m 
 
 
 IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 «- 
 
 1.0 
 
 1.1 
 
 11.25 
 
 2f B4 ""^ 
 
 ^ i:fi 12.0 
 
 Sciences 
 Corporation 
 
 23 WK MAIN STREIT 
 
 A'reSTBR.N.Y. 14SS0 
 
 (7U) 872^503 
 
 4l^ 
 
 
CIHM/ICMH 
 
 Microfiche 
 
 Series. 
 
 CIHIVl/ICMH 
 Collection de 
 microfiches. 
 
 Canadian Institute for Historical l\/licroreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques 
 
Technics! and Bibliographic l\lotos/Notes techniques et bibliographiques 
 
 The Institute has attempted to obtain the best 
 original copy available for filming. Features of this 
 copy wh'ch may lie bibliographically unique, 
 which may alter any of the images in the 
 reproduction, or which may significantly change 
 the usual method of filming, are checked below. 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 Coloured covers/ 
 Couverture de couleur 
 
 I I Covers damaged/ 
 
 Couverture endommag^e 
 
 Covers restored and/or laminated/ 
 Couverture restaurte et/ou peiiiculie 
 
 r~l Cover title missing/ 
 
 Le titre de couverture manque 
 
 r~1 Coloured maps/ 
 
 Cartes gAographlques en couleur 
 
 Coloured init (i.e. other than blue or black)/ 
 Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) 
 
 I I Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ 
 
 Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur 
 
 Bound with other material/ 
 ReliA avec d'autres documents 
 
 Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion 
 along interior margin/ 
 
 La re iiure serr^e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la 
 distortion le long de la marge intArieure 
 
 Bla' k leaves added during restoration may 
 appear within the text. Whenever possible, these 
 have been omitted from filming/ 
 II se peut que certainus pages blanches ajouttes 
 lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texts, 
 mais. lorsque cela Atait possible, ces pages n'ont 
 pas 6t6 filmtes. 
 
 Additional comments:/ 
 Commentaires suppl6mentaires: 
 
 L'Institut a microfilm* le meilleur exemplaire 
 qu'il lui a At4 possible de se procurer. Les details 
 de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du 
 point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier 
 une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une 
 modification dans la mAthode normale de f ilmsge 
 sont indiqute ci-dessous. 
 
 Tl 
 to 
 
 I I Coloured pages/ 
 
 Pages de couleur 
 
 Pages damaged/ 
 Pages endommagtes 
 
 Pages restored and/or laminated/ 
 Pages restauries et/ou pellicul6es 
 
 Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ 
 Pages dicolortes. tacheties ou piqu6es 
 
 Pages detached/ 
 Pages ditach^es 
 
 r77| Showtl trough/ 
 
 Transparence 
 
 I I Quality of print varies/ 
 
 Quality in^gaie de I'impression 
 
 Includes supplementary material/ 
 Comprend du materiel suppiimentaire 
 
 Only edition available/ 
 Seule Edition disponible 
 
 Tl 
 
 P< 
 of 
 fil 
 
 Oi 
 bi 
 th 
 si( 
 ot 
 fir 
 
 Si( 
 
 or 
 
 T^ 
 sh 
 Til 
 
 wl 
 
 Ml 
 dil 
 
 s 
 
 re 
 mi 
 
 D 
 
 Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata 
 slips, tissues, etc.. have been refilmed to 
 ensure the best possible image/ 
 Les pages totalement ou partiellement 
 obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure. 
 etc.. ont M fiim^es A nouveau de fa^on d 
 obtenir la meiileure image possible. 
 
 This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ 
 
 Ce document est f ilm* au taux de rMuction indiquA ci-dessous. 
 
 10X 
 
 
 
 
 14X 
 
 
 
 
 18X 
 
 
 
 
 22X 
 
 
 
 
 26X 
 
 
 
 
 30X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12X 
 
 
 
 
 16X 
 
 
 
 
 20X 
 
 
 
 
 24X 
 
 
 
 
 28X 
 
 
 
 
 32X 
 
 
The copy filmed here he* been reproduced thenks 
 to the generosity of: 
 
 Librsry of the Public 
 Archives of Canade 
 
 L'exemplaire filnfi* fut reproduit grAce A la 
 gAnArositA de: 
 
 La bibliothique des Archives 
 publiques du Canada 
 
 The images appearing here are the best quality 
 possible considering the condition and legibility 
 of the original copy and in keeping with the 
 filming contract specifications. 
 
 Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed 
 beginning with the front cover and ending on 
 the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- 
 sion, or the back cover when appropriate. Ail 
 other original copies are filmed beginning on the 
 first page with a printed or illustrated impres- 
 sion, and ending on the last page with a printed 
 or illustrated impression. 
 
 The last recorded frame on each microfiche 
 shall contain the symbol — ► (meaning "CON- 
 TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), 
 whichever applies. 
 
 l\Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at 
 different reduction ratios. Those too large to be 
 entirely included in one exposure are filmed 
 beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to 
 right and top to bottom, as many frames as 
 required. The following diagrams illustrate the 
 method: 
 
 Les images suivantes ont 4tA reproduites avec le 
 plus grand soin. compte tenu de la condition et 
 de la nettetA de I'exempiaire film*, et en 
 conformity avec les conditions du contrat de 
 filmage. 
 
 Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en 
 papier est ImprimAe sont filmte en commenpant 
 par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la 
 dernlAre page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impresslon ou d'illustration, soit par le second 
 plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires 
 originaux sont filmte en commenpant par la 
 premiere page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impresslon ou d'illustration et en terminant par 
 la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle 
 empreinte. 
 
 Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la 
 dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le 
 cas: le symbols -^ signifie "A SUIVRE". le 
 symbols Y signifie "FIN". 
 
 Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., oenvent Atre 
 f ilmfo A des taux de reduction diffArents. 
 Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre 
 reproduit en un seul clichA, 11 est f limA A partir 
 de Tangle supArieur gauche, de gauche A droite, 
 et de haut en bhs, on prenant le nombre 
 d'images nAcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants 
 illustrent la mAthode. 
 
 32X 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
T 
 
 ::45:«T 
 
,. '"."/A- 
 
 (• J -,-■'' t ,' 
 
 4, 
 
 LETTERS 
 
 -■.;.■ :•"«-»._•»•; 
 
 ,">««., ^.;.r.«t 
 
 Bf 
 
 MAJOR NORMAN PRINGLE, 
 
 LATE OF THE 21.st ROYAL SCOTS FUSILEERS, 
 
 ■',.'ft: 
 
 I 
 
 ■ ■XL'i* 
 
 <••. .1* 
 
 > . VINDICATING 
 
 THE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 
 
 ■ EMPLOYED IN NORTH AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1814-15, • * 
 _ FROM ASPERSIONS CAST UPON IT 
 
 >.-'<., *-W- .• f "^J 
 
 > ^a i- 
 
 
 
 ■1.1-c 
 
 STUART'S 
 "THREE YEARS IN NORTH AMERICA." . 
 
 
 ,.:.-,.•, v--/ 
 
 i ,• 
 
 'ff ". i 
 
 ;t • 1.. . 
 
 ..ir-ic ;i-?W» 
 
 £#■- 
 
 ■v-'t 
 
LETTERS, &c. 
 
 LETTER I. 
 
 " 
 
 TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBUIIGH EVENING COUBANT. 
 
 Edinhuryh, 29</< October, 1833. 
 
 Sm, — Having within these few days read Mr Stuart's work on America, I was 
 particularly struck with the manner in which the conduct of the British troops 
 serving under General Ross tit the attack on Washington, is described. In vol. 
 ii. p. 83, after commenting upon the merits of the exp' dition, and lamenting the 
 destruction of the Capitol, War Office, and the ^rea^ br'ulge across the Potomac, Mr 
 Stuart proceeds to say, pp. 86, 87, that the library, and a great part of the state 
 papers, were destroyed. I shall here quote the author's own words : — "I heard 
 many anecdotes of this much-to-be-regretted incursion. The commanders had 
 directed private property to be respected, but it was impossible to restrain the 
 soldiery. Much private property was destroyed. Mr p]lliot was with the army ; 
 his house was sacked. The destruction of Mr Gules' printing establishment was 
 the most pitiful of all the proceedings." Now, sir, I am desirous of putting the 
 public in possession of a few facts, which, I trust, will be the means of rescuing 
 the character of the British soldiery from the imputation cast upon it. Subsequent 
 to the defeat of the Americans at Bladensburg, General Ross advanced towards 
 Washington with 1000 men, and about eight o'clock in the evening arrived at an 
 open piece of ground two miles from the Federal city. Soon after our arrival, I 
 was informed by the adjutant of the regiment that General Ross wished to see 
 me immediately. On coming to the General, I was informed by him that lie 
 had ordered the grenedier compatiy of the 21st regiment to parade for a particular 
 service, and that I was to command them, and about 39 men more, making in all 
 100 rank and file. The General stated to me that be was about to advance into 
 Washington, accompanied by this body of men only, who were to act as his 
 advanced guard in approaching the city. That, on my arrival, I was to take up a 
 position with my men, to place sentries at the different entrances into the city, 
 to send patroles round every half hour, to prevent any soldier or seaman belonging 
 to the expedition from entering the city, and on no account whatever to permit my 
 men to go into any house. These orders were most punctually attended to. I 
 went round with every patrole myself, I paraded my men every hour to see that 
 none were absent, and for twelve hours held possession of the capital of the 
 United States, with that handful of British soldiers, and preserved its peace. 
 
