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Les diagrammes suivants lllustrent la m6thode. 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. BY JOHN ARMSTRONG, I.ATE A MAJOR-GEKTEilAL IK THE ARMY OF THE UWTED STATES, AND SECBETAHY OF WAR. IN TWO VOLUMES. Vol. I. NEW YORK: PUBLISHED BY WILEY d disappointment of all, the plan was abandoned, the encampment raised, and the army, with the exception of a small detachment of one hundred and fifty men, recrossed in the night of the 7th of August, to the town and fort of Detroit ! While the American commander was thus de- pressing the spirit of his own army, raising that of his enemy, taking from the savages every motive for longer inaction, and entirely destroying the con- fidence reposed in his promises by the Canadian colonists, his adversary (General Brock) was pursu- ing a system, which, in all respects, tended directly to augment and confirm these effects. Apprised, as early as the 26th of June, of the declaration of war," he hastened to transmit the information to his outposts ; and without waiting the instructions of Sir George Provost, suggested to the commandant I Colonel Casa'a letter to the Secretary of War, of the 10th Sep- tepiber, 1812. 8 Christie's Memoir of the late war in the Canadas. M0TICR8 OF THE WAR OF 1813. of St. Joseph's, an immediate attack on Fort Michi- limackinac, as the hest mode of defending his own. Though Captain Roberts, the officer to whom this suggestion was made, found himself ill-pre- pared for an enterprise of such moment ; yet enter- ing fully into the views of his commander, and being cordially supported by the agents of the two western fur-companies, he in the short space of eight days, organized a force, naval and military, with which on the 17th of July he made the experi- ment; and (it may be safely presumed, as much to his surprise, as entirely to his satisfaction) found the commanding officer not only unprepared for the attack, but ignorant of the declaration of war. and not unwilling to surrender his post, without even the ceremony of a refusal.* Having thus easily and cheaply succeeded in wresting from the United States their most important western position, the British General now conceived a project of yet more contemptuous daring ; having for its object, not merely the safety of Maiden and the expulsion of the American army from Canada, but the pursuit and capture of this very army, within its own territorial limits and defences. As i This surrender, to say the least of it, was precipitate. Some experiment of the enemy's power to take the fort, was due to the American flag and ought to have been made ; and the more so, as the result would probably have shown, that an investing corps, com- posed of thirty regulars and a rabble of engages and savages, with two old rusty iron guns of small caUbre, was much less formidable than had been imagined. §4 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. i \ ,, fm a first step in this new career, he superseded Colonel St. George in the command of the district, and sub- stituted for him Colonel Proctor. This officer, who arrived at Maiden on the 29th of July, brought with him no important accession to the number of the garrison;' but, what was justly considered as even more necessary, — a competent knowledge of his profession, a thorough acquaintiince ^ith the views, and a ready submission to ihr uuthority of his chief. With such qualificafions it is not to be supposed that he would be slow in appreciating the advantages to be derived irom the position of the fort in which he commanded ; the concentrated state of the force it contained, and the naval means given him to employ and to second this. He accordingly determined to avail himself of the swamps and defiles on the American side of the Detroit ; and by thus seizing the k3y of his adver- sary's resources, not merely recall him from Canada, but literally compel him to fight for his daily bread, or surrender at discretion. Nor had he long to wait for an occasion, on which to test the value of the plan he had adopted. Three days before the retreat of the American army from Canada, General Hull, who had hitherto shown gre ,1 indifference to the state of his com- mmiicatioui^,* cor^ented '; 4,he march of a detach- i "Ten or twelve men." Hull's trial; Gooding's testimony. i " The Colonels of the Ohio militia applied for leave to take a detadw ment and open a communication with Brush, and bring the provisions in safety to Detroit j but the General refused to grant tlie request and NOTICE8 OP THE WAR OF 1819. t5 ment, as a guard to the mail and additional convoy to a quantity of flour and a number of cattle, des- tined for the U8e of the army, which the policy, adopted by Proctor and already detailed, had stopped at the river Raisin. With that infatuation, how- ever, which luarked so much of his public con duct, and entirely forgetting the panic he had himself sulfercd n passing the defil ^ of Maguago and Brownstown, on ♦he preceding U\i of July, (though then at the head of a am >%) he per versely limited the number of th detachment to two hundred men.* This sni dl bo \ composed of volunteers and militia, and marching s ith that want of circur^spection which so v^ \ occurs in the movements of troops of this descn ion, fell into an ambuscade prepared for them neat rowiistown, and were imniei lately beaten and disf the loss of four uptains, two subaltcr vates and the pul lie mail, of which th the escort. Maj( Van Home, the < officer, did what w is possible, to lessen the loss and prevent the disorder of the retreat ; and tin endea- vored to atone for the error he had comir ted, in disregarding the inDrmation previously given him, of the strength and position of the enemy ; of appeared indifferent about t le fate of the Captain and the proviaons. On the 6th, the Colonels o plied for five hundred men to bury the killed (in Van Home's affair,) and to open the communication with Brush ; but the General ret ising to let them take more than one hundred, and this being a n amber much too small, the project wa« abandoned."— 'jMTc^/ce'jj Hist ry of the War in the West. 1 Hull's trial j McArthur's cstimony. 3 rsed ; with , sixty pri- ll ad been unanding 26 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812, i i I which, had a proper use been made, the mi-^fortune might have been easily and entirely avoided.' To fulfil the intention of this unsuccessful and ill-conducted enterprise, the importance of which, (now that the army had recrossed the Detroit and could no longer live on the resources of the enemy,) became every moment more obvious and urgent, a second detachment was ordered, and the command assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of the fourth United States regiment of infantry. But, as in the former case, the General had not become wise by the experience of others, so in this, he continued to be ignorant in despite of his own. Disregarding the admonition, so abundantly furnished by the disaster and disgrace incurred on the 5th, and entirely overlooking the fact, that, his adversary having now nothing to fear with regard to Maiden, was at all times in a condition to repeat the lesson with his whole force, if deemed necessary, — he per- tinaciously refused to extend the corps beyond five hundred combatants; and would have hazarded these without the protection of a single piece of artillery, had not Colonel Miller insisted upon taking with him, one six-pounder and one five and a hal/ inch howitzer.'^ 1 "After passing the Maguago villages, a Frenchman informed Major Van Home, that three or four hundred Indians and some British, were lying in ambusli near Brownstown, for the purpose of intercepting the party. Not sufficiently respecting the information, the Major marched on."— JWc^Jee's History. « Dalliba'a Narrative. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 27 1 '1 The detachment beginning its march on the 8th of August, and being conducted with the necessary attention and skill, suffered no serious interruption from the enemy, until the afternoon of the 9th ; when on entering a wood near Brownstown, the advanced guard, commanded by Captain Snelling, found itself within pistol-shot of a long and hostile line, covered in front by a breastwork of logs and brushwood, and strongly flanked by the Detroit on one side, and a succession of swamps and thickets on the other. A heavy and destructive fire now^ opened on Snelling, who sustained and returned it with his usual gallantry, until Colonel Miller (by promptly converting his order uf march into an order of battle) was enabled to interpose his front line. It was in executing this manoeuvre, tliat finding himself both outflanked and outnumbered, and perceiving many of his men to fall and some to waver, while little if any impression was made on the covered ranks of the enemy, this distinguished officer determined to bring the contest to the deci- sion of the bayonet. The execution of this purpose was not less rapid than its conception was judicious; the order to charge was received with loud and re- peated huzzas ; the breastwork was instantaneously mounted and passed, and the centre and left of the enemy, (composed of British regulars and Canadian militia,) not merely beaten, but decidedly routed.^ > "This rout continued for a milp, when coming into apiece of open ground, they endeavored to form, but on tlie approach of the Ameri- cans, again broke and fled into the woods."— /)rt/,';&a's J^arrative. 28 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. Tecumseh, who at the head of what remained of his tribe formed the left of the British line, was more difficult to move. Apparently unaffected by the fate of his ally, he continued the contest with great vigor ; and when compelled to abandon the breastwork, withdrew to the neighboring thickets, took new and strong positions, and for a moment rendered it doubtful, whether, after all, the battle was more than half won. Unfortunately, these last efforts, (the agonies of exhaustion and despair,) were mistaken by Mfijor Van Home, who com- manded the right flank of the American line, as evidence only of the habitual prowess, untiring en- ergy and great force of his Indian enemy ; which, as he concluded, could not be long resisted, with- out the aid of a re-enforcement. A message to this effect overtook Colonel Miller, while closely pursuing the British and Canadian fugitives, a circumstance which could not fail to embarrass his movements. A halt was accordingly commanded, when, after a moment's reflection, giving up the glory of cap- turing one half of his enemy's force, he rapidly retraced his steps to rescue his comrades and cannon from the grasp of the other. A second message, soon after received from the right, leaving no doubt that the victory was as complete, as the action had been general ; and that Tecumseh, like Muir, had at last been compelled to save himself by flight. The pursuit of the latter was resumed ; but with the effect only of increasing the regret, at the well- meant hut erroneous estimate nf tho nnw^ra nr^/^ NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 29 was as perseverance of the Shawanee chief. On reaching the shore of Lake Erie, the flying enemy was still visible ; but at a distance, that rendered every attempt at farther annoyance useless, and on an element prohibiting all nearer approach.^ Returning to the place of combat, an encamp- ment was hastily traced and the necessary guards posted ; when the American commander employed himself in collecting the wounded, burying the dead, and ascertaining the state of 'lis communications with the river Raisin. Receiving on this last head satisfactory information, that the Indian villages in his front were abandoned, and that there no longer existed any obstruction, on the part of the enemy, to his farther progress, he hastened to detach Cap- tain Snelling to General Hull with an account of the action, and a requisition for bo s to remove the wounded ; for provisions, of whi . he was already much in want ; and for sucli reinforcement of men, as would replace thor?^ who had fallen in the combat. With even these modest and moderate demands, the General did not think it prudent to comply. Boats were indeed permitted to be sent, which, by the exertion of Colonel McAithur, arrived at nine o'clock on the morning of the 10th ; but a reinforcement suflficient to fill up the chasm made in the ranks of the detachment, could not be spared ; and of provisions, so much only was forwarded, as in the present hungry and comfortless condition of t;.'| ^ *■ ^ and 2 Dalliba's Narrative. 30 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. ! n i ! Ill il !!■ the troops, " but sufficed for a single meal." * Be- lieving, however, that the scantiness of this supply- was the result of haste or accident, rather than of design, Colonel Miller despatched a second requisi- tion on the contractor, and fresh assurances to the General, that "his commvmications with the river Raisin were now fully re-established." The mes- senger employed on this occasion, by some misdi- rection of his route, did not get back to the en- campment until the evening of the 11th, and to the regret and astonishment of all, brought with him not the required supply of food, but a written and peremptory order "for the immediate return of the detachment." This order was strictly, though reluctantly obeyed, and at midday of the 12th, the corps re-entered Detroit.* The General's conduct on this occasion could not escape animadversion. His more seyere critics, com- i Hull's trial ; Miller's testimony. « The American General, as usual, saw every thmg through the medium of his fears. The effect of even this victory on his mind, was depressing and degrading. His official letter giving an account of it, laments "that nothing was gained by it but honor; and that the blood of seventy-five men had been shed in vain; as it but opened his com- munications as far as their bayonets had extended." It is thus he spokn of a victory, which drove the enemy from the field and from his pur- pose ; which enabled the victors to remain neariy three days in front of Maiden without molestation ; and which, but for his orders of recall, would have enabled them to accomplish all the objects of the expedition. What would a bold and able leader have made of the moral effect of this victory on his own troops and on those of his enemy ! With Mr. Hull, it degenerated into a chapter of lamentations on the value of a soldier's blood, and the vanity of a soldier's honor. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 31 » Be- supply ban of requisi- te the le river e mes- misdi- :he en- and to it with written turn of though Ith, the uld not s, corn- rough the nind, was )unt of it, the blood I his com- i he ppoko n his pur- ^s in front orders of cts of the de of the >se of his lentations honor. bining his uniform indifference to the state of his communications, the pressure necessary to induce him to take any measures for re-opening them, and the perverse preference given to those of the most inefficient and hopeless character, with this last act, of recalling a corps, which had beaten and routed the enemy from a fortified position of liis own choos- ing, and which had thus substantially freed from obstruction the short remaining distance between itself and the river Raisin — did not scruple to im- pute to him a secret and systematic co-operation with the enemy ; while others, less prone to suspicion and of more charitable temperament, ascribed it to an honest but false estimate of the value of the ob- ject to be attained, or of the degree of danger to be incurred in attaining it ; and lastly, to a persuasion that the safety of his own position, now required a speedy and entire concentration of his forces. But of the several branches of this apology the General hastened to deprive himself, by organizing a new expedition, having the same object, but possessing inferior means ; and with the additional objec 'on, that its plan involved a longer march, by a route merely conjectural, and at a moment when the British force was fast accumulating in his front, and its bold and active leader had arrived at Maiden.^ Colonel McArthur, the officer to whom the com- mand of this new detachment had been assigned, I General Brock arrived at Maiden on the 13th of August — Ckris- tic''s Memoirs, 32 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. set out late in the afternoon of the 14th, and after strugghng with many and unforeseen difficulties— with thickets nearly impervious, with swamps almost impassable, and with hunger, which the General had forgotten to satisfy^— was at last compelled to retrace his steps towards Detroit ; and arrived in the neigh- borhood of that post, in time to share in the misfor- tune, and witness the disgrace, which now awaited the main army. This army, as has been already stated, recrossed the river Detroit on the evening of the 7th and morning of the 8th of August, with the exception of a few volunteers, who, in madness or in mockery, had been left for the protection of such British colo, nists as yet adhered to the American standard.* On the 1 1th, this shadow of support was also withdrawn ; and on the 14th, General Brock, in prosecution of the plan already indicated, appeared at Sandwich, and immediately employed himself in constructing a battery to protect, at once, his present position and future operations. In executing this work, he met with no interruption ; as every species of annoyance was either indirectly declined, or expressly forbidden I " The only food they had on this march, was green corn and pumpkins, found in the fields."— Jtf coffee. a " Major Denny was left at the stockade-work at Sandwich, with one hundred and thirty convalescents and Anderson's artUleiists, un- der orders « to hold possession of that part of Upper Canada ; to afibrd all possible protection to the well-disposed inhabitants, and to defend his post to the last extremity against musquetry ; hut if overpowered by artillery, to retreat.' "—/(/cm. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 33 by General Hull. In vain, was permission solicited to erect a battery, with which to dislodge or destroy the enemy's shipping ; in vain, a small detachment of one hundred men, required for the purpose of spiking the British cannon ; to these, and to every similar proposition, involving credit to himself or danger to his adversary, the General turned either a deaf ear, or a positive refusal.* Such was the state of things on the morning of the 15th, when a marquee (the top of which was so painted as to give it a strong resemblance to the British flag) was found erected in the centre of the American encampment. While this circumstance engaged the attention of the troops, exciting the surprise of all, and the suspicion of many, a boat from the enemy was seen approaching the shore. The officer under whose direction it came, having announced himself " the bearer of a written message from General Brock to General Hull," was promptly received and conducted to head-quarters. On ex- amination, the letter he brought was found to con- tain a demand for the immediate surrender of the fort, and a menace of indiscriminate massacre in case of refusal. A requisition of this kind, which, in all its aspects, was alike important and unexpected, would, no '. K^ ■1 1 "If you will give permission, I will clear the enemy, on the oppo. site shore, from the lower batteries?" The General answered, "Mr. Dalliba, I will make an agreement with the enemy, that if they will not fire on me, I will not fire on them."— ZXrfKfto's testimmy; HutPs trial. $4 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. doubt, have warranted an immediate recurrence to u council of war; but no such step was either taken or suggested. For once, the American General appeared to be both competent and willing to act without advice, and to take upon himself all respon- sibility. He accordingly, in terms sufficiently decided, rejected the demand, and to God and his sword com- mitted the issue. Unfortunately, this defiance was addressed to one who knew well how to appreciate Its meaning ; and who did not for a moment suffer It to abate his diligence, lessen his hopes, or even mcrease his circumspection. His measures were pushed with a haste and temerity, which excluded all doubts of success ; and with a disregard to rules, which sufficiently indicated his own conviction that he was but taking part in a pantomime. ' The re- turn of his messenger becoming the signal of attack, a fire from the newly-constructed battery was now opened on the town and fort of Detroit. This con- tinued until ten o'clock in the evening, and was recommenced in the morning, but without any ma- terial injury to its objects ; and was, in fact, but remarkable from its being the only semblance o^ stratagem, which the British commander conde- scended to employ in passing a river eleven hundro.] yards wide, in broad day, and within stroke of an t So satisfied was Brock t^.at he had nothing to fear from his enem v, that when advancing to the storm of the fort, his column of march wa^ not preceded by a vanguard of any kind ; and the General himself was seen ndmg alone, two hundred yards in advance of his column. — bnelhng's teslimony; HuWs trio!. ^m. i mmmm'^ ' NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 35 enemy not less strong than himself. Nor, as the event showed, was there any error in the estimate (which this fact presupposes) of a want of courage, capacity, or fidehty in his adversary ; for, on makhig the experiment, it completely succeeded, and not merely without the loss of a single life, or of a mo- ment's time, but under a full demonstration that neither obstruction nor annoyance of any kind was meditated by the American General.' On crossing the Detroit, it was Brock's intention to establish himself at Spring- Wells, and with the aid of the Indians, so to interpose between the Amor- ican army and its resources, as to compel it to quit its fortress, and risk a field-fight for the defence of its communications ; but having, soon after landinff, received new information with regard to the fort an'c^' army generally, and having in particular, assur(d himself of the detachment made on the 14th f^r n the latter under the command of Colonel IVIcArtI ir, he determined to shorten the process, and substitute assault for investment.' The force at his disposal for this purpose did not exceed seven hundred com- batants,3 and of this number, four hundred were Canadian militia disguised in red coats. With this small corps, preceded by five pieces of light artillery, 1 " On the 12th, (two days hcfore Brock's donmnd of a surrender ) tlie commanding officers of three of tl^ -egimcnts (the fourth bein't absent) were mformed, through « medium admitting of no doubt, that the General had stated that ' a capitulation would be necessary '"- Colonel Cassis Letter to the Secretary of War, September lOlh, 1812 2 Brock's official letter of the 17th of Auffust. 1812. a Td^^ ,1 36 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. I \i U il! !; (six and three pounders,) he began his march along the margin of the river ; while the savages, by a parallel movement through a wood, covered his left flank. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, the head of the column presented itself at the tanyards below the town, (about five hundred yards from the fort,) when the American officer, commanding an exterioi battery of twenty-four pounders cliarged with grape shot, believing the; moment had arrived when hos- tilities could no longer be postponed with propriety, directed his men to point their guns and commence a fire ; but the order was immediately counter- manded, and ar^other issued in its stead, forbidding every kind of hostiUty, and menacing with imme- diate death all who should dare to infract it.^ The strength, position, and supplies of the Ameri- can army, at this critical moment, have been fre- quently stated, and even judicially establiehed. The morning reports to the Adjutant-General, made its effective force one thousand and sixty, exclusive of three hundred Michigan militia, and as many Ohio volunteers, detached under Mc Arthur. Of this force, four hundred effectives (infantry and artillerists of the hne) occupied the fort— a work of regular form and great solidity ; surrounded by a wide and deep ditch, strongly fraised and palisadoed, and sustained by an exterior battery of two twenty-four pounders." Three hundred Michigan militia, ready to combat foi I Mc A tree's History. « IlnJtf ? trial ; testimony of Captain Dalliba, General Tayloi, -nd Majo Jo-fsup. !;■ JfOTfCf ^ OF Til WAR OF 1819. S7 tlieir firesides and altars, lelP the towr which in itself formed a respectable defence agaiiist the bent troops, and one quite redoubtable agninpt the attacks of Indians or militia. Flanking the approach to the fort, and covered by a high and heavy picket-fence, lay four hundred Ohio volunteers, expert in the use of their weapons and anxious to employ them ; while one mile and a half on the right, advancing by long and rapid strides, was Mc Arthur's detachment, re- turning by a route which (had a defence been hazarded) would have brought them directly on the rear of the enemy." Of provisions and ammunitions the supply was abundant; fifteen days rations, and much fixed and loose powder and lead, were amply sufficient for a trial of strength and skill, which a single hour would have decided. Under circumstances thus auspicious, " while the troops, in sure anticipation of victory, awaited the approach of the enemy ; when no sound of discontent was heard, nor any appearance of cowardice or dis- affection seen ; when every individual was at his post, and expected a proud day for his country and him- self" — an order was received from the General to withdraw the troops from all exterior positions ; to stack the arms and hoist a white flag, in token of submission to the enemy ! " This order was re- ceived by the men with a universal burst of indig- nation ; even the women were ashamed of an act, so disgraceful to the arms of their country ; and all •>tl I' ' fl 1 Colonel Cass's letter, 10th September. 9 Idem. i 1 4 ^'^ 1 i si 58 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. felt ag was proper and decorous, except the man m whose hands were the reins of authority."* The terms of the capitulation which followed, were such as might he expected from the views and feelings in which it originated. No stipuin ion was made for the Canadian colonists who had joined the American standard; the Ohio and Michigan militia were brought under engagements not to serve again during the war, unless exchanged; the territory in its whole extent, was yielded with the army; and (that even more might be granted than was asked,) the supplies at the river Raisin, with their convoy and McArthur's detachment, (the exact situation of which was not then known at the fort,) were, on the suggestion of General Hull, included within the act of surrender. By another provision of this instrument, the militia, whether drafts or volunteers, were liberated, while Hull and the regular troops were despatched to Montreal.* About the date of these transactions, a calamity of similar, and to the individuals concerned, of severer character, awaited the garrison of fort Dear- born, — a military post on the south-western extrem- ity of Lake Michigan, possessing as was believed, a considerable influence over Indian wants and policy. i Colonel Cass's letter of the 10th September. « "General Hull with the officers and men of his army, were intro- duced into Montreal on the evening of the 6th of September, in a tri- umphal, though mock procession, amidst the shouts of a scornful njultitude, indignant at the savage threat of extermination breathed in hia proclamation."— CAmWc's Memoirs. I NOTICES OF THE VfktL OF 1819. 39 Forgotten alike by the government and the General until about the middle of July, an order was then sent by the latter to Captain Heald, *Ho dismantle the fort, destroy the surplus arms and ..mnmnition, and withdraw the garrison to Detroit." From an ill-judged mode of communication, this order did not reach the fort until the 12th of August. On the 14th, the garrison, reinforced by a few Miami Indians, under the command of Captain Wells, begun its intended march ; but had not proceeded more than a mile, when it was attacked, in both front and rear, by a body of five or six hundred savages, whom it had left at Chicago, professing a neutral, if not a friendly character. Captain Heald, after a liard and unequal combat, in which fifty of his party fell, (and being himself wounded and deserted by the Miamis,) was compelled to accept a proposition for a parley, which was soon and necessarily followed by a surrender, on condi- tion that the lives of ♦he American survivors, not now exceeding twenty, should be sptired.^ Such was the termination of this first expedition of the new war ; the details of which, have in them 80 little to flatter, and so much to mortify the pride of the American arms. Nor must it be forgotten that this catastrophe, however disgraceful in itself 1 Captain Heald, his wife and some third person, fell to the share of a party of Indians living at St. Josephs. Carried thither by their savage masters, they soon possessed themselves of a boat, in which they made their escape to Micliilimackinac, where thuy found protec- tion and the means of returning to the United States. 40 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. ! ; i II It It i 1 1 l!i^ or disastrous in its consequences, was not the result of any of those occurrences, which, in the affairs of nations and of individuals, are denominated acci- dents; and which sometimes, triumph alike over the precautions of wisdom and the efforts of valor. We have seen that the army, in iis march from the place of its rendezvous to that of its destination, was neither melted by heat, nor frozen by cold ; neither persecuted by storms, nor crippled by ene- mies ; neither wasted by disease, nor exhausted by famine ; but that on the 5th of July it arrived at Detroit, in unimpaired health and spirits. From its friends, it received a cordial welcome, abundant supplies and a respectable addition to its force ; and in its subsequent descent upon Canada, was scarcely less fortunate, as it found the British colonists indif- ferent, if not repugnant to the war ; the Indian tribes, though secretly hostile, cautious and calcu- lating ; and the fortress of Maiden, which alone sustained the enemy's interest in that section of the country, wholly indefensible. When at last, impor- tant changes had been wrought in this state of things, by the fall of Michilimackinac, the defeat of Van Home, the obstruction given to our communi- cations, the altered tone and temper of the British and savage population, and the doubts and mis- givings which could not but prevail in our own ranks — when, in a word, fortune appeared to have decidedly taken part with tlie enemy against us, it was but to lead him into indiscretions ; which, had they been seen and punished, would have promptly ^\\ NOTICES OF THE WAR OV 1813. 41 be result affairs of ted acci' like over of valor, from the !tination, by cold ; : by ene- usted by rrived at From its ibundant roe ; and scarcely sts Indif- 3 Indiaa id calcu- ch alone on of the it, impor* state of defeat of 3m muni* le British md mis- our own to have nst us, it lich, had Dromotly reinstated our ascendency and accomplished the principal objects of the campaign. Like other ad- vantages, these were permitted to escape, probably without notice, and certainly without improvement; leaving us only the mortifying reflection, that our disasters were of our own making, and the neces- sary consequence of an ignorance, which knew not what to do ; of a self-sufficiency, refusing to be instructed ; and of a cowardice, that in its terrors, lost all sense of national interest, personal dignity and professional duty.* Remarks. The crimes and errors of public func- tionaries, however calamitous and disgraceful, are not without their uses ; and that ok f.his occasion^ the bitter fruits of experience may, ri possible, be converted into wholesome aliment, we subjoin a few observations indicating the principal fctilts commit- ted, and the means by which they mi lit have been substantially obviated, if not entirely is voided. I. "Every commander of a corp^j .1 estined to the reduction of a fortress by siege or investiuent, ought, if possible, to draw his antagonist from behind his works, and induce him to risk an action in the open field." This maxim, nearly as old as the art to which it belongs, is founded on a reason suffi- ciently obvious, viz. that, "as forts make the weak strong, and the strong stronger, it necessarily fol- lows, that it will be more easy to beat your enemy 1 Hull'a tria\ ■ tr>at\mctnv nf TAaann Snellipf Tnvlnr. Rnatman RrfL. 4* 'il «J • ! I, «! i'li'i li 11* \:i Hi! nil; II 42 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. without, than within his intrenchments." Of this rule and the reason on which it is founded, General Hull was either entirely ignorant or utterly regard- less ; for though on the 2d of July, according to his own statement, he found his adversary willing to forego the advantages given him by his fortress, and determined to risk a battle against a force much superior to his own ; and with the additional disadvantage of interposing between himself and his only place of refuge, a wide and rapid river, — the challenge was not merely declined on our part, but such cunningly devised fables transmitted to Colonel St. George, as induced that officer to aban- don his chivalrous, but unmilitary project.^ II. Another maxim of the art, which, like the preceding, is but a dictate of common sense, level to any ordinary capacity and requiring no scientific research, is, — that "whenever it be sufficiently as- certained, that your enemy is suffering under any extraordinary degree of debility, arising from defi- cient supplies, prevailing diseases, impaired disci- 1 " A large body of the militia had reinforced the British garrison, and ail the surrounding tribes of Indians had been invited to his standard. Every preparation for attack was m*de on the 5th of July, and it was only prevented by a communication made to a person in Maiden, who had the confidence of the commander ; that it teas mt the intention of the army to match to Detroit ; that all the boats loere col- lected on the icestsideof the river; that cannon had been sent for to Detrwi; and that my intention was to cross the river and attack the fort. This information caused the commanding officer to abandon the enterprise, and concentrate all his forces for tlie defence of his post — HxtWa Jtf»- T Im '^;* NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 48 pline, disaflfection or want of numbers in his ranks, or ill-condition of his defences, it becomes your duty to assail him incessantly and vigorously." It has been abundantly established, that between the 5th and 20th of July, fort Maiden was, in all its parts, in a dilapidated state, and on two of it^ sides, (the north and west,) wholly indefensible ; that during the same period, its nominal garrison did not exceed seven hundred men, of which, more than six hundred were militia and savages ; the one, indifferent, if not disaffected to the war, and the other, professing neutrality and strictly forbidden by their military usages, from taking part in the defence of fortified places.^ From these facts we are authorized to conclude, that had General Hull, at any time between the 5th and 20th of July, pushed boldly forward and presented his columns of attack before Maiden, the place would have been surrendered to him, with as little ceremony as he surrendered Detroit on the 16th of August ; a con- clusion, put beyond all doubt by this additional fact, that when, on the 16th of July, the British out- post on the Canard was defeated and the bridge taken, so great was the alarm in Maiden, that the shipping was brought up to the wharves, and actually employed in taking in the baggage, &c.'* »*l| •.:• {■■ 1 Tecumaeh's speech to General Proctor, 18th September, 1813,— "you told us that we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's garrisms, and that you would taJte good care of your own; which made our hearts glad." a "There was a great deal of confusion in the town, moving effects, *' ' h Ill' 1! ■It ■■A ■' II ill- pi ' li ¥1 IP 44 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. III. Nothing can be more ill-judged and ruinous, than to send out small parties on services which necessarily expose them to the attacks of large ones ; and hence the maxim, that « the strength of a detachment should be proportioned, 1st, to the importance of the object to be obtained in sending it ; and 2d.; to the disposable means possessed by the enemy of embarrassing or defeating the attain- ment of that object." In none of the detachments made by General Hull, were these conditions ful- filled ; and in that of Major Van Home, both were directly and grossly violated. What object could have been more important to the American army, situated as it then was, than the re-establishment of its communications with the State of Ohio ; from which alone were to be expected reinforcements of men and supplies of provision 1 And again, what fact was better ascertained, than the facility with which the whole British force concentrated at Mai- den, and amounting to even hundred combatants, could be brought to act upon any American detach- ment, marching by the route of Maguago and Brownstown? Yet was Van Home sent to fulfil that object and by this route, with only two hun- dred militia-riflemen!* IV. When, on the 8th of Ajgust, Colonel Miller was detached to effect the purpose which Major &c. The Clueen Charlotte came to the wharf and took in the women and baggage, and had her topsails loose and ready to atiiV'—Forbisk mtd Gooding's testimony on HviPs trid. I HuU'» official report of iiie gSth uf Au^ust^ iSiS. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 45 Van Home had failed to accomplish on tlie 5th, it required no spirit of prophecy to foresee, that Proctor (the British commander) would make every possible effort to overwhelm the second detachment as he had done the first ; but that to this end he must employ the whole force, composing the garrison under his command. It is extraordinary, that this simple and obvious view of the subject, should have escaped the attention of any man to whom military ideas were at all familiar ; or if it did occur to General Hull, that it should have failed to suggest the only means left for prosecuting his own objects, and con- verting the policy and enterprise of his antagonist into folly and misfortune. These means obviously were — so to strengthen Miller's detachment, as to leave nothing to chance ; and thus to assure him- self not merely of 'he discomfiture, but of the destruction of whatever force the enemy might hazard on the southern side of the Detroit ; while, contemporaneously with Miller's movement, a second and small detachmerit should silently and rapidly descend the river to the neighborhood of Maiden, and thence proceed to assail and carry the fort. That both parts of this plan (had it been adopted) would have entirely succeeded, there cannot now be a doubt ; since, with the corps he had, Miller defeated Muir at the head of the whole British, Canadian and Indian force ; and since, from the evening of the 7th to the 9th of August, fort Mai- den (ordinarily rec^uiring the defence of seven hun- * • ' i ^- 46 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. (I '. I iii dred men) was left to the custody of a sergeanVs guard /' V. Notwithstanding these repeated blunders of the American General, fortune did not yet entirely abandon him ; and on the 16th of August, pre- sented a new occasion, requiring on his part only the vulgar quality of defensive courage, to have completely baffled the designs of Brock and re- established his own ascendency on the Detroit. This occasion was found in the indiscretion of his adversary ; who, on crossing the river with a force smaller than that it was his purpose to assail, had hastily determined to risk the storm of a fortifica- tion, strong in itself, abundantly supplied and suffi- ciently garrisoned. If it be thought extraordinary, that under these circumstances. General Brock should have forgotten all the dissuasives from at- tack furnished by history, it was certainly still less to be expected, that General Hull should have for- gotten all the motives for defence furnished by the same source. Such, however, was the fact ; the timidity of the one kept pace with the temerity of the other ; and at last, in an agony of terror, which cunning could no longer dissemble and which his- tory is ashamed to describe, the fort, army and ter- ritory were surrendered without pulling a trigger ! The errors which yet remain to bs noticed are attributable to the administration — a fact, furnish- l lieutenant Forbish's testimony. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 47 ing no reason why they should be treated with more ceremony than others, with which they were associated. They will be sufficiently indicated by the following remarks. VI. The nation which meditates the invasion of a neighboring territory, should be careful to employ the last moments of peace, in acquiring a thorough knowledge of the force it may have to encounter. Another duty, not less obvious and imperative than the preceding, will be that of speedily withdrawing or promptly reinforcing its own remote and isolated posts. If there be any thing in the local position of these, that may render their retention important to the progress or issue of the war, the latter course should be pursued—but if on the contrary, it will have no material bearing on either, the garrisons should be speedily recalled and the posts abandoned, while this can be done successfully and safely. Yet were both these important duties neglected. When Hull arrived at Detroit, he was ignorant alike of the condition of Maiden and the number of its garrison. So also the commandant of Michilimack- inac continued to be uninformed of even the declara- tion of war, until after the investment and surrender of his post ; while the garrison of fort Dearborn, still more remote, remained unrecalled, until the middle of Augast, when retreat had become wholly impracticable. VII. We have seen that General Hull lost his own baggage and that of the army, the whole of his hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men, in M ..'M. 