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A LECTURE PELIVEBED BEFORE THE MEMBERS OF THE ^^^amilton Jttercantiie Cibrarg /^^BBoriottoiu ON THE EVENING OF THE 18th OF FEBRLARY 1851; AND NOW PUBLISHED AT THEIR REQUEST^ BY THE REV. JOHN BAYNE, ,0F KNOX'S CHURCH, G A L T, GALT: V JPBINTED BY JAMES AINSLIEisCo. 1851. ' *■■ f L Preface. ^iiE Lecture 6ni man's responsibility for his belief, herewith submiifec^ io the Public, was delivered to the youug men of the " Hamilton Mer. baintile Library Association," a^ one of a series, for which the members df that Association, with a commendable desire to find suitable occupa- tion for their leisure hours, and with a view to their intellectual and Moral improvement, had secured the services of various ministers and 6ther individuals, during the past winter. Soon after its delivery, the managing Committee of the Association, requested the author to allow them to publish it in pamphlet form. I'his request iie fdlt that he 6ould not refuse. In acceding to it, howCv6r, he explained to the Com. mittee, what he woiuld now also explain to those who may honor it with a perusal, that it was not composed with a view to publication, and that ^ad he been appearing i>efore the public of his own accord, he would have felt it desirable to illustrate and fortify at much greater length his views on some of the controverted points of which it treats. Within the compass of a single Lecture, it was possible for him to do little more than sketch the outline of his argument, — rather suggesting to his hearers, the mode in which the sutbject should be investigated and decided, than professing to exhaust it. As it is, however, its brevity may be a greater recommendation in the view of some to its perusal, than it was in the author's to its publication. And it is now submitted to those who take an interest in such subjects, ini the hope that it may serve to confirm the opinions of those who agree' #itfa its conclusions, and that it may direct those are still inquiring, to such a solution of the question discussed, as shall stand the scrutiny of that day, when only tnUh shall abide. In preparing it for the press, a few alt^ations have been made, bui! thesd will be found immaterial. ! 19076 .* • • is '■i-iiy Is MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR lIlS BELIEF?' 'The question which, as you aro aware, I am now to discuaii, —the <j|UOBtion, ** Is man responsible for his belief," is not merely as some are <tpt to fancy, a curious and somtiwhat abstruse question in Ethics, but a question of inraienso practical importance ; in which all have an interestt en which all, too, must in one form or other, comb to a decision, ani the decisioti come to on which, must necessarily exert a power- ful influence, either for good or evil. Whatever the origin of our beliefs, especially of our beliefs on moral and religious subjects, it must be plain to every one, who has ever studied his own mental history, or traced the secret influences in men's minds, which mould the character of succeeding generations, and determine the destinies of the world, that •uch beliefs have a most important influence in the formation of our moral and religious character, and not less so in thia re gulation of our con* duct, in the highest of all departments of duty, tha t viz : which relates to etir preparation for eternity. And the view which we take of the respon-* sibility connected with beliefs, — thus exerting an influence so vast and eternal, — must necessarily affect the formation of our beliefs themselves. Consciously or unconsciously, it will tell on our mode of dealing with the evidience on which truth is presented to us; it will tell, too, on our mbde of contemplating the' truth itself. It wore at variance with all eiperience to suppose, that the man who goes to the iir* litigation of Afuth, under the solemnizing influence of the feelmg that he is respon- sible to God, for every conclusion at which he arrives, every opinion which he forms, will not be more likely to arrive at the knowledge of the truth, than the man who goes to the investigation, imagining that belief, however erroneous, if only sincere, can involve no criminality, ilad expose to no condemnation. fortunately the great majority of men, however inadequately they iMay be impressed with a sense of their responsibility, assent to it, as~ an' almost self-evident truth, that man is reponsible for his belief; and this assent, originating in the clear testimony of unbiased conscience, % sanctioned by the explicit declarations of the word of God. But a •ceptical philosophy has often started doubts on the subject ; a/nd names" ■ .*»»!?-- ot high authority in literaturo and ncioncc, have openly avowod tho' opinion that man ia not responsible for \m belief, and have attomptoii to defend it On philosophical grounds. Among the supporters of ultrat liberal views in politics too, tho favorite maxim, that man is not respf»n- sible to man for his boliof, — a maxim which, with certain qualiflcations, is soitnd, and important as tho only basis on which religious toleration, or rather, equality among tho members of tho same commonwealth, c4ri be adrquately secured,— is not unfrequently advanced in a form or advocated on grounds which imply, that if man is not rospon- siblei to' man for his belief, so neither is he responsible to God. While among the young whom thoughtlessness or vice has inclined to infidelity, the doctrine is often employed as an excuse for their indifference to all rieligion, — either avowed explicitly as a tenet of their infidel creed, or more vaguely under tho plea, that they are honest in their convictions, and cannot be blameable for holding, or for acting on honest convic- tfons. Tho question is thus one, which is well entitled to careful con- stderation aimong a body of young men, met as you are for intellectual and moral improvement, — who are either forming their opinions on ihany of the most important questions with which immortal beings can be occupied, or exposed in holding the opinions which they have em- braced, and in which, perhaps, by godly parents they have been reared, to the assaults of infidelity. And a clear and thorough conviction of the responsibility to God, under which eVery belief is formed and held as well as acted on, cannot fail to be of immense importance in enabling you to discharge aright your duty, in dealing with all those questions of vital interest, which imperatively demand the investigation of intelligent and immortal beings, and a right solution of which is an essential element of that godliness, which has tho promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come. In endeavoring to assist you in coming to a right decision on this question, we might examine it, either in the light of reason, or in the ' light of revelation, or in the light furnished by both ; and in either, or in both of these ways, the doctrine which it is our wish to impress upon you, might, we think, be Incontrovertibly established. Time, however, would fail to enter on a field so extensive, and we propose to consider the question chiefly as a question in Ethics, and to show you on consid- od thnf ptofl to f ultrs respon- cations, loration, wealth, a form rospon- While iifidolity, ICO to all iroed, or victiohs, convic- ul con- ;cllectual in ions on tings can lave em- •eared, to iction of handheld enabling $stions of telligent I element , as well on this r in the ither, or ess upon however, consider 1 consid- «rfttion» of natural roasou, that man <j responiiililu for his beliuf ; and that the grounds on which tho oppositu opinion is advocated, aro un* philosophical and untunable. This may have tho advantage of disem- barrassing your consideration of thu (lucstion, of tho jealousy which it not unfroquently unturtainod of Theological dogmas, us well as of bettor assisting you in mooting on thuir own ground thu advocates of tnan's non-responsibility, who, unable to grapplo with tho clear and explicit testimony of Scripture on the subject, usually take refuge in the dim and broken light of reason, or in what they pompously term, tho enlightened philosophy of modern times. And first and bofore entering on thu moi'o rigid examination of the question, there is a preliminary remark as to a consequence inevitably resulting from the doctrine of man's non-responsibility for his belief* to which it will be of use to cull your attention, as being fitted both to show you tho extensive and vital bearings of the question under discus- sion, and to prove, as by a simple reductio ad ubsut'dum, the untenable- ness of that doctrine, — and that is, that if man be not responsible to God for his beliefs, then there is scarcely any thing for which with couBis. tency, he can be hold to be responsible. In religious matters especially — the most important of all — a man'g habitual feelings and conduct must bo chiefly determined by his beliefs, ^ay, it might easily bo shown, that certain feelings and actions, corres- ponding with the beliefs cherished, must as necessarily flow from these beliefs, as belief itself is supposed necessarily to flow from the mannner in which tho evidence of truth presents itself to the mind. Who can for a moment doubt, that the beliefs which a man entertains in relation ^0 the questions, — whether the Bible is the word of God, or whether Christ is the son of God, and the Saviour of sinners, or whether man ig here on trial for eternity, — an eternity which, terminating the evanescent distinctions of earth, shall know but two classes of men, — the good and the bad, the inhabitants of heaven, and tho inhabitants of hell, — must of necessity tell, and powerfully tell, alike upon his feelings and his life ? Now, if there be no responsibility for belief, on