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 «. .* ■ Jk 
 
 THE 
 
 OREGON QUESTION. 
 
 • >i 
 
 BY 
 
 ^ » 
 
 ' 4 
 
 ALBERT GALLATIN. 
 
 NEW YORK; 
 BARTLETT & WELF0RD,7 ASTOR HOUSE 
 
 1846. 
 
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 «~ iitrjip iiliiiP'W.i 
 
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 THE 
 
 OEEGON QUESTION. 
 
 4 
 
 BY 
 
 ALBERT GALLATIN. 
 
 'i M 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 BARTLETT &WELF0RD,7 ASTOR HOUSE 
 
 1846. 
 
 i' 1 
 
 t ; 
 

 H. CRAIGHEAD, PRI.VTER, 112 FULTON 9TRKET, NEW YORK. 
 
THE OREGON QUESTION. 
 
 NUMBER I 
 
 I HAD been a pioneer in collecting facts and stating the case. 
 The only materials within my reach consisted of the accounts of 
 voyages previously published, (including that of Maurelle, in Bar- 
 rington's Miscellanies), of the varied and important infoi mation 
 derived from Humboldt's New Spain, and of the voyage of the 
 Sutil and Mexicano, the introduction to which contains a brief 
 official account of the Spanish discoveries. The statement of the 
 case was the best I was able to make with the materials on hand, 
 and may be found defective in many respects. Since that time manu- 
 script journals of several of the voyages have been obtained at Ma- 
 drid. New facts have thus been added ; others have been better 
 analyzed, and some errors rectified. Arguments which had been 
 only indicated have been enforced, and new views have been 
 suggested. 1 ue subject, indeed, seems to be exhausted ; and it 
 would be difhcult to add anything to the able correspondence 
 between the two Governments which has been lately published. 
 
 Ministers charged with diplomatic .llscussions are not, however, 
 in those official papers intended for publication, to be considered as 
 philosophers calmly investigating the questions, with no other 
 object but to elicit truth. They are always, to a certain extent* 
 advocates, who use their best endeavors to urge and even strain the 
 
w 
 
 reasons that may be alleged in favor of the claims set up by their 
 Governments ; and in the same manner to repel, if not to deny, all 
 that may be adduced by the other party. Such official papers are 
 in fact appeals to public opinion, and generally published when 
 there remains no hope to conclude for the present an amicable 
 arrangement. 
 
 But, though acting in that respect as advocates, diplomatists are 
 essentially ministers of peace, whose constant and primary duty is 
 mutually to devise conciliatory means for the adjustment of conflict- 
 ing pretensions, for the continuance of friendly relations, for pre- 
 venting war, or for the restoration of peace. It has unfortunately 
 happened that on this occasion, both Governments have assumed 
 such absolute and exclusive grounds as to have greatly increased, 
 at least for the present, the obstacles to an amicable arrangement. 
 
 It is morally impossible for the bulk of the people of any country 
 thoroughly to investigate a subject so complex as that of the 
 respective claims to the Oregon territory ; and, for obvious reasons, 
 it is much less understood by the great mass of the population in 
 England than in the United States. Everywhere, when the 
 question is between the country and a foreign nation, the people at 
 large, impelled by natural and patriotic feelings, will rally around 
 their Government. For the consequences that may ensue, those 
 who are entrusted with the direction of the foreign relations are 
 alone responsible. Whatever may be the cause, to whomsoever 
 the result may be ascribed, it appears from the general style of the 
 periodical press, that, with few exceptions, the people, both in 
 Great Britain and in the United States, are imbued with the belief 
 that the contested territory belongs exclusively to themselves, and 
 that any concession which might be made would be a boon to the 
 other party. Such opinions, if sustained by either Government and 
 accompanied by corresponding measures, must necessarily lead to 
 immediate collisions, and probably to war. Yet, a war so calami- 
 tous in itself, so fatal to the general interests of both countries, is 
 almost universally deprecated, without distinction of parties, by all 
 the rational men who are not carried away by the warmth of their 
 feelings. 
 
 In the present state of excitement, an immediate amicable arrange- 
 
ment is almost hopeless ; time is necessary before the two (iovern- 
 mcnts can be induced to recede from their extreme pretensions. 
 In the meanwhile, nothing, as it seems to me, should for the present 
 be done, which might increase the excitement, aggravate the dilR- 
 culties, or remove the only remaining barrier against immediate 
 collision. 
 
 The United States claim a right of sovereignty over the whole 
 territory. The pretensions of the British Government, so far as 
 they have been heretofore exhibited, though not extending to a 
 claim of absolute sovereignty over the whole, are yet such as cannot 
 be admitted by the United States, and, if persisted in, must lead to 
 a similar result. 
 
 If the claim of Great Britain be properly analyzed, it will be 
 found that, although she has incidentally discussed other questions, 
 she in fact disregards every other claim but that of actual oecu- 
 pancy, and that she regards as such the establishment of tr.iding 
 factories by her subjects. She accordingly claims a participation 
 in the navigation of the river Columbia, and would make that river 
 the boundary between the two Powers. This utter disregard of 
 the rights of discovery, particularly of that of the mouth, sources, 
 and course of a river, of the principle of contiguity, and of every 
 other consideration whatever, cannot be admitted by the, United 
 States. The offer of a detached defenceless territory, with a single 
 port, and the reciprocal offisrs of what are called free ports, cannot 
 be viewed but as derisory. An amicable arrangement by way of 
 compromise cannot be effected without a due regard to the claims 
 advanced by both parties, and to the expediency of the dividing 
 line.* *- 
 
 An equitable division must have reference not only to the extent 
 of territory, but also to the other peculiar advantages attached to 
 each portion respectively. 
 
 From and including Fuca Straits, the country extending north- 
 wardly abounds with convenient sea-ports. From the 42d degree 
 
 * I allude here only to the compromise proposed by Great }3ritain. lier 
 actual claim, as explicitly stated by herself, ■ ♦o the whole territory, 
 limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with other States, leaving 
 the right of excluBive dominion in abeyance. 
 
of latitutle to those Stnilts, there is Iml one port of any importance, 
 the mouth of the River Coluinlia ; and this is of (hflicult and 
 dangerous access, and cannot achnit ships of war of a hir^e size. 
 It is iinpoitant only as a port of exports. As one of common 
 resort fur supplies, or asylum, in case of need, for the numberless 
 American vessels en^ai^ed in the ri.>heriesor commerce of the Pacific, 
 it would be almost useless, even if in the exclusive possession of 
 the United States. It must also be observed that the navigable 
 channel of the river, from its mouth to Puget's Island, is, according 
 to Vancouver, close along the northern shore. Great Britain pro- 
 poses that till' river should be the boundary, and that the United 
 States should bo content with the possession of the port it oflered, 
 in common with herself. It is really unneces«Ty to dwell on the 
 consetjuences of such an anangenient. it is sufficient to say that, 
 in case of war between the two countries, it would leave the United 
 States without a single poit, and give to Great Britain the indis- 
 putable and exclusive contiol over those seas and their commerce. 
 
 The first and indispensitlle step towards an amicable arrange- 
 ment consists in the investigation, not so much of the superiority ol 
 one claim o\er the other, as of the question whether there be 
 sufficient grouad:i to sustain the exclusive pretensions of either 
 Government. 
 
 If the claim of the United States to the whole of the contested 
 territory can be sustained against Great Britain, or if the pretensions 
 of this Power can to their full extent be maintained against the 
 United Slates, it must be, by either party assuming that the other 
 has no oi)posite claim of any kind whatever, that there are no 
 doubtful and debatable questions pending between the two countries. 
 This, if true and maintained, must n(!cessarily lead to war, unless 
 one of the two Powers should yield what it considers as its absolute 
 right. But, if there be any such debatable (juestions, the way is 
 still open for negotiations ; and both powers may recede from their 
 extreme pretensions, without any abandonment of positive rights, 
 without disgrace, without impairing national honor and dignity. 
 
 It has been asserted that the title of the Unite<i States to the 
 whole Oregon territory was maintained by irrefragable facts and 
 arguments. These must be sought for in the correspondence lately 
 
published. They cont.l.>t — first, ol llic assertion ol tlie aiici<'n( 
 claim of Spain to tht- alKSoIute sovert'if^nly ovt r thf whole north- 
 west coast of America as far north as the Gist degree of north h»ti- 
 tude. Secondly, of the « uinidated proofs which sustain the claims 
 of the United States to the various jjorlions of the territory (whe- 
 ther in tlieir own right, or as derived from the actjuisition of 
 Louisiana and the Spanish discoveries), and ol t'.e refutation of tlu* 
 argumints adduced by ihe other party. The fust mentioned posi- 
 tion would, if it could be sustained, be sulfieient to prove, and is, 
 as I think, the (*iily one that could prove, the absolute and com- 
 plete right of the United States to the whole contested territory. 
 
 It is un«loubtedly true that " Spain con.ji<i red the nortiiwest 
 coast of America as exclusively her own;" thitt this claim " had 
 been asserted by her, and maintained with liiu most vigilant jea- 
 lousy, ever since the discovery of the Ai.ie.ican continent, or near- 
 ly three centm'ies, as far iioith as her settlements or missions ex- 
 tended." There were two ways of examinmg the soundness ol 
 that claim ; an investigation of the principles on which it was 
 founded, and an appeal to precedents. The Secretary of State has 
 abstained from discussing t'le principle ; but he has said that tiic 
 claim of Spain to sovereii;nty " had never been seriously (juestion- 
 ed by any European nation : that it had been acquiesced in by all 
 European Governments." This appears to me the most vulnera- 
 ble part of his arguments. 
 
 The early charters of the British monarchs to the colonies bor- 
 dering on the Atlantic, extended from sea to sea, from the Atlantic 
 to the Pacific ocean, with the single excej)tion which excluded from 
 the grants the places actually occupied by the subjects of any 
 Christian nation. The right of prior occupancy was recognized ; 
 but the general claim of Spain to the sovereignty of the whole 
 coast bordering on the Pacific was utterly disregarded. Mad that 
 claim been considered as un(juestionable,had it been acquiesced in, 
 it never could have been supposed that, in any case whatever, Eng- 
 land could have a right to bestow on her subjects a single foot of 
 land bordering on the Pacilic. 
 
 Coming down to modern times, the only nations which have set 
 up any claims or attempted any settlements on the Pacific, north of 
 
8 
 
 the country actually occupied by the Spaniards, are Russia, Great 
 Britain, and the United States. All three have asserted claims to 
 the northwestern coasts of America, irreconcilable with the uni- 
 versal sovereignty claimed by Spain : Russia and England, from the 
 time when their flags first floated along the coast and their subjects 
 landed on its shores; the United States from a similar dale, or at 
 least from the time when they acquired Louisiana. 
 
 If the right of Spain was absolute and exclusive to the whole, 
 there was no reason why it should not have extended beyond the 
 6 1st degree of latitude. The right of Russia was founded only on 
 her discoveries and the establishment of some trading factories. 
 She respected the right of Spain only as far as it did not interfere 
 with her own claim. She has, in fact, extended this more than 
 six degrees further south ; and to this the United States, who had 
 acquired all the rights of Spain, have assented by a solemn treaty. 
 Whatever might be the boundary acquiesced in by Spain, it was 
 not Russia which recognized the claim of Spain ; it was Spain which 
 recognized that her claim was not unlimited. And, let it be also 
 observed, that, since Spain still claimed as far north as the 61st 
 degree of north latitude (the southern limit of the Russian facto- 
 ries when first visited by Spanish navigators), the United States, if 
 they believed the Spanish right absolute and exclusive, ought not 
 to have ceded to Russia a country extending more than six degrees 
 of latitude along the shores of the Pacific. ; 
 
 Great Britain contested the exclusive claim of Spain from the 
 year 1778, the date of Cook's third voyage ; and he w^as the first 
 British navigator that had for more than two centuries appeared on 
 those coasts. This doctrine she has maintained ever since. She 
 did not resist the exclusive claim of Spain by virt\ie of the Nootka 
 convention, but prior to it. It was on that ground that she impe- 
 riously demanded indemnity and restoration for the property and 
 factory of one of her subjects, which had been forcibly taken by 
 the Spanish Government. She even threatened war ; and the 
 Nootka convention was the result of those transactions. "Whatever 
 construction may at this time be given to that instrument, it is cer- 
 tain at least that Spain by it conceded a portion of the absolute and 
 sovereign right she had till then asserted ; that she yielded the 
 
9 
 
 right of trade with the natives on all that part of the coast lying 
 north of her actual settlements ; and that, by suffering the ultimate 
 right of sovereignty to remain in abeyance, she made that preten- 
 sion questionable which she had contended could not be called in 
 question. 
 
 With respect to the United States, without recurring to former 
 negotiations which were not attended with any result, it is suffi- 
 cient to advert to the convention between them and Great Britain 
 of the year 18 18, concluded prior to the date of the treaty by 
 which they acquired the claims of Spain to the territory north of 
 the 42d degree of north latitude. 
 
 The United States at that time distinctly claimed, in their own 
 right and independent of the Spanish claims, that the boundary 
 along the 49th parallel, which had been agreed on as that between 
 them and Great Britain, from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony 
 Mountains, should be extended to the Pacific. To this division of 
 territory Ureat Britain would not accede ; and the provision for a 
 joint occupancy during the next ensuing years was substituted. A 
 clause was inserted that the agreement should not be taken to affect 
 the claims of any other Power or State to any part of the country 
 west of the Stony Mountains. This provision clearly referred to 
 the claims of Russia and Spain. The northern and southern boun- 
 daries of the country, which the two contracting parties might 
 claim, were left undefined : Great Britain probably thought herself 
 bound by the Nootka convention to respect the Spanish claims to 
 the extent provided by that instrument : the United States could 
 not but recognize those derived from discovery, with which they 
 were at that time but imperfectly aco"?inted, since their own 
 claims were in a great degree derived from a similar source. But 
 the convention decisively proves that the United States did not 
 acquiesce in the antiquated claim of Spain to the absolute and ex- 
 clusive sovereignty of the whole country ; since, if they had re- 
 cognized that prior claim to the whole, they could have had none 
 whatever to any portion of it. 
 
 It is therefore undeniable that the assertion of the Spanish claim 
 of absolute sovereignty cannot be sustained by a presumed ac- 
 quiescence on the part of the only nations which now claim the 
 
 .1' 
 
10 
 
 1,1 
 
 country. It may perhaps be said that their opposition came too 
 late, and that they neglected too long to protest against the Spanish 
 pretension on the Pacific. No stress will be laid on Drake's voy- 
 ase, which had a warlike character. But the British charters to 
 their colonies show that those pretensions were disregarded at a 
 very early date. There v, as no occasion for opposition or direct 
 denial;, with respect to the Pacific, until the attention of other na- 
 tions was directed towards that remote country. This was neglect- 
 ed because all the commercial nations were, in their attempts to 
 colonize, or to conquer the foreign and till then unexplored regions, 
 attracted by countries far more accessible, and were exclusively 
 engaged in pursuits much more important. The East Indies and 
 the West India Islands offered a vast and lucrative field for com- 
 mercial enterprise and territorial acquisition. With respect to the 
 continentof America, France, England, and Holland most natural- 
 ly planted their colonies on the nearest opposite shores of the At- 
 lantic ; and they did it in opposition to the pretended claim of Spain, 
 which extended to the whole of America. Although strenuously 
 engaged in extending those colonies westwardly, these, in the year 
 1754, twenty years only before Cook's third voyage, hardly ex- 
 tended beyond the Mississippi. What immediate interest could 
 then have impelled either France or England to enter a formal 
 protest against the antiquated claim of Spain to a country with 
 which they nad never attempted even to trade ? And what op- 
 portunity had occurred for doing it prior to Cook's voyage % 
 
 But, what is still more conclusive, the country in question was 
 equally neglected by Spain herself. Some exploring voyages, few 
 of which are authentic, were indeed made by Spanish navigators ; 
 and the claims which may be derived from their discoveries have 
 now been transferred to the United States, so far as discovery alone 
 can give a claim, and no further. But, during more than two 
 centuries that Spain had no competitor on the Pacific, there >vas 
 on her part no occupancy, no settlement, or attempt to make 
 a settlement. She had some missions on the western coast of 
 the peninsula of California : but her missions or settlements in 
 Northern or Now California are of quite recent date ; that of the 
 most southern (San Diego) in 1769, and that of the most northern 
 
'5 
 
 re 
 
 u 
 
 (San Francisco) in 1776, two years only before Cook's arrival at 
 Nootka Sound. 
 
 In point of fact, the contested territory had been utterly neg- 
 lected by Spain. All the energies, such as they were, of her 
 Mexican colonies were much more advantageously applied to the 
 improvement of the vast and rich countries which they had con- 
 quered, principally to the discovery and working of the richest and 
 most productive mines of the precious metals as yet known. 
 
 Anson's expedition was purely military, and confined to southern 
 latitudes. But the narrative drew the public attention towards the 
 Pacific ocean, and gave a new impulse to the spirit of discoveiy. 
 Almost immediately after the peace of 1763 voyages were under- 
 taken for that purpose by the Governments of England and France : 
 the Pacific w^as explored : the Russians on the other hand had, 
 more than thirty years before, ascertained the continuity of the 
 American continent from Behiing's Straits to Mount St. Ehas. 
 It was then, and not till then, that Spain, or rather the Mexican 
 Government, awakening from its long lethargy, extended its mis- 
 sions to New California. In the year 1774, Perez, with his pilot, 
 Martinez, sailed as far north as the notthern extremity of Queen 
 Charlotte's Island, having anchored in Nootka Sound, and, as 
 Martinez asserts, perceived the entrance of Fuca's Straits. New 
 and important discoveries were made by Quadra and Heceta in 
 the year 1775. The sequel is well known. 
 