 To one species of plunder I and many of my comrades must indeed plead 
 guilty. The inhabitants of Washington, with becoming consideration, had 
 provided an ample repast in every house for the conquering army, which was to 
 return from Bladensburg with the British in chains ; but, in its hurry to cross 
 the Potomac, they swept past like its torrent, and left all the good things behind 
 them. Then, indeed, there was a sad destruction of private property, — 
 ducks, geese, hams, turkeys, bufTalos' tongues, and buffulos' bumps, were devoured 
 by wholesale ; nor was Mr Maddison's health forgotten, in his own best claret, 
 for being so good a fellow as to leave us such a capital supper. This fell to the 
 share of those who were employed in destroying the Capitol, &c. For myself 
 and men, we were most kindly treated by an honest barber, who came to me in 
 great distress, saying, that he had provided an excellent supper, but that he had no 
 one to eat it. He accordingly brought us out ham and fowls, various other 
 good things, and he gave the men a quantity of bread and very good cider ; and 
 what remuneration did this excellent citizen demand for his kindness ? Why, 
 that I would allow one of my soldiers to remain in his house, to protect him 
 against a set of rascals who were prowling about the city taking advantage of its 
 distress. At eight o'clock, in the morning of the 25tb, I was ordered to return 
 
 I 
 
' 
 
 plead 
 bad 
 
 ^ 
 
 3 
 
 to the bivouac of the army, two miles distant from Washin^toii ; and previous to 
 our mureliin^ off, the men iiiidei* my commai.l had not only the aatisfac-tion to 
 receive the 'lanks of the ever-to-be-lamcnted General Ross, for the manner they 
 had preserved the peace of the city, but my friend the barber, and a great many 
 other inhabitants of Washington, thanked the General and the soldiers, /or the 
 protection they had (fforded them from the marauding attacks of their own country- 
 men. In adverting to what is said about the destruction of the great bridge across 
 the Potomac, I have yet to learn, that a prudent military measure is contrary to 
 the usages of war, particularly as the Americans themselves had destroyed the two 
 bridges crossing the eastern branch. 
 
 I shall now, in corroboration of the facts which came under my own observa- 
 tion, quote one or two remarks from American publications. The Columbian 
 Centinet says, " The British officers pay inviolable respect to private projxrty, 
 and no peaceable citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under date of 
 27tn August, 1814, says, " The enemy, I learn, treated tlnj; inhabitants of 
 "Washington well ;" and what says Mr Gales, the mouth-piece of the Government, 
 and the bitter enemy of the British ? " When we remarked," iays he, " in our 
 paper of yesterday, that private property had, in general, been /respected by the 
 enemy, we spoke what we believed ; greater respect was certair^ly paid to private 
 property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his ir'arauding parties ; 
 no houses were half as much plundered by the enemy as by the /Inavish rogues about 
 the town, who profited by the general distress." (National Intelligencer, Slst 
 August.) I shall close my quotations with one from the George Town paper, 
 8th September : — " The list of plunder and destruction, copied from a vile and 
 libellous print of that city (Washington) into several Federal papers, is a gross 
 and abominable fabrication, known to be such by every inliabitant s most of the 
 plunder was committed by rabble of the place, fostered among the citizens, and 
 subsequent to the departure of the British troops ; it is but justice to say, that the 
 British army preserved moderation and discipline, with respect to private property, 
 unexampled in the annals of war." 
 
 I have not, sir, the honour of a personal acquaintance with Mr Stuart, the 
 author of " Three Years in North America." I trust he will forgive me for 
 saying, that I think he has allowed himself to be imposed on by American mis- 
 statements, in almost every instance, where the operations of the British army 
 are describeii ; and that he will believe, I publish the above in no spirit of 
 hostility towards him, but simply, as far as in me lies, to put the character of my 
 fellow-soldiers in a true light before the eyes of their countrymen, in justice to 
 the memory of many brave men and valued friends, and in justice to that army 
 of which I was a member for nine-and-twenty years, and with which I served in 
 almost every quarter of the globe. — I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient 
 servant, 
 
 Norman Pringle, 
 Late Major 2 1st Royal Scots Fusileers. 
 
 LETTER IL 
 
 TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBUROII EVENING COURANT. 
 
 of its 
 
 13th November, 1833. 
 Sir, — In addressing this letter to you, I trust it will be found that I am 
 actuated by no motive but that which I declared in my letter published in your 
 paper of the 31st ultimo, namely, the strong desire of doing justice, in every 
 point of view, to the character of the British troops employed during the last 
 American War. Mr Stuart says, in his letter to you, •• I am therefore most 
 culpat'e if even a single material error in this part of my work can be pointed 
 out." Is it no material error to state that the British soldiery could not be 
 restrained from plundering private property, when there is direct evidence, both 
 British and American, to shew that such an accusation is not correct ? Is it no 
 material error to state that the British force at New Orleans was 12,000, and 
 the American only 3000 or 4000, when the reverse is much nearer the truth, as 
 
official documents run shew ? Is it no material error roundly to assert thnt the 
 British never reached the ditch, when there are many living witnesses to testify 
 that they did, and when even Amerieun authority eiui he produced to shew that, 
 the British not only reiu-hcd the ditch hut ^ot into their lines? 
 
 I hope Mr Stujrt will have the kindness to excuse me if I repeat, what, in 
 charity to him, I continue to tliink, that he has allowed himself to lie imposed on 
 by American mis-statements; and if any reli.ince is to he placed on official 
 documents, I hclicve I shall he enabled to shew that Mr Smart has bud bad 
 •".iformation respecting the Britinh troops employed in the United States. 
 
 Mr Stuart, in his letter to the Editors of the Conrant and Caledonian 
 M(!n'iiry, says, that I have impnj;Mcd his statement reurardin^' the behaviour of 
 the Britisli troops at Wasliinf,'toti. I shall now beg leave again to call in 
 question the coi reduces of his iti formation, come from what source it may, and, 
 in military phrase, break frcsli ground with hi;n, and the field shall be New 
 Orleans. 
 
 In vol. ii. page 253, of Mr Stuart's work, the author says, " The British are 
 understood to have had bi'twccn 10,000 and 12,000 men in this engagement, and 
 the Americans between :)000 and 4000." Now, sir, as I happened to have an 
 official return of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition, 
 I shall give the list : Mr Stuart can refer to the Horse Guards to know if I am 
 correct. The list is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines of 
 New Orleans, on the morning of the 8th January, 1815: — 4th foot, 747 ; 7th 
 do. 750 ; 21st do. 800 ; 43d do. 820 ; 44th do. 427 ; 85th do. 298 ; 93d do. 775 ; 
 95th do. 276 — making in all 4893 rank and file British; there remains to be 
 added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. For the amount of the American 
 force, I shall leave the public to draw the inference from Mr Stuart's own words, 
 merely stating, that I have now before me a very beautiful plan of the operations, 
 and of the American lines before New Orleans, executed by Major Lacarriere 
 Latour, principal engineer, 7ih military district, U. S. army, which line?, to use 
 the Major's own expression, "were a mile in length, and filled with men." In 
 vol. ii. page 952, Mr Stuart says, " General Jackson placed his riflemen, each of 
 whom had one, two, or three men behind him ;" and again he says, " the fire of 
 the American militia was most unintermitting — (no wonder) — the men in some 
 places ranged six deep." Now, sir, taking for grunted that Major Latour's plan 
 is most perfectly correct, and that Mr Stuart's information is in this instance 
 good, I shall split the difference with him, and allow the Americans to have 
 stood four deep, and each file at one yard distance from the other, (good elbow 
 room, as every soldier will allow,) there being 1760 yards in a mile, will make 
 the American force, by Mr Stuart's own account, amount to 7040. That the 
 Americans had many more men is my firm belief, as General Jackson was much 
 too skilful an officer to throw up lines a mile long, unless he had masses of men 
 to fill them ; and I am sure I shall be borne out by my brother officers in saying, 
 that such a torrent of fire (if I may so express it) as poured on the British troops 
 that day along the whole extent of the line, was, perhaps, never witnessed, not 
 even at St Sebastian. In page 253, Mr Stuart says, " the British never reached 
 the ditch." I think I can easily disprove this assertion, and by American 
 authority too. In consequence of an unfortunate mistake, the facines and ladders 
 had never reached the head of our column. Major-General Gibbs, leading on 
 the attack at the head of the 21st regiment, finding that the facines were not 
 forthcoming, ordered the two leading companies of the 21st regiment to move 
 forward in double quick time under Major Whitaker, the senior Major of the 
 regiment, for the purpose of making a lodgment in the ditch. Almost imme- 
 diately on giving this order. General Gibbs was mortally wounded, and, at the 
 same instant, the enemy commencing a destructive fire, our column was absolutely 
 mowed down. The smoke was so great that we could not see our two companies 
 which had been sent in advance ; but those brave men, under their gallant leader, 
 pressed on, got into the ditch, made steps with their bayonets in ths parapet, and 
 succeeded in getting into the American lines, where, from want of support, they were 
 made prisoners. There are many of the officers still alive who can vouch for 
 this fact. Major Whitaker was killed in climbing up the parapet. At the first 
 burst of the fire from the American lines, Colonel, now Sir William Paterson 
 
 % 
 
that thu 
 
 testify 
 liew that 
 
 what, in 
 posed on 
 II uflii-ial 
 
 hud bud 
 s. 
 
 iledonian 
 iivioiir of 
 u cut I in 
 may, and, 
 
 be New 
 
 ritish are 
 inent, and 
 ) have an 
 xpedition, 
 kV if I am 
 e lines of 
 747; 7th 
 
 1 do. 773 ; 
 lins to be 
 American 
 wn words, 
 iperations, 
 Lacarriere 
 \ef, to use 
 nen." In 
 
 n, each of 
 the fire of 
 n in some 
 our's plan 
 s instance 
 IS to have 
 ood elbow 
 will make 
 That the 
 was much 
 «es of men 
 i in saying, 
 tish troops 
 lessed, not 
 rer reached 
 American 
 )nd ladders 
 leading on 
 i were not 
 nt to move 
 ajor of the 
 lost imme- 
 and, at the 
 3 absolutely 
 I companies 
 lant leader, 
 arapet, and 
 :, they were 
 1 vouch for 
 At the first 
 (n Paterson 
 
 of the 2l8t, was badly wounded ; Major Aiexai.der James Ross Wu^ iilso most 
 severely wounded, from the effects of which lie never recovered, and died in 
 Edinburgh some years after. 
 