'i:;J ^ I,! I 48 NOTICES OF. THE WAR OF 1812. consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner employed in transmitting to him the declan.tion of war. A fact, so extraordinary in itself, and so pro- ductive of injury to the public, calls for more devel- opment than has yet been given to it. 1. will be remembered that a declaration of war was autho rized on the 18th of June, 1813. On this day, Secretary Eustis wrote two letters to General Hull. In one of these, no mention was made of this impor- tant event ; in the other, it was distinctly and offi- cially announced. The former of the two, was carefully made up and expedited by a special mes- senger, who arrived in the General's camp on the 24ih of June ; while the latter, was committed to the public mail as far as Cleveland; and thence, through a wilderness of one hundred miles, to such conveyance, " as accident might supply.'' The result was, that the declaration did not reach its destina- tion until the 2d of July, two days after it had been received by the enemy at Maiden. On this occasion, the British government was better served : Provost received notice of it on the 24th of June, at Quebec ; Brock, on the 26th, at Newark ; St. George, on the 30th, at Maiden ; and Roberts on the 8th of July, at St. Josephs. But a fact, still more extraordinary than the celerity of these transmissions is, that the information thus rapidly forwarded to Maiden and St. Josephs, was received under envelopes, franked by the Secretary of the Mierican Treasury.^ I Official Report of Captain Hanks to the commanding General at Detroit, see also Appendix, No. 6. I i|i NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 40 VIII. Few things are more self-evident, than that 80 long as the enemy had a fleet on Lake Erie and we had none, Maiden could be supplied and reinforced by the British posts below ; and that if hardly pressed, its garrison could be safely withdrawn to one or other of these posts. To meet these contingencies, and to protect Hull's long line of provisionment from inter- ruption,' two suggestions were made — the one, to construct a navy competent to the command of the lake ;" the other, to assemble on the Niagara a mili- tary force, which by menacing the safety of forts Erie and George, would prevent Brock from making detachments to Maiden. In choosing between these alternatives, the government did not hesitate — they promptly rejected the former, and adopted the latter; but, unfortunately, without taking measures suflB- ciently decided for giving it execution. When, ac- cordingly, Hull perceived that the enemy's force at Maiden was increased and increasing, he called aloud on the militia officer commanding at Buffalo for sup- port — who announced in reply, that " he had none to give, direct or indirect.^^ So also, when the Secretary of War ordered Major-General Dearborn to make speedy movements on the British posts in his front, the General answered — that "fi7i then, he had not known that the troops on the J^iagara made part of his command.**' I The line extended two hundred miles throu^ a desert, and in a great part of its length was skirted by the lake, commanded by ths British ships. s Hull's Memoirs ; testimony of Mr. Eustis on Huirs tiiaL « Appendix No. 7. ^^^^H t 1 ^^^^H i< iii ^Hi §■■'•■ 50 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819. IX. The principal advantage accruing to a nation, which is the first to declare war, is that of selecting its time and point of attack, and of concentrating on the latter, such force as will ensure victory, and the moral effect produced by it on both belligerents. Of this truth, so obvious in itself, the American cabinet of 1812, do not appear to have been apprised — for when (according to General P. B. Porter% testimony) Hull required three thousand men, as the least num- ber with which all the objects of the campaign could be successfully prosecuted ; the government replied, that "more than two thousand could not be given."^ Whether this decision be examined in relation to the capacity of the nation ; to the variety and im- portance of the services to be performed ; or to the means necessary to their execution, nothing could have been more erroneous. To those who know any thing of the character or numbers of the western population, or of their peculiar interests and feelings at that period and on this subject, we need but re- mark, (and without any fear of contradiction,) that five thousand men could have been obtained as promptly as two thousand. When again it is recol- lected, that the defence of our western posts and ter- ritory ; the prevention of a war with the savages ; the capture of Maiden; the command of Lake Erie, and the means of a prompt co-operation with the troops destined to act on the Niagara, formed the objects of the campaign — who can for a moment doubt 1 Hull's trial : General P. B. Portei's testimony. ■ iir* ■ WOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 51 -i t " their magnitude or interest ? And lastly, though it be readily admitted, and we hone sufficiently proved, that the force given to General Hull was competent to the capture of Maiden and the preservation of Detroit, still it by no means follows, that it was com- mensurate with all the objects of the expedition ; since among these were to be found, " the capture or destruction of the liritish fleet,"' an object which, in the absence of all naval means, could only be effected by such an augmentation of the army, as would have entirely excluded that arm from the shores of the lake. Had the government taken this short and plain view of the subject, and invited Governor Shelby ot Kentucky, or Governor Meigs of Ohio, to follow in Hull's track, with two thousand gun-men and Win- chester's brigade of infantry, how different would have been the issue of the campaign ? Unfortunately, we began by weighing military expeditions in gold scales ; and the experiment proved (as it will never fail to do) that parsimony, always paltry, in war is the most lavish and criminal prodigality. ' President's Message of November 4th, 1812. >i I M $t NOTICES or TUG WAR OF 1819. r I ! |l 1 MC CHAPTER III. Militia Operations in the West. — Harrison's Autumnal and Winter Campaigns. Of the disasters detailed in the preceding chapter, those of most early occurrence — the fall of Michili- mackinac, the occlusion of supplies from Ohio, the defeat of Van Home, and the retreat of the army from Canada, were more productive of surprise than alarm : all wondered at the events which had so unexpect- edly taken place ; but few, if any, ascribed them to their true cause, or foresaw either the extent of the evil, or the means most proper for remedying it. The executive confidence in the competency of the commander, continued to he unshaken ; and no doubts were entertained, but that with the aid of a prompt reinforcement and a vigorous diversion on the Niagara, he would be able to hold what he pos- sessed, recover what he had lost, and eventually accomplish all the objects of the expedition. With these views of the subject, orders were issued for immediately organizing two corps in the west ; one of which, to consist of sixteen hundred volun- teers and four hundred regular troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Winchester, was des- tined to the suDDort of Hull : the other, to be com- •^.'\ NOTICES OF THE WAR OP ISlfl. 05 posed of three regiments of Kentucky militia, sub- jecteJ to the orders of Brigadier-General Harrison, was assigned to die defence of Indiana and Illinois ; while the army of the north, under the command of Major-Gcneral Dearborn, was directed to hold itself in readiness, for an immediate attack upon one or more, of the British positions in its front.* Of these orders, the first, so far as regarded the assembling of the troops, was promptly executed ; and the corps assigned to Winchester, actually in motion for the Ohio frontier, when on the 24th of August, the appalling information was received, that Detroit, the territory, and the army, had been already surrendered to the enemy. Unexpected ca- lamities are in general bad counsellors, and often hurry those disposed to listen to them, into the adop- tion of measures Httle calculated to promote their own objects. On the present occasion, the govern- ment, adliering to its policy of carrying the war into Canada, without apparently perceiving the want, and certainly without providing the aid, of any co-ope- rating naval force, now hastily determined to put its trust in an unlimited employment of militia and a lavish expendiiure of money-— a plan which, though > On the 1st of August, Mr. Eustis gave notice to General Dearborn of the cont uts of a letter received from General Hull, of July lOtli, by express, in consequence of which he subjoins the following order .— " Vou will make a diversion in his (General Hull's) favor at Niagara and at Kingston, as soon as may he practicable, and by such other ope- rations as m..y be within your control." See vol. 6th, p. 199, Records of the War Department These orders, substantially, were repeated in several subsequent communioations. 5* ; I 54 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF X819. S» ' I'l H I, far short of its objects, was, notwithstanding, well adapted to the feelings, wants, and calculations of the west. The sedative effect produced by the war on the value of ordinary labor and its products ; the com- paratively ample compensation given for military service ; the political excitement of the times, and the increased impulse given to this by the late disaster at Detroit, operating conjointly on an abundant, un- occupied, and high-spirited population, could not fail to bring together a large mass of ill-equipped and undisciplined men, who believing in the infallibihty of western courage and rifles, sought no auxiliary in fulfilling the intentions of government, within even the short period of their own engagements.* The force, which under these influences was in a few weeks assembled at different points of the frontier, exceeded ten thousand combatants ;* of which, that portion originally destined to the support of Hull, and best prepared for immediate service, was de- tached to fort Wayne — a small post on the Miami of the Lake, already sustaining an Indian investment, and still farther menaced by a British detachment, advancing under the command of Major Muir. But of these enemies, the former disappeared on the ap- proach of the American column, without making any resistance ; and the latter, not showing more disposition to hazard a contest, hastily withdrew to its boats and returned to Maiden. It was now deemed m 1 McAffee. > \1 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 55 proper, as well for the purpose of giving occupation to the troops, as for that of preventing any new at- tempt on the fort, to direct a few detachments against such of the Indian villages as had most contributed to the late investing party ; but though made with sufficient zeal and activity, the experiment failed in producing any effect more important than the destruction of a few cabins and the corn growing around them. While these circumstances were taking place in the northern section of the di^^rict, others, of a mixed character, good and bad, grave and ludicrous, were occurring in the southern. Early in September, a small band of savages, of the Potowatamie and Win- ebago tribes, appeared at fort Harrison ; and feigning weariness and hunger, besought for the night the shelter and hospitality of the fort. But on finding that Captain Taylor, the commanding officer, gave no credit to their story, and even suspected their hostility, they threw off the mask, and collecting their associates, (who had hitherto lain concealed in the neighboring thickets,) united in a bold and per- severing attack on the fort. During the progress of this, the assailants found means to burn a block- house, (which made part of the work,) and thus opened to themselves a new passage to the interior ; but, though making many strenuous effortf.. to profit by this advantage, they failed in all, and were ulti- mately repulsed with considerable loss. To make up in some degree for this disappointment, the party repaired to a frontier settlement on the Pie-eon'a '•I % •I Nil ■■•! .i'- ■ 56 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. im I III Roost, where they killed or captured twenty-one of the inhabitants. This last incident would, perhaps, have been alone sufficient to have called forth a new display of Ken- tucky population and patriotism ; but to its authority was superadded that of a requisition from General Harrison for a force, which, with the three regiments already detached to Vincennes, would be competent not merely to the defence of Indiana and Illinois, but to the punishment of such Indian tribes as were most likely to disturb and molest any neighboring terri- tory.^ Governor Shelby, upon whom the requisition was made, hastened to give it execution, and with not more of attention, than the General himself had employed, in proportioning the quantum of ^'^rce to the nature and exigencies of the service i hen, therefore, we consider that tlie invitation to the field was without limitation as to numbers ; that the causes requiring it were not a little exaggerated,' and that the policy, no less than the patriotism of the state, induced every man to become a soldier, we can no longer wonder that the Governor's proc- lamation should, within twenty days, have assem- bled an army of four thousand men, equipped for service, and all, Tartar-like, mounted on horseback. The command of this formidable array was com- mitted to Major-General Hopkins of the militia, who reached fort Harrison about the 10th of Octo- ber. Finding nothing nearer to his own frontier to 1 McAffee. a Harrigon's letter to Shelby, 5th Sept, 1812 ; McAffee, p. 156, ','i 'If ^\i NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1813. 57 ^ive him occupation, he on the 14th, began his march for the Indian villages on the Wabash and Illinois. Much of the ground he had to traverse was of the prairie character, (scantily supplied with water and entirely destitute of wood,) but abound- ing in tall, coarse grass. The effect of this redun- dant herbage on the army resembled enchantment ; every step they took upon it, abated alike their ardor and intelligence ; the guides lost their way ; the General his authority, and the troops their sub- mission ; and on the fourth day after leaving fort Harrison (discovering that the prairie was on fire, and mistaking this for a ruse of the enemy) this " press of western chivalry" turned their backs on the war, and withdrew en masse to Kentucky. About the same time, and in concert with the preceding movement, an expedition on a smaller scalo, but of more successful character, was insti- w. eu by Governor Edwards of the Illinois Territory, and conducted by Colonel Russell of the rangers! Its object was an Indian town at the head-waters of Lake Peoria, which, by a rapid and well-directed march, the detachment was able to surprise and destroy. On the first alarm, the savages betook themselves to a neighboring swamp, whither they were hotly pursued and speedily routed— leaving behind them twenty dead bodies, a considerable store of corn, and sixty horses laden with baggage. A second expedition under the direction of Gene- ral Hopkins, and made for the laudable purpose of fulfiUin&r the intentions nnA wininn- «..# tu^ a; ^ I I. * 'I 1 ' 1 62 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1819. expedition, when one half of the corps, in the exer- cise of its volunteer rights, refused to go farther. The Colonel, being thus left to choose between an abandonment of his purpose, or an attempt to exe- cute it with half the force originally assigned to the enterprise, did not hesitate to adopt the latter; and supplying the want of numbers by vigilance and activity, was soon able to reach and destroy the two villages indicated in his orders. It was now the 28th of October. The fortnight whi 3I1, according to General Harrison's calculations, was to have done much, had passed away without doing any thing ; the rainy season had already be- gan ; land transportation, always difficult, was now impracticable ; and idleness, nakedness and hunger were working their ordinary effects on the health, habits and temper of the troops ; rendering them sick, and sour, and restless — a state of things which the General could no longer conceal from himself, and which brought him, at last, to the reluctant confes- sion, that the project of an autumnal campaign must be abandoned, and a winter expedition adopted in its stead. " My present plan," he says, in a letter of the preceding date, to the Secretary of War, " is to occupy Sandusky and accumulate, at that place, as much provision and forage as possible ; to be taken from thence in sleds to the river Raisin. For to get supplies forward through a swampy wilderness of nearly two hundred miles extent, in wagons, or on pack-horses carrying their own provender, is impos- sible. Still the main object may be accomplished it: NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 68 by using the frozen margin of the lake, if the troops are provided with warm clothing, and the winter be such as it usually is in this climate."* As, however, many weeks must elapse between the date of this new determination and the actual occurrence of such a condition of weather as could alone render it practicable, it was deemed expedient to employ the interval in destroying such Indian lodgements, temporary and permanent, as from ac- tual force or locality of position, were most likely to disturb the left wing of the army, or the transporta- tion of supplies going on under its protection. Of these lodgements, one had recently been made at the foot of the Itapids ; ostensibly for the purpose of gathering and transporting corn, but, as was suspected, secretly destined to co-operate witli the Miamis in son)e military enterprise on our frontier posts and convoys. To break up this party became, therefore, a matter of moment ; and to effect it. Gen- eral Tupper, whose feats in arms we have already commemorated, was detached, early in November, at the head of six hundred and fifty Ohio militia and a few mounted rangers. On approaching his object, he prudently employed a reconnoitring party to ascertain whether any changes had taken place in the force or position of the enemy ? And being as- » It was by thus qualifying his real opinions, that he carried the cabinet along with him in his attempts to execute his absurd projects. They at last saw, or thought they sow, in these contradictory state- ments, a desire on the part of the General, to escape responsibility, and a design to induce them to incur it a i i. i I !• i Mil H illn 4 64 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. iured, on the return of the party, that the allies, red and white, besides continuing where they had been, and witliout any material increase of numbers, were "now indulging themselves in singing and dancing,'* he manfully determined to cross the Miami and take part in the revel ; but defeated in this by the depth of the water and strength of the current, instead of ascending the river and seeking a fording place of safer and quieter character, (which might have been readily found,) he foUowed the stream downward, and placing himself directly in front of the British and Indian camp, sufficiently announced, not only his arrival, but his intention also of shifting from himself and imposing on his enemy, both the trouble and danger of crossing the river. In this last cal- culation, however, he entirely lost sight of the anti- chivalrous character of Indian warfare. The first care of the red man of the forest is to take care of himself; and the second, so to measure the strength and temper of his antagonist as will enable him to judge, not merely on what side of a stream he shall fight, but whether he shall fight on either side of it. With this view, on the present occasion, after send- ing their women and children to the woods, and their allies to their boats, the Indians made a show of engaging at long shot ; while a few mounted par- ties despatched across the Miami, soon found out the flanks and rear of their adversary, and sufficiently indicated their intention — not of tighti. g a pitched battle, but of harassing his progress when he moved, and disquieting his positions when he became sta- NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1818. 16 tionary. As this was a state of things the General had not foreseen, and greatly disliked, he quickly resorted to the only expedient by which he supposed it could be remedied ; and accordingly, early in the night of the 15th, began a rapid retreat to fort Mc- Arthur.* While Tup{)er was making this second display of military talent, another expedition, under bet- ter auspices, was preparing at Frankhntown. A corps of six hundred mounted men, selected from the army, were placed under the direction of Lieu- tenant-Colonel Campbell, with orders to march against the Indian villages on the Missisineway. Of these, they reached the most northwardly, at daybreak on the 18th of December, but without having been able to surprise it completely. A por- tion of the occupants escaped across the river ; whilst the remainder, after a short and feeble resist- ance, surrendered to the assailants. No time was lost in pursuing this advantage, and three other vil- lages were visited and destroyed by the party. The troops, having been now thirt^ six hours on horseback, and having suffered much from cold, hunger, and fatigue, encamped for the night on the bank of the river, where they remained undis- turbed till near daylight ; when the outposts were furiously driven in, and the camp sharply and gen- erally assailed, but without producing the smallest ill-effect on its spirit and order. At the dawn of 1 A/1/.Aa: (^^, p. 17 • if. 66 NOTICES OF THE 1YA.R OF 1819. ■Ml li :;, II ,;' 1 ^ ' 1 lii^^'- J It day, when a proper direction could be given to the movement, both flanks of the Indian line were rapidly- turned, and its rear charged and routed. The gen- eral result of the expedition, however, was not flat- tering : twenty-three Indians were killed, forty-two taken, and four out of five villages, destroyed ;* while on our side, ten men were killed, forty-eight wounded, and nearly two hun The fifth, and unapproached village, contained the principal Indian force. I m *^. I, i NOTICES OF THE WAR OF i819. 67 expresses were received from Uie inhabitants of Frcnchtown, representing the many and ag-^ravated hotrorsof their situation, and rntreatin^^ the interpo- sition of the American arms. " The British,** they said, " no longer conceal their intention of carrying off our grain and our cattle ; and the savages menace us with the destruction of our dwellings, and the massacre or captivity of our persons. Without your aid, we have no hope ; with li, we may be able to defend ourselves, our wiveb, nnd our children ; but this aid, to be effectual, must be prompt. The pres- ent number of the enemy among us, does not exceed three hundred combatants — a for» e vhat will be soon and considerably augmented ; after which, your in- terposition woidd be useless, and our ruin complete.** An appeal like this, addressed to men of high and liberal views, could not be made in vain. The warm- hearted and gallant Allen, became its ready and zealous advocate. To his quick and intelligent mind, the policy it invoked appeared to be sustained by every motive that ought to govern in the case — sympathy for the afflicted ; duty to fellow-citizens, and a correct interpretat'on of military maxims. " Can we," he said, "turn a deaf ear to the cries of men, women and children, about to perish under the scalping-knife and tomahawk of the savage 1 Can we regard with indifference tlie perils of those whose attachments to the United States have alone rendered them obnoxious to the calamities they dread 1 Can it be possible, that the wisdom of beating an enemy in detail, can either escane our notice or reauire ar^^u- III i ■ I •4; 68 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. monts to obtain our approbation ? For what purpose are we here, but to seek, to find, and to fight this very enemy ? And shall we permit his advanced guard to perpetrate all the mischief it meditates, and return in safety to its main body ] Is it by such con- duct that we shall wipe out the disgrace of Hull's surrender, or fulfil the promises made to our friends when, leaving our own firesides, we took upon us the temporary profession of arms 1 And if not, by what considerations is it recommended'? Will it be said, that the force of the hostile detachment is too great to be successfully combated, or in other words, that a thousand freemen are unequal to a contest with three hundred savages and slaves ? The supposition is degrading, and merits not the ceremony of a refu- tation. Will it, on the other hand, be alleged, that it is too inconsiderable to be noticed] This also would be an error — for besides, that victory, on any scale, is not without its moral effects on both bellige- rents, an abstraction of three hundred men fropi the present force of the enemy, would materially dimin- ish his power, and give us a decided ascendency in prosecuting what remains of the campaign. Again : will it be said, (and, if I mistake not, it has been said,) that so near an approach to the den of the Lion would be imprudent 1 To this I reply, that danger is inseparable from war, and that the soldier who goes upon the plan of running no risk, is ne- cessarily self-condemned to inaction and disgrace ; whereas he who dares boldly, may do much. Since then, activity and enterprise are the elements of NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1818. 69 victory, let us beware of calculating dangers too nicely — this was the fault and ruin of Hull, and cannot surely be thought worthy of our imitation. If the Lion, as he has been called, moves at all, he will do so in one of two ways: — he will either send a second detachment to support the first, in which case, both may be separately beaten, — or he will put his whole force in motion, and thus furnish us with a si> iicient excuse for falling back upon our own army, which cannot now be far in the rear. From this brief and general view^ of the subject, I am led to conclude, that we should hasten our march to Frenchtown ; attack, and if possible, destroy the advanced corps of the enemy ; give protection to a meritorious and suffering people, and obtain the con- trol of resources, of which we are much in want, and which otherwise will go to sustain the war against us." The effects of this ada.ess were not equivocal the General no longer hesitated, and the council, not having many or important doubts to remove,* it was speedily determined that ."a detachment should be sent, as expeditiously as possible, to Frenchtown.^' A corps was organized accordingly, and beginning its march on the 17th, it was able at three o'clock, P. M. of the 18th, to present itself in front of the town, when the fire of the British artil- ■J » 1. I Colonel Lewis and Major Madison stated, that according to their recollection, the opinion of the council of war was unanimous for proceeding to Frenchtown, H li 70 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. lery opened upon it. The measures taken by Colonel Lewis, the commander of the American detach- ment, were well-timed and well-judged. Without the smallest unnecessary delay, he ordered the two battalions of Graves and Madison, (preceded by Bal- lard's light infantry,) to cross the river^ and drive the British and their allies from the houses and picket fences, of which they had hitherto availed themselves ; while the remaining battalion, under the command of Colonel Allen, was so posted on the right as to flank any retrograde movement made or attempted by the enemy. The first of these orders was gallantly executed, and in a few minutes, Reynolds, the British commander, was driven from the village and compelled to seek an- other position. In doing this, he was soon and necessarily brought into contact with Allen's bat- talion, by which he was vigorously attacked and pursued, until at last, the shelter of a second group of houses and a wood enabled him to renew his defence. Lewis's conduct under these new circumstances was not less prudent and proper than on the former occasion. Retaining Allen's battalion on the ground it occupied, and which menaced at once the front and left of the enemy's position, he detached those of Graves and Madison to turn his right and rear. The firing which grew out of this manoeuvre be- came the signal for Allen to act ; when, under the 1 The river was then covered bv a thick and stronor ice. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 71 pressure of the two attacks, Reynolds was again routed and compelled to betake himself wholly to the forest. It was here that his Indian auxiliaries found their true champ de battaille; for thougii kept in constant retreat for three miles in succession, ihey maintained the conflict with great obstinacy, and but yielded at last to the superior force and well- conducted charges of the Kentucky militia. Colonel Lewis now led back his detachment to the town, and hastened to inform General Winchester of the events of the day. If victory often impairs the faculties of strong and practised minds, what ill-effects may it not pro- duce on those of less power, wholly unacquainted with war as a science? Unfortunately, on the present occasion, its only product was a self-suffi- ciency , which every thing approaching the char- acter of military foresight and discretion was for- gotten. A council of war, convened on the morning of the 19th, determined "to maintain their new position and wait the arrival of remfoi cements," and in this decision, the two Generals, Winchester and Harrison, imited, but without sufficiently foreseeing the necessity of rendering more defensible an . -i village, within stroke of the enemy, and unproteci ;u by a single cannon. Nor was it the effect of the arrival of the former of these commanders to correct or in any degree to qualify, this oversight. On the contrary, the small accession of force brought by him, (not exceeding two hundred and fifty men,) became the cause of an increased securitv, which ' H' ' 'i/ • I ■■ Ml '.■-'J . Vi : I I «l 72 NOTIC IS OF THE WAR OP 1812. set aside even the most ordinary precautions ; as on the night of the 21st, (though informed that the enemy meditated an attack,) the troops were neither kept together, nor was a picket-guard placed on the only road, by which their position could be readily or conveniently approached.* While thus in the American camp nothing was seen, but disregard for themselves, nor any thing heard, but contempt for their enemy. Proctor, the British commander, was fast advancing from Mai- den, at the head of his whole disposable force, and was even permitted to establisli a battery within point-blank shot of the town, without being either disturbed or discovered. Instead, however, of avail- ing himself of this advantage, and making his attack before daybreak, which would have best secured him against Kentucky rifles, and probably effected the complete surprise of his adversary, he waited the approach of dawn, and thus became visible to an out-lying sentinei, who gave the alarm at the moment that the American drums were pre- paring to beat the reveille. Failing, therefore, to catch his enemy asleep, and forbidden alike by sea- son, weather and want of preparation, from employ- ing siege or investment, he resorted to assault, as the only means he had left for accomplishing his purpose ; and with this view, covering his front with artillery and his flanks with Indian marksmen, he began his movements on the town, and had ap- m I McAffee, p. 302. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 73 preached within musket-shot of the pickets, when he was met by a fire so galling and incessant, as made an immediate retreat necessary.' The left of his attack was more fortunate. In the hasty dispositions made for defence, the de- tachment of two hundred and fifty men brought by Winchester on the 20th, instead of being posted behind the pickets and held there in reserve, or made to occupy the houses which entirely com- manded the approaches to the place, were most preposterously drawn out in line, on the right of the town, and without a 'point d'appui, for either flank. This weak and isolated position could not long escape the notice of the enemy, who hastened to concentrate upon it all his disposable means, In- dian and British ; and in twenty minutes, threw the American line into a state of confusion, which no possible exertion could restrain, and which soon and necessarily terminated in the capture or slaughter of nearly all the fugitives, including two companies of fifty men each, led from behind the pickets by Colonels Lewis and Allen. Yet with even this decided advantage. Proctor indicated little, if any disposition, to renew the attack on his first object. The experi- ment he had made on the covered part of the Ameri- can position, had taught him a lesson of prudence he could not forget. He had lost by it nearly one fourth of his regular force, without having made any serious impression upon either the strength or the spirit of iMcAffee, p. 216. 7 1^ ^'•51 * 9*1 •t i I ' \ I. 74 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813. his adversary ; and to incur a similar loss by a second attempt, though attended by success, would in effect be exhaut^ing on an advanced corps, the means given him of resistliig th.i main body. Other considerations may be supporei to have increased the weight of thj ? leo jonirsg — the weather was cold, the Bnow deep, ar.l Harrison's head-quarters already advanced to the Rapids ; while his own corps was neither sufficiently provided against the elements nor the enemy. What, therefore, could not be done by a coup de maiyi^ (a sadden attack and speedy retreat) he should fbrbcar to attempt ; and the more so, as he was now encumbered with prisoners, and with the wounded of both armies. The pause in his operations, which took place about this time, may, therefore, be justly ascribed to reasoning like this, which must have been conclusive, and would have sent him back to Maiden, satisfied with the advan- tage he had gained, but that information was now brought that General Winchester was among the number of prisoners made by the Indians. This un- expected incident, suggested to Proctor a new course of proceeding, of which he hastened to make the ex- periment. Causing the prisoner to be brought before him, he dilated freely on the extent of his force, and still more on that of his humanity. " I have," he said, " the means of setting fire to every house in the village, without risk to myself; and may thus, soon and safely reduce the party, which so unwisely attei v,)i53 to defend it. But in this case, what will be t* c fate of the inhabitants, men, women NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1819. 76 and children, and of the American militia associated with tliein 1 Such of these as may escape the fire of our musketry and cannon, will unavoidably fall under the tmnahawks of our allies, whom it will be impossible to restrain in the heat of action. May I never witness such a spectacle! But, need I tell you, that private feelings cannot be indulged at the expense of public duty ; and that, however agreea- ble it would be to me as a man, to avoid the employ- ment of means, so terrible in themselves as those I have suggested, yet as an officer, I cannot be justi- fied in omitting to do, wJiatever may be necessary or useful to the King's service. I have, therefore, to submit to you a single and short proposition, con- taining the only remedy the case admits of, and that is — that in your quality of commanding Gene- ral, you will inmnediately surrender to me French- town and the garrison it contains." To Winchester, the situation of the gallant band, whom Proctor called the garrison of Frenchtown, appeared to be hopeless. He saw no reason to ex- pect any interposition in their favor from the Rapids, and from no other quarter was it possible to obtain any, in time to be useful ; yet without a reinforce- ment, the contest, as he supposed, must be short and unavailing. He had, besides, just witnessed the slaughter or capture of nearly one half of his com- mand ; and saw with horror what would probably be the fate of the other, if, as menaced by Proctor, it was deprived of its covering and obliged to combat on the open ground. His decision on Proctor's proposition r ' i *i Il« 1l 76 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. was, therefore, soon and humanely taken, and bar- ing yielded his assent, he immediately despatched an Aid-decamp to inform Majors Graves and Madison, that " they and their followers had been surren- dered prisoners of war, to the arms of his Britannic Majesty^"' This annunciation of the unconditional surrender of a corps, which had hitherto triumphed over every attack made upon it, and which yet beHeved in its capacity of self-defence, could not fail to be ill-re- ceived by those to whom it was addressed. Thoug^h entertaining no doubts of the purity and benevolence of the General's views in taking this step, they did not scruple to question the validity of any engage- ment made by him in their behalf, after he had be- come a prisoner ; and the less so, as the agreement actually entered into and communicated, contained no security whatever against Indian or other out- rage, in the event of their acceding to it. The de- termination of Major Madison (whom the disasters of the day had now made commandant of the corps) was therefore judicir.dsly taken. — "We shall run all risks," he &aid, " of a prolonged resistance, and per- ish, if such must be our fate, in a free and full use of our arms, unless the British commander will con)e under a solemn engagement that private property shall in all cases be respected ; that the side-arms of officers shall be restored to them on their arrival at Amherstburg; that the wounded shall be promptly I McASe, p. ai5» NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. n and securely transported to that post ; and that, until this last provision be complied with, a guard suffi- cient for their protection shall be assigned to them." These conditions, though altogether such as brave men had a right to demand, and a liberal enemy would have had no hesitation in granting, were for a time resisted by Proctor ; but finding that his at- tempts at either duping or intimidating his adversary were unavailing, and feeling the importance to him- self of even a qualified surrender, which should make unnecessary a renewed attack on the town or a longer continuance before it, he at last, after an altercation as little honorable to his manners as to his princi- ples,' yielded his objections, and entered into the engagements proposed to him. What remained of the day was assiduously em- ployed by the enemy in preparing for an immediate retreat, and in actually retreating, as far as Stony Creek. At twelve o'clock, the prisoners (amounting to about six hundred) were put in motion, and in the evening of the 23d, arrived at Amherstburg ; where "they were penned up in a small and muddy wood-yard, and exposed throughout the night to a cold and constant rain, without tents or blankets, and with only fire enough to keep them from freez- ing."* The dead, who lay where they had fallen, » In detailing the circumstances of this meeting, Major Madison stated to the Secretary of War, that " Proctor's conduct at French- town was as unmanly, as at Maiden it was iase"— alluding to his im- pudent denial, tliat " any engagements favorable to the prisoners had been entered into by him." a McAffee. 7* ll 78 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. i in Frenchtown and its neighborhood, were not merely disregai Jed, but " formally denied the rights of sep- ulture, and left a prey to the hogK and dogs of the village ;"' while the wounded, still ni re unfortunate, were literally abandoned to the mercy of the savages ; who, it was tauntingly remarked, "would be found to be excellent surgeons."* Soon after sunrise, the day following, instead of the sleighs which Proctor hrcd ^lu'./sed, and which were anxiously expected, came two hundred Indians, hideous as yells and paint could make them ; who, after plundering the two houses in which the wounded were collected, set them on fire, and repulsing every attempt of the prisoners at escape, burnt the whole to the ground.* Information of this disaster reached tho Rapids at twelve o'clock of the day of its ocrurrence, and pro- duced effects there, wh'ch had no I ndeiicy to miti- gate the evil. The lu st mtention of the commanding General, (who had arrived ■ this pobi earl on the morning of the SOl.h) was to push for wn^ such force as could be Pi-^^edily asH«-mbled, interp^^e it h( ween the flying troops and tlieir pursuers, and mvc po«- sibl , the wreck of the American detachment. Jm. being infoi.ned at the end c^ a sing' > hour's iiiurch, that the retreating party (when last seen by such of tlh? fugiti', cs as had been able to make good their escape) was reduced to le s than forty men, much exhausted by fatigue, and hotly pui.,ued by a body n anted Indi is, he abaadoned his purpcse, and I McAfTee. 8 Idem. • Idem. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. n committing the service, originally proposed for him- self, to a small detachment, he speedily retreated to the Rapids and immediately assembled a council of war. To the wisdom of this enlightened body, it appeared not merely possible, but highly probable, that Proctor wouh^ follow up the blow he had already given, and attack the po t they now occupied ; or, that leaving this behind him, he would throw him- self on tlie head or flanks of the column of the right and the convoys moving in its rear. From such premises, it was not diflicult to come tc a conclu- sion — that the post must be abandoned; its dt nces, and the stores collected in them, destroyed ; and the garrison, amounting to eight or nine hundred men,* instantly withdrawn behii. 1 Portage river. Orders in conformity with this decision, were speedily given and executed, and with this event, virtually ter- minated General Harrison's second, or winter cam- paign ; which, unfortunately, having recovered no ground we had lost, nor eflaced any disgrace we had suffered, utterly failed in accomplishing its objects ; and as matter of history, is only remarka- ble for a wash' of money, time, character and life. ■A.«| «l Rem*i»k9. Of the many errors which signalize this exped' i, the first in date as well as in char- acter, was tue plan of campaign, suggested by the government, and pursued by the General ; and which differed but little from that prescribed to ,♦ * 1 McAffce, p. 236. 80 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819. Hull, with respect to route, object and means. It may be concisely deHcribed as follows : — « Get to- gether a large mass of militia and volunteers ; arm, equip, subsist and march them without loss of time through the wildernens ; give pro( ction to the fron- tier, recapture Detroit, and invade Canada." In thus 8u})stantially renewing their first and ill-fated plan, the govermncnt ♦ntirely overlooked, or disre- gardrd the circumstances which induced and jus- tified the rirst expidition, and the very important changes wrought in these, by Hull's surrender and other causes, in relation, as well to their own con- dition, as to that of the enemy. When on the Ist of June, 1812, Hull began his march to Detroit, we had an Indian war to prevent, which could be best accomplished by augmenting our military means in the neighborhood of the lakes ; we had several old-eytablished forts on the frontier, which, from different views, it was deemed important to sustain ; we had a young and increasing settlement bordering on a British province, which both justice and policy commandnl us to protect ; we were yet in a state of peace, which enabled us to carry on our operations without interruption ; wc had the summer before us, from which to select the moments most propitious for crossing the swampy region, which separate.l us from our objects ; and lastly, we had an organizer^ corps, equipped, supphed and ready for service. Such was the state of things on the 1st of June, when Hull began his march for Detroit. But how changed in all respects was it ni f-: 'it ;?i NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1819. 81 by the 30th of September — the da. ^.i which Har- rison readied the St. Mary, and tuok conunand of the army and district ? It will be remembered, that at this period, we were at open wur with Great Britain ; that our frontier settlements and posts had been wrested from us ; that the Indian tribes of the west, with few, if any exceptions, had taken part with the enemy ; that the rainy season had already com- menced, and the roads (always precarious) had be- come difficult for infantry and nearly impracticable to carts and wagons ; that the means of both sub- iistence and transportation, (beyond contract limits) were yet to be provided ; that the artillery, destined for the service and indispensable to it, was not far- ther advanced than Pittsburg ; that several corps of the army were also far in the rear, and that all, whether present or absent, required supplies, reorgan- ization and instruction. The condition of the enemy had also undergone changes, quite as important as our own, but of a character altogether different. In acquiring Detroit, he had become possessed of a fortress, much more defensible than Maiden ; and in the general it jue of the campaign, had completely re-established the allegiance and services of his militia. In receiving the submission of Michigan, he had ac- quired the command of such supplies as that terri- tory could finnish, and of as much of the personal labor of its inhabitants, as was necessary to military purposes; and lastly, in securing the attachment of the Indian tribes, he had obtained an allv. of all . / I ' i i f .1 ■»(!* * t«l * ■ ■ '1 82 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. ti Others the most important to him, and formidable to us. That circumstances, thus multiplied and impor- tant, all forbidding a prosecution of the prescribed plan of campaign, and all pointing distinctly to the safer, the shorter and more efficient plan of a joint operation of naval and military means, in the spring, were either overlooked or underrated by the cabinet] is not to be doubted; but of this apology, the com- manding General has deprived himself by his own written acknowledgments ^ for in a letter of the 4th of January, 1813, he says, "The experience of a few days, was sufficient to convince me, that the supplies of provision could not be procured for an autumnal advance ; and if even this difficulty was removed, another of equal magnitude existed, in the want of artillery." ^ On another occasion, he says, « A suspension of the operations of this army for the winter, without having accomplished the prmcipal objects for which it was embodied, is an event, which has been long looked for by well-in- formed men, who know the character of the country and rec Uect, that the army of General Wayne, after a whole summer's preparation, was unable to advance more than seventy miles from the Ohio ; and that the prudent caution of President Washing- ton had directed it to be placed in winter quarters, at the very season when our arrangements were beginning. ''» 1 Harrisou's official letter of the 4th January, 1813. 2 Letter of the 8th of Jan,: ay, 1813. NOTICES OP THE WAR OF lb 12. 83 On another occasion, he says, « From my know- ledge of the cost of transportation, I do believe that the expense, that will be incurred in the course of SIX weeks in the spring, in i^oving the provisions of tne army along the roads leading from the Rapids to Detroit, would build and equip all the vessels necessary to give us the command of the lake ;»» to which, in a subsequent letter, he adds,— "If a small proportion of the sums that will be expended m the Quartermaster's department, in an active pro- secution of the campaign during the winter, was devoted to obtaining the command of Lake Erie the wishes of the government, in their utmost ex' tent, could be accomplished without difficulty, in the months of April and Mav Maiden, Detroit and Mackinaw, would fall in rapid succession." With sue h decided convictions ol what was wroncr in the plan he was pursuiiig, and of what woufd be right, in the measure he suggests as its sub- stitute, we certainly had reason to expect, that the General, possessing as he did, a carte hlarwhe for conductmg the war, would have instantly aban- doned his crusad.^ upon the elements and the trea- sury; taken a new and better frontier on the eastern side of the swampy region ; retained barely troops enough to occupy and defend it during the winter t-nd dismissed without farther ceremonv or hesita- tion, the mass of his militia to their own firesides. Or, If failing to do this, that he would, at least, i Letter of December 12th, 1812. !r Bit. Pi If H' |f*» IS .' " PI' f»fT i* r ♦1 84 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. have made a prompt and full disclosure of the prin- cipal facts connected with the case, and of his own impressions under them, without the smallest ad- mixture of other matter, having a tendency to neu- tralize their effects and keep up a false confidence in a mode of operating, which he thought so ob- viously wrong. Had he pursued either of these courses, he would have acted wisely and deserved well of his country ; but unfortunately he pursued neither. The hope- less business of transportation was kept up, not merely until its follies and abuses became apparent to all, but until it had actually ceased to be practi- cable in any possible way ; until two teams had become necessary to carry the forage for a third ;* until two trips, from one blockhouse to another, were sufficient to destroy a whole brigado of pack- horses ; until the whole route was marked with the wrecks of carriages and their lading, abandoned by their drivers and given up to destruction ; until the creeks and rivers had become as impracticable for boats, as the roads were for carts and wagons ; and lastly, (notwithstanding these wasteful and injudi- cious efforts,) until his advanced corps, though not now exceeding one thousand men, were literally starving in his front, and " compelled to subsist from the 10th to the 22d of December, on bad beef and the boiled roots of the hickory-tree."* r 1 General Harrison's letter of the 22d December, 1818, i McAffee, p. 184, 5. 1 1 * NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 85 Nor will the time, or the manner, selected by the General (or disclosing his opinions and convictions to the govern,„cnt, be more likely to satisfy an impartial mqimer ; for though these, as we have seen, were matured as early as the last of Septem- ber, or begmning of October, 1812, they were not communicated until the December or January fol- Wmg ; and when they did make their appearance, weie accompanied by so much that shook thei^ authority and even led to opposite conclusions, that Ae cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring „„y re- sponsibility.t could avoid, determined (with perhaps Is of patriotism than of prudence) to leave the question of continuing the winter campaign exclu- sively with the General ; who, appearing to hold two opimons on the subject, and being aheady ve stL witl full authority for deciding between them, would, It was presumed, select that, which under all circumstances, would be the safest and best ' But If Mr. Harrison's conduct was culpable in adhering to a campaign, forbidden alike by political and physical reasons, the course he adopted in prose, cutmg It, was not less open to censure, in a military view ; as in this, he scrupled not to violate the plainest and most important maxims of the art he professed ; and, with a uniformity, indicating either an entire ignorance of thhir existence, or an utter contempt for their authority. Of these maxim., we 1 McAffee, p, 190. 8 i*"*! ■i%*i 86 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. subjoin the following, with a few brief remarks, applying them to the cases to which we refer. 1st. "Of all military operations, winter campaigns are the most to be condemned ; because, most de- structive to health, temper, habiliments and equip- ments. The best troops cannot long sustain them." Yet did General Harrison institute a winter cam- paign, though left by the government to choose between that, and one in the spring; and though affecting to consider the former as doubtful, if not dangerous, and the latter as safe, economical and efficient — thus virtually convicting himself of omit- ting to do what he believed to be right, and of actually doing what he knew to be wrong. 2d. "Every military expedition ought to have a useful and important object ; for without such, however successful it may be, it will be fruitless; and of course, a mere waste of time, treasure and life." By the General's letter of the 12th Decem- ber, 1812, we find, that "the sole object he could certainly promise to accomplish, was the recapture of Detroit," of which he says, "this will be worse than useless, so long as the enemy hold Maiden in my rear, and Sandwich in my front; as from the former, he can intercept my supplies ; and from the latter, by a shower of shot and shells, comp'^1 me to hide the army, for its preservation, in -.'■'> adjacent swamps." Yet did the General prosecute a cam- paign, having this worthless object, and such dan- gerous consequences ! NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 87 3d « In oflfensive war, a single line of operation IS to be preferred; as it keeps your forces in a state that best enables you to make, or to repel attacks." Ihe General, in his wisdom, came to a different conclusion ; and accordingly, instead of keeping his force together, divided it into three corps, 4th "Other things being equal, the shortest luie of operation is the best, as it most economizes time and money, and offers to your enemy the fewest opportunitio8 for attack or annoyance." Hull's road would have best satisfied the demands of this rule as Its distance to the point of rendezvous was less,' and Its central position the safest. Yet to this route was assigned the smallest and least efficient of the tJiree corps, 5th. "Double, or multiplied lines, are only to be employed when your enemy has committed the error of forming similar lines exterior to yours » But as in this case. Proctor committed no such fault, the reason, which could alone justify the General's arrangement, did not exist. Gth. "Double, or multiplied lines, whenever adopted, should be kept within sustaining distance of each other ; and to this end, their movements must be simultaneous." This maxim, of the first importance in itself, was wholly disregarded ; as the General's lines were so far apart, and so deficient m the ordinary means of communication, as in a military sense to be completely isolated. Nor was the last injunction of the rule better observed than the first ; as Winchester's marcli from Defiance to ■:v*l I 88 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. the Rapids, was made without any corresponding movement on the part of either Tupper or Harrison. 7th. "Military magazines should invariably be formed in the rear of the army they are intended to supply. If established in its front, they n.vite attacks from the enemy ; and if captured or destroyed, com- pel an innnediate retreat." Instead, however, of acting on this rule, the General's constant effort and greatest care, was to accumulate a million of rations at the Rapids, forty miles in front of his central column, and seventy in front of his right wing, and without other protection than Winchester's corps, now reduced by disease or fatigue to eight or nine' hundred con\batants, destitute alike of fortifications and artillery, and but fifty miles distant from the enemy's main body.^ 8th. « On a rigid maintenance of discipline, will depend the safety of the country, the preservatior> of the anuy, and the niccessful prosecution of any enterprise in which it may be employed." This maxim is so universally known, and so generally adm tted, as to render unnecessary any new illustra- tion of it. It but remains, therefore, to inquire, how far this sine qua non of successful war, was attended to by General Harrison ? On beginning his career, this officer unfortunately adopted a theory with re- gard to western mihtia which, though it sufl^ciently answered his purpose of displacing a senior officer and securing to himself the command of the army, operated very mischievously on the public interests! I Appeiuii c, No. 7. NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 89 In his letter to the War Department, of the 3d of teeptember, 1812, he says, "The backwoodsmen are a smgidar people. They are susceptible [capable he probably meant] of the most heroic achievements • but they must be taken in then- own way. From their affection and attachment, every thing is to be expected ; but 1 will venture to say, that they never did, nor ever will perform any thing brilliant under a stranger." AH which, when translated into plain fcnghsh amounts to this-the men of the west ac knowledge no principle of obedience, stroi.ffer or nafer, than that of personal attachment to their chief With them, respect for the government, reverence for the laws, sensibility to the national interest, and even a decent regard to their own characters, avail nothing, unless to all these be superadded, the ap. pointment of a leader " who will take them in their own way"_or in other words, who will gratify their whims, yield to their opinions, overlook their follies and connive at their faults. ' We need hardly remark, that a creed like this, foiinded on an assumed insubordination on the part of the troops, and an unavoidable compliance on that of the General, is incompatible with every thin- de serving the name of discipline ; and will never fail to erminate m waste, peculation, disorder, and de- feat. Nor were its effects different on the present casion as may be seen by recurring to m'any o I e incidents mentioned in the text; and still more Get::? 'y'", ""'""'"^ -'-ts,'mnde fl"" General s official correspondence ; from McAflee'» h '4' '%«! " t' .1 90 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. history of the war in the west ;> and lastly, from the journal of the late Colonel Wood of the Engineer corps. In a letter of the 12th of December, to the War Department, when assigning the reasons why he did not sooner apprize the government of the im- pediments that obstructed his progress, he says — " Though I was always sensible that there were great difficulties to be encountered, &c., I did not make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inex- perience of public agents, and the villany of the con- tractors." In the second letter of the 25th of January, m attempting to explain, why, after censuring Win- chester so freely for hazarding Lewis's movement on Frenchtown, he directed that officer to hold the position "a^ any rate,'' he says, "I am persuaded that nothing but a reiterated order would have produced obedience on the part of the troops. "^ To these sentiments. Wood's Journal is an echo. "In the use of the axe, the mattock, and the spade, ' says the Engineer, " consisted the chief military knowl- edge of our army." And again : — speaking of Lewis's expedition and the arrangement of the troops at Frenchtown, he adds — " Not the least re- gard was paid to defence, order, regularity, or sys- tem, in posting the different corps." The historian, however, is still more frank in his confessions, than the General or the Engineer, for according to 1 Report says, this work was principally founded on documents furnished and revised by the General, with a view to his biography. « If such would have been the effect of a second order, why hesitate to give it 1 I NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 9] him -« Chao, and misconduct reigned m even, de. which the best organization and arrangement, were necessary ,0 n.eet the n.co„ceivahle ditlcnUi::; ,>^ were to be snrmonnted in that line. Tlie General Drocnre, 7 . > ^ "'^ P'"''""' •'''■" '^""•'l he procured as packhorse-drivers were, generally the most worthless creatures in society ;^.hTnei'.i took care of the horses, nor of the goods with wh h they were nurusted. The horses were of course soon t red to h'"',' "'""f "' "^^ P--""" '''^''- Tl.e teams hired to haul, were also commonly valued so high m omn,g ,„to service, that the owners were willing o dr,ve hem to debility and death, to get the pri e and „> addifon to this, no bills of lading were r ed' e^achTadt '"'"' ^"" "^^ -^o-rsf of cZt', each had an opportunity to plunder the public with out much risk of detection."" 9th. "The General who divides his forces will be beaten m detail. Officers who have negL J th,s rule, have generally paid a heavy penfl y 2 doutg so^ Never, therefore, when actin J olTensi^ely make a detachment." ,„ ,he wisdom and autho ity of tins max,m. the General appeared to concur • as he more than once asserts, that he "made it a rule sufficiently strong to resist the whole force of the ■ ♦ 1 McAffto, p. 141. » Idem, p. 184. liw H NOTICES OF Tlh UAR Oi 1812. 9i ^;n;:'l enemy." li, however, we test this assertion by facts,^ wc shall soon discover that, in this respecf the General has peafjy over-rated Ins own discre- tion ; and that !.is ^tiial conduct, so ^ir from ob- serviiijrthe rule by which he says he was always governed, was often a direct violation of it. ^e have already (h; tailed the progress and for- tunesof three detachments, made under his r-ction, viz., TupperV two nttempts on the Rnnids, and that of Campbell a«rainst th^ Missisineway villagts ; all of which fniled to accomplish the objects prescribed to them, either from the defident numb'^r of the party, (as in the case of i;ampb(^i) or from the in- competency of the leader, as n .at of Tupper. In these instances, therefore, Mr. f arrison was no r observer of his own rule; vm will his general plan be found to be better conformed to it, than his occa- sional practice ; for, from the moment he divided his army into three corps, and so placed these as to render mutual support impracticable, he virtually converted them into detachments of the worst kind ; and of course, subjected them Id all the evils incident to subdivision, and himself, to all the cens( re attach- ing to so great an error. 10th. « When the head of your line of operation IS carried near to your enemy's principal station, it ought to be carefully strengthened ; for if it be weak, he will certainly attack and probably destroy it." Such, however, was not the General's opinion ; since, far from strengthening Winchester, when approach- ing the enemy, ho would have taken two regiments ■iH NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 93 froi.. m, and thus reduced the advanced corps to 101' •• ve hundred men.' t iduct like this, could only be juntified hy one or more of the following reasons ; that the strength of the whole army was so small, as to forbid an aug. mentation of any par(icuhir part ; that the objec^ts 10 be gamed or secured, by re-enforcing the advanced g< .rd, weio comparatively unimportant; that the the roads and weather, rendered the move- of troops impracticable ; or, that the enemy's uionstrations, against other and important parts the line, not only made a diminution from their strengtli improper, but justified a recall of a part of tiie vanguard, for the purpose of strengthening the men- aced points. Unfortunately for the General, every fact hereassu.ncd, i^ without a shadow of foundation The nominal force of the army amounted to ten thousand men ; and its effective or disposable force to SIX or seven thousand.' The object to be attained' (by re-enforcing Winchester) was of tlie highest im- portance, as well in itself, as in its conseij lences- being notliing less than the security of the milliorl of rations, collected and collecting at the Rapids- and without which, in the General's opinion, the expedition must fail. The weather and roads, far from presenting any serious obstruction, were, during twenty days of December, peculiarly favorable ;» 1 Appendix, No. 7. » McAffee's History. 3 Letter from General Harrison to the War Department of the 4th of January, 1813. *^ -j «* -1 X K wSmy IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) ^O 1.1 j^-t ^ -^ 1.0 I.! l;^ 1 2.8 us M_o 1-25 111.4 2.5 12.2 M 1.6 V] <^ /a /: >> / >^ '/ Photographic Sdences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 94 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. nor was there any thing in the movements of the • enemy alarming to other parts of the line. It would be unjust to Mr. Harrison not to add, that he made no attempt to exculpate his conduct on either of these grounds ; and had he been equally prudent in forbearing to employ the defence he actually set up, it would have furnished, at least, one occasion for speaking favorably of his discretion. But what can we think of the capacity of a General, who, when the magazines necessary to his own eventual success were in jeopardy, could seriously wish to send back one half of the small corps employed in their protection ? And for what purpose 1 For a pitiful saving, arising from the mere difference be- tween contract and commissariat prices, to be made on the few rations necessary to the subsistence of five or six hundred men !^ 11th. "Every position, taken by an advanced corps in the face of an enemy's army, (if too weak to defend itself) should be promptly abandoned, or speedily re-enforced and fortified." And again : — "No advanced corps should be hazarded, beyond sustaining distance from its own army." Inatten- tion to these two rules, was no doubt the proximate cause of the disaster at French town, and the subse- quent defeat of the campaign. For, who will be hardy enough to assert, that if (after the affair of the 18th) Winchester's corps had been withdrawn, or his posi- 1 McAfiee, p. 193. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 95 don re-enforced and fortified : or lastly, if Harrison had been within sustaining distance of it, the loss and disgrace suffered on the 22dj would not have been avoided 1 * The first notice of the expedition to Frenchtown, reached the commanding General on the 16th. Its eflfects on him and the troops he commanded, is thus described by the late Colonel Wood. — " This news, for a moment, paralyzed the army, or at least, the thinking part of it ; for no one could imagine that it was possible for him [Winchester] to be guilty of such a hazardous step. General Harrison was as- tonished at the imprudence and inconsistency of such a measure ; which, if carried into execution, could be viewed in no other light, than as attended with certain and inevitable destruction to the left wing. Nor was it difficult for any one to foresee and predict the terrible consequences which were sure to mark the result of a scheme, no less rash in its conception than hazardous in its execution.'"* What then, we ask, under convictions thus full and distinct, of the folly and danger of the enterprise, was the duty of the commanding General ] Un- questionably, to prevent the movement if possible ; and if not, to recall the detachment without a mo- ment's delay. Yet were both entirely omitted ! No order, forbidding the expedition, was given by Har- i Appendix, No. 9, affidavit of Governor Madison, &c 8 McAffee's History p. 228. ,. i: .f ■ W] 5 #i 96 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. rison ; nor after his arrival at the Rapids on the 20th, did any issue for recalling the troops. On the con- trary, he on that day, despatched his Inspector- General with an order to Winchester, " to hold fast the position at any rate,^^ or in other words, at every risk, — thus making himself entirely responsible, for whatever consequences might follow. NOTICES OF TUB WAR OF 1813. 97 CHAPTER IV. Operations on the Niagara. — Partial Armistice. — Renewal of hostilities. — ^Van Rensselaer's attack on Gtueenstown. — Smjrth's invasion of Canada. — Dearborn's Campaign against the British advanced posts on Lake Champlain. We have already stated, that to lessen the pres- sure made upon Hull, and to reinstate the ascen- dency he had lost on the Detroit, Major-General Dearborn, who, in the distribution of service for the year 1812, had b oa assigned to the command of the northern army, was directed to make such move- ments against the British posts in his front, as would have the effect of preventing them from re-enforcing the garrison of Malder • or otherwise altering the relations as to streng , wiiljh had hitherto existed between Hull and Proctor. But for this service, the Major-General had made no preparation, and ap- peared to have little relish ;^ as on the very day on which he was thus instructed by the government, 1 In the General's letter of the 8th of August, we find an apology for this inaction, quite as unjustifiable as the inaction itself—" TiU now^^ he says, "I did not consider the Niagara frontier as coming witlrin the hmits of my command," — an assertion direcUy contradicted by the armistice entered into between him and Provost, and utterly inconsis- tent with the orders he received, from the 26th of June, to the 1st of August For these orders, see Appendix, Nos. 10 and 14. @ * 1i^ of the heights of Queenstown. During the pause that now followed in the com- bat, several attempts were made to carry over from the American camp, supplies necessary to the further prosecution of the general plan ; but so few and in- suflicient were the means provided for the purpose, I This battery was a redan, — open in the rear, by which the assail- ants entered. * ..k| I 104 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. ha. ■ ■i'si III. \ and so disorderl}^ the employment of such as did exist, tlint the eflfects expected from them were verv inadequately produced. Of artillery, but one gun could be brought to the west side of the river ; of ammunition, but a small quantity ; and of entrench- ing tools, all were forgotten and left at the place of embarcation. Nor was the transportation of the army, more successful than that of the supplies. Two detachments of the 6(h, 13th and 23d regiments of infantry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Christie and Major Mullany, found means to cross, » and were soon followed by Brigadier-General Wadsworth and a small battalion of militia ; but the mass of this latter description of force was immoveable. Neither entreaty nor threats— neither arguments nor ridicule availed any thing. They had seen enough of war, to satisfy them that it made no part of their special calling ; and at last, not disdaining to employ the mask, invented by faction to cover cowardice or treason, fifteen hundred able-bodied men, well armed and equipped, who a week before boasted loudly of patriotism and prowess, were now found openly plead- ing constitutional scruples, in justification of disobe- dience to the lawful authority of their chief ! While this degrading scene was going forward on the eastern bank of the river, occurrences no less in- teresting, but of a character somewhat diflferent, were taking place on the western. Between two and three o'clock, P. M., a scattering fire was heard on the southern side of the heights, produced by an Indian I Appendix, No. 12. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 105 attack made on a small party of straggling militia ; who being completely surpriHcd, fled in great con- fusion, and carrj'ing their panic along with them, threatened to extend the infection to other corps. It was at this critical moment that Lieutenant-Colonel Scott of the second regiment of artillery, placing him- self at the head of a few platoons of regular troops, charged the savages witi a gallantry which soon checked, and at length drove them into a neigh- boring wood ; where the combat became nearly sta- tionary, and a mere trial of skill at sharp-shooting. Perceiving that a champ de battaille like this, secured to the Indians all the advantages of tlu i; habitual and peculiar mode of fighting ; while to his own troops it produced effects directly the reverse, the Lieutenant-Colonel prudently withdrew his party to the open ground ; and there took a position which, though it did not entirely put an end to the attack, made it too inefficient, longer to disturb the order of the American line. A discovery was, however, soon made, that the savages were not the only enemy the invading corps would have to contend with. From the heights of Queenstown, in the distance eastward, was now seen advancing a column of artillery and infantry. Its approach, though slow and circumspect, was ste; x'y and unremitting ; and of its character and objects there could be no doubts. About three o'clock, P. M., General Sheafe, the successor of Brock and leader of the column, after turning the village and throw- ing into it a detachment competent to its defence, ii* ■1- ll m 1 1 106 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. presented himself and a force of eight hundred regu- lars, militia and Indians, in front of the American line — now reduced to less than three hundred com- batants, and sustained but by a single piece of artil lery, badly supplied with ammunition. In this state of things, a note was received from General Van Rensselaer, advising an immediate retreat, and pro- mising, on his part, the utmost exertion in furnishing the necessary boats and a covering tire, dining the passage of the river ; but, at the same time, leaving to Wadsworth (the senior officer on the field) entire liberty to follow the dictates of his own judgment on the occasion. This note was immediately com- municated to the commandants of the different corps, and their opinions en the subject requested; but without producing a decision, either for or against, the proposed measure. The British commander in the meantime continued to manoeuvre from right to left, and from left to right ; countermarching nearly the whole length of the American hne twice, as if determined to count every man in the ranks, and to make himself familiar with every foot of the position, before he hazarded an attack. This deliberation on his part gave time for renewed councils on that of his adversary ; and a second consultation being held, a determination was at last taken to try the experi- ment of a retreat, as recommended by General Van Rensselaer. To have executed successfully, a purpose of this kind, in the face of an enemy so much more formi- «fj-tc iiiw-iL iiivinscivco, III nuiiiDciS, uiKuipune aiiU NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 107 variety of arms, would have been no easy task for soldiers the most practised, and officers the most skilful ; but was j^erfectly hopeless, when required from American levies, who had seen only an imper- fect service of three or four months. The result was such as mighc have been, and probably was anticipated by the reflecting portion of the corps ; the first step taken in retreat, produced a movement on the part of the enemy, which at once converted the march into a route; and (superadded to the fact, that not a boat was found on the shore ready to receive tljem) made necessary an immediate and uncondition. surrender. General Van Rensselaer, disgusted with the con- duct of the mihtia, and perhaps not entirely satisfied with his own, withdrew from service, about the 18th of October ; when the command of the Niagara or central army, as it was now called, devol/ed on Brigadier-General Smyth ; an oflScer, from whose patriotic and professional pretensions, the multitude had drawn many favorable conclusions. Nor was the estimate made of his military character by the government, more correct ; as it took for granted, a temperament, bold, ardent and enterprising, and requiring only restriction to render it useful. In the orders given for the regulation of his conduct, he was accordingly forbidden to make any new at- tempt at invasion, with a force "less than three thousand combatants, or with means of transporta- tion (across the Niagara) insufficient to carry over simultaneoualy the whole of that number." , i 1 \ ■ 1 1 % 1 ' ■ L J %^ It , J 108 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. The interval between the 26th of October and 27th of November, was usefully employed in getting together and preparing the necessary number of boats, and such increase of physical force, as would enable the new commander entirely to fulfil the cautious policy prescribed to him by the govern- ment. Having at the last of these dates, sufiiciently secured both objects, as he believed, he issued an order, that the army should assemble early on the 28th, at Black Rock, for the purpose of entering on the projected invasion. Nor was there any thing in the state of the weather, or of the river, or in the force and condition of the enemy, seriously to ob- struct the execution of this design. The width of the Niagara from Black Rock to the Canada shore, does not exceed a mile — a distance ordinarily passed in a few minutes ; the weather was clear and cool, not cold ; the outposts of the enemy few and feeble, and too remote from forts Erie and Chippewa, to be promptly sustained by the garrison of either ; and of course offering to the invading army an opportu- nity of breaking down in succession, any detach- ments sent to their support. Such was not, however, the view of the subject taken by the General ; for besides, that no man had more thoroughly convinced himself that the " better part of valor is discretion," he had on this occasion, made a special promise " not to be beaten,'* * and to fulfil this engagement, determined to risk only a night-attack, with two 1 Smyth's letter to Dearborn, of the 30th October, 1812. ^ : ■"«»i < . ■ < , ■ « , for j> NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 109 /iall detachments, which, whether successful or not, should terminate the enterprise by a hasty retreat to their own shore. In pursuance of this plan. Captain King of the fourteenth United States regiment, with one hun- dred and fifty regular infantry, and seventy seamen, led by Lieutenant Angus, was despatched about midnight of the 27th, with orders to attack and carry the British posts at the Red House ; while Lieutenant -Colonel Boerstler, with two hundred rank and file of the same regiment, was instructed to land near the mouth of Frenchman's Creek; assail the guard posted at that place, and destroy the bridge necessary to a communication between forts Erie and Chippewa. From bad pilotage, or some of the untoward accidents which often befall night movements, neither party succeeded in carry- ing over its whole force. Of King's ten boats, but four reached the point of attack designated for them. In these, were the seventy seamen and an equal number of infantry, who landed under a shower of grape and musket shot. The former, unaccus- tomed to the order of military movements, and re- quiring only to be told where the enemy was, rushed forward with their habitual gallantry and appropriate weapons, (pikes and cutlasses,) and after a short but sanguinary contest, carried the position, made sev- eral prisoners, threw two pieces of artillery and their caissons into the river, and set fire to the building. During these occurrences. King with his infantry was not idle. Directing his march on the two exte- 10 it, f> ill 1* E*! il :;■*€.. 110 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. rior batteries, which the enemy yet held, he gallantly carried the lower by storm ; and on reaching the upper, found it astily abandoned. After spiking the cannon and destroying the carriages of both, it but remained to fulfil the last injunction of his orders — assemble his party, and recross the river. But to his great surprise, neither on his retrograde march to the shore, nor on his arrival there, was any thing to be seen of Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, or the boats. All had disappeared, and he now found him- self in a situation the most painful to a soldier — that of encountering a sudden and unavoidable dan- ger, against which skill and courage could avail nothing. An accident, however, tended to mitigate the evil ; for in seeking his own craft, he found two of the enemy's, in which he despatched as many of his party as the boats would hold, but refusing to abandon the remainder, he and they were soon after made prisoners of war. The explanation of this unfortunate circumstance, offers a new proof of the perils of night movements ; and of the great inexperience of our best officers, at that period of the war, in this branch of military service. After the seamen, as already stated, had carried the first object of attack, (not knowing what direction had been given to the infantry of the detachment, and no signal of retreat having been agreed upon,) they hastened to the shore, with the wounded of their own party, and the prisoners they had made ; when finding but four boats of the ten, (with which the enterprise began,) and these with- NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. Ill out a guard, and ignorant of the fact, that this number only had made good their landing. Lieu- tenant Angus concluded, and not unreasonably, that Captain King had anticipated him in the retreat ; and accordingly embarking his party, returned to the Navy-Yard, near Black Rock. Boerstler's adventures, on this occasion, had in them little of interest, with respect either to what was done, or what was suffered. Mistaking some- what the point of attack, he effected his landing with three boats out of seven, and without the loss of a man. The British guard being a small one and soon routed, the pursuit was continued towards the bridge, (the destruction of which formed the principal object of this part of the enterprise,) but being now informed by a prisoner, that " Ormsby was in full march, and nearly approaching it,'* the Colonel contented himself with detaching a Lieu- tenant and a few men, to effect its destruction ; and retiring with the mass of his party to the shore, entered his boats, and recrossed to Squaw Island. The return of both Angus and Boerstler, in a total ignorance of what had befallen their comrades of the expedition, could not fail to create much disqui- etude in the army ; and induced Colonel Winder to offer himself, with another small party, to go in quest of them. But on approaching the Canada shore, and finding the British batteries re-established and sustained by a body of infantry, he returned to Black Rock, with a loss of six killed and twenty- mj wuuxiucvU ■iV*l m , j^H IL ''I^E :| *^ 7 ^^^1 ' 'U t. 1 :»• 1 , r " I ^■t V ! i ■ 112 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. The result of the enterprise, though sufficiently indicative of the error committed, in departing from the letter, as well as the spirit of the orders given by the government, had no tendency to quicken the General's appetite for a second experiment, upon a larger and more efficient scale. He even now be- gan to doubt, whether the force present and willing to co-operate with him, amounted to the number prescribed by his orders as necessary to invasion ; nor did he forget the use, that in his piesent extrem- ity, might be made of the second injunction of the government, that «« no attempt at invasion should be hazarded, without the advice and approbation of his principal officers." While, therefore, he ostensi- bly prepared for a second attack at another point, and with his whole force, he secretly held a council of war, in which, under different motives,^ it was agreed, that " the further prosecution of the present plan of invasion, should be abandoned." This de- cision was promptly followed by a general order, putting an end to the campaign, and directing the' army to be placed in winter quarters; when, to complete the gasconade, a flag was despatched to 1 Councils of war are famous for giving bad advice, and hence the maxim adopted by Eugene and Frederick, that the General who resorts to them, seeks only an apology for dobg nothing. The deci- sion in this case, was, however, taken on a diflerent principle from that assumed in the precedmg maxim ; it aro»i not from a dislike of an efficient course, but fiom a want of confidence in the skill and viffor of the GeneroL * NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819. 