CIHM Microfiche Series (lyAonographs) ICMH Collection de microfiches (monographies) 111 Canadian Inatltuta for Historieal MIcroraproduetiora / Inatitut Canadian da mieraraproduetlona Matorlquaa • I# TMtmieal nd KMiafrapMc Notn / NoM tkdmiqim M WWietrwIiiquM Tha IntiiniM hn i t m ii p m to oboin tha bm ariflml copy maiMte for lilmint. Faatum of iMi cam wkidi may bi bWlotraplilaally yiilqi n , wtiieli my •Hw my of Ik* lim(n in Uw n pi uilmllu ii. a* aliiali may lifiilfiaantly cliiiita tha iMial matfnd of fHMkii, afa CII90IMO DMOW. ICovor* fa i ttwad and/or la m lwani/ Comamin mtaurta at/o« paM l eM W a QColotmd ink (i.a. othar than bkia or Waak)/ Enaia da eoidaw (i.a. autra qua Maua ou noiial □ Colouiad plaiat and/cr Hlumatiom/ t u u I PlanclMi at/ou illintratiom an coulaur Bound with othar malarial/ tMI* anac d'autrat doaimana Tifht Mndinf may eawa ihadom or dmortion at caw ar da I'omiva ou d< la dManian la lanf da la maiia intiriaun □ Blank laana addad durint raitoration may appaar withn tha taxt. Whanamr pooiMa, fliaaa haM baan oniiiad from filminfl/ M M paut qua eartainai paias Manchat aioutta Ion d'una raitauration apparainam dan la taxta, mail, lonqua aala tait ponibla. oai pafn n'ant pasMfilmtes. Additional eammants:/ pagn 208, 674, 679 1 Commantairat uipplimantairat: Thii itam ii f ilmad at tha raduetion ratio chackad halew/ Ca documant an filni« au taux da r«duet>on indiqui ctdanoui. L'lnnitut a miarofikn* la maillaur axanwlaira qu'll lui a M poMiMa da w proeurar. Lat dtoih da eat a«amplaira qui Hint paut-Mra uniquaa du point da nn h l h lioiripbiqua. qui pamant modif iar una imafa rapfoduita. ou qui pau«ant aiiiiar una mod U laalion dana la mMMda nomula da f iknapa wnt indiquia □ Colouiad roiaadai n; n 0; n; Papn lanauriu at/ou palll a uMa i 0Shawthrou#l/ Trampaianoa □ Quality of print «ariat/ Oualit* in«fala da t'impratiion □ Continuoua papination/ Pafination continua 0lncluda< indaxlail/ Comprand un (dati indax Titia on haadii takan from:/ La titia da I'an-ttte proniant: □ Tida paia of inua/ Pafa da titra da la linrainn □ Caption of iuua/ Titra da d«part da la linaiton □ IMasthaad/ G*n*riqua Iptriodiquai) da la li«ra'-on Inoorrootly nuAomd pagaa 08, 7* 4 S7. lOX 14 X 18X ax 2CX XX 1 J j n ux i(x aox 24X ax «« Th« copy fllmad har* hn baan raproducad thanki to tha ganarotity of: National Library of Canada L'axamplaira film* fut raprodult grtea t la gtntroaM da: BIbllotMqua natlonala du Canada Tha Imagaa appaaring ^ara ara tha baat quality poaalbia conaMarlng tha condition and lagiblllty of tha original copy and In kaaping wKh tha filming contract apaclflcatlona. Original coplaa In printad papar eovara ara fllmad baglnnlng with tha front eovar and anding on tha laat paga with a printad or illuatratad Impraa- alon, or tha back covar whan approprlata. Ail othar original coplaa ara fllmad baglnnlng on tha first paga with a printad or Illuatratad impraa- (ion, and anding on tha last paga with a printad or lllustratad impraaslon. Tha last racordad frama on aach microfioha shall contain tha symbol — *■ I moaning "CON- TINUED"), or tha symbol V (moaning "END"), whichavar applias. Laa Imagas suivantao ont ttt raproduitas avae la plua grand soln, compta tanu da ia condition at da la nattat* da raxamplcira Aim*, at an conformM avac las conditions du contrat da filmaga. Laa axampialras origlnaux dont is couvsrtura an papiar aat imprlm^a sont f llmte an commandant par la pramiar plat at an tarminant solt par ia darnitra paga qui comporta una amprslnta d'impraaalon ou dlllustratlon, soit par la sacond plat, aalon la cas. Toua las autras axampialras origlnaux sont fiimta an commandant par la pramlira paga qui comporta una amprainta d'Impraaslon ou d'lilustration at an tarminant par la darnlira paga qui comporta una taHa ampialnta. Un daa symbolas suhrants apparattra sur la darni*ra Imaga da chaqua microflcha, salon la cas: Is symbols — »- signifia "A SUIVRE", la symbols V signifia "FIN". Maps, pistas, charts, ate, may ba fHmsd at diffarant raductlon ratios. Thosa too larga to bs antiraly included In ona axposurs srs fllmad baglnnlng in tlia uppar laft hand comar, laft to right and top to bottom, as many framas as raquirsd. Tha following diagrams illustrata tha Las cartas, pisnchss, tablasux, ate, pauvant ttn flimis * das taux da rMuction difftrants. Lorsqua la documant aat trap grand pour ttra raprodult an un saul cilcht, 11 ast fiim< * partir da I'angio sup4riaur gaucha, da gaucha i droha, at da haut an has, an pranant la nombra d'Imagas ntcsssaira. Las disgrammas suivsnts lllustrsrK la mtthoda. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 Miaocon aBouiTioN tbt omit (ANSI ond ISO IIST CHAKT No. J) 1.0 U|2J 121 Itt I.I s 12.2 L£ IZO 11.8 W^IJ^u; A ^PPLED IM^OE Inc 1653 EotI Main Straat RochMtar, Nm> Yorti 14800 us* (7ie) 482 - 0300 - Phont (718) 288-5984 - Fan L ^?s^. THE GEEAT BOER WAR Capyiifbl ItOO wd IMl, bjr A CoNU Doni in °^' U THE OSEAT BOER WAR VSu an oecuional cap of coffee with the anxioni man who triee to rule them. Tha three hundred ponndi a year of coffee money allowed by the TrsnBvaal to iti Pretident iibynomeaniamereform. Awiae adminiitrator would fall into the eociable and democratic habits of the people. Sir Theophilua Bhepstone did «o. Sir Owen Lanyon did not. There wai no Yolkiraad and no coffee, and the popular discontent grew rapidly. In three year* the British had broken up the two savage hordes which bad been threatening the land. The finances, too, had been restored. The reasons which had made so many favour the annexation were weakened by the very power which had every interest in preserving them. It cannot be too often pointed out that in this annexa- tion, the starting-point of onr troubles, Great Briiain, however mistaken she may have been, had no obvious selfish interest in view. There were no Band mines in those days, nor was there anything in the country «j tempt the most covetous. An empty treasury and two native wars were the reversion which we took over. It was honestly considered that the country was in too distracted a stste to govern itself, and had, by its weak- ness, become a scandal and a danger to its neighbours. There was nothing sordid in onr action, though it may have been both injudicious and high-handed. In December 1880 the Boers rose. Every farm- house sent out its rMemen, and the trysting-place was the outside of the nearest British fort. All through the country small detachments were surrounded and besieged by the farmers. Standerton, Pretoria, Pttchefstroom, Lydenburg, Wakkerstroom, Bustenberg, and Maraba- stad were all invested and all held out until the end of the war. In the open country we were less fortunate. At Bronkhorst Spruit a small British force was taken by raa BOER KAnONS I, » exaggerated At ttf "T '" importance which beg^^C^a new ire^a't ^% ^"^ T^ """ fact-only too badiv }^ZJt' 7 rove home the wcond. ThevXeonI;«„^TI^i''* '"''"*' '°' 'h" 90 THE CHEAT BOER WAB man to draw sway from the smaU before blows are atrnck but when the big man has been knocked down three times It 18 harder stUl. An overwhehning British force was m the field, and the General declared that he held the enemy in the hoUow of his hand. Our miKtary oal- culations have been falsified before now by these farmers and It may be that the task of Wood and Boberts would have been harder than they imagined ; but on paper, at leMt, It looked as if the enemy could be crushed without difficulty. So the public thought, and yet they consented to the upraised sword being stayed. With them, as apart from the poUticians, the motive was undoubtedly a moral and Christian one. They considered that the annexation of the Transvaal had evidenUy been an injustice, that the farmers had a right to the freedom for which they fought, and that it was an unworthy thing for a great nation to continue an unjust war for the sake of a mill ary revenge. It was the height of idealism, and the resuJt has not been such as to encourage its repetition. An armistice was concluded on March 6th, 1881 which led up to a peace on the 23rd of the same month. The Government, after yielding to force what it had repeatedly refused to friendly representations, made a clumsy compromise in their settlement. A policy of Idealism and Christian moraUty should have been thorough If It were to be tried at aU. It was obvious that If the annexation were unjust, then the Transvaal should have reverted to the condition in which it was before he annexation, as defined by the Sand Eiver Convention. But the Government for some reason would not go so far as this. They niggled and quibbled and bargamed until the State was left as a curious hybrid hing such as the world has never seen. It was a repubhc which was part of the system of a monarch v Me JiO«K NAfloM 2, it was antonomoua, aaa ye* snl .«.* J . An ugly feeling of resentment was left hlinT T u might perhaps have passed awayTad he ";alue bnt which grew more and more dangerous as d^^J tt!t t° '""' r ^^'^ «»"• " thouf htXt thetrw' that he Dutch repubUcs aimed not merely at equaWy but at dom«>aace in South Africa. Professor Bryce, a « THE GREAT BOEH WAR friendly critic, after a personal examination of the country and the question, has left it upon record that the Boers saw neither generosity nor humanity in our conduct, but only fear. An outspoken race, they conveyed theur feelings to their neighbours. Can it be wondered at that South Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown in England for the hour of revenge ? The Government of the Transvaal after the war was left m the hands of a triumvirate, but after one year Kruger became President, an office which he continued to hold for eighteen years. His career as ruler vindicates the wisdom of that wise but unwritten provision of the American Constitution by which there is a Umit to the tenure of this office. Continued rule for half a genera- tion must turn a man into an autocrat. The old President has said himself, in his homely but shrewd way, that when one gets a good ox to lead the team it is a pity to change him. If a good ox, however, is left to choose his own dkection without guidance, he may draw his wagon into trouble. During three years the little State showed signs of a tumultuous activity. Considering that it was as large as France and that the population could not have been more than 50,000, one would have thought that they might have found room without any inconvenient crowding. But the burghers passed beyond their borders in every du-eetion. The President cried aloud that he had been shut up in a kraal, and he proceeded to find ways out of it. A great trek was projected for the north, but fortunately it miscarried. To the east they raided Zululand, and succeeded, in defiance of the British settlement of that country, in tearing away one third of it and adding it to the Transvaal. To the west. ^'^mmys' Mi^mmr^' ir-p-- THE BOEK NATIONS 33 With no regard to the three-year-old treaty, they invaded Beohnanaland. and set up the two new repubUca of Goshen and SteUaUmd. 80 outrageous were these pro- ceedings that Great Britain was forced to fit out in 1884 a new expedition under Sir Charles Warren for the purpose of turning these freebooters rut of the country. It may be asked, why should these men be caUed free- booters If the founders of Bhodesia were pioneers ? The answer w that the Transvaal was limited by treaty to certain boundaries which these men transgressed, while no pledges were broken when the British power expanded to the north. The upshot of these trespasses was the scene upon which every drama of South Africa rmss doTO. Once more the purse was drawn from the pocket of the unhappy taxpayer, and a million or so was paid out to defray the expenses of the police force necessary to keep these treaty-breakers in order. Let Una be borne in mind when we assess the moral and material damage done to the Transvaal by that ill- conceived and fooUsh enterprise, the Jameson Baid. In 1884 a deputation from the Transvaal visited England, and at their soUcitation the clumsy Treaty of Pretoria was altered info the still more clumsy Con- vention of London. The changes in the provisions were all in favour of the Boers, and a second successful war could hardly have given them more than Lord Derby handed them in time of peace. Their style was altered from the Transvaal to the South African republic, a change which was ominously suggestive of expanaon in the future. The control of Great Britain over their foreign poUcy was also relaxed, though a power of veto was retained. But the most important thmg of all, and the fruitful cause of future trouble, lay m an omission. A suzerainty is » vague term, but in * THE GREAT BOEK WAB poUticB, u in theology, the more nebniong a thine is the more does it excite the imagination and thepaBsions . T°: . "OMrainty vas declared in the preamble of the first treaty, and no mention of it was made in the Tr°»-.-Y*' '' "'*"'^y abrogated or was it not? Ihe British contention is that only the articles were changed, and that the preamble continued to hold good for both treaties. They point out that not only the suzerainty, but also the independence, of the Transvaal IS proclaimed in that preamble, and that il one lapses the other must do so also. On the other hand, the Boers point to the fact that there is actuaJly a preamble to the second convention, which would seem, therefore, to take the place of the first. The point is so technical that It appears to be eminently one of those questions which might with propriety be submitted to the decision of a board of foreign jurists-or possibly to the Supreme Court of the Cmted States. If the decision were given against Great Britain, we might accept it in a chastened spint as a fittmg punishment for the carelessness of the representative who failed to make our meaning intelli- gible. Carlyle has said that a political mistake always ends m a broken head for somebody. Unfortunately the somebody is usually somebody else. We have read the story of the political mistakes. Only too soon we shall come to the broken heads. This, then, is a synopsis of what had occurred up to the signing of the Convention, which finally estabUshed. or failed to establish, the position of the South African Eepubhc. Wo must now leave the larger questions, and descend to the mtemal affairs of that small State, and especiaJly to that train of events which has stirred the mmd of our people more than anything since the Indian Mutmy, and hmniliated our arms as they have not been humihated in the century. CHAPTEB II THH OAOSB or QUABBEL Thebb might almost seem to be some subtle ec action between the barrenness and worthlessness of a »../ace and the value of the minerals which lie beneath it The crag^ mountawa of Western America, the arid ™S.'' '"'' ?.' vT "'"P*" °^ "•« Witwatersrand c^lt?rerr.d: ''^ '''"' '°''' ''' ^-' '~ Gold had been known to exist in the Transvaal before but it was only in 1886 that it was reaS'd tZ^ the deposits which he some thirty miles south of the capital are of a very extraordinary and valuable nature The proportion of go d in the quartz is not partic^rriy h^gh,nor are the veins of a remarkable thickness, but the pecuharity of the Band mmes lies in the fact that throughout this .banket- formation the met^ is so nm ormly distributed that the enterprise can claim a cer amty which is not usually associated with the T*t^\^. . 'I loa^'yi^g rather than mining. Add to th« that the reefs which were originally worked as outcrops have now been traced to enormous depths and present the same features as those at the surface A conservative estimate of the value of the gold has placed It at seven hundred miUions of pounds. 31 Pif v^kn^.i'^' , m MM :r*m «• THE GREAT BOEB WAB Bach a discovery produced the inevitable effect. A great number of adventurers flocked into the countrv some desirable and some very much the reverse. There' were circumstances, however, which kept away the rowdy and desperado element who usnaUy nake for a newly opened goldflelcj, It was not a class of minina which encouraged the individual adventurer. There were none of those nuggets which gleamed through the mud of the doUies at Ballarat, or recompensed the forty-nmers in California for all their travels and their toils. It was a field for elaborate machinery, which could only be provided by capital. Managers, engineers, m^er^, technical ezperts, and the tradesmen and middlemen who live upon them, these were the Uitlanders drawn from all the races under the sun, but with the Anglo-Celtie vastly predominant. The best engineers were American, the best miners were Cornish, the best managers were English, the money to run the mines was largely subscribed in England. As time went on however, the German and French interests became more extensive, until their joint holdings are now probably as heavy as those of the British. Soon the population of the mining centres became greater than that of the whole Boer community, and consisted mainlv of men m the prime of life-men, too. of exception^ mtelligence and energy. r"""" I^e situation was an extraordinary one. I have already attempted to bring the problem home to an American by suggesting that the Dutch of New York had trekked west and founded an anti-American and highly unprogressive State. To carry out the analogy we wiU now suppose that that State was California, that the gold of that State attracted a large inrush of American citizens, who came to outnumber the original irx^< THE CAUSE OF QUABREL jj inhabitants, that these citizens were heavily taxed and badly nsed, and that they deafened Washington with their outcry about their i^^uries. That would be a fair parallel to the relations between the Transvaal, the Uitlanders, and the British Government. That these UitUnders had very real and pressina grievances no one could possibly deny. To recount them aU would be a formidable task, for their whole Uves were darkened by injustice. There was not a wrong which had driven the Boer from Cape Colony which he did not now practise himself upon others- and a wrong may be excusable in 1885 which is monstrous in 1896. The primitive virtue which had characterMed the farmers broke down in the face of temptation. The country Boers were httle affected, some of them not at all, but the Pretoria Government became a most corrupt oligarchy, venal and incompetent to the last degree. Officials and imported HoUanders handled the stream of gold which came in from the mines, while the unfortunate Uitlander who paid nine-tenths of the taxation was fleeced at every turn, and met with laughter and taunts when he endeavoured to win the franchise by which he might peaceably set right the wrongs from which he suffered. He was not an unreasonable person. On the contrary, he was patient to the verge of meekness as capital is likely to be when it is surrounded by rifles' But his situation was intolerable, and after successive attempts at peaceful agitation, and numerous humble petitions to the Volksraad, he began at last to realise that he would never obtain redress unless he could find some way of winning it for himself. Without attempting to enumerate aU the wrongs which embittered the Uitlanders, the more serious of them may be gummed up in this way. ■i*».j«. f^. * THE GREAT BOEH WAH Kvei J^hth^J.r" '"*'"' *""^ ""* P«>"d«> about Tf rhfo^^u !1'.'''* "^*°°« °' *•"« connt-y. The revenue ^rLu^ L^ ?ewcomer, had changed from one of the Ktion) " """ ''°"' ''"'* *«' •■-' »' brouBhf tLr t^ '''■^^' ^"^^''^y 'bich they had brought, they, the majority of the inhabitante of th. country, were left without a'vote, andco^rnomeaS. trhttvrr"£rCwn.'"'"°" '^'•'-' -•>--'- of nffinM *' *«^ ''"'* "" '"''''« ^ *be choice or payment ^pSwi^h '" °!^ '°"* private character m"S be placed with complete authority over valuable interests StoTumr'^"°*'t*''"''**'°'^-«""«-p"^^^^^^^ in if, . r^ rr^T '"»'i"gofficWly learned ^meflrw n Its title. The total official flalarieg bad risen ^1899 S:r';i;S"*'°^'^*'''-^'''^»^'°''"«-«^e2 T v^' J^*' *''*y bad no control over education nr, IZm^r f r^^^"'°' GeneraToftrS JJ:: 0^?^/ "^ ^°'^="' ^0 '««koned the sum sp^nt on Uitlander schools as 6601. out of 68 000/^oZ] for education, making one shilling and ^^Jent^'^J head per annum on "Uitlander children Tdete^t pounds SIX shillings per head on Boer chiliUhe UiUander. as always, paying seven-eighths of the ^gi^ 6- No power of municipal government. Watercarts mstead of pipes, filthy buckets insteL of drS^l corrupt and violent police, a high death.«te ^^1 THE CAUSE OF QDABBEL gg ■honid be a hetlth rosort-aU thi. in • city which the, nsd bnilt tbemselTes. 6. Despotic government in the matter of the preH and ol the right of Public meeting. 7. Disability from gerrice upon a jury. 8. Continual haraBsing of the mining interest bv vexatious legislation. Under this head come many grievances, some special to the mines and some afifcctinB all Uitlanders. The dynamite monopoly, by which the miners had to pay 600.000<. extra per annum in order to get a worse quaUty of dynamite; the liquor laws by whidi one-third of the Kaffirs were allowed to be habitually drmik; the incompetence and extortions of the State-owned railway j the granting of concessions for numerous articles of ordinary consumption to indivi- duals, by which high prices were maintained; the Burroundmg of Johannesburg by toUs from which the town had no profit-these were among the economical (grievances, some large, some petty, which ramified through every transaction of life. And outside and b«yond aU these definit wroncs uMgme to a free bom i-rogressive man, an American or a Bnton, the constant irritation of being absolutely ruled by a body of twenty-five men, twenty-one of whom bad m the case of the SelaU BaUway Company been Dubl'dv and circumstantially accused of bribery, with fulldetaUs of the bribes received, while to their corruption they added such crass ignorance that they argue in the pubhshed reports of the Volksraad debates that using dynamite bombs to bring down rain was firing at God that It 18 impious to destroy locusts, that the word ' pturticipate • should not be used because it is not in the Bible, and that postal pillar boxes are extravagant and effemmate. Such oUter dUta may be amusing at a * IHB OHEAT BOEB WAH totanoe, but they are leu entertaining when thev oome SSn^trir "" ""''''"' ^''^ -- ^« - From the fact that they were a community extremelv VT^^VM by their own basine.,, it followed thS UUIanderi were not ardent politicians, and that they de8>red to ha.e a .hare in the governm;nt of the sS for the purpoee of making the condition, of their o™ ^dLd h T ""*? °' '"'''' »» interference may t thffr 1 ^'^^* fair-minded man who reads the Ust o? the.r compUintB. A superficial view may recognise the mr It ''':^''"'"' °' "•'•"'y- ■"" » -leepeTiTaigS rTr«T • ' ^7 <*" "P'^ented by th^r elected rulers) have jr. ^ruth stood for all that history has riiown to be odious in the form of eiclasiveness and oppreTsL^ Their conception of liberty has b«,n a ^Jflsh'^SneTi they have consistently inflicted upon others far hekrier r3d " *''°" '^'' ''^''"' «"«' "^^ *«-"^^ As the mines increased in importance and the miners aff^t«d some of hat cosmopoUtan crowd far more than others m proportion to the amount of freedom to whi^ ^eu: home institutions had made them rcustTm^ The continental Uitlanders were more patient of Thtt* which was unendurable to the American Ld the Briton S irwr°' "T^^"" '° =° ereat a minority that It was upon the British that the brunt of the S w ' '"''°'° ''"• ^P"' '^"^ 'he fact that tte BntiBh were more numerous than all the other Uitlanders ombmed there were special reasons why they sCd feel their humihating position more than the meS of any other race. In the first place, many of thTBriS THE CAUSE OF QUABREL $1 were Britieh Soath AHcMi, who knew that in (he neighbouring countriee which gave them hirih the moet hberal possible institutions had been given to the lunsmen of these very Boers who were refusing them the management of their own drains and water supply And again, every Briton knew that Great Britain claimed to bo the paramount power in South Africa, and so he felt as U hia own land, to which he might have looked for protection, was conniving at and acquiescing in his ill treatment. As citizens of the paramount power it was peculiarly galling that they should be held in pol'iti- cal subjection. The British, therefore, were the most persistent and energetic of the agitators. But it is a poor cause which cannot bear to fairly state and honestly consider the case of its opponents. The Boers had made, as has been briefly shown, great efforts to estahhsh a country of their own. They had travelled far, worked hard, and fought bravely. After aU their efforts they were fated to see an influx of strangers mto their country, some of them men of questionable character, who outnumbered the original inhabitants. If the franchise were granted to these. there could be no doubt that though at first the Boers might control a majority of the votes, it was only a question of time before the newcomers would dominate the Eaad and elect their own President, who might adopt a pohcy abhorrent to the original owners of the land Were the Boers to lose by the ballot-box the victory which they had won by their rifles ? Was it laii to expect it ? These newcomers came for gold. They got ttieir gold. Their companies paid a hundred per cent. Was not that enough to satisfy them ? If they did not like the country why did they not leave it? No one compelled them to stay there. But if they stayed, let 'iwik^^:i " THE GREAT BOER WAR them bo th«nkful that they were tolerated at aU and n„t preeume to interfere with the Uw. ofthoL b, who2 courteey they were aUowed to enter the con„V ««» • i." ' ^ "atement of the Boer poeition, and at fc^ ..ght an .mpart^al man might .ay tZ the« wa. . S^fr^^^.-'u"""."'' *"" ' o'o"' examination Zonld •how that, hongh it might bo tenable in theory Tk nnjuet and impoeeible in practice. ^' TI,il!r*""' '"i!"'" "'""''^ "*'« °' "•« "Of" » policy of cannot be done in a great tract of country whiih ll. nght acrosa the main line of industrial iSrlee Th, poe.t.on .s too ab«,lutely artificial. A ha^^dWo "pj^: by the right of conqueet take p.«^88ion of an e~u! country over which they are dotted at .u?h XI hat .t IB their boast that one farmhouw cannot e^?he smoke of another, and yet, though their number 1 so disproportionate to the area which they covTr «1 claim to be a privileged class who shall dominate the newcomer, completely. They are outnumbered fntheir 0^ land by unmigrants who are far morehighly educated ^d progressive, and yet they hold them down to a w^y ^!„i!, .^'^f Shtof conquest. Then the same right on ,^^^*^r°"'''"'^'"''«'^«»'"='««"''edge. 'Come rL Wk' 9°'"' °" ' ' ""'^ " '"^'"ber of the VoC raad when the franchise petition of the Uitlanders was presented. -Protest! Protest! What is the g^d "f protesting? • .aid Kruger to Mr. W. Y. CampbeU • yon have not got the guns, I have.' There was alwaVs th« final court of appeal. Judge Crensot ^dJudgrManter were always behind the President. aai^ niE CAUSE OP QUARHEL „ ».lidhl!!?'.i!'"' '"■*i"T' "' ""•B"*" "ooW b« more the, proLted th ™S a the uitli."' f'"" "'"'' Thoy could not havf it^th w^^ i "^f,';'^^ ^Jl^ ..on« hy hU .xatrl?,Xra„t! And again, the whole argument is based „n«n .1, narrow racial suDnositinn (»,■* "P°" "'s not of Rn«, «"PPOf»"on that every naturalised citizen balanced upon its apex. It ig trn« tw .^ ' oUgarchy would have^ished .nd th.. •/ / T'^P' more tderant /r^„„- a ','"**?'"'»'» broader obdurate. The Hot«;i= „f *u 1 ^ '°® ^erwas Beekere for tS V^^^ n'd KuS^f t"" '^" luackly eketohed, hut they cannot beXeg i^re^ ^ «4 THE GREAT BOER WAR Bny one who deeireg to nnderstand the inception of that great contest which was the outcome of the diepnte. At the time of the Convention of Pretoria (1881) the rights of bnrghership might be obtained by one year's residence. In 1882 it was raised to five years, the reasonable limit which obtains both in Great Britain and in the United States. Had it remained so, it is safe to say that there would never have been either an Uitlander question or a great Boer war. Grievances would have been righted from the inside without external inter- ference. In 1890 the inrush of outsiders alarmed the Boers, and the franchise was raised so as to be only attainable by those who had lived fourteen years in the country. The Uitlanders, who were increasing rapidly in numbers and were suffering from the formidable Ust of grievances already enumerated, perceived that their wrongs were so numerous that it was hopeless to have them set right seriatim, and that only by obtaining the leverage of the franchise could they hope to move the heavy burden which weighed them down. In 1898 a petition of 18,000 Uit- landers, couched in most respectful terms, was submitted to the Eaad, but met with contemptuous neglect. Unde- terred, however, by this failure, the National Eeform Union, an association which organised the agitation, came back to the attack in 1894. They drew up a petition which was signed by 85,000 adult male Uitlanders a greater number than the total Boer male population of the country. A smail liberal body in the Kaad supported this memoriaJ and endeavoured in vain to obtain some justice for the newcomers. Mr. Jeppe was the mouthpiece of this select band. ' They own half the soil, they pay at least three quarters of the taxes,' said he. ' They are men who in capital, energy, and education are at least our equals THE CAUSE OF QUABREL 35 twenty ^tho^trl^Sd a^:„g7:xi:: " among those who wiU then teU ns th!t t^J wLKl' brothers, but that we by our own act ha™ 1.^ «? strangers to the repubUe?' Su^rra^SCj Vb'S sen unents were combated by membrwho asS that the signatures could not belong to law abml. l^VT 't' "''' -^'"^"y "^''i Sins t"f the President, actually made more stringent tht, ever years of probation the applicant should rive un JW. SZr'^'f'"' ^° '^''* '"' *■«" period he woJw really belong to no country at all. No h^Zul th Vtl T -"^ P"-"«^««"^ up^°th'e7arrTf the Uitlanders would soften the deterTination of the President and his burehers On« »>,„ . w..led outside the sSSdini°;ri% St' [Tt "^Vt*"" "''"'""^ fl»S 'You see tLt S" said he • If I grant the franchise, I may as weU nuU it down.' Hisanimosity against the immigrants la" bUto oth^-'";.*'""'''' *''^^^=' -«'l«'-B,lwcome s "rd aaoresses. Ihough Johannesburg is onlv thirtv ♦»„ mdes from Pretoria, and though the'state of wh^S betas the head depended for its revenue upon the gold fierds he paid It only three visits in nine y^rs. ^ ' This settled animodt, was deplorable, but not D 2 »• THE GHEAT BOER WAR nim»tnr»l. A man imbued with the idea of a chosen people, and unread in any book save the one which cul- tivates this very idea, could not be expected to have learned the historical lessons of the advantages which a State reaps from a liberal poUoy. To him it was as if the Ammonites and Moabites had demanded admission into the twelve tribes. He mistook an agitation against the exclusive poUoy of the State for one against the existence of the State itself. A wide franchise would have made his republic firm-based and permanent. It was a small minority of the Uitlanders who had any desire to come into the British system. They were a cos- mopolitan crowd, only united by the bond of a common injustice. But when every pther method had failed, and their petition for the rights of freemen had been flung back at them, it was natural that their eyes should turn to that flag which waved to the north, the west, and the south of them— the flag which means purity of govern- ment with equal rights and equal duties for all men. Constitutional agitation was laid aside, arms were smuggled in, and everything prepared for an organised rising. The events which followed at the beginning of 1896 have been so thrashed out that there is, perhaps, nothing left to teU— except the truth. So far as the Uitlanders themselves are concerned, their action was most natural and justifiable, and they have no reason to exculpate themselves for rising against such oppression as no men of our race have ever been submitted to. Had they trusted only to themselves and the justice of their cause, their moral and even their material posi- tion would have been infinitely stronger. But unfortu- nately there were forces behind them which were more questionable the nature and extent of which have never THE CAUSE OF QtTAHKEt „ Johannesbnrg rmta the universal sympathy whilh th^v cause excited throaithont Hnnth '^/.^ ™"'" t^eir Jur. oecu Bhodes was Premier of the Cane a m-nTj immense energy, and one who w j ^ °^ poUoe of tie cJZT^ZnT^Z^LT'"'^ founder and director fc, t^ -Rhodes was with the XiraWoLaLi^^T' °' ''°-°P«"'ti"« revolt at Johanne bu»^rLaL„!S''''°'"' ''''° """ ai^^eement as to ^^rn^S^^^^^^rLl:: W fli ■ THB GREAT BOEB WAK it appeara that Jameson (with or without the orders of Bhodes) forced the hand of the conspirators by invading the country with a force absurdly inadequate to the work which he had taken in hand. Five hundred policemen and three field guns made up the forlorn hope who started from near Mafeking and crossed the Transvaal border upon December 29th, 1896. On January 2nd they were surrounded by the Boers amid the broken country near Domkop, and after losing many of their number killed and wounded, withonl food and with spent horses, they were compelled to lay down their arms. Six burghers lost their lives in the skirmish. The Uitlanders have been severely criticised for not having sent out a force to help Jameson in his difficulties, but it is impossible to see how they could have acted in any other manner. They had done aU they could to prevent Jameson coming to then: relief, and now it was rather unreasonable to suppose that they should relieve their reUever. Indeed, they had an entirely exaggerated idea of the strength of the force which he was bringing, and received the news of his capture with incredulity. When it became confirmed they rose, but in a half- hearted fashion which was not due to want of courage, but to the difficulties of their position. On the one hand, the British Government disowned Jameson en- tirely, and did all it could to discourage the rising ; on the other, the Presidept had the raiders in his keepmg at Pretoria, and let it be understood that their fate depended upon the behaviour of the Uitlanders. They were led to believe that Jameson would be shot unless they laid down their arms, though, as a matter of fact, Jameson and his people had surrendered upon a promise of quarter. So skilfuUy did Kruger use his hostages that he succeeded, with the help of the British Commis- \ MhW'MM THE CAUSE OF QUABBEL 39 tZ: ^, 8f ^8 "»« tJ'onx^'JB Of excited JohanneB- cZ 1^ ? ''*"™ "''^ »™« ''"•'<»" Woodshed. Completely on^manoeuvred by the astute old President the leaders of the reform movement used all thefc mfluence m the direction of peace, thinking that a tdT""'^ T^^ '''"°^' •"" tte moment that amed burghers occupied the town, and sixty of the^ number were hurried to Pretoria Gaol To tuo raiders themselves the President behaved rf),f T^rr'¥ ^^^''P" ^^ ^^^ "ot find it In h.8 heart to be harsh to the men who had managed to the world, as own iUiberal and oppressive treatmU ,°„Vn^ TfiiTT """■ ^'"■8°"'° ^ *•>« '■«» of this illegal by this mtrusion that it has taken years to clear them, and perhaps they will never be wholly cleared. It was whic? "the real cause of the unfortunate raid. From wn™. 7f' tl"* government might grov. vrse and worse^^„at .t was always possible to point to th, raid as justifymg everythmg. Were the Uitlanders to have the W™i^R l ^"V"^^ ^'^ "P*"' " •'ft" the" ^™^^n?"^^ °''^*"' '° *^* *°°™°"« importation arms and obvious preparations for war ? They were only precaut.o.-s agamst a second raid. For years the raid stood m the way, not only of aU progress, but of all remonstrance. Through an action over which they had no control, ^d which they had done their best to prevent, the British Government was left with a bad case and a weakened moral auihority. The raiders were sent home, where the rank and file were very properly released, and the chief officer, were 40 THE OKEAT BO£H WAR I condemned to terms of impriaonment which certainly did not err upon the side of severity. Cecil Bhodes was left nnpnnished, he retained his place in the Privy OouncU, and his Chartered Company oontinaed to have a corporate existence. This was iUogical and incon- elusive. As Kruger said, ' It is not the dog which should be beaten, but the man who set him on to me.' Public opinion— m spite of, or on account of, a crowd of wit- nesses—was m informed upon the exact bearings of the question, and it was obvious that as Dutch sentiment at the Cape appsared already to be thoroughly hostile to us It would be dangerous to alienate the British Africanders also by makmg a martyr of their favourite leader. But whatever arguments may be founded upon expediency, it IS dear tha the Boers bitterlv resented, and with justice the immunity of Bhodes. Ttfat great man has done good service to the Queen both before and since, but it must be a prejudiced admirer who wiU not acknowledge that our position m Africa would in some respects have been In the meantime, both President Kruger and his burghers had shown a greater severity to the political prisoners from Johannesburg than to the armed followers of Jameson. The nationaUty of these prisoners is mtorestmg and suggestive. There were twenty-three Enghshmen. sixteen South Africans, nine Scotchmen BIX Americans, two Welshmen, one Irishman, one Australian, one Hollander, one Bavarian, one Canadian one Swiss, and one Turk. The prisoners were arrested in January but the trial did not take place until the end ?. T ■ .^.' ''«'■« ^""""l guilty of high treason. Mr. ^i°j\^ ^''•^^°'°"*' ^^"^^^ (''™'''» o' M'- Ceca Ehodes),GeorgeFarrar,andMr.Hammond,theAmerican THE CAUSE OF QUABREL 41 engineer were condemned to death, a sentence which was £ TheTr"**'*" "■* ^^'^' of anenormZ «.». • • "■" Pr'wnorg were condemned to two years imprisonment, with a fine of 2,000;. each. The Jmprisonment was of the most arduous and tryinR sort riessis One of the unfortunate men cut his throat and several fell seriously ill, the diet and the sanitar; con^' Mayan the prisoners I.ut six were released. Four of the six soon foUowed, two stalwarts, Sampsonand Dav es refu mg to sign any petition and remaining in prLon Sn^r? ^r "■*"'"'*' ^ ^'"" '^-^ the reform n^^ r . enormous sum of 212.000i. A certain comic rehef was immediately afterwards given to so p-ave an eptaode by the presentation of a bm to Great iTL tn L f ^/"^^ °* """^ ■""* intellectual damage, unpaid? *'"'" "'*" ^''^ ''• S-^- "main still r»..f^!