 But on what foundation did the claim of Spain rest 1 If she 
 had indeed an absolute right to the whole country bordering on 
 the Pacific, derived either from natural or international law, or 
 from usages generally recognized, it matters but little, as respects 
 right, whether other nations had acquiesced in, or opposed her 
 claim. If there was no foundation for that absolute and exclusive 
 right of sovereignty, Spain could transfer nothing more to the 
 United States than the legitimate claims derived from her dis- 
 coveries. 
 
 The discovery gives an incipient claim not only to the identical 
 spot thus discovered, but to & certain distance beyond it. It has 
 been admitted that the claim extends generally, though not uni- 
 versally, as far inland as the sources of rivers emptying into the 
 
 \V 
 
n 
 
 sea where the discovery has bern made. The distance to which 
 the right or claim extends along the sea shore may not be precisely 
 defined, and may vary according to circumstances. But it never can 
 be unlimited; it has never been recognized beyond a reasonable ex- 
 tent. Spain was the first European nation which discovered and 
 occupied Florida. A claim on that account to the absolute sove- 
 reignty over the whole of the Atlantic shores as far as Hudson's 
 Bay, or the 60th degree of latitude, would strike every one as 
 utterly absurd. A claim on the part of Spain to the sovereignty 
 of all the shores of the Pacific, derived from her having established 
 missions in California, would be similar in its nature and extent, 
 and equally inadmissible. It cannot be sustained as a natural 
 right, nor by the principles of international law, nor by any 
 general usage or precedent. The claim of Spain rested on no such 
 grounds. 
 
 It was derived from the bull of Pope Alexander VI., which the 
 Spanish monarchs obtained in the year 1493, immediately after the 
 discovery of America by Columbus. By virtue of that bull, com- 
 bined with another previously granted to Portugal, and with modi- 
 fications respecting the division line between the two Powers, the 
 Pope granted to them the exclusive sovereignty over all the dis- 
 coveries made or to be made in all the heathen portions of the 
 globe, including, it must be recollected, all the countries in 
 America bordering on the Atlantic, as well as those on the Pacific 
 ocean. Yet, even at that time, the Catholic Kings of England 
 and France did not recognize the authority of the Pope on such 
 subjects ; as evidently appears by the voyages of Cabot under the 
 orders of Henry VII. of England, and of Cartier under those of the 
 King of France, Francis I. Subsequently, the colonies planted by 
 both countries, from Florida to Hudson's Bay, were a practica'f 
 and continued protest and denial of the Spanish claim of absolute 
 sovereignty over the whole of America : whilst the acquiescence 
 of Spain was tantamount to an abandonment of that claim where 
 it was resisted. Ridiculous as a right derived from such a source 
 may appear at this time, it was not then thus considered by Spain j 
 and the western boundary of Brazil is to this day regulated by the 
 ^Uvision line prescribed by the Pope. 
 
I am not aware of any other principle by which the claim ever 
 was or can be sustained, unless it be the idle ceremony of taking 
 possession, as it is called. The celebrated Spaniard who first dis- 
 covered the Pacific ocean, " Balboa, advancing up to the middle 
 in the waves, with his buckler and sword, took possession of that 
 ocean in the name of the King his master, and vowed to defend it, 
 with his arms, against all his enemies." — (Robertson.) 
 
 I have dwelt longer on this subject than it may seem to deserve. 
 The assertion of the solidity of this ancient exclusive Spanish 
 claim has had an apparent effect on public opinion fatal to the 
 prospect of an amicable arrangement. I am also fully satisfied 
 that the resort to vulnerable arguments, instead of strengthening, 
 has a tendency to lessen the weight of the multiplied proofs, by 
 which the superiority of the American over the British claim has 
 been so fully established. 
 
 
NUMBER II 
 
 Hi 
 
 It has, it is believed, been conclusively proveri that the claim of 
 the United States to absolute sovereignty over the whole Oregon 
 territory, in virtue of the ancient exclusive Spanish claim, is wholly 
 unfounded. The next question is, whether the other facts and 
 arguments adduced by either party establish a complete and absolute 
 title of either to the whole ; for the United States claim it expli- 
 citly ; and, although the British proposal of compromise did yield 
 a part, yet her qualified claim extends to the whole. It has been 
 stated by herself in the following words : " Great Britain claims no 
 exclusive sovereignty over any portion of that territory. Her 
 present claim, not in respect to any part, but to the whole, is 
 limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with other States, 
 leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance." And, again : 
 " The qualified rights which Great Britain now possesses over the 
 whole of the territory in question, embrace the right to navigate 
 the waters of those countries, the right to settle in and over any 
 part of them, and the right freely to trade with the inhabitants and 
 occupiers of the same. * * * * * * It is fully admitted 
 that the United States possess the same rights ; but beyond they 
 possess none." 
 
 In the nature of things, it seems almost impossible that a com- 
 plete and absolute right to any portion of America can exist, unless 
 it be by prescriptive and undisputed adxial possess.on and settle- 
 ments, or by virtue of a treaty. 
 
 At the time when America was discovered, the law of nations 
 was altogether unsettled. More than a century elapsed before 
 Grotius attempted to Jay its foundation on Natural Law and the 
 moral precepts of Christianity ; and, when sustaining it by prece- 
 dents, he was compelled to recur to Rome and Greece. It was in 
 
15 
 
 reality a new case, to which no ancient precedents could apply,* 
 for which some new rules must be adopted. Gradually, some 
 general principles were admitted, never universally, in their nature 
 vague and often conflicting. For instance, discovery varies, from 
 the simple ascertaining of the continuity of land, to a minute explo- 
 ration of its various harbors, rivers, &c. ; and the rights derived 
 from it may vary accordingly, and may occasionally be claimed to 
 the same district by different nations. There is no precise rule for 
 regulating the time after which the neglect to occupy would nullify 
 the right of prior discovery ; nor for defining the extent of coast 
 beyond the spot discovered to which the dis( overer may be entitled, 
 or how far inland his claim extends. The principle most generally 
 admitted was, that, in case of a river, the right extended to the 
 whole country drained by that river and its tributaries. Even this 
 was not universally conceded. This right might be affected by a 
 simultaneous or prior discovery and occupancy of some of the 
 sources of such river by another party ;. or it might conflict with a 
 general claim of contiguity. This last claim, when extending 
 beyond the sources of rivers discovered and occupied, is vague 
 and undefined : though it would seem that it cannot exceed in 
 breadth that of the territory on the coast originally discovered and 
 occupied. A few examples will show the uncertainty resulting 
 from those various claims, when they conflicted with each other. 
 
 The old British charters extending from sea to sea have already 
 been mentioned. They were foundetl, beyond the sources of the 
 rivers emptying into the Atlantic, on no other principle than that 
 of contiguity or continuity, ^he grant in 1621 of Nova Scotia, by 
 James the First, is bounded on the north by the river St. Lawrence, 
 though C artier had more than eighty-five years before discovered 
 the mouth of that river and ascended it as high up as the present 
 site of Montreal, and the French under Charaplain had several 
 years before 162 1 been settled at Quebec. But there is another 
 case more important, and still more in point. 
 
 The few survivors of the disastrous expedition of Narvaez, who, 
 coming from Florida, did in a most extraordinary way reach Culia- 
 
 * Grotius, however, sustains the right of occupation by a maxim of the 
 Civil Roman Code. 
 
16 
 
 can on the Pacific, were the first Europeans who crossed the Mis- 
 sissippi. Some years later, Ferdinand de Soto, coming also from 
 Florida, did in the year 1541 reach and cross the Mississippi, at 
 some place between the mouth of the Ohio and that of the Arkan- 
 sas. He explored a portion of the river and of the adjacent country ; 
 and, after his death, Moscoso, who succeeded him in command, did, 
 in the year 1543, build seven brigantines or barques, in which, 
 with the residue of his followers, he descended the Mississippi, the 
 mouth of which he reached in seventeen days. Thence putting to 
 sea with his frail vessels, he was fortunate enough to reach the 
 Spanish port of Panuco, on the Mexican coast. The right of dis- 
 covery clearly belonged to Spain ; but she had neglected for near 
 one hundred and fifty years to make any settlement on the great 
 river or any of iis tributaries. The French, coming from Canada, 
 reached the Mississippi in the year 1680, and ascended it as high 
 up as St. Anthony's Falls ; and La Salle descended it in 1682 to 
 its mouth. The French Government did, in virtue of that second 
 discovery, claim the country, subsequently founded New Orleans, 
 and forme 1 several other settlements in the interior, on the Missis- 
 sippi or its waters. Spain almost immediately occupied Pensacola 
 and Nacogdoches, in order to check the progress of the French east- 
 wardly and westwardly ; but she did not attempt to disturb them 
 in their settlements on the Mississippi and its tributaries. We have 
 here the proof of a prior right of discovery being superseded, when 
 too long neglected, by that of actual occupancy and settlement. 
 
 The French, by virtue of having thus discovered the mouth cf 
 the Mississippi, of having ascended it more than fifteen hundred 
 miles, of having explored the Ohio, the Wabash, and the Illinois, 
 from their respective mouths to their most remote sources, and of 
 having formed several settlements as above mentioned, laid claim 
 to the whole country drained by the main river and its tributaries. 
 They accordingly built forts at Le Boeuf, high up the Alleghany 
 river, and on the site where Pittsburgh now stands. On the ground 
 of discovery or settlement. Great Britain had not the slightest claim. 
 General, then Colonel Washington, was the first who, at the age 
 of twenty-two, and in the year 1754, planted the British banner on 
 the Western waters. The British claim was founded principally 
 
17 
 
 on the ground of contiguity, enforced by other considerations. The 
 strongest of these was, that it could not consist with natural law, 
 that the British colonies, with a population of near two millions, 
 should be confined to the narrow belt of land between the Atlantic 
 and the Alleghany Mountains, and that the right derived from the 
 discovery of the main river should be carried to such an extent as 
 to allow the French colonies, with a population of fifty thousand, 
 rightfully to claim the whole valley of the Mississippi. The con- 
 test was decided by the sword. By the treaty of peace of 1763, 
 the Mississippi, with the exception of New Orleans and its imme- 
 diate vicinity, was made the boundary. The French not only lost 
 all that part of the valley which lay east of that river, but they 
 were compelled to cede Canada to Great Britain. 
 
 It may, however, happen that all the various claims from which 
 a title may be derived, instead of pertaining to several Powers, 
 and giving rise to conflicting pretensions, are united and rightfully 
 belong to one nation alone. This union, if entire, may jusily be 
 considered as giving a complete and exclusive title to the sove- 
 reignty of that part of the country embraced by such united 
 claims. 
 
 The position assumed by the British Government, that those va- 
 rious claims exclude each other, and that the assertion of one for- 
 bids an appeal to the others, is obviously untenable. All that can 
 be said in that respect is, that if any one claim is alone sufficient to 
 establish a complete and indisputable title, an appeal to others is 
 superfluous. Thus far, and no farther, can the objection be main- 
 tained. The argument on the part of the United States in reality 
 was, that the Government considered the title derived from the 
 ancient exclusive Spanish claim as indisputable ; but that, if this 
 was denied, all the other just claims of the United States taken to- 
 gether constituted a complete title, or at least far superior to any 
 that could be adduced on the part of Great Britain. 
 
 It is not intended to enter into th•^ merits of the question, which 
 has been completely discussed, since the object of this paper is only 
 to show that there remain on both sides certain debatable ques- 
 tions J and that therefore both Governments may, if so disposed. 
 
 ifl 
 
1« 
 
 Hi 
 
 w 
 
 ^'1 
 
 i 
 
 recede from some of their pretensions, without any abandonment of 
 positive rights, and without impairing national honor and dignity. 
 
 Although Great Britain seems, in this discussion, to have relied 
 almost exclusively on the right derived from actual occupancy and 
 settlement, she cannot reject absolutely those derived from other 
 sources. She must admit that, both in theory and practice, the 
 claims derived from prior discovery, from contiguity, from the prin- 
 ciple which gives to the first discoverer of the mouth of a river and 
 of its course a claim to the whole country drained by such river, 
 have all been recognized to a certain, though not well-defined ex- 
 tent, by all the European nations claiming various portions of 
 America. And she cannot deny the facts, that (as Mr. Greenhow 
 justly concludes) the seashore had been generally examined from 
 the 42d, and minutely from the 45th to the 48th degree of latitude, 
 Nootka Sound discovered, and the general direction of the coast 
 from the 48th to the 58th degree of latitude ascertained, by the 
 Spanish expeditions, in the years 1774 and 1775, of Perez, Heceta, 
 and Bodego y Quadra ; that the American Captain Gray was the 
 first who, in 1792, entered into and ascertained the existence of the 
 River Columbia, and the place where it empties into the sea; that, 
 prior to that discovery, the Spaniard Heceta was the first who had 
 been within the bay, called Deception Bay by Meares, into which 
 the river does empty ; that, of the four navigators who had been in 
 that bay prior to Gray's final discovery, the Spaniard Heceta and 
 the American Gray were the only ones who had asserted that a 
 great river emptied itself into that bay, Heceta having even given 
 a name to the river (St. Roc), and the entrance having been desdg^ 
 nated by his own name (Ensennada de Heceta), whilst the. two 
 English navigators, Meares and Vancouver, had both concluded 
 that no large river had its mouth there ; that, in the year 1805, 
 Lewis and Clarke were the first who descended the river Columbia, 
 from one of its principal western sources to its mouth ; that the first 
 actual occupancy in that quarter was by Mr. Astor's company, on 
 the 24th of March, 1811, though Mr. Thompson, the astronomer 
 of the British Northwest Company, who arrived at Astoria on the 
 15th of July, may have wintered on or near some northern source of 
 the river in 52 degrees north latitude ; that amongst the factories 
 
10 
 
 established by that American company one was situated at the con- 
 fluence of the Okanagan with the Columbia, in about 49 degrees 
 of latitude ; that the 42d degree is the boundary, west of the Stony 
 Mountains, established by treaty between Spain, now Mexico, and 
 the United States ; that the 49th degree is likewise the boundary, 
 from the Lake of the Woods to the IStony Mountains, established 
 by treaty between Great Britain and the United States ; and that 
 therefore the right of the United States, which may be derived from 
 the principle of contiguity or continuity, embraces the territory 
 west of the Stony Mountains contained between the 42d and 49th 
 degrees of latitude. 
 
 Omitting other considerations which apply principally to the ter- 
 litory north of Fuca Straits, where the claims of both parties are 
 almost exclusively derived from their respective discoveries, in- 
 cluding those of Spain, it may be rationally inferred from the pre- 
 ceding enumeration that there remain various questions which 
 must be considered by Great Britain as being still doubtful and de- 
 batable, and that she may therefore, without any abandonment of 
 positive rights, recede from the extreme pretensions which she has 
 advanced in the discussion respecting a division of the territory. 
 But, although conjectures may be formed, and the course pursued 
 by the Government of the United States may have an influence on 
 that which Great Britain will adopt, it does not belong to me to 
 discuss what that Government may or will do. This paper is in- 
 tended for the American, and not for the English public ; and my 
 attention has been principally directed to those points which may 
 be considered by the United States as doubtful and debatable. 
 
 It was expressly stipulated that nothing contained in the conven- 
 tions of 1818 and 1827 should be construed to impair, or in any 
 manner affect, the claims which either of the contracting parties 
 may have to any part of the country westward of the Stony or 
 Rocky Mountains. After the most cool and impartial investiga- 
 tion of which I am capable, I have not been able to perceive any 
 claim on the pa-t of Great Britain, or debatable question, respect- 
 ing the territory south of Fuca's Straits, but the species of occu- 
 pancy by the British Fur companies between the year 1813 and 
 October 20th, 1818 ; and this must be considered in connection 
 
 i.' 
 
 ::] 
 

 m 
 
 with the restoration of " all territory, places, and possessions what- 
 soever, taken by either party from the other during the war," pro- 
 vided for by the treaty of Ghent. To this branch of the subject 
 belongs also the question whether the establishment of tra(hng fac- 
 tories with Indians may eventually give a right to sovereignty. 
 My opinion was expressed in the American counter-statement of 
 the case, dated 19th December, 1826 : " It is believed that mere 
 factories, established solely for the purpose of trafficking with the 
 natives, and without any view to cuUivation and permanent settle- 
 ment, cannot, of themselves, and unsupported by any other con- 
 sideration, give any better tiile to dominion and absolute sovereign- 
 ty than similar establishments made in a civilized country." How- 
 ever true this may be as an abstract proposition, it must be admit- 
 ted that, practically, the modest British factory at Calcutta has 
 gradually grown up into absolute and undisputed sovereignty over 
 a population of eighty millions of people. 
 
 The questions which, as it appears to me, may be allowed by the 
 United States to be debatable, and therefore to make it questiona- 
 ble whether they have a complete right to the whole Oregon ter- 
 ritory, are : 
 
 1st. The Nootka convention, which applies to the whole, and 
 which, though not of primary importance, is nevertheless a fact, 
 and the inferences drawn from it a matter of argument. 
 
 2dly. The discovery of the Straits of Fuca. 
 
