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 f 
 
 IS MAN 
 
 EESPOMBLE FOR HIS BELIEF ? 
 
 A LECTURE 
 
 PELIVEBED BEFORE THE MEMBERS OF THE 
 
 ^^^amilton Jttercantiie Cibrarg /^^BBoriottoiu 
 
 ON THE EVENING OF THE 18th OF FEBRLARY 1851; 
 
 AND NOW PUBLISHED AT THEIR REQUEST^ 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. JOHN BAYNE, 
 
 ,0F KNOX'S CHURCH, G A L T, 
 
 
 GALT: 
 
 V 
 
 JPBINTED BY JAMES AINSLIEisCo. 
 
 1851. 
 
 ' *■■ 
 
 f 
 
 
L 
 
Preface. 
 
 ^iiE Lecture 6ni man's responsibility for his belief, herewith submiifec^ 
 io the Public, was delivered to the youug men of the " Hamilton Mer. 
 baintile Library Association," a^ one of a series, for which the members 
 df that Association, with a commendable desire to find suitable occupa- 
 tion for their leisure hours, and with a view to their intellectual and 
 Moral improvement, had secured the services of various ministers and 
 6ther individuals, during the past winter. Soon after its delivery, the 
 managing Committee of the Association, requested the author to allow 
 them to publish it in pamphlet form. I'his request iie fdlt that he 
 6ould not refuse. In acceding to it, howCv6r, he explained to the Com. 
 mittee, what he woiuld now also explain to those who may honor it with 
 a perusal, that it was not composed with a view to publication, and that 
 ^ad he been appearing i>efore the public of his own accord, he would 
 have felt it desirable to illustrate and fortify at much greater length 
 his views on some of the controverted points of which it treats. Within 
 the compass of a single Lecture, it was possible for him to do little more 
 than sketch the outline of his argument, — rather suggesting to his hearers, 
 the mode in which the sutbject should be investigated and decided, than 
 professing to exhaust it. 
 
 As it is, however, its brevity may be a greater recommendation in the 
 view of some to its perusal, than it was in the author's to its publication. 
 And it is now submitted to those who take an interest in such subjects, 
 ini the hope that it may serve to confirm the opinions of those who agree' 
 #itfa its conclusions, and that it may direct those are still inquiring, to 
 such a solution of the question discussed, as shall stand the scrutiny of 
 that day, when only tnUh shall abide. 
 
 In preparing it for the press, a few alt^ations have been made, bui! 
 thesd will be found immaterial. 
 
 ! 19076 
 
 .* 
 
• • 
 
 is 
 
 '■i-iiy 
 
Is MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR lIlS BELIEF?' 
 
 'The question which, as you aro aware, I am now to discuaii, —the 
 <j|UOBtion, ** Is man responsible for his belief," is not merely as some are 
 <tpt to fancy, a curious and somtiwhat abstruse question in Ethics, but a 
 question of inraienso practical importance ; in which all have an interestt 
 en which all, too, must in one form or other, comb to a decision, ani 
 the decisioti come to on which, must necessarily exert a power- 
 ful influence, either for good or evil. Whatever the origin of our 
 beliefs, especially of our beliefs on moral and religious subjects, it must 
 be plain to every one, who has ever studied his own mental history, or 
 traced the secret influences in men's minds, which mould the character 
 of succeeding generations, and determine the destinies of the world, that 
 •uch beliefs have a most important influence in the formation of our 
 moral and religious character, and not less so in thia re gulation of our con* 
 duct, in the highest of all departments of duty, tha t viz : which relates to 
 etir preparation for eternity. And the view which we take of the respon-* 
 sibility connected with beliefs, — thus exerting an influence so vast and 
 eternal, — must necessarily affect the formation of our beliefs themselves. 
 Consciously or unconsciously, it will tell on our mode of dealing with the 
 evidience on which truth is presented to us; it will tell, too, on our 
 mbde of contemplating the' truth itself. It wore at variance with all 
 eiperience to suppose, that the man who goes to the iir* litigation of 
 Afuth, under the solemnizing influence of the feelmg that he is respon- 
 sible to God, for every conclusion at which he arrives, every opinion 
 which he forms, will not be more likely to arrive at the knowledge of 
 the truth, than the man who goes to the investigation, imagining that 
 belief, however erroneous, if only sincere, can involve no criminality, 
 ilad expose to no condemnation. 
 
 fortunately the great majority of men, however inadequately they 
 iMay be impressed with a sense of their responsibility, assent to it, as~ 
 an' almost self-evident truth, that man is reponsible for his belief; and 
 this assent, originating in the clear testimony of unbiased conscience, 
 % sanctioned by the explicit declarations of the word of God. But a 
 •ceptical philosophy has often started doubts on the subject ; a/nd names" 
 
 ■ .*»»!?-- 
 
ot high authority in literaturo and ncioncc, have openly avowod tho' 
 opinion that man ia not responsible for \m belief, and have attomptoii to 
 defend it On philosophical grounds. Among the supporters of ultrat 
 liberal views in politics too, tho favorite maxim, that man is not respf»n- 
 sible to man for his boliof, — a maxim which, with certain qualiflcations, 
 is soitnd, and important as tho only basis on which religious toleration, 
 or rather, equality among tho members of tho same commonwealth, 
 c4ri be adrquately secured,— is not unfrequently advanced in a form 
 or advocated on grounds which imply, that if man is not rospon- 
 siblei to' man for his belief, so neither is he responsible to God. While 
 among the young whom thoughtlessness or vice has inclined to infidelity, 
 the doctrine is often employed as an excuse for their indifference to all 
 rieligion, — either avowed explicitly as a tenet of their infidel creed, or 
 more vaguely under tho plea, that they are honest in their convictions, 
 and cannot be blameable for holding, or for acting on honest convic- 
 tfons. 
 
 Tho question is thus one, which is well entitled to careful con- 
 stderation aimong a body of young men, met as you are for intellectual 
 and moral improvement, — who are either forming their opinions on 
 ihany of the most important questions with which immortal beings can 
 be occupied, or exposed in holding the opinions which they have em- 
 braced, and in which, perhaps, by godly parents they have been reared, to 
 the assaults of infidelity. And a clear and thorough conviction of 
 the responsibility to God, under which eVery belief is formed and held 
 as well as acted on, cannot fail to be of immense importance in enabling 
 you to discharge aright your duty, in dealing with all those questions of 
 vital interest, which imperatively demand the investigation of intelligent 
 and immortal beings, and a right solution of which is an essential element 
 of that godliness, which has tho promise of the life that now is, as well 
 as of that which is to come. 
 
 In endeavoring to assist you in coming to a right decision on this 
 question, we might examine it, either in the light of reason, or in the 
 ' light of revelation, or in the light furnished by both ; and in either, or 
 in both of these ways, the doctrine which it is our wish to impress upon 
 you, might, we think, be Incontrovertibly established. Time, however, 
 would fail to enter on a field so extensive, and we propose to consider 
 the question chiefly as a question in Ethics, and to show you on consid- 
 
od thnf 
 
 ptofl to 
 
 f ultrs 
 
 respon- 
 
 cations, 
 
 loration, 
 
 wealth, 
 
 a form 
 
 rospon- 
 
 While 
 
 iifidolity, 
 
 ICO to all 
 
 iroed, or 
 
 victiohs, 
 
 convic- 
 
 ul con- 
 ;cllectual 
 in ions on 
 tings can 
 lave em- 
 •eared, to 
 iction of 
 handheld 
 enabling 
 $stions of 
 telligent 
 I element 
 , as well 
 
 on this 
 r in the 
 ither, or 
 ess upon 
 however, 
 consider 
 1 consid- 
 
 «rfttion» of natural roasou, that man <j responiiililu for his beliuf ; and 
 that the grounds on which tho oppositu opinion is advocated, aro un* 
 philosophical and untunable. This may have tho advantage of disem- 
 barrassing your consideration of thu (lucstion, of tho jealousy which it 
 not unfroquently unturtainod of Theological dogmas, us well as of bettor 
 assisting you in mooting on thuir own ground thu advocates of tnan's 
 non-responsibility, who, unable to grapplo with tho clear and explicit 
 testimony of Scripture on the subject, usually take refuge in the dim 
 and broken light of reason, or in what they pompously term, tho 
 enlightened philosophy of modern times. 
 
 And first and bofore entering on thu moi'o rigid examination of the 
 question, there is a preliminary remark as to a consequence inevitably 
 resulting from the doctrine of man's non-responsibility for his belief* 
 to which it will be of use to cull your attention, as being fitted both to 
 show you tho extensive and vital bearings of the question under discus- 
 sion, and to prove, as by a simple reductio ad ubsut'dum, the untenable- 
 ness of that doctrine, — and that is, that if man be not responsible to God 
 for his beliefs, then there is scarcely any thing for which with couBis. 
 tency, he can be hold to be responsible. 
 
 In religious matters especially — the most important of all — a man'g 
 habitual feelings and conduct must bo chiefly determined by his beliefs, 
 ^ay, it might easily bo shown, that certain feelings and actions, corres- 
 ponding with the beliefs cherished, must as necessarily flow from these 
 beliefs, as belief itself is supposed necessarily to flow from the mannner 
 in which tho evidence of truth presents itself to the mind. Who can 
 for a moment doubt, that the beliefs which a man entertains in relation 
 ^0 the questions, — whether the Bible is the word of God, or whether 
 Christ is the son of God, and the Saviour of sinners, or whether man ig 
 here on trial for eternity, — an eternity which, terminating the evanescent 
 distinctions of earth, shall know but two classes of men, — the good and 
 the bad, the inhabitants of heaven, and tho inhabitants of hell, — must of 
 necessity tell, and powerfully tell, alike upon his feelings and his life ? 
 
 Now, if there be no responsibility for belief, on what principle, or 
 with what consistency, can a man be held responsible for the feelings or 
 actions which flow from that belief, and which are only the necessary 
 /Bffect, the simple, natural, inevitable product of that belief. 
 