*^^^ '*' P*"' *°^ "'^ ■^•"■o™ movement was iTL'hrV, '"""^ "[^"^ produced them both remainTd. cLntrt^ fo»-=eivabIe that a statesman who loved his HmL ^^^''."''■''^*<' from making some effo Buch grave dangers, and which must obviously become more serious with every year that passed. But Pau fcogerhad hardened his heart, and was not to be moved evtr'^aCr/' "' ?"'r'*" "«<=»■"« heavier than ever. ITie one power in the land 'to which they had b^n able to appeal for some sort of redress amid thdr ff^eyances was the law courts. Now it was decre^ that the courts should be dependent on the VolkS -»*-y m a THE GREAT BOSH WAR Jfh- K- u «'"* P"**"*^ "S^"' "uch a degradation of h« high office, and he wa. dismissed in cogence withont a pension. The judge who had condemZl the tion of a filed law was withdrawn from the Uitlanders. A commission appointed by the State was sent to Mamine mto the condition of the mining industry and tte grievances '-cm which the newcomers suffered. The chairman was Mr. Schalk Burger, one of the most hberal of the Boers, and the proceedings were thorough and impartial. The result was a report which amiJy vindicated the reformers, and suggested remedies which would have gone a long way towards satisfying the Uitlanders. With such enlightened legislati^ thd^ motives for seekmg the franchise would have been less pressing But the President and his Baad would have none of the recommendations of the commission. The rugged old autocrat declared that Schalk Burger was a traitor to his country for having signed such a document, and a new reactionary committee was chosen to report upon the report. Words and papers were the Jnly outcome of the affair. No amelioriation came to the newcomers. But at least they had again put their case pubhcly upon record, and it had been endorsed by the most respected of the burghers. GraduaUy in the press of the Enghsh-speaking countries the raid was ceasing to obscure the issue. More and more clearly it was commg out that no permanent settlement was possible where the majority of the population was oppressed by the minority. They had tried peaceful means and fMled They had" tried warlike means and failed. What was there left for them to do? Their own country, the paramount power of South Africa, had never helped them. Perhaps if it were direcUy appealed to it THE CAUSE OF QUABBEt, 43 might do » It could not. if only for the sake of it. own impeml preitige, leave its children for ever in « •tato of objection. The Uitlandera determined upon a petition to the Queen, and in doing bo they brought their grievances out of the limit, of a local controveny into the broader field of international politics. Great Britain must either protect them or acknowledge that their protection was beyond her power. A direct petition to the Queen praying for protection was signed in April 1899 by twenty-one thousand Uitlanders. From that time events moved inevitably towards the one end. Some- times the surface was troubled and sometimes smooth, but the stream always ran swiftly and the roar of the »U MOnded ever louder in the ears. u THE GREAT BOER WAR CHAPTEB HI IHI MIOOTUTIONI Th« British Government and the British people do not deaire any direct authority in Sonth Africa. Their one Bupreme mtereet is that the various States there should iive m concord and prosperity, and that there should be no need for the presence of a British redcoat within the whole great peninsula. Our foreign critics, with their misapprehension of the British colonial system, can never realise that whether the four-colonred flag of the Transvaal or the Union Jack of a self-governing colony waved over the gold mines would not make the difference of one shiUing to the revenue of Great Britain. Tho Transvaal as a British province would have its own legis- tature, Its own revenue, its own expenditure, and its own tariff against the mother country, as weU as against the rest of the worid, and England be none the richer for the change. This is so obvious to a Briton that he has ceased to msist upon it, and it is for that reason perhaps that it IS so universaUy misunderstood abroad. On the other hand, while she is no gainer by the change, most of the expense of it in Wood and in money faSg upon the home country. On the face of it. therefore, Great iJntam had every reason to avoid so formidable a task as the conquest of the South African EepubUc. At the best she had nothing to gain, and at the worst she had an immense deal to lose. There was no room for ambi. THE NE00TIATI0N8 « «on or •ggrcMion. It wm a case ot shirking or ful- nlung a most arduoui duty. There could be no qneition of a plot for the annexa- tion of the Transvaal. In a free country the Government cannot move in advance of public opinion, and public opmion is influenced by and reflected in the newspapers One may examine the lUes of the press during aU the months of negotiaUons and never find one reputable opmion m favour of such a course, nor did one in society ever meet an advocate of such a measure. But a great wrong was being done, and all that was asked was the mmimum change which would set it right, and restore equahty between the white races in Africa. ■ Let Kruger only be hberal in the extension of the franchise,' said the paper which is most representative of the sanest British opinion, ' and he will find that the power of the repubUo will become not weaker, but infinitely more secure. Let him once give the m^ority of the resident males of fnU age the full vote, and he will have given the republic a stabiUty and power which nothing else can. If he rejects aU pleas of this kind, and persists in his present pohoy, he may possibly stave off the evU day. and preserve his cherished ohgarchy for another few years • but the end wiU be the same.' The extract reflects the tone of all of the British press, with the exception of one or two papers which considered that even the persistent ill usage of our people, and the fact that we were peculiarly responsible for them in this State, did not justify us in mterfenug in the internal affairs of the repubUc. It cannot be denied that the Jameson raid and the incom- plete manner in which the circumstances connected with it had been investigated had weakened the force of those who wished to interfere energetically on behalf of British subjects. There was a vague but widespread feeling • THE OBEAT BOER WAR U»t parhapi Um cpitaUgU were engineering the lito.. t.on for their own end.. It i. diffloult to imlgta' howi^ .Ute of unr«,t ^ l„«eurity. to «y nothi^g^ a .UtJ of WM CM embetotheiulTwtiHjeof oapitaUndrorllr it uobyu.a.th.t if «.me «eh^hemer weri Mingtt grievance, of the Ditlander, for hi. own ^".Te^beS way to checkmate him would be to r«nove tb^* tho« who hke to Hsnor, the obvion. nd magn^th! remote and thronghont the negotiation. the^Sd o, Great Britain wa. weakened, a. her adverwrrh^ fa..y and faddy minority. Idealiem and a morbid restlcM con.c.entioa«,eM are two of the mo.t daZrou. uZ^'^f '"odem progressive State ha. t^fS It wa. m AprJ 1899 that the Britieh Uitlander, »« theu petibon praying for protection to Zr ^tive country. Since the AprU previou. a correBpTndlncTS b^ going on between Dr. Leyd.. Secretarrof StatofM Co ontl L^"*" ^P"''""' ""^ ^'- Chamb^ruL Co onuU Secretary, upon the existence or non-eiistw^; that^e"::^/';- °°, """•"* '•"«'' " "« oonS inn„^/»f 1'*"/'°" °' • "^"^ convention had entirely annulled he first; on the other, that thepreamble of 1*9 fcs tapphed also to the second. If the Transvaal 'on! tontion we« correct it i, clear that Great Britain h^ been tncked and jockeyed into such a position. "face she ^n IT"^ ?.° '"^^ "'^ '"" ^ '»•« "^oond Tven! !nT,'.T ru*^*?"^' '"«'«"« "^ Colonial Secretaries could hardly have been expected to give away a^^ ubstantial something for nothing. But the c^ntonto throws us back upon the academic question of wha a Buzeramty is. The Transvaal admitted a powe Tf vtt^ over then- foreign policy, and this admisrion in itLu ^^m^ THE NEGOTIATIONS „ MleM they openly tore np the convention, mnit deorive hem of thepcition of a K,yereign State. On the whl which",^Z °""* ^ «'»'""«d8e '^-^ «»e of war, it wouM ri • ""t'"* "^""Pa^ which, in M^esty's sub/ectr? " et'I "Ik" ^'=''°» "^ ^^' supportedasitis by a f^i,!' ■"{**"" *''•« -io^trine, lies about the intends ThtSrs « """"'"* IB producing a great effect 1.1 ^^ GoTernment. Dutch feUow colo^ts ll» "?' °"'°'^'- "^ our which seems to im^yttSS i' '''^"^""^ '"'^'^ right, even in this c^onv m *!f f '"'°'°' ""P*™' British birth. ThonSs ;f n, '^ ^^Uo'-^itizens of ond if left alonepS; J « f ^^^^^ ^"P""^. Britishsubj.ts!XK ;;'rST"'°°'" there is a corresnonHm^ I . u«8ffection, and theBritish. ^ "« exasperation upon the part of mis^hieZsTrop^Sarr ''"'.'^' " '""^ '» *his intention of he "Ev's 1 " ='"'''"8 P^°°^°f '^e from its positionrSoSh Sloa •""' "'" '" "" "'^^ Such were the cravn anj ' Which th, British pro^ne„]^LT'?""' '«''" Wth *^ consul warned his countrymen of I'fe.lK.^' as THE On£AT BOER WAS what was io come. He saw the 8tormcloud piling In the north, bat even his eyes had not yet discerned how near and bow terrible was the tempest. Throaghout the end of June and the early part of July mnch was hoped from the mediation of the heads of the Africander Bond, the political miion of the Dntch Cape colonists. On the one hand, they were the kinsmen of the Boers ; on the other, they were British subjects, and were enjoying the blessings of those liberal institutions which we were anxious to see extended to the Transvaal. ' Only treat our folk as we treat yours ! ' Our whole contention was compressed into that prayer. But nothing came of the mission, though a scheme endorsed by Mr. Hofmeyer and Mr. Herholdt, of the Bond, with Mr. Fischer of the Free State, was introduced into the Baad and applauded by Mr. Schreiner, the Africander Premier of Cape Colony. In its original form the provisions were obscure and complicated, the franchise varying from nine years to seven nnder diffe- rent conditions. In debate, however, the terms were amended until the time wcs reduced to seven years, and the proposed representation of the gold fields placed at five. The concession was not a great one, nor could the representation, five out of thirty-one, be considered a generous provision for the minority of the population ; but the reduction of the years of residence was eagerly hailed in England as a sign that a compromise might be effected. A sigh of relief went up from the country. ' If,' said the Colonial Secretary, • this report is confirmed, this important change in the proposals of President Kruger, coupled with previous amendments, leads Govern- ment to hope that the new law may prove to be the basis of a settlement on the linos laid down by Sir Alfred Mihier in the Bloemfontein Conference.' He added wrnis^:: THE NEGOTUTIONS ^ ^^'i*^*^* -T* ?"°' vexationB conditions attached, but ^«tf1' Tl' ^■"'^^'y'" Government feel assured tha the President having accepted the principle for which detail of his scheme which can be shown to be a possible todrancetothe full accomplishment of the obTe 1 1 V ew, and that he will not allow them to be nullified o^ reduced in value by any subsequent alterations of the tLI'^"^ fad^mmistration.- At the same time, the Times declared the crisis to be at an end. 'If tha Dutch statesmen of theCapehave induced their brethren m the TrMisvaal to cany such a Bill, they will have deserved the lasting gratitude, not only of their own Tf J^r'^'^-'^u l*''* ^"^^^ ""'""'^'^ « South Africa, but of the British Empire and of the civilised world.' But this fan- prospect was soon destined to be over- cast. Questions of detaU arose which, when closely !!„■., A " ^'.*''""'«" '^d British South Afric^s. who had experieneed in the past how illusory the promises of the President might be. insisted upon guarantees The seven years offered were two y^rs more than that which Sir Alfred Milner had deOar^ to be an irreducible mmimnm. The difference of two years would not have hindered their acceptance, even at the expense of some humiliation to our representative. But there were conditions which excited distrust when drawn up by so w^y a diplomatist. One was that the ahen who aspired to burghership had to produce a certificate of continuous registration for a certmn time. But the law of registration had fallen into disuse in the Ih^J^TX^ consequently this provision might render the whole Bin valueless. Since it was carefully retained it was certainly meant for nse. The door had been W THE GHEAT BOER WAR opened, but a stone wag placed to block it. Again, the continued burgherBhip of the newcomers was made to depend upon the resolution of the first Baad, so that should the mining members propose any measure of reform, not only their BiU but they also might be swept out of the house by a Boer majority. What could an Opposition do if a vote of the Government might at any moment unseat them aU ? It was clear that a measure which contained such provisions mjat be very carefully sifted before a British Government could accept it as a final settlement and p, "omplete concession of justice to its subjects. On the other hand, it naturally felt loth to refuse those clauses which offered some prospect of an amelioration in their condition. It took the course, therefore, of suggesting that each Government should appoint delegates to form a joint commission which should inquire into the working of the proposed Bill before it was pnt into a final form. The proposal was submitted to the Eaad upon August 7th, with the addition that when this was done Sir Alfred Milner was pre- pared to discuss anything else, including arbitration without the intorference of foreign powers. The suggestion of this joint commission has been criticised as an unwarrantable intrusion into the iaternal affairs of another country. But then the whole question from the beginning ras about the internal affaiis of another country, since the internal equality of the white inhabitants was the condition upon which self-govern- ment was restored to the Transvaal. It is futile to suggest analogies, and to imagine what France would do if Germany were to interfere in a question of French franchise. -Supposing that France contained as many Germans as Frenchmen, and that they were iU-treated, Germany woul interfere quickly enough and continue THE NEGOTIATIONS jj that no previous precedent can apnlv to it .1™^ juBHce are all on the eide of England A long delay foUowed upon the pronosal nt ti,. tW .i^ ^"' "^ *" ""Jes there came evident of the Lr.'^'T^^ ''"' «-"• *° the XaTion Jz^rrgix^^-a'^irf''^-' ^ ^•'^'-^ ^ towns. The condoiHeri of Europe were ^ ,»L did they fulfil their share of the bargain. For three weeks and more during which Mr. fouger was lalZ these eloquent preparations went on. BufuZd them and of infinitely more importance, thero was one I^J which dommated the situation. A burgher ornotl to war without his horse, his horse cannoTmove i^? grass, grass will not come untU after rain, andtt Z, s^S some weeks before the rain would be due. KegoS^ then, must not be unduly hurried while the vfwt was « •* THE GREAT BOER WAR bare russot-ooloured dust-swept plain. Mr. Chamberlain and tl 9 Eritish public waited week after week for their answer. But there was a limit to their patience, and it was reached on Augn8t26th, when the Colonial Secretary sho i*ed, with i. plainness ol speech which is as unusual as it is welcome in diplomacy, that the question could not be hung up for ever. ' The sands are running down in the glass," said he. ' If they run out, we shall not hold ourselves limited by that which we have already offered, but, having taken the matter in hand, we will not let it go until we have secured conditions which once for all shall establish which is the paramount power in South Africa, and shall secure for our fellow-subjects there those equal rights and equal privUeges which were promised them by President Kruger when the indepen- dence of the Transvaal was granted by the Queen, and which is the least that in justice ought to be accorded them.' Lord SaUsbury, a Uttle time before, had been equally emphatic. ■ No one in this country wishes to disturb the conventions so long as it is recognised that while they guarantee the independence of the Transvaal on the one side, they guarantee equal political and civil rights for settlers of all nationaUties upon the other. But these conventions are not like the laws of the Medea and the Persians. They are mortal, they can be destroyed ... and once destroyed they can never be reconstructed in the same shape." The long-enduring patience of Great Britain was beginning to show signs of giving way. In the meanUme a fresh despatch had arrived from the Transvaal which offered as an alternative proposal to the joint commission that the Boer Government should grant the franchise proposals of Sir Alfred Milner on con- dition that Great Britain withdrew or dropped her claim THE NEGOTIATIONS „ arbitration, that she hoped never aven over here, that our de JX:^'^!^:^-^- then- concessions were encouraging us to Til "„ *' questions. As a matter of W tu ^^ "^ "*" questions, but the sZects of .^ ' ,"" ""'^ "^ "«' vTer^rnr^"^ '-- openhTthes^r^S * THE GREAT DOER WAR Of tha bnrgheri, the imaU garriwn of Natal had beon taking up posHioM to cover the frontier. The li'^llffi i^f ''" "^ "P'^-'tion of their pre«ence. Bit AJfred Mitaer answered that they were guarding British intoreBta, and preparing against contingenoie.! The roar of the faU was sounding loud and near. On September 8th there was held a Cabinet Council- one of the most important in recent years. A messaee was sent to Pretoria, which even the opponenta oftte Government have acknowledged to be temperate, and Offering the basis for a peaceful settlement. It begins by repudiating emphatically the claim of the Transvaal to be a sovereign international State in the same sense in which the Orange Free State is one. Any proposal made conditional upon such an acknowledgment couM not be entertained. The British Government, however, was prepared to accept the five years' ■ franchise ■ as stated in the nota of August 19th, assuming at the same time that in the Baad each member might talk his own language. 'Acceptance of these terms by the South African Bepnbhc would at once remove tension between the two Govemmenta, and would in all probability render un- necessary any future intervention to secure redress for grievances which the Uitlanders themselves would be SI Volk^3*° ** °°"''*' "^ "■* ^^^n"™ Council and 'Her Majesty's Government are increasingly im- pressed mth the danger of further delay in relieving the strain which has abeady caused so much injury to the mteresta of P uth Africa, and they earnestly press for an immediate and definite reply to the present proposal. If It IS acceded to they will be ready to makeJmmediate arrangements ... to setUe aU details of the proposed THE NEGOTIATIONS ,, tribunal of arbitration if. however » th«, . anxioaBly hope will not b« .hi °°*«7/. « they most tion d« noDo, and to formnln.^ ♦>,«,•. Mtua- itaal MttlemenT- *" '"'° P'^P"""^ ^« » Ti,„kr V * mounted rifleman would have it The bur^era were in no humour for coneeeaions Thet ttat'h™"r:hrtr' r r"""^ -"^ j"«^ power i^Zii,? *""•' '" ^^^ "''""gest military n^? eri«^ i" "°'- ""« '" *'"' "'='"°e'« *aU give Ter debated hnt *k \ ^ *'** *"P"^« »"ted and i I THE GREAT BOER WAR CHAPTER IV TM mn or irAa Th« message sent from the Cabinet ConncU of Sep- tember 8th was evidently the precursor either ol peace or of war. The cloud must burst or blow over. As the nation waited in hushed expectancy for a reply it ■pent some portion of its time in eiamining and specu- lating upon those military preparations which might be needed. The War Oifice had for some monthsbeen arranging for every contingency, and had made certain dispositions which appeared to them to be adequate, but which, our future experience was to demonstrate to be far too small for the very serious matter in hand. It is curious in turning over the files of such a paper as the • Times ' to observe how at first one or two small paragraphs of military significance might appear in the endless columns of diplomatic and poUtical reports, how gradually they grew and grew, unta at last the echpse was complete, and the diplomacy had been thrust mto the tiny paragraphs while the war fiUed the journal. Under July 7th comes the first glint of arms amid the drab monotony of the state papers. On that date it was announced that two companies of Eoyal Engineers and departmental corps with reserves of snpphes and ammunition were being despatched. Two companies of engineers ! Who could have foreseen that they were the vanguard of the greatest army which ever THE EVE OF WAB (g ^\^%''^,^' ''""■• ^"'"'y •"" «<»«d an ~«W, and far the groatost which • BritiBh aeneHJ hM commanded in the fieid ? On the same date wf md •The General Officer Commanding in South AfrS. «JriL ^' °l '"\«»»°>'«">. and the tolJowin|,pecial Sr- xZlr '^°M°"'"^ *° ?"'='«'' '» South E (Ll Hani 'nl^" °'"°*" = Baden-Powell. Lord McMioJung Bird-prosaio travellers aU, with ruR and handbag, but never in picturesque days of old did a morel^ightlyeompanyrideinthlforeCtofCand'B SKS^a?;-S^^hSrt^ SitrBSrCest ttta-: stsL-o^^oSStini-u^H^^ must open the eyes of those who. in ptte of\ui tl British. A statesman who forces on a war usu^v prepares for a war. and this is exactlv what M^ «.' dH do and the British authori^ Sd'n^ ^f^. a huge frontier, two cavaby regiments, three field tettene. and six and a half infantry battaUons-L si^ been seen upon a battlefield Af ti,;. *• TT. certain that^heBoerriSU mi tS;l;^^ «tl,er to Durban or to Cape Town. The BrU^lZZ II • TIIE GREAT UOEB WAB condemn 6d to act upon the dofeniive, could havo bcon masked and afterwardi destroyed, while the main body of the invaders would have encountered nothing but an irregular local resistance, which would have been neutralised by the apathy or hostility of the Dutch colonists. It ii extraordinary that onr authorities seem never to have contemplated the possibility of the Boers taking the initiative, or to have understood that in that case our belated reinforcements would certainly have had to land under the fire of the republican guns. In July Natal had taken alarm, and a strong representation had been sent from the prime minister of the colony to the Governor, Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, and so to the Colonial Office. It was notorious that the Transvaal was armed to the teeth, that the Orange Free State was Ukely to join her, and that there had been strong attempts made, both privately and through the press, to alienate the loyalty of the Dutch citizens of both the British colonies. Many sinister signs were observed by those upon the spot. The veldt had been burned unusually early to ensure a speedy grass-crop after the first rains, there had been a collecting of horses, a dis- tribution of rifles and ammunition. The Free State farmers, who grazetheir sheep and cattle upon Natal soil during the winter, had driven them off to places of safety behind the line of the Drakensberg. Everything pointed to approaching war, and Natal refused to be satisfied even by the despatch of another regiment. On September 6th a second message was received at the Colonial Office, which states the case with great clearness and precision. ' The Prime Minister desires me to urge upon yon by the unanimous advice of the Ministers that sufficient troops should be despatched to Natal immediately to JBTJiL ^ -#feiMTLa THE EVE OF WAR g] ^Bt an .tteok from the Tran.voal and the Orange Free SUte. I am informed |v ', , General Officer Commanding Natal, that h. „ot b. . Moagh troop., even when the Manoh. . ..a. ....,„ lo protect the colony wnth o; it f. rxi.N, „hi|„ ;, 3^ ^ded. My M|m.ter. k,, ^ (hat .v^.y i .,-.,.aionhM b^n made both in the 1 ,.,..aa' ,„ i t'.e Oran^rFr" State which would enable .n ■... u) !,« n,ade on Na^al at short notice. My Mini.t,., be! o 'hat the Boers have made up their mi,,,:. ,„t„. will take pla^ amost certainly, and their oest chance will ll when It seems unavoidable, to deliver a blow before ^forcements have time to arrive. Information ha Wffl?8u"" ""^..^y*"™ ""-J by way of Blond's a^.ft and Stangar, with a view to striking the raUway between Pietermaritzburg and Durban and cutting off OiZrCZ?' '/°°^ ■"■■* ""PP"*'- Nearly all the OMmgeFree State farmers in the Klip Eiver division. W. ! L"^ ?* ""'""y """*"? t"' October at least ire u™. *^' "* r" '°"' *° 'temselves; their sLp are lambing on the road, and the lambs die or are d«^royed Two at least of the Entonjanani d° tri iransvaal. in tbe first case attempting to take as ^tages the chiidren of the natives on the fU *mper with loyal natives, and to set tribe against t^ibe in order to create confusion and detail Vhe S «ve forces of the colony. Both food and warUke stores m large quantities have been accumulated at VoSZst • THE GREAT BOER rAR " "P'es have been seen eiamminir the bridim on the Natal EaUway. and it is known teat thiet^ sp es m aU the principal centres of the colony. In the opmion of Ministers, such a catastrophe as the «S«ure ^rK^hef -r' *'" "-t-'tion'ofThe no^:^^ TnM ^^ "^^ "^^ *" '^'■«^« " contemplated, Td on'^^T ',T' "■^"'"""-B effect on the naZe and on the loyal Europeans in the colony, and would afford great encouragement to the Boers i,d toTheir sympathisers in the colonies, who, although aLed and prepared, will probably keep quiet unlesf th^rece've some encouragement of the sort. They concw in the PoUcy of her Majesty-s Government of exha^tig^ CraJ/r" '°. '"'fr."''"^ o{ the grievancfs of of G™1^ «^ ""xl authoritatively assert the supremacy otmaSg ^J " '""""" °' "•''*""''' J"-""-- -^ o^^^rTl !°, *''*"* ""^ '"'■«' remonstrances the garruion of Natal was graduaUy increased, partly by troops from Europe, and partly by the des^teh of five thons«,d British troops from India. The 2nd Berkshires. the Eoyal Munster FusiUers. the Mm- chesters. and the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers arrived " succession with reinforcements of artillery. The 6th from°?n.?°"-!L'I? """"•'"• '"'» 19*^ Hussars came ttra^H K- ' »*', ^" D^'o^'bires. 1st Glonces- tera. 2nd King's Boyal Bifles and 2nd Gordon High- Sh A^r ""'K *'" ''"' '^°'^' ■"<> «8rd batteries of Fie d ArtiUery made up the Indian Contingent. Their South Africa to 22.000. a force which was inadequate to THE EVE OF WAH gg ft conteit in the open field with the nmnerong Tnlfi'^^'^* ""«"y ^ "I'O"' they wWto to WW f *?'.' o^^^'hehning disaeter whifh. wiToM Mer^Wledge. we can now see to have' been Z As to the disposition of these troops a difference of opmion broke out between the rnlinR wwers b, N^f^l ^dthejtary chiefs at the spotl^^lSVaffS poutics bat the pohtical necessity should be very di?«h-« • t,,?"^ '" "• '*^''«*» " "^'o from our rtn !!•* r^.". '""^ P'ofessional soldier to recognise attversary m the mounted farmer, it is certain th^t even while our papers were proclai'milgtha £ ttae at least we would not nnderrate our Inemy, wlZre Nati^rr^ ^, ""'tr'"* "''"• '^'' "orthe«'LTof Natal IS as vutoerable a military position as a player of knegspid could wish to have sl^mitted to C It nms up „to a thin angle, culminating at Z a^i in a ttf«^l ^' "■? ?'-°'"'*"^ ^""S'" N«k. domina^ by the even more smister bulk of M,«uba. Each sMe of this ang^B IS open to invasion, the one from The W vaal and the other from the Orange Free State a fcrce up at the apex is in a perfect t^p^for the tobilt enemy can flood into the country to the^'south oflej cut the hue of suppUes, and throw up a series of en b'enchments which would make retreft a very dMc^ matter Further down the country, at such posSa « LadyBmith or Dundee, the da^er. Tough^not " •mnu^ent. is .tiU an obvious one, u^le , the def^^ 81 THE GREAT BOER WAR force 13 strong enough to hold its own in the open field and mobUe enough to prevent a mounted enemy from getting round its flanks. To us. who are endowed wUh that profound military wisdom which only com^itT a knowledge of toe event, it is obvious that with Tdefend 2 force whh could not place more than 12,000 m«, to Ime of the Tugela. As a matter of fact, Ladysmith was tT'A f}^l<^°^^ indefensible itself, as it " dominated by high hUls in at least two direction Such an event as the siege of the town appears neTto Mked for or sent. In spite of this, an amount of stores which IS said to have been valued at more than a mUhW poimds was dumped down at this small raUwaySl 80 that the position could not oe evacuated without a cnpphng OSS. The place was the point of bifur' aHon of the mam line, which divides at thiVuttle town i^to one bra^ich running to Harrismith in the Orange FreTstate Lr '"^\"^'^« through the Dund'ee cc^ fields' and Newcastle to the Lang's Nek tunnel and the Trans- vaa^. An importance, which appears now to have been TalTl n °"''"'" f"""''^'' ^^ '*"« Government of Nakl to the possession of the coal fields, and it was at their strong suggestion, but with the concu^ e^fe ! General Penn Symons. that the defendingforrwas divided, and a d,^tachment of between thrl and fou, thousand sent to Dundee, about forty miC fwm ihe ma^ body, which remained under GeLal Si g"o 1 ^S of^h '™"J- ""r"" «y-«--derratedT power of the invaders, but it is hard to criticise an error of judgment which has been so nobly atonrand «o tragically paid for. At the time, then, which our poht«>al narrative has reached, the time of Xn^ THE EVE OF WAR gj Which foUowed the despateh of the Cabinet mesBa« of September Stb, the military situation had 3 to be desperate, but was stiU precarious Twlf * toousand regular troops were'orthe spot who fit sr^rK;^r:-af=.» rihtL^h^jrc^^hS: rhUrisf ».ight conceivably throw in' its weight a^t us'otlv heit the regulars could be apared to dS NaW and in tne Jieid, for by tms time it was evidpnt (h.f lu Orange Free State, with which .eTj^l^^^: ^1 t^f"' '". *''°«' ^ * ""^y 'Wch some ZSI «^ wanton and some chivalrous, to throw i^ its assured basis to start from i <=»lcuiation had no S !1 'Zi.^lf'* S"' ".'*? •* "»' ■^'« ~ • THE GnEAT BOEH WAR there had been, lind the fighting age is five years earlier than the voting age in the repubUca. We recognise new that aU calonlations were far below the true figure. It B probable, however, that the information of the British InteUigence Department was not far wrong. Aeeording t-, this the fighting strength of the Transvaal alone was 82,000 men, and of the Orange Free State 22,000. With meroeMmes and rebels from the colonies they would amount to 80,000, while a considerable rising of the Cape Batch would bring them up to 100,000. In artille: y they were known to have about a hundred guns, many of them (and the fact will need much explaining) more modern an,!?\^''%''*''' " friendly as the Orange Sev arm 9 n ^^ '"'. '"'■'y ?«»". 'h? then should they arm? It was a difficult question, and one in an wenng which we find ourselves in a egion of con" But the T T'T ™"^'" *•"" °' a^ertainedTt But the fairest and most unbiassed of historians must thai te r H "; '"«^ "^^ °' *^"" ""' in the northern republics and in the Cape, there had entered the conception ofasingle Dutch comiJth. eitondmgfrom Cape Town to the Zambesi, in which flag, speech, and law should all be Dutch. X U in tht 2"-at.on that many shrewd and well-informed ^dg Z nn ^"« ■;"'•«' "•""'-g Of this persistent arm ng, o the constant hostihty, of the forming of ties between hi two repubhcs (one of whom had befn reconst Sd and fV r*"'«° independent State by our o^ a^t) and finaUy of that intriguing which endeavoZd to « THE OREAT BOER WAH poison the affection and allegiance of onr own Dutch coloniBts who had no political grievances whatever. They all aimed at one end. and that end was the final expulsion of British power from South Africa and the formation of a single great Dutch repnbUc. The large sum spent by the Transvaal in secret service money-a larger sum, I believe, than that which is spent by the whole British Empire-would give some Idea of the subterranean influences at work. An army of emissaries, agents, and spies, whatever their mission were certauily spread over the British colonies. News- papers were subsidised also, and considerable sums spent upon the press in France and Germany. In the very nature of things a huge conspiracy of this sort to substitute Dutch for British rule in South Africa IS not a matter which can be easily and definitely proved. Such questions are not discilssed in pnblio documents, and men are sounded before being taken into the confidence of the conspirators. But there is plenty of evidence of the individual ambition of pro- mment and representative men in this direction, and it IS hard to believe that what many wanted individually was not striven for collectively, especially when we see how the course of events did actually work towards the end which they indicated. Mr. J. P. FitzPatrick in • The Transvaal from Within '-a book to which 'aU subsequent writers upon the subject must acknowledge theur obligations— narrates how in 1896 he was an- proached. by Mr D. P. Graaff, formerly a member of the Cape Legislative CouncU and a very prominent Africander Bondsman, with the proposition that Great Britain should be pushed out of South Africa. The same pohtician made the same proposal to Mr Beit Bompare with thia the foUowing rtatement of Mr.* h; rm EVB OF WAR ep ?thfc» ^'"■'''"'' *"'' •'"'""'' °' "" I^i-ne Minister 8ut? °""n^'' ?*"'• *^'' * J"''8« °' ""> Orange Free State, m Bloemfontein between seventeen and eLteen r/^^'K "'■ V**"^ ""^ retroceesionof the Tr^S Ur^^T^" T "^"'^ """"'U^g the Africander Bond eLT P r*!"' '° '"^-^y °"* """ "' 'hat time, at all events, England and its Government had no intention she h^'fulT'^^ *"' independence of the Transvaator tl^S ?"^»°""°->»ly" granted the same no fi»U 7''rf'«'«; no intention to seize the Band gold th n% t. M^ T "°' y^' ''"»°^-«^- At that time: ^n, I met Mr Ro.tz, and he did his best to get mo to become a member of his Africander Bond, bu t.^ft r studjmg Its constitution and programme,! r^fu^d to do nLltr^"" *'' 'f °"^« '°"^"y '" -h^-™ took pkce between us. which has been indelibly imprinted on my mmd ever since : "'prmiea ' ^"'' ■■ Why do you refuse ? Is the object of gettina "l^tr '''' "^ ^^'-' ^ '-'^'^ -"- s •My.4^: Yes, it is ; but I seem to see plainly here between he Imes of this constitution much more niti mately aimed at than that. "' •Beitz: What? «mlf T^*K^ ""' ''"J'* '''**'''y ""»' ">« "'"n""** object ~med at is the overthrow of the British power and the expulsion of the British flag from South ffrll " r. :*;Xwrs:of'^'-^^ '*-' --* --- '%.ef/: You don't suppose, do yon, that that flag 'I •• THE OHEAT BOEB WAR ii going to diiappeu from Soiith Africa withont • tremendoDs straggle and fight ? 'Reitt (witli the $ame pUatant $ey-eoniciout, lelf. latiified, and yet lemi-apologetie emile) : WeU, I sappoM not ; but even bo, what of that ? ^^^ 'Myiey-. Only this, that when that struggle takes place you and I will be on opposite sides ; and what is more, the God who was on the side of the Transvaal in the late war, because it had right on its side, will be on the side of EngUnd, because He must view with abhor- rence any plotting and scheming to overthrow her power and position in South Africa, which have been ordamed by Him. •Reiti: We'U see. ' Thus the conversation ended, but during the seven- teen years that have elapsed I have watched the propa- ganda for the overthrow of British power in South Africa bemg ceaselessly spread by every possible means -the press, the pulpit, the platform, the schools, the coUeges. the Legislature-untU it has ouhninated in the present war. of which Mr. Eeitz and his co-workers are the ori,^ and the cause. Believe me, the day on which ^. W. Beitz sat down to pen his ultimatum tn Great Bntam was the proudest and happiest moment of bit hfe, and one which had for long years been looked for- ward to by him with eager longing and expectation.' Compare with these utterances of a Dutch politician of the Cape, and of a Dutch poUtician of the Orange Free State, the foUowing passage from a speech dehvered by Kruger at Bloemfontein in the year 1887 : 'I think it too soon to speak of a United South Africa under one flag. Which flag was it to be ? The Queen of England would object to having her flag hauled down, and we, 'he burghers of the Transvaal THE EVE OF WAR 71 ^ect to htnlmg onri down. What U to be done? We are now imall and of Uttle importance, but we an growing, and are preparing the way to take our pUe« among the great nations of the world.' 'The dream of our life,' eaid another, ' ii a union of the States of South Africa, and this has to come from withm, not firom without. When that is aooompUshed. South Afnca will be great.' Always the same theory from aU quarters of Dutch Uiought, to be followed by many signs that the idea was bemg prepared for in practice. I repeat that the fairest and most unbiassed historian cannot dismiss the con- spiraoy as a myth. And to this one may retort, why should they not conspire? Why should they not have their own views as to the future of South Africa ? Why should they not endeavour to have one universal flag and one common speech ? Why should they not win over our colonists. If they can, and push us into the sea ? I see no reason why they should not. Let them try if they will. And et us try to prevent them. But let us have an end of talk about British aggression, of capitaUst designs upon the gold fields, of the wrongs of a pastoral people, s^d all the other veils which have been used to cover the issue. Let those who talk about British designs upon the republics turn their attention for a moment to the evidence which there is for republican designs upon the colonies. Let tbem reflect that in the one system all white men are equal, and that in the other the minority of one race has persecuted the majority of the other, and let them consider under which the truest freedom Ues winch stands for universal Uberty and which for reaction and racial hatred. Let them ponder and answer all this before they determine where their sympathies Ue i.!l mi! n THE GREAT BOEK WAB " < .V- ^ Ti? ^•" '" v" 9»«*"°'» o' politic, and diimii.. ™. 