 3dly. North of those straits ; along the sea shores, the discove- 
 ries of the British contrasted with those of the American and Span- 
 ish navigators ; in the interior, the question whether the discovery 
 of the mouth and the navigation of one of its principal branches, 
 from its source to the mouth of the river, implies without exception 
 a complete right to the whole country drained by all the tributa- 
 ries of such river ; and also the British claim to the whole terri- 
 tory drained by Frazer's river — its sources having been discovered 
 in 1792 by Sir Alexander Mackenzie, factories having been es- 
 tablished upon it by the British as early ^s the year 1806, and the 
 whole river thence to its mouth having been for a number of years 
 exclusively navigated by British subjects. 
 
 It appears to me sufficient generally to suggest the controverted 
 
21 
 
 points. That which relates to Fuca's Sliaits is the most important, 
 and deserves particular ronsideralion. 
 
 If Fuca's voyage in 1592 could be i)roved to be an authentic 
 document, this would settle at once the (juestion in favor of the 
 United States ; but the voyage was denietl in the introduction to 
 the voyage of the Sutil and Mexicano. This was an oflicial docu- 
 ment, published under the auspices of the Spanish Government, 
 and intended to vindicate Spain against tlie charges, that she had 
 contributed nothing to the advancement of geography in those 
 quarters. This negative evidence was confirmed by Humboldt, 
 who says that no trace of such voyage can be found in the archives 
 of Mexico. Unwilling to adduce any doubtful fact, I abstained 
 from alluding to it in the statement of the American case in 1826. 
 Later researches show that, although recorded evidences remain of 
 the voyages of Gali from Macao to Acapulco in 1584, of the Santa 
 Anna (on board of which was, as he says, F'uca himself) from Ma- 
 nilla to the coast of California, where she was captured in 1587 
 by Cavendish, and of Vizcaino in 1602-1G03, and even of Maldo- 
 nado's fictitious voyage in 1588, yet no trace has been found in 
 Spain or Mexico of Fuca's, or any other similar voyage, in 1C92, 
 or thereabout. 
 
 On reading with attention the brief account published by Pur- 
 chas, I will say that the voyage itself has much internal evidence 
 of its truth, but that the inference or conclusion throws much dis- 
 credit on the whole. The only known account of the voyage is 
 that given verbally at Venice in 1596, by Fuca, a (ireek pilot, to 
 Mr. Lock, a respectable English merchant, who transmitted it to 
 Purchas. 
 
 Fuca says that he had been sent by the Viceroy of Mexico to 
 discover the straits of Anian and the passage thereof into the sea, 
 which they called the North Sea, which is our Morthwest Sta ; 
 that between 47 and 48 degrees of latitude he entered into a broad 
 inlet, through which he sailed more than twenty days ; and, being 
 then come into the North Sea already, and not being sufficiently 
 armed, he returned again to Acapulco. He offered then to Mr. 
 Lock to go into England and serve her Majesty in a voyage for 
 the discovery perfectly of the Northwest passage into the South 
 
 ii ( 
 
22 
 
 ( i 
 
 Sea. If it be granted that the inlet through which he had sailed 
 was really the same as the straits which now bear his name, that 
 sea into which he emerged, and which he asserts to be our JSTorth- 
 west SeUy must have been that which is now called Queen Char- 
 lotte's Sound, north of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, in about 
 51 degrees of latitude. Our JVbrthwest Sea was that which 
 washes the shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, then univers- 
 ally known as far north as the vicinity of the 60lh degree of lati- 
 tude. Hudson's Straits had not yet been discovered, and the dis- 
 covery of Davis's Straits might not be known to Fuca. But na 
 navigator at that time, who, like he, had sailed across both the At- 
 lantic and the Pacific oceans, could be ignorant that the northern 
 extremity of Newfoundland, which lies nearly in the same latitude 
 as the northern entrance of Fuca's Straits, is situated sixty or seventy 
 d^rees of longitude east of that entrance. The only way to re- 
 concile the account with itself is, to suppose that Fuca believed 
 that the continent of America did not, on the side of the Atlantic, 
 extend further north than about the 60th degree, and was bounded 
 northwardly by an open sea, which extended as far west as the 
 northern extremity of the inlet through which he had sailed. It is 
 true nevertheless that, between the years 1774 and 1792, there 
 was i. prevailing opinion amongst the navigators that Fuca had 
 actually discovered an inlet leading towards the Atlantic. Prior 
 to the year 1787 they were engaged in seeking for it, and the 
 Spaniards had for that purpose explored in vain the sea coast lying 
 south of the 48th degree ; for it is well known that Fuca's en- 
 trance lies between the 48th and 49th, and not between the 47th 
 and 48lh degrees of latitude, as he had announced. 
 
 The modern discovery of that inlet is due to Captain Barclay, 
 an Englishman, commanding the Imperial Eagle, a vessel owned 
 by British merchants, but which was equipped at, and took its de- 
 parture from Ostend, and which sailed under the flag of the Aus- 
 trian East India Company. The British Government, which has 
 objected to the American claim derived from Captain Gray's dis- 
 covery of the mouth of the river Columbia, on the ground that he 
 was a private individual, and that his vessel was not a public ship, 
 cannot certainly claim anything m virt\?e of a discovery by n 
 
 
23 
 
 private Englishman, sailing under Austrian colors. In that case, 
 and rejecting Fuca's voyage, neither the United States nor Eng- 
 land can lay any claim on account of the discovery of the straits. 
 
 Subsequently, the Englishman, Meares, sailing under the Portu- 
 guese flag, penetrated, in 1768, about ten miles into the inlet, and 
 the American, Gray, in 1789, about fifty miles. The pretended 
 voyage of the sloop Washington throughout the straits, under the 
 command of either Gray or Kendrick, has no other foundation than 
 an assertion of Meares, on which no reliance can be placed. 
 
 In the year 1790 (1791 according to Vancouver) the Spaniards, 
 Elisa and Quimper, explored the straits more than one hundred 
 miles, discovering the Port Discovery, the entrance of Admiralty 
 Inlet, the Deception Passage, and the Canal de Haro. In 1792 
 Vancouver explored and surveyed the straits throughout, together 
 with their various bays and harbors. Even there he had been 
 preceded in part by the Sutil and Mexicano ; and he expresses 
 his regret that they had advanced before him as far as the Canal 
 del Rosario. 
 
 Under all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be doubted 
 t£at the United States must admit that the discovery of the straits, 
 and the various inferences which may be drawn from it, are doubt- 
 ful and debatable questions. 
 
 That which relates to a presumed agreement of Commissioners 
 appointed under the treaty of Utrecht, by which the northern 
 boundary of Canada was, from a certain point north of Lake Su- 
 perior, declared to extend westwardly along the 49th parallel ot 
 latitude, does not appear to me definitively settled. As this had 
 been assumed many years before, as a positive fact, and had never 
 been contradicted, I also assumed it as such and did not thoroughly 
 investigate the subject. Yet I had before me at least one map 
 (name of publisher not recollected), of which I have a vivid re- 
 collection, on which the dividing lines were distinctly marked and 
 expressly designated, as being in conformity with the agreement 
 of the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. The evidence 
 against the fact, though in some respects strong, is purely negative. 
 The line, according to the map, extended from a certain point 
 near the source of the river Saguenay, in a westerly direction, to 
 
 i\ I 
 
lit 
 
 24 
 
 another designated point on another river emptying either into the 
 St. Lawrence or James's Bay ; and there were, in that way, four 
 or five lines following each other, all tending westwardly, but with 
 different inclinations northwardly or southwardly, and all extend- 
 ing, from some apparently known point on a designated river, to 
 another similar point on another river; the rivers themselves 
 emptying themselves, some into the river St. Lawrence and others 
 into James's Bay or Hudson's Bay, until, from a certain point 
 lying north of Lake Superior, the line was declared to extend 
 along the 49th degree of latitude, as above stated. It was with 
 that map before me that the following paragraph was inserted in 
 the Ame-ican statement of December, 1826 : 
 
 !? 1, 
 
 i I 
 
 " The limits betwcon the possessions of Great Britain in North America, 
 and those of France in thc5 same quarter, namely, Canada and Louisiana, 
 were determined by Commissioners appointed in pursuance of the treaty of 
 Utrecht. From the coast of Labrador to a certain point North of Lake 
 Superior, those limits were fixed according to certain metes and bounds ; 
 and from that point the line of demarcation was agreed to extend indefinitely 
 due west, along the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. It was in con- 
 formity with that arrangement that the United States did claim that parallel 
 as the northern boundary of Louisiana. It has been ar )rdingly thus 
 settled, as far as the Stony Mountains, by the convention oi 1818 between 
 the United Statos and Great Britain ; and no adequate reason can be given 
 why the same boundary should'not be continued as far as the claims of the 
 United States do extend, that is to say, as far as the Pacific ocean." 
 
 It appears very extraordinary that any geographer or map-maker 
 should have invented a dividing line, with such specific details, 
 without having sufficient grour^ds for believing that it had been 
 thus determined by the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. 
 It is also believed that Douglass' Summary (not at this moment 
 within my reach) adverts to the portion of the line from the coast 
 of Labrador to the Saguenay. Finally, the allusion to the 49th 
 parallel, as a boundary fixed in consequence of the treaty of Utrecht, 
 had been repeatedly made in the course of preceding negotiations, 
 as well as in the conferences of that of the year 1826 ; and there 
 is no apparent motive, if the assertion was known by the British 
 negotiators not to be founded in fact, why they should not have 
 
■■ 
 
 25 
 
 at once denied it. It may be, however, that the question having 
 ceased to be of any interest to Great Britain since the acquisition 
 of Canada, they had not investigated the subject. It is of some 
 importance, because, if authenticated, the discussion would be con- 
 verted from questions respecting undefined claims, into one concern- 
 ing the construction of a positive treaty or convention. 
 
 It is sufficiently clear that, under all the circumstances of the 
 case, an amicable division of the territory, if at all practicable, must 
 be founded in a great degree on expedienrv. This of course must 
 be left to the wisdom of the two Governments. The only natural, 
 equitable, and practicable line which has occurred to me, is one 
 which, running through the middleofFuca Straits, from its entrance 
 to a point on the main, situated south of the mouth of Frazer's river, 
 should leave to the United States all the shores and harbors lying 
 south, and to Great Britain all those north of that line, including 
 the whole of Quadra and Vancouver's Island. It would be through 
 Fuca's Straits a nearly easterly line, along the parallel of about 481 
 degrees, leaving to England the most valuable and permanent por- 
 tion of the fur trade, dividing the sea-coast as nearly as possible 
 into two equal parts, and the ports in the most equitable manner. 
 To leave Admiralty Inlet and its Sounds to Great Britain, would 
 give her a possession in the heart of the American portion of the 
 territory. Whether from the point where the line would strike the 
 main, it should be continued along the same parallel, or run along 
 the 49th, is a matter of secondary importance. 
 
 If such division should take place, the right of the inhabitants of 
 the country situated on the upper waters of the Columbia to the 
 navigation of that river to its mouth, is founded on natural law ; 
 and the principle has almost been recognized as the public law of 
 Europe. Limited to commercial purposes, it might be admitted, 
 but on the express condition that the citizens of the United States 
 should in the same manner, and to the same extent, have the right 
 to navigate the river St. Lawrence. 
 
 But I must say that, whatever may be the ultimate destinies of 
 the Oregon territory, I would feel great regret in seeing it in any way 
 divided. An amicable division appears to me without comparison 
 preferable to a war for that object between the two countries. In 
 
% 
 
 every other view of the subject it is highly exceptionable. Without 
 adverting for the present to considerations of a higher nature, it 
 may be sufficient here to observe, that the conversion of the north- 
 ern part of the territory into a British colony would in its effects 
 make the arrangement very unequal. The United States are for- 
 bidden by their Constitution to give a preference to the ports of 
 one State over those of another. The ports within the portion of 
 territory allotted to the United Sta' es would of course remain open . 
 to British vessels ; whilst American vessels would be excluded from 
 the ports of the British colony, unless occasionally admitted by 
 special acts depending on the will of Greit Britain. 
 
 A\ ■'; 
 
 >• 
 
 i 
 
■VI 
 
 bout 
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 trth- 
 'ects 
 for- 
 s of 
 1 of 
 ipen. 
 rom 
 
 by 
 
 NUMBER III. 
 
 Beyond the naked assertion of an absolute right to the whole 
 territory, so little in the shape of argument haa been adduced, and 
 so much warmth has been exhibited in the discussion of the subject, 
 that it cannot be doubted that the question has now become, on 
 both sides, one of feeling rather than of right. This, in America, 
 grows out of the fact that, in this contest with a European nation, 
 the contested territory is in America and not in Europe. It is iden- 
 tical with the premature official annunciation, that the United States 
 could not acquiesce in the establishment of any new colony in 
 North America by any European nation. This sentiment was al- 
 ready general at the time when it was first publicly declared ; and 
 now that it has been almost universally avowed, there can be no 
 impropriety in any private citizen to say, as I now do, that I share 
 in that feeling to its full extent. For the Americans, Oregon is or 
 will be home : for England, it is but an outpost, which may afford 
 means of annoyance, rather than be a source of real power. In 
 America all have the san:e ultimate object in view ; we differ only • 
 with respect to the means hy which it may be attained. 
 
 Two circumstances have had a tendency to nourish and excite 
 these feelings. The British fur companies, from their position, 
 from their monopolizing character, from their natural influence 
 upon the Indians, and from that, much greater than might have 
 been expected, which they have constantly had upon the British 
 Government in its negotiations with the United States, have for 
 sixty years been a perpetual source of annoyance and collisions. 
 The vested interests of the Hudson Bay Company are at this mo- 
 
[■ "i 
 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 ment the greatest obstacle to an amicable arrangement. It is at 
 the same time due to justice to say that, as far as is known, that 
 company has acted in Oregon in conformity with the terms of the 
 convention, and that its officers have uniformly treated the Ameri- 
 cans, whether visitors or emigrants, not only courteously, but with 
 great kindness. 
 
 If the British colonies on the continent of America were an in- 
 dependent country, or were they placed in their commercial rela- 
 tions, at least with the United States, on the same footing as the 
 British possessions in Europe, these relations would be regulated 
 by the reciprocal interests and wants of the parties immediately 
 concerned. Great Britain has an undoubted right to persist in her 
 colonial policy ; but the result has been extremely vexatious, and 
 to the United States injurious. All this is true. But feelings do 
 not confer a right, and the indulgence of excited feelings is neither 
 virtue nor wisdom. 
 
 The Western States have no greater apparent immediate interest 
 in the acquisition of Oregon than the States bordering on the At- 
 lantic. These stand in greater need of an outlet for their surplus 
 emigrating population, and to them exclusively, will for the present, 
 the benefit accrue of ports on the Pacific, for the protection of the 
 numerous American ships employed in the fisheries and commerce 
 of that ocean. It is true that in case of war the inhabitants of the 
 Western States will not, if a naval superiority shall be obtained on 
 the Upper Lakes, feel those immediate calamities of war to which 
 the country along the seashore is necessarily exposed ; but no sec- 
 tion of the United States will be more deeply affected, by the im- 
 possibility of finding during the war a market for the immense sur- 
 plus of its agricultural products. It must also be remembered that 
 a direct tax has heretofore been found as productive as the ag- 
 gregate of all the other internal taxes levied by the General Gov- 
 ernment ; that, in case of war, it must necessarily be imposed ; and 
 that, as it must, in conformity with the Constitution, be levied in 
 proportion to the respective population of the several States, it will 
 be much more oppressive on those which have not yet accumulated 
 a large amount of circulating or personal capital. The greater 
 degree of excitement which prevails in the West is due to other 
 and more powerful causes than a regard for self-interest. 
 
KS 
 
 Bordering through the whole of their northern frontier on the 
 British possessions, the Western people have always been person- 
 ally exposed to the annoyances and collisions already alluded to ; 
 and it may be that the hope of getting rid of these by the conquest 
 of Canada has some influence upon their conduct. Independent of 
 this, the indomitable energy of this nation has been and is nowhere 
 displayed so forcibly as in the new States and settlements. It was 
 necessarily directed towards the acquisition of land and the cultiva- 
 tion of the soil. In that respect it has performed prodigies. Three 
 millions of cultivators of the soil are now found between the Lakes 
 and the Ohio, where, little more than fifty years before, save only 
 three or ibur half Indian French settlements, there was not a single 
 white inhabitant. Nothing now seems impossible to those men ; 
 they have not even been sobered by fresh experience. Attempting 
 to do at once, and without an adequate capital, that which should 
 have been delayed five-and-twenty years, and might have then 
 been successfully accomplished, some of those States have had the 
 mortification to find themselves unable to pay the interest on the 
 debt they had contracted, and obliged to try to compound with 
 their creditors. Nevertheless, undiminished activity and locomo- 
 tion are still the ruling principles : the Western people leap over 
 time and distance ; ahead they must go ; it is their mission. May 
 God speed them, and may they thus quietly take possession of the 
 entire contested territory ! 
 
 All this was as well known to the British Government as to 
 ourselves. A public and official declaration by the President of 
 the United States was unnecessary and at least premature. Mr. 
 Rush's correspondence of 1824 bears witness of its unfortunate 
 effect on the negotiations of that year. These feelings had gradu- 
 ally subsided. But, whatever may be the cause, the fact that an 
 extraordinary excitement on this subject has manifested itself, 
 and does now exist on both sides, cannot be denied. Time is 
 absolutely necessary in order that this should subside. Any pre- 
 cipitate step now taken by either Government would be attended 
 with the most fatal consequences. That which, if done some years 
 ago, might have been harmless, would now be highly dangerous, 
 and should at least be postponed for the present. 
 
