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32X

NOTICES

THE WAR OF 1812.

BY JOHN ARMSTRONG,

I.ATE A MAJOR-GEKTEilAL IK THE

ARMY OF THE UWTED STATES,
AND SECBETAHY OF WAR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

Vol. I.

NEW YORK:
PUBLISHED BY WILEY <fe PUTNAM.

1840.

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1836,

BY GEORGE DEARBORN. ^ , ■ . ^t

in the Clerk's Office of the I^stnct^Court of the Southern Distnct ol

/7 7J

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Causes of the War.— Declaration of War by the United States.—
Opposition to the measure.—Its character and effects. . . 9

CHAPTER II.

Hull's Expedition.— Loss of MichUimackinac— Surrender of De-
troit, the Michigan Territory, and the Army. .... 16

CHAPTER III.

Militia Operations in the West.— Harrison's Autumnal and Win.
ter Campaigns go

CHAPTER IV.

Operations on the Niagara.— Partial Armistice.— Renewal of
hostiUties.— Van Rensselaer's attack on aueenstown.—
Smyth's invasion of Canada.— Dearborn's Campaign against
the British advanced posts on Lake Champlain. ... 97

CHAPTER V.
First investment of Fort Meigs.- Dearborn and Chauncey's Ex-
pedition.— Reduction of York and Fort George.-Chandler's
defeat and capture on Stony Creek.-Boerstler's defeat.-Af-
fair of Sacket's Harbor ^2i

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER Vl.

PAGE

Second investment of Fort Meigs.— Gallant defence of Fort Ste-
phenson.— Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie.— Capture
of Amherstburg.— Recapture of Detroit and the Michigan Ter-
ritory.— Harrison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor.— Arrival of
a part of the Western Army on the Niagara. . . .163

Appendix.

187

"Were nations to review in peace their motives
for having made war, with the means they em-
ployed, and the method by which they conducted
it, they would in general find much to blame in
a moral as well as a military view ; the conviction
of the wrongs they did, and the blunders they com-
mitted, might, on another and similar occasion,
improve both their ethics and their tactics, and
make them, at once, better men and abler soldiers ;
but as nations cannot be brought together, it rests
with governments to perform this duty of self-
examination ; when, if they omit it, the task de-
volves on I le historian."

Mabbt.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

CHAPTER I.

Causes of tho War. — ^Declaration of War by the United States. —
Opposition to the measure. — Its character and eficcts.

The Treaty of Paris of 1783, by which Great
Britain acknowledged "the freedom, sovereignty,
and independence of the United States," was, on
the part of the former, virtually a truce, not a
pacification ; a temporary and reluctant sacrifice of
national pride to national interest ; not a frank and
honest adjustment of differences, seeking no cause,
nor indulging any disposition, to renew the contro-
versy. Indeed, so little careful was this power to
conceal, or even to dissemble her temper and policy
on this subject, that the first American minister
accredited to her court, had scarcely passed the
threshold of the palace, when he discovered, that
a spirit of unextinguished animosity towards the
United States, pervaded alike her councils and her
conduct. ^ Nor was it the effect of longer residence,
or more intimate acquaintance, to modify, much less
to efface this first impressi*)n. Every overture on

I Appendix, No. 1.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

his part, made with a view of placing the diplo-
matic relations of the two countries on a fair and
friendly footing, was disregarded; the north-west-
ern, and other military pests, though confessedly
within the limits of the United States, were forcibly
retained ;' the Indian nations in alliance with Great
Britain, were openly instigated to a renewal of hos-
tilities ; and when at last, this diabolical purpose
was accomplished, as if to leave no room for doubt-
ing her instrumentality in the case, she was found
extending her territorial encroachments, and taking
a new and formidable position on the Miami of the
Lake ; whence, during three campaigns, she supplied
the wants, and prompted the attacks of these savage
tribes.'

Checked by Wayne's victory in 1794, in this plan
of desolating the west, she next employed herself
in attempting to corrupt the east ; and in 1809,
mistaking the freedom of political discussion, for a
spirit of revolt, despatched a confidential agent to
Boston, with authority to mature the terms on which
that section of the country would separate from the
Union, and reconnect itself with the British Em-
pire. The failure, no less than the atrocity of this
project, forbade its acknowledgment ; but though
officially disavowed, the number and character of

1 The posts retained contrary to treaty, were Michilimackinac, De-
troit, Niagara, Oswegotch^, Point au Fer, and Dutchman's Point

« SL Clair's Narrative of the campaign of 1791, and Lord Dorches-
ter's Speech to the Indians, in 1794. See, also, Washington's letter
to Jay, of the 30th of August of the same year. Appendix, No. 3.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1819.

the documents produced in support of the charge,
leave no doubt of its validity.*

It cannot be supposed that the spirit of hostility,
thus manifested on the land, v^'ould be slow in show-
ing itself on the ocean. Having in 1793, become
a party to the coalition against republican France,'
she adopted a policy, which sought at once to dis-
tress and impoverish her enemy and enrich herself,
at the expense of neutral commerce ; and accord-
ingly, on the 8th of June of that year, issued an
order for capturing and carrying into British ports,
"all vessels laden wholly or in part with corn, flou»-
or meal, and destined to France, or to other coun-
tries, if occupied by tl.o arms of that nation."

Offensive as this measure could not fail to be, its
vexations and injuries were nearly forgotten, in the
greater mischief and malignity which characterized
that of the 6th of November of the same year ; and
which, by instructions secretly communicated to her
cruisers, subjected « to capture and adjudication, all
vessels laden with the produce of any French colony,
or with supplies for such colony" — a measure, which
in the opinion of a careful inqui er and competent
judge, « annihilated at a blow, a large portion of
the commerce of the United States." » But how-
ever great, in this case, the lo^s to us, or the profit

I Appen-lix, No. 4.

« The basis of the several coalitions against France, was the con-
ference at Mantua in 1791 j to which the King of England was a
party, as elector of Hanover.— ilf. Mollink's Annals.

3 Dallas's exposition of the causes and character of the late war.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

to her, there was soon superadded another measure,
which interdicted all neutral commerce, not only
with ports blockaded by forces sufficient for the
purpose, (which the laws of war would not have
forbidden) but with places where no force whatever
existed; and even with whole coasts of territory,
which her naval means, if acting in concert, would
have been incompetent to blockade. Still, her abuse
of power did not stop here ; it was not enough that
she thus outraged our rights on the ocean ; the
bosoms of our bays, the mouths of our rivers and
even the wharves of our harbors, were made the
theatres cf the most flagitious abuse ; and, as if
d Hermined to leave no cause of provocation untried,
the personal rights of our seamen were invaded ;
and men, owing her no allegiance, nor having any
connexion with her policy or arms, were forcibly
siezed, dragged on board her ships of war and made
to fight her battles, under the scourge of tyrants
and slaves, with whom submission, whether right
or wrong, forms the whole duty of man.*

Evils of such magnitude and continuance, could
not fail to produce a high degi'ee of excitement in
the nation, and much of a correspondent feeling on
the part of the government ; but though three suc-
cessive administrations saw in the conduct of Great
Britain, sufficient cause of war, all doubted the
expediency of acting upon it. Barely recovered
from the debility, resulting from the defects of their

1 Official letters of Mr. King while Minister at London.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

first Federal compact, and but just entered on the
experiment of another of more efficient character,
forbearance was adopted as a principle, and means
simply diplomatic prescribed, as those alone which
cculd be employed with safety and success. Un-
fortunately, this estimate of their value was decep-
tive, and the event showed, that with a nation like
Great Britain, which makes her own interest and
convenience the governing rules of her conduct,
persuasion, admonition, remonstrance, argument,
and even concession, are alike unavailing. All
these elements of diplomacy were frequently and
faithfully employed, but without other effect than
that of multiplying and augmenting the evils they
were intended to mitigate or remove ; the appetite
of the aggressor grew on what it fed ; her insolence
increased with her power, and the violation of one
right, was made to justify that of another ; when
at last, disdaining longer to discuss wrongs she had
no intention to redress, she officially announced —
that « farther negotiation wap inadmissible." ^

Having thus lost the respect of her adversary, it
but remained for the United States to decide, whether
she would preserve her own 1 On this question^ she
could not hesitate long or seriously; and accord-
ingly, on the 18th of June, 1812, declared war
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and their dependancies.

It must not however be dissembled, that this act,

I Dallas's Exposition.
2

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1813.

though forced upon the government by the long
continued and increasing injustice of England, re-
ceived from the community, a less general support,
than might have been expected from the purity of
the motives in which it originated, or the nature
and extent of the evils it was intended to redress.
The habitual opponents of the administration, believ-
ing the circumstances of the times furnished a favor-
able opportunity for attempting the recovery of the
pohtical ascendency they had lost, hastened to in-
stitute a system of indiscriminate opposition ; directed
as well against measures merely preparatory for war,
as against those which were in themselves acts of
war. In this headlong career, the fiscal operations
of the government were opposed ; the recruiting ser-
vice discountenanced ; the miHtia made insuh'^rdi-
nate, and even the constitutional authorit; ^^
President to organize their masses and direct . gjj
services within the states respectively, denied and
resisted. We need hardly add, that an opposition,
thus active and lawless, could not fail to be mis-
chievous, and became, as will be seen in the progress
of our story, the source of both calamity and disgrace
to the nation.*

1 Appendix, No. 5.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

CHAPTER II.

Hull's Expedition. — Loss of Michilimakinac. — Surrender of Detroit,
the Michigan Territory, and the Army.

Among the measures of precaution, taken by the
Government of the United States, previously to their
declaration of war,^ was that " of placing within
the Michigan Territory, a force that should be com-
petent to the defence of the north-western frontier
against Indian hostility ; and which, in the event
of '0*15 bture with Great Britain, would enable the
tJi iiiStates to obtain the command of Lake Erie ;
and with it, the means of more easily co-operating
with such other corps, as might be destined to the
invasion of the Canadas."* The troops assigned
to this service, amounting to two thousand men of
all arms,* were placed under the command of Brig-
adier-General Hull, then Governor of the Michigan

i The principal of these were, an Act laying an embargo on ship"
ping — a second, authorizing a detachment of one hundred thousand
militia — a third, for increasing the regular army — a fourth, for the
acceptance of volunteers — and a fifth, for borrowing money on public
account

i President Madison's Message to Congress, of Nov. 4th, 1813.

• Three companies of the first United States regiment of Artillery ;
the fourth, and part of the first regiment of Infantry ; three regiments

Ot vuiO VOiUlitccre j tn6 i.viiCiugan IXiiiitia auu Oiic COrnpauj Oi xvEn^TS.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1813.

Territory ; and formerly an officer, not without dis-
tinction, in the war of the revolution.

This General, after giving the necessary attention
to the equipment and subsistence of his corps,* began
his march from Dayton, a frontier town in the State
of Ohio, on the first day of June, 1812. Though
unencumbered with artillery, and in no way impeded
by an enemy, his progress was unavoidably slow ;
from the necessity of opening roads, making bridges
and constructing blockhouses, for the better security
of his rear, and of the supplies and reinforcements
moving upon it. It was not, therefore, until the
SOth of the month, that he was enabled to reach
the Miami of the Lake ; where, under an admoni-
tion, recently received from the War Department,
"to quicken his movements," he determined to
avail himself of the means of navigation which now
offered, for the more rapid and economical trans-
portation of his baggage, stores, sick and convales-
cent.« Embarking these, accordingly, on board of
the Cayahoga Packet, they were despatched for
Detroit ; while the army, with the same destination,
resumed its march by land.

The day following this transaction, the General

I Hull asserts, that he found the Ohio volunteers deficient in arms
equipment and clothing; and even unprovided vrith either contract,
or commissariat, for the supply of their £ood.~HuWs JYIemoirs.

a Colonel McArthur admonished the General against this measure,
on the presumption that war was already declared, and fiimished
strong evidence of the fact ; but with so little effect, that the General *
availed himself of the packet to forward, even "the instructions of h»
government and the returns of his army."

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

received the first ofiicial notice of the declaration of
war ; and on reaching the river Raisin, was made
acquainted with the fate of his detachment ; which,
in attempting to pass the British post of Maiden,
had been attacked and captured, ''by a subal-
tern and six men, in a small and open boat.'*

The effect of this disaster on General Hull, was
not such as might have been expected from long
military service, or high military character ; and
probably produced the first doubts that existed of
his capacity as a leader. Instead of exciting to
increased spirit and exertion, which would soon
have compensated for the loss and atoned for the
disgrace so unexpectedly incurred, he unfortunately
saw it only in the light of an evil omen, and pre-
cursor of an attack, fatal alike to the objects and
agents of the expedition ; and accordingly employed
himself in imagining and practising devices to avoid
a battle,^ which all circumstances — time, place and
relative strength — made it his duty to seek. Nor
were his stratagems on this occasion unavailing ;
the enemy saw and respected his strength, and per-
mitted him to reach Detroit, without molestation or
menace.

Finding himself now vested with an authority to
invade the Canadas, " if consistent with the safety
of his own posts," and not having, as he believed,
any thing to fear on their account, he on the 12th
of July crossed the river Detroit and encamped at

I Hull's Memoirs, p. 39.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

Sandwich, with the professed object of marching
directly upon Maiden — a measure, recommended
by many considerations ; but more particularly by
the fact, that from the local position of the fort,
(nearly twenty miles in the rear of Detroit) its gar-
rison had the power of destroying or obstructing all
supplies coming from the United States, unless pro-
tected by a force superior to itself.

In prosecution of this important object, the Gene-
ral began by issuing a proclamation addressed as
well to the hopes, as to the fears of the Canadian
colonists ; and vaunting, in an especial manner, the
possession of a force " equal to the purpose of either
protection or punishment." Nor did the party ad-
dressed, put a different estimate on its power of
doing good or evil — « all opposition seemed to fall
before it; one month it remained in the country,
and was fed from its resources. In different direc-
tions, detachments penetrated sixty miles into the
settled parts of the province, and the inhabitants
seemed satisfied with the change of situation which
appeared to be taking place. The militia at Am-
herstburg were daily deserting, and the whole
country under the control of the army, asking for
protection— while the Indians generally, appeared
to be neutralized and determined to take no part in
the controversy." ^

If such was the effect of the mere appearanoe of
the American army within the limits of Canada,

I Hull's official letter to the War Department, 27th August, 1812.

Ill

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

what might not have been expected from a prompt,
steady and well-directed application of it8 powers 7
Maiden was but eighteen miles from Sandwich ;
the road between the two, wholly unobstructed ;
and what at the former was called a fortification,
utterly unworthy of the name.^ Nor was the gar-
rison more formidable than the work it occupied ;
consisting only of one hundred regular troops, and
four hundred disaffected militia and neutralized
Indians. Instead, however, of availing himself of
circumstances thus auspicious, and putting into his
conduct that vigor and intelligence, which always
deserve success and often command it, the General
unfortunately took council only from his fears, and
for the lust time discovered, that " he had neither
cannon nor howitzers of large calibre, fit to travel ;
and that without arms of this description, it would
be unsafe to advance." Artificers were therefore
set to work to supply the deficiency, and at the end
of three weeks, two twenty-four pounders and three
howitzers, were put upon wheels strong enough to
carry them.'*

It may be reasonably supposed that this long
interval had not been permitted to escape, without

1 Hull's trial ; Cass and Miller's testimony.

8 General Brock's estimate of the use of heavy cannon in breaching
earthern walls and cedar pickets, was very different. In approaching
Detroit, a work of much more strength than Maiden, he would not
encumber his movements with guns of larger calibre than six and
tliree pounders. Yet to Brock's knowledge of his trade, General
Hull bears willing testimony.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 18 ».

some movements calculated to try the strength and
temper of the enemy ; and more particularly, that
the approaches to his position, as well as the posi-
tion itself, had been thoroughly reconnoitred and
ascertained. Nothing, however, of this character
was either meditated or executed, if we except two
or three small and isolated detachments, sent as far
as the river Canard ; but without any sustaining
corps, to enable them to hold what they gained, if
found to be useful ; nor even any instruction to 'do
80, if practicable, by the means they possessed. Of
these, the detachment commanded by Colonels Cass
and Miller is most worthy of notice.

On approaching the river (a narrow but deep
stream four miles from Maiden) a British picket
was found in possession of the bridge, and appa-
rently determined to hold it. After a short trial of
strength, the position was turned and the picket
driven back upon the fort, whither the fugitives
carried their panic along with them, "creating in
the garrison much alarm and confusion"— a state
of things which continued to exist until it was dis-
covered that the detachment, instead of being (as
had been imagined) the precursor of an army, was
merely a reconnoitring party, ignorant of the value
of the position it had gained, or not instructed and
prepared to maintain it.»

If the effects of this experiment on the enemy,
appear to be extraordinary and without sufficient

» Hull's trial ; Forbish's testimony;

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

cause, how much more so must be considered those
which it produced on the American commander]
When the success of the party in taking the bridge
and driving in the picket, was reported by Colonels
Cass and Miller, they did not fail to report also the
importance of the acquisition they had made to the
future objects of the campaign ; and entreated, that
if any circumstances unknown to them, made it
inexpedient or improper to move the army to this
new and important position, they might themselves
be permitted to hold it and be sustained in doing
so, by occasional or permanent reinforcements and
supplies. On this expression of facts and opinions,
which should have excited only respect for those
who had given them, the General yielded to a
paroxysm of ill-temper and obstinacy ; criminated
the attack made on the enemy, as a breach of
orders ; rejected the advice offered to him in all its
parts, and peremptorily commanded the immediate
return of tlie detachment. Nor could any modifi-
cation of this order be obtained, but on condition
that Colonels Cass and Miller would take upon
themselves the whole responsibility of the measure,
without any corresponding ol3ligation on the part of
the General to supply the means necessary to its
execution — a condition, to which he well knew, no
prudent officer would yield his assent.*

I ,j

1 Hull's trial. Colonel Miller's testimony. — ** Witness mentioned to
Colonel Cass and they agreed, that as they had not the disposition of
the whole force, they should not take the responsibility." See also
the testimony jf duarterm aster-General Taylor.

!l!f

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

Such want of knowledge, of judgment and of
enterprise, could not be long concealed by any
devices; and had now become so flagrant and
alarming, that even the General appeared to be
touched by a desire of redeeming what he had lost.
He regretted that a blow had not been already
struck ; and declared himself pledged to lead the
army promptly and directly to Malc'en.* The am-
munition was accordingly placed in wagons ; the
cannon, on floating batteries ; and every other
requisite for the attack prepared, when to the grief
ai.>d disappointment of all, the plan was abandoned,
the encampment raised, and the army, with the
exception of a small detachment of one hundred
and fifty men, recrossed in the night of the 7th of
August, to the town and fort of Detroit !

While the American commander was thus de-
pressing the spirit of his own army, raising that of
his enemy, taking from the savages every motive
for longer inaction, and entirely destroying the con-
fidence reposed in his promises by the Canadian
colonists, his adversary (General Brock) was pursu-
ing a system, which, in all respects, tended directly
to augment and confirm these effects. Apprised,
as early as the 26th of June, of the declaration of
war," he hastened to transmit the information to his
outposts ; and without waiting the instructions of
Sir George Provost, suggested to the commandant

I Colonel Casa'a letter to the Secretary of War, of the 10th Sep-
tepiber, 1812.
8 Christie's Memoir of the late war in the Canadas.

M0TICR8 OF THE WAR OF 1813.

of St. Joseph's, an immediate attack on Fort Michi-
limackinac, as the hest mode of defending his own.

Though Captain Roberts, the officer to whom
this suggestion was made, found himself ill-pre-
pared for an enterprise of such moment ; yet enter-
ing fully into the views of his commander, and
being cordially supported by the agents of the two
western fur-companies, he in the short space of
eight days, organized a force, naval and military,
with which on the 17th of July he made the experi-
ment; and (it may be safely presumed, as much to
his surprise, as entirely to his satisfaction) found
the commanding officer not only unprepared for the
attack, but ignorant of the declaration of war. and
not unwilling to surrender his post, without even
the ceremony of a refusal.*

Having thus easily and cheaply succeeded in
wresting from the United States their most important
western position, the British General now conceived
a project of yet more contemptuous daring ; having
for its object, not merely the safety of Maiden and
the expulsion of the American army from Canada,
but the pursuit and capture of this very army,
within its own territorial limits and defences. As

i This surrender, to say the least of it, was precipitate. Some
experiment of the enemy's power to take the fort, was due to the
American flag and ought to have been made ; and the more so, as
the result would probably have shown, that an investing corps, com-
posed of thirty regulars and a rabble of engages and savages, with
two old rusty iron guns of small caUbre, was much less formidable
than had been imagined.

§4

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

i \ ,,

a first step in this new career, he superseded Colonel
St. George in the command of the district, and sub-
stituted for him Colonel Proctor. This officer, who
arrived at Maiden on the 29th of July, brought
with him no important accession to the number of
the garrison;' but, what was justly considered as
even more necessary, — a competent knowledge of
his profession, a thorough acquaintiince ^ith the
views, and a ready submission to ihr uuthority of
his chief. With such qualificafions it is not to be
supposed that he would be slow in appreciating the
advantages to be derived irom the position of the
fort in which he commanded ; the concentrated
state of the force it contained, and the naval means
given him to employ and to second this. He
accordingly determined to avail himself of the
swamps and defiles on the American side of the
Detroit ; and by thus seizing the k3y of his adver-
sary's resources, not merely recall him from Canada,
but literally compel him to fight for his daily bread,
or surrender at discretion. Nor had he long to wait
for an occasion, on which to test the value of the
plan he had adopted.

Three days before the retreat of the American
army from Canada, General Hull, who had hitherto
shown gre ,1 indifference to the state of his com-
mmiicatioui^,* cor^ented '; 4,he march of a detach-

i "Ten or twelve men." Hull's trial; Gooding's testimony.

i " The Colonels of the Ohio militia applied for leave to take a detadw
ment and open a communication with Brush, and bring the provisions
in safety to Detroit j but the General refused to grant tlie request and

NOTICE8 OP THE WAR OF 1819.

ment, as a guard to the mail and additional convoy
to a quantity of flour and a number of cattle, des-
tined for the U8e of the army, which the policy,
adopted by Proctor and already detailed, had stopped
at the river Raisin. With that infatuation, how-
ever, which luarked so much of his public con
duct, and entirely forgetting the panic he had
himself sulfercd n passing the defil ^ of Maguago
and Brownstown, on ♦he preceding U\i of July,
(though then at the head of a am >%) he per
versely limited the number of th detachment to
two hundred men.* This sni dl bo \ composed of
volunteers and militia, and marching s ith that
want of circur^spection which so v^ \ occurs in
the movements of troops of this descn ion, fell into
an ambuscade prepared for them neat rowiistown,
and were imniei lately beaten and disf
the loss of four uptains, two subaltcr
vates and the pul lie mail, of which th
the escort. Maj( Van Home, the <
officer, did what w is possible, to lessen the loss and
prevent the disorder of the retreat ; and tin endea-
vored to atone for the error he had comir ted, in
disregarding the inDrmation previously given him,
of the strength and position of the enemy ; of

appeared indifferent about t le fate of the Captain and the proviaons.
On the 6th, the Colonels o plied for five hundred men to bury the
killed (in Van Home's affair,) and to open the communication with
Brush ; but the General ret ising to let them take more than one
hundred, and this being a n amber much too small, the project wa«
abandoned."— 'jMTc^/ce'jj Hist ry of the War in the West.
1 Hull's trial j McArthur's cstimony.

rsed ; with
, sixty pri-
ll ad been
unanding

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812,

i i I

which, had a proper use been made, the mi-^fortune
might have been easily and entirely avoided.'

To fulfil the intention of this unsuccessful and
ill-conducted enterprise, the importance of which,
(now that the army had recrossed the Detroit and
could no longer live on the resources of the enemy,)
became every moment more obvious and urgent, a
second detachment was ordered, and the command
assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of the fourth
United States regiment of infantry. But, as in the
former case, the General had not become wise by
the experience of others, so in this, he continued to
be ignorant in despite of his own. Disregarding
the admonition, so abundantly furnished by the
disaster and disgrace incurred on the 5th, and
entirely overlooking the fact, that, his adversary
having now nothing to fear with regard to Maiden,
was at all times in a condition to repeat the lesson
with his whole force, if deemed necessary, — he per-
tinaciously refused to extend the corps beyond five
hundred combatants; and would have hazarded
these without the protection of a single piece of
artillery, had not Colonel Miller insisted upon taking
with him, one six-pounder and one five and a hal/
inch howitzer.'^

1 "After passing the Maguago villages, a Frenchman informed
Major Van Home, that three or four hundred Indians and some
British, were lying in ambusli near Brownstown, for the purpose of
intercepting the party. Not sufficiently respecting the information,
the Major marched on."— JWc^Jee's History.

« Dalliba'a Narrative.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

1 '1

The detachment beginning its march on the 8th
of August, and being conducted with the necessary
attention and skill, suffered no serious interruption
from the enemy, until the afternoon of the 9th ;
when on entering a wood near Brownstown, the
advanced guard, commanded by Captain Snelling,
found itself within pistol-shot of a long and hostile
line, covered in front by a breastwork of logs and
brushwood, and strongly flanked by the Detroit on
one side, and a succession of swamps and thickets
on the other. A heavy and destructive fire now^
opened on Snelling, who sustained and returned it
with his usual gallantry, until Colonel Miller (by
promptly converting his order uf march into an
order of battle) was enabled to interpose his front
line. It was in executing this manoeuvre, tliat
finding himself both outflanked and outnumbered,
and perceiving many of his men to fall and some to
waver, while little if any impression was made on
the covered ranks of the enemy, this distinguished
officer determined to bring the contest to the deci-
sion of the bayonet. The execution of this purpose
was not less rapid than its conception was judicious;
the order to charge was received with loud and re-
peated huzzas ; the breastwork was instantaneously
mounted and passed, and the centre and left of the
enemy, (composed of British regulars and Canadian
militia,) not merely beaten, but decidedly routed.^

> "This rout continued for a milp, when coming into apiece of open
ground, they endeavored to form, but on tlie approach of the Ameri-
cans, again broke and fled into the woods."— /)rt/,';&a's J^arrative.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

Tecumseh, who at the head of what remained
of his tribe formed the left of the British line, was
more difficult to move. Apparently unaffected by
the fate of his ally, he continued the contest with
great vigor ; and when compelled to abandon the
breastwork, withdrew to the neighboring thickets,
took new and strong positions, and for a moment
rendered it doubtful, whether, after all, the battle
was more than half won. Unfortunately, these last
efforts, (the agonies of exhaustion and despair,)
were mistaken by Mfijor Van Home, who com-
manded the right flank of the American line, as
evidence only of the habitual prowess, untiring en-
ergy and great force of his Indian enemy ; which,
as he concluded, could not be long resisted, with-
out the aid of a re-enforcement. A message to this
effect overtook Colonel Miller, while closely pursuing
the British and Canadian fugitives, a circumstance
which could not fail to embarrass his movements.
A halt was accordingly commanded, when, after
a moment's reflection, giving up the glory of cap-
turing one half of his enemy's force, he rapidly
retraced his steps to rescue his comrades and cannon
from the grasp of the other. A second message,
soon after received from the right, leaving no doubt
that the victory was as complete, as the action had
been general ; and that Tecumseh, like Muir, had
at last been compelled to save himself by flight.
The pursuit of the latter was resumed ; but with the
effect only of increasing the regret, at the well-
meant hut erroneous estimate nf tho nnw^ra nr^/^

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

was

perseverance of the Shawanee chief. On reaching
the shore of Lake Erie, the flying enemy was still
visible ; but at a distance, that rendered every
attempt at farther annoyance useless, and on an
element prohibiting all nearer approach.^

Returning to the place of combat, an encamp-
ment was hastily traced and the necessary guards
posted ; when the American commander employed
himself in collecting the wounded, burying the dead,
and ascertaining the state of 'lis communications
with the river Raisin. Receiving on this last head
satisfactory information, that the Indian villages in
his front were abandoned, and that there no longer
existed any obstruction, on the part of the enemy,
to his farther progress, he hastened to detach Cap-
tain Snelling to General Hull with an account of
the action, and a requisition for bo s to remove the
wounded ; for provisions, of whi . he was already
much in want ; and for sucli reinforcement of
men, as would replace thor?^ who had fallen in the
combat. With even these modest and moderate
demands, the General did not think it prudent to
comply. Boats were indeed permitted to be sent,
which, by the exertion of Colonel McAithur, arrived
at nine o'clock on the morning of the 10th ; but a
reinforcement suflficient to fill up the chasm made
in the ranks of the detachment, could not be spared ;
and of provisions, so much only was forwarded, as
in the present hungry and comfortless condition of

t;.'|

^ *■
^

and

2 Dalliba's Narrative.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

! n

i !

Ill

il !!■

the troops, " but sufficed for a single meal." * Be-
lieving, however, that the scantiness of this supply-
was the result of haste or accident, rather than of
design, Colonel Miller despatched a second requisi-
tion on the contractor, and fresh assurances to the
General, that "his commvmications with the river
Raisin were now fully re-established." The mes-
senger employed on this occasion, by some misdi-
rection of his route, did not get back to the en-
campment until the evening of the 11th, and to
the regret and astonishment of all, brought with
him not the required supply of food, but a written
and peremptory order "for the immediate return of
the detachment." This order was strictly, though
reluctantly obeyed, and at midday of the 12th, the
corps re-entered Detroit.*

The General's conduct on this occasion could not
escape animadversion. His more seyere critics, com-

i Hull's trial ; Miller's testimony.

« The American General, as usual, saw every thmg through the
medium of his fears. The effect of even this victory on his mind, was
depressing and degrading. His official letter giving an account of it,
laments "that nothing was gained by it but honor; and that the blood
of seventy-five men had been shed in vain; as it but opened his com-
munications as far as their bayonets had extended." It is thus he spokn
of a victory, which drove the enemy from the field and from his pur-
pose ; which enabled the victors to remain neariy three days in front
of Maiden without molestation ; and which, but for his orders of
recall, would have enabled them to accomplish all the objects of the
expedition. What would a bold and able leader have made of the
moral effect of this victory on his own troops and on those of his
enemy ! With Mr. Hull, it degenerated into a chapter of lamentations
on the value of a soldier's blood, and the vanity of a soldier's honor.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

» Be-
supply
ban of
requisi-
te the
le river
e mes-
misdi-
:he en-
and to
it with
written
turn of
though
Ith, the

uld not
s, corn-

rough the
nind, was
)unt of it,
the blood
I his com-
i he ppoko
n his pur-
^s in front
orders of
cts of the
de of the
>se of his
lentations
honor.

bining his uniform indifference to the state of his
communications, the pressure necessary to induce
him to take any measures for re-opening them, and
the perverse preference given to those of the most
inefficient and hopeless character, with this last act,
of recalling a corps, which had beaten and routed
the enemy from a fortified position of liis own choos-
ing, and which had thus substantially freed from
obstruction the short remaining distance between
itself and the river Raisin — did not scruple to im-
pute to him a secret and systematic co-operation
with the enemy ; while others, less prone to suspicion
and of more charitable temperament, ascribed it to
an honest but false estimate of the value of the ob-
ject to be attained, or of the degree of danger to be
incurred in attaining it ; and lastly, to a persuasion
that the safety of his own position, now required a
speedy and entire concentration of his forces. But
of the several branches of this apology the General
hastened to deprive himself, by organizing a new
expedition, having the same object, but possessing
inferior means ; and with the additional objec 'on,
that its plan involved a longer march, by a route
merely conjectural, and at a moment when the
British force was fast accumulating in his front, and
its bold and active leader had arrived at Maiden.^

Colonel McArthur, the officer to whom the com-
mand of this new detachment had been assigned,

I General Brock arrived at Maiden on the 13th of August — Ckris-
tic''s Memoirs,

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

set out late in the afternoon of the 14th, and after
strugghng with many and unforeseen difficulties—
with thickets nearly impervious, with swamps almost
impassable, and with hunger, which the General had
forgotten to satisfy^— was at last compelled to retrace
his steps towards Detroit ; and arrived in the neigh-
borhood of that post, in time to share in the misfor-
tune, and witness the disgrace, which now awaited
the main army.

This army, as has been already stated, recrossed
the river Detroit on the evening of the 7th and
morning of the 8th of August, with the exception
of a few volunteers, who, in madness or in mockery,
had been left for the protection of such British colo,
nists as yet adhered to the American standard.* On
the 1 1th, this shadow of support was also withdrawn ;
and on the 14th, General Brock, in prosecution of
the plan already indicated, appeared at Sandwich,
and immediately employed himself in constructing
a battery to protect, at once, his present position and
future operations. In executing this work, he met
with no interruption ; as every species of annoyance
was either indirectly declined, or expressly forbidden

I " The only food they had on this march, was green corn and
pumpkins, found in the fields."— Jtf coffee.

a " Major Denny was left at the stockade-work at Sandwich, with
one hundred and thirty convalescents and Anderson's artUleiists, un-
der orders « to hold possession of that part of Upper Canada ; to afibrd
all possible protection to the well-disposed inhabitants, and to defend
his post to the last extremity against musquetry ; hut if overpowered
by artillery, to retreat.' "—/(/cm.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

by General Hull. In vain, was permission solicited
to erect a battery, with which to dislodge or destroy
the enemy's shipping ; in vain, a small detachment
of one hundred men, required for the purpose of
spiking the British cannon ; to these, and to every
similar proposition, involving credit to himself or
danger to his adversary, the General turned either
a deaf ear, or a positive refusal.*

Such was the state of things on the morning of
the 15th, when a marquee (the top of which was so
painted as to give it a strong resemblance to the
British flag) was found erected in the centre of the
American encampment. While this circumstance
engaged the attention of the troops, exciting the
surprise of all, and the suspicion of many, a boat
from the enemy was seen approaching the shore.
The officer under whose direction it came, having
announced himself " the bearer of a written message
from General Brock to General Hull," was promptly
received and conducted to head-quarters. On ex-
amination, the letter he brought was found to con-
tain a demand for the immediate surrender of the
fort, and a menace of indiscriminate massacre in
case of refusal.

A requisition of this kind, which, in all its aspects,
was alike important and unexpected, would, no

'. K^

■1

1 "If you will give permission, I will clear the enemy, on the oppo.
site shore, from the lower batteries?" The General answered, "Mr.
Dalliba, I will make an agreement with the enemy, that if they will
not fire on me, I will not fire on them."— ZXrfKfto's testimmy; HutPs
trial.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

doubt, have warranted an immediate recurrence to
u council of war; but no such step was either taken
or suggested. For once, the American General
appeared to be both competent and willing to act
without advice, and to take upon himself all respon-
sibility. He accordingly, in terms sufficiently decided,
rejected the demand, and to God and his sword com-
mitted the issue. Unfortunately, this defiance was
addressed to one who knew well how to appreciate
Its meaning ; and who did not for a moment suffer
It to abate his diligence, lessen his hopes, or even
mcrease his circumspection. His measures were
pushed with a haste and temerity, which excluded
all doubts of success ; and with a disregard to rules,
which sufficiently indicated his own conviction that
he was but taking part in a pantomime. ' The re-
turn of his messenger becoming the signal of attack,
a fire from the newly-constructed battery was now
opened on the town and fort of Detroit. This con-
tinued until ten o'clock in the evening, and was
recommenced in the morning, but without any ma-
terial injury to its objects ; and was, in fact, but
remarkable from its being the only semblance o^
stratagem, which the British commander conde-
scended to employ in passing a river eleven hundro.]
yards wide, in broad day, and within stroke of an

t So satisfied was Brock t^.at he had nothing to fear from his enem v,
that when advancing to the storm of the fort, his column of march wa^
not preceded by a vanguard of any kind ; and the General himself
was seen ndmg alone, two hundred yards in advance of his column.
— bnelhng's teslimony; HuWs trio!.

^m. i mmmm'^ '

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

enemy not less strong than himself. Nor, as the
event showed, was there any error in the estimate
(which this fact presupposes) of a want of courage,
capacity, or fidehty in his adversary ; for, on makhig
the experiment, it completely succeeded, and not
merely without the loss of a single life, or of a mo-
ment's time, but under a full demonstration that
neither obstruction nor annoyance of any kind was
meditated by the American General.'

On crossing the Detroit, it was Brock's intention
to establish himself at Spring- Wells, and with the
aid of the Indians, so to interpose between the Amor-
ican army and its resources, as to compel it to quit
its fortress, and risk a field-fight for the defence of
its communications ; but having, soon after landinff,
received new information with regard to the fort an'c^'
army generally, and having in particular, assur(d
himself of the detachment made on the 14th f^r n
the latter under the command of Colonel IVIcArtI ir,
he determined to shorten the process, and substitute
assault for investment.' The force at his disposal
for this purpose did not exceed seven hundred com-
batants,3 and of this number, four hundred were
Canadian militia disguised in red coats. With this
small corps, preceded by five pieces of light artillery,

1 " On the 12th, (two days hcfore Brock's donmnd of a surrender )
tlie commanding officers of three of tl^ -egimcnts (the fourth bein't
absent) were mformed, through « medium admitting of no doubt, that
the General had stated that ' a capitulation would be necessary '"-
Colonel Cassis Letter to the Secretary of War, September lOlh, 1812

2 Brock's official letter of the 17th of Auffust. 1812. a Td^^

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

I \i

il! !;

(six and three pounders,) he began his march along
the margin of the river ; while the savages, by a
parallel movement through a wood, covered his left
flank. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, the head
of the column presented itself at the tanyards below
the town, (about five hundred yards from the fort,)
when the American officer, commanding an exterioi
battery of twenty-four pounders cliarged with grape
shot, believing the; moment had arrived when hos-
tilities could no longer be postponed with propriety,
directed his men to point their guns and commence
a fire ; but the order was immediately counter-
manded, and ar^other issued in its stead, forbidding
every kind of hostiUty, and menacing with imme-
diate death all who should dare to infract it.^

The strength, position, and supplies of the Ameri-
can army, at this critical moment, have been fre-
quently stated, and even judicially establiehed. The
morning reports to the Adjutant-General, made its
effective force one thousand and sixty, exclusive of
three hundred Michigan militia, and as many Ohio
volunteers, detached under Mc Arthur. Of this force,
four hundred effectives (infantry and artillerists of
the hne) occupied the fort— a work of regular form
and great solidity ; surrounded by a wide and deep
ditch, strongly fraised and palisadoed, and sustained
by an exterior battery of two twenty-four pounders."
Three hundred Michigan militia, ready to combat foi

I Mc A tree's History.

« IlnJtf ? trial ; testimony of Captain Dalliba, General Tayloi, -nd
Majo Jo-fsup.

!;■

JfOTfCf ^ OF Til WAR OF 1819.

tlieir firesides and altars, lelP the towr which in
itself formed a respectable defence agaiiist the bent
troops, and one quite redoubtable agninpt the attacks
of Indians or militia. Flanking the approach to the
fort, and covered by a high and heavy picket-fence,
lay four hundred Ohio volunteers, expert in the use
of their weapons and anxious to employ them ; while
one mile and a half on the right, advancing by long
and rapid strides, was Mc Arthur's detachment, re-
turning by a route which (had a defence been
hazarded) would have brought them directly on the
rear of the enemy." Of provisions and ammunitions
the supply was abundant; fifteen days rations, and
much fixed and loose powder and lead, were amply
sufficient for a trial of strength and skill, which a
single hour would have decided.

Under circumstances thus auspicious, " while the
troops, in sure anticipation of victory, awaited the
approach of the enemy ; when no sound of discontent
was heard, nor any appearance of cowardice or dis-
affection seen ; when every individual was at his post,
and expected a proud day for his country and him-
self" — an order was received from the General to
withdraw the troops from all exterior positions ; to
stack the arms and hoist a white flag, in token of
submission to the enemy ! " This order was re-
ceived by the men with a universal burst of indig-
nation ; even the women were ashamed of an act,
so disgraceful to the arms of their country ; and all

•>tl

I' '

1 Colonel Cass's letter, 10th September.

9 Idem.

^'^

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

felt ag was proper and decorous, except the man m
whose hands were the reins of authority."*

The terms of the capitulation which followed,
were such as might he expected from the views
and feelings in which it originated. No stipuin ion
was made for the Canadian colonists who had joined
the American standard; the Ohio and Michigan
militia were brought under engagements not to
serve again during the war, unless exchanged; the
territory in its whole extent, was yielded with the
army; and (that even more might be granted than
was asked,) the supplies at the river Raisin, with
their convoy and McArthur's detachment, (the
exact situation of which was not then known at
the fort,) were, on the suggestion of General Hull,
included within the act of surrender. By another
provision of this instrument, the militia, whether
drafts or volunteers, were liberated, while Hull and
the regular troops were despatched to Montreal.*

About the date of these transactions, a calamity
of similar, and to the individuals concerned, of
severer character, awaited the garrison of fort Dear-
born, — a military post on the south-western extrem-
ity of Lake Michigan, possessing as was believed, a
considerable influence over Indian wants and policy.

i Colonel Cass's letter of the 10th September.

« "General Hull with the officers and men of his army, were intro-
duced into Montreal on the evening of the 6th of September, in a tri-
umphal, though mock procession, amidst the shouts of a scornful
njultitude, indignant at the savage threat of extermination breathed in
hia proclamation."— CAmWc's Memoirs.

NOTICES OF THE VfktL OF 1819.