 With regard to actions in particular; whenever belief is the sourpp 
 
♦ f 
 
 8 
 
 ,of action, if tho boliof itsolf be neither good nor evil, and not the lubr 
 Ject of reiponsibilityj it seoms plainly abaurd to hold, that action, which 
 ii but the oxprossion or embodiment of ttiat belief, can bo possesied of 
 luch a moral character, ai to render him Hrho perform! it subject t« 
 responsibility. This were to rererse the axiom, that actions have no 
 moral character in themselves, but only In so far as they are the acts of an 
 intelligent and moral agent ; and that tho good or evil which wo ascribe 
 to them, and which renders him who performs them praiseworthy or 
 blameworthy in their jporformance, properly lies not in the actions, but 
 in the principles, — the views, the feelings^ the affections, the motives by 
 which the agent has been actuated. This wore to suppose that Ood 
 looks to tho outside alone, in dealing with his creatures as responsible, 
 .and overlooks the inward springs and soi^rces of their conduct,-^the 
 Tiew of Him, the feeling toward Him, the object or end in reference to 
 Him, — all which are involved in belief, — by which that conduct has been 
 .determined. This were to imply^ that should a man beli«ve in hisheart« 
 the most High God to bo a boing like unto himself, or 'a hard and 
 rigorous and cruel master, he could only be punishable for avowing or 
 acting on such belief, but would at the samo time be held guiltless for 
 harboring tho foul and dishonoring source of his practice ungodUnesi 
 in his bosom. 
 
 It is true, that ^ose who deny man> responsibility for his belief, do 
 liot usually admit, or, at least, do not usually advert to this necessary in^ 
 ference from their own doctrine ; but on the contrary admit, that man, 
 though not responsible for his belief, is still responsible for his actions * 
 Itnd one hears this curious theory of responsibility, not unfrequently 
 iavowedin such remarks as these, " It matters little what a manbelievea 
 if his conduct is good for ** His creed can't be wrong, whose life is in tho 
 right ;" or " Men are Christians or Mahon^medans just as they are 
 jtrained ; the great matter is an honest life." But the admission tfius 
 jnade, and which we have never seen even plausibly attempted to bo 
 «hown consistent with the denial of man's responsibility for his belief, 
 98 usually made in a very qualified form; — n;iade so as to admit of t)»e 
 condemnation of sins against society, whatever the belief in which they 
 .originate, but qualified so as to allow of most philosophical indifferent 
 .to sins against God;— made so as to admit the condemnation of crinjysa, 
 auch as flowed from tho creed of the Anabaptists of Germany, or woN^d 
 
 lajvlti 
 
 
 •lit 
 
■v 
 
 the iub» 
 
 |ion, whiok 
 
 •Messed of 
 
 ubject t9 
 
 hare no 
 
 acts of an 
 
 ascribe 
 
 orthy or 
 
 itions, but 
 
 notires by 
 
 that God 
 
 'sponsible* 
 
 Iuct,-r-the 
 
 fereuce to 
 
 It has bee9 
 
 hisheartf 
 
 hard and 
 
 avowing or 
 
 uiltlesB for 
 
 ngodlinesi 
 
 belief, do 
 leessary in^ 
 that man, 
 is actions > 
 frequently 
 an believes 
 fe is in the 
 I they are 
 Ission tdug 
 >ted to bo 
 his beljief, 
 nit of t}»e 
 rhich they 
 differenAO 
 of crinjiM^ 
 
 orwoj^d 
 
 I/i'jTltaMy f<>llo\T tho ftsro i.larir^y of tho do'trinos of S.»oinli'(tn ; hut 
 qutiHAoil so as to w.irraiit tlio utmost conipl.K'oiicy, in npoakiM;» of tho 
 fjoiitool vie M, that si>r'iii; n[) tuiclior'!:oi!, uiulor tho ncr^ativi? erotMl of tho 
 i:i!iil'il ; th ) p.'a:5tic^l uii^o IHuoih vvhioh lo.iulta ffom ti>o criM'd of tho 
 Sirritiiati; or t\\') d'V^ri Ihi:; lilidatry wiiieh U tncoiira;^od hy tho crccil 
 of tho Churcli of Homo. 
 
 Ill I'vi I, witliiut 9'v.ii ) siit'i q'lalinrxMiiM, tlioir d ictriiin, tikcti a» a 
 w!iol'), vvotiM not siibs».»rvo tho purpoaesr for which it sodins to havohotMi 
 duvi^od ; an I th'» only olK'iit oi' ahiiitti!!'; man'? ro-ip'nnU)ility for Win 
 aBtiom, whil(Hl !nyi i^; his re3;iotHil»ility for \m bjliel", >vonM !»», that 
 thu Olio partoftlio doctrine wonld njutralizo and nullify tho othor. 
 a'lil leavn tho wliolo suhjast of UMu'a rosponsibility involved in incxtri- 
 cabln; rifu^ion. lloldincj ma:i ti bo not raspon^iblo for his beliefs, but 
 r^Mpoimhlo for Iiii aetirm^ rosnltiui^ from thcso boliof^, they would 
 plainly freo liiui with ono hand, only to hold him fast with thn other; — 
 they would asuiro nirn, yon nhill ni?vn.* bo cDndo:nn'3 1 for thinkin):^ 
 that to bo truth, which God ha* dcolarod to bo error, or that to bo law. 
 fnl, which ho ha>i pronounced to bo sin, but you shall iniallibly bo con- 
 domned for aotin;; on that opinion : — thoy would deliver him from all 
 I'oar ofpunish.nont for his boliofi, but loavo him hri.it(? I with tlio foar 
 of punisiimont for aitioni to which tlnno bolioH inevitably led; — and 
 tho only solaco that would thus remain to th • inlidid or heretie would 
 bo, that arisino; from tho consideration, that ha wa^ placed under tho 
 government of an omnipotent Jud^e, v.'ho cared nothing f»r what lio 
 believed, but who, at tho sam;) tim.>, mlq-lit aoizo on him -m a dvj!)tor to 
 justic) for allowini; hiij beliof:s to Inriuonco his life. 
 
 In a word, deny mati'i responsibility for hh belief, and we do not 
 see whoro you can stop, till you have freed liim from all responsibility, 
 or at tho least, from all rcraponsiinlity for actions Uawinj; from belief, 
 and till yon hivo arrived at tlio conclusion, that tho sceptic or tlw 
 Pantheist, who believes that ho has no duties to God, is innocent in 
 neglecting every duty which God has enjoined. 
 
 But wo come to tho more riijid examination of tho question. 
 
 And fii*sfr, it is of importance that you undorstauil distinctly and 
 definitely tho doctrine which wo are to controvert, with the grounds on 
 which it is usually made to rest, as wall as tho opposite truth which it is 
 proposed to e'^tablish. > 
 

 10 
 
 Tho Joctrino of man's iion-rosponaibilUy for his belief, it would hate 
 boon deairablo to present to you, in tho words of somo of it» most dis- 
 tinguished supporters. That doctrine, it may hero bo mentioned, was 
 the doctrine of the ancient phiIoP'>|vierp, who, according to Sir J. 
 Mcintosh, ««from Plato to Marcus Aurolius, taught, that error of judg- 
 ment boing involuntary^ is not the proper subject of moral disapproba- 
 tion." In tho days of tho Schoolmen, it was revived — or at least tho 
 leading principles on which it is usually rested — by the celebrated Scotus, 
 who, according to tho same authority, " contended at great length that 
 o ir thoughts, (consequently our opinions,) are not subject to tho will."* 
 s^ And as already intimated, it has in various forms been avowed or 
 ~ insinuated in modern times. We have not, however, been able to fall 
 in with an cxpcsitioii of the doctrine so brief, and at tho same time 
 comprehensive, as to enable us to present it to you in tho words of 
 its defenders, and we must endeavor to lay it before you in our own. 
 
 And the following propositions appear to us to embody, fairly and 
 fully, the substance of the doctrine, with the grounds on which it is com- 
 monly rested, — or in other words, to present syllogistically the argument 
 by which man's non-responsibility is supposed to bo proved. 
 
 1. And first, grounding on tho axiom, that belief is tho assent of the 
 raind to the evidence, by which any proposition submitted to it is 
 establighed, it is assumed, that a man necessarily believes according to 
 the view which his mind takes of the evidence, — or in other words, as 
 one writer has expressed it, " that belief must necessarily, correspond 
 with the perception of evidence, it being in the nature of things impos- 
 Bible, that the mind should believe or disbelieve, otherwise than as evi- 
 dence is or is not discerned." 
 
 2. Secondly it is maintained, that a man is only responsible, when 
 he bas control over tho operations of his mind, — or in other words, wheii 
 tho will is concerned in thorn. 
 
 3. And thirdly it is argued, that as a man's will is not concerned in 
 his beliefs, ae they are involuntary, as they spring up spontaneously 
 and hold their place in his mind, whether he will or no, according as 
 
 *It would appear that S. did not explicitly state the conclusions, to which his 
 own principles, logically carried out, would have led him. The language of Sir 
 J. M., on tins puint is, " one step more would have led him to acknowledge, 
 that all erroneous judgment is involuntary, and therefore inculpable and un- 
 punishable, however pernicious." 
 
 5-5 
 
Id have 
 
 LOSt dis- 
 
 liod, was 
 
 ,0 Sir J. 
 
 of judg- 
 
 ipproba- 
 
 ioast tho 
 
 d Scotus, 
 
 igth that 
 
 ho will."* 
 
 rowed or 
 
 ble to fall 
 
 Einie timo 
 
 words of 
 
 r own. 
 
 ■airly and 
 
 it is oom- 
 
 argument 
 
 ent of the 
 d to it is 
 Bording to 
 words, as 
 iorrespond 
 igs impos- 
 lan as evi- 
 
 iblo, when 
 ords, when 
 
 iccrned in 
 ntaneously 
 !Cording as 
 
 to which his 
 ;uage of Sir 
 ^knowledge, 
 ble and un- 
 
 
 11 
 
 the ovideice connocte 1 witli the'r object, has been discerned ; or " j,3he," 
 as Lord Brougham expresses it "can no more change them than ho can 
 the hue of his skin, or tho height of his stature;" that therefore he can- 
 not be responsible for them, and thet/ cannot be mado legitimately tho 
 subject of praise or blame. 
 
 This wo conceive a fair statement; and at first sight wo frankly 
 admit it appears not a little plausible. But in answer wo shall ondoa- 
 vour to establish the following positions, involving tho proof of tho 
 directly opporute conclusion, — >viz : that man is, and that most legiti- 
 mately, tho subject of responsibility for every belief which lie enter* 
 tains. 
 