 I, Ml 
 
30 
 
 !l -1 
 
 Ii:1 
 
 I i 
 
 The first incipient step recommended by the Executive is, to 
 give the notice that the convention of 1827 shall expire at the end 
 of one year. This measure at this time, and connected with the 
 avowed intention of assuming exclusive sovereignty over the whole 
 territory, becomes a question of peace or war. 
 
 The conventions of 18 18 and 1827, whilst reserving the rights 
 of both parties, allowed the freedom of trade and navigation 
 throiighout the whole territory to remain common to both; and the 
 citizens or subjects of both powers were permitted to occupy any 
 part of it. The inconveniences of that temporary arrangement 
 were well understood at the time. The British fur companies had 
 established factories on the banks, and even south of the river Co- 
 lumbia, within the limits of that portion of the country which the 
 United States had, whenever the subject was discussed, claimed as 
 belonging exclusively to them. The conditions of the agreement 
 were nominally reciprocal ; but, though they did not give, yet they 
 did in fact leave the British company in the exclusive possession of 
 the fur trade. This could not be prevented otherwise than by 
 resorting to actual force : the United States were not then either 
 ready or disposed to run the risks of a war for that object ; and it 
 was thought more eligible, that the British traders should remain on 
 the territory of the United States, by virtue of a compact and with 
 their consent, than in defiance of their authority. It is but very 
 lately that the Americans have begun to migrate to that remote 
 country : a greater number will certainly follow ; and they have 
 under the convention a perfect right to occupy and make settle- 
 ments in any part of the territory they may think proper, with 
 the sole exception of the spots actually occupied by the British 
 company. 
 
 What is then the object in view, in giving the notice at this time ? 
 This has been declared without reserve by the President : " At 
 the end of the year's notice, should Congress think it proper to 
 make provision for giving that notice, we shall have reached a 
 period when the national rights in Oregon must either be aban- 
 doned or firmly maintained. That they cannot be abandoned with- 
 out a sacrifice of both national honor and interests, is too clear to 
 admit of doubt." And it must be recollected that this candid avowal 
 
 I 
 
31 
 
 has been accompanied by the declaration that " our title to the 
 whole Oregon territory had been asserted and, as was believed, 
 maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Nothing can 
 be more plain and explicit. The exclusive right of the United 
 States to absolute sovereignty over the whole territory must be 
 asserted and maintained. 
 
 It may not be necessary for that purpose to drive away the 
 British fur company, nor to prevent the migration into Oregon of 
 British emigrants coming from the British dominions. The com- 
 pany may, if deemed expedient, be permitted to trade as heretofore 
 with the Indians. British emigrants may be treated in the same 
 manner as the other sixty or eighty thousand who already arrive 
 yearly in the United States. They may at their option be natural- 
 ised, or remain on the same footing as foreigners in other parts of 
 the Union. In this case they will enjoy no political rights ; they 
 will not be permitted to own American vessels and to sail under 
 the American flag ; the permission to own real property seems, so 
 long as Oregon remains a territory, to depend on the will of Con- 
 gress. Thus far collision may be avoided. 
 
 But no foreign jurisdiction can be permitted, from the moment 
 when the sovereignty of the United States over the whole terri- 
 tory shall be asserted and maintained. To this, all those who 
 reside in the territory must submit. After having taken the deci- 
 sive step of giving the notice, the United States cannot, as the 
 President justly states, abandon the right of sovereignty without a 
 sacrifice of national honor. 
 
 It had been expressly agreed by the convention that nothing 
 contained in it should affect the claims of either party to the terri- 
 tory. The all-important question of sovereignty remained there- 
 fore in abeyance. Negotiations for a division of the territory have 
 failed : the question of sovereignty remains undecided, as it was 
 prior to the convention. If the United Sat es exercise the reserved 
 right to put an end to the convention, and if, from the time when 
 it shall have expired, they peremptorily assume the right of sove- 
 reignty over the whole, it cannot be doubted that Great Britain 
 will at once resist. She will adhere to the principle she had 
 asserted prior to the Nootka convention, and has ever since main- 
 
 - i 
 
38 
 
 tained, that actual occupancy can alone give a right to the country. 
 She will not permit the jurisdiction of the United States* to be 
 extended over her subjects : she will oppose the removal, arrest, 
 or exercise of any other legal process, against her justices of the 
 peace, against any other officerswho directly or indirectly Jict under 
 her authority, against any of her subjects ; and she will continue 
 to exercise her jurisdiction over all of them throughout the whole 
 territory. Whatever either Power asserts must be maintained : 
 military occupation and war must necessarily ensue. 
 
 A portion of the people, both in the West and elsewhere, see 
 clearly that such must be the consequence of giving the notice. 
 Such men openly avow their opinions, prefer war to a longer con- 
 tinuation of the present state of things, are ready to meet all the 
 dangers and calamities of the impending conflict, and to adopt at 
 once all the measures which may ensure success. With them, the 
 discussion brings at once the question to its true issue : Is war ne- 
 ces'-ary for the object they have in view 1 Or may it not be at- 
 tained by peaceable means ? It is a question of war or peace, and 
 it is fairly laid before the nation. 
 
 But many respectable men appear to entertain hopes that peace 
 may still be preserved after the United States shall have assumed, 
 or attempted to assume, exclusive sovereignty. The reverse ap- 
 pears to me so clear, so obvious, so inevitable, that I really cannot 
 understand on what grounds these hopes are founded. 
 
 Is it thought that the President will not, after the assent of Con- 
 gress has been obtained (and whether immediately or at the end of 
 this session, is quite immaterial), give the notice which he has 
 asked Congress to authorize 1 Or is it supposed that a change in 
 the form which, in order to avoid responsibility, would give him a 
 discretionary power, could lead to a different result, or be anything 
 else but a transfer by Congress to the Executive of the power to 
 declare war 1 
 
 Can it be presumed that when, after the expiration of the term 
 of notice, the convention shall have been abrogated, the President 
 will not assert and maintain the sovereignty claimed by the United 
 States ? I have not the honor of a personal acquaintance with 
 him ; I respect in him the First Magistrate of the Nation ; and he 
 
,u, 
 
 to 
 
 !d 
 
 is universally represented as of irreproachable character, sincere, 
 and patriotic. Every citizen has a right to differ with him in opi- 
 nion : no one has that of supposing that he ^ays one thing and 
 means another. I feel an intimate conviction of his entire sin- 
 cerity. 
 
 Is it possible that any one, who does not labor under a sintjular 
 illusion, can believe that England will yield to threats and defiance 
 that which she has refused to concede to our arguments ? Reverse 
 the case : Suppose for a moment that Great Britain was the ag- 
 gressor, and had given the notice ; declaring, at the same time, 
 that, at the expiration of the year, she would assume exclusive 
 sovereignty over the whole country, and oppose the exercise of any 
 whatever by the United States : is there any American, even 
 amongst those who set the least value on the Oregon territory, and 
 are most sincerely desirous of preserving peace, who would not at 
 once declare that such pretension on the part of Great Britain was 
 outrageous and must be resisted ? 
 
 It is not certainly the interest of Great Britain to wage war 
 against the United States, and it may be fairly presumed that the 
 British Government has no such wish. But England is, as well 
 as the United States, a great, powerful, sensitive, and proud nation. 
 Every effusion of the British press which displays hostility to the 
 United States, produces an analogous sentiment, and adds new 
 fuel to excitement in America. A moment's reflection will enable 
 us to judge of the inevitable effect of an offensive and threatening 
 act, emanating from our Government; an act which throws, in the 
 face of the world, the gauntlet of defiance to Great Britain. Her 
 claims and views, as laid down in her statement of December, 1826, 
 remos'e every doubt respecting the steps she will take. " Great 
 Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion of that 
 territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any part, but to the 
 whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy in common with 
 other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance. 
 * * * * ']?jjg pretensions of Great Britain tend to the mere 
 maintenance of her own rights, in resistance to the exclusive cha- 
 racter of the pretensions of the United States. * * * * These 
 rights embrace the right to navigate the waters of those countries, 
 
 y' 
 
J 
 
 
 Hi 
 
 the righf to settle in and over any part of them, and the right freely 
 to trade with the inhabitanls and occupiers of the same. It is fully 
 admit led that the United States possess the same rights. But be- 
 yond these rights, they possess none. To the interests and es- 
 tablishments wliich British industry and enterprise have created 
 Great Britain owes protection. That protection will he given, 
 both as regards settlement and freedom of trade and navigation, 
 with every attention not to infringe the co-ordinate rights of the 
 United States." 
 
 Thus, the United States declare that they give notice of the ab- 
 rogation of the convention, with the avowed determination of as- 
 serting their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty 
 over the whole territory of Oregon. And Great Britain has expli- 
 citly declared that her pretensions were, in resistance to the exclu- 
 sive character of those of the United States ; and that protection 
 will be given both as regards settlement and freedom of trade and 
 navigation to the interests and establishments which British indus- 
 try and enterprise have created. 
 
 How war can be avoided, if both Powers persist in their con- 
 flicting determinations, is incomprehensible. Undei such circum- 
 stances negotiation is morally impossible during the year following 
 the notice. To give that notice, with the avowed determination 
 to assume exclusive sovereignty at the end of the year, is a deci- 
 sive, most probably an irretrievable, step. " After that period the 
 United States cannot abandon their right of sovereignty without a 
 sacrifice of national honor." 
 
 The question of sovereignty has hbver been decided. Simply 
 to give notice of the abrogation of the convention, would leave the 
 question in the same situation : it would remain in abeyance. But 
 when the President has recommended that the notice should be 
 given with the avowed object of assuming exclusive sovereignty, 
 an Act of Congress, in compliance with his recommendation, ne- 
 cessarily implies an approbation of the object for which it is given. 
 If the notice should be given, the only w ay to avoid that implica- 
 tion and its fatal consequences, is to insert in it, an explicit decla- 
 ration, that the sovereignty shall not be assumed. But then why 
 give the notice at all ? A postponement is far preferable, unless 
 
35 
 
 some other advantage shall be obtained by the abrogation of the 
 convcntif)n. This must be examined, and it is necessary to inquire 
 whether any and what ineasui<'s may be adopted, without any vio- 
 hitionof the convention, that will preserve the rights and strengthen 
 the position of the United States. 
 
 1 1 
 
 -'11 
 
i 
 
 NUMBER IV. 
 
 ^1 
 
 j; 
 
 li' 
 
 The acts which the government of the United States may do, 
 in conformity with the convention, embrace two objects : the 
 measures applicable to the territory within their acknowledged 
 limits which may facilitate and promote migration ; and those 
 which are necessary for the protection of their citizens residing in 
 the Oregon territory. 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that, although the convention has now 
 been in force twenty-seven years. Congress has actually done 
 nothing with respect to either of those objects. Enterprising 
 individuals have, without any aid or encouragement by Govern- 
 mer*, opened a wagon-road eighteen hundred miles in length, 
 through an arid or mountainous region, and made settlements on 
 or near the shores of the Pacific, without any guaranty for the 
 possession of the land improved by their iubors. Even the attempt 
 to carry on an inland trade with the Indians of Oregon has been 
 defented, by the refusal to allow a drawback of the high duties 
 imposed on the importation of foreign goods absolutely necessary 
 for that commerce. Thus the fur trade has remained engro~3ed by 
 the Hudson Bay Company ; missionaries were, till very lately, 
 almost the only citizens of the United States to be found in Oregon; 
 the United States, during the whole of that period, have derived 
 no other advantage from the convention than the reservation of 
 their rights, and the express provision that these should in no way 
 be affected by the continuance of the British factories in the terri- 
 tory. And, now that the tide of migration has turned in their 
 favor, they are suddenly invited to assume a hostile position, to 
 
87 
 
 endure the calamities and to run the chances and consequences of 
 war, in order to gain an object which natural and i-.-caistible 
 causes, if permitted to operate, cannot fail ultimately to attain. 
 
 The measures applicable to the territory within the acknowledged 
 limits of the U. States have generally been recommended by the Pre- 
 sident. Avery xioderate appropriation will be sufficient to improve 
 the most difficult portions of the road: and block-houses or other tem- 
 porary works, erected in proper places and at convenient distances, 
 and garrisoned by a portion of the intended additional force, will pro- 
 tect and facilitate the progress of the emigrants. However unin- 
 viting may be the vast extent of prairies, destitute of timber, 
 which intervene between the western boundary of the State of 
 Missouri and the country bordering on the Stony Mountains, it 
 seems impossible that there should not be found come more favored 
 spots where settlements may be formed. If these were selected 
 for military posts, and donations of land were made to actual set- 
 tlers in their vicinity, a series of villages, though probably not a 
 continuity of settlements, would soon arise through the whole 
 length of the road. The most important place, that which is most 
 wanted, either as a place of rest for the emigrants, or for mi'Hary 
 purposes, is one in the immediate vicinity of the Stony Mourdains. 
 Reports speak favorably of the fertility of the soil in some of the 
 valleys of the upper waters, within our limits — of Bear's river, of 
 the Rio Colorado, and of some of the northern branches of the 
 river Platte. There, also, the seat of justice might be placed of 
 the new territory, whose cc'-fs should have su^)erior jurisdiction 
 over Oregon. 
 
 The measures which the United States have a right to carry 
 into effect within the territory of Oregon must now be considered. 
 
 The only positive condition of the convention is, that the territo- 
 ry in quesl'on shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, 
 and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be fiee and open 
 to vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers. 
 
 For the construction put on this article by Great Britain, it is 
 necessary to recur again to the statement of her claim, as given 
 by herself, and to her own acts subsequent to the convention. 
 
 The acts of England, subsequent to the convention of 1818, are 
 
 I 
 
38 
 
 
 to be found in the various charters of the Hudson Bay Company 
 (observing that seme of their most important provisions, though 
 of a much earlier date, stand unrepealed), and in the act of Parlia- 
 ment of the year 1821, which confirms and extends a prior one of 
 the year 1803. It must also be recollected that, by grants or acts 
 subsequent to the convention, the ancient Hudson Bay Company 
 and the Northwest Company of Montreal have been united together, 
 preserving the name of Hudson Bay Company. > • 
 
 This Company was and remains a body corporate and politic, 
 with provisions for the election of a Governor and other officers, 
 who direct its business ; and amongst other powers, the Company 
 is empowered to build fortifications for the defence of its posses- 
 sions, as well as to make wra- or pea':e with all nations or people, 
 not Christian, inhabiting their territories, which now embrace the 
 entire Oregon. By the act of Pailiament of 1821, the jurisdiction 
 of the courts of Upper Canada is extended, in all civil and criminal 
 cases, to the Oregon territory ; provision is made for the appoint- 
 ment of justices of the peace within the said territory, with a limit- 
 ed jurisdiction, and power to act as Commissioners in certain cases, 
 and to convey offenders to Upper Canada. 
 
 It must also be observed that, although the Company is for- 
 bidden to claim any exclusive trade with the Indians, to the preju- 
 dice or exclusion of any citizen of the United States who may be 
 engaged in the same trade, yet the jurisdiction above mentioned is, 
 by the letter of the act, extended to any persons whatsoever re- 
 siding or being within the said territory. The British Plenipo- 
 tentiarips did, however, explicitly declare, in the course of^he ne- 
 gotiations of 1826-1827, thnt the act had no other object but the 
 maintenance of order amongst British subjects, and had never been 
 intended to apply to citizens of the United States. 
 
 It is perfectly clear that, since it has been fully admitted that the 
 United States possess the same rights over the territory as Great 
 Britain, they are fully authorized, under the convention, to enjoy 
 all the rights which Great Britain claims for herself, and to exer- 
 cise that jurisdiction which she has assumed as being consistent 
 with the convention. 
 
 The citizens of the United Siates have, the.eforr v>t thJ- time a 
 
 ft 
 
i 
 
 r 
 
 full and acknowledged right to navigate the waters of the Oregon 
 territory, to settle in and over any part of it, and freely to trade 
 with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same. And the Govern- 
 ment of the United States is likewise fully authorized to incor- 
 porate any company or association of men for the purpose of 
 trading or of ocv^jpying and settling the country ; to extend the 
 jurisdiction of the courts of any of its territories lying within its 
 acknowledged limits, in all civil and criminal cases, to the terri- 
 tory aforesaid ; to appoint within the same justices of the peace 
 and such other officers as may be necessary for carrying the 
 jurisdiction into effect ; and also to make war and peace with the 
 Indian inhabitants of the territory, including the incidental power 
 to appoint agents for that purpose. 
 
 ^ On the other hand, it sejms to be understood that, so long as 
 the convention remain", in force, neither Government shall lay 
 duties in the Territory on tonnage, merchandise, or commerce ; 
 nor exercise exclusive juiisdiction over any portion of ii; and that 
 the citizens and subjects of the two Powers, residing in or re- 
 moving to the territory, shall be amenable only to the jurisdiction 
 of their own country respectively. 
 
 It has been contended by the British Government that the 
 establishment of any military post, or the introduction of any re- 
 gular force under a national flag, by either Power, would be an act 
 of exclusive sovereignty, which could not be permitted to either 
 whilst the sovereigr.ty remained in abeyance. Under existing 
 «, ircumstances, it is bellevrd that such an act would be highly 
 
 'angerous, and prove unfavorable to the United States. 
 
 But the establishn^ent by the United States of a Territorial Go- 
 vernment over Oregon is also objected to on the same principle. 
 The want of such government appears to be the only serious in- 
 con\enience attending a continuance of the convention, and re- 
 quires special consideration. 
 