Forgotten alike by the government and the General
until about the middle of July, an order was then
sent by the latter to Captain Heald, *Ho dismantle
the fort, destroy the surplus arms and ..mnmnition,
and withdraw the garrison to Detroit." From an
ill-judged mode of communication, this order did
not reach the fort until the 12th of August. On
the 14th, the garrison, reinforced by a few Miami
Indians, under the command of Captain Wells,
begun its intended march ; but had not proceeded
more than a mile, when it was attacked, in both
front and rear, by a body of five or six hundred
savages, whom it had left at Chicago, professing
a neutral, if not a friendly character. Captain
Heald, after a liard and unequal combat, in which
fifty of his party fell, (and being himself wounded
and deserted by the Miamis,) was compelled to
accept a proposition for a parley, which was soon
and necessarily followed by a surrender, on condi-
tion that the lives of ♦he American survivors, not
now exceeding twenty, should be sptired.^

Such was the termination of this first expedition
of the new war ; the details of which, have in them
80 little to flatter, and so much to mortify the pride
of the American arms. Nor must it be forgotten
that this catastrophe, however disgraceful in itself

1 Captain Heald, his wife and some third person, fell to the share
of a party of Indians living at St. Josephs. Carried thither by their
savage masters, they soon possessed themselves of a boat, in which
they made their escape to Micliilimackinac, where thuy found protec-
tion and the means of returning to the United States.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

! ; i II

i 1 1

l!i^

or disastrous in its consequences, was not the result
of any of those occurrences, which, in the affairs of
nations and of individuals, are denominated acci-
dents; and which sometimes, triumph alike over
the precautions of wisdom and the efforts of valor.
We have seen that the army, in iis march from the
place of its rendezvous to that of its destination,
was neither melted by heat, nor frozen by cold ;
neither persecuted by storms, nor crippled by ene-
mies ; neither wasted by disease, nor exhausted by
famine ; but that on the 5th of July it arrived at
Detroit, in unimpaired health and spirits. From its
friends, it received a cordial welcome, abundant
supplies and a respectable addition to its force ; and
in its subsequent descent upon Canada, was scarcely
less fortunate, as it found the British colonists indif-
ferent, if not repugnant to the war ; the Indian
tribes, though secretly hostile, cautious and calcu-
lating ; and the fortress of Maiden, which alone
sustained the enemy's interest in that section of the
country, wholly indefensible. When at last, impor-
tant changes had been wrought in this state of
things, by the fall of Michilimackinac, the defeat of
Van Home, the obstruction given to our communi-
cations, the altered tone and temper of the British
and savage population, and the doubts and mis-
givings which could not but prevail in our own
ranks — when, in a word, fortune appeared to have
decidedly taken part with tlie enemy against us, it
was but to lead him into indiscretions ; which, had
they been seen and punished, would have promptly

^\\

NOTICES OF THE WAR OV 1813.

be result
affairs of
ted acci'
like over
of valor,
from the
!tination,
by cold ;
: by ene-
usted by
rrived at
From its
ibundant
roe ; and

scarcely
sts Indif-
3 Indiaa
id calcu-
ch alone
on of the
it, impor*

state of
defeat of
3m muni*
le British
md mis-
our own

to have
nst us, it
lich, had
Dromotly

reinstated our ascendency and accomplished the
principal objects of the campaign. Like other ad-
vantages, these were permitted to escape, probably
without notice, and certainly without improvement;
leaving us only the mortifying reflection, that our
disasters were of our own making, and the neces-
sary consequence of an ignorance, which knew not
what to do ; of a self-sufficiency, refusing to be
instructed ; and of a cowardice, that in its terrors,
lost all sense of national interest, personal dignity
and professional duty.*

Remarks. The crimes and errors of public func-
tionaries, however calamitous and disgraceful, are
not without their uses ; and that ok f.his occasion^
the bitter fruits of experience may, ri possible, be
converted into wholesome aliment, we subjoin a few
observations indicating the principal fctilts commit-
ted, and the means by which they mi lit have been
substantially obviated, if not entirely is voided.

I. "Every commander of a corp^j .1 estined to the
reduction of a fortress by siege or investiuent, ought,
if possible, to draw his antagonist from behind his
works, and induce him to risk an action in the
open field." This maxim, nearly as old as the art
to which it belongs, is founded on a reason suffi-
ciently obvious, viz. that, "as forts make the weak
strong, and the strong stronger, it necessarily fol-
lows, that it will be more easy to beat your enemy

1 Hull'a tria\ ■ tr>at\mctnv nf TAaann Snellipf Tnvlnr. Rnatman RrfL.

'il

«J

• !

I, «!
i'li'i

11* \:i

Hi!

nil; II

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

without, than within his intrenchments." Of this
rule and the reason on which it is founded, General
Hull was either entirely ignorant or utterly regard-
less ; for though on the 2d of July, according to his
own statement, he found his adversary willing to
forego the advantages given him by his fortress,
and determined to risk a battle against a force
much superior to his own ; and with the additional
disadvantage of interposing between himself and
his only place of refuge, a wide and rapid river, —
the challenge was not merely declined on our part,
but such cunningly devised fables transmitted to
Colonel St. George, as induced that officer to aban-
don his chivalrous, but unmilitary project.^

II. Another maxim of the art, which, like the
preceding, is but a dictate of common sense, level
to any ordinary capacity and requiring no scientific
research, is, — that "whenever it be sufficiently as-
certained, that your enemy is suffering under any
extraordinary degree of debility, arising from defi-
cient supplies, prevailing diseases, impaired disci-

1 " A large body of the militia had reinforced the British garrison,
and ail the surrounding tribes of Indians had been invited to his
standard. Every preparation for attack was m*de on the 5th of July,
and it was only prevented by a communication made to a person in
Maiden, who had the confidence of the commander ; that it teas mt
the intention of the army to match to Detroit ; that all the boats loere col-
lected on the icestsideof the river; that cannon had been sent for to
Detrwi; and that my intention was to cross the river and attack the fort.
This information caused the commanding officer to abandon the enterprise,
and concentrate all his forces for tlie defence of his post — HxtWa Jtf»-

'^;*

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

pline, disaflfection or want of numbers in his ranks,
or ill-condition of his defences, it becomes your duty
to assail him incessantly and vigorously."

It has been abundantly established, that between
the 5th and 20th of July, fort Maiden was, in all
its parts, in a dilapidated state, and on two of it^
sides, (the north and west,) wholly indefensible ; that
during the same period, its nominal garrison did
not exceed seven hundred men, of which, more than
six hundred were militia and savages ; the one,
indifferent, if not disaffected to the war, and the
other, professing neutrality and strictly forbidden
by their military usages, from taking part in the
defence of fortified places.^ From these facts we
are authorized to conclude, that had General Hull,
at any time between the 5th and 20th of July,
pushed boldly forward and presented his columns of
attack before Maiden, the place would have been
surrendered to him, with as little ceremony as he
surrendered Detroit on the 16th of August ; a con-
clusion, put beyond all doubt by this additional fact,
that when, on the 16th of July, the British out-
post on the Canard was defeated and the bridge
taken, so great was the alarm in Maiden, that the
shipping was brought up to the wharves, and
actually employed in taking in the baggage, &c.'*

»*l|

•.:• {■■

1 Tecumaeh's speech to General Proctor, 18th September, 1813,—
"you told us that we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's
garrisms, and that you would taJte good care of your own; which
made our hearts glad."

a "There was a great deal of confusion in the town, moving effects,

*' ' h

Ill'

1!
■It

■■A ■'

II ill-

' li

¥1

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

III. Nothing can be more ill-judged and ruinous,
than to send out small parties on services which
necessarily expose them to the attacks of large
ones ; and hence the maxim, that « the strength of
a detachment should be proportioned, 1st, to the
importance of the object to be obtained in sending
it ; and 2d.; to the disposable means possessed by
the enemy of embarrassing or defeating the attain-
ment of that object." In none of the detachments
made by General Hull, were these conditions ful-
filled ; and in that of Major Van Home, both were
directly and grossly violated. What object could
have been more important to the American army,
situated as it then was, than the re-establishment of
its communications with the State of Ohio ; from
which alone were to be expected reinforcements of
men and supplies of provision 1 And again, what
fact was better ascertained, than the facility with
which the whole British force concentrated at Mai-
den, and amounting to even hundred combatants,
could be brought to act upon any American detach-
ment, marching by the route of Maguago and
Brownstown? Yet was Van Home sent to fulfil
that object and by this route, with only two hun-
dred militia-riflemen!*

IV. When, on the 8th of Ajgust, Colonel Miller
was detached to effect the purpose which Major

&c. The Clueen Charlotte came to the wharf and took in the women
and baggage, and had her topsails loose and ready to atiiV'—Forbisk
mtd Gooding's testimony on HviPs trid.
I HuU'» official report of iiie gSth uf Au^ust^ iSiS.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

Van Home had failed to accomplish on tlie 5th, it
required no spirit of prophecy to foresee, that Proctor
(the British commander) would make every possible
effort to overwhelm the second detachment as he
had done the first ; but that to this end he must
employ the whole force, composing the garrison under
his command. It is extraordinary, that this simple
and obvious view of the subject, should have escaped
the attention of any man to whom military ideas
were at all familiar ; or if it did occur to General
Hull, that it should have failed to suggest the only
means left for prosecuting his own objects, and con-
verting the policy and enterprise of his antagonist
into folly and misfortune. These means obviously
were — so to strengthen Miller's detachment, as to
leave nothing to chance ; and thus to assure him-
self not merely of 'he discomfiture, but of the
destruction of whatever force the enemy might
hazard on the southern side of the Detroit ; while,
contemporaneously with Miller's movement, a second
and small detachmerit should silently and rapidly
descend the river to the neighborhood of Maiden,
and thence proceed to assail and carry the fort.
That both parts of this plan (had it been adopted)
would have entirely succeeded, there cannot now
be a doubt ; since, with the corps he had, Miller
defeated Muir at the head of the whole British,
Canadian and Indian force ; and since, from the
evening of the 7th to the 9th of August, fort Mai-
den (ordinarily rec^uiring the defence of seven hun-

* • '

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

(I '.

I iii

dred men) was left to the custody of a sergeanVs

guard /'

V. Notwithstanding these repeated blunders of
the American General, fortune did not yet entirely
abandon him ; and on the 16th of August, pre-
sented a new occasion, requiring on his part only
the vulgar quality of defensive courage, to have
completely baffled the designs of Brock and re-
established his own ascendency on the Detroit.
This occasion was found in the indiscretion of his
adversary ; who, on crossing the river with a force
smaller than that it was his purpose to assail, had
hastily determined to risk the storm of a fortifica-
tion, strong in itself, abundantly supplied and suffi-
ciently garrisoned. If it be thought extraordinary,
that under these circumstances. General Brock
should have forgotten all the dissuasives from at-
tack furnished by history, it was certainly still less
to be expected, that General Hull should have for-
gotten all the motives for defence furnished by the
same source. Such, however, was the fact ; the
timidity of the one kept pace with the temerity of
the other ; and at last, in an agony of terror, which
cunning could no longer dissemble and which his-
tory is ashamed to describe, the fort, army and ter-
ritory were surrendered without pulling a trigger !

The errors which yet remain to bs noticed are
attributable to the administration — a fact, furnish-

l lieutenant Forbish's testimony.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

ing no reason why they should be treated with
more ceremony than others, with which they were
associated. They will be sufficiently indicated by
the following remarks.

VI. The nation which meditates the invasion of
a neighboring territory, should be careful to employ
the last moments of peace, in acquiring a thorough
knowledge of the force it may have to encounter.
Another duty, not less obvious and imperative than
the preceding, will be that of speedily withdrawing
or promptly reinforcing its own remote and isolated
posts. If there be any thing in the local position
of these, that may render their retention important
to the progress or issue of the war, the latter course
should be pursued—but if on the contrary, it will
have no material bearing on either, the garrisons
should be speedily recalled and the posts abandoned,
while this can be done successfully and safely.
Yet were both these important duties neglected.
When Hull arrived at Detroit, he was ignorant
alike of the condition of Maiden and the number of its
garrison. So also the commandant of Michilimack-
inac continued to be uninformed of even the declara-
tion of war, until after the investment and surrender
of his post ; while the garrison of fort Dearborn,
still more remote, remained unrecalled, until the
middle of Augast, when retreat had become wholly
impracticable.

VII. We have seen that General Hull lost his
own baggage and that of the army, the whole of his
hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men, in

..'M.

'i:;J

I,! I

48 NOTICES OF. THE WAR OF 1812.

consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner
employed in transmitting to him the declan.tion of
war. A fact, so extraordinary in itself, and so pro-
ductive of injury to the public, calls for more devel-
opment than has yet been given to it. 1. will be
remembered that a declaration of war was autho
rized on the 18th of June, 1813. On this day,
Secretary Eustis wrote two letters to General Hull.
In one of these, no mention was made of this impor-
tant event ; in the other, it was distinctly and offi-
cially announced. The former of the two, was
carefully made up and expedited by a special mes-
senger, who arrived in the General's camp on the
24ih of June ; while the latter, was committed to
the public mail as far as Cleveland; and thence,
through a wilderness of one hundred miles, to such
conveyance, " as accident might supply.'' The result
was, that the declaration did not reach its destina-
tion until the 2d of July, two days after it had been
received by the enemy at Maiden. On this occasion,
the British government was better served : Provost
received notice of it on the 24th of June, at Quebec ;
Brock, on the 26th, at Newark ; St. George, on the
30th, at Maiden ; and Roberts on the 8th of July,
at St. Josephs. But a fact, still more extraordinary
than the celerity of these transmissions is, that the
information thus rapidly forwarded to Maiden and
St. Josephs, was received under envelopes, franked by
the Secretary of the Mierican Treasury.^

I Official Report of Captain Hanks to the commanding General
at Detroit, see also Appendix, No. 6.

I i|i

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

VIII. Few things are more self-evident, than that
80 long as the enemy had a fleet on Lake Erie and we
had none, Maiden could be supplied and reinforced
by the British posts below ; and that if hardly pressed,
its garrison could be safely withdrawn to one or other
of these posts. To meet these contingencies, and to
protect Hull's long line of provisionment from inter-
ruption,' two suggestions were made — the one, to
construct a navy competent to the command of the
lake ;" the other, to assemble on the Niagara a mili-
tary force, which by menacing the safety of forts
Erie and George, would prevent Brock from making
detachments to Maiden. In choosing between these
alternatives, the government did not hesitate — they
promptly rejected the former, and adopted the latter;
but, unfortunately, without taking measures suflB-
ciently decided for giving it execution. When, ac-
cordingly, Hull perceived that the enemy's force at
Maiden was increased and increasing, he called aloud
on the militia officer commanding at Buffalo for sup-
port — who announced in reply, that " he had none to
give, direct or indirect.^^ So also, when the Secretary of
War ordered Major-General Dearborn to make speedy
movements on the British posts in his front, the General
answered — that "fi7i then, he had not known that the
troops on the J^iagara made part of his command.**'

I The line extended two hundred miles throu^ a desert, and in
a great part of its length was skirted by the lake, commanded by ths
British ships.

s Hull's Memoirs ; testimony of Mr. Eustis on Huirs tiiaL

« Appendix No. 7.

^^^^H t

^^^^H i<

iii

^Hi

§■■'•■

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819.

IX. The principal advantage accruing to a nation,
which is the first to declare war, is that of selecting
its time and point of attack, and of concentrating on
the latter, such force as will ensure victory, and the
moral effect produced by it on both belligerents. Of
this truth, so obvious in itself, the American cabinet
of 1812, do not appear to have been apprised — for
when (according to General P. B. Porter% testimony)
Hull required three thousand men, as the least num-
ber with which all the objects of the campaign could
be successfully prosecuted ; the government replied,
that "more than two thousand could not be given."^

Whether this decision be examined in relation to
the capacity of the nation ; to the variety and im-
portance of the services to be performed ; or to the
means necessary to their execution, nothing could
have been more erroneous. To those who know any
thing of the character or numbers of the western
population, or of their peculiar interests and feelings
at that period and on this subject, we need but re-
mark, (and without any fear of contradiction,) that
five thousand men could have been obtained as
promptly as two thousand. When again it is recol-
lected, that the defence of our western posts and ter-
ritory ; the prevention of a war with the savages ;
the capture of Maiden; the command of Lake Erie,
and the means of a prompt co-operation with the
troops destined to act on the Niagara, formed the
objects of the campaign — who can for a moment doubt

1 Hull's trial : General P. B. Portei's testimony.

■ iir* ■

WOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

-i

their magnitude or interest ? And lastly, though it
be readily admitted, and we hone sufficiently proved,
that the force given to General Hull was competent
to the capture of Maiden and the preservation of
Detroit, still it by no means follows, that it was com-
mensurate with all the objects of the expedition ;
since among these were to be found, " the capture
or destruction of the liritish fleet,"' an object which,
in the absence of all naval means, could only be
effected by such an augmentation of the army, as
would have entirely excluded that arm from the shores
of the lake.

Had the government taken this short and plain
view of the subject, and invited Governor Shelby ot
Kentucky, or Governor Meigs of Ohio, to follow in
Hull's track, with two thousand gun-men and Win-
chester's brigade of infantry, how different would have
been the issue of the campaign ? Unfortunately, we
began by weighing military expeditions in gold scales ;
and the experiment proved (as it will never fail to do)
that parsimony, always paltry, in war is the most
lavish and criminal prodigality.

' President's Message of November 4th, 1812.

I M

NOTICES or TUG WAR OF 1819.

r I

! |l 1 MC

CHAPTER III.

Militia Operations in the West. — Harrison's Autumnal and Winter

Campaigns.

Of the disasters detailed in the preceding chapter,
those of most early occurrence — the fall of Michili-
mackinac, the occlusion of supplies from Ohio, the
defeat of Van Home, and the retreat of the army from
Canada, were more productive of surprise than alarm :
all wondered at the events which had so unexpect-
edly taken place ; but few, if any, ascribed them to
their true cause, or foresaw either the extent of the
evil, or the means most proper for remedying it.
The executive confidence in the competency of the
commander, continued to he unshaken ; and no
doubts were entertained, but that with the aid of a
prompt reinforcement and a vigorous diversion on
the Niagara, he would be able to hold what he pos-
sessed, recover what he had lost, and eventually
accomplish all the objects of the expedition.

With these views of the subject, orders were issued
for immediately organizing two corps in the west ;
one of which, to consist of sixteen hundred volun-
teers and four hundred regular troops, under the
command of Brigadier-General Winchester, was des-
tined to the suDDort of Hull : the other, to be com-

•^.'\

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP ISlfl. 05

posed of three regiments of Kentucky militia, sub-
jecteJ to the orders of Brigadier-General Harrison,
was assigned to die defence of Indiana and Illinois ;
while the army of the north, under the command of
Major-Gcneral Dearborn, was directed to hold itself
in readiness, for an immediate attack upon one or
more, of the British positions in its front.*

Of these orders, the first, so far as regarded the
assembling of the troops, was promptly executed ;
and the corps assigned to Winchester, actually in
motion for the Ohio frontier, when on the 24th of
August, the appalling information was received,
that Detroit, the territory, and the army, had been
already surrendered to the enemy. Unexpected ca-
lamities are in general bad counsellors, and often
hurry those disposed to listen to them, into the adop-
tion of measures Httle calculated to promote their
own objects. On the present occasion, the govern-
ment, adliering to its policy of carrying the war into
Canada, without apparently perceiving the want, and
certainly without providing the aid, of any co-ope-
rating naval force, now hastily determined to put its
trust in an unlimited employment of militia and a
lavish expendiiure of money-— a plan which, though

> On the 1st of August, Mr. Eustis gave notice to General Dearborn
of the cont uts of a letter received from General Hull, of July lOtli, by
express, in consequence of which he subjoins the following order .—
" Vou will make a diversion in his (General Hull's) favor at Niagara
and at Kingston, as soon as may he practicable, and by such other ope-
rations as m..y be within your control." See vol. 6th, p. 199, Records
of the War Department These orders, substantially, were repeated
in several subsequent communioations.

; I

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF X819.

S» ' I'l

H I,

far short of its objects, was, notwithstanding, well
adapted to the feelings, wants, and calculations of
the west.

The sedative effect produced by the war on the
value of ordinary labor and its products ; the com-
paratively ample compensation given for military
service ; the political excitement of the times, and the
increased impulse given to this by the late disaster
at Detroit, operating conjointly on an abundant, un-
occupied, and high-spirited population, could not fail
to bring together a large mass of ill-equipped and
undisciplined men, who believing in the infallibihty
of western courage and rifles, sought no auxiliary in
fulfilling the intentions of government, within even
the short period of their own engagements.* The
force, which under these influences was in a few
weeks assembled at different points of the frontier,
exceeded ten thousand combatants ;* of which, that
portion originally destined to the support of Hull,
and best prepared for immediate service, was de-
tached to fort Wayne — a small post on the Miami
of the Lake, already sustaining an Indian investment,
and still farther menaced by a British detachment,
advancing under the command of Major Muir. But
of these enemies, the former disappeared on the ap-
proach of the American column, without making
any resistance ; and the latter, not showing more
disposition to hazard a contest, hastily withdrew to
its boats and returned to Maiden. It was now deemed

1 McAffee.

> \1

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

proper, as well for the purpose of giving occupation
to the troops, as for that of preventing any new at-
tempt on the fort, to direct a few detachments against
such of the Indian villages as had most contributed
to the late investing party ; but though made with
sufficient zeal and activity, the experiment failed
in producing any effect more important than the
destruction of a few cabins and the corn growing
around them.

While these circumstances were taking place in
the northern section of the di^^rict, others, of a mixed
character, good and bad, grave and ludicrous, were
occurring in the southern. Early in September, a
small band of savages, of the Potowatamie and Win-
ebago tribes, appeared at fort Harrison ; and feigning
weariness and hunger, besought for the night the
shelter and hospitality of the fort. But on finding
that Captain Taylor, the commanding officer, gave
no credit to their story, and even suspected their
hostility, they threw off the mask, and collecting
their associates, (who had hitherto lain concealed in
the neighboring thickets,) united in a bold and per-
severing attack on the fort. During the progress of
this, the assailants found means to burn a block-
house, (which made part of the work,) and thus
opened to themselves a new passage to the interior ;
but, though making many strenuous effortf.. to profit
by this advantage, they failed in all, and were ulti-
mately repulsed with considerable loss. To make
up in some degree for this disappointment, the party
repaired to a frontier settlement on the Pie-eon'a

'•I
% •I

Nil ■■•!

.i'- ■

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

I III

Roost, where they killed or captured twenty-one of
the inhabitants.

This last incident would, perhaps, have been alone
sufficient to have called forth a new display of Ken-
tucky population and patriotism ; but to its authority
was superadded that of a requisition from General
Harrison for a force, which, with the three regiments
already detached to Vincennes, would be competent
not merely to the defence of Indiana and Illinois, but
to the punishment of such Indian tribes as were most
likely to disturb and molest any neighboring terri-
tory.^ Governor Shelby, upon whom the requisition
was made, hastened to give it execution, and with
not more of attention, than the General himself had
employed, in proportioning the quantum of ^'^rce to
the nature and exigencies of the service i hen,
therefore, we consider that tlie invitation to the field
was without limitation as to numbers ; that the
causes requiring it were not a little exaggerated,'
and that the policy, no less than the patriotism of
the state, induced every man to become a soldier,
we can no longer wonder that the Governor's proc-
lamation should, within twenty days, have assem-
bled an army of four thousand men, equipped for
service, and all, Tartar-like, mounted on horseback.

The command of this formidable array was com-
mitted to Major-General Hopkins of the militia,
who reached fort Harrison about the 10th of Octo-
ber. Finding nothing nearer to his own frontier to

1 McAffee.

a Harrigon's letter to Shelby, 5th Sept, 1812 ; McAffee, p. 156,

','i

'If ^\i

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1813.

^ive him occupation, he on the 14th, began his
march for the Indian villages on the Wabash and
Illinois. Much of the ground he had to traverse
was of the prairie character, (scantily supplied with
water and entirely destitute of wood,) but abound-
ing in tall, coarse grass. The effect of this redun-
dant herbage on the army resembled enchantment ;
every step they took upon it, abated alike their
ardor and intelligence ; the guides lost their way ;
the General his authority, and the troops their sub-
mission ; and on the fourth day after leaving fort
Harrison (discovering that the prairie was on fire,
and mistaking this for a ruse of the enemy) this
" press of western chivalry" turned their backs on
the war, and withdrew en masse to Kentucky.

About the same time, and in concert with the
preceding movement, an expedition on a smaller
scalo, but of more successful character, was insti-
w. eu by Governor Edwards of the Illinois Territory,
and conducted by Colonel Russell of the rangers!
Its object was an Indian town at the head-waters
of Lake Peoria, which, by a rapid and well-directed
march, the detachment was able to surprise and
destroy. On the first alarm, the savages betook
themselves to a neighboring swamp, whither they
were hotly pursued and speedily routed— leaving
behind them twenty dead bodies, a considerable
store of corn, and sixty horses laden with baggage.
A second expedition under the direction of Gene-
ral Hopkins, and made for the laudable purpose of
fulfiUin&r the intentions nnA wininn- «..# tu^ a;

^<l

'« I-

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t

♦
...

— 1

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

Pi' ".I

of the first, was now organized at fort Harrison.
The corps employed on this occasion, was composed
of a few regular troops, about fifty mounted gun-
men, and the three regiments of Kentucky mihtia,
detached under the first requisition ; who, directing
their march along the eastern bank of the Wabash,
in eight days reached their first object, and destroyed
in succession three of the principal Indian villages,
with the loss of eighteen of their own corps ; who,
by some negHgence or misdirection in their march,
fell into an ambuscade of the enemy. Admonished
alike by this disaster, the nakedness of the troops,
an unfavorable change in the weather, and the
impossibility of bringing the savages to a general
action, the commanding officer thought it advisable
to return to Vincennes.

Such was the state of things on the western
frontier, when the government, having decided the
rival pretensions of Generals Winchester and Harri-
son, vested in the latter the command of the army
and district;* with orders sufficiently definite as to

1 The intrigue by which this outrage on military rules and the laws
of Kentucky was accomplished, will be found in McAffee, pp. 107 —
8, and is substantially as follows : Governor Scott had a desire to
commission Harrison as a Major-Generd of the Kentucky militia,
with a view of thus enabling him to supersede Winch'^ster in the com-
mand ; but to the honest and unsophisticated mind of Scott, the ar-
rangement appeared impossible, inasmuch as by the laws of li^entucky,
officers of militia must be inhabitants of the state — a qualification
which did not apply to General Harrison. To get over these scruples
of conscience on the part of the Governor, a few casuists were em-
ployed to change his opinions, and in this they at last succeeded. For
thfl OcJieral'B own ao'encv in the business see Anien.dix Wo fi

I^i

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813. 59

the Objects to be pursued, but entirely discretionary
as to the time and mode of pursuing them. Avail.
ing hunself of the latitude given by this new and
increased authority, the General hastened to re-
model his plan of campaign, and promptly rejecting
his first project of recapturing Detroit by a coup de
mam,|substituted for it a march by three separate
and distant routes across the swampy and unin-
habited region in his front, to the Rapids of the
Miami-whence, « after accumulating one million
oj rations for th^ troops, and forage for two thousand
horses and oxen,' he proposed marching rapidly on
Brownstown, crossing the river Detroit, and before
the commencement of winter, taking Maiden and recap-
turing the Michigan Territory.''

J ^^^' Tl^. '" ^^"^^'•^'"^te capacity to Winchester, the Gene-

S trol r f '""° ''^'' ^'"^ ^ '^^ ^^^'^t^^ ^'-^ to retake

Detroit by a cou;,t/« mam, and was careful so to inform the govern-

Z^Tff^'T '"'• '^'^"' ^°"^^^^' ^^— -f this and other
representaUons, having the same object, he became commanding offi-
cer of the army and district, his views suddenly changed ; the rapid

^l.T"' Prr'i'^^''"^ ^^ "^'^^■^^"^ ^^^"d«"«^ ^« hopele's,
{Mu^ffee, p. 141,) and one, more systematic and imposing, substituted
tor it-requinng as a preHminaiy to any direct movement on Maiden
or Detroit, an accumulation at the Rapids of twelve months' forage and
provisions, with carts, wagons, &c, necessary to transport them from
the place of deposit to the scene of action-or, in other words, the
entire purchase of all surplus corn, flour and fodder, oxen, horse,
carts, wagons, &c, to be found within the State of Ohio : and this at
a time (22d of October,) when he says of the roads-" to get supplie.
forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles in
wagons or on pack-horses, which are to cany their own provisions i«
absolutely impossible." *

« McAffee, i% 167.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

ii!!il

In prosecution of this plan, the army was divided
into three columns ; that of the left, composed of
Kentucky militia and the seventeenth United States
regiment, (commanded by Brigadier-General Win-
chester) was assigned to the route of the St. Mary;
the central column, consisting of twelve hundred
Ohio militia and eight hundred mounted infantry,
commanded by Brigadier-General Tupper, to that of
fort McArthur ; while the column of the right, made
up, or intended to be made up, (for all its elemen-
tary parts had not yet arrived) of three brigades of
militia from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio, led
by General Harrison in person, was to approach its
object by the two Sandusky's.

Under these arrangements, the General had hopes
on the 4th of October, that "within a fortnight from
that date" he would be able to accumulate at the
Rapids the necessary supply of food and forage, as-
semble the several parts of the army and begin his
intended movement on Brownstown. But these
hopes, which had little if any thing to justify them,
were not fated to be of long duration ; as on the
very day on which they were expressed, the column
of the left was found to be on the verge of mutiny
and desertion. This conduct in a corps, which had
hitherto showed only zeal in forwarding the objects
of the expedition, was produced by the increased
coldness of the weather and the miserable condition
of their clothing ; by a state of the roads, rendering
them nearly impassable ; by a deficiency of food,
not easily to be accounted for ; and by a discovery

« II

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819.

(in which they but anticipated their commander)
that his project of an autumnal campaign was wholly
impracticable. * In this dilemma, the General found
it prudent to employ persuasion rather than author-
ity, and invoking the aid of Colonel Allen's elo-
quence in addition to his own, prevailed upon the
column to prolong its stay and its efforts.

With Brigadier-General Tupper and the mounted
men of the central column, he was less fortunate.
Learning while at Winchester's cantonment that a
party of Indians occupied the Rapids, (his intended
point of concentration,) he ordered Tupper with
eight hundred mounted men to advance and dis-
lodge them, but this order, though reinforced by
another from Winchester, was from time to time
scandalously evaded — when the troops losing all
confidence in their General and the General in
the troops, they mutually agreed to withdraw to
Urbanna.

To this useless band succeeded another, fortu-
nately possessing a leader of more efficient character.
Colonel Allen Trimble having arrived at St. Mary
with a corps of five hundred mounted infantrj^, was
directed to march to the defence of fort Wayne,
(now menaced with a second investment by the
Indians,) and thence to the Potowatornie villages,
on the sources of the river St. Joseph. No enemy
being found at the fort, the Colonel hastened to
execute the remaining and secondary part of thts

» McAffee. p. 146, 183—4.
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expedition, when one half of the corps, in the exer-
cise of its volunteer rights, refused to go farther.
The Colonel, being thus left to choose between an
abandonment of his purpose, or an attempt to exe-
cute it with half the force originally assigned to the
enterprise, did not hesitate to adopt the latter; and
supplying the want of numbers by vigilance and
activity, was soon able to reach and destroy the two
villages indicated in his orders.

It was now the 28th of October. The fortnight
whi 3I1, according to General Harrison's calculations,
was to have done much, had passed away without
doing any thing ; the rainy season had already be-
gan ; land transportation, always difficult, was now
impracticable ; and idleness, nakedness and hunger
were working their ordinary effects on the health,
habits and temper of the troops ; rendering them sick,
and sour, and restless — a state of things which the
General could no longer conceal from himself, and
which brought him, at last, to the reluctant confes-
sion, that the project of an autumnal campaign must
be abandoned, and a winter expedition adopted in its
stead. " My present plan," he says, in a letter of
the preceding date, to the Secretary of War, " is to
occupy Sandusky and accumulate, at that place, as
much provision and forage as possible ; to be taken
from thence in sleds to the river Raisin. For to get
supplies forward through a swampy wilderness of
nearly two hundred miles extent, in wagons, or on
pack-horses carrying their own provender, is impos-
sible. Still the main object may be accomplished

it:

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

by using the frozen margin of the lake, if the troops
are provided with warm clothing, and the winter be
such as it usually is in this climate."*

As, however, many weeks must elapse between
the date of this new determination and the actual
occurrence of such a condition of weather as could
alone render it practicable, it was deemed expedient
to employ the interval in destroying such Indian
lodgements, temporary and permanent, as from ac-
tual force or locality of position, were most likely to
disturb the left wing of the army, or the transporta-
tion of supplies going on under its protection. Of
these lodgements, one had recently been made at
the foot of the Itapids ; ostensibly for the purpose
of gathering and transporting corn, but, as was
suspected, secretly destined to co-operate witli the
Miamis in son)e military enterprise on our frontier
posts and convoys. To break up this party became,
therefore, a matter of moment ; and to effect it. Gen-
eral Tupper, whose feats in arms we have already
commemorated, was detached, early in November,
at the head of six hundred and fifty Ohio militia and
a few mounted rangers. On approaching his object,
he prudently employed a reconnoitring party to
ascertain whether any changes had taken place in
the force or position of the enemy ? And being as-

» It was by thus qualifying his real opinions, that he carried the
cabinet along with him in his attempts to execute his absurd projects.
They at last saw, or thought they sow, in these contradictory state-
ments, a desire on the part of the General, to escape responsibility,
and a design to induce them to incur it

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

iured, on the return of the party, that the allies, red
and white, besides continuing where they had been,
and witliout any material increase of numbers, were
"now indulging themselves in singing and dancing,'*
he manfully determined to cross the Miami and take
part in the revel ; but defeated in this by the depth
of the water and strength of the current, instead of
ascending the river and seeking a fording place of
safer and quieter character, (which might have been
readily found,) he foUowed the stream downward,
and placing himself directly in front of the British
and Indian camp, sufficiently announced, not only
his arrival, but his intention also of shifting from
himself and imposing on his enemy, both the trouble
and danger of crossing the river. In this last cal-
culation, however, he entirely lost sight of the anti-
chivalrous character of Indian warfare. The first
care of the red man of the forest is to take care of
himself; and the second, so to measure the strength
and temper of his antagonist as will enable him to
judge, not merely on what side of a stream he shall
fight, but whether he shall fight on either side of it.
With this view, on the present occasion, after send-
ing their women and children to the woods, and their
allies to their boats, the Indians made a show of
engaging at long shot ; while a few mounted par-
ties despatched across the Miami, soon found out
the flanks and rear of their adversary, and sufficiently
indicated their intention — not of tighti. g a pitched
battle, but of harassing his progress when he moved,
and disquieting his positions when he became sta-

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1818.

tionary. As this was a state of things the General
had not foreseen, and greatly disliked, he quickly
resorted to the only expedient by which he supposed
it could be remedied ; and accordingly, early in the
night of the 15th, began a rapid retreat to fort Mc-
Arthur.*

While Tup{)er was making this second display
of military talent, another expedition, under bet-
ter auspices, was preparing at Frankhntown. A
corps of six hundred mounted men, selected from
the army, were placed under the direction of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Campbell, with orders to march
against the Indian villages on the Missisineway.
Of these, they reached the most northwardly, at
daybreak on the 18th of December, but without
having been able to surprise it completely. A por-
tion of the occupants escaped across the river ;
whilst the remainder, after a short and feeble resist-
ance, surrendered to the assailants. No time was
lost in pursuing this advantage, and three other vil-
lages were visited and destroyed by the party.

The troops, having been now thirt^ six hours on
horseback, and having suffered much from cold,
hunger, and fatigue, encamped for the night on
the bank of the river, where they remained undis-
turbed till near daylight ; when the outposts were
furiously driven in, and the camp sharply and gen-
erally assailed, but without producing the smallest
ill-effect on its spirit and order. At the dawn of

1 A/1/.Aa:

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NOTICES OF THE 1YA.R OF 1819.

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day, when a proper direction could be given to the
movement, both flanks of the Indian line were rapidly-
turned, and its rear charged and routed. The gen-
eral result of the expedition, however, was not flat-
tering : twenty-three Indians were killed, forty-two
taken, and four out of five villages, destroyed ;*
while on our side, ten men were killed, forty-eight
wounded, and nearly two hun<lred rendered unfit for
service, by disease and frost-bicten hands and feet.

These preliminary steps taken, and the column
of the right with the park of artillery arrived at San-
dusky, orders werf now given to General Winchester,
who had hitherto occupied a posiuonnear the mouth
of the Au Ulaize,to push forward to the Rapids; clear
the front and flanks of that post of hostile parties ;
construct huts for the better protection of the ad-
vancing supplies; and prepare sleds for the intended
movement on Maiden. Under these orders, the Gen-
eral commenced his march on the Slst of December,
at the head of about one thousand effectives ; but
the roads becoming much obstructed by snow, it was
not till the 10th of January, that he reached the point
to which he was destined. Finding on his arrival
no traces of an enemy, excepting a single and small
Indian encampment, (the occupants of which were
promptly pursued and routed,) he now directed his
attention to the preparatory labors already indicated
--when on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of the month,

> The fifth, and unapproached village, contained the principal Indian
force.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF i819.

expresses were received from Uie inhabitants of
Frcnchtown, representing the many and ag-^ravated
hotrorsof their situation, and rntreatin^^ the interpo-
sition of the American arms. " The British,** they
said, " no longer conceal their intention of carrying
off our grain and our cattle ; and the savages menace
us with the destruction of our dwellings, and the
massacre or captivity of our persons. Without your
aid, we have no hope ; with li, we may be able to
defend ourselves, our wiveb, nnd our children ; but
this aid, to be effectual, must be prompt. The pres-
ent number of the enemy among us, does not exceed
three hundred combatants — a for» e vhat will be soon
and considerably augmented ; after which, your in-
terposition woidd be useless, and our ruin complete.**
An appeal like this, addressed to men of high and
liberal views, could not be made in vain. The warm-
hearted and gallant Allen, became its ready and
zealous advocate. To his quick and intelligent
mind, the policy it invoked appeared to be sustained
by every motive that ought to govern in the case —
sympathy for the afflicted ; duty to fellow-citizens,
and a correct interpretat'on of military maxims.
" Can we," he said, "turn a deaf ear to the cries of
men, women and children, about to perish under the
scalping-knife and tomahawk of the savage 1 Can
we regard with indifference tlie perils of those whose
attachments to the United States have alone rendered
them obnoxious to the calamities they dread 1 Can
it be possible, that the wisdom of beating an enemy
in detail, can either escane our notice or reauire ar^^u-

III

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

monts to obtain our approbation ? For what purpose
are we here, but to seek, to find, and to fight this
very enemy ? And shall we permit his advanced
guard to perpetrate all the mischief it meditates, and
return in safety to its main body ] Is it by such con-
duct that we shall wipe out the disgrace of Hull's
surrender, or fulfil the promises made to our friends
when, leaving our own firesides, we took upon us the
temporary profession of arms 1 And if not, by what
considerations is it recommended'? Will it be said,
that the force of the hostile detachment is too great
to be successfully combated, or in other words, that
a thousand freemen are unequal to a contest with
three hundred savages and slaves ? The supposition
is degrading, and merits not the ceremony of a refu-
tation. Will it, on the other hand, be alleged, that
it is too inconsiderable to be noticed] This also
would be an error — for besides, that victory, on any
scale, is not without its moral effects on both bellige-
rents, an abstraction of three hundred men fropi the
present force of the enemy, would materially dimin-
ish his power, and give us a decided ascendency in
prosecuting what remains of the campaign. Again :
will it be said, (and, if I mistake not, it has been
said,) that so near an approach to the den of the
Lion would be imprudent 1 To this I reply, that
danger is inseparable from war, and that the soldier
who goes upon the plan of running no risk, is ne-
cessarily self-condemned to inaction and disgrace ;
whereas he who dares boldly, may do much. Since
then, activity and enterprise are the elements of

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1818.

victory, let us beware of calculating dangers too
nicely — this was the fault and ruin of Hull, and
cannot surely be thought worthy of our imitation.
If the Lion, as he has been called, moves at all, he
will do so in one of two ways: — he will either send
a second detachment to support the first, in which
case, both may be separately beaten, — or he will put
his whole force in motion, and thus furnish us with
a si> iicient excuse for falling back upon our own
army, which cannot now be far in the rear. From
this brief and general view^ of the subject, I am
led to conclude, that we should hasten our march
to Frenchtown ; attack, and if possible, destroy the
advanced corps of the enemy ; give protection to a
meritorious and suffering people, and obtain the con-
trol of resources, of which we are much in want,
and which otherwise will go to sustain the war
against us."