 The command of the '2Ist regiment devolved on the junior field officer. From 
 the effects of the tremendous fire, the advancing cuhimn was for a moment thrown 
 into confusion. Tlie comiiiauding officer of the regiment ordered a bugle to 
 sound the advance, called to the men to follow him, which they did with cheers. 
 They adviiMced to the ditch ; some of the men were already in it i the present 
 Lionteiiant General Sir Joim Kcaiie, with tliut g.illantry for which he is con- 
 spicuous, arrived, and, in the act of Icudin;? on and cheering the men, was badly 
 wounded, and carried off tiie field ; at tiie same instant, a stafF ollicer came up, 
 and ordered the officer commanding tlie 21st rc^iimcnt to collect the remtiunt of 
 his corps, and retreat to a wood in the rear. General Jackson in his despatch 
 says, *' Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness 
 wliich reflects upon them the highest credit. Twice the column which approached 
 my left was repulsed, and twice they formed again and renewed the assauft." 
 (Assault of whiit ? why, of the ditch and parapet.) And now, sir, from my 
 heart I thank Mr Stuart for giving me an opportunity of paying a tardy but just 
 tribute to the memory of one of my earliL-st and most esteemed friends — to one 
 of the bravest soldiers that ever drew u sword — I mean the late Brevet 
 Lieutenant- Colonel Reniiie of the 21st Scots Fusileers, nephew of the late Sir 
 David Btird. This officer had been wounded severely in the knee at the attack 
 on Washington, still more severely on landing at the attack on Baltimore. 
 Neither of these wounds were as yet healed, but nothing could prevent Rennie 
 ,^ from performing his duty. Sir Edward Packenham had given Colonel Rennie 
 "^ a separate command, for the jiurpose of acting on the American right Hank, and, 
 as I am unwilling to make the ]>ul>lic trust to the partial testimony of a friend, I 
 shall forego the privilege, and recount the gallantry of Colonel Rennie in the 
 words of his enemy, and I shall quote them from General Jackson's biographer, 
 (Mr Eaton) : — " Colonel Rennie, of the fusileers, was ordered to storm a redoubt 
 on the American right. Rennie executed his orders with great bravery, and 
 urging forwiiid, arrived at the ditch, and reaching the works, and passing the ditch, 
 Rennie, sword in hand, leaped on the wall, and culling to his troops, bade them 
 follow him. He had scaniely spoken, when he fell by the fatal aim of one of 
 our riflemen. Pressed by the impetuosity of superior numbers, who were 
 mounting the walls, and entering at the embrasures, our troops had retired to the line 
 in rear of the redoubt. To advance, or maintain the point gained, was equally 
 impracticable for the enemy. The situation of these brave fellows may be easily 
 conceived. They were nearly all killed or taken prisoners." 
 
 There is another circumstance connected with my gallant friend's death, which 
 I cannot refrain from relating, as it gave me then, and does now give me, the 
 greatest ple>is»re, to think that he was not only regretted by his friends, but that 
 ho, in his death, was honoured hy his foes. The night previous to the action of 
 the 8tli of January, Rennie said to me, " I am always hit, and in case I should 
 fall to-morrow, 1 bog you will use every endeavour to recover this ring, this 
 brooch with some hair in it, and my watch, and if you survive, deliver them to 
 my sister." After the attack on the lines of New Orleans had failed, a flag of 
 truce was sent from Sir John Lambert to General Jackson. I wrote a few lines 
 by the officer who carried it to the American general, mentioning my friendship 
 for Colonel Rennie, and his request to me. On the return of the flag of truce, 
 I received a polite message from General Jackson, saying that it gave him the 
 greatest pleasure to comply with any request made by the friend of such a gallant 
 soldier as Colonel Rennie — that he had taken care to protect his remains, and 
 to order for them an honourable grave. The watch, ring, and brooch, were all 
 returned to me. 
 
 Accustomed as we had been for years to oppose an honourable and a courteous 
 enemy, it was a green spot in the wilderness of American campaigning to find 
 one of the same stamp in the present President of the United States. 
 
 If, sir, I ha\ e expressed myself strongly, I have felt deeply. In that expedition 
 I lost three of my earliest and most intimate friends, and there is u bond of 
 afFection between those who have stood by each other in many a well-fought field 
 
T 
 
 h 
 
 M 
 
 which men in ordinary life run hardly know. I have now to apologize to you 
 and to the public for tri'RpasHing so long upon your time, hut I hope you will 
 both admit that it is a little too hard that men who are willing to Huffer every 
 privation, and to shed the la»t drop of their blood in the defence, or for the 
 honour of their country, should have their " good name filthM from tlicm" by 
 those who are (no disrespect to Mr Stuart) equally unwilling to allow and 
 unable to oppreciate their worth. I have the honour to be, wir, your obedient 
 tiervant, 
 
 NonMAN I'lllNGLE, 
 
 Lute J)Iajor2lst Uoyul Scots Fusileers. 
 
 LETTER III. 
 
 TO THE EOITOH OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 
 
 29/A Novmbcr, 1803. 
 Sir, — In addressing the following re-marks to the public, I do not now come 
 before it as merely wishing to defend the character of the British army from 
 aspersions which have been cast upon it, and trust I have not infringed the rules 
 of courtesy in not waiting longer for Mr Stuart's documents, but I wish to claim 
 for that portion of the combined British forces employed in the expedition to 
 !Nevv Orleans the merit they so well deserve. In tlic work already alluded to in 
 letters published by me in the Edinburgh newspapers, where the author has 
 thought it necessary to mention the failure of our attack on the lines of New 
 Orleans, I was in hopes I might have found some description of other circum- 
 stances connected with that expedition, but I um sorry to say there is no page 
 allotted to praise of the British seaman or British soldier in that work. Censure 
 alone finds ample room.^ Why are the unparalleled exertions of our seamen and 
 our soldiers withheld ? Why is the gallant action fought by Captain Lockyer 
 near the pass of the Rigolets with the enemy's gun-boats — why is the capture of 
 the whole of the American flotilla by that officer, with the boats of the British 
 fleet, withheld? Why is the action fought by our troops under Sir John Keane 
 (under every disadvantage) withheld ? After being exposed to the most severe 
 weather in open boats for nearly twenty-four hours, the troops landed on a shore 
 unknown to them, — they had laid down to rest in their bivouac, when, in the 
 darkness of the night, they were suddenly attacked by 5000 Americans under 
 General Jackson himself. (See Sir John Keane's despatch, December 28, 
 1814.) The British stood to their arms, repulsed the enemy at every point! 
 and took up a position in advance of the one originally held ! The action fought 
 by the troops and seamen under Colonel (nov/ General) Thornton, and which 
 action was completely successful, on the right bunk of the Mississippi — why is 
 this not mentioned ? I shall take the liberty of doing so in General Jackson's 
 own words, given in his despatch of iith January, 1813. The General says, 
 " These" (meaning the British) " having landed, were hardy enough to advance 
 against the works of General Morgan ; and, what is strange and difficult to 
 account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for, 
 the Kentucky reinforcements, in whom so much reliance had been placed, 
 ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the 
 forces, (about 1600,) and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position." 
 Well might the late Sir Alexander Cochrane say, in bis despatch to the Admi- 
 ralty, dated January 18, 1815, " That ihe hardships undergone by the seamen 
 and the troops had rarely been equalled." 1 will venture to assert, that in the 
 whole annals of his own glorious service, that respected admiral never knew the 
 combined energies of British seamen and British soldiers more severely put to 
 the test. All were animated by the same enthusiasm. Officers and soldiers, 
 admirals and seamen, were seen hauling on the same rope, and dragging at the 
 same gun. It is not for British soldiers nor British sailors, any more than other 
 mortals, to command success, but in this expedition they did deserve it. 
 
 I shall now speak of the retreat ot our troops from the American shores. It 
 will be naturally supposed that we were harassed to a degree by the enemy, — 
 
 I 
 
 f 
 
to you 
 you will 
 t-r every 
 r for tliu 
 icm" by 
 How und 
 obedient 
 
 tilecrs. 
 