 The United States have the same right as Great Britain, and 
 are equally bound, to protect their citizens residing in the Oregon 
 territory, in the exercise of all the ri^jhts secured to them by the 
 convention. It has lieen fully admitted that these rights embrace the 
 right to settle in and over any part of the territory, and that they 
 
 
 i 
 
40 
 
 m 
 
 are to be, in all cases whatever, amenable only to the jurisdiction 
 of their own country. The subjects of Great Britain, who are not 
 in the employ of the Hudson Bay Company, are forbidden to trade 
 with the natives ; and the company does in fact control and 
 govern all the British subjects residing in the territory. This 
 gives a strong guaranty against the violation, by rash individuals, 
 of the rights of the citizens of the United States. Should any of 
 them, however, be disturbed in the exercise of their legitimate 
 rights, and the company should be unable or unwilling to relieve 
 and indemnify them, the United States would be justly entitled to 
 appeal to the British Government for the redress of a violation of 
 rights secured by i ■ ■'' ontion ; for the British Government has 
 preserved a control *_ ihe Hudson Bay Company, and does in 
 fact, through it, govern uie British subjects who reside in the ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 The United States are placed, in that respect, in a very different 
 situation. It is not believed that the General Government is 
 authorized to incorporate, as a political body, a commercial com- 
 pany, with such powers as would give it an efficient control over 
 the private cit'zeiis residing in ihe territory. Such delegation of 
 powers, either by any of the Stales or by Congress, is wholly 
 inconsistent with our institutions. The United States may indeed 
 give to their c'iizens in Oregon a regular and "complete judiciary 
 system; and they may also extend to them, as the British Govern- 
 ment has done on its part, the laws of an adjacent territory. But 
 an executive local power is wanted in this case, as it is every- 
 where else, under any form of government whatever, to cause 
 the laws to be executed, and to have that general control 
 which is now exercised, through the Hudson Bay Company, by 
 the British Government. There are, besides, v arious acts of a 
 ])ublic though local nature, such as opening roads, making bridges, 
 erecting block-houses for protection against the natives, providing 
 for the destitute, &c., all which are performed by the Hudson Bay 
 Company, and cannot be accomplished by insulated individuals, 
 bound by no legal association or government. 
 
 Whether any measures may be devised, other than a territorial 
 government, that will be sufficient for the purpose intended; 
 
41 
 
 whether all the American citizens residing in Oregon raight not 
 be incorporated and made a body politic, with powers equivalent 
 to those vested in the Hudson Bay Company, and with the reserva- 
 tion by the General Government of a check or control analogous 
 to that reserved by the Government of Great Britain, are questions 
 worthy of serious consideration. But Great Britain has the same 
 interest as the United States to prevent collision during the con- 
 tinuance of the convention ; and it is believed that, if negotiations 
 should be renewed, with an equal and sincere desire on both sides 
 to preserve friendly relations, there would be no difficulty at this 
 time in coming to an understanding on the subject. It would 
 seem sufficient that this should be accompanied with provisions, 
 preventing the possibility of the powers exercised by the United 
 States being ever applied to British subjects, and with an explicit 
 declaration that these powers should never be construed as an 
 admission by Great Britain of any claim of the United States to 
 exclusive sovereignty. 
 
 There is another important subject Avhich has not, it is believed, 
 ever been discussed by the two Powers. This is the claim to the 
 ownership of the places settled and improved under the convention. 
 It seems to me that, on the principles of both natural and interna- 
 tional law, these rights, to a defined extent, should be respected 
 by each Power respectively, whose sovereignty over the portion of 
 the territory in which such improved settlements may be situated 
 will ultimately be recognized. It appears also that the United 
 States may, in conformity with the convention, and without 
 alfecting in any shape the claims advanced by Great Britain, pass 
 a law declaring that they abandon or grant without warranty, to such 
 of their citizens as shall have made actual and bona fide settle- 
 ments in any part of Oregon, under the convention, all the rights 
 of and claims to the ownership of the soil, on which such settle- 
 ments shall have been made, which the United States may now or 
 hereafter claim or acquire : limiting and defining the extent of the 
 grant in the same manner as would be done if such grant was 
 absolute; and promising that the title should be confirmed, in 
 case and whenever the sovereignty of the United States was 
 recognized or asserted and maintained. 
 
 m 
 
 1 11 
 
J hi 
 
 w 
 
 43 
 
 The prolongation, in 1827, of the convention of 1818, was 
 evidently intended as a temporary measure, since it was made 
 revocable at the will of either party. The plenipotentiaries of 
 the two Powers had been unable to hgree on the terms of a defini- 
 tive arrangement, or even in defining with precivsion the conditions 
 on which the convention of 1818 might be continued for a deter- 
 minate period. It will be seen, by reference to the protocols and 
 correspondence, that, although it was generally admitted that 
 neither party ought during such continuance to exercise any 
 exclusive sovereignty over the territory, the American Plenipo- 
 tentiary declined to agree to any convention containing an express 
 provision to that effect, or accompanied by the insertion in the 
 protocol of a declaration for the same purpose by the British 
 Plenipotentiaries. The reason was not only because an exclusive 
 right over Astoria and its dependencies was claimed by the United 
 States, but principally because it was anticipated that, in order to 
 have in fact an authority equal to that exercised by the Hudson 
 Bay Company, it would become necessary for the United States 
 to perform acts which the British Government might contend to 
 be forbidden by such express provision or declaration. The con- 
 sequence was, that the convention recognizes some certain rights, 
 and imposes no positive restrictions but only such, as may be sup- 
 posed to be implied in the clause which ('eclares, that nothing 
 contained in it should be construed to impair or affect the claims 
 of either party. The probability that it might become necessary 
 for the United States to establish a territory or some sort of 
 government over their own citizens was explicitly avowed ; the 
 deficiencies of the renewed convention of 1827, and the incon- 
 veniences which might ensue, were fully understood ; and the 
 continuance of that of 1818, made revokable at will, was agreed 
 on, with the hope that the two Powers would embrace an early 
 opportunity, if not to make a definitive arrangement, at least to 
 substitute for the convention another, defining with precision the 
 acts which both parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform 
 so long as the sovereignty remained in abeyance. 
 
 The inconveniences alluded to have been fairly stated in this 
 paper, and some of the means by which they may be avoided 
 
43 
 
 have been suggested. It is not, therefore, on account of the 
 intrinsic value of the convention that its abrogation is objectionable 
 and dangerous. It is because nothing is substituted in its place ; 
 it is because, if the two Powers are not yet prepared to make a 
 definitive agreement, it becomes the duty of both Governments, 
 instead of breaking the only barrier which still preserves peace, 
 to substitute for the existing convention one adapted to the present 
 state of things, and which shall prevent collisions until the ques- 
 tion of sovereignty shall have been settled. The inconveniences 
 which were only anticipated have become tangible, from the time 
 when American citizens, whom the United States are bound to 
 protect began to make settlements in the territory of Oregon. 
 The sudden transition, from an agreement however defective to a 
 promiscuous occupancy, without any provisions whatever that may 
 prevent collisions, is highly dangerous. When this is accompa- 
 nied by an avowed determination on the part of the United States 
 to assume that exclusive sovereignty which Great Britain has posi- 
 tively declared she would resist. War becomes inevitable. 
 
 
, 1 
 i 
 ,i 
 
 i' 
 
 NUMBER V. 
 
 t ,. , i 
 
 m 
 
 1 ': 
 
 It may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of certain- 
 ty, the number of citizens of the United States who, aided by these 
 various measures, will, within any given period, remove to the 
 territory beyond the Stony Mountains. It is certain that this 
 number will annually increase, and keep pace with the rapid in- 
 crease of the population of the V/estern States. It cannot be 
 doubted that ultimately, and at no very distant time, they will have 
 possession of all that is worth being occupied in the territory. 
 On what principle, then, will the right of sovereignty be de- 
 cided ? 
 
 It may, however, be a.sked whether, if this be the inevitable 
 consequence of the continuance of the convention, England will 
 not herself give notice that it shall be abrogated. It might be 
 sufficient to answer that we must wait till that notice shall have 
 been given, and the subsequent measures which England means 
 to adopt shall have been made known to us, before we assume 
 rashly a hostile position. The United States may govern them- 
 selves ; although they may irritate Great Britain, they cannot con- 
 trol the acts of her Government. The British Government will 
 do whatever it may think proper ; but for the consequences that 
 may ensue it will be alone responsible. Should the abrogation of 
 the convention on her part be followed by aggressive measures ; 
 should she assume exclusive possession over Oregon or any part 
 of it, as it is now proposed that the United States should do, 
 America will then be placed in a defensive position j the war, if 
 any should ensue, will be one unprovoked by her, a war purely of 
 
 i. 
 

 45 
 
 defence, which will be not only sustained, but approved by the 
 unanimous voice of (he nation. We may, however, be permitted 
 to examine what motive could impel England, what interest she 
 might have, either in annulling the convention or in adopting ag- 
 gressive measures. 
 
 When it is recommended that the United States should give 
 notice of the abrogation of the convention, it is with the avowed 
 object of adopting measures forbidden by the convention, and 
 which Great Britain has uniformly declared she would resist. But, 
 according to the view of the subject uniformly taken by her, from 
 the first time she asserted the rights she claims to this day, the 
 simple abrogation of her convention with the United States will 
 produce no effect whatever on the rights, relations, and position 
 of the two Powers. Great Britain, from the date at least of 
 Cook's third voyage, and prior to the Nootka convention, did deny 
 the exclusive claim of Spain, and assert that her subjects had, in 
 common with those of other States, the right freely to trade with 
 the natives, and to settle in any part of the Northwestern coast of 
 America, not already occupied by the subjects of Spain. The 
 Nootka convention was nothing more than the acquiescence, on 
 the part of Spain, in the claims thus asserted by Great Britain, 
 leaving the sovereignty in abeyance. And the convention between 
 the United States and Great Britain is nothing more nor less than 
 a temporaiy recognition of the same principle^ so far as the two 
 parties wert concerned. England had, prior to that convention, 
 fully admitted that the United States possessed the same rights as 
 were claimed by her. The abrogation of the convention by her 
 will leave those rights precisely in Ihe same situation as they now 
 stand, and as they stood prior to the convention. It cannot there- 
 fore be perceived what possible benefit could accrue to Great Bri- 
 tain from her abrogation of that instrument ; unless, discarding all 
 her former declarations, denying all that she has asserted for 
 more than sixty years, retracting her admission of the equal rio-hts 
 of the United States to trade, to occupy, and to make settlements 
 in any part of the country, she should, without cause or pretext, 
 assume, as is now threatened on the part of the United States, ex* 
 elusive sovereignty over the whole or part of the territory. It may 
 
 
46 
 
 if 
 
 be pri milted to believe that the British Government entertains no 
 such intention. 
 
 It may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no 
 disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She 
 has, indeed, declared most cxplicilly her determination to protect 
 the British interests that had been created by British enterprise and 
 capital in that (piarter. But, by giving a monopoly of the fur trade 
 to the Hudson Bay Company, she has virtually arrested private 
 efforts on the part of British subjects. Her Government has been 
 in every other respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless 
 about the ultimate fate of Oregon. The country has been open 
 to her enterprise at least fifty years ; and there are no other Bri- 
 tish settlements or interests within its limits than those vested in, or 
 connected with the Hudson Bay Company. Whether the British 
 Government will hereafter make any effort towards that object 
 cannot be known ; but as long as this right to colonize Oregon 
 shall remain common to both Po\ve;s, the United States have no- 
 thing to apprehend from the competition. 
 
 The negotiations on that subject between the two Governments 
 have been carried on, on both sides, with perfect candor. The 
 views and intentions of both parties were mutually communicated 
 without reserve. The conviction on the part of America that the 
 country must ultimately be occupied and settled by her agricul- 
 tural emigrants, was used as an argument why, in case of a divi- 
 sion of the territory, the greater share should be allotted to the 
 United ^States. The following quotation, from the American 
 statement of the case of December, 1826, proves that this expec- 
 tation was fairly avowed at the time : 
 
 " If the present state of occupancy is urged on the part of Great Britain, 
 the probability of the manner in which the territory west of tlie Rocky 
 Mountains must be settled belongs also essentially to the suliject. Under 
 whatever nominal sovereignty that country may be placed, and wliatever 
 its ultimate destinies may be, it is ncaiiy reduced to a certainty that it will be 
 almost exclusively peopled by the surplus population of the United States. 
 The distance i'rom Great Britain, and the expense incident to emigration, 
 forbid the expectation of any being practicable from that quarter but on a 
 comparatively small scale. Allowing the rate of increase to be the same in 
 
no 
 
 47 
 
 the United StaLes and in the \<irtli American British possessions, the dif- 
 ference in the actual poimlation of holli is siicli that the pniures-ivc rate 
 which would, witliin forty years, sidd tiiree million.'^ to tliosc, wniild within 
 the same time give a positive increase of more than twenty millions to the 
 United States. And if circiimf;tancep, arisinjf from localities and hahits. 
 have piven superior facilities to IJritish isuhjects of exteudinjf their commerce 
 with the natives, and to that expam-ion which lias the appearance, and the 
 appearance only, of occupancy, the sloucr hut sure progress and extension 
 of an aj^'ricultural population will he regulated by distanc;', by natural 
 obstacles, and by its own amount." 
 
 There was no exaggeration in that comparative view ; the su- 
 periority of the progressive increase of popdation in the United 
 States was, on the contrary, underrated. The essential difference 
 is, that migration from the United States to Oregon is the result 
 of purely natural causes, whilst England, in order to colonize 
 that country, must resort to artificial means. The number of 
 American emigrants may not, during the first next ensuing years, 
 be as great as seems to be anticipated. It will at first be limited 
 by the amount of provisions with which the earlier settlers can 
 supply them during the first year, and till they can raise a crop 
 themselves; and the rapidity with which a new country may be 
 settled is also lessened where maize cannot be piufitably culti- 
 vated. ' 
 
 Whether more or less prompt, the result is nevertheless indubi- 
 table. The snowball sooner or later becomes an avalanche: where 
 the cultivator of the soil has once made a permanent establishment 
 game and hunters disappear; within a few years the fur trade 
 will have died its natural death, and no vestige shall remain, at 
 least south of Fuca's Straits, of that temporary occupancy, of 
 those vested British interests, which the British Government is 
 now bound to protect. When the whole territory shall have thus 
 fallen in the possession of an agricultural industrious po^.ulation, 
 the question recurs, by what principle will then the right of sove- 
 reignty, all along kept in abeyance, be determined ? 
 
 The answer is obvious. In conformity with natural law, with 
 that right of occupancy for which Great Britain has always con- 
 tended, the occupiers of the land, the inhabitants of the country, 
 from whatever quarter they may have come, will be of right as 
 
 HI 
 
 .;,(! 
 
4S 
 
 I 1 
 
 i\ 
 
 :^. I « 
 
 %\ 
 
 ■]■: 
 li 
 
 vi 
 
 well as in fact the sole legitimate sovereigns of Oregon. When- 
 ever sufTiciently numerous, lliey will decide whether it suits them 
 best to be an independent nation or an integral part of our great 
 Republic. There cannot be the slightest apprehension that they 
 will choose to become a dependent colony ; for they will be the 
 most powerful nation bordering on the American shores of the Pa- 
 cific, and will not »tand in need of protection against either their 
 Russian or Mexican neighbors. Viewed as an abstract proposi- 
 tion, Mr. Jefferson's opinion appears correct, that it will be best 
 for both the Atlantic and the Pacific American nations, whilst enter- 
 taining the most friendly relations, to remain independent rather 
 than to be united under the same Government. But this conclu- 
 sion is premature; and the decision must be left to posterity. 
 It has been attempted in these papers to prove — 
 
 1. 'I'hat neither of the two Powers has an absolute and indis- 
 putable right to the whole contested territory ; that each may re- 
 cede from its extreme pretensions without impairing national honor 
 or wounding national pride ; and that the way is therefore still 
 open for a renewal of negotiations. 
 
 2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice 
 of the abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert 
 and maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sove- 
 reignty over the whole territory ; that Great Britain is lully com- 
 mitted on that point, and has constantly and explicitly declared 
 that such an attempt would be resisted, and the British interests 
 in that quarter be protected ; and that war is therefore the una- 
 voidable consequence of such a decisive step — a war not only ne- 
 cessarily calamitous and expensive, but in its character aggressive, 
 not justifiable by the magnitude and importance of its object, and 
 of which the chances are uncertain. 
 
 3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in 
 a great degree be avoided ; that, if no war should ensue, they will 
 be the same, if not greater, without than under a convention ; that 
 not a single object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, 
 unless it be to do something not permitted by the present conven'- 
 tion, and therefore provoking resistance and productive of war. If 
 
4$ 
 
 a single other advantage can be gained by giving the notice, let 
 it be stated. 
 
 4th. Ihat it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, 
 whether under or without a convention, the United States have 
 the same rights as herseN", to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and 
 make settlements in and over every part of the territory ; and that, 
 if this state of things be not disturbed, natural causes must neces- 
 sarily give the whole territory to the United States. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject 
 may be postponed for the present ; that Government should not 
 commit itself by any premature act or declaration ; that, instead 
 of increasing the irritation and excitement which exist on both 
 sides, time be given for mutual reflection, and for the subdual or 
 subsidence of angry and violent feelings. Then, and then only, 
 can the deliberate opinion of the American people on this momen- 
 tous question be truly ascertained. It is not perceived how the 
 postponement for the present and for a time in, in any shape or in 
 the slightest degree, injure the United States. 
 