what principle, or with what consistency, can a man be held responsible for the feelings or actions which flow from that belief, and which are only the necessary /Bffect, the simple, natural, inevitable product of that belief. With regard to actions in particular; whenever belief is the sourpp ♦ f 8 ,of action, if tho boliof itsolf be neither good nor evil, and not the lubr Ject of reiponsibilityj it seoms plainly abaurd to hold, that action, which ii but the oxprossion or embodiment of ttiat belief, can bo possesied of luch a moral character, ai to render him Hrho perform! it subject t« responsibility. This were to rererse the axiom, that actions have no moral character in themselves, but only In so far as they are the acts of an intelligent and moral agent ; and that tho good or evil which wo ascribe to them, and which renders him who performs them praiseworthy or blameworthy in their jporformance, properly lies not in the actions, but in the principles, — the views, the feelings^ the affections, the motives by which the agent has been actuated. This wore to suppose that Ood looks to tho outside alone, in dealing with his creatures as responsible, .and overlooks the inward springs and soi^rces of their conduct,-^the Tiew of Him, the feeling toward Him, the object or end in reference to Him, — all which are involved in belief, — by which that conduct has been .determined. This were to imply^ that should a man beli«ve in hisheart« the most High God to bo a boing like unto himself, or 'a hard and rigorous and cruel master, he could only be punishable for avowing or acting on such belief, but would at the samo time be held guiltless for harboring tho foul and dishonoring source of his practice ungodUnesi in his bosom. It is true, that ^ose who deny man> responsibility for his belief, do liot usually admit, or, at least, do not usually advert to this necessary in^ ference from their own doctrine ; but on the contrary admit, that man, though not responsible for his belief, is still responsible for his actions * Itnd one hears this curious theory of responsibility, not unfrequently iavowedin such remarks as these, " It matters little what a manbelievea if his conduct is good for ** His creed can't be wrong, whose life is in tho right ;" or " Men are Christians or Mahon^medans just as they are jtrained ; the great matter is an honest life." But the admission tfius jnade, and which we have never seen even plausibly attempted to bo «hown consistent with the denial of man's responsibility for his belief, 98 usually made in a very qualified form; — n;iade so as to admit of t)»e condemnation of sins against society, whatever the belief in which they .originate, but qualified so as to allow of most philosophical indifferent .to sins against God;— made so as to admit the condemnation of crinjysa, auch as flowed from tho creed of the Anabaptists of Germany, or woN^d lajvlti •lit ■v the iub» |ion, whiok •Messed of ubject t9 hare no acts of an ascribe orthy or itions, but notires by that God 'sponsible* Iuct,-r-the fereuce to It has bee9 hisheartf hard and avowing or uiltlesB for ngodlinesi belief, do leessary in^ that man, is actions > frequently an believes fe is in the I they are Ission tdug >ted to bo his beljief, nit of t}»e rhich they differenAO of crinjiM^ orwoj^d I/i'jTltaMy f<>llo\T tho ftsro i.larir^y of tho do'trinos of S.»oinli'(tn ; hut qutiHAoil so as to w.irraiit tlio utmost conipl.K'oiicy, in npoakiM;» of tho fjoiitool vie M, that si>r'iii; n[) tuiclior'!:oi!, uiulor tho ncr^ativi? erotMl of tho i:i!iil'il ; th ) p.'a:5tic^l uii^o IHuoih vvhioh lo.iulta ffom ti>o criM'd of tho Sirritiiati; or t\\') d'V^ri Ihi:; lilidatry wiiieh U tncoiira;^od hy tho crccil of tho Churcli of Homo. Ill I'vi I, witliiut 9'v.ii ) siit'i q'lalinrxMiiM, tlioir d ictriiin, tikcti a» a w!iol'), vvotiM not siibs».»rvo tho purpoaesr for which it sodins to havohotMi duvi^od ; an I th'» only olK'iit oi' ahiiitti!!'; man'? ro-ip'nnU)ility for Win aBtiom, whil(Hl !nyi i^; his re3;iotHil»ility for \m bjliel", >vonM !»», that thu Olio partoftlio doctrine wonld njutralizo and nullify tho othor. a'lil leavn tho wliolo suhjast of UMu'a rosponsibility involved in incxtri- cabln; rifu^ion. lloldincj ma:i ti bo not raspon^iblo for his beliefs, but r^Mpoimhlo for Iiii aetirm^ rosnltiui^ from thcso boliof^, they would plainly freo liiui with ono hand, only to hold him fast with thn other; — they would asuiro nirn, yon nhill ni?vn.* bo cDndo:nn'3 1 for thinkin):^ that to bo truth, which God ha* dcolarod to bo error, or that to bo law. fnl, which ho ha>i pronounced to bo sin, but you shall iniallibly bo con- domned for aotin;; on that opinion : — thoy would deliver him from all I'oar ofpunish.nont for his boliofi, but loavo him hri.it(? I with tlio foar of punisiimont for aitioni to which tlnno bolioH inevitably led; — and tho only solaco that would thus remain to th • inlidid or heretie would bo, that arisino; from tho consideration, that ha wa^ placed under tho government of an omnipotent Jud^e, v.'ho cared nothing f»r what lio believed, but who, at tho sam;) tim.>, mlq-lit aoizo on him -m a dvj!)tor to justic) for allowini; hiij beliof:s to Inriuonco his life. In a word, deny mati'i responsibility for hh belief, and we do not see whoro you can stop, till you have freed liim from all responsibility, or at tho least, from all rcraponsiinlity for actions Uawinj; from belief, and till yon hivo arrived at tlio conclusion, that tho sceptic or tlw Pantheist, who believes that ho has no duties to God, is innocent in neglecting every duty which God has enjoined. But wo come to tho more riijid examination of tho question. And fii*sfr, it is of importance that you undorstauil distinctly and definitely tho doctrine which wo are to controvert, with the grounds on which it is usually made to rest, as wall as tho opposite truth which it is proposed to e'^tablish. > 10 Tho Joctrino of man's iion-rosponaibilUy for his belief, it would hate boon deairablo to present to you, in tho words of somo of it» most dis- tinguished supporters. That doctrine, it may hero bo mentioned, was the doctrine of the ancient phiIoP'>|vierp, who, according to Sir J. Mcintosh, ««from Plato to Marcus Aurolius, taught, that error of judg- ment boing involuntary^ is not the proper subject of moral disapproba- tion." In tho days of tho Schoolmen, it was revived — or at least tho leading principles on which it is usually rested — by the celebrated Scotus, who, according to tho same authority, " contended at great length that o ir thoughts, (consequently our opinions,) are not subject to tho will."* s^ And as already intimated, it has in various forms been avowed or ~ insinuated in modern times. We have not, however, been able to fall in with an cxpcsitioii of the doctrine so brief, and at tho same time comprehensive, as to enable us to present it to you in tho words of its defenders, and we must endeavor to lay it before you in our own. And the following propositions appear to us to embody, fairly and fully, the substance of the doctrine, with the grounds on which it is com- monly rested, — or in other words, to present syllogistically the argument by which man's non-responsibility is supposed to bo proved. 1. And first, grounding on tho axiom, that belief is tho assent of the raind to the evidence, by which any proposition submitted to it is establighed, it is assumed, that a man necessarily believes according to the view which his mind takes of the evidence, — or in other words, as one writer has expressed it, " that belief must necessarily, correspond with the perception of evidence, it being in the nature of things impos- Bible, that the mind should believe or disbelieve, otherwise than as evi- dence is or is not discerned." 2. Secondly it is maintained, that a man is only responsible, when he bas control over tho operations of his mind, — or in other words, wheii tho will is concerned in thorn. 3. And thirdly it is argued, that as a man's will is not concerned in his beliefs, ae they are involuntary, as they spring up spontaneously and hold their place in his mind, whether he will or no, according as *It would appear that S. did not explicitly state the conclusions, to which his own principles, logically carried out, would have led him. The language of Sir J. M., on tins puint is, " one step more would have led him to acknowledge, that all erroneous judgment is involuntary, and therefore inculpable and un- punishable, however pernicious." 5-5 Id have LOSt dis- liod, was ,0 Sir J. of judg- ipproba- ioast tho d Scotus, igth that ho will."* rowed or ble to fall Einie timo words of r own. ■airly and it is oom- argument ent of the d to it is Bording to words, as iorrespond igs impos- lan as evi- iblo, when ords, when iccrned in ntaneously !Cording as to which his ;uage of Sir ^knowledge, ble and un- 11 the ovideice connocte 1 witli the'r object, has been discerned ; or " j,3he," as Lord Brougham expresses it "can no more change them than ho can the hue of his skin, or tho height of his stature;" that therefore he can- not be responsible for them, and thet/ cannot be mado legitimately tho subject of praise or blame. This wo conceive a fair statement; and at first sight wo frankly admit it appears not a little plausible. But in answer wo shall ondoa- vour to establish the following positions, involving tho proof of tho directly opporute conclusion, — >viz : that man is, and that most legiti- mately, tho subject of responsibility for every belief which lie enter* tains. 1st. That tho above statement of the mode in which belief arises, and exists In the mlnd,-^ospecially in so far as belief on moral and reli- gious subjects is concerned, — is partial and defective, and overlooks an essential element involved in belief, and to which alone it is intended that responsibility attaches. 