 1st. That tho above statement of the mode in which belief arises, 
 and exists In the mlnd,-^ospecially in so far as belief on moral and reli- 
 gious subjects is concerned, — is partial and defective, and overlooks an 
 essential element involved in belief, and to which alone it is intended 
 that responsibility attaches. 
 
 2nd. That it is not true, that in tho formation of our beliefs, tho 
 will is not concerned; but that on tho contrai'y, in reference to our 
 beliefs on all moral and religious subjects, the will is concerned, and so 
 far concerned as to involve the responsibility, which is admitted to be- 
 long to the products of tho will. And, 
 
 3rd. That even if it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that tho 
 will cannot conclusively be shown to be concerned in belief, that still 
 this would not exempt belief from I'tfsponsibility ; but that on ^e sim- 
 ple assumption, that God has presented evidence of any truth, the belief 
 of the opposite must necessarily involve criminality and sin. 
 
 1. It is assumed then, as tho basis of tlio argument for man's non-re- 
 sponsibility, that a man nccessarlhf believes, according as evidenco 
 presents itself to his mind. And undoubtedly so far as belief is tho 
 product of mere intellect or reason, as contradistinguished from tho 
 emotive element of man's nature, and of that reason exorcised about 
 objects which address themselves to reason alone, tho assumption is just. 
 In such a case, belief is clearly the natural and necessary effect of tho 
 apprehension of the evidence by the reason. The examination of that 
 evidence may, or may not, have been the product of will : but tho belief 
 itsolf, is just the irresistible assent of the mind to tho evidence within 
 its view. A man, for instance, cannot examine the records and the 
 
 'k; 
 
M 
 
 
 12 
 
 traJuioiis of Canada, witlujut bolioving it to bo a fact, tliat tlioGenoraf/ 
 whu3o monumont still crowns tlio heights of Quconslon, actually lived, 
 uiiJ actually was slain in battle. No one can go intelligently over tho 
 steps of a demonstration in Euclid, without assenting to the truth of tho 
 proposition, which that demonstration establishes. Nor can any ono 
 master tho details of astronomy, and learn how tho theory which has 
 immortalized the name of Newton, explains aud harmonizes the facts of 
 that science, without as«enting to the soundness of tho theory. And so 
 in other cases. . 
 
 And if tliis wore all that is involved in every bdief ; if this were a 
 correct and full account of the process by M-hich every belief is formed, 
 Ave do not see how ii would be possible to resist tho conclusion, that 
 man cannot be held to be responsible for his belief. 
 
 It appiiars to us a self-evident truth, that responsibility cannot justly 
 attacii to an act, or pi'oduct of mere intellect or reason, altogether 
 detached from, u'ld uncoiniected with, any movement of the emotional 
 element of our nature. ►Suppose for e.vamplc, a simple and im- 
 compouruled intelligence, — a being with reason, but utterly without 
 ttmotiou, afiectian, conscience, or will, what would the knowledge, or 
 belief of such an intelligence amount to? Why to the mere passive re- 
 flection, according to its peculiarproj)erticB, of the objects set before it. 
 The intellect of such a being would but receive as passively as a mirror 
 tho likejiess or conception of the things brought within its view. Its 
 conceptions would of course be more or less acurate and true, that is, more 
 or less in correspondence Avith the reality conceived of, according to its 
 own perfection or imperfection, — just as the reflections of a perfect 
 mirror will bo perfect, while in the case of an in.perfect, it Avill be broken 
 by flaws in its substance, or distorted by inequalities on its surface, or 
 vitiated in coloring, by defects in its t rans])arency ; but still they would 
 1k3 as passive, as necessary, as completely beyond its own com ol, as arc 
 tho roHections of the mirror. Not indeed that there woiud be no 
 movement, no activity in an intellect of thia kind ; but it would bo 
 nioveuient or activity, so to speak, according to fixed laws, operating 
 Its f/from without; not movement or activity, directed by a governing 
 power hi the mind itself. Introduce into such an intoiletit, inclination 
 or choice one Avay or other, — introduce in any form, a g-^n'orning power 
 such as wo are able to form any conception of, and you just invest i^ 
 
I 
 
 MMM 
 
 icGeueralf/ 
 lallv lived, 
 y over tho 
 ruth of tho 
 111 any ouo 
 which has 
 the tacts of 
 y. And so 
 
 his wore a 
 
 ■ is formed, 
 
 lusion, that 
 
 innot justly 
 , altogether 
 u emotional 
 )lo and II n- 
 rly without 
 nowlcdgo, or 
 3 passive re- 
 let before it. 
 
 » 
 Its 
 
 as a mirror 
 ;s view 
 , that is, more 
 ording to its 
 of a perfect 
 ill be broken 
 s surface, or 
 11 they would 
 nt ol, as aro 
 ouiJ be no 
 it would bo 
 fs, operating 
 a governing 
 , iucllnation 
 rning power 
 ist invest i^ 
 
 with cniotloii, dosiro, will. Ainl to tlio opinions or beliefs of an intel- 
 lect thus pas-si ve, wo du not see howresiinnsibility could possibly attach » 
 and iii the same way to mere naked, uticompoundod act!- of reason in 
 man, it seems uh unreaf;()nal)le to attach sucii responsibility. 
 
 What rendeis man u rosponslblo bcinu', is not the fJmplo fact that 
 he has reason ; but tho fact, that in his luituro, the element of reason is 
 combined with an emotional element. — the fact, that he not only thinks, 
 but that he has also feeling, ailectlon, conscience, will. In a word, it is 
 the emotional element in his nature, as existing in combination with 
 tiie intellectual, tliut is tho moral and responsible element. 
 
 lii confirmation of this conclusion, it may be also well to remind you 
 of what is universally conceded, that lufd/d'tion or thought alone, is not> 
 andcannotlx; tho sotu'co of action. A Kiore inte]li;.>-ence, never liking or 
 disliking, never approving or disapproving, never vAUUkj, would of 
 course, never be prompted to action; — or if we could conceive of such a 
 being in action, it would seem impossibbi t" ascribe to such action any 
 moral ciiaracter, oi' to award to it either praise or blame. So that if 
 we overlook iho emotional element, tliere 'seems no basis on which 
 responsibility can rest, either for bebef ii'lfhhi, or for action without. 
 
 An unwarranted advantage accordingly, is given to the advocates of 
 man's non-res[>onsibility for his belief, by allowing them, as Is often 
 done, to rest unchallenged in the assumption which wo are considering. 
 And wliat we assert in opposition to this assumption is, that in relation 
 to moral and religious subjects, tlie emoti(nial or moral element, — that 
 is the emotional excited a1)0ut moral or religious objects, — does always 
 enter into the boli<'f, and thus renders it legitimately the subject of 
 responsibility. 
 
 1 . And first, wc apprehend there could T)0 no conception oven, much 
 less belie f, in respect of moral and religious subjects, without the presence 
 and movement in the mind of this emotional or moral clement. It 
 seems a simple imposssibility, that a being without affection, — without 
 love or hatred, benevolence or justice, could conceive of such affections 
 and sentiments; or that one without conscience, could conceive of tho 
 distinction betweenright and wrong, virtue and vice, or of the feelings of 
 approval and disapproval, always involved in tho apprehension of that 
 distinction. It rooms impossibe in a word, that a being without emotions 
 could entertain any of tho radical ideas, wb.ich outer nci^essarily intc 
 
A^! 
 
 1. 
 
 14 
 
 every concoptioii, rts well 'm T>«liof, in moral and roligiou's subjects. As 
 well miL,'ht a man born blind bo supposed to conceive of color, or one 
 born deaf, of sound. Indeed only suppose the conception of love or 
 hatred, benevolence or justice, approval or disapproval, and the very 
 conception iniplios cither the past or present consciousness of these 
 feelinj;s in the mind. Without this, conception would plandy want its 
 vital element. Nay more than this, to accurate and vivid conception, 
 not merely the past or [)re8ent consciousneBs, but a heaUhfal suscepti- 
 bility of such emotions in the mind, at the time of forming the con- 
 ception, would seem to be indispensable. A defect in respect of the 
 soundness of such susceptibility, by vitiatin;^, so to speak, the elononts 
 or materials out of which conception is formed, would aft'ect the ac- 
 curacy of the conception, a defect in respect of liveliness or intensity, 
 would in like manner affect its vividness. And hence, it may be here 
 remai'kod, a simple and philosophical explanation of a doctrine, often 
 cavilled at, but not the less true on that account, — that u defect in the 
 moral elements within, — that is in a man's own breast, — incapacitates 
 for a right conception of moral objects without, — ^such as the character 
 and law of God; and that a man's moral nature must bo right, that ha 
 must be pure in heart, before he can see God. For on the principles 
 which we have explained, as without a sense of benevolence and justice' 
 and the kindred moral emotions in his own bosom, a man cannot con- 
 ceive of the corresponding qualities in God, so in proportion to the 
 purity and strength of these feelings in the mind, must be the correct- 
 ness and liveliness of his conceptions of the moral character of God. 
 
 2. But secondly wo remark, that from the nature of the object before 
 the mind when contemplatmg moral and religious subjects, the moral 
 element ia the mind, cannot possibly bo in a state of indifference. 
 