113 Fort Erie, requiring an immediate surrender of that post, and its garrison. The temper discovered by the militia and volun- teers, on this termination of the campaign, was highly insubordinate and disgraceful — the General was hissed and hunted from one hiding-place to another ; and at length, compelled to fly for safety to his own home, in Virginia. In noticing this cir- cumstance in his official report, he says — " It has been in the power of the contractor's agent to excite a clamor against the course pursued. He finds the contract a losing one at this time, and would wish to see the army in Canada, that he might not be bound to supply it." Such wa,a the veil, with which he endeavored to cover his own follies and faults. During these occurrences, the main army, occupy- ing a position on the eastern side of Lake Cham- plain, and commanded by the senior Major-General in person, continued to slumber on its arms, though both the time, and the policy of adopting measures of offence, had been distinctly indicated by his own increasing strength,* by the continued weakness of ■, i. %*l ,f 1 On the 26th of September, 1812, there were within district No. 9, commanded by General Dearborn, 13,000 men of all arms. On the Niagara, 3,300 regulars, and 3,000 volunteers and militia; at Sacket'a Harbor, 200 regulars, and 2,000 militia; and on Lake Champlain, 3,000 regulars, and 2,000 militia. Throughout the campaign, Pro- vost's regular force, covering a frontier of 900 miles, and extending from the Sorel to Fort St Josephs, did not exceed 3,000 men. See Colonel Cochran's statement, Appendix No. 13. The British commander was, of course, unable to occupy the Isle aux Noix, during the campaign of 1812, or to obstruct the roads leadins to MontreaL from New- 10* • •' ■« •■ 114 NOTICES or THE WAR C!? 1812. his enemy, and lastly, by the urgent character of the orders given him, — " not to lose a moment in at- tacking the British posts in his front,** ^ — ^yet in despite of considerations so numerous and imperative, no movement of any kind, in the direction of the enemy, was made, till the 20th of November ; — and what then was hazarded, was on a scale so small, and for an object so unimportant, * as rendered this last act of the campaign, though less disastrous, quite as ridiculous as any of its predecessors. Of this movement, the historian of the war in the Canadas, offers the following details ; which we the more readily adopt, because, not differing materially from those given by our own functionaries, they dis- tinctly show the feeble character of Provost's out- posts, and the small disposable force with which he York and Vermont. Three gun-boats sent out from England, for the defence of the Sorel, could not be employed for want of seamen, till June, 1813. About this time, a small re-enforcement arriving from New-Brunswick, the old fortifications on the Isle aux Noix, were re- paired, and the position occupied by a detachment under the command of Colonel Taylor.— Sec life and service of Sir George Provost, and ChrisHe's History of the War in the Canadas. At any time, therefore, during the autumn of ?812, this important post, emphatically called the key of Central Canada, might have been seized and held by the American General, without loss or risk of any kind ; as besides abun- dant means, strictly military, he was authorized, about the middle of October, to buy and equip such number of vessels, as would secure to the United States a decided ascendency on Lake Champlain and the Sorel. » For the orders given to General Dearborn, during this period, see Appendix, No, 14. 8 This mighty object was the destruction of a blockhouse, occupied by a sma'! party of Indians and Canadian militia. NOTICES OP THB WAR OF 1819. 115 was able to sustain them, when in November, 1812, he expected the attack of an army of ten thousand men. " The American army under General Dearborn," says Mr. Christie, " now gradually approached the frontier of Lower Canada ; and on the 17th of No- vember, Major Salaberry (commanding on the lines) received information that this army, to the number of ten thousand men, were advancing to Odletown. He immediately despatched two companies of Volti- geurs and three hundred Indians, to the support of Major La Force ; who, with two companies of the embodied militia, formed the British outposts on the La Cole. The day following. Major Salaberry with the remainder of the Voltigeurs, a corps of Voyageurs, and four companies of Ciiasseurs, advanced to the neighborhood of the menaced points. By this time the American army occupied the town of Champlain, two or three miles from the line, and a serious inva- sion was now momentarily expected ; but nothing of any consequence occurred till the 20th, when be- tween three and four o'clock, A. M., the Americans were discovered fording the La Cole. The guard- house was soon and completely surrounded ; when the British militia and a few Indians, who were with them, rushed from it, broke through the American line and escaped unhurt. In the meantime, a second party of the Americans now advanced, and mistak ing those in possession of the ground for the British picket, a smart firing between the two ensued, which continued for nearly half an hour ; when being un- r. V'. f I in' ■-J i )%• 4] ^ -t: m if- 116 a. -i NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1812. i I ^ w , iU NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. ment, " the remainder of the brigade should land on the opposite shore, fight its way into the camp, and thus favor a sortie to be made by the garrison upon the third, and only remaining British battery." This plan, no doubt, indicated military character, (combination and enterprise,) and was only objec- tionable from the confidence it reposed in a militia, ignorant of the art of war, and likely from personal habits, to be as insubordinate, as they were unskilful. Still, trie first steps of the detachment were, if not circumspect, particularly fortunate ; for neither its landing, nor its approach to the batteries, was seen or suspected by the enemy ; and so utterly uncov- ered were their redoubts, that Colonel Dudley, the officer commanding the enterprise, was able to make himself master of two of them, without losing a man. But here, good fortune and discretion alike abandoned the Colonel and his followers ; for, in- stead of confining their attention, as ordered, to the destruction of the enemy's artillery, and the security of their own retreat, they inconsiderately engaged in a bush-fight with a few straggling Indians, who thus contrived to amuse them, until Proctor had time to interpose a strong corps between them and their only means of retreat. The result was such as may be readily imagined, partaking less of the character of defeat, than of destruction ; for of the eight hundred combatants, numbered in the morn- ing, but one hundred and fifty escaped captivity or slaughter, ^ The undetached portion of Clay's brig- l Harrison's Report, dated May 5th, 1813. NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 125 ade, (led by Colonel Boswell,) though resisted by the savages, effected its object, with little of either loss or annoyance ; while a detachment from the seventeenth and nineteenth regular regiments, aided by a few volunteers and militia, gallantly assaulted and carried the battery on the eastern bank, made a number of British soldiers prisoners, and handled roughly, such Canadians and Indians as came to its support. Though, on the whole, the fortunes of the day were such as furnished the enemy with pretensions to a victory,' still the siege, in many of its circum- stances, was marked by facts, which, whether con- sidered separately or together, extinguished in the British commander, every hope of eventual success. No part of his calculations had hitherto been veri- fied ; his batteries had not only failed to make any serious impression on the American fort, but had all, in succession, been wrested from him ; and were at last, but partially recovered through an error of his enemy not likely to be repeated. His allies, also, were found to be incompetent to the service assigned to them ; they neither did, nor could, so invest the American camp, as to intercept or even seriously impede the junction of re-enforcements ad- vancing to its aid ; and at last, becoming weary of a service, little adapted to their personal habits and military usages, they no longer disguised their inten- tion of speedily abandoning it. If to these motives 1 Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 14th June, 1813. 11* '{ ili- P1 > 'n 'i;-' ! ;N: 126 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. for discontinuing the siege, be superadded the fact, that information of General Dearborn's successful descent at York, in the month of April, had already reached the British camp, we cannot wonder, that Proctor should deem it prudent to abandon all fur- ther prosecution of his designs, and regain, as quickly as possible, his position at Maiden. But to this course, however expedient, physical impediments had now arisen : his artillery being of large calibre, could not be transported by land ; and the wind blowing strong from the north, prevented its movement by w^ater. To fill up the pause thus made unavoidable in his operations, and to cover at once the defeat of his general object, the retrograde movement he now contemplated, and the apprehen- sion excited by the probability of Indian desertion and American attack, he h'ad recourse to negotiation. The form given to this, was the blustering one em- ployed against Hull — affected humanity, ridiculous menaces, and insolent demands. Despatching a flag on the evening of the 3th, he required the immediate surrender of the American post and army, as " the only means left for saving the latter from the toma- hawks and scalping-knives of the savages." Har- rison's answer to this proposition was sufficiently manly and decided. Considering it unworthy of a more serious notice, he but adverted to its folly, and admonished Proctor, " not to repeat it," — thus leav- ing to his adversary the choice of continuing the con- test, or, failing to do so, of virtually acknowledging his weakness or his fears. In making this election. A.. T NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 187 Proctor did not hesitate long or seriously ; the tone and object of his first message, were immediately abandoned, and a simple proposition for an exchange of prisoners, substituted in its stead. Bungling and lil-disguised as these expedients were, they became to the enemy, active and useful auxiliaries ; and appear to have effectually concealed his real pur- poses, until, « a change of wind and a general move- ment in his camp," made them apparent to all. But it was now too late to profit by the discovery ; at twelve o'clock the whole • .rmament, with the excep- tion of the Indians, (who had gone off on the 7th and 8th,) was found embarking and rapidly descending the river. Harrison's presence on the Miami being no longer necessary, he now hastened back to Sandusky and Franklintown, to organize the means indicated for prosecuting his part of a new plan of campaign, having for its objects — 1st. The reduction of Kingston and York on Lake Ontario, and of forts George and Erie on the Ni- agara ; and 2d. The capture of Maiden, and recovery of Detroit and the Michigan Territory.* In prosecution of the former, two modes of pro- ceeding, differing as to time and means, were prescribed to Major-General Dearborn. The one, (founded on the supposition that Kingston might not be accessible at that season of the year to the '■..H !■ . 1 « ■ ! JM*] 'k ST* ,- See Appendix, No. 14 1^. r \ 1 t ^'"■ 128 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819. approacliesof infantry and artillery,) made provision, that the movement should not be attempted until the navigation of the lake should cease to be impeded by ice ; when, by a joint operation of the fleet and army, Kingston, York, and fort George, should be attacked in succession, and in the order in which they are here named. The other, resting on the contrary supposition, that no important impediment arising from snow or ice would obstruct movements exclusively military, directed, that the two brigades wintering on Lake Champlain, and amounting to twenty-five hundred combatants, should be placed in sleighs, and moved under the command of Colonel Pike, by the most eligible route and with the greatest possible rapidity, to Kingston ; where (being joined by such force as could be brought from Sacket's Har- bor) they should, by surprise or assault, carry that post, destroy the shipping wintering there, and sub- sequently be governed by circumstances, in either retaining the position or in withdrawing from it." Though neither of the movements prescribed by these views of the subject was objected to on the ground of any great or unavoidable difficulty in its execution,' some reports of the increased strength of the enemy, and of an intention on his part to attack 1 General Dearborn's letters of the 18th and 25th of I-'ebruary. In the former he says, " Nothing shall be omitted on my part, in endeav- oring to carry into effect the expedition proposed ;» and in the latter he adds, "Chauncey has not returned from New- York. I am satis- fied that if he had arrived as soon aa I had expected him, vs'e might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ; but liis presence was necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines." m NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 129 Sacket's Harbor, got up by Provost ns a mere ruse to conceal his own weakness and fear?,' were unfortu- nately mistaken by both the Major-General and the naval commander, as furnishing sufficient authority for altogctlier dispensing with the movement pro- posed to be executed by Pike ; and for so fur changing the prescribed order of proceeding in the other, as to make Kingston tlie last ol)ject of attack, instead of making it the first.* In prosecution of this inverted plan of campaign. General Dearborn (embarking sixteen hundred rank and file of the army) sailed from Sacket's Harbor on the 25th of April, and on the 27th arrived off York, k 1 Provost, alarmed for the safety of his western posts, prorogued the legislature on the 22d of February, and set out hastily for Kingston. That he brought no troopp with him, and even took from Prescott an escort to protect him in what remained of his journey, are f;«cts well ascertained. Yet was this, and ether similar movements, mistaken for evidences of the mar^h westward of large re-enforcements. See Appendix, Nos. 16 and 17. 2 " To take or destroy the armed vessels at York, will give us the complete command of the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with liim ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara and attack fort George by land and water; while the troops at Buffalo cross over, carry forts Erie and Chippewa and join those at fort George, and thence, collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature deUberation, the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself, as tlie most certain of ultimate success."— General P'o^bom^a qfficial letter to the War Department. PresidenVt Message, 31st Jan^ nary, 1814. To this change of plan the President gave his approba- tion, from a belief, that " being on the spot, the General and Com-, modore were most likely to be possessed of tlae information which should govern in the case," f II ii! 130 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. the capital of Upper Canada and the headquarters of General Sheafe. The d< /ences of the place were few and feeble, composed of two or three earthen redoubts, four hundred regular troops, an equal number of embodied militia, and between forty and fifty Indians. Positions having been given to such of the armed vessels as were destined to ^over the landins;-, and take part in the attack of the batteries, the debark- ation of the troops began about 8 o'clock, A. M. Forsyth and the rifle corps, forming the head of the column, were the first to make the experiment, and after much effort effected a landing ; not, however, as was intended, at the bite of the old French fort Toronto, but at a point, more than a mile farther westward, " thickly covered with brush-wood, and already occupied by British and Indian marksmen." In the contest that followed, FoiLvlh lost some men, but no credit ; and being speedily sustained by Ma- jor King and a battalion of infantry, and soon after by the presence of General Pike and the arrival of the main body, the enemy were driven from one po- sition to another, and at last compelled to seek shel- ter in their redoubts. Of these, the first approached by the assailants, made little resistance ; as the oc- cupants, perceiving the storm that awaited them, made haste to abandon the work.* The second, presented an aspect of more firmness ; but discon- i The Grenadier company of the sixteenth, commanded by Captain Walworth, was proceeding to the assault, when the redoubt waa rbandoncd. X, NOTICES OF THE WAR Ob 181:1. 131 diiuiiig its lire suddenly and entirely, Pike concluded, and not unreasonably, that his untagonist, by so acting, sought the means of making an overture of surrender ; and in this belief, halted his troops at the distance of sixty rods from the battery, when a magazine exploding, burst on the head of the col- umn, spreading its mischief far and wide ; killing and wounding more than two hundred men, and creating in the remainder, much temporary alarm and confusion.' Of this circumstance, Sheafe, the British comman- der, was careful to avail himself. Collecting what of his regular force remained, and leaving to their own resources the civil authorities and embodied militia, he began a hasty retreat in the direction of Kingston. The assailants, w^ho in the meantime, had re-established their order, and resumed their march, were yet in a condition to have overtaken the fugitives, but unfortunately, their gallant leader had fallen a victim to the explosion ; the General- in-chief, was yetonboard of the fleet ;« and Colonel Pierce, who thus fortuitously became the command- ing offiGer, being wholly uninstructed as to the orders or views of either, permitted himself to be amused by proposals for a capitulation, forbidden alike by the » Sheafe asserts, that the explosion was the effect of accident ; and states the loss sustained by the garrison in consequence of it, as a proof of the fact a Dearborn, in his letter of the 28th of April, says,—" I had been induceJ *o confide the command of the troops in action to General Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated." f.l I. I 132 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. liil .1 4 ^. laws of war and the policy of the nnouiont ; and thus gave time to Sheafe and his followers, not merely to elfect their escape, but to destroy, as they went along, a ship of war on the stocks, and a mag- azine of military and naval stores in the harbor. The defence of the town being no longer practi- cable, a surrender necessarily followed, by which it was stipulated, that the militia and others attached to the British military and naval service, should be paroled ; that private property of every kind should be respected, and that all public stores should be given up to the captors. These last, according to the report of the General, consisted of an " innnense depot of supplies, military and naval, and a sloop of war repairing for service."^ The enemy's loss on this occasion, amounted in killed, wounded and ta- ken, to five hundred men ; that of the Uniled States, in killed and wounded, to tliree hundred and twenty. The first object of the expedition being thus ac- complished, the troops were immediately re-embark- ed, in the hope that they would be able to proceed to the second and more important, without loss 1 Of this immense dep6t, we hear nothing further from the General, excepting that "so great was its magnitude, that the fleet could not carry the whole away," a fact the loss to be regretted, as wJiat they did carry with them, was burnt with many other stores at Sacket's Harbor, through a misconception of the naval oflScer having charge of the magazines. Our trophies were fewer, but better taken care of. — One regimental standard taken, was, (by some strange confusion of ideas,) sent to the Navy department ; and one human scalp, a prize made, as we have understood, by the Commodore, was offered, but not accepted, as a decoration to the walls of the War Office. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1818. 133 of time ; hut. ihe wind becoming adverse, it was not till the 8th of May, that they arrived off fort George ; nor until the 27th, that they were suffi- ciently prepared for the attack of that post.' At four o'clocic, A. M . of this day, the batteriea on the American aide of the Niagara being ready for action, the means necessary for transportation provided, and a considerable le-enforccnient of troo[>8 drawn from Sacket's Harbor, — the army, (now amounting to nearly six thousimd combatants,) began their move- ment in boats, along the lake shore, to Two-Mik- Run, the point designated for a general landing. When abreast of this, they rested on their oars, till the armed vessels had severally taken their covering positions, and the signal had been given for descent ; after which, resuming the movement, they pressed vigorously forward to the shore. At nine o'clock, the light infantry commanded by Colonel Scott, effected a landing ; and being speedily supported by Boyd's brigade, and a well-directed fire from the shipping,' were soon enabled to surmount the bank, [•' 1 This delay, was at one time ascribed by the General to some sins of omission, on the part of Generals Lewis and Winder, — and at an- other, to the late arrival of the fleet from York. 8 In Commodore Chauncey's report of this affair, he says, — " All the vessels anchored within musket-shot of the shore, and in ten min- utes after they opened upon the [water] batteries, they were com- pletely silenced and abandoned." Again ; " The enemy, who had been concealed in a ravine, now advanced in great force, to the edge of the bank, to charge our troops, [when] the schooners opened so well-directed and tremenJous a fire of grape and canister, that they [tlje enemy] soon retreated from the bank." 12 • / N 134 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. !i*» ■' k '•' !, V :if, l> i ■!'' ', ■ :| iipii '- break down the enemy's line in their front, and compel its scattered parts to fly in the direction of Newark and fort George. On approaching these, Vincent, the British com- mander, finding the former in flames, and the latter, nearly if not altogether untenable, wisely determined to hazard a retreat in the face of his enemy ; and by thus deserting his post, multiply the chances of saving his garrison. Fortunately for him, a contin- gency of this kind, was neither provided for in the original plan of attack, nor by any subsequent order given on the field ; and would, perhaps, have en- tirely escaped notice, had not Scott, from his advanced position, made the discovery, and deemed it his duty, to institute and continue a pursuit of five miles; not merely without orders, but in evasion of such as were given, until at last, a mandate reached him, of a character so decided and peremptory, as, by leav- ing nothing to discretion, could not fail to recall him to fort George. About the time of this last occurrence, the com- manding General, who had now landed from the fleet, received information, that Vincent, re-enforced by the garrisons of Chippewa and Erie, and a battal- ion of the eighth or King's regiment, had determined to risk a second combat for the defence of the pen- insula ; and that with this view, he had called in the miUtia, and was pressing forward to occupy a strong mountain-pass, called the Beaver Dams. Though much of this information was unwar- ranted, by any thing which had been seen of the •: '3 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 135 numbers, condition, or order of the retreating troops, and though directly contradicted by the report of an officer of the American staff;* still, receiving as it did the entire confidence of the General, an order was issued « for renewing the pursuit at daybreak of the 28th, in the direction of the Dams." Of this movement, we need only say, that it resulted in dis- appointment and mortification, — in disappointment, because on approaching its object, Vincent was not to be found ; and in mortification, because it was now evident, that the report, on which the move- ment was ordered, was a mere artifice employed by the enemy, to put the army of the United States on a wrong track, and thus enable Vincent to anticipate them in the possession of Burlington heights ; " a position," without which, according to his own statement, « he could neither retain the peninsula, nor make a safe exit from it." Under circumstances thus distinctly indicating the policy of the enemy, the American General could no longer mistake his own. We accordingly find him recalling the army, for the purpose of giving to their efforts a new and better direction. One chance, he eaid, yet remained — " embark the troops on board tlie fleet, and (should the winds be favorable) they will arrive at the head of Burlington Bay, before the British can reach it ; and we shall then close the campaign successfully." But to this arrange- r- i i I' ll i Letter from Major Van de Venter, A. O. M. G. to the War De- partment. I •J- %; t. n \4 r ■ ^ ■ Ill's. It" I' .* .1 S 4 iii iM 136 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1819. meiit, the assent of the naval commander was not less necessary than his own ; and though on the 29th, the Commodore saw no objection to the plan, he on the 30th, entirely changed his opinion ; and instead of lending himself to a co-operation that would in all probability have been successful, he de- cided on a movement principally naval in its object, and altogether useless in its effects.* Deprived as the General now was of the aid of the fleet, (which in his opinion furnished the last remaining chance of excluding Vincent from the heights of Burlington,) he was necessarily left to choose between the inaction of a campaign merely defensive on the strait, and the pursuit and attack of the enemy amidst the mountain gorges and defiles, in which they had wisely placed their safety. Of these alternatives, he on the 1st of June, adopted the latter, and accordingly despatched General Winder with a single and small brigade, amounting, m all arms, to somewhat less than eight hundred com- batants, to give it execution. This officer, in the progress of his march, was not long in discovering that the enemy's force was more formidable than had been supposed ; and very properly decided, to await at Forty-Mile Creek, the arrival of such re-enforce- ments as, on a representation of the preceding fact, the General might think proper to send to his aid.' t His object was the defence of his naval stores and the new ship then on the stocks at Sacket's Harbor— but for the protection of neither did he arrive in time. They were saved by Brown and the garason. • Bums reports the whole force (after Chandler's arrival) at ona NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 137 On the 3d of June, Brigadier-General Chandler brought up a second brigade; and understanding that Vincent occupied a strong camp, eight miles in his front, which he was every hour making stronger, the new commander determined to shorten the dis- tance between them, and bring him to action as promptly as possible. The division was accordingly put in motion in the direction of the British camp, and Stony Creek passed by the American advanced guard; between which and an out-lying British picket, a skirmish, of short duration and little im- portance, ensued. But as it was now sunset, the General found it necessary to halt for the night ; and proceeded accordingly to make the necessary dispo- sition of the troops, for passing it in safety. Taking the road as the centre of his line, he there placed his artillery, supporting it on the right by the twenty- fifth regiment, three companies of light infantry, and one of riflemen ; and on the left, by the fifth, six- teenth, and twenty-third regiments. Half a mile in his front, was posted a strong picket, and similar guards on both flanks and rear, with orders to send out frequent patrols. In addition to these arrange- ments, the thirteenth and fourteenth regiments, with Archer's company of artillery, were stationed near the mouth of Stony Creek, (for the better security of the boats and baggage ascending the lake,) and thousand three hundred men ; if, therefore, this report be correct, the force originally sent did not exceed eight hundred, nor the re-enforce- ment five hundred. 12* ■*''^*f'i 1 i %■ 1 • i ■i j H t '' * .J 1 1 - ! ; 1 * ll ''■ 1 1' ■ ' ' ', ' * ) r . ijl |, 1 A I 'I. ' i 1 j{ V'1 H . ll iiffi, V f ' 7 I I ili 138 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. in the rear of the whole, was posted the second regiment of light dragoons.* While Chandler was thus employed in securing his camp, Vincent, who now saw that to retain his present position (on which all his hopes of eventual success depended) another battle must be fought, was deliberating on the n>ode most proper for giving it ; and having found by a careful reconnoissance, inade early in the evening, that his enemy's camp- guards were few and negligent ; that his hne of encampment was long and broken ; that his artil- lery was feebly supported, and several of the corps placed too far in the rear to aid in repelling a blow, rapidly and vigorously struck at their front, — he wisely determined to hazard a night-attack, in the hope of effecting by surprise, what he despaired of being able to accomplish openly and directly. In pursuance of this plan, the British column (seven hundred combatants) began its march about midnight ; and prosecuting it with great silence and much general attention to order, it was able at three o'clock in the morning to surprise and capture every man of the American picket, without giving the slightest alarm to the main body. Nor were its subsequent movements less judicious, though fortu- nately, much less successful. Selecting the centre of the encampment for assault, two small demon- strations (the one, made on the extremity of the right I "This corps (the dragoons) lay at a considerable distance from the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed dia- gram." — General Lewises report, Hth of June. m' ■ A . hundred prisoners— among whom were found the two American Generals. How much farther the mischief might have been carried, but for one of those accidents common to night movements, can only be conjectured. Vincent, the British commander, quitting for a moment the track of the column which he had liitherto followed, lost his way ; and, as is not unusual in similar cases, every effort to recover it, carried him further from his object. It was not, however, until after Hervey's attack had succeeded, that he was missed; when (having been sought for without success) it was not unreasonably concluded, that a fortune, similar to that which had befallen Chandler, had awaited him.* Hervey, finding himself in this new and unexpected situation, prudently determined to make sure of the trophies he had won ; and, accordingly, began his retreat under cover of the night, leaving to his enemy, the care of his wounded, the burial of his 1 "Hearing a firing in the rear, I instantly ordered Colonel Milton with the fifth, to fonn in otir rear, near the woods.»'— Chandler's report. « "He was found the next day, four nules from the scene of action, without hat or horse." — Lewises Report. ■ISIt-f-, i li i' .f" ; : ! -.Iwb Wi ii I i ' I I' »■ 140 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. dead, and one hundred privates of the eighth and forty-ninth regiments. Though at daybreak, the American army was found to have sustained some diminution of its nume- rical force,' still, as this was not such as made retreat either necessary or expedient, an order for renewing the pursuit of the enemy, was both desired and ex- pected — but as the capture of Chandler and Winder had unfortunately devolved the command on an officer of cavalry, having no confidence in his own capacity for directing infantry movements,' a coun- cil of war, to whom the question was submitted, advised " the immediate retreat of the army to Forty- Mile Creek, there to await the further directions of General Dearborn." This officer, who, from ill-health and other causes, had uniformly committed the direction of field-opera- tions to subordinate agents, seeing nothing in the circumstances of the moment, to render necessary a departure from his ordinary practice, satisfied his sense of duty, by despatching to the army. General Lewis and the sixth regiment, with orders to bring the enemy to action, as promptly as possible. This new commander reached his destination at five o'clock, P. M., and found the troops encamped 1 The loss of the American anny in this action was small, " much less than that of the enemy:'— Report of Colonel Burns. s « Had either of the Generals remained in command, or, if Colonel Burns had been an officer of infantry, the enemy would have been pursued and cut up."— Dearborn's Report of June the Glhyto the War Department, Si. »' si i 4> T' "iiw NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 141 on a plain, "at the foot of a perpendicular mountain of considerable height," whence, at six o'clock, the British fleet was discovered, shaping its course in the direction of Vincent's post; — a circumstance, forbidding, as the General believed, an immediate movement upon that officer, and making it proper that the American army should retain for the night its present position. At daybreak, on the 8th, the hostile armament was found "in a dead calm," about a mile from the shore, and abreast of the camp ; while an armed schooner, towed forward to a station favorable for the purpose, opened a fire on the American baggage and boats, drawn up on the beach. But a few discharges of hot-shot, soon con- vinced the British commander, that the experiment was not likely to turn out advantageously, and thus hastened the recall of the schooner to the fleet. It was under these circumstances, by no means inauspicious to the eventual success of the expedi- tion, that an order was received from General Dear- born, directing the immediate return of the troops to fort George ; from an apprehension, (founded on the appearance of two British schooners apparently em- ployed in examining the shore,) " that a serious attack on that post was meditated by the enemy." This ill-judged order was scarcely executed, when it was found that the "minute examinations" made by the British schooners, had an object very different from that, which the General in his alarm, had as- cribed to them. Having in an hour or two, suf- ficiently ascertained, "that no American vessels, 'U. •f • i * I I 1 l| . < f * I.' . ^ I. t [I, 142 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. remained in or near the mouth of the Niagara,' they hastened back to their fleet ; which, after land- ing the supplies and re-enforcement it had carried to Vincent, repaired to the southern side of the lake, and was there, (according to Provost's statement to Lord Bathurst,) " usefully employed in intercepting provision-boats, going to fort George."^ The tranquillity, which followed the preceding alarm in the American camp, was unfortunately permitted to become an absolute sleep of fourteen days ; of which, the British commander was careful to avail himself Advancing his main body (now re-enforced by a battalion of the hundred and fourth) to Forty-Mile Creek, he thence pushed forward a party, under the command of Colonel Bishop, " to seize and fortify such mountain passes, as would best secure his own position ; and, at the same time, so circumscribe the range of the American troops, as to compel them to live on their own resources."* In pursuance of these directions. Bishop began by establishing two posts on the lake road, and one on that of Queenstown ; the garrisons of which, with the aid of preconcerted signals, could be readily brought to sustain each other. The American General, awakened at last by a report of these encroachments, thought it expedient, on the Q3d of June, to despatch Colonel Bosrstler, at the head of six hundred men of all arms — dragoons. I Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 3d of July, 1813. i Idem. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812, 143 artillerists and infantry, to strike at the Stone House, (one of tlie posts established by Bishop,) about two miles beyond the Beaver Dams, and seventeen from fort George. The result of the movement was such as might have been foreseen. Boerstler was per- mitted to reach the Dams without annoyance, but having neither reserve to sustain, nor demonstration to favor him, he was surrounded by enemies, to whom (after three hours' useless fighting) he surren- dered himself, and his party. ^ The reader will recollect, that before General Dearborn thought ii safe to attack fort George, he withdrew from the garrison of Sacket's Harbor, the whole of Chandler's brigade, and six companies of Macomb's artillerists, serving as infantry — the effect of which, with the absence of the fleet, left the post (important as it was) in a condition decidedly weak. Provost, whose public duties brought him to Kings- ton, about the time of this occurrence, was soon made acquainted with it ; and believing that it fur- nished a favorable occasion for retaliating the blows sustained at York and fort George, and for perma- nently settling the doubtful question of naval ascen- dency on the lake, he hastened to organize an expedition, having for its objects, " the capture of the harbor and naval stores, and the destruction of the new ship General Pike, then on the stocks." Fortunately, the disposable force, under the direc tion of this functionary, was, at that period, not i <»<' «M. 1 For Bcerstler's detailed account of this affair, see Appendix, No. 24. # ,1 I*, ■ il <• fi il 11^ 1 i f? v>»' lU 144 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. hi' 1 fc il redundant ; and on actual muster, could be made to amount to but seven hundred, rank and file.^ With this small force, a few artillerists and two pieces of light ordnance, embarked on board of small vessels and convoyed by the fleet, the British commander-in-chief began his movement on th« 27th of May — "intending to reach the harbor in the night, and at daybreak in the morning, to as- sault and carry the place by surprise.'"* Retarded by baffling or adverse winds, it was not until ten o'clock, P, M. of the 28th, that he arrived within striking distance of his object ; and then, under cir- cumstances, which had entirely changed the rela- tions as to force, previously existing between himself and his enemy. Unable to make the movement covertly, as he had expected to do, some of even his first steps were discovered by the younger Chauncey; who, while hastening back to his post, fired signals of alarm — which, taken up by the guns of the fort, and thus extended to the country, had the effect of bringing together by mid-day of the 28th, six hun- dred militia in aid of the garrison ; and with them, a leader, both sagacious and intrepid, who, hke Cincinnatus, was found at his plough.* 1 The detachments employed in the attack of Sacket's Harbor, were, "one company of the one hundredth, one section of the Royal Scots, two companies of the eighth, four of the one hundred and fourth, two of the Voltigeurs, and one of Glengary light infantry, with two six-pounders and their gunners." a Bayne's Official Report, May 30th, 1813, and "Life and Services of Sir George Provost" • General Dearborn, commanding the district, Colonel Backus, NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 145 General Brown, the person of whom we speak, having a perfect knowledge of the ground on which he stood, was at no loss to discover the point at which the enemy would attempt to disembark ; or the route, by which, after landing, he would endea- vor to reach the forts. His dispositions were made accordingly; to the volunteers and militia forming the first line, was assigned the duty of meeting and repelUng the descent of the enemy from his boats ; while midway between the shore and the village, and on ground made difficult of approach by an ab- batis, was placed the second line, composed of regular troops,' amounting to four hundred com- batants, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Backus. Still further in the rear, were a few artillerists, charged with the custody of the forts, which, in the General's plan of defence, formed his dernier resource. Such was the disposition made of the small Amer- ican force, when at daybreak of the 29th, the enemy's fleet was seen in line, between Stony Point and Horse Island ; and his troops, in small craft, covered by gun-boats, making for the southern side of a sandy ridge, thrown up by adverse currents, and occasionally forming a causeway between the island k..- ■ 4 senior officer of the United States troops at the Harbor, and Major Swan, acting Adjutant-General, had previously united in urging General Brown, a militia officer residing in the neighborhood, to take the command, in the event of an attack on the post 1 Detachments from the first dragoons, ninth and twenty-third infantry, and a few artillerists. 