The effects of this ada.ess were not equivocal

the General no longer hesitated, and the council,
not having many or important doubts to remove,*
it was speedily determined that ."a detachment
should be sent, as expeditiously as possible, to
Frenchtown.^' A corps was organized accordingly,
and beginning its march on the 17th, it was able at
three o'clock, P. M. of the 18th, to present itself in
front of the town, when the fire of the British artil-

■J
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I Colonel Lewis and Major Madison stated, that according to their
recollection, the opinion of the council of war was unanimous for
proceeding to Frenchtown,

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

lery opened upon it. The measures taken by Colonel
Lewis, the commander of the American detach-
ment, were well-timed and well-judged. Without
the smallest unnecessary delay, he ordered the two
battalions of Graves and Madison, (preceded by Bal-
lard's light infantry,) to cross the river^ and drive
the British and their allies from the houses and
picket fences, of which they had hitherto availed
themselves ; while the remaining battalion, under
the command of Colonel Allen, was so posted on
the right as to flank any retrograde movement
made or attempted by the enemy. The first of
these orders was gallantly executed, and in a few
minutes, Reynolds, the British commander, was
driven from the village and compelled to seek an-
other position. In doing this, he was soon and
necessarily brought into contact with Allen's bat-
talion, by which he was vigorously attacked and
pursued, until at last, the shelter of a second group
of houses and a wood enabled him to renew his
defence.

Lewis's conduct under these new circumstances
was not less prudent and proper than on the former
occasion. Retaining Allen's battalion on the ground
it occupied, and which menaced at once the front
and left of the enemy's position, he detached those
of Graves and Madison to turn his right and rear.
The firing which grew out of this manoeuvre be-
came the signal for Allen to act ; when, under the

1 The river was then covered bv a thick and stronor ice.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

pressure of the two attacks, Reynolds was again
routed and compelled to betake himself wholly to
the forest. It was here that his Indian auxiliaries
found their true champ de battaille; for thougii kept
in constant retreat for three miles in succession, ihey
maintained the conflict with great obstinacy, and
but yielded at last to the superior force and well-
conducted charges of the Kentucky militia. Colonel
Lewis now led back his detachment to the town,
and hastened to inform General Winchester of the
events of the day.

If victory often impairs the faculties of strong
and practised minds, what ill-effects may it not pro-
duce on those of less power, wholly unacquainted
with war as a science? Unfortunately, on the
present occasion, its only product was a self-suffi-
ciency , which every thing approaching the char-
acter of military foresight and discretion was for-
gotten. A council of war, convened on the morning
of the 19th, determined "to maintain their new
position and wait the arrival of remfoi cements," and
in this decision, the two Generals, Winchester and
Harrison, imited, but without sufficiently foreseeing
the necessity of rendering more defensible an . -i
village, within stroke of the enemy, and unproteci ;u
by a single cannon. Nor was it the effect of the
arrival of the former of these commanders to correct
or in any degree to qualify, this oversight. On the
contrary, the small accession of force brought by
him, (not exceeding two hundred and fifty men,)
became the cause of an increased securitv, which

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NOTIC IS OF THE WAR OP 1812.

set aside even the most ordinary precautions ; as on
the night of the 21st, (though informed that the
enemy meditated an attack,) the troops were neither
kept together, nor was a picket-guard placed on
the only road, by which their position could be
readily or conveniently approached.*

While thus in the American camp nothing was
seen, but disregard for themselves, nor any thing
heard, but contempt for their enemy. Proctor, the
British commander, was fast advancing from Mai-
den, at the head of his whole disposable force, and
was even permitted to establisli a battery within
point-blank shot of the town, without being either
disturbed or discovered. Instead, however, of avail-
ing himself of this advantage, and making his
attack before daybreak, which would have best
secured him against Kentucky rifles, and probably
effected the complete surprise of his adversary, he
waited the approach of dawn, and thus became
visible to an out-lying sentinei, who gave the alarm
at the moment that the American drums were pre-
paring to beat the reveille. Failing, therefore, to
catch his enemy asleep, and forbidden alike by sea-
son, weather and want of preparation, from employ-
ing siege or investment, he resorted to assault, as
the only means he had left for accomplishing his
purpose ; and with this view, covering his front
with artillery and his flanks with Indian marksmen,
he began his movements on the town, and had ap-

I McAffee, p. 302.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

preached within musket-shot of the pickets, when he
was met by a fire so galling and incessant, as made
an immediate retreat necessary.'

The left of his attack was more fortunate. In
the hasty dispositions made for defence, the de-
tachment of two hundred and fifty men brought
by Winchester on the 20th, instead of being posted
behind the pickets and held there in reserve, or
made to occupy the houses which entirely com-
manded the approaches to the place, were most
preposterously drawn out in line, on the right of
the town, and without a 'point d'appui, for either
flank. This weak and isolated position could not
long escape the notice of the enemy, who hastened
to concentrate upon it all his disposable means, In-
dian and British ; and in twenty minutes, threw the
American line into a state of confusion, which no
possible exertion could restrain, and which soon and
necessarily terminated in the capture or slaughter
of nearly all the fugitives, including two companies
of fifty men each, led from behind the pickets by
Colonels Lewis and Allen. Yet with even this decided
advantage. Proctor indicated little, if any disposition,
to renew the attack on his first object. The experi-
ment he had made on the covered part of the Ameri-
can position, had taught him a lesson of prudence he
could not forget. He had lost by it nearly one fourth
of his regular force, without having made any serious
impression upon either the strength or the spirit of

iMcAffee, p. 216.
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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813.

his adversary ; and to incur a similar loss by a
second attempt, though attended by success, would
in effect be exhaut^ing on an advanced corps, the
means given him of resistliig th.i main body. Other
considerations may be supporei to have increased
the weight of thj ? leo jonirsg — the weather was cold,
the Bnow deep, ar.l Harrison's head-quarters already
advanced to the Rapids ; while his own corps was
neither sufficiently provided against the elements nor
the enemy. What, therefore, could not be done by
a coup de maiyi^ (a sadden attack and speedy retreat)
he should fbrbcar to attempt ; and the more so, as
he was now encumbered with prisoners, and with
the wounded of both armies. The pause in his
operations, which took place about this time, may,
therefore, be justly ascribed to reasoning like this,
which must have been conclusive, and would have
sent him back to Maiden, satisfied with the advan-
tage he had gained, but that information was now
brought that General Winchester was among the
number of prisoners made by the Indians. This un-
expected incident, suggested to Proctor a new course
of proceeding, of which he hastened to make the ex-
periment. Causing the prisoner to be brought before
him, he dilated freely on the extent of his force,
and still more on that of his humanity. " I have,"
he said, " the means of setting fire to every house
in the village, without risk to myself; and may
thus, soon and safely reduce the party, which so
unwisely attei v,)i53 to defend it. But in this case,
what will be t* c fate of the inhabitants, men, women

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1819.

and children, and of the American militia associated
with tliein 1 Such of these as may escape the fire
of our musketry and cannon, will unavoidably fall
under the tmnahawks of our allies, whom it will be
impossible to restrain in the heat of action. May I
never witness such a spectacle! But, need I tell
you, that private feelings cannot be indulged at the
expense of public duty ; and that, however agreea-
ble it would be to me as a man, to avoid the employ-
ment of means, so terrible in themselves as those I
have suggested, yet as an officer, I cannot be justi-
fied in omitting to do, wJiatever may be necessary
or useful to the King's service. I have, therefore,
to submit to you a single and short proposition, con-
taining the only remedy the case admits of, and
that is — that in your quality of commanding Gene-
ral, you will inmnediately surrender to me French-
town and the garrison it contains."

To Winchester, the situation of the gallant band,
whom Proctor called the garrison of Frenchtown,
appeared to be hopeless. He saw no reason to ex-
pect any interposition in their favor from the Rapids,
and from no other quarter was it possible to obtain
any, in time to be useful ; yet without a reinforce-
ment, the contest, as he supposed, must be short
and unavailing. He had, besides, just witnessed the
slaughter or capture of nearly one half of his com-
mand ; and saw with horror what would probably be
the fate of the other, if, as menaced by Proctor, it was
deprived of its covering and obliged to combat on the
open ground. His decision on Proctor's proposition

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

was, therefore, soon and humanely taken, and bar-
ing yielded his assent, he immediately despatched
an Aid-decamp to inform Majors Graves and Madison,
that " they and their followers had been surren-
dered prisoners of war, to the arms of his Britannic
Majesty^"'

This annunciation of the unconditional surrender
of a corps, which had hitherto triumphed over every
attack made upon it, and which yet beHeved in its
capacity of self-defence, could not fail to be ill-re-
ceived by those to whom it was addressed. Thoug^h
entertaining no doubts of the purity and benevolence
of the General's views in taking this step, they did
not scruple to question the validity of any engage-
ment made by him in their behalf, after he had be-
come a prisoner ; and the less so, as the agreement
actually entered into and communicated, contained
no security whatever against Indian or other out-
rage, in the event of their acceding to it. The de-
termination of Major Madison (whom the disasters
of the day had now made commandant of the corps)
was therefore judicir.dsly taken. — "We shall run all
risks," he &aid, " of a prolonged resistance, and per-
ish, if such must be our fate, in a free and full use
of our arms, unless the British commander will con)e
under a solemn engagement that private property
shall in all cases be respected ; that the side-arms
of officers shall be restored to them on their arrival
at Amherstburg; that the wounded shall be promptly

I McASe, p. ai5»

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

and securely transported to that post ; and that, until
this last provision be complied with, a guard suffi-
cient for their protection shall be assigned to them."
These conditions, though altogether such as brave
men had a right to demand, and a liberal enemy
would have had no hesitation in granting, were for
a time resisted by Proctor ; but finding that his at-
tempts at either duping or intimidating his adversary
were unavailing, and feeling the importance to him-
self of even a qualified surrender, which should make
unnecessary a renewed attack on the town or a longer
continuance before it, he at last, after an altercation
as little honorable to his manners as to his princi-
ples,' yielded his objections, and entered into the
engagements proposed to him.

What remained of the day was assiduously em-
ployed by the enemy in preparing for an immediate
retreat, and in actually retreating, as far as Stony
Creek. At twelve o'clock, the prisoners (amounting
to about six hundred) were put in motion, and in
the evening of the 23d, arrived at Amherstburg ;
where "they were penned up in a small and muddy
wood-yard, and exposed throughout the night to a
cold and constant rain, without tents or blankets,
and with only fire enough to keep them from freez-
ing."* The dead, who lay where they had fallen,

» In detailing the circumstances of this meeting, Major Madison
stated to the Secretary of War, that " Proctor's conduct at French-
town was as unmanly, as at Maiden it was iase"— alluding to his im-
pudent denial, tliat " any engagements favorable to the prisoners had
been entered into by him." a McAffee.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

in Frenchtown and its neighborhood, were not merely
disregai Jed, but " formally denied the rights of sep-
ulture, and left a prey to the hogK and dogs of the
village ;"' while the wounded, still ni re unfortunate,
were literally abandoned to the mercy of the savages ;
who, it was tauntingly remarked, "would be found
to be excellent surgeons."* Soon after sunrise, the
day following, instead of the sleighs which Proctor
hrcd ^lu'./sed, and which were anxiously expected,
came two hundred Indians, hideous as yells and
paint could make them ; who, after plundering the
two houses in which the wounded were collected,
set them on fire, and repulsing every attempt of the
prisoners at escape, burnt the whole to the ground.*

Information of this disaster reached tho Rapids at
twelve o'clock of the day of its ocrurrence, and pro-
duced effects there, wh'ch had no I ndeiicy to miti-
gate the evil. The lu st mtention of the commanding
General, (who had arrived ■ this pobi earl on the
morning of the SOl.h) was to push for wn^ such force
as could be Pi-^^edily asH«-mbled, interp^^e it h( ween
the flying troops and tlieir pursuers, and mvc po«-
sibl , the wreck of the American detachment. Jm.
being infoi.ned at the end c^ a sing' > hour's iiiurch,
that the retreating party (when last seen by such
of tlh? fugiti', cs as had been able to make good their
escape) was reduced to le s than forty men, much
exhausted by fatigue, and hotly pui.,ued by a body

n anted Indi is, he abaadoned his purpcse, and

I McAfTee.

8 Idem.

• Idem.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

committing the service, originally proposed for him-
self, to a small detachment, he speedily retreated to
the Rapids and immediately assembled a council of
war. To the wisdom of this enlightened body, it
appeared not merely possible, but highly probable,
that Proctor wouh^ follow up the blow he had already
given, and attack the po t they now occupied ; or,
that leaving this behind him, he would throw him-
self on tlie head or flanks of the column of the right
and the convoys moving in its rear. From such
premises, it was not diflicult to come tc a conclu-
sion — that the post must be abandoned; its dt nces,
and the stores collected in them, destroyed ; and the
garrison, amounting to eight or nine hundred men,*
instantly withdrawn behii. 1 Portage river. Orders
in conformity with this decision, were speedily given
and executed, and with this event, virtually ter-
minated General Harrison's second, or winter cam-
paign ; which, unfortunately, having recovered no
ground we had lost, nor eflaced any disgrace we
had suffered, utterly failed in accomplishing its
objects ; and as matter of history, is only remarka-
ble for a wash' of money, time, character and life.

■A.«|

«l

Rem*i»k9. Of the many errors which signalize
this exped' i, the first in date as well as in char-
acter, was tue plan of campaign, suggested by the
government, and pursued by the General ; and
which differed but little from that prescribed to

,♦ *

1 McAffce, p. 236.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819.

Hull, with respect to route, object and means. It
may be concisely deHcribed as follows : — « Get to-
gether a large mass of militia and volunteers ; arm,
equip, subsist and march them without loss of time
through the wildernens ; give pro( ction to the fron-
tier, recapture Detroit, and invade Canada." In
thus 8u})stantially renewing their first and ill-fated
plan, the govermncnt ♦ntirely overlooked, or disre-
gardrd the circumstances which induced and jus-
tified the rirst expidition, and the very important
changes wrought in these, by Hull's surrender and
other causes, in relation, as well to their own con-
dition, as to that of the enemy.

When on the Ist of June, 1812, Hull began his
march to Detroit, we had an Indian war to prevent,
which could be best accomplished by augmenting
our military means in the neighborhood of the
lakes ; we had several old-eytablished forts on the
frontier, which, from different views, it was deemed
important to sustain ; we had a young and increasing
settlement bordering on a British province, which
both justice and policy commandnl us to protect ;
we were yet in a state of peace, which enabled us
to carry on our operations without interruption ; wc
had the summer before us, from which to select the
moments most propitious for crossing the swampy
region, which separate.l us from our objects ; and
lastly, we had an organizer^ corps, equipped, supphed
and ready for service. Such was the state of things
on the 1st of June, when Hull began his march for
Detroit. But how changed in all respects was it

ni f-:

'it ;?i

NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1819.

by the 30th of September — the da. ^.i which Har-
rison readied the St. Mary, and tuok conunand of
the army and district ? It will be remembered, that
at this period, we were at open wur with Great
Britain ; that our frontier settlements and posts had
been wrested from us ; that the Indian tribes of the
west, with few, if any exceptions, had taken part with
the enemy ; that the rainy season had already com-
menced, and the roads (always precarious) had be-
come difficult for infantry and nearly impracticable
to carts and wagons ; that the means of both sub-
iistence and transportation, (beyond contract limits)
were yet to be provided ; that the artillery, destined
for the service and indispensable to it, was not far-
ther advanced than Pittsburg ; that several corps
of the army were also far in the rear, and that all,
whether present or absent, required supplies, reorgan-
ization and instruction.

The condition of the enemy had also undergone
changes, quite as important as our own, but of a
character altogether different. In acquiring Detroit,
he had become possessed of a fortress, much more
defensible than Maiden ; and in the general it jue
of the campaign, had completely re-established the
allegiance and services of his militia. In

receiving the submission of Michigan, he had ac-
quired the command of such supplies as that terri-
tory could finnish, and of as much of the personal
labor of its inhabitants, as was necessary to military
purposes; and lastly, in securing the attachment of
the Indian tribes, he had obtained an allv. of all

. / I

' i

f
.1

■»(!*

* t«l

* ■ ■ '1

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

Others the most important to him, and formidable
to us.

That circumstances, thus multiplied and impor-
tant, all forbidding a prosecution of the prescribed
plan of campaign, and all pointing distinctly to the
safer, the shorter and more efficient plan of a joint
operation of naval and military means, in the spring,
were either overlooked or underrated by the cabinet]
is not to be doubted; but of this apology, the com-
manding General has deprived himself by his own
written acknowledgments ^ for in a letter of the 4th
of January, 1813, he says, "The experience of a
few days, was sufficient to convince me, that the
supplies of provision could not be procured for an
autumnal advance ; and if even this difficulty was
removed, another of equal magnitude existed, in
the want of artillery." ^ On another occasion, he
says, « A suspension of the operations of this army
for the winter, without having accomplished the
prmcipal objects for which it was embodied, is an
event, which has been long looked for by well-in-
formed men, who know the character of the country
and rec Uect, that the army of General Wayne,
after a whole summer's preparation, was unable to
advance more than seventy miles from the Ohio ;
and that the prudent caution of President Washing-
ton had directed it to be placed in winter quarters, at
the very season when our arrangements were beginning. ''»

1 Harrisou's official letter of the 4th January, 1813.

2 Letter of the 8th of Jan,: ay, 1813.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF lb 12. 83

On another occasion, he says, « From my know-
ledge of the cost of transportation, I do believe that
the expense, that will be incurred in the course of
SIX weeks in the spring, in i^oving the provisions of
tne army along the roads leading from the Rapids
to Detroit, would build and equip all the vessels
necessary to give us the command of the lake ;»»
to which, in a subsequent letter, he adds,— "If a
small proportion of the sums that will be expended
m the Quartermaster's department, in an active pro-
secution of the campaign during the winter, was
devoted to obtaining the command of Lake Erie
the wishes of the government, in their utmost ex'
tent, could be accomplished without difficulty, in
the months of April and Mav Maiden, Detroit
and Mackinaw, would fall in rapid succession."

With sue h decided convictions ol what was wroncr
in the plan he was pursuiiig, and of what woufd
be right, in the measure he suggests as its sub-
stitute, we certainly had reason to expect, that the
General, possessing as he did, a carte hlarwhe for
conductmg the war, would have instantly aban-
doned his crusad.^ upon the elements and the trea-
sury; taken a new and better frontier on the eastern
side of the swampy region ; retained barely troops
enough to occupy and defend it during the winter
t-nd dismissed without farther ceremonv or hesita-
tion, the mass of his militia to their own firesides.
Or, If failing to do this, that he would, at least,

i Letter of December 12th, 1812.

Bit.

|f*»

IS .'

" PI'

f»fT

♦1

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

have made a prompt and full disclosure of the prin-
cipal facts connected with the case, and of his own
impressions under them, without the smallest ad-
mixture of other matter, having a tendency to neu-
tralize their effects and keep up a false confidence
in a mode of operating, which he thought so ob-
viously wrong.

Had he pursued either of these courses, he would
have acted wisely and deserved well of his country ;
but unfortunately he pursued neither. The hope-
less business of transportation was kept up, not
merely until its follies and abuses became apparent
to all, but until it had actually ceased to be practi-
cable in any possible way ; until two teams had
become necessary to carry the forage for a third ;*
until two trips, from one blockhouse to another,
were sufficient to destroy a whole brigado of pack-
horses ; until the whole route was marked with the
wrecks of carriages and their lading, abandoned by
their drivers and given up to destruction ; until the
creeks and rivers had become as impracticable for
boats, as the roads were for carts and wagons ; and
lastly, (notwithstanding these wasteful and injudi-
cious efforts,) until his advanced corps, though not
now exceeding one thousand men, were literally
starving in his front, and " compelled to subsist
from the 10th to the 22d of December, on bad beef
and the boiled roots of the hickory-tree."*

1 General Harrison's letter of the 22d December, 1818,
i McAffee, p. 184, 5.

1 1 *

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 85

Nor will the time, or the manner, selected by the
General (or disclosing his opinions and convictions
to the govern,„cnt, be more likely to satisfy an
impartial mqimer ; for though these, as we have
seen, were matured as early as the last of Septem-
ber, or begmning of October, 1812, they were not
communicated until the December or January fol-
Wmg ; and when they did make their appearance,
weie accompanied by so much that shook thei^
authority and even led to opposite conclusions, that
Ae cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military
diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring „„y re-
sponsibility.t could avoid, determined (with perhaps
Is of patriotism than of prudence) to leave the
question of continuing the winter campaign exclu-
sively with the General ; who, appearing to hold two
opimons on the subject, and being aheady ve stL
witl full authority for deciding between them,
would, It was presumed, select that, which under
all circumstances, would be the safest and best '

But If Mr. Harrison's conduct was culpable in
adhering to a campaign, forbidden alike by political
and physical reasons, the course he adopted in prose,
cutmg It, was not less open to censure, in a military
view ; as in this, he scrupled not to violate the
plainest and most important maxims of the art he
professed ; and, with a uniformity, indicating either
an entire ignorance of thhir existence, or an utter
contempt for their authority. Of these maxim., we

1 McAffee, p, 190.
8

i*"*!

■i%*i

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

subjoin the following, with a few brief remarks,
applying them to the cases to which we refer.

1st. "Of all military operations, winter campaigns
are the most to be condemned ; because, most de-
structive to health, temper, habiliments and equip-
ments. The best troops cannot long sustain them."
Yet did General Harrison institute a winter cam-
paign, though left by the government to choose
between that, and one in the spring; and though
affecting to consider the former as doubtful, if not
dangerous, and the latter as safe, economical and
efficient — thus virtually convicting himself of omit-
ting to do what he believed to be right, and of
actually doing what he knew to be wrong.

2d. "Every military expedition ought to have
a useful and important object ; for without such,
however successful it may be, it will be fruitless;
and of course, a mere waste of time, treasure and
life." By the General's letter of the 12th Decem-
ber, 1812, we find, that "the sole object he could
certainly promise to accomplish, was the recapture of
Detroit," of which he says, "this will be worse than
useless, so long as the enemy hold Maiden in my
rear, and Sandwich in my front; as from the former,
he can intercept my supplies ; and from the latter,
by a shower of shot and shells, comp'^1 me to hide
the army, for its preservation, in -.'■'> adjacent
swamps." Yet did the General prosecute a cam-
paign, having this worthless object, and such dan-
gerous consequences !

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 87

3d « In oflfensive war, a single line of operation
IS to be preferred; as it keeps your forces in a state
that best enables you to make, or to repel attacks."
Ihe General, in his wisdom, came to a different
conclusion ; and accordingly, instead of keeping his
force together, divided it into three corps,

4th "Other things being equal, the shortest
luie of operation is the best, as it most economizes
time and money, and offers to your enemy the fewest
opportunitio8 for attack or annoyance." Hull's road
would have best satisfied the demands of this rule
as Its distance to the point of rendezvous was less,'
and Its central position the safest. Yet to this route
was assigned the smallest and least efficient of the
tJiree corps,

5th. "Double, or multiplied lines, are only to be
employed when your enemy has committed the
error of forming similar lines exterior to yours »
But as in this case. Proctor committed no such
fault, the reason, which could alone justify the
General's arrangement, did not exist.

Gth. "Double, or multiplied lines, whenever
adopted, should be kept within sustaining distance
of each other ; and to this end, their movements
must be simultaneous." This maxim, of the first
importance in itself, was wholly disregarded ; as the
General's lines were so far apart, and so deficient
m the ordinary means of communication, as in a
military sense to be completely isolated. Nor was
the last injunction of the rule better observed than
the first ; as Winchester's marcli from Defiance to

■:v*l

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

the Rapids, was made without any corresponding
movement on the part of either Tupper or Harrison.
7th. "Military magazines should invariably be
formed in the rear of the army they are intended to
supply. If established in its front, they n.vite attacks
from the enemy ; and if captured or destroyed, com-
pel an innnediate retreat." Instead, however, of
acting on this rule, the General's constant effort and
greatest care, was to accumulate a million of rations
at the Rapids, forty miles in front of his central
column, and seventy in front of his right wing, and
without other protection than Winchester's corps,
now reduced by disease or fatigue to eight or nine'
hundred con\batants, destitute alike of fortifications
and artillery, and but fifty miles distant from the
enemy's main body.^

8th. « On a rigid maintenance of discipline, will
depend the safety of the country, the preservatior>
of the anuy, and the niccessful prosecution of any
enterprise in which it may be employed." This
maxim is so universally known, and so generally
adm tted, as to render unnecessary any new illustra-
tion of it. It but remains, therefore, to inquire, how
far this sine qua non of successful war, was attended
to by General Harrison ? On beginning his career,
this officer unfortunately adopted a theory with re-
gard to western mihtia which, though it sufl^ciently
answered his purpose of displacing a senior officer
and securing to himself the command of the army,
operated very mischievously on the public interests!

I Appeiuii c, No. 7.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 89

In his letter to the War Department, of the 3d of
teeptember, 1812, he says, "The backwoodsmen are
a smgidar people. They are susceptible [capable
he probably meant] of the most heroic achievements •
but they must be taken in then- own way. From
their affection and attachment, every thing is to be
expected ; but 1 will venture to say, that they never
did, nor ever will perform any thing brilliant under
a stranger." AH which, when translated into plain
fcnghsh amounts to this-the men of the west ac
knowledge no principle of obedience, stroi.ffer or
nafer, than that of personal attachment to their chief
With them, respect for the government, reverence
for the laws, sensibility to the national interest, and
even a decent regard to their own characters, avail
nothing, unless to all these be superadded, the ap.
pointment of a leader " who will take them in their
own way"_or in other words, who will gratify their
whims, yield to their opinions, overlook their follies
and connive at their faults. '

We need hardly remark, that a creed like this,
foiinded on an assumed insubordination on the part
of the troops, and an unavoidable compliance on that
of the General, is incompatible with every thin- de
serving the name of discipline ; and will never fail
to erminate m waste, peculation, disorder, and de-
feat. Nor were its effects different on the present
casion as may be seen by recurring to m'any o
I e incidents mentioned in the text; and still more

Get::? 'y'", ""'""'"^ -'-ts,'mnde fl""
General s official correspondence ; from McAflee'»

'4'

'%«!

" t'
.1

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

history of the war in the west ;> and lastly, from the
journal of the late Colonel Wood of the Engineer
corps. In a letter of the 12th of December, to the
War Department, when assigning the reasons why
he did not sooner apprize the government of the im-
pediments that obstructed his progress, he says —
" Though I was always sensible that there were
great difficulties to be encountered, &c., I did not
make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inex-
perience of public agents, and the villany of the con-
tractors." In the second letter of the 25th of January,
m attempting to explain, why, after censuring Win-
chester so freely for hazarding Lewis's movement
on Frenchtown, he directed that officer to hold the
position "a^ any rate,'' he says, "I am persuaded that
nothing but a reiterated order would have produced
obedience on the part of the troops. "^ To these
sentiments. Wood's Journal is an echo. "In the
use of the axe, the mattock, and the spade, ' says
the Engineer, " consisted the chief military knowl-
edge of our army." And again : — speaking of
Lewis's expedition and the arrangement of the
troops at Frenchtown, he adds — " Not the least re-
gard was paid to defence, order, regularity, or sys-
tem, in posting the different corps." The historian,
however, is still more frank in his confessions,
than the General or the Engineer, for according to

1 Report says, this work was principally founded on documents
furnished and revised by the General, with a view to his biography.

« If such would have been the effect of a second order, why
hesitate to give it 1

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 9]

him -« Chao, and misconduct reigned m even, de.

which the best organization and arrangement, were
necessary ,0 n.eet the n.co„ceivahle ditlcnUi::; ,>^
were to be snrmonnted in that line. Tlie General

Drocnre, 7 . > ^ "'^ P'"''""' •'''■" '^""•'l he
procured as packhorse-drivers were, generally the

most worthless creatures in society ;^.hTnei'.i

took care of the horses, nor of the goods with wh h

they were nurusted. The horses were of course soon

t red to h'"',' "'""f "' "^^ P--""" '''^''- Tl.e teams
hired to haul, were also commonly valued so high

m omn,g ,„to service, that the owners were willing

o dr,ve hem to debility and death, to get the pri e

and „> addifon to this, no bills of lading were r ed'

e^achTadt '"'"' ^"" "^^ -^o-rsf of cZt',
each had an opportunity to plunder the public with
out much risk of detection.""

9th. "The General who divides his forces will
be beaten m detail. Officers who have negL J
th,s rule, have generally paid a heavy penfl y 2
doutg so^ Never, therefore, when actin J olTensi^ely
make a detachment." ,„ ,he wisdom and autho ity
of tins max,m. the General appeared to concur • as
he more than once asserts, that he "made it a rule

sufficiently strong to resist the whole force of the

■ ♦

1 McAffto, p. 141.

» Idem, p. 184.

liw

NOTICES OF Tlh UAR Oi 1812.

^;n;:'l

enemy." li, however, we test this assertion by
facts,^ wc shall soon discover that, in this respecf
the General has peafjy over-rated Ins own discre-
tion ; and that !.is ^tiial conduct, so ^ir from ob-
serviiijrthe rule by which he says he was always
governed, was often a direct violation of it.

^e have already (h; tailed the progress and for-

tunesof three detachments, made under his r-ction,
viz., TupperV two nttempts on the Rnnids, and that
of Campbell a«rainst th^ Missisineway villagts ; all
of which fniled to accomplish the objects prescribed
to them, either from the defident numb'^r of the
party, (as in the case of i;ampb(^i) or from the in-
competency of the leader, as n .at of Tupper. In
these instances, therefore, Mr. f arrison was no r
observer of his own rule; vm will his general plan
be found to be better conformed to it, than his occa-
sional practice ; for, from the moment he divided his
army into three corps, and so placed these as to
render mutual support impracticable, he virtually
converted them into detachments of the worst kind ;
and of course, subjected them Id all the evils incident
to subdivision, and himself, to all the cens( re attach-
ing to so great an error.

10th. « When the head of your line of operation
IS carried near to your enemy's principal station, it
ought to be carefully strengthened ; for if it be weak,
he will certainly attack and probably destroy it."
Such, however, was not the General's opinion ; since,
far from strengthening Winchester, when approach-
ing the enemy, ho would have taken two regiments

■iH

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

froi.. m, and thus reduced the advanced corps to
101' •• ve hundred men.'

t iduct like this, could only be juntified hy one
or more of the following reasons ; that the strength
of the whole army was so small, as to forbid an aug.
mentation of any par(icuhir part ; that the objec^ts
10 be gamed or secured, by re-enforcing the advanced
g< .rd, weio comparatively unimportant; that the
the roads and weather, rendered the move-
of troops impracticable ; or, that the enemy's
uionstrations, against other and important parts
the line, not only made a diminution from their
strengtli improper, but justified a recall of a part of tiie
vanguard, for the purpose of strengthening the men-
aced points. Unfortunately for the General, every
fact hereassu.ncd, i^ without a shadow of foundation
The nominal force of the army amounted to ten
thousand men ; and its effective or disposable force
to SIX or seven thousand.' The object to be attained'
(by re-enforcing Winchester) was of tlie highest im-
portance, as well in itself, as in its conseij lences-
being notliing less than the security of the milliorl
of rations, collected and collecting at the Rapids-
and without which, in the General's opinion, the
expedition must fail. The weather and roads, far
from presenting any serious obstruction, were, during
twenty days of December, peculiarly favorable ;»

1 Appendix, No. 7. » McAffee's History.

3 Letter from General Harrison to the War Department of the 4th
of January, 1813. *^ -j «*

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TEST TARGET (MT-S)

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Photographic

Sdences

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23 WEST MAIN STREET

WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580

(716) 872-4503

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

nor was there any thing in the movements of the •
enemy alarming to other parts of the line. It would
be unjust to Mr. Harrison not to add, that he made
no attempt to exculpate his conduct on either of
these grounds ; and had he been equally prudent
in forbearing to employ the defence he actually set
up, it would have furnished, at least, one occasion
for speaking favorably of his discretion. But what
can we think of the capacity of a General, who,
when the magazines necessary to his own eventual
success were in jeopardy, could seriously wish to
send back one half of the small corps employed in
their protection ? And for what purpose 1 For a
pitiful saving, arising from the mere difference be-
tween contract and commissariat prices, to be made
on the few rations necessary to the subsistence of
five or six hundred men !^

11th. "Every position, taken by an advanced
corps in the face of an enemy's army, (if too weak
to defend itself) should be promptly abandoned, or
speedily re-enforced and fortified." And again : —
"No advanced corps should be hazarded, beyond
sustaining distance from its own army." Inatten-
tion to these two rules, was no doubt the proximate
cause of the disaster at French town, and the subse-
quent defeat of the campaign. For, who will be hardy
enough to assert, that if (after the affair of the 18th)
Winchester's corps had been withdrawn, or his posi-

1 McAfiee, p. 193.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

don re-enforced and fortified : or lastly, if Harrison
had been within sustaining distance of it, the loss
and disgrace suffered on the 22dj would not have
been avoided 1 *

The first notice of the expedition to Frenchtown,
reached the commanding General on the 16th. Its
eflfects on him and the troops he commanded, is thus
described by the late Colonel Wood. — " This news,
for a moment, paralyzed the army, or at least, the
thinking part of it ; for no one could imagine that
it was possible for him [Winchester] to be guilty of
such a hazardous step. General Harrison was as-
tonished at the imprudence and inconsistency of
such a measure ; which, if carried into execution,
could be viewed in no other light, than as attended
with certain and inevitable destruction to the left
wing. Nor was it difficult for any one to foresee
and predict the terrible consequences which were
sure to mark the result of a scheme, no less rash in
its conception than hazardous in its execution.'"*
What then, we ask, under convictions thus full and
distinct, of the folly and danger of the enterprise,
was the duty of the commanding General ] Un-
questionably, to prevent the movement if possible ;
and if not, to recall the detachment without a mo-
ment's delay. Yet were both entirely omitted ! No
order, forbidding the expedition, was given by Har-

i Appendix, No. 9, affidavit of Governor Madison, &c
8 McAffee's History p. 228.

,. i:

■ W]

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

rison ; nor after his arrival at the Rapids on the 20th,
did any issue for recalling the troops. On the con-
trary, he on that day, despatched his Inspector-
General with an order to Winchester, " to hold fast
the position at any rate,^^ or in other words, at every
risk, — thus making himself entirely responsible, for
whatever consequences might follow.

NOTICES OF TUB WAR OF 1813.

CHAPTER IV.

Operations on the Niagara. — Partial Armistice. — Renewal of hostilities.
— ^Van Rensselaer's attack on Gtueenstown. — Smjrth's invasion of
Canada. — Dearborn's Campaign against the British advanced posts
on Lake Champlain.

We have already stated, that to lessen the pres-
sure made upon Hull, and to reinstate the ascen-
dency he had lost on the Detroit, Major-General
Dearborn, who, in the distribution of service for the
year 1812, had b oa assigned to the command of the
northern army, was directed to make such move-
ments against the British posts in his front, as would
have the effect of preventing them from re-enforcing
the garrison of Malder • or otherwise altering the
relations as to streng , wiiljh had hitherto existed
between Hull and Proctor. But for this service,
the Major-General had made no preparation, and ap-
peared to have little relish ;^ as on the very day on
which he was thus instructed by the government,

1 In the General's letter of the 8th of August, we find an apology for
this inaction, quite as unjustifiable as the inaction itself—" TiU now^^
he says, "I did not consider the Niagara frontier as coming witlrin the
hmits of my command," — an assertion direcUy contradicted by the
armistice entered into between him and Provost, and utterly inconsis-
tent with the orders he received, from the 26th of June, to the 1st of
August For these orders, see Appendix, Nos. 10 and 14.

* 1<I

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

(though sufficiently apprised that detachments had
been sent to Maiden, and that the situation of Hull
was becoming more critical every moment) he did
not hesitate to enter into an armistice, by which he
completely disabled himself from giving any aid to
that officer ; either by vigorously assailing the British
posts in his front, (now rendered comparatively weak
by the absence of Brock and the troops carried with
him,) or by extending to him or his army, the ben-
efits of the temporary suspension of hostilities into
which he had entered. Nor did this extraordinary
policy, on the part of the General, stop here — for
though promptly informed, that the arrangement he
had made was disapproved by the President, and
though peremptorily ordered to put an end to it as
speedily as possible, he notwithstanding, continued
its operation till the 29th of August ; thus enabling
Brock, not only to consummate his victory on the
Detroit, but to lead back his detachment and re-
establish his defences on the Niagara.^

It would be a mere waste of time to inquire into
the motives of the British commander, in proposing
an arrangement, productive of sucli decided advan-
tage to himself and his army ;* but why the Amer-
ican General should have consented to it, in the first

1 Brock left York on the 5th of August; arrived at Maiden on the
13th; received Hull's surrender on the 15th; returned to his post
on the Niagara, on the 25th; visited York on the 27th; and early
in October was again at Fort George, playing off his artifices on
General Van Rensselaer.

2 For the use made of the armistice by Provost, see Appendix, No. 1 1.

•1 ,

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

instance, or continued it in the second, contrary to
the express orders of his government 1 are problems
less easily solved. Two official solutions have, how-
ever, been given of them, which it is our duty to
commemorate ; and which, if they do not instruct,
can hardly fail to amuse the reader. According to
that of the Secretary of War, the General had only
mistaken a private, for a public letter ; and presum-
ing that it contained some new and important over-
ture on the subject of peace, hastened to adopt the
preliminary measure of an armistice. But hoAvever
well this solution may account for the General's first
step in the business, it entirely fails to explain the
second ; which must have been made with a full
knowledge, that his mo'mtain had not even pro-
duced a mouse, and that the despatch to which he
had ascribed so much importance, had neither been,
nor was intended to be, communicated to the Amer-
ican Government. To supply, therefore, this obvious
defect in the Secretary's explanation, we must recur
to that of the General, who in a letter of the 27th
of August, lets us into the secret that the ruse was
altogether on his side ; that it was now in full ope-
ration, and [though it might have deprived him
of the power of saving Hull, or of capturing the
enemy's posts in his front] was not to be either
too much undervalued, or hastily given up ; " as he
had yet on hand some useful stores which must be
forwarded to Sacket's Harbor." »

?. *i

J-iM

» i'l

t Dearborn*s letters of the 9th and 20th of August, 1812.

100

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

But the time had now arrived, when something
more important than the transportation of puncheons
and packages, was expected from an army impatient
of longer inactivity; and loudly, if not seriously,
demanding an opportunity of meeting the enemy
in the field. To this ostensible ardor, the gallant
and successful enterprise of Lieutenant Elliot of the
navy, (aided by Captain Towson and a detachment
of the army) in capturing two armed brigs of the
enemy under the guns of Fort Erie, gave a new and
increased impulse ; approaching so nearly to a state
of insubordination on the part of the miUtia, that
motives of personal safety and reputation, no less
than those derived from a sense of public duty, made
a compliance with it indispensable.* Major-General
Van Rensselaer, (the local commanding officer) hav-
ing accordingly made such preparations as he deemed
necessary ; and having besides assured himself, that
" General Brock had again set out for Maiden with
a considerable re-enforcement,"* selected the morn-
ing of the 11th of October, for making an attack on
Queenstown — a small village on the Canada side
of the strait, defended by three batteries, a few artil-
lerists, two companies of the 49th British regiment,
and a small detachment of York volunteers.

The corps designated for this service, and princi«
pally composed of militia, assembled punctually and
in good order, at the place of rendezvous ; and with

I General Van Rensselaer's report of October 14th, 1818,
t Idem,

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

101

the exception of the weather, which was wet and
windy, every thing wore a propitious aspect. But
when, after long and patiently abiding the pelting
of a north-easterly storm, the embarcation was or-
dered, and the boats called for, none were found to
be in readiness ; and on inquiry, it was discovered,
that the person having charge of them, had not only
withdrawn himself, but had carried with him all the
oars, necessary for the service. For this unexpected
occurrence, there was no remedy but patience ; the
expedition was accordingly suspended, and the troops
sent back to their cantonments.

On the 13th, the project was renewed, without
any essential change in relation to its object, or the
mode of obtaining it. The former, continued to be
the mere expulsion of the enemy from Queenstown,
and the occupation of that village, « as a covering
for the American army against the inclemency of
the weather ;"Svhile the latter, proposed only a
hardy attack on that portion of the enemy's line of
defence, which confronted the American camp at
Lewistown. To effect these pt- ;;oses, a corps of six
hundred infantry, composed in equal parts of regular
troops and militia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colo-
nels Van Rensselaer and Christie, were, under cover
of the night, to cross the Niagara and carry the bat-
teries by assault ; after which, the residue of the
army was to follow and occupy the heights and the
village.

In prosecution of this plan, the infantry selected
for the attack, assembled at the lower, or old French

■(:

^ !

•App. No.

25,

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102

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

Ferry, near Lewistown, about four o'clock, A. M. ;
when, notwithstanding the recent admonition on the
subject of boats, it was found that those provided for
the present occasion, " were insufficient to transport
more than three hundred men at a single trip."*
Two companies of the 13th United States regiment,
forming the right of the line, and commanded by
Captains Armstrong and Malcom, were the first em-
barked ; and from good fortune and skilful pilotage,
were able to reach the opposite shore without either
annoyance or discovery. Other and smaller parts
of the same regiment followed, and with equal suc-
cess, until the whole number who had made good
their landing, amounted to somewhat more than one
hundred combatants ; when it was deemed advisable
to quit the shore, and take a position on the first or
river bank, and there await the arrival of the resid-
uary part of the corps. In executing this movement,
noises which could not be entirely avoided, reached
the British sentinels on the heights, and produced an
immediate and general alarm. A random cannon-
ade, on the course of the Ferry and place of American
embarcation, followed; while the two flank com-
panies of the 49th and the York militia, forming the
garrison of the post, concentrated their fire (from
different parts of the hill) on the ground occupied by
the American detachment, and with so much effect,
that every commissioned officer belonging to it was
in a few minutes either killed or wounded.' Lieuten-

1 Appendix, No. 12.

8 Idem.

» , \

NOTICES or THE WAR OP 1818.