1 * ^' !?°*' "^'^ con«der»Uon. wUoh were soon to be of .uoh vital moment, we may now be ween the Government of the Transvaal andTe Colomal Office. On September 8th, a. already narrated afinalmesMgewas sent to Pretoria, which stated tS; Z'„Tr.'-"°' 7^'' "•' *"'^ Govemmenrcould fransvaal A definite answer was demanded, and the nation waited with sombre patience for the reply There were few illusions in this country m to the difficulties of a Transvaal war. It was cle^l^^n th!t little honow- and immense vexation were in store for us. The first Boer war stiU smarted in our minds ^d we knew the prowess of the indomitable burghers But our people, if gloomy, were none the less resolute, for that men had borne it m upon them that this was no local quarrel, but one upon which the whole existence of the empue hung. The cohesion of that empire Ta. tot tested. Men had emptied their glasses to it in "me of peace. Was it a meaningless pouring of wine, or were they ready to pour their hearts' blood also in tLITf waj;? Had we really founded a series of discowe^t^ nations, with no common sentiment or inter^ or w« the empu-e an organic whole, as ready to thrill Z^ oneemoto. or to harden into one resolve « „e^ .^veral SUi,s of the Union ? That was the ^es"on at issue, and much of the fftture history of the word wm at stake upon the answer. Already there were indications that the colonies the mother country alone, but that she was upholding THE EVE OP War jf fiery and wm.trop.cal, had offered a contiuBei^t of Western Australia. Tasmania, Victoria. New RoTh Wales, and South Australia foltowed in th ordel named ?» th;7? " «' '". 'P^' ••"* '^^^ '•« -"ore tonly for th delay Her citizens were the least concernTrf S^'adtn. , v"" '*" """y ■» South Africa bu Canadmngfew. Nonetheless, she cheerfully took her share of the common burden, and grew the rLdier ani Prom T'th" "" '"J'^" """^ *° '«'«'-""'™ '"«vUy 1 rom^l the men of many hues who makeup the Soul. ?"'• M ? ^'°''''° ^J"'"'' '-"• W«»' African Houssas, from Malay police, from Western Indians there came offers of service. But this was to be a w" iS mans war and if the British could not work out Thd^ own salvafaon then it were well that empire should ™^ 60 OoS'^m" "^- '''"' '"'«°"'''™' '"dian armfTf 160.000 soldiers, many of them seasoned veterans was for the same reason left untouched. England has clsamed no credit or consideration for such a1.rntit" bntan irresponsible writer may well ask how many o those foreign critics whose respect for our public morihtv 21^7^.1^"'''°'^ """''* ^"^^ advocated such self- Sn °™ °°"°'"'' ''**° P''^*'' '» ">« »>"e On September 18th the official reply of the Boer Government to the message sent from the Ca£ Council was published in London. I„ manner it w« unbending and unconciliatory ; i„ substance, it wal" #J*^. MKMCorr nsounioN tbt omit (ANSI „nl ISO TEST CHAHI N«. 2] l.v/ la ^" 1^ [2.2 III 1.1 |2j0 III Im H ij^ 1^ 1^ A jS /IPPLIED IIVMLDb Inc K 16H CI win Slr«( U ItochMttr. Itfw York UQ09 USA ■ (71«) «! - 0300 - IW ■ (IIS) 2se - Has - Fg. 74 THE GREAT BOER WAR complete rqection of all the British demands. 14 v!„!?J° "f""""*""? °' propose to the Eaad the five years franchwe and the other measures which had been detoed as he muumum which the Home Government vmiT^ Hi " *" °"^'"' °^ J°««<«' to'^d" the BhouHL ;•,• T^^'!^"" thatthedebatesof theEaad should be hhngua^, as they are in the Cape Colony and m Canada, was absolutely waived aside. The British f^ZT'u t"^ '^^ ^ ^^"^ •»"' ''•»?'''«•> that if the reply should be negative or inconclusive they reserved to themselves the right to ' reconsider the situation rC ment. The reply had been both negative and inconcln- s.ve andon September 22nd a council met to determine what the next message should be. It was short and firm, but BO planned as not to shut the door upon peace. It^ rrr/*?.' """ '^' British GovemmenfexpVessed d4p rep-et at the rejecton of the moderate pro^sals which had been submitted in their last despatch, and that now m accordance with their promise, they would shortly put forward their own plans for a settlement. The messLe was not an ultimatum, but it foreshadowed an ultimatZ lu tne future. *T, ^ "** meantime, upon September 21st the Baad of the Orange IVee State had met, and it became more and more evident that this republic, with whom we had no possible quarrel but, on the contrary, for whom we had . ^eat deal of friendship and admiration, intended to throw m Its weight against Great Britain. Some time before, an offensive and defensive alliance had been con- eluded between the two States, which must, until the secret history of these events comes to be written, appear to have been a singularly rash and unprofitable bargain for the smaUer one. She had nothing to fear from THE EVJ3 OF WAK jg Great Britain, since ehe had been voluntarily turned into an independent republic by her and had Uved -i peace with her for forty years. Her laws were as liberal as our own. But by this suicidal treaty she agrees' to share the fortunes of a State which was deliberately eourtins war by its persistently unfriendly attitude, and whose reactionary and narrow legislation would, one might imagme, have alienated the sympathy of her progressive neighbour. There may have been ambitions like those already quoted from the report of Dr. Beitz's conversa- tion, or there may have been a complete haUucination as to the comparative strength of the two combatants ajnd the probable future of South Africa; but however that may be, the treaty was made, and the time had come to test how far it would hold. The tone of President Steyn at the meeting of the Kaad, and the support which he received from the majority of his burghers, showed unmistakably that the two republics would act as one. In his opening speech Hteyn declared uncompromisingly against the British contention, and declared that his State was bound to the Transvaal by everything which was near and dear Among the obvious miUtary precautions which could no longer be neglected by the British Government was the aendmg of some small force to protect the long and exposed hne of raUway which Ues just outside the Trans- vaal border fromKimberleyto Ehodesia. Sir AlfredMitaer communicated with President Steyn as to this movement of troops, pomting out that it was in no way directed against the Free State. Sir Alfred MUner added that the Imperial Government was still hopeful of a friendly settlement with the Transvaal, but if this hope were disappomted they looked to the Orange Free State to preserve strict neutraUty and t» prevent miUtary 78 THE GBEAT BOER WAR would be BtrioKsemfFwrf'l ^""« ''°°«" was absolutely no ca„7e to d^f I' ^^ ''****'^ '^"t *«« between the /reesLteldGrBri^' "^ "'"'••""■ animated by the moat tria^Aj^.."'' *"«« we were To this the Presid^n /I !™ V°'*°"°°' ''"'"''» th^m- answer, to the e£ that he dil''°'°'''^* "■'«"^'°'"' towards the TransL >„,, thf 7"""^ °' °" ~"'»' ment of troops, wW^wo ja t T*"*^ '''^ ">»'«• the burghers A =1 !" considered a menace by State EfLndingSrwoiT^r""" °' ">e Free Free State will ClVtlf •!l,'^r' "'"" ""'y.«'« tions towards the i^a? bv w f' ^ulfiUts obliga- alliance existing betwTnlhe t!n m-°^ ""' P"'^""'^ impossible it wfs ZZiTJZr7^^''':il^°'''^ ^"^ and without ashadowof a cans?l7' ™f ^^ °°"«'^«« be saved from beingdrawn ^o ITT] ''"" "'' '»"''' where, from over both Cde« ca™! *f ''^'"""- ^^"y- preparations. Already at tl „*? * = """' °' """''"^ and armed burghers were i„r^ °^ ^''"'■"'«' ''""P" and the most infred„C8l™L^*."P''° *•"« ''<»>«er. stand that the shadow oTa^r^rr^ ''''»'' founder- across them. Artillerv L, 8^^*'.,^" "^ really, falling being accumulated at irw"„t°°V"e'''°'«« "«'« "bowing where the storm m7ahfT" **■* ^'"»' '»^'J«r. 0nthelastday7sentembrrf ^ "^"""'^ '" ''«»'' were reported "^lo hat iS^*?*;'^"'"™''^^^^ '™^ for that point. At the sll f • ^ '^'^ Johannesburg centration at kafman' uZ Z^Tr "T "' » <"»" threatening the raiIwavC« »L *\ "^""'""""^'Jsr, Mafeking, f name d Sj Tef^e ' « .^f f '"^ °' the world. ""^^ '°°6 '° be familiar to On October 8rd there occurred what was in truth «, / THE EVB OF WAR ^ 5S:!^:vsc:eS::S';^7-. patient to continued to draw up hetfilMf '* "" ''"''^' "><> train from the Transvaal o r.i't ^"P*'" ^^^ ">"" Vereerigi„g,andthewrek' °u ^ ^^T ""» "'"PP^d "t amount^ to about hTfaSr**"'^"" ^orEn^ni, the Boer Government Ina^e^LTr'^V ***» ^-^ same daytheAfricanderS^o,?SJ«.-"Po« the that as many a8 404trnck8 hTn. !, '*"°'"*^°''««'J ment toe over the frontt !nd C T "" '^o^^'"" Taken in conjunction with thl'^ '"" ■**" "'"°ed. cartridges through he Cane t^pT'*^'' °^ """■ """l tein,thieinciden?arousedThed ^'^'°™ ""^ B'oemfon- the Colonial Enghsh aid tL p^'^ "><''«°ation among increased by the reportf of t),!'^'^^ ^"'''^"' "'"'"h waf towns, such as K mberiev and V "1!"^ '"'='' ^'^'^ getting cannon for their oL if ^^''"ii '""'^ ^""^ « been dissolved. and the old Prf m"';. ^^^ ^'"^'' ''"d been a statement that "a, ^""'^^"'Vast words had invocation of the Lord Ts IT T*""' ""'' a stern ready less obtrusively but no 1^^"*';-, ^"^"^^ ^'^ quarrel to the same dread Cdge ^""''''' *° ^*^» ♦'"^ On October 2nd President a*l™ • , Mihier that he had deemed t'j T'^ ^"^^^''^ Free State burghers-Zt ! T'"^^ *" =*" ""' tl-e Sir A. Milner w'ro "eSi^l' t "'°'""»« •>" ^""e- declaring that he did nof vet dll • f «P«ations, and sure that any reaToLbl/ ^ "^P**"'- for he was consideredby^eXSv'fT"^ '°"""'* ^"^^''Wy was that there WM no V» •"*"'"*'"• S^^y"'"^?!? Btream of Brrtish re.W " "^Sotiating unless tte South Africa Is ^r"'" '"^^ """^S -to minority.itwaeimpos^SeriT 'w ^ " «"»' «>eeorres^ndenceW;::SXSSSh^ 7« THE OBEAT BOEK WAS amy reserves for the First Army Corps were called out in Great Britain and other signs shown that it bad been determined to send a considerable force to South Africa. Parliament was also summoned that the formal national' assent might ha gained for those grave measures which were evidently pending. It was on October 9th that the somewhat leisurely proceedings of the British Colonial Office were brought to a head by the arrival of an unexpected and audacious ultimatum from the Boer Government. In contests of wit, as of arms, it must be confessed that the laugh has up to now been usually upon the side of our simple and pastoral South African neighbours. The present instance was no exception to the rule. While our Government was cautiously and patiently leading up to an ultimatum, our opponent suddenly played the very card which we werepreparing to lay upon the table. The document was very firm and explicit, ' ut the terms in which it was drawn were so impossible that it was evidently framed with the deliberate purpose o'. forcing an immediate war. It demanded that the troops upon the borders of the republic should be irstantly with- drawn, that all reinforcements which had arrived within the last year should leave South Africa, and that those who were now upon the sea should be sent back without being landed. Failing a satisfactory answer within forty- eight hours, ' the Transvaal Government will with great regret be eompeUed to regard the action of her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, for the con- sequences of which it will not hold itself responsible." The audacious message was received throughout the empire with a mixture of derision and anger. The answer was despatched next day through Sir Alfred Milner. THE EVE OF WAK 79 -lOth Octob,r.~HeT Majesty'B Governmont have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Eepnblie, conveyed in your telegram of the 9tU October. Yon will inform the Government of the South African Republic in reply that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Bepublic are such as her Majestv's Government deem it impossible to discuss.' And so we have come to tho end of the long road past the battle of the pens and the wranghng of tongues! to the arbitrament of the Lee-Metford and the Mauser • It was pitiable that it should come to this Thes^ ' people were as near akin to us as any race which is not our own. They were of the same Frisian stock which peopled our own shores. In habit of mind, in reUgion in respect for law, they were as ourselvf,. Brave, too' they were, and hospitable, with those sporting instincts which are dear to the Anglo-Celtic race. There was no people m the world who had more quaUties which we might admire, and not the least of them was that love of -ndependence which it is our proudest boast that we have encouraged in others as weU as exercised ourselves And yet we had come to this pass, that there was no room m all vast South Africa for both of us. We cannot hold ourselves blameless in the matter • The evil that men do lives after them,' and it has been told in this small superficial sketch where we have erred in the past m South Africa. On our hands, too, is the Jameson raid, carried out by EngUshmen and led by officers who held the Queen's Commission; to us, also, the blame of the shnflling, half-hearted inquu-y into that most unjustifiable business. These are matches which helped to set the great blaze alight, and it is we who held them But the faggots which proved to be so inflammable they w THE GREAT BOER WAR were not ol our Betting. They were the wrongs done to half the community, the settled resolution ol the minority to tax and vex the m^ority, the determination of a people who had lived two generations in a country to claim that country entirely for themselves. Behind them all there may have been the Dutch ambition to dominate South Africa. It was no petty object for which Britain fought. When a nation struggles uncomplainingly through months of disaster she may claim to have proved her conviction of the justice and necessity of the struggle. Shall Dutch ideas or English ideas of government pievail throughout that huge country 1 The one means frsedom for a single race, the other means equal rights to all white men beneath one common law. What each means to the coloured races let history declare. This was the main issue to be determined from the instant that the clock struck five upon the afternoon of Wednesday, October the eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine. That moment marked the opening of a war destined to determine the fate of South Africa, to T7ork great changes in the British Empire, to seriously affect the future history of the world, and incidentally to alter many of our views as to the art of war. It is the story of this war which, with limited materia' but with much aspira- tion to care and candour, I shaU now endeavour to tell. CHAPTEB V TALUU BILL It was on the morning of October 12th, amid cold and mist, that the Boer camps at Sandspruit and Volksruat broke np, and the burghers rode to the war. Some twelve thousand of them, all mounted, with two batteries of eight Krupp guns each, were the invading force from the north, which hoped later to be joined by the Free- staters and by a contingent of Germans and Trans- vaalers who were to cross the Free State border. It was an hour before dawn that the guns started, and the riflemen followed close behind the hist limber, so that the first light of day fell upon the black sinuous line winding down between the hills. A spectator upon the occasion says of them : ' Their faces were a study. For the most part the expression worn was one of determina- tion and bulldog pertinacity. No sign of fear there, nor of wavering. Whatever else may be laid to the charge of the Boer, it may never truthfully be s'aid that he is a coward or a man unworthy of the Briton's steel.' The words were written early in the campaign, and the whole empire will endorse them to-day. Could we have such men as willing fellow-citizens, they are worth more than all the gold mines of their country. This main Transvaal body consisted of the commando of Pretoria, which comprised 1,800 men, and those of 81 a w ." THE GBEAT BOEB WAK Heidelberg. Middelburg, Krugerodorp, Standerion part of the cmpmgn. In addition to these native forces Hf!f! / ^ J ^^ ^*"°'"' ""P" were with the Free State forces, but a few hundred came down tram ih! «nd fifty and an Irish-or perhaps more properly an Insh-Amencan-corps of the same number who ^ under the green flag and the harp. ' " "^^ V. J^^r" f?^' ^^ "^^ '^<'°"°*'' ^ d^ded into two very different types. There were the town &,!« smartened and perhaps a little enervated bylrosS more"!::' "T'" l' ''"^^""' '"'' P«feLonZ"n! more alert and qmcker than their rustic comrades These men spoke EngUsh rather than Dutch Td hem 'tt T T"'"" <" ^"«"'^ descentt^^g hr^nn^h "f"^"' ""* ""'■* formidable both if IhTL ? mT,,""'^ ^ *^''^ P^^'tiT« qualities, were the back-veldt Boers, the sunburned. tanl-hZd m ' unbued with the traditions of their own gueriUa wlJl' Sh mrk/"''T ?■' '""' "atural'warriors „^;- TALA>'« HILL ^ hose whom the narrow lawsoJhi, new oountnSu J m regarding as outside the pale Ha ,.«m , ^ xl French Huguenot blood whih ha. ,1™?! °^ *•"* refined every r»ce which it ht toucU'^d^tL ut S'antSreuTS'opliir?^^- n^ive broil, and in the Britth "T ^ o/resTh^ had .hown him.elf a capable leader His r^^fj t rtaning ou or the ind.pendence of the T^JnZiZ remained ^Z'^lrSZZ.^' tJ-J^I^^ do^ asrhutTe ixSe" x s s^ct ts:.'n'nsrprabi? r^ 't ^'^- thousand men, were the contingent from the fL «f™° Tho I?'"?-'' ""^P^' *°g^t''- with sTh ers G rm^r ^e^CrS inf r r"*' "•« various™: through*!^-;-:- SeSxttr outupon the more fertile plains of WesterTNaS The Bl THE GREAT BOEIl WAR toW forcB may have bMn lomething between twenty and thirty thouBand men. By aU account* they were of an aatomihingly high heart, convinced that a path of eacv wotory lay before them, and that nothing coold bur their way to the .ea. If the Britieh commanderi underrated their opponenti, there ii ample evidence that the mistake wai reciprocal. A few words now as to the disposition of the British forces, concerning which it mast be borne in mind that Sir George White, though in actual command, had only been a few days in the country before war was declared, so that tho arrangements fell to General Penn Symons. aided or hampered by the advice of the local politick authorities. The main position was at Ladysmith. bat an advance post was strongly held at Glencoe, which i. five mUes from the station of Dundee and forty from Ladysmith. The reason for this dangerous division of force was to secure each end of the Biggarsberg section of the railway, and «Jso to cover the important collieries of that district. The positions chosen seem in each case to show that tho British commander was not aware of the number and power of the Boer guns for each was equally defensible against rifle Are 'and vulnerable to an artillery attack. In the case of Glenooe ITm ''".I.'' *f^ °"''*"' """ 8""' "P°" "« hills above would, as they did, render the position untenable. This outlying post was hold by the 1st Leicester Begiment, the 2nd Dublin FusiUers, and the first battaUon o Kifles with he 18th Hussars, three companies of mounM infantry, and three batteries of field artillerv the 13th fi7th, and 69th. The 1st Boyal S' FuBihers were on their way to reinforce It, and arrived before the first action. Altogether the Glencoe camp contained some four thousand men. TALANA UILL u Tlie main body oJ the »ruy remoined at Ladyimith These consisted of the l.t Devon., the Ut Liverpools and the Gordon Highlander!, with the 1st Qlouceiter. the 2nd King's Royal Bifles, and the 2nd Kifle Bri«ade' remforoed later by the Manohesters. The cavalry included the 6th Dragoon Guards, the fith Lancers a detachment oflOth Hussars, the Natal Carabineers, the Natal Mounted Police, and the Border Mounted Rifles remforced later by the Imperial Light Horse, a fine body of men raised principally among the refugees from the Rand. For artillery there were the 21.t, 42nd, and 58rd batteries of field artillery, and No. 10 Mountain Battery with the Natal Field Artillery, the gun, of which were too light to be of service, and the 28rd Company of Boyal Engineers. The whole force, some eight or nine thousand strong, was under the immediate command of Sir George White, with Sir Archibald Hunter, fre,', from the Soudan, General French, and General U ^ iiamilton as bis lieutenants. .J^" fl"'»|'°f'' of the Boers, then, must fall upon 4,000 men. If these could be overwhelmed, there were 8,000 more to be defeated or masked. Then what was there between them and the sea? Some detachments of local volunteers, the Durban Light Infantry at Colenso, and the Natal Boyal Rifles, with some naval volonteers at Estconrt. With the power of the Boers and their mobility it is inexplicable how the colony was saved. We are of the same blood, the Boers and we and we show It in our failings. Over-confidence on our part gave them the chance, and over-confidence on theirs prevented them from instantly availing themselves of it. If passed, never to come again. .1, ^'!,!J'^?"**'' °' "" ''** "P°° O^'obw "th- On Uie 12th the Boer forces crossed the frontier both on 88 THE GREAT BOEB WAR the north and on the west. On the 18th they occupied tht h!^°'" t '}l^ ''°8'* °' Natal. On^he l«h they had reached Newcastle, a larger town some fifteen mUes mside the border. Watchers from the houses »w s« mUes of canvas-tilted bullock wagons winding do^ the passes and learned that this was not a raid bnt an invasion. At the same date news reached the Bri i^ headquarters of r.n advance from the western paaset On f^ iirjT"' ''■°'° *•"« ^"^f*"" Bi™' on the ea«t tof^rcVrfW^T*^^''''''^'"'''^«»'««''>°«»»°ce »^. 1 »(. • "f ?°' """"^ •" *°"''h with the enemy. On the 16th s« of the Natal Police were surrounded and captured at one of the drifts of the Buffalo Biven On the 18th our cavalry patrols came into touch with the Boer scouts at Acton Homes and Besters Station thse ?n°?h l«^'f'"^'" '"' ^^-^^^ ^'- Stateflrc^ mat fl -f^'" " 'J«''"=''ment was reported from Hadders Sprmt seven miles north of Glencoe Camp. The cloud was dnftmg up, and it could not be long before it would burst. ^ Two days later, on theearly morning of October 20th the forcescame at last into collision. At half-past three m the morning, well before dayUght, the^mouS mfantry picket at the junction of the roads frorn Landmans and Vants Drifts was fired into by the Door" berg commando, and retired upon its sup^rts. Two companies of tha Dublin Fusiliers were senUut Jit five o'clock on a fine but misty morning the whde of S^ons s force was under arms with the knowledge that t^\?T],''™ P™^^8 ^^^y *°'"ds them The khaki-c ad Imes of fighting men stood in their long thL ranks stermg up at the curves of the saddle-back hUls to the north and east of them, and straining their eyes to catch a ghmpse of the enemy. Why thesfsame Zllt TALANA HILL gf ^i ^"^ T* T^ °'.°"P'*^ ^y "" °™ people ». it must be confeseed, an msolable myetery. In a hoUow ^,n 7'k.^ ^^ "**'*' "*" *^» "8^*««n motionless guns, limbered np and ready, the horses fidgeting and atampmg in the raw morning air. And then suddenly-conld that be they ? An officer ^a^.M^T '^'^ "**""y »"'' P"''"*'^- Another and another turned a steady field glass towards the same place. And then the men could see also, and a little murmur of interest ran down the ranks. A long sloping hill-Talana HiU-olive-green in hue was stretching away in front of them. At The s^mr^ t' ^rose mto a rounded crest. The mist was clearing and the curve was hard-outlined against the limpid blue or ^LZ'^T '^i °° **"•"' '"""^ '^0 »°d " h»" ">ileB »L 1 ""lit" °^' " "'"« 8roup of black dots had ^^f •.?" "'*" '^^^ °' *•>« «>^yl^« ^0^ become serrated with movmg figures. They clustered into a Knot, then opened again, and then There had been no smoke, but there came a long crescendo hoot, rising into a shrill wail. The sheU Tn^f^ "^^ ^^'^^ "'«'»■ 'Tben another- and yet another-and yet another. But there was no time'^to heed them, for there was the hiUside and there the enemy So at it again with the good old murderous obso ete heroic tactics of the British tradition - There Me tunes when, in spite of science and book-lore, the best plan a the boldest plan, and it is weU to fly straight at your enemy's throat, facing the chan=e that your moved oflFround the enemy's left flank. The guns dashS to the front. mUimbered. and opened fire. The infrt^ " THE GHEAT BOEK WAK were moved round in the direction of Bandapruit. passing through the little town of Dundee, where the women and children came to the doors and windows to cheer them. It was thought that the hiU was more accessible from that side. The Leicesters and one field battery-the 67th-were left behind to protect the camp and to watch the Newcastle Boad upon the west At seven in the morning all was ready for the assault. Two military facts of importance had already been disclosed. One was that the Boer percussion-sheUs were useless m soft ground, as hardly any of them exploded; the other that the Boer guns could outran^ ou; ordmary fifteen-pounder field gun, which had Zn the one thmg perhaps m the whole British equipment upon which we were prepared to pin our faith. The two fir . rp± '^i'' '"'' *^« «»"'■ '«" ""oved near^° ZJ°,^-^- -"m *^r *' '■"' *° ^-^ y'ds, at which range they quickly dominated the guns upon the hill. Other guns had opened from another crest to the east of 1 qfrS ** "^T '^^ '^" mastered by the fire of the 18th Battery. At 7.80 the infantry were ordered to advance, which they did in open order, extended to ten paces. The Dublin PusiUers formed the first linj Z Bifles the second, and the Irish Fnsihers the third nrJ , '^T"*^ ^^^^ °f **•« ''^^""e were over open grassland, where the range was long, and the ifT r^"^ °^ *''* ^''^' "«°<^"J "«'' tl^e withered Itlt ^ r.T'/*' casualties until the wood was reached, which lay halfway up the long slope of the hill. It was a plantation of larches, some hundreds of yards wood-that 18, the left side to the advancing troops- there stretched a long nullah or hoUow, which rar per- pendicularly to the hill, and served rather as a condu^or TALANA HILL gg Of bullets than aa a cover. So severe wag the fire at this point that both in the wood and in the nullah the troops lay down to avoid it. An officer of Irish Fusi- liers has narrated how in trying to cut the straps from a fallen private a razor lent him for that purpose by a wounded sergeant was instantly shot out of his hand. The ^lant Symons, who had refused to dismount, was shot through the stomach and fell from his horse mortally wounded. With an excessive gallantry, be had not only attracted the enemy's fire by retaining his horse, but he had been accompanied throughout the action by an OTderly bearing a red pennon. • Have they got the hiU ? Have they got the hill ? • was his one eternal question as they earned him dripping to the rear. It was at the edge of the wood that Colonel Shersijpn met his end From now onwards it was as much a soldiers' battle as Inkermaiin. In the shelter of the wood the more eager of the three battalions had pressed to the front tmtU the frmge of the trees was lined by men from aU of them. The difficulty of distinguishing particular regi- mento where aUwere clad aUke made it impossible in the heat of action to keep any sort of formation. So hot was the fire that for the time the advance was brought to a standstill, but the 69th battery, firing shrapnel at a range of 1,400 yards, subdued the rifle fire and about half-past eleven the infantry were able to push on once more. Above the wood there was an open space some hun- dreds of yards across, bounded by a rough stone waU buUt for herding cattle. A second wall ran at right angles to this down towards the wood. An enfilading rifie fire had been sweeping across this open space, but the wall m mt does not appear to have been occupied by the enemy, who held the kopje above it. To avoid * THE GREAT BOEB WAB t^!lT ^tu""" '"''""■'' '»" « -^ele file under the shelter of the waU, which covered them to the riRht and 80 reached the other waU across their front. Here' there was a second long delay, the men dribbling np from below, and firing over the top of the wall and between the chmks of the stones. The Dublin FusiUers, through bemg a a more difficult position, had been unable to get up as quickly as the others, and most of the hard- of the Eifles and of the Irish FusUiers. The air was so 1« 'f t!."''? "^"^ "^^'^'^ ^ live upTn th^ others.de of this shelter. Two hundred yards interned between the waU and the crest of the kopje. And yet the kopje had to be cleared if the battle were to be won. .n™ t ^ ^""^^^ ^"^ °' crouching men an officer sprang shoutmg, and a score of soldiers vaulted over the wall and foUowed at his heels. It ^as Captain cLor of the Irish Fusihers, but his personal magnetism carried up with him some of the Bifles as weU as men of his own command He and half his litUe forlorn hope were struck down-he, alas ! to die the same night-hut Ce were other leaders as brave to take his place. ' Forrard 11?' f"*"' '°"«d '^^^J ! ' eried Nugent, of the Bifles. seH up be boulder-studded hill. Others foUowed and others, from aU sides th«y came running, the crouching yelhng khaki-clad figures, and the sup^rts rushTup from the rear. For a time they were beaten down by theur own shrapnel striking into them from behind which IB an amazing thing when one considers that the ZftZl ^•yj'"^»- K was here, between the r^l frr'' *•"*' Colonel Gunning, of the Bifles, and many other brave men met their end, some hy our own bullets and some by those of the enemy; hZ Z TALANA HILL gj Boers thinned away in front of them, and the an.-doug onlookers from the plain below saw the waving hehnets on the crest, and learned that aU was well. But it was, it must be confessed, a Pyrrhic victory. We had our hill, but what else had we? The jrans which had been disabled by our fire had been removed from the kopje. Of the Boer losses it is impossible even now to say anything definite. The commando wluch seized the hiU was that of Lucas Meyer and It 18 computed that he had with him about 4 000 men The most moderate computation of his losses atTalana HiU itself wbt 50 kiUed and 180 wounded, but among the killed were many whom the army could m spare. The gallant but optimistic Symons, Gunning of the Eifles, Sherston, Connor, Hambro, and many other brave men died that day. The loss of officers wa« out of aU proportion to that of the men. An incident which occurred immediately after the act»n did much to rob us of the fruits of our vTctory! Artillery had pushed up the moment that the hUl wm earned, and had nnlimbered on Smith's Nek between ifKn'"^'^^'""",:""''*''' ^'"^^'^ broken groups of 50 and 100, could be seen streaming away. A fairer chance for the use of shrapnel has never been. BuH this mstant there ran from an old iron church on the reverse side of the hill, which had been used all day as a tt^t'thT • " ""^ ''"•• " "^^^ «'«• « " P'°bable in^nH ^ '"'t'on WM m good faith, and that it was simply whtw n ^^•"P'"''"""" ^°' *^« ambulance paJ^y which followed him. But the too confiding gnnnJr > fa command appears to have thought that an armistice had « THE GREAT BOEH WAB been declared, and held his hand during those preoioui mrnuteg which might have turned a defeat into a rout. The chance passed, never to return. The double error of firing into our own advance and of failing to fire into the enemy's retreat makes the battle one which cannot be looked back to with satisfaction by our gunners: In the meantime some miles away another train of events had led to a complete disaster to our small cavalry force— a disaster which robbed our dearly bought infantry victory of much of its importance. That action alone was undoubtedly a victorious one, but the net result of the day's fighting cannot be said to have been certainly in our favour. It was Wellington who asserted that his Mvalry always got him into scrapes, and the whole of British mihtary history might furnish examples of what he meant. Here again our cavalry got into trouble. Suffice It for the civilian to chronicle the fact, and leave it to the miUtary critic to portion out the blame. One company of mounted infantry (that of the Eifles) had beer told off to form an escort for the guns. The rest of the mounted infantry with part of the 18th Hussars (Colonel MoUer) had moved round the right flank until thej r-iched the right rear of the enemy. Such a movement, had Lucas Meyer been the only opponent, would have been above criticism ; but knowing, as we did, that there were several commandoes converging upon Glencoe it was obviously taking a very grave and certain risk to allow the cavalry to wander too far from support. They were soon entangled in broken country and attacked by superior numbers of the Boers. There was a time when they might have exerted an important influence upon the action by attacking the Boer ponies behmd the hills, but the opportunity was aUowed to pass. An attempt was made to get back to the army, and a series I TALANA HILL gg of defensiye poritionB were held to coyer the retreat bat the enemy's fire became too hot to aUow them to be retamed. Every route eave one appeared to be blocked. BO the horsemen took this, which led them into the heart of a second commando of the enemy. Findino no way through, the force took up a defensive position. f^ked it "" * '^'° *"^ ''"' °° * '"'PJ* '""'* °™'- The party consisted of two troops of Hussars one company of mounted infantry of Iho Dublin Fusiliers and one section of the mounted infantry of the Bifles- about two hundred men in all. They were subjected to a hot fare for some hours, many being kUled and wounded, (runs were brought up, and fired sheU into the farmhouse At 4 80 the force, being in a perfectly hopeless position! laid down their arms. Their ammunition was gone, many of then- horses had stampeded, and they were hemmed in by very superior numbers, so that no slightest slur can rest upon the survivors for their decision to surrender though the movements which brought them to such a pass are more open to criticism. They were the van- guard of that considerable body of humiliated and bitter-hearted men who were to assemble at the capital of onr brave and crafiy enemy. The remainder of the 18th Hussars, who under Major Knox had operated on the other flank of the enemy, underwent a somewhat simUar experience, but succeeded in extricating them- selves with a loss of six kaied and ten wounded. Their efforts were by no means lost, as they engaged the atten- tion of a considerable body of Boers during the day and were able to bring some prisoners back with them. The battle of Talana Hill was a tactical victory but a strategic defeat. It was a crude frontal attack without any attempt at even a feint of flanking, but the valour •• THE GREAT BOER WAR Of the troopB, from general to private, carried it throngb. ISe force was in a position so radically false *ha.t the only nse which they conld make of a victory was to cover their own retreat. Prom aU points Boer com. maadoes were converging upon it, and already it was imderstood that the guns at their command were heavier than any which could be placed against them This was made more clear on October 21st, the day after the battle, when the force, having withdrawn over- mght from the useless hill which they had captured moved across to a fresh position on the far side of the railway. At four in the afternocr i very heavy gun opened from a distant hill, altogether beyond the extreme range of our artillery, and plumped shell after shell into our camp. It was the first appearance of the great Creusot. An officer with several men of the Leicesters and some of our few remaining cavalry, were hit The position wa" clearly impossible, bo at two in the mommg of the 22nd the whole force was moved to a pomt to the south of the town of Dundee. On the rame day a reconnaissance was made in the direction of Olencoe Station, but the passes were found to be strongly occupied, and the little army marched back again to its original position. The command hdd fallen to Colonel Yule, who justly considered that his men were dangerously and uselessly exposed, and that his correct strategy was to fall back, if it were still possible, and join the mam body at Ladysmith, even at the cost of abandon- mg the two hundred sick and wounded who lay with General Symons in the hospital at Dundee. It was a painful necessity, but no one who studies the situation can have any doubt of its wisdom. The retreat was no Msy task, a march by road of some sixty or seventy miles through a very rough country with an enemy pressing on .-fe.— __. TALANA HIL. ^ every tide. Its sncceMfnl completion wilhont .n» i tein in ofder to keenth. - i^" """* "' ^'«"°°- mainly t^ the sMfaf ' w/ ' T^ '"^ *''^"' '^^ o^i^H Natal Pdi»e7h„ * t".™ °' '^°'''°*' DartnelLof the Sn^cSer'fitry'SStr^^^^^ Waschbank Spruit, on the 2«h a Llv «■ ''* " Lady.r„ithajni^tShreonh*i:eSar''th;^^^^ They bad fouBhtanrJ!