13 '.A r. if 146 NOTICES JF THE ^'AR OF 1819. and the main land. To m* ot this movement,* the volunteer regiment atationed on Horse Island, waa promptly withdrawn, and made to take a position on the shore, adjacent to tiiat occupied by the mi- litia ; when orders were given to both corps, " to conceal themselves as much as possible ; to reserve their tire until the enemy's approach should enable them to count his coat-buttons ; and, if driven from their ground, to rally in the adjoining wood, attack the enemy's flank, and, if imable to stop him, to retire on the left and recir of Colonel Backus's posi- tion, and there await further t.trders." Unfortunately, no part of these directions ^^ as complied with. A fire, much at randpm and ;^iven prematurely, was followed by a flight, nearly ^eneral, of both parts of the first line, and with such determination to avoid new dangers, that every attempt at rallying either, proved unsuccessful." For this unmanly and unexpected conduct on the part of the militia and volunteers, the General found himself greatly consoled by the coolness and courage of the regular troop?, who, though compelled to abandon their first position, hastened to occupy 1 "It was my intention to have landed in the cove, formed by Horse Island ; but on approaching, we discovered that the enemy were fully prepared, with a very heavy fire of musketry, supported by a field- piece. I therefore directed the boats to pull round to the other side of the island, where a landins; was effected in good order, and with little loss."— B«t/ne's Repm-t, jMay 30th, 1813. s General Brown's official letter, of June 1st, 1813. The only ex- ception to this conduct ni tiie militia and volunteers, was found in the parties headed by Captains McNitt and Collins. NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 147 another, which, in their \u\mh became iiDprognnble j and soon hroii.irht ili<; British commander to the con- clnsion, that "the reputation and interest of his Majesty's arms, would be best promoted by an im- mediate retreat."' Tliis was accordingly ordered and executed ; Icavini^, as was his custom, his killed and wounded on the field of battle, as new subjects for the exercise of tlie humanity of his antagonist. On this fortunate issue of a business, involving so many high interests, and so little promising in the outset, we fmd but one drawback— the burning of the naval stores, storehouses and barracks — an effect of false information, imprudently given and too has- tily believed, by the officer charged with the custody of these buildings. The aflair of Sacket'^i Harbor was followed by an attack of similar character and fortune, on Black Rock; and which, 'hough having liule, if any bear- ing i the progress or issue of the war, may, not- withstanding, be entitled to a brief notice. Colonel Bishop, commanding the elite of General Vincent's division, encouraged as well by the diminished strength, as the uniform inaction of the American army, pushed his enterprise onward to the Niagara, sfiPl » " At this point, the further 'nergies of the troops became unavail- ing; the block-house and atockadod battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them. Seeing no object within our reach, that could compensate for the loss we were momently sustaining, I directed tlie troops to form on the crest of the hill ; and from this position, we were ordered to re-embark." —Bayne' RerwrL ■") Ml ."', f/^.'. It* » *iM :1 I I?' '0 148 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813. and finding fort Erie without a garrison, hastened to re-establish himself in that post. Being now within sight of Black Roclc, and informed that it was the depository of a considerable quantity of public stores, he determined to make it a visit ; and on the 11th of June, crossed the river at the head of two hundred and fifty men, of the eighth, forty- first, and forty-ninth regiments. The militia in charge of the place, and nearly as numerous as the enemy, being non-combatants,^ withdrew at his ap- proach, and permitted him to execute his purposes without hindrance or molestation. Having at last accomplished his objects, spiked the heavy cannon, carried off the light ones, loaded his boats with flour and salt, and burned to the ground, both barracks and block-houses, he withdrew to the shore, with the intention of embarking himself and his party, when he discovered, that he had yet, like Csesar at Munda, to fight for his life. A report of the predatory character of the expe- dition, spreading rapidly through the country, had the effect of assembling at Buffalo, about one hun- dred and fifty United States infantry, as many militia and a few Indians, who immediately set out to re- capture the public stores, and punish the invaders of the soil. For the first of these purposes, their arrival was too late — the plunder having been al- t An effect of the eastern doctrine (on the causes and character of the war) industriously circulated in the northern and western frontiers of New- York. f' >'.( I ^f* NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812 149 ready secured; but for the last, it was yet in good time, and after a contest made as brief by the fall of Bishop, as it had been vigorous while he lived, the British party was compelled to fly to their oars and recross the river; leaving behind them nine of their number killed and fifteen wounded. At other points, the enemy pursued his purposes with better effect ; and at last, virtually reduced fort George from a fortress, into a prison, with limits, little, if at all exceeding the range of its cannon. To account for a state of things so unexpected, and falling so far ^hort of the promises held out by the General and the naval commander, when they began the expedition, we subjoin the following ex- tract from an official despatch of the former, of the 20th of June. « From resignations, sickness, and other causes, the number of regimental officers pres- ent and fit for duty, is far below what the service re- quires. A considerable portion of the army being new recruits, and the weather very unfavorable to health, the sick have become so numerous, in addition to the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far below what could have been contemplated. The enemy have been re-enforced with about five hun- dred men of the one hundred and fourth regiment ; whence I conclude, that he will endeavor to keep up such a plan, at, and near the head of the lake, as will prevent any part of our force in this quarter from joining, or proceeding to Sacket's Harbor, for the purpose of attacking Kingston ; and such is the state of the roads in fhi« flnt munfrv i^ nr^r^^'^n^^r^^a 13* \\\ ' i- ■ m I ' ■ I ■ f! S 150 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813. of continual rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult, without the aid of a fleet, for the transportation of provisions, ammunition and other necessary supplies. Tiie enemy would probably retreat on our approach and keep out of our reach, being covered by one or more armed vessels. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake." » The accounts of the General's health, were not more encouraging than that given of the condition of the army. In a letter of the 4th of June, he says, — " I am still very feeble, and gain strength very slowly." June the 6th, " I never so severely felt the want of health as at present ; a time when my services might perhaps be most useful." June the 8th, "My ill state of health renders it extremely pain- ful to attend to current duties, and unless it improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some place where my mind may be more at ease." June the 14th, "General Dearborn, from indisposition, has resigned the command, — not only of the Niagara army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service."'* "As the Gen- eral is unable to write, 1 am directed to inform you, that in addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with, he has, within the last twenty-four hours, experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his 1 General Dearborn's letter to the War Department, of the 20th of June, 1813. 2 General Lewis's letter of the 14th of June, to the Secretary of War. I NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 151 It cannot be thought extraordinary, that under circumstances so alarming, as well in relation to the Oreneral as to the troops, an order should have issued on the 6th of July, recalling the former from the command of the district - and enjoining on his suc- cessor, « not to prosecute any offensive operation, until our ascendency on the lake was re-estaWished." Remarks. We have seen that, by the plan of campaign prescribed to General Dearborn, Kingston was made the first object of attack ; after which (i( successful) the army should proceed to the reduction of York, fort George and fort Erie. This arrange- ment, so far as regarded the order of attack, was recommended by considerations the most decisive • inasmuch, as the ^ tire of the first named of these posts, would have involved that of the British fleet (then frozen up in its harbor;) the entire separatior! of Lower from Upper Canada ; the necessary fall of all military and naval armaments within the latter, 1 Letter from Colonel Connor, Aid-decamp of General Dearborn, of June the 12th, to the Secretary of War. 2 TWs act of the Executive autliority, originated with that portion Ot the Houae of Representatives most active and influential in support- ing the war ; who, believing that habitual ill-health on the part of the General, disqualified him from such a discharge of his duty as the exigencies of the seiVice required, deputed Messrs. Clay and In<.ersoll to represent Uieir views on the subject to the President. Mr. Monroe became the medium of communication between these gentlemen, and Mr. Madison, coinciding in their opinion, soon after directed the Gen- eral's recall. m r I ii 152 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. and a speedy termination of the Indian war in the west— advantages not to be expected from the most successful operations against York, fort George, or fort Erie. Nor will it appear that on receiving this order, the General put a different estimate on the practicability of the project, or on the value and importance of the objects it presented. In his letter of the 18th of February, he says—" Nothing shall be omitted on my part, in endeavoring to carry into effect the ex- pedition proposed ;" and in that of the 25th he adds, "Chaunceyhas not yet returned from New- York ; if he had arrived as soon as I expected him, we might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ; but his presence was necessary for having tlie aid of the marines and seamen."^ Unfortunately, this coincidence of views between the government and the General was of short duration. On the 3d of March, be became " satisfied, on information, (as he declared,) entitled to full credit, that a force had been collected from Quebec, Montreal and Upper Canada, of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston; and that an attack would be made on Sacket's Harbor within forty-eight hours, perhaps sooner." Again, on the 9th, (though then entertaining doubts whether 1 What an extraordinary reason to be given by the commanding General of an army and district, (of which Sacket's Harbor made a part,) for omitting to execute an order directly emanating from tho President of the United States ! Did Mr. Chauncey leave tlie fleet without a commander de facto ? And if not, what rendered his au- thority over seamen and marines less efficient than that of the Com- modore. ^.„; NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1819. 153 Provost would hazard an attack,) he announces to the government, that "this unexpected movement of the enemy, would effectually oppose the measures contemplated on our part." And in conformity with this^ desponding view of the subject, a council of war, held on the 1 5th of March, decided, that - no attempt upon Kmgston should be made before the naval force could act ;» or, in other words, before the lake was navigable ;--a decision, which, besides puttino- an end to Pike's expedition on the ice, gave to Provost all he wanted-an entire month to strengthen his de- fences, and a thaw, to restore Yeo and his fleet to their ordinary activity and usefulness. After thus demol- ishmg the most important part of the plan of cam- paign. It was not to be expected that what remained of It would be treated with more ceremony « To take," says the General, «or destroy the armed ves- eels at York, will give us the complete command of the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike ; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara and attack fort George by land and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry forts Erie and Chippewa and join those at fort George, and then collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston After the most mature deliberation, the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as the most certain of ultimate success.^'^ " I Of this plan, we have the following estimate by General Pike and other. "The opinion of General Pike, founded on a knowledge 01 (jreneral Dearhnm'a infpnHf-'i > c ^ • .. *= ifuenacu luuvemwiis, is, mat our country ia i; I' 154 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. ii: It will not be easy, perhaps impossible, to give any sufficient reason for the course thus recommended, and eventually adopted, by the two commanders. If they continued to believe, that Provost had assem- bled from "six to eight thousand men at Kingston, for the express purpose of attacking and destroying Sacket's Harbor," as stated by the General in his despatch of the 3d of March — what could justify a project on their part, which would necessarily ab- stract a large portion of the military and the whole of the naval force, from this menaced point ? If, on the other hand, they had ceased to give credit to a fable so absurd, (which is most probable,) and had returned to the opinion, that " the garrison of Kings- ton was weak,"^ why not return also to the intention of carrying the attack on that important post, and thus have fulfilled the original plan of campaign 1 It now but remains for us to show, that the infor- mation taken by the General as the guide of his opinions and conduct on this occasion, was wholly unfounded. Our proofs on this head are, I. "That Provost, on arriving at Prescott, borrowed from that post an escort of soldiers, to prevent his being kid- napped on his way to Kingston"* — a fact, utterly in- again doomed to defeat, if the operations now meditated by the Gen- eral are attempted to be accomplished. The opinion is also prevalent with the best officers, that no conquest of character will be made, if your plans of invasion be subject to the continual wavering of the commanding General." — Letter from Major Van de Venter, D. Q.M. G., of the SUt March, 1813, to the Secretary of War. 1 General Dearborn's letter of the 14th of February, 1813. 8 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. JOl. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 155 consistent with the story of his having brought with him, large detachments from Quebec and Montreal ;» 2d, that Proctor, Barclay, Vincent, and Sheafe, so far from being in a condition to yield any aid to the supposed project of an attack on Sacket's Harbor, were themselves in great want of re-enforcements— the former, postponing on that account, an attack which he had been ordered to m ke on Perry's fleet, while fitting out at Presque Isle ;« 3d, that when late in the month of May, the British commander-in-chief (mdured by the continued absence of the American fleet and army at the head of the lake) made an attack on Sacket's Harbor, he was unable to bring agamst that post, more than seven hundred combatants, —a conduct, utterly unaccountable in an old soldier' having at his disposition a corps of either six or eight thousand men ; 4th, that the maximum of the British regular force at Kingston, in 1813, was one thousand men— a fact ascertained by the late Major-General Brown during the war, and subsequently, on a visit to that place.^ And lastly, that Sheafe's papers, taken at York and examined by the late Colonel Connor, Aid-decamp to General Dearborn, « showed satisfac- torily, that the garrison of Kingston, during the winter and spring of 1813, was weak, and much below the force necessary to its defence.''* 1 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 101. 2 Letters of Prevost and De Rottenburg to Proctor and Barclay. Appendix, No. 19. ^ 8 Appendix, No. 16. < Appendi.x, No. 17. >c;i v»¥ 'It I ill In; 156 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. II. The error next in date, as well as in magni- tude, was that of omitting to make any competent provision for preventing the escape of the two British garrisons, the one from York, the other from fort George ; an object, which, had it been accomplished, would have given us a complete command of the peninsula, and necessarily prevented those blunders and misfortunes, the occurrence of which, so com- pletely verified the prediction of the much and justly lamented Pike. Had the commander-in-chief in the first of the above mentioned cases, been on the field of battle or near it, or had he made Colonel Pierce acquainted with the orders given to Pike, (as he ought to have done,) the unnecessary delay made in the pursuit of the enemy would not have occurred ; and in this case, Sheafe and his followers would, in all proba- bility, have been overtaken and captured. Again, in the other case, if, instead of concentrating his whole force, naval and military, on the water-side of the enemy's defences, he had divided the attack, and made Chandler's brigade, Macomb's regiment, and Burns's cavalry, with a few pieces of artillery, cross the Niagara below Lewistov^rn, and advance on fort George by the Queenstown road, the invest- ment of that place would have been complete, and a retreat of the garrison impracticable. That this important duty should have escaped the General's notice is the more extraordinary, as the Secretary of War, in a letter of the 15th of May, 1813, had suf- ficiently apprised him of what would be the obvioua %'. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 157 policy, and probable conduct of bis adversary, should he find himself compelled to choose, between giving up his fortress, or saving his garrison.* III. To correct the preceding error, the army was ordered to march on the 28th, to the Beaver Dams, in the belief that Vincent, after calling in his outposts, would make a stand at that point ; but, unfortunately, though the pursuit was right, the direction given to it was wrong. Of the two routes in the General's choice, that known by the name of the Lake-road, would have placed him two miles in Vincent's front ; and would of course, have compelled that officer (had he committed the blunder ascribed to him) to fight a battle, with a force greatly supe- rior to his own, when, on the contrary, if approached by the Queenstown route, a direct and uninterrupted retreat would have been left open to him. IV. The effect of this false movement, besides unnecessarily trying the strength and patience of the troops, was the loss of tw^o entire days to the pur- suit. Two others (the army being now recalled to fort George) were given to the consideration of some expedient, which should best indemnify us for the time and labor thus thrown away. The Gene- ral's own wish, was to avail himself of the fleet, to carry the army to Burlington Bay ; but the high destiny of that arm, on this, as on a later occasion, gave it a different and less useful direction. Left, therefore, without a choice of measures, he at last adopted one, (a march on the enemy by the Ljike- 1 AppendLt, No. 18. 14 MV: r> ft- . I it ' ■ i , i ii :.: m 1*\ * 158 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. road,) which ought to have been taken at daybreak of the 28th. But here, the General defeated the wisdom of his own decision by the means employed to execute it ; for, instead of sending a force com- petent to the service required, he on the 1st of June, under some extraordinary delusion, despatched only a single and small brigade to combat a force, which, according to his own estimate on the 28th of May, required the pi* sence and co-operation of nearly the whole army. V. Doubting, at last, the sufficiency of Winder's brigade, the General on the 3d of June, despatched a second, which, with its precursor, reached Stony Creek in the evening of the 5th, when it was de- cided that the army should halt for the night. Chandler, who was now the leader of the enter- prise, finding himself but six miles from the enemy, concluded, and not unreasonably, that if Vincent intended to give battle, he would make the attempt during the ensuing night; and under this impres- sion, hastened to call into exercise all his general- ship to meet that contingency. Pickets were ac- cordingly placed in front and rear, and on both flanks ; while a chain of sentinels encircled the camp. Yet, with all these precautions, the camp was surprised, a portion of its artillery taken, and one hundred prisoner- made, among whom, were the two Brigadiers. A misfortune like this, mus* have had a cause, or causes, worth inquiring into , with regard to which, we offer the following sug- gestions : — • NOTICES OP THE WAK OF 1812. IM Ist. « If a General take a position in the neigh- borhood of an enemy, from whom a niglit-aftack may be expected, his fir^i care oncrht to he, to keep his force together, and so pUiced, that its several parts may be promptly brought to sustain each other." This maxim does not appear to have been eufliciently attended to. The thirteenth and four- teenth regiments, composing the boat and baggage guard, w re stationed three miles from the encamp- ment; and the cavalry so placed as to be unable to act.i Wliy the position given to the boat-guard, had not been taken as the ground of encampment for the whole detachment, is not very apparent ; for here, besides the advantages of concentration, the General would have found himself three miles nearer his object ; on the very route, by which he intended moving in the morning; and with flanks and rear, well secured by the lake and the creek, against the night-attack he expected.'* 2d. " It is not enough that patrols and pickets be established againsi night-attacks. These parties should be frequently visited by the General himself, or by some one- of his stnff, who will be careful to enforce the orders already giv^n, or issue new ones accommodated to such change of circumstances as may have arisen in the case." Had such a super- vision been exercised on the present occasion, it is quite impossible, that an entire picket would have •J "i\*\ i%<* i I Bums's Report to General Dearborn. * Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the 18tli of June. •5: S i I*. ■ ! M Is t II • I '■■■ ' 1 %4 m ii 160 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. been caujrht asleep on its post; or that fires, ordered to be extinguished in the evening, should liuve been found burning at daybreak.' 3d. " In night operations, when the eye can do little, false attacks may be mistaken for real ones — but even in this case, the ear of a practised soldier cannot long be deceived — for if the onset be neither vigorous nor extended, it may at once be considered as false." Vincent's demonstrations were of this kind, few and feeble ; and making no serious im- pression but upon the two Generals — who, mistaking them for the main attack, dre^\ off the fifth regi- ment from the centre of the line, and thus left the artillery unsupported. 4th. The next blunder in this comedy of errors, must be ascribed to Burns, on whoni the command of the army had devolved, in consequence of the capture of Chandler and Winder. When, at day- break, this officer was called to exercise his new functions, he found, as he tells us in his official report, that " all the views of the enemy had been completely frustrated ; himself obliged to fly, leaving the field of battle covered with his dead and wounded, and more than seventy men, principally of the forty- ninth, made prisoners :" while, on the other hand, the troops of the United States had suffered little loss, were in perfect order, and entirely in condition, had not both Generals been taken, to have pressed Vincent to a second combat, the issue of which. i Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the IStli of Junet. I I' NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819. let would not have been doubtful. Yet, in despite of all these discoveries, our modest cavalier (from sheer diffidence in his own capacity to direct infintry movements) refused to avail himself of the advan- tages he possessed, and, instead of 1< nger pursuing the objects of the expedition, turned his bacit at once on Vincent and victory, and hastily nMired to Forty-Mile Creek ; thus practically contradicting his own official statements, and giving to the affiiir of Stony Creek, the nsw and unmerited cliaructv-i of a pos live I'ofeat on our part. 5t i. But 'ittle more mismanagement was now wanth o, to Jake the campaign of 1813, as much a subject of ridicule at home, and contempt abroad, as that of the preceding year. Nor had we long to wait for such new instances of misconduct, as could not fail to produce this degrading eflect. On the 6th of June — the day on which Burns was flying, when none pursued — an order was received from the commander-in-chief, recalling without loss of time, the whole army to fort George, and virtually abandoning all tlie objects of the campaign. Nor was even this ill-judged movement executed, with- out a disorder which entailed upon it, the loss of " twelve boats, principally laden with the baggage of the army."' These events were soon known and justly appre- ciated by the British commander, who, advancing as we retreated, was willing on the 20th of the \. * 1 General Lewb's Letter of the 14th of June, 1813. 14* m . % I ! ; 1 i ' I I 162 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813. month; to hazard the elite of his army (about five hundred combatants) within stroke of his adver- bary.* Every just view of this circumstance, indi- cated the wisdom of immediately assailing this corps ; the capture, or destruction of which, would have effectually defeated the present views and future operations of Vincent. But unfortunately, though the General adopted this opinion, he altogether failed, as in other cases, in the employment of means, proper for giving to the experiment a suc- cessful issue. Instead of placing, as he ought to have done,^Scott and Miller at the head of fifteen hundred men each,' and moving them by a night- march and the shortest route on De Coos's station, he despatched Bcsrstler (an oflScer not distinguished by any prior service) with five hundred and forty effectives only, by the Queenstown road, in open day, without reserve or demonstration of any kind, either to sustain the attack, or cover the retreat !' i The Stone House, called De Coos's station, was seventeen miles from fort George. s The effective strength of General Dearborn's army, amounted at thii time, to three thousand five hundred combatants. rt. A' I ■I ' i NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812» 163 CHAPTER VI. ■jf. Mil Second investment of Fort Meigs.— Gallant defence of Fort Stephen- son.— Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie.- Capture of Aro- herstberg.— Recapture of Detroit and the Michigan Territory.- Har- rison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor.- Arrival of a part of the Western Army on the Niagara. Alarmed by the reports in circulation of Perry's progress in building and equipping armed vessels at Presque Isle, Proctor and Barclay, early in the spring, projected an attack on that post ; but for this pur- pose, an augmentation of their several means was deemed indispensable. The General, accordingly, called for a re-enforcement of regular infantry, and the Commodore, for an additional number of practised seamen; but though the enterprise was promptly ap- proved by Provost, and entirely conformed to views previously given by him, so weak at the moment was the British central division on Lake .Ontario, that an immediate compliance with either branch of the requisition was impracticable ; nor was it till about the 10th of July, that "sixty seamen and four hundred infantry" could be sent to the division of the west.^ In the meantime, to avoid a state of inaction, and 1 K>ss tetters of Pfovost and De Rottenburg, Appendix, No. 20. 'M* r. I * ii > u I ^'li p " ; !!l:i!| 1 ! i 164 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. to give employment, in particular, to a great mass of restless Indians, which had been assembled at Maiden in March and April, Proctor began the cam- paign with a demonstration on fort Meigs, from which he expected the following results; 1st, That Clay, and his garrison, made up of insubordinate militia, might be provoked or seduced to quit their intrench- ments, and take the risk of a field-fight with him and Tecumseh ; and 2d, that by seriously alarming Har- rison (then at Lower Sandusky) for the safety of his outpost and stores on the Miami, that officer would be induced to march to their defence ; and thus losing the power of sustaining fort Stephenson, Cleveland and Presque Isle, render certain and easy the capture of those places.^ With these views, the British commander began his movement at the head of a force, regular, militia and Indian, amounting to four thousand combat- ants ;^ with which, on the 22d of May, he appeared before fort Meigs. But perceiving early, that his stratagem in relation to that place, was not likely to succeed, and that what remained of his plan might be jeoparded by delay, he on the 28th, raised his camp ; sent back a part of his allies to Maiden, de- tached another and larger portion to watch and way- lay Harrison, and with the residue of his force, white and red, hastened to the attack of Lower Sandusky. Nor could circumstances more propitious be imag- ined, than those under which he found this nominal 1 See letters of Provost and De Rottenburg, Appendix, No. 19. S Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 117. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 165 fortress, — injudiciously placed and badly constructed, neither finished nor furnished, and even stripped of a part of its ordinary armament, — with a small garrison not exceeding one hundred and fifty men, under orders to retreat, "should the enemy approach in force and with cannon, provided a retreat should then be practicable.^^ Fortunately for the credit of the American arms, the first step taken by Proctor was that of isolating the fort by a cordon of Indians; thus rendering the retreat of the garrison highly perilous, if not imprac- ticable, and leaving to the commander a choice only between submission and resistance. In making" this selection, the young and gallant Crorhan did not hesitate ; «rjd to the demand of a surrender, enforced by the usual menace ' indiscriminate slaughter in case of refusal, he answered substantially, — that the defence of his post was a point of honor, which could only be satisfied by an actual experiment of the rela- tive force and fortune of his antagonist and himself. While this negotiation was in progress. Proctor was employed in landing his artillery and giving it a position in aid of his gun-boats ; from which, on the delivery of Croghan's answer, a heavy fire was opened and continued on the fort, with little if any intermission during the night. At daybreak, a second battery of three six-pounders was established within two hundred and fifty yards of the pickets ; and about four o'clock, P. M., it was found that the whole fire of the British cannon, was concentrated on the north- west corner of the fort — a circumstance, sufficiently ,'#" 1?^ ,. i *:r ' -f 1 li; ^ .i 1 i j i i 1 c. •li II; ' Ifli 1^ I' li M J* Ifl. ' I'i 166 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. indicating the point and species of attack meditated upon it. Major Croghan, accordingly, hastened to employ such means as he possessed to strengthen the menaced angle,* and had barely executed his purpose, when the enemy (covering himself with smoke) was seen rapidly advancing, and but a few paces distant from the pickets. A general and well- directed fire of musketry from the garrison, which immediately followed this discovery, had the effect of checking his progress and considerably disturbing his order ; but the latter being speedily restored, the movement was resumed, and the ditch reached and occupied by the head of the column. It was at this critical moment, that Croghan's single piece of artil- lery, charged with grape-shot and so placed as to enfilade the assailants!?, opened its fire and with such effect, that in a few minutes, the combat was virtu- ally ended and the battle won.'' Most of the enemy who had entered the ditch, were killed or wounded ; and such of them as were less advanced and able to fly, sought safety in the neighboring woods — carry- ing with them no disposition to renew the attack, and strongly impressing their Indian allies with their own panic. Proctor now saw, that all attempts to rally the fugitives were hopeless ; and that to avoid a greater calamity,^ his most prudent course would 1 Bags of flour and sand. 2 The cannonade and bombardment lasted thirty-six hours. * A fear that Harrison would quit his camp at Seneca, and pounce upon him in his then crippled state. It is worthy of notice, that of these two commanders, (always the terror of each other,) one, was NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 167 be, to re-embark what could be collected of his force, red and white, and return immediately to Maiden. His retreat began accordingly at three o'clock in the morning, leaving behind him a note, recom- mending to American humanity the burial of his dead and the care of his wounded. The enemy's movements not immediately requir- ing further attention from General Harrison, he now became actively and exclusively occupied, in bring- ing together such militia, in aid of the regular troops assigned to his command, as was deemed competent to the objects of the campaign. To this service, the popular and patriotic Governors of Kentucky and Ohio lent themselves freely and successfully ; and by the 15th of September, the army collected on the southern shore of Lake Erie, and destined to a new invasion of Canada, amounted to more than seven thousand men. Nor was the naval and auxiliary armament con- structed at Erie, more tardy in its movements. On the 2d of August, the vessels were brought over the bar; and on the 5th, were in condition to offer battle to the enemy's fleet. This challenge being declined, a second experiment, made with the same view on the 7th, had a similar result. It was, however, soon found, that Barclay's hesitancy had not arisen from any settled purpose of avoiding a combat, but merely to supply a defect in the necessary preparation of his now actually flying from his supposed pursuer ; while the other, waited only the arrival of Croglian at Seneca, to begin a camp-con fkgration, and flight to Upper Sandusky. :\': W J'i 1*. i> '■SMk liV 168 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. ships. At sunrise of the 10th of September, he was seen bearing down from Maiden in the direction of Put-in Bay, whither Perry hastened to foliow and to fight him. The relative force of the two flee is, was not v/idely different — that of the Bniish, was composed of two ships, two schooners, one brig, and one sloop, car- r5ang sixty-riiree guDs (twelve, eighteen and twenty- four-pounders) with five hundred and eleven seamen and marines ; while tiiat of siie United Slates, con- sisted of three brigs, two scijooner-, and four sloops, mc'Un(ing fifty-four carronades, and manned by four huudred seamen and marines.^ In command of iht fojiiter, was a distinguisiied veteran of the Nel- son school, to whom all the secrets, real and pre- tended, of naval tactics, musl have been intimately known ; while, at the head of the latter, was a youth "whose home had long been on the deep" — glowing with patriotism and courage, but having no experimental knowledge of battles fought in squadron. As if in some degree, to compensate this and other points of disparity, the wind, which early in the morning blew from the south-west, shifted to the south-east, and gave to the American fleet the weather-gage. Availing himself of this advantage, perhaps with too little attention to the sailing qual- ities of his smaller vessels. Perry, at a quarter before twelve, placed the Lawrence in a position to begin 1 'McAjik.^'i Ilwtor/. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 169 an action, which, for pertinacity and effect, will rank high in the annals of naval warfare. Finding, after an experiment of ten minutes, that the distance he had taken was better adapted to his enemy'a guns than to his own, he made sail ahead ; soon after which, to his great mortification, "the brig became unmanageable — every brace and bowline being, in the meantime, shot away." Yet in this crippled condition, she gallantly " sustained the contest for more than two hours," ai canister dis- tance ; when ■* every gun she had, being rendered useless, and a large portion of her crew killed or wounded,"' her commander transferred himself and his flag on board the Niagara, which, at this critical moment, a gust of wind had brought to his aid. A movement was now wanting that should give to the conflict a decided character and favorable issue ; and this. Perry hastened to employ. At forty-five minutes past two, the smaller vessels having got into line, the signal for close action was made ; when the Niagara, bearing up and passing the Detroit, Queen Charlotte and Lady Provost, at half pistol-shot distance, poured into them a most de- structive fire from her starboard guns ; and from her larboard battery another of equal execution, on the Chippewa and Little Belt. What yet remained to be done, was soon accomplished by the gun-boats, under the skilful direction of Captain Elliot ;* the %-'^fi '*.» I ' I Perry's official letter, dated September 13th, 1813. S Idem. 15 ;l .if i IS*. '' 'iih i » 'fi' ^i 170 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. flags of the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Lady Provost, were struck in quick succession ; those of the brig Hunter and schooner Chippewa, were not slow in following the example ; and the Little Belt, which now attempted to escape, was promptly pur- sued and soon captured. Such was the termination of this well-fought and decisive battle — brilliant in itself, having the most important bearing on the issue of the campaign, and requiring nothing to complete its glory, but the humble and pious grati- tude with which it was announced. The road to Maiden being no longer obstructed by the enemy, the commanding General now has- tened to avail himself of the first impression made on Proctor by this naval victory. Embarking the army on the 27th, he on that day sailed under con- voy of the fleet for the Canada shore ; which, from the favorable state of the wind and weather, he was enabled to reach at three o'clock, P. M. No enemy appearing to interrupt the debarcation, it was safely and promptly made, and the march continued to Amherstburg, where the troops bivouacked for the night. It was here, that General Harrison first learned, that Proctor, after dismantling Maiden, burning the barracks and navy-yard, and stripping the adjacent country of horses and cattle, had early on the 26th, began his retreat into the interior of the province. Though no time was lost in resuming the pursuit in the morning, still, reasoning from the urgency of Proctor's motives for a speedy flight, and the ample '' f |H h ♦ ' NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 171 means he possessed for executing it successfully, the movement was made without the smallest hope that the American army could, by any cHbit, be able to overtake him.» This desponding view of ihe busi- ness, which, had it continued longer, would no doubt have verified itself, was fortunately much dimin- ished, if not entirely removed, (soon after the arrival of the army at Sandwich,) by finding, that the want of horses, which, in the General's opinion, rendered the pursuit hopeless, would be well and abundantly supplied by Johnson's mounted regiment, which was now seen winding its way along the opposite bank of the Detroit.* Two days were now employed in re-establishing (he civil government of the Michigan Territory, and assigning to it a defensive corps ; in organizing a portion of the army for rapid movement, and in giving to the whole of it an order of march and battle. It was not, therefore, until the 2d of Octo- ber, that the pursuit was resumed, nor until the 5th, that the enemy was overtaken. On this day, he was discovered in a position skilfully chosen, in relation as well to local circumstances, as to the character of his troops. A narrow strip of dry 1 General Harrison's letter to the Secretary of War, dated Septem- ber 27th, 1813. In this letter, the General says— "I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of overtaking him ; as he has upwards of one thousand horses, and we have not one in the army." « This corps had been organized by direction of the War Depart- ment, for frontier defence, in the spring of 1813, under the command of Colonel R. M. Johnson. »•! i\ ;% > '4 4 i ' -» ai J . ii ■1 172 NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. ground, flanked by the Thames on the left, and by a swamp on the right, was occupied by ])is regular infanti'- noimting to eif^ht hundred bayonets, sus- tainid >*y aiuiiery: while on the right flank, lay Tecnaiseh and his followers, on the eastern mai in of the swamp. After satisfying himself of these facts, General Harrison hastened to make such dis- position of his fo.ce, as, in his opinion, was best accommodated to the case. To Trotter's brigade of Kentucky volunteers, was assigned the front line, extending from the swamp to the road near the bank of the river. One hundred and fifty yards in the rear of Trotter, King's brigade formed a second line, of similar extent; and in the rear of King, Child's brigade was held in reserve. On the left of Trotter and covering his flank, Dei^ha's division, composed of two brigades, was posted in crotchet or en potence — while to the mountr I gun-nr> i, was assigned the duty of turning the right flank of the Indian position. This arrangement was scarcely announced, when two i'nporttint circ instances, which had either not been uitended tout all, or very negligent % were now fully ascertained ; the one, that the service assigned to the mounted regiment, was impractica- ble, from the miry character of the soil, md the number and clr enesp of the thicke's which cov- ered it ; the otj •, at Proctoi had neglected to strengthen the i. n v. his positit > with eiilier ditch or abbatis ; and had )esides, comuiUted the i^reater fault, of giving to his regular infantry a formatio- JTICE8 OP THE WAR OP 1813. 