10$

ant-Colonel Van Rensselaer, who had accompanied
this party, though among the latter and suffering
severely, was yet able to stand ; and from a first and
hasty consideration of the case, directed the men to
withdraw, and shelter themselves under the bank ;
but soon perceiving that a position of this kind was
not less dangerous than the former, and wholly in-
efficient as regarded the enemy, he hastened to issue
the wiser and more military order, that "al! auch as
could move, should immediately mount the hill and
storm the batteries." Captains Ogilvie and Wool
of the 13th, (the former of whom had about this
time crossed the river,) promptly undertook the exe-
cution of this order, and ascending the heights,
turned the British position, seized the battery, » and
drove the covering party (composed of the two flank
companies of the 49th) into a strong stone building
near the water's edge. From this fortress, the com-
panies soon after, made two or more vigorous, but
unsuccessful efforts, to recover the ground they had
lost ; in the last of which, the gallant Brock was
fated to fall : — a circumstance which, for the mo-
ment, g.?ve the American party full and undisturbed
possess! >i^ of the heights of Queenstown.

During the pause that now followed in the com-
bat, several attempts were made to carry over from
the American camp, supplies necessary to the further
prosecution of the general plan ; but so few and in-
suflicient were the means provided for the purpose,

I This battery was a redan, — open in the rear, by which the assail-
ants entered.

..k|

104

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

ha. ■ ■i'si

III.

and so disorderl}^ the employment of such as did
exist, tlint the eflfects expected from them were verv
inadequately produced. Of artillery, but one gun
could be brought to the west side of the river ; of
ammunition, but a small quantity ; and of entrench-
ing tools, all were forgotten and left at the place of
embarcation. Nor was the transportation of the
army, more successful than that of the supplies.
Two detachments of the 6(h, 13th and 23d regiments
of infantry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Christie and
Major Mullany, found means to cross, » and were
soon followed by Brigadier-General Wadsworth and
a small battalion of militia ; but the mass of this
latter description of force was immoveable. Neither
entreaty nor threats— neither arguments nor ridicule
availed any thing. They had seen enough of war,
to satisfy them that it made no part of their special
calling ; and at last, not disdaining to employ the
mask, invented by faction to cover cowardice or
treason, fifteen hundred able-bodied men, well armed
and equipped, who a week before boasted loudly of
patriotism and prowess, were now found openly plead-
ing constitutional scruples, in justification of disobe-
dience to the lawful authority of their chief !

While this degrading scene was going forward on
the eastern bank of the river, occurrences no less in-
teresting, but of a character somewhat diflferent, were
taking place on the western. Between two and three
o'clock, P. M., a scattering fire was heard on the
southern side of the heights, produced by an Indian

I Appendix, No. 12.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

105

attack made on a small party of straggling militia ;
who being completely surpriHcd, fled in great con-
fusion, and carrj'ing their panic along with them,
threatened to extend the infection to other corps. It
was at this critical moment that Lieutenant-Colonel
Scott of the second regiment of artillery, placing him-
self at the head of a few platoons of regular troops,
charged the savages witi a gallantry which soon
checked, and at length drove them into a neigh-
boring wood ; where the combat became nearly sta-
tionary, and a mere trial of skill at sharp-shooting.
Perceiving that a champ de battaille like this, secured
to the Indians all the advantages of tlu i; habitual
and peculiar mode of fighting ; while to his own
troops it produced effects directly the reverse, the
Lieutenant-Colonel prudently withdrew his party to
the open ground ; and there took a position which,
though it did not entirely put an end to the attack,
made it too inefficient, longer to disturb the order of
the American line.

A discovery was, however, soon made, that the
savages were not the only enemy the invading corps
would have to contend with. From the heights of
Queenstown, in the distance eastward, was now seen
advancing a column of artillery and infantry. Its
approach, though slow and circumspect, was ste; x'y
and unremitting ; and of its character and objects
there could be no doubts. About three o'clock, P. M.,
General Sheafe, the successor of Brock and leader
of the column, after turning the village and throw-
ing into it a detachment competent to its defence,

ii*

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1 1

106

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

presented himself and a force of eight hundred regu-
lars, militia and Indians, in front of the American
line — now reduced to less than three hundred com-
batants, and sustained but by a single piece of artil
lery, badly supplied with ammunition. In this state
of things, a note was received from General Van
Rensselaer, advising an immediate retreat, and pro-
mising, on his part, the utmost exertion in furnishing
the necessary boats and a covering tire, dining the
passage of the river ; but, at the same time, leaving
to Wadsworth (the senior officer on the field) entire
liberty to follow the dictates of his own judgment
on the occasion. This note was immediately com-
municated to the commandants of the different corps,
and their opinions en the subject requested; but
without producing a decision, either for or against,
the proposed measure. The British commander in
the meantime continued to manoeuvre from right to
left, and from left to right ; countermarching nearly
the whole length of the American hne twice, as if
determined to count every man in the ranks, and to
make himself familiar with every foot of the position,
before he hazarded an attack. This deliberation on
his part gave time for renewed councils on that of
his adversary ; and a second consultation being held,
a determination was at last taken to try the experi-
ment of a retreat, as recommended by General Van
Rensselaer.

To have executed successfully, a purpose of this

kind, in the face of an enemy so much more formi-

«fj-tc iiiw-iL iiivinscivco, III nuiiiDciS, uiKuipune aiiU

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

107

variety of arms, would have been no easy task for
soldiers the most practised, and officers the most
skilful ; but was j^erfectly hopeless, when required
from American levies, who had seen only an imper-
fect service of three or four months. The result
was such as mighc have been, and probably was
anticipated by the reflecting portion of the corps ;
the first step taken in retreat, produced a movement
on the part of the enemy, which at once converted
the march into a route; and (superadded to the
fact, that not a boat was found on the shore ready
to receive tljem) made necessary an immediate and
uncondition. surrender.

General Van Rensselaer, disgusted with the con-
duct of the mihtia, and perhaps not entirely satisfied
with his own, withdrew from service, about the 18th
of October ; when the command of the Niagara or
central army, as it was now called, devol/ed on
Brigadier-General Smyth ; an oflScer, from whose
patriotic and professional pretensions, the multitude
had drawn many favorable conclusions. Nor was
the estimate made of his military character by the
government, more correct ; as it took for granted,
a temperament, bold, ardent and enterprising, and
requiring only restriction to render it useful. In
the orders given for the regulation of his conduct,
he was accordingly forbidden to make any new at-
tempt at invasion, with a force "less than three
thousand combatants, or with means of transporta-
tion (across the Niagara) insufficient to carry over
simultaneoualy the whole of that number."

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108

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

The interval between the 26th of October and
27th of November, was usefully employed in getting
together and preparing the necessary number of
boats, and such increase of physical force, as would
enable the new commander entirely to fulfil the
cautious policy prescribed to him by the govern-
ment. Having at the last of these dates, sufiiciently
secured both objects, as he believed, he issued an
order, that the army should assemble early on the
28th, at Black Rock, for the purpose of entering on
the projected invasion. Nor was there any thing
in the state of the weather, or of the river, or in the
force and condition of the enemy, seriously to ob-
struct the execution of this design. The width of
the Niagara from Black Rock to the Canada shore,
does not exceed a mile — a distance ordinarily passed
in a few minutes ; the weather was clear and cool,
not cold ; the outposts of the enemy few and feeble,
and too remote from forts Erie and Chippewa, to be
promptly sustained by the garrison of either ; and
of course offering to the invading army an opportu-
nity of breaking down in succession, any detach-
ments sent to their support. Such was not, however,
the view of the subject taken by the General ; for
besides, that no man had more thoroughly convinced
himself that the " better part of valor is discretion,"
he had on this occasion, made a special promise
" not to be beaten,'* * and to fulfil this engagement,
determined to risk only a night-attack, with two

1 Smyth's letter to Dearborn, of the 30th October, 1812.

^ : ■"«»i

< . ■ <

, ■ « ,

for

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

109

/iall detachments, which, whether successful or not,
should terminate the enterprise by a hasty retreat
to their own shore.

In pursuance of this plan. Captain King of the
fourteenth United States regiment, with one hun-
dred and fifty regular infantry, and seventy seamen,
led by Lieutenant Angus, was despatched about
midnight of the 27th, with orders to attack and
carry the British posts at the Red House ; while
Lieutenant -Colonel Boerstler, with two hundred
rank and file of the same regiment, was instructed
to land near the mouth of Frenchman's Creek;
assail the guard posted at that place, and destroy
the bridge necessary to a communication between
forts Erie and Chippewa. From bad pilotage, or
some of the untoward accidents which often befall
night movements, neither party succeeded in carry-
ing over its whole force. Of King's ten boats, but
four reached the point of attack designated for them.
In these, were the seventy seamen and an equal
number of infantry, who landed under a shower of
grape and musket shot. The former, unaccus-
tomed to the order of military movements, and re-
quiring only to be told where the enemy was, rushed
forward with their habitual gallantry and appropriate
weapons, (pikes and cutlasses,) and after a short but
sanguinary contest, carried the position, made sev-
eral prisoners, threw two pieces of artillery and their
caissons into the river, and set fire to the building.

During these occurrences. King with his infantry
was not idle. Directing his march on the two exte-

it, f>

ill

E*!

il :;■*€..

110

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

rior batteries, which the enemy yet held, he gallantly
carried the lower by storm ; and on reaching the
upper, found it astily abandoned. After spiking
the cannon and destroying the carriages of both, it
but remained to fulfil the last injunction of his orders
— assemble his party, and recross the river. But to
his great surprise, neither on his retrograde march
to the shore, nor on his arrival there, was any thing
to be seen of Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, or the
boats. All had disappeared, and he now found him-
self in a situation the most painful to a soldier —
that of encountering a sudden and unavoidable dan-
ger, against which skill and courage could avail
nothing. An accident, however, tended to mitigate
the evil ; for in seeking his own craft, he found two
of the enemy's, in which he despatched as many of
his party as the boats would hold, but refusing to
abandon the remainder, he and they were soon after
made prisoners of war.

The explanation of this unfortunate circumstance,
offers a new proof of the perils of night movements ;
and of the great inexperience of our best officers, at
that period of the war, in this branch of military
service. After the seamen, as already stated, had
carried the first object of attack, (not knowing what
direction had been given to the infantry of the
detachment, and no signal of retreat having been
agreed upon,) they hastened to the shore, with the
wounded of their own party, and the prisoners they
had made ; when finding but four boats of the ten,
(with which the enterprise began,) and these with-

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

Ill

out a guard, and ignorant of the fact, that this
number only had made good their landing. Lieu-
tenant Angus concluded, and not unreasonably, that
Captain King had anticipated him in the retreat ;
and accordingly embarking his party, returned to
the Navy-Yard, near Black Rock.

Boerstler's adventures, on this occasion, had in
them little of interest, with respect either to what
was done, or what was suffered. Mistaking some-
what the point of attack, he effected his landing
with three boats out of seven, and without the loss
of a man. The British guard being a small one
and soon routed, the pursuit was continued towards
the bridge, (the destruction of which formed the
principal object of this part of the enterprise,) but
being now informed by a prisoner, that " Ormsby
was in full march, and nearly approaching it,'* the
Colonel contented himself with detaching a Lieu-
tenant and a few men, to effect its destruction ; and
retiring with the mass of his party to the shore,
entered his boats, and recrossed to Squaw Island.
The return of both Angus and Boerstler, in a total
ignorance of what had befallen their comrades of
the expedition, could not fail to create much disqui-
etude in the army ; and induced Colonel Winder to
offer himself, with another small party, to go in quest
of them. But on approaching the Canada shore,
and finding the British batteries re-established and
sustained by a body of infantry, he returned to
Black Rock, with a loss of six killed and twenty-

mj wuuxiucvU

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112

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

The result of the enterprise, though sufficiently
indicative of the error committed, in departing from
the letter, as well as the spirit of the orders given
by the government, had no tendency to quicken the
General's appetite for a second experiment, upon a
larger and more efficient scale. He even now be-
gan to doubt, whether the force present and willing
to co-operate with him, amounted to the number
prescribed by his orders as necessary to invasion ;
nor did he forget the use, that in his piesent extrem-
ity, might be made of the second injunction of the
government, that «« no attempt at invasion should
be hazarded, without the advice and approbation of
his principal officers." While, therefore, he ostensi-
bly prepared for a second attack at another point,
and with his whole force, he secretly held a council
of war, in which, under different motives,^ it was
agreed, that " the further prosecution of the present
plan of invasion, should be abandoned." This de-
cision was promptly followed by a general order,
putting an end to the campaign, and directing the'
army to be placed in winter quarters; when, to
complete the gasconade, a flag was despatched to

1 Councils of war are famous for giving bad advice, and hence the
maxim adopted by Eugene and Frederick, that the General who
resorts to them, seeks only an apology for dobg nothing. The deci-
sion in this case, was, however, taken on a diflerent principle from that
assumed in the precedmg maxim ; it aro»i not from a dislike of an
efficient course, but fiom a want of confidence in the skill and viffor
of the GeneroL *

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819.

113

Fort Erie, requiring an immediate surrender of that
post, and its garrison.

The temper discovered by the militia and volun-
teers, on this termination of the campaign, was
highly insubordinate and disgraceful — the General
was hissed and hunted from one hiding-place to
another ; and at length, compelled to fly for safety
to his own home, in Virginia. In noticing this cir-
cumstance in his official report, he says — " It has
been in the power of the contractor's agent to excite
a clamor against the course pursued. He finds the
contract a losing one at this time, and would wish
to see the army in Canada, that he might not be
bound to supply it." Such wa,a the veil, with which
he endeavored to cover his own follies and faults.

During these occurrences, the main army, occupy-
ing a position on the eastern side of Lake Cham-
plain, and commanded by the senior Major-General
in person, continued to slumber on its arms, though
both the time, and the policy of adopting measures
of offence, had been distinctly indicated by his own
increasing strength,* by the continued weakness of

■, i.

%*l

1 On the 26th of September, 1812, there were within district No. 9,
commanded by General Dearborn, 13,000 men of all arms. On the
Niagara, 3,300 regulars, and 3,000 volunteers and militia; at Sacket'a
Harbor, 200 regulars, and 2,000 militia; and on Lake Champlain,
3,000 regulars, and 2,000 militia. Throughout the campaign, Pro-
vost's regular force, covering a frontier of 900 miles, and extending from
the Sorel to Fort St Josephs, did not exceed 3,000 men. See Colonel
Cochran's statement, Appendix No. 13. The British commander was,
of course, unable to occupy the Isle aux Noix, during the campaign
of 1812, or to obstruct the roads leadins to MontreaL from New-

10*

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114

NOTICES or THE WAR C!? 1812.

his enemy, and lastly, by the urgent character of
the orders given him, — " not to lose a moment in at-
tacking the British posts in his front,** ^ — ^yet in despite
of considerations so numerous and imperative, no
movement of any kind, in the direction of the enemy,
was made, till the 20th of November ; — and what
then was hazarded, was on a scale so small, and for
an object so unimportant, * as rendered this last act
of the campaign, though less disastrous, quite as
ridiculous as any of its predecessors.

Of this movement, the historian of the war in the
Canadas, offers the following details ; which we the
more readily adopt, because, not differing materially
from those given by our own functionaries, they dis-
tinctly show the feeble character of Provost's out-
posts, and the small disposable force with which he

York and Vermont. Three gun-boats sent out from England, for the
defence of the Sorel, could not be employed for want of seamen, till
June, 1813. About this time, a small re-enforcement arriving from
New-Brunswick, the old fortifications on the Isle aux Noix, were re-
paired, and the position occupied by a detachment under the command
of Colonel Taylor.— Sec life and service of Sir George Provost, and
ChrisHe's History of the War in the Canadas. At any time, therefore,
during the autumn of ?812, this important post, emphatically called
the key of Central Canada, might have been seized and held by the
American General, without loss or risk of any kind ; as besides abun-
dant means, strictly military, he was authorized, about the middle of
October, to buy and equip such number of vessels, as would secure to
the United States a decided ascendency on Lake Champlain and the
Sorel.

» For the orders given to General Dearborn, during this period, see
Appendix, No, 14.

8 This mighty object was the destruction of a blockhouse, occupied
by a sma'! party of Indians and Canadian militia.

NOTICES OP THB WAR OF 1819.

115

was able to sustain them, when in November, 1812,
he expected the attack of an army of ten thousand
men.

" The American army under General Dearborn,"
says Mr. Christie, " now gradually approached the
frontier of Lower Canada ; and on the 17th of No-
vember, Major Salaberry (commanding on the lines)
received information that this army, to the number
of ten thousand men, were advancing to Odletown.
He immediately despatched two companies of Volti-
geurs and three hundred Indians, to the support of
Major La Force ; who, with two companies of the
embodied militia, formed the British outposts on the
La Cole. The day following. Major Salaberry with
the remainder of the Voltigeurs, a corps of Voyageurs,
and four companies of Ciiasseurs, advanced to the
neighborhood of the menaced points. By this time
the American army occupied the town of Champlain,
two or three miles from the line, and a serious inva-
sion was now momentarily expected ; but nothing
of any consequence occurred till the 20th, when be-
tween three and four o'clock, A. M., the Americans
were discovered fording the La Cole. The guard-
house was soon and completely surrounded ; when
the British militia and a few Indians, who were with
them, rushed from it, broke through the American
line and escaped unhurt. In the meantime, a second
party of the Americans now advanced, and mistak
ing those in possession of the ground for the British
picket, a smart firing between the two ensued, which
continued for nearly half an hour ; when being un-

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NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1812.

deceived, they united and hastily retreated, leaving
behind them five killed and as many wounded. This
party consisted of one thousand five hundred infantry
and a troop of dragoons, commanded by Colonels
Pike and Clarke ; and with the main body of the
army, soon after withdrew to winter quarters."*

Remarks. The errors which signalize the close
of this campaign in the north, are numerous and
striking. Those of Deartorn and Smyth appear to
have been the result of constitutional defects — bar-
renness or inactivity of mina in the one, and infirmity
of purpose in the other ; while those of Van Rens-
selaer were obviously sins of ignorance, the offspring
of that deficient knowledge, which every man must
feel, who for the first time, and without any previous
instruction, finds himself at the head of an army and
on the eve of a battle. Of the former, any new
illustration would be unnecessary, as they have been
already sufficiently indicated ; while of the latter, a
special but brief notice may be useful.

I. The false and improbable report of a spy, was
made the groundwork of the expedition. "With
practised Generals, the credibility of spies is always
doubtful, and never confided in, unless sustained by
some collateral evidence, furnishing a strong proba-
bility in its favor." In the present case, such proof
was entirely wanting ; and the report itself expressly
contradicted by the fact, that the complete success
of Brock's late expedition to Detroit, had left no rea-

l Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 90.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819.

117

sonable motive for a repetition of the visit ; and the
less 80, as the liourly augmentation of the American
army in his front, made the safety of the British posts
on the Niagara his most important duty. Notwith-
standing these obvious considerations, the knowledge
and integrity of the spy were taken for granted, and,
in the General's opinion, warranted not merely an
attack on Queenstown, but a full dispensation from
the employment of all military rules while making it.

II. " Every military enterprise, should have some
useful and important object." Yet, according to the
General's official report, his views were limited on
this occasion, to the expulsion of a small British de-
tachment from Queenstown, and the occupation of
that village as winter quarters for his troops — objects
which, if attained, would have little if any influence
on the progress or issue of the war, while they could
not fail to impose upon him the perils of defending
throughout the winter, an open and unfortified vil-
lage ; and (what would be worse) the absurdity of
placing between himself and his resources, a wide,
rapid, and unfordable river.

III. The troops employed, or intended to be em-
ployed, on this service, were principally militia ;
and, therefore, not better chosen than the object
itself. Why this was so, is a problem, not yet
satisfactorily explained. If it originated in an esprit
du corps, or belief of militia efficiency, there may be
some color of excuse for the error ; but, if as re-
ported, the arrangement was made to gratify the
ambition of an individual, the act was not merely

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iiij idicious, tmi criminal. At tlio period in ques-
tion, there were al the General's dieposition, more
than three thousand troops of the line ; from whom
a corps ni.„^ht have been selected, which, if well
found, equipped and commanded, would not have
fewen either beaten or oaffled.

IV. " If it be necessary to pass an army over a
large and rapid river, in presence of an enemy,
demonstrations should never be omitted— -provided
the extent of your own force will justify detaching."
That General Van Rensselaer had at this time a
redundant force, will be seen by his official report;
yet so far from assigning any portion of it to this
use, he was even careful so to distribute it as would
have completely counteracted this intention, had it
existed. Colonel Scott and his artillerists, were
called from the Falls, and Smyth and his brigade
from Black Rock— points, where, had they been
left, their presence would have kept at their posts,
the garrisons of Erie and Chippewa, and thus pre-
vented their co-operation in the defence of Queens-
town. *

V. « Every officer, charged with the direction of
a military enterprise, should, before commencing it,
assure himself that the means nee .roy for the
purpose, are provided and ready for u v. in this
case, it was different, as we have seen, that neither
boats, oars, nor pilots, had been assembled in suffi.
ient numbers; and, (what is still more extraor-

I See Appendix, No. 12.

NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1819.

119

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dinary) that no efficient means had been taken, for
ensuring the . ^^fety, or regulating the employment,
of such of fhese arti^'les aa liud been colh ted.

VI. " An ariny crossing a river in small detach-
ments and conseci'tively, exposes itself to be beaten
in detail, by an enemy much inferior to itself"—
another and important maxim, which, on this occa-
sion, was forgotten or disregarded.

VII. The place selected for crossing the river,
was ill-judged. " A sheet of eddies, from shore lo
shore," as described by the General, and conmiandt \
by two of the enemy's batteries, could not fail to
aggravate the evil of the preceding error ; and both
multiply and increase the difficultie inherent in the
operation, under circumstances the nost favorable.

VIII. The omission to ascertain previously to
the adoption of the project, the politi. al sentiments
of the militia on the question of invasi ui ; and that
of not promptly recalling the advanced corps, after
having ascertained that point, were er ors of great
magnitude. Both measures were em irely within
the General's power, and had they bi u adopted,
would either have prevented the enterpi se, or have
terminated it at a moment, when, by tli-; death of
Brock, and the flight of the enemy, we si ould have
had the credit of a victory, instead of th discredit
of a defeat. And lastly, nothing could b( more ill-
judged than the attempt made to withdraw the
corps, after it had lost its ascendency in the field ;
and when the means necessary for pas ing the
river, or of covering the retreat, no longer t xisted.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

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Blunders and faults like those we have been em-
ployed in narrating, could not fail to make a power-
ful impression upon public opinion. With such of
our population as had opposed the war, they became
a fruitful source of ridicule, and augury of future
and greater evils; and with those who had honestly
and zealously advocated it, of sorrow and humilia-
tion. These last mentioned feelings were not, how-
ever, unmingled with hopes, that a second campaign,
under better auspices, and more of preparation than
was permitted to the first, would redeem many of
its errors, and demonstrate that, though a peace of
thirty years might have obscured or blunted the
knowledge necessary for conducting, the war, it had
not utterly extinguished that spirit and aptitude for
miUtary enterprise, which so eminently characte-
rized the latter stages of the revolutionary contest ;
and which even now, began to display itself on the
ocean and the lakes.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

121

. './H

CHAPTER V.

First inveatment of Fort Meigs.-Dearbom and Chauncey's Expedi-
tion.— Reduction of York and Fort George.-Chandler's defeat and
capture on Stony Creek.-BcErsUer's defeat— Affair of Sacket's
Harbor,

With the exception of a few unimportant combats
on the St. Lawrence, between Forsyth's riflemen
and the garrison of Prescott,* the first military move-
ments of this year took place in the west. It will
be remembered that while Proctor, after defeating
and capturing Winchester, was hastening back to
Maiden, to escape the attacks of Harrison,*— this

1 On the 6th of February, Forsyth with two companies of the rifle
corps in sleighs, ascended tlie St Lawrence from Ogdensburg to
Ehzabeth on the Canada shore, surprised the British guard, made
fifty-two prisoners, (among whom were one Major, three Captains and
two Lieutenants,) hberated sixteen deserters, and made prize of one
hundred and forty muskets and a considerable quantity of ammunition,
without losing a man of his party. The British commander at Prcs-
cott, retaliated tJiis blow on the 22d, by a visit to Ogdensburg; drove
Forsyth out of the place (killing and wounding about twen'ty of his
corps, and capt^iring a nuantity of stores and provisions and six pieces
of artillery) with the loss of seven rank and file killed, and seven offi-
cers and forty-one privates wounded.

8 Proctor's reasoning on this occasion was sanctioned by military
rules. Could it be supposed, that tiie main body of an invading army
was so far in the rear of its advanced guard, as to be unable to sus-
tain It ? If not, the circumstances assumed by Proctor were exactly
those, in which Harrison ought to have been found on die 23d of
Januarv. 1813.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

last mentioned officer, from similar apprehensions of
his adversary, after setting fire to his stores, baggage
and defences at the Rapids, retreated hastily to
Portage river. The delusion under which this
movement was made, could not be of long duration,
and actually yielded to a few hours' reflection on
the many embarrassments, from which even victory
could not exempt the British commander; severity
of weather, roads rendered nearly impassable by
snow,^ ranks thinned by fatigue and battle, prisoners
to be guarded, wounded men to be taken care of,
and though last, not least, the imperative character
of Indian usages, which never fail to denirr d a
debauch, as the first and best reward of valor and
victory. Under the influence of these, and perhaps
of other considerations leading to the same conclu-
sion, General Harrison, on the evening of the 24th
of January, announced to the government, that " a
few days would enable him to resume and defend
the position he had left, against any thing Proctor
could bring against it." Advancing, accordingly,
on the 1st of February, he took post on the eastern
bank of the Miami ; and with a force amounting
nearly to two thousand men, began a fortified camp,
to cover the head of his intended operations.'*

Neither these movements, nor the objects at which

1 " From the depth of the snow, those on foot were soon exhausted "•
—HarrLm's Report of Winchester's defeat.

2 The General's late experience had taught him a lesson of pru-
dence. He had now, also, the benefit of Colonel Wood's presence
and advice.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

123

thev aimed, could be long unknown to the British
commander ; who, to defeat the latter, assiduously
employed himself in organizing a corps (British,
Canadian and Indian) which, judging from past
events, would be competent to the reduction of the
American camp, either by direct attack, or by inter-
cepting supplies, coming to its aid and necessary to
its support. Leaving Maiden, therefore, on the 22d
of April, and availing himself of his naval means to
cross Lake Erie, and ascend the Miami, he on the
26th, took a position on the western bank of that
river, and there began the construction of two or
more batteries. These being soon completed and
mounted, a fire commenced on the 30th, of sufficient
vivacity but of little effect, and so continued until the
4th of May, when a message from Brigadier Clay,
arriving about midnight, announced the near ap-
proach of twelve hundred Kentucky militia, coming
to the support of the garrison. Under this informa-
tion, the American General immediately determined
to risk a project of attack, suggested at once by
the dispersed state of the enemy's force, and the
incompetent protection given to his batteries. In-
stead, therefore, of allowing the re-enforcement to
form an immediate junction with the garrison, (as
Clay intended,) he directed that officer to debark
eight hundred of his brigade on the western side of
the river, with orders, " to turn and take the two
British batteries there, spike the cannon, destroy the
gun-carriages, and regain their boats as speedily as
possible ;" while, simultaneously with this move-

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

ment, " the remainder of the brigade should land
on the opposite shore, fight its way into the camp,
and thus favor a sortie to be made by the garrison
upon the third, and only remaining British battery."
This plan, no doubt, indicated military character,
(combination and enterprise,) and was only objec-
tionable from the confidence it reposed in a militia,
ignorant of the art of war, and likely from personal
habits, to be as insubordinate, as they were unskilful.
Still, trie first steps of the detachment were, if not
circumspect, particularly fortunate ; for neither its
landing, nor its approach to the batteries, was seen
or suspected by the enemy ; and so utterly uncov-
ered were their redoubts, that Colonel Dudley, the
officer commanding the enterprise, was able to make
himself master of two of them, without losing a
man. But here, good fortune and discretion alike
abandoned the Colonel and his followers ; for, in-
stead of confining their attention, as ordered, to the
destruction of the enemy's artillery, and the security
of their own retreat, they inconsiderately engaged
in a bush-fight with a few straggling Indians, who
thus contrived to amuse them, until Proctor had
time to interpose a strong corps between them and
their only means of retreat. The result was such
as may be readily imagined, partaking less of the
character of defeat, than of destruction ; for of the
eight hundred combatants, numbered in the morn-
ing, but one hundred and fifty escaped captivity or
slaughter, ^ The undetached portion of Clay's brig-
l Harrison's Report, dated May 5th, 1813.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

125

ade, (led by Colonel Boswell,) though resisted by
the savages, effected its object, with little of either
loss or annoyance ; while a detachment from the
seventeenth and nineteenth regular regiments, aided
by a few volunteers and militia, gallantly assaulted
and carried the battery on the eastern bank, made
a number of British soldiers prisoners, and handled
roughly, such Canadians and Indians as came to
its support.

Though, on the whole, the fortunes of the day
were such as furnished the enemy with pretensions
to a victory,' still the siege, in many of its circum-
stances, was marked by facts, which, whether con-
sidered separately or together, extinguished in the
British commander, every hope of eventual success.
No part of his calculations had hitherto been veri-
fied ; his batteries had not only failed to make any
serious impression on the American fort, but had
all, in succession, been wrested from him ; and were
at last, but partially recovered through an error of
his enemy not likely to be repeated. His allies,
also, were found to be incompetent to the service
assigned to them ; they neither did, nor could, so
invest the American camp, as to intercept or even
seriously impede the junction of re-enforcements ad-
vancing to its aid ; and at last, becoming weary of
a service, little adapted to their personal habits and
military usages, they no longer disguised their inten-
tion of speedily abandoning it. If to these motives

1 Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 14th June, 1813.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

for discontinuing the siege, be superadded the fact,
that information of General Dearborn's successful
descent at York, in the month of April, had already
reached the British camp, we cannot wonder, that
Proctor should deem it prudent to abandon all fur-
ther prosecution of his designs, and regain, as quickly
as possible, his position at Maiden.

But to this course, however expedient, physical
impediments had now arisen : his artillery being of
large calibre, could not be transported by land ; and
the wind blowing strong from the north, prevented
its movement by w^ater. To fill up the pause thus
made unavoidable in his operations, and to cover at
once the defeat of his general object, the retrograde
movement he now contemplated, and the apprehen-
sion excited by the probability of Indian desertion
and American attack, he h'ad recourse to negotiation.
The form given to this, was the blustering one em-
ployed against Hull — affected humanity, ridiculous
menaces, and insolent demands. Despatching a flag
on the evening of the 3th, he required the immediate
surrender of the American post and army, as " the
only means left for saving the latter from the toma-
hawks and scalping-knives of the savages." Har-
rison's answer to this proposition was sufficiently
manly and decided. Considering it unworthy of a
more serious notice, he but adverted to its folly, and
admonished Proctor, " not to repeat it," — thus leav-
ing to his adversary the choice of continuing the con-
test, or, failing to do so, of virtually acknowledging
his weakness or his fears. In making this election.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

187

Proctor did not hesitate long or seriously ; the tone
and object of his first message, were immediately
abandoned, and a simple proposition for an exchange
of prisoners, substituted in its stead. Bungling and
lil-disguised as these expedients were, they became
to the enemy, active and useful auxiliaries ; and
appear to have effectually concealed his real pur-
poses, until, « a change of wind and a general move-
ment in his camp," made them apparent to all. But
it was now too late to profit by the discovery ; at
twelve o'clock the whole • .rmament, with the excep-
tion of the Indians, (who had gone off on the 7th and
8th,) was found embarking and rapidly descending
the river.

Harrison's presence on the Miami being no longer
necessary, he now hastened back to Sandusky and
Franklintown, to organize the means indicated for
prosecuting his part of a new plan of campaign,
having for its objects —

1st. The reduction of Kingston and York on Lake
Ontario, and of forts George and Erie on the Ni-
agara ; and

2d. The capture of Maiden, and recovery of
Detroit and the Michigan Territory.*

In prosecution of the former, two modes of pro-
ceeding, differing as to time and means, were
prescribed to Major-General Dearborn. The one,
(founded on the supposition that Kingston might
not be accessible at that season of the year to the

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819.

approacliesof infantry and artillery,) made provision,
that the movement should not be attempted until the
navigation of the lake should cease to be impeded
by ice ; when, by a joint operation of the fleet and
army, Kingston, York, and fort George, should be
attacked in succession, and in the order in which
they are here named. The other, resting on the
contrary supposition, that no important impediment
arising from snow or ice would obstruct movements
exclusively military, directed, that the two brigades
wintering on Lake Champlain, and amounting to
twenty-five hundred combatants, should be placed
in sleighs, and moved under the command of Colonel
Pike, by the most eligible route and with the greatest
possible rapidity, to Kingston ; where (being joined
by such force as could be brought from Sacket's Har-
bor) they should, by surprise or assault, carry that
post, destroy the shipping wintering there, and sub-
sequently be governed by circumstances, in either
retaining the position or in withdrawing from it."

Though neither of the movements prescribed by
these views of the subject was objected to on the
ground of any great or unavoidable difficulty in its
execution,' some reports of the increased strength of
the enemy, and of an intention on his part to attack

1 General Dearborn's letters of the 18th and 25th of I-'ebruary. In
the former he says, " Nothing shall be omitted on my part, in endeav-
oring to carry into effect the expedition proposed ;» and in the latter
he adds, "Chauncey has not returned from New- York. I am satis-
fied that if he had arrived as soon aa I had expected him, vs'e might
have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ; but liis presence was
necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines."

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

129

Sacket's Harbor, got up by Provost ns a mere ruse to
conceal his own weakness and fear?,' were unfortu-
nately mistaken by both the Major-General and the
naval commander, as furnishing sufficient authority
for altogctlier dispensing with the movement pro-
posed to be executed by Pike ; and for so fur changing
the prescribed order of proceeding in the other, as to
make Kingston tlie last ol)ject of attack, instead of
making it the first.*

In prosecution of this inverted plan of campaign.
General Dearborn (embarking sixteen hundred rank
and file of the army) sailed from Sacket's Harbor on
the 25th of April, and on the 27th arrived off York,

1 Provost, alarmed for the safety of his western posts, prorogued the
legislature on the 22d of February, and set out hastily for Kingston.
That he brought no troopp with him, and even took from Prescott an
escort to protect him in what remained of his journey, are f;«cts well
ascertained. Yet was this, and ether similar movements, mistaken
for evidences of the mar^h westward of large re-enforcements. See
Appendix, Nos. 16 and 17.

2 " To take or destroy the armed vessels at York, will give us the
complete command of the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with
liim ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike; take
York, from thence proceed to Niagara and attack fort George by
land and water; while the troops at Buffalo cross over, carry forts
Erie and Chippewa and join those at fort George, and thence, collect
our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature
deUberation, the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and
myself, as tlie most certain of ultimate success."— General P'o^bom^a
qfficial letter to the War Department. PresidenVt Message, 31st Jan^
nary, 1814. To this change of plan the President gave his approba-
tion, from a belief, that " being on the spot, the General and Com-,
modore were most likely to be possessed of tlae information which
should govern in the case,"

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

the capital of Upper Canada and the headquarters
of General Sheafe. The d< /ences of the place were
few and feeble, composed of two or three earthen
redoubts, four hundred regular troops, an equal
number of embodied militia, and between forty and
fifty Indians.

Positions having been given to such of the armed
vessels as were destined to ^over the landins;-, and
take part in the attack of the batteries, the debark-
ation of the troops began about 8 o'clock, A. M.
Forsyth and the rifle corps, forming the head of the
column, were the first to make the experiment, and
after much effort effected a landing ; not, however,
as was intended, at the bite of the old French fort
Toronto, but at a point, more than a mile farther
westward, " thickly covered with brush-wood, and
already occupied by British and Indian marksmen."
In the contest that followed, FoiLvlh lost some men,
but no credit ; and being speedily sustained by Ma-
jor King and a battalion of infantry, and soon after
by the presence of General Pike and the arrival of
the main body, the enemy were driven from one po-
sition to another, and at last compelled to seek shel-
ter in their redoubts. Of these, the first approached
by the assailants, made little resistance ; as the oc-
cupants, perceiving the storm that awaited them,
made haste to abandon the work.* The second,
presented an aspect of more firmness ; but discon-

i The Grenadier company of the sixteenth, commanded by Captain
Walworth, was proceeding to the assault, when the redoubt waa
rbandoncd.

NOTICES OF THE WAR Ob 181:1.

131

diiuiiig its lire suddenly and entirely, Pike concluded,
and not unreasonably, that his untagonist, by so
acting, sought the means of making an overture of
surrender ; and in this belief, halted his troops at
the distance of sixty rods from the battery, when a
magazine exploding, burst on the head of the col-
umn, spreading its mischief far and wide ; killing
and wounding more than two hundred men, and
creating in the remainder, much temporary alarm
and confusion.'

Of this circumstance, Sheafe, the British comman-
der, was careful to avail himself. Collecting what
of his regular force remained, and leaving to their
own resources the civil authorities and embodied
militia, he began a hasty retreat in the direction of
Kingston. The assailants, w^ho in the meantime,
had re-established their order, and resumed their
march, were yet in a condition to have overtaken
the fugitives, but unfortunately, their gallant leader
had fallen a victim to the explosion ; the General-
in-chief, was yetonboard of the fleet ;« and Colonel
Pierce, who thus fortuitously became the command-
ing offiGer, being wholly uninstructed as to the orders
or views of either, permitted himself to be amused
by proposals for a capitulation, forbidden alike by the

» Sheafe asserts, that the explosion was the effect of accident ; and
states the loss sustained by the garrison in consequence of it, as a
proof of the fact

a Dearborn, in his letter of the 28th of April, says,—" I had been
induceJ *o confide the command of the troops in action to General
Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much
mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated."

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liil

.1 4

laws of war and the policy of the nnouiont ; and
thus gave time to Sheafe and his followers, not
merely to elfect their escape, but to destroy, as they
went along, a ship of war on the stocks, and a mag-
azine of military and naval stores in the harbor.

The defence of the town being no longer practi-
cable, a surrender necessarily followed, by which it
was stipulated, that the militia and others attached
to the British military and naval service, should be
paroled ; that private property of every kind should
be respected, and that all public stores should be
given up to the captors. These last, according to
the report of the General, consisted of an " innnense
depot of supplies, military and naval, and a sloop
of war repairing for service."^ The enemy's loss on
this occasion, amounted in killed, wounded and ta-
ken, to five hundred men ; that of the Uniled States,
in killed and wounded, to tliree hundred and twenty.

The first object of the expedition being thus ac-
complished, the troops were immediately re-embark-
ed, in the hope that they would be able to proceed
to the second and more important, without loss

1 Of this immense dep6t, we hear nothing further from the General,
excepting that "so great was its magnitude, that the fleet could not
carry the whole away," a fact the loss to be regretted, as wJiat they
did carry with them, was burnt with many other stores at Sacket's
Harbor, through a misconception of the naval oflScer having charge of
the magazines. Our trophies were fewer, but better taken care of. —
One regimental standard taken, was, (by some strange confusion of
ideas,) sent to the Navy department ; and one human scalp, a prize
made, as we have understood, by the Commodore, was offered, but not
accepted, as a decoration to the walls of the War Office.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1818.

133

of time ; hut. ihe wind becoming adverse, it was
not till the 8th of May, that they arrived off fort
George ; nor until the 27th, that they were suffi-
ciently prepared for the attack of that post.' At
four o'clocic, A. M . of this day, the batteriea on the
American aide of the Niagara being ready for action,
the means necessary for transportation provided, and
a considerable le-enforccnient of troo[>8 drawn from
Sacket's Harbor, — the army, (now amounting to
nearly six thousimd combatants,) began their move-
ment in boats, along the lake shore, to Two-Mik-
Run, the point designated for a general landing.
When abreast of this, they rested on their oars, till
the armed vessels had severally taken their covering
positions, and the signal had been given for descent ;
after which, resuming the movement, they pressed
vigorously forward to the shore. At nine o'clock,
the light infantry commanded by Colonel Scott,
effected a landing ; and being speedily supported by
Boyd's brigade, and a well-directed fire from the
shipping,' were soon enabled to surmount the bank,

[•'

1 This delay, was at one time ascribed by the General to some sins
of omission, on the part of Generals Lewis and Winder, — and at an-
other, to the late arrival of the fleet from York.

8 In Commodore Chauncey's report of this affair, he says, — " All
the vessels anchored within musket-shot of the shore, and in ten min-
utes after they opened upon the [water] batteries, they were com-
pletely silenced and abandoned." Again ; " The enemy, who had
been concealed in a ravine, now advanced in great force, to the edge
of the bank, to charge our troops, [when] the schooners opened so
well-directed and tremenJous a fire of grape and canister, that they
[tlje enemy] soon retreated from the bank."

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134

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

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break down the enemy's line in their front, and
compel its scattered parts to fly in the direction of
Newark and fort George.