 We may conceive an individual going for the first tiino, to the exami- 
 nation of the demonstration by which some proposition in Euclid is 
 established, without being biassed by his feelings, — Iris liking or dislikings, 
 one way of another; and wo can conceive the assent of his mind being 
 given to the truth of the proposition, without the concurrence or revolt 
 of a single moi*al emotion with or from that assent. It may be a pure 
 act of intellection. But it cannot be so, when the mind deals with 
 moral or religious propositions. As certainly as the intellect is affected 
 one way or another, by the presentation of intellectual truth, so must 
 the moral nature be affected one way or another, by the presentation 
 
|octs. As 
 V, or one 
 >f love or 
 the very 
 of these 
 want its 
 inception, 
 susccpti- 
 the con- 
 ct of tho' 
 elements 
 t tlio ac- 
 intensity, 
 f he here 
 ine, often 
 Jct in the 
 apaeitatos- 
 character 
 ', that ha 
 principles 
 nd justice 
 luofc con- 
 )n to the 
 > correct- 
 f God. 
 3ct before 
 ho moral 
 ice. 
 
 le exami- 
 Euclid 19 
 lislikings, 
 nd being 
 or revolt 
 '6 a pure 
 ials with 
 I aflfected 
 so must 
 untatiou 
 
 
 15 
 
 «f moral and rolii^ious truth. Just as tho intellect assents or dissents 
 so must tho nionil nature, like or dislik(3, approve or disapproro, em- 
 brace or spurn. Constituted as ninn is, it is nnpossiblo that tho moral 
 element in his hoaom, will not ho at work,accordinu; to its peculiar pro- 
 perties, hi dealing with such questions a i these; — with tho question for 
 instance, whloh in a mercantile community like thi>', may often suggest 
 itself, whether a merchant pressed by business, may without violating 
 tho sanctity of tho Sabbath, work up his acoounta, or read his business 
 letters on that holy day; or with the question now agitating tho 
 neighboring Union, whether tlio fugitive slave law is reconcilable with 
 the principles of immutable justice; or with the question of wider im- 
 portance, and eternal Interest, whether the way of justification revealed 
 in tho Bible is by faith alone ; or with that question which has made such 
 havoc of the peace of tho Churches, whether the doctrine of election is a 
 doctrine of God. AVhatever may have been a man's previous training, tho 
 simple presentaf'on of such questions to his mind, will set in motion the 
 moral elements in his bosom, and consciously or unconsciously, there will 
 bo a moral bias, inclining him to one side or the other. And not only so, 
 but iu deciding upon them, not merely tho intellect, but tho moral 
 nature also, will, so to speak, sit in judgment. Nor will it bo possible 
 for him to come to a decision on either side, involving full, — that is 
 settled and operative belief, — which does not carry with it, the assent 
 of the moral nature,— -the approval of the heart. 
 
 Nay such is tho present state of our peculiar compound nature, that 
 it is a notable and notorious fact, that in dealing with questions like 
 those, the intelbctual and moral elements do not always work in har- 
 mony. Tho emotive may mislead and overpower the intellectual, 
 producing what is termed, moral blindness ; or even after tho intellect 
 has been satisfied, and compelled to give assent, or at least brought into 
 a state of conscious inability, to set aside tho foi'ce of the evidence, and 
 there has been fastened in tho mind what we call a secret conviction of 
 the truth, tho moral element may still dislike, still hate the truth, and 
 stand out in an attitude of proud and obstinate hostility. Who, for in- 
 stance, has not met with a case, where a regard to self-interest was so 
 obviously misleading, in spite of the convictions of a clear understanding, 
 that we have been compelled to say, that the error was not in the un- 
 derstanding, but in the heart. Or who has not been conscious in his own 
 
 "*►.» 
 
immamt 
 
 
 history, of evil inclinationis, not only ovorboariii;^ thn authority of con- 
 Bcionpo, but tlio clo!irei«t convictions and boliola of his understanding 
 
 itself. 
 
 It is also of importance to. observe, that oven in lookinsj at the mrro 
 evidence of truth, it is not tho intellect alono that is concerned. This 
 it is often found convenient, by tho a^sertors of man's non-responsi- 
 bility for his belief, to assnnie, in order that the intellect may bo 
 described, almost as if conipelliiiif belief through the views taken by it 
 of the evidence of truth, irrespective altogether of the moral nature, or 
 tho estimate formed by that nature. But it should not be overlooked, 
 that the evidence of moral and reiic;ious truth, is not liko the evidence 
 of an inditferent historical fixct, or of a geometrical proposition; but in- 
 cludes more or less in all cases, and in sonu! cascfi exclusively consists of, 
 moral elements, and appeals directly to the moral nature. Take for 
 example, the evidence of many f)f Uio mof:t important conclusions of 
 Natural Theology ; or take, above all, what aro called tho "Internal 
 Evidences of revealed religion,"' and it is plain that thcHO cannot bo ap- 
 prehended, nor their force felt, except through tho moral elements in a 
 man's heart, — nay that to a proper decision concerning them, there is 
 required the nicest exercise of moral discrimination. And such evidence 
 ■will always appear stionger or weaker, according to tho state of tho 
 moral nature, and indeed take its w hole coloring, from tho healthy or 
 unhealthy, the sound or unsound state of the heart. 
 
 It seems then clear, that belief in respect of moral and religious sub- 
 jects, must ahyays involve a moral element, — nay more, if our statement 
 has been sound, that/it/^ belief must involve, not only the assent of tho 
 underst|nding, but also of the heart, — the liarmony of both elements of 
 our compound nature with the truth. And if so, we see, why belief 
 ma^, or rather, why belief mast bo subject to responsibility. It in- 
 volves necessarily a iiwral clement, — A Lovi: oi' Tin: truth, oil A hathkd 
 OF THE truth; and unless wo exclude all that makes us moral beings 
 from responsibility, we cannot exclude belief. 
 
 And not only so, but we may now see wh/ it is, that whatever the con- 
 victions of tho understanding, an unsound belief must be evil, and 
 therefore punishable. From the very passiveness of mere intellect in 
 assenting to the evidence before it, of which the assertors of non-re- 
 sponsibility try to make so much, wo may infer, that the usual condi- 
 tions admitted on all hands as being essential to responsibility being 
 
of con- 
 standing 
 
 1 
 
 ho mrro 
 
 This 
 
 csponsi- 
 
 may bo 
 
 m by it 
 
 atnre, or 
 
 rlooked, 
 
 evidenco 
 
 i; but in- 
 
 >nsists of, 
 
 Take for 
 
 usions of 
 
 ' Internal 
 
 ot bo ap- 
 
 ents in a 
 
 I, there 13 
 
 evidence 
 
 to of tho 
 
 ealthy or 
 
 ious Eub- 
 tatement 
 nt of tho 
 ments of 
 ly belief 
 . It in- 
 
 . HATUKD 
 
 1 beings 
 
 the con- 
 ;vil, and 
 ellect in 
 ■ non-re- 
 l condi- 
 y being 
 
 17 
 
 vati^ficJ, vi/: tho reason beiiii,' adequate to tlio investigation,— an op- 
 portunity of investigation being given,— and sufiiciont evidence being 
 proi-eiHod, — th.i only cause wliich can lead to an unaound belief, must 
 bo tlie moral elonioiii, — the o])po.siriou of tho heart to the truth, — a 
 hatred of the thing to' be believed. Take away tliis hindrance, and 
 mere reason would present none. And whotlier the unbeliever stand 
 at the poreh ef thi; tomph) of truth, refusing assent to tho evideneo 
 Ix'foro liiin, Or within tho precincts of tho temple itself, intellectua.ly 
 eonvinced, but still in heart refusing homage to tho truth which is there 
 enshrined, his unsound beliefs, no matter what plea of honesty he may 
 urge on their behalf, must be regarded as punishable sins. 
 
 II. l\ut sov^ondly, It is argued by the assertors of man's non-ropponsi- 
 bility, that responsiliility can only attach to what is voluntary, or to acts 
 of will; that tho will is not concerned in tho formation of our beliefs, 
 that they are involuulary; and therefore that our beliefs cannot be sub- 
 ject to responsibility ; and wo aro now to endeavor to show, that the 
 will is concerned in our beliefs. 
 
 1. But first I must qualify my assent to tho principle, that responsi- 
 bility can only attach to what is called voluntary. 
 
 This principle seems to bo very frequently conceded, though not 
 always explicitly aiuiounced, by Ethical writers, and conceded in a very 
 broad and unqualified form. And we find, even Dr. Chalmers, laying it 
 down as an '• all-important principle, that nothing is moral or immoral 
 which is not voluntary." ''' Now if tho principlo bo applied to actions 
 alone, we fully concur in it ; in this sense it is only a familiar axiom 
 universally recognised and acted upon in tho world. But if it bo ex- 
 teiided so as to includ j the emotions, or what some Avriters term the 
 pathological or pathematic elements of our nature, we hold it to be un- 
 sound and unt(n]able. Where desire is regarded, as is tho case with 
 
 *Dr. Chalmers apjienrs to i;.s to have been led into error in laying down the 
 prineipla here; roforod to, from his dcsii-p to cstablisli the position, tiiat emotions 
 mclining to good, iC not cherished ami not acted on by the Avill, are worthless. 
 This position he has established with his usual clfjirness and force, but he has 
 erred we conceive, both Ethically and Theologically, in assuming or seeming to 
 assume, that the converse position is also true, and that emotions incHning U> 
 evil, which are not cherished or acted on by the will, are not evil. The reason 
 why emotions in the first case are worthless, is, that the action of the will de- 
 termines whether good or evil has the ascendancy in the heart, and in this case 
 its action shows, that evil not good, has the ascendancy. l'>ut it does not follow 
 that because emotions inclinin/x to evil, may be shown bv the action of the will 
 not to have the ascendancy, bur on the contrary to be juccessfuDy resisted, that 
 therefore these emotions are not in themselves evil. 
 
 
 
lit' 
 
 
 I s 
 
 I 
 
 1 I 
 
 ■i I 
 
 18 
 
 some writers, as iJentical with tho will, or whoro as witli others, dealro 
 is at loast included under tho torm will, because an oloinent essontial to 
 ovory volition, tho principle mi^'ht indeed bo explained in a senio 
 comparatively harmless ; but whore, as is usually the case, the will 
 i» regarded as a distinct faculty, and by what is voluntary is un- 
 derstood acts or decisions or tho products of buch acta or docisions of 
 tho will, the principle we deem to bo as dangerous as it is unsound. 
 Tho simplest and most spontaneous, and most involuntary alfoction 
 toward, or desiro for, what is morally evil, wo hold to bo itself morally 
 ovil and culpable, — nay, to be tho very root and germ of all sin in tho 
 heart. Tho simplest rising of such a feeling in tho heart, — as for in- 
 stance, of enmity or hatred toGod,orof tho desiro to c«cape the restraints 
 of His law, — however speedily it may sink to rest under tho rebuke of 
 conicienco, and although tho only act of volition which may have taken 
 place in connection with it, may have been an act directed to its sup- 
 pression, — must, we conceive, be regarded as rendering a man criminal 
 before Ood. Deny this, and you just deny, that the germ of sin is sin; 
 and that that is evil and culpable, without which there would not, and 
 could not be, an evil act of will. 
 