17S of open order. Acting on this state of things, which left no doubt of the true point of attack, or of the means most proper to be employed in making it, the mounted corps was now ordered to form in close column in front of the volunteer? , to advance ob- liquely in the direction of the British inf ntry, and after receiving their fire, to charge them at full speed. On examining the ground directed by the preceding order to be taken, the space was found to be too narrow for a useful employment of the whole regiment; when Colonel Johnson, in the exei\ .de of a discretion wisely left to him, separated the two battalions of which it was composed ; giv- ing to the one, the execution of the projected charge on the British infantry, and to the other, a simul- taneous attack on the Indian line. Of the two corps, the second battalion, "in four columns of double files," had advanced but a short distance, when it received the enemy's fire ; which, as might have been expected from men and horses unpractised in war, and brought for the first time into actual com- bat, produced a recoil in the heads of the columns. The disorder was, however, soon and completely relieved, and a second ^re sustained, with the sang froid of veterans ; when charge, as directed, wa? promptly and vigorously made, and with a suc- cess, sp 'lorn equalled and never surpassed. In " the Bing^*^ u mute of ime" which it occupied,* the vic- tory of the dnv we ^ essentially won, and nearly the .^ t Harn a*8 Official Report of the action. IS- w Ill * Mm IH 174 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. whole of the regular force of the enemy killed, wounded, or taken. The contest between the first battalion and the savages, was, like the preceding, sharp but short ; its duration not exceeding six or seven minutes. In this, the gallant Colonel John- son way uirice severely wounded ; and his not less gallant adversary, Tecumseh, the head and heart of the Indian line, killed on the spot he defended. Proctor, who had saved himself and part of his suite, by a base desertion of his troops, was now strenu- ously but unsuccessfully pursued. The chase was not, however, altogether barren; fifty additional pris- oners and six pieces of brass artillery were captured and secured. Thus fortunately terminated an expedition, the results of which were of high importance to the United States ; a naval ascendency gained on Lakes Erie and Superior; Maiden destroyed, Detroit re- covered. Proctor defeated, the alliance between Great Britain and the savages dissolved, and peace and mdustry restored to our widely extended and m:ich exposed western frontier. With the proud satisfac- tion of having contributed to these important events, the Kentucky volunteers began their homeward march, under the direction of their gallant and ven- erable leader, the late Governor Shelby. The attention of General Harrison and rommo- dore Perry, on getting back to Sandwich, was for a moment, attracted to measures necessary to the reduction of Michilimackinac ; but the weather be- coming stormy, and the navigation of Lake Superior m l¥ !'': NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812. 175 dnngerous, tlie project wns nhnndoner], nnd nnolhei niul betler siibHliluied in its siead. Leaving to General Cuss and liis brioade tlie defence of Detroit, the residue of the re«rular troops, amounting to thir- teen hundred men, were promptly embarked nnd brought down to Hufliilo, wliere they arrived on the 24tli of October. In taking this step, the General had anticipated (lie wishes of tlic Secretary of War, wlio, in a despatch of tlie 22d of October, suggested' as an uherior operation for the army of the west, a movement to the Niagara, and an attack of the right and rear of De Rottenburg's position ; while McChne's mihtia and Porter's volunteers should assail it in front— a measure, the execution of which was oidy prevented by tiie slowness with which both corps assembled for tlie purpose ; by the reported movement of the enemy from the peninsula to Kingston ; and by the risk arising from any great accumulation of force at that post, to our naval depdt at Sacket's HarI)or, in the absence of the army, which was now moving in another direction.' The better to obviate this cause of alarm, the Secretary of War directed, that McArthur's brigade should be reniuved, as promptly as miglit be conve- nient, to the harbor ; intending by the limitation thus given to the order, that Smith's battalion of riflenricn -hould be left to make part of the garrison I See Appendix, No. 24 1 1 NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1812. of fort George, and the defence of the Niagara fron- tier; instead of which, both corps were brought down the lake by the General, who, hastening his return to the west, soon after closed his military career by a resignation of his commission. Remarks. This third and last campaign of Gen- eral Harrison, though in its issue highly important to the nation and honorable to its arms, would, in all probability, have had a termination as disas- trous as its immediate predecessor, had the General been indulged, as formerly, with a carte blanche in the mode of conducting it. It will be remembered, that in prosecuting the war in the west, the cabinet of 1812, limited the exercise of its authority to a mere designation of objects ; leaving to the knowledge and judgment of the commanding General, the selection of means, time and manner of pursuing them. The frequent and unexpected misfortunes, which in this and part of the succeeding year, befel the American arms in district No. 8, could not fail to suggest a change of this system, in two essential points — the exclusively military character of the armament : and the latitude, given to the General with respect to the number and kind of troops to be employed, and the time and mode of employing them,. A plan of campaign conformed to these general views, was accordingly prescribed, limiting the army to seven thousand combatants ; des- ignating Maiden as the object of attaoi; adding NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 177 to the military, a naval force ;^ and directing a move- ment of the former by water, instead of a land-march of "nearly two hundred miles''' through a swampy desert; in which, besides the ordinary impediments arising from roads and weather, it would, at every step, have been liable to the attacks, open and covered, of four thousand savages.^ 1 No efficient measures were taken by the government to obtain a command of the lakes, until October, 1812. A letter, written about this time, by General Armstrong to Mr. Gallatin, was probably the means of recalling the attention of th^ cabinet to this important sub- ject In this letter, the General stated the following facte—" that he was informed by Captain Chauncey, that as early as the 1st of July» Captain Woolsey had requested twenty six-poi; ndcrs, of which, there were more than one hundred in the navy-yard unemployed ; thi.. the intention of Woolsey was to arm such vessels of commerce, as could be found on the lake, and at Saclu t's Harbor, with the aid of which he would be able to get a complete command of the water, and that he (Captain Chauncey) not believing himself authorized to do more, had but referred the letter to the Secretary of the Navy, from whom no answer had been received." On these facts, the General subjoined the following opinions, that " it was not yet too late to accomplish Mr. Woolsey's object; and that the object in itself was of the liighest importance ; that besides giving us the advantage of an exclusive and unintemipted use of the Lakes for public ptirposes, it would effectually separate Upper from Loioer Canada, cut asunder the enemy's line of communication, and prevent Brock and Provost from succoring each other." Soon after the receipt of this letter, Commodore Chauncey received authority to build and equip, armed vessels on Lake On- tario ; and General Dearborn a eunilar authority, to arm and otherwise fit out for public service, such commercial craft as might be useful oa Lake Champlain, For another communication, involving this and other subjects, see Appendix, No. 22. a McAfije and Christie. The latter, residing in Canada, and hav- ing access to public functionaries, must be considered good authority with respect to the numbers with which the expedition begaii. i^- 1^ " II Ji I 11 ' i'l!' 111 I 178 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. To a strategic movement of this kind, expressly calculated to gain an ascendency on the Lake, and thus to neutralize the Indian part of the enemy's force, and secure to the American army a direct approach to its object, without expense, fatigue, or peril — no opposition, on the part of the General, was anticipated ; and the more so, as in December or January preceding, he had officially announced, that " if the government would employ naval means, all their objects could be accomplished, in the short space of two months in the sprlng.^^^ Yet, so vacil- lating was his judgment on this subject, that in March, 1813, he substantially revoked this advice, and did what he could, to obtain permission to con- duct the campaign by the old route, and in the old way.^ Fortunately, time, and the experience it brought with it, had lessened the weight of the General's opinions at Washington ; his suggestions on the present occasion, were, therefore, promptly and decidedly discarded, and a new order issued, for prosecuting the campaign on the plan given in March, which, as we have seen, terminated success- fully in August. Mr. Harrison's next error was of a character even more menacing than the preceding ; and but for the counteraction given to it by Major Croghan, must have been followed by disaster and disgrace — a con- 1 General Harriaon's letter to tlie War Dcpartincnt, of tiie 12th December, 1812. s Harrison's official letter, of the 17th of March, and answer of tho Sciretary of War, Appendix, No. 23. h ft ■ .U:: NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1«1:«. 179 elusion, abundantly established by the following facts. On the 21st of April, after inspecting the defences at Lower Sandusky, the General, in a letter to the War Department, denounced that post aa worthless in itself, and " impossible to save," and, therefore, " to be immediately stripped of its stores, and promptly abandoned on the approach of the enemy "^ Yet, on the 26th or 27th of July, though apprised of Proctor's coming, at the head of a force, esti- mated at five thousand combatants ; though having done nothing to render the place more defensible, and somewhat to make it less so ; though neither promising, nor intending to sustain it, should it be attacked; and though actually withdrawing hin»self and the army to Seneca, nine miles distant from it — yet, in despite of all these circumstances of inhi- bition, he placed in fort Stephenson a detachment of one hundred and sixty United States infantry, w'*h "a single and small piece of artillery, and seven rounds of cannon cartridges," under orders to retreat, if " the enemy landed in force and with cannon, provided retreat should then be practicable" We need hr.rdly remark, that an order of this kind, which put to hazard a detachment of this magnitude, in an untenable post, with few of the means necessary for meeting either siege or assault, and which forbade a retreat, while this could have been made with certainty and safety; and for a purpose altogether unnecessary, as he had already '? '.:* I Harrison's letter of the 2 1st of April, 1813. ill 180 NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819. concluded — that " coming by water, Proctor had not neglected to bring with him artillery''^ — was, in its whole bearing, a direct violation of every military rule applicable to the case. Nor was the General's subsequent conduct better conformed to their in- junctions. Having on the 29th, sufficiently assured himself with regard to the number and equipment of Proc- tor's force, and suspecting that this formidable array might he. directed against his own intrenched camp at Seneca ; he at once determined, " to collect and destroy his surplus stores, abandon his present posi- tion and make good a retreat to Upper Sandusky" —leaving to the fate that might await them, the settlements on the southern shore of the Lake ; the boats built and stores collected at Cleveland ; and Perry's fleet, then fitting out and nearly ready for service, at Presque Isle." But though willing and prepared to make these sacrifices, he could not but perceive that a mere presumption of danger to his own camp, would not justify the abandonment of Crogh m's detachment, without some effort on his part, to extend to it the eventual security he sought for himself. On this point, however, the General's 1 "As the enemy, coTiiag by water, could bring with facility any quantity of battering cannon against it, it must inevitably fall"— a fact assumed by the General, in the council of war, held on the cvenin<» of the 2dth.—Mc4ff'ee's History, p. 322. " 2 That this was the great object of the expedition will be seen by Provost's letter to Proctor, of tha 1 1th of July, and De Rottenburg's to Barclay, of the same month, Appendix, No. 19. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 181 sense of duty was soon satisfied ; forgetting alike the admonition contained in his first order to Crog- han, « mt to hazard a retreat in the face of an Indian investments'^ and the fact, now perfectly known to himself, that such investment did exist ;* he des- patched to that ofiicer a second order, for " an imme- diate retreat,"" at all hazards; indicating the route by which he was to make it, but taking no step to cover, or otherwise sustain the movement. And, as if the task thus imposed, was not in itself sufficiently peril- ous, he farther prescribed — that the garrison, instead of employing all possible means to mask the opera- tion, should begin " by setting fire to their stores and barracks,^^ and thus virtually announce their inten- tion to the surrounding enemy.* Fortunately, the great disposer of the events of this world, not unfrequcntly converts evil into good, and folly into wisdom. On the present occasion, we have seen, that by the first order given to Croghan, he was assigned to the defence of a post, which, in the GeneraPs opinion, " could not be saved,^' and at the same time, forbidden to retreat, in the face of an Ifndian investment ; and that by a second, he was or- dered to abandon this untenable post, and make good a retreat of nine miles, through a continuous forest filled with savages, without aid or support of any kind. Left, ' In Harrison's official letter of the 4th of August, he says — " Hav* ing heard the firing [at the fort] I made many attempts to ascertain the farce of the enemy ; but our scouts Wf.re unable to get near the fort, from the Indians who surrounded it.^^ « Second order given to Croghan, Appendk, No. 21. 1 R III ii « m 'I. ' 1^ i! ll I 1 1 182 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. therefore, to choose between taking the risk of a British assault, or an Indian massacre, this officer did not hesitate, and was thus compelled to disobey an order, which directly defeated its own object. Yet, under circumstances so unpromising, whether separately or collectively considered, results of the most benign character followed — the defeat of the enemy's objects, present and ^prospective, and the pres- ervation of our own army, from the disgrace of a waste- ful and unnecessary fights A word or two, at parting, on the charge made by a battalion of Johnson's mounted regiment, (un- equipped with either swords or lances,) on a corps of veteran infantry, well armed with muskets and bayonets, sustained by cannon, and numerically stronger than their assailants. That the charge was gallantly made, and eminently successful, {^win- ning the battle, as acknowledged by the General himself, "ma single minute, ^^) cani.ot be doubted; but to bestow on it, the additional praise of deserv- ing its good fortune, must depend on a single fact, whether the measure was, or was not, adopted under a sense of the advantage furnished to the assailant, by this error of his enemy ? If this question can be answered affirmatively, the merit of the charge will be greatly enhanced and fully established. The affair will no longer be subject to be classed with victories merely 1 Extract from Governor Duncan's report of the defence of San- dusky, by Major Croghan, made to Mr. Mercer, chairman of tho Military Committee of the House of Representatives, in 1834, Ap- pendix, No. 20. NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 183 Jortuifotis ; but take its place with those mspirations^ (as they have been called) of Turenne and Bonaparte, which, founded on the error of an enemy, and seen at a glance of the eye, could justify the most palpable de- viation from ordinary rules. Another and last question on this subject — On whose suggestion was the charge under consideration, made? Did the General, as he insinuates, "find the daisy all himself?" or, was the conception of the project, the legitimate property of Colonel R. M. John- son ? Non nostrum tantas componere lites.* Proctor's situation at Maiden (after Barclay's de- feat) made necessary on his part, a prompt retreat to Vincent, unencumbered with baggage ; or, a vigorous defence of the post committed to his custody. By adopting the former, he would have saved seven hun- dred veteran soldiers and a train of artillery, for the future service of his sovereign ; by adopting the latter, he would have retained the whole of his Indian allies (three tho.usand combatants) ; given time for the militia of the interior to come to his aid ; had the full advan- tage of iis fortress and its munitions — and a chance, at least, of ./entual success, with a certainty of keep- ing inviolate his own self-respect, and the confidence of his followers. Taking a middle course between ' The affair more particularly alluded to in this pasfsage, is the attack and capture made of the Spanish batteries, planted on the crest and covering the ascent of the Sommo-Sierra, by the lancers of the Imperial guard, in 1808. See Napier's Peninsular War, Vol. I, p. 402. * Appendix, No. 21. Ill ',§' i U' 184 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. these extremes, he lost the advantages that would have resulted from either. His retreat began too late— was much encumbered with women, children, and bag- gage, and at no time urged with sufficient vigor, or protected with sufficient care. Bridges and roads, ferries and boats, were left behind him, neither de- stroyed nor obstructed; and when, at last, he was overtaken and obliged to fight, he gave to his veterans a formation, which enabled a corps of four hundred mounted infantry, armed with rifles, hatchets, and butcher-knives, to win the battle « in a single minute." Conduct like this, deserved all the opprobrium and punishment it received, and justly led to General Har- rison's conclusion— that "his antagonist had lost his senses." ,1* APPENDIX. n ii ■Hi * I i tP« ""l^i ^ii ii ill :"H;!ii \ %■ APPENDIX. . ^ o. 1.] The ministry oi j elder Adams in England, began on the 10th of Jun. , 1786. In a letter to the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the 19tli of July follow- ing, he says—" The popular pulse seems to beat high against America; the peoph" are deceived by numberless falsehoods circulated by the gazettes, &c., so that there is too much reason to beUeve, that if the nation had an- other hundred million to spend, they would soon force the ministry into a war against us. Their present sys- tem, as far as I can penetrate it, is to maintain a de- termined peace with all Europe, in order that they may war singly against America, if they should think it neces- sary." In a second letter of the 30ii of August following, he says — "In sh~rt, sir, America has no party at present in her favor— ai parties, on the contrary, have committed themselvcF gainst us — even Shclburne and Buckingham. I had almost said, the friendd of America are reduced to Dr. Price and Dr. Jebb." Again, on the 15th of Octo- ber, 1785, he informs the American Secretary — "that though it is manifestly as much the interest of Great Britain to be well with us, as for us to be well with them, yet this is not tlie judgment of the English nation ; it is 11 ^'- IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I »- ilM 2.5 2.2 1^ IIIIIM 1.8 IIIIIL25 11.4 11.6 V] <^ /2 7 y Photographic Sciences Corporation 33 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 '« :> « H 188 AFPENDIX. not the judgment of Lord North and his party ; it is not the judgment of the Duke of Portland and his friends, and it does not appear to be the judgment of Mr. Pitt and the present set. In short, it does not at present appear to be the sentiment of any body ; and I am much inclined to believe, they will try the issue of importance with us." In his two last letters, the one dated in No- vember, the other in December, 1787, we ^.nd the fol- lowing passages — " If she [England] can bind Holland in her shackles, and France from internal dissension is unable to interfere, she will make war immediately against us. No answer is made to any of my memorials, or letters to the ministry, nor do I expect that any will be done while I stay." [No. 2.] Letters from Colonel McKee (British Superintendent of Indian affairs) to Colonel England, dated 6th of July, and 13th and 30th of August, 1794, found among Proc- tor's papers, captured in 1813. — " I send this by a party of Saganas, who returned yesterday from fort Recovery, where the whole body of Indians, except the Delawares, who had gone another route, imprudently attacked the fort on Monday, the 30th of last month, and lost sixteen or seventeen men, besides a good many wounded. " Every thing had been settled prior to their leaving the Fallen Timber, and it had been agreed upon, to con- fine themselves to taking convoys and attacking at a dis- APPENDIX. 189 tance from the forts, if they should have the address to entice the enemy out ; but the impetuosity of the Macki- naw Indians, and their eagerness to begin with the nearest, prevailed with the others to alter their system ; the con- sequences of which, from the present appearance of things, may most materially injure the interests of these people ; both the Mackinaw and Lake Indians seeming resolved on going home again, having completed the belts they carried with scalps and prisoners, and having no provision there, or at the Glaze, to subsist upon ; so that his ma- jesty's post will derive no security from the late great influx of Indians into this part of the country, should they persist in their resolution of returning so soon. " Captain Elhot writes, that they [the British agents] are immediately to hold a council at the Glaze, in order to try if they can prevail on the Lake Indians to remain ; but without provisions, ammunition, &c., being sent to that place, I conceive it will be extremely difficult to keep them together. " I was honored last night with your letter of the 11th, and am extremely glad to find you are making such exer- tions to supply the Indians with provisions. Captain Elliot arrived yesterday; what he has brought will greatly relieve us, having been obliged yesterday to take all ihe com and flour wliich the traders had here. Scouts are sent up to view the situation of the [American] army, and we now muster one thousand Indians. All the Lake Indians, from Sagana downwards, should not lose one moment in joining their brethren, as every accession of strength is an addition to their spirits. " I have been employed several days in endeavoring to fix the Indians (who have been driven from their villages I ! ! :ii .M A i St.. . 4 190 APPENDIX. and cornfields) between the fort and the bay. Swan Creek is generally agreed upon, and will be a very convenient place for the delivery of provisions, &c. The last accounts from General Wayne's army were brought me last night by an Indian, who says, the army would not be able to reach the Glaze, beforo yesterday evening ; it is supposed on accoimt of the sick and wounded, many of whom they bury every day." [No. 3.] Letter from President Washington to Mr. Jay, dated 30th August, 1794. — " As you will receive letters from the Secretary of State's Office, giving an official account of the public occurrences as they have arisen and ad- vanced, it is unnecessary for me to retouch any of them ; and yet, I cannot restrain myself from making some obser- vations on the most recent of them, the communication of which, was received this morning only. I mean the pro- test of the Governor of Upper Canada, delivered by Lieu- tenant Sheafe, against our occupying lands far from any of the posts, which, long ago, they ought to have surren- dered, and far within the known, and until now, the acknowledged limits of the United States. " On this irregular and high-handed proceeding of Mr. Simcoe, which is no longer masked, I would rather hear what the ministry of Great Britain will say, than pronounce my own sentiments thereon. But can that government, or will it attempt, after this official act of one of their APPENDIX. 191 ' .1 f-- governors, to hold out ideas of friendly intentions towards the United States, and suffer such conduct to pass with impunity 1 " This may be considered as the most open and daring act of the British agents in America, though it is not the most hostile and cruel ; for there does not remain a doubt in the mind of any well-informed person in this country, not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we en- counter with the Indians, their hostilities, the murders of helpless women and children along our frontiers, result from the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this country. In vain is it then for its administration in Britain, to dis- avow having given orders which will warrant such conduct, whilst their agents go unpunished ; wiiilst we have a thousand corroborating circumstances, and in'^!'^;ed as many evidences, some of which cannot be brougut forward, to })rove, that they are seducing from our alliances, and endeavoring to remove over the line, tribes that have hith- erto been kept in peace and iricndshij) with us a* a heavy expense, and who have no causes of complaint, xci^t pretended ones of their creating ; whilst they .jtp in a state of irritation the tribes who are hostile to us, and are instigating those who know little of us, or we of them, to unite in the war against us ; and whilst it is an undeniable fact, thai they are furnishing the whole with arms, ammuni- tion, clothing, and even provisions to carry on the war. I might go farther, and, if they are not much belied, add, men also in disguise. " Can it be expected, I ask, so long as these things are known in the United States, or at least, firmly believed, and suffered with impunity by Great Britain, that there ever will or can be any cordiality between the two coun- \ 'if 192 APPENDIX. H- • tries? I answer — No. And I will undertake, withoUk the gift of prophecy to predict, that it will be impossible to keep this country in a state of amity with Great Britain long, if these posts are not surrendered. A knowledge of tliese being my sentiments would have little weight, I am persuaded, with the British administration, or perhaps with the nation, in effecting the measure, but both may rest satisfied, that if they want to be at peace with this country, and to enjoy the benefits of its trade, to give up the posts is the only road to it. Withholding them, and the consequences we feel at present continuing, war will be inevitable." f [No. 4.] Letter of credence given by the Governor-General of the Canadas to John Henry. " The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me, and full confidence may be placed in him for communications which any person may wish to make to me in the business committed to him. In faith of which, I have given him this, under my hand and seal, at Quebec, the 6th of February, 1809. (Signed.) J. H. CRAIG." Extract from the letter of instructions to Mr, Henry, [Most secret and confidential.] " Quebecy 6tk February, 1809. " It has been supposed, that if the federalists of the eastern states should be successful in obtaining that de- cided influence, which may enable them to direct the public APPENDIX. 193 ' -If opinion, it is not improbable, that rather than rubmit to a continuance of the difticulties and distress to which they are now subject, they will exert that influence to bring about a separation from the general Union, The eariiest information on this subject, may be of great consequence to our government, as it may also be, that it should be informed, hoio far, in such an event, they would look to England for assistance, or he disposed to enter into a con- nexion with us ?" Report made to Sir James Craig, under the preceding instruction, and dated Boston, March 7th, 1809. " Sir, I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course intended to be pursued by the measures and politics of the general government. I have already given a decided opinion, that a declaration of war is not to be expected ; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the Congress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in jeo^ rdy by so strong a measure, the legislature of JSIassachuseUs will give the tone to the neighboring states; will declare itself permanent, until a new election of members ; invite a Congress, to be composed of delegates from the federal states, and erect a separate gov- emmentfor their common defence and common interest." Time, that great betrayer of political secrets, has pro- duced a curious illustration of the opinion given by Henry in the preceding report. Mr. Adams, ci-devant President of the United States, in a late publication admits, that in 1808, " he earnestly recommended to the friends of the administration of that day, the substitution of the non- intercourse for the embargo ; and in giving his reasons for that preference, was necessarily led to enlarge upon the views and purposes of certain leaders of the party, which 17 1. j '•' I III i: 194 APPENDIX. had the management of the state legislature in their hands. He urged, that a continuance of the embargo much longer^ would certainly be met by forcible resistance^ supported by the legislature, and probably, by the judiciary of the state ; that to quell that resistance, (if force should be resorted to by the government,) would produce a civil war ; and that in that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the parly would secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain, That their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confedera- Hon, he knetofram unequivocal evidence, although not prove- able in a court of law ; and that in the case of a civil war, the aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose, would be as surely resorted to, as it would be indispensably necessary to the design.'' It would be unjust to the party, thus accused by Mr. Adams, were we not to add, that the expositions sub- sequently made on this subject, do not sustain the opinions given by that gentleman. [No. 5. J As a specimen of the temper of the opposition of that day, we subjoin the following resolution of the Senate of Massachusetts, passed on the 16th of June, 1813, in con- sequence of the capture of his His Britannic Majesty's ship Peacock, by the American ship Hornet. " Resolved, As the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that APPENDIX. 195 conquest and ambition are its real motives ; it is not be- coming a moral and religious people, to express any approbation of military or naval exploits, which are not immediately connected with the defence of our "-^acoast and soil.'* A further exposition of this temper will be found in on act of the legislature of Connecticut, declaring the law of the United States (authorizing the enlistment, of minors) unconstitutional and providing, that all persons acting under it within the state, should be punished by fine and imprisonment. The penal clause was, however, qualified at the instance of the Speaker of the House, and the punishment by imprisonment given up. About the same time, all troops of the United States were, by an act of the Corporation of Hartford, excluded from the city. Major {now General) Jessufs Report to the Department of State, 14-' ii'i •':^i [No. 6.] Our authority for making this statement will be found in the following extract from a letter of the 28th of Sep- tember, 1834, written by Major-General Jessup, of the army of the United States, ♦* As to the particular fact in relation to which you desire information, (the franking of the letters from which the enemy derived his knowledge of the declaration of war,) it rests on general report and Mr. Gallatin's admission^ (made to General Findley, in 1812,) that he had franked 1 1 j ll m liii >i i tl 1 !l r;si il 196 APPENDIX. letters addressed to persons in the enemy^s territory." Of letters, ao/ranked and addressed, three have been noticed ; one sent to the west, (probably to St. Joseph,) furnished the first authentic evidence of the declaration of war re- ceived there ; and with it a good and sufficient reason, for attacking and capturing Michilimackinac and its gar- rison. Such was the substance of a report made by Lieutenant Hanks to General Hull- and the officer then serving as his Adjutant-General. A second, sent to Mai- den, (according to information given to General Jessup and the late Major Dugan, while at tliat place,) was re- ceived by the British commanding officer, on the 2Sth of June ; and, no doubt, caused the attack and capture of the Cayahoga packet, carrying the sick and convalescent of Hull's army, with his and their baggage. A thirds reached Detroit, " was there retained and seen by many persons, among whom, was General James Taylor, of Kentucky." Whatever may have been the motive of the letter writer, the injury done to the United States cannot be denied — as its direct, if not obvious effect, was to take from them and give to the enemy, the power of striking the first blow — an advantage, which oflen decides the fate of a campaign, and not unfrequently, that of a war. [No. 7.] Memorandum of statements made by General Win- chester and Major Madison to the Secretary of War, on their return from captivity. APPENDIX. 197 ** To avoid embarrassing the service with a personal controversy, and at the request of General Harrison, though the elder Brigadier, I continued in the command of the advanced corps, then on the Au Glaize, under a promise on his part, that * I should be soon re-enforced and sufficiently supplied.' Early in December, I received orders to advance to the Rapids ; a point, selected by the General, for establishing a magazine for the supply of the expedition. From the freezing up of the rivers, which prevented the use of boats, and from not being provided with teams or pack-horses for transporting the baggage and provisions, and being consequently obliged to drag both by hand, over roads then deeply covered with snow, it was the 10th of January before we arrived at that post. When two days on the march, I received a letter from General Harrison, advising me to send back within con- tract limits, two of the regiments composing the brigade, which was now reduced by sickness and fatigue to less than nine hundred effectives. This advice I declined following, for the subjoined reasons — The post assigned to us had become highly important, from its being the site of our magazine, and from the fact, that it was con- siderably nearer to the enemy's main body than to our own ; that the roads betweer vlalden and the Rapids, were more easily travelled than those between the Rapids and General Harrison's head-quarters ; that having no intermediate post to observe or interrupt a movement against us, if made by the enemy, they might come on secretly and invest and carry the position, without giving us the power of even making known our condition to the other parts of the army ; and lastly, that being thus ex- posed to attack and out of sustaining distance, the post 1' m y* m 198 APPENDIX. «■ •» I «, ft' t had not the ordinary means of defence ; having neither cannon nor fortification, nor intrenching or other tools, necessary for making the latter ; nor even an order for so using them, if they had been provided — the only instruc- tion given me being that * of clearing my front of an Indian party, supposed to have established itself on Swan Creek, and making huts for covering the provisions and baggage.' Had I taken the General's advice, my effective force on my arrival at the Rapids, would not have exceeded four hundred effectives, left to defend themselves and the magazines, with muskets and rifles only, against the at- tacks of a British and Indian force, which General Har- rison did not estimate at less than /our thousand combatants. Having promptly fulfilled the order above mentioned, of driving off the Indian party, we proceeded to make a large and strong house ; which besides covering our supplies, would be useful as a place of defence against the attacks of the enemy. Of our arrival and situation the General was informed, by the best means I had — a party returning to McArthur's block-house ; by whom I also requested a fulfilment of his promise of a speedy re-enforcement. In this state of things, three expresses, bringing letters from Mr. Day of Frenchtown, arrived in my camp in quick succession, with information, that a British and Indian force had arrived there (about three hundred in number) with orders to seize and send to Maiden, all inhabitants attached to the United States government, or suspected of being so attached, and with them, all horses and cattle, sleds, carioles, and provisions of every kind, and con- demning at once the whole settlement to starvation, im- prisonment or slaughter, in case of refusal or resistance. The information was forthwith communicated to a council APPENDIX. 199 of war, who, after full diHcussion, unanimously agreed, that a detachment should be immediately marched against the British and Indian marauders. A detachment of six hundred men was accordingly sent under Colonel Lewis, of whose success on the 18th, General Harrison was im- mediately apprised, and a request made on General Per- kins (whose post was nearest to me) for another battalion or regiment, and some artillery if practicable. Siispocring that Proctor would make an attempt to revenge this stroke, and knowing that our wounded men could not be removed, I hastened to re-enforce Colonel Lewis with Wells's regi- ment, (two hundred and fifty men,) and set out myself to join him, and arrived on the morning of the 20th. The town, lying on the north side of the river, was picketed on thre« sides — the longest, facing the north and making the front. Within these pickets. Colonel Lewis's corps was found. Not thinking the position elegible, nor the pickets a suf- ficient defence against artillery, I would have retreated, but for the wounded, of whom there were fifty-five ; but having no sufficient means for transporting <}»ose, and equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly, I issued an order for putting the place in the best condition for defence that might be practicable ; intending to con- struct some new works, as soon as the means for getting out timber might be had. On the evening of the 20th, Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp on the right, in an open field, immediately without the picketing. On the 21st, a patrole as far as Brownstown was sent out, and returned without seeing any thing of an enemy ; on the same day, a man from Maiden came in, who reported, that the enemy were preparing to attack us, but knowing nothing of the kind or extent of the preparation made or i 200 APPENDIX. making, what he brought was thought to be only conjee ture, and such as led to a belief, that it would be some days before Proctor would be ready to do any thing. The troops were now in high spirits, expecting the arrival of General Harrison with re-enforcements from the Rapids, where he had got on the 20th ; despatching his Inspector-General on the same day with orders to me, ' to hold the ground we had got at any rate,' implying as we believed, an engagement on his part, to be soon with us and in force. Neither night-patrole, nor night-pickets were ordered by me, from a belief, that both were matters of routine and in constant use. Our force now amounted to seven hundred and fifty men, stationed as before men- tioned ; the volunteers within, and Wells's regiment with- out the pickets. Not to discommode the wounded men, who, with Colonel Lewis's corps, occupied the houses on the north side of the river, I at some increased personal risk, took quarters for myself aid suite, in a house on the southern bank, directly fronting the troops and only separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and but between eighty and one hundred yards wide. While the reveille was beating on the morning of the 22d, the alarm was given, and was soon followed by an attack of the British on the front, and by that of the Indians on both flanks. I was with the troops in a few minutes, and found every man at his post. Finding the left of the line on the outside of the pickets somewhat galled by the enemy's fire, (in pursuance of a plan previously laid in case of attack,) I requested Colonel Allen to draw them forward, and bring them within the picketing. When this order had been nearly executed, and the head of the line was within a few steps of the enirance, where I stood, APPENDIX. 