On approaching these, Vincent, the British com-
mander, finding the former in flames, and the latter,
nearly if not altogether untenable, wisely determined
to hazard a retreat in the face of his enemy ; and
by thus deserting his post, multiply the chances of
saving his garrison. Fortunately for him, a contin-
gency of this kind, was neither provided for in the
original plan of attack, nor by any subsequent order
given on the field ; and would, perhaps, have en-
tirely escaped notice, had not Scott, from his advanced
position, made the discovery, and deemed it his duty,
to institute and continue a pursuit of five miles; not
merely without orders, but in evasion of such as
were given, until at last, a mandate reached him, of
a character so decided and peremptory, as, by leav-
ing nothing to discretion, could not fail to recall
him to fort George.

About the time of this last occurrence, the com-
manding General, who had now landed from the
fleet, received information, that Vincent, re-enforced
by the garrisons of Chippewa and Erie, and a battal-
ion of the eighth or King's regiment, had determined
to risk a second combat for the defence of the pen-
insula ; and that with this view, he had called in
the miUtia, and was pressing forward to occupy a
strong mountain-pass, called the Beaver Dams.

Though much of this information was unwar-
ranted, by any thing which had been seen of the

•:

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

135

numbers, condition, or order of the retreating troops,
and though directly contradicted by the report of an
officer of the American staff;* still, receiving as it
did the entire confidence of the General, an order
was issued « for renewing the pursuit at daybreak
of the 28th, in the direction of the Dams." Of this
movement, we need only say, that it resulted in dis-
appointment and mortification, — in disappointment,
because on approaching its object, Vincent was not
to be found ; and in mortification, because it was
now evident, that the report, on which the move-
ment was ordered, was a mere artifice employed
by the enemy, to put the army of the United States
on a wrong track, and thus enable Vincent to
anticipate them in the possession of Burlington
heights ; " a position," without which, according to
his own statement, « he could neither retain the
peninsula, nor make a safe exit from it."

Under circumstances thus distinctly indicating the
policy of the enemy, the American General could no
longer mistake his own. We accordingly find him
recalling the army, for the purpose of giving to their
efforts a new and better direction. One chance, he
eaid, yet remained — " embark the troops on board
tlie fleet, and (should the winds be favorable) they
will arrive at the head of Burlington Bay, before
the British can reach it ; and we shall then close
the campaign successfully." But to this arrange-

i Letter from Major Van de Venter, A. O. M. G. to the War De-
partment.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1819.

meiit, the assent of the naval commander was not
less necessary than his own ; and though on the
29th, the Commodore saw no objection to the plan,
he on the 30th, entirely changed his opinion ; and
instead of lending himself to a co-operation that
would in all probability have been successful, he de-
cided on a movement principally naval in its object,
and altogether useless in its effects.*

Deprived as the General now was of the aid of
the fleet, (which in his opinion furnished the last
remaining chance of excluding Vincent from the
heights of Burlington,) he was necessarily left to
choose between the inaction of a campaign merely
defensive on the strait, and the pursuit and attack of
the enemy amidst the mountain gorges and defiles,
in which they had wisely placed their safety. Of
these alternatives, he on the 1st of June, adopted the
latter, and accordingly despatched General Winder
with a single and small brigade, amounting, m all
arms, to somewhat less than eight hundred com-
batants, to give it execution. This officer, in the
progress of his march, was not long in discovering
that the enemy's force was more formidable than had
been supposed ; and very properly decided, to await
at Forty-Mile Creek, the arrival of such re-enforce-
ments as, on a representation of the preceding fact,
the General might think proper to send to his aid.'

t His object was the defence of his naval stores and the new ship then
on the stocks at Sacket's Harbor— but for the protection of neither
did he arrive in time. They were saved by Brown and the garason.

• Bums reports the whole force (after Chandler's arrival) at ona

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

137

On the 3d of June, Brigadier-General Chandler
brought up a second brigade; and understanding
that Vincent occupied a strong camp, eight miles in
his front, which he was every hour making stronger,
the new commander determined to shorten the dis-
tance between them, and bring him to action as
promptly as possible. The division was accordingly
put in motion in the direction of the British camp,
and Stony Creek passed by the American advanced
guard; between which and an out-lying British
picket, a skirmish, of short duration and little im-
portance, ensued. But as it was now sunset, the
General found it necessary to halt for the night ; and
proceeded accordingly to make the necessary dispo-
sition of the troops, for passing it in safety. Taking
the road as the centre of his line, he there placed his
artillery, supporting it on the right by the twenty-
fifth regiment, three companies of light infantry, and
one of riflemen ; and on the left, by the fifth, six-
teenth, and twenty-third regiments. Half a mile in
his front, was posted a strong picket, and similar
guards on both flanks and rear, with orders to send
out frequent patrols. In addition to these arrange-
ments, the thirteenth and fourteenth regiments, with
Archer's company of artillery, were stationed near
the mouth of Stony Creek, (for the better security
of the boats and baggage ascending the lake,) and

thousand three hundred men ; if, therefore, this report be correct, the
force originally sent did not exceed eight hundred, nor the re-enforce-
ment five hundred.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

in the rear of the whole, was posted the second
regiment of light dragoons.*

While Chandler was thus employed in securing
his camp, Vincent, who now saw that to retain his
present position (on which all his hopes of eventual
success depended) another battle must be fought,
was deliberating on the n>ode most proper for giving
it ; and having found by a careful reconnoissance,
inade early in the evening, that his enemy's camp-
guards were few and negligent ; that his hne of
encampment was long and broken ; that his artil-
lery was feebly supported, and several of the corps
placed too far in the rear to aid in repelling a
blow, rapidly and vigorously struck at their front, —
he wisely determined to hazard a night-attack, in
the hope of effecting by surprise, what he despaired
of being able to accomplish openly and directly.

In pursuance of this plan, the British column
(seven hundred combatants) began its march about
midnight ; and prosecuting it with great silence and
much general attention to order, it was able at three
o'clock in the morning to surprise and capture every
man of the American picket, without giving the
slightest alarm to the main body. Nor were its
subsequent movements less judicious, though fortu-
nately, much less successful. Selecting the centre
of the encampment for assault, two small demon-
strations (the one, made on the extremity of the right

I "This corps (the dragoons) lay at a considerable distance from
the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed dia-
gram." — General Lewises report, Hth of June.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

139

flank; and the other, on that of the rear guard) were
mistaken by Chandler and Winder for real attacks ;
and had the effect of producing such changes in the
disposition made of the American line,» as enabled
Hervey, at the head of the forty-ninth and part of
the eighth British regiments, to gain the rear of the
artillery, envelop a part of it, and make prize of some
pieces of ordnance, three tumbrils, and about c-<>
hundred prisoners— among whom were found the
two American Generals.

How much farther the mischief might have been
carried, but for one of those accidents common to
night movements, can only be conjectured. Vincent,
the British commander, quitting for a moment the
track of the column which he had liitherto followed,
lost his way ; and, as is not unusual in similar cases,
every effort to recover it, carried him further from
his object. It was not, however, until after Hervey's
attack had succeeded, that he was missed; when
(having been sought for without success) it was not
unreasonably concluded, that a fortune, similar to
that which had befallen Chandler, had awaited him.*
Hervey, finding himself in this new and unexpected
situation, prudently determined to make sure of the
trophies he had won ; and, accordingly, began his
retreat under cover of the night, leaving to his
enemy, the care of his wounded, the burial of his

1 "Hearing a firing in the rear, I instantly ordered Colonel Milton
with the fifth, to fonn in otir rear, near the woods.»'— Chandler's report.

« "He was found the next day, four nules from the scene of action,
without hat or horse." — Lewises Report.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

dead, and one hundred privates of the eighth and
forty-ninth regiments.

Though at daybreak, the American army was
found to have sustained some diminution of its nume-
rical force,' still, as this was not such as made retreat
either necessary or expedient, an order for renewing
the pursuit of the enemy, was both desired and ex-
pected — but as the capture of Chandler and Winder
had unfortunately devolved the command on an
officer of cavalry, having no confidence in his own
capacity for directing infantry movements,' a coun-
cil of war, to whom the question was submitted,
advised " the immediate retreat of the army to Forty-
Mile Creek, there to await the further directions of
General Dearborn."

This officer, who, from ill-health and other causes,
had uniformly committed the direction of field-opera-
tions to subordinate agents, seeing nothing in the
circumstances of the moment, to render necessary a
departure from his ordinary practice, satisfied his
sense of duty, by despatching to the army. General
Lewis and the sixth regiment, with orders to bring
the enemy to action, as promptly as possible.

This new commander reached his destination at
five o'clock, P. M., and found the troops encamped

1 The loss of the American anny in this action was small, " much
less than that of the enemy:'— Report of Colonel Burns.

s « Had either of the Generals remained in command, or, if Colonel
Burns had been an officer of infantry, the enemy would have been
pursued and cut up."— Dearborn's Report of June the Glhyto the War
Department,

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

141

on a plain, "at the foot of a perpendicular mountain
of considerable height," whence, at six o'clock, the
British fleet was discovered, shaping its course in
the direction of Vincent's post; — a circumstance,
forbidding, as the General believed, an immediate
movement upon that officer, and making it proper
that the American army should retain for the night
its present position. At daybreak, on the 8th, the
hostile armament was found "in a dead calm,"
about a mile from the shore, and abreast of the
camp ; while an armed schooner, towed forward to
a station favorable for the purpose, opened a fire on
the American baggage and boats, drawn up on the
beach. But a few discharges of hot-shot, soon con-
vinced the British commander, that the experiment
was not likely to turn out advantageously, and thus
hastened the recall of the schooner to the fleet.

It was under these circumstances, by no means
inauspicious to the eventual success of the expedi-
tion, that an order was received from General Dear-
born, directing the immediate return of the troops to
fort George ; from an apprehension, (founded on the
appearance of two British schooners apparently em-
ployed in examining the shore,) " that a serious
attack on that post was meditated by the enemy."
This ill-judged order was scarcely executed, when
it was found that the "minute examinations" made
by the British schooners, had an object very different
from that, which the General in his alarm, had as-
cribed to them. Having in an hour or two, suf-
ficiently ascertained, "that no American vessels,

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

remained in or near the mouth of the Niagara,'
they hastened back to their fleet ; which, after land-
ing the supplies and re-enforcement it had carried
to Vincent, repaired to the southern side of the lake,
and was there, (according to Provost's statement to
Lord Bathurst,) " usefully employed in intercepting
provision-boats, going to fort George."^

The tranquillity, which followed the preceding
alarm in the American camp, was unfortunately
permitted to become an absolute sleep of fourteen
days ; of which, the British commander was careful
to avail himself Advancing his main body (now
re-enforced by a battalion of the hundred and fourth)
to Forty-Mile Creek, he thence pushed forward a
party, under the command of Colonel Bishop, " to
seize and fortify such mountain passes, as would
best secure his own position ; and, at the same time,
so circumscribe the range of the American troops,
as to compel them to live on their own resources."*
In pursuance of these directions. Bishop began by
establishing two posts on the lake road, and one on
that of Queenstown ; the garrisons of which, with
the aid of preconcerted signals, could be readily
brought to sustain each other.

The American General, awakened at last by a
report of these encroachments, thought it expedient,
on the Q3d of June, to despatch Colonel Bosrstler, at
the head of six hundred men of all arms — dragoons.

I Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 3d of July, 1813.
i Idem.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812,

143

artillerists and infantry, to strike at the Stone House,
(one of tlie posts established by Bishop,) about two
miles beyond the Beaver Dams, and seventeen from
fort George. The result of the movement was such
as might have been foreseen. Boerstler was per-
mitted to reach the Dams without annoyance, but
having neither reserve to sustain, nor demonstration
to favor him, he was surrounded by enemies, to
whom (after three hours' useless fighting) he surren-
dered himself, and his party. ^

The reader will recollect, that before General
Dearborn thought ii safe to attack fort George, he
withdrew from the garrison of Sacket's Harbor, the
whole of Chandler's brigade, and six companies of
Macomb's artillerists, serving as infantry — the effect
of which, with the absence of the fleet, left the post
(important as it was) in a condition decidedly weak.
Provost, whose public duties brought him to Kings-
ton, about the time of this occurrence, was soon
made acquainted with it ; and believing that it fur-
nished a favorable occasion for retaliating the blows
sustained at York and fort George, and for perma-
nently settling the doubtful question of naval ascen-
dency on the lake, he hastened to organize an
expedition, having for its objects, " the capture of
the harbor and naval stores, and the destruction of
the new ship General Pike, then on the stocks."

Fortunately, the disposable force, under the direc
tion of this functionary, was, at that period, not

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1 For Bcerstler's detailed account of this affair, see Appendix, No. 24.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

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redundant ; and on actual muster, could be made
to amount to but seven hundred, rank and file.^
With this small force, a few artillerists and two
pieces of light ordnance, embarked on board of
small vessels and convoyed by the fleet, the British
commander-in-chief began his movement on th«
27th of May — "intending to reach the harbor in
the night, and at daybreak in the morning, to as-
sault and carry the place by surprise.'"* Retarded
by baffling or adverse winds, it was not until ten
o'clock, P, M. of the 28th, that he arrived within
striking distance of his object ; and then, under cir-
cumstances, which had entirely changed the rela-
tions as to force, previously existing between himself
and his enemy. Unable to make the movement
covertly, as he had expected to do, some of even his
first steps were discovered by the younger Chauncey;
who, while hastening back to his post, fired signals
of alarm — which, taken up by the guns of the fort,
and thus extended to the country, had the effect of
bringing together by mid-day of the 28th, six hun-
dred militia in aid of the garrison ; and with them,
a leader, both sagacious and intrepid, who, hke
Cincinnatus, was found at his plough.*

1 The detachments employed in the attack of Sacket's Harbor,
were, "one company of the one hundredth, one section of the Royal
Scots, two companies of the eighth, four of the one hundred and fourth,
two of the Voltigeurs, and one of Glengary light infantry, with two
six-pounders and their gunners."

a Bayne's Official Report, May 30th, 1813, and "Life and Services
of Sir George Provost"

• General Dearborn, commanding the district, Colonel Backus,

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

145

General Brown, the person of whom we speak,
having a perfect knowledge of the ground on which
he stood, was at no loss to discover the point at
which the enemy would attempt to disembark ; or
the route, by which, after landing, he would endea-
vor to reach the forts. His dispositions were made
accordingly; to the volunteers and militia forming
the first line, was assigned the duty of meeting and
repelUng the descent of the enemy from his boats ;
while midway between the shore and the village,
and on ground made difficult of approach by an ab-
batis, was placed the second line, composed of
regular troops,' amounting to four hundred com-
batants, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Backus.
Still further in the rear, were a few artillerists,
charged with the custody of the forts, which, in
the General's plan of defence, formed his dernier
resource.

Such was the disposition made of the small Amer-
ican force, when at daybreak of the 29th, the enemy's
fleet was seen in line, between Stony Point and
Horse Island ; and his troops, in small craft, covered
by gun-boats, making for the southern side of a
sandy ridge, thrown up by adverse currents, and
occasionally forming a causeway between the island

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senior officer of the United States troops at the Harbor, and Major
Swan, acting Adjutant-General, had previously united in urging
General Brown, a militia officer residing in the neighborhood, to take
the command, in the event of an attack on the post

1 Detachments from the first dragoons, ninth and twenty-third
infantry, and a few artillerists.

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146

NOTICES JF THE ^'AR OF 1819.

and the main land. To m* ot this movement,* the
volunteer regiment atationed on Horse Island, waa
promptly withdrawn, and made to take a position
on the shore, adjacent to tiiat occupied by the mi-
litia ; when orders were given to both corps, " to
conceal themselves as much as possible ; to reserve
their tire until the enemy's approach should enable
them to count his coat-buttons ; and, if driven from
their ground, to rally in the adjoining wood, attack
the enemy's flank, and, if imable to stop him, to
retire on the left and recir of Colonel Backus's posi-
tion, and there await further t.trders." Unfortunately,
no part of these directions ^^ as complied with. A
fire, much at randpm and ;^iven prematurely, was
followed by a flight, nearly ^eneral, of both parts of
the first line, and with such determination to avoid
new dangers, that every attempt at rallying either,
proved unsuccessful."

For this unmanly and unexpected conduct on
the part of the militia and volunteers, the General
found himself greatly consoled by the coolness and
courage of the regular troop?, who, though compelled
to abandon their first position, hastened to occupy

1 "It was my intention to have landed in the cove, formed by Horse
Island ; but on approaching, we discovered that the enemy were fully
prepared, with a very heavy fire of musketry, supported by a field-
piece. I therefore directed the boats to pull round to the other side of
the island, where a landins; was effected in good order, and with
little loss."— B«t/ne's Repm-t, jMay 30th, 1813.

s General Brown's official letter, of June 1st, 1813. The only ex-
ception to this conduct ni tiie militia and volunteers, was found in the
parties headed by Captains McNitt and Collins.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

147

another, which, in their \u\mh became iiDprognnble j
and soon hroii.irht ili<; British commander to the con-
clnsion, that "the reputation and interest of his
Majesty's arms, would be best promoted by an im-
mediate retreat."' Tliis was accordingly ordered
and executed ; Icavini^, as was his custom, his killed
and wounded on the field of battle, as new subjects
for the exercise of tlie humanity of his antagonist.
On this fortunate issue of a business, involving so
many high interests, and so little promising in the
outset, we fmd but one drawback— the burning of
the naval stores, storehouses and barracks — an effect
of false information, imprudently given and too has-
tily believed, by the officer charged with the custody
of these buildings.

The aflair of Sacket'^i Harbor was followed by an
attack of similar character and fortune, on Black
Rock; and which, 'hough having liule, if any bear-
ing i the progress or issue of the war, may, not-
withstanding, be entitled to a brief notice. Colonel
Bishop, commanding the elite of General Vincent's
division, encouraged as well by the diminished
strength, as the uniform inaction of the American
army, pushed his enterprise onward to the Niagara,

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» " At this point, the further 'nergies of the troops became unavail-
ing; the block-house and atockadod battery could not be carried by
assault, nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them.
Seeing no object within our reach, that could compensate for the loss
we were momently sustaining, I directed tlie troops to form on the
crest of the hill ; and from this position, we were ordered to re-embark."
—Bayne' RerwrL

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813.

and finding fort Erie without a garrison, hastened
to re-establish himself in that post. Being now
within sight of Black Roclc, and informed that it
was the depository of a considerable quantity of
public stores, he determined to make it a visit ; and
on the 11th of June, crossed the river at the head
of two hundred and fifty men, of the eighth, forty-
first, and forty-ninth regiments. The militia in
charge of the place, and nearly as numerous as the
enemy, being non-combatants,^ withdrew at his ap-
proach, and permitted him to execute his purposes
without hindrance or molestation. Having at last
accomplished his objects, spiked the heavy cannon,
carried off the light ones, loaded his boats with flour
and salt, and burned to the ground, both barracks
and block-houses, he withdrew to the shore, with
the intention of embarking himself and his party,
when he discovered, that he had yet, like Csesar at
Munda, to fight for his life.

A report of the predatory character of the expe-
dition, spreading rapidly through the country, had
the effect of assembling at Buffalo, about one hun-
dred and fifty United States infantry, as many militia
and a few Indians, who immediately set out to re-
capture the public stores, and punish the invaders
of the soil. For the first of these purposes, their
arrival was too late — the plunder having been al-

t An effect of the eastern doctrine (on the causes and character of
the war) industriously circulated in the northern and western frontiers
of New- York.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812

149

ready secured; but for the last, it was yet in good
time, and after a contest made as brief by the fall
of Bishop, as it had been vigorous while he lived,
the British party was compelled to fly to their oars
and recross the river; leaving behind them nine of
their number killed and fifteen wounded. At other
points, the enemy pursued his purposes with better
effect ; and at last, virtually reduced fort George
from a fortress, into a prison, with limits, little, if at
all exceeding the range of its cannon.

To account for a state of things so unexpected,
and falling so far ^hort of the promises held out by
the General and the naval commander, when they
began the expedition, we subjoin the following ex-
tract from an official despatch of the former, of the
20th of June. « From resignations, sickness, and
other causes, the number of regimental officers pres-
ent and fit for duty, is far below what the service re-
quires. A considerable portion of the army being new
recruits, and the weather very unfavorable to health,
the sick have become so numerous, in addition to
the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far
below what could have been contemplated. The
enemy have been re-enforced with about five hun-
dred men of the one hundred and fourth regiment ;
whence I conclude, that he will endeavor to keep
up such a plan, at, and near the head of the lake,
as will prevent any part of our force in this quarter
from joining, or proceeding to Sacket's Harbor, for
the purpose of attacking Kingston ; and such is the

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813.

of continual rains, as to render any operations against
the enemy extremely difficult, without the aid of a
fleet, for the transportation of provisions, ammunition
and other necessary supplies. Tiie enemy would
probably retreat on our approach and keep out of
our reach, being covered by one or more armed
vessels. The whole of these embarrassments have
resulted from a temporary loss of the command of
the lake." »

The accounts of the General's health, were not
more encouraging than that given of the condition
of the army. In a letter of the 4th of June, he says,
— " I am still very feeble, and gain strength very
slowly." June the 6th, " I never so severely felt
the want of health as at present ; a time when my
services might perhaps be most useful." June the
8th, "My ill state of health renders it extremely pain-
ful to attend to current duties, and unless it improves
soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some
place where my mind may be more at ease." June
the 14th, "General Dearborn, from indisposition, has
resigned the command, — not only of the Niagara
army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he
will ever again be fit for service."'* "As the Gen-
eral is unable to write, 1 am directed to inform you,
that in addition to the debility and fever he has been
afflicted with, he has, within the last twenty-four
hours, experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his

1 General Dearborn's letter to the War Department, of the 20th of
June, 1813.

2 General Lewis's letter of the 14th of June, to the Secretary of War.

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 151

It cannot be thought extraordinary, that under
circumstances so alarming, as well in relation to the
Oreneral as to the troops, an order should have issued
on the 6th of July, recalling the former from the
command of the district - and enjoining on his suc-
cessor, « not to prosecute any offensive operation,
until our ascendency on the lake was re-estaWished."

Remarks. We have seen that, by the plan of
campaign prescribed to General Dearborn, Kingston
was made the first object of attack ; after which (i(
successful) the army should proceed to the reduction
of York, fort George and fort Erie. This arrange-
ment, so far as regarded the order of attack, was
recommended by considerations the most decisive •
inasmuch, as the ^ tire of the first named of these
posts, would have involved that of the British fleet
(then frozen up in its harbor;) the entire separatior!
of Lower from Upper Canada ; the necessary fall of
all military and naval armaments within the latter,

1 Letter from Colonel Connor, Aid-decamp of General Dearborn,
of June the 12th, to the Secretary of War.

2 TWs act of the Executive autliority, originated with that portion
Ot the Houae of Representatives most active and influential in support-
ing the war ; who, believing that habitual ill-health on the part of the
General, disqualified him from such a discharge of his duty as the
exigencies of the seiVice required, deputed Messrs. Clay and In<.ersoll
to represent Uieir views on the subject to the President. Mr. Monroe
became the medium of communication between these gentlemen, and
Mr. Madison, coinciding in their opinion, soon after directed the Gen-
eral's recall.

152

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

and a speedy termination of the Indian war in the
west— advantages not to be expected from the most
successful operations against York, fort George, or

fort Erie.

Nor will it appear that on receiving this order, the
General put a different estimate on the practicability
of the project, or on the value and importance of the
objects it presented. In his letter of the 18th of
February, he says—" Nothing shall be omitted on
my part, in endeavoring to carry into effect the ex-
pedition proposed ;" and in that of the 25th he adds,
"Chaunceyhas not yet returned from New- York ;
if he had arrived as soon as I expected him, we
might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ;
but his presence was necessary for having tlie aid
of the marines and seamen."^ Unfortunately, this
coincidence of views between the government and
the General was of short duration. On the 3d of
March, be became " satisfied, on information, (as he
declared,) entitled to full credit, that a force had been
collected from Quebec, Montreal and Upper Canada,
of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston; and
that an attack would be made on Sacket's Harbor
within forty-eight hours, perhaps sooner." Again,
on the 9th, (though then entertaining doubts whether

1 What an extraordinary reason to be given by the commanding
General of an army and district, (of which Sacket's Harbor made
a part,) for omitting to execute an order directly emanating from tho
President of the United States ! Did Mr. Chauncey leave tlie fleet
without a commander de facto ? And if not, what rendered his au-
thority over seamen and marines less efficient than that of the Com-
modore.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1819.

153

Provost would hazard an attack,) he announces to
the government, that "this unexpected movement
of the enemy, would effectually oppose the measures
contemplated on our part." And in conformity with
this^ desponding view of the subject, a council of war,
held on the 1 5th of March, decided, that - no attempt
upon Kmgston should be made before the naval force
could act ;» or, in other words, before the lake was
navigable ;--a decision, which, besides puttino- an
end to Pike's expedition on the ice, gave to Provost
all he wanted-an entire month to strengthen his de-
fences, and a thaw, to restore Yeo and his fleet to their
ordinary activity and usefulness. After thus demol-
ishmg the most important part of the plan of cam-
paign. It was not to be expected that what remained
of It would be treated with more ceremony « To
take," says the General, «or destroy the armed ves-
eels at York, will give us the complete command of
the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him
ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by
Pike ; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara
and attack fort George by land and water, while the
troops at Buffalo cross over and carry forts Erie and
Chippewa and join those at fort George, and then
collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston
After the most mature deliberation, the above was
considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as
the most certain of ultimate success.^'^ "

I Of this plan, we have the following estimate by General Pike
and other. "The opinion of General Pike, founded on a knowledge

01 (jreneral Dearhnm'a infpnHf-'i > c ^ • .. *=

ifuenacu luuvemwiis, is, mat our country ia

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

ii:

It will not be easy, perhaps impossible, to give any
sufficient reason for the course thus recommended,
and eventually adopted, by the two commanders. If
they continued to believe, that Provost had assem-
bled from "six to eight thousand men at Kingston,
for the express purpose of attacking and destroying
Sacket's Harbor," as stated by the General in his
despatch of the 3d of March — what could justify a
project on their part, which would necessarily ab-
stract a large portion of the military and the whole
of the naval force, from this menaced point ? If, on
the other hand, they had ceased to give credit to a
fable so absurd, (which is most probable,) and had
returned to the opinion, that " the garrison of Kings-
ton was weak,"^ why not return also to the intention
of carrying the attack on that important post, and
thus have fulfilled the original plan of campaign 1

It now but remains for us to show, that the infor-
mation taken by the General as the guide of his
opinions and conduct on this occasion, was wholly
unfounded. Our proofs on this head are, I. "That
Provost, on arriving at Prescott, borrowed from that
post an escort of soldiers, to prevent his being kid-
napped on his way to Kingston"* — a fact, utterly in-

again doomed to defeat, if the operations now meditated by the Gen-
eral are attempted to be accomplished. The opinion is also prevalent
with the best officers, that no conquest of character will be made, if
your plans of invasion be subject to the continual wavering of the
commanding General." — Letter from Major Van de Venter, D. Q.M. G.,
of the SUt March, 1813, to the Secretary of War.

1 General Dearborn's letter of the 14th of February, 1813.

8 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. JOl.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

155

consistent with the story of his having brought with
him, large detachments from Quebec and Montreal ;»
2d, that Proctor, Barclay, Vincent, and Sheafe, so far
from being in a condition to yield any aid to the
supposed project of an attack on Sacket's Harbor,
were themselves in great want of re-enforcements—
the former, postponing on that account, an attack
which he had been ordered to m ke on Perry's fleet,
while fitting out at Presque Isle ;« 3d, that when late
in the month of May, the British commander-in-chief
(mdured by the continued absence of the American
fleet and army at the head of the lake) made an
attack on Sacket's Harbor, he was unable to bring
agamst that post, more than seven hundred combatants,
—a conduct, utterly unaccountable in an old soldier'
having at his disposition a corps of either six or eight
thousand men ; 4th, that the maximum of the British
regular force at Kingston, in 1813, was one thousand
men— a fact ascertained by the late Major-General
Brown during the war, and subsequently, on a visit to
that place.^ And lastly, that Sheafe's papers, taken
at York and examined by the late Colonel Connor,
Aid-decamp to General Dearborn, « showed satisfac-
torily, that the garrison of Kingston, during the winter
and spring of 1813, was weak, and much below the
force necessary to its defence.''*

1 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 101.

2 Letters of Prevost and De Rottenburg to Proctor and Barclay.
Appendix, No. 19. ^

8 Appendix, No. 16.

< Appendi.x, No. 17.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

II. The error next in date, as well as in magni-
tude, was that of omitting to make any competent
provision for preventing the escape of the two British
garrisons, the one from York, the other from fort
George ; an object, which, had it been accomplished,
would have given us a complete command of the
peninsula, and necessarily prevented those blunders
and misfortunes, the occurrence of which, so com-
pletely verified the prediction of the much and justly
lamented Pike.

Had the commander-in-chief in the first of the
above mentioned cases, been on the field of battle or
near it, or had he made Colonel Pierce acquainted
with the orders given to Pike, (as he ought to have
done,) the unnecessary delay made in the pursuit of
the enemy would not have occurred ; and in this
case, Sheafe and his followers would, in all proba-
bility, have been overtaken and captured. Again,
in the other case, if, instead of concentrating his
whole force, naval and military, on the water-side
of the enemy's defences, he had divided the attack,
and made Chandler's brigade, Macomb's regiment,
and Burns's cavalry, with a few pieces of artillery,
cross the Niagara below Lewistov^rn, and advance
on fort George by the Queenstown road, the invest-
ment of that place would have been complete, and
a retreat of the garrison impracticable. That this
important duty should have escaped the General's
notice is the more extraordinary, as the Secretary of
War, in a letter of the 15th of May, 1813, had suf-
ficiently apprised him of what would be the obvioua

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

157

policy, and probable conduct of bis adversary, should
he find himself compelled to choose, between giving
up his fortress, or saving his garrison.*

III. To correct the preceding error, the army
was ordered to march on the 28th, to the Beaver
Dams, in the belief that Vincent, after calling in his
outposts, would make a stand at that point ; but,
unfortunately, though the pursuit was right, the
direction given to it was wrong. Of the two routes
in the General's choice, that known by the name of
the Lake-road, would have placed him two miles in
Vincent's front ; and would of course, have compelled
that officer (had he committed the blunder ascribed
to him) to fight a battle, with a force greatly supe-
rior to his own, when, on the contrary, if approached
by the Queenstown route, a direct and uninterrupted
retreat would have been left open to him.

IV. The effect of this false movement, besides
unnecessarily trying the strength and patience of the
troops, was the loss of tw^o entire days to the pur-
suit. Two others (the army being now recalled
to fort George) were given to the consideration of
some expedient, which should best indemnify us for
the time and labor thus thrown away. The Gene-
ral's own wish, was to avail himself of the fleet, to
carry the army to Burlington Bay ; but the high
destiny of that arm, on this, as on a later occasion,
gave it a different and less useful direction. Left,
therefore, without a choice of measures, he at last
adopted one, (a march on the enemy by the Ljike-

1 AppendLt, No. 18.
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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

road,) which ought to have been taken at daybreak
of the 28th. But here, the General defeated the
wisdom of his own decision by the means employed
to execute it ; for, instead of sending a force com-
petent to the service required, he on the 1st of June,
under some extraordinary delusion, despatched only
a single and small brigade to combat a force, which,
according to his own estimate on the 28th of May,
required the pi* sence and co-operation of nearly the
whole army.

V. Doubting, at last, the sufficiency of Winder's
brigade, the General on the 3d of June, despatched
a second, which, with its precursor, reached Stony
Creek in the evening of the 5th, when it was de-
cided that the army should halt for the night.
Chandler, who was now the leader of the enter-
prise, finding himself but six miles from the enemy,
concluded, and not unreasonably, that if Vincent
intended to give battle, he would make the attempt
during the ensuing night; and under this impres-
sion, hastened to call into exercise all his general-
ship to meet that contingency. Pickets were ac-
cordingly placed in front and rear, and on both
flanks ; while a chain of sentinels encircled the
camp. Yet, with all these precautions, the camp
was surprised, a portion of its artillery taken, and
one hundred prisoner- made, among whom, were
the two Brigadiers. A misfortune like this, mus*
have had a cause, or causes, worth inquiring into ,
with regard to which, we offer the following sug-
gestions : — •

NOTICES OP THE WAK OF 1812.

Ist. « If a General take a position in the neigh-
borhood of an enemy, from whom a niglit-aftack
may be expected, his fir^i care oncrht to he, to keep
his force together, and so pUiced, that its several
parts may be promptly brought to sustain each
other." This maxim does not appear to have been
eufliciently attended to. The thirteenth and four-
teenth regiments, composing the boat and baggage
guard, w re stationed three miles from the encamp-
ment; and the cavalry so placed as to be unable to
act.i Wliy the position given to the boat-guard,
had not been taken as the ground of encampment
for the whole detachment, is not very apparent ; for
here, besides the advantages of concentration, the
General would have found himself three miles nearer
his object ; on the very route, by which he intended
moving in the morning; and with flanks and rear,
well secured by the lake and the creek, against the
night-attack he expected.'*

2d. " It is not enough that patrols and pickets
be established againsi night-attacks. These parties
should be frequently visited by the General himself,
or by some one- of his stnff, who will be careful to
enforce the orders already giv^n, or issue new ones
accommodated to such change of circumstances as
may have arisen in the case." Had such a super-
vision been exercised on the present occasion, it is
quite impossible, that an entire picket would have

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I Bums's Report to General Dearborn.

* Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the 18tli of June.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

been caujrht asleep on its post; or that fires, ordered
to be extinguished in the evening, should liuve been
found burning at daybreak.'

3d. " In night operations, when the eye can do
little, false attacks may be mistaken for real ones —
but even in this case, the ear of a practised soldier
cannot long be deceived — for if the onset be neither
vigorous nor extended, it may at once be considered
as false." Vincent's demonstrations were of this
kind, few and feeble ; and making no serious im-
pression but upon the two Generals — who, mistaking
them for the main attack, dre^\ off the fifth regi-
ment from the centre of the line, and thus left the
artillery unsupported.

4th. The next blunder in this comedy of errors,
must be ascribed to Burns, on whoni the command
of the army had devolved, in consequence of the
capture of Chandler and Winder. When, at day-
break, this officer was called to exercise his new
functions, he found, as he tells us in his official
report, that " all the views of the enemy had been
completely frustrated ; himself obliged to fly, leaving
the field of battle covered with his dead and wounded,
and more than seventy men, principally of the forty-
ninth, made prisoners :" while, on the other hand,
the troops of the United States had suffered little
loss, were in perfect order, and entirely in condition,
had not both Generals been taken, to have pressed
Vincent to a second combat, the issue of which.

i Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the IStli of Junet.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819.

let

would not have been doubtful. Yet, in despite of
all these discoveries, our modest cavalier (from sheer
diffidence in his own capacity to direct infintry
movements) refused to avail himself of the advan-
tages he possessed, and, instead of 1< nger pursuing
the objects of the expedition, turned his bacit at
once on Vincent and victory, and hastily nMired to
Forty-Mile Creek ; thus practically contradicting
his own official statements, and giving to the affiiir
of Stony Creek, the nsw and unmerited cliaructv-i of
a pos live I'ofeat on our part.

5t i. But 'ittle more mismanagement was now
wanth o, to Jake the campaign of 1813, as much a
subject of ridicule at home, and contempt abroad,
as that of the preceding year. Nor had we long to
wait for such new instances of misconduct, as could
not fail to produce this degrading eflect. On the
6th of June — the day on which Burns was flying,
when none pursued — an order was received from
the commander-in-chief, recalling without loss of
time, the whole army to fort George, and virtually
abandoning all tlie objects of the campaign. Nor
was even this ill-judged movement executed, with-
out a disorder which entailed upon it, the loss of
" twelve boats, principally laden with the baggage
of the army."'

These events were soon known and justly appre-
ciated by the British commander, who, advancing
as we retreated, was willing on the 20th of the

\. *

1 General Lewb's Letter of the 14th of June, 1813.

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162

NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1813.

month; to hazard the elite of his army (about five
hundred combatants) within stroke of his adver-
bary.* Every just view of this circumstance, indi-
cated the wisdom of immediately assailing this corps ;
the capture, or destruction of which, would have
effectually defeated the present views and future
operations of Vincent. But unfortunately, though
the General adopted this opinion, he altogether
failed, as in other cases, in the employment of
means, proper for giving to the experiment a suc-
cessful issue. Instead of placing, as he ought to
have done,^Scott and Miller at the head of fifteen
hundred men each,' and moving them by a night-
march and the shortest route on De Coos's station,
he despatched Bcsrstler (an oflScer not distinguished
by any prior service) with five hundred and forty
effectives only, by the Queenstown road, in open
day, without reserve or demonstration of any kind,
either to sustain the attack, or cover the retreat !'

i The Stone House, called De Coos's station, was seventeen miles
from fort George.

s The effective strength of General Dearborn's army, amounted at
thii time, to three thousand five hundred combatants.

rt.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812»

163

CHAPTER VI.

■jf.

Mil

Second investment of Fort Meigs.— Gallant defence of Fort Stephen-
son.— Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie.- Capture of Aro-
herstberg.— Recapture of Detroit and the Michigan Territory.- Har-
rison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor.- Arrival of a part of the
Western Army on the Niagara.

Alarmed by the reports in circulation of Perry's
progress in building and equipping armed vessels at
Presque Isle, Proctor and Barclay, early in the spring,
projected an attack on that post ; but for this pur-
pose, an augmentation of their several means was
deemed indispensable. The General, accordingly,
called for a re-enforcement of regular infantry, and
the Commodore, for an additional number of practised
seamen; but though the enterprise was promptly ap-
proved by Provost, and entirely conformed to views
previously given by him, so weak at the moment
was the British central division on Lake .Ontario,
that an immediate compliance with either branch
of the requisition was impracticable ; nor was it till
about the 10th of July, that "sixty seamen and four
hundred infantry" could be sent to the division of
the west.^

In the meantime, to avoid a state of inaction, and

1 K>ss tetters of Pfovost and De Rottenburg, Appendix, No. 20.

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812.

to give employment, in particular, to a great mass
of restless Indians, which had been assembled at
Maiden in March and April, Proctor began the cam-
paign with a demonstration on fort Meigs, from which
he expected the following results; 1st, That Clay,
and his garrison, made up of insubordinate militia,
might be provoked or seduced to quit their intrench-
ments, and take the risk of a field-fight with him and
Tecumseh ; and 2d, that by seriously alarming Har-
rison (then at Lower Sandusky) for the safety of
his outpost and stores on the Miami, that officer
would be induced to march to their defence ; and
thus losing the power of sustaining fort Stephenson,
Cleveland and Presque Isle, render certain and easy
the capture of those places.^

With these views, the British commander began
his movement at the head of a force, regular, militia
and Indian, amounting to four thousand combat-
ants ;^ with which, on the 22d of May, he appeared
before fort Meigs. But perceiving early, that his
stratagem in relation to that place, was not likely to
succeed, and that what remained of his plan might
be jeoparded by delay, he on the 28th, raised his
camp ; sent back a part of his allies to Maiden, de-
tached another and larger portion to watch and way-
lay Harrison, and with the residue of his force, white
and red, hastened to the attack of Lower Sandusky.
Nor could circumstances more propitious be imag-
ined, than those under which he found this nominal

1 See letters of Provost and De Rottenburg, Appendix, No. 19.
S Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 117.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

165

fortress, — injudiciously placed and badly constructed,
neither finished nor furnished, and even stripped of a
part of its ordinary armament, — with a small garrison
not exceeding one hundred and fifty men, under
orders to retreat, "should the enemy approach in
force and with cannon, provided a retreat should then
be practicable.^^

Fortunately for the credit of the American arms,
the first step taken by Proctor was that of isolating
the fort by a cordon of Indians; thus rendering the
retreat of the garrison highly perilous, if not imprac-
ticable, and leaving to the commander a choice only
between submission and resistance. In making" this
selection, the young and gallant Crorhan did not
hesitate ; «rjd to the demand of a surrender, enforced
by the usual menace ' indiscriminate slaughter in
case of refusal, he answered substantially, — that the
defence of his post was a point of honor, which could
only be satisfied by an actual experiment of the rela-
tive force and fortune of his antagonist and himself.

While this negotiation was in progress. Proctor
was employed in landing his artillery and giving it
a position in aid of his gun-boats ; from which, on
the delivery of Croghan's answer, a heavy fire was
opened and continued on the fort, with little if any
intermission during the night. At daybreak, a second
battery of three six-pounders was established within
two hundred and fifty yards of the pickets ; and about
four o'clock, P. M., it was found that the whole fire
of the British cannon, was concentrated on the north-
west corner of the fort — a circumstance, sufficiently

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NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

indicating the point and species of attack meditated
upon it. Major Croghan, accordingly, hastened to
employ such means as he possessed to strengthen
the menaced angle,* and had barely executed his
purpose, when the enemy (covering himself with
smoke) was seen rapidly advancing, and but a few
paces distant from the pickets. A general and well-
directed fire of musketry from the garrison, which
immediately followed this discovery, had the effect
of checking his progress and considerably disturbing
his order ; but the latter being speedily restored, the
movement was resumed, and the ditch reached and
occupied by the head of the column. It was at this
critical moment, that Croghan's single piece of artil-
lery, charged with grape-shot and so placed as to
enfilade the assailants!?, opened its fire and with such
effect, that in a few minutes, the combat was virtu-
ally ended and the battle won.'' Most of the enemy
who had entered the ditch, were killed or wounded ;
and such of them as were less advanced and able to
fly, sought safety in the neighboring woods — carry-
ing with them no disposition to renew the attack,
and strongly impressing their Indian allies with their
own panic. Proctor now saw, that all attempts to
rally the fugitives were hopeless ; and that to avoid
a greater calamity,^ his most prudent course would

1 Bags of flour and sand.

2 The cannonade and bombardment lasted thirty-six hours.

* A fear that Harrison would quit his camp at Seneca, and pounce
upon him in his then crippled state. It is worthy of notice, that of
these two commanders, (always the terror of each other,) one, was

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813.