 And irrespective, therefore, of all reference to tho will, if we have suc- 
 ceeded in showing, that a moral clement is always involved in belief on 
 moral and religious subjects, we would hold that man's responsibility for 
 his belief has been established. But we think it can bo shown, that tho 
 will is concerned in belief. 
 
 2. In order, however, to our illustration of this point, it will be of 
 use hero to I'cfer to a distinction which is sometimes attempted to be 
 drawn by tho advocates of man's non-responsibility. It is tho distinc- 
 tion between, man's responsibility for his mode of dealing with evidence, 
 and his responsibility for belief itself. By some, his responsibility in tho 
 former case is admitted, while in respect of the latter, it is denied . And as 
 undoubtedly the will is, if not chiefly, at least most palpably concerned 
 in the treatment of evidence, a neglect to dispose of this distinction, 
 might weaken the force of our proof. 
 
 Now wo maintain, that we cannot thus dissever, the dealing with the 
 evidence on which belief must rest, from tho belief itself. The one is 
 an essential preliminary to the other ; thoy are related as causo and 
 olfect; and the moral character which attaches to tho former, must 
 necoflsarily attach to tho latter. Thus if an individual',? dishonest 
 
lors, deairo 
 
 usscMitial to 
 
 III a seniu 
 
 se, tlio will 
 
 ary is un- 
 
 OL'isions of 
 
 is unsound. 
 
 ry afFoctiou 
 
 elf morally 
 
 1 sin in the 
 
 , — as for in- 
 
 he restraints 
 
 rebuke of 
 y have taken 
 
 to its sup- 
 nan criminal 
 of sin is sin ; 
 ild not, and 
 
 we have sue- 
 in belief on 
 onsibility for 
 )wn, that the 
 
 it will be of 
 mptod to be 
 the diatinc- 
 ith evidence, 
 ibilityintho 
 lied. And as 
 y concerned 
 distinction, 
 
 ngwith the 
 The one is 
 
 1 cause and 
 )rmer, must 
 
 '3 dishonest 
 
 10 
 
 doalinc; witli tho ovidcnro of truth,— proniptod too, as may bo tho 
 caso, by his hatnjd to tlio truth itself, load to an unsound bolicf, 
 does not such dishonesty leave his unsound belief without excuse? 
 — nay entitle us to rharactorize it as in reality dishonest? Or if 
 a wilful fearfhiiii; for ovideneo on one side of a question, and a wilful 
 neglect of tho evidence on tho other, — and this too prompted by tho 
 desire to establish sonio foreijono conclusion, — leave a wian in imbelicf 
 regarding it, how can this unbelief bo estimated; but as xvil/ul blind- 
 ness ? 
 
 Tho language of every day life in estimating tho opinions of those, 
 who in a question of practical duty, have aUowed their judgments to 
 bo biassed by self-interest, shows what is the universal feeUng on this 
 point. 
 
 Keeping this in view, lot us then see to what extent the will is con- 
 cerned in tho formation of belief 
 
 Ist. And first, wo observe, tho will is confessedly and necessarily con- 
 corned in tho examination of th(j ovideneo of truth. Truth is not 
 found by simply opening the eyes. It has to be searched for as wo 
 search for hidden treasures. IIo who o.xpectcdto know all that it was 
 essential he should know, by simply looking around him, would bo r,s 
 •wise, as tho man who should expect to understand tho whole state and 
 constitution of tho world, by merely looking at tho objects within tho 
 range of his own narrow horizon. Xow the power of making tho 
 search after truth, is a power we are universally conscious of possess- 
 ing. Tho power of directing tho attention, we all feel, is a matter of 
 will. We can go as ive will to tho examination of the evidence, on 
 ■which any truth is presented to us. Wo can go, or we can refrain. 
 We can adopt one raodo of conducting tho examination, or wo can 
 adopt another. We can bo painstaking, or we can bo careless in tho 
 examination. And when at any time we arc satisfied with our oxami- 
 * nation of evidence, cease further inquiry, and thus settle down in any 
 - belief, is it not by an act of will that this is done ? Nor is it by an act 
 of will in which no regard is had to tho moral aspects of tho subject, 
 that our dealing with evidence is thus regulated. On tho contrary, in 
 dealing with the evidence of moral and religious truth, the acticm of tho 
 will, ia always chiefly excited by tho moral aspects of tho subject under 
 review. As we have already seen, tho moral nature is not, and cannot 
 
■I- I 
 
 n 
 
 ■■'■t; 
 
 i';l'<'l: 
 
 m, 
 
 1)0, in a statu of iiulillorcnco in surli a Ciisc, iitxl tliiB tin; oxamiiiation 
 id always, not only diroctoil by will, but by will uikUt t!i<f iiithiunco of 
 tho nuiotioiis, proper to tlio moral nature. 
 
 This peculiar action of tlic will ni:iy b.) especially noticed, wlien an 
 attempt is made to convince an individual of any truth which ho is un- 
 willin<,' to believe. In such cases, the action of the will in dealing with 
 tho evidence, ii^ notorious. As an excellent writer on rhid subject re- 
 marks, "Who indeed is there, who lias not had tho experience of how 
 easy a task it is to convinco a man by ar'j,iiini;nt, when inclination has 
 l>een llrst j;ained over;— and how hard and hopelcHS tho ta.sk to satisfy 
 him, when tho will is in opposition ?— Iiov,- li-ht the assault required to 
 storm tho citadel of the \nuleri-itandin;,s wIkmi tho atiections and desires 
 have once capitulated, and how desperate tho resistance, how determin- 
 ed and pertinacious tlie liolding- oat, when tiio heart il hnstilo to the 
 ofi'erod proposals, or to the p;roundy, however just and unexceptionable, 
 on which they are presented ?—'• Why iU ye not understand my 
 epoech ?" said Jesus to tho Jews, '• even because yo cannot hear," (that 
 is yo cannot hear,) '• my words."' 
 
 2nd. But again, while tho will is thu-; invariably concerned in tho 
 formation of belief, no less invariably and necessarily, does it accom- 
 pany, nay, incorporate itself with, every act of belief. 
 
 It appeal's to us that tho province of will has, in general, been un- 
 necessarily restricted, and that tho will ha5 to do as directly with belief 
 on subjects of tho kind wo aro referring to, us it has with action ; or 
 in other woi'ds, that there is as much an act of liking, of pi'eference, of 
 choice, in tho one case, as in the other, — and neither moro nor less of 
 necessiti/ in the determinations conio to. Tho connection between the 
 discoveries of the intellect and tho decisions of tho will, appears to us 
 to be substantially similar to tho connection, which subsists between 
 the decisions of conscience and tho decisions of the will. As tho de- 
 cisions of conscience do not always caiTy with them the assent of tho 
 will, so neither do tho discoveries of the intellect. And as avo do not 
 consider tho mere decision of the conscience, on the side of right, to be 
 
 * Dr. Wai'dlaw ; whoso excpllent loctiires on tho siibjoot tinder discussion, — 
 althnticj-li chioHy oonfinod, as being orginally dtilivorod from tho pulpit, to tho 
 r-liojious and practical bearings of the quoslion, — wo would recommend for 
 perusal. 
 
Miuatit>n 
 uijiu;t) of 
 
 hIkmi nn 
 ID is uii- 
 liiiu; with 
 )jtjct ro- 
 ) of liow 
 Llio:i lias 
 ;<) satisfy 
 (luired to 
 id doslres 
 lotormiii- 
 lo to tiie 
 [itionablc, 
 itand my 
 ar," (tiiat 
 
 lod in tho 
 it accom- 
 
 boen un- 
 vith belief 
 Lction; or 
 ei'eiico, of 
 31* less of 
 ;\voon the 
 oars to us 
 ts between 
 18 the do- 
 ent of tho 
 vo do not 
 ight, to be 
 
 isciissicn, — 
 iilpit, to tho 
 Miiinend for 
 
 irov 
 
 al 
 
 as 
 
 21 
 
 the full apprdvnl of what U rijiht, uiid »!<. n«>t loo', on ihn apj 
 full, until the will lias decided in its favor : so iK'itlicr can we euU that 
 full belief, whieh eonsists merely in an intelleetual conviction of tlio 
 truth, but where tho will vefusoa itd ufisent. 
 
 But whatever may be thouj,'ht on thifj point, which is too pxtensivo 
 for discussion at present, the fact wbich wo have .'generally iUnstruted 
 under the previous head, tliat tlie ntfcent «d' iln' ia<.ral nature is always 
 implied 'mj'i'd belief, nece?,-arily involves tho conclusion, that belief 
 carries with it the assent o* tli" will. I'or just suppo-so, that the assent 
 of the will is v.Ilhlnjld in boiief, tlien oni! rlcineiik of tlio moral 
 nature, and that an hulex to the Ktnto of all the rest, would not be In 
 liarniony with tiio convictions of tho understaiidin^:, and the belief 
 therefore would not be full. 
 
 But the necessary connection of tho will with belief, will be seen do- 
 nionstrativoly, we apprehend, by attending to one important aspect, in 
 which tho objects of belief, on moral aiid reli^dous subjects, must over 
 be contemplated, viv;: the i)ractical, — or tbo bearincs of tho thinjr be- 
 lieved, on that province over which the will his confessedly a supremo 
 control. 
 
 In moral and religious subjects, fall belief, — Inclndin;^ the assent of 
 the moral nature, as well as of tin; intellect, — must always point to 
 action, and must thus include the decision of tlio will in reference to 
 such action. In doalin';' with n^ere intellectual truth, as with an his- 
 torical fact, or a geometrical demonstration, the belief formed may 
 have no reference to action ; and the will may thus bo conceived to bo 
 at rest with regard to it ; but in deaiing with moral and religious 
 truths, it cannot be so. Such truths not only invariably unfold direct 
 practical obligati(nis, but they necesBarily require, fur their full appre- 
 hension, a reference of the mind to the obligations thus unfolded, and 
 to tliG idea of action, in harmony with, or opposed to those obligations. 
 Let this aspect of these truths bo overlooked, and then the whole truth , 
 is plainly not before tho mind. It is Inipossibio, for instance, to con- 
 ceive of a man making up his mind on tho questions, whether the 
 Bible is a Revelation from Heaven, or whether it reveals a way of 
 salvation for sinners; or, — to take particular qaestions referable to the 
 decision of the Bible, — Avhother it is lawful in any circumstances, to 
 misstate the tnilh with a mental reservation, or to do that which is in 
 itself evil that good may come, without having the practical bearings 
 
II 
 
 i ' , 
 t H 
 
 Jiff S 
 
 ■'!• 
 
 m 
 
 ofBunli qtiostioii"^ profulnontly in hid rlosr. Anil in r'lmin;; to a non- 
 cliisiuii upon tlioiM, in tMitortainln^^ ii full boliof, on tlio uno aiilo or tlio 
 (•ilior, thoro nuist thurcforo bo involvod, an adoption or ropudiatiim of 
 tlio obli^Jitiondi conni'ctod with tho truth, and a dotorniinatlou of tho 
 will, i\s to !i certain courao of action to bo pur.sn(>d. 
 