2nd. That it is not true, that in tho formation of our beliefs, tho will is not concerned; but that on tho contrai'y, in reference to our beliefs on all moral and religious subjects, the will is concerned, and so far concerned as to involve the responsibility, which is admitted to be- long to the products of tho will. And, 3rd. That even if it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that tho will cannot conclusively be shown to be concerned in belief, that still this would not exempt belief from I'tfsponsibility ; but that on ^e sim- ple assumption, that God has presented evidence of any truth, the belief of the opposite must necessarily involve criminality and sin. 1. It is assumed then, as tho basis of tlio argument for man's non-re- sponsibility, that a man nccessarlhf believes, according as evidenco presents itself to his mind. And undoubtedly so far as belief is tho product of mere intellect or reason, as contradistinguished from tho emotive element of man's nature, and of that reason exorcised about objects which address themselves to reason alone, tho assumption is just. In such a case, belief is clearly the natural and necessary effect of tho apprehension of the evidence by the reason. The examination of that evidence may, or may not, have been the product of will : but tho belief itsolf, is just the irresistible assent of the mind to tho evidence within its view. A man, for instance, cannot examine the records and the 'k; M 12 traJuioiis of Canada, witlujut bolioving it to bo a fact, tliat tlioGenoraf/ whu3o monumont still crowns tlio heights of Quconslon, actually lived, uiiJ actually was slain in battle. No one can go intelligently over tho steps of a demonstration in Euclid, without assenting to the truth of tho proposition, which that demonstration establishes. Nor can any ono master tho details of astronomy, and learn how tho theory which has immortalized the name of Newton, explains aud harmonizes the facts of that science, without as«enting to the soundness of tho theory. And so in other cases. . And if tliis wore all that is involved in every bdief ; if this were a correct and full account of the process by M-hich every belief is formed, Ave do not see how ii would be possible to resist tho conclusion, that man cannot be held to be responsible for his belief. It appiiars to us a self-evident truth, that responsibility cannot justly attacii to an act, or pi'oduct of mere intellect or reason, altogether detached from, u'ld uncoiniected with, any movement of the emotional element of our nature. ►Suppose for e.vamplc, a simple and im- compouruled intelligence, — a being with reason, but utterly without ttmotiou, afiectian, conscience, or will, what would the knowledge, or belief of such an intelligence amount to? Why to the mere passive re- flection, according to its peculiarproj)erticB, of the objects set before it. The intellect of such a being would but receive as passively as a mirror tho likejiess or conception of the things brought within its view. Its conceptions would of course be more or less acurate and true, that is, more or less in correspondence Avith the reality conceived of, according to its own perfection or imperfection, — just as the reflections of a perfect mirror will bo perfect, while in the case of an in.perfect, it Avill be broken by flaws in its substance, or distorted by inequalities on its surface, or vitiated in coloring, by defects in its t rans])arency ; but still they would 1k3 as passive, as necessary, as completely beyond its own com ol, as arc tho roHections of the mirror. Not indeed that there woiud be no movement, no activity in an intellect of thia kind ; but it would bo nioveuient or activity, so to speak, according to fixed laws, operating Its f/from without; not movement or activity, directed by a governing power hi the mind itself. Introduce into such an intoiletit, inclination or choice one Avay or other, — introduce in any form, a g-^n'orning power such as wo are able to form any conception of, and you just invest i^ I MMM icGeueralf/ lallv lived, y over tho ruth of tho 111 any ouo which has the tacts of y. And so his wore a ■ is formed, lusion, that innot justly , altogether u emotional )lo and II n- rly without nowlcdgo, or 3 passive re- let before it. » Its as a mirror ;s view , that is, more ording to its of a perfect ill be broken s surface, or 11 they would nt ol, as aro ouiJ be no it would bo fs, operating a governing , iucllnation rning power ist invest i^ with cniotloii, dosiro, will. Ainl to tlio opinions or beliefs of an intel- lect thus pas-si ve, wo du not see howresiinnsibility could possibly attach » and iii the same way to mere naked, uticompoundod act!- of reason in man, it seems uh unreaf;()nal)le to attach sucii responsibility. What rendeis man u rosponslblo bcinu', is not the fJmplo fact that he has reason ; but tho fact, that in his luituro, the element of reason is combined with an emotional element. — the fact, that he not only thinks, but that he has also feeling, ailectlon, conscience, will. In a word, it is the emotional element in his nature, as existing in combination with tiie intellectual, tliut is tho moral and responsible element. lii confirmation of this conclusion, it may be also well to remind you of what is universally conceded, that lufd/d'tion or thought alone, is not> andcannotlx; tho sotu'co of action. A Kiore inte]li;.>-ence, never liking or disliking, never approving or disapproving, never vAUUkj, would of course, never be prompted to action; — or if we could conceive of such a being in action, it would seem impossibbi t" ascribe to such action any moral ciiaracter, oi' to award to it either praise or blame. So that if we overlook iho emotional element, tliere 'seems no basis on which responsibility can rest, either for bebef ii'lfhhi, or for action without. An unwarranted advantage accordingly, is given to the advocates of man's non-res[>onsibility for his belief, by allowing them, as Is often done, to rest unchallenged in the assumption which wo are considering. And wliat we assert in opposition to this assumption is, that in relation to moral and religious subjects, tlie emoti(nial or moral element, — that is the emotional excited a1)0ut moral or religious objects, — does always enter into the boli<'f, and thus renders it legitimately the subject of responsibility. 1 . And first, wc apprehend there could T)0 no conception oven, much less belie f, in respect of moral and religious subjects, without the presence and movement in the mind of this emotional or moral clement. It seems a simple imposssibility, that a being without affection, — without love or hatred, benevolence or justice, could conceive of such affections and sentiments; or that one without conscience, could conceive of tho distinction betweenright and wrong, virtue and vice, or of the feelings of approval and disapproval, always involved in tho apprehension of that distinction. It rooms impossibe in a word, that a being without emotions could entertain any of tho radical ideas, wb.ich outer nci^essarily intc A^! 1. 14 every concoptioii, rts well 'm T>«liof, in moral and roligiou's subjects. As well miL,'ht a man born blind bo supposed to conceive of color, or one born deaf, of sound. Indeed only suppose the conception of love or hatred, benevolence or justice, approval or disapproval, and the very conception iniplios cither the past or present consciousness of these feelinj;s in the mind. Without this, conception would plandy want its vital element. Nay more than this, to accurate and vivid conception, not merely the past or [)re8ent consciousneBs, but a heaUhfal suscepti- bility of such emotions in the mind, at the time of forming the con- ception, would seem to be indispensable. A defect in respect of the soundness of such susceptibility, by vitiatin;^, so to speak, the elononts or materials out of which conception is formed, would aft'ect the ac- curacy of the conception, a defect in respect of liveliness or intensity, would in like manner affect its vividness. And hence, it may be here remai'kod, a simple and philosophical explanation of a doctrine, often cavilled at, but not the less true on that account, — that u defect in the moral elements within, — that is in a man's own breast, — incapacitates for a right conception of moral objects without, — ^such as the character and law of God; and that a man's moral nature must bo right, that ha must be pure in heart, before he can see God. For on the principles which we have explained, as without a sense of benevolence and justice' and the kindred moral emotions in his own bosom, a man cannot con- ceive of the corresponding qualities in God, so in proportion to the purity and strength of these feelings in the mind, must be the correct- ness and liveliness of his conceptions of the moral character of God. 2. But secondly wo remark, that from the nature of the object before the mind when contemplatmg moral and religious subjects, the moral element ia the mind, cannot possibly bo in a state of indifference. We may conceive an individual going for the first tiino, to the exami- nation of the demonstration by which some proposition in Euclid is established, without being biassed by his feelings, — Iris liking or dislikings, one way of another; and wo can conceive the assent of his mind being given to the truth of the proposition, without the concurrence or revolt of a single moi*al emotion with or from that assent. It may be a pure act of intellection. But it cannot be so, when the mind deals with moral or religious propositions. As certainly as the intellect is affected one way or another, by the presentation of intellectual truth, so must the moral nature be