 1883. 
 ow come 
 rmy from 
 tlie rules 
 
 to claim 
 L*(lition to 
 ided to in 
 utbor has 
 
 of New 
 r circum- 
 I no page 
 
 Censure 
 lamen und 
 
 Loc'kyer 
 capture of 
 lie British 
 ihn Keane 
 ost severe 
 on a shore 
 en, in the 
 uns under 
 ember 28, 
 ery point! 
 :ion fought 
 and which 
 i — why is 
 Jackson's 
 iieral says, 
 to advance 
 diflicult to 
 ooked for, 
 len placed, 
 der of the 
 e position." 
 the Admi- 
 :he seamen 
 that in the 
 r knew the 
 rely put to 
 d soldiers, 
 ;ing at the 
 ! than other 
 t. 
 
 shores. It 
 ; enemy, — 
 
 that be followed up his victory in the lines by driving uh before him, and 
 8'.vccping us from the face of the eartli. No, General .lackson knew better than 
 to leave his stronghold, — it was the |)ruyer of every soldier that he would do so. 
 The IJritish lion had, indeed, been sorely stricken, but he was the lion still. 
 Well has it been said by the eloquent author of the I'cninsular War, — " A 
 Briti!«li army may be gleaned, but it caiuiot be reaped." We remained until tho 
 18th in our original position, and commenced our retreat on the evening of thut 
 day, — a retreat equally honouralile to the general commanding, (Lieutenant- 
 General Sir John Lambert,) and to the holdiers under him. 
 
 It is easy for gentlemen to sit at home and criticise the operations of an army 
 or the movements of a fleet, — they little know the ordeal to be passed ere thut 
 victory is won which may bring sorrow or rejoicing to their lireside. Hut the 
 liritish public may rest assured that its seamen and its soldiers are ever the 
 same. On the shores of the Mediterranean as on the banks of the Mississippi, 
 one feeling alone animates them — the faithful discharge of their duty. 
 *' England expects every man to do his duly ; " or the simple but characteristic 
 appeal of the greatest (Captain of ANY agi: — " What will they say in England ? " 
 these are signals British seamen and British soldiers will fly to ans'ver. These 
 AUK watch-words they will cheer to ! Look on the deck of the Victory ! look 
 oti the field of Corunna ! or on the green turf, the humble death-bed of the 
 humblest soldier — one sentiment pervades them all. Listen to the last sob 
 of the dying man, and in it you will find u whispered hope that he has done his 
 duty ! It is also very easy for gentlemen, either in books or in House of 
 Commons harangues, to send forth to the world systems hyi»othc; 'ally got up 
 for the proper management of British soldiers, to tell us that thi.s puniishment is 
 right and that wrong. I will take leave to tell those gentlemen, they do not, 
 they cannot know, the true character of u British soldier. They must have 
 served with him for years — they must have studied the dispositions of individuals 
 of the three countries from whence the British ranks are recruited — they must 
 have feasted with him to-day, and fasted with him to-morrow — they must have 
 dwelt with him in palaces, and couched with him in hovels — they must have 
 stretched their limbs with him on the sands of Egypt, or in the swamps of 
 Louisiana — they must have witnessed his utter contempt of all danger und hard- 
 ship, his perfect devotedncss to the cause in which he is embarked — they must 
 have shared with him the triumph of victory or the mortitication of defeat ! 
 Then, and not till then, can I admit them to be proper judges of the character 
 of a British soldier. 
 
 I shall conclude this communication, as I commenced my correspondence, by 
 stating, that I have no motive but that of doing justice to my fellow-soldiers in 
 every point of view. With whatever spirit of hostility I might have fought in 
 1815, in 1833 I write with none. As I have before stated, we ever found in 
 General Jackson an honourable and a courteous enemy, and all our prisoners 
 were tieated with kindness and generosity. I shall venture again to assure the 
 author of " Three Years in North America," thut he hus been misled, and I 
 would fain flutter myself thut one day he will admit it. In the meantime our 
 cause is before the public ; to it I look for judgment, and with submission will 
 await the verdict, whether for those who have mude the charges, or for him who 
 very humbly has offered the defence. I have the honour to be, your obedient 
 servant, 
 
 Norman Pringlk, 
 Late Major 2 let Scots Fusileers. 
 
 LETTER IV. 
 
 9 
 
 TO THE EUITOK OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 
 
 January 24, 1834. 
 Sir, — In answering portions of a pamphlet just published by Mr Stuart, 
 purporting to be " A Refutation of Aspersions on Stuart's Three Years in 
 America, " I a.n afraid I shall be obliged to trouble you with more than one 
 
h ' 
 
 Iftter, but I ithuil muko each ai brief as eircumntunces will alluw. In the Hmt 
 plucv, Mr Stuurt myt*, thut "if I had allowed his buok to speuk for itself, 
 iriMtcad of giving my reudern piirtiid extructn from hiti iiiirrative, it would have 
 been hardly requisite for him to nay u word in vindication of it." Ho farther 
 states, that " the quotatiotin are ohviouHly extracted with a view to serve u 
 purpose." Undoubtedly tliey were ko, and the purpoNe wiih to contradict certain 
 HNHcrtions made by \[r Stuart in his work, and which I have quoted in uiy 
 letters already publiHiicd ; and why Mr Stuart hlamcH me for not quoting more 
 largely, I am really at a loss to under>tand. Mr Sluart'ri book was before the 
 public, and tho^e who wished to read it had the opportunity of doing so for 
 months before the publication of my letters. In that book I found aKHertions 
 derogatory to the character of that part of the IJritish army with which I acted 
 in America, and thc^e H«xertionN I contradicted. In page 12 of the pamphlet, 
 Mr Stuart sayn, "that I neither defend the proceedings at Washington, nor call 
 in question the propriety of his remuiUs — cxcupt in so far as concerns the private 
 property de8t"o;'pd by the soldiery, and the dentructioii of the bi'dge across the 
 Potomac." * .', I did not profess to do more. With regard to the merit or 
 demerit of the expedition to Washington I h.ive nothing to say. With regard tu 
 the burning and destroying public buildings, or what nuty have been considered 
 public property, I have nothing to suy. i\Iy sole object was to shew that Mr 
 Stuart's Htatemeut was incorrect when he declared that the liritish noldiery could 
 not be restrained from ptumlerimj at Washington. In my letter to you of the 
 29th of October, I stated that I was in command of a small force sent to 
 Washington for the porpose of protecting private property ; that I rema'ned in 
 possession of the city from the evening of the 24lh to the morning of I'le 2ath, 
 when I returned to the bivouac of the army, two miles from the ci^y. I will 
 a;^ain assert, that during my occupation of the city no private poperty was 
 plundered by the soldiery. The army, with the exception of my small detach- 
 ment, and those employed in the destruction of public buildings, was in bivouac 
 two miles from the city, where it remained until the evening of the 2oth. Page 
 14, " Mr Stuart says that my testimony comes no farther down than to eight 
 o clock of the morning of the 25th. It is, therefore, good for nothing. Every 
 house in Washington might have been plundered between ei{;ht o'clock in the 
 morning and the night of the 25th, when General Ross commenced retiring." 
 If the plunder of private property did commence after my leaving the city, it 
 must have done so under the eye of General Ross himself, which I think Mr 
 Stuart will hardly venture to iiffirm. From what I know of the character of 
 General Ross, I am convinced had any soldier been found plundering, or in any 
 way molesting an unoffending citizen, in twelve hours he would have been shot, 
 and the whole army must have known it. I beg JMr Stuart clearly to understand, 
 that my orders from General Ross were, to let no stragglers from the army, on 
 any condition, enter Washington ; hut I had nothing to do with detachments of 
 men employed under the commiind of other oflicers in the destruction of public 
 buildings, or what might have been considered public properly. In page 13 of 
 the pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Major Pringle would have us to believe, that 
 he was omnipresent in u city above four miles long, and of very considerable 
 breadth." 
 
 This sounds very well, until we fmd that the city contained, at that time, 
 about 400 houses ; and therelcre I think it will be allowed, that 100 well 
 disciplined British soldiers, under the immediate eye of their oflicers, could 
 insure the safety of the inhabitants f and that they did do so, I will again prove by 
 American testimony. The Columbian Centinel of the 31st of August says, 
 " The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable 
 citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under the date of August 29th, 
 says, " The enemy, I learn, treated the inhabitants of Washington well." T4ie 
 George Town paper of 8th September suys, " The list of plunder and destruc- 
 tion, copied from a vile and libellous print of tl.at city, (Washington,) into 
 several Federal papers, is a gross and abominable lalsilicution, known to be such 
 by every inhabitant. Most of the plunder was committed by the rabble of the 
 place fostered among the citizens. The Eiitish army, it is no more than justice to 
 say, preserved a moderation r.nd discipline, with respect to jirivati persons and 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 property, uiifxatiiplfd in tho unniilM ot' war." Mr Stuiirt complains of my 
 iinfiiiriii'Ns ill not quoting Mr GiiUh' >v|ioIc pRra^riipli. Mr Stiiiirt \h quite 
 welcomo to the t'lili heiiclit of it nil. Mr (»Hlt!s miys, " TIutl- wort', howovor, 
 Ncvonil privaie buildiiiKN wantonly dt'Htroyfd, and moiiiu of those pcrNoim who 
 rLMnuined in the city were KeitndahMi«iy innltreated ;" mid what cvideiiee is there 
 liere thiit tlie " liiiavisli roBnett" Mr (iaIeM already mentions were not tiio 
 perpetrutorH of these seandaloiis proeeedinKs? as it is well Unown in siieli times 
 every advanta},'e i.s taken of the eoiifiiNion and panie wliieh rei^n. The latter 
 paragraph of Mr (rales' lemaiks, legardiiiK Admiral Coekbiiiii, is lienealli notice, 
 for which, Hue |)amplilet, page 18. With respect to the desirnction of the 
 bridge, I again repeat, that it was u pnidunt military measure. A very small 
 British force had penetrated u con ,iderable distance into an enemy's country, 
 they colli. 1 not know from what (luarfcr u large force might be brought against 
 them. 
 