*!, L *■ * ^"""'«« ""'"mi- never havrwtRnMK^ *?' "P"* "^'"^ ^^^^ *ouId no woS^dtd f:'ltriTi^ziX':'°''- ^hind them Te'h tir r^r^ha" ^'^"'""^ -eiroSr^i^Vhir '^"^^^^^^^^ ™i otners m other days are nerved to do the like. THE GREAT BOER WAR CHAPTEB VI ■LlKOBUAOn AMD BUTFONIEIN Whilb the Glencoo force had Btrnck furiously at the amy of Lucas Meyer, and had afterwards by hard marching disengaged itself from the numerous dangers which threatened it, its comrades at Ladysmith had loyally co-operated in drawing o«f the attention of the enemy and keeping the line of retreat open. On October 20th— the same day as the Battle of Talana HiU— the line was cut by the Boers at a point nearly midway between Dundee and Ladysmith. A smsl! body of horsemen wore the forerunners of a con- siderable commando, composed of Freestaters, Trans- vaalers, and Germans, who had advanced into Natal through Botha's Pass under the command of General Koch. They had with them the two Maxim-Nordenfelds which had been captured from the Jameson raiders, and were now destined to return once more to British hands. Colqnel Schiel, the German artillerist, had charge of these guns. On the evening of that day General French, with a strong reconnoitring party, including the Natal Carabineers, the 6th Lancers, and the 2l8t battery, had defined the enemy's position. Next morning (the 2lBt) he returned, but either the enemy had been reinforced during the night or he had underrated them the day before, for the force which he took with him was too EL\ND8LAAGT£ AND RIETFONTEIN VI we»k tor »ny lerioat attack. He had one battery of the Natal artiUery, with their little neven-poander popgunii, five iqaadroni of the Imperial Horee, a ., in the train which ilowly accompanied his advance, half a battalion of the Manchester Eegiment. Elated by the newi of Talana Hill, and anxioui to emulate their brotheri of Dundee, the little force moved out of Ladysmith in the early morning. Some at least of the men were animated by feelings such as seldom find a place in the breast of the British soldier as he marches into battle. A sense of duty, a belief in the justice of his oa . a love for his regiment and for his country, these are the common incentives of every soldier. But to the men of the Imperial Light Horse, recruited as they were from among the British refugees of the Band, there was added a burning sense of injustice, and in many cases a bitter hatred against the men whose rule had weighed so heavily upon them. In this singular corps the ranks were full of wealthy men «nd men of education, who, driven from their peaceful vocations in Johannesburg, were bent upon fighting their way back to them again. A most un- merited slur had been cast upon their courage in con- nection with the Jameson raid— a slur which they and other similar corps have washed out for ever in their own blood and that of their enemy. Ghisholm, a fiery little Lancer, was in command, with Karri Davis and Sampson, the two stalwarts who had preferred Pretoria Gaol to the favours of Kruger, as his majors. The troopers were on fire at the news that a cartel had arrived in Ladysmith the night before, purporting to come from the Johannesburg Boers and Hollanders, asking what uniform the Light Horse wore, as they were anxious to meet them in battle. These men were •• THE GREAT BOER WAR feUow townimen and knew each other well. They need not hare troubled about the uniform, for before eraning the Light Horee were near enough for them to know their faoei. It »M about eight o'clock on a bright inmmer morning that the email force came in contact with a few icattered Boer outpoaU, who retired, firing, before the advance of the Imperial Light Horee. As they fell back the green and while tents of the invadere came into view upon the rueeet-coloured hillside of Elands- laagte. Down at the red brick raUway stetion the . Boers could be seen swarming out of the buildings in which they had spent the night. The UtUe Natal guns, firing with obsolete black powder, threw a few sheUs into the station, one of which, it is said, penetrated a Boer ambulance which could not be seen by the gunners. The accident was to be regretted, but as no patiente could have been in the ambulance the mischance was not a serious one. But the busy, smoky litUe seven-pounder guno were soon to meet their master. Away up on the distant hiUside, a lon^; thousand yards beyond their own furthest range, there was a sudden brif^t flash. No smoke, only the throb of flame, and then the long sibilant scream of the sh^Il, and the thud as it buried itself in the ground under a limber. Surf- judgment of range would have delighted the most martinet of inspectors at Okehampton. Bang came another, and another, and another, right into the heart of the battery. The six little guns lay back at their eitremest angle, and all barked together in impotent fury. Another shell pitched over them, and the officer in oomn; md lowered his field-glasB in despair as he saw his owr shells bursting far short upon the hillside. Jameson's defeat doos not -r, ELANDBLAAOTE AND RIETFOirrEIN M to h»Te been dae to uiy defect in hii krtiUery. Frenoh, peering and pondering, loon oame to the con. elasion that there were too many Boere for him, and that if thoM flfteen-poundere deeired target practice they iboold And lome other mark than the Natal Meld Artillery A few curt ordere, and hie whole force wai making ita way to the rear. There, out of range of thoee perilone gnne, they haltod, the telegraph wire wae out, a telephone attachment wai made, and Frenoh whiipered his troubles into the eympathetio ear of Ladyamith. He did not whisper in vain. What he had to say was that where he had expected a few hundred rifle- men he found something like twc thounand, and that where he expected no guns he found two very excellent ones. The reply was that by road and by rail as many men as could be spared were on their way to join him. Soon they began to drop in, those nsefnl reinforce- ments—first the Devons, quiet, business-like, reliable ; then the Gordons, dashing, fiery, brilliant. " o squadrons of the 6th Lancers, the 42nd R.F.A., the aist B.F.A., another squadron of Lancers, a squadron of the 8th Dragoon Quards-French began to feel that he was strong enough for the task in f.ont of him. He had a decided superiority of numbers and of guns. But the others were on their favourite defensive on a hill. It would be a &ir fight and a deadly one. It was late after noon before the advance began. It was hard, among those billowing hills, to make out the exact limits of the enemy's position. All that was eer- tain was that they were there, and that we meant having them out if it were humanly possible. ' The enemy are there,' said Ian Hamilton to his infantry; 'I hope you will shift them out before sunset— in fact I know yon wiU." The men cheered and laughed. In long 100 THE GREAT BOER WAR open lines they advanced aorosB the veldt, while the thunder of the two batteries behind them told the Boer gunners that it was their turn now to know what it was to be ontmatched. The idea was to take the position by a front and a flajk attack, but there seems to have been some difficulty in determining which was the front and which the flank. In fact, it was only by trying that one could know. General White with his staff had arrived from Ladysmith, but refused to take the command out of French's hands. It is typical of White's chivalrous spirit that within ten days he refused to identify himself with a victory when it was within his right to do so, and took the whole re- sponsibility for a disaster at which he was not present. Now he rode amid the shells and watched the able dis- positions of his lieutenant. About half-past three the action had fairly begun. In front of the advancing British there lay a rolling hill, topped by a further one. The lower hill was not defended! and the infantry, breaking from column of companies into open order, advanced over it. Beyond was a broad grassy valley which led up to the main position, a long kopje flanked by a small sngar-lonf one. Behind the green slope which led to the ridge of death an ominous and terrible cloud was driving up, casting its black shadow over the combatants. There was the stUlnesa which goes before some great convulsion of nature. The men pressed on in silence, the soft thudding ol their feet and the rattle of their sirlearms filling the air with a low and continuous murmur. An additional solemnity was given to the attack by that huge black cloud which hung before them. The British guns had opened at a range of 4,400 yards, and now against the swarthy background there ELAND8LAAQTE AND KIETFONTEIN 101 came the quick smokeless twinkle of the Boer reply It was an unequal fight, but gallantly sustained. A 'shot and another to find the range; then a wreath of smoke from a bursting sheU exactly where the guns had been, followed by another and another. Overmatched, the two Boer pieces relapsed into a sulky sUence, broken now and agam by short spurts of frenzied activity. The British batteries turned their attention away from them and began to search the ridge with shrapnel and prepare the way for the advancing infantry. The scheme was that the Devonshires should hold the enemy in front while the main attack from the left ank was carried out by the Gordons, the Manchesters, and the Imperial Light Horse. The words 'front ' and •flank," however, cease to have any meaning with so mobile and elastic a force, and the attack which was mtended to come from the left became really a frontal one, whUe the Devons found themselves upon the right flank of the Boers. At the moment o.' ihe final advance the great black cloud had burst, and a torrent of rain lashed into the faces of the men. Shpping and sliding upon the wet grass, they advanced to the assault. And now amid the hissing of the rain there came the fuller, more menacing whine of the Mauser bullets, and the ndge rattled from end to end with the rifle fire. Men fell fast, but their comrades pressed hotly on. There was a long way to go, for the summit of the position was nearly 800 feet above the level of the raU- way. The hillside, wl: l.ch had appeared to be one slope, was really a successiun of undulations, so that the advancing infantry alternately dipped into shelter and emerged mto a hail of bullets. The line of advance was dotted with khaki-clad figures, some still in death Bome writhing in their agony. Amid the litter of bodies va THE GREAT BOEK WAR a major of the Gordons, ehot through the leg, sat philo- BophicaUy smoking his pipe. Plucky Uttle Chisholm, Colonel of the Imperials, had fallen with two mortal wounds as he dashed forward waving r oloured sash in the air. So long was the advanc. ad so trying the hill that the men sank panting upon the ground, and took their breath before making another rush. As at Talana Hill, regimental formation was largely gone, and men of the Manchesf-rs, Gordons, and Imperial Light Horse surged upwaras in one long ragged fringe, Scotchman, EngUshman, and British Africander keeping pace in that race of death. And now at Ust they began to see their enemy. Here and there among the boulders m front of them there was the glimpse of a slouched hat, or a peep at a flushed bearded face which drooped over a rifle barrel. There was a pause, and then with a fresh impulse the wave of men gathered themselves together and flung themselves forward. Dark figures sprang up from the rooks in front. Some held up their rifles in token of surrender. Some ran with heads sunk between their shoulders, jumping and ducking among the rocks. The panting breathless climbers were on the edge of the plateau. There were the two guns which had flashed so brightly, silenced now, with a litter of dead gunners around them and one wounded officer standing by a trail. It was the famous Schiel, the German artillerist. A small body of the Boers stiU resisted. Their appearance horrified some of our men. ' They were dressed in black frock coats and looked Uke a lot of rather seedy business men,' said a spectator ' It seemed like murder to kill them.' Some surrendered, and some fought to the death where they stood. Their leader Koch, an old gentleman with a white beard, lay amidst the rocks, wounded in three places. He was ELANtSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN 103 treated with all courtesy and attention, but died in Lady- smith Hospital some days afterwards. In the meanwhUe the Devonshire Eegiment had waited until the attack had developed and had then charged the hill upon the flank, while the artillery moved np until it was within 2,000 yards of the enemy's position. The Devons met with a less fierce resistance than the others, and swept up to the summit in time to head ff some of the fugitives. The whole of our infantry were now upon the ridge. But even so these dour fighters were not beaten. They clung desperately to the further edges of the plateau, firing from behind the rocks. There had been a race for the nearest gun between an officer of the Man- chesters and a drummer sergeant of the Gordons. The officer won, and sprang in triumph on to the piece. Men of all regiments swarmed round yelling and cheering, when upon their astonished ears there sounded the ' Cease fire ' and then the ' Betire." It was incredible, and yet it pealed out again, unmistakable in its urgency. TV.th the instinct of discipline the men were slowly fauing back. And then the truth of it came upon the minds of some of them. The crafty enemy had learned our bugle calls. ' Eetire be damned ! ' shrieked a little bugler and blew the 'Advance' with all the breath that the hillside had left him. The men flooded back over the plateau, and in the Boer camp which lay beneath it a white flag showed that the game was up. A squadron of the 6th Lancers and of the 5th Dragoon Guards, under Colonel Gore of the latter regiment, had prowled round the base of the hill, and in the fading light they charged through and through the retreating Boers, killing several, and making from twenty to thirty prisoners. It was one of the very few occasions in the war where the mounted Briton overtook the mounted Boer. lot THE GREAT BOER WAR ' What price Majuba ? ' vraa the cry raised by some of the infantry as they dashed up to the enemy's position, and the action may indeed be said to have been in some respects the converse of that fomoas fight. It is true that there were many more British at Elandslaagte than Boers at Majuba, but then the defending force was much more numerous also, and the British had no guns there. It is true, also, that Majuba is very much more precipitous than Elands- laagte, but then every practicoJ soldier knows that it is easier to defend a moderate glafis than an abrupt slope, which gives cover under its boulders to the attacker while the defender has to crane his head over the edge to look down. On the whole, this brilliant little action may be said to have restored things to their true pro- portion, and to have shown that, brave as the Boeis ondoubtedly are, there is no military feat within their power which is not equally possible to the British soldier. Talana Hill and Elandslaagte, fought on successive days, were each of them as gallant an exploit as Majuba. We had more to show for our victory than for the previous one at Dundee. Two Mazim-Nordenfeld guns, whose efficiency had been painfully evident during the action, were a welcome addition to our artillery. Two hundred and fifty Boers were killed and wounded and about two hundred taken prisoners, the loss falling inost heavily upon the Johannesburgers, the Germans, and the Hollanders. General Eoch, Dr. Coster, Colonel Schiel, Pretorius, and other well-known Transvaalers fell into our hands. Our own casualty list consisted of 41 killed and 220 wounded, much the same number as at Talana Hill, the heaviest losses falling upon the Gordon Highlanders and the Imperial Ijight Horse. In the hollow where the Boer tents had stood, amid ELANDSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN 105 the laagered wagons of the Tanqnished, under a marky sky and a constant drizzle of rain, the victors spent the night. Sleep was out of the question, for all night the fatigue parties were searching the hillside and the wounded were being carried in. Camp-fires were lit and soldiers and prisoners crowded round them, and it is pleasant to recall that the warmest corner and the best of their rude fare were always reserved for the downcast Dntchmen, while wordt of rude praise and sympathy ■jftened the pain of defci>t. It is the memory of such vhings which may in happier days be more potent than all the wisdom of statesmen in welding our two races into one. Having cleared the Boer force from the line of the railway, it is evident that General White could not continue to garrison the point, as he was aware that considerable forces were moving from the north, and his first duty was the security of Ladysmith. Early next morning (October 22nd), therefore, his weary but victorious troops returned to the town. Once there he learned, no doubt, that General Yule bad no intention of using the broken railway for his retreat, but that he intended to come in a circuitous fashion by road. White's problem was to hold tight to the town and at the same time to sirike hard at any northern force so as to prevent them from interfering with Yule's retreat. It was in the furtherance of this scheme that he fought upon October 24th the action of Bietfontein, an engage- ment slight in itself, but important on account of the clear road which was secured for the weary forces retiring from Dundee. The army from the Free State, of which the com- mando vanquished at Elandslaagte was the vanguard, had been slowly and steadily debouching from the 108 THE GBEAT BOER WAR pasB€8, and working south and eastwards to cnt th« line between Dundee and Ladysmlth. It was White's inten- tion to prevent them from crossing the Newcastle Boad, and tor this purpose he saUied out of Ladysmith on Tuesday the 24th. having with him two regents cf cav^, the 6th Lancers and the 19th H^sars the 42nd and 68rd field batteries with the lO^m^tS ffll^V "^^. "giments, the Devons, Liverpools. Gkucesters, and 2nd King's Boyal Bifles, the Im^ Light Horse, and the Natal Volunteers-some fo« thousand men in all. of vn* *"•*"?? '"* ^°'^^ *° "^ ^ possession of a line of hdls within seven miles of Ladysmith. the m™* conspicuous of which is caUed Tintalnyoni. ItwaTno p«t of General White's ph« to attempt to ^TZ from this position-it is not wise generalship to fight always upon ground of the enemy's choosing-but it was attention during this last day of the march of the re treatmg column For this purpose, since no direct attack was mtended, the guns were of more importance than the mfan ry-and indeed the infantry should, fortheartaiery. A desultory and inconclusive action ensued ■ ,eh contmued from nine in the morning until ^^'^ °°* f *^* '^**"~'°- ^ "eU-directed fire of tte Boer guns from the hills was dominated and <^n troUed by our field artiUery, while the advance of tteir riflemen was restrained by shrapnel. The enemas pinB were more easily marked down than at Elands- bTl^ ^^r\^^'^^ ^^^''- The ranges varied from three to four thousand yards. Our losL in the l^^r^^^^Zfi^"'' "^ i"«g"ifieant had it not happened that the Gloucester Begiment advanced some- ELANDSLAAGTE AND MKTFONTEIN 107 what incautiously into the open and was caught in a cross fire of musketry which struck down Colonel Wil- ford and fifty of his officers and men. Within four days Colonel Dick-Ounyngham, of the Gordons,' Colonel Chishohn, of the Light Horse, Colonel Gunning, of the Bifles, and now Colonel Wilford, of the Gloucesters, had all fallen at the head of their regiments. In the after- noon General Whits, having accompUshed his purpose and secured the safety of the Dundee column while traversing the dangerous Biggarsberg passes, withdrew his force to Ladysmith. We have no means of ascer- taining the loLises of the Boers, but they were probably Blight. On our side we lost 109 killed and wounded, of which only 13 cases were fatal. Of this total 64 belonged to the Gloucesters and £5 to the troops raised in Natal. Next day, as already narrated, the whole British army was re-assembled once more at Lady- smith, and the campaign was to enter upon a new phase. At the end of this first vigorous week of hostilities it is interesting to sum up the net result. The strategical advantage had lain with the Boers. They had made our position at Dundee untenable and had driven us back to Ladysmith. They had the country and the rail- way for the northern quarter of the colony in their possession. They had killed and wounded between six and seven hundred of our men, and they had captured some two hundred of our cavali^, while we had been compelled at Dundee to leave considerable stores and our wounded, including General Penn Symons, who actually died while a prisoner in their hands. On the other hand, the tactical advantages lay with us. We had twice driven them from their positions, and captured two of their guns. We had taken two hundred prisoners, IW THE GREAT BOER WAR toBt On the whole the honours of that week's fighting m Nat^ may be said to have been fairly equal-which is m»e than we could claim for many alary ^eef to CHAPTEB Vn LOHBiBD'B lOP AND NIOHOLBOM's HEX Sib Giobob Whitb had now reunited his force, and found himself in command of a formidable little array Bome twelve thousand in number. His cavalry included the 6th Lancers, the 8th Dragoons, part of the 18th and the whole of the 19th Hussars, the Natal Carabi- neers, the Border Eifles, some mounted infantry, and the Imperial Light Horse. Among his infantry were the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the Dublin Fusiliers, and the King's Eoyal Bifles, fresh from the ascent of Talana Hill, the Gordons, the Manchesters, and the Devons who had been blooded at Elandslaagte, the Leicestera, the Liver- pools, the 2nd battalion of the King's Boyai EiBes, the 2nd Bifle Brigade, and the Gloucesters, who had been 80 roughly treated at Bietfontein. He had six batteries of excellent field artUlery— the 13th, 21st, 42nd, 53rd, 67th, 69th, and No. 10 Mountain Battery of screw guns. No general could have asked "or a more compact and workmanlike little force. It had been recognised ly the British General from the beginning that his tactics must be defensive, since he was largely outnumbered and since also any con- siderable mishap to his force would expose the whole colony of Natal to destruction. The actions of Elands- laagte and Bietfontein were forced upon him in order to disengage his compromised detachment, but now there loe no THE GREAT BOER WAR was no longer any reason why he should asroma tha trail of ransports which already extended from the Channel to Cape de Verde were hourly drawing nearer night or less the first of them would be at Durban. It was h.s game therefore, to keep his army intact, and to et those hrobbmg engines and whirling propelers do the work of the emp.re. Had he entrenched himself up the end"'* '"^^' " '°°'^ ''*'* ^"^ "■" ■*" ^ . fi ^"J- °° '^^ ""* inglorious a policy is impossible to a fighbng soldier. He could not with his sple^d for^ permit himsef to be shut in without an action. Ct poUcy demands honour may forbid. On October STth there were ahready Boers and rumours of Boers on every ~de of him. Joubert with his main body was moving across from Dundee. The Freestaters were to^f north and west. Their combined numbers were uncer- tain, but at least it was already proved that they were ^ more numerous and also more formidable th^ had teen anticipated. We had had a taste of their artilleS also, and the pleasant delusion that it would be a mere useless encumbrance to a Boer force ha4 vanished for ever. It was a grave thing to leave the town in order to give ba tie, for the mobile enemy might swing round and seize It behmd us. Nevertheless White det«mined to make the venture. On the 29th the enemy were visibly converging upon a watcher could see no less than six Boer camps to the east and north. French, with his cavalry, pushed out f^ers. and coasted along the edge of the adv^^g host. His report warned White that if he would strikf LOKBASira KOP AND NIOHOLBOITS NEK Ul Wore all the letttered bandi were anited he mtut do •0 Mi once. The wounded were lent down to Pieter- maritiborg, and it would bear explanation why the non-oombatauM did not accompany them. On the evening of the same day Joubert in person was said to be only lix mhos off, and a party of his men cut the water supply of the town. The Klip, however, a fair- sised river, runs through Ladysmith, so that there was no danger of thirst. The British had inflated and sent up a balloon, to the amazement of the back-veldt Boers ; its report confirmed the fact that the enemy was in force in front of and around them. On the night of the 99th General White detached two of his best regiments, the Irish Fusiliers and the Glonoesters, with No. 10 Mountain Battery, to advance under cover of the darkness and to seize and hold a long ridge called Nicholson's Nek, which lay about su miles to the north of Ladysmith. Having determined to give battle on the next day, his object was to protect his left wing against those Preestaters who were stUl moving lirom the north and west. This small detached column numbered about a thousand men— whose fate will be afterwards narrated. At five o'clock on the morning of the 80th the Boera who had already developed a perfect genius for hauUng heavy cannon up the most difficult heights, opened fire from one of the hUls which he to the north of the town. Before the shot was fired, the forces of the British had ahready streamed out of Ladysmith to test the strength of the invaders. White's army was divided into three columns. On the extreme left, quite isolated from the others, was the small Nicholson's Nek detachment under the command of Colonel ' jrleton of the Fusiliers (one of three gallant Ill IHB GREAT BOER WAR teoUiMi eMh of wham eommanda « Britiih regiment). With him wai Major Adye of the itaff. On the right Bntiih flank Colonel Grimwood commanded a brigadit eompoaed of the lit and and battaUons of the King'e Hoyal Biflea, the Leicesteri, the Liverpools, and the B< yal DnbUn FuiiUen. In the centre Colonel Ian HamUton commanded the Devoni, the Gordoni. the Mancheiterg, and the tod battalion of the Bifle Brigade, which marched direct mto the battle from the train which had brought them from Durban. Six batteriee of artillery were matted in the centre under Colonel Downing. French with the cavahr and mounted infantry wag on the ex reme right, bat found little opportunity for the use of the mounted arm that day. m Boer poeition, eo far as it could be eeen, was a formidable one. Their centre lay upon one o' th- ,purfl of Signri Hill, about three mUes from the town. Here they had two forty-pounders and three other Ughter guns, but then: artillery strength developed both in numbers and in weight of metal as the day wore on. Of their dispositions litOe could be seen. An observer looking westward might discern with his glass sprays of mounted riflemen galloping here and there over the . "^'i fu •'""^"y "°"" «""'P^ '•'»« the gnnners stood by their guns, or the leaders gazed down at that town which- hey were destined to have in view for such a weary whUe. On the dun-coloured plains before the sparkle of steel, showed where Hamilton's and Grim- wood s mfantry were advancing. In the clear cold air of an African morning every detail could be seen, down to the distant smoke of a train toiling up the heavy toLlSytith.'"' """^^"^^ °^" *"• ColensoBridg^ LOMBARD'S KOP AND NICHOLSON'S NEK 111 The .crambling, incoriMquential. unwti.factory notion which cMued IB as difficult to describe as it must have be«n to direct. The Boer front covered some seven or •ight mUes, with kopjes, like chains of fortresses, between. They formed a huge semicircle of wh.ch our advance was the chord, and they were able from this position to pour in a convergmg artillery fire which grew steadily hotter a> the day advanced. In the early part of the day our forty-two guns, working furiously, though with a want of accuracy which may be due to those errors of refraction Which are said to be common in the limpid air of the vcW. preserved their superiority. There appears to have been a want of concentration about our fire, and at some periods of the action each particular battery was flrmg at some different point of the Boer half-circle. Bometimes for an hour on end the Boer r»ply would die away altogether, only to break out with ■,. innented violence, and with an accuracy whica increased our respect for their training. Huge shells-the largest that ever burst upon a battlefield-hurled from dUtanoes which were unattainable by our fifteen-pounders, en- veloped our batteries in smoke and flame. One cnor- mous Creusot gun on Pepworth HUl threw a 96-pound sheU a distance of four miles, and several 40-pound howitzers outweighted our field guns. And on the same day on which we were so roughly taught how large the guns were which labour and good will could haul on to the field of battle, we learned also that our enemy -to the disgrace of our Board of Ordnance be it re- corded-was more in touch with modern invention than we were, and could show us not only the largest, but also the smallest, shell which had yet been need. Would that It had been our officials instead of our gunners irho heard the devilish Uttle one-pound sheUs of the Vickers- X 114 THE GftEAT BOEft WAil Maxim antomatio gun, exploding with a continuous string of crackings and hangings, like a huge cracker in their faces and about their ears ! Up to seven o'clock our infantry had shown no disposi- tion to press the attack, for with so huge a posiiion in front of them, and so many hills which were held by the enemy It was difficult to know what line of advance should be taken, pr whether the attack should not be converted into a mere reconnaissance. Shortly after that hour however, the Boers decided the question by themselves developmg a vigorous movement upon Grimwood and the right flank. With field guns, Maxims, and rifle fire they closed rapidly in upon him. The centre column was drafted off, regiment by regiment, to reinforce the right. The Gordons, Devons, Manchesters. and three batteries were sent over to Grimwood's relief, and the 6th Lancers, acting as infantry, assisted him to hold on At nine o'clock there was a lull, but it was evident that fresh commandoes and fresh guns were continuaUy streaming into the firing line. The engagement opened agam with redoubled violence, and Grimwood's three ad- vanced batallions feU back, abandoning the ridge which they had held for five hours. Tho reason for this with- towal was not that they could not continue to hold their position, but it was that a message had just reached Bir George White from Colonel Knox, commanding in Ladysmith, to the effect that it looked as if the enemy was about to rush the town from the other side. Cross- ing the open in some disorder, they lost heavily, and would have done so more had not the 13th Field Battery followed after an internal by the 53rd, dashed forward firmg shrapnel at short ranges, m order to cover the retreat of the infantry. Amid the bursting of t^e huge 96-ponad shells, and the snapping of the vie oaa Uttle LOMBARD'S KOr u-'P NICHOLSON'S NEK 115 r^r'^T'T' '"'"■ ^'"^ ^'•'> ^-flre of rifles as well. Abdy a and Dawlun ' -dlant batf .ries swung round their S thlvnf' * 'ff '^i:'""^ "«' flo^-g'nd bla.inl to^firl ri 1*' ^'^^ '"'"'= '"'' '"«"• So severe wa UD bv th^^rf f ,r ?™ "•'"'"'^'^ •'y 'h« ''"«' ''nocked np by the little sheUs of the automatic gun. Then when theu^workwasdoneandtheretiringinfantryhadst^^^^^^^^^^^ aJter th!™ *V'' ""T^^^""^ whirled and bounded were left untJ the teams could be brought back for them, which was successfully done through the gallantry oneoTtrfJ T'"- J}!\-«-<"tl'-e batteries was work W- r ^^T.°^ ''^^ " " °°' "« ^'^^t d-^y's work. With splendid coolness and courage they helped ea^h other by alternate retirements after 'he reieatbg wfa^try had passed them. The 21st Battery (Blewitfs) al distinguished itself by its staunchness in covering the ^^Z^'^t °t ""? ""^"''y' '"""^ f-^^and (Goulbufn's) suffered the heaviest losses of any. On the whole, such honours as fell to our lot were mainly with the gunners. nr,.! -f ; .,T" ^^"^ ^""^ "ow uneasy for his position, and It had become apparent that his only course was to fall back and concentrate upon the town. His left flank was up in the air, and the sound of distant firing, wafted over five miles of broken country, was the only mes- sage which arrived from them. His right had been pushed back, and, most dangerous of all, his centre had there. What would happen if the enemy burst rudely through and pushed straight for the town ? It was the more possible, as the Boer artUlery had now proved itself to be far heavier than ours. That terrible 96-pounder B^nely safe and out of range, was plumping its great projectiles into the masses of retiring troops. The men 1 2 lie THE GBEAT BOER WAR had had little sleep and little food, and this unanswer able fire was an ordeal for a force which is retreatZ which the watcher had obserted T th/"""' 'T''^ dra^n nearer and nearer asthJhi . ™°^ '""^ and creakina .m *J,77 • ,■ ^^^^ '™" <=»™e Puffiog had drat uVrthe Ladv'°"^.''v''^'°' '^'"°«' "«'"« " LOMBARD'S KOP AND NICHOLSON'S NEK 11? draggled field force came traUine back int^ To-j„ vu sxr '""f"^ "' ^' nif bThtd'ttr t was a high price to pay, but other misfortunes were in :et SSS.-^^* '""^ «'~' 0^ *••« mo^in'g In the meantime we may follow the unhappy fortunes of the small column which had, as alreadfdeS Wn sen tout by Sir George White in order, if pos bk to preven the junction of the two Boer arm es S Ihe same t,me to threaten the right wing of XmTto force sfrr ""^^ ^fjf^i-'S from the direction oTDundee Sir George White throughout the campaign consistentiv t'& . TV""'"^ """'"^ " ■* charmig one i^ an rfiiTi^s^h^rhtr^^^^^^^ Ssn^hr^ '-' SreotShH 1 Spe^tS^-^Sr:^ttr pation of Dundee the retention of the non-combaS m Ladysmith until it was too late to get rid of their uaekss mouths or the failure to make any serious prTara&ns for the defence of the town nntil his troops wereTeaten who habitually hopes that all will go well and i^^n consequence remiss in making prepLtiS Tor he" fhZ-i ^,f "'^"PP'ly i° every one of these instances they *d go il^ though the slowness of the Boers enaS us, both at Dundee and at Ladysmith, to escape wh^ might have been disaster. "scape wnat Sir George White has so nobly and frankly taken upon himself the blame of Nicholson's Nek thar^ impartial historian must rather regard his self-co^ demnation as having been excessive. The immediate causes of the faUure were undoubtedly the resu^^p^e 118 THE GHEAT BOEH WAB "M oasea upon the supposition tha* ♦>,« „-• between S^sra^SoSnTN^er ifa.?* ^T could then re-unitfl with j,; • i ^ f' ""^ ""*« ^^e -houia lose hni^^irrr^af":" t" become of this detachment five miles un^ ♦». *2 How was it to be extricated? Thli^ Tr \'"' Beems to have waved aside the very idef "fl/'f ""f" be relieved. 'tZ; tmf ^Zl T' ^Z'' action. But ™ "*"* "O" Ws They were Sft Idtr rrtrfrlT7™ Carleton, of the FusSs to i ""'' ""^'- Colonel manded the column, with Maior ZZT '""/"«• «om- On the night of Sund;y OctSasth^L': ^^ °®''*'- of Ladysmith, a thous^d mej „on beSf ^"^h ^ "'" Little they thought, as they «eC^ed I ^ "'"^• with the outlying pickets, that theyTt Lfi t^', '"? montr """ '"'"^'' --*'^- fo^rn^aX Mii^a^ -t LOMBAHD'S KOP AND NICHOLSON'S NEK 119 through the darknees. The column tramped Btolidly along the Fumhers in front, the guns and Gloucesters behmd. Several times a short halt was caUed to make sure of the bearings. At last, in the black cold hours Which come between midnight and morning, the column swung to the left out of the road. In front of them, hardly visible, stretched a long black kopje. It was the very Nicholson's Nek which they had come to occupy. Carleton and Adye must have heaved a sigh of rcUef as they reahsed that they had actually struck it. The force was but two hundred yards from the posit,. -uid all had gone without a hitch. And yet in those two hundred yards there came an incident which decided the fate both of then: enterprise and of themselves. Out of the darkness there blundered and rattled five Horsemen, then: horses galloping, the loose stones flyine around them. In the dim light they were gone as soon as seen. Whence coming, whither going, no one knows, nor 13 It certain whether it was design or ignorance or panic which sent them riding so wildly through the darkness. Somebody fired. A sergeant of the FusiUers took the bullet through his hand. Some one else shouted to fix bayonets. The mules which carried the spare ammunition kicked and reared. There was no question of treachery, for they were led by our own men but to hold two frightened mules, one with either hand IS a feat for a Hercules. They lashed and tossed and bucked themselves loose, and an instant afterwards were flymg belter skelter through the column. Nearly aU the mules caught the panic. In vain the men held on to their heads. In the mad rush they were galloped over and knocked down by the torrent of frightened crea ures. In the gloom of that early hour the men must have thought that they were charged by cavalry 190 THE QilEAT BOER WAH thorn/ men he «vT'"l°'.'^''''«"°°^ *"«' "'J''«° "ver with many a mutZ^'"" "" P''^''' ""'' **"« '°«° •""! their ranTs onrl .1""' K"'^"*-! themselvo, into misforne wh ch hid beTn"^'!?' '°' ^^'''^ ^^ '" those mad hoostmr„m!5 "*.*''""• ^''^«' '"'ere -pare cartrS thirfn '"*'''. ''''*'"''*' ^«™ *•>«, mountain Sl\o^T.^' '""*.*''^''^ "'">"'"■• ^ in adiustarpar: olrSeTar r^h 1 'i: r™"^ "outh, a trail ea»f «. nV,. ^ 7,' '^^ "'''*^' ^^^ gone alsoprovokesotC t-i^nTl^^^^^^^^ iB to take chances, and toT'htlif f " ""'"'"^ wo M htti^itS: r^e^i/iirdi^r ^ the north and west, b! ^^tot :ZZXZ. %*,# f ...iiJi^.Wl* LOMBAHD'S KOP AND NICHOLSON'S NEK 121 and he believed that, come what might, he could hoH out until th.il. These are the most obvious of the con- siderations which induced Colonel Carleton to determine to carry out so far as he could the programme which had been laid down for him and his command. He marched up the hUl and occupied the position. His heart, however, must have sunk when he examined it. It was very large-too large to be effectively occupied by the force which he commanded. The length was about a mile and the breadth four hundred yards. Shaped roughly like the sole of a boot, it was only the heel end which he could hope to hold. Other hills all round offered cover for Boer riflemen. Nothing daunted, however, he set his men to work at once building sangars with the loose stones. With the fuU dawn and the first snappmg of Boer Mausers from the hills around they had thrown up some sort of rude defences which they might hope to hold until help should come. But how could help come when there was no means by which they could let White know the plight in which they found themselves ? They had brought a heUograph with them, but It was on the back of one of those accursed mules. The Boers were thick around them, and they could not send a messenger. An attempt was made to convert a polished biscuit tin into a heUograph, but with poor success. A Kaffir was despatched with promises of a heavy bribe, but he passed out of history. And there m the clear cold morning air the balloon hung to the south of them where the first distant thunder of White's guns was beginning to sound. If only thev could attract the attention of thpt baUoon' Vainlv they wagged flags at it. Serene and unresponsive it brooded over the distant battle. And now the Boerg were thickening round them on lis THE GREAT BOER WAR Jell among the men, and smS ^* '**'• ^uUet. breas wort. Thetw^comS. "^ •'^'^»' «"« "tone h^^vJyintheopenas^rora^dT?''''''"''