affected one way or another, by the presentation |octs. As V, or one >f love or the very of these want its inception, susccpti- the con- ct of tho' elements t tlio ac- intensity, f he here ine, often Jct in the apaeitatos- character ', that ha principles nd justice luofc con- )n to the > correct- f God. 3ct before ho moral ice. le exami- Euclid 19 lislikings, nd being or revolt '6 a pure ials with I aflfected so must untatiou 15 «f moral and rolii^ious truth. Just as tho intellect assents or dissents so must tho nionil nature, like or dislik(3, approve or disapproro, em- brace or spurn. Constituted as ninn is, it is nnpossiblo that tho moral element in his hoaom, will not ho at work,accordinu; to its peculiar pro- perties, hi dealing with such questions a i these; — with tho question for instance, whloh in a mercantile community like thi>', may often suggest itself, whether a merchant pressed by business, may without violating tho sanctity of tho Sabbath, work up his acoounta, or read his business letters on that holy day; or with the question now agitating tho neighboring Union, whether tlio fugitive slave law is reconcilable with the principles of immutable justice; or with the question of wider im- portance, and eternal Interest, whether the way of justification revealed in tho Bible is by faith alone ; or with that question which has made such havoc of the peace of tho Churches, whether the doctrine of election is a doctrine of God. AVhatever may have been a man's previous training, tho simple presentaf'on of such questions to his mind, will set in motion the moral elements in his bosom, and consciously or unconsciously, there will bo a moral bias, inclining him to one side or the other. And not only so, but iu deciding upon them, not merely tho intellect, but tho moral nature also, will, so to speak, sit in judgment. Nor will it bo possible for him to come to a decision on either side, involving full, — that is settled and operative belief, — which does not carry with it, the assent of the moral nature,— -the approval of the heart. Nay such is tho present state of our peculiar compound nature, that it is a notable and notorious fact, that in dealing with questions like those, the intelbctual and moral elements do not always work in har- mony. Tho emotive may mislead and overpower the intellectual, producing what is termed, moral blindness ; or even after tho intellect has been satisfied, and compelled to give assent, or at least brought into a state of conscious inability, to set aside tho foi'ce of the evidence, and there has been fastened in tho mind what we call a secret conviction of the truth, tho moral element may still dislike, still hate the truth, and stand out in an attitude of proud and obstinate hostility. Who, for in- stance, has not met with a case, where a regard to self-interest was so obviously misleading, in spite of the convictions of a clear understanding, that we have been compelled to say, that the error was not in the un- derstanding, but in the heart. Or who has not been conscious in his own "*►.» immamt history, of evil inclinationis, not only ovorboariii;^ thn authority of con- Bcionpo, but tlio clo!irei«t convictions and boliola of his understanding itself. It is also of importance to. observe, that oven in lookinsj at the mrro evidence of truth, it is not tho intellect alono that is concerned. This it is often found convenient, by tho a^sertors of man's non-responsi- bility for his belief, to assnnie, in order that the intellect may bo described, almost as if conipelliiiif belief through the views taken by it of the evidence of truth, irrespective altogether of the moral nature, or tho estimate formed by that nature. But it should not be overlooked, that the evidence of moral and reiic;ious truth, is not liko the evidence of an inditferent historical fixct, or of a geometrical proposition; but in- cludes more or less in all cases, and in sonu! cascfi exclusively consists of, moral elements, and appeals directly to the moral nature. Take for example, the evidence of many f)f Uio mof:t important conclusions of Natural Theology ; or take, above all, what aro called tho "Internal Evidences of revealed religion,"' and it is plain that thcHO cannot bo ap- prehended, nor their force felt, except through tho moral elements in a man's heart, — nay that to a proper decision concerning them, there is required the nicest exercise of moral discrimination. And such evidence ■will always appear stionger or weaker, according to tho state of tho moral nature, and indeed take its w hole coloring, from tho healthy or unhealthy, the sound or unsound state of the heart. It seems then clear, that belief in respect of moral and religious sub- jects, must ahyays involve a moral element, — nay more, if our statement has been sound, that/it/^ belief must involve, not only the assent of tho underst|nding, but also of the heart, — the liarmony of both elements of our compound nature with the truth. And if so, we see, why belief ma^, or rather, why belief mast bo subject to responsibility. It in- volves necessarily a iiwral clement, — A Lovi: oi' Tin: truth, oil A hathkd OF THE truth; and unless wo exclude all that makes us moral beings from responsibility, we cannot exclude belief. And not only so, but we may now see wh/ it is, that whatever the con- victions of tho understanding, an unsound belief must be evil, and therefore punishable. From the very passiveness of mere intellect in assenting to the evidence before it, of which the assertors of non-re- sponsibility try to make so much, wo may infer, that the usual condi- tions admitted on all hands as being essential to responsibility being of con- standing 1 ho mrro This csponsi- may bo m by it atnre, or rlooked, evidenco i; but in- >nsists of, Take for usions of ' Internal ot bo ap- ents in a I, there 13 evidence to of tho ealthy or ious Eub- tatement nt of tho ments of ly belief . It in- . HATUKD 1 beings the con- ;vil, and ellect in ■ non-re- l condi- y being 17 vati^ficJ, vi/: tho reason beiiii,' adequate to tlio investigation,— an op- portunity of investigation being given,— and sufiiciont evidence being proi-eiHod, — th.i only cause wliich can lead to an unaound belief, must bo tlie moral elonioiii, — the o])po.siriou of tho heart to the truth, — a hatred of the thing to' be believed. Take away tliis hindrance, and mere reason would present none. And whotlier the unbeliever stand at the poreh ef thi; tomph) of truth, refusing assent to tho evideneo Ix'foro liiin, Or within tho precincts of tho temple itself, intellectua.ly eonvinced, but still in heart refusing homage to tho truth which is there enshrined, his unsound beliefs, no matter what plea of honesty he may urge on their behalf, must be regarded as punishable sins. II. l\ut sov^ondly, It is argued by the assertors of man's non-ropponsi- bility, that responsiliility can only attach to what is voluntary, or to acts of will; that tho will is not concerned in tho formation of our beliefs, that they are involuulary; and therefore that our beliefs cannot be sub- ject to responsibility ; and wo aro now to endeavor to show, that the will is concerned in our beliefs. 1. But first I must qualify my assent to tho principle, that responsi- bility can only attach to what is called voluntary. This principle seems to bo very frequently conceded, though not always explicitly aiuiounced, by Ethical writers, and conceded in a very broad and unqualified form. And we find, even Dr. Chalmers, laying it down as an '• all-important principle, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary." ''' Now if tho principlo bo applied to actions alone, we fully concur in it ; in this sense it is only a familiar axiom universally recognised and acted upon in tho world. But if it bo ex- teiided so as to includ j the emotions, or what some Avriters term the pathological or pathematic elements of our nature, we hold it to be un- sound and unt(n]able. Where desire is regarded, as is tho case with *Dr. Chalmers apjienrs to i;.s to have been led into error in laying down the prineipla here; roforod to, from his dcsii-p to cstablisli the position, tiiat emotions mclining to good, iC not cherished ami not acted on by the Avill, are worthless. This position he has established with his usual clfjirness and force, but he has erred we conceive, both Ethically and Theologically, in assuming or seeming to assume, that the converse position is also true, and that emotions incHning U> evil, which are not cherished or acted on by the will, are not evil. The reason why emotions in the first case are worthless, is, that the action of the will de- termines whether good or evil has the ascendancy in the heart, and in this case its action shows, that evil not good, has the ascendancy. l'>ut it does not follow that because emotions inclinin/x to evil, may be shown bv the action of the will not to have the ascendancy, bur on the contrary to be juccessfuDy resisted, that therefore these emotions are not in themselves evil. lit' I s I 1 I ■i I 18 some writers, as iJentical with tho will, or whoro as witli others, dealro is at loast included under tho torm will, because an oloinent essontial to ovory volition, tho principle mi^'ht indeed bo explained in a senio comparatively harmless ; but whore, as is usually the case, the will i» regarded as a distinct faculty, and by what is voluntary is un- derstood acts or decisions or tho products of buch acta or docisions of tho will, the principle we deem to bo as dangerous as it is unsound. Tho simplest and most spontaneous, and most involuntary alfoction toward, or desiro for, what is morally evil, wo hold to bo itself morally ovil and culpable, — nay, to be tho very root and germ of all sin in tho heart. Tho simplest rising of such a feeling in tho heart, — as for in- stance, of enmity or hatred toGod,orof tho desiro to c«cape the restraints of His law, — however speedily it may sink to rest under tho rebuke of conicienco, and although tho only act of volition which may have taken place in connection with it, may have been an act directed to its sup- pression, — must, we conceive, be regarded as rendering a man criminal before Ood. Deny this, and you just deny, that the germ of sin is sin; and that that is evil and culpable, without which there would not, and could not be, an evil act of will. And irrespective, therefore, of all reference to tho will, if we have suc- ceeded in showing, that a moral clement is always involved in belief on moral and religious subjects, we would hold that man's responsibility for his belief has been established. But we think it can bo shown, that tho will is concerned in belief. 