201 some of the soldiers mistaking the movement for a retreat, sounded the alarm and began to fly, when the whole broke and rushed towards the river. I instantly ordered them to be reformed under the bank ; but though great efforts were made by Colonels Lewis and Alien, and others, to effect this object, they failed ; the panic of the men overcoming all authority. Parts of two companies from the picketing, brought out to aid in restoring order, were carried off by the current ; and a daring Indian attack from both flanks being now commenced on the fugi- tives, all further resistance was overwhelmed. Colonel Allen fell, and Colonel Lewis and -lyself were captured. My farther agency was only thaw of an adviser. No longer hoping any thing from the intervention of General Harrison, and seeing one half of our force already cap- tured or dispersed, I anticipated only the slaughter of those within the pickets who yet bravely held out ; and assured by Proctor, that on a surrender, he would give honorable terms, I advised to that measure. Not being permitted to communicate with Majors Graves or Madi- son in person, my opinion was probably misunderstood, and certainly misrepresented, as after my own capture, I had no idea that I could legally exercise authority over them. I will not, however, pretend that I am able now to recollect the terms I used on the occasion, but the present is a true statement of what I intended." Major Madison's statement, ** Our force, on the 22d of January, was between seven hundred and fifly and eight hundred men. The original detachment under Colonel Lewis was diminished by tlie action of the 18th with Reynolds, upwards of seventy-five ii'-,; ■*l 202 APPENDIX. \h ' ■.? , >.- •■ « , men — fifty- five of whom were wounded — and increased two hundred and fifty, by Wells's regiment, brought on by General Winchester. Proctor's force did not much, if at all, exceed one thousand men, three hundred regu- lars, the remainder Canadian militia and Indians. On the first (the regulars) Proctor's principal dependance was placed, but from the coldness of the weather and the depth of the snow, his artillery became unmanageable ; and his infantry after doing its best, and losing one-fourth of its number, was not in either condition or disposition to renew its attack on the picketed part of our position. ** Our camp-police was, perhaps, not what it ought to have been ; but I am not here the accuser or excuser of any one, though thoroughly convinced that the principal error of the campaign, and that which brought all other evils upon us, was the great distance at which the other parts of the army were kept. Had the disposition been different, had the main body been located within sustain- ing distance of the advanced corps, or had this corps been re-enforced by even a single battalion of five hundred men, ours would have been a victory instead of a defeat. As it was, so firmly did the few men holding the town believe in their power of defending it, even after General Winchester's capture, that it was with great reluctance they gave it up ; and principally from a want of ammuni- tion to continue the contest, and not from Proctor's threats of smoking or burning us out, which we knew to be ridicu- lous, A sight of the enemy's condition, which could not be prevented after our surrender, satisfied me that if we could have been supplied with ammunition, we might have held out, for no one could show more impatience to begin and continue a retreat than Proctor, embarrassed AJ '^ENDIX. 203 as he was with wounc'ui and dying men, with the pris- oners he had made, and expecting to be attacked every moment by Harrison, of whose arrival at the Rapids he had been informed by an Indian runner, while the attack was going on." K' !3r [No. 8.] Major Eve^s testimony, "A few days after General Winchester had assumed the command at fort Wayne, we were met at the St. Mary's by General Harrison, who called together all the field-officers who were at that place, with the Hon. Samuel McKee. General Harrison then stated that the army was in a deplorable situation— that he had relin- quished the command to General Winchester ; but from a letter which had met him at St. Mary's, he was at a loss to understand whether the Secretary of War intended that he (Harrison) or Winchester should have the com- mand — that the troops at fort Wayne were much dissatis- fied at being commanded by General Winchester, and that he had to take some pains to satisfy them. He then requested the officers present to say, who they, and the troops under their respective commands, would rather be commanded by. The answer to a man was, that they had rather be commanded by General Harrison. He then requested the officers to make that expression in writing, and called on Mr, McKee to draw up a written statement to that effect, observing at the same time, that i W w 204 APPENDIX. ml he would send it to the officers at fort Wayne^ and if it was the wish of the army generally ^ that he s' mid command^ he would take it, and risk the consequences with the government. But upon reflection, (after General Harrison h;id retired,) it was thought improper by the officers to sign the statement drawn up by Mr. McKee. General Harrison was, in a few days afterwards, invested with the command by the Secretary of War, which made any further call on the officers unnecessary. I have only to state facts, without intending to eulogize General Winchester, or to injure General Harrison. With the former, I have very little acquaintance ; but have no hesitation in saying, that I believe his conduct whilst in the army has been much misrepresented to his prejudice." v<. «' [No. 9.] Extracts from affidavits in relation to the affair at Frenchtown, of the 22d of January, 1813, made by the late Governor Madison of Kentucky, Colonel William Lewis, and Major S. Garrard. " Sometime between the 8th and 12th of January, we arrived at the Rapids of the Miami, where a co-operation was expected with General Tupper— but in that we were disappointed. In a few days after our arrival at the Rapids, I understood that General Winchester had re- ceived communications from the inhabitants of the Au Raisin settlement, making application to him for assist- ance and protection — ^wbich was repeated, with statements APPENDIX. 205 that the enemy were plundering them of their property. A council of the officers was then called and their opinions taken. To the best of my recollections, they were unani- mously of opinion, that a detachment ought to be sent to the relief of the inhabitants at Raisin, as soon as prac- ticable. I cannot say whether or no General Winchester had any right to expect re-enforcements from General T upper and Perkins, but it was generally believed that we would receive troops from them. I am well per- suaded, that could xve have been re-enforced with jive hundred additional men^ a victory on the 22d of January ^ 1813, ivould have been the result instead of a defeat." Extract from the statement of Colonel W. Lewis. " / think, had the GeneraV s force at Frenchtown been five hundred greater than it was, he would not have experienced a defeat. I was immediately with General Winchester, during great part of the action, and can bear testimony to his coolness and bravery. Extract from the affidavit of Major S. Garrard, Inspector of Brigadier- General Payne's brigade of Kentucky vol- unteers, made a prisoner at Frenchtown. " On my return from Canada, I passed the Rapids, where General Harrison informed me that General Winches- ter had every reason to expect re-enforcements on the 2\st; and further, that they were delayed in consequence of having, in the first instance, attempted an advance on the ice, which they were compelled to abandon, return back, and take Hull's road." 18 206 APPENDIX. I*:- 1. [No. 10.] Orders given to General Dearborn by the Secretary of War in relation to the Niagara frontier. June 26M, 1812. — " Tour preparations fat Albany] it is presumed, will be made to move in a direction for JS'iagara^ Kingston, and MontreaU^ July 1 5th. — "On your arrival at Albany, your attention will be directed to the security of the northern frontier by the lakes."' July 2Qth. " You will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins, as will place the militia, detached by him for the Magara and other posts on the lake, under your control." July '29th. — " Should it be advisable to make any other disposition of these restless people, [the warriors of the Seneca tribe of Indians,] you will give orders to Mr. Granger and the commanding officer at Magara.^' August Is/.— "You will make a diversion in favor of him [General Hull] at Magara and Kingston, as soon as may be practicable." How, we ask, was it possible for the General, with these orders in his portfolio, to believe, that the Niagara fron- tier had not been within the hmits of his command ? And if he did so believe, by what authority did he extend the armistice (entered into between him and Provost) to that frontier ? As, however, the inaction which enabled Brock to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and un- menaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force to Detroit, and there to capture Hull, his army and terri- tory, was not noticed by any kind of disapprobation on the part of the government, the inference is fair, that it (the government) was willing to take the respousibihty on itself. APPENDIX. 807 [No. 11.] Extract of a letter from Sir George Provost to General Brock, dated SOth of August, 1812. ** I consider it most fortunate, that I have been able to prosecute this object of the government (the armistice) without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you men, money and stores of all kinds." — See Life and Services of Sir George Provost. * '^ [No. 12.] ♦» Albany^ February 22rf, 1813. **SiR, — In obedience to orders of the 8th instant, requir- ing from me * a particular statement in relation to the aifair at Queenstown,' I have the honor to transmit a journal of the incidents connected with that affair which fell under my observation. "On the 10th of October, 1812, 1 waited on Lieutenant- Colonel Fenwick, commanding at fort Niagara, to report my arrival on the evening of the 9th instant, with a detach- ment of nearly four hundred of the thirteenth, at the Four- Mile Creek, in charge of military stores, and thirty-nine boats capable of carrying conveniently each thirty men. He informed me of an intended attack that night at Queenstown, and I requested orders to join the corps designated foi it. Such orders he was not authorized to li t^^^...«.ii^j^^ * ' m I,, II Is ki ;ii ^.f- ?*■> 208 APPENDIX. give, but sent off an express that evening to General Van Rensselaer to procure them. They arrived (I have since learned) at Niagara about nine at night, but I was pre- vented by an accident from receiving them ; and my detach- ment was saved a night's march in a storm, and exposure and march the next day, by which all the other regulars in that quarter were very considembly harassed ; as, being without tents or cwn.^ equipage, they were obliged to keep on foot until they returned to their quarters. This intended attack, in which my detachment was not origin- ally included, was to have been conducted by Colonel Van Rensselaer and Captain Machesney at the head of a party of regulars, but was defeated by some mistake or treachery of a man in charge of the boats. " On the 11th, (the storm still continuing with unabated violeijce, and the road still covered with stragglers from the different detachments of regulars, which had marched the night before from fort Niagara and its vicinity to Lewistown, on the proposed expedition,) I rode to General Van Renssalaer's encampment in order to report more particularly the detachment under my command, and to request a place in the next attempt ; mentioning that I should like forty-eight hours for preparation, being myself an entire stranger to the country, and the detachment being just off a long march expedition from Oswego, re- quiring some time for the issue of several articles of petit equipment, and for putting themselves in the best condi- tion. It was intimated to me that I should have a part in the first attack, and that it would take place in a few days. On the 12th, about twelve o'clock, Colonel Van Rensselaer rode into my camp and informed me that I must march immediately to Lewistown — that he intended APPENDIX. 209 to attack at Queenstown that night. The weather had cleared away early, and at this time my tents were struck, every musket and lock taken to pieces, and every thing in the camp going through the process of police usual on such occasions ; I was also informed that the provisions for that day had not yet been received from fort Niagara and could not be before evening. Colonel Van Rens- selaer stated, however, that we should be able to reach Lewistown early, and that he would have rations ready for them there. "We conversed about my waiving rank with him, which I told him was impossible ; but as it was equally impossible for me to command in a night-attack on a place I had never seen — as I was informed it was a critical moment which must be used — and as I was not disinclined to yield as much as possible to an officer of established reputation, and as I was, and knew my whole detachment to be anxious for an opportunity of seeing some actual service on any terms, I consented to take a part without interfering with his arrangements for it, and requested for myself only good guides, and a landing in good order at the proper point. The detachment ac- cordingly moved a little before five o'clock in the after- noon, and marched or rather waded to Lewistown, where we arrived sometime before ten ; and most of the men and some of the officers had then their first meal for that day. October 13th. — At half-past three. Colonel Van Rens- selaer woke me and informed me it was time to move. I formed the detachment, read to tlie officers General Van Rensselaer's orders for the battle, and conducted partly by a guide and by Colonel Van Rensselaer, marched to the river. On the way. Colonel Van Rensselaer in- 18* Ml Ml ii .I'll Et4, ll 1^ tio APPENDIX. troduced my guide for the battle to me. Between four and five o'clock we embarked our first parties. The number of boats was eleven or twelve, I understood, aver- aging about twenty-five men each, being calculated to carry just half of our respective detachments at a time. The boats assigned to the detachment under my orders were on the right, i. e. down the stream. Having em- barked the first party, and given orders to Captain Ogilvie to take charge of the embarcation of the next on the return of the boats, I chose the boat in which was my principal guide, one Hopkins, and a party selected agree- ably to General Van Rensselaer's orders, for the advanced guard of my detachment in the attack. The first that reached the Canada shore was the boat in which Captain Armstrong commanded, Captain Malcolm and Lieutenant Hugunen being also on board ; and the pilot being skil- ful, returned immediately and gave Captain Ogilvie an opportunity of executing his orders in part. The boat to which I had committed myself, (if the circumstances under which I embarked are appreciated, that phrase will not be deemed improper,) unhappily lost a row-lock on the right, which gave it a direction down the stream ; and although an officer. Lieutenant Fink, remedied that evil in a great measure, so far as the oar was concerned, by holding it, the pilot wanted skill or presence of mind to alter his course ; and no one else knowing any thing of the stream or point of landing, and it being perfectly dark, we were obliged to confide in him. Having in this man- ner gone farther down the stream than across it, we soon fell below the others, and the fire of the leflt of the village was directed against this boat. The pilot, panic-struck, turned about, but being ordered with severity to make the APPENDIX. sn Canada shore at any point, he made another effort lileraUy groaning with fear. Hopkins, who w&a called on to assist him, was useless. The situation of a boat thus managed on a rapid stream when descending, not only subjected to the severest fire on the boats which was decidedly from the lefl of the village, (where they seemed prepared for accidents of this kind, or perhaps expected the principal debarkation below,) but also separated from the corps, may easily be imagined. It became necessary to take the steering-oar from the boatman, and return to the American shore. Here my guide, Hopkins, disappeared. Being several hundred yards below the point of embarka- tion, I returned on foot by the edge of the river, thinking I could more immediately procure a proper pilot, and cross from that place. In the meantime the troops landed and formed immediately on the bank, about twenty paces or less from the river, under Colonel Van Rens- selaer. Here a severe fire continued for a few minutes ; but having himself received several wounds, and no other person being acquainted with the force or defences of the enemy, or the topography of the village and its environs, bd ordered the troops to fall below the bank by which they were in a great degree covered. In this scene. Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris of the thirteenth, both men of the most estimable character, the latter quite a youth and of extraordinary promise, were killed ; Lieu- tenant Rathbone of the first artillery, severely wounded, (since dead;) Captains Armstrong and Malcolm of the thir- teenth, and Ensign Lent of the thirteenth, severely wound- ed, and Captain Wool of the thirteenth, also wounded. On my return to the upper ferry, I found there a scene of confusion hardly to be described. The enemy concen- M I i 2U a- fPiUDIX. trated their ip^Hpoa ou. embarking place : no person be- ing charged with directing the boats and embarkation, or with the government of th« boatmen, they forsook their duty. lVr^'»t*ja unarquriinted wsfh the river (which was indeed the ca*'' wif^ nio^t of the militia wh • had been en- camped at Lewistoji u-veral weeks, whereas all the regu- lars had been marched there that niT these marches and counter-marches of the enemy, we were consulting, and at last determined to avail ourselves of the possibility of riirenting suggested hi General Van Rensse- APPENDIX. *219 laer's letter. It was de^in;!!,..,!, .iccoidiiiglv, to throw our right on the road leading- liom the hill to (lie village, and form with the ri\er in our rear. To do this it w as neces- sary to march by the left which brought the militia in front of the column. They soon broke, on the commencement of the enemy's fire, and a peifect rout ensued. IVot a boat bo ng ready, nor any appearance of an attempt to bring them, we surrendered— were taken into the village of Queenstown, and treated with the greatest delicacy and humanity by General Sheafle. .The wounded were attend- ed to here ; the prisoners, private soldiers, were collected and marched to Newark ; and, after being about an hour in the village, we marched with a guj.vd, which was neces- sary to protect us from the Indians, to Fort George. Wo arrived there just at dark. I am, with great respect. Your obedient Servant, JOHN CHRYSTIE, Lieutenant-Colonel 13th. General Thomas H. Gushing, Adjutant-General. [No. 13.] " Colonel Cochrane, formerly an aid-de-camp to Sir George Prevost, and at present Military Inspector, and at- tached to the District o(^ New Brunswick, states, * that the regular troops in the Canadas and New Brunswick, at the commencement of the war of 1812 between the United clatcS and ixreat junta.!!!, did nut excccu t;vo ihousund no APPENDIX. men ; but were increased from time to time, till, in 1815, their numbers amounted to about sixteen thousand five hundred.' (Signed,) James Watson Webb." April 201K 1830. [No. 14.] For orders given from the 26th of June to the 1st of August to General Dearborn, see Appendix No. 10. To these we now add the following :—^MgMs/ the Sth.^ " Should the recruits and volunteers be found inadequate to immediate operations on the frontier, you are instructed to call on any Governor, or commander of a division or a brigade, for as many militia as you may deem necessary." Mgust 16 * I Total, 7,030 The time for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of Lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the 1st of April. The Adjutant-General has orders to put the more south- ern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on Lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new raised regiments from the east. You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and that their principal effort will be made on the Niagara, in co-operation with General Harrison. As the route to Sackett's Harbor and to Niagara is for a considerable dis- tance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at Lake Champlain. (Signed,) John Armstrong." War Department, Fehmai^j 24//i, 1813. " Before I left New-York, and, till very recently, since my arrival here, I was informed through various channels, that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not prac- ticable on account of the snow, which generally lies to the depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that northern region during those seasons. Hence it is that it APPENDIX. 223 >» in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest and best to make the attack by a combination of naval and mililary means, and to approach our object, not by directly crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy ot the fleet. liator informalion differs from that on which this plan was founded ; and the fortunate issue of Major For- syth's last expedition shews, tliat small enterprises, at least, may be successfully executed at the present season. The advices, given in your letter of the 14th instant, have a bearing also on the same point, and to the same effect. If the enemy be really weak at Kingston, and approachable by land and ice, Pike, (who will be a brigadier in a day or two,) may be put into motion from Lake Champlain by the Chateaugay route, (in sleighs) and, with the two brigades, cross the St. Lawrence where it may be thought best, de- stroy the armed ships, and seize and hold Kingston, until you can join him with the other corps destined for the fu- ture objects of the expedition ; and, if pressed by Prevost before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw him- flelf to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security, on our side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence is now every where well bridged, and oflTers no obstruction to either attack or retreat. Such a movement, will, no doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet him. The dilemma it presents will be serious. Either he must give up his western posts, or, to save them, he must carry himself in force, and promply, to Upper Canada. In the latter case he will be embarrassed for subsistence. His convoys of provision will be open to our attacks, on a line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage *ll llll i r 224 APPENDIX. will be, to let us into the secret of hia real strcnc* i. If he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to re- cover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all maintain himself at Montreal and on Lake Cham|)lain, ho is stronger thin I imagined, or than any well-authenticated reports make him to be. With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we have nothing to fear ; because, as stated above, Pr(* .ost's Httention must be given to the western posts and to our movements against them. He will not dare to advance southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank and menacing his line of communication. But on the other supposition, they (the magazines) may be easily secured ; 1st, by taking them to Wilbhorough ; or 2d, to Burlington ; or 3d, by a militia call, to protect them where they are. Orders are given for the march of the eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two companies of axe-men sent to open the route to th^ Chaudiere. " The southern detachments will be much stronger than I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will amount to nearly one thousand effectives. (Signed,) "JOHN ARMSTRONG." [No. 16.] Extract from a letter of the late Major-General Brown. ^^ Ilead-Q'iarlcrs, BrownvUlc, July 20lh, 1813. " I have delayed giving the estimate you requested, of the enemy's forces in Canada, during the years 1612 and APPENDIX. 225 :f^. If )r to re- after all >lain, ho nticated that we ro vest's J to our advance kis flank on the easily ; or 2d, ct them 1 of the and tv'O ! to tho igcr than lount to 1813 of the late war, that I might examine my minutes and papers the more carefully. " At the commencement of the war, Sir George Provost had the conunand of very low regulars. The number placed under tlie orders of Covernor Brock for the de- fence of Upper Canada, was never equal to twelve hun- dred men ; and at no time did the; couuuand of this distinguished chief consist of less than ♦ one third of old men and invalids fit only for garrison duty.' No con- siderable increase of force on the part of the enemy took place during the campaign of IS 12, and 1 have never been able to discover that at the opening of the campuign of 1813, [June 26th,] there were more than five thousand regular troops in the Canadas. The force, whatever it may have been, was principally in the Upper province. By the 27tb of May of that year, the enemy had assem- bled on the Niagara about two thousand men, to resist any incursion — and at Kingston, about one thousand, for the projected attack on Sacket's Harbor, under the com- mand of Sir George in person. The two columns would not have exceeded three thousand combatants, and I have it from unquestionable authority that the left column sus- tained a loss of fuliybur hundred men." ■% Brown. 1813. 3sted, of 812 and [No. 17.] Letter of Colonel Cc-^^wr, of the ISth of March, 1816. »* Of the immense dep6t I know nothing but by report, which stated that it had been carried to Sacket's Harbor, fai 1 ' 1 ^ 1, *' -^ K. tri > •;■ I* 22G APPKNDIX. and had thoro boon burnt hy the mistake of the Commo- dore's brother. Of the contents of Slieafl's pupiM's, muny of which Coh)nol King and njyself examined, I know enough to convinie me th:U dm ing the uinter and spring of 1613, the L'rltish garrison of Kingston was extremely weak and (juitc iusulbcient for defence. *' 1 am, &c. (Signed) "SAMUEL CONNOR." "General Armstrong." [No. IS.] Letter from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn. {Private) " Washincrlon^ \5lh Maij^ 1813. "Dear General, — Your affair of the 27th ult. is matter of public and private congratidation ; much quali- fied, however, by the loss of Pike and the escape of the frigate, the capture or destruction of which, was, according to the Commodore's calculations, to give him a decided and permanent ascendency on the Lake. Another draw- back upon it, less apt to be noticed by ordinary critics, but in itself very vexatious, is the escape also of Sheafe with the main body of h s regular force. Under the present circumstances of Great Britain, bound as she is, neck and heels, to the prosecution of the war in Europe, she can ill afford to send to this country, cither men or money, to support the peUle guerre in which she has so inconsiderately involved herself with us. From informa- AVfCNDIX. £27 tion the most direct unci rcspcctiiblo, I am assured that her re'iular force in hoth the Cana;las lias at no time sinco the declaration of wur exceeded three thousand men; and that at the present time, by casualties, (death, desertion, &c., always at work thinning the raidts of an army) this force is reduced at leiist one-tifth. Takinjr then this fact for granted, we caimot doubt but that in all cases in which a British commundor is constrained to act deiensiveiy, his policy will be that ad )pte:l by Sheafc — to prefer tho preservat on of his troops to that of his post, and thus carrying off the kernel leave us only the shell. To coun- teract this policy, becomes, therefore, a special duty on our part — requiring the strictest attention, as well in pro- jecting^ as in executing our attacks. On this head, my distance from you and my very insufficient knowledge of the topography of the country in which you act, make it improbable that any suggestion 1 could make, has not already presented itself to your mind. As a general maxim, however, I may be permitted to say, that in con- centrating our whole force on any given point of an enemy's position, we necessarily leave all others open to him for escape ; whence it follows, that to deprive him of this advantage, two attacks (if our force permit it) should be made, and one of these so directed as to shut him out from all means of retreat ; or at least to force him into roads, where finding little or no accommodation, he may sustain the greatest possible loss. In your late affair, I have thought (perhaps erroneously) that had the descent been made between the town and the barracks, things would have turned out better. On that plan, the two batteries you had to encounter, wouic have been lefl out of the combat ; and Sheafe, instead of retreating to I if I If pi: i* Jr. ^ is*. ^ r - ** i!|l lir 228 APPENDIX. Kingston, must have sought retngu at fort George. In the afTiir before yon, nothing Mill, I hope, be omitted, nor any thing be misunderstood ; and that with regard to the garrison in particular, it will not be permitted to escapia to-day that it may fight us to-morrow. For obvious rea- sons, I have made this letter private. On the records of the War Department it would appear to carry with it an official cens-ure, whereas, it is in truth nothing more than the suggestions of one, who for both your sake, and his own, wishes you the fullest and most unqualified prosperity." [No. 19.] *^ Head-Quarters, Kingston, July lltk, 1813. "Dear Sir, — Having sent Captain McDonald to England with despatches, your letter of the 27th ultimo, addressed to him, I opened. I was much pleased it con- tained a report of Mr. R. Dickson's arrival at Mackinac on the 11th. " Your wants have been supplied as far as I had the ability of doing so. In addition to the specie and paper- money, and articles of clothing, forwarded for the right division from hence, in charge of Captain Chambers and Lieutenant M'Clean, a considerable supply of shoes, trowsers, &c., w^ere eml)arked in a flotilla going to York a few days ago, for Detroit and Michilimackinac. " The ordnance and naval stores you require must be taken from the enemy, whose resources on Lake Erie APPENDIX. must become yours. 1 am much mistaken if you do not find Captain Barclay well disposed to play that game. I conclude the whole of the forty-first regiment is placed under vour command. The presents for the Indians are not arrived from England, but I shall direct two hundred guns for them, to be purchased at Montreal and forwarded to you, with a proportion of powder and ball by the Ottawa. " I request you will communicate with me upon all occasions, with the characteristic frankness which disUn- guishes a zealous and good soldier. " I have the honor, &c. "GEORGE PROVOST." « Brigadier-General Proctor." SL David's, July 18/A, 1813. " Sir,— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, and have to inform you in reply thereto, that a force of nearly four hundred men are directed to march in successive divisions upon Long Point, as detailed in my letter to General Proctor of this day's date. I am fully impressed with the indispensable necessity of an attack upon Presque Isle, and should have co-operated with you long ago, had I possessed the means of so doing. I trust it will not yet be too late, and that you will lose no time in making your arrangements for taking up the troops from Long Point. » I have the honor to be. Sir, " Your most obedient servant, "FRANCIS DE ROTTENBURG, " Major- General.^* «« Commodore Barclay." 20 m *J fr U 1 ' li> ' 9 ill Pil lii ;i -> m n A ••' fi ,1 U 1 230 APPENDIX. [No. 20.] Extract from Governor Duncari's Report. " McAffee, the historian of the late war, and Dawson, the biographer of General Harrison, have studiously kept out of view, that the object of the invasion was the de- struction of our ships under Commodore Perry at Presgue Isle, and the boats and stores at Cleveland. These were looked upon with great solicitude by the British, were re- connoitred, and on one or two occasions were attempted to be destroyed by landing a small force from their fleet. " They have also failed to account for the movement of the whole British force down the Lake in the direction of Cleveland and Erie, before their defeat at Sandusky ; which was attacked to gratify their Indian allies, who de- manded the scalps and plunder of the place. They have kept out of view the fact, that General Harrison had deter- mined to retreat to the interior after burning all the supplies he had collected ; that he ordered Major Croghan to aban- don and burn fort Stephenson ; that his refusal to obey and failure to arrive at head-quarters, prevented this retreat, and consequent destruction of our fleet and millions of public stores; and the exposure also, o^ five hundred miles of frontier, to the combined enemy. Both have stated, that General Harrison never doubted that Major Croghan would be able to repulse an enemy of near two thousand men (and which they say he understood to be five thou- sand) with one hundred and thirty men, (Croghan's efTective force on the day of the battle,) one six-pounder, with am- munition for only seven shols, and -ahout forty rounds for the APPENDIX. 231 small arms^ when the fact was notorious, that General Har- rison was heard to say during the siege, while the firing could be hoard in his camp, and speaking of Croghan, * The blood be on his own head^ I wash my hands of it,,' not doubting for a moment, nor did any one with him, that the garrison would be cut off. " These historians have also published two letters, as part of their history, written by Major Croghan and others, to allay the excitement against Harrison^ for his neglect to support Croghan^ when he lay ivilhin three hours^ march of the fort,, with a strong force. Those patriotic officers wrote these letters, it has been said, to save the army and prevent them from following up the indignation manifested in the States against the General destined to command them — believing it of the utmost importance at that mo- ment, that he should stand well with the army and the country; and it is further said that they were written under the beUef, that every thing should be placed before the pubUc in a proper light at the end of the campaign. (Signed) "JOSEPH DUNCAN." " General Mercer, Chairman of a Committee of the House of Representatives.^* At Second Order to Major Croghan. *^ Head-Quarters^ Camp Seneca, \ ^'Mjutant- General's Office, July 27M, 1813. ] " Sir,-— Immediately on receiving this letter you will abandon fort Stephenson, set fire to it and repair with your command this night to head-quarters. Cross the river and come up upon the opposite side. If you should deem, and find it impracticable to make good your march 232 APPENDIX. to this station, take the road to Huron and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and despatch. By command. "God be with you. "A. H. HOLMES, Assistant JldjulanUGeneraU " P. S. Effect your retreat in the manner heretofore directed you. " A. H. HOLMES, w2. A, G.» " Major Crochan." 1^ I M [No. 21.] Letter from Colonel R, M. Johnson, '■^Decemhfi.r 'M.iU 1834. "Dear Sir, — I have just receiv^ed your favor of the 17th, containing certain inquiries as to the battle of the Thames, 6th of October, 1813, in Upper Canada. *' 1st. Tlie mounted regiment under my command, con- sisted of one thousand men at the time of the charge. " 2d. They were armed with muskets and rifles, and tomahawks or small hatchets, and butcher-knives. "3d. The British had one brass field-piece, (six- pounder,) the same that was taken by us in the revolu- tionary war at Saratoga, and retaken from us at the surrender of Detroit by General Hull. It was placed in the road near the Thames, not far from the centre of the Britis line. ** 4th. The British formed two lines, resting on the Thames and running out to a swamp two or three hua- dred yai'ds from the river and parallel with it. APPENDIX. 233 (4 (( ^ " 6th. I presume Proctor was stationed considerably in the rear of his troops, and probably commenced his flight the moment he saw his forces defeated and taken prisoners. 6th. I think the best ground for defence was selected. 7th. The [militia] infantry were stationed a reasona- ble distance in the rear of the mounted regiment, in order of battle, say from one half to one mile. My brother, Colonel James Johnson, charged the British forces with the first battalion, (five hundred men,) and succeeded without the loss of a man — one horse killed, shot in the head — in advancing, he received the fire of one line of the British, and then of the other, in close succession ; the cannon was not fired. I crossed the swamp with the second battalion, (five hundred men,) and fought against the Indians, (supposed fourteen hundred warriors, under Tecumseh,) without any aid whatever. A regiment was ordered to re-enforce me at the close of the battle ; but did not reach us until the battle was over and the Indians had fled. The official report is incorrect in saying, that the hard fighting on the left was by a part of Governor Shelby's men. We had no assistance, except that of a few scattering volunteers from the infantry, who might have pushed into our ranks. I was wounded and could give no information to the commanding General, and he did not know at the time he made his report, that I had crossed the swamp with my regiment ; as when he gave the order to make the charge, he thought from my information, that I could not cross the swamp ; which I discovered I could do a few minutes after he left me, and believing that it was most safe, and that my regiment was sufficient, I divided my force as stated above, and the victory on both -20 234 APPENDIX. sides was complete ; but, no doubt, the instantaneous capture of the British, and the early dealii of the Indian chief, were powerful operating causes in our favor. I am, &c., (Signed) R. M. Johnson. N. B. // is due to truth to state, that I requested Gene- ral Harrison to permit me to charge, and knoioing that 1 had trained my men for it during our short service, he gave the order. [No. 22.] ill Red Hook, January 2d, 1812. Dear Eustis— Yesterday's mail brought your hypo- thetical note, which I hasten to answer by a ^e\v suggestions that, if approved, may be readily drawn out into^^s much detail as may be useful. 1st. An abundant supply of what is technically called the materiel of war is indispensable. This single lerm in- cludes arms, equipments, and ammunition, in all their varieties; tents, blankets, and clothing; cavalry and draught-horses ; oxen, wagons, carts, entrenching tools, &c. &c. To make a competent provision of these will require a large expenditure of money, but to this you must submit, for two unanswerable reasons— the one, that without them, war cannot be made, either morally or successfully the other, that their cost, now, will be from 50 to 100 p(^ cent, less than it will be after the declaration of war. APPENDIX. 235 antaneous he Indian )r. aNSON. led Gene- ng that 1 By he gave 1812. ur hypo- ^gestions as much ly called lerm in- all their ilry and ig tools, lese will '^ou must t without Jssfully; looker I 2d. When obtained, these supplies should be placed m magazines, the location of which must be governed by two considerations — the security of the articles deposited in them, and the facility and safety with which these may bo brought into use. To each magazine should be attached a Laboratory, for fixing ammunition, making and mending gun and other carriages, repairing arms, &c. 3d. If you have remote posts, liable to attack, and diffi- cult to sustain, and having no direct or important bearing on the progress or issue of the war, hasten to dismantle them and withdraw the garrisons. 4th. Resting, as the hue of Canadian defence does, in its whole extent, on navigable lakes and rivers, no time should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both, for coiteris paribus^ the belligerent who is the first to obtain this advantage, v/ill (miracles excepted) win the game. Whether the commercial craft, at present employed on these waters, can be made useful for the purpose, I do not know ; but among the sages, now assembled at Washing- ton, you cannot fail to find some one who can answer the question. 6th. Without a knowledge, nearly approximating the truth, of the force you will have to contend with ; of the dis- position made of this, and of the character, physical and artificial, of the posts occupied by it, you will be compelled to make war conjecturally ; and, of course, on data fur- nishing no just conclusions with regard to either the number or composition of your own army, or of the kind and ex- tent of operations which ought to be assigned to it. That a state of peace, like the present, will be more favorable than one of war for acquiring this preliminary information, cannot be doubted ; and if it be true, as I have been told. I 236 APPENDIX. that the British posts are victualled by American contract- ors, these agents (who by their vocation must have freo access to them) may probably form the safest and surest medium through which to obtain it. But, whatever be the means employed for accomplishing this object, a moment should not be lost in putting them into exercise. 