 In page "24 of the pamphlet are these words, " Major Fringle woul.l have the 
 world to believe that the Uritisli, on alt occasianii, respected private property." I 
 have read my former letters over, and I cannot find any expression in them which 
 wurr lilts this remark — I cannot plead guilty to such an absurdity. Mr Stuart 
 goes on to say, "but it is hardly possible that he can be ignorant of all that was 
 taking place iiroiind him." Mr Stiiurt then carries me oH' bodily from Washington 
 to Alfcxaiidria on the Potomac, to Captain Gordon and tlie Sea-horse, to 15,U(N) 
 barrels of tloiir ! and 800 hogsheads of tobacco ! What lias that to do with Mr 
 Stuart's assertion that the British soldiery couM not be restrained from plunder 
 tit Washington. What impression does Mr Stuart suppose the world in general 
 would have of an army whose soldiery could not be teslrainrd frum plunder / 
 Why — that such an army had become an ungovernable rabble ; that the men had 
 shaken ofT the restraint of discipline, and set at nought the authority of their 
 oflicers ; that they had delivered themselves over to evry sjieeies of enormity 
 which an excited soldiery can commit. Does Mr Stuart mean to say, that this 
 was the state of the army under General Koss, at Washington ? He cannot 
 believe it, the public will uot believe it. Mr Stuart accuses me of only quoting 
 those |)arts of documents which suit my purpose. What does he think of the 
 following specimen of his own candour ? In page 20 of the pamphlet, he says, 
 " INIajor Priiigle cannot be ignorant that Sir Alexander Cochrane's celebrated 
 communication to the American Government, uiiiunincing that it was his purpose 
 to employ the force under bis direction in * destroying and laying waste such 
 towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable,' became a subject 
 of a proclamatidii by the President of America." Mr Stuait has (pioted part of 
 Sir Alexander Cochrane's letter. I shall give the wfivle. '* From Vice- 
 Admiral Cochrane to Mr Muiiroe. — Sir, — Having been called on by the 
 Governor- General of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into tfTect measures of 
 retaliation against the inhabitants of the United Stales, for the wanton destruction 
 committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty, 
 con/brmab!y with the nature of the Governor- General's application, to issue to 
 the naval force, under my command, an ordtr to lay waste such towns and 
 districts upon the coast as may be found assailable. I hud hoped that this 
 contest would have terminated without my being obliged to resort to severities 
 which are contrary to the usages of civilized warfare ; and as it has been with 
 extreme reluctance and concern that I have found myself compelled to adopt 
 this system of devastation, I shall be equally gratified if the conduct of the 
 executive of the- United Slates will authorize my slaying such proceedings, by 
 making reparation to the si/^^-W//^' inhubitunts of Upper Ciinada; thereby mani. 
 festiiig, that if the destructive measiiris pursued by this army were ever sanctioned, 
 they will no longer be permitted by the Government, I have the honour," &c. 
 
 In Mr Stuart's book, page 87 of volume second, he mentions the following 
 circumstance: — He says, " They (the Americans) were not at the time aware 
 that it was to Sir George C ockburn they were indebted for the vi-it of the 
 British to Washington ; and it was upon the brave and amiable General Ross, 
 who afterwards fell in the attack upon Baltimore, that they intended to retaliate 
 for the devastation at Washington ! It was resolved to send a fast sailing armed 
 vessel to the coast of Ireland, to destroy Ross Trevor, the beautiful property 
 
10 
 
 belonging to General Ross. A party were to land in the night at the entrance 
 of Carlingford Bay ; they were to burn the house upon' the mountain, and the 
 village below. The peace put an end to this de!:ign, which was, however, 
 seriously entertained." I"deed ! Magnanimous resolution of this brave and 
 generous nation ! A set uf men were to cross the Atlantic with all the malice 
 prepense of premeditated marauders and incendiaries, fur the purpose of attacking 
 the property of an unoffending and defenceless woman; whose husband, by the 
 time th' - design could have been put in execution, bad fallen, in the hour of 
 victory, and with his last breath had recommended "a young unprovided family 
 to the protection of his king and country." See Colonel Brooke's despatch after 
 the action before Baltimore. I trust that it is unnecessary for me to tell Mr 
 Stuart that I do not quote this passage as receiving from him countenance or 
 support in any way. i am quite sure that he is as inv.'apable as any man alive of 
 receiving it in any other light than thiit of unqualified detestation ; but let us 
 hear no more of these sticklers for the '" usages of civilized warfare." I have 
 the honour to be, sir, your obliged liutnble servant, 
 
 Norman Puingle, 
 Late Major 21bt Foot. 
 
 LETTER V. 
 
 TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COUHANT. 
 
 ii 
 
 ■ n 
 
 'H 
 
 •' i Edinburgh, '25th January, 1834. 
 
 Sir, — Having now answered Mr Stuart's objections to my statement regarding 
 Washington, I proceed to defend the accuracy of those I made respecting the 
 attack on the lines of New Orleans. In page 32 of Mr Stuart's pam])hlet, he 
 says, " It is not by the perusal of garbled and partial extracts from my work, or 
 the documentary evidence which supports it, that my statements are to be judged 
 of." I have already said, that in Mr Stuart's work 1 found statements regarding 
 the British army serving in the United States which I did not think correct, and 
 I quoted those passages for the purpose of bringing them before the public and 
 refuting them. In page 48 of the pamphlet, with reference to my list of the 
 number of British troops engaged on the 8th of January, on the attack of the 
 lines before New Orleans, are these words, " I confess that the first perusal of 
 the very distinct testimony thus afforded by a gentleman who, upon the occasion 
 to which his evidence relates, was himself acting as a field officer, startled me, 
 and led me to think that I must have relied on defective information ; but upon 
 again consulting the oflicial documents to which I had recourse in writing this 
 first part of my work, 1 am glad to be able to prove that it is Major Pringle who 
 is in error, and that my information was not only correct, but is supported by a 
 mass of authorities." For the remainder, see pamphlet, page 49. In my letter 
 to you, sir, of the 13ih November, 1833, I mention that I have an official return 
 of every regiment employed on the expedition to New Orleans. I then stated 
 that the list I gave is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines 
 at New Orleans, on the morning of the 8th of January. Then follows a list of 
 the regiments employed in the attack, making 4893 rank and file British. There 
 remains to he added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. See my two letters. 
 In page 50 of t\.e panr-phlet, Mr Stuart says, "Nothing is better known to a 
 military .nan than that the rank and file of a regiment, or of an army, comprehend 
 merely the men armed with the bayonet, and that the whole of the officers, non- 
 commissioned officers, the staff of the army, military as well as medical, the 
 drum-major, drummers, pipers, &c. are not comprehended under that description. 
 This is a serious objection to Major Pringle's detailed and conclusive information, 
 as it is termed by you ; but it is a slight objection, compared with those which 
 are to follow." Sir, in giving a list of the British infantry employed on the 
 attack of the lines before New Orleans, I, as a matter of course, designate them 
 as rank and file, being, what I believe every military man will allow, the fighting 
 part of a regiment. It may be a st 'r\x--\:^ proposition to the author of " Three 
 Years in North America" to hear an old campaigner declare that he does not 
 consider the officers a fighting part of a regiment, and that any officer who goes 
 
11 
 
 3 entrance 
 1, and the 
 however, 
 brave and 
 the malice 
 ■ iittuckinfif 
 id, by the 
 e hour of 
 led family 
 patch after 
 to tell Mr 
 onunce or 
 tin alive of 
 )ut let us 
 " I have 
 
 [NGLE, 
 
 st Foot. 
 
 tj, 1834. 
 t regardini^ 
 )ecting the 
 nphlct, he 
 Y work, or 
 
 be judged 
 I regarding 
 orrect, and 
 public and 
 list of the 
 »ck of the 
 perusal of 
 e occasion 
 tirtled me, 
 
 but upon 
 riting this 
 ringlo who 
 orted by a 
 I my letter 
 cial return 
 len stated 
 the lines 
 a list of 
 <h. There 
 vo letters, 
 lown to a 
 )mprehend 
 cers, non- 
 sdical, the 
 escription. 
 formation, 
 lose which 
 /ed on the 
 [nate them 
 he fiyhting 
 )f " Three 
 e does not 
 
 who goes 
 
 into action determined to fight with his own proper hand, is not fit for the 
 situation he holds ; it is his duty to pay excluHive attention to his men, to see 
 that they are so held in hand, as to be enabled promptly to obey any orders he 
 may require to give, emanating from himself or from his superior officer. The 
 duty of the serjuants is the same ; and in my day they| were annod with a halbert, 
 which, against an enemy carrying muskets, could not be considered a very offensive 
 weapon. It certainly would be new to me, to include medical men with their 
 lancets, or musicians with their clarionets, in the list of fighting men. I have 
 always understood it to be the duty of the one to carry off the wounded, and of 
 the other to attend them. The only error I have committed is in placing the 
 85th regiment in the list of British infantry employed in the attack of the lines 
 before New Orleans ; this admirable corps was under the immediate command 
 of their own most distinguished commanding officer. Colonel Thornton, on the 
 other side of the Mississippi. I have, by including them in my list, made the 
 amount of British infantry attacking the lines greater, by 298 rank and file, (the 
 strength of the 85th,) than it ought to be. 
 