2. In order, however, to our illustration of this point, it will be of use hero to I'cfer to a distinction which is sometimes attempted to be drawn by tho advocates of man's non-responsibility. It is tho distinc- tion between, man's responsibility for his mode of dealing with evidence, and his responsibility for belief itself. By some, his responsibility in tho former case is admitted, while in respect of the latter, it is denied . And as undoubtedly the will is, if not chiefly, at least most palpably concerned in the treatment of evidence, a neglect to dispose of this distinction, might weaken the force of our proof. Now wo maintain, that we cannot thus dissever, the dealing with the evidence on which belief must rest, from tho belief itself. The one is an essential preliminary to the other ; thoy are related as causo and olfect; and the moral character which attaches to tho former, must necoflsarily attach to tho latter. Thus if an individual',? dishonest lors, deairo usscMitial to III a seniu se, tlio will ary is un- OL'isions of is unsound. ry afFoctiou elf morally 1 sin in the , — as for in- he restraints rebuke of y have taken to its sup- nan criminal of sin is sin ; ild not, and we have sue- in belief on onsibility for )wn, that the it will be of mptod to be the diatinc- ith evidence, ibilityintho lied. And as y concerned distinction, ngwith the The one is 1 cause and )rmer, must '3 dishonest 10 doalinc; witli tho ovidcnro of truth,— proniptod too, as may bo tho caso, by his hatnjd to tlio truth itself, load to an unsound bolicf, does not such dishonesty leave his unsound belief without excuse? — nay entitle us to rharactorize it as in reality dishonest? Or if a wilful fearfhiiii; for ovideneo on one side of a question, and a wilful neglect of tho evidence on tho other, — and this too prompted by tho desire to establish sonio foreijono conclusion, — leave a wian in imbelicf regarding it, how can this unbelief bo estimated; but as xvil/ul blind- ness ? Tho language of every day life in estimating tho opinions of those, who in a question of practical duty, have aUowed their judgments to bo biassed by self-interest, shows what is the universal feeUng on this point. Keeping this in view, lot us then see to what extent the will is con- cerned in tho formation of belief Ist. And first, wo observe, tho will is confessedly and necessarily con- corned in tho examination of th(j ovideneo of truth. Truth is not found by simply opening the eyes. It has to be searched for as wo search for hidden treasures. IIo who o.xpectcdto know all that it was essential he should know, by simply looking around him, would bo r,s •wise, as tho man who should expect to understand tho whole state and constitution of tho world, by merely looking at tho objects within tho range of his own narrow horizon. Xow the power of making tho search after truth, is a power we are universally conscious of possess- ing. Tho power of directing tho attention, we all feel, is a matter of will. We can go as ive will to tho examination of the evidence, on ■which any truth is presented to us. Wo can go, or we can refrain. We can adopt one raodo of conducting tho examination, or wo can adopt another. We can bo painstaking, or we can bo careless in tho examination. And when at any time we arc satisfied with our oxami- * nation of evidence, cease further inquiry, and thus settle down in any - belief, is it not by an act of will that this is done ? Nor is it by an act of will in which no regard is had to tho moral aspects of tho subject, that our dealing with evidence is thus regulated. On tho contrary, in dealing with the evidence of moral and religious truth, the acticm of tho will, ia always chiefly excited by tho moral aspects of tho subject under review. As we have already seen, tho moral nature is not, and cannot ■I- I n ■■'■t; i';l'<'l: m, 1)0, in a statu of iiulillorcnco in surli a Ciisc, iitxl tliiB tin; oxamiiiation id always, not only diroctoil by will, but by will uikUt t!i<f iiithiunco of tho nuiotioiis, proper to tlio moral nature. This peculiar action of tlic will ni:iy b.) especially noticed, wlien an attempt is made to convince an individual of any truth which ho is un- willin<,' to believe. In such cases, the action of the will in dealing with tho evidence, ii^ notorious. As an excellent writer on rhid subject re- marks, "Who indeed is there, who lias not had tho experience of how easy a task it is to convinco a man by ar'j,iiini;nt, when inclination has l>een llrst j;ained over;— and how hard and hopelcHS tho ta.sk to satisfy him, when tho will is in opposition ?— Iiov,- li-ht the assault required to storm tho citadel of the \nuleri-itandin;,s wIkmi tho atiections and desires have once capitulated, and how desperate tho resistance, how determin- ed and pertinacious tlie liolding- oat, when tiio heart il hnstilo to the ofi'erod proposals, or to the p;roundy, however just and unexceptionable, on which they are presented ?—'• Why iU ye not understand my epoech ?" said Jesus to tho Jews, '• even because yo cannot hear," (that is yo cannot hear,) '• my words."' 2nd. But again, while tho will is thu-; invariably concerned in tho formation of belief, no less invariably and necessarily, does it accom- pany, nay, incorporate itself with, every act of belief. It appeal's to us that tho province of will has, in general, been un- necessarily restricted, and that tho will ha5 to do as directly with belief on subjects of tho kind wo aro referring to, us it has with action ; or in other woi'ds, that there is as much an act of liking, of pi'eference, of choice, in tho one case, as in the other, — and neither moro nor less of necessiti/ in the determinations conio to. Tho connection between the discoveries of the intellect and tho decisions of tho will, appears to us to be substantially similar to tho connection, which subsists between the decisions of conscience and tho decisions of the will. As tho de- cisions of conscience do not always caiTy with them the assent of tho will, so neither do tho discoveries of the intellect. And as avo do not consider tho mere decision of the conscience, on the side of right, to be * Dr. Wai'dlaw ; whoso excpllent loctiires on tho siibjoot tinder discussion, — althnticj-li chioHy oonfinod, as being orginally dtilivorod from tho pulpit, to tho r-liojious and practical bearings of the quoslion, — wo would recommend for perusal. Miuatit>n uijiu;t) of hIkmi nn ID is uii- liiiu; with )jtjct ro- ) of liow Llio:i lias ;<) satisfy (luired to id doslres lotormiii- lo to tiie [itionablc, itand my ar," (tiiat lod in tho it accom- boen un- vith belief Lction; or ei'eiico, of 31* less of ;\voon the oars to us ts between 18 the do- ent of tho vo do not ight, to be isciissicn, — iilpit, to tho Miiinend for irov al as 21 the full apprdvnl of what U rijiht, uiid »!<. n«>t loo', on ihn apj full, until the will lias decided in its favor : so iK'itlicr can we euU that full belief, whieh eonsists merely in an intelleetual conviction of tlio truth, but where tho will vefusoa itd ufisent. But whatever may be thouj,'ht on thifj point, which is too pxtensivo for discussion at present, the fact wbich wo have .'generally iUnstruted under the previous head, tliat tlie ntfcent «d' iln' ia<.ral nature is always implied 'mj'i'd belief, nece?,-arily involves tho conclusion, that belief carries with it the assent o* tli" will. I'or just suppo-so, that the assent of the will is v.Ilhlnjld in boiief, tlien oni! rlcineiik of tlio moral nature, and that an hulex to the Ktnto of all the rest, would not be In liarniony with tiio convictions of tho understaiidin^:, and the belief therefore would not be full. But the necessary connection of tho will with belief, will be seen do- nionstrativoly, we apprehend, by attending to one important aspect, in which tho objects of belief, on moral aiid reli^dous subjects, must over be contemplated, viv;: the i)ractical, — or tbo bearincs of tho thinjr be- lieved, on that province over which the will his confessedly a supremo control. In moral and religious subjects, fall belief, — Inclndin;^ the assent of the moral nature, as well as of tin; intellect, — must always point to action, and must thus include the decision of tlio will in reference to such action. In doalin';' with n^ere intellectual truth, as with an his- torical fact, or a geometrical demonstration, the belief formed may have no reference to action ; and the will may thus bo conceived to bo at rest with regard to it ; but in deaiing with moral and religious truths, it cannot be so. Such truths not only invariably unfold direct practical obligati(nis, but they necesBarily require, fur their full appre- hension, a reference of the mind to the obligations thus unfolded, and to tliG idea of action, in harmony with, or opposed to those obligations. Let this aspect of these truths bo overlooked, and then the whole truth , is plainly not before tho mind. It is Inipossibio, for instance, to con- ceive of a man making up his mind on tho questions, whether the Bible is a Revelation from Heaven, or whether it reveals a way of salvation for sinners; or, — to take particular qaestions referable to the decision of the Bible, — Avhother it is lawful in any circumstances, to misstate the tnilh with a mental reservation, or to do that which is in itself evil that good may come, without having the practical bearings II i ' , t H Jiff S ■'!