167

be, to re-embark what could be collected of his force,
red and white, and return immediately to Maiden.
His retreat began accordingly at three o'clock in
the morning, leaving behind him a note, recom-
mending to American humanity the burial of his
dead and the care of his wounded.

The enemy's movements not immediately requir-
ing further attention from General Harrison, he now
became actively and exclusively occupied, in bring-
ing together such militia, in aid of the regular troops
assigned to his command, as was deemed competent
to the objects of the campaign. To this service, the
popular and patriotic Governors of Kentucky and
Ohio lent themselves freely and successfully ; and
by the 15th of September, the army collected on the
southern shore of Lake Erie, and destined to a new
invasion of Canada, amounted to more than seven
thousand men.

Nor was the naval and auxiliary armament con-
structed at Erie, more tardy in its movements. On
the 2d of August, the vessels were brought over the
bar; and on the 5th, were in condition to offer battle
to the enemy's fleet. This challenge being declined,
a second experiment, made with the same view on
the 7th, had a similar result. It was, however, soon
found, that Barclay's hesitancy had not arisen from
any settled purpose of avoiding a combat, but merely
to supply a defect in the necessary preparation of his

now actually flying from his supposed pursuer ; while the other, waited
only the arrival of Croglian at Seneca, to begin a camp-con fkgration,
and flight to Upper Sandusky.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

ships. At sunrise of the 10th of September, he was
seen bearing down from Maiden in the direction of
Put-in Bay, whither Perry hastened to foliow and to
fight him.

The relative force of the two flee is, was not v/idely
different — that of the Bniish, was composed of two
ships, two schooners, one brig, and one sloop, car-
r5ang sixty-riiree guDs (twelve, eighteen and twenty-
four-pounders) with five hundred and eleven seamen
and marines ; while tiiat of siie United Slates, con-
sisted of three brigs, two scijooner-, and four sloops,
mc'Un(ing fifty-four carronades, and manned by four
huudred seamen and marines.^ In command of
iht fojiiter, was a distinguisiied veteran of the Nel-
son school, to whom all the secrets, real and pre-
tended, of naval tactics, musl have been intimately
known ; while, at the head of the latter, was a
youth "whose home had long been on the deep" —
glowing with patriotism and courage, but having
no experimental knowledge of battles fought in
squadron.

As if in some degree, to compensate this and
other points of disparity, the wind, which early in
the morning blew from the south-west, shifted to
the south-east, and gave to the American fleet the
weather-gage. Availing himself of this advantage,
perhaps with too little attention to the sailing qual-
ities of his smaller vessels. Perry, at a quarter before
twelve, placed the Lawrence in a position to begin

1 'McAjik.^'i Ilwtor/.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

169

an action, which, for pertinacity and effect, will
rank high in the annals of naval warfare. Finding,
after an experiment of ten minutes, that the distance
he had taken was better adapted to his enemy'a
guns than to his own, he made sail ahead ; soon
after which, to his great mortification, "the brig
became unmanageable — every brace and bowline
being, in the meantime, shot away." Yet in this
crippled condition, she gallantly " sustained the
contest for more than two hours," ai canister dis-
tance ; when ■* every gun she had, being rendered
useless, and a large portion of her crew killed or
wounded,"' her commander transferred himself and
his flag on board the Niagara, which, at this critical
moment, a gust of wind had brought to his aid. A
movement was now wanting that should give to
the conflict a decided character and favorable issue ;
and this. Perry hastened to employ. At forty-five
minutes past two, the smaller vessels having got
into line, the signal for close action was made ;
when the Niagara, bearing up and passing the
Detroit, Queen Charlotte and Lady Provost, at half
pistol-shot distance, poured into them a most de-
structive fire from her starboard guns ; and from her
larboard battery another of equal execution, on the
Chippewa and Little Belt. What yet remained to
be done, was soon accomplished by the gun-boats,
under the skilful direction of Captain Elliot ;* the

%-'^fi

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I '

I Perry's official letter, dated September 13th, 1813.
S Idem.

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170

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

flags of the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Lady
Provost, were struck in quick succession ; those of
the brig Hunter and schooner Chippewa, were not
slow in following the example ; and the Little Belt,
which now attempted to escape, was promptly pur-
sued and soon captured. Such was the termination
of this well-fought and decisive battle — brilliant in
itself, having the most important bearing on the
issue of the campaign, and requiring nothing to
complete its glory, but the humble and pious grati-
tude with which it was announced.

The road to Maiden being no longer obstructed
by the enemy, the commanding General now has-
tened to avail himself of the first impression made
on Proctor by this naval victory. Embarking the
army on the 27th, he on that day sailed under con-
voy of the fleet for the Canada shore ; which, from
the favorable state of the wind and weather, he
was enabled to reach at three o'clock, P. M. No
enemy appearing to interrupt the debarcation, it was
safely and promptly made, and the march continued
to Amherstburg, where the troops bivouacked for
the night.

It was here, that General Harrison first learned,
that Proctor, after dismantling Maiden, burning the
barracks and navy-yard, and stripping the adjacent
country of horses and cattle, had early on the 26th,
began his retreat into the interior of the province.
Though no time was lost in resuming the pursuit in
the morning, still, reasoning from the urgency of
Proctor's motives for a speedy flight, and the ample

'' f |H

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

171

means he possessed for executing it successfully, the
movement was made without the smallest hope that
the American army could, by any cHbit, be able to
overtake him.» This desponding view of ihe busi-
ness, which, had it continued longer, would no doubt
have verified itself, was fortunately much dimin-
ished, if not entirely removed, (soon after the arrival
of the army at Sandwich,) by finding, that the want
of horses, which, in the General's opinion, rendered
the pursuit hopeless, would be well and abundantly
supplied by Johnson's mounted regiment, which
was now seen winding its way along the opposite
bank of the Detroit.*

Two days were now employed in re-establishing
(he civil government of the Michigan Territory, and
assigning to it a defensive corps ; in organizing a
portion of the army for rapid movement, and in
giving to the whole of it an order of march and
battle. It was not, therefore, until the 2d of Octo-
ber, that the pursuit was resumed, nor until the 5th,
that the enemy was overtaken. On this day, he
was discovered in a position skilfully chosen, in
relation as well to local circumstances, as to the
character of his troops. A narrow strip of dry

1 General Harrison's letter to the Secretary of War, dated Septem-
ber 27th, 1813. In this letter, the General says— "I will pursue the
enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of overtaking him ;
as he has upwards of one thousand horses, and we have not one in
the army."

« This corps had been organized by direction of the War Depart-
ment, for frontier defence, in the spring of 1813, under the command
of Colonel R. M. Johnson.

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812.

ground, flanked by the Thames on the left, and by
a swamp on the right, was occupied by ])is regular
infanti'- noimting to eif^ht hundred bayonets, sus-
tainid >*y aiuiiery: while on the right flank, lay
Tecnaiseh and his followers, on the eastern mai in
of the swamp. After satisfying himself of these
facts, General Harrison hastened to make such dis-
position of his fo.ce, as, in his opinion, was best
accommodated to the case. To Trotter's brigade of
Kentucky volunteers, was assigned the front line,
extending from the swamp to the road near the
bank of the river. One hundred and fifty yards in
the rear of Trotter, King's brigade formed a second
line, of similar extent; and in the rear of King,
Child's brigade was held in reserve. On the left
of Trotter and covering his flank, Dei^ha's division,
composed of two brigades, was posted in crotchet
or en potence — while to the mountr I gun-nr> i, was
assigned the duty of turning the right flank of the
Indian position.

This arrangement was scarcely announced, when
two i'nporttint circ instances, which had either not
been uitended tout all, or very negligent % were
now fully ascertained ; the one, that the service
assigned to the mounted regiment, was impractica-
ble, from the miry character of the soil, md the
number and clr enesp of the thicke's which cov-
ered it ; the otj •, at Proctoi had neglected to
strengthen the i. n v. his positit > with eiilier ditch
or abbatis ; and had )esides, comuiUted the i^reater
fault, of giving to his regular infantry a formatio-

JTICE8 OP THE WAR OP 1813.

17S

of open order. Acting on this state of things, which
left no doubt of the true point of attack, or of the
means most proper to be employed in making it,
the mounted corps was now ordered to form in close
column in front of the volunteer? , to advance ob-
liquely in the direction of the British inf ntry, and
after receiving their fire, to charge them at full
speed. On examining the ground directed by the
preceding order to be taken, the space was found
to be too narrow for a useful employment of the
whole regiment; when Colonel Johnson, in the
exei\ .de of a discretion wisely left to him, separated
the two battalions of which it was composed ; giv-
ing to the one, the execution of the projected charge
on the British infantry, and to the other, a simul-
taneous attack on the Indian line. Of the two
corps, the second battalion, "in four columns of
double files," had advanced but a short distance,
when it received the enemy's fire ; which, as might
have been expected from men and horses unpractised
in war, and brought for the first time into actual com-
bat, produced a recoil in the heads of the columns.
The disorder was, however, soon and completely
relieved, and a second ^re sustained, with the sang
froid of veterans ; when charge, as directed,

wa? promptly and vigorously made, and with a suc-
cess, sp 'lorn equalled and never surpassed. In " the
Bing^*^ u mute of ime" which it occupied,* the vic-
tory of the dnv we ^ essentially won, and nearly the

t Harn a*8 Official Report of the action.

IS-

Ill

174

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

whole of the regular force of the enemy killed,
wounded, or taken. The contest between the first
battalion and the savages, was, like the preceding,
sharp but short ; its duration not exceeding six or
seven minutes. In this, the gallant Colonel John-
son way uirice severely wounded ; and his not less
gallant adversary, Tecumseh, the head and heart
of the Indian line, killed on the spot he defended.
Proctor, who had saved himself and part of his suite,
by a base desertion of his troops, was now strenu-
ously but unsuccessfully pursued. The chase was
not, however, altogether barren; fifty additional pris-
oners and six pieces of brass artillery were captured
and secured.

Thus fortunately terminated an expedition, the
results of which were of high importance to the
United States ; a naval ascendency gained on Lakes
Erie and Superior; Maiden destroyed, Detroit re-
covered. Proctor defeated, the alliance between Great
Britain and the savages dissolved, and peace and
mdustry restored to our widely extended and m:ich
exposed western frontier. With the proud satisfac-
tion of having contributed to these important events,
the Kentucky volunteers began their homeward
march, under the direction of their gallant and ven-
erable leader, the late Governor Shelby.

The attention of General Harrison and rommo-
dore Perry, on getting back to Sandwich, was for
a moment, attracted to measures necessary to the
reduction of Michilimackinac ; but the weather be-
coming stormy, and the navigation of Lake Superior

m l¥ !'':

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1812.

175

dnngerous, tlie project wns nhnndoner], nnd nnolhei
niul betler siibHliluied in its siead. Leaving to
General Cuss and liis brioade tlie defence of Detroit,
the residue of the re«rular troops, amounting to thir-
teen hundred men, were promptly embarked nnd
brought down to Hufliilo, wliere they arrived on the
24tli of October. In taking this step, the General
had anticipated (lie wishes of tlic Secretary of War,
wlio, in a despatch of tlie 22d of October, suggested'
as an uherior operation for the army of the west, a
movement to the Niagara, and an attack of the
right and rear of De Rottenburg's position ; while
McChne's mihtia and Porter's volunteers should
assail it in front— a measure, the execution of
which was oidy prevented by tiie slowness with
which both corps assembled for tlie purpose ; by
the reported movement of the enemy from the
peninsula to Kingston ; and by the risk arising from
any great accumulation of force at that post, to
our naval depdt at Sacket's HarI)or, in the absence
of the army, which was now moving in another
direction.'

The better to obviate this cause of alarm, the
Secretary of War directed, that McArthur's brigade
should be reniuved, as promptly as miglit be conve-
nient, to the harbor ; intending by the limitation
thus given to the order, that Smith's battalion of
riflenricn -hould be left to make part of the garrison

I See Appendix, No. 24

NOTICES or THE WAR OF 1812.

of fort George, and the defence of the Niagara fron-
tier; instead of which, both corps were brought
down the lake by the General, who, hastening his
return to the west, soon after closed his military
career by a resignation of his commission.

Remarks. This third and last campaign of Gen-
eral Harrison, though in its issue highly important
to the nation and honorable to its arms, would, in
all probability, have had a termination as disas-
trous as its immediate predecessor, had the General
been indulged, as formerly, with a carte blanche in
the mode of conducting it.

It will be remembered, that in prosecuting the
war in the west, the cabinet of 1812, limited the
exercise of its authority to a mere designation of
objects ; leaving to the knowledge and judgment of
the commanding General, the selection of means,
time and manner of pursuing them. The frequent
and unexpected misfortunes, which in this and part
of the succeeding year, befel the American arms in
district No. 8, could not fail to suggest a change of
this system, in two essential points — the exclusively
military character of the armament : and the latitude,
given to the General with respect to the number and
kind of troops to be employed, and the time and mode
of employing them,. A plan of campaign conformed
to these general views, was accordingly prescribed,
limiting the army to seven thousand combatants ; des-
ignating Maiden as the object of attaoi; adding

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

177

to the military, a naval force ;^ and directing a move-
ment of the former by water, instead of a land-march
of "nearly two hundred miles''' through a swampy desert;
in which, besides the ordinary impediments arising
from roads and weather, it would, at every step,
have been liable to the attacks, open and covered,
of four thousand savages.^

1 No efficient measures were taken by the government to obtain a
command of the lakes, until October, 1812. A letter, written about
this time, by General Armstrong to Mr. Gallatin, was probably the
means of recalling the attention of th^ cabinet to this important sub-
ject In this letter, the General stated the following facte—" that he
was informed by Captain Chauncey, that as early as the 1st of July»
Captain Woolsey had requested twenty six-poi; ndcrs, of which, there
were more than one hundred in the navy-yard unemployed ; thi.. the
intention of Woolsey was to arm such vessels of commerce, as could
be found on the lake, and at Saclu t's Harbor, with the aid of which
he would be able to get a complete command of the water, and that
he (Captain Chauncey) not believing himself authorized to do more,
had but referred the letter to the Secretary of the Navy, from whom
no answer had been received." On these facts, the General subjoined
the following opinions, that " it was not yet too late to accomplish
Mr. Woolsey's object; and that the object in itself was of the liighest
importance ; that besides giving us the advantage of an exclusive and
unintemipted use of the Lakes for public ptirposes, it would effectually
separate Upper from Loioer Canada, cut asunder the enemy's line of
communication, and prevent Brock and Provost from succoring each
other." Soon after the receipt of this letter, Commodore Chauncey
received authority to build and equip, armed vessels on Lake On-
tario ; and General Dearborn a eunilar authority, to arm and otherwise
fit out for public service, such commercial craft as might be useful oa
Lake Champlain, For another communication, involving this and
other subjects, see Appendix, No. 22.

a McAfije and Christie. The latter, residing in Canada, and hav-
ing access to public functionaries, must be considered good authority
with respect to the numbers with which the expedition begaii.

i^-

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178

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

To a strategic movement of this kind, expressly
calculated to gain an ascendency on the Lake, and
thus to neutralize the Indian part of the enemy's
force, and secure to the American army a direct
approach to its object, without expense, fatigue, or
peril — no opposition, on the part of the General,
was anticipated ; and the more so, as in December
or January preceding, he had officially announced,
that " if the government would employ naval means,
all their objects could be accomplished, in the short
space of two months in the sprlng.^^^ Yet, so vacil-
lating was his judgment on this subject, that in
March, 1813, he substantially revoked this advice,
and did what he could, to obtain permission to con-
duct the campaign by the old route, and in the old
way.^ Fortunately, time, and the experience it
brought with it, had lessened the weight of the
General's opinions at Washington ; his suggestions
on the present occasion, were, therefore, promptly
and decidedly discarded, and a new order issued,
for prosecuting the campaign on the plan given in
March, which, as we have seen, terminated success-
fully in August.

Mr. Harrison's next error was of a character even
more menacing than the preceding ; and but for the
counteraction given to it by Major Croghan, must
have been followed by disaster and disgrace — a con-

1 General Harriaon's letter to tlie War Dcpartincnt, of tiie 12th
December, 1812.

s Harrison's official letter, of the 17th of March, and answer of tho
Sciretary of War, Appendix, No. 23.

h ft ■

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1«1:«.

179

elusion, abundantly established by the following
facts. On the 21st of April, after inspecting the
defences at Lower Sandusky, the General, in a letter
to the War Department, denounced that post aa
worthless in itself, and " impossible to save," and,
therefore, " to be immediately stripped of its stores,
and promptly abandoned on the approach of the enemy "^
Yet, on the 26th or 27th of July, though apprised
of Proctor's coming, at the head of a force, esti-
mated at five thousand combatants ; though having
done nothing to render the place more defensible,
and somewhat to make it less so ; though neither
promising, nor intending to sustain it, should it be
attacked; and though actually withdrawing hin»self
and the army to Seneca, nine miles distant from it
— yet, in despite of all these circumstances of inhi-
bition, he placed in fort Stephenson a detachment
of one hundred and sixty United States infantry,
w'*h "a single and small piece of artillery, and
seven rounds of cannon cartridges," under orders to
retreat, if " the enemy landed in force and with
cannon, provided retreat should then be practicable"

We need hr.rdly remark, that an order of this
kind, which put to hazard a detachment of this
magnitude, in an untenable post, with few of the
means necessary for meeting either siege or assault,
and which forbade a retreat, while this could have
been made with certainty and safety; and for a
purpose altogether unnecessary, as he had already

'.:*

I Harrison's letter of the 2 1st of April, 1813.

ill

180

NOTICES OP THE WAR OP 1819.

concluded — that " coming by water, Proctor had not
neglected to bring with him artillery''^ — was, in its
whole bearing, a direct violation of every military
rule applicable to the case. Nor was the General's
subsequent conduct better conformed to their in-
junctions.

Having on the 29th, sufficiently assured himself
with regard to the number and equipment of Proc-
tor's force, and suspecting that this formidable array
might he. directed against his own intrenched camp
at Seneca ; he at once determined, " to collect and
destroy his surplus stores, abandon his present posi-
tion and make good a retreat to Upper Sandusky"
—leaving to the fate that might await them, the
settlements on the southern shore of the Lake ; the
boats built and stores collected at Cleveland ; and
Perry's fleet, then fitting out and nearly ready for
service, at Presque Isle." But though willing and
prepared to make these sacrifices, he could not but
perceive that a mere presumption of danger to his
own camp, would not justify the abandonment of
Crogh m's detachment, without some effort on his
part, to extend to it the eventual security he sought
for himself. On this point, however, the General's

1 "As the enemy, coTiiag by water, could bring with facility any
quantity of battering cannon against it, it must inevitably fall"— a fact
assumed by the General, in the council of war, held on the cvenin<»
of the 2dth.—Mc4ff'ee's History, p. 322. "

2 That this was the great object of the expedition will be seen by
Provost's letter to Proctor, of tha 1 1th of July, and De Rottenburg's to
Barclay, of the same month, Appendix, No. 19.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

181

sense of duty was soon satisfied ; forgetting alike
the admonition contained in his first order to Crog-
han, « mt to hazard a retreat in the face of an Indian
investments'^ and the fact, now perfectly known to
himself, that such investment did exist ;* he des-
patched to that ofiicer a second order, for " an imme-
diate retreat,"" at all hazards; indicating the route by
which he was to make it, but taking no step to cover,
or otherwise sustain the movement. And, as if the
task thus imposed, was not in itself sufficiently peril-
ous, he farther prescribed — that the garrison, instead
of employing all possible means to mask the opera-
tion, should begin " by setting fire to their stores and
barracks,^^ and thus virtually announce their inten-
tion to the surrounding enemy.*

Fortunately, the great disposer of the events of this
world, not unfrequcntly converts evil into good, and
folly into wisdom. On the present occasion, we
have seen, that by the first order given to Croghan,
he was assigned to the defence of a post, which, in
the GeneraPs opinion, " could not be saved,^' and at
the same time, forbidden to retreat, in the face of an
Ifndian investment ; and that by a second, he was or-
dered to abandon this untenable post, and make good a
retreat of nine miles, through a continuous forest filled
with savages, without aid or support of any kind. Left,

' In Harrison's official letter of the 4th of August, he says — " Hav*
ing heard the firing [at the fort] I made many attempts to ascertain the
farce of the enemy ; but our scouts Wf.re unable to get near the fort, from
the Indians who surrounded it.^^

« Second order given to Croghan, Appendk, No. 21.

1 R

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NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

therefore, to choose between taking the risk of a
British assault, or an Indian massacre, this officer
did not hesitate, and was thus compelled to disobey
an order, which directly defeated its own object.
Yet, under circumstances so unpromising, whether
separately or collectively considered, results of the
most benign character followed — the defeat of the
enemy's objects, present and ^prospective, and the pres-
ervation of our own army, from the disgrace of a waste-
ful and unnecessary fights

A word or two, at parting, on the charge made
by a battalion of Johnson's mounted regiment, (un-
equipped with either swords or lances,) on a corps
of veteran infantry, well armed with muskets and
bayonets, sustained by cannon, and numerically
stronger than their assailants. That the charge
was gallantly made, and eminently successful, {^win-
ning the battle, as acknowledged by the General
himself, "ma single minute, ^^) cani.ot be doubted;
but to bestow on it, the additional praise of deserv-
ing its good fortune, must depend on a single fact,
whether the measure was, or was not, adopted under a
sense of the advantage furnished to the assailant, by
this error of his enemy ? If this question can be
answered affirmatively, the merit of the charge will be
greatly enhanced and fully established. The affair will
no longer be subject to be classed with victories merely

1 Extract from Governor Duncan's report of the defence of San-
dusky, by Major Croghan, made to Mr. Mercer, chairman of tho
Military Committee of the House of Representatives, in 1834, Ap-
pendix, No. 20.

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

183

Jortuifotis ; but take its place with those mspirations^
(as they have been called) of Turenne and Bonaparte,
which, founded on the error of an enemy, and seen at
a glance of the eye, could justify the most palpable de-
viation from ordinary rules.

Another and last question on this subject — On
whose suggestion was the charge under consideration,
made? Did the General, as he insinuates, "find the
daisy all himself?" or, was the conception of the
project, the legitimate property of Colonel R. M. John-
son ? Non nostrum tantas componere lites.*

Proctor's situation at Maiden (after Barclay's de-
feat) made necessary on his part, a prompt retreat to
Vincent, unencumbered with baggage ; or, a vigorous
defence of the post committed to his custody. By
adopting the former, he would have saved seven hun-
dred veteran soldiers and a train of artillery, for the
future service of his sovereign ; by adopting the latter,
he would have retained the whole of his Indian allies
(three tho.usand combatants) ; given time for the militia
of the interior to come to his aid ; had the full advan-
tage of iis fortress and its munitions — and a chance,
at least, of ./entual success, with a certainty of keep-
ing inviolate his own self-respect, and the confidence
of his followers. Taking a middle course between

' The affair more particularly alluded to in this pasfsage, is the
attack and capture made of the Spanish batteries, planted on the
crest and covering the ascent of the Sommo-Sierra, by the lancers
of the Imperial guard, in 1808. See Napier's Peninsular War,
Vol. I, p. 402.

* Appendix, No. 21.

Ill

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184

NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812.

these extremes, he lost the advantages that would
have resulted from either. His retreat began too late—
was much encumbered with women, children, and bag-
gage, and at no time urged with sufficient vigor, or
protected with sufficient care. Bridges and roads,
ferries and boats, were left behind him, neither de-
stroyed nor obstructed; and when, at last, he was
overtaken and obliged to fight, he gave to his veterans
a formation, which enabled a corps of four hundred
mounted infantry, armed with rifles, hatchets, and
butcher-knives, to win the battle « in a single minute."
Conduct like this, deserved all the opprobrium and
punishment it received, and justly led to General Har-
rison's conclusion— that "his antagonist had lost his
senses."

,1*

APPENDIX.

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APPENDIX.

. ^

o. 1.]

The ministry oi j elder Adams in England, began
on the 10th of Jun. , 1786. In a letter to the American
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the 19tli of July follow-
ing, he says—" The popular pulse seems to beat high
against America; the peoph" are deceived by numberless
falsehoods circulated by the gazettes, &c., so that there
is too much reason to beUeve, that if the nation had an-
other hundred million to spend, they would soon force
the ministry into a war against us. Their present sys-
tem, as far as I can penetrate it, is to maintain a de-
termined peace with all Europe, in order that they may
war singly against America, if they should think it neces-
sary." In a second letter of the 30ii of August following,
he says — "In sh~rt, sir, America has no party at present
in her favor— ai parties, on the contrary, have committed
themselvcF gainst us — even Shclburne and Buckingham.
I had almost said, the friendd of America are reduced to
Dr. Price and Dr. Jebb." Again, on the 15th of Octo-
ber, 1785, he informs the American Secretary — "that
though it is manifestly as much the interest of Great
Britain to be well with us, as for us to be well with them,
yet this is not tlie judgment of the English nation ; it is

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188

AFPENDIX.

not the judgment of Lord North and his party ; it is not
the judgment of the Duke of Portland and his friends,
and it does not appear to be the judgment of Mr. Pitt
and the present set. In short, it does not at present
appear to be the sentiment of any body ; and I am much
inclined to believe, they will try the issue of importance
with us." In his two last letters, the one dated in No-
vember, the other in December, 1787, we ^.nd the fol-
lowing passages — " If she [England] can bind Holland
in her shackles, and France from internal dissension is
unable to interfere, she will make war immediately against
us. No answer is made to any of my memorials, or
letters to the ministry, nor do I expect that any will be
done while I stay."

[No. 2.]

Letters from Colonel McKee (British Superintendent
of Indian affairs) to Colonel England, dated 6th of July,
and 13th and 30th of August, 1794, found among Proc-
tor's papers, captured in 1813. — " I send this by a party
of Saganas, who returned yesterday from fort Recovery,
where the whole body of Indians, except the Delawares,
who had gone another route, imprudently attacked the
fort on Monday, the 30th of last month, and lost sixteen
or seventeen men, besides a good many wounded.

" Every thing had been settled prior to their leaving
the Fallen Timber, and it had been agreed upon, to con-
fine themselves to taking convoys and attacking at a dis-

APPENDIX.

189

tance from the forts, if they should have the address to
entice the enemy out ; but the impetuosity of the Macki-
naw Indians, and their eagerness to begin with the nearest,
prevailed with the others to alter their system ; the con-
sequences of which, from the present appearance of things,
may most materially injure the interests of these people ;
both the Mackinaw and Lake Indians seeming resolved
on going home again, having completed the belts they
carried with scalps and prisoners, and having no provision
there, or at the Glaze, to subsist upon ; so that his ma-
jesty's post will derive no security from the late great
influx of Indians into this part of the country, should they
persist in their resolution of returning so soon.

" Captain Elhot writes, that they [the British agents]
are immediately to hold a council at the Glaze, in order
to try if they can prevail on the Lake Indians to remain ;
but without provisions, ammunition, &c., being sent to
that place, I conceive it will be extremely difficult to keep
them together.

" I was honored last night with your letter of the 11th,
and am extremely glad to find you are making such exer-
tions to supply the Indians with provisions. Captain
Elliot arrived yesterday; what he has brought will greatly
relieve us, having been obliged yesterday to take all ihe
com and flour wliich the traders had here. Scouts are
sent up to view the situation of the [American] army, and
we now muster one thousand Indians. All the Lake
Indians, from Sagana downwards, should not lose one
moment in joining their brethren, as every accession of
strength is an addition to their spirits.

" I have been employed several days in endeavoring to
fix the Indians (who have been driven from their villages

! !

:ii

A i

St.. . 4

190

APPENDIX.

and cornfields) between the fort and the bay. Swan Creek
is generally agreed upon, and will be a very convenient
place for the delivery of provisions, &c. The last accounts
from General Wayne's army were brought me last night
by an Indian, who says, the army would not be able to
reach the Glaze, beforo yesterday evening ; it is supposed
on accoimt of the sick and wounded, many of whom they
bury every day."

[No. 3.]

Letter from President Washington to Mr. Jay, dated
30th August, 1794. — " As you will receive letters from
the Secretary of State's Office, giving an official account
of the public occurrences as they have arisen and ad-
vanced, it is unnecessary for me to retouch any of them ;
and yet, I cannot restrain myself from making some obser-
vations on the most recent of them, the communication of
which, was received this morning only. I mean the pro-
test of the Governor of Upper Canada, delivered by Lieu-
tenant Sheafe, against our occupying lands far from any
of the posts, which, long ago, they ought to have surren-
dered, and far within the known, and until now, the
acknowledged limits of the United States.

" On this irregular and high-handed proceeding of Mr.
Simcoe, which is no longer masked, I would rather hear
what the ministry of Great Britain will say, than pronounce
my own sentiments thereon. But can that government,
or will it attempt, after this official act of one of their

APPENDIX.

191

' .1 f--

governors, to hold out ideas of friendly intentions towards
the United States, and suffer such conduct to pass with
impunity 1

" This may be considered as the most open and daring
act of the British agents in America, though it is not the
most hostile and cruel ; for there does not remain a doubt
in the mind of any well-informed person in this country,
not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we en-
counter with the Indians, their hostilities, the murders of
helpless women and children along our frontiers, result from
the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this country.
In vain is it then for its administration in Britain, to dis-
avow having given orders which will warrant such conduct,
whilst their agents go unpunished ; wiiilst we have a
thousand corroborating circumstances, and in'^!'^;ed as many
evidences, some of which cannot be brougut forward, to
})rove, that they are seducing from our alliances, and
endeavoring to remove over the line, tribes that have hith-
erto been kept in peace and iricndshij) with us a* a heavy
expense, and who have no causes of complaint, xci^t
pretended ones of their creating ; whilst they .jtp in a
state of irritation the tribes who are hostile to us, and are
instigating those who know little of us, or we of them, to
unite in the war against us ; and whilst it is an undeniable
fact, thai they are furnishing the whole with arms, ammuni-
tion, clothing, and even provisions to carry on the war. I
might go farther, and, if they are not much belied, add,
men also in disguise.

" Can it be expected, I ask, so long as these things are
known in the United States, or at least, firmly believed,
and suffered with impunity by Great Britain, that there
ever will or can be any cordiality between the two coun-

'if

192

APPENDIX.

H- •

tries? I answer — No. And I will undertake, withoUk
the gift of prophecy to predict, that it will be impossible
to keep this country in a state of amity with Great Britain
long, if these posts are not surrendered. A knowledge
of tliese being my sentiments would have little weight, I
am persuaded, with the British administration, or perhaps
with the nation, in effecting the measure, but both may
rest satisfied, that if they want to be at peace with this
country, and to enjoy the benefits of its trade, to give up
the posts is the only road to it. Withholding them, and
the consequences we feel at present continuing, war will
be inevitable."

[No. 4.]

Letter of credence given by the Governor-General of
the Canadas to John Henry. " The bearer, Mr. John
Henry, is employed by me, and full confidence may be
placed in him for communications which any person may
wish to make to me in the business committed to him.
In faith of which, I have given him this, under my hand
and seal, at Quebec, the 6th of February, 1809.

(Signed.) J. H. CRAIG."

Extract from the letter of instructions to Mr, Henry,

[Most secret and confidential.]

" Quebecy 6tk February, 1809.
" It has been supposed, that if the federalists of the
eastern states should be successful in obtaining that de-
cided influence, which may enable them to direct the public

APPENDIX.

193

' -If

opinion, it is not improbable, that rather than rubmit to a
continuance of the difticulties and distress to which they
are now subject, they will exert that influence to bring
about a separation from the general Union, The eariiest
information on this subject, may be of great consequence
to our government, as it may also be, that it should be
informed, hoio far, in such an event, they would look to
England for assistance, or he disposed to enter into a con-
nexion with us ?"

Report made to Sir James Craig, under the preceding
instruction, and dated Boston, March 7th, 1809. " Sir, I
have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible,
the course intended to be pursued by the measures and
politics of the general government. I have already given
a decided opinion, that a declaration of war is not to be
expected ; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation,
should the Congress possess spirit and independence
enough to place their popularity in jeo^ rdy by so strong a
measure, the legislature of JSIassachuseUs will give the tone
to the neighboring states; will declare itself permanent, until
a new election of members ; invite a Congress, to be composed
of delegates from the federal states, and erect a separate gov-
emmentfor their common defence and common interest."

Time, that great betrayer of political secrets, has pro-
duced a curious illustration of the opinion given by Henry
in the preceding report. Mr. Adams, ci-devant President
of the United States, in a late publication admits, that in
1808, " he earnestly recommended to the friends of the
administration of that day, the substitution of the non-
intercourse for the embargo ; and in giving his reasons for
that preference, was necessarily led to enlarge upon the
views and purposes of certain leaders of the party, which

j '•' I

III

194

APPENDIX.

had the management of the state legislature in their hands.
He urged, that a continuance of the embargo much longer^
would certainly be met by forcible resistance^ supported by the
legislature, and probably, by the judiciary of the state ; that
to quell that resistance, (if force should be resorted to by
the government,) would produce a civil war ; and that in
that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the parly would
secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain, That
their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution
of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confedera-
Hon, he knetofram unequivocal evidence, although not prove-
able in a court of law ; and that in the case of a civil war, the
aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose, would be as surely
resorted to, as it would be indispensably necessary to the
design.'' It would be unjust to the party, thus accused by
Mr. Adams, were we not to add, that the expositions sub-
sequently made on this subject, do not sustain the opinions
given by that gentleman.

[No. 5. J

As a specimen of the temper of the opposition of that
day, we subjoin the following resolution of the Senate of
Massachusetts, passed on the 16th of June, 1813, in con-
sequence of the capture of his His Britannic Majesty's
ship Peacock, by the American ship Hornet.

" Resolved, As the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts,
that in a war like the present, waged without justifiable
cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that

APPENDIX.

195

conquest and ambition are its real motives ; it is not be-
coming a moral and religious people, to express any
approbation of military or naval exploits, which are not
immediately connected with the defence of our "-^acoast
and soil.'*

A further exposition of this temper will be found in
on act of the legislature of Connecticut, declaring the law
of the United States (authorizing the enlistment, of minors)
unconstitutional and providing, that all persons acting
under it within the state, should be punished by fine and
imprisonment. The penal clause was, however, qualified
at the instance of the Speaker of the House, and the
punishment by imprisonment given up. About the same
time, all troops of the United States were, by an act of

the Corporation of Hartford, excluded from the city.

Major {now General) Jessufs Report to the Department of
State,

14-'

ii'i

•':^i

[No. 6.]

Our authority for making this statement will be found
in the following extract from a letter of the 28th of Sep-
tember, 1834, written by Major-General Jessup, of the
army of the United States,

♦* As to the particular fact in relation to which you desire
information, (the franking of the letters from which the
enemy derived his knowledge of the declaration of war,)
it rests on general report and Mr. Gallatin's admission^
(made to General Findley, in 1812,) that he had franked

liii

tl 1

r;si

196

APPENDIX.

letters addressed to persons in the enemy^s territory." Of
letters, ao/ranked and addressed, three have been noticed ;
one sent to the west, (probably to St. Joseph,) furnished
the first authentic evidence of the declaration of war re-
ceived there ; and with it a good and sufficient reason,
for attacking and capturing Michilimackinac and its gar-
rison. Such was the substance of a report made by
Lieutenant Hanks to General Hull- and the officer then
serving as his Adjutant-General. A second, sent to Mai-
den, (according to information given to General Jessup
and the late Major Dugan, while at tliat place,) was re-
ceived by the British commanding officer, on the 2Sth of
June ; and, no doubt, caused the attack and capture of
the Cayahoga packet, carrying the sick and convalescent
of Hull's army, with his and their baggage. A thirds
reached Detroit, " was there retained and seen by many
persons, among whom, was General James Taylor, of
Kentucky." Whatever may have been the motive of the
letter writer, the injury done to the United States cannot
be denied — as its direct, if not obvious effect, was to take
from them and give to the enemy, the power of striking
the first blow — an advantage, which oflen decides the fate
of a campaign, and not unfrequently, that of a war.

[No. 7.]

Memorandum of statements made by General Win-
chester and Major Madison to the Secretary of War, on
their return from captivity.

APPENDIX.

197

** To avoid embarrassing the service with a personal
controversy, and at the request of General Harrison,
though the elder Brigadier, I continued in the command
of the advanced corps, then on the Au Glaize, under a
promise on his part, that * I should be soon re-enforced
and sufficiently supplied.' Early in December, I received
orders to advance to the Rapids ; a point, selected by the
General, for establishing a magazine for the supply of the
expedition. From the freezing up of the rivers, which
prevented the use of boats, and from not being provided
with teams or pack-horses for transporting the baggage
and provisions, and being consequently obliged to drag
both by hand, over roads then deeply covered with snow,
it was the 10th of January before we arrived at that post.
When two days on the march, I received a letter from
General Harrison, advising me to send back within con-
tract limits, two of the regiments composing the brigade,
which was now reduced by sickness and fatigue to less
than nine hundred effectives. This advice I declined
following, for the subjoined reasons — The post assigned
to us had become highly important, from its being the
site of our magazine, and from the fact, that it was con-
siderably nearer to the enemy's main body than to our
own ; that the roads betweer vlalden and the Rapids,
were more easily travelled than those between the Rapids
and General Harrison's head-quarters ; that having no
intermediate post to observe or interrupt a movement
against us, if made by the enemy, they might come on
secretly and invest and carry the position, without giving
us the power of even making known our condition to the
other parts of the army ; and lastly, that being thus ex-
posed to attack and out of sustaining distance, the post

198

APPENDIX.

«■ •»

I «, ft' t

had not the ordinary means of defence ; having neither
cannon nor fortification, nor intrenching or other tools,
necessary for making the latter ; nor even an order for so
using them, if they had been provided — the only instruc-
tion given me being that * of clearing my front of an Indian
party, supposed to have established itself on Swan Creek,
and making huts for covering the provisions and baggage.'
Had I taken the General's advice, my effective force on
my arrival at the Rapids, would not have exceeded four
hundred effectives, left to defend themselves and the
magazines, with muskets and rifles only, against the at-
tacks of a British and Indian force, which General Har-
rison did not estimate at less than /our thousand combatants.
Having promptly fulfilled the order above mentioned, of
driving off the Indian party, we proceeded to make a large
and strong house ; which besides covering our supplies,
would be useful as a place of defence against the attacks
of the enemy. Of our arrival and situation the General
was informed, by the best means I had — a party returning
to McArthur's block-house ; by whom I also requested a
fulfilment of his promise of a speedy re-enforcement. In
this state of things, three expresses, bringing letters from
Mr. Day of Frenchtown, arrived in my camp in quick
succession, with information, that a British and Indian
force had arrived there (about three hundred in number)
with orders to seize and send to Maiden, all inhabitants
attached to the United States government, or suspected
of being so attached, and with them, all horses and cattle,
sleds, carioles, and provisions of every kind, and con-
demning at once the whole settlement to starvation, im-
prisonment or slaughter, in case of refusal or resistance.
The information was forthwith communicated to a council

APPENDIX.

199

of war, who, after full diHcussion, unanimously agreed,
that a detachment should be immediately marched against
the British and Indian marauders. A detachment of six
hundred men was accordingly sent under Colonel Lewis,
of whose success on the 18th, General Harrison was im-
mediately apprised, and a request made on General Per-
kins (whose post was nearest to me) for another battalion
or regiment, and some artillery if practicable. Siispocring
that Proctor would make an attempt to revenge this stroke,
and knowing that our wounded men could not be removed,
I hastened to re-enforce Colonel Lewis with Wells's regi-
ment, (two hundred and fifty men,) and set out myself to join
him, and arrived on the morning of the 20th. The town,
lying on the north side of the river, was picketed on thre«
sides — the longest, facing the north and making the front.
Within these pickets. Colonel Lewis's corps was found.
Not thinking the position elegible, nor the pickets a suf-
ficient defence against artillery, I would have retreated,
but for the wounded, of whom there were fifty-five ; but
having no sufficient means for transporting <}»ose, and
equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly,
I issued an order for putting the place in the best condition
for defence that might be practicable ; intending to con-
struct some new works, as soon as the means for getting
out timber might be had. On the evening of the 20th,
Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp on the right,
in an open field, immediately without the picketing. On
the 21st, a patrole as far as Brownstown was sent out, and
returned without seeing any thing of an enemy ; on the
same day, a man from Maiden came in, who reported,
that the enemy were preparing to attack us, but knowing
nothing of the kind or extent of the preparation made or

200

APPENDIX.

making, what he brought was thought to be only conjee
ture, and such as led to a belief, that it would be some
days before Proctor would be ready to do any thing.
The troops were now in high spirits, expecting the arrival
of General Harrison with re-enforcements from the
Rapids, where he had got on the 20th ; despatching his
Inspector-General on the same day with orders to me,
' to hold the ground we had got at any rate,' implying as
we believed, an engagement on his part, to be soon with
us and in force. Neither night-patrole, nor night-pickets
were ordered by me, from a belief, that both were matters
of routine and in constant use. Our force now amounted
to seven hundred and fifty men, stationed as before men-
tioned ; the volunteers within, and Wells's regiment with-
out the pickets. Not to discommode the wounded men,
who, with Colonel Lewis's corps, occupied the houses on
the north side of the river, I at some increased personal
risk, took quarters for myself aid suite, in a house on
the southern bank, directly fronting the troops and only
separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and
but between eighty and one hundred yards wide. While
the reveille was beating on the morning of the 22d, the
alarm was given, and was soon followed by an attack of
the British on the front, and by that of the Indians on
both flanks. I was with the troops in a few minutes, and
found every man at his post. Finding the left of the line
on the outside of the pickets somewhat galled by the
enemy's fire, (in pursuance of a plan previously laid in
case of attack,) I requested Colonel Allen to draw them
forward, and bring them within the picketing. When this
order had been nearly executed, and the head of the line
was within a few steps of the enirance, where I stood,

APPENDIX.