^'^'^ "wdcra^kJe of rifle fire cameTomu .' ^ ""o^"*"'* ratO. "Jowly but steadily nearer T " '■°"'"^' "^^'ing very °^ « dark figure VorLtL"'/'^" '*"« "''^^ a" that ever was seen J 1 '^®'' *° another wa« fired Slowly and steadV/or :;'""'*"■ ^"^'^^^ but the cover of the Boefs' was T', ""'"'^«« ""-""ed: was seldom that there was much * '*"^ "^«" '^at i fould ever see/ s4yg onr„T *° ^'^ ««• 'AUyon parrels of the riflT The« la!*!.^^'^"'*' '"ere th^ that long morning, and to s^ir , .'i""* ^°' tJ^o^gW in ever had .n the mechanical J • ^""''"S ''ad they ~, or the shoo^rof anT '{'"'' ^'"'^' cartndgesat exposed tarleuL. '"*8'"' °' pilt' T'r "^ NichoZnt Net ^orrf "^«'- « I-lain, which has to be learned ktC, f "' °^ ^'^'«'» Daring those weary honrfi^ '"*"«• WI and hstening to the et^«j^'"? °° *'>« bullet-swept chckmg on the rocks, the Sh S* ^ '""^ "^ »°d fight which raged to the south nfft'*" """^d see the cheering sight.^nd Carleton Td ^^ " ""^ "»' « comrades must have felt thu*^^* '''"' '!■«■• gaUant they watched. Tk: Zr^'^^'T '''^ '^^'^^ Bntish batteries, the ^U^^Tj """""S ^^ ''" °^~»- The Long .^^J^^I J^ 0°? WMBABD-S KOP AND NICHOLSON-S NEK m the effect of fh5,"'f!" "*" """ exhausted from s^t w»k let V""? nT ^'*°°°« '"'' 'heir ince" Some sat dZedlv^^^ th •'"'^^, '"'''"'' ''"' '^-' their .Led fiSi vr.e%r;tr:heii-'-;str :Them""She; 7^ ""^"'"^ •"^^^-hLmeZ cri^'The r!S rtTeir'S'-SiaSr^f m paid, iU thanked how ^rlyTL slISul oHhe woj-Id com,,,,,,, w.t'h thoir nnselfish loyalty and deto! But the sting of contumely or insult was not »AA^A to the.r misfortunes. There is a feUow^hp°o SJ men which r„es above the feuds of nations, and may It a.t go far, « hope, to heal them. From everTLk there rose a Boer-strange, grotesque figures m^^Hf on toihetS TV"' »?-«8y-bearded!;nd swZ^ Boer cannot shoot,' was the haXst w Jd^tlh 2 LOMBABD'a KOP AND MKJHOLSON-S NEK Its ■oavenirs of the day. They will for generations remain as the most precious ornaments of some colonial farm- house. Then the victors gathered together and sang psahns, not jubilant but sad and quavering. The prisoners, in a downcast column, weary, spent, and un- kempt, filed off to the Boer laager at Waschbank, there to take train for Pretoria. And at Ladysmith a bugler of Fusiliers, his arm bound, the marks of battle on hia dress and person, burst in upon the camp with the news that two veteran regiments had covered the flank of White's retreating army, but at the cost of their own annihilation. I y r-«rT** f^rr. i IfS THE GREAT BOER WAR CHAPTEB VIU MBD MlIHDEN'g IDTANCl alarm the PubU^r^^/omTLTto'tu" 'l" r '^ ... ^^0^ natii;" «ef r r^'iS^' certain that the contli " r.,'"™' '"""'"" Manimon. as in the^prematu™ J ' """" '^" •» with an eitraordinwv J^Z , "JO'^'OB" over what, ance of our SaTehara ter Tr"°"'- """^ "«»'"• damaging blow to the bZTk'J^I '"1^ t '^ " courteouBa^d tljaeln rr.^°'''-'°''' '''°"«'' " nations of Europe notahlv nf t. i ^ '"' '""aUer Turkey, andHugkry '^ "' "'^^' ^"°"«''' <^^^. The exact position at the end of thi, fortnight of LORD METnUEN'8 ADVANCE 127 hard ilogging WM that a quarter of the colony o( Natal and a hundred milei of railway were in the handiof the enemy. Five distinct actiona had been fought, none of them perhaps coming within the fair meaning of a battle. Of these one had been a distinct British victory, two had been indecisive, one had been unfortunate, and one had been a positive disaster. We had lost about twelve hundred prisoners and a battery of small guns. The Boers had lost two fine guns and three hundred prisoners. Twelve thousand British troops had been shut up in Ladysmiih, and there was no serious force between the invaders and the sea. Only in those distant transports, where the grimy stokers shovelled and strove, were there hopes for the safety of Natal and the honour of the Empire. In Cape Colony the loyalists waited with bated breath, knowing well that there was nothing to check a Free State inv>'£;on, and that if it came no bounds could be placed upon how far it might advance, or what effect it might have upon the Dutch population. Leaving Ladyemith now apparently within the v^'P of the Boers, who had settled down deliberately to the work ol throttling it, the narrative must pass to the western side of the seat of war, and give a consecutive account of the events which began with the siege of Kimberley and led to the ineffectual efforts of Lord Methuen's column to relieve it. On the declaration of war two important movements had been made by the Boers upon the west. One was the advance of a considerable body under the formidable Cronje to attack Mafeking, an enterprise which demands a chapter of its own. The other was the investment of Kimberley by a force which consisted principally of Free- ataters under the command of Weasels and Botha. The iAi^fil^Ja'il 138 THE GREAT BOER WAR pl«e. was defended by Colonel Kekewich, aided bv th« thrown himaelf u,to the town by one of the iSS wh.ch reached it. As the founder and direotor of th« grea De Beers diamond mines he desired tot with hk The troops which Colonel Kekewich had at hi. d^posal consisted of four companies of the Loyal North Kimberley Light Horse, and a battery of Lm^ °^ pounder minn Ti,->- , oaitery of light seven- circuVsrireiT; tinrct? '-t ^Jish Bechuanaland HesHS m^So^ih^r the commandant of police, made some attemnf tl g-^e a defence, but having no SeryS'^^Jg" httle sympathy, he was compelled to abandon Ws3 to the invaders The gallant Scott rode s^uth ^i LOHD METHUEN'8 ADVANCE 129 annexed to the South African Republic. This policy of the instant annexation of all territoriee invaded was habitually carried out by the enemy, with the idea that British subjects who joined *hem would in this way be shielded from the consequences of treason. Meanwhile several thousand Freestaters and Transvaalers with artillery had assembled round Kimberley, and all news of the town was cut off. Its relief was one of the first tasks which presented itself to the inpouring army corps. The obvious base of such a movement must be Orange Eiver, and there and at De Aar the stores for the advance began to be accumulated. At the latter place especially, which is the chief raflway junction in the north of the colony, enormous masses of provisions, ammunition, and fodder were collected, with thousands of mules which the long arm of the British Govern- ment had rounded up from many parts of the world. The guard over these costly and essential snppUes seems to have been a dangerously weak one. Between Orange Eiver and De Aar, which are sixty miles apart, there were the 9th Lancers, the Eoyal Munsters, the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light In&ntry, and the 1st North- umberland FusiUers, under three thousand men in all, with two million pounds' worth ol stores and the Free State frontier within a ride of them. Verily if we have something to deplore in this war we have much also to be thankful for. Up to the end of October the situation was so dangerous that it is really inexpUcable that no advan- tage was taken oi it by the enemy. Our main force was concentrated to defend the Orange Eiver raUway bridge, which was so essential for our advance upon Kimberley! This left only a single regiment without guns for the defence of De Aar and the valuable stores. A fairer I m^. -•*. m: uo THE GREAT BOES WAR mark for a clashing leader and a raid of mounted rifle- men was never seen. The chance passed, however a« TO many others of the Boers' had done. Early in November Colesberg and Naanwpoort were abandoned by our small detachments, who concentrated at De Aar The Berkshires joined the Yorkshire Light Infantry, and nme field guns arrived also. General Wood worked hard at the fortifying of the surrounding kopjes, nnta withm a week the place had been made tolerablv secure. ^ The first collision between the opposing forces at this part of the seat of war was upon November 10th, when Colonel Gough of the 9th Lancers made a reconnaissance from Orange itiver to the north with two squadrons of his own regiment, the mounted infantry of the North- amberland FusiUers, the Boyal Munsters, and the North Lancashires, with a battery of field artillery. To the east of Belmont, about fifteen miles off, he oame on a detachment of the enemy with a gun. To make out the Boer position the mounted infantry galloped round one of then: flanks, and in doing to passed close to a lopje which was occupied by sharpshooters. A deadly &re crackled suddenly out from among the boulders. Of BIX men hit four were officers, showing how cool were the marksmen and how dangerous those dress dis- tinctions which win probably disappear henceforward* upon the field of battle. Colonel Keith-Falconer of the Northumberlands, who had earned distinction in the Soudan, was shot dead. So was Wood of the North Lancashires. HaU and Bevan of the Northumberlands were wounded. An advance by train of the troops in camp drove back the Boers and extricated our smaU force from what might have proved a serious position, for the enemy in superior numbers were working n>nnd m^^M '.-^ -IN W)BD METHDEIfS ADVANCE 131 necessary fate of many a cavalry reconnaissance. On November 12th Lord Methuen arrived at Oran™ River and proceeded to organise the column wLehwf L hT* ^ *•"■ '*''*'' °' «'"'^''«y- Generamefhren i 188^h°f r/"''""" ^°""^ *'""«" experience wC ^^nant fearless soldier. He waslt y'et d^'^L: !«,«?* 'T '^'"'^ gradually assembled at Oranne frZ > T''^"'"^ ''*"^«' fr"-" i'« qua ity than for artUlery the 76th and 18th Batteries E.F.I on November 22n,l ,■'''" '"^™=°'g"t. At daybreak fK^ J *^ '^°"''' numbering about oiuht thousand men set off upon its eventful journey The d«tance to K.«berley was not more than sixty m.ls and It IS probable that there was not one man i^ b» ZTJ2' ''r" °^ Wednesday, November 22nd liord Methaen moved forward nntii v,L . • 1 f ' ■-urou lurwara until he came mto touch \ m THE OBEAT BOER WAB I with the Boer position at Belmont. It was anrveyed that evening by Colonel Willoughby Verner, and every disposition made to attack it in the morning. The force of the Boers was much inferior toonrown some two or three thousand in all, but the natural strength of their position made it a difficult one to carry, while it could not be left behind us as a menace to our line of communications. A double row of steep hills lay across the road to Kimberley, and it was along the ridges, snuggling closely among the boulders, that our enemy was waiting for us. In their weeks of prepara- tion they had constructed elaborate shelter pits in which they could Ke in comparative safety while they swept all the level ground around with their rifle fire. Mr. Balph, the American correspondent, whose letters have been among the most vivid of the war, has described these lairs, httered with straw and the debris of food, isolated from each other, and each containing its grim and formidable occupant. ' The eyries of birds of prey ' is the phrase with which he brings them home to us. In these, with nothing visible but their peering eyes and the barrels of their rifles, the Boer marksmen crouched, and munched their biltong and their meaUes as the day broke upon the morning of the 28rd. With the light their enemy was upon them. It was a. soldiers' battle in the good old primeval British style, an Alma on a small scale and against deadlier weapons. The troops advanced in grim silence against the savage-looking, rock-sprinkled, crag-topped position which confronted them. They were in a fierce humour, for they had not breakfasted, and miUtary history from Agincourt to Talavera shows that want f food wakens a dangerous spirit among British troops. A Northumberland Fusilier exploded into words which Im.'-B.^.^.wi^M. LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE ijj expressed the grufhess of his comrades. As a too ?n Zt" '*,fi°?r ^'^"'^ "^'°«' *•"''' '^« he roared n h.s rough North-country tongue. • Domn thee ! Get thee to hel and let's fire I ' In the golden light of the m^gsuntte men set their teeth and dashld up the «UaX I!^. f? ""'°^f *"i"8' '''^"'"K. gallant men. gallantly led, then: one thought to close with that grim bns tie of nfle-barrels which fringed the rocks above th^!^ frnnf .n^l T'.^v*"''"" ^"^ '^«° ""^ attack from rnaTh • r ^'"'''' ^"* ''^'^^'' ^""^ «-« Grenadiers losing then- beanngs, or from the mobility of the Boers thf.^T^" " ?■' "^^^ ■" impossibiUty, it is certain ani™L T'/r?*^- ^'■^ '"''"« 'e«oived itself into a number of isolated actions in which the various kopies sT«» °''!f ^^ '"'"''I* ^""^ '«S-«»t«. always wth m h t"^"- '^"' '°''- '''•'' ^°»°"" "' the fight, as tested by the gr.m record of the casualty returns, V w-uthe Grenadiers, the Coldstreams, the Northnmber- s and the Scots Guards. The brave Guardsmen thickly on the slopes, but their c. ades crowned ne heights. The Boers held on desperately and fired their r^es m the very faces of the stormers. One ^JmlT'l ^""'"•'r hlown to pieces by a rifle which almost touched him. Another, BlundeU of the Guards was shot dead by a wounded desperado to whom he w« '^"^B h" '"'"-bottle. At one point a white flag Mr E rK„,vt"'f,^^ V°"'y- "'"= 'here that ^etim 'J; ^ t' f *''' ^°'"^S Post,' became the wound, from which ne lost his right arm, was from an exp osive bullet. The man who raised the flag was captured and it says much for the humanity of BritTsh wldiers that he was not bayoneted upon the spot. Ye Tt IM THE GREAT BOEH WAB u not fair to blame a whole people for the misdeeda of • few, and it is probable that the men who descend to euoh devioee, or who deliberately fire upon our ambulances, are as much execrated by their own comrades as by ourselVea. The victory was an expensive one, for fifty killed and two hundred wounded lay upon the hiUside, and, like so many of our skirmishes with the Boers, it led to small material results. Their losses appear to have been much about the same as ours, and we captured some fifty prisoners, whom the soldiers regarded with the utmost interest. They were a sullen slouching crowd rudely clad, and they represented probably the poorest of the burghers, who now, as in the middle ages, suffer most in battle, since a long purse means a good horse. Most of the enemy galloped very comfortably away after the action, leaving a fringe of sharpshooters among the kopjes to hold back our pursuing cavalry. The want of horsemen and the want of horse artillery are the two reasons which Lord Methuen gives why the defeat was not converted into a rout. As it was, the feelings of the retreating Boers were exemplified by one of their number, who turned in his saddle in order to place his outstretched fingers to his nose in derision of the victors. He exposed himself to the fire of half a battalion while doing so, but he probably was aware that with our present musketry instruction the fire of a British half-battalion against an individual is not a very serious matter. The remainder of the 28rd was spent at Belmont Camp, and next morning an advance was made to Enslin, some ten mUes further on. Here lay the plain of Enslin, bounded by a formidable line of kopjes as dangerous as those of Belmont. Lancers and Kiming- ton's Scouts, the feeble but very capable cavalry of the m #: LOBD METHUEN'8 ADVANCE Its Army, oaime in with the report that the hills were strongly held. Some more hard dogging was in front of the relievers of Kimberley. The advance had been on the line of the Capetown- Kimberley Bailway, and the damage done to it by the Boers had been repaired to the extent of permitting an armoured train with a naval gun to accompany the troops. It was six o'clock upon the morning of Saturday the 28th that this gun came into action against the kopjes, closely foUowed by the guns of the field artiUery. One of the lessons of the war has been to disillusion us as to the effect of shrapnel fire. Positions which had been made theoretically untenable have again and again been found to be most inconveniently tenanted. Among the troops actually engaged the confidence in the effect of shrapnel fire has steadUy declined with their experience. Some other method of artillery fire than the curving bullet from an exploding shrapnel shell must be devised for dealing with men who lie close among boulders and behind cover. These remarks upon shrapnel might be included in the account of half the battles of the war, but they are particularly apposite to the action at Enslin. Here a single large kopje formed the key to the position, and a considerable time was expended upon preparing it for the British assault, by directing upon it a fire which swept the face of it and searched, as was hoped, every comer in which a rifleman might lurk. One of the two batteries engaged fired no less than five hundred rounds. Then the infantry advance was ordered, the Guards being held in reserve on account of their exertions at Behnont. The Northumberlands, Northamptons, North Lancashires, and Yorkshires worked round upon the right, and, aided by the artiUery fire, cleared thft 186 TflE OREAT BOER WAB trenches in tbeir front. The honoort of the assMilt, however, mnat be awarded to the lailori and marinei of the Naval Brigade, who nnderwent each an ordeal as men have seldom faced and yet come out as victors. To them fell the task of carrying that formidable hill which had been so .jonrged by our artillery. With a grand rush they swept up the slope, bat were met by a horrible Are. Every rook sported flame, and the front ranks withered away before the storm of the Mansers. An eye-witness has recorded that the brigade was hardly visible amid the sand knocked up by the ballets. For an instant they fell back into cover, and then, having taken their breath, up they went again, with a deep-chested sailor roar. There were but four hundred in all, two hundred seamen and two hundred marines, and the losses in that rapid rush were terrible. Yet they swarmed up, their gallant officers, some of them little boy-middies, cheering them on. Ethelston, the commander of the ' Powerful,' was struck down. Plnmbe and Senior of the Marines were killed. Captain Prothero of the ' Doris ' dropped while'still yelling to his seamen to • take that kopje and be hanged to it ! ' Little Huddart, the middy, died a death which is worth many inglorious years. Jones of the Marines feU wounded, but rose again and rushed on with his men. It was on these gallant marines, the men who are ready to fight anywhere and anyhow, moist or dry, that the heaviest loss feU. When at last they made good their foothold upon the crest of that murderous hill they had left behind them three officers and eighty-eight men out of a total of 206— a loss within a few minutes of nearly 60 per cent. The bluejackets, helped by the curve of the hill, got off with a toll of eighteen of their number. Half the total British losses of the action fell upon this Uttle LORD METHUEN-S ADVANCK IJ7 body of men, who upheld most gloriously the honour and reputation of the service from which they Zl dr»wn. With such men under the white ensign we leave our island homes in safety behind us. """va of kiUed and wounded, and beyond the mere fact that we ft I'^T .r; '"'y''y'««'"'er stage towards Kimberley ^1. difficult to say what advantage we had from it. We won the kopjes, but we lost our men. The Boir and wounded were probably less than half of our own, and the exhaustion and weakness of our cavalrv forbade us to pursue and prevented us from capturing their guns. In three days the men had fought two eihaus mg actions in a waterless country and under a tropical sun. Their exertions had been great and ye were barren of result. Why this should be so was naturaUy the subject of keen discussion both in the camp and among the public at home. It always came back to Lord Methuen's own complaint about the absence of cavaby and of horse artiUery. Many very nryust charges have been hurled against our Wsi Office-adei^rtment which in pome matters has done extraordmarUy and unexpectedly well-but in this ones- ^rmf ^' '"^ "" "■* ^"^^^^ °' °" cavalry and artillery, knowmg as we did the extreme mobiMty of our enemy, there is certainly ground for an inquiry The Boers who had fought these two actions had been drara mamly from the Jacobsdal and Fauresmith com- mandoes, with some of the burghers from Boshof The famous Cronje, however, had been descending from Mafe- king with his old guard of Transvaalers, and keen disaD- pomtment was expressed by the prisoners at Belmont and at Enelm that he had not arrived in time to take command of them. There were evidences, however, at this latter 188 THI OREAT BOEB WAB aofaon, that reinforcement, for the enemy were oomina up knd that the labours of the Kimberley relief fon* were by no meuiii at an end. In the height of th« engagement the Lancer patrohi thrown out npon onr right Bank reported the approach of a considerable body of Boer horsemen, who took up a position npon a hiU on our right rear. Their position there was distinoUr menacmg and Colonel Willoughby Vemer was de.^ patched by Lord Methuen to order up the brigade of Guards. The gallant officer had the misfortnnTin hit return to mjore himself seriously through a blander of his horse. His mission, however, succeeded in its effect, for the Guards moving across the plain intervened in such a way that the reinforcements, without an open attack, which would have been opposed to all Boer traditions, could not help the defenders, and were com- peUed to witness their defeat. This body of horsemen returned north next Jay and were no doubt among those whom we encountered at the foUowing action of the Modder Eiver. The march from Orange Biver had begun on the Wednesday. On Thursday was fought the action of Behnont, on Saturday that of Graspan. There waa no protection against the sun by day nor against the cold at night. Water was not plentiful, and the quality of It was occasionally vile. The troops were in need of a rest, so on Saturday night and Sunday they remained at finshn. On the Monday morning (November 27th) the weary march to Kimberley was resumed. On Monday, November 27th, at early dawn, the little iiritiBh army, a dust-coloured column upon the dusty veldt, moved forwards again towards their objective. That night they halted at the pools of KUpfontein. having for once made a whole day's march without u I V \ LOBD MBTHOEirs ADVAKOB 13» eoming to touch with the enemy. Hope, row that POMiWy the two luooeuiTe defeaU had taken the heart out of them and that there would be no further regUt- «ioe to the advance. Some, however, who were aware of the prewnce of Croiye, and of hie formidable character took a juiter view of the Bituation. And tbii perhapi « where a few words might be laid about the celebrated leader who played upon the western side of the leat of war the game part which Joubert did upon the east Commandant Cro^je wag at the time of the war saty-flve years of age. a hard, swarthy man. quiet of inanner, fierce of soul, with a reputation among a nation or resolute men for unsurpassed resolution. His dark face was bearded and virile, but sedate and gentle in expression. He spoke little, but what he said was to the pomt. and he had the gift of those fire-words which brace and strengthen weaker men. In huntina expeditions and in native wars he had first won the admiration of his countrymen by his courage and his fertility of resource. In the war of 1880 he had led the R>er8 who besieged Potchefstroom. and he had pushed the attack with a relentless vigour which was not hampered by the chivakous usages of war. Eventu- aUy he compelled the surrender of the place by concealing from the garrison that a general armistice had been signed, an act which was afterwards disowned by his own government. In the succeeding years he lived as an autocrat and a patriarch amid his farms and his herds, respected by many and feared by aU. For a time he was Native Commissioner and left a reputation for hard dealing behind him. Called into the field again by the Jameson raid, he grimly herded his enemies into an impossible position and desired, as it is stated, that the hardest measure should be dealt out to the captives ♦J' MO THK OAEAT BOER WAJl «.« ptth of Lord M.tha.n-, tired Mldier.^1 wiH fcir m.toh. On the one .ide the hardy men "h! L.n7 T • ^'"^ • ^^ ^ ""' tte du.t.oolou«d column moved on ove, the duty .elai """""w So entirely h.d hiU. and Boer fighting become mmd.. 80 great was the confidence or eo lai the twhw '"''* 'PP*"" *" •"»"« '>««" conducted .'pStion^h'^""''" *" ™P«'"^'"« '«'"'«• The woK a'liur°! 'T *° ' '"«''"'• "-"t a river sutance, .eem. to have been ignored. It ig perhan. nave vexed hu .pint more than ours-one-s evm- P«th.e8 go out to the gentle and brave man. who ^ heard calhng out in his eleep that he ' shcSS have h^ tZ 8"'?'' -••"* " " "P-S"""" to common sen^ to euppoee that no one. neither the cavalry norTJ Intelhgence Department, i. at fault foTw eitra! thTi^' ^°^f^^' 28th. the British troop, were fold that they would march at once, and have thdr Irelk fa t t^l '^«y ""olxj^ th« Moddcr Biver-a «im joke tl those who hved to appreciate it. ^ ' LORD JttIHUBN'8 ADVANCE m The army lu^ been reinforced the nighi before by to. welcome i^^d.fon of the ArgyU .nd Sutherland Highlander, which made up for the Io..e, of the week. JLI^M "'"f ""fjo^'ng. »nd a dazzling eun ro.e in a deep blue .ky. The men, though hungry, marched .heerUy he reek of their tobacco-pipe, floaZ°„p from their r«,k. It cheered themto «e th^f th^ Td tH".',, ""': Y' '■?' ""> ""*' ^'^ '«" behind! and that fte great plam inclined .lightly downward, to Oni^ , ^ u T" '^"""^ '^* «"»"• o' the river! On the further bank were a few Mattered building, with one con..derable hotel, n«,d a, a week-end re.^l*by the ^n^:i ""■! ■ '^^'■"'y- " '"y "O' "aJm "d mnocent, with it, open window, looking out upon a ^Jmg garden; but death lurked at the'window^nS .tood by the door, peering through hi, gla,. .t'h^ approaching column, wa. the mtaiater of death the dangerous Cronje. ' ' * Hi, diapogition, had been both maaterly and oririnal rivers he had concealed hi, men upon both bank, pta«mg a, it i. ,tated, tho«, in whow .Uu^ hne,The had le«t confidence upon the Britirf, «de of the Lr «> that they could only retreat under the rifle, of S mexoraWe companion.. The trenche. had been Ld" with ,uch a regard for the ,lope, of the ground ttat if wme place, a triple Une of fire wa. eecurld hu artUlery con.i,ting of wveral heavy piece, and a nnmbe" of machine gun. (including one of the diabolical °^m- pom. ). wa, cleverly placed upon the '-rther .ide of rit^htT; ""* T °°' -"'y P'o^-J^" with ehelt^ ^r ^ , t«T u '*'""' P"'' "» """ the gun, cIuM be readily dnfted when their range wa, found Bow. of 14S THE GREAT BOEK WAB trenches a broadish river, fresh rows of trenche* well placed, It was a serious task which lay in front of the gallant little army. The whole position cove ed between four and five miles. wverea An obvious question must here occur to the mind of every non-mJ.tary reader-' Why should this Son be attacked at aU? Why should we not cross'^Sr up where there were no such formidable obsteclesT The answer, so far as one can answer it, must be that so httle was known of the dispositions ,f our «,emy that we were hopelessly involved in the action before we knew of It and that then it was more dang^ous to extncate the army than to push the attack. Tretir^ yards would have been a dangerous and disastrons movement. Having once got there, it was wisTZ best to see it through. The dark Crouje still waited reflective in the hotel the poor fellows eager, after seven miles of Aat upland a r for the breakfast which had been promised ftem It was a quarter to seven when our patrols of LanceTs thP,^ ''"/,"P°°- There were Boers, then, bebZ them and their meal! The artillery was orieZiZ the Guards were sent forward on the right the 9th BrigadeunderPole-Carewon the left, includC 'the new v arrived Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. TheyswS then, there blamed out upon them four miles of rifle/ cannon, and machine guns, and they realised frT™ E' «" ^":f ' '•"** '^"^ ""^ w:jked unStingly into the fiercest battle yet fought in the war. "^ before the position was understood the Gn ads were if^ ^ ^A-^im' * LORD METHtJEN'S ADVANCE 143 Irithin seven hundred yards of tbe Boer trenches and the other troops about nine hundred, on he Sof f r^ gentle slo^ which made it most difficult to find me river, the houses, the hotel, no movement of men, no smoke-everything pea;efnl ZTT^lr^l nant ploop «p.ng' of tbe automatic quick-firer than a large walnut, bu flyi^; Kts ofl?" '''«'i men and gun were destroyed^in a^blnt ^s't'^'^^'' ro9;rtrby:,ratii.:rs^^^ -th^r:x^rredth- 'xrtr^ ^°''-'- helpless and harried it ai:ayTclts?nrZnre;: upon the guns, and rarely indeed is it that the gallant |MB do not respond. Now the 75th and Ke°d Battene, came rattling and dashing to the fr L S 144 THE GREAT BOER WAX nnlimbered at one ihoasand yards. The naval gaht were working at four thousand, but the two combined were insufficient to master the fire of the pieces of large cahbre which were opposed to them. Lord Methuen must have prayed for guns as WeUington did for night and never was a prayer answered more dramatically A strange battery came lurching up from the British rear unheralded, unknown, the weary gasping horses panting at the traces, the men, caked with sweat and dirt, urging them on mto a last spasmodic trot. The bodies of horseswhich had diedof pure fatigue marked their course the sergeants' horses tugged in the gun-teams, and the sergeants staggered along by the limbers. It was the 62nd Field Battery, which had marched thirty-two miles in eight hours, and now, hearing the crash of battle in front of them, had with one last desperate effort thrown itself into the firing line. Great credit is due to Major Granet and his men. Not even those gallant German batteries who saved the infantry at Spicheren could boast of a finer feat. Now it was guns against guns, and let the best gunners win 1 We had sixteen field-guns and the naval pieces against the concealed cannon of the enemy. Back and forward flew the sheUs, howling past each other m mid-air. The weary men of the 62nd Bat- tery forgot their labours and fatigues as they stooped and strained at their clay-coloured 15-pounders. Half of them were within rifle range, and the Hmber horses were the centre of a hot fire, as they were destined to be at a shorter range and with more disastrous effect at the Tugela. That the same tactics should have been adopted at two widely sundered points 8how^with>hat care the details of the war had been pre-arranged by the Boer leaders. 'Before I got my horses out,' says an officer, 'they shot one of my drivers ^mmk: LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE i« and two horaea and brought down my own horse. When we got the gun round one of the gunners was shot through the brain and fell at my feet. Another was shot whUe bringing up shell. Then we got a look in.' The roar of the cannon was deafening, but gradually the British were gaining the upper hand. Here and there the httle knolls upon the further side which had erupted into constant flame lay cold and silent. One of the heavier guns was put out of action, and the other had been withdrawn for five hundred yards. But the infantry fire still crackled and rippled along the trenches, and the guns could come no nearer with living men and horses. It was long past midday, and that unhappy breakfast seemed further off than ever. As the afternoon wore on, a curions condition of .hings was established. The guns could not advance and would not "itire. The infantry could not advance and would not retire. The Guards on the right were prevented from opening out on the flank and getting round the enemy's line, by the presence of the Biet Eiver which joins the Modder almost at a right angle. All day they lay under a blistering sun, the sleet of bullets whiiizmg over their heads. ' It came in solid streaks like telegraph wires,' said a graphic correspondent. The men gossipped, smoked, and many of them slept. They lay on the barrels of their rifles to keep them cool enough for use. Now and again there came the dull thud of a bullet which had found its mark, and a man gasped, or drummed with his feet ; but the casualties at this point were not numerous, for there was some Uttle cover, and the piping bullets passed for the most part overhead. But in the meantime there had been a development upon the left which was to turn the action into a British victory. At this side there w»s ample room to extend, 'smMf^^r^ us TBE GREAT BOEit WAR and the Qth Brigade spread oat, feeling ite way do\m the enemy's line, until it came to a point where the fire was less morderoas and the approach to the river more in favour of the attack. Here the Torkshires, a party of whom under Lieutenant Fox had stormed a farm- house, obtained the command of a drift, over which a mixed force of Highlanders and Fusiliers forced their way, led by their Brigadier in person. This body of infantry, which does not appear to have exceeded five hundred in numbv^r, were assailed both by the Boir riflemen and by the guns of both parties, our own gunners being unaware that the Modder had been successfully crossed. A small hamlet called Eosmead formed, however, a point d'appui, and to this the infantry clung tenaciously, while reinforcements dribbled across to them from the farther side. 'Now, boys, who's for otter hunting ? ' cried Major Coleridge, of the North Lancashires, as he sprang into the water. How gladly on that baking, scorching day did the men jump into the river and splash over, to climb the opposite bank with their wet khaki cUnging to their figures! Borne blundered into holes and were rescued by grasping the unwound putties of their com- rades. And so between three and four o'clock a strong party of the British had established their position upon the right fiank of the Boers, and were holding on like grim death with an intelligent appreciation that the for- tunes of the day depended upon their retaining their grip. ' Hollo, here is a river ! ' cried Codrington when he led iiis forlorn hope to the right and found that t^e Biet had to be crossed. ' I was given to understand that the Modder was fordable everywhere,' says Lord Methnen in his official despatch. One cannot read the account of the operations without being strack by the mumimjmmm:^^wmm.j^m^m. n LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE 117 casual, sketchy knowledge which cost as so dearly. The soldiers slogged their way through, as they have slogged it before; but the task might have been made much lighter for them had we but clearly known what it was that we were trying to do. On the other hand, it is but fair to Lord Methuen to say that his own personal gallantry and unflinching resolution set the most stimu- lating example to his troops. No general could have done more to put heart into his men. And now, as the long weary scorchmg hungry day came to an end, the Boers began at last to flinch from their trenches. The shrapnel was finding them out and this force upon their flank filled them with vague alarm and with fears for their precious guns. And so as night fell they stole across the river, the cannon wera withdrawn, the trenches evacuated, and next morning, when the weary British and their anxious general turned themselves to their grim task once more, they founu a deserted village, a line of empty houses, and a litter of empty Mauser cartridge-eases to show where their tenacious enemy had stood. Lord Methuen, in congratulating the troops upon their achievement, spoke of 'the hardest-won victory in our annals of war,' and some such phrase was used in his official despatch. It is hypercritical, no doubt, to look too closely at a term used by a wounded man with the flush of battle still upon him, but atill a student of military history must smile at duch a comparison between this action and such others as Albuera or Inkerman, where the numbers of British engaged were not dissimilar. A fight in which five hundred men are killed and wounded cannot be classed in the same category as those stern and desperate encounters where mora ,of the victors were carried than walked from the Liiii-*.-».TlL- Hr" 148 THE GREAT BOEE WAR field of battle. And yet there were some special featorei which will differentiate the fight at Modder Biver from any of the hundred actions which adorn the standards of onr regiments. It was the third battle which the troops had fonght within the week, they were nnder fire for ten or twelve hours, were waterless nnder a tropical sun, and weak from want of food. For the first time they were called upon to face modem rifle fire and modem machine guns in the open. The result tends to prove that those who hold that it will from now onwards be impossible ever to make such frontal attacks as those which the English made at the AUna or the French at Waterloo, are justified in their belief. It is beyond human hardihood to face the pitiless beat of bullet and shell which comes from modem quick-firing weapons. Had our flank not made a lodgment across the river, it is impossible that we could have carried the position. Once more, too, it was demonstrated how powerless the best artillery is to disperse resolute and well-placed riflemen. Of the minor points of interest there will always remain the record of the forced march of the 62nd Battery, and artillerymen will note the use of gun-pits by the Boers, which ensured that the range of their positions should never be permanently obtained. The honours of the day upon the side of the British rested with the ArgyU and Sutherland Highlanders, the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Coldstreams, and the artillery. Out of a total casualty list of about 460, no less than 112 came from the gallant Argylls and 69 from the Coldstreams. The loss of the Boers is exceedingly difficult to gauge, as they throughout the war took the utmost pains to con- ceal it. The number of desperate and long-drawn actions which have ended, according to the official M«f.A LOHD METHUErra ADVANCE 149 Pretorian acconnt, in a loss of one wonnded bnraher may in some way be better poUcy. but doss not imply a higher standard of pnbUo virtue, than those long UsU which have saddened our hearts in the halls of the War Office. What is certain is that the loss at Modder Biver could not have been far inferior to our own. and that It arose almost entirely from artillery fire, since at no time of the action were any large number of their *i T^u r !'