• m ofBunli qtiostioii"^ profulnontly in hid rlosr. Anil in r'lmin;; to a non- cliisiuii upon tlioiM, in tMitortainln^^ ii full boliof, on tlio uno aiilo or tlio (•ilior, thoro nuist thurcforo bo involvod, an adoption or ropudiatiim of tlio obli^Jitiondi conni'ctod with tho truth, and a dotorniinatlou of tho will, i\s to !i certain courao of action to bo pur.sn(>d. It is truo that popularly, tho term bi;liof is api»liod to tho convic- tions of tho undorstauflljiu; alono, without roforonco to tho stato of tlm will. But whilo thiri may bo correct in spoakint,' of tho conclusioni of tho untlorstandinu", iu roforonco to subjocts addrossing thoinsolveA to renson aluiie ; it is iucorroct in speaking' of such conclusion? or convic- tions, in roforonco ty moral and relicjious snbjoptt?. It is an error to call such convi(!tions /nfl boliof ; Birnilar to what it would bo, to call moro convictions of conscionco tho full approval of what i3 rii^lit, whilo ovorlookini^ tho motlo in which tho will was dociding. To full boliof on Buch subjects, thoro must bo n concurronco of tho will with tho under- Btandine. In tho formation of such belief, tho decisions of tho ono aro 80 incorporated with tho con(dusion3 of tho other, that tako away tho Rpprovin'^' dccij'ion of the will, and you inevitably destroy full boliof, and leave only that kind of belief in which thoro is a disruption and contrariety, between the intellect and tho moral nature, tho head and the heart. Lot us suppose, for example, that a man holds it as a spoculativo belief, that it is his duty to embrace, and oboyj and openly profess, tho gospel ; bnt suppose, that there is no corro?pondini; deci- sion of his will, actually loading him to carry out his belief in action ; is it not perfectly logitimato to infer, that his belief is not of tho right kind, that it hnot full, that ho is still not really <lecided in his belief on tho subject. Only Avhen his will is so decided in favor of tho practical obligations involved in his professed boliof, as to render him prepared to act upon them, can wo ascribe to him full belief ? Xay, so essential is this actjonof tho will to full belief, that oven in tho case of beliefs which wo feel to be evil, and where wo are least ready to suspect" a contrariety between the moral nature and will, and the thing believed, wo aro ac- customed to say, when a man recoils from acting out his belief, that his belief is not thorough. Thus let an individual speculatively believe, that tho word of God sanctions tho extermination of heretics, after tho man- ner of the Church of Rome; but let his moral natural dissent, let his will Kcoil from the practical enforcement of such a belief, and wo should tin $k fton- b or tho liatioii of \n of tlu) convic- |to of tim [isioni of ?i)Ive< to »t' ooiivic- orror to S to c:ill Ijt, whllo I'tjliof on iinder- c one aro iway tho ill beliof, •tiou ami load and it as a 1 openly no: doci- action ; ho right belief on practical pared to '©ntial is ^hich wo trariety aro ac- that his v^o, that man- his will should fffl at anrn, that !iii fieliuf wantod a vital • 1. uicnt, and lliat it rould not If toiiiicd full. And If m act of wiIl,di»cidiii,G; uitli refcrcnro to thfl ]irartlfal ln-nr- intrs of tho thing l)ili»'v»'d, I? thus incM poratid \* tU belief, in the very act of its formation ; ntill more d'arly ia it l/j<'orpornt«d with ovory ro- oo;,'iiitlon uf tho belief, wlit'U it iMM-onuiS a jiositive eoiireo of iictlon. It only lliit»u;;li tho will, that belief, or any thint!; els^o in tlu> mind, eun IB be And it itte >t what be til omo a sourc'o ot fif'tior taken o( tho nature of tlie will, «-.r of tlit> mode in wliicli its dceislons arc rouie to, AvIicnevtT a belief Icud'^ to actiup, tlii>re nuiRt preet'dc if, an aet of will, involvlnju; n deeision in favor of tho fiioh ihUiij believed. To deny this, woro to bU))].ose, that tho will njijihtbo determined hy a buliof, while yet there was no moral harmony between the will and tho thing believed ; — a f>uppo.-<ltion which would roduco the will to tho eon- dition of a mere blind nnconscio'.is executor of belief; — ami which would take away every thin,a like a ba.sis for man's responsibilify, and furnish as pood reason for freeing' him from resitousibility for his acts of will, as for his beliefrf theniselves. In fact, it is only by this conjunction of an approving; docision of tho ■will, with the convictionR or coneluBions of the understanding, that belief can become, whatyW// belief is universally acknowledged to be, an operative practical i)rinciple. 'When onco tho will has asaented to the conclusions of the uiuierstanding, when once, in other words, beliof '\9/itU, tho belief naturally and inevitably conies to operate, as a motive in determining tho future decisions of tho will; or. rather tho belief now takes its place in the mind, not in tho form of a more intel- lectual convictipn, with Avliich tho will may be at war, but in the form of a conviction, accompanied with a fixed and settled purpose of action in the mind, — or, in other words, as an operative practical principle. But before tho assent of tho will has been given, tho belief cannot thus hare any influence on action ; and the will must first decide in barmony with the conclusions of tho understanding, before tho belief can be pos- sessed of tho power, or entitled to the name of a principle. Thus to recur again to the case of religious belief, or beliof in tho gospel, what is it, that is commonly called sjieculative belief, as dis- tinguished from full, or as it is sometimes termed by Divines, ■aying belief. Tg it not just a belief, which has its seat in the LU M ^^ U'-'i Its.'' ' tiiulurstaniTiiig merely, uliii-'i cimsists only in certain convictions of the reason, biic from wMcli tln' moral iintur(3 and tlie will dissent; or witlx wjiicli, .it l^vist, tlioy aro not in hirmony? And wluit on tlie othor liaml is tlio real, or full belief, which is so clearly distini^'aislialj!',? from this merely s])03ulative h'.'H'f; is it not just euuh ii belief as involves tlio harmony of the moral nnture with th(; truthf? of the ft-ospel, and the assent of the will to the practical obligations \vhi(di those truths nnfohl ; and which has tluis ;'.u operative power, to ro!;u- lato and purify th'-' life ? And which of these kinds of belief, are we accustomed to desio^nate, or do \v<^ feid to be entitled to the dosi,a;na- t ion of, a prla<'\ph> ofh"!.!,'/'':' rnquostion.ably the latter alone : — oven as we never fail to fed, it is the belief, whicli alone can entitle any one to be clesi;i"nated a tru/' hcU'V'cr, a truQ C'a-lsti'iii. I doubt not that you can scarcely have f;iilod, to draw this distinction for yourselves between beliefs in reli'rion. It may be that some of you have had exporienco of both kinds of belief in your ow'u hearts ; and we tlnnk you cannot refer, either to your observation, or ex- perience, without finding evidence of the fact, that the will is necessari- ly involved in the formation of belief, whether that belief be sound or imsound. On the ground then, that will is involved in every belief on moral and religious subjects, we see why belief must be as much subject to responsibility, as any thing else in which the will is involved. And not only so, but on the principles which wo have explainoil, wo are now prepared, more particularly to show you, that every unsound belief, must bo the product of an evil ivUI; and as such itself evil and culpable. Those who entertain unsound beliefs, may bo ranked among one or other, of the following classes : — Those who are determined not to bo convinced, — who will not trouble themselves to examine the truth, — and who shut their eyes against the light. Those who from thoughtlessness or indifference, examine carelessly and superficially, and do not deal with the truth in the way which its high importance, and their own best intei'csts, demand. Those who have made a partial, prejudiced, and one-sided examina- tion. Those whoso reason is unable to resist the force of the evidence be- I onvictiona tlio will ^•ny? And so dourly list such ii trutlis of |i()!is \vhi(!li ", to rc\;?i.i- ivi\ nre wo dosigjia- ne : — oven 'iititio any tlistinction it some of v'a hearts ; on, or ex- necessari- be sound on moral subject to And not are now nd belief, culpable. ig one or )t trouble ainst the jarelessly vhich its Jxamina- enoe bo- 2'> foro thorn, but whose hearts stiil refuse to submit. And lastly, those who soom to liare made thorouj^h and fair examina- tion, and to have honestly arrived at the unsound belief which they entertain. Now with regard to the first fom* of those classes, thcro <;ai. ■ e no difficulty. No nice analysis is requiredhere. An evil will, so to speak, is written on their foreheads. If their unsound beliefs be not the product of will, and of will deciding on the side of evil, wo do not see, how anything- a man is, or dues, can bo called a product of his will, and of tliat will choosing evil. The only ai)parent difficulty is in relation to the hist class specified, — the class who seem to have arrived hoacntly at an unsound belief; — a class, however, whoso representatives are but very rarely to be found. But even theu* case will be found, on the principles which we have