201

some of the soldiers mistaking the movement for a retreat,
sounded the alarm and began to fly, when the whole
broke and rushed towards the river. I instantly ordered
them to be reformed under the bank ; but though great
efforts were made by Colonels Lewis and Alien, and
others, to effect this object, they failed ; the panic of the
men overcoming all authority. Parts of two companies
from the picketing, brought out to aid in restoring order,
were carried off by the current ; and a daring Indian
attack from both flanks being now commenced on the fugi-
tives, all further resistance was overwhelmed. Colonel
Allen fell, and Colonel Lewis and -lyself were captured.
My farther agency was only thaw of an adviser. No
longer hoping any thing from the intervention of General
Harrison, and seeing one half of our force already cap-
tured or dispersed, I anticipated only the slaughter of
those within the pickets who yet bravely held out ; and
assured by Proctor, that on a surrender, he would give
honorable terms, I advised to that measure. Not being
permitted to communicate with Majors Graves or Madi-
son in person, my opinion was probably misunderstood,
and certainly misrepresented, as after my own capture, I
had no idea that I could legally exercise authority over
them. I will not, however, pretend that I am able now
to recollect the terms I used on the occasion, but the
present is a true statement of what I intended."

Major Madison's statement,

** Our force, on the 22d of January, was between seven
hundred and fifly and eight hundred men. The original
detachment under Colonel Lewis was diminished by tlie
action of the 18th with Reynolds, upwards of seventy-five

ii'-,;

■*l

202

APPENDIX.

\h '

■.? , >.- •■ « ,

men — fifty- five of whom were wounded — and increased
two hundred and fifty, by Wells's regiment, brought on
by General Winchester. Proctor's force did not much,
if at all, exceed one thousand men, three hundred regu-
lars, the remainder Canadian militia and Indians. On
the first (the regulars) Proctor's principal dependance
was placed, but from the coldness of the weather and the
depth of the snow, his artillery became unmanageable ;
and his infantry after doing its best, and losing one-fourth
of its number, was not in either condition or disposition
to renew its attack on the picketed part of our position.

** Our camp-police was, perhaps, not what it ought to
have been ; but I am not here the accuser or excuser of
any one, though thoroughly convinced that the principal
error of the campaign, and that which brought all other
evils upon us, was the great distance at which the other
parts of the army were kept. Had the disposition been
different, had the main body been located within sustain-
ing distance of the advanced corps, or had this corps been
re-enforced by even a single battalion of five hundred
men, ours would have been a victory instead of a defeat.
As it was, so firmly did the few men holding the town
believe in their power of defending it, even after General
Winchester's capture, that it was with great reluctance
they gave it up ; and principally from a want of ammuni-
tion to continue the contest, and not from Proctor's threats
of smoking or burning us out, which we knew to be ridicu-
lous, A sight of the enemy's condition, which could not
be prevented after our surrender, satisfied me that if we
could have been supplied with ammunition, we might
have held out, for no one could show more impatience to
begin and continue a retreat than Proctor, embarrassed

AJ '^ENDIX.

203

as he was with wounc'ui and dying men, with the pris-
oners he had made, and expecting to be attacked every
moment by Harrison, of whose arrival at the Rapids he
had been informed by an Indian runner, while the attack
was going on."

!3r

[No. 8.]

Major Eve^s testimony,

"A few days after General Winchester had assumed
the command at fort Wayne, we were met at the St.
Mary's by General Harrison, who called together all
the field-officers who were at that place, with the Hon.
Samuel McKee. General Harrison then stated that the
army was in a deplorable situation— that he had relin-
quished the command to General Winchester ; but from
a letter which had met him at St. Mary's, he was at a
loss to understand whether the Secretary of War intended
that he (Harrison) or Winchester should have the com-
mand — that the troops at fort Wayne were much dissatis-
fied at being commanded by General Winchester, and
that he had to take some pains to satisfy them. He then
requested the officers present to say, who they, and the
troops under their respective commands, would rather be
commanded by. The answer to a man was, that they
had rather be commanded by General Harrison. He
then requested the officers to make that expression in
writing, and called on Mr, McKee to draw up a written
statement to that effect, observing at the same time, that

i W

204

APPENDIX.

he would send it to the officers at fort Wayne^ and if it was
the wish of the army generally ^ that he s' mid command^ he
would take it, and risk the consequences with the government.
But upon reflection, (after General Harrison h;id retired,)
it was thought improper by the officers to sign the statement
drawn up by Mr. McKee. General Harrison was, in a
few days afterwards, invested with the command by the
Secretary of War, which made any further call on the
officers unnecessary. I have only to state facts, without
intending to eulogize General Winchester, or to injure
General Harrison. With the former, I have very little
acquaintance ; but have no hesitation in saying, that I
believe his conduct whilst in the army has been much
misrepresented to his prejudice."

v<.

«'

[No. 9.]

Extracts from affidavits in relation to the affair at
Frenchtown, of the 22d of January, 1813, made by the
late Governor Madison of Kentucky, Colonel William
Lewis, and Major S. Garrard.

" Sometime between the 8th and 12th of January, we
arrived at the Rapids of the Miami, where a co-operation
was expected with General Tupper— but in that we were
disappointed. In a few days after our arrival at the
Rapids, I understood that General Winchester had re-
ceived communications from the inhabitants of the Au
Raisin settlement, making application to him for assist-
ance and protection — ^wbich was repeated, with statements

APPENDIX.

205

that the enemy were plundering them of their property. A
council of the officers was then called and their opinions
taken. To the best of my recollections, they were unani-
mously of opinion, that a detachment ought to be sent to
the relief of the inhabitants at Raisin, as soon as prac-
ticable. I cannot say whether or no General Winchester
had any right to expect re-enforcements from General
T upper and Perkins, but it was generally believed that
we would receive troops from them. I am well per-
suaded, that could xve have been re-enforced with jive hundred
additional men^ a victory on the 22d of January ^ 1813, ivould
have been the result instead of a defeat."

Extract from the statement of Colonel W. Lewis.

" / think, had the GeneraV s force at Frenchtown been five
hundred greater than it was, he would not have experienced a
defeat. I was immediately with General Winchester,
during great part of the action, and can bear testimony to
his coolness and bravery.

Extract from the affidavit of Major S. Garrard, Inspector
of Brigadier- General Payne's brigade of Kentucky vol-
unteers, made a prisoner at Frenchtown.

" On my return from Canada, I passed the Rapids,
where General Harrison informed me that General Winches-
ter had every reason to expect re-enforcements on the 2\st;
and further, that they were delayed in consequence of
having, in the first instance, attempted an advance on the
ice, which they were compelled to abandon, return back,

and take Hull's road."

206

APPENDIX.

I*:- 1.

[No. 10.]

Orders given to General Dearborn by the Secretary of
War in relation to the Niagara frontier.

June 26M, 1812. — " Tour preparations fat Albany] it is
presumed, will be made to move in a direction for JS'iagara^
Kingston, and MontreaU^ July 1 5th. — "On your arrival
at Albany, your attention will be directed to the security

of the northern frontier by the lakes."' July 2Qth. " You

will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins,
as will place the militia, detached by him for the Magara
and other posts on the lake, under your control." July '29th.
— " Should it be advisable to make any other disposition
of these restless people, [the warriors of the Seneca tribe
of Indians,] you will give orders to Mr. Granger and the
commanding officer at Magara.^' August Is/.— "You
will make a diversion in favor of him [General Hull] at
Magara and Kingston, as soon as may be practicable."
How, we ask, was it possible for the General, with these
orders in his portfolio, to believe, that the Niagara fron-
tier had not been within the hmits of his command ? And
if he did so believe, by what authority did he extend the
armistice (entered into between him and Provost) to that
frontier ? As, however, the inaction which enabled Brock
to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and un-
menaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force
to Detroit, and there to capture Hull, his army and terri-
tory, was not noticed by any kind of disapprobation on
the part of the government, the inference is fair, that it
(the government) was willing to take the respousibihty
on itself.

APPENDIX.

807

[No. 11.]

Extract of a letter from Sir George Provost to General
Brock, dated SOth of August, 1812.
** I consider it most fortunate, that I have been able to
prosecute this object of the government (the armistice)
without interfering with your operations on the Detroit.
I have sent you men, money and stores of all kinds." —
See Life and Services of Sir George Provost.

* '^

[No. 12.]

♦» Albany^ February 22rf, 1813.

**SiR, — In obedience to orders of the 8th instant, requir-
ing from me * a particular statement in relation to the aifair
at Queenstown,' I have the honor to transmit a journal of
the incidents connected with that affair which fell under
my observation.

"On the 10th of October, 1812, 1 waited on Lieutenant-
Colonel Fenwick, commanding at fort Niagara, to report
my arrival on the evening of the 9th instant, with a detach-
ment of nearly four hundred of the thirteenth, at the Four-
Mile Creek, in charge of military stores, and thirty-nine
boats capable of carrying conveniently each thirty men.
He informed me of an intended attack that night at
Queenstown, and I requested orders to join the corps
designated foi it. Such orders he was not authorized to

t^^^...«.ii^j^^

* '

I,,

II Is

ki ;ii

^.f-

?*■>

208

APPENDIX.

give, but sent off an express that evening to General Van
Rensselaer to procure them. They arrived (I have since
learned) at Niagara about nine at night, but I was pre-
vented by an accident from receiving them ; and my detach-
ment was saved a night's march in a storm, and exposure
and march the next day, by which all the other regulars in
that quarter were very considembly harassed ; as, being
without tents or cwn.^ equipage, they were obliged to
keep on foot until they returned to their quarters. This
intended attack, in which my detachment was not origin-
ally included, was to have been conducted by Colonel
Van Rensselaer and Captain Machesney at the head of a
party of regulars, but was defeated by some mistake or
treachery of a man in charge of the boats.

" On the 11th, (the storm still continuing with unabated
violeijce, and the road still covered with stragglers from
the different detachments of regulars, which had marched
the night before from fort Niagara and its vicinity to
Lewistown, on the proposed expedition,) I rode to General
Van Renssalaer's encampment in order to report more
particularly the detachment under my command, and to
request a place in the next attempt ; mentioning that I
should like forty-eight hours for preparation, being myself
an entire stranger to the country, and the detachment
being just off a long march expedition from Oswego, re-
quiring some time for the issue of several articles of petit
equipment, and for putting themselves in the best condi-
tion. It was intimated to me that I should have a part in
the first attack, and that it would take place in a few
days. On the 12th, about twelve o'clock, Colonel Van
Rensselaer rode into my camp and informed me that I
must march immediately to Lewistown — that he intended

APPENDIX.

209

to attack at Queenstown that night. The weather had
cleared away early, and at this time my tents were struck,
every musket and lock taken to pieces, and every thing
in the camp going through the process of police usual on
such occasions ; I was also informed that the provisions
for that day had not yet been received from fort Niagara
and could not be before evening. Colonel Van Rens-
selaer stated, however, that we should be able to reach
Lewistown early, and that he would have rations ready
for them there. "We conversed about my waiving rank
with him, which I told him was impossible ; but as it was
equally impossible for me to command in a night-attack
on a place I had never seen — as I was informed it was a
critical moment which must be used — and as I was not
disinclined to yield as much as possible to an officer of
established reputation, and as I was, and knew my whole
detachment to be anxious for an opportunity of seeing
some actual service on any terms, I consented to take a
part without interfering with his arrangements for it, and
requested for myself only good guides, and a landing in
good order at the proper point. The detachment ac-
cordingly moved a little before five o'clock in the after-
noon, and marched or rather waded to Lewistown, where
we arrived sometime before ten ; and most of the men
and some of the officers had then their first meal for that
day.

October 13th. — At half-past three. Colonel Van Rens-
selaer woke me and informed me it was time to move.
I formed the detachment, read to tlie officers General
Van Rensselaer's orders for the battle, and conducted
partly by a guide and by Colonel Van Rensselaer, marched
to the river. On the way. Colonel Van Rensselaer in-

18*

.I'll

Et4,

tio

APPENDIX.

troduced my guide for the battle to me. Between four
and five o'clock we embarked our first parties. The
number of boats was eleven or twelve, I understood, aver-
aging about twenty-five men each, being calculated to
carry just half of our respective detachments at a time.
The boats assigned to the detachment under my orders
were on the right, i. e. down the stream. Having em-
barked the first party, and given orders to Captain
Ogilvie to take charge of the embarcation of the next on
the return of the boats, I chose the boat in which was my
principal guide, one Hopkins, and a party selected agree-
ably to General Van Rensselaer's orders, for the advanced
guard of my detachment in the attack. The first that
reached the Canada shore was the boat in which Captain
Armstrong commanded, Captain Malcolm and Lieutenant
Hugunen being also on board ; and the pilot being skil-
ful, returned immediately and gave Captain Ogilvie an
opportunity of executing his orders in part. The boat to
which I had committed myself, (if the circumstances
under which I embarked are appreciated, that phrase will
not be deemed improper,) unhappily lost a row-lock on
the right, which gave it a direction down the stream ; and
although an officer. Lieutenant Fink, remedied that evil
in a great measure, so far as the oar was concerned, by
holding it, the pilot wanted skill or presence of mind to
alter his course ; and no one else knowing any thing of
the stream or point of landing, and it being perfectly dark,
we were obliged to confide in him. Having in this man-
ner gone farther down the stream than across it, we soon
fell below the others, and the fire of the leflt of the village
was directed against this boat. The pilot, panic-struck,
turned about, but being ordered with severity to make the

APPENDIX.

Canada shore at any point, he made another effort lileraUy
groaning with fear. Hopkins, who w&a called on to assist
him, was useless. The situation of a boat thus managed
on a rapid stream when descending, not only subjected to
the severest fire on the boats which was decidedly from
the lefl of the village, (where they seemed prepared for
accidents of this kind, or perhaps expected the principal
debarkation below,) but also separated from the corps,
may easily be imagined. It became necessary to take
the steering-oar from the boatman, and return to the
American shore. Here my guide, Hopkins, disappeared.
Being several hundred yards below the point of embarka-
tion, I returned on foot by the edge of the river, thinking
I could more immediately procure a proper pilot, and
cross from that place. In the meantime the troops
landed and formed immediately on the bank, about twenty
paces or less from the river, under Colonel Van Rens-
selaer. Here a severe fire continued for a few minutes ;
but having himself received several wounds, and no other
person being acquainted with the force or defences of the
enemy, or the topography of the village and its environs,
bd ordered the troops to fall below the bank by which
they were in a great degree covered. In this scene.
Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris of the thirteenth,
both men of the most estimable character, the latter quite
a youth and of extraordinary promise, were killed ; Lieu-
tenant Rathbone of the first artillery, severely wounded,
(since dead;) Captains Armstrong and Malcolm of the thir-
teenth, and Ensign Lent of the thirteenth, severely wound-
ed, and Captain Wool of the thirteenth, also wounded.

On my return to the upper ferry, I found there a scene
of confusion hardly to be described. The enemy concen-

I i

fPiUDIX.

trated their ip^Hpoa ou. embarking place : no person be-
ing charged with directing the boats and embarkation, or
with the government of th« boatmen, they forsook their
duty. lVr^'»t*ja unarquriinted wsfh the river (which was
indeed the ca*'' wif^ nio^t of the militia wh • had been en-
camped at Lewistoji u-veral weeks, whereas all the regu-
lars had been marched there that ni<rht,) would occasionally
hurry into a boat as they could find one, cross, and leave
it on the shore, perhaps to go adrifl, or else to be brought
back by the wounded and their attendants, and others re-
turning without order or permission; and these would land
where they found it convenient, and leave the boat where
they landed. During this state of things (the day just be-
ginning to break) Lieutenant Colonel Fenwick arrived with
a party consisting of Major Mullany's detachments of the
"iSth fi M 23d, and Capt. Machesney's of the 6th. He found
ine at ihe river's side, anxiously endeavoring to procure
boatinen, and was himself bitterly disappointed by the im-
possibility of crossing his detachment. Deeming it impro-
per to expose his troops in such a situation without use, he
countermarched in the best order possible, but not without
some confusion, owing to the narrowness of the ravine
which led down to the river, and the severe fire of grape,
cannister, and shells, which was directed on it. It was
about this period, and from this fire, that Captain Nelson
of the 6th, a gentleman equally respected and esteemed in
his oflicial character and private life, was mortally wounded.
While things were in this state on the American shore,
and partial, and generally unsuccessful and ruinous at-
tempts to cross were nade by diflferent officers, the troops
that had crossed asct. '.d by order of Coknel Van R.,
the east side of the h-H t. ' Oi-enstown. Captain Ogilvie
...... vi.^ ui^xii ,Ti„i Hi;, i-ui« 'Hiiiions Oi iiEVing led on this

APPENDIX.

8t8

occasion. It waa a few minutes a{\er dn '-break when
thia movement, which was uitofrelher anobaerved by the
enemy, was made. Finding no ^^ •'k, nor evfn a sentmel
on the hill, they marched to the north aide, hait way
down which wua a one gun battery open n rear. Near
it were paraded their principal force, which our bent intel-
ligence makoa to c jnaist of the two flunk companies of the
49th, conimrsiidcd by Captains WrIHam© and Dennis.
These fled on a single fire fiom the party in their rear on
the height, but soon rallied, and did not finally retreat un-
til they had made two unsuccessful attempts to get posses-
sion of the hill. In this affair Captain Wool of the 13th,
a gallant officer, commanded, and displayed a firmnew-s
and activity in the highest degree honorable to him. Capt.
Ogilvie and 1st Lieutenant Kearney of the 13th, 2d
Lieutenants Randolph of the Light Artillery, and Carr and
Hugunin of the 13th, and Ensign Reib, were also highly
distinguished. On the part of the British, General Brock,
urd his aid, Colonel M'Donald, fell ; both of the officers
commanding the companies of the 49th were wounded, and
they lost about twenty or thirty taken prisoners, most of
them wounded. This affair ended in a few minutes after
sunrise ; and of the American party^ few men and not an
officer was killed or wounded.

But it is necessary to state further particulars of the
disasters attending the embarkation and crossing of the re-
gulars at this period, as they were the great cause of the
destruction and confusion of the regulars that day, and of
so small a number of them being engaged in the subse-
quent scenes.

It appears, then, that of four regular officers commanding
corps, who actually attempted to cross before this affair of
\he morning, (all of them in different boats,) not one sue-

IS I-

214

APPENDIX.

ceeded. They were Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, Major
Mullany, Captain Machesney, and myself.

it appears, also, that five regular officers were taken
prisoners immediately on landing on the left of the village,
their parties being almost entirely cut to pieces in their
boats. These were, Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, Lieu-
tenants Phelps (13th) and Clark, (23d) which three were
severely wounded, and Lieutenants Bailey (3d Artillery)
and Turner (13th Infantry).

The names of several other officers might be mentioned
who were defeated in their attempts to land at the proper
point, and were obliged to return.

Our best intelligence on this subject authorises me to
state, that at lemt one hundred regulars were killed, wound-
ed, and taken prisoners on the left of the village before or
about sunrise.

About seven, or a ^ew minutes past seven o'clock, I
crossed; having for some time previous, as soon as the
crossing became practicable, collected different detach-
ments and sent them over. I found the senior officer
there to be Captain Machesney of the 6th, who had, how-
ever, crossed but a few minutes before under my orders.
Being in expectation of an immediate attack of the enemy
in force, I employed myself in disposing of the prisoners
which were still brought in ; checking the disorders to
which some of the troops seemed inclined ; and arranging
the fragments of the different detachments of regulars in
their proper order. The gun, in the battery which has
been mentioned, I found had been spiked by one of our
own artillerists. In the course of an hour, in which I was
momently expecting the approach of our main force with
its artillery, and equipage, and supplies, a dragoon who- I
puspect, threw himself into our hands, was brought to me

It ;«

APPENDIX.

215

with a dispatch addressed to the commanding officer at
Fort George. It was from the commanding officer at
Chippeway, stating that the corps (Colonel Scott's) which
had laid opposite the day preceding, had moved ; that every
thing was quiet there, and that he was ready to move.
After interrogating the bearer, I sent him, in charge of an
officer, with the dispatch to General Van Rensselaer. He
was a native of the United States, personally known to one
of our officers, and stated with great readiness and even
interest, that the enemy were already in motion from that
quarter, consisting of regulars and Indians, principally the
latter. This gave a favorable occasion for a movement
in the direction of Chippeway, and attacking this party on
their march, and preventing their junction with the main
force from Fort George. But at Queenstown every thing
was stagnant. No considerable or regular embarkation
appeared to be making on the opposite shore. A large
stone house on the left of the village remained still in pos-
session of the enemy, with two light pieces of artillery ; and
as not a piece of artillery had yet been brought over, it ap-
peared impossible to attack it advantageously. After some
time General Wadsworth appeared on the hill, thinking, as
he told me, that his example might have a better effect than
his orders in making the militia cross. He had seen the
dispatch above mentioned, and was aware of the state of
things on the hill. After some consultation he agreed that
I should recross and represent it to General Van Rensse-
laer : this I did on meeting the General on the road about
half a mile from the river. He informed me that he had
ordered Colonel Scott across, and that he would himself
cross in a short time. He ordered Captain Totten of the
engineers to repair to the opposite bank, and lay out a for-
tified encampment, and caused the intrenching tools to be

III,

4 '■r\ ,

if!

if d ■■ m

•i

216

APPENDIX.

brought down with a view to be sent after, which, however,
was neglected to be done. In the course of an hour,
while the General was giving his directions to his staff and
preparing for the passage of the river, a small and distant
fire of musketry was heard. It was evident that this at-
tack was from the forces from Chippeway, and that it was
in fact the commencement of an iction which must perhaps
decide the fate of the campaign in that quarter. At least
half of the boats we had in the morning were lost or da-
maged ; not half the troops had crossed, although it was
by this time about eleven o'clock in the morning ; Lieute-
nant-Colonel Scott had not received orders to take his ar-
tillery across ; Captain Gibson had taken but one piece —
a circumstance attributable to the small size of the only
boat calculated for that service ; and on reaching the em-
barking place, we found there a company of men, very
handsomely equipped, which was just on the point of
entering the boats when this firing was heard, but had
thereupon halted, and now absolutely refused to cross ;
regarding neither the orders, nor threats, nor remonstrances
of the General. Finding it useless to urge them further,
he crossed. Major Mullany joining us just as we went on
board the boat. The instant we ascended the hill, seeing
the regulars engaged three or four hundred yards from the
river, near a wood, I hastened to that point, and urging my
way directly to the front, found there Ijieutenant-Colonel
Scott, with a gallantry I cannot too much extol, leading and
animating the troops. This officer had a few minutes be-
fore checked the first charge of the Indians, and saved his
troops from the disorder they had nearly been thrown into
by the precipitate retreat of a party of militia. We soon
rftached the wood and nenetvated some distance into it ;
but after some time it was represented to Colonel Scott

;!:'«•

APPENDIX.

«17

that the Indians here presented no object for a charge ;
that while their fire was bloody, ours produced a compa-
ratively small effect ; that the wood was not so desirable a
position as one about two hundred yards nearer the river ;
and the intervening space being cleared, the attacks of the
Indians must be made in the open fielu, and would, of course,
be easily repelled ; and we might take the order and position
intended in the expected engagement. This change of
position being approved by him, was made gradually and
with care ; small detachments being ordered to move to dif-
ferent points in rear, as with a view to meet other attacks,
Colonel Scott and myself remaining with the last. After
this movement had been accomplished, the fire of the
Indians was of course less general and fatal, but it was
never intermitted during the remainder of the day. About
the time of this movement the first detachments of the Bri-
tish army were seen at a great distance on the plain on
their march from Fort George. Meanwhile our numbers
instead of increasing were diminishing. The boat in which
General Van llenssalaer came over, returned immediately
full of men, who had concealed themselves under the bank
for the purpose of seizing opportunities to recross, and had
embarked in his presence ; and I understand they even
crowded info the very boat in which he afterwards return-
ed, with a view to bring over his principal force which was
still on the American shore. At about a quarter of an
hour after two o'clock in the afternoon, the British troops
paraded in front of us, we being formed on the edge of the
hill — -the village in our rear, the river on our left, and a
bush cantonment on our right. In this were disposed a
number of regulars and a small party of volunteer riflemen,
commanded by Lieutenant Smith of the militia, who was
highly distinguished by his activity and courage. These

im«

■'; II

i ' \

« *i

« ^\

n: .

II. 4L

218

APPENDIX.

served to keep the Indians in chrck, although they still
maintained a galling tire on the right flank. My opinion
of the Ikilish force, founded on my own observation and
subsequent informalion is, that they had from four to five
hundred regulars, with f)ur pieces of artillery, from five to
six hundred militia, and three hundred Indians. Our whole
force under arms at this time was less than three hundred,
with but one piece of artillery, and not a dozen rounds for
it ; yet I am well persuaded a retreat, much less a surren-
der, was not thought of; and ihat the troops were in lact in
as high spirits as if we had been siiperior. Such was the
state of things when a note from General Van Hensselaer
to General Wadsworlh arrived, commanding him to save
his troops, informing him that not a regiri.ent or company
would move to reinforce us ; that he had himself seen the
movements of the enemy, and knew that we were overpow-
ered ; and that he would endeavor to furnish boats and
cover our retreat. He added in a postrript, that General
Wadsworth might nevertheless govern himself according
to circumstances under his more immediate vif^w. Gene-
ral Wadsworth called together the senior officers of corps,
read this letter, and asked their opinions. Nothing wag
decided on. Meanwhile, the enemy, manoBuvering with
great caution if not with some hesitation, moved in force
by their right towards the river in such a way as to recon-
noitre our whole front and left in part. Finding it difficult
to believe, perhaps, that so small a body of men as that in
view was the whole force they were to contend with, they
then retm-ned by their left, always skirting the woods, and
presented themselves in line on our riiiht flank. Durin>T
these marches and counter-marches of the enemy, we were
consulting, and at last determined to avail ourselves of the
possibility of riirenting suggested hi General Van Rensse-

APPENDIX.

*219

laer's letter. It was de^in;!!,..,!, .iccoidiiiglv, to throw our
right on the road leading- liom the hill to (lie village, and
form with the ri\er in our rear. To do this it w as neces-
sary to march by the left which brought the militia in front
of the column. They soon broke, on the commencement
of the enemy's fire, and a peifect rout ensued. IVot a
boat bo ng ready, nor any appearance of an attempt to
bring them, we surrendered— were taken into the village of
Queenstown, and treated with the greatest delicacy and
humanity by General Sheafle. .The wounded were attend-
ed to here ; the prisoners, private soldiers, were collected
and marched to Newark ; and, after being about an hour
in the village, we marched with a guj.vd, which was neces-
sary to protect us from the Indians, to Fort George. Wo
arrived there just at dark.

I am, with great respect.

Your obedient Servant,

JOHN CHRYSTIE,
Lieutenant-Colonel 13th.
General Thomas H. Gushing, Adjutant-General.

[No. 13.]

" Colonel Cochrane, formerly an aid-de-camp to Sir
George Prevost, and at present Military Inspector, and at-
tached to the District o(^ New Brunswick, states, * that the
regular troops in the Canadas and New Brunswick, at the
commencement of the war of 1812 between the United
clatcS and ixreat junta.!!!, did nut excccu t;vo ihousund

APPENDIX.

men ; but were increased from time to time, till, in 1815,
their numbers amounted to about sixteen thousand five

hundred.'

(Signed,) James Watson Webb."

April 201K 1830.

[No. 14.]

For orders given from the 26th of June to the 1st of
August to General Dearborn, see Appendix No. 10. To
these we now add the following :—^MgMs/ the Sth.^
" Should the recruits and volunteers be found inadequate
to immediate operations on the frontier, you are instructed
to call on any Governor, or commander of a division or a
brigade, for as many militia as you may deem necessary."
Mgust 16</i.— " Proceed with the utmost vigor in your
operations." Mgiist 26//i.— " Every thing indicates the
necessity of early and efficient operations on the Niagara
and posts below." September 21s/.—" Your arrangements
for an attack on the British posts on the Niagara will, it is
hoped, be in season." The General about this time pro-
posed an attack to be made at the same time on Fort
George, Kingston, and Montreal ; to which the Secretary
answered, " The Piesident thinks not a moment should be
lost in getting possession of the British posts at Niagara
and Kingston, or at least of the former."

APPENDIX.

221

[No. 15.]

Lcltera from the Secretary of JVar to General Dearborn,
War Department^ February 10//j, 1813.

*' I have the President's orders to commimiciitc to you,
DS expeditiously as possible, the outline of campaign which
you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper
Canada : —

1st. 4000 troops will be assembled at Sackett's harbor.

2d. 3000 will be brought together at Buffalo and its
vicinity.

3d. The former of these corps will be embarked and
transported under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, where
they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison, and the British
ships wintering in the harbor of that place will be its first
object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of
Upper Canada) the stores collected, and the two frigates
building there. Its third object, Forts George and Eric
and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last
there will be a co-operation between the two corps. Tho
composition of these will be as follows:

1st. Bloomfield's brigade, - . - 1,43G

2d. Chandler's do, - - - l,044

3d. Philadelphia detachment, - - - 400

4th. Baltimore do, - - . 300

5th. Carlisle do, - - - 200

€th. Greenbush do, - - - 400

7lh. Sackett's Harbor do, - - - - 250

—J —

19*

222

APPENDIX.

8lh. Several corps at Buffalo under the com-
mand of General Porter, and the re-
cruits belonging thereto,

3,000

> *

Total, 7,030
The time for executing the enterprise will be governed
by the opening of Lake Ontario, which usually takes place
about the 1st of April.

The Adjutant-General has orders to put the more south-
ern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible.
The two brigades on Lake Champlain you will move so
as to give them full time to reach their place of destination
by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I
think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by
some new raised regiments from the east.

You will put into your movements as much privacy as
may be compatible with their execution. They may be
masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and
that their principal effort will be made on the Niagara, in
co-operation with General Harrison. As the route to
Sackett's Harbor and to Niagara is for a considerable dis-
tance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders,
that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at
Lake Champlain.

(Signed,) John Armstrong."

War Department, Fehmai^j 24//i, 1813.
" Before I left New-York, and, till very recently, since
my arrival here, I was informed through various channels,
that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not prac-
ticable on account of the snow, which generally lies to the
depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that
northern region during those seasons. Hence it is that

APPENDIX.

223

>»

in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest
and best to make the attack by a combination of naval and
mililary means, and to approach our object, not by directly
crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out
from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy ot
the fleet. liator informalion differs from that on which this
plan was founded ; and the fortunate issue of Major For-
syth's last expedition shews, tliat small enterprises, at least,
may be successfully executed at the present season. The
advices, given in your letter of the 14th instant, have a
bearing also on the same point, and to the same effect. If
the enemy be really weak at Kingston, and approachable
by land and ice, Pike, (who will be a brigadier in a day or
two,) may be put into motion from Lake Champlain by the
Chateaugay route, (in sleighs) and, with the two brigades,
cross the St. Lawrence where it may be thought best, de-
stroy the armed ships, and seize and hold Kingston, until
you can join him with the other corps destined for the fu-
ture objects of the expedition ; and, if pressed by Prevost
before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw him-
flelf to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security, on our
side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to
the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence
is now every where well bridged, and oflTers no obstruction
to either attack or retreat. Such a movement, will, no
doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet
him. The dilemma it presents will be serious. Either
he must give up his western posts, or, to save them, he must
carry himself in force, and promply, to Upper Canada. In
the latter case he will be embarrassed for subsistence.
His convoys of provision will be open to our attacks, on a
line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at
Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage

*ll

llll

224

APPENDIX.

will be, to let us into the secret of hia real strcnc* i. If
he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to re-
cover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all
maintain himself at Montreal and on Lake Cham|)lain, ho
is stronger thin I imagined, or than any well-authenticated
reports make him to be.

With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we
have nothing to fear ; because, as stated above, Pr(* .ost's
Httention must be given to the western posts and to our
movements against them. He will not dare to advance
southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank
and menacing his line of communication. But on the
other supposition, they (the magazines) may be easily
secured ; 1st, by taking them to Wilbhorough ; or 2d,
to Burlington ; or 3d, by a militia call, to protect them
where they are. Orders are given for the march of the
eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two
companies of axe-men sent to open the route to th^
Chaudiere.

" The southern detachments will be much stronger than
I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will amount to
nearly one thousand effectives.

(Signed,) "JOHN ARMSTRONG."

[No. 16.]

Extract from a letter of the late Major-General Brown.
^^ Ilead-Q'iarlcrs, BrownvUlc, July 20lh, 1813.
" I have delayed giving the estimate you requested, of
the enemy's forces in Canada, during the years 1612 and

APPENDIX.

225

:f^. If

)r to re-
after all
>lain, ho
nticated

that we
ro vest's
J to our
advance
kis flank
on the

easily
; or 2d,
ct them

1 of the
and tv'O
! to tho

igcr than
lount to

1813 of the late war, that I might examine my minutes
and papers the more carefully.

" At the commencement of the war, Sir George Provost
had the conunand of very low regulars. The number
placed under tlie orders of Covernor Brock for the de-
fence of Upper Canada, was never equal to twelve hun-
dred men ; and at no time did the; couuuand of this
distinguished chief consist of less than ♦ one third of old
men and invalids fit only for garrison duty.' No con-
siderable increase of force on the part of the enemy took
place during the campaign of IS 12, and 1 have never been
able to discover that at the opening of the campuign of
1813, [June 26th,] there were more than five thousand
regular troops in the Canadas. The force, whatever it
may have been, was principally in the Upper province.
By the 27tb of May of that year, the enemy had assem-
bled on the Niagara about two thousand men, to resist
any incursion — and at Kingston, about one thousand, for
the projected attack on Sacket's Harbor, under the com-
mand of Sir George in person. The two columns would
not have exceeded three thousand combatants, and I have
it from unquestionable authority that the left column sus-
tained a loss of fuliybur hundred men."

■%

Brown.
1813.
3sted, of
812 and

[No. 17.]

Letter of Colonel Cc-^^wr, of the ISth of March, 1816.
»* Of the immense dep6t I know nothing but by report,
which stated that it had been carried to Sacket's Harbor,

fai

1 '

1 ^

*' -^

tri

•;■ I*

22G

APPKNDIX.

and had thoro boon burnt hy the mistake of the Commo-
dore's brother. Of the contents of Slieafl's pupiM's, muny
of which Coh)nol King and njyself examined, I know
enough to convinie me th:U dm ing the uinter and spring
of 1613, the L'rltish garrison of Kingston was extremely
weak and (juitc iusulbcient for defence.

*' 1 am, &c.
(Signed) "SAMUEL CONNOR."

"General Armstrong."

[No. IS.]

Letter from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn.

{Private)

" Washincrlon^ \5lh Maij^ 1813.
"Dear General, — Your affair of the 27th ult. is
matter of public and private congratidation ; much quali-
fied, however, by the loss of Pike and the escape of the
frigate, the capture or destruction of which, was, according
to the Commodore's calculations, to give him a decided
and permanent ascendency on the Lake. Another draw-
back upon it, less apt to be noticed by ordinary critics,
but in itself very vexatious, is the escape also of Sheafe
with the main body of h s regular force. Under the
present circumstances of Great Britain, bound as she is,
neck and heels, to the prosecution of the war in Europe,
she can ill afford to send to this country, cither men or
money, to support the peUle guerre in which she has so
inconsiderately involved herself with us. From informa-

AVfCNDIX.

£27

tion the most direct unci rcspcctiiblo, I am assured that
her re'iular force in hoth the Cana;las lias at no time sinco
the declaration of wur exceeded three thousand men; and
that at the present time, by casualties, (death, desertion,
&c., always at work thinning the raidts of an army) this
force is reduced at leiist one-tifth. Takinjr then this fact
for granted, we caimot doubt but that in all cases in which
a British commundor is constrained to act deiensiveiy,
his policy will be that ad )pte:l by Sheafc — to prefer tho
preservat on of his troops to that of his post, and thus
carrying off the kernel leave us only the shell. To coun-
teract this policy, becomes, therefore, a special duty on
our part — requiring the strictest attention, as well in pro-
jecting^ as in executing our attacks. On this head, my
distance from you and my very insufficient knowledge of
the topography of the country in which you act, make it
improbable that any suggestion 1 could make, has not
already presented itself to your mind. As a general
maxim, however, I may be permitted to say, that in con-
centrating our whole force on any given point of an
enemy's position, we necessarily leave all others open to
him for escape ; whence it follows, that to deprive him
of this advantage, two attacks (if our force permit it)
should be made, and one of these so directed as to shut
him out from all means of retreat ; or at least to force
him into roads, where finding little or no accommodation,
he may sustain the greatest possible loss. In your late
affair, I have thought (perhaps erroneously) that had the
descent been made between the town and the barracks,
things would have turned out better. On that plan, the
two batteries you had to encounter, wouic have been lefl
out of the combat ; and Sheafe, instead of retreating to

pi:

Jr. ^

is*. ^

r - **

i!|l

lir

228

APPENDIX.

Kingston, must have sought retngu at fort George. In
the afTiir before yon, nothing Mill, I hope, be omitted, nor
any thing be misunderstood ; and that with regard to the
garrison in particular, it will not be permitted to escapia
to-day that it may fight us to-morrow. For obvious rea-
sons, I have made this letter private. On the records of
the War Department it would appear to carry with it
an official cens-ure, whereas, it is in truth nothing more
than the suggestions of one, who for both your sake,
and his own, wishes you the fullest and most unqualified
prosperity."

[No. 19.]

*^ Head-Quarters, Kingston, July lltk, 1813.

"Dear Sir, — Having sent Captain McDonald to
England with despatches, your letter of the 27th ultimo,
addressed to him, I opened. I was much pleased it con-
tained a report of Mr. R. Dickson's arrival at Mackinac
on the 11th.

" Your wants have been supplied as far as I had the
ability of doing so. In addition to the specie and paper-
money, and articles of clothing, forwarded for the right
division from hence, in charge of Captain Chambers
and Lieutenant M'Clean, a considerable supply of shoes,
trowsers, &c., w^ere eml)arked in a flotilla going to York
a few days ago, for Detroit and Michilimackinac.

" The ordnance and naval stores you require must be
taken from the enemy, whose resources on Lake Erie

APPENDIX.

must become yours. 1 am much mistaken if you do not
find Captain Barclay well disposed to play that game. I
conclude the whole of the forty-first regiment is placed
under vour command. The presents for the Indians are
not arrived from England, but I shall direct two hundred
guns for them, to be purchased at Montreal and forwarded
to you, with a proportion of powder and ball by the Ottawa.
" I request you will communicate with me upon all
occasions, with the characteristic frankness which disUn-
guishes a zealous and good soldier.

" I have the honor, &c.

"GEORGE PROVOST."

« Brigadier-General Proctor."

SL David's, July 18/A, 1813.
" Sir,— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of the 10th instant, and have to inform you
in reply thereto, that a force of nearly four hundred men
are directed to march in successive divisions upon Long
Point, as detailed in my letter to General Proctor of this
day's date. I am fully impressed with the indispensable
necessity of an attack upon Presque Isle, and should have
co-operated with you long ago, had I possessed the means
of so doing. I trust it will not yet be too late, and that
you will lose no time in making your arrangements for
taking up the troops from Long Point.
» I have the honor to be. Sir,

" Your most obedient servant,

"FRANCIS DE ROTTENBURG,

" Major- General.^*

«« Commodore Barclay."

U 1 '

li> ' 9

ill

Pil

lii

;i -> m

A ••'

fi ,1

U 1

230

APPENDIX.

[No. 20.]