 It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has 
 often abused her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner 
 than by the impressment of seamen, whether American, English, 
 or other foreigners, sailing under and protected by the American 
 flag. I am not aware that there has ever been any powerful 
 nation, even in modern times, and professing Christianity, which 
 has not occasionally abused its power. The United States, who 
 always appealed to justice during their early youth, seem, as their 
 strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a similar dispo- 
 sition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations, might 
 not the two nations, by their united etlorts, promote a great object, 
 and worthy of their elevated situation ? 
 
 With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which 
 extends from 42 to 54^ 40' north latitude, all the American shores 
 of the Pacific Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are 
 occupied, on the north by the factories of the Russian Fur Com- 
 pany, southwardly by semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europe- 
 ans of Spanish descent and of native Indians, who, notwithstand- 
 ing the efforts of enlightened, intelligent, and liberal men, have 
 
 4 
 
 'S 
 
so 
 
 f .1' 
 
 i*'11 
 
 '■I 
 
 ifiii 
 
 ,i>V 
 
 heretofore failed in the attempt to establish governments founded 
 on law, that might ensure liberty, preserve order, and protect 
 persons ar.d property. It is in Oregon alone that we may hope 
 to see a portion of the western shores of America occupied and 
 inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may exer- 
 cise a moral inflnence over her less favored neighbors, and extend 
 to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that 
 account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territo- 
 ry may not be divided. The United States and England are 
 the only Powers who lay any claim to that country, the only 
 nations which may and must inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in 
 the power of either Government to prevent this taking place ; but 
 it depends upon them, whether they shall unite in promoting the 
 object, or whether they shall bring on both countries the calamities 
 of an useless war, which may retard but not prevent the ultimate 
 result. It matters but little whether the inhabitants shall come 
 from England' or from the United States. It would seem that 
 more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a 
 period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to 
 the population of the United States by migrations from the 
 dominions of Great Britain ; yet, since permitted by both Powers, 
 they may be presumed to be beneficial to .oth. The emigrants 
 to Oregon, whether Americans or English, will be united together 
 by the community of language and literature, of the principles of 
 law, and of all the fundamental elements of a similar civilisation. 
 The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the 
 Norlh-west Coast of America is all that England can expect, all 
 perhaps that the United States ought to desire. It seems almost 
 incredible that, whilst that object may be attained by simply not 
 impeding the effect of natural causes, two kindred nations, having 
 such powerful motives to remain at peace, and standing at the 
 head of European and American civilisation, should, in this enlight- 
 ened age, givd to the world the scandalous spectacle, perhaps not 
 unwelcome 'o some of the beholders, of an unnatural and an unne- 
 cessary war ; that they should apply all their faculties and exhaust 
 their resources in inflicting, each on the other, every injury in their 
 power, and for what purpose ? The certain consequence, inde- 
 
r 
 
 tl 
 
 pendent of all the direct calamities and miseries of war, will be a 
 mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate fate of 
 Oregon will be the same as if the war Vad not taken place. 
 
i i^ 
 
 I ; .'I 
 
 ,i ! 
 
 Jli 
 
 M 
 
 . 1 
 
 .;)'i'?Hf 
 
 ii" 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 WAR EXPENSES, 
 
 Those expenses may be arranged under three heads : 1st. Such 
 as are of a permanent nature, and should be considered as belong- 
 ing to the Peace establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which 
 should be adopted when there is an impending danger of war. 
 3dly. Those which actual war renders necessaiy. 
 
 To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that 
 require considerable time to be execu and cannot, without 
 great difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are 
 fortifications, building ships of war including steamers, accumu- 
 lating materials for the same purpose. Navy Yard- providing 
 a sufficient artillery, and other important objects of the ord- 
 nance department. It may be taken for granted, that Government 
 has done, or will do all that is necessary and practicable in ihat 
 respect. 
 
 The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there 
 is danger of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety 
 of opinions must be expected. It has been repeatedly assei w, 
 that such is the structure of our Government, that it never will or 
 can prepare for war, till after it has actually commenced ; that is 
 to say, that, because Congress was dilatory in making effectual 
 provision for carrying on the last war against Great Britain, and 
 because the Administration, at the time when it was declared, was 
 
54 
 
 urn 
 
 ,,,:•>•» 
 
 inefficient and not well calculated for conducting it, the United 
 States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement of every 
 war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be induced 
 *o put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other 
 use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were 
 formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people 
 for being sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. 
 They must be told the whole truth ; and if they are really in fa- 
 vor of war, they will cheerfully sustain Government in all the 
 measures necessary to carry it into effect. The frank annunciation 
 of the necessity of such measures is called, " creating a panic." It 
 is not the first time that under similar circumstances the same lan- 
 guage has been held. If ^nere be no danger or intention of making 
 war, those create a panic, who proclaim a determination to assert 
 the exclusive sovereignty of the United States over the whole con- 
 tested territory, with the full knowledge that Great Britain has 
 uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any such 
 attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the at- 
 tempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite 
 for car-ying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the pub- 
 lic sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have 
 become impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxa- 
 tion, for which the Nation had not been prepared. 
 
 I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military cha- 
 racter, otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts. 
 
 The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 
 1812, were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a 
 suflScient regular force. Governmc tit had < Ijtained a correct state- 
 ment of the regular force of the British in Canada, with the ex- 
 ception of the garrison of Quebec, This last was estimated at 
 about three thousand men, and could not be lessened without great 
 inconvenience and some danger. The regular force at Montreal, 
 St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to 1 130 men ; that in the 
 whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an additional 
 military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th < f January, 
 1812. The selection of the oflficers was not completed before the 
 termination of that year j the recruiting service was nut organized 
 
mumm 
 
 55 
 
 in time ; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most 
 moderate calculation ; and the total number recruited was so small, 
 as to render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of 
 the most important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as 
 was the force by which they were defended. The volunteer act 
 was also extremely unproductive. At that time the treasury was 
 amply supplied ; and the v;ant was not that of money, but of a 
 regular force. 
 
 Such force cannot be raised without money ; and yet it will be 
 admitted that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress 
 to lay internal taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. 
 In order to provide means for having an additional regular force 
 ready to act as soon as actual war takes place, a loan and Trea- 
 sury notes must be resorted to. But it is deemed absolutely ne- 
 cessary, that the internal taxes should be imposed simultaneously 
 with the declaration of war, and that provision should be made 
 for their immediate collection. With the exception of the act for 
 doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any 
 law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year 
 after the declaration of the last war ; nor did it even lay a second 
 direct tax in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit 
 was iruined, after Treasury notes which were had due remained 
 unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas had been placed at the head of the 
 Treasury, that at last the laws for imposing a double direct tax, 
 for increasing the rate of the existing internal duties, and for laying 
 new ones, were enacted. The peace was ratified immediately 
 after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000 dollars were 
 paid in the Treasviry before the end of the war, on account of the 
 direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were 
 received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 
 1815, 1816 and 1817. 
 
 The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an im- 
 mediate collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing 
 such taxes shall have been passed, are those on which I may 
 speak with confidence. These consist simply in a previous or- 
 ganization of the machinery necessary for the collection of every 
 species of internal taxes, and the assessment of a direct tax. 
 
 ' 1 
 
56 
 
 ! I' 
 
 
 The proper selection of the numerous officers necessary for the 
 collection always consumes several months. A previous selection 
 and appointment of those officers would obviate that difficulty, 
 and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should receive 
 no pay till called into actual service ; this would be the natural 
 consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this being 
 a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary 
 measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury 
 should, at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with 
 all the necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts. 
 
 The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every 
 individual who possesses such property, is the only operation 
 which requires considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. 
 This cannot be otherwise obviated than by making that assess- 
 ment a preparatory measure, to be completed before actual war 
 takes place. 
 
 In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I 
 undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the 
 several Counties and State Districts in each State ; and the Act of 
 2d August, 1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of 
 dollars, was passed in conformity with that apportionment. The 
 process was easy for every State in which there was a direct State 
 tax; but though derived from the best data that could be col- 
 lected, it was defective and partly arbitrary for the States in 
 which there was no State tax. As there is at present hardly any 
 (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this mode 
 may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This 
 will reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota 
 of each County or District, on the several individuals liable to the 
 tax, and the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding 
 probably two hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and 
 correct assessment will, of course, be provided for, with respect to 
 the direct taxes which may be laid after the first year of the war 
 
 The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove 
 useless if the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war 
 should not take place ; but certainly this is too small an item to 
 deserve consideration. 
 
m 
 
 This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary 
 in order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other 
 internal taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have 
 been imposed by Congress. 
 
 The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a 
 war with England, and the resources for defraying them, are the 
 next objects of inquiry. 
 
 It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the 
 expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrear- 
 ages due on account of the military services at the time when the 
 peace was ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public 
 documents which I have seen. Although the laws show the 
 number of men voted, that of those actually raised has never to 
 my knowledge been officially stated. There can be no doubt that 
 the want of a proper organization increased the amount of expendi- 
 ture much beyond that which would have been sufficient under a 
 regular and efficient system. This has undoubtedly been much im- 
 proved ; yet the expenses incurred in the Seminole war, compared 
 with the number of men employed and that of the hostile Indians, 
 show that either there are still some defects in the organization, 
 or that there were great abuses in the execution. 
 
 The payments from the Treasury for the military department, 
 embracing only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, 
 and exclusive of those for fortifications and the Indian department, 
 amounted for the year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the 
 year 1814 to 20,508,000 dollars. The disbursements for the 
 navy are stated at 6,446,000 and 7,311,000 dollars for these two 
 years respectively. By comparing the reports of the Secretaries 
 of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817, it would appear 
 that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded ten 
 millions of dollars : and it seems certain that the actual war ex- 
 penses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of 
 dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that 
 year amounted to 35,000 men. 
 
 The population of the United States has nearly trebled during 
 the thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the 
 last war against England was declared. Their wealth and 
 
S8 
 
 I.I 
 
 I •: ^i 
 
 I I, 
 
 Yii'r 
 
 iii 
 
 resources have increased in the same ratio ; and that, in case of 
 war, these should be brought into action as promptly as possible, 
 admits of no doubt. Once engaged in the conflict, to make the 
 war as efficient as possible will shorten its duration, and can alone 
 secure honorable terras of peace. I have not the documents 
 necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual 
 expenses of a war with Great Britain ; and if I had, I could not 
 at this time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely 
 necessary in order to draw correct inferences. Taking only a 
 general view of the subject, and considering the great difference 
 of expense in keeping a navy in active service, between one of 
 eight frigates and one of ten ships of the line, fourteen frigates 
 and a competent number of steamers ; that Texas and Oregon 
 are additional objects of defence ; that the extensive system of 
 fortifications which has been adopted will require about fifteen 
 thousand additional men ; and that, in order to carry a successful 
 and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the British 
 dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely neces- 
 sary ; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that, 
 after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the 
 country shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and 
 naval expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. 
 To this must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, 
 for the year ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near 
 fifteen millions, but which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes 
 may be reduced to eleven millions and a half. The gross annual 
 expenses for all objects will be estimated at seventy-seven millions ; 
 to be increased annually by the annual interest on each successive 
 loan. 
 
 In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans 
 required to defray that expense, the first question which arises, is 
 the diminution of the revenue derived from customs, which will be 
 the necessary consequence of the war. 
 
 The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source 
 of revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814, 
 respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars ; and 
 the nett revenue which accrued during those three years respect- 
 
69 
 
 ively amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. 
 From the 1st of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was 
 doubled ; and in order to compare these receipts with those col- 
 lected in peace time, they must be reduced for those three years 
 respectively, to 7,470,000,* 6,600,000 and 3,000,000 ; or, if the 
 revenue accrued be compared (which is the correct mode), to 
 9,850,000,* 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars. At that time the 
 duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed, collected on 
 an average only six or eight months later ; and the unexpected 
 importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American ves- 
 sels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the decla- 
 ration of war and to the act which doubled the rr.te of duties, 
 swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only 
 in 1814 that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived 
 from that source was felt. 
 
 The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage 
 employed in the foreign trade of the United States is strongly 
 exhibited by the following statement : 
 
 Tonnage in foreign trade, U. S. American ves. Foreign ves. Total. 
 
 Year 1811 948,207 33,203 981,450 
 
 " 1812 667,999 47,099 715,098 
 
 « 1813 237,348 113,827 351,175 
 
 « 1814 59,626 ^ 48,302 107,928 
 
 And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 
 1814, Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of 
 Europe, and that these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly 
 ventured to trade with us. 
 
 The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, 
 as well as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the 
 eleven years 1801 to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual 
 average of about 12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven 
 years the average amount of tonnage employed in the foreign trade 
 of the United States was 943,670 tons, of which 844,170 were 
 in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels. 
 
 I 
 
 ;l 
 i| 
 
 
 * Estimated for 1812. 
 
60 
 
 M 
 
 "P 
 
 ■A 
 
 ■* 
 
 |i ; I ' 
 
 I', lie 
 
 
 Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had 
 been reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if com- 
 pared according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importa- 
 tions), the tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United 
 States to nearly one ninth; and that of the American vessels 
 employed in that trade, to one fourteenth part of their respective 
 :.verage amount during the eleven years of peace. 
 
 The small American navy did during the last war with England 
 all and more than could have been expected. The fact was 
 established to the satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain 
 herself, that the navy of the United States, with a parity of force, 
 was at least equal to that of England. But the prodigious numeri- 
 cal superiority of the British navy rendered it impossible for a few 
 frigates to protect the commerce of the United States, which was 
 accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten ships of the 
 line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels. 
 The great numerical superiority of the British navy still continues ; 
 and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion will 
 be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in 
 our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force 
 that can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance 
 into consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, 
 though much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. 
 Although the actual diminution which will be experienced is alto- 
 gether conjectural, I think that no great error is to be apprehended 
 in estimating the revenue from customs, after the first year of the 
 war, at about one half of its present amount ; and the whole 
 revenue from that source, from the sale of lands and all the 
 branches of the existing income, at fourteen milUons of dollars ; 
 leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions, besides the 
 interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be estih 
 mated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However 
 energetic and eflBcient Congress and the Executive may be, the 
 resources and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought 
 forth : the expenses will therefore be less during the first year, 
 after which the whole amount will be required and will be annu" 
 
61 
 
 ally wanted. In reference therefore to the second year of the 
 war — 
 
 Assuming the total war expenses at . . . $65,000,000 
 All the others at . 12,000,000 
 
 In all, $77,000,000 
 
 From which deduct for existing revenue, . . 14,000,000 
 
 To be provided for by taxes and loans, . . $63,000,000 
 
 On the principle that the amount of annual taxes 
 should be at least equal to the expenses of 
 the peace establishment and the interest on 
 the war loans, annual peace expenses at . . 27,000,000 
 
 And for interest on the loans of 1st and 2(1 years, ; 
 viz. 1st year 25, and 2d year 45 millions at 
 7 per cent 5,000,000 
 
 "- Together, $32,000,000 
 
 From which deduct existing revenue, . . . 14,000,000 
 
 Leaves to be provided for by new taxes, at least $18,000,000 
 And by loans, 45,000,000 
 
 $63,000,000 
 
 The estimate of 5,000,000 dollars for the interest of the loans 
 the second year after the war, is founded on the supposition that 
 the direct and other internal taxes or duties laid for the first year, 
 together with the existing revenue, and twenty-five millions bor- 
 rowed by loans or Treasury notes, will be sufficient to defray the 
 expense incurred prior to and during the first year of the war. 
 The deficiency in the regular force for that year must be supplied 
 by large drafts of militia, which will be as expensive at least as 
 the regular soldiers whose place they will supply. 
 
 But it appears very doubtful whether such a large sum as forty- 
 five millions can be raised annually by loans and Treasury notes. 
 It is necessary in the first place to correct some erroneous opinions 
 respecting the extent to which these notes may be kept in circu- 
 lation, and the legitimate objects to which they may be applied. 
 
 The Treasury notes were first introduced on my suggestion, 
 
 '\i 
 
62 
 
 •'\ •! 
 
 ii'.t. I 
 
 W I 
 
 !:i 
 
 which was no new discovery, since they are a Ki*»re transcript of 
 the Exchequer Bills of Great Britain. As these have been resorted 
 to for more than a century, and have never become there a portion 
 of the ordinary currency, the extent to which they may be used 
 for other purposes is well ascertained, and bears always £ certain 
 ratio to the wealth of the country and to the revenue of the iState. 
 Whether Issued to the bank as an anticipation of the revenue, or 
 used by capitalists for short investments, the gross amount has 
 rarely exceeded twenty millions sterling. Judging from past 
 experience, the amount which may, in time of war, be kept in 
 circulation at par in the United States falls far short of a propor- 
 tionate sum. 
 
 The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the years 1812 
 
 and 1813 amounted to $8,930 000 
 
 Of which there had been paid including interest $4,240 000 
 The amount in actual circulation was less than five millions, and 
 thus far they had been kept at par. 
 
 All the demands from the other departments had b&Bn met by 
 the Treasury, and there were but few, if any, outstanding arrears. 
 Nothing had as yet been collected on account of the direct tax 
 and of the internal duties. Besides the five millions of Treasury 
 Notes, there had been paid into the Treasury in the years 1812 and 
 1813, $28,740,000 on account of war loans, and $22,283,000 
 from the customs. The balance in the Treasury* amounted to 
 $5,196,542 on the 31st December, 1813. 
 