explained clearly to involve an evil will. For, the conditions essential to responsibility in all cases, and to which we have already referred being supposed to be satisfied, if the will had not misled them in dealing with the evidence of truth bcfoio them, a sound conclusion, a right belief would necessarily have been como to. Aigain in cheiushing the full belief of error which they entertain, the will has decided in favor of that which is evil; — there has been a liking, an approving, a choosing of that evil ; — and especially, there has been a resolving or determining to act upon the practical obligations, »ot to good, but to evil, which the object of their belief appeared to unfold ; and in all this, there has of necessity been, what is sinful, cul- pable, punishable. Nay, had the will in their case been in harmony with the truth, it could not have decided in favor of error. In the case X)f a being whoso will was pure, was in perfect harmony with the will of God, all the dedsiona of the will, would necessarily be in harmony with the truth of God. It could not approve or choose as good, that which God regarded as evil, — that which God had revealed as evil, — iind reject that which He had revealed as good. Or if before pure, tlu^ first act of this kind, would be the first act of sin. And we are thus shut r.p to the conclusion, that wherever an unsound belief on moral and reli- gious subjects is formed, it involves an evil act of the will. In the case •of the class referred to, there may be, so to speak, less moral depraviiy. ^.il. !f, m ! J [I t I H' 1, t ,1' 1 BafcifflajESi 20 loss strongtli of ovil will, anil consequently less of criminality con- noctod with their unsound belief, than in the case of the former; but still their unsound belief, is no less certainly the pi'oduct of will, and no lesg really, as such, evil and culpable. III. But this leads us to tho last argument which we proposed to illustrate. Many are apt to feel puzzled in attempting an analysis of mental pror eesseg, and to think that conclusions which can only bo arrived at through such an analysis, are placed beyond their roach. Now it apr pears to us, that disposing of tho points wo have been examining as you may, — or at least conceding it, for the sake of argument, to bo difficult, or even impossible to dotorraino, whether and to what extent tho moral nature and the will ai'o concerned in belief ; still there is a short and simple way, by which an unbiassed mind may arrive, even on principles of natural reason, at tho conclusion, that man is responsiblo for his belief. iiOt MS just suppose that there is such a thing as truth, on moral and religious subjects, — that God has furnished us with sufficient evi- dence of that truth, — and that ho has given us an opportunity of in- vestigating such evidence, as well as understandings competent to tho investigation ; then it appears to us to follow as self-evident truth : — First, that wo are solemnly bound to investljato that truth, and upon the evidence furnished to receive it ; — the fact of God's present- ing to us the truth in the way supposed, virtually involving a command to receive it. Secondly, that the failure to receive that truth, and the belief of the opposite, implies contrariety to God, — opposition to his will, to his com^ mand, to his law. And thirdly, that whatever tho particular way in which that unsound belief may have been formed in tho mind, its simple presence there, implies moral evil, — something which in its very nature must bo hate- ful to God, something which he must condemn. Under tho government of a wise, holy, and benevolent Being, a rightly constituted mind, — a mind in harmony with the mind of tho Creator, in harmony too with tho truths revealed by that Creator, — would be prepared to receive and choose and delight in, such truths . and in tliem alone. Such a mind would have no elements within it, to 'f linality con- former; but of will, ant! |e proposed to f mental pror fo arrived at Now it ap^ nining as you bo difficult, '< extent the lero is a short rive, even on is responsible ith, on moral sufficient evi- 'tunity of in- petent to tho lit truth : — it truth, and irod's present- ig a command belief of the 11, to his com- that unsound 38cnce there, mst bo hate- snt Being, a ; mind of tho i Creator, — such truths, within it, to 27 harmonize with any opposite errors. Tho harmonizing with such, — the belief of Buch, — can only be accounted for, on tho supposition of dark- ness, disorder, moral evil, sin, that which is justly the subject of punish- mont. Such is tho argument which wo proposed to submit to you ; and its l^eight V/O must leave to bo estimated by yourselves. Had time pcr- tnitted, wo should have liked to confirm the conclusion arrived at, by art appeal to the testimony of conscience, — to the practical judgment of mankind, — and to the exi)licit statomcnta of Scripture. But wo can C^nly gay a word about cacli. 1. As to tho testimony of conscicnco, let us take one case. A man finds reasoft to change his belief about tlio character of God, or about some important Bible truth. From having tho belief about God and his moral government, wliich arniys liim in the attributes of a stern and vindictive judge, ho comes to have tho beliefs, which invest him with tho attributes of a kind and forgiving father ; or from believing that ho must seek deliverance from wrath by his own works, ho comes to believe, that ho may find it through a simple reliance on tho merits of a crucified Saviour. And what is the decision of conscience about hig former beliefs ? All who have undergone tho change will tell you, . that it amounts to a most pungent and overwhelming testimony against ^^ those beliefs as evil. And similar illustrations might be multiplied in- definitely. It is true that men often seem, to have no trouble of con- science about the unsound beliefs which tlioy cherish. But if it be really tho case that conscience is thus asloop within them, will not tho defect in their moral state, which that unsound belief of itself implies, more than sufficiently account for it. 2. Again, what is the practical judgment of the world about unsound beliefs ? Do men usually look upon them all, as free from moral evil and inculpable, if they are only sincere ? Do not, on the contrary, Bomo beliefs fill us instinctively with horror, — and do wc not shrink from him who entertains them, as from the touch of a serpent, and all tho more vehemently, if wo think that ho is sincere in holding tlicm ? Wo doubt if tho sturdiest assertor of man's non-responsibility for his beliefs, that over formed tho resolution, *' henceforward nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to bhune any one for tlial, which he can no mure i change than ho can tliu hue of his skin, or the height of his stature,'' I f:n m4 28 «'oiil(l Bit liesnlo a siiiccfc Tliug,— lor it woulil soirm that there aro really such,— however iiuioeont of ackiial crime, and however little likely to exercise his vociitioii upon his own person, without feel- ing in liis own breast, a testimony to t!io fact, that such beliefs aro eviU — abominable, — nay vehcinontly to be condemned. And what is this, but a practical illustration of the fact, that men aro sometimes compelled, and that, so to speak, in spite of themselves and their philosophi- cal theories, to feel that there is moral evil in erroneous beliefs, and even to treat thorn as culpable. 3. And finally, what saith the word of God about beliet and unbelief? A few passjiges will sulUcc. " And this is his commandment tliat wo should believe on the name of his son Jesus Christ.* This is the work of God, that yo believe on him whom he hath sent."t « Doltovo on the Lord Josus Christ and thou shall be saved. ^ lie that bcliereth and is baptised shall be saved ; but he that believcth not shall be damned."** " With the heart man believcth unto righteous!iess.'l''t* Take heed lest there be in any of you au evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God.^T[ This is the condemTi;ition that light is come intc the world, and men loved darkness rather than lij^ht, because their deeds were evil.*** Ye wiU not come unto mo that ye might have life. "'Hi* " If any man will do hiss will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether itbeofOod.'l^^ Hero we have belief, first, represented as a duty, — made the subject of a command, — the response to which is an act of will ; secondly, held fftrtli as the turning point of salvation, — that by which a man ia saved, — for the want of which ho is condeinned ; and thirdly, described as having its seat in the heart, and involving the assent of the heart. Here too we have belief traced, first, to an evil heart ; secondly, to- the love of darkness or sin ; and tliirdly, and most explicitly to the will And here too wo are informed, that a right moral state is tl^e grand prereciuisito to a sound belief. And thus we have, as it appears tous,everypositioni which on grounds of reason have been advanced and advocated, sanctioned and confirmed *.Tolin in- and 2.SH. ^ohn VI. and 29f,h. f Acts XVI. and 3Ut. **Mark N\'I. and Uifh. tfl^^'nans X and ^Oth. ff Hebrews Ill.anrl Vlih. ***Johiv 1 1 J . and 19th. ftt Jolin V and 40th. ff fjohn VII. and 17th. J there aro however ttliout feol- lofg are etrily |it is this, but npcllod, and I philosophi- peliefs, and Id unbelief ? the name of eve on him 1 thou shall ; but he that Take heed rting from s come into their deeds e life. "'Hi- le, whether the subject ondly, held is saved, — das having 5condly, to- o the will tlje grand >n grounds confirmed t. **Mark . ***Johiv •J9 by the word of (ioil, — wliosf tlclivenincos, as has been well said, will bo" always found in harmony with the conclusions of ii sound philosophy. In