 I now proceed, sir, to give a list of the killed and wounded in every corps 
 employed on both sides of the river on the 8th of January, to shew what 
 regiments bore the bruJit of the action. On that day — 4th foot, 1 ensign, 
 2 Serjeants, 39 rank and file killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 5 captains, 
 1 1 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 1 staff, 9 Serjeants, 222 rank and file wounded ; 1 lieu- 
 tenant, 1 Serjeant, 53 rank and file missing. 1th foot reserve, 1 major, 1 captain, 
 1 Serjeant, 38 rank ".nd file killed ; 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 47 rank 
 and file wounded. 21st foot — 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 se^jeants, 
 65 rank and file killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 2 lieutenants, 6 Serjeants, 
 
 1 drummer, 144 rank and file wounded ; 2 captains, 7 lieutenants, 8 Serjeants, 
 
 2 drummers, 217 rank and Jile missing, taken prisoners inside the American lines. 
 43d foot reserve — 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 8 rank and file killed ; 2 lieutenants, 
 
 3 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded ; 1 captain, 5 rank and file 
 missing. 44th foot — 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 s'^-rjeant, 32 rank and file killed ; 
 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 5 Serjeants, 149 rank and file wounded; 
 1 lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 76 rank and file missing. 8.')th foot, on the 
 right bank of the river — 2 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 lieutenant, 
 
 3 Serjeants, 2 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded , 1 rank and file missing. 
 93d foot — 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains, 2 serjeants, 5H rank and file killed; 
 
 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 17 serjeants, 3 drummers, 848 rank and file wounded ; 
 3 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 99 rank and file missing. 95th foot — 
 1 Serjeant, 10 rank and file killed ; 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 5 serjeants, 89 rank 
 and file wounded. Royal marines — 2 rank and file killed ; 1 captain, 2 lieu- 
 tenants, 1 Serjeant, 12 rank and file woundfd. Royal navy — 2 seamen killed; 
 1 captain, 18 seamen wounded. 1st West '. ndia regiment — 5 rank and file killed ; 
 1 captain 2 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 2 serjeants, IG rank and file wounded ; 1 rank 
 and file missing. 5th West India regiment — 1 Serjeant wounded. Royal 
 Artillery on both sides — 5 rank and file killed ; 10 rank and file wounded. 
 Royal engineers, sappers and miners — 3 rank and Jile wounded. The 14th dragoons 
 are not mentioned in the list, they having none either killed or wounded. That 
 Sir John Lambert thanked the officers commanding the Royal Anillery, the 
 14th dragoons, the West India regiments, the sappers and miners, the seamen 
 nnd marines, — that he thanked every individual belonging to all these corps, for 
 the manner in which every duty, of whatever kind, had been performed by them, 
 for " an assiduity" (I quote the General's own words) " and perseverance, beyond 
 all example, by all ranks, and the most hearty co-operation which existed between 
 two services," is well known to me. Rut I wish to ask the author of " Three 
 \ ears in North America," of what use would dragoons have been in an attack on 
 lines situated in very wet ground, with a parapet of great height, and a deep ditch 
 into the bargain ? — of what use would artillery have been in an action where the 
 troops were to march as fast as consisted with good order, to the attack of lines 
 yvhere they were immediately to come in close contact with their enemy? — Would 
 it not have been an equal chance whether they destroyed friend or foe ? The 
 same holds good with respect to sappers and miners, as far as regards an attacking 
 force against the lines of New Orleans. The list in my second letter is of 
 

 f E 
 
 . 
 
 12 
 
 British infantry employed in the attack of the lines of New Orleans ; the above 
 list of killed and wounded will shew that my statement as to the attacking force 
 is correct. On bf)th sides of the river the force ready for action was about 7300. 
 Colonel Thornton luid of that number 298 rank and file of the 85th regiment, 
 600 seamen and marines, the 5th West India regiment, which Mr Stuart says 
 " he believes was the strongest that landed on the shores of Louisiana," and 4 
 pieces of artillery ; and if the whole British army had been on the right bank of 
 the Mississippi, I could not iiave included it as being a part of the force which 
 attacked the lines in front of New Orleans. I of course cannot prove by any 
 well authenticated account the precise amount of the American force within the 
 lines of New Orleans ; and if I were to take the reports of Mr Ducros, and 
 other American prisoners, I mi,t?ht give their statement that there were 13,000 or 
 14,000 troops within the city of New Orleans ; but I do not wish to avail myself 
 of testimony which might have been given with a view to intimidate, by exag- 
 gorating the force we had to encounter. I shall now endeavour to prove that 
 General Jackson's lines were about a mile long, and that they were filled with 
 men. I have no hesitation in saying that I take the authority of Major Latotir 
 as the very best which can be had ; he was the tngineer officer who constructed 
 the lines, and must have been perfectly acquainted with their extent. He must 
 have known to a yard what it really was. and I have already s(jid that General 
 Jackson was much too skilful an officer to construct such lines unless he had 
 men to fill them, as it is obvious j°o common sense thiit in as much as defences 
 are extensive, so do they become weak, if not guarded by troops within them. 
 In page 59 of the pamphlet, Mr StUiU't says, " Latour's calculation of the length 
 of his line, may perhaps be explained by a statement of Levasseur, though, if 
 his explaiin/ion be correct, it will not redound to tlie candour of JVIiijor Pringle, 
 who, having accompanied the army, could not fail to know the real state of the 
 case. Levasseur's information, iiowever, is probably correct, for he mentions that 
 the details were given to him on the spot, and that he was possessed of Latour's 
 memoirs." " The position (he writes) chosen by the American General to wait 
 for reinforcements, and to arrest the advance of so formidable an enemy, appeared 
 to me judicious. He threw up intrenchments about five miles below the city, 
 along an old canal, the left of which was lost in the depths of a swampy wood, 
 whilst the right rested on the river. The total length of the line was about 
 eight hundred toises, but as three hundred toises up the left were unassailable, 
 the eneniy was confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and 
 obliged to advance in full view over a perfectly level plain." See pamphlet, 
 page 60, for the latter part of this paragraph in which Mr Stuart mentions a toise 
 to be two yards. 
 
 Now, sir, I shrill jjroceed to show that the swamp or wooded marsh towards 
 the left of the American lines, and in front of them, was not impassable. Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Rennie, of the 21st regiment, having himself reconnoitered the 
 wood, made a report to General Gibbs, oflTering to conduct a body of troops 
 through it. General Gibbs no sconer heard Colonel Rennie's report, than he 
 accompanied him to the Commander of the forces, Sir E. Packenham. The 
 consequence was, that, on the 28th of December, a demonstration of the whole 
 army was ordered, and Colonel Rennie, in command of his own light company 
 of the 21st regiment, was ordered to penetrate into the wood, as far as he could, 
 and gain tlie enemy's left. He executed his orders in the most admirable manner, 
 succeeded in getting the whole of his men through, and debouched from the wood 
 upon the American left. According to the orders he had received, he kept 
 up a brisk fire until he was desired to retire. Sir Edward Packenham, not 
 thinking himself authorized to attack such strong lines with his very small force, 
 withdrew his troops, determined to wait the arrival of the 7th and 43d regiments, 
 which reached us on the 6th of J; nuary. On the 8th of January, Jiieutenant- 
 Colonel Jones, of the 4th regiment, was put in command of a body of troops, I 
 believe about 400, to make his way through the wood and gain the enemy's left 
 flank ; in fact, to pursue the route, as nearly as possible, which Colonel Rennie 
 had done on the 28th. Colonel Jones succeeded, as Colonel Rennie bad done, 
 in conducting his force through the swamp, debouched at the same spot, but found 
 the line of defence in a very different condition from what it had been on the 
 
 I 
 
t 
 
 ; the above 
 tcking force 
 bout 7300. 
 I regiment, 
 Stuart says 
 iiu," and 4 
 ht bunk of 
 >rce which 
 ve by any 
 svithin the 
 ucros, and 
 
 13,000 or 
 vaii myself 
 , by exag- 
 prove that 
 tilled with 
 or Latoiir 
 oiistructed 
 
 lie must 
 it General 
 ss he had 
 s defences 
 hin them, 
 the length 
 though, if 
 »r Pringle, 
 itte of the 
 itions that 
 )f Latour's 
 ;ral to wait 
 r, appeared 
 V the city, 
 npy wood, 
 was about 
 assailable, 
 toises, and 
 
 pamphlet, 
 sns a toise 
 
 ih towards 
 le. Lieu- 
 litered tlie 
 ' of troops 
 t, than he 
 am. The 
 the whole 
 t company 
 i be could, 
 le manner, 
 I the wood 
 1, he kept 
 nham, not 
 mall force, 
 regiments, 
 ieutenant- 
 ' troops, I 
 lemy's left 
 el Rennie 
 had done, 
 , but found 
 ;en on the 
 