Extract from Governor Duncari's Report.
" McAffee, the historian of the late war, and Dawson,
the biographer of General Harrison, have studiously kept
out of view, that the object of the invasion was the de-
struction of our ships under Commodore Perry at Presgue
Isle, and the boats and stores at Cleveland. These were
looked upon with great solicitude by the British, were re-
connoitred, and on one or two occasions were attempted
to be destroyed by landing a small force from their fleet.
" They have also failed to account for the movement
of the whole British force down the Lake in the direction
of Cleveland and Erie, before their defeat at Sandusky ;
which was attacked to gratify their Indian allies, who de-
manded the scalps and plunder of the place. They have
kept out of view the fact, that General Harrison had deter-
mined to retreat to the interior after burning all the supplies
he had collected ; that he ordered Major Croghan to aban-
don and burn fort Stephenson ; that his refusal to obey and
failure to arrive at head-quarters, prevented this retreat,
and consequent destruction of our fleet and millions of public
stores; and the exposure also, o^ five hundred miles of
frontier, to the combined enemy. Both have stated, that
General Harrison never doubted that Major Croghan
would be able to repulse an enemy of near two thousand
men (and which they say he understood to be five thou-
sand) with one hundred and thirty men, (Croghan's efTective
force on the day of the battle,) one six-pounder, with am-
munition for only seven shols, and -ahout forty rounds for the

APPENDIX.

231

small arms^ when the fact was notorious, that General Har-
rison was heard to say during the siege, while the firing
could be hoard in his camp, and speaking of Croghan,
* The blood be on his own head^ I wash my hands of it,,' not
doubting for a moment, nor did any one with him, that the
garrison would be cut off.

" These historians have also published two letters, as
part of their history, written by Major Croghan and others,
to allay the excitement against Harrison^ for his neglect to
support Croghan^ when he lay ivilhin three hours^ march of
the fort,, with a strong force. Those patriotic officers
wrote these letters, it has been said, to save the army and
prevent them from following up the indignation manifested
in the States against the General destined to command
them — believing it of the utmost importance at that mo-
ment, that he should stand well with the army and the
country; and it is further said that they were written
under the beUef, that every thing should be placed before
the pubUc in a proper light at the end of the campaign.
(Signed) "JOSEPH DUNCAN."

" General Mercer,
Chairman of a Committee of the House of Representatives.^*

Second Order to Major Croghan.

*^ Head-Quarters^ Camp Seneca, \

^'Mjutant- General's Office, July 27M, 1813. ]
" Sir,-— Immediately on receiving this letter you will
abandon fort Stephenson, set fire to it and repair with
your command this night to head-quarters. Cross the
river and come up upon the opposite side. If you should
deem, and find it impracticable to make good your march

232

APPENDIX.

to this station, take the road to Huron and pursue it with
the utmost circumspection and despatch. By command.
"God be with you.
"A. H. HOLMES, Assistant JldjulanUGeneraU
" P. S. Effect your retreat in the manner heretofore
directed you.

" A. H. HOLMES, w2. A, G.»
" Major Crochan."

1^ I

[No. 21.]

Letter from Colonel R, M. Johnson,

'■^Decemhfi.r 'M.iU 1834.

"Dear Sir, — I have just receiv^ed your favor of the
17th, containing certain inquiries as to the battle of the
Thames, 6th of October, 1813, in Upper Canada.

*' 1st. Tlie mounted regiment under my command, con-
sisted of one thousand men at the time of the charge.

" 2d. They were armed with muskets and rifles, and
tomahawks or small hatchets, and butcher-knives.

"3d. The British had one brass field-piece, (six-
pounder,) the same that was taken by us in the revolu-
tionary war at Saratoga, and retaken from us at the
surrender of Detroit by General Hull. It was placed in
the road near the Thames, not far from the centre of the
Britis line.

** 4th. The British formed two lines, resting on the
Thames and running out to a swamp two or three hua-
dred yai'ds from the river and parallel with it.

APPENDIX.

233

((

" 6th. I presume Proctor was stationed considerably
in the rear of his troops, and probably commenced his
flight the moment he saw his forces defeated and taken
prisoners.

6th. I think the best ground for defence was selected.

7th. The [militia] infantry were stationed a reasona-
ble distance in the rear of the mounted regiment, in order
of battle, say from one half to one mile. My brother,
Colonel James Johnson, charged the British forces with
the first battalion, (five hundred men,) and succeeded
without the loss of a man — one horse killed, shot in the
head — in advancing, he received the fire of one line of
the British, and then of the other, in close succession ;
the cannon was not fired. I crossed the swamp with the
second battalion, (five hundred men,) and fought against
the Indians, (supposed fourteen hundred warriors, under
Tecumseh,) without any aid whatever. A regiment was
ordered to re-enforce me at the close of the battle ; but
did not reach us until the battle was over and the Indians
had fled. The official report is incorrect in saying, that
the hard fighting on the left was by a part of Governor
Shelby's men. We had no assistance, except that of a few
scattering volunteers from the infantry, who might have
pushed into our ranks. I was wounded and could give
no information to the commanding General, and he did
not know at the time he made his report, that I had crossed
the swamp with my regiment ; as when he gave the order
to make the charge, he thought from my information, that
I could not cross the swamp ; which I discovered I could
do a few minutes after he left me, and believing that it
was most safe, and that my regiment was sufficient, I

divided my force as stated above, and the victory on both

-20

234

APPENDIX.

sides was complete ; but, no doubt, the instantaneous
capture of the British, and the early dealii of the Indian
chief, were powerful operating causes in our favor.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) R. M. Johnson.
N. B. // is due to truth to state, that I requested Gene-
ral Harrison to permit me to charge, and knoioing that 1
had trained my men for it during our short service, he gave
the order.

[No. 22.]

ill

Red Hook, January 2d, 1812.

Dear Eustis— Yesterday's mail brought your hypo-
thetical note, which I hasten to answer by a ^e\v suggestions
that, if approved, may be readily drawn out into^^s much
detail as may be useful.

1st. An abundant supply of what is technically called
the materiel of war is indispensable. This single lerm in-
cludes arms, equipments, and ammunition, in all their
varieties; tents, blankets, and clothing; cavalry and
draught-horses ; oxen, wagons, carts, entrenching tools,
&c. &c. To make a competent provision of these will
require a large expenditure of money, but to this you must
submit, for two unanswerable reasons— the one, that without
them, war cannot be made, either morally or successfully
the other, that their cost, now, will be from 50 to 100 p(^
cent, less than it will be after the declaration of war.

APPENDIX.

235

antaneous
he Indian
)r.

aNSON.

led Gene-
ng that 1
By he gave

1812.
ur hypo-
^gestions
as much

ly called
lerm in-
all their
ilry and
ig tools,
lese will
'^ou must
t without
Jssfully;
looker

2d. When obtained, these supplies should be placed m
magazines, the location of which must be governed by two
considerations — the security of the articles deposited in
them, and the facility and safety with which these may bo
brought into use. To each magazine should be attached a
Laboratory, for fixing ammunition, making and mending
gun and other carriages, repairing arms, &c.

3d. If you have remote posts, liable to attack, and diffi-
cult to sustain, and having no direct or important bearing
on the progress or issue of the war, hasten to dismantle
them and withdraw the garrisons.

4th. Resting, as the hue of Canadian defence does, in
its whole extent, on navigable lakes and rivers, no time
should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both, for
coiteris paribus^ the belligerent who is the first to obtain
this advantage, v/ill (miracles excepted) win the game.
Whether the commercial craft, at present employed on
these waters, can be made useful for the purpose, I do not
know ; but among the sages, now assembled at Washing-
ton, you cannot fail to find some one who can answer the
question.

6th. Without a knowledge, nearly approximating the
truth, of the force you will have to contend with ; of the dis-
position made of this, and of the character, physical and
artificial, of the posts occupied by it, you will be compelled
to make war conjecturally ; and, of course, on data fur-
nishing no just conclusions with regard to either the number
or composition of your own army, or of the kind and ex-
tent of operations which ought to be assigned to it. That
a state of peace, like the present, will be more favorable
than one of war for acquiring this preliminary information,
cannot be doubted ; and if it be true, as I have been told.

236

APPENDIX.

that the British posts are victualled by American contract-
ors, these agents (who by their vocation must have freo
access to them) may probably form the safest and surest
medium through which to obtain it. But, whatever be the
means employed for accomplishing this object, a moment
should not be lost in putting them into exercise.

6th. The number and composition of your army (as
already suggested) should be decided by the service given
it to perform, and the kind and degree of resistance vour
enemy may be able to oppose to it. Though, from pre-
sent appearances, it be true that the exigencies of the war
in Europe will disable England from sending promptly any
important aid, strictly military, to the Canadas ; it does
not follow that she will omit to employ such other means
as she may possess, to supply the deficiency. Of these,
the most vexatious to us would be a portion of her armed
vessels, acting separately or in squadron, on our long and
defenceless line of sea-coast ; while, at the same time,
hordes of savages are let loose on the women and child-
ren of the West. And that, in the event of war. Great
Britain will not hesitate to employ this policy in both
its branches, cannot be doubted by those who have any re-
collection of what her past conduct towards the United
States has been, or who are now capable of perceiving the
impunity to herself and the mischief to us with which she
may pursue it.

From this general view of the subject it follows, that in
composing your army, you must be careful to provide corps
specially adapted for two purposes — the protection oj your
own frontiers^ eastern and western, and the invasion of
those of your enemy. Oi* each of these I offer the fol-
lowing outline.

APPENDIX.

237

contract-
ave fieo
id surest
3r be the
moment

irmy (as
ice given
nee vour
"om pre-
' the war
»ptly any
; it does
3r means
)f thesie,
T armed
long and
ne time,
id child-
r, Great
in both
3 any re-
3 United
iving the
hich she

!, that in
de corps
I oj your
asion of
r the fol-

For the former, divide your coast into military districts
— open in each a rendezvous for volunleer'assoclaiion and
local defence, with engagements commensurate with the
war, and pay and emoluments, such as are now given to
the regular army. Of this description of force the maxi-
mum may be twenty battalions located as follows :

1 at Portsmouth, 2 at Boston, 1 at Newport, 3 at New-
York, 1 at Philadelphia, 3 at Baltimore, 3 at Norfolk, 2 at
Charlestown, 1 at Savannah, and 3 at New-Orleans.
Each of these stations to be well supplied with heavy guns
for position — furnaces for heating shot, light pieces, well
horsed, for field service, and muskets and bayonets for
camp and garrison duty. Corps, thus constituted and
equipped, well instructed in the use of their arms and res-
pectably commanded, will do much to check, if they do not
entirely prevent, predatory excursion — the evil most to be
apprehended from the crews of single ships, or from those
of small squadrons not sustained by infantry.

For western defence employ western men, accustomed
to the rifle and the forest, and not unacquainted with the
usages and stratagems of Indian warfare. To their cus-
tomary arms add a pistol and a sabre ; and to ensure ce-
lerity of movement, mount them on horseback. Give
them a competent leader and a good position, within
striking distance of Indian villages or British settlements.
Why not at Detroit, where you have a strong fortress and
a detachment of artillerists 1 Recollect, however, that this
position, far from being good, would be positively bad
un'ess your naval means have an ascendancy on Lake
Erie ; because Buffalo, Erie, Cleaveland, and the two
Sanduskys must be its base or source of supply. The
maximum of this corps may be six battalions.

238

APPENDIX.

iii

! it

Lastly, for a successful invasion of the Canadas, (the
great operation of the war, because that only by which
Great liritain can be brought to a sense of justice,) you
must rely on a regular army. Of this description of force,
you have now the skeletons of ten regiments ; which, if
completed, will give you ten thousand combatants — a corps
that, in the present circumstances of England, and aided by
militia for the purposes of demonstration, will be compe-
tent to great achievements. Hasten then to fill up the rank
and tile of your present establishment : and to existin<»- in-
ducements for enlisting, add an increased pay, and a liberal
bounty at the end of the war.

Should better information with regard to your enemy's
strength make an increase of your own expedient, give
one or two additional battalions to each of your seven regi-
ments of infantry — a mode of increasing an army much to
be preferred to creations altogether new. For, besides
being obviously more economical, the direct association of
raw recruits with old soldiers has the effect of making the
former efficient in half the time it would otherwise take to
do so — the example of comrades being a principle of
tuition much more active than the instruction of officers.

On this head it is but necessary to add, that the whole of
your disposable or field force, when obtained, should be
immediately assembled at some given point, from which,
the moment that war siiall be authorized, it may begin its
operations. Under present views, Albany, or its neighbor-
hood, should be the place of this rendezvous ; because,
besides other recommendations, it is here that all the roads
leading from the cenrral portion of the United States to the
Canadas, diverge — a circumstance which, while it keeps
up your enemy's doubts as to your real point of attack,

' b

APPKNDIX.

239

cannot fail to keep his means of defence in a state of
division.

7lh. In sketching the composition of an army, two
branches of it, the one having charge of its discipline and
its movements, the other of its subsistence, must not be
forgotten For the first (a General Staff) I refer you to
Grimoai(i\s publication, which I sent to the war department
from Paris, some years ago. If this book be not already
translated into English, no time should be lost in natu-
ralizing it for the use of the army.

The second or feeding department, is of three kinds —
that founded on Caesar's maxim, that " war should sustain
war," though fashionable at present, is, in fact, a system ot
indiscriminate plunder ; forbidden alike, as I hope, by the
moral feelings and political views of the United States.
The remaining two are sufficiently known, under the namea
of the Contract and Commissariat systems. To recom-
mend either, as exclusively and under all circumstances the
best, would show only great ignorance or great folly. In
old and well-peopled districts, where corn and cattle are
abundant, prices little subject to change, roads safe and
unobstructed, and the means of transportation (teams or
boatsy easily procured, the contract plan is the best— be-
cause the most economical, sufficiently punctual in the dis-
charge of its engagements, and, from the settled character
of its terms, rarely, if ever, embarrassing the government
with extra or unexpected charges. In districts of an op-
posite character, where the population is thin and poor,
supplies scarce and high priced, roads few and bad, and
much exposed to obstruction, the commissariat must be
submitted to ; though certainly liable to great abuse, from
the ignorance, indolence, or knavery of the agents era-

240

PPENDIX.

. •

ployed. The best remedy for the evilH of this system
will be fomid in subjecting the agents to military law, and
in rigorously enforcing its provisions.

8th. and lastly. A project of campaign, conformed to
military maxims, must embrace three things: 1st. Jin
object of important or decisive character; the attainment
of which will give a successful issue to the campaign if
not to the war. 2d. Ji line of operation, as short and per-
pendicular to this object, as possible ; and 3d. Ji tvell
secured base, on which must be accumulated and ready for
transportation, all supplies necessary to sustain the opera-
tion. Each of these rules has its own special laws, but it
is only of the first that I will say more at present than a
few words.

In invading a neighboring and independent territory like
Canada — having a frontier of immense extent ; destitute
of means strictly its own for the purposes of defence ; se-
parated from the rest of the empire by an ocean, and hav-
ing to this but one outlet — this outlet forms your true object
or point of attack; because, if gained, every thing depend-
ing upon it is gained also. Such was the consequence of
the capture of Quebec in the war, which ended in 1763 ;
and such would again be the consequence of the reduction
of that capital, had we the menna to effect it. tnfortu-
nately, from deficient foresight in the government, .hese
are wanting. Still, though unable to do what in the ab-
stract would be best, it by no means follows that we should
omit to do what may be both practicable and expedient.
Such, in my opinion, would be the capture oj Montreal —
a post, which, commanding alike the navigation of the St.
Lawrence and the Otawa, if seized and heid, would give
the same control over all that portion of the Canadaa lying

APPENDIX.

241

westward of itfscif, that Quebec now exercises over tlie
whole territory : Kiu^rston, York, Fort Cieor^ro, F<,rt Erie,
and Maiden, out oil' from their common base, must soon
ni](i necessarily fall. To reach this object, your line of
operation may be taken on either side of I^ake Champlain,
provided you have secured the conunand of the lake ; in
which case also, Albany, Greenbush, Troy, Whitehall, &c.
covered by a dense population, or secured by a large
river, no where fordubic by infantry, will give you a suffi-
cient base. When begun, the movement should be made
rapidly and audaciously ; and the better to secure its suc-
cess, three demonstrations by masses of militia, may be
employed : one on the Niagara, to keep within their walls
the garrisons of Forts George and Erie ; a second at
Sackett's Harbor, to produce a similar eflect on whatever
force may be found at Kingston ; and a third in Vermont,
so placed on the eastern side of the Sorel as to menace
the Biitish posts on that river.

Though taking for granted, as stated above, that the
capture of Montreal would involve that of all posts west-
ward from itself, it will no do-jbt be proper that the six bat-
talions of mounted gun-men should march on Maiden, as
soon as they shall be apprised that the campaign on Lake
Champlain is opened. And here we must stop : what
remains of the subject, being Tactical^ and governed by
circumstances as they occur in the camp or the field,
must be entirely left to the genius and judgment of your
Commanding General. I am, &c.

(Signed) John Armstrong.

Hon. William Eustis, Secretary of War.

243

APPENDIX.

[No. 23.]

Letter from General Harrison to the Secretary of War.
" Head-Quarters, Chilicolhe, March Mtk 1813.

i( SiR^ — The known candor of your character, is a suf-
ficient security for my receiving your pardon for the Hberty
I take, in making objections to the plan of operations
communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there
is a positive certainty of our getting the command of
Lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand
five hundred, or even three thousand, well-disciplined
men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland,
and landing on the northern shore, below Maiden, would,
perhaps, be the one by which that place and its depen-
dencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted
with the extent of the preparations that are making to
obtain the naval superiority upon Lake Eric, but, shoiild
they fail, and the troops be assemMcd at Cleveland, it
would be difficult to get again upon the proper track f )r
making the attack round the head of the Lake. The at-
tempt to cross the Lake from Cleveland should ))ot be
made with any other than well-disciplin(>d troops. A
comparatively smaller number of men of this description
could effect the object, and for those, means of convey-
ance might be found ; but the means of transporting such
an army as would be required of militia or undisciplined
regulars, could not be procured. I can see no reason
why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of em-
barkation for the troops, or the deposite of provisions or
stores. These are already accumulated at the Rapids of
Miami, nr in situations to be easilv sent thither, to an

APPENDIX.

243

amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted
campaign. Although the expense and diflSculty of trans-
porting the provisions, artillery and stores for an army,
round the head of the Lake, would be very considerable,
the Lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy bag-
gage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would
find no difficulty in the land route. The force contem-
plated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to
secure success. Admitting that the whole should be
raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little
superior to militia ; the officers having, with scarcely an
exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct
their men ; we have therefore no alternative but to make
up by numbers the deficiency of discipline.

" I am well aware of the intolerable expense which at-
tends the employment of a large militia force. We are
now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors which
made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our
supplies are procured, and so deposited that the period
for the march of the army from the advanced posts can
be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need
not be called out until the moment they are to act. Ex-
perience has convinced me that militia are more efficient
in the early, than in the latter part of their service. Upon
the whole, it is my decided opinion, that the Rapids of
Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops,
as well as the principal dep6t. Indeed, it must neces-
sarily be the first deposite — the provisions for the army
being so placed that they can be taken to the Lake in no
other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of
ammunition are already there. Boats and perouges have
been built in considerable numbers on the Au Glaize and

111^

It' .;

f^J..

i"'!

i!'

! I

244

APPENDIX.

St. Mary's rivers ; and every exertion is now making to
increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking
down the provisions to the Rapids, and for coasting the
Lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I hod
calculated upon being able partially to use this mode of
transportation, even if the enemy should continue their
naval superiority on the Lake ; but with this advantage on
our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely
and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and
perouges, which could be taken into the strait to transport
the army to the Canada shore.

" As I have before observed, the army, unencumbered
with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching
round the Lake at any season, but what the enemy would
create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that
would be irresistible.

" The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my
letter to Colonel Munroe, arose from the time that would
be necessary to construct boats after we should have ar-
rived at the strait ; but this objection is entirely obviated
by our obtaining the command of the Lake, as the boats
and perouges built upon the Miami will answer the pur-
pose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion
is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your let-
ter, but a large auxiliary corps of mihtia should be em-
ployed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness
of troops of that description. This, however, could not
be an object, considering the very short time that it would
be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the
commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed,
and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and
accomplish the object, and return home in two months.

APPENDIX.

245

" Amongst the reasons which make it necessary to
employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay
and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail
in the western country; numbers must give that confi-
dence which ought to be produced by conscious valor
and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a
superior degree, than amongst the greater part of the
militia who were with me through the winter. The new
draughts from this State are entirely of another character,
and are not to be depended on. I have no doubt, how-
ever, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured,
and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Ken-
tucky would furnish some regiments that would be not
inferior to ♦ ^ -^o that fought at the river Raisin ; and they
were, in r y .pinion, superior to any militia that ever took
the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have
been formed in Kentucky, to offer me their services, and
several of them were intended for twelve ; ^ ."^ hs' volun-
teers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of taking the
field in person — a number of good men will follow him.

" Every exertion shall in the meantime be used to
forward the recruiting service ; for a few weeks I think
that my service would be more useful in that than in any
other employment."

" War Department, Jlpril 4M, 1813.
« Sir, — Your despatches of the 17th ultimo, from Chili-
cothe, have been received, and I hasten to repeat to you
the views of the President, in relation to the next cam-
paign, and the injunctions growing out of these, with
regard to the employment of militia, &c.

»* Our first object is to set a command of the Lakes.

21*

246

APPENDIX.

IfP?

Means to accomplish this object have been taken, and
we have the fullest assurance, that by the first day of June
it will be accomplished.

"This fact assum^id, there can be no longer a doubt
by what means, or by what route, the division of the army
assigned to you, ought to approach Maiden. A passage
by water will carry you directly to the fortress you would
attack, without impairing your strength by fatigue, or
diminishing it by battle. A passage by land will, on the
other hand, call for great efforts, and expose you to great
losses, which if they do not destroy, will at least cripple
you. The former will be easy, safe and economical ; the
latter, difficult, dangerous, and enormously expensive.

" On the other supposition, that we fail to obtain com-
mand of the Lake, a new question will arise — whether
the campaign shall take an offensive or defensive char-
acter ? Be this question determined as it may, the utmost
extent which can be given to the force employed, will be
seven thousand effectives.

" Various reasons determine this point. The enemy
have never had in the field, for the defence of Maiden,
more than two thousand men. Their number has no
doubt been hitherto limited by their means of subsistence,
and this cause is not hkely to suffer any material change
in their favor during the ensuing campaign. More than
seven thousand men, therefore, would be unnecessary on
our part. Again, to maintain a greater number, would
be impracticable in the present state of the treasury.

" It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and
distinctly, the kind offeree the government mean hereafter
to employ in offensive operations, if it can be obtained.

♦* When the legislature, at their last session, adopted the

111 M

Kit

APPENDIX.

247

taken, and
ay of June

;er a doubt
•f the army
A passage
you would
Eatigue, or
nil, on the
)u to great
ast cripple
iiical ; the
ensive.
•tain com-
— whether
sive char^
the utmost
id, will be

he enemy
f Maiden,
3r has no
bsistence,
ial change
VEore than
essary on
•er, would
jury.

[early and
I hereafter
jtained.
[opted the

measure of augmenting the army to fifty-two regiments
of the line, it was expressly with the view of superseding
hereafter the necessity of employing militia, excepting in
moments of critical invasion. In obedience to this policy,
the President assigned to the eighth military district of the
United States, four of these new regiments, which, if filled,
and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that
district, and the twenty-fourth now in march for it, will give
a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This
number forbids the belief, that any employment of militia
draughts will be necessary, when it shall have been collect-
ed. Until, however, this be done, or at least until time be
given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be
called out, as shall be necessary for the defence of your
posts on the Miami, and of your dep6ts of provision on
the Lake. And should the recruiting service go on less
prosperously in.the patriotic States of Kentucky and Ohio,
than in other parts of the Union, you are in that case, and
in that case only, authorized to call out so many militia
draughts as will make good the deficiency ; and organizing
these under the rules already prescribed, await the farther
orders of the President hi your camp at the Rapids.

" To these orders I have to add, that you will regard it
as your duty to keep this department regularly and fre-
quently informed of the actual condition of the troops under
your command ; as well in regard to equipment and sup-
plies of provision and ammunition, as to number, discipline
and health ; and that vour weekly and monthly reports
shall include also the state of the ordnance and quarter-
master's departments, noting particularly, the number of
horses and oxen employed by both. You will readily per-
ceive the necessity of giving this order, when I state, that

in i

iilh'

248

APPENDIX.

% 1

no return of any description from your division of the arr
has ever been received at the Adjutant-Generates office. Y( tti
proportion of the new staff has boen given to you. Cnp-
tain Adams has been appointed Assistant Adjutant-Gen-
eral, and Mr. Bartlett, Deputy Quartermaster-General of
your division. The Brigadiers Mc Arthur and Cass are
employed in superintending the recruiting service. A letter
from the latter, gives reason to believe that this will go on
well in the State of Ohio.

" I am &c.
(Signed) "JOHN ARMSTRONG."

" Major-General Harrison,

" Com, 8th Mil. Dist. U. 5."

Letter to Governor Meigs, of Ohio*
(Private.)
" War Department, March 28M, 1813.

" Sir, — I have this moment been informed by a Senator
from Ohio, that the plan of campaign presented to Gen-
eral Harrison, has not been fortunate enough to meet the
approbation of that officer ; and that there is reason to
fear that the objections made to it on his part (which it
appears he has taken no pains to conceal) are likely to
make an unfavorable impression on public opinion.

" Under these circumstances, I have believed it to be
my duty to exhibit to your Excellency a brief view of the
objections, fiscal and military, to the land march, which the
General prefers ; and on the other hand, to state the
grounds on which the approach to Maiden is directed to
be made by water, and under convoy of the fleet.

" 1st. The great expensiveness of a land movement

APPENDIX.

249

Ihe art
ce. Yf t»i
u. Cpp-
tant-Gen-
eneral of
Cass are
. A letter
vill go on

)NG.»»

1813.
a. Senator

to Gen-
meet the
•eason to
(which it

hkely to
tn.

it to be
iw of the
tvhich the
state the
rected to

ovement

The cost to the public (according to a statement made in
December last by the General) for ' transportalion alone,''
during the six weeks required for a land march to Maiden,
would of itself be sufficient to build and equip a naval
force on Lake Erie, which would give us a decided and
permanent command of that Lake.

" 2d. The increased number of the array, which accord-
ing to another statement of the General, will be indispen-
sable, from the altered character of the western militia ;
composed as it will now be of men greatly inferior to the
gallant bands of the last campaign, and with regard to
whom, numbers alone must compensate for the want of spirit
and patriotism,

" 3d. The bad policy of any plan which, like that pro-
nosed by the General, leaves your enemy to choose the
time and place of this attack, and with these, the power of
compelhng you to hazard a battle, upon plans and dispo-
sitions of his making.

" 4th. The farther and incalculable advantage, of avail-
ing himself to the utmost of the Indian hordes attached to
him — who, on a long march of six weeks, through swamps,
forests, and thickets, will find a battle-ground in every
milf, peculiarly adapted to their arms, powers, and habits
— a circumstance which renders them more formidable
than double the number of British grenadiers would be,
on the same ground.

" On the other hand, if we turn to the new plan, none of
these objections against it will be found. It makes neces-
sary no augmentation of force, nor increase of expenditure.
It carries you directly to your object, in full health and
spirits — unimpaired by battle, hunger, or fatigue. It avoids
all the waste and embarrassment of land transportation,

250

APPENDIX.

and what, on military principles, will alone decide the
question of preference between the two modes of pro-
ceeding, it instantly and completely neutralizes the
whole Indian force, (now noted by the General at four
or five thousand combatants,) and leaves the battle to
be fought on the part of the enemy, by British regu-
lars and Canadian militia.

" Your Excellency will best knowho\\% and to whom
to communicate these views.
" I am, &c.,

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."

[No. 24.]

"War Department,

Wilna, October 30M, 1813.

" Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your letters of the 5th and 24th instant.

*' The despatch by Captain Brown, of the 22d inst.,
and which, with him, was lost in Lake Erie, suggested,
as an ulterior movement, the coming down to the Ni-
agara river, and putting yourself on the right and rear
of De Rottenburg's position before Fort George ; while
General McClure, with his brigade of militia, volun-
teers, and Indians, should approach it in front. The
enemy seems to have been aware of this, or some
similar movement, as he began his retreat on the 9th,
and did not stop until he had gained the head of Bur-
lington bay, where I understand, by report, he yet is.
This is his last stronghold in the peninsula j routed

APPENDIX.

251

from this he must surrender, or make his way down
Lake Ontario to Kingston. His force is estimated at
twelve or fifteen hundred effectives, the capture or
destruction of which would he a glorious finah to
your campaign. Our operations in this quarter are
but beginning at a time when they ought to have ended.
"I am, &c.,

" JOHN ARMSTRONG."

" Major-General Harrison."

" BooNViLLE, J\*ovember 3d, 1813.
" When I wrote to you from Wilna it was doubtful
whether our attack would be made directly upon
Kingston or upon Montreal. Reasons exist for pre-
ferring the latter, and have probably determined Gen-
eral Wilkinson to go down the St. Lawrence. In this
case the enemy will have at Kingston, beside his fleet,
a garrison of twelve or fourteen hundred men ; had
we not a corps in the neighborhood, these might do
mischief, and even render insecure the winter station
of our fleet. To prevent this, it is deemed advisable
to draw together at Socket's Harbor a considerable
military force. There are now at that post between
four and five hundred men of all descriptions, sick,
convalescent, and eflfective ; Colonel Scott's detach-
ment (about seven hundred) are on their march thither,
and it is barely possible that Colonel Randolph's (not
arriving in time to move with the army) may be there
also ; this does not exceed three hundred and fifty.
McArthur's brigade added to these will make a force
wholly competent to our object. This new disposition
will render necessary the employment of so many of
the militia and volunteers, now in service under Gen-

252

APPENDIX.

eral McClure, as you may deem competent to the safe-
keeping of forts George and Niagara and their de-
pendencies. I am, &c.,

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."
"Major-General Harrison."

"Head-Quarters,

Newark, JVov. 16ih, 1813.

" Sir — Commodore Chauncey with the fleet arrived
here yesterday morning, and informed me that he was
ready to receive the troops to convey them down the
lake ; and that the season was so far advanced, ren-
dering the navigation dangerous to the smaller vessels,
that it was desirable they should be embarked as ex-
peditiously as possible, ^s a very small part of the
militia and volunteers had arrived ^ and the situation of
Socket's Harbor appearing to me to require immediate
reinforcement^ I did not think proper to take upon my-
self the responsibility of postponing the departure of
the troops for the lower part of the lake, conformably to
the directions contained in your letter of the 3d inst.

" The information I received yesterday from two
respectable citizens who were taken near Fort Meigs
in June last, and who made their escape in an open
boat from Burlington, confirms me in the propriety of
sending them off. These men state that the troops
were hurrying to Kingston from York as fast as possible;
the regulars going down in boats, and the militia
bringing the latter back,
" I am, &c.,

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON."

" Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War"

APPENDIX.

253

it to the safe-
,nd their de-

rRONG."

6/J/i, 1813.
fleet arrived
5 that he was
!m down the
vanced, ren-
aller vessels,
rked as ex-

part of the
situation of
'6 immediate
ke upon my-
'eparture of
iformably to

the 3d in St.
ly from two

Fort Meigs

in an open
propriety of
it the troops
'as possible;

the militia

RISON."

'ar.''

[No. 25.]

In producing the disaster at Queenstown, two causes
were efficient, which, as they are not touched upon in
the text, we will note here. It appears from the letter
of General Van Rensselaer, given below, that the as-
sailing force was to consist of two columns ; the one,
composed of militia, led by Colonel Solomon Van
Rensselaer ; the other, of regular t )ops, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie. Instead of remaining
at the head of his corps, the first-mentioned of these
officers, embarked with a part of the regular detach-
ment, and was, soon after reaching the Canada shore,
disabled by wounds. The movement of the militia
column became necessarily embarrassed by the ab-
sence of its commander, and this absence will also
sufficiently account for the insubordination and reluc-
tance to embark, afterward evinced by that portion of
the American force. Had Colonel Van Rensselaer
remained at his post, instead of thrusting himself
where his presence was not needed, the militia would,
in all probability, have crossed the river, and the re-
sult of the action have been different. Again ; why
did not General Wadsworth, after the first success of
the attack, take possession of the village in his front,
which would have afforded a covering to his troops,
and more than counterbalanced the inequality of
numbers which existed between the two armies, after
the arrival of General Sheafe and his reinCorcementl

'I *

* It

254

APPENDIX.

Letter from General Van Rensselaer to General Deaf'
born^ October UM, 1812.

Head-Quarters, Lewistown.

Sir : As the movements of the army under my
command, since I hud last the honor to address you,
on the 8th irat., have been of a very important char-
acter, producing consequences serious to many indi-
viduals, establishing facts actually connected with the
interest of the service, and safety of the army 5 and
as I ^tand prominently responsible for some of these
consequ fences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and
through you to my country, the situation and circum-
stances in which I have had to act, and the reasons
and motives which governed me ; and if the result is
not all that might have been wished, it is such, that
when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheer-
fully submit myself to the judgment of my country.

In my letter of the 8th inst., I apprised you that a
crisis in this campaign was rapidly approaching, and
that (to repeat the same words) " the blow must be
soon struck, or all the toil and expense of the cam-
paign go for nothing; and worse than nothing, for the
whole will be tinged with dishonor." Under such
impressions I had, on the 5th inst., written to Briga-
dier-General Smyth, of the United States forces, re-
questing an interview with him, Major-General Hall,
and the commandants of United States regiments, for
the purpose of conferring on the subject of future
operations. I wrote Major-General Hall to the same
purport. On the llth, I had received no answer
from General Smyth ; but in a note of the 10th, Gen-
eral Hall mentioned that General Smyth had not yet
then agreed upon any day for the consultation.

AITENDIX.

255

In the moniitiine, llie pnrtiitl success of Lieutenant
Elliot, at liliick Rock, beg^an to excite a stionp dispo-
8ition in the troops to act. This was expressed tome
through various channels, in the shape of an alterna-
tive ; that they must have orders to act, or at all Imz-
ards they would go home. I forbear liere comment-
ing upon the obvious consequences to me personally,
of longer withholding my orders uijder such circum-
stances.

I had a conference with as to the possibility of

getting some person to pass over o Canada and obtain
correct information. On tie mor 'ng of the kh, he
wrote to me that he had pro- u red he man who bore
his letter to go over. Instru. ions were given him ;
he passed over, and obtained such information ns war-
ranted an immediate attack. This wus confidentially
communicated to several of my officers, and produced
great zeal to act ; more especially, as it might have a
controling effect on the movements at Detroit, where
it was supposed General Brock had gone, with all the
force he dare spare from the Niagara frontier. The
best preparations in my power were therefore made to
dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown,
and gain possession of the village, where the troops
might be sheltered from the inclemency of the weather.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick's flying artillery, and a
detachment of regular troops under his command,
were ordered to be up In season for Fort Niagara.
Orders were also sent to General Smyth to send down
from Bulialo such detachment from his brigade as ex-
isting circumstances in that vicinity might \varrant.
The attack was to have been made at 4 o'clock of the
morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats from

(:■ <: ^i

I.' "

<156

APPENDIX.

the old fe>Ty opposite the heights. To avoid any em-
barrassment in crossing the river (which is here a
sheet of eddies), experienced boatmen were procured
to take the boats from the landing below to the place
of embarkation. Lieutenant Simms was considered
the man of greatest skill for this service. He went
ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the in-
tended place far up the river, and there, in a most ex-
traordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and
abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had
carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all
the boats. In this agonizing dilemma stood officers
and men, whose ardor had not been cooled by exposure
through the night to one of the most tremendous
northeast storms, which continued unabated for twenty-
eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. The ap-
proach of daylight extinguished every hope of success,
and the detachment returned to camp. Colonel Van
Eensselaer was to have commanded.

After this result, I had hoped the patience of the
troops would have continued, until I could submit to a
council the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that
I might act under, and in conformity to, the opinion
which might then be expressed. But my hope was
idle, and the previously excited avdor seemed to have
gained new heat from the late miscarriage. Brave men
were mortified to stop short of the object, and the
timid thought laui^ls half won by the attempt.

On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure
upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that
my refusal to act would involve me in suspicion, and
the service in disgrace. Viewing affairs at Bufl'alo as
yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the

APPENDIX.

257

march of General Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of
the first expedition ; but having now determined to
attack Queenstown, I sent new orders to General
Smyth to march ; not with the view of his aid in the
attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient,
but to support the detachment should the conflict be
obstinate.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie, who had just arrived
at the Five Mile creek, had late in the nighi of the
first contemplated attack, gallantly ofl^ered me his own
and his men's service, but he got my permission too
late. He now again came forward, had a conference
with Colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might
have the honor of a command in the expedition. The
arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was
to command one column of three hundred militia, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie a column of the same
number of regulars.

Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and
confidential and experienced men selected to manage
them. At an early hour of the night, Lieutenant-
Colonel Chrystie marched his detachment by the rear
road from Niagara to camp. At 7 in the evening,
Lieutenant-Colonel Stranahan's regiment moved from
Niagara Falls ; at 8 o'clock, Mead's ; and at 9, Lieu^
tenant-ColonelBlain's regiment marched from the same

place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably
to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two col-
umns were to pass over together ; and as soon as the
heights should be carried, lieutenant-Colonel Fen-
wick's flying artillery was to pass over, then Major
Mullany's detachment of regulars, and the other troops

to follow in order.

22*

"♦. ■

It 4

?i 1

1 1 ; ''

258

APPENDIX.

At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the
troops commenced embarking under the fire of a
commanding battery mounting two 18-pounders and
two 6. The movement was soon discovered, and a
brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line
of the Canada shore. Our battery then opened to
sweep the shore, but it was for some minutes too dark
to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade
was now opened on the boats from three difl^erent
batteries — our battery returned their fire, and occa-
sionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself
served with shells from a small battery of the enemy.
Colonel Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march
from Niagara Falls in the night, arrived in time to re-
turn the fire with two 6-pounders.

The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the
eddies, as well as with a shower of shot ; but Colone?
Van Rensselaer, with about one hundred men, soon
effected his landing amid a tremendous fire directed
upon him from every point ; but to the astonishment
of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column
advanced slowly against the fire. It v as a serious
misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expe-
dition, that in a few minutes after landing, Colonel Van
Rensselaer received four wounds. Under so severe a
fire, it was difficult to form raw troops. By some
mismanagement of the boatmen, Lieutenant-Colonel
Chrystie did not arrive until sometime after this, and
was wounded in the hand, in passing the river. Col-
onel Van Rensselaer, still able to stand, with great
presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with
rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gal-
lantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill

i!!i'

APPENDIX.

259

3SS, and the

fire of a

unders and

ired, and a

whole line

opened to

3s too dark

cannonade

e different

and occa-

was itself

he enemy.

his march

time to re-

with the
ut Colone?
men, soon
e directed
onishment
he column

a serious
iole expe-
)lonel Van
3 severe a

By some
it-Colonel
• this, and
^er. Col-
^ith great
ceed with

was gal-
^n the hill

in every direction. Soon after this, both parties were
reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in various
places — many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone
guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was briskly
served. I ordered the fire of the battery to be di-
rected against the guard-hou&e, and it was so effectu-
ally done, that, with eight or ten shot, the fire was si-
lenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large
storehouse j but in a short time the rout became gen-
eral, and the enemy's fire was silenced, except from a
one gun battery so far down the river, as to be out of
reach. A number of boats now passed over unan-
noyed, except from the one unsilenced gun. For
sometime after I had crossed over the victory appear-
ed complete ; but in the expectation of future attacks,
I took measures for fortifying my camp immediately.
The direction of this service I gave to Liei ' nant
Totten, of the engineers. But very soon the v s .my
were reinforced, by a detachment of several hundred
Indians from Chippewa. They commenced a furious
attack, but were met and routed by the rifle and bay-
onet. By this time I perceived my troops were em-
barking very slowly. I passed immediately over to
accelerate their movements, but to my astonishment I
found that, at the moment when victory was in our
hands, the ardor of the unengaged troops had subsi-
ded. I rode in all directions, urged the men by every
consideration to pass — ^but in vain.

At this time, a large reinforcement from Fort
George was discovered coming up the river. As the
battery on the hill was considered an impoitant check
against their ascending the heights, measures were
immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of am-

ifVI

i: H

ii. 1

260

APPENDIX.

munition as I learned there was left but twenty shot
for the 18-pounders. The reinforcement obliqued to
he right from the road, and formed a junction with
the Indians m the rear of the heights. Finding, to
my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would
pass over,- seeing that another severe conflict must
soon commence ; and knowing that the brave men on
the heights were quite exhausted, and nearly out of
ammunition, all I could do was to send a fresh supply
of cartridges. At this critical moment, I despatched
a note to General Wadsworth, acquainting him with
our situation-leaving the course to be pursued to his
own judgment, with assurance, that if he thought
best to retreat, I would endeavor to send over as many
boats as I could command, and cover his retreat by
every fire I could make. But the boats were dis-
persed, many of the boatmen had fled panic-struck,
and but few got off. But my note could but little
more than have reached General Wadsworth, about
4 o clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict
ensued, and continued about half an hour with a tre-
mendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry.
Ihe enemy succeeded in re-possessing their battery
and gained advantage on every side ; the brave men
ivho had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and
ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect
ot their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict."

It twenty shot
snt obliqued to
L junction with
'" Finding^, to
rcement would
conflict must
brave men on
1 nearly out of
a fresh supply
, I despatched
ting him with
pursued to his
f he thought
over as many
is retreat by
Its were dis-
panic-struck,
lid but little
worth, about
inate conflict
>r with a tre-
nd musketry,
heir battery,
e brave men
strength and
able neglect
ict."