conclusion, just allow mo as briefly as possible, to refer, as I did at the outset, to the practical improvement to bo made of this subject. I know not, my young frionds, what are your individual beliefs ; and it is not my province at present, to deal with you particularly about these. But if I have succeeded, to any extent, in the argument now laid before you, there is one lesson grounded on it, which I am war^ ranted to impress upon you ail, and that is, — to cherish a deep and habitual sense of tlio solemn responsibility to God, under which every belief you have already formed is cherished, and under which every belief you may hereafter adopt, while engaged in tlio investigation of truth, shall be entertained. A sense of this, will bo your safeguard against many errors, — your surest guide to the knowledge and belief of the truth. It is aji idle dream, that there is no monil good or evil in belief; or that the searcher of hearts can regard with indiiferencCy those potent springs of action, which indicate so truly the state both of the understanding and of the heart in reference to himself and to the - tritfk, and which infallibly determine the tenor of a man's life. If roAsou or revelation is to be trusted to, your beliefs will save you, or your beliefs will danm you. They will determine your character here* they will decide your destiny in eternity. Beware of the levity, the thoughtlessness, the indifference, which can, not bo troubled to givo to the search after truth, and especially the highest of all truth, — the truth as it is in Jesus, — the time, the labour, the patience, the perseverance, which the importance of the object de- mands. Beware of the bias on the side of error, which springs from a defec- tive moral nature and an evil will, and which will be ever ready to- geduce you, in the form of the wish, that Avhat is distasteful, or what would put an arrest on impure indulgencies, may not be true, — or the forgone conclusion which must at all hazards be established, — or tho desire to be at one with a party, instead of being at one with the truth itself And above all, beware of that hostility to the truth, Avhich may re- main in the heart, after the understanding has felt the force of iti evidence, — and which may tempt you to trample on reason and con- |- kMiliksi I , I M hh* 30 Bclcttco tDgctllor, tliat you m.iy Avorship some idol in its room. In a word, search aftor tlio truth, as for the very springs of lifo ; — by carcjful Bolf-:?ovornmcnt and moral discipline, lay aside the shackles and oncumbranceg which an undisciplined state of the understanding and tho heart, never fails to impose on the inquirer after truth, and train yourselves for earnest, thoroughgoing invostin;ation ; — and as fallen and dopondont beings, fail not to seek the aid of that divine teacher, — that Spirit of truth, — who is promised to them that ask him, and who will load you into all truth. Young, ardent, elastic, full of hope, and free fi'om tho depressing influence of the cares and disappointments, that never fail to gather around men of advancing years, tho present has doubtless many peculiar charms to allure you ; still amidst all your keen relish of life»^ keep it ever before you, that you arc on trial for eternity. As cer- tainly as you have succeeded tho men of a fovmcr generation, so certainly will another generation arise to fill tho places that you now occupy. A little time, — it may be a very little time, — and you must stand i'aco to faco with tho God of truth, — the great fountain and standard of truth, — tho glorious Being, whose immutablo truth is tho corner stone on which rests tho stability of the universe ; and set in tho blaze of that light inotfablc, — searching all things, revealing all things, discovering every speck of darkness and of sin, Ok! never forget, that that only will bo found truth in you, which is in harmony with His mind and will, in harmony with His eternal truth. Knowing the truth, believing tho truth, you will ho found resting on that which cannot fail, and in a higher sense than can ever be the case on earth, as pure in heart you will seo God. But believing what is not tho truth, — resting on what is not tho truth, — the very truth of God v^hich onduroth for ever, — tho foundation on which you have built, must inevitably sink from under you, a mockery, a delusion, a lie. 'U ff AVi- w -it a m X'lll Hvi: i life ;— Ljr lacklus and fading and and train I fallen and |hcr,— that who will iloprcssing to gather OSS many ish of life,' As cer- ration, so you now you must itain and ^th is the n<l set in baling all ^H ! never harmony Knowinir at wliich )n earth, ! not the 3d which It, must APPENDIX. ■'SVk (iaiint)t forbear .dimply noticing by way of appendix, tho elucidation whit-h, >it appears to us, the principles explained in tho foregoing Lecture, may Lo x'niployed to furnish of some of tho most important doctrines of Scripture. 1. IJy these principlis, an explanation is furnished of the difference, — referred to in tho Lecture, but in a Theological point of view, deserving of special notice, — the difference betw(.'en a ^iKCulativeaad a sat'///// belief or faith; u subject about which many persons appear to bo puzzled. In real or saving faith, there is a harmony of the moral nature with the truths that relate to the way of salvation by Christ, including the assent of the will to Gosi)el offers, and to the i)ractical obligations wlucsh the Gospel unfolds ; by which the belief becomes an operative principle, working by love, purifying the heart, and overcoming the world. In the case of merely speculative faitii, there is only the conviction of tho under- standing, 80 fiEii* as such conviction can exist with reference to moral and religious truth, such p-s tho gospel reveals, separate and alone ; but there is no harmony of the moral nature, no assent of tho will, with the truth ; and tho belief thus remains dead, inoperative and worthless. 2. The same princii)les explain, how true faith mttst always be, a spring or source of holy obedience. Implying the assent of the moral nature and will to the practical obligations imfolded in the truths of the Gospel, it must of necessity lead to action in harmony with these truths. It cnliats, as it were, on the side of holiness, the whole active powers of the soul, and thus inevitably produces evangelical oboJieuuo. 3. These principles also explain the reason of the prominence which is given to faith in the Gospol, and in particular, why justification is connected with faith alone. By faith, of the kind wliich wo have described, the soul is brought into harmony with the miud and will of God, and especially with that mind and will in relation to the free way of salvation by Christ, — the way by which " God is just in justifying the ungodly." There is thus, in a variety of aspects in which this harmony may be regarded, what some divines term, a fitness or con- decency in faith to be the instrument or means of jastification. 4. Upon these principles, it may also besoen, vvliy a subjective change, wrought in the heart by the Spirit of God, is necessary to the exercise of faith. In tho un- regeneratc state, tho moral nature of man is opposed to the truth of God revealed in the Gospol; — it cannot rightly approve of that truth, and tho will ■ ^i^'^ 11 ll : ■,niT ,. m. -* I.-' 82 cannot, or ratlior mU not, dose with tlic offers of tho flospel, and Rubmit to th' practical obligations, thu aclnowleilj^nicnt of whicli u riy;iit reception oi u. Cospol implies ; and till a change bo wrought in the ije^rt, there can tliorefore be no true beliet. IJy changing the moral nature, by bringing it into harmony ■with the mind and will of God, the Spirit imparts tho power of believing; ami belief or faith thus co.nes as a natural and ntu'essary result to bo exercised. I'.y the first act of faith, the work of regeneration, begun in the subjective opera- tion of the Spirit in the fteart, is completed, the soul being then vitally united to Christ. And under the influence of this faith, now existing in tho soul as an operative practical princii»le, the work of sanctification is carried on, — believers being more and more «anctifled, through tlie belief of the truth. < 5. On the same principles, we may explain, how faith's being the one onhj pre-re(|uisite to justification, makes salvation free, or how, tis the apostle ex- presses it, "it is by faith that it might be by grace." Faith, as the fruit of the Spirit's subjective operation in the heart, is itself a free gift of God ; in its exercise it implies the reception of salvation as a free gift ; and by its influence it produces the only holy obedience of which a sinner is, or can be capable, thus making obedience itself, on which sinners ate so prono to rest for accep-- tance with God, q, fruit of gr<ace. 6. And lastly, on the same principles we see, ^-ith what justice sinners are condemned for unbelief. Unbelief implies a contrariety of the moral nature, and especially of the will, to tho truth of God. And it involves a wilful rojec- tion of the free gospel salvation, and a vo'dful persistance in sin, — attended wth the fearful aggravation, of a contempt of the brightest display of God's moral perfections and saving grace ever made to the universe, and a resistance to the most powerful motives ever brought to bear upon the human heart. The members of the Association, which has undertaken the publication of the foregoing Lecture, will, it is hoped, excuse this addition to it ; as it may direct their attention to several new and important aspects of tho subject which it discusses, and stimulate them to tho investigation of some momentous questions, with wliich the subject has a natural connection, but of which the Lecture does not directly treat. ?■■ / ..: