft in this par- tial to my own countrymen : and furely no Englifh officer can, with a very good grace, fuppofe his countrymen, efpecially the irre- gulars of it, inferior to the French ones ; if he but recolledts, that our regulars have within thefe few years flood in no very advantageous light of comparifon with our irregulars, ei- ther within the precinds of this ifland, or in America. The naming of Port L'Orient feems too a little mifplaced ; for I do not re- member that we made a very capital figure in that fame expedition of ours again fc it in 3746. I do not know what proofs of cowar- dice, on coming to the pomt, the French country -people tn arms then Ihewed -j but this J know, cur regulars gave incontefdble ones of their expedition at getting on board their fhips again. There were fcurvy reports at that time propagated, of their having taken r^ather too fudden a panic ; but may be they were falfe ones raifed by the French ^ though never fufiicientlv contradicted here. As the above quoted paragraph, however, tended to corroborate the recommendation of an attempt to furprife Rochefort, by fliewing there was no material oppofition to be feared from dirciplin'^ ^t J grant acjiio- the nore than this par- lirely no od grace, the irre- cjies i if ve within ntageous ulars, ei- id, or in L'Orient not re- al figure life it in : cowar- French but this bleones d their 3orts at g taken be they though wever, Ltion of iewini> feared ti'om f 17 ] from the militia, or the country people In arnUy you will not think it bcfide the purpofe, my having given you the contradidory idea others have entertained of that point. I do not pretend to lay whicli is the trueft ; but I dare I'wear yon will not hciitate upon pronouncing \\hi<-h is the moll: probable. But granting that the militia was no fuch invincible obllable to fuch a fine body of re- gular troops, on the fuppofing thefe landed, and on ti:ieir march towards Rochefort j and that it would not have flood a brufh at their approach, how many efientials remained to be indifpenfibly confidered ? which never were fo, becaufe they were not even known, before Rochefort could be, with any fliadow of reafon, prefumiCd pofTible to be carried by a conp-de-niain, if I underiland that expref- fion ricrht. Definitions, it is faid, in law are dangerous; but in common fenfe I am fure, they areab- folutely necefiary. I prefume then, a coup^ dc-main is a French term for what in plain Engliih I fiiould call, a iudden exploit of arms, or flroke of war; the fuccefs of which generally depenas on tlie fnrprize and con- llernation of the parties aifaiJcdjand the impc- tuofity of the afiailants, I do not, however, pretend to give this Englifli tranflation of mine for a juiloncj but of this, I am fure, the French cxpreilion, conndering the idea it is meant ^^: "yp^ : ! 't f [ i3 ] meant to convey, ij a very vague and dcliclent one; a-j nceoriiinvi; to tlic lliicl: import of the words, tlicic ib liaidlv an ac^tion in \wav but vvliat may come under tliat denomination, .iJut not to cliicane t'.rmb farther where the idea fcems to be fufliciently fjttled, you will cafdy fee, in tlie Enquiry, that tlie time con- iidcred between thetleet's appearance on the coait, that ib to fiy, the 20th, wiicn the objedl ot" it'i miflion became patent, and the council of war held the 25th, that furprize which is one good half of the eonflitutive of a ccup-de- tnain^ muil have abfolutely cealed, and been out of the queilion. Unlefs, indeed, you can fuppofe, tliat after having fo long known the general deilination of the armament againil the French coait, that people had fallen into a profound lleep, or would Hand v.ith tlieir hands folded, and omit all difpofitions fur receiving, as the cafe required, fuch a vifit. As I lincerely believe, not only col. (Jl~'s account to be exactly juli:, to the beJl of his knowledge and apprehcnlion, and confjrma- ble to the truth of things; nay, that no mate- rial allciations had been made in the works for defending Rochefoit itfelf, fiace the time he faw them in 