• ^ "' '°''^' *•"" •""g pelting match, the dark Cronje sullenly withdrawing under the cover of darkness with his resolute heart filled with fierce determination for the future, whUe the British soldiers torew themselves down on the ground which they occupied and slept the sleep of exhaustion. 160 THE GREAT BOER WAR CHAPTEB IX BATTLI or UAOEBSFOMTEIli Lord Metbuem's force had now fought three actions in the space of a single vieek, losing in killed and wounded about a thousand men, or rather more than one-tenth of its total numbers. Had there been evidence that the enemy were seriously demoralised, the General would no doubt have pushed on at once to Kimberley, which was some twenty miles distant. The information which reached him was, however, that the Boers had fallen back upon the very strong position of Spytfontein, that they were full of fight, and that they had been strongly reinforced by a commando from Mafeking. Under these circumstances Lord Mcthaen had no choice bat to give his men a well-earned rest, and to await reinforcements. There was no use in reaching Kimberley unless he had completely defeated the investing force. With the his- tory of the first relief of Lncknow 'n his memory he was on his guard' against a repetition of such an experience. It was the more necessary that Methuen should strengthen his position, since with every mile which he advanced the more exposed did his line of communications become to ; raid from Fauresmith and the southern districts of the Orange Free State. Any serious danger to the railway behind them would leave the British Army in a very critical position, and precautions were taken for the protection of the more vnlnerable portions of the line. It was well that this was so, for on the 8th of BATTLE OF HAOEBSFONTEIM Ul December Commandant Prinsloo, of the Orange Free State, with a thousand horsemen and tvo light seven- pounder guns, appeared suddenly at Enslin and vigorously attacked the two companies of the Northampton Regiment who held the station. At the same time they destroyed a couple of culverts and tore up three hundred yards of the permanent way. For some hours the Northamptons under Captain Oodley were closely pressed, but a telegram had been despatched to Modder Camp, and the 12th Lancers with the ubiquitous 62nd Battery were sent to their assis- tance. The Boers retired with their usual mobility, and in ten hoars the line was completely restored. Beinforcements were now reaching the Modder River force, which made it more formidable than when it had started. A very essential addition was that of the 12th Lancers and of G battery of Horse Artillery, which would increase the mobiUty of the force and make it possible for the Oeneral to follow up a blow after he had struck it. The magnificent regiments which formed the Highland Brigade— the 2nd Black Watch, the 1st Gordons, the 2nd Seaforths, and the let Highland Light Infantry- had arrived under the gallant and ill-fated Wauchope. Four five-inch howitzers had also come to strengthen the artillery. At the same time the Canadians, the Australians, and several line regiments were moved up on the line from De Aar to Belmont. It appeared to the public at home that there was the material for an overwhelming advance ; but the ordinary observer, and even perhaps the military critic, had not yet appreciated how great is the advantage which is given by modem weapons to the force which acts upon the defensive. With enormous pains Cronje and his men were en- trenching a most formidable position in front of our advance, with a confidence, which proved to be justified, m ...Ik 161 THE GREAT BOEB WAR m that it would be on thuir own gronnd and nnder their own oonditiona that in this, aa in the three preceding actioni, we should engage them. On themomingof Saturday,Deoeniber9th,theBritiih General made an attempt to find out what lay in front of him amid that semicircle of forbidding hills. To this end he sent out a reconnaissance in the early morn- ing, which included G Battery Horse Artillery, the 9th Lancers, and the ponderous 47 naval gun, which, preceded by the majestic march of thirty- two bullocks and attended by eighty seamen gunnera, creaked forwards over the plain. What was there to shoot at in those annht boulder-atrewn hills in front ? They lay aUent and untenanted in the glare of the African day. In vain the great gun exploded ite huge sheU with iU fifty pounds of lyddite over the ridges, in vain the amaUer pieces searched every cleft and hollow with their Arapnel. No answer came from the far-stretching hUIs. Not a flash or twinkle betrayed the fierce bands who lurked among the boulders. The force returned to camp no wiser than when it left. There was one sight visible every night to all men which might well nerve the rescuera in their enterprise. Over the northern horizon, behind those hills of danger, there quivered up in the darkness one long, flashing! quivering beam, which awnng up and down, and up again like a seraphic sword-blade. It was Kimberley praying for help, Kimberley solicitous for news. Anxiously, distractedly, the great De Beers search- light dipped and rose. And back acrosa the twenty miles of darkness, over the hills where Cronje lurked, there came that other aonthern column of light which answered, and promised, and aoothed. • Be of good heart, Kimberley. We are here! The Empire is behind ii:^ -• BATTLE OF MAOKUSFONTEIN la M. We have not forgotten you. It m»y be days, or it may be weeki, but rest assured that we are coming.' About three in the afternoon of Sunday, December 10th, the force which was intended to clear a path for the army through the lines of Magersfontein moved oat upon what proved to be its desperate enterprise. The 8rd or Highlaud Brigade included the Black Watch, the Seaforths, the Argyll and Sutherlands, and the Highland Light Infantry. The Gordons had only arrived in camp that day, and did not advance nntU next morning. Besides the infantry, the 9th Lancers, too mounted infantry, and all the artUlery moved to the front. It was raining hard, and the men with one blanket between two soldiers bivouacked upon the cold damp ground, about three mUes from the enemy's position. At one o'clock, without food, and drenched, they moved forwards through the drizzle and the dark- ness to attack those terrible lines. Clouds drifted low in the heavens, and the falling rain made the darkness more impenetrable. The Highland Brigade was formed into a column— the Black Watch in front, then the Seaforths, and the other two behind. To prevent the men from straggling in the night the four regiments were packed into a mass of quarter column as densely as was possible, and the left guides held a rope in order to preserve the formr tion. With many a trip and stumble the ill-fated detachment wandered on, uncertain where they were gomg and what it was that they were meant to do. Not only among the rank and file, but among the principal officers also, there was the same absolute ignorance. Brigadier Wauohope knew, no donbt, but his voice was soon to be staled in death. The others were aware, of course, that they were advancing either to turn the ji^kmi M rsmm d^Em! in THE GREAT BOER WAR enemy's trenohm or to attack them, bat they may weU have argued from their own formation that they coald not be near the riflemen yet. Why they ehoold be itill •dvancing in that denae clomp we do not now know, nor can we aurmiae what thoughta were poaaing through thenundof the gaUant and experienced chieftain who walked beatde them. There ore aome who claim on the night before to have aeen upon bia atrangely aacetic face that shadow of doom which ia sommed np m the one word < fey.' The hand of coming death may already have lain cold upon his aonl. Out there, close beside him, atretohed the long trench, fringed with ita Une of fierce, staring, eager faces, and Its bristle of gun-barrels. They knew he was coming. They were ready. They were waiting. But atiU, with the dull murmur of many feet, the dense column, nearly our thousand strong, wandered onwards through the rain and the darkness, death and mutilation crouching upon their path. It matters not what gave the signal, whether it was the flashing of a lantern by a Boer scout, or the tripping of a soldier over wire, or the firing of a gun in the ranks It may have been any. or it may have been none, of these things. As a matter of fact I have been assured by a Boer who was. present that it was the sound of the hns attached to the alarm wires which disturbed them. However this may be. in an instant there crashed out of he darkness into their faces and ears a roar of point-blank fire, and the night was slashed across with the throbbmg flame of the rifles. At the moment before this outflame some doubt as to their whereabouta seems to have flashed across the mind of their leaders. The order to extend had just been given, but the men had not had time to act upon it. The storm of lead m-'Mk^. jL'iL^'M. ■ <'j more . A a ''j« . _ Willi) ynlj II il Bb to ; inj. S for ever. !« dying 'orbida ranco I went 'dsfiu iitiL ui»i 3t>aggling i; - 1- BOD'p dead, by rVo rush and horriiyl'' uusiness. ■11 A .Hiugle Mauser BATTLE OF MAOERSFONTEIN ]M burat upon the head and right flank of the column, which broke to piecea nnder the mnrder'^'s volley. Wauchope wai ahot, ttrnggled np, and Bnmonr haa placed worda oi i . lipa, but hia nature, both r," '! the Buppoaition. 'What r, ();■.. which a brother Highlaiuiei p'> down in awathei, and ahcui of .1. over the veldt, swelled 1 1 froia t'/ crowd. By the hundiuii the some wounded, gome knocke,. liu away of the broken ranks. It wr. At such a range and in such a for., bullet may well pass through many men. A few dashed forwards, and were found dead at the very edgea of the trench. The few survivors of companies A, B, and of the Black Watch appear to have never actually retired, but to have clung on to the immediate front of the Boer trenches, while the remains of the other five companies tried to turn the Boer flank. Of the former body only six got away unhurt in the evening after m^e "ll day within two hundred yards of the enemy. The rest of the brigade broke and, disentangling them- selves with difficulty from the dead and the dying, fled back out of that accursed place. Some, the most unfortunate of aU, became caught in the darkness in the wire defences, and were found in the morning hung np ' like crows,' as one spectator describes it, and riddled with buUets. Who shall blame the Highlanders for retiring when fliey did ? Viewed, not by desperate and sa/nrised men, but m aU calmness and sanity, it may ws " jeem to have been the very best thing which they could do. Dashed into chaos, separated from their officers, with no one who knew what was to be done, the first necessity was IM THE GBEAT BOER WAS, s*Leir«d*l"^'^ *^^ ^'^^ ^«' ''^'^ ^ already ?ound Th„d °' ^^ """"^ °P°»^e pound. The danger was that men so shaken wonM h! Btr.cken ,ith panic, scatter in the da^toeu o'e^ th^ nmt Bat the Highlanders were true to their oharaTter and their traditions. There was shouting i^ the S- ness, hoarse voices calling for the Seafnrth. 7 *u Argylls, for Company c/fo CoS.Mv H .1 " where i^theglooLh'ere'cal't^ra^Lf;,^^^ SunJ'""- '■*" "" '•°"'"'' tbe break of daX wSed w r?'' ""^^ "■'»""*•'' ""J- BhattereYS 80^. .*» •'»' «''a'^t«d. prepared to renew the contest Some attempt at an advance was made upon theriS^ ' ebbmg and flowing, one Uttle band even IchL^h* 5S;Si':h°:;rJd'i%reXThut'^t that he never once had seen anything positivVTlS to aim. Lieutenant Lindsay'brou|ht Te S^fS Maxm. mto the firing-line. and. though^ W ctw except two were hit. it continued to do mod se^v! dunng the day. The Lancers' Marim ^ Sv staunch, though it also was left flns^ "«!. onTtSi neutonant in charge and one trooper toUk it. ' *'' Fortunate y the guns were at hand, and, as usual Ssrwrj;^ru;ts^te^tt^'«""'' m^vtt^ ^ VyaS^Lt^Srtt:::- (18th. 62nd. 76th) were working with shrannrf ^w mUe. and the troop of Horse Artillfryw^upS right BATTLE OP MAQER8F0NTEIN 187 front trying to enfilade the trenches. The guns kent down the rifle-fire, and gave the wearied Highlanrrs some eSvld^r./'"" •'?'""*"• '''"' "•ole*sit„ati "hL Tmjr °! '°'° '^°''«» Battle 0' Modder Bive^ hld^^ '^' V ^^ *' ''■•"° "" '""'•J'ed to eight hundred paces, could not advance and would not retire The artJlery only kept the battle going, and the huge r H„T ^""^ "^^^ "" J°'"^8 ''""«« deep bark fn Wn^ T-*"?'"*'- ^"* "'^ ^°«« had air Jy n^f~!^t^t " °'"' °' ^^'^ ""o^t ^»'«aWe miliary -that shell fire rs less dangerous in a trench than among rocks. These trenches, very elaborate in character had been dug some hundreds oTyards from the foot of the hiUs, so that there was hardly "nv t^de to our artillery fire. Yetitistothe artilleryfire that aU the losses of the Boers that day were due! The cleverness of Cronje's disposition of his trenches some h„„drod yards ahead of the kopjes is accon'aS by the fascmation which any rising object has for a he nnhmbered his guns two hundred yards in front of the church of Chlum, and how the Austrian reply firo almost invanably pitched upon the steeple. So our own Snu'r° "i " *'°:«>°»«^'> y«d «»rk, found it h^l *^ f •"* ''^"'"^ting the invisible line, and Sitting the obvious mark behmd. „n tl^X^7 wore on reinforcements of infantry came tL « J^' °"- I""'" '""' '^" left to guard the camp of th« rr f "^'''^""^"^e first and second battalions of the Coldstream Guards, and all the artillery was moved nearer to the enemy's position. At the same time W„M fliTT T' '"••'"='"'°"'' of M attack upon ou^ right flank the Grenadier Guards with five companies of .^mm^ m THE GREAT BOEB WAR the Yorkahire Light Infantry were moved np in that direction, while the three remaining companies of Barter's Yorkshu-emen secured a drift over which the enemy might cross the Modder. This threatening movement upon our right flank, which would have put the Highlanders into an impossible position had it succeeded was most gallantly held back aU morning, before the arrival of the Guards and the Yorkshires, by the mounted infantry and the 12th Lancers, skirmishing on foot It was in this long and successful struggle to cover the flank of the 8rd Brigade that Major MUton. Major Kay, and many another brave man met his end. The Coldstreams and Grenadiers relieved the pressure upon this side, and the Lancers retired to their horses, having rfiown, not for the first time, that the cavalry- man with a modern carbine can at a pinch very quickly turn himself into a useful infantry soldier. Lord Aurhe deserves aU praise for his unconventional use of hii men, and for the gaUantry with which he threw both him- self aoQd them into the most critical corner of the fight While the Coldstreams, the Grenadiers, and the Yorkshure Light Lifantry were holding back the Boer attack upon our right flank the indomitable Gordons, the men of Dargai, furious with the desire to avenge their comrades of the Highland Brigade, had advanced straight agamst the trenches and succe.^ded without any very great loss in getting within four hundred yarv out- flanking it, and we were not numerous enough nor mobUe enough to outflank it. There i»y the whole (scret of our troubles, and no conjectures as to what lai^t under other circumstances have happened oan alter it. About half-past five the Boer guns, which had for some unexplained reason been silent all dav, opened upon the cavalry. Their appearance was a signal for the general faUing back of the centre, ana tun last attempt to retrieve the day was auamloneu. Tlie High- landers were dead-beat ; the Coldstreams had Imd enough; the nlounted infantry was badly mauied. There remained the Grenadiers, the Scots (iuarris, and two or three hne regiments who were available for a new attack. There are occasions, such as Sadowa, where a general must play his last card. Tiere ^e others where with remforcements in hie rear, he can do oetter by saving his force and trying once agun. General Grant had an axiom that the best time for an advance was when you were utterly exhausted, for that was the moment when your enemy was probably utterly ex- rm BATTI-E OF MAQEESFONTEIN ifli hausted too, and of two such forces the attacker has the moral advantage. Lord Methuen determined— and no doubt wisely— that it wa° no occasion for counsels of desperation. His men were withdrawn— in some cases withdrew themselves— outside the range of the Boer gons, and next morning saw the whole force with bitter and humiliated hearts on their way back to their camp at Modder Biver. The repulse of Magersfontein cost the British neaily a thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing, of which over seven hundred belonged to the Highlanders. Fifty- seven officers had fallen in that brigade alone, including their Brigadier and Colonel Downman of the Gordons. Colonel Codrington of the Coldatreams was wounded early, fought through the action, and came back in the evenmg on a Maxim gun. Lord Winchester of the same battalion was killed, after injudiciously but heroically exposing himself all day. The Black Watch alone bad lost nineteen officers and over three hundred men killed and wounded, a catastrophe which can only be matched in all the bloody and glorious annals of that splendid regiment by their slaughter at Ticonderoga in 1767, when no fewer than five hundred fell before Montcalm's muskets. Never has Scotland had a more grievous day than this of Magers- fontein. She has always given her best blood with lavish generosity for the Empire, but it may be doubted if any single battle has ever put so many families of high and low mto mourning from the Tweed to the Caithness shore. There is a legend that when sorrow comes upon Scotland the old Edinburgh Castle is lit by ghostly lights and gleams white at every window in the mirk of midnight. If ever the watcher could have seen so sinister a sight, it should have been on this, the fatal night of December 11, 1899. As to the Boer loss it is imposBible to determine la THE GREAT BOER WAR it. Their official returns stated it to be seventy killed and two hundred and fifty wounded, but the reports of prisoners and dcserturs placed it at a very much higher figure. One unit, the Scandinavian corps, was placed in an advanced position at Spytfontein, and was over- whelmed by the Seaforths, who killed, wounded, or took the eighty men of whom it was composed. The stories of prisonerB and of deserters all speak of losses very much higher than those which have been officially acknowledged. In his comments upon the battle next day Lord Methnen was said to have given o£Fence to the Highland Brigade, and the report was allowed to go uncontra- dicted until it became generally accepted. It arose, however, from a complete misunderstanding of the purport of Lord Methuen's remarks, in which he praised them, as he well might, for their bravery, and condoled ith them over the wreck of their splendid regiments. I'he way in which officers and men hung on under conditions to which no troops have ever been exposed was worthy of the highest traditions of the British iirmy. From the death of Wacchope in the early morning, until the assumption of the command of the brigade by Hughes-Hallett in the late afternoon, no one seems to liave taken the direction. ' My heutenant was wounded and my captain was killed,' says a private. ' The General waa dead, but we stayed where we were, for there was no order to retire.' That was the story of the whole brigade, until the flanking movement of the Boers comiielied them to fall back. The most striking lesson of the engagement is the extreme bloodiness of modem warfare under some condi- tiojis, and its bloodiessness under others. Here, out of a total of something under a thousand casualties, seven BATTLE OF MAGER8F0NTEIN igs hundred were incurred ia about five minutes, and the whole day oj shell, machine-gun, and rifle fire only furnished the odd three hundred. So also at Lombard's Kop the British forces (White's column) were under heavy fire from 5.80 to H.30, and the loss again was somethmg under three hundred. With conservative generalship the losses of the battles of the future will be much less than those of the past, and as a consequence the battles themselves will last much longer, and it will be the most enduring rather than the most fiery which will win. The supply of food and water to the com- batants will become of extreme importance to keep them up during the prolonged trials of endurance, which will last for weeks rather than days. On the other hand, when a general's force is badly compromised, it will be so punished that a quick surrender wUl be the only alternative to annihilation. On the subject of the quarter-column formation which proved so fatal So us, it must be remembered that any other form of advance is hardly possible during a night attack, though at Tel-el-Kebir the exceptional curcnmstance of the march being over an open desert aUowed the troops to move for the last mile or two in a more extended formation. A line of battalion double- company columns is most difficult to preserve ui the darkness, and any confusion may lead to disaster. The whole mistake lay in a miscalculation of ,i few hundred yards in the position of the trenches. Had the regi- ments deployed five minutes earlier it is probable (though by no means certain) that the position would have been carried. The action was not without those examples of military virtue which soften a disaster, and hold out a brighter promise for the future. The Guards withdrew 4^:PWiJk IM THE GREAT BOEU WAB from the field as if on parade, with the Boer sbelli barsting over their ranks. Fine, too, ^ras the restraint of G Battery of Horse Artillery on the morning after the battle. An armistice was understood to exist, but the naval gun, in ignorance of it, opened on our extreme left. The Boers at once opened fire upon the Horse Artillery, vho, recognising the mistake, remained motion- less and unlimbered in a Une, with every horse, and gunner and driver in bis place, without taking any notice of the fire, which presently slackened and stopped as the enemy came to understand thu situation. It is worthy of remark that iu this battle the three field batteries engaged, ns well us G Battery, E.H.A., each iircd over 1,000 rounds and remained for 30 consecutive hours within 1,500 yards of the Boor position. But of all the corps who deserve praise, there was none more gallant than the brave surgeons and ambu- lance bearers, who encounter all of the dangers and enjoy none of the thrills of warfare. All day under fire these men worked and toiled among the wounded. Bccvor, Ensor, Douglas, Probjn— nil were equally de- voted. It is almost incredible, and yet it is true, tbat by ten o'clock on the morning after the battle, before the troops had returned to camp, no less than five hundred woahded were in the train and on their way to Cape Town. li^«n-^ if Vn.^.^ , CHAPTEU X IH» BATTLB OF BTOSUBEnO Some attempt has now been made to sketch thesucceasion of events which had ended in the inTeatment of Lady- smith in northern Natal, and also to show the fortunes of the force which on the western side of the seat of war attempted to advance to the relief of Kimberley. The distance between these forces may be expressed in terms familiar to the European reader by saying that it was that which separates Paris from Frankfort, or to the American by suggesting that Ladysmith was at Boston and that Methuen was trying to relieve Philadelphia. Waterless deserts and rugged mountain ranges divided the two scenes of action. In the case of the British there could be no connection between the two move- ments, but the Boers by a land journey of something over a hundred miles had a double choice of a route by which Cronje and Joubert might join hands, either by the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg-Laing's-Nek Railway or by the direct Une from Harrismith to Ladysmith' The possession of these internal lines should have been of enormous benefit to the Boers, enabling them to throw the weight of their forces unexpectedly from the one flank to the other. In a future chapter it will be recorded how the Army Corps arnvmg from England was largely diverted into Hiatal in order m the first instance to prevent the colony lefi 188 THE GREAT BOER WAS from being overrun, and in the noond to reaene the beleaguered garriaon. In the meantime it is neoeiiary to deal with the military operation! in the broad ipaoe betveen the eastern and western armies. After the declaration of war there waa a period of some weeks during which t'je position of the British over the whole of the northern part of Cape Colony was full of danger. Immense supplies had been gathered at De Aar which were at the mercy of a Free State raid, and the burghers, had they possessed a cavalry leader with the dash of a Stuart or a Sheridan, might have dealt a blow which would have cost ns a million pounds' worth of stores and dislocated the whole plan of campaign. However, the chance was allowed to pass, and when, on November Ist, the burghers at last in a leisurely fashion sauntered over the frontier, arrangements had been made by reinforcement and by concentration to guard the vital points. The objects of the British leaders, until the time for a general advance should come, were to hold the Orange Biver Bridge (which opened the way to Kimberley), to cover De Aar Junction, where the stores were, to protect at all costs the line of railway which led from Cape Town to Kimberley, and to hold on to as mnch as possible ni those other two lines of railway which led, the one through Colesberg and the other through StonuLicrg, into the Free State. The two bodies of invaflerc who entered the colony moved along the line of these two railways, the one crossing the Orange Biver at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie. They enlidted m> 168 THE OHEAT BOER WAR back before the Boer advance, he found himself early in December at Sterkstroom. whUe the Boers occupied the very strong position of Stormberg, some thirty mUes to the nor h of him. With the enemy so near him it^as thotwl" r.*" """"''' """^ *•"« °"»"«°* that he thought himself strong enough he did so. No doubt he had private information as to the dangerous hold which the Boers were getting upon the colonial Dnteh, and it .8 possible that while Buller and Methuen were attacking east and west they urged Gatecre to do something to hold he enemy in the centre. On the night of December 9th he advanced. 1,.^ "^^^^^ '^** *"* '*' *''°°* t° ^° «>. and oven the n°^,? ,!,.'^"' *PP'" *» ^"^^ "^^ the common property of the camp some days before the actual move. m ^ ?^™«^ =°"«9Pondent under the date December 7th details all that it is intended to do. It is to the »Mil™ ♦w^fu'"'" ■" """"• •>"' ^ their detriment as soldiers, that they seem throughout the campaign to ^Z'^Zl *^i"^'<''"""y httle power of dissiiulSion. Ihey did the obvious, and usually allowed it to be obvious what they were about to do. One thinks of Napoleon S^M *^'iu.°''"8a^* " "hroad that thVreal object of the expedition was Ireland, but breathed into ™, ^' ^ ,°° o"' *'"' ^'™'''*'' *hat in very truth it was bound for Genoa. The leading official at Toulon had no more idea where the fleet and army of France had gone than the humblest caulker in the yard How- ever, It IS not fair to eipect the subtlety of the Corsioan iT *\« ''°'""«''t Saxon, but it remains strange and deplorable that m a country fiUed with spies any one should have known in advance that a so-called ■ surprise ' was about to be attempted. The force with which General Gatacre advanced THE BATTLE OF STOEMBERO 1«3 consisted of the 2nd Northumberland FuBiliers, 960 Btrong, with one Maiim ; the 2nd Irish Eifles, 840 strong with one Maxim; 260 Cape Mounted Eifles, witii four light guns, and 260 Mounted Infantry. There were two batteries of Field Artillery, the 74th and 77th The total force was well under 3,000 men. It has been stated that of the two infantry battaUons engaged one had been out early upon a field day on the day of march and the other had been engaged in laborious fatigue work. About three in the afternoon the men were entramed m open trucks under a burning sun, and for some reason, at which the impetuous spirit of the General must have chafed, were kept waiting for three hours. At eight o'clock they detrained at Molteno, and thence after a short rest and a meal they started upon the night march which was intended to end at the break of day at the Boer trenches. One feels as if one were describmg the operations of Magersfontein once again, and the parallel continues to be painfully exact. It was nine o'clock and pit«h dark when the column moved out of Molteno and struck across the black gloom of the veldt, the wheels of the guns being wrapped in hide to deaden the rattle. It was known that the dis- tMce was not more than ten miles, and so when hour followed hour and the guides were stiU unable to say that they had reached their point it must have become perfectly evident that they had missed their way. The men were dog-tired, a long day's work had been followed by a long night's march, and they plodded along drowsily through the darkness. The ground was broken and irregular. The weary soldiers stumbled as they marched. Daylight came and revealed the column stiU looking for its objective, the fiery General walking m front and leading his horse behind him. It was 170 THE OKEAT BOEB WAR evident thai h>8 plans had miscarried, but his energetic and hardy temperameut would not permit him to turn back wthot.: a blow being struck. However '^LT'. commend his energy, one cannot but stand aghast at his dispositions. The country was wild and rod^ the very places for those tactics of the surprise and tte ambuscade in which the Boers excelled. And yet the column still plodded aimlessly on in its dense formation and if there ware any attempt at scouting ahead and on the flanks the result showed how in- effectively it was carried out. It was at a quarter past four in the dear light of a South African morning that a shot, and then another, and then a rolling crash of mnsketij, told thai we were to have one more rough lesson of the result of neglecting the usual precautions of warfare. High up on the face of a steep line of hill the Boer riflemen hiy hid, and from a short range their fire scourged our exposed flank. The men appear to have been chiefly coloiiial rebels, and not Boers^the backveldt, and to that happy chance it may be that the comparative harmlessness of their fire was due. Even now, m spite of the surprise, the situation might have been saved had the bewildered troops and theiTharried officers known exactly what to do. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it appears now that the only oonfte that could commend itself would be to extricate tiie troops from tjieir powtion, and then, if thought feasiUe to plan an attack. Instead of this a rush was made at the hiUside, and the infantry made their way some distance up it only to find that there were positive ledges m front of them which could not be climbed. The advance was at a dead stop, and the men lay down under the boulders for cover from the hot fire which came from inaccessible marksmen above them. Mean- THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG 171 while the artillery had open-Kl behind them, and their fire (not for the first time in this campaign) was more deadly to their friends than to their foes. At least one prominent o£Scer fell among hig men, torn by British shrapnel bullets. lalana Hill and Modder Biver have shorn also, though perhaps in a less tragic degree, that what with the long rRnge of modern artillery fire, and what with the difficulty of locating infantry who are nsing smokeless powder, it is necessary that officers commanding batteries should be provided with the coolest heads and the most powerful glasses of any men in the service, for a responsibility which will become more and more terrific rests upon their judgment. The question now, since the assault had failed, was how to extricate the men from their position. Many withdrew down the hill, running the gauntlet of the enemy's fire as they emerged from the boulders on to the open ground, while others clung to their positions, some from a soldierly hope that victory might finally incline to them, others because it was clearly safer to lie among the rocks than to cross the bullet-swept spaces beyond. Those portions of the force who extricated themselves do not appear to have realised how many of their comrades had remained behind, and so as the gap gradually increased between the men who were stationary and the men who fell back all hope of the two bodies reuniting became impossible. All the infantry who remained upon the hillside were captured. The rest rallied at a point fifteen hundred yards from the scene of the surprise, and began an orderly retreat to Molteno. In the meanwhile three powerful Boer guns upon the ridge had opened fire with great accuracy, but fortunately with defective shells. Had the enemy's contractors been as trustworthy as their gunners in 173 THE GREAT BOEB WAR this campaign, our losses would have been very much heavier, and it is possible that here we catch a glimpse of some consequences of that corruption which was one of the curses of the country. The guns were moved with great smartness along the ridge, and opened fire again and again, but never with great result. Our own batteries, the 74th and 77th, with our handful of mounted men, worked hard in covering the retreat and holding back the enemy's pursuit. It is a sad subject to discuss, but it is the one mstanoe in a campaign containing many reverses which amounts to demor^Usation among the troops engaged The Guards marching with the steadiness of Hyde Park off the field of Magersfontein, or the men of Nicholson's IJek chafing because they were not led in a last hopeless charge, are, even in defeat, object leusons of military virtue. But here fatigue and sleepledsnesn had taken all fire and spirit out of the men. They dropper', asleep by the roadside and had to be prodded up oy their exhausted officers. Many were taken prisouors in their slumber by the enemy who gleaned behind them. Units broke mto smaU straggling bodies, and it was a sorry and bedraggled force which about ten o'clock came wandering into Molteno. The place of honour in the rear was kept throughout by the Irish Kifles, who preserved some military formation to the end. Our losses m killed and wounded were not severe— miUtary honour would have been less sore had they been more so. Twenty-six killed, sixty-eight wounded --that IB all. But between the men on the hillside and the somnambulists of the column, six hundred, about equally .ided between the Irish Eifles and the Noriiumberland Fusiliers, had been left as prisoners. Two guns, too, had been lost in the hurried retreat TIIE BATTLE OF STORMDERO 173 It is not for the historian — especially for a civilian historian— to say a word unnecessarily to aggravate the pain of that brave man who, having done all that personal courage could do, was seen afterwards sobbing on the table of the waiting-room at Molteno, and bewailing his 'poor men.' He had a disaster, but Nelson had one at Tenerilfe and Napoleon at Asre, and built their great reputations in spite of it. But the one good thing of a disaster is that by examining it we may learn to do better in the future, and so it would indeed be a perilous thing if we agreed that our reverses were not a fit subject for open and frank discussion. It is not to the detriment of an enterprise that it should be daring and call for considerable physical effort on the part of those who are engaged in it. On the contrary, the conception of such plans is one of the signs of a great military mind. But in the arranging of the details the same military mind should assiduously occupy itself in foreseeing and preventing every unneces- sary thing which may make the execution of such a plan more difficult. The idea of a swift sudden attack upon Stormberg was excellent— the details of the operation are continually open to criticism. Passing over the fact— the root, probably, of all tha trouble— that the plan was known in the camp at least two days before it was carried out, what can one say about the work to which the troops were subjected before starting on their tiring expedition ? When the column had traversed a longer distance than that between Molteno and the place to be attacked, was it not time ta halt and reconsider the whole position? When daylight found the column wandering in an enemy's country, was it not advisable to advance in open order with flanking scouts? Could not the attack be guided into some 174 THE GREAT BOEK WAR direction which was not inaccessible? There were troon. the Boyal Scots, in Molteno. Could they norhfJ:^' eft on the line of retreat so as to formTrit" ^ in case of a mishap 1 These are a few of th.V ^ which suggest themselves to the mind S the" W censorious of observers. '**•' How far the Boers suffered at Stormbere is nnknn»„ ?onbttb"- *'*" '^°"' ^ »''" '-tancen'o r'son to ^ght At no time was any body of them exposed to oS fl e whUe we, as usual, fought in the o^n. TlZ of thenr shootmg and want of energy in pursuit makf the defeat the more galling. On thYother h^d,S guns were served with skiU and audacity. They co^ TL°l '""^T"^"' from Bethulie, BouxvE Z Smithfleld, under the orders of Olivier with %),?