 It is truo that popularly, tho term bi;liof is api»liod to tho convic- 
 tions of tho undorstauflljiu; alono, without roforonco to tho stato of tlm 
 will. But whilo thiri may bo correct in spoakint,' of tho conclusioni of 
 tho untlorstandinu", iu roforonco to subjocts addrossing thoinsolveA to 
 renson aluiie ; it is iucorroct in speaking' of such conclusion? or convic- 
 tions, in roforonco ty moral and relicjious snbjoptt?. It is an error to 
 call such convi(!tions /nfl boliof ; Birnilar to what it would bo, to call 
 moro convictions of conscionco tho full approval of what i3 rii^lit, whilo 
 ovorlookini^ tho motlo in which tho will was dociding. To full boliof on 
 Buch subjects, thoro must bo n concurronco of tho will with tho under- 
 Btandine. In tho formation of such belief, tho decisions of tho ono aro 
 80 incorporated with tho con(dusion3 of tho other, that tako away tho 
 Rpprovin'^' dccij'ion of the will, and you inevitably destroy full boliof, 
 and leave only that kind of belief in which thoro is a disruption and 
 contrariety, between the intellect and tho moral nature, tho head and 
 the heart. Lot us suppose, for example, that a man holds it as a 
 spoculativo belief, that it is his duty to embrace, and oboyj and openly 
 profess, tho gospel ; bnt suppose, that there is no corro?pondini; deci- 
 sion of his will, actually loading him to carry out his belief in action ; 
 is it not perfectly logitimato to infer, that his belief is not of tho right 
 kind, that it hnot full, that ho is still not really <lecided in his belief on 
 tho subject. Only Avhen his will is so decided in favor of tho practical 
 obligations involved in his professed boliof, as to render him prepared to 
 act upon them, can wo ascribe to him full belief ? Xay, so essential is 
 this actjonof tho will to full belief, that oven in tho case of beliefs which wo 
 feel to be evil, and where wo are least ready to suspect" a contrariety 
 between the moral nature and will, and the thing believed, wo aro ac- 
 customed to say, when a man recoils from acting out his belief, that his 
 belief is not thorough. Thus let an individual speculatively believe, that 
 tho word of God sanctions tho extermination of heretics, after tho man- 
 ner of the Church of Rome; but let his moral natural dissent, let his will 
 Kcoil from the practical enforcement of such a belief, and wo should 
 
tin $k fton- 
 b or tho 
 
 liatioii of 
 \n of tlu) 
 
 convic- 
 |to of tim 
 [isioni of 
 ?i)Ive< to 
 »t' ooiivic- 
 orror to 
 S to c:ill 
 Ijt, whllo 
 I'tjliof on 
 
 iinder- 
 c one aro 
 iway tho 
 ill beliof, 
 •tiou ami 
 load and 
 
 it as a 
 
 1 openly 
 no: doci- 
 
 action ; 
 ho right 
 belief on 
 practical 
 pared to 
 '©ntial is 
 ^hich wo 
 trariety 
 aro ac- 
 that his 
 v^o, that 
 man- 
 his will 
 should 
 
 fffl at anrn, that !iii fieliuf wantod a vital • 1. uicnt, and lliat it rould not 
 If toiiiicd full. 
 
 And If m act of wiIl,di»cidiii,G; uitli refcrcnro to thfl ]irartlfal ln-nr- 
 intrs of tho thing l)ili»'v»'d, I? thus incM poratid \* tU belief, in the very 
 act of its formation ; ntill more d'arly ia it l/j<'orpornt«d with ovory ro- 
 oo;,'iiitlon uf tho belief, wlit'U it iMM-onuiS a jiositive eoiireo of iictlon. It 
 
 only lliit»u;;li tho will, that belief, or any thint!; els^o in tlu> mind, eun 
 
 IB 
 
 be 
 
 And it 
 
 itte 
 
 >t what 
 
 be til 
 
 omo a sourc'o ot fif'tior 
 taken o( tho nature of tlie will, «-.r of tlit> mode in wliicli its dceislons 
 arc rouie to, AvIicnevtT a belief Icud'^ to actiup, tlii>re nuiRt preet'dc if, 
 an aet of will, involvlnju; n deeision in favor of tho fiioh ihUiij believed. 
 To deny this, woro to bU))].ose, that tho will njijihtbo determined hy a 
 buliof, while yet there was no moral harmony between the will and tho 
 thing believed ; — a f>uppo.-<ltion which would roduco the will to tho eon- 
 dition of a mere blind nnconscio'.is executor of belief; — ami which 
 would take away every thin,a like a ba.sis for man's responsibilify, and 
 furnish as pood reason for freeing' him from resitousibility for his acts 
 of will, as for his beliefrf theniselves. 
 
 In fact, it is only by this conjunction of an approving; docision of tho 
 ■will, with the convictionR or coneluBions of the understanding, that 
 belief can become, whatyW// belief is universally acknowledged to be, 
 an operative practical i)rinciple. 'When onco tho will has asaented to 
 the conclusions of the uiuierstanding, when once, in other words, 
 beliof '\9/itU, tho belief naturally and inevitably conies to operate, as a 
 motive in determining tho future decisions of tho will; or. rather tho 
 belief now takes its place in the mind, not in tho form of a more intel- 
 lectual convictipn, with Avliich tho will may be at war, but in the form 
 of a conviction, accompanied with a fixed and settled purpose of action 
 in the mind, — or, in other words, as an operative practical principle. 
 But before tho assent of tho will has been given, tho belief cannot thus 
 hare any influence on action ; and the will must first decide in barmony 
 with the conclusions of tho understanding, before tho belief can be pos- 
 sessed of tho power, or entitled to the name of a principle. Thus to 
 recur again to the case of religious belief, or beliof in tho gospel, 
 what is it, that is commonly called sjieculative belief, as dis- 
 tinguished from full, or as it is sometimes termed by Divines, 
 ■aying belief. Tg it not just a belief, which has its seat in the 
 
LU 
 
 M ^^ 
 
 U'-'i 
 
 Its.'' ' 
 
 
 tiiulurstaniTiiig merely, uliii-'i cimsists only in certain convictions 
 of the reason, biic from wMcli tln' moral iintur(3 and tlie will 
 dissent; or witlx wjiicli, .it l^vist, tlioy aro not in hirmony? And 
 wluit on tlie othor liaml is tlio real, or full belief, which is so clearly 
 distini^'aislialj!',? from this merely s])03ulative h'.'H'f; is it not just euuh ii 
 belief as involves tlio harmony of the moral nnture with th(; truthf? of 
 the ft-ospel, and the assent of the will to the practical obligations \vhi(di 
 those truths nnfohl ; and which has tluis ;'.u operative power, to ro!;u- 
 lato and purify th'-' life ? And which of these kinds of belief, are we 
 accustomed to desio^nate, or do \v<^ feid to be entitled to the dosi,a;na- 
 t ion of, a prla<'\ph> ofh"!.!,'/'':' rnquostion.ably the latter alone : — oven 
 as we never fail to fed, it is the belief, whicli alone can entitle any 
 one to be clesi;i"nated a tru/' hcU'V'cr, a truQ C'a-lsti'iii. 
 
 I doubt not that you can scarcely have f;iilod, to draw this distinction 
 for yourselves between beliefs in reli'rion. It may be that some of 
 you have had exporienco of both kinds of belief in your ow'u hearts ; 
 and we tlnnk you cannot refer, either to your observation, or ex- 
 perience, without finding evidence of the fact, that the will is necessari- 
 ly involved in the formation of belief, whether that belief be sound 
 or imsound. 
 
 On the ground then, that will is involved in every belief on moral 
 and religious subjects, we see why belief must be as much subject to 
 responsibility, as any thing else in which the will is involved. And not 
 only so, but on the principles which wo have explainoil, wo are now 
 prepared, more particularly to show you, that every unsound belief, 
 must bo the product of an evil ivUI; and as such itself evil and culpable. 
 
 Those who entertain unsound beliefs, may bo ranked among one or 
 other, of the following classes : — 
 
 Those who are determined not to bo convinced, — who will not trouble 
 themselves to examine the truth, — and who shut their eyes against the 
 light. 
 
 Those who from thoughtlessness or indifference, examine carelessly 
 and superficially, and do not deal with the truth in the way which its 
 high importance, and their own best intei'csts, demand. 
 
 Those who have made a partial, prejudiced, and one-sided examina- 
 tion. 
 
 Those whoso reason is unable to resist the force of the evidence be- 
 
I 
 
 onvictiona 
 tlio will 
 ^•ny? And 
 so dourly 
 list such ii 
 trutlis of 
 |i()!is \vhi(!li 
 ", to rc\;?i.i- 
 ivi\ nre wo 
 dosigjia- 
 ne : — oven 
 'iititio any 
 
 tlistinction 
 it some of 
 v'a hearts ; 
 on, or ex- 
 necessari- 
 be sound 
 
 on moral 
 subject to 
 And not 
 are now 
 nd belief, 
 culpable. 
 ig one or 
 
 )t trouble 
 ainst the 
 
 jarelessly 
 vhich its 
 
 Jxamina- 
 
 enoe bo- 
 
 2'> 
 
 foro thorn, but whose hearts stiil refuse to submit. 
 
 And lastly, those who soom to liare made thorouj^h and fair examina- 
 tion, and to have honestly arrived at the unsound belief which they 
 entertain. 
 