6th. The number and composition of your army (as already suggested) should be decided by the service given it to perform, and the kind and degree of resistance vour enemy may be able to oppose to it. Though, from pre- sent appearances, it be true that the exigencies of the war in Europe will disable England from sending promptly any important aid, strictly military, to the Canadas ; it does not follow that she will omit to employ such other means as she may possess, to supply the deficiency. Of these, the most vexatious to us would be a portion of her armed vessels, acting separately or in squadron, on our long and defenceless line of sea-coast ; while, at the same time, hordes of savages are let loose on the women and child- ren of the West. And that, in the event of war. Great Britain will not hesitate to employ this policy in both its branches, cannot be doubted by those who have any re- collection of what her past conduct towards the United States has been, or who are now capable of perceiving the impunity to herself and the mischief to us with which she may pursue it. From this general view of the subject it follows, that in composing your army, you must be careful to provide corps specially adapted for two purposes — the protection oj your own frontiers^ eastern and western, and the invasion of those of your enemy. Oi* each of these I offer the fol- lowing outline. APPENDIX. 237 contract- ave fieo id surest 3r be the moment irmy (as ice given nee vour "om pre- ' the war »ptly any ; it does 3r means )f thesie, T armed long and ne time, id child- r, Great in both 3 any re- 3 United iving the hich she !, that in de corps I oj your asion of r the fol- For the former, divide your coast into military districts — open in each a rendezvous for volunleer'assoclaiion and local defence, with engagements commensurate with the war, and pay and emoluments, such as are now given to the regular army. Of this description of force the maxi- mum may be twenty battalions located as follows : 1 at Portsmouth, 2 at Boston, 1 at Newport, 3 at New- York, 1 at Philadelphia, 3 at Baltimore, 3 at Norfolk, 2 at Charlestown, 1 at Savannah, and 3 at New-Orleans. Each of these stations to be well supplied with heavy guns for position — furnaces for heating shot, light pieces, well horsed, for field service, and muskets and bayonets for camp and garrison duty. Corps, thus constituted and equipped, well instructed in the use of their arms and res- pectably commanded, will do much to check, if they do not entirely prevent, predatory excursion — the evil most to be apprehended from the crews of single ships, or from those of small squadrons not sustained by infantry. For western defence employ western men, accustomed to the rifle and the forest, and not unacquainted with the usages and stratagems of Indian warfare. To their cus- tomary arms add a pistol and a sabre ; and to ensure ce- lerity of movement, mount them on horseback. Give them a competent leader and a good position, within striking distance of Indian villages or British settlements. Why not at Detroit, where you have a strong fortress and a detachment of artillerists 1 Recollect, however, that this position, far from being good, would be positively bad un'ess your naval means have an ascendancy on Lake Erie ; because Buffalo, Erie, Cleaveland, and the two Sanduskys must be its base or source of supply. The maximum of this corps may be six battalions. 238 APPENDIX. iii ! it Lastly, for a successful invasion of the Canadas, (the great operation of the war, because that only by which Great liritain can be brought to a sense of justice,) you must rely on a regular army. Of this description of force, you have now the skeletons of ten regiments ; which, if completed, will give you ten thousand combatants — a corps that, in the present circumstances of England, and aided by militia for the purposes of demonstration, will be compe- tent to great achievements. Hasten then to fill up the rank and tile of your present establishment : and to existin<»- in- ducements for enlisting, add an increased pay, and a liberal bounty at the end of the war. Should better information with regard to your enemy's strength make an increase of your own expedient, give one or two additional battalions to each of your seven regi- ments of infantry — a mode of increasing an army much to be preferred to creations altogether new. For, besides being obviously more economical, the direct association of raw recruits with old soldiers has the effect of making the former efficient in half the time it would otherwise take to do so — the example of comrades being a principle of tuition much more active than the instruction of officers. On this head it is but necessary to add, that the whole of your disposable or field force, when obtained, should be immediately assembled at some given point, from which, the moment that war siiall be authorized, it may begin its operations. Under present views, Albany, or its neighbor- hood, should be the place of this rendezvous ; because, besides other recommendations, it is here that all the roads leading from the cenrral portion of the United States to the Canadas, diverge — a circumstance which, while it keeps up your enemy's doubts as to your real point of attack, ' b APPKNDIX. 239 cannot fail to keep his means of defence in a state of division. 7lh. In sketching the composition of an army, two branches of it, the one having charge of its discipline and its movements, the other of its subsistence, must not be forgotten For the first (a General Staff) I refer you to Grimoai(i\s publication, which I sent to the war department from Paris, some years ago. If this book be not already translated into English, no time should be lost in natu- ralizing it for the use of the army. The second or feeding department, is of three kinds — that founded on Caesar's maxim, that " war should sustain war," though fashionable at present, is, in fact, a system ot indiscriminate plunder ; forbidden alike, as I hope, by the moral feelings and political views of the United States. The remaining two are sufficiently known, under the namea of the Contract and Commissariat systems. To recom- mend either, as exclusively and under all circumstances the best, would show only great ignorance or great folly. In old and well-peopled districts, where corn and cattle are abundant, prices little subject to change, roads safe and unobstructed, and the means of transportation (teams or boatsy easily procured, the contract plan is the best— be- cause the most economical, sufficiently punctual in the dis- charge of its engagements, and, from the settled character of its terms, rarely, if ever, embarrassing the government with extra or unexpected charges. In districts of an op- posite character, where the population is thin and poor, supplies scarce and high priced, roads few and bad, and much exposed to obstruction, the commissariat must be submitted to ; though certainly liable to great abuse, from the ignorance, indolence, or knavery of the agents era- m ki 240 PPENDIX. . • ployed. The best remedy for the evilH of this system will be fomid in subjecting the agents to military law, and in rigorously enforcing its provisions. 8th. and lastly. A project of campaign, conformed to military maxims, must embrace three things: 1st. Jin object of important or decisive character; the attainment of which will give a successful issue to the campaign if not to the war. 2d. Ji line of operation, as short and per- pendicular to this object, as possible ; and 3d. Ji tvell secured base, on which must be accumulated and ready for transportation, all supplies necessary to sustain the opera- tion. Each of these rules has its own special laws, but it is only of the first that I will say more at present than a few words. In invading a neighboring and independent territory like Canada — having a frontier of immense extent ; destitute of means strictly its own for the purposes of defence ; se- parated from the rest of the empire by an ocean, and hav- ing to this but one outlet — this outlet forms your true object or point of attack; because, if gained, every thing depend- ing upon it is gained also. Such was the consequence of the capture of Quebec in the war, which ended in 1763 ; and such would again be the consequence of the reduction of that capital, had we the menna to effect it. tnfortu- nately, from deficient foresight in the government, .hese are wanting. Still, though unable to do what in the ab- stract would be best, it by no means follows that we should omit to do what may be both practicable and expedient. Such, in my opinion, would be the capture oj Montreal — a post, which, commanding alike the navigation of the St. Lawrence and the Otawa, if seized and heid, would give the same control over all that portion of the Canadaa lying APPENDIX. 241 westward of itfscif, that Quebec now exercises over tlie whole territory : Kiu^rston, York, Fort Cieor^ro, F<,rt Erie, and Maiden, out oil' from their common base, must soon ni](i necessarily fall. To reach this object, your line of operation may be taken on either side of I^ake Champlain, provided you have secured the conunand of the lake ; in which case also, Albany, Greenbush, Troy, Whitehall, &c. covered by a dense population, or secured by a large river, no where fordubic by infantry, will give you a suffi- cient base. When begun, the movement should be made rapidly and audaciously ; and the better to secure its suc- cess, three demonstrations by masses of militia, may be employed : one on the Niagara, to keep within their walls the garrisons of Forts George and Erie ; a second at Sackett's Harbor, to produce a similar eflect on whatever force may be found at Kingston ; and a third in Vermont, so placed on the eastern side of the Sorel as to menace the Biitish posts on that river. Though taking for granted, as stated above, that the capture of Montreal would involve that of all posts west- ward from itself, it will no do-jbt be proper that the six bat- talions of mounted gun-men should march on Maiden, as soon as they shall be apprised that the campaign on Lake Champlain is opened. And here we must stop : what remains of the subject, being Tactical^ and governed by circumstances as they occur in the camp or the field, must be entirely left to the genius and judgment of your Commanding General. I am, &c. (Signed) John Armstrong. Hon. William Eustis, Secretary of War. 21 243 APPENDIX. [No. 23.] Letter from General Harrison to the Secretary of War. " Head-Quarters, Chilicolhe, March Mtk 1813. i( SiR^ — The known candor of your character, is a suf- ficient security for my receiving your pardon for the Hberty I take, in making objections to the plan of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there is a positive certainty of our getting the command of Lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand five hundred, or even three thousand, well-disciplined men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on the northern shore, below Maiden, would, perhaps, be the one by which that place and its depen- dencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted with the extent of the preparations that are making to obtain the naval superiority upon Lake Eric, but, shoiild they fail, and the troops be assemMcd at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get again upon the proper track f )r making the attack round the head of the Lake. The at- tempt to cross the Lake from Cleveland should ))ot be made with any other than well-disciplin(>d troops. A comparatively smaller number of men of this description could effect the object, and for those, means of convey- ance might be found ; but the means of transporting such an army as would be required of militia or undisciplined regulars, could not be procured. I can see no reason why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of em- barkation for the troops, or the deposite of provisions or stores. These are already accumulated at the Rapids of Miami, nr in situations to be easilv sent thither, to an APPENDIX. 243 amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted campaign. Although the expense and diflSculty of trans- porting the provisions, artillery and stores for an army, round the head of the Lake, would be very considerable, the Lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy bag- gage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the land route. The force contem- plated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia ; the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct their men ; we have therefore no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency of discipline. " I am well aware of the intolerable expense which at- tends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and so deposited that the period for the march of the army from the advanced posts can be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need not be called out until the moment they are to act. Ex- perience has convinced me that militia are more efficient in the early, than in the latter part of their service. Upon the whole, it is my decided opinion, that the Rapids of Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops, as well as the principal dep6t. Indeed, it must neces- sarily be the first deposite — the provisions for the army being so placed that they can be taken to the Lake in no other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition are already there. Boats and perouges have been built in considerable numbers on the Au Glaize and 111^ It' .; f^J.. I i"'! i!' ! I 244 APPENDIX. St. Mary's rivers ; and every exertion is now making to increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking down the provisions to the Rapids, and for coasting the Lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I hod calculated upon being able partially to use this mode of transportation, even if the enemy should continue their naval superiority on the Lake ; but with this advantage on our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and perouges, which could be taken into the strait to transport the army to the Canada shore. " As I have before observed, the army, unencumbered with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching round the Lake at any season, but what the enemy would create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that would be irresistible. " The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my letter to Colonel Munroe, arose from the time that would be necessary to construct boats after we should have ar- rived at the strait ; but this objection is entirely obviated by our obtaining the command of the Lake, as the boats and perouges built upon the Miami will answer the pur- pose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your let- ter, but a large auxiliary corps of mihtia should be em- ployed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness of troops of that description. This, however, could not be an object, considering the very short time that it would be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed, and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and accomplish the object, and return home in two months. APPENDIX. 245 " Amongst the reasons which make it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the western country; numbers must give that confi- dence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree, than amongst the greater part of the militia who were with me through the winter. The new draughts from this State are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended on. I have no doubt, how- ever, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Ken- tucky would furnish some regiments that would be not inferior to ♦ ^ -^o that fought at the river Raisin ; and they were, in r y .pinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have been formed in Kentucky, to offer me their services, and several of them were intended for twelve ; ^ ."^ hs' volun- teers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of taking the field in person — a number of good men will follow him. " Every exertion shall in the meantime be used to forward the recruiting service ; for a few weeks I think that my service would be more useful in that than in any other employment." " War Department, Jlpril 4M, 1813. « Sir, — Your despatches of the 17th ultimo, from Chili- cothe, have been received, and I hasten to repeat to you the views of the President, in relation to the next cam- paign, and the injunctions growing out of these, with regard to the employment of militia, &c. »* Our first object is to set a command of the Lakes. 21* 246 APPENDIX. IfP? Means to accomplish this object have been taken, and we have the fullest assurance, that by the first day of June it will be accomplished. "This fact assum^id, there can be no longer a doubt by what means, or by what route, the division of the army assigned to you, ought to approach Maiden. A passage by water will carry you directly to the fortress you would attack, without impairing your strength by fatigue, or diminishing it by battle. A passage by land will, on the other hand, call for great efforts, and expose you to great losses, which if they do not destroy, will at least cripple you. The former will be easy, safe and economical ; the latter, difficult, dangerous, and enormously expensive. " On the other supposition, that we fail to obtain com- mand of the Lake, a new question will arise — whether the campaign shall take an offensive or defensive char- acter ? Be this question determined as it may, the utmost extent which can be given to the force employed, will be seven thousand effectives. " Various reasons determine this point. The enemy have never had in the field, for the defence of Maiden, more than two thousand men. Their number has no doubt been hitherto limited by their means of subsistence, and this cause is not hkely to suffer any material change in their favor during the ensuing campaign. More than seven thousand men, therefore, would be unnecessary on our part. Again, to maintain a greater number, would be impracticable in the present state of the treasury. " It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and distinctly, the kind offeree the government mean hereafter to employ in offensive operations, if it can be obtained. ♦* When the legislature, at their last session, adopted the 111 M Kit APPENDIX. 247 taken, and ay of June ;er a doubt •f the army A passage you would Eatigue, or nil, on the )u to great ast cripple iiical ; the ensive. •tain com- — whether sive char^ the utmost id, will be he enemy f Maiden, 3r has no bsistence, ial change VEore than essary on •er, would jury. [early and I hereafter jtained. [opted the measure of augmenting the army to fifty-two regiments of the line, it was expressly with the view of superseding hereafter the necessity of employing militia, excepting in moments of critical invasion. In obedience to this policy, the President assigned to the eighth military district of the United States, four of these new regiments, which, if filled, and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that district, and the twenty-fourth now in march for it, will give a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This number forbids the belief, that any employment of militia draughts will be necessary, when it shall have been collect- ed. Until, however, this be done, or at least until time be given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be called out, as shall be necessary for the defence of your posts on the Miami, and of your dep6ts of provision on the Lake. And should the recruiting service go on less prosperously in.the patriotic States of Kentucky and Ohio, than in other parts of the Union, you are in that case, and in that case only, authorized to call out so many militia draughts as will make good the deficiency ; and organizing these under the rules already prescribed, await the farther orders of the President hi your camp at the Rapids. " To these orders I have to add, that you will regard it as your duty to keep this department regularly and fre- quently informed of the actual condition of the troops under your command ; as well in regard to equipment and sup- plies of provision and ammunition, as to number, discipline and health ; and that vour weekly and monthly reports shall include also the state of the ordnance and quarter- master's departments, noting particularly, the number of horses and oxen employed by both. You will readily per- ceive the necessity of giving this order, when I state, that in i iilh' I 248 APPENDIX. % 1 no return of any description from your division of the arr has ever been received at the Adjutant-Generates office. Y( tti proportion of the new staff has boen given to you. Cnp- tain Adams has been appointed Assistant Adjutant-Gen- eral, and Mr. Bartlett, Deputy Quartermaster-General of your division. The Brigadiers Mc Arthur and Cass are employed in superintending the recruiting service. A letter from the latter, gives reason to believe that this will go on well in the State of Ohio. " I am &c. (Signed) "JOHN ARMSTRONG." " Major-General Harrison, " Com, 8th Mil. Dist. U. 5." Letter to Governor Meigs, of Ohio* (Private.) " War Department, March 28M, 1813. " Sir, — I have this moment been informed by a Senator from Ohio, that the plan of campaign presented to Gen- eral Harrison, has not been fortunate enough to meet the approbation of that officer ; and that there is reason to fear that the objections made to it on his part (which it appears he has taken no pains to conceal) are likely to make an unfavorable impression on public opinion. " Under these circumstances, I have believed it to be my duty to exhibit to your Excellency a brief view of the objections, fiscal and military, to the land march, which the General prefers ; and on the other hand, to state the grounds on which the approach to Maiden is directed to be made by water, and under convoy of the fleet. " 1st. The great expensiveness of a land movement APPENDIX. 249 Ihe art ce. Yf t»i u. Cpp- tant-Gen- eneral of Cass are . A letter vill go on )NG.»» 1813. a. Senator to Gen- meet the •eason to (which it hkely to tn. it to be iw of the tvhich the state the rected to ovement The cost to the public (according to a statement made in December last by the General) for ' transportalion alone,'' during the six weeks required for a land march to Maiden, would of itself be sufficient to build and equip a naval force on Lake Erie, which would give us a decided and permanent command of that Lake. " 2d. The increased number of the array, which accord- ing to another statement of the General, will be indispen- sable, from the altered character of the western militia ; composed as it will now be of men greatly inferior to the gallant bands of the last campaign, and with regard to whom, numbers alone must compensate for the want of spirit and patriotism, " 3d. The bad policy of any plan which, like that pro- nosed by the General, leaves your enemy to choose the time and place of this attack, and with these, the power of compelhng you to hazard a battle, upon plans and dispo- sitions of his making. " 4th. The farther and incalculable advantage, of avail- ing himself to the utmost of the Indian hordes attached to him — who, on a long march of six weeks, through swamps, forests, and thickets, will find a battle-ground in every milf, peculiarly adapted to their arms, powers, and habits — a circumstance which renders them more formidable than double the number of British grenadiers would be, on the same ground. " On the other hand, if we turn to the new plan, none of these objections against it will be found. It makes neces- sary no augmentation of force, nor increase of expenditure. It carries you directly to your object, in full health and spirits — unimpaired by battle, hunger, or fatigue. It avoids all the waste and embarrassment of land transportation, 250 APPENDIX. and what, on military principles, will alone decide the question of preference between the two modes of pro- ceeding, it instantly and completely neutralizes the whole Indian force, (now noted by the General at four or five thousand combatants,) and leaves the battle to be fought on the part of the enemy, by British regu- lars and Canadian militia. " Your Excellency will best knowho\\% and to whom to communicate these views. " I am, &c., "JOHN ARMSTRONG." [No. 24.] "War Department, Wilna, October 30M, 1813. " Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 5th and 24th instant. *' The despatch by Captain Brown, of the 22d inst., and which, with him, was lost in Lake Erie, suggested, as an ulterior movement, the coming down to the Ni- agara river, and putting yourself on the right and rear of De Rottenburg's position before Fort George ; while General McClure, with his brigade of militia, volun- teers, and Indians, should approach it in front. The enemy seems to have been aware of this, or some similar movement, as he began his retreat on the 9th, and did not stop until he had gained the head of Bur- lington bay, where I understand, by report, he yet is. This is his last stronghold in the peninsula j routed APPENDIX. 251 from this he must surrender, or make his way down Lake Ontario to Kingston. His force is estimated at twelve or fifteen hundred effectives, the capture or destruction of which would he a glorious finah to your campaign. Our operations in this quarter are but beginning at a time when they ought to have ended. "I am, &c., " JOHN ARMSTRONG." " Major-General Harrison." " BooNViLLE, J\*ovember 3d, 1813. " When I wrote to you from Wilna it was doubtful whether our attack would be made directly upon Kingston or upon Montreal. Reasons exist for pre- ferring the latter, and have probably determined Gen- eral Wilkinson to go down the St. Lawrence. In this case the enemy will have at Kingston, beside his fleet, a garrison of twelve or fourteen hundred men ; had we not a corps in the neighborhood, these might do mischief, and even render insecure the winter station of our fleet. To prevent this, it is deemed advisable to draw together at Socket's Harbor a considerable military force. There are now at that post between four and five hundred men of all descriptions, sick, convalescent, and eflfective ; Colonel Scott's detach- ment (about seven hundred) are on their march thither, and it is barely possible that Colonel Randolph's (not arriving in time to move with the army) may be there also ; this does not exceed three hundred and fifty. McArthur's brigade added to these will make a force wholly competent to our object. This new disposition will render necessary the employment of so many of the militia and volunteers, now in service under Gen- 252 APPENDIX. eral McClure, as you may deem competent to the safe- keeping of forts George and Niagara and their de- pendencies. I am, &c., "JOHN ARMSTRONG." "Major-General Harrison." "Head-Quarters, Newark, JVov. 16ih, 1813. " Sir — Commodore Chauncey with the fleet arrived here yesterday morning, and informed me that he was ready to receive the troops to convey them down the lake ; and that the season was so far advanced, ren- dering the navigation dangerous to the smaller vessels, that it was desirable they should be embarked as ex- peditiously as possible, ^s a very small part of the militia and volunteers had arrived ^ and the situation of Socket's Harbor appearing to me to require immediate reinforcement^ I did not think proper to take upon my- self the responsibility of postponing the departure of the troops for the lower part of the lake, conformably to the directions contained in your letter of the 3d inst. " The information I received yesterday from two respectable citizens who were taken near Fort Meigs in June last, and who made their escape in an open boat from Burlington, confirms me in the propriety of sending them off. These men state that the troops were hurrying to Kingston from York as fast as possible; the regulars going down in boats, and the militia bringing the latter back, " I am, &c., "WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON." " Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War" APPENDIX. 253 it to the safe- ,nd their de- rRONG." 6/J/i, 1813. fleet arrived 5 that he was !m down the vanced, ren- aller vessels, rked as ex- part of the situation of '6 immediate ke upon my- 'eparture of iformably to the 3d in St. ly from two Fort Meigs in an open propriety of it the troops 'as possible; the militia RISON." 'ar.'' [No. 25.] In producing the disaster at Queenstown, two causes were efficient, which, as they are not touched upon in the text, we will note here. It appears from the letter of General Van Rensselaer, given below, that the as- sailing force was to consist of two columns ; the one, composed of militia, led by Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer ; the other, of regular t )ops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie. Instead of remaining at the head of his corps, the first-mentioned of these officers, embarked with a part of the regular detach- ment, and was, soon after reaching the Canada shore, disabled by wounds. The movement of the militia column became necessarily embarrassed by the ab- sence of its commander, and this absence will also sufficiently account for the insubordination and reluc- tance to embark, afterward evinced by that portion of the American force. Had Colonel Van Rensselaer remained at his post, instead of thrusting himself where his presence was not needed, the militia would, in all probability, have crossed the river, and the re- sult of the action have been different. Again ; why did not General Wadsworth, after the first success of the attack, take possession of the village in his front, which would have afforded a covering to his troops, and more than counterbalanced the inequality of numbers which existed between the two armies, after the arrival of General Sheafe and his reinCorcementl 22 'I * * It 254 APPENDIX. Letter from General Van Rensselaer to General Deaf' born^ October UM, 1812. Head-Quarters, Lewistown. Sir : As the movements of the army under my command, since I hud last the honor to address you, on the 8th irat., have been of a very important char- acter, producing consequences serious to many indi- viduals, establishing facts actually connected with the interest of the service, and safety of the army 5 and as I ^tand prominently responsible for some of these consequ fences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and through you to my country, the situation and circum- stances in which I have had to act, and the reasons and motives which governed me ; and if the result is not all that might have been wished, it is such, that when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheer- fully submit myself to the judgment of my country. In my letter of the 8th inst., I apprised you that a crisis in this campaign was rapidly approaching, and that (to repeat the same words) " the blow must be soon struck, or all the toil and expense of the cam- paign go for nothing; and worse than nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonor." Under such impressions I had, on the 5th inst., written to Briga- dier-General Smyth, of the United States forces, re- questing an interview with him, Major-General Hall, and the commandants of United States regiments, for the purpose of conferring on the subject of future operations. I wrote Major-General Hall to the same purport. On the llth, I had received no answer from General Smyth ; but in a note of the 10th, Gen- eral Hall mentioned that General Smyth had not yet then agreed upon any day for the consultation. AITENDIX. 255 In the moniitiine, llie pnrtiitl success of Lieutenant Elliot, at liliick Rock, beg^an to excite a stionp dispo- 8ition in the troops to act. This was expressed tome through various channels, in the shape of an alterna- tive ; that they must have orders to act, or at all Imz- ards they would go home. I forbear liere comment- ing upon the obvious consequences to me personally, of longer withholding my orders uijder such circum- stances. I had a conference with as to the possibility of getting some person to pass over o Canada and obtain correct information. On tie mor 'ng of the kh, he wrote to me that he had pro- u red he man who bore his letter to go over. Instru. ions were given him ; he passed over, and obtained such information ns war- ranted an immediate attack. This wus confidentially communicated to several of my officers, and produced great zeal to act ; more especially, as it might have a controling effect on the movements at Detroit, where it was supposed General Brock had gone, with all the force he dare spare from the Niagara frontier. The best preparations in my power were therefore made to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown, and gain possession of the village, where the troops might be sheltered from the inclemency of the weather. Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick's flying artillery, and a detachment of regular troops under his command, were ordered to be up In season for Fort Niagara. Orders were also sent to General Smyth to send down from Bulialo such detachment from his brigade as ex- isting circumstances in that vicinity might \varrant. The attack was to have been made at 4 o'clock of the morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats from (:■ <: ^i I.' " <156 APPENDIX. the old fe>Ty opposite the heights. To avoid any em- barrassment in crossing the river (which is here a sheet of eddies), experienced boatmen were procured to take the boats from the landing below to the place of embarkation. Lieutenant Simms was considered the man of greatest skill for this service. He went ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the in- tended place far up the river, and there, in a most ex- traordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all the boats. In this agonizing dilemma stood officers and men, whose ardor had not been cooled by exposure through the night to one of the most tremendous northeast storms, which continued unabated for twenty- eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. The ap- proach of daylight extinguished every hope of success, and the detachment returned to camp. Colonel Van Eensselaer was to have commanded. After this result, I had hoped the patience of the troops would have continued, until I could submit to a council the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that I might act under, and in conformity to, the opinion which might then be expressed. But my hope was idle, and the previously excited avdor seemed to have gained new heat from the late miscarriage. Brave men were mortified to stop short of the object, and the timid thought laui^ls half won by the attempt. On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act would involve me in suspicion, and the service in disgrace. Viewing affairs at Bufl'alo as yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the APPENDIX. 257 march of General Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of the first expedition ; but having now determined to attack Queenstown, I sent new orders to General Smyth to march ; not with the view of his aid in the attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient, but to support the detachment should the conflict be obstinate. Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie, who had just arrived at the Five Mile creek, had late in the nighi of the first contemplated attack, gallantly ofl^ered me his own and his men's service, but he got my permission too late. He now again came forward, had a conference with Colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might have the honor of a command in the expedition. The arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to command one column of three hundred militia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie a column of the same number of regulars. Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and confidential and experienced men selected to manage them. At an early hour of the night, Lieutenant- Colonel Chrystie marched his detachment by the rear road from Niagara to camp. At 7 in the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel Stranahan's regiment moved from Niagara Falls ; at 8 o'clock, Mead's ; and at 9, Lieu^ tenant-ColonelBlain's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two col- umns were to pass over together ; and as soon as the heights should be carried, lieutenant-Colonel Fen- wick's flying artillery was to pass over, then Major Mullany's detachment of regulars, and the other troops to follow in order. 22* "♦. ■ H, It 4 ?i 1 1 1 ; '' 258 APPENDIX. At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the troops commenced embarking under the fire of a commanding battery mounting two 18-pounders and two 6. The movement was soon discovered, and a brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line of the Canada shore. Our battery then opened to sweep the shore, but it was for some minutes too dark to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade was now opened on the boats from three difl^erent batteries — our battery returned their fire, and occa- sionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself served with shells from a small battery of the enemy. Colonel Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march from Niagara Falls in the night, arrived in time to re- turn the fire with two 6-pounders. The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the eddies, as well as with a shower of shot ; but Colone? Van Rensselaer, with about one hundred men, soon effected his landing amid a tremendous fire directed upon him from every point ; but to the astonishment of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column advanced slowly against the fire. It v as a serious misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expe- dition, that in a few minutes after landing, Colonel Van Rensselaer received four wounds. Under so severe a fire, it was difficult to form raw troops. By some mismanagement of the boatmen, Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie did not arrive until sometime after this, and was wounded in the hand, in passing the river. Col- onel Van Rensselaer, still able to stand, with great presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gal- lantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill I! i!!i' APPENDIX. 259 3SS, and the fire of a unders and ired, and a whole line opened to 3s too dark cannonade e different and occa- was itself he enemy. his march time to re- with the ut Colone? men, soon e directed onishment he column a serious iole expe- )lonel Van 3 severe a By some it-Colonel • this, and ^er. Col- ^ith great ceed with was gal- ^n the hill in every direction. Soon after this, both parties were reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in various places — many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was briskly served. I ordered the fire of the battery to be di- rected against the guard-hou&e, and it was so effectu- ally done, that, with eight or ten shot, the fire was si- lenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large storehouse j but in a short time the rout became gen- eral, and the enemy's fire was silenced, except from a one gun battery so far down the river, as to be out of reach. A number of boats now passed over unan- noyed, except from the one unsilenced gun. For sometime after I had crossed over the victory appear- ed complete ; but in the expectation of future attacks, I took measures for fortifying my camp immediately. The direction of this service I gave to Liei ' nant Totten, of the engineers. But very soon the v s .my were reinforced, by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippewa. They commenced a furious attack, but were met and routed by the rifle and bay- onet. By this time I perceived my troops were em- barking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements, but to my astonishment I found that, at the moment when victory was in our hands, the ardor of the unengaged troops had subsi- ded. I rode in all directions, urged the men by every consideration to pass — ^but in vain. At this time, a large reinforcement from Fort George was discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an impoitant check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of am- i i ifVI i: H ii. 1 260 APPENDIX. munition as I learned there was left but twenty shot for the 18-pounders. The reinforcement obliqued to he right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians m the rear of the heights. Finding, to my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would pass over,- seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence ; and knowing that the brave men on the heights were quite exhausted, and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do was to send a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment, I despatched a note to General Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation-leaving the course to be pursued to his own judgment, with assurance, that if he thought best to retreat, I would endeavor to send over as many boats as I could command, and cover his retreat by every fire I could make. But the boats were dis- persed, many of the boatmen had fled panic-struck, and but few got off. But my note could but little more than have reached General Wadsworth, about 4 o clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict ensued, and continued about half an hour with a tre- mendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry. Ihe enemy succeeded in re-possessing their battery and gained advantage on every side ; the brave men ivho had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect ot their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict." It twenty shot snt obliqued to L junction with '" Finding^, to rcement would conflict must brave men on 1 nearly out of a fresh supply , I despatched ting him with pursued to his f he thought over as many is retreat by Its were dis- panic-struck, lid but little worth, about inate conflict >r with a tre- nd musketry, heir battery, e brave men strength and able neglect ict."