1745; fo mull it be full as evident to any oi-ficer or engineer, who con- fiders his defcription, joined with the ne- ceifity of taking preliminarily .the fort of P'ouras cfpecially, at the inouth of the river, (of ? {of\^ rcafo o.n til in fill t "• A ■s ' mm m » ilejicient It of tlic war but Hnati(;n, Hcj c tlie iHi vviJI uic cun- e oil the le ohjtd- i council ivhich is oup-de- nd been yoLi can :jvvn the M^-niiiCl: CD c;i into ith their ions lor vi/it. f. (Jl-s 1: of his ifjnna- ) mate- : works le time full as o con- le ne- brt of : river, (of [19 ] (of which coluMcl CI — , c;)ukl for very po' d reafoMii give no acccinn at all ;) that few places on the globe could more f:fclv defy a IiidJcn infult tnan Rochef )rt. " A numerous militi:i, a ready fiipply fioni neighbouring garri('.;ns, on tlie appc:nince of a fleet, the neceiruv of lo much tirne to be confumed in a dcb.uk'i'ion, at fo urc:it a di- fiance as Chatelailion-bav, and tliit under every difadvuntaf-e iina'^inable ; or the im- polilbility of landing]; nearer, witliont t.dn 1 which iirc at once its defence aj,ainft f>jrei;i;n invalion, and its tyrannical Ih'ong-holds for perpetuating domcflic flave- rv : an advantage which Britain would not \\'\(h to buy at fo dear a rate, nor, thank God, has any occafjon for, whilft its natural bulwark of a fjperi'M- navy lublills. Vict.-r Am-idcDS of Savoy, whofe juft jea- lou/y of French ambition no ties of alliance could di'lipate, and was certainly neither a coward nor a b.id politician, on being urged to iiKikc an irruption into France, conlhmtly anfwcred , " That be knew a thoufand ways *' into Isaiire, but did not know one out of ** it av'aiii " C:in tliC commander of the expedition t'len, Vv'ho was ;>: once intruded wirh the luccels of it, and tl'C lives of (o m tny of his gallant ccninirMncn, incur fo much as the fhadj\v of b!a:n:', f)r inikiir^ a point of pievioiillv' takiir: liie fjrc of- Fouras, by way of focuring a reircat, when the hopes of fr: mmm ircd another e for a mere Schombcrir. tlic Frerich, ^d\ ;.^Micral5;, :lvi;ig Fiance ^ili by the lent fjrtili- ^vhcTc pro- its defence tyrannical i^flic ilave- wouKl no: Iiank God» rul bulwark ^c jufl jea- of alliance neither a 'ing urged condanrly and ways nc out of xpeditlon wi:h the nijny of mijcli as a point uris, by w hopes of [ 23 ] of taking Rochcfort by furprizc were nW rc.uly I'^.-^'aUy cut olf? Whcic the open Ccr.qneft indctd of a country h:is been in- tended, a comniandcr has, in order to lake from his troops all hopes oi* icireat, burnt the riiips that broui'ht them, fr m which they were to know, that there was no alter- native for them but death or cnnquefl. But this bold nieaiure always (uppoled in ihc tonnnander a th.orou^di knowledge of the country he was attempting, r.nd of the dan- gers he was to encounter ; whereas, in this cafe, the flate of the pLice to be attacked is not, even to this hour, known here, with any fort of preclfion fuilicient to ground a plan of opcraiiun upon it. To h.a.e landed them, and without fe- curin,^ fort Fouras, to have marched on to Rochcfort, without the Icafl intelligence of what difpoiiiions were tliere made to re- ceive them, C!r on fuch a mad prefumption as that of their having been intirely r,e- gleded, would not have argued true courage, or even merited fo Iionourable an appella- tion as that of radinefs, which is often in mi- litary exploits crowned by fuccefs j bat of fuch grcfs Ihipidity and ignorance of duty, as no general, diit delerved the name of one, could have been guilty of it. Fouras then was undoubtedly to be taken, hJoTQ the redudion of ilochefort could be at- •-■I'l mmm ! [ 24 ] . . attempted. But how ? '' Ay, that Is the " queftion." Difficulties invincible appeared, merely from its fituation, againft carrying even that paultry hen-coop. A lingle fliip, laying againft it, would probably have bat- tered it to the ground in a lew hours -, but even a frigate could not be got up within gun-ll^ot of it {E/jg. p. 32). The pilot Thierry engaged, indeed, to pilot a (hip within a