 The amount of Treasury Notes Issued during the year 1814 
 amounted to near eight millions, and there had been paid off 
 during the same year, including interest, $2,700,000; making an 
 addition of about five millions and a half, and the total amount 
 outstanding about ten millions and a half. The receipts during 
 that year, on account of the direct tax and internal duties, amounts 
 ed to $3,877,000, from war loans to $15,080,000, and from cus- 
 toms to only six millions. Before the end of the year, Government 
 was unable to pay the notes which had become due. It is per- 
 fectly clear that, if new notes could not be issued in lieu of those 
 which had become due. It was because they had fallen below par, 
 and therefore that the amount outstanding was greater than the 
 
 
 ii 
 
m 
 
 *^ 
 
 ?tate. 
 
 68 
 
 demand for them. There was but one rtipedy, and it was very 
 simple. A reduction in that amount must be made, by funding at 
 their market price a quantity sufficient to re-establish the equili- 
 brium. But all the banks west oi r.'ew England had in the mean- 
 while suspended their specie payments. A period of anarchy in 
 the currency of the country was the consequence, and lasted till 
 those payments were resumed in the year 1817. 
 
 The result of the suspension of specie payments in England 
 was, that the notes of the Bank of England became in fact a legal 
 tender and the standard of the currency. All the other banks 
 were obliged to keep their own notes on a par with those of that 
 bank ; and all that was necessary in order to prevent a deprecia- 
 tion, was to regulate the issues of the Bank of England, so as to 
 keep them at par with gold and silver. Nevertheless, the clamor 
 for more currency prevailed; the bank found it very convenient 
 and profitable to issue notes which it was not obliged to pay, and 
 these finally depreciated twenty-five per cent. But in the United 
 States the banks were under no other control than that of the seve- 
 ral States respectively. The consequence was, that we had fifty 
 and more species of local currencies, varying in value in thediflerent 
 States or districts of country, and from time t'^ ♦'.ne in the same 
 district. The banks might with facility have resumed specie pay- 
 ments during the first year of peace. The effoits of the Secretary 
 of the Treasury to induce them to resume proved unsuccessful; 
 and th« resumption did not take place till after a new Bank of the 
 United States had been organized. 
 
 We have had two general suspensions of specie payments, the 
 last at a time of profound peace. I was then behind the scenes, 
 had some agency in restoring specie payments, and may speak on 
 that subject with knowleilge and confidence. The obstacles came 
 partly from the Banks, principally fr. ;n the Debtor interest, which 
 excites sympathy and preponderates throughout the United States. 
 The mis-named Bank of the United States, and the banks under 
 its influence, were, it is true, a formidable impediment ; and this 
 obstacle is now fortunately removed. Still the continuance of 
 specie payments stands, wlienever a crisis occurs, on a most pre- 
 carious basis ; and if any important place, especially New York, 
 
\y' \\ 
 
 if I 
 
 S} 
 
 ii 
 
 happened to break, all the banks through the United States would 
 instantaneously follow the example. This is the most imminent 
 danger to which the Treasury of the United States will be ex- 
 posed in time of war ; and what effect the Sub-Treasury system 
 may produce in that respect remains to be tested by experience. 
 
 It is impossible to draw any inference respecting Treasury Notes, 
 from what took place in the United States during the confused 
 state of the currency in the years 1815 and 1816. The taxes 
 were paid everywhere with the cheapest local currency, in Trea- 
 sury Notes only in the places where sp*^'cie payments had been con- 
 tinued, or where bank notes were nearly at par. The depreciation 
 of the Treasury Notes was arrested by the fact, that they might 
 at all times be converted into a six or seven per cent, stock ; but 
 in that case they became assimilated to a direct loan. They never 
 can become a general currency, on account of their varying value, 
 so long as they bear an interest and are made payable at some 
 future day. In order to give them that character, they should as- 
 sume that of bank notes, bearing no interest and payable on de- 
 mand. It does not require the gift of prophecy to be able to assert 
 that, as the wants of Government increased, such notes would de- 
 gene' ate into paper money to the uUer ruin of the public credit. 
 
 They may, however, be made a special currency for the purpose 
 of paying taxes as goll and silver, and to the exclusion of any other 
 species of paper currency. The amount which might be thus kept 
 111 circulation, in addition to that wanted for short investments, 
 would be limited by the r,ross amount of the annual revenue, and 
 bear but a small proportion to it ; since one thousand dollars, in 
 silver or in any paper currency, are sufficient to elfect in one year 
 fifty payments of the sam?i amount. 
 
 Although the amount kept in circulation may fluctuate according 
 to circumstances, the fundamental principu is, that the issue of 
 such notes 1^ an anticipation of the revenue, which, after it has 
 reached the maximum that may be kept in circulation without 
 being deprecir.led, never can be increased. Be the amount ten or 
 twenty millions, the anticipation may be continued, but not re- 
 newed ; it is not an annual resource, but one, the whole amount of 
 w^hich never can exceed that which may be kept in circulation. 
 
■JB!LUi..i. . 
 
 65 
 
 
 The operation jonsists in re-issuing annually the amount which is 
 paid off in the year. Whenever, owing to incidental fluctuations, 
 the amount to be redeemed by the Treasury exceeds that which 
 may be re-issued, the difference must be immediately funded at the 
 market price of the notes, so as to keep them always at par or a 
 little above par. 
 
 It is evident, that if the direct tax and internal duties laid in 
 August, 1813, had been imposed in July, 1812^ and if the acts of 
 January, 1815, which increased both, had been enacted in August, 
 1813 ; there would have been an addition of at least eight millions 
 to the revenue of the years 1812 and 1813; the Treasury Notes 
 which had become due would have been paid, public credit would 
 havii been maintained, and the amount of war loans lessened. 
 
 The principal causes of the fall of public stocks during a war, 
 and of the consequent necessity of borrowing on dearer terms, are 
 a want of confidence in Government, and the large amount of 
 stocks thrown in the market beyond the natural demand for them. 
 The effect ot this last cause is remarkably illustrated by the fluctua- 
 tions in the price of the stocks of Great Britain, where it does not 
 appear that there ever was a want of confidence in the ability and 
 fidelity of Government in fulfilling its engagements. The British 
 three per cents, are now, and were before th ' war of American In- 
 dependence, and before those which had their origin in the French 
 revolution, near par or at par. They fell gradually during tl: e war 
 of independence, and were as low as fifty-four in February, 1782. 
 The long war with France was attended with the same result, and 
 the three per cents, had fallen to fifty-five in July, 1812. Not- 
 withstanding the deranged state of the finances of the United 
 States in 1814, the American stocks had not fallen in the same 
 proportion. Such great depreciation is the result of the long con- 
 tinuance of a war. No one can say what would have been its pro- 
 gress, had the last war with England continued much longer. 
 
 There was not, however, at that time, at least in America, any 
 want of confidence in the Government : no one doubted that it 
 would ultimately faithfully discharge all its engagements. Al- 
 though the General Government is in no way responsible for the 
 errors of any of the individual States, it is nevertheless certain, that 
 
•I ■! 
 
 II 
 
 I 
 
 m 
 
 I; 
 
 i; 
 
 ■i : 
 
 I ; i\ 
 
 66 
 
 the credit of the Union has been injured abroad by the failure of 
 several of the States to fulfil their engagements, and that no ex- 
 pectation can be entertained of being able to borrow money in 
 Europe. It is not less true that the Administration will cease to 
 enjoy the confidence of American capitalists, if the measures it has 
 recommended should be adopted and productive of war. No one 
 can doubt that, if that event should take place, the Americans will 
 fight in defence of their country, and none with greater zeal and 
 bravery than the people of the Western States. During the last 
 war, their militia and volunteers flocked either to the Lakes, to 
 New Orleans, or wherever there was danger ; nor did they refuse 
 to take part in offensive operations, and to serve without the limits 
 of the United States. But men cannot, either there or elsewhere, 
 afford to render gratuitous services. V\'hether regulars, volunteers, 
 or militia, they must be fed, clothed, transported, supplied with arms 
 and artillery, and paid. There is as yet but very little active cir- 
 culating capital in the new States : they cannot lend ; they, on the 
 contrary, want to borrow money. This can be obtained in i\\e 
 shape of loans only from the capitalists of the Atlantic States. A 
 recurrence to public documents will show that all the loans of the 
 last war were obtained in that quarter. 
 
 Men of property are perhaps generally more timid than others, 
 and certainly all the quiet people, amongst whom the public stocks 
 are ultimately distributed, are remarkably cautious. Prudent capi- 
 talists, who do not speculate, and consider public stocks only as 
 convenient and safe investments, will not advance money to Gov- 
 ernment so long as it is controlled by men whom they consider as 
 reckless, and as entertaining rather lax opinions respecting public 
 credit. Yet money will be obtained, but on much dearer terms 
 than if public confidence was unimpaired. There will always be 
 found bold speculators, who will advance it at a premium — en- 
 hanced by the want of competition, and proportionate to the risks 
 they may be supposed to incur. Independent of this, it is most cer- 
 tain that the rate of interest at which loans may be obtained, will 
 always be increased in proportion to their magnitude. The only 
 ways by which these difficulties may be obviated, or at least les- 
 sened, are perfect fidehty in fulfilling the engagements of Govern- 
 
1 
 
 67 
 
 ment ; an economical, that Is to say, a skilful application of the 
 public moneys to the most important objects, postponing all those 
 which are not immediately wanted, or are of inferior real utility ; 
 and an increase of the amount of revenue derived from taxation. 
 This has the double advanta":e of diminishin<i the amount to be 
 borrowed, and of inspiring confidence to the money-lenders. In 
 all cases, direct loans will be preferable to, and prove a cheaper 
 mode of raising money than the over issues of Treasury Notes. 
 
 The Act of July, 1812, which doubled the duties on importa- 
 tions, afforded a resource which, on account of the high rate at this 
 time of those duties, cannot now be resorted to. Duties may, how- 
 ever, be levied on the importation of Tea and Coffee, and perhaps 
 some other articles now duty free. Other modifications may be 
 found useful, but it may be difficult to ascertain, even without any 
 regard to protection, what are the rates of duties which should be 
 imposed in time of war on the various imported articles, in order to 
 render the revenue derived from that source as productive as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 It must also be observed that if, on account of the credit then 
 allowed for the payment of duties on importations, the Treasury 
 had, when the war of 1812 commenced, a resource in the revenue 
 previously accrued but not yet collected, which does not now exist ; 
 on the other hand the Ignited States were vStill encumbered with a 
 considerable portion of the Revolutionary debt, and the payments 
 on account of its principal and interest amounted during the years 
 1812, 1813, 1814, to about $11,000,000, whilst the annual interest 
 on the now existing debt is less than one million. 
 
 The direct tax of the year 1815 amounted to $6,000,000, and the 
 revenue which accrued during the same year, on the aggregate of inter- 
 nal duties, as increased or imposed at the same time, amounted to about 
 the same sum. That year is also the most proper for a compara- 
 tive view of the revenue derived from each object. In the subse- 
 quent years the revival of business increased the amount derived 
 from the duties connected with the commerce of the country, much 
 beyond that which could be collected in time of war; whilst, on 
 the other hand, the excise on spirits was much less productive. 
 The nett revenue derived from internal duties, which accrued 
 during that year was in round numbers, about 
 
68 
 
 If.., I' 
 
 Lf'i'^' 
 
 8i' 
 
 Excise on spirits . 
 Licences to retailers 
 Sales at auction 
 Stamp duties . . 
 Tax on carriages . 
 Refined sugar 
 
 ^2,750,000 
 880,000 
 780,000 
 420,000 
 150,000 
 80,000 
 
 Several manufactured 
 
 articles . . . $840,000 
 Household furniture 20,000 
 Watches worn by 
 
 individuals . . 80,000 
 
 Total $6,000,000 
 
 The three last items were those added on Mr. Dallas's recom- 
 mendation to the first items laid in 1813, but the rate of which 
 was increased, also on his recommendation. The manufactured 
 articles not before taxed on which the new duties were laid were, pig 
 and bar iron, nails ; wax and tallow candles ; hats, caps and um- 
 brellas ; paper and playing cards ; leather, saddles, bridles, boots 
 and shoes ; beer, ale and porter ; snuff, cigars and manufactured 
 tobacco. This was the boldest measure proposed by the Secretary, 
 for these duties were from their nature intrinsically obnoxious. 
 Yet no voice was raised against them ; and so far from becoming 
 unpopular, Mr. Dallas, oy his courage and frankness, acquired a 
 well-earned popularity. No stronger proof can be adduced of the 
 propriety of telling the whole truth and placing an entire confi- 
 dence in the people. 
 
 The only important measure omitted at that time, was an Act 
 of Congress ordering that all the Treasury notes actually due and 
 not paid should be immediately funded at their nominal value ; 
 that is to say, that for every one hundred dollars in Treasury 
 notes, the same amount of funded stock should be issued as it wai 
 necessary to give for oiie hundred dollars in gold or silver. It was 
 impossible to obtain a regular loan in time, and on reasonable 
 terms, for the purpose ol defraying the war expenses of the first 
 six months of the year 1815. There was an absolute necessity for 
 recurring to Treasury notes for that purpose, and the attention of 
 the Treasury was forcibly directed to that object. But the first 
 and fundamental element of public credit is the faithful and punc- 
 tual fulfilment of the public engagements ; and the payment of 
 the Treasury notes, when becoming due, was as necessary as that 
 of the interest of the funded debt, which never was suspended 
 during the war. As an immediate and considerable issue of Trea- 
 
69 
 
 sury notes was absolutely necessary, it was not sufficient that they 
 might be convertible into a funded stock, which was already 
 much below par, since that would be in fact an issue of depre- 
 ciated paper. The Act should, therefore, have pledged the public 
 faith, that if the Treasury notes were not discharged in specie 
 when they became due, they should be funded at their nominal value 
 on the same terms as above stated. Mr. Dallas to great energy 
 united pre-eminent talents, he wanted only experience ; and I 
 have no doubt that, had the war continued, he would within six 
 months have adopted that course. If I have alluded here to this 
 subject, it is on account of the primary importance, if placed here- 
 after in a similar difficult position, of adhering rigorously to those 
 principles respecting the legitimate use of Treasury notes and the 
 punctual discharge of every public engagement, which are abso- 
 lutely necessary for the maintenance of public credit. 
 
 Since a direct tax of six millions could be raised thirty years 
 ago, there can be no difficulty in raising one of nine millions at 
 the very beginning of the war : this must be gradually increased, 
 but would be most heavily felt if beyond eighteen millions. 
 Should an equal sum be raised by internal duties, the annual 
 loans wanted after the first year of the war would be lessened in 
 the same proportion. The following estimate may assist in form- 
 ino^ a correct opinion on that subject : — 
 
 The stamp duties, those on sales at auction, the 
 licences of retailers, and the carriage tax, 
 which accrued in the year 1815, amounted 
 together to $2,230,000, and may be now es- 
 timated at twice as much $4,460,000 
 
 The aggregate annual value of leather, boots, 
 shoes, and other manufactures of leather; of 
 hats, caps and bonnets ; snuff and cigars ; 
 paper and playing cards, manufactured in the 
 United States, are estimated by the last census 
 at fifty-three millions, a tax on which of ten 
 per cent would give 5,300,000 
 
 On the same authority, three millions pounds of 
 spermaceti and wax candles would yield, at 
 five cents per pound, 150,000 
 
 Amount carried forward, 
 I* 
 
 $9,910,000 
 
1^ 
 
 70 
 
 •:t 
 
 m"^\i 
 
 'i 
 
 Amount brought forward, $9,9 If ,000 
 
 Three millions two hundred and fifty thousand 
 
 pounds of refined sugar, at the same rate . . 160,000 
 
 Five hundred tons of pig and bar iron, nails and 
 
 brads, at two dollars per ton 1,000,000 
 
 The gross amount of spirits and beer manufac- 
 tured in the United States, is stated in the 
 census at sixty-five millions of gallons ; but 
 the happy influence of the Temperance cause 
 has probably reduced this amount to less than 
 fifty millions, a tax on which of ten cents per 
 gallon 5,000,000 
 
 $16^670,000 
 
 i have inserted only such articles as were heretofore taxed, and 
 have no menns of indicating such other as might l)e addt d or pre- 
 ferred ; nor must I he understood as recommending any specially, 
 or in reference to the rates of duties to be imposed on any one. 
 
 It has been very generally asserted that men of property were 
 averse to the war because the losses and burthens which it must 
 occasion fall ex illusively upon them ; and that poor men were 
 generally in favor of war, because they had nothing to lose. 
 
 It is true that the first great loss, caused by the war, will fall 
 immediately on those interested in the maritime commerce of the 
 United States, either as owners, insurers, or in any way employed 
 in it. Considering the imminent danger to which is exposed the 
 immense amount of American property afloat on every sea, and the 
 certain annihilation, during the war, of the fisheries, of the com- 
 merce with Great Britain, and of that with all the countries beyond 
 Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope, the American merchants 
 may be alarmed at the prospect of a War, the necessity of which 
 they do not perceive. But if the apprehension of immediate danger 
 is more vividly felt, the calamitous effects of the war on the agricul- 
 tural interests are not less certain. The price of all the products, 
 of which large quantities are exported, must necessarily fall so low 
 that all the farmers must lessen the amount and with it their income, 
 whilst they must pay dearer for all the articles which they are 
 obliged to purchase. The distinction between rich and poor is 
 vague. The most numerous class in the United States is that of 
 the men who are at the same time owners and cultivators of the 
 
71 
 
 soil, and who have but small properties and a very moderate 
 income. Every diminution of this, whether from the want of a 
 market or from any additional tax, is in that and the corresponding 
 class of mechanics, attended with the i)rivation of the necessaries 
 or comforts of life. The really rich, the capitalists v;ho have inde- 
 pendent incomes, and are not obliged to engage in any of the active 
 puisuits of life, may, in any calamitous season, accumulate less, or 
 at most, must retrench only some luxuries. Thus the unavoidable 
 losses and burthens which are the consequences of a war, fall with 
 the greatest weight on those who derive their means of existence 
 from the pursuits of industry, and whose industry alone contributes 
 to the increase of the general wealth of the country. 
 