 Now with regard to the first fom* of those classes, thcro <;ai. ■ e no 
 difficulty. No nice analysis is requiredhere. An evil will, so to speak, 
 is written on their foreheads. If their unsound beliefs be not the 
 product of will, and of will deciding on the side of evil, wo do not 
 see, how anything- a man is, or dues, can bo called a product of his 
 will, and of tliat will choosing evil. 
 
 The only ai)parent difficulty is in relation to the hist class specified, — 
 the class who seem to have arrived hoacntly at an unsound belief; — a 
 class, however, whoso representatives are but very rarely to be found. 
 But even theu* case will be found, on the principles which we have 
 explained clearly to involve an evil will. 
 
 For, the conditions essential to responsibility in all cases, and to 
 which we have already referred being supposed to be satisfied, if the 
 will had not misled them in dealing with the evidence of truth bcfoio 
 them, a sound conclusion, a right belief would necessarily have been 
 como to. 
 
 Aigain in cheiushing the full belief of error which they entertain, 
 the will has decided in favor of that which is evil; — there has been a 
 liking, an approving, a choosing of that evil ; — and especially, there has 
 been a resolving or determining to act upon the practical obligations, 
 »ot to good, but to evil, which the object of their belief appeared to 
 unfold ; and in all this, there has of necessity been, what is sinful, cul- 
 pable, punishable. Nay, had the will in their case been in harmony 
 
 with the truth, it could not have decided in favor of error. In the case 
 X)f a being whoso will was pure, was in perfect harmony with the will of 
 
 God, all the dedsiona of the will, would necessarily be in harmony with 
 the truth of God. It could not approve or choose as good, that which 
 God regarded as evil, — that which God had revealed as evil, — iind 
 reject that which He had revealed as good. Or if before pure, tlu^ first 
 act of this kind, would be the first act of sin. And we are thus shut r.p 
 to the conclusion, that wherever an unsound belief on moral and reli- 
 gious subjects is formed, it involves an evil act of the will. In the case 
 •of the class referred to, there may be, so to speak, less moral depraviiy. 
 
^.il. 
 
 !f, 
 
 m 
 
 ! 
 
 J 
 [I t 
 
 I 
 
 H' 1, 
 
 t 
 
 ,1' 1 
 
 BafcifflajESi 
 
 20 
 
 loss strongtli of ovil will, anil consequently less of criminality con- 
 noctod with their unsound belief, than in the case of the former; but 
 still their unsound belief, is no less certainly the pi'oduct of will, and 
 no lesg really, as such, evil and culpable. 
 
 III. But this leads us to tho last argument which we proposed to 
 illustrate. 
 
 Many are apt to feel puzzled in attempting an analysis of mental pror 
 eesseg, and to think that conclusions which can only bo arrived at 
 through such an analysis, are placed beyond their roach. Now it apr 
 pears to us, that disposing of tho points wo have been examining as you 
 may, — or at least conceding it, for the sake of argument, to bo difficult, 
 or even impossible to dotorraino, whether and to what extent tho 
 moral nature and the will ai'o concerned in belief ; still there is a short 
 and simple way, by which an unbiassed mind may arrive, even on 
 principles of natural reason, at tho conclusion, that man is responsiblo 
 for his belief. 
 
 iiOt MS just suppose that there is such a thing as truth, on moral 
 and religious subjects, — that God has furnished us with sufficient evi- 
 dence of that truth, — and that ho has given us an opportunity of in- 
 vestigating such evidence, as well as understandings competent to tho 
 investigation ; then it appears to us to follow as self-evident truth : — 
 
 First, that wo are solemnly bound to investljato that truth, and 
 upon the evidence furnished to receive it ; — the fact of God's present- 
 ing to us the truth in the way supposed, virtually involving a command 
 to receive it. 
 
 Secondly, that the failure to receive that truth, and the belief of the 
 opposite, implies contrariety to God, — opposition to his will, to his com^ 
 mand, to his law. 
 
 And thirdly, that whatever tho particular way in which that unsound 
 belief may have been formed in tho mind, its simple presence there, 
 implies moral evil, — something which in its very nature must bo hate- 
 ful to God, something which he must condemn. 
 
 Under tho government of a wise, holy, and benevolent Being, a 
 rightly constituted mind, — a mind in harmony with the mind of tho 
 Creator, in harmony too with tho truths revealed by that Creator, — 
 would be prepared to receive and choose and delight in, such truths . 
 and in tliem alone. Such a mind would have no elements within it, to 
 
 'f 
 
linality con- 
 former; but 
 of will, ant! 
 
 |e proposed to 
 
 f mental pror 
 fo arrived at 
 Now it ap^ 
 nining as you 
 bo difficult, 
 '< extent the 
 lero is a short 
 rive, even on 
 is responsible 
 
 ith, on moral 
 sufficient evi- 
 'tunity of in- 
 petent to tho 
 lit truth : — 
 it truth, and 
 irod's present- 
 ig a command 
 
 belief of the 
 11, to his com- 
 
 that unsound 
 38cnce there, 
 mst bo hate- 
 
 snt Being, a 
 ; mind of tho 
 i Creator, — 
 such truths, 
 within it, to 
 
 27 
 
 harmonize with any opposite errors. Tho harmonizing with such, — the 
 belief of Buch, — can only be accounted for, on tho supposition of dark- 
 ness, disorder, moral evil, sin, that which is justly the subject of punish- 
 mont. 
 
 Such is tho argument which wo proposed to submit to you ; and its 
 l^eight V/O must leave to bo estimated by yourselves. Had time pcr- 
 tnitted, wo should have liked to confirm the conclusion arrived at, by art 
 appeal to the testimony of conscience, — to the practical judgment of 
 mankind, — and to the exi)licit statomcnta of Scripture. But wo can 
 C^nly gay a word about cacli. 
 
 1. As to tho testimony of conscicnco, let us take one case. A man 
 finds reasoft to change his belief about tlio character of God, or about 
 some important Bible truth. From having tho belief about God and 
 his moral government, wliich arniys liim in the attributes of a stern 
 and vindictive judge, ho comes to have tho beliefs, which invest him 
 with tho attributes of a kind and forgiving father ; or from believing 
 that ho must seek deliverance from wrath by his own works, ho comes 
 to believe, that ho may find it through a simple reliance on tho merits 
 of a crucified Saviour. And what is the decision of conscience about 
 hig former beliefs ? All who have undergone tho change will tell you, 
 
 . that it amounts to a most pungent and overwhelming testimony against 
 ^^ those beliefs as evil. And similar illustrations might be multiplied in- 
 definitely. It is true that men often seem, to have no trouble of con- 
 science about the unsound beliefs which tlioy cherish. But if it be really 
 tho case that conscience is thus asloop within them, will not tho defect 
 in their moral state, which that unsound belief of itself implies, more 
 than sufficiently account for it. 
 
 2. Again, what is the practical judgment of the world about unsound 
 beliefs ? Do men usually look upon them all, as free from moral 
 evil and inculpable, if they are only sincere ? Do not, on the contrary, 
 Bomo beliefs fill us instinctively with horror, — and do wc not shrink from 
 him who entertains them, as from the touch of a serpent, and all tho 
 more vehemently, if wo think that ho is sincere in holding tlicm ? Wo 
 doubt if tho sturdiest assertor of man's non-responsibility for his beliefs, 
 that over formed tho resolution, *' henceforward nothing shall prevail 
 upon us to praise or to bhune any one for tlial, which he can no mure 
 
 i change than ho can tliu hue of his skin, or the height of his stature,'' 
 

 I 
 
 
 f:n 
 
 m4 
 
 
 28 
 
 «'oiil(l Bit liesnlo a siiiccfc Tliug,— lor it woulil soirm that there aro 
 really such,— however iiuioeont of ackiial crime, and however 
 little likely to exercise his vociitioii upon his own person, without feel- 
 ing in liis own breast, a testimony to t!io fact, that such beliefs aro eviU 
 — abominable, — nay vehcinontly to be condemned. And what is this, but 
 a practical illustration of the fact, that men aro sometimes compelled, and 
 that, so to speak, in spite of themselves and their philosophi- 
 cal theories, to feel that there is moral evil in erroneous beliefs, and 
 even to treat thorn as culpable. 
 
 3. And finally, what saith the word of God about beliet and unbelief? 
 A few passjiges will sulUcc. 
 
 " And this is his commandment tliat wo should believe on the name of 
 his son Jesus Christ.* This is the work of God, that yo believe on him 
 whom he hath sent."t « Doltovo on the Lord Josus Christ and thou shall 
 be saved. ^ lie that bcliereth and is baptised shall be saved ; but he that 
 believcth not shall be damned."** 
 
 " With the heart man believcth unto righteous!iess.'l''t* Take heed 
 lest there be in any of you au evil heart of unbelief in departing from 
 the living God.^T[ This is the condemTi;ition that light is come intc 
 the world, and men loved darkness rather than lij^ht, because their deeds 
 were evil.*** Ye wiU not come unto mo that ye might have life. "'Hi* 
 
 " If any man will do hiss will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether 
 itbeofOod.'l^^ 
 
 Hero we have belief, first, represented as a duty, — made the subject 
 of a command, — the response to which is an act of will ; secondly, held 
 fftrtli as the turning point of salvation, — that by which a man ia saved, — 
 for the want of which ho is condeinned ; and thirdly, described as having 
 its seat in the heart, and involving the assent of the heart. 
 
 Here too we have belief traced, first, to an evil heart ; secondly, to- 
 the love of darkness or sin ; and tliirdly, and most explicitly to the will 
 And here too wo are informed, that a right moral state is tl^e grand 
 prereciuisito to a sound belief. 
 
 And thus we have, as it appears tous,everypositioni which on grounds 
 of reason have been advanced and advocated, sanctioned and confirmed 
 
 *.Tolin in- and 2.SH. ^ohn VI. and 29f,h. f Acts XVI. and 3Ut. **Mark 
 N\'I. and Uifh. tfl^^'nans X and ^Oth. ff Hebrews Ill.anrl Vlih. ***Johiv 
 1 1 J . and 19th. ftt Jolin V and 40th. ff fjohn VII. and 17th. 
 