quarter of a mile of it •, but it does not appear that he was capable of perform- ing that engagement. The Barfleur, which drew two foot water lefs than the Magna- nime (the ihip which he dedicd for that purpofe, and which was refufed him, on the account of the damage it had recently fuf- tained), was on ground where flie lay, be- tween four and ^ve miles diftance from the Ihore. Even a bombketch {Enq. p. 44), that drew but eleven leet of water, ran a- ground at a greater diftance from Fouras than the bombardier could throw the (hells, with the greaieft requifite of powder, at an e'evation of forty-iive degrees, that is to fay, above two miles and two thirds. In the mean tin^.c, you will obfcrve, the French gave them one proof of their being neither afleep, nor frightened out of their fenles ; fincc, whilft the bvimb- ketch was a (li ore, they detached two large rovv'-boats with two pieces of heavy cannon in their prow, and ' full ■MlMiiiM iMa m to n t ?.S ] full of men each, to attack the ketcli, in the face of the whole fleet ; and would probably hvive carried her too, it the vice- admiral Knowles had not eftecflually inter- pofed, by making a fignal immediately for all the boats of the . fleet to fpeed to her refcne, himfelf going on board the Coventry- frigate, to drive away the row-boats ; in which i'lmQ lie ran a-ground, conflderably within the fpace of an hour, five times, and at a greater diftance from the (liorc than the bomb ketch. This however may fliew you, that Fouras Wvis unexpugnable by our fliipping. And here it is prefumeable, that the pilot Thier- ry, who had engaged for bringing the Mag- nanime, which drew (as before obferved) two foot water more than the Baril'^ur, muih have acknowledged his miftuke; for it c?n hardly be fuppoled that he would refufe un- dertaking to pilot the Ibip fubflituted on fuch good realbns. He was not, you will remarks- examined before the board, being, it leems, ablcnt, as well as Sir Edward Hawke. It appears too, by the Enquiry, that even after the council of war of the 25th of Sep- tember, in which it was iinani imuPy agreed, that ilie redudlion of Rochefort was, in the adlual pofition of things, neither advifeahle or prabicablc^ both the land and Tea com- manders were highly unwilling to give over all I [ 26 ] all thoughts of landing, and attempting at \e2{\ to do fomething. Some probability of fuccefs in .attacking Fouras dawning to them, in frtili inforiDution that came in to them by iheir prifoners, they greedily feized it. The coming on the back of it, by land- ing f>rce=; in Chatelaillon-bay, carried with it at hill an air of temptation. Nothing feemcd more eafy, more inviting, or more fafe, tlian a fine beach, accefilble to boats; not a man to be fcen on the fhore, no bat- teries to annoy a landing en it : for a few guns, en barbette^ on Chatelaillon- point, that could not reach it, are fcarce worth mentioning. This fpot, though at fo much greater a difiance from Rochefcrr, yet as it fvCmed to give fome chance fcr an attack by land en Foura?, induced the land and fea offi- cers in chief command to think of putting the forces a (here there. Here it plainly appears, by the Enquiry, that they were fo far from being defirous of returning vNithont attempting a defcent, that they feized the fiiil: overture of one, with- out even a due )c iiard to the moft obvious rules of war, and I might not unjuflly add, of comm.on fenfe. For, according to all ?xcounts, this beach was farroundcd by land-hills, conhdeiably wiihin lefs than mullvet-ihct of ihc water-edge, by which any numbci- of i\x\\ \\\y^\i have been con- cealed. iMHMiHiil ( 27 ) cealcd, witli the utmofl fafcty from the can- non of the ihips, till the inltaiit of fallying (liould offer for taking advantages of the troops in their landing. This too was a circumflancc in which the night would but be the more favorable to the enemies : in the confuiioii they mufl fo rea- fonably ho|>e to find troops fetting foot on an unknown ihorc, thcmiclvcs not only being at home, with a firm footing on dry land, but in cale of a fuperior repulfe, being alfuied of an eaiy retreat. If it llic^dd be faid, that the exitlence of troops behind thofe fand-hdis is only a gratuitous fuppofition, a mere begging of the queflion ; let anyone who knows any thing ot the matter, but afk himlelf, whether any general could poiTibly not take it for granted, that there mail: be forces at hand, even without the inlorrnation of prifoncrs ? Would any man in his fenfes, that knew in the leafi; what France or War was, allow him- felf to doubt of there being troops in that country, alarmed and forewarned as it had been ? The motions then of our f^eet being watched, as they naturally mufh have been, nothing on earth could offer a more favorable mafk to the numbers the French would have to oppofe a defcenr, than thofe fmd-hills. As nothing: need to be furer too than that fuch forces they bad in rcadinefs; fo it was equally E fure, i|H!'»W|! wmmmm 4 r 28 ] Tui'c, that it was their game to conceal them, till the madnefs of a dclcciit fliould afford tlicm a cheap market of us, when not the crcatcic coiiracre could have Hood the leaft chance againil fuch obvious and unfair ad- vantage. But this was not all. When from an ea- gcrnefs pardonable only to that courage which does not lland upon weighing of obilacles, and to that juft fpirit ot theirs for ferving their country at all events, this landing was refolved on ; when even one divifion of the troops was already in the boats prepared to carry them to land, you will lind a new and infupcrable difficulty flarted. It appeared, that it was nut pollible to carry above two thoufand men at a time to the landing-place. There were they to remain fix hours, ex- pofcd to the whole force of an enemy, that could not Vvxll be fuppofed to be dead afleep, or iniciiftble of fuch an advantage, before they could pofllhly be reinforced by a fecond debarkation. Then it was that the com- manders opened their eyes at length, on the foily of fuch an attempt, which had been lluit by the falfe (liame only of doing nothing, where notjjing was to be done: then it was they returned to the mod fenfible refolution they had yet taken, that of the council of the 25th, of giving over w^hat, for io many clear VMMdr^M'MTMM ( 29 ) clear renfons, had fo much better never have been uridcrtaken. I do not aik you to fuli'cr your judgment to be influenced by merely the names of the gentlemen who fubfcribed to that conlulta- tion of the 25th, though 1 fu-mly believe they do not yield in point of bravery even to the foremoil of thofe who have blamed tlieir refolution for returninp-. No ! onlv Vv'ci'jh but their reafons, and the examination pre- vious to the report, and more cfpecially tlie defedive information of the liril: fuciireilcr of the undertaking (be it faid vvithout the leall offence to him, lince he could lay no more than he knew, and wl:iat he did lav was pro- bably the exadteft truth), and you will own, that none but the French could have wilhecl our armament had proceeded further in the execution of its miflion. I'hey indeed might have rejoiced, that fo fine a body of troops lliould fall into a trap, the grolnefs of which would have robbed them of any pity for fall- ing into it. They muit, in all human proba- bility, have been theviclims to a mircake that was not their own, and that with their eves open on the palpability of it. But, Sir, the unpromifmgnefs of this expe- dition was not judged of only by the event, but numbers here, on knowing its deftination for the coaft of France, and the conflitution L 2 oi ^^mm^ tmfmm^ „t*m»mmk h i i i l:i (30) of things in thofe parts, made even no merit of pronouncing boldly, that nothing would or could bw done by that grand armada. Many too, on lecing the equipment of lo gallant a fleet, lamented its not having been earlier fitted out againll: another, and the only place in which France can receive a wound in her vitaia, and tiiat is Cape-hrfton. The infinite impoi ■ ancc of America, and ihe adtual fitua- tion of thin;:!:s tlicre, loudly called for fuch a decifivc meafure. And what could hinder its being taken with all afi'urance of fuccefs, early enough m the fcafon, unleis the activity of the ftate's bei'ig about that time milerably fufpendcd by a fcramble for power amongft private juntos, and infignificant party-cabals, may be given for a reaiun ? Had a 'niich lefs a; mament than this one proceeded on rhat deilination, the French in- terefi; iii Ameiica mufi:, in ail human proba- bility, ha'.e been deib-oyed by the ax being thus laid to the root; and the Ihips of our late unfoiiunate fquadron in thofe parts might have, not unlikely, been riding the florm out fafc and triumphant in the harbour of Louif- bourn^. Thofe who know moft of things, know there is nothing exagerated in the con- sequences, nor romantic in the hopes of fuch an undertaking; efpeciallv had it been then carried into execution. Had Rochefort even been mm [ 3' ] been taken, what would have been the confe- quence but rhe deftruvition of a few (Inps, na- val flores, and arfenal: call it great -, but flill it could be lo more than a tranficnt reparable damage : whereas, by getting poflelllon of Cape-Breton, you not only cut off the fpring- head of the French power in America, but may nip in the bud their befl-, and perhaps only nurfery of feamen for their navy, with many other advantages therefrom, too ob- vious need deducing here, where the men- tion of it figures only as a digreffion -, but a digreffion you Vvill, 1 hope, pardon, in favor ot the well-meaning of it. In that confaltation of the 25th above re- ferred to, and elpecially from the opinion of the chief enLnncer, who cannot be fuppofed very favorable to any rcfolutionof defiflence from an attempt of w'hich himfclf was in fome fort the parent, you will eafily fee at one elance, the nature, and caufe of fai- lure of the enterprize. You will fee, that not a foul on board knew half the requifites to be known before any execution could be proceeded to, or even rightly planned ; and at the fame time, that it was no fault of theirs that thev did not know them. Vac^ue and contradictory reports of the flate of Roche- fort, of its ditch and rampart ; in fliort, only the moll: material points, and fuch as the fate of the enterprize, and of the hves of thofe wmmsmiiimmi mm :ei;^timmflt»i, , C r- ) cmploy.-^fl in it, muft turn upon, were th*^ very points tluit rcmaircd, and iiill remain periVdily un-afccrtaincii. The pl:iQ furnifhcd froni meinory by the chief ciunneer, with at leaR a coniefl'ed doubt oi liis, for want of intormation, what alteration., nii'^ht have been made lince, was of It leh liifticietit to aiilne any general or en- gineer, " That li noplace was more capable of bein?; ta!::n by aifault, if it could be come at by iurpriic ; k) no place, you can perhaps name, was more capable of being, within even a Tew hour?, put into a poPiure of defence againll fuch a fudden alTault: and that no regular attack made any part of the deiign, cannot appear plainer, than for lb good a reafon as the engineer himfclf gives. That the Imall quantity of artillery they had, was not lent on that plan." (Enq. The poifibilitv of a fiirprife, then being abiblutely over, the only chance for fuccels bv a re:i;ular allault, mulL have been their bringing their forces before it, and that too without artillery. But even that chance, defperate as it \\\\f<, and which the comman- ders lujwevcr were apparently determined to try, was denied them. By water^ tiie litua- tion v.-as inacceffible : bv landing indeed at Chatelaiilon bav, that is to lay, if the French would luive been fo vciv polite as not to mo- Icll [ 33 ] IcR them, in their attempt of it, they might have got perhaps hctoie Rcjchcfort; and what to do there ? to Ihmd with their liniJ;en iii their mouths, or try to hatter down its dc- lenccs with threats, lor either eiiectivc arms they could have none. \\\ iliort, when I fi- J^ure to my(elf the lituation of our troops, fairly arrived heiore R^'chefort, drums heat- ing, and colors flyinjT, I m.^ tempted to think the i'rench knew their own nitereii: too well to interfere witli the landinc; of cur forces, or hinder them from proceeding up to the town. Nothing in all human prol)ability would have afforded them a finer opportunity, or have played the game better into their hands. No retreat, no communication with the ihips, any more than if thefc fhins had been at J a- pan, no chance forclcapiiig, but by fighting their way back a'^-ain, under the Q-reateil un- certainty in the world, of being able to get off the ihore, even fiiould the I oats be ready to take them off, and all the wliilc harrafledby thofe French forces, ■svhich not invincibly to have prefumcd, were ready for their recep- tion, after fo long an alarm, vs'ould have been a iolly beneath ierious refutation : all thefe, I fay, incline me to think the French denred nothing: fo much, as what fome are fo forry here did not happen. Every true Engliihman, however, who will give his own iudq-mcnt: 1 1 !i t 34 ] judgment fair play, in fcorn of popular an ignorant prejudice, may rejoice, that fuch a number of liii> countrymen did nc^t pcrilli in fo filly ii fnare, witl:out p. olit to their coun- try, without honor to tliemielves. You will, I hope too, Sir, forgive me if I ownmyfelfnot exticmcly edified by fome paflages in the enquiry, of which I refpedt- fully take for granted, die forms of public procedure, rendered the publication indif- penfably nccelfary j aivd which otherwife one would imagine, were highly improper to be publi filed : and that is the names and defcrip- tions of perlons, who, either they, or their families arc iliU under the French power, or are liable to come under it. Every oneknows the alert and v/atchful genius of that govern- ment, over its fubjedts, or rather its flaves, whofe adtions and words arc under the ri- gideft comptrol of its arbitrary refentment or caprice. Mr. Macnamara is, if I am not miftaken, deceafed, or the lead that his politenefs to an officer in Engliih regimentals, in permitting him to view the works of the place, would have cofl him, was a fevere reprimand, or perhaps a difmiffion from his pc^lt, which he would have owed to the fpecific mention of him in the report. Further: amongll the accidents of war, there might occafions often offer for examination of French prilbner?, from w^licnce very [ 35 ] very valuable clifiovcrks iiiij^ht arifc. Now, miglu wot it prove a ^^rcat chock on t-liclr cc-n- hdcnce, on their cuinnumicativenels and na- tural inclination to taiiving ; the liavin^jj fuch reafon to think their names and pcrfor.s nii^ht poflibly come to he puMiflied n^ainll them, in theprocedureot Ibme court-martial, or enqui- ry, io as to render them obnoxious to tlieir own j^ovcrnment ? Miaht not this be a ll:ron^ motive for dieir being fliy and referved ? I am iipt to believe fuch publications are never prac- tifed under any governn\ent but ours ; but at the fame time, no doubt, it has its reafons for being above fuch an attention, though I do not pretend to penetrate them. It was alio for much the fame caufe I ob- ferved with infinite pain, that palTage in Sir J. L — r's memorial of advice to Sir J. M (Enq. p. 22.) " I'here are numbers of protcf- *' tants in that province that wifh you well, *' and would be f^lad to o;o on board with vou." This hint was doubtlels purely intended as a private one, and never for publication, fo that no blame can in that light fall upon it. But is it not unhappily publillied ? All who know the nature of the French government, efpeci- ally its con Rant difpofition to opprefs the pro- teftants, mufl eafdy allow that fuch a para- graph cannot come unwelcome to it, as it may give it a handle, at leaft for a greater vi- F i>;ilance, [ 36 ] gilancc, over a let of people thus marked out to tlicin. Nor can they ihemfelvcs be ex- tremely ublif^ed to us for fuch a (lerii;nation : but what is llill vvorfc, it is moll: probably not cntirclv a jull one. The protelLants, who are flill iurtered, or rather coimived at in France, in n;'"neral, picque iheniielves on the utmofl lovalty to their king and country. They deduce this duty from their religion, which even under pejlbeution, forbids them to turn traitors, at fucii a crifis too, as that of an adual invafion. If numbers of refugees, on their quitting France, and flying from the faceof opprcffion, took fervice under powers at enmity with it j it was not till after their Jocal refidcnce in the countries in which they had found refuge, iroin the moil inhuman opprcffion at home, had changed the objcds of their allegiance, that they departed i'rom it, and became perhaps the mofi: faithful, and certainly not the leafh uleful inbjeds of thofe powers that were wife enough to give them harbour and protedlion. It is, I fancy, with realbn, laid, that numbers of the prefent pro- teflants of France, cfpecially in thofe very parts that were the fcene of our projecffed in- vafion, would delire no better than an op- portunity of fjgnalizing their loyalty to their country, by way of the jufleft and bittereft re- proach to their opnreflors, for their infamous as [ 37 ] as well as iinpolitic Tpirit of pcrfccution. Numbers, vvc are told, of thcic ficoplc of- fered their rcrvicc, fpecirtcally on tiii . VLry occalion, to the French gv)vcrninent. Jiiir, however that may be, I e.mnot but think fuch a piillage might, for obvious rcalbns, have better been left out, efpeciidly as it is nothing to the pur[)ol"e of the l!]nc]uiry. I eonie now to the report itlclf, given in by th<" appointed conimillu;ners of I'jiquiry, and 'efultinLj from the matter of it. {Sc'f En'}. '• ''-:.) And here 1 begin with fairly ov i.n , to you, that it pades my eompre- I' . i <■•. Could fo extiava^^ant a cafe be <*' '^ ., as that there was a colhifive com- promife agreed on between tlie projectors of the expedition and the commanders of it j that iince fome report mull necellarily pafs, fuch an one fliould be di(itated as ihould neither acquit the one, nor condemn the other ; I ihould think there could not have been a more admirable piece framed for liich a purpofe. Not a word is, indeed, laid in it that might impeach the wifdom of the [mo'jic- tion, or impute tlie fiiilure of the expeiiition, to its infutiiciency. But not a word too [^ there in it, but what the commanders nm^ht even jrlorv in avowinrr and fublcribini^ to. If it fatislics the public but liall ab much i.s F 2 it .^mttm I^'t ( 38 ) it ought to fatlbfy them, then all parties owe to thofe honorable pedbnages who palTed the Report the juftefl thanks. I pais over tlie preamble, as being merely matter of form and introdiidlion ; and fliall only point out to you fome parts of the Re- port, that cannot but juflify to you my ad- miration of It. I fuppofe you have it before you, and |)roceed. The lirll: caufc of failure appears to have been tlic not attacking Pouras by fea, at the lame time that it would be attacked by land. But the abfcnce of fu* Edward Hawke, and of the pilot of the Magnanime, not admit- ting an examiria;:ion into that particular, the opinion upon tiJiit point is left open and un- decided. AIJ that appears very plain is, that Fouras was inacccffiblc to an attack by lliip- ping, notwl.hflanding the pilot Thicrri's promifc, wdiich, it Ihould feem, he could not make good. At Icuft, in this the com- manders arc in no fault. Another caufe of failure affiLnied in the Report, is the non-attempting to land on the report received on the 24th of September from icar-adojiral 1] rod rick and the captains, who had been fent out to found and recon- noitre ', when, inlfcad of landing diredly, a council of war was called on the 25th, in wliich it Vv'as unaniiu^iijly refolvcd not to land, mmtauiillm I 39 ] land, as tliC attempt upon Rochefort was neither advij cable nor praBi cable. To lay the truth, after fuch a report as the com- manders then received, after what they thernfelves could fee of the local pofition of things, and what they mull know or pre- fume of the flatc of the country, they were, if it is not too difrefpedful in me to fay fo, rather in the wrong for calling any conful- tation, if their refolution could have dif- pcnfed vc'ith the form of it : for, in fadt, there was no matter of confultatlon at all. The nature of tne errand they were fent on, and the impoilibdity of its execution, were already .plain enough. ■** But it did not- appear that there were *' then, or at any time afterwards, either " a body of troops or U.teiies on the Ihore, *' fufficient to have prevented their defccrt." This is moft religioully true. As to troops, nothing can on earth be more certain, than that troops there were and. muil be in the country i and as certain, that the French muft have been very great id-iots indeed to have futfered them to be Jeen^ when it was fo eafy and fo much their game to conceal them. As to batteries in Chatelaillon-bay, the only convenient place for a defcent, not one otFiCer ever faid there were any, or did not but aver the contrarv : but v/ho of them could J. I', [ 40 ] could not but fee the iir> propriety, according to all the rules of war and of common fenfe, of effedtuating a defcent, from which no good could be hoped for the fuccefs of the main of the enterprize, the attack upon Rochefort ? Could any thing counterbal- lance the moral aiTurance of being cut off divifion by divifion, which mufl have been the cafe, unlefs the French could be fufped:- ed of tailing off, on fuch a tempting occaiion, from their ufual alertnefs, or have only fuf- pended its exertion, in order to draw us more compleatly into the fnare ? " It does not appear (fays the Report), that there were any fufficicnt reafons to induce the council of war to believe that Rochefort was fo far changed, in refpe6t of its ffcrength, or pofture of defence, fince the expedition was firft refolved on in England, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon the place, in order to burn and deftroy the docks, magazines, arfenals, and fliipping, in obedience, &c." To all this the commanders might chear- fully fubfcribe, fince it does honor both to their fenfe and obedience. They were fent furely on the plan of a furprize, or coup- de- main. Nothing can be plainer than their inftrudtions on this head : but that cafe of fur- <( (< CC (C <( (C (C C( (C f 43 ] Shou|d you, however, after fettling this point in your own mind, proceed to any de- gree of curiolity for what further may be expedled from this mf^ailire of an enquiry, which feems hut a preparatory one to an uherior procedure upon it, it is not at leafl to me you muft addrefs yourfelf for fatisfac- tion. The low level ranq-e of humble com- mon fenfe can never pretend to reach the fublimity of thofe clouds in which the ex- alted wifdom of our councils has fo long rolled, and carried the public affairs to that pitch of profperity and renown in which they are at prefent fo coiifpicuouily feen. But if you will deign to accept a general rule of conjedlure on any future terns of af- fairs that as yet He hid within the womb of time, or in the heads of our modern ftatef- men ; a rule that has for thefe many years hardly been known to fail; this it is. Ima- gine to yourfelf fpecifically what is mod agreeable to common fenfe, and to the once believed juft order of judgment, and then do not hzfurprifcd at finding the event diame- trically oppofite to it. In the prefent cur- rent of things, no oracle can afford you a furer prognoftic than this method of anti- cipation by contraries. Should you then find a ftatue decreed to the great projector of this celebrated expedition, and national G dif- \ ..«»^K«NMk ill [ 44 ] difgrace, or even an ignominious punifh- ment allotted for thofe unfortunate enough to have been fent in command upon it, there can be nothing fo flrange in fuch a diftribu- tion of juftice as to make you flare at it, if you refled: upon all the unaccountablenefs in our judgment and affairs for thefe many 37ears laft pafl. The folly would indeed nov^ be to be furprifed at any thing. I am, Sir, Yours, &c. ! f« 3mInIous punifliJ fortunate enough md upon it, there n fuch a diftribu- you ftare at it, if maccountablenefs s for thefe many ly would indeed iny thing. ours. &c.