 But this is not all. Exclusive of those who, either as con- 
 tractors, or in some other way, are concerned with the large supplies 
 wanted for the support of the army and navy, there is a class ot 
 capitalists who are enriched by the war. These are the money 
 lenders, who shall have been bold enough to take up the public 
 loans : unless indeed it should be intended to break public fai h, 
 and, on the return of peace, to question the obligation to pay them, 
 upon the pretence of their enormous profits. What these profits 
 are may be again illustrated hy the example of Great Britain. 
 
 It has already been seen that, whenever a war is one of long 
 continuance, the British Government may at first borrow at par, 
 and ends by being compelled to sell its stock at the rate of fifty 
 per cent of its nominal value ; which gives for the whole of the war 
 loans an average of about 75 per cent. In point of fact that Gov- 
 ernment received in the year 1812 less than 55 per cent ; for the 
 money actually received consisted of bank notes, which had then 
 depreciated twenty per cent ; so that the money lenders gave only 
 that which was equivalent to forty-four per cent, in gold or silver, 
 of the nominal v alue of the stock which they received. Besides 
 receiving the interest on the nominal amount of the stock till the 
 principal shall have been paid, they might shortly after the peace, 
 and may now, receive from ninety-seven per cent to par, in gold 
 or silver, for that same stock for which they gave but forty-four. 
 Thus, assuming the public debt of Great Britain at eight hundred 
 thousand pounds sterling ; not only was the whole of that capital 
 
4^h 
 
 Vf^l 
 
 III 
 
 72 
 
 (lestroyod by the wars ; not only are the British people subject 
 now, anil it would seem for ever, to a burthen of taxes sufficient 
 to pay the interest on that debt; but of the eight hundred millions 
 thus consumed, only six hundred were received by the public, and 
 the other two hundred millions made the rich capitalists, who had 
 advanced the money, still ncl er. 
 
 There is another class of men who may occasionally derive 
 wealth from a war. Privateering consists in robbing- of their 
 property unarmed and unresisting men, engaged in pursuits not 
 only legitimate but highly useful. It is nothing more nor less than 
 legalized Piracy. For this the Tnited States are not responsible ; 
 and it must be admitted, that the practice of all nations justifies 
 them in resorting to those means, in order to make the eneir' eel 
 the calamities of war. But the necessity of resorting to means 
 immoral in themselves affords an irrefragable argument against 
 precipitating the country into war for slight causes, indeed against 
 any war which is not purely in self defence. 
 
 It is equally untrue to assert that the poorer class of people, by 
 \vhich must be meant all the laborers, or generally those who live 
 on their wages, have nothing to lose by the war. 
 
 In this, and other large cities, for every thousand merchants, or 
 men of capital who may be injured or thrown out of business, there 
 are ten thousand men living on wages, whose employment depends 
 directly or indirectly on the commerce of those cities. The number 
 of common laborers is proportionately less in the purely agricultural 
 districts. But it is evident that in both, a considerable number 
 must be thrown out of employment either by the destruction of 
 commerce, or in consequence of the lessened value and quantity of 
 the a!i;ricultural products. And it seems impossible that this should 
 take place without affecting the rate of wages, than which a more 
 afflicting evil could not fall on the community. There is no man 
 of pure and elevated feelings who does not ardently wish, that 
 means could be devised to ameliorate the state of society in that 
 respect, so as that those who live by manual labor should receive a 
 more just portion of the profits, which are now very unequally di- 
 vided between them and their employers. 
 
 But even if the rate of wages was not materially affected, yet 
 
 ETIZirSA.^'llU.UMIU" J '■ 
 
7« 
 
 I 
 
 when it is said that the poor have nothing to lose by war, it must 
 be because their lives are counted for nothing. "Whether militia, 
 regulars, or sailors, the privates, the men who actually fight the 
 battles, are exclusively taken from amongst the poorer classes of 
 society. Officers are uniformly selected from the class which has 
 some property or influence. They indeed risk gallantly their lives, 
 but with the hopes of pronrotion and of acquiring renown and con- 
 sideration. According to the present system, at least of the regu- 
 lar army, it is extremely rare, almost impossible that a private 
 soldier should ever rise to the rank of an officer. In the course of 
 a war thousands are killed, more die of diseases, and the residue, 
 when disbanded, return home with habits unfavorable to the pur- 
 suits of industry. And yet it is asserted that they are predisposed 
 for war, because they have nothing to lose. 
 
 As yet, however, we have had recourse only to voluntary enlist- 
 ments for raising a regular force ; the pay or bounties must be in- 
 creased in order to obtain a sufficient number ; and thus far to 
 become a private soldier has been a voluntary act. The calling of 
 militia into actual service is a modified species of conscription, and 
 it has also been deemed a sufficient burthen to limit the time of that 
 service to six months. Another plan is now contemplated by those 
 who are so eager to plunge the country into a war. Fearing that 
 the sufficient number of men may not be voluntarily raised, they 
 propose that the militia should be divided into two portions ; those 
 belonging to the first class shall; if called into actual service, be 
 bound to serve twelve months instead of six ; and the other portion 
 shall be liable to furnish a number of recruits for the army, not ex- 
 ceeding one tenth part of their total number. This last provision 
 seems to be borrowed from the Russian military code. The Em- 
 peror of Russia requires each village to supply him with a certain 
 number of men, in proportion to that of the male population. In 
 time of war he requires, at the rate of three men for each hundred 
 males, which answers nearly to that of ten for every one hundred 
 men enrolled in the militia ; and he also grants to the serfs the 
 same privilege intended to be allowed to a portion of the militia by 
 the new project, that of selecting the recruits amongst themselves. 
 
 If it be any consolation, it is certain that, although we may not 
 
V- ■!: 
 
 74 
 
 ' 
 
 il ! 
 
 
 !:n![ 
 
 fill 
 ill'-' 
 
 invade England, the evils arising from the war will b>j as sensibly 
 and more permanently felt by Great Britain than hj the United 
 States. Her e.Torts must be commensurate with those of the 
 United States, much greater by sea in order to be efficient, in 
 every respect more expensive on account of her distance from the 
 seat of war. Such is the rapidly progressive state of America, 
 that the industry of the people will, in^a few years of peace, have 
 repaired the evils caused by the errors of C^iovernment. Eng- 
 land will remain burthened with additional debt and taxation. 
 
 An aged man, who has for the last thirty years been detached 
 from party politics, and who has now nothing whatever to hope or 
 to fear from the world, has no merit in seeking only the truth and 
 acting an independent part. But I know too well, and have felt 
 too much the influence of party feeling, not to be fully aware 
 that those men will be entitled to the highest praise, who, being 
 really desirous of preserving peace, shall or 'his momentous oc- 
 casion dare to act for themselves, notwithstanding the powerful 
 sympathies of party. Yet no sacrifice of principles is required : 
 men may remain firmly attached to those on which their party 
 was founded and which they conscientiously adopted. There is 
 no connexion between the principles or doctrines on which each 
 party respectively was founded, and the question of war or peace 
 with a foreign nation which is now agitated. The practice 
 which has lately prevailed to convert every subject, from the most 
 frivolous to the most important, into a pure party question, de- 
 stroys altogether personal independence, and strikes at the very 
 roots of our institutions. These usages of party, as they are 
 called, make every man a slave, and transfer the legitimate au- 
 thority of the majority of the nation to the majority of a party, 
 and, consequently, to a minority of the sovereign people. If it 
 were permitted to appeal to former times, I would say that, 
 during the six years that I had the honor of a seat in Congress, 
 there were but two of those party meetings, called for the purpose 
 of deliberating upon the measures proper to be adopted. The 
 first was after the House had asserted its abstract right to decide 
 on the propriety of making appropriations necessary to carry a 
 treaty into effect, whether such appropriations should be made 
 
 ■I I 
 
75 
 
 ^ 
 
 with respect to the treaty with England of 1794. The other was 
 in the year 1798, respecting tlie course proper to be pursued after 
 the hostile and scandalous conduct of the French Directory. On 
 both occasions we were divided ; and on both the members of the 
 minority of each meeting were left at full liberty to vote as they 
 pleased, without being on that account proscribed or considered 
 as having abandoned the principles of the party. This, too, took 
 place at a time when, unfortunately, each party most erroneously 
 suspected the other of an improper attachment to one or the other 
 of the great belligerent foreign nations. I must say that I never 
 knew a man belonging to the same party as myself, and I have 
 no reason to believe that there was any in the opposite party, 
 who would have sacrificed the interests of the country to those of 
 any foreign power. I am confident that no such pcrGon is lo be 
 found now in our councils or amongst our citizens \ nor am I apt to 
 suspect personal views, or apprehensive of the effect these might 
 produce. My only fear is that which I have expressed, the diffi- 
 culty for honorable men to disenthral themselves from those party 
 sympathies and habits, laudable and useful in their origin, but 
 which carried to excess become a tyranny, and may leave the 
 most important measures to be decided in the National Councils 
 by an enthusiastic and inflamed minority. * 
 
MP 
 
 Purchased.30-^^(JL>:5>^^^ 
 
 From lAxj^^fiJu^.^.^^^P:^ 
 
 Place of Purchase iTAi^AiCHft^^jl^..* 
 
 PRICE.i5..rrr: 
 
 Later Catalogued Prices 
 
 i 
 
 ' -*j rmkiiiMlda 
 

 ' 9 
 
 I J 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 MR. GALLATIN'S LATE XA^ORK ON MEXICO. 
 
 B A 11 'I' L J: '1' T & W I-: L F R I ) , 
 
 Xo. 7 ASTOR M'^I'SK, NKW YORK, 
 HAVE LATELY PUBLISHED, IN ONE THICK VOLUME, OCTAVO.— $2.40. 
 
 THE TKAxNSAOTlONS 
 
 OK Tllli: 
 
 AMEIIfl^A^ S^THM)LUilI('AL SOCIETV. 
 
 -the coatribiifioiis of its Meinbers : — 
 
 Eiiibruciiig the 
 
 t'oliowing Artici 
 
 Art. I. — NoTK.s ox tiik SEiMi-civif.i/,i:i) ]\ations of Mi;.s.ico. Yucatan, ano 
 Ckntkai- A:mi;i;ii'.\. Hy Alkimit (iallatin. 
 
 'I'his ;.rtic[(' occiiimis '■'.■'y.l pii{;-c.s ; it is illiistrufoil with sevenil folding (iif)lc«, exiii- 
 l>itin;j: coinijarative vociiinii;!'"''^'^ of tlic s.'veral ii-'nuuiiiCf'^^ "f .XFoxicn, Giidtcinala, 
 Yuc;itiin, Ciuviina, &c., iilludeft to in it; tables of iho Ancient jMcxican Almanac, a 
 foldinii-phite of tho colobratod Calendar -Stono of Mexico, and enirravintrs oflVIcxican 
 paintings, illustrating some important events in her annals. 
 
 Art. II. — An Account w Ancient Remains in 'I'knni-.s.ski:. Uy Gkrard 
 Ti;(>osT, M.]).. Professor of Chemistry, (leolofry. \:c.. in tlio University of 
 Tennessee. 
 
 'I'his paper gives an account of some remarkable antiquities loiind in '['ennessee, 
 showing till' I'onncr existi!nc(Mjf an ancient idol-worship, practised by the Kgyptians, 
 (irecks, H;)inaiis., and the ))eo[)le of Mindostan; also a description of tlie ancient 
 burial-places oi 'i"eniicsse(>, I'.entucky, ami adjacent parts, illustrated witli fonr eii- 
 irravings of idols. 
 
 Ajit. III. — Obsi;kvations Ki;.-^rKCTiN(; thk (ikayi:: Ckkkk .Moind in- VVkstekn 
 YiRuiNiA. By Henry K. iScHooLCitAyr. 
 
 Observations respecting tiio (iravoCrcck iVIotuid in Western Virginia ; the 
 aMti(|ue inscription discovered in its excavation, and tin.' competed evidences of tlie 
 occupancy of the Mississippi Valley during the Mound period, and pri<ir to the dis- 
 covery by Columbus. Illustrated \vitli iour enirravings. 
 
 'liie (Ji'ave-Creek Mound is not only nmarkable as being tiie iariiest artificial 
 work of the kind in the United .States, but Inr an inscribed tablet lound within it, the 
 only instance yet discovered of an inscription having any reseiniilanc;! to alphabetic 
 characters. A det iled account of the JVlound and other remains in the vicinity ; oi 
 tin- various relics l>und within it ; the character of tlu; inscription : a -omparison of 
 seve d ancien' alphfuets uith it: and coHJi'C,ur(s on its era and origin, form the 
 subji'cts iif this paper. 
 
 .'\i:t. IV. — Un thk Rk' i:NT Di>.:uvi;uie.'> ok IIimvauitic Inscku'TIOiS. and tjik 
 ArTi;Aii'r.s made to ])i;ciriiKU 'jiikm. 15y Wiemam W. ^ri'tiNKK. 
 'I'ha attention of the sniutnn of Euiope is now turni'd to the ancient r(Mnain8 and 
 inscriptions recently discovered in .Southern Arabia, a Iietter knowledge of which 
 will tend to throw liirht on a portion ol' scriptural history of which little was known. 
 ;\lr. Turner's labors have been liii;idy applauded lor their acutenes^, both in franco 
 and (jcnnany. A 'olding-plate ol comparative alphabets, a map, and ei^dit engrav- 
 ings of inscriptions, illustrate this papi'r. 
 
 .\i;t. V. — AccoiNT or riii; I'lMco-ljiiiN an .Monimi'.nx m Dl'GcA. and thk 
 
 He.MAINS (,V an AmiKNT StKI.i-ITRE AT liEESS. NEAK TilE StTE OK AMlENT 
 
 Carthage. By 1''kei>euii: CATiiEiiwrtoD. 
 
 The ti.onunieiits and inscri))tions described in this paper aic tlu; result ol a pcr- 
 soind evainination by Mr. Catlierwood (the well-linowu c(jinpanu)n of Mr. .Stephens 
 in histravels in Central America). 1' is oiieotthe most perfect yet discovin-ed in the 
 region, and is as remarkalde for its arcdiiteriural beautv (in which there is a siniridar 
 combination cf the Kgyptian and (rreciaii stylijs) as tor its hiu;h anti(piity. A \ icw 
 of this inonument, its ground-plan, a fac-siinile of the inscription, and live engravings 
 of other etiitices, accoinpanv this paper. 
 
 Jcy* 'I'lip Atufrii'.'iii Etliii()l(iul(:;i| Sdi icty was ('Maljlis-licil liir llic jiroaioliim ol' (lie siiidy dl' llie 
 Naliiiiil IlisKiiy 1)1' Man aiiil tlie liliilic lie inliiibllH, iihIiicIuii; llic (|jsti'i)iuisliiii),' cliaractiTislics of the 
 v.iriilics i| tlir Hainan Race, anil tlic r;iiisci (it'saiii illviT'.iilic.J. .\iiliii()lii;!i<iil anil pliilolop Jul sci- 
 riici' arc iiiiioii!; tlic itinsl lMi|iorl:iiit nmunti lor clmiiliinii!; llusc Milijri l>. anil will iiccivi' a toiilion 
 I'lnni the Siicicty. Oiigaail |in|Mrs on lliisi; siihji its will Iim iircipl:ilili' to tin; Hocielj , ami nay l)u 
 ailriic-^siiii 111 thi; f 'oirc'iiiumliiij; Stcretiiry, JnH.s If. U.vR ri.l. i i , N'-vv Yuili. 
 
iil 
 
 ICO. 
 
 kVO.— $2,60. 
 
 I E T V. 
 
 lers : — 
 ;atan, AlNo 
 
 iihlcs, c'xlii- 
 Oiiiitemala, 
 Alinaniic, a 
 of'Mcxicnn 
 
 y (ic.RARn 
 niver.sity ol' 
 
 Tennessee, 
 
 i'-fivptiims, 
 
 ;lie ■.uii'ient, 
 
 itii four cii- 
 
 W I ; STERN 
 
 nces ul" Uie 
 ' tu tile dift- 
 
 '^t -.irhticiiil 
 itliin it, the 
 alphabetic 
 .icinity ; di 
 inparisdn ot' 
 !, I'orni till' 
 
 5, AM) THi; 
 
 omains ami 
 ;e of which 
 vas known. 
 
 I in Krance 
 j:lit eiigrav- 
 
 , AMJ 11 IK 
 J\- A.MU'iNT 
 
 II 111 a |ivr- 
 r. .Stephens 
 (ired in the 
 i a siiiirnlur 
 /. A \ ic\\ 
 en!;i;ivitias 
 
 hUuU III' ilie 
 •lisiics of the 
 lilolop cul bci- 
 t'ivi' ;i tonlioii 
 , aiul iiiiy l)u