 18 
 
 28th. The enemy having now found, that what they had ronsidered (previous 
 to the demonstration) an impassable morass, was no hinderance to our troops ; had, 
 between the 28th of December and the 8th of January so fortifiud this, the left 
 of their line, as to make it perhaps the most formidable of their whole position. 
 Colonel Jones fell, mortally wounded, gallantly leading on his men, composed of 
 detachments of the 4th, or King's Own, 21st regiment, and 95th rilles ; but no 
 effort of his troops could surmount the difficulties opposed to them of a high 
 parapet, deep ditch, and skilful ritlemen to defend tliem. I here subjoin the 
 copy of a letter which I liav,,' received within these few days from Lieutenant- 
 Colonel the hoiiom-ahle James Sinel;iir, at that time an olHcer in the 21st 
 regiment, and who acccompanied Colonel Rennie with t e light company of the 
 2lst regiment during the demonstration on the 28th of December, and also was 
 attached to the 400 men under Colonel Jones of the 4th on the 8th of January : — 
 
 " Edinbunjh, January 27, 1834. 
 " Mv Dkar Pringlk, — On the evening of the 27th of December, our ever to 
 be lamented friend, Lieutenant- Colonel Rennie, in whose company I was, 
 received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed with his own company, 
 and endeavour to make his way through the wood, and turn the enemy's left. 
 Accordingly, on the morning of the 28th we proceeded, and entered the wood, 
 and made our way with some difficulty, owing to the thickness of jhe wood and 
 swampy ground. We kept still moving forward cautiously, until we heard two 
 shots, and saw two of our advance fall, cii which we dashed on, and found 
 ourselves among some huts, which were occupied by the enemy. We continued 
 to exchange for some time a pretty hot fire. Colonel Rennie, perceiving that 
 the firing of our guns on bis left had ceased, (the signal for him to retire,) 
 commenced his retreat slowly, bringing our wounded with us. We got back 
 nearly the same way as we advanced, and returned with the main body to the 
 camp. On the morning of the 8th of January, I was ordered with the light 
 company of the 2 1st to join a brigade of between 400 or 500 men — the whole 
 under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. We were ordered to proceed in 
 the same manner and to the same place we had got to before. After pushing 
 throuj^h the wood, with great difficulty, we approached that part of the encny's 
 line we formerly found unprotected. A tremendous fire of grape and musketry 
 was opened on us, which killed and wounded u great many men, and we found, 
 with all our efforts, that on this part of the line it was impossible to make any 
 impression. Jones was wounded towards the enemy's extreme left, when 
 cheering on his men. We remained under tire a considerable time, and made 
 several vain attempts to get over, when a staff officer came up, itnd ordered us 
 to retire into the wood. From the moment we came out of the wood, in 
 our advance, the whole of the American line from right to left seemed one 
 sheet of fire, and it never ceased for an instant : as far as I could see, the 
 men appeared to be in crowds. I have always understood that the Ami rican 
 lines in front of New Orleans were towards a mile in length. Yours, with much 
 regard, (Signed) " Jas. Sinclaiu, 
 
 Major, H. P." 
 
 I have, sir, already taken notice, at page 59 of the pamphlet, where Mr Stuart 
 gives the information of Levasseur as being probably correct. We find in this 
 quotation, that Levasseur says, " The length of this line was about eight hundred 
 toises, but as three hundred toises of the left were unassailable, the enemy was 
 confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and obliged to 
 advance in full view over a perfectly level plain." 
 
 I have shewn, sir, by the above letter from an officer who accompanied not 
 only Lieutenant- Colonel Renr-e on the day of his reconnoisance, but forr^ed, 
 with the company to which he belonged, part of the force sent to attack the 
 enemy's left on the morning of the 8th, that it was not wcessary for the British 
 " to confine their attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and be obliged to 
 advance in full view over a perfectly level plain ;" that I have proved that a 
 considerable force, under Colonel Jones, did advance under cover of the wood, 
 passed through it, and arrived at that part of the enemy's line which, previous to 
 the 28th December, was considered by Levasseur and the Americans as unassailable, 
 but which, or ♦he 8th of January, was attacked by the force under Colonel Jones 
 and found to be full of men, and as strong as any other part of the position. I 
 
14 
 
 w 
 
 \ ■■■. 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 U' ! 
 
 therefore say, that the American line of defence before New Orleans was, by 
 Levosseur's own words, (Mr Stuart's authority,) eight hundred toises, or sixteen 
 hundred yards, the three hundred toises not being unassailable, as found by the 
 attack under Colonel Jones. Thus making, after all, Levasseur's measurement 
 '^ithin 160 yards of Major Latour's, with this difference, that Mr Stuart says, 
 page 39, that " Levasseur's information is probably correct." 
 
 With respect to the numb-jr of men composing the American force within the 
 lines, I, of course, can have no certain mode of calculation ; but convinced, as I 
 have always been, from every authority I could obtain, that the American lines 
 were towards a mile long, and considering that General Jackson could not know 
 in what quarter of his line he was to be attacked, it was necessary for him to be 
 equally prepared at every point ; and as Mr Stuart has allowed in his book, page 
 292, that the Americans " ranged in some places six deep," I have a right to 
 assume that, as the nature of the ground was nearly the same on which the lines 
 were formed, so was it necessary to have them equally well lined with men ; and 
 since Mr Stuart nrjects my former calculation, I will abide by his. He says, 
 " six deep in some places ;" they might have been eight in others ; it does not at 
 all follow that the tiles are to melt away to suit a particular purpose, there they 
 stand sijc deep ; and giving up even the odd hundred and sixty yards between 
 Levasseur and Latour, six times sixteen hundred will come to more than my 
 former calculation. 1 have always understood, from officers present at that 
 action, and who had gone through the Peninsular war, (therefore no bad judges,) 
 that from the extent of the line, and the tremendous Are kept up, the Americans 
 must have had from eight to ten thousand men within it. I now, sir, come to 
 that part of " Three Years in North America," where the author says, the 
 British never reached the ditch. At puge 238, are these words, " The British 
 never reached the ditch " and in page Gl of the pamphlet, the author says, " It is 
 obvious to every one who reads my narrative with attention, that it is ordy by a 
 forced construction, that it can be held to maintain that the British in no part of 
 the action readied the ditch." The second paragraph, detailing Sir Edward 
 PackenhanCs attach, contains no srich impression. It is in the third which relates 
 to the contituiation of the attach by General Gibbs and Keane, that the assertion is 
 contained, that the British did not reach the ditch. Now, sir, any one acquainted 
 with the details of the action before New Orleans, is aware, that oiu* most gallant 
 Commander-in-Chief lost his life in an early part of the action, and before it was 
 almost possible that the men could have reached the ditch ; and it was when he 
 was in front of the men, cheering them on, that he lost his valuable life. 
 Subsequent to his death, owing to the example and exertion of General Gibbs, 
 the column which he headed, and where he fell, were brought up to the ditch, the two 
 leading companies of the 21st regiment, under Major Whitaker got into the ditch, 
 and were taken prisoners inside the lines. The individual who now addresses 
 you, with the remainder of the 21st regiment, was close to the ditch, some of 
 his men were in it, when General Sir John Keane came up encouraging the men, 
 but almost instantly fell, severely wounded, at the same moment a staff officer 
 arrived, and ordered the ofdcer commanding the 2Ist regiment to retire with his 
 men. See my second letter. I have thus shewn, sir, that the author of " Three 
 Years in North America" has been misinformed even with respect to the period 
 of the action at which the British did reach the ditch ; but he has distinctly 
 stated, in page 238, that the British never reached the ditch. He now says, 
 indeed, that he never meant to deny that a few rash men did reach the ditch. 
 Does Mr Stuart mean to say that two companies of the 21st regiment, with all 
 the officers that belonged to them, were only a few rash men ? General Jackson 
 states, in his despatch, that he took 300 prisoners. It is notorious to every one, 
 that the Americans were never on the outside of their lines And were these 
 prisoners then, in Mr Stuart's estimation, only a few rash men ? I leave the 
 public to judge of the word never. At page 60 of the pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, 
 " I find myself charged with not having thought it necessary, in noticing the 
 failure of the attack on the lines at New Orleans, to give any description of 
 other incidents connected with the expedition." Mr Stuart is quite right ; I 
 ought not to have expected that he would take notice of the actions I mention, 
 as he very probably never heard of them ; they were successful, and it is not likely 
 the Americans would dwell much on British victories. At page 43, Mr Stuart 
 