 J 
 
 
there aro 
 however 
 ttliout feol- 
 lofg are etrily 
 |it is this, but 
 npcllod, and 
 I philosophi- 
 peliefs, and 
 
 Id unbelief ? 
 
 the name of 
 eve on him 
 1 thou shall 
 ; but he that 
 
 Take heed 
 
 rting from 
 
 s come into 
 
 their deeds 
 
 e life. "'Hi- 
 
 le, whether 
 
 the subject 
 ondly, held 
 is saved, — 
 das having 
 
 5condly, to- 
 o the will 
 tlje grand 
 
 >n grounds 
 confirmed 
 
 t. **Mark 
 . ***Johiv 
 
 •J9 
 
 by the word of (ioil, — wliosf tlclivenincos, as has been well said, will bo" 
 always found in harmony with the conclusions of ii sound philosophy. 
 In conclusion, just allow mo as briefly as possible, to refer, as I did at 
 the outset, to the practical improvement to bo made of this subject. 
 
 I know not, my young frionds, what are your individual beliefs ; and 
 it is not my province at present, to deal with you particularly about 
 these. But if I have succeeded, to any extent, in the argument now 
 laid before you, there is one lesson grounded on it, which I am war^ 
 ranted to impress upon you ail, and that is, — to cherish a deep and 
 habitual sense of tlio solemn responsibility to God, under which every 
 belief you have already formed is cherished, and under which every 
 belief you may hereafter adopt, while engaged in tlio investigation of 
 truth, shall be entertained. A sense of this, will bo your safeguard 
 against many errors, — your surest guide to the knowledge and belief of 
 the truth. It is aji idle dream, that there is no monil good or evil in 
 belief; or that the searcher of hearts can regard with indiiferencCy 
 those potent springs of action, which indicate so truly the state both of 
 the understanding and of the heart in reference to himself and to the 
 - tritfk, and which infallibly determine the tenor of a man's life. If 
 roAsou or revelation is to be trusted to, your beliefs will save you, or 
 your beliefs will danm you. They will determine your character here* 
 they will decide your destiny in eternity. 
 
 Beware of the levity, the thoughtlessness, the indifference, which can, 
 not bo troubled to givo to the search after truth, and especially the 
 highest of all truth, — the truth as it is in Jesus, — the time, the labour, 
 the patience, the perseverance, which the importance of the object de- 
 mands. 
 
 Beware of the bias on the side of error, which springs from a defec- 
 tive moral nature and an evil will, and which will be ever ready to- 
 geduce you, in the form of the wish, that Avhat is distasteful, or what 
 would put an arrest on impure indulgencies, may not be true, — or the 
 forgone conclusion which must at all hazards be established, — or tho 
 desire to be at one with a party, instead of being at one with the truth 
 itself 
 
 And above all, beware of that hostility to the truth, Avhich may re- 
 main in the heart, after the understanding has felt the force of iti 
 evidence, — and which may tempt you to trample on reason and con- 
 
 |- 
 
kMiliksi 
 
 I , 
 
 I M 
 
 hh* 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 Bclcttco tDgctllor, tliat you m.iy Avorship some idol in its room. 
 
 In a word, search aftor tlio truth, as for the very springs of lifo ; — by 
 carcjful Bolf-:?ovornmcnt and moral discipline, lay aside the shackles and 
 oncumbranceg which an undisciplined state of the understanding and 
 tho heart, never fails to impose on the inquirer after truth, and train 
 yourselves for earnest, thoroughgoing invostin;ation ; — and as fallen and 
 dopondont beings, fail not to seek the aid of that divine teacher, — that 
 Spirit of truth, — who is promised to them that ask him, and who will 
 load you into all truth. 
 
 Young, ardent, elastic, full of hope, and free fi'om tho depressing 
 influence of the cares and disappointments, that never fail to gather 
 around men of advancing years, tho present has doubtless many 
 peculiar charms to allure you ; still amidst all your keen relish of life»^ 
 keep it ever before you, that you arc on trial for eternity. As cer- 
 tainly as you have succeeded tho men of a fovmcr generation, so 
 certainly will another generation arise to fill tho places that you now 
 occupy. A little time, — it may be a very little time, — and you must 
 stand i'aco to faco with tho God of truth, — the great fountain and 
 standard of truth, — tho glorious Being, whose immutablo truth is tho 
 corner stone on which rests tho stability of the universe ; and set in 
 tho blaze of that light inotfablc, — searching all things, revealing all 
 things, discovering every speck of darkness and of sin, Ok! never 
 forget, that that only will bo found truth in you, which is in harmony 
 with His mind and will, in harmony with His eternal truth. Knowing 
 the truth, believing tho truth, you will ho found resting on that which 
 cannot fail, and in a higher sense than can ever be the case on earth, 
 as pure in heart you will seo God. But believing what is not tho 
 truth, — resting on what is not tho truth, — the very truth of God v^hich 
 onduroth for ever, — tho foundation on which you have built, must 
 inevitably sink from under you, a mockery, a delusion, a lie. 
 
 'U 
 
 ff 
 
 AVi- 
 
 w 
 
 -it a 
 
 m 
 
 X'lll 
 
 Hvi: 
 
i 
 
 life ;— Ljr 
 lacklus and 
 fading and 
 and train 
 I fallen and 
 |hcr,— that 
 who will 
 
 iloprcssing 
 to gather 
 OSS many 
 ish of life,' 
 As cer- 
 
 ration, so 
 you now 
 
 you must 
 
 itain and 
 
 ^th is the 
 
 n<l set in 
 
 baling all 
 
 ^H ! never 
 
 harmony 
 
 Knowinir 
 
 at wliich 
 
 )n earth, 
 
 ! not the 
 
 3d which 
 
 It, must 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ■'SVk (iaiint)t forbear .dimply noticing by way of appendix, tho elucidation whit-h, 
 >it appears to us, the principles explained in tho foregoing Lecture, may Lo 
 x'niployed to furnish of some of tho most important doctrines of Scripture. 
 
 1. IJy these principlis, an explanation is furnished of the difference, — referred 
 to in tho Lecture, but in a Theological point of view, deserving of special notice, 
 — the difference betw(.'en a ^iKCulativeaad a sat'///// belief or faith; u subject about 
 which many persons appear to bo puzzled. In real or saving faith, there is a 
 harmony of the moral nature with the truths that relate to the way of salvation 
 by Christ, including the assent of the will to Gosi)el offers, and to the i)ractical 
 obligations wlucsh the Gospel unfolds ; by which the belief becomes an operative 
 principle, working by love, purifying the heart, and overcoming the world. In 
 the case of merely speculative faitii, there is only the conviction of tho under- 
 standing, 80 fiEii* as such conviction can exist with reference to moral and 
 religious truth, such p-s tho gospel reveals, separate and alone ; but there is no 
 harmony of the moral nature, no assent of tho will, with the truth ; and tho 
 belief thus remains dead, inoperative and worthless. 
 
 2. The same princii)les explain, how true faith mttst always be, a spring or 
 source of holy obedience. Implying the assent of the moral nature and will to 
 the practical obligations imfolded in the truths of the Gospel, it must of necessity 
 lead to action in harmony with these truths. It cnliats, as it were, on the side 
 of holiness, the whole active powers of the soul, and thus inevitably produces 
 evangelical oboJieuuo. 
 
 3. These principles also explain the reason of the prominence which is given 
 to faith in the Gospol, and in particular, why justification is connected with 
 faith alone. By faith, of the kind wliich wo have described, the soul is brought 
 into harmony with the miud and will of God, and especially with that mind and 
 will in relation to the free way of salvation by Christ, — the way by which " God 
 is just in justifying the ungodly." There is thus, in a variety of aspects in 
 which this harmony may be regarded, what some divines term, a fitness or con- 
 decency in faith to be the instrument or means of jastification. 
 
 4. Upon these principles, it may also besoen, vvliy a subjective change, wrought 
 in the heart by the Spirit of God, is necessary to the exercise of faith. In tho un- 
 regeneratc state, tho moral nature of man is opposed to the truth of God 
 revealed in the Gospol; — it cannot rightly approve of that truth, and tho will 
 
■ 
 
 
 
 ^i^'^ 
 
 11 
 
 ll : 
 
 ■,niT ,. 
 
 m. 
 
 -* 
 
 I.-' 
 
 82 
 
 cannot, or ratlior mU not, dose with tlic offers of tho flospel, and Rubmit to th' 
 practical obligations, thu aclnowleilj^nicnt of whicli u riy;iit reception oi u. 
 Cospol implies ; and till a change bo wrought in the ije^rt, there can tliorefore 
 be no true beliet. IJy changing the moral nature, by bringing it into harmony 
 ■with the mind and will of God, the Spirit imparts tho power of believing; ami 
 belief or faith thus co.nes as a natural and ntu'essary result to bo exercised. I'.y 
 the first act of faith, the work of regeneration, begun in the subjective opera- 
 tion of the Spirit in the fteart, is completed, the soul being then vitally united to 
 Christ. And under the influence of this faith, now existing in tho soul as an 
 operative practical princii»le, the work of sanctification is carried on, — believers 
 being more and more «anctifled, through tlie belief of the truth. < 
 
 5. On the same principles, we may explain, how faith's being the one onhj 
 pre-re(|uisite to justification, makes salvation free, or how, tis the apostle ex- 
 presses it, "it is by faith that it might be by grace." Faith, as the fruit of the 
 Spirit's subjective operation in the heart, is itself a free gift of God ; in its 
 exercise it implies the reception of salvation as a free gift ; and by its influence 
 it produces the only holy obedience of which a sinner is, or can be capable, 
 thus making obedience itself, on which sinners ate so prono to rest for accep-- 
 tance with God, q, fruit of gr<ace. 
 
 6. And lastly, on the same principles we see, ^-ith what justice sinners are 
 condemned for unbelief. Unbelief implies a contrariety of the moral nature, 
 and especially of the will, to tho truth of God. And it involves a wilful rojec- 
 tion of the free gospel salvation, and a vo'dful persistance in sin, — attended wth 
 the fearful aggravation, of a contempt of the brightest display of God's moral 
 perfections and saving grace ever made to the universe, and a resistance to the 
 most powerful motives ever brought to bear upon the human heart. 
 
 The members of the Association, which has undertaken the publication of the 
 foregoing Lecture, will, it is hoped, excuse this addition to it ; as it may direct 
 their attention to several new and important aspects of tho subject which it 
 discusses, and stimulate them to tho investigation of some momentous questions, 
 with wliich the subject has a natural connection, but of which the Lecture does 
 not directly treat. 
 
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