15 
 
 wmmm 
 
 ns was, by 
 or sixteen 
 ind by the 
 !Hsurement 
 tuart says, 
 
 within the 
 need, as I 
 I'icun lines 
 not know 
 him to be 
 )ook, page 
 a right to 
 li the lines 
 men ; and 
 He says, 
 lOes not at 
 there they 
 s between 
 ! than my 
 It at that 
 d judges,) 
 \mericans 
 ', come to 
 says, the 
 le British 
 ys, " It is 
 only by a 
 no part of 
 r Edward 
 r'h relates 
 issertion is 
 icquainted 
 3st gallant 
 ore it was 
 1 when he 
 able life, 
 ■al Gibbs, 
 :h, the two 
 the ditch, 
 addresses 
 1, some of 
 [the men, 
 afF officer 
 ; with his 
 f " Three 
 the period 
 distinctly 
 low says, 
 the ditch, 
 t, with all 
 1 Jackson 
 3very one, 
 ere these 
 leave the 
 tuart says, 
 ticing the 
 ription of 
 right ; I 
 mention, 
 not likely 
 Ir Stuart 
 
 says, " If I had been inclined to accuse the British army of plundering, without 
 ever considering the evidence on which such charges rested, I might have stated, 
 that the Duke of Saxe Weimar expressly mentions, that the British carried off 
 the cattle, and above CO negroes from General Villaret. But as I did not find 
 this fact staled in the American oflicial accounts, I omitted all notice of it." I 
 do not, sir, attempt to contradict this statement ; it may be quite true, or it may 
 not. I certainly saw many negroes in our camp ; but whether they were brought 
 there by force, or whether they escaped from their masters, I cannot pretend to 
 say. With regard to the bullocks, I can affirm they did not come my way ; but from 
 some passages I have read in " Three Years in North America," with respect to 
 good dinners, if the author had been as Uing eating salt junk and hard biscuit as 
 we had, I suspect he would have enjoyed a fresh beef steak, and not have been 
 very particular in his inquiries from whence it came. At page 68, 69 of the 
 pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Sir John Keane's action with General Jackson, to 
 which Major Pringle particularly alludes, was fought during the night of the 
 22d December. Major Pringle, it will be seen, describes the British as suddenly 
 attacked in the darkness of the night, by five thousand Americans, who were 
 repulsed at every point, the British taking up a position in advance of the one 
 originally held. Sir J. Keane's account of this action, is, however, very different." 
 Nort', sir, I copy the following passages from Sir J. Keane's despatch: — "At 
 about eight o'clock in the evening, when the men, much fatigued by the length 
 of time they had been in the boats, were asleep in their bivouac, a heavy slanting 
 fire of round and grape was opened upon them, by a large schooner, and two war 
 vessels which had dropped down the river from the town, and anchored abreast 
 of our fires, &c. A most vigorous attack was then made on the advanced front 
 and right flank piquets, the former of the 95th, under Captain Hatton, the latter, 
 85th, under Captain Schaw ; these officers, and their respective piquets, conducted 
 themselves with firmness, and checked the enemy for a considerable time, but 
 renewing their attack with a large force, and pressing at these points. Colonel 
 Thornton judged it necessary to move up the remainder of both corps. The 
 85th regiment was commanded by Brevet-Major Gihbonsi whose conduct cannot 
 be too much commended ; on the approach of his regiment to the point of attack, 
 the enemy, favoured by the darkness of the night, concealed themselves behind a 
 high fence which separated the fields, and calling to the men as friends under 
 pretence of being part of our own force, offered to assist them in getting over, 
 which was no sooner accomplished, than the 85th found itself in the midst of 
 very superior numbers, who discovering themselves, called on the regiment 
 immediately to surrender — the answer was an instantaneous attack. A more 
 extraordinary conflict has perhaps never occurred, absolutely hand to hand with 
 officers and men ; it terminated iu the repulse of the enemy, with the capture of 
 30 prisoners. A similar finesse was attempted with the 95th regiment, which 
 met the same treatment. The enemy finding his reiterated attacks were repulsed 
 by Colonel Thornton, at half past ten advanced a large column against our centre. 
 Perceiving his intention, I directed Colont'l Stovin to order Lieut.- Colonel 
 Dale, with 130 men of the 93d regiment, who had just reached the camps, to 
 move forward and use the bayoJiet, holding the 4th regiment in hand formed in 
 line, as my last reserve. Colonel Dale endeavoured to execute his orders, but 
 the crafty enemy would not meet him ; seeing the steadiness of his smalt body, 
 gave it a heavy fire, and quickly retired. Colonel Brooke, with four companies 
 of the 21st regiment, fortunately appeared at that moment on our right flank, 
 and sufficiently secured it from farther attack. The enemy now determined on 
 making a last effort, and, collecting the whole of his force, formed an extensive 
 line, and moved directly against the light brigade. At first, this line drove in all 
 the advanced posts ; but Colonel Thornton, whose rr'iije exertions had guaranteed 
 all former success, was at hand ; he rallied his brave comrades round him, and 
 moving forward, with a firm determination of charging, appalled the enemy, who, 
 from the lesson he had received on the same ground in the early part of the 
 evening, thought it prudent to retire, and did not again dare to advance. It was 
 now twelve o'clock, and the firing ceased on both sides. From the best information 
 I can obtain, the enemy's force amounted to 5000 men, and was commanded by 
 General Jackson himself. Judging from the number left on the field, his loss 
 must have been severe." * 
 
 / 
 
 U. 
 
 "'^ 
 
 ') 
 
 -^^^ 
 
16 
 
 I may now ask in what my account of this action differs from that of Sir John 
 Keane, except that I do not enter so minutely into detail, nor bestow the same 
 commendation on the troops who fought it, and "repitUed the tntmy at mtry 
 point." 
 
 I am far, sir, from wishing to detract from the merit the Americans deserve, 
 for the manner they defended their country ; and if the commendation of an 
 individual, much behind General Jackson in experience and military rank, can be 
 at all acceptable to him, I can have no hesitation in saying, that his position at 
 New Orleans shewed consummate judgment, and the manner in which he w<i8 
 seconded in the defence of the lines there, reflects the highest credit on the troops 
 under him. Willing as I am to allow what I have now written, I cannot abate 
 one iota of the eulogiuro, however ungrateful to some ears, I formerly passed on 
 the soldiers of my own country ; nor will I admit, that any expression I made 
 use of in that eulogium, will be cavilled at by those whose opinion I value. I 
 think, sir, I may venture to say, that I have shewn Mr Sluart has failed to prove 
 that "the British soldiery couM not be restrained from piander at Washington;" 
 that I have proved my account of the British force employed in the attach on the 
 Imei in front of New Orleans to be substantially correct ; that I have proved my 
 estimate of the length of the lines to be supported by the best authority, — the 
 officer who constructed them ; and that my inference deduced from that, with 
 regard to the American numbers, is not an unfair one ; and that I have proved, 
 even by Mr Stuart's own admission, that " the British did reach the ditch." 
 
 I shall now advert to page 42 of the pamphlet, where Mr Stuart Writes these 
 words : " Moreover, he (Major Pringle) has not scrupled to make it a public 
 complaint, 'that men who are willing to suffer every privation, and to shed the 
 last drop of their blood in "the defence, or for the honour, of their country, should 
 have their good name filched from them by those who are equally unwilling to 
 allow, and unable to appreciate, their worth.' These are heavy charges ; affecting 
 as they do, not only the credit of the work, but the character of the writer in 
 point of veracity, intelligence, and good feeling." Sir, I never made such charges 
 against Mr Stuart ; I never questioned his " veracity, intelligence, and good 
 feeling." I knew too well what was diie to his feelings, and to my own character ; 
 and if Mr Stuart had done me the justice to quote the latter part of my letter, as 
 it was written, this explanation would not have been necessary. Let him turn 
 to his own pamphlet, in which my letter is published, and he will 6nd the 
 passage thus expressed, — « should have their good name ' filched from them' by 
 those who are (no disrespect to Mr Stuart) equally unwilling to allow, and 
 unable to appreciate, their worth. '^ It was my firm conviction that Mr Stuart 
 had received his intelligence from^ persons not capable of giving him correct 
 information on several points stated in his work. To those persons alone were 
 my observations directed ; and that no mistake might occur on this point, I 
 inserted the words, « no disrespect to Mr Stuart," of which he has taken no 
 notice. 
 
 Thus, sir, I have fully proved, in two letters, that my objections to certain 
 passages in the work " Three Years in North America," (and which related to 
 the operations of that part of the British army with which 1. served in the United 
 States) were well founded, and that a pamphlet lately published by the author of 
 " Three Years in North America," the materials for which he has taken nearly 
 three months to collect, is no refiitati^ at all. To characterize this pamphlet, I 
 cannot do it in fewer words than by taaking use of the somewhat trite quotation, 
 " Parturiunt mantes, nascitur ridiciMU mus." I have now, sir, trespassed long on 
 your time, and that of the public. I trust the anxiety I have felt that the 
 character of British soldiers should be put in a true light before the eyes of their 
 fellow-countrymen, will plead' my excuse, and though now no longer one of them, 
 I must confess myself their very inadequate, but zealous advocate. — I have the 
 honour to be, sir, your obliged humble servant. 
 
 NOBMAN PbIMGLE, 
 
 Late Major 21st Regiment. 
 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 Printed by Andkbw Shobtbbdb, Thistle Laoe. 
 
 s. 
 
lat of Sirr John 
 Btow the same 
 nemy at entry 
 
 ricans deserve, 
 ^ndation of an 
 y rank, can be 
 lis position at 
 which he whs 
 : on the troops 
 [ cannot abate 
 irly passed on 
 ession I made 
 m I value. I 
 'ailed to prove 
 Washington ;" 
 I attack on the 
 ive proved my 
 thority, — the 
 )m that, with 
 
 have proved, 
 i ditch." 
 t writes these 
 :e it a public 
 d to shed the 
 luntry, should 
 Y unwilling to 
 ges ; affecting 
 
 the writer in 
 '■ such charges 
 ce, and good 
 vn character ; 
 ' my letter, as 
 Let him turn 
 will 6nd the 
 rom them' by 
 o allow, and 
 at Mr- Stuart 
 
 him correct 
 18 alone were 
 this point, I 
 has taken no 
 
 ns to certain 
 ich related to 
 in the United 
 the author of 
 taken nearly 
 pamphlet, I 
 te quotation, 
 issed long on 
 felt that the 
 eyes of their 
 one of them, 
 —I have the 
 
 INGLE, 
 
 Regiment.