„ colonjals whom they had seduced from tLdr I^ l^ialt . This defeat of General Gata^re's, occurring mhZ m a disaffected district and one of weat Zul ■ ' portance might have produced ^e w^s 'c:n:eXr Fortunately no very evil result foUowed. No doubTth." recruitmg of rebels was helped, bu. there w^no f"d movement and Molteno remained in our hands T„^ meanwhile Gatacre's force was reinfeed by , JJh battery, the 79th. and by a strong regiment, toe Derbl h^BVii'"' T ''"' '"' ^oy-'J Scorand'the S; nnta 1 ♦•'"%''' ""^ '''""S «''°»8h to hold hTo^ nn U the tmie for a general advance should come. Z m T^"^ '^"'™'' "' »' '»•« Modder ntev the CHAPTER XI BilTLB OT OOLKNBO upon the British forces in South Africa. The dark Cronje lurking behind his trendies and his barbed £ entanglements, barred Methuen's road to SrW whi]« m the northern part of Cape Colony GaS weaned troops had been defeated a^ drive/ by at-ce whid. consisted largely of British subjects. But to! pubhc at home steeled their hearts and fiied their eves ilLT^LT '"'^LI''''' ""^ ^'^ senior G^nt^L and there the main body of their troops. As brigade after brigade and battery after battery touchefal Cape Town, and were sent on instantly to Durb^ it was effort was to be made, and that there the Hght might at last break. In club, and dining room, and'rail^y ca -wherever men met and talked-the same words might be heard: ' Wait untU Buller moves.' ThehZ of a great empire lay in the phrase. "« "0P«s h^!.\T !T f"'""*' ^^ """ Sir George White had t^eLljv" '""'' ^^ Ladysmith. On November 2nd telegraphic communication with the town was intsr rupted. On November 3rd the railway ii^rwar c„t On November 10th the Boers held Colen'so and the Un^of the Tuge^a. On the 14th was the affair of the armoured tram. On the 18th the enemy were near Eit 176 178 THE GREAT BOEH WAR Chi the aiBt they had reached the Mooj River On th. 23rd Hi dyard attacked them at WiUow Grange S theee action. wiU be treated elsewhere. ThisTat one mark, the turn of the ti le. From then onward. Sir RedversBuJler wa. maB.ug hi. troop, at S'ta Srr"",'" ".r"! "^°'' '" "°» the river T/ S relieve Ladyemith. the g„n, of which, calling from behind the line of northern hill,, told theboLeZ tale of resUes. attack and .tubbom defence But the task was a. severe a one as the most floht LaKmed""'? "' r °" ""« -i™ "de t^^ banks formed a long slope which could bo shaved as with a ra.or by the rifle fire of the enemy. How to uJTTr "" 'r' •""° ^o"" *" indeed a ^ro? blem It was one of many occasions in this war in which one wondered why. if a bullet-proof shieW cZbTe of sheltering a lying man could be constructed a C with a'slf^^T";;*- ^'--'--hes of S.;.^: with a safe rest after each rush would save^e have 'been don:r';i^'i; te't et t^ Iht "■'«" ground had to be passed, Ld the'thercamfto-'n:* the enemy, but a broad and deen river ^7h ■ ? hnd^. probably undermined' S^a"5eL? XS was found not to exist in practice. Beyond the rim oy tne next, and so, one behind the other, like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills and hollj. rolled Battle of oo- bnso i,, uie open. AU defence vaa from undei cover if . mobility who .igTattack hU CkVi ^^'17^ enabl^ hi. to attenapt^ra: tltg ^vLTn ''£ advantage he had, the Dcssps.mn „» ""^e^nent. One that purpose at da,break°r p::L:;,s:::ts '"'• m THK onEAT BOfiR WAlt brig»dei : the 2nd ard'«) coniiniing of the 3nd Devom, the 2nd Queen'i or We«t Surrey, the 2nd West Yorkihire, and the 2nd Eaat Surrey ; the 4th Brigade (Lyttelton'e) comprising the 2nd Cameroniane, the 8rd Rifles, the lat Durhame, and the 1st Rifle Brigade ; the 6th Brigade (Hart's) with the 1st InniskiUing Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Bangers, 2nd Dubhn Fusiliers, and the Border Regiment, this last taking the place of the 2nd Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre. There remained the 6th Brigade (Barton's), which included the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the 1st Welsh Fusiliers, and the 2nd Irish Fusiliers— in all about 16,000 infantry. The mounted men, who were commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the 18th Hussars, the Ist Royals, Bethune'e Mounted Infantry, Tborneycroft's Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of South African Horse, with a composite regiment formed from the mounted infantry of the Rifles and of the Dublin FusiUers with squadrons of the Natal Carabineers and the Imperial Light Horse. These irregular troops of horse might be criticised by martinets and pedants, but they contained some of the finest fighting material of the army, some urged on by personal hatred of the Boers and some by mere lust of adventure. As an eiample.of the latter one squadron of the South African Horse was composed almost entirely of Texan muleteers, who, hiiiing come over with their animals, had been drawn by their own gallant spirit into the fighting line of their kinsmen. Cavalry was General Bailer's weakest arm, but his artiUery was strong both in its qualjty and its number of guns. There were five batteries (30 guns) of the Field ArtUlery, the 7th, 14th, 68rd, 64th, and 66th. Besides these there were no less than sixteen naval guns from BATTLE OF COI.KNSO 179 ?-f ;?• ' Tr"''" *-'»"'«•" 0' "Woh were 12-pounder., •nd tho other two of the 47 type which had done .uch good jerviee both at Ladysmith and with Methuen. Tho whole force which moved out from Chievcley Camp numbered about 21,000 men. The work which wai allotted to the army was simple to conception, however terrible it might prove in exeou- lion. There were two point, at which the river might tL«T ' ?• **"■** '"'''" °" °» ^^^ >ef*. naraed Bridle Drift the other straight ahead at the Bridge of Colen«). The 6th or Irish Brigade was to endeavour to cross at Bndle Drift, and ther to work down tho river bank on the far side so as to support the 2nd or English Brigade, which was to cross at Colenso. Tho 4th Brigade was to advance between these, so as to help either which should be in difficulties. Meanwhile on the extreme right the mounted troops under Dundonald were to cover the flank and to attack HIangwane Hill, a formidable position held strongly by the enemy upon the south bank of the Tuge.a. The remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was to support this movement on the right. The gnns were to cover the various attacks, and if possible gain a position from which the trenches might be enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the British army. In the bright clear morning sunshine, under a cloudless blue sky, they advanced with high hopes to the assault. Before them lay the long level ™ iT "^* °^ f' "■"*■■• ""d beyond, silent and serene, hke some peaceful dream landscape, stretched the hnes and Imes of gently curving hiUs. It was just five o clock m the mornmg when the naval guns began to bay and huge red dustclouds from the distant foothiUa showed where the lyddite was bursting. No answer came back, nor was there any movement upon the X 2 I I 180 THE GREAT BOER WAR sunlit hiUs. It wag almost brutal, thia furious violenc* to so gentie and unresponsive a countryside. In no plMe could the keenest eye detect a sign of guns or men and yet death lurked in every hollow and crouched by every rock. ' It is so difficult to make a modem battle intelligible when fought, af this was, over a front of seven or eight miloB, that It IS best perhaps to take the doings of each ^lumn in turn, beginning with the left flank, where Harts Irish Brigade had advanced to the assault of iindle Drift. Ujder an unanswered and therefore an unaimed hre from the heavy guns the Irish infantry moved forward upon the points which they had been ordered to attack The Dublins led, then the Connaughts, the Inniskimngs, and the Borderers. Incredible as It may appear after the recent experiences of Macers- fontem and of Stormberg, the men in the two rear regiments appear to have been advanced in quarter column, and not to have deployed untU after the enemy s fire had opened. Had shrapnel struck this close formation, as it was within an ace of doing, the loss of hfe must have been as severe as it was unieces- sary. On appl-oaching the Drift-the position or even the existence of which does not seem to have been very clearly defined-it was found that the troops had to advance mto a loop formed by the river, so that they were exposed to a very heavy cross-fire upon their right flank, while they were rained on by shrapnel from in front. No sign of the enemy could be seen, though the men were dropping fast. It is a weird and eoul-shakina experience to advance over a sunht tnd apparently a Jonely countryside, with no sUghtest movement upon its BATTLE OF COLENSO igj broad face, while the path which you take is marked behind you by sobbmg, gasping, writhing men, who can only guess by the position of their wounds whence the shots came which struck them down. All round, like the «Tl, ^i V^' P*°' " ^^ '"""otonous crackle and rattle of the Mausers ; but the air is full of it, and no one can define exactly whence it comes. Far away on some hJl upon the skyline there hangs the least gLy veU of thin smoke to indicate whence the six men who havejustaUfrilen together, as if it were some grim drUl, met their death. And somewhere else, np yonder among he boulders, there rises a horrible quacUng, a dreadful monotonous hyena laugh, which comes from the worst gun of all, the malignant one-pounder Maxim, the hateful 'Pom-pom.' Into such a hell-storm as this it was that the soldiers have again and again advanced in he course of this war, but it may be questioned whether they wUl not prove to be among the last of mortals to be asked to endure such an ordeal. Other methods of attack must be found or attacks must be abandoned, for smokeless powder, quick-firing guns, and modern rifles make it all odds on the defence ! The gaUant Irishmen pushed on, flushed with battle and careless for their losses, the four regiments clubbed into one, with all military organisation rapidly dis- appearing, and nothing left but their gaUant spirit and their furious desire to come to hand-grips with the enemy EoUmg on in a broad wave of shouting angry men they never winced from the fire until they had swept up to the bank of the river. Northern Inniskil- hng and bouthorn man of Connaught. orange and green, Protestant and Catholic, Celt and Saxon, their only rivalry new was who could shed his blood most fceejy for the common cause. How hateful seem those 183 THE GREAT £0£B WAH provinoial politics and narrow sectarian oreeds vhieh can hold such men apart ! The bank of the rirer had been gained, bnt where was the ford 1 The water swept broad and onrnffled in front of them, with no indication of shallows, h. few dashing fellows sprang in, but their cartridges and rifles dragged them to the bottom. One or two may even have strnggled through to the further side, but on this there is a conflict of evidence. It may be, though it seems incredible, that the river had been partly dammed to deepen the Drift, or, as is more probable, that in the rapid advance and attack the position of the Drift was lost. However this may be, the troops could find no ford, and they lay down, as had been done in so many previous actions, unwilling to retreat and nnable to advance, with the same merciless pelting from front and flank. The naval guns had silenced the Boer artillery, but who could silence the unseen riflemen ? In every fold and behind every anthill the Irishmen lay thick and waited for better times. There are many instances of their cheery and uncomplaining hnmonr. Colonel Brooke, of the Connaughts, fell at the head of his men. Private Livingstone helped to carry him into safety, and then, his task done, he confessed to having ' a bit of a rap meself,' and sank fainting with a bullet through his throat. Another sat with a bullet through both legs. • Bring me a tin whistle and I'll blow ye any tune ye like,' he cried, mindful of the Dargai piper. Another with his arm hanging by a tendon puffed morosely at his short black pipe. Every now and then, in face of the impossible, the fiery Celtic valour flamed furiously upwards. ' Fiz bayonets, men, and let us make a name for ourselves,' cried a colour sergeant, and he never spoke again. For five hours, under the tropical sun, the BATTLE OF CX)LENSO 18S grimy parched men held on to the ground they had occupied. British shells pitched short and fell among them. A regiment in support fired at them, not know- ing that any of the line were so far advanced. Shot at from the front, the flank, and the rear, the 6th Brigade held grimly on. But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain that had they not reached them the regiments would have been uselessly destroyed where they lay. It seems to have been BuUer himself, who showed extraordinary and ubiquitous personal energy during the day, that ordered them to fall back. As they retreated there was an entire absence of haste and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and Genera) Hart— whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool courage was beyond praise— had hard work to reform the splendid brigade which six hours ago had tramped out of Chieveley Camp. Between five and six hundred of them had fallen— a loss which approximates to that of the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein. The Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest sufierers. So much for the mishap of the 6th Brigade. It is superfluous to point out that the same old omissions were responsible for the same old results. Why were the men in quarter column when advancing agatast an unseen foe ? Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position of the ford ? Where were the clouds of skirmishers which should precede such an advance? The recent examples in the field and the teachings oi tue text-books were equally set at naught, as they had been, and were to be, so often in this campaign. There may be a science of war in the lecture rooms at Camberley, but very little of it found H i m^ 184 THE asEAT BOER WAR "a way to the veldt Th« .i„ • Pnvate, the careless dash of ih«^? ^*'°« »' ""> these were onr military „sets ti ''f^'^^ "fficer- foresight of onr commas jn" fr^" ""« »"'» ">ake such comments, but L ' " '''*°"''™ '•^k *» war has been that the a^L' • T ^"" '«'"'°'> «' the fato the hands of I caste ^Vtha^:""' " ''^« «» '"^ for every man to sneak W. ■ " " " "'''"■"J duty ''elieves to be the trTh '"'"^ ""'' ^'^^'^ "hat he - c're "a! ^:::^: fStr-'^ ,»' '^-^ eth Bn-^ade I-yttelton's Briars ° ''«^' "P°° 'l"* 4th, or "-'f but to sfpSrt the\rr"""'''1"°' '"""-k With the help cfih.nl , °° ^'^^^^ side of it extricateanZo^^rte ret t^h'T'^t''"" " ^"^^ *« play no very important 3'° th! ^"'*'°»' ''"titcoald wereinsignifica^V OnitsrTltV^ tZ' *"'' "' '"""o" Brigade had developed t»ff/ t ° ^'^yard's Enghsh bridge. llerS2slde^t-,"r°/°'*"''' ""^ the 2°d West Surrey, The zTn! "^^f "^ " '^"'^ '^^'^ the was doing so we^ with fh^ r 7 ^'^""^ ^'* "^'t^J^on Surreys, and the West Cth?'"'"V°"«^' *''« ^^t evidently anticipated the J^^'^ri ^^^ *°«"'y bad and not only weretir tr *"*"'' °» *bis position exceptionall/strr but tl'^ Vr" ""« "^C d"' 'be bridge, ^at Teaft a dotn "^'^ ?°--^rgoi upon number of quick firL k ? ^""^ P'"«8, besides a andtheQuelTmoprio^dTlTi'- '''"-'^-- dots, blending so admLuy j"hl?'f '^^^''''''W were hardly visible when hey haled, "ITI^"' '^'^ being supported bv the vl t o ^' ^^ 'be attack. Yorkshires!' AdvaXing^S a ""T h"' ^'^ ^-' brigade experienced much the » ^ ^^"^ ^« 'be ^•1' BATTLE OF COLENSO igj fact that from the first they preserved their open order r„/JiTf.' °' haW-companies extended to sUp^e" WUhafn? /' "•'f r ■" ^""^ *° the Irishmen With a loss of some two hundred men the leading reri me^ts succeeded in reaching Colenso, and the'wert Burrey, advancing by rushes of fifty yards at a tim« ii~d'f '*h "".•(.'^ *'« ^'*'^°" wK eata troTh' occurred to the artJlery which was supporting it which rendered all further advance impossible How far the undecided. For the reason of this we must follow the fortunes of the next unit upon their right. This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told off to support the mahi attack U comprised two field batteries, the 14th .^d the 66tS under the command of Colonel Long, and sk S OgJvy of the Terrible.' Long has the record of being ih^t^°'"' ?n ''"*'"8 °^''''- ^'^''^ handling of mucK f.'ll '''^ "' ""^ •"""« °f "■« Atbara had tW trh« '"°''*"'°'**'* '""°"- Unfortunately! tnese barbarum campaigns, in which liberties may be F«nnbT 'rT'y- '«»-« an evil tradition, ^^he French have found with their Algerians. Our own close formations, our adherence to volley firing and i^ hS instance the use of our artillery all seem to be iLcfe ofour savage wars. Be the cause what it may Tan ™ ^ f'-S^ ,1 *^.«f «°° Long's guns whirled foiw^ds outstripped the mfantrj brigades upon their flanks,Tef; them and unhmbered within seven hundred-some sav five bupdred-yards pf the enemy's trenches From IM THE GKEAT BOBa WAB this position he opened fire upon Fort WvUe «hJ-.K the^centre of that portion oHhe tL^^S".^ burnish th^S'rai':^ S'i n """" *- gunners, and Zwor^felrjtS •"' "".^ working of the guns were »11 .= *"° '*■« ^yng and Okehampton. Not onlv Z tf "'ethodioal as at fire, parOy from theSstaVon? ^'^"V'^^^ "«« village of Colenso u^n t"ei^^°,:^ ^^'^^h ' %°V'"' automatic quick-firerVfonn7*K ' ''"* *•■* ^oer the little aheUs werreiVa^;"^"* •" " "'"'y' ''°'' over the batter 'es AW^^ """^^S continually dead around it b„t^1^^^'''''y 6"° J""l its Wter of groupXlil'offi erTand'sw^f "T"^ '^ «» "^ Poor Long was d^wrZ a bleul Tv' «"'^«"- another through his livT ^Ahin k"^*" ^ a™and don't abandon guns,' was his W " ' ^^'^ ' ^^ him into the shXr ofllittk f "'l "' ^^^' "^™«g«'' Goldie dropped dead So L?'?*^"'''^- ^^P"^ Colonel Hun'f feluS in two plact^'oTJ '""r"^^- were falling fast Ths ^,7 ,? Oncers and men yettheyeo^uld1;tb?rol:tX':CS\*"^ up teams from the shelter where thT^bf fC e^TJ H, BATTLE OF OOLENSO 187 in the death of the horaei. The Burvivorg took refuge from the murderous fire in that small hollow to whioh Long had been carried, a hundred yards or so from the line of bnllet-splaahed cannon. One gun on the right wae still served by four men who refused to leave it. They seemed to bear charmed lives, these four, as they strained and wrestled with their beloved 16-pounder, amid the spurting sand and the blue wreaths of the bursting shells. Then one gasped and fell against the trail, and his comrade sank beside the wheel with hig chin upon his breast. The third threw up his hands and pitched forward upon his face ; while the survivor, a grim powder-stained figure, stood at attention looking death in the eyes until he too was struck down. A useless sacrifice, you may say ; but while the men who saw them die can tell such a story round the camp fire the example of such deaths as these does more than clang of bugle or roll of drum to stir the warrior spirit of our race. For two hours the Uttle knot of heart-sick humiliated officers and men lay in the precarious shelter of the donga and looked out at the bullet-swept plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them were wounded. Their chief lay among them, still calling out in his delirium for his guns. They had been joined by the gallant Baptie, a brave surgeon, who rode across to the donga amid a murderous fire, and did what he could for the injured men. Now and then a rush was made into the open, sometimes in the hope of firing another round, sometimes to bring a wounded comrade in from the pitiless pelt of the bullets. How fearful was that lead-storm may be gathered from the fact that one gunner was found with sixty-four wounds in his body. Several men dropped in these sorties, and the 188 THE GREAT BOEB WAS Ji J«rf ned mvi.or. ..tiled down one. n.o«, in th. The hope to which they clanit wu that th.!, ™ were not reaUy loet, but that Sfe '"riviT o inf^' would enable them to work then, on" more?' ^S urivers were. This was some distance behind tv.,t iu mfemalfire, and each team eucceeded in Retti^fb.^ "th a gun: But the Iobb was fearTul £bZ ^J lite. My first bullet went throuoh mv left »lo/™ j made the joint of my elbow bleed, next a id T. wk caught me sma^k on the right ar^.Ten" 4°',!"!^^ Ztl^^r "«1''8 °°'' '''*° »y horse another^d that settled UB.' The gallant fellow managed to crawUo the groupof castaways in the donga. Bo'ber 7^^^ BATTLE OF C0LEN80 IW on being left where he fell, for fear he should hamper the othera. In the meanwhile Captain Heed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with two spare teams of horses, and another determined eCort was made under his leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too murderous. Two-thirds of his horses and half his men, including himself, were struck down, and General BuUer com- manded that all further attempts to reach the abandoned batteries should be given up. Both he and General Clery had been slightly wounded, and there were many operations over the whole field of action to engage their attention. But making every allowance for the pressure of many duties and for the confusion and turmoil of a great action, it does seem one of the most inexplicable incidents in British military history that the guns should ever have been permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy. It is evident that if our gunners could not live under the fire of the enemy it would be equally impossible for the enemy to remove the guns under a fire from a couple of battalions of our infantry. There were many regiments which had hardly been engaged, and which could have been advanced for such a purpose. The men of the Mounted Infantry actually volunteered for this work, and none could have been more capable of carrying it out. There was plenty of time also, for the guns were abandoned about eleven and the Boers did not venture to seize them until four. Not only could the guns have been saved, but they might, one would think, have been transformed into an excellent bait for a trap to tempt the Boers out of their trenches. It must have been with fear and trembling that they first approached them, for how could they believe that such mcredible good fortune had come to them ? However IW fBX GREAT BOER WAR !J;' 1 DeToni, with their Colon.1 .nr«, • ■ ''»°^'"' <>' for th«L r^t.. Z i.^'w'"""."'''^ *" forthcoming LyttelCrBri^'ae''^ .upZ' V n^;'"'..^*' "" attacked Colenw and^of tl^?' u ^t'''^"'^* "hioh river, wffile Bartot^'BriS^Tto tV""?. °'.''' rather a. 1 -.il^lhrasTrnu'TZ' not more than a thoueand men in al7^. ^ ^^^ and the position which W h™ i^ ^■'^*8"'*"' entrenched, with barbed wT™ i? f P^^'PitoM^nd matiognns But the lu.! *°'»"8'™»t'> "nd aato- first aSL/and i C" ™ °'"'^'' T' '""''"^''^^ home. Leaving their hoZsr^*/"'^*"^ »'"' «tt~k a half on loot before Th^^ clm^ X »^'=*<^ » "^^ ""'J hidden riflemen, and le^ed^^ !. ""^ ff «« "^ ^e taught to their 'comradeTS S ng ^ S'thA' """ that the more ^^^^ffT^.^J^^^^Z^u'^ PI ' BATTLK OF C0LEN80 in repulse. The irregulori carried tbemBelvcs liku old ■oldiera, they did all that mortal man could do, and they retired coolly and slowly with the loss o( 180 r' the brave troopers. The 7th Field Battery did all that \.m possible to support the advance and cover the retirement. In no single place, on this day of disaster, did one least gleam of success come to warm the hearts and reward the exertions of onr much-enduring men. Of Barton's Brigade there is nothing to be recorded, for they appear neither to have supported the attack upon Hlangvane Hill on the one side nor to have helped to cover the ill-fated ; on the other. If General BuUer's real idea was a reconnaissance in force in order to determine the position and strength of the Boer lines, then of course his brigadiers must have felt a reluctance to entangle their brigades in a battle which was reaUy the result of a misunderstanding. On the other hand, if, as the orders of the day seem to show, a serious engagement was always intended, it is strange that two brigades out of four should have played so insignificant a part. To Barton's Brigade was given the responsibility of seeing that no right flank attack was carried out by the Boers, and this held it back until it was clear that no such attack was contemplated. After that one would have thought that, had the situation been appreciated, at least two battalions might have been spared to cover the abandoned guns with their rifle fire. A few of the Scots Fusiliers did find thtiir way up to the guns and were taken in the donga with the others, but the brigade as a whole, together with the 1st Boyals and the 18th Hussars, might as well have been at Aldershot for any bearing which their work had upon the fortunes of the day. And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith T^^mEST IM »»« ORKAT flOES WAR ^0 to an Md. At twelve o'clock all th. » «>• ground wer. r^treatina for ^I „ "" ''^P^ "POn nothing in the .hap. of roat or „ • "?P- '^'■>"» »•• »" •• orderly a.Te Jd"l°.'*u '!' '?'' ""> ""Wrawal miMUig, and had oained .^h!;! °,"^< wounded, and noteve„the«ti.facrn1,tJ:^J,^JVf''^«' ^""•^ ». well a. endured punXent fof i ' "* ""' '"«•»»«' throughout the day »1":,'" '''*' *°*°"y "Gained doubtful whether BoTeh^'T''*^''^ *'"" '' » occurred in their rank. On^ ' ^?"^'^ «"n«J«e. we^ an arm is artillery agS^tr' '" """"■ ''<"' •helter. ' "**"" M enemy who liei in onrJKrhtjXrSd!:; ' ^'' "-'-«- '<• ttan .hell fire whichTeffllve S " 'm'"' '''"•"'er kUled and about 720 woaJ^ a ^''^^^^ '» ^ad 180 « *l.e 250 or .o who ;rmtint ""th '"""^"''^ ''«'» Banner., the Devon, and thl l^* V"^ '"*° "e^the ••ken in the do„« to^tttr • !! ^"'"""- '^o were tt.6Comaaught.."th*:DlhL anTotr"" "^^ '-- having found .ome .helter ™» vf "Pment. who. «W.on untU the Semrrof^^h'- "^ 'V^^^ '*• <^i them in a hopele.. po.iti"n L° "■;!!: '^S*""™'" Wt of men ,ere allowS to r;tir?rl"'''^ """^ ^°f Boer., who .eemed by no meane ^n,^ ?'?^« ^^ 'he number of their prisoner, T "'^""" *» ^^eaM the Inm.killingF„si,~ 'dhiSriirr™^^ "' ''« men eurrounded by the enemT^f '""'°'''"' <" hi. humour and hi. own tLrhe ^' 'l?'"'? '° "^«^ «<^ them in .afety. The lowe. ZiT^'^ '° withdrawing ffildyard'. Brimde anrfT ''V.'*''^°° Harfg Brigade off the honourfo^^hTfigM '"'"'^ "'"''■ "»• '^o^ In hi. Official report General Bulleretate. that w«e ■: in BATTLB OF COLENSO IM d^ter to th. .rtUlery h, thought that thTbatUe ought hare been a inoceMdU one. Thi. ii » hard •aym^ and throw, perhap. too much responaibiUty upon me gaUant but unfortunate gunner. There have been occaiioM in the war when greater daih upon the part of Ti 'j;^^'',"^?' ^"' '^"^'^ ^' '»'* "' the daVTand Uk.„ •? ^^.*? ^^ '*^"' "P"" 'he man who ha. taken a r.ek and f«led. The whole operaUon. with it. advance over the open again.t a concealed enemy with a mer m hu. front wa. k> abwiutely desperate that Long he „tuat.on To bring gun. into action in front of the nfantry without having clearly defined the portion of the oppoeing infantry mu.t alway. remain ine of the mo.t haxardou. venture, of war. 'It would cerfJnlv to withm 600 or 800 yard, of a po«Uon held by uifantry nnlcM the latter were under thVflre of infantry from an even .horter range." Thi. -mere foUy i. eiacUy what Colonel Long did. but it mu.t le [rr .w'!!. *i'«n"»«o''- 'hat he .hared with other. nU Lr that £" w" ''''* "P "" '»'« ''"'''• »=^'» h*d no S mLT .'""', "-^n^he. were down at the mer. With the imperfect m.ans at his disposal he i^Ju'^ "^i^f^g a. he could, and if his firrTand impetuous spmt ed him into a position which has cost bim so dearly it is certainly more easy for the critic to Llow^ f. \''f """ *•'»* '"bsequent one which ^r.f v"^"""'' Bans to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any evidence that the loss of orTt fhZ :^ '*"°""'y ''^^'" "■« '"'« °f 'he action. had the full and unceasing support of the artillery THE GREAT BOEH WAB IH the jBult was aot more favourable than at the ^.irftsrhaSZaT^^-lS baen taught ns before. But this time th?l. .earned. Not again eboul/lSellCltS IXZ the ground which had been prepared by om en!^ Kot again should we in cold blood'^mllXl aS npon strong positions. Not again should ?o^pr-n close formation come under the Boer rifles wfh^ taken long to learn and had paid dear fo 'our^Lof but now we had mastered it at last. In thTs darkest hour was born the knowledge which was to tad tt I CHAPTER Xn IBE DABE HOCB Thb week which extended from December 10th to December 17th, 1899, was the blackest one known during our generation, and the most disastrous for Brituh arms during the century. We had in the short space of seven days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three sepa- rate actions. No single defeat was of vital importance in itself, but the cumulative effect, occurring as they did to each of the main British forces h South Africa, was very great. The total loss amounted to about three thousand men and twelve guns, while the indirect effects in the way of loss of prestige to ourselves and increased confidence and more numerous recruits to our enemy were incalculable. It ia singular to glance at the extracts from the European press at that time and to observe the delight and foolish exultation with which our reverses were received. That this should occur in the French journals is not unnatural, since our history has been largely a contest with that Power, and we can regard with complacency an enmity which is the tribute to our success. Russia, too, as the least progressive of European States, has a natural antagonism of thought, if not of interests, to the Power which stands most prominently for individual freedom and liberal institu- tions. The same poor excuse may be made for the 105 o2 I') !M 196 THE GREAT BOER WAR ' organs of the Vatican. But what are we to say of tho msenjate railing of Germany, a courtry who^^u' t f„ IL /\ * r '"^^^ ? In the d of Marlb<^lh m the darkest hours of Frederick th. .reat, in the 2at world struggk of Napoleon, we have been he brotK S?™« °f *•■*"* ^P^'- So with the Au8tri~^ If both these countries were not finally swept fTom the n.ap by Napoleon, it ,. largely to &itish X^e and British tenacity that they owe it. And yet theL are the folk who turned most bitterly against u'T a tthl only time m modern history when we had a chance of distinguishmg our friends from our foes. NeverTgli^ I trus^ on any pretext will a British guinelle ,S or a British soldier or sailor shed his mZ for Tuch allies. The political lesson of this war haTbeen fW aTdlra,r'^, r*'^^^ ^'^^^ wUhin^h? m?e and et all outside it, save only our kinsmen of America, go their own way and m'eet theb own fate Tnd tb / "' ^'^T'^ ^""" "'• « " ami to ftoJkfrlrwt ^'°'"'='""' '""^^ «»<^«st;nd^he stock from which they are themselves sprung so little ml-nT ♦hT" "". '^' '^'^ ^'>'^ Herafd^shoiid imagme that our defeat at Colenso was a g-^d opportunity for us to terminate the war. The oZt leading American journals, however, took a more sane view of the situation, and reaUsed that ten years of such oftr'^e-srees?' '"' ''' ^^ ^"^^ of ourLo.u^r .nr^!!,'?**^"'"'' ^^^^ """^ ^ the empire at lajge our misfortunes were met by a sombre buf unalterab!e determination to carry the war to a successful conclusYon and to spare no sacrifices which could lead to that end Amid the humihation of our reverses there was a certahi undercurrent of satisfaction that the deeds of our foem^n !# THE DARK HOUR 19? should at least have made the contention that the strong was wantonly attacking the weak an absurd one. Under the stimulas of defeat the opposition to the war sensibly decreased. It had become too absurd even for the most unreasonable platform orator to contend that a struggle had been forced upon the Boers when every fresh detnil showed how thoroughly they had prepared for sue a contingency and how much we had to make up. Many who had opposed the war simply on that sporting instinct which backs the smaller against the larger began to realise that what with the geographical position of these people, what with the nature of their country, and what with the mobility, number, and hardihood of their forces, we had undertaken a task which would necessitate such a military effort as we had never before been called upon to make. When Kipling at the dawn of the war had sung of 'fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay,' the statement had seemed extreme. Now it was growing upon the pnb"y mind that four times this number would not be an excessive estimate. But the nation rose grandly to the effort. Their only fear, often and loudly expressed, was that Parliament would deal too tamely with the situa- tion and fail to demand snfiScient sacrifices. Buch was the wave of feeling over the country that it was im- possible to hold a peace meeting anywhere without a certainty of riot. The only London daily which had opposed the war, though very ably edited, was overborne by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line. In the provinces also opposition was almost si- lent, and the great colonies were even more unanimous than the mother country. Misfortune had solidified us where success might have caused a sentimental opposi- tion. 198 TIIE OnEAT BOEB WAlt teaSefVT',^^-:T^'^^ ""^ °f 'te nation wm 1. That aa General Bailer's hands were fnll in w * i the supervision and direction „, "'/'f /""» Natal sfir Lt/^ir? ;'P^'^ -s old Boldie and he faton, t "^''^- ^'""'' *•"« f™o°« to the assisTanSSreorry' °" '^''^ "^^^ «» ealle'do?t" "^^ *' '"^""'^'"g "^7 reserves should be dispL£\o*l?a\°TZ ^''!;r."=*"^ ^"-'^ "« formed read^trTe/vic" '" * division should be 5. Tha eleven Militia battalions be sent abroad. ^^^6. That a strong contingent of Volunteers be sent l Th!t' "JTT'^ """"'^^ '»"« be dispatched *~i. ... .bo," ™-ii';zi7 ■" "" ■" THE DARK HOUK 198 ments, and it is another, in a free cotmtry vbere no compulsion wonld be tolerated, to turn these plans into actual regiments and squadrons. But if there vere any who doubted that this ancient nation still glowed with the spirit of its youth his fears must soon have passed away. For this far-distant war, a war of the nnseen foe and of the murderous ambuscade, there were so many volunteers that the authorities were embarrassed by their numbers and their pertinacity. It "as a stimulating sight to see those long queues of top-hatted, frock-coated young men who waited their turn for the orderly room with as much desperate anxiety as if hard fare, a veldt bed, and Boer bullets were all that life had that was worth the holding. Espe- cially the Imperial Yeomanry, a corps of riders and shots, appealed to the sporting instincts of our race. Many could ride and not shoot, many could shoot and not ride, more candidates were rejected than were accepted, and yet in a very short time eight thousand men from every class wern wearing the grey coats and bandoliers. This singular and formidable force was drawn from every part of England and Scot- land, with a contingent of hard-riding Irish fox-hunters. Noblemen and grooms rode knee to knee in the ranks, and the officers included many well-known country gentlemen and masters of hounds. Well horsed and well armed, a better force for the work in hand could not be imagined. So high did the patriotism run that corps were formed in which the men not only found their own equipment bat contributed their pay to the war fund. Many young men about town justified their existence for the first time. In a single club, which is peculiarly consecrated to the jeunetie dorle, three hundred members rode to the wars. 210 THE OKEAT BOER WAB *° look to, one of wWohTr.^ n" '""' '"° •^^^Wo"" otlier was on ^867 tTI , "^'^/"^^'"e-'hile the under Sir Charles Warr J .. T'^ ""' "^ »'^ion General Ke%.K™7n«ri''f'''^ ''.'"'''°" »»•"* was obWously best that th^fh, '°"*'' '''°"''' ""'^^ it nnless there shonM^! '.''^ee armies should wait, for "^ the beslX«i'oro?""'°'''^'''°°'''«'P-* European eoiplieaCn^r^^rwhict "^^T*" "^ onr favoar. There wa« f hlw ^''^'^ ™"='' Pwsed was in during which mZ^ stre^l' 'T/"" « '•■« '^»'. Modder Biver, Gatecre he d h^ ""* ^'^ I^''°° »t and Bailer bait up h J strenih, ""^ " S'erkstroom, the relief of LadysmUh Thf n^f '"""'*' ''"^'"P' »' operations during that J^! °"'^ """"^''ted series of F-enchin the nefghKhooTo/T, T'' "' ««"^"" of which will be found fc their '°f"^' "» ^oount short narrative mav !«. ^„ T "'""^'y elsewhere. A of these force^^til ttaoj^r-' ''.^ "^'"^^ "' ^-^ end. °* P^"od of inaction came to an fallef lTuSV^hnTo';Ml*'T"'°"'«° J"-^ fortified them in such a wlvtL^^''r,/"^'""' ""-^ ^ad against assault. Cronje TthM ?" ^™'«" ^^''U'e his position both toZ ri^hf J"? '"""'• ^O'' ^''nded strength: .<, the worL whtl'" u".*''^ '^«' »d had formidable. ' In tW way 1 eor^?"'' """^y '°und so estabhshedwhichwasr^ilverrir/' ^'^*'°" '^^ since Methuen retained h,.^ ^ '° """^ "''"antage. while all supplies to Oronie had r"'"'^'"'"''"^ ^^ ^^ by road. The Brih«W *** """"^ a hundred miles 'and Brigado'lettlyTK a'^"";^ '"^ ^«^ -re ordeal Which the/hruitr'Cer^^Ct:^ THE DARK HOUH 301 Mwdonald, whose military record had earned the soldierly name of 'Fighting Mac,' was sent for from India to take the place of the ill-fated Wanchope. Pend- ing his arrival and that of reinforcements, Methnen remained quiet, ",nd the Eoers fortunately followed his ewmple. From over the northern horizon those silver flashes of light told that Kimberley was dauntless in the present a ,d hopeful of the future. On January 1st the British pos of Kurumanfell, by which twelve officers and 120 poice were captured. The town was isolated, and Its capture could have no effect upon the general operations, but it is remarkable as the only capture of a forti^ed post up lo this point made by the Boers. The monotony of the long wait was broken by one dashing raid carried out by a detachment from Methucn's hne of communications. This fore; consisted of 200 Queenslanders. 100 Canadians (Toronto Company) 40 mounted Munster FusUiers, a New South Wales Ambu- lance, and 200 of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with one horse battery. This singular force, so small in numbers and yet raked from the ends of the earth. WM under the command of Colonel Pilcher. Movina out suddenly and rapidly from Belmont, it struck at the extreme right of the Boer line, which consisted of a laager occupied by the colonial rebels of that part of the country. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the colonists at the prospect of action. < At last ! ' was the cry which went up from the Canadians when they were The rebels broke and fled, their camp was taken, and shght, three killed and a few wounded. The flyins column occupied the town of Douglas and hoisted the British flag there ; but it was decided that the time had •Fii IM IBE GRKAT BOER WAR i down to Cape Town for triaJ S thlT"". """ """ Buccessfol litUe expedition r. . l^f i°" *»y« °' 'hi. consisted partly KtvH '^"'^ '"""• "■'* twenty. Xn/anl Tw^VrtilT l^*"''"'-"' was covered bv ih,> .j , ' '■"^ movement horn Methnen^ hcfTllVT """''' ^"''^8'- the 9th and 12th ill-. •i*''"'""""*' "on'isting of and G To^p o?HZTrS'^"°'°«-°-t«dinfaftry ference with Piieher's fLt f {l '""''"''' »"y inier- of record that J ugh he Z h:,"""", " '" ''"'^^ operating at a dist^cl oMV f '^'*' "' *"»?" '«" border. SK re:nXbi^ f"» ' T' ""^ ^"« State case of Colonel Plu"e"sBh!^ 'i^'^ """''"^^ « the time that the ene3sfrorttf rrJ°"-'." '"' »''« ^^t pedition under Babto^tSfiofT.™''''^"'- ^'=''"- andthe same battervEH °'tt««ame regiments The line taken was a .o^th « fT'"''' ^^^ber'sadvance. round the left flank ortheB:!*^^ .''"•'• '°^« to get far ofapartyoftheVictorianMoTntedRr- ^"^ '''« "'1 tract of country was overrun tnf * T'"'"™"« destroyed. The latt7r !If ' ^ """* farmhouses taken L a wJniig /t^ 'CsTar TI '"^^ ''^- as they had carried out fn ?. ? )t """^ "^^P^dations with iipunity but bo?h h^ r °^ ^^i"^ "'""'* "°' ^"^^ Buch a course';ppea.'to be o'l^nl""' *'' ''"'"''""y °' was some cause for th« ,L^ * ^"''*'°"' »°d there Kruger shortrafter Xred"'*!"""' "''t ^^^»''«"* The e.^dition%eturnefi:rddt"rpTtreStf THE DAKK HOUH !X)3 two days withoat having seen the enemy. Save for one or two similar cavalry reconnaissances, an occasional interchange of long-range shells, a little sniping, and one or two false alarms at night, which broke the whole front of Magersfontein into yellow lines of angry light, nothing happened to Methuen's force which is worthy of record np to the time of that movement of General Hector Kaodonald to Koodoosberg which may be con- sidered in connection with Lord Boberts's decisive opera- tions, of which it was really a part. The doings of General Gatacre's force during the long interval which passed between his disaster at Stormberg and the final general advance may be rapidly chrr^icled. Although nominally in command of a division, Gatacre's troops were continually drafted off to east and to west, so that it was seldom that he had more than a brigade under his orders. During the weeks of waiting, his force consisted of three field batteries, the 74th, 77th, and 79th, some mounted poUce and irregular horse, the remains of the Eoyal Iriph Rifles and the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, the let Eoyal Scots, the Derbyshire regiment, and the Berkshires, the whole amounting to about 5,500 men, who had to hold the whole district from Bterkstroom to East London on the coast, with a victorious enemy in front and a disaffected population around. Under these circumstances he could not attempt to do more than to hold his ground at Sterkstroom, and this he dii', unflinchingly until the Une of the Boer defence broke down. Scouting and raiding expeditions, chiefly organised by Captain De Montmorency— whose early death cut short the career of one who possessed every quality of a partisan leader broke the monotony of inaction. During the week which ended the year a succession of small skirmishes KM THE GREAT BOER WAR eight mUei in advanJ. «f n . . ' "'"''' '•» •«»« movement. L^ZZ^^^rT.'^^'''''- ""^^ beaten off^ith ^^ill^po^tk^^Tt °Tr' "" ours. From then onwards n^Z.T "^ x ^"^ '*" "P"" took place in oSvi n^."*"* "' '■"'»"'""» .dvanc^e along J:LriLtj.^JS^^^^^^^ from m front 0/ him. reared bis difficulties .•ngi"wSi";'^'r *"?•"■" ^•'"'" '"^ -^"^ been play. '■ng up his strpLw "*• •"* ''^^ been build- thf h^d ; esS and much "^T"^ ""'""P' *° -"-« the repulse at aie„^ Hadv^ """5 .«*"•"«"• *"» had remained at SVeZ ^Uh T^ ^"^'f ".'" ''"8»de« the naval guns, and two fidd .»?*! """"'^f ^'^^'y- the force retir;d to F^ere i^™*"*T ^^ ""^ "' Emboldened by theb sn!!!;.^ »"** ^ *''« '«»'• parties over the Tuglt^^'^ j^n^" .-»' «^0-« checked by our D»trnl.M° ? *"''' 'bich were only on the weft towltn onT/'^l^' !""^ «P""«««'^ farmhouses and a smal, list Tlut ''\^'^-^^'^ horsemen on either .m .? ^'"^ ""^ wounded apaamodic LSV^Xi ::'' "^"" "' «- /or r2^Lzt':^r:zr'^'"'' ^'^ «'"^»-- army. By the new vlsirrh^ '°T« *° ^"""'^ (the 6th) was ne«l t^ Sir Charles Warren's division TflS DARK HOUR SOS Snd Middlewx ; alio the lUb, called the Lancashire Brigade, formed by the 2nd Boyal Lancaiter, the Snd Lancashire Fusiliera, the let South Lancashire, and the York and Lancaster. The division also included the 14th Hussars acd the 19th, 20th, and 28th Batteries of Field Artillery. Other batteries of artillery, including one hovitzer battery, came to strengthen Buller'g force, which amounted now to more than 80,000 men. Im- mense transport preparations had to be made, low^ver, before the force could have the mobility necessary ior a flank march, and it was not until January 11th that General BuUer's new plans for advance could be set into action. Before describing what these plans were and the disappointing fate which awaited them, we will return to the story of the siege of Ladysmith, and show how narrowly the relieving force escaped the humiliation — some would say the disgrace — of seeing the town which looked to them for help fall beneath their very eyes. That this did not occur is entirely due to the fierce tenacity and savage endurance of the disease-ridden and half-starved men who held on to the frail lines which covered it. SM TBE GREAT BtM WAB CHAPTEB XIU ''ADVglllTH MoNDiY, Oetoler 80th IfiOfi ;. . looked back to with s'atS ■ "?' « '*'"« »Woh can be •orambling and illV. ,''°" ^y ""y Briton Tn Je.achedKVi«f^V„t" h't "'^ '-' - b«n hustled with no great lat^J.^."* °" "H^' had jnto Ladysmith. Our Bun» ^ / '°'"* '8'"»°«y ■nfantrj checked, and our L.? "**" ""'"hot, o"r hundred priBoner may seem nT^ ff''^'*''- E^ht pared with a Sedan, or eZ w .f*" '"'' ^-i^ei^ ■*^- """"ersarecomparaUve IIT,r"? " ^'°'; hut w^h Sir George Whitn no. ''-tfuty of an inveieTt an"'' '7''"°"'*^ ''"h the «ntly no preparation haH ■? "' '°' ''hich anpa open railway ^hindhi^lrn """',' '^"^ '"hTn heen permitted to remaTn in T? "'*'''= '"""'hs had « a hollow and is SaTed f ^": ^""^'"""h Z near and some distant The J ' ""^ " '''"''' 'o^e hands, but no attemp had J "" °T "''' « our days of the war to fo tifv „n^ . ?/'^' ^ 'he early hard's Kop, and the 3 TsH" °'^^"''"'°''' ^^--n town might be shelled. meCr' '™'". ''^''"' 'he vvfiether these might or might lADYSMITH J07 noi have bMn inoMufolIy held hai been mnoh diipated by military men, the bahnee of opinion being that Bulwana, at leait, which has a water-supply of its own might have been retained. This question, however, was' already academic, as the outer hills were in the bands of the enemy. As it was, the inner line-Cssar's Camp, Waggon Hill, Bifleman's Post, and round to Helpmakaar HiU— made a perimeter of fourteen mUes, and the diffi- culty of retaining so extensive a line goes far to exonerate General White, not only for abandoning the outer hiUs, but also for retaining his cavalry in tho town. -Uer the battle of Lombard's Kop and the retreat of the British, the Boers in their deliberate but effective fashion set about the investment of tho town, while the British commander accepted the same as inevitable, con- tent If he could stem and hold back from the colony the threatened boud of invabion. On Tuesday, ^■,•.:Jnesday. Thursday, and Friday the commandoes gradually closed m upon the south and east, harassed by some cavalry operations and reconnaissances upon our part, the effect of which was much exaggerated by the press. On Thnrsday, November 2nd, the last train escaped under a task lire, the passengers upon the wrong side of the seats. At 2 P.v, on the same day the telegraph line was cut, and the lonely town settled herself sombrely down to the task of holding off the exultant Boers untU tho day-supposed to be imminent-when the relieving army should appear from among tho labyrinth of mountains which lay to the south of them. Some there were who, knowing both the enemy and the mountains, felt a cold chill within their hearts as they asked themselves how an army was o come through, but the greater number, from general to private, trusted implicitly in the valour of their com rades and m the luck of the British Army. 08 THE GREAT BOEH WAR One example of that historical luck was fiv« k., their eyes in the shane of tl,«.„ • . , ^^"^ "*'<"■« which had arrived To draw? n ""?*"* "aval gun, of the fight, in time to cS thl": "\ '"* '"' *=""" Hill and to cover the reW of fh» ''" ^° ^^P"""" the besieged must hav« Wn • f *™^- ^"* ^« ""em of the hu'ge cTelS'^rirsSr /the"''* ""r'«" put forward by the Boera tn" ? H* "*'''* "'""s a process which a frrnil n ' °P*°'*' Providence- very peculiar degree Z^. 7 " ""'*'" '''»' '» » there came agalf and l^n'r^ '"°"''"' °' '^^^^ «»' ful interposirr^hlTed thSsT/' " r"^"'" Now in this first week of N„l f ^ ^'■°'" ^'^a^'". north and south and fast nJCt'f;" T'^ '>'"• and the great 96.poun7 shells t± J '^'^ °'°°''^''' over the town, it was VT, ^^^^^ *"'* Bcreamed Wy bearded M^SLftem'thT' ^-^ *" '''^ townsfolk looked for heir Th«! ' .^''"'^' "''' supplemented by two oSshioSe-rn'"/ ''*°''''°°'^' l)y survivors from No in w . • ^^^ ''owitzers manned waspossible to kTep a;™ th firStSt^' '^ ^ '^'" If they could not save Lr , j 5 ,* ^^"^ ^°^^ eon,. punishment i" n^ ' & ^ " at 1 °' •"" •""=''' '^'^ well as receiving "" '''''° °»« '» giving as had'^llJLt^i.l'Llil''-''/ ^"r"- the Boers town, broken J. thrC of h^tV ^ '^' «"«* "f the green plain, some mi^7i^°ei?,? ^T K" '"'"'^ ing ground for the horl .n^ .^"^ ^^'""'^'^ «'*''- Beyond it rises inL „? f f "*'"' "^ *••« besieged. BuLna upon^hchlavon ''"'T^'' ''""''« '«'"« smaller guns T„ tL ^ ?u ^'** ^'^"^"^ ""i s .veral another ^eusoty^afd^eTi Z ^""''' «^' ^"^ Mteries upon Lombard^ '^tirna^S gts' w^^ar^mrmfms^ ««« placed upon this Gidc, fcr. aa the open loop formed by the river lies at this end, it is the part of the defences which is most liable to assault. From thence aU round the west down to Hesters in the south was a continuous series of hills, each crowned with Boer guns, which, If they could not harm the distant town were at least effective in holding the garrison to its ines So formidable were these positions that, amid that White would have been justified with a limited garriK,n m incurring the heavy loss of life which must have followed an attempt to force them A. f?*r1"* ^7 ^*y' °' *''* ""8* "«■•« "lo"-!*"! I-y the death of Lieutenant Egerton of the • Powerful,' one of the most promising officers in the Navy. One leg and the other foot were carried off, as he lay upon the fand- bag parapet watching the effect of our fire. ' There's an end of my cricket,' said the gallant sportsman, and he was carried to the rear with a cigar between his clenched teeth. «„«h.°i 7"°^. ^'^ " °'™"8 ""^"'■■y 'eooMsiBsance was pushed down the Colenso road to ascertain the force which the enemy had in that direction. Colonel Brockle- hurst took with him the 18th and 19th Hussars, the 6th Lancers and the 5th Dragoon Guards, with the Light Horse and the Natal Volunteers. Some desultory remarkable for he excellent behaviour of the Colonials, who showed that hey were the equals of the Eegulars in gallantry and their superiors in the tactics which such a country requires. The death of Major Taunton, Captain Knapp, and young Brabant, the son of the general who did such good service at a later stage of thenar, was a heavy price to pay for the knowledge that the Boers were m considerable strength to the south, 210 THE GHEAT BOER WAB ^1 By the end of this week the town had ah'eady settled down to the routine of the siege. General Joubert, with the chivalry which had always distingnished him had permitted the garrison to send out the non-combatants to a place caUed lutombi Camp (promptly named Funk- ersdorp by the facetious) where they were safe from the shells, though the burden of their support still fell of course upon the much-tried commissariat. The hale and male of the townsfolk refused for the most part to avoid the common danger, and clung tenaciously to their Bhot-tom village. Fortunately the river has worn down its banks until it runs through a deep channel, in the sides of which it was found to be possible to hollow out caves which were practically bomb-proof. Here for some months the townsfolk led a troglodytic existence, returning to their homes upon that much- appreciated seventh day of rest which was granted to them by their Sabbatarian besiegers. The perimeter of the defence had been divided off so that each corps might be responsible for its own section. To the south was the Manchester Eegiment upon the hiU called Ctesar's Camp. Between Lombard's Kon and the town, on the north-east, were the Devons. To the north at what seemed the vulnerable point, were the Rifle Brigade, the Eifles, and the remains of the 18th Hussars. To the west were the 6th Lancers, 19th Hussars, and 5th Dragoon Guards. The rest of the force was encamped round the outskirts of the town. There appears to have been some idea in the Boer mmd that the mere fact that they held a dominant position over the town would soon necessitate the surrender of the army. At the end of a week they had realised, however, just as the British had, that a siege Uy before both. Their fire upon the town was hea^ LADYSMITH «,, but not deadly, though it became more effective as the weeks went on Their practice at a range of five miles was exceedmgly accurate. At the same time their nflemen became more venturesome, and on Tuesday, November 7th, hey made a half-hearted attack upon the Manchesters' position on the south, which was dnyen back without difficulty. On the 9th, however their attempt was of a more serious and sustained character I began with a heavy shell-fire and with a demonstration of rifle-fire from every side, which had for its object the prevention of reinforcements for the true pomt of danger, which again was Cfflsar'a Camp at the south. It IS evident that the Boers had from the be^nnmg made up their minds that here lay the key of the position, as the two serious attacks-that of November 9th and that of January 6th-were directed upon this point. • /■'^i^afhesters at Caesar's Camp had been re- mforced by the 1st battalion 60tb Eifles, who held the pro- ^ngation of the same ridge, which is called Waggon Hill. With the dawn it was found that the Boer riflemen were withm eight hundred yards, and from then till evening a constant fire was maintained upon the hill. The Boer in spite of his considerable personal bravery, at his bes in attack His racial traditions, depending upon the necessity for economy of human life, „e all opposed to »K1« * \'=°°«fq"e°<=« two regiments well posted were able to hold them off all day with a loss which did not exceed thirty killed and wounded, while the enemy exposed to the shrapnel of the 42nd battery, as wel as the rifle-fire of the infantry, must have suffeTd very much more severely. The result of the action was « well-grounded beUef that in dayhght there wlsv'; ^..jim^M 212 THE GHEAT BOER WAR Utile chance of the Boers being able to carry the lines As the date was that of the Prince of Wales's birthday a salute of twenty-one shotted naval guns wound nn 'a successful day. "^ The faUure of the attempt upon Ladysmith seems to have convinced the enemy that a waiting wme, in which hunger, shell-flre, and disease wer« their allies, would be surer and less expensive than an open assault. From their distant hilltops they continued to plague the town, while garrison and citizens sat grimly patient, and learned to endure if not to enjoy the crash of the 96-pound sheUs, and the patter of shrapnel upon their corrugated-iron roofs. The supplies were adequate, and the besieged were fortunate in the presence of a first-class organiser, Colonel Ward of Islington fame, who with the assistance of Colonel Stoneman systemat'sed the collection and issue of all the food, civil and miliii ry so as to stretch it to ite utmost. With rain overhead and mud underfoot, chafing at their own idleness and humihated by their own position, the soldiers waited through the weary weeks for the reUef which never came. On some days there was more shell-fire, on some less ; on some there was sniping, on some none • on some they sent a little feeler of cavalry and guns out of the town, pn most they lay still-such were the ups and downs of life in Ladysmith. The inevitable siege paper ' The Ladysmith Lyre,' appeared, and did some- thmg to reheve the monotony by the exasperation of its jokes. Night, morning, and noon the sheUs rained upon the town until the most timid learned fatalism if not bravery. The crash of the percussion, and the strange musical tang of the shrapnel sounded ever in their ears. With theur glasses the garrison could see the gay frocks and parasols of the Boer ladies who had come down by tram to see the torture of the doomed town. LADYSMITH :!13 The Boers were sufficiently numerous, aided by heu' strong positions and excellent artillery, to mask the Ladysrmth force and to sweep on at once to the conquest of Natal. Had they done so it is hard to see what could have prevented them from riding their horses down to salt water. A few odds and ends, half battalions wid local volunteers, stood between them and Durban. But here, as on the Orange Biver, - -ingular paralysis seems to have struck them. When road lay clear before them the first transports of the army corps were hardly past St. Vincent, but before they had made up their mind to take that road the harbour of men had thrown themselves across their path For a moment we may leave the fortunes of Lady, mnith to follow this southerly movement of the Boers. Withm two days of the investment of the town they had swung round their left flank and attacked CoLso twelve mUes south, eheUing the Durban Light Infantry out of their post with a long-range fire. The British fell back twenty-seven miles and concentrated at Estcourt, leaving the all-important Colenso raUwav- bridge in the hands of the enemy. From this onwards they held the north of the Tugela, and many a widow wore crepe before we got our grip upon it once more Never was there a more critical week in the war but havmg got Colenso the Boers did little more They formally annexed the whole of Northern Natal to the Orange Free State-a dangerous precedent when the tables should be turned. With amazing assurance the burghers pegged out farms for themselves and sent for their people to occupy these newly won estates ♦u ?1 ^rr*"' ^"' ""* ^°«™ ^^ remained so inert that the British returned in small force to Colenso and removed some storea-which seems to suggest that the 914 THE OREAT BOER WAR original retirement was prematare. Four days pasBed in inactivity-four precious days for js— and on ♦he evening of the fourth, November 9th, the Vfatchers on the signal station at Table Mountain saw the smoke of a great steamer coming past Eobben Island. It was the 'Boslin Castle- with the first of the reinforcements. Withm the week the 'Moor,' 'Yorkshire,' 'Anrania 'Hawarden Castle," Gascon,' Armenian,' 'Oriental,' and a fleet of others had passed for Durban with 16,000 men Oi-e again the command of the sea had saved the Empire. But, now that it was too late, the Boers suddenly took the initiative, and in dramatic fashion. Korth of Estcourt, where General Hildyard was being daily reinforced from the sea, there are two small townlets' or at least geographical (and railway) points. Frere is about ten miles north of Estcourt, and Chieveley is five miles north of that and about as far to the south of Colenso. On November 15th an armoured train was dispatched from Estcourt to see what was going on up the line. Already one disaster had befallen us in this campaign on account of these clumsy contrivances and a heavier one was now to confirm the opinion that actmg alone, they are totaUy inadmissible. As a means' of carrying artillery for a force operating upon either flank of them, with an assured retreat behind, there maybe a place for them in modern war, but as a method of scouting they appear to be the most inefficient and also the most expensive that has ever been invented An mtelligent horseman would gather more information" be less visible, and retain some freedom as to route' After our experience the armoured train may steam out of military history. The train contained ninety Dublin FusUiers, eighty LADySMITH ns Durban VoIunteerB, and ten Bailors, with a naval 7-pounder gun. Captain Haldane of the Gordons, LieutenwitFrankland (Dublin Fusiliera), and Winston ChurchUl, the well-known correspondent, accompanied the expedition. What might have been foreseen occurred. Ihe train steamed into the advancing Boer army was fired upon, tried to escape, found the rails blocked behind It, and upset. Dublins and Durbans were shot helplessly out of their trucks, under a heavy fire A railway accident is a nervous thing, and so is an ambuscade, but the combination of the two must be appalling. Yet there were brave hearts which rose to the occasion. Haldane and Frankland rallied the troops, and Churchill the engine-driver. The engine was disentangled and sent on with its cab full of wounded. Churchill, who had escaped upon it, came gallantly back to share the fate of his comrades. The dazed shaken soldiers contmued a futile resistance for some time, but there was neither help nor escape and nothing for them but surrender. The most Spartan mUitary critic cannot blame them. A few slipped away besides those who escaped upon the engine. Our losses were two killed, twenty wounded, and about eighty taken. It is remark- able that of the three leaders both Haldane and Churchill succeeded in escaping from Pretoria. A double tide of armed men was now pouring into BDnthem Natal. From below, trainload after trainload of British regulars were coming up to the danger point, feted and cheered at every station. Lonely farmhouses near the hne hung out their Union Jacks, and the folk on the stoep heard the roar of the choruses as the great trams swung upon their way. From above the Boers were floodmg down, as Churchill saw them, dour resolute, riding sUently through the rain, or chanting S16 THE OBEAT BOEH WAH EraLdT ^'" ''!""P fi'«B-brave honest iarmer.. ruLo^ * inconaciously for medievalism and cor Ssal?° "" °" «'°8'-'<'"«««d Tommies stood tor cmlwation. progre.B. and equal rights for aU men. The mvading force, the numbers of which could not the,r mobility, lapped round the more powerful but less acfc,ve force at Estcourt, and .truck "lehlnd it at i s communications. There was for a day or two «,me etdTrd'^'"'^" "'"■''' ••"'«"^y«^^^^^^^^^ ™Tn^ f ^,. V.™* ""'' P"""*""* Of Colonel Long, deter- mmed to hold his ground. On November 21st the «.•£ Boers were as far south as Nottmgham Eoad a wtal no/tif T'?. "'"*^ °' ^'''"""' ""^ oniyfoHy mile north of he considerable city of PietermarUzK The situation was serious. Either the invaders S r,n^ ^ ^ "" ^""''- ^""^ "" "des came tales of plundered farms and broken households. Some at W^t of the raiders behaved with wanton brutahtv sir] pianos shattered pictures, slaughtered S and S Ktribution forfteweewsof Niw.^ "°" "«"" ""™ "" • jurt k Jfi A 1 # LADYSUITH 017 His movemetits were accelerated by a sally made by General Hildya.d from Eatcourt to clear the Boers out of the strong position which they had taken up to the south of h.m With this object a force was sent out I^fV w'" *v°', '•" ^'"'' ^""«y'' ""« West Surreys. and the West Yorkshires, with No. 7 Field Battery, two navaJ guns, and some hundreds of the excellent colonial cavalry. This smaU army, starting from Willow Grange (which has given its name to the engagement), climbed a steep hUl and attacked the enemy at early dawn. A scrambhng and confused skirmish, in which once a least we suffered from our own firo, ended in our attaming the object of clearing the position, but at a cost of fourteen killed and fifty wounded or missing. From the acUon of WiUow Grange the Boer invasion refede" 97*w f.1^ ..u"*' ""■""■8 to the front on November a7th found that the enemy were once more occupying the hne of the Tugela. He himself moved up to Frere and devoted his time a. 1 energies to the coUection of that force with which he was destined after three failures to force hiB way to Ladysmith. Leaving BuUer to organise his army »t Frere, and the Boer commanders to draw their screen of formidable defences .long the Tnge'a, we will return once more t^ ntl™. r!.°' the unhappy town round which the interest of the world, and possibly the destiny of the fZr'-tw n **"'"?«• " " '"'y '"^"^ that had Ladysmith faUen. and ten thousand British soldiers with a million pounds' worth of stores fallen into the hands of the invaders ne should have been faced with the alter- native of abai-^oning the struggle, or of reconquering South Africa from Cape Town northwards. South Africa IS the keystone of the Empire, and for the insta^ Ladysmith was the keystone of South Africa. Bat the JM^ 118 THE GREAT BOER WAR from wh.ch one of the great Creusots had pla^ei SThe btr raraSTh'-^r ""^"^ « I^I..U., one £a aSanrcla-hLrr ri«ht win '"' f f ■'^P' '"""o formation, and the wa a d^f™ ^Xw ''^^^ ™™ no bayonets/bat that aetau. At the word the gunners were off, and there LADY8MITH j,j in the darknegg in front of the storming party loomed iifw^T"' f "' S'^*""" ^ *''»* ""certain light. Out round wi^"'" ^'T^-^^r^' ^"P""- '""S'""" ""'"•« round with a colar of gun-cotton! Keep the guard upon the run unti the work is done ! Hunter stood by wi ha night hghtm his hand until the charge was in position, and then, with a crash which brought both , armies from their tents, the huge tube reared up on its mountmgs and toppled backwards into the pit A howitzer lurked beside it, and this also was blown into rum The attendant Maxim was dragged back by the exultant captors who reached the town amid shouiinge Tnli'"/^!" ""^ "•* ^'■'" ^'""^ "' -Joy- One man wounded, he gallant Henderson, is the cheap price for «ie best-planned and most dashing exploit of the war. Becrecy m conception, vigour in execution-they are the root Ideas of the soldier's craft. So easily was the enterprise carried out, and so defective the Boer watch, toat It IS probable that if aU the guns had been simul- taneously attacked the Boers might have found them- selves without a single piece of ordnance in the mommg.' _ On the same morning (December 9th) a cavalry recon- naissanoe wag pushed in the durection of Pepworth Hill The o^ect no doubt wag to ascertain whether the enemy *ere stUI present in force, and the terrific roU of the Mansers answered it in the affirmative. Two killed and twenty wounded was the price which we paid for the mformation. There had been three such recon- naissances m the five weeks of the siege, and it is difficult ifU 3-JO THE OREAT BOER WAR ,t!!^j''*',,'^r "«* ""'y 8»^« <" how they „e to be Jtutified. Far be it for the civilkn to doim.tk. mw« or offiSr *'"■''• ""' °''"'°° °' '•"' "" ""^iori'y There were heartbumingi among the Regalan th.t Panie, of the 9„d Bifle BriX::r^ Sl^ooJeThr =3/=f=^h-:Str^*^ ti-Lh'^ ?' .^"^ ''°'"'"'" "Pon Surprise Hill wa. J J . ' *8ain the two companiea carc'nllv Zhf '/r° "'*™'" "-o "hallengeX r„"hS Here and only here the atorv vari™ F«, . reaaon the fase nsed for the gaTcott^'^waa^TfecZ' but it waa a wSy'tilleTeX' T^efonrt'^^' descended the hill, but tho Boer. Ze alreX crowZ in upon them, from either side. The EngUsL orfej o'f the soldiers were answered in English by the Boe™ and slouch hat or helmet dimly «»n*in the mrH^tSe only badge of friend or foe. A eingnlar letter is "tint from young Beits (the son of the TransvX»etaS but eight Boers present, but assertion or contrLLtf™ - equally valueless in the darkness of such a „i^S here are some obvious discrepancies in his statement We fired among them,' s»ys Beit.. • They stopS LADySMlTH 191 ul^'"^.^"} ^^* Brig»de." Then one of them .aid Chargel One officer, Captain Paley, advanced, though he had two bullet wounds already. Joubcrt gave him another •hot and he fell on the top of ue. Four Englishmen got bold of Jan LutUg and struck him on the head with their nfles and stabbed him in the stomach with a bayonet He seized two of them by the throat and shouted " Help boys I " His two nearest comrades shot two of them' and the other two bolted. Then the English came up' in numbers, about eight hundred, along the footpath' (there were two hundred on the hill, but the exacKera- tion 18 pardonable in the darkness), • and we lay as quiet as mice along the bank. Farther on the English killed three of our men with bayonets and wounded two. Jn the mornmg we found Captain I'aley and t^;■enty-two of them killed and wounded.' It seems evident thot Reitz means that his own little party were eight men, and not that that represented the force which intercepted the returmg riflemen. Within his own knowledge five of his countrymen were killed in the scuffle, so the total loss was probably considerable. Our own casuolties were eleven dead, fortythree wounded, and six prisoners, but the price was not excessive for the howitzer and for the moraU which arises from such exploits. Had it not been for that unfortunate fuse, the second success might have been as bloodless as the first. ' I am sorry,' ■aid a sympathetic correspondent to the stricken Paley ' But we got the gun,' Paley whispered, and he spoke for the Brigade. Amid the shell-fire, the scanty rations, the enteric and the dysentery, one ray of comfort had always brightened the garrison. Buller was only twelve mUes away— they could hear his guns— and when his advance came in earnest their sufferings would be at an end. mr «t THE aSEAT BOEH WAH Boiler hadtr/^tr '"'Tut^r r '° *•"-• been defeated at Colenso ;„Vth« ."'''• ^« ""^ but beginninK Wirw!" u "^*'* ''*' °°' ending tbe long, dour sffie The e^.f ^ '"'"'^'^ ""^ *° their Bhattered Sfa^id drtw f^ V'"""^ "P''"'*'' round the stricke^towT ""'" '"'*" "'"«» "'"1 New^YeTeelt' uZ T "'?"'" ""^ '-'^ of the retur„,andrtL"rerff^''Sf '"^°' *^« ='"'' on the next, passed under tte'h2nTTh:"^' ™'?'^ and devoted doctors. Fifteen 1^„^ ^ ^ overworked ftouaand, of the mrr^on ^ f''^' '^^ '»'«' '"«> poisoned by foul seCeTn7? j""'"' ''''« "^ "« Tl>eyspec4d tL sl^^ yS^ 1:"' "''"^^ ««'• Bliilling each ciearpltT ^ ^^ "^'^ "^wady a bottlef a cit; Tet: Z^^^ZlZT^ ' has never been seen. ''^ dmnkennesn Shell-fire has shown itsslf ;„ it- exceUent ordeal for tho^who L^ t'! ,T *"> *° with a minimum of danger But now ^ excitement black chance guides a k,n,f ^- *"** »8ain some perhaps-to a rslL^ct^urSuch" f\^°-'^^ Mingamong.Boersne.^Cbedeyista^/At''"'?"' nmeand wounded seventeen. In Sv '^*>, x° ""fj* '''"° days to be marked in red when ,^^''"'^^ 'o° there are than he knew. One shiu L n f"""" "•"" ''«'*«■• men (Natal CaraWs) wol^ .Tu''" ""^ ^"'^ «« fourteen horses. CriTrAK*^'"*' "^^ •'^''"'y^d separate human leSrSnh:'»^rr°.''^''*''''«^« 22nd another trag.^shotTlt^ « ^ f' °" ^eownber *» dl^ LADYSMITH 233 6th Lancers (incladiog the Colonel) and one sergeant were wounded— a most disastrous day. A little later it wag again the turn of the Devons, who lost one officer killed and ten wounded. Christmas set in amid misery, hunger, and disease, the more piteous for the grim attempts to amuse the children and live up to the joyous season, when the present of Santa Claus was too often a 96-pound shell. On the top of all other troubles it was now known that the heavy ammunition was running short and must be husbanded for emergencies. There was no surcease, however, in the constant hail which fell upon the town. Two or three hundred shells were a not unusual daily allowance. The monotonous bombardment with which the New Year had commenced was soon to be varied by a most gal- lant and spirit-stirruig clash of arms. On January 6th the Boers delivered then: great assault upon Ladysmith —an onfall so gallantly made and gallantly met that it deserves to rank among the classic fights of British military history. It is a tale which neither side need be ashamed to tell. Honour to the sturdy infantry who held their grip so long, and honour also to tho rough men of the veldt, who, led by untrained civilians, stretched as to the utmost capacity of our endurance. It may be that the Boers wished once for all to have done at all costs with the constant menace to their rear, or it may be that the deliberate preparations of BuUer for his second advance had alarmed them, and that they realised that they must act quickly if they were to act at all. At any rate, early in the New Year a most determined attack was decided upon. The storming party consisted of some hundreds of picked volunteers from the Heidelberg (Transvaal) and Harrismith (Free State) contingents, led by de Villiers. They were ^%i 1*^^ 224 THE GREAT BOEH WAR supported by several thousand riflemen, who muhl jeonre their success or cover their retreat. Eighteen heavy guns had been trained upon the long ridge one end of wh.ch has been called Cesar's CampTi the other Waggon Hill. This hUl, three miles long lay to the south of the town, and the Boers had early ref^d It as bemg the most vulnerable point, for it was aS J^ that the.r attack of November 9th had been dirS ftte;n/ -.r ""onthB. they were about to renew the attempt with greater resolution against less roh ,»f opponents. At twelve o'clock our'^outs h^rd tie ItTwo' ff "'"'"*"« *" '"y""" « '''^ Boer Ip'! At two, n the mommg crowds of barefooted men were clustering round the base of the ridge, and thrUfng cat'Lrj'H"M" '"'"^r°"«"''' "'■"OB'-bushS scattered boulders which cover the slope of the hHl Some working parties were moving guns into position" and the no.se of their Ubour helped to drown th^sord of the Boer advance. Both at Cesar's Camp, the eTst end of the ridge, and at Waggon Hill, the wesf end (the pomts being. I repeat, three mUes apart), the attack came as a complete surprise. The outposts were 8^01 or driven in and the stormers were on the ridrrimos as soon as their presence was detected. The linfof rrk* blazed with the flash of their guns. ».,» w'^'u ^f"" was garrisoned by one sturdy regiment th Manchesters, aided by a Colt automatic gun The defence bad been arranged in the form of small sangars each held by from ten to twenty men. Some few of these w^ere rushed in the darkness, but the Lanoalire men pulled themselves together and held on strenuotly to those which remained. The crash of musketry woke he sleepmg town, and the streets resounded tu. the shoutmg of the officer, and the rattling of arm^Ts the •*^^ *y wyrM LADVSMlTn J2., Three companies of the Gordons had been left near S!r ^ '^^1 "Tu* *''*°*' ""•'*'• ^»P*»*" Carnegie, threw themselveB into the struggle. Four other companies of Gordons came up in support from the town, losing upon .« Hai^^ ^^l""^^ u*°'°"«'' Diok-Cmiyngham, who was kiUed by a chance shot at three thousand yards, on this Ins first appearance since he had recovered from his wounds atElandBlaagte. Late.- four companies of th Eifle Brigade were thrown into the firing line, and a total of two Mida half mfantry battaUons held that end of the position It was not a man too much. With the dawn of day it could be seen that the Boers held the southern and we J^r^ r '}°^l 1^" *^* '"'"■°' P'''^*" •'etween formed a bloody debateable ground. Along a front of a quarter of a mile fierce eyes glared and rifle barrels flashed from behind every rock, and the long fight swayed a htUe back or a little forward with each upward heave of the stormers or rally of the soldiers. For hours the combatants were so near that a stone or a taunt could be thrown from one to the other. Some scattered sangars still held their own, though the Boers privates of the Manchester Eegiment, remained untaken but had only two defenders left at the end of the bloody With the coming of the light the 68rd Field Battery fte one which had ahready done so admirably at Lombards Kop, again deserved weU of its country It was impossible to get behind the Boers and fire straight at their position, so every sheU fired had to akun over the heads of our own men upon the ridge and so pitch upon tho reverse slope. Yet so accurate was IT -I "• THE GREAT BOEB WAS frl^' ^^ °° ""''" *" ioMBsantrain of shell, from the big Duteh gun on Bolwana. that not one S ""Beamed and that Miyor Abdy and his men 128^] at the answering shot which flashes ont throueh the fiow fine must have been the spectacle of these two th«^T T^!" ^ ^' "P*"-' ^ thegronnZS them Bhardea with splinters. Eye-witnesses ^vL Wtu and down among his guns, and turning oyer ^^ too the last faUen section of iron, was one o7 th^ mS SrSX "^""^ r^r^^"" ''^•' t^^y '^^ from ^r^S^^anthi\rBSe^^«CeZ' SrTldTf f^""'^^'"'^ determination upon tSe western end of the position caUed Waggon HiS; The »^1» whn h rJT" °.' ^"P*"*" I-HJ" Horse ^d Happers who he^d the position. Mathias of the former Digby Jones and Dennis of the latter, showed that Uwo highest of mahtary virtues. They and their men were sorpnsed but not disconcerted, and stood d..^tZZ a .loggmg match at the closest quarters. sCtl^ .^Jll" M ^ii 1 «^ 'I feebly fortmed,an?irir8„Bri8Ltht *'"' P"-''""" "«■ sound a soldier ag Ian ^7* u 'P/'P'"*"''*'' »»d The defence had no^S'!^,^" "'"'■^'' ''»^'' '«« " «>■ tired onder the sheL of the ^w^ ^ °" ""*" "^ the further slope. ""^ ""^""^ t" "ke B<.?e::^st:JSoSSirr' '^"' *••« « 2 M THE OHEaT BOfiH WAR down. In a gua-empUcement a strange encomLr to^k pU.«, at pom^blank range between a g^up o?Crs^d wS°d i?'"r °' '"« ^'«« sSte'lt mX Wallnut dead, Ian Hamilton fired at de VillW. »■•».. his revolver and missed him. Young I'bSS ofte Light Horse shot de Villiers A TW\, j ? t shot Albrecht. Digby^on"; ot ^ « °"^ ''\''*«" Jaamr nni„ . t"li''7/'>°eB of the Sappers shot de Jaeger. Only a few minutes later the gallant lad who Z ^ ." ^«* ''*"'' °^ "'»»'>'' 'Wch had towered X"tSr^h^ '/ ''.^ Btrugglingmen burst sudd n^ into a terrific thunderstorm with vivid lightnings and m^A"^- " ? ""^""^ *'"'* *he Brit^hTetoryat Elandslaagte was heralded by just such anothw K lU •*• Jf.r . • LA'JySMITH jj, Up on the buUet-gwept hill the long fringes of fightino men took no more heed of the elements than would tw? boIldogB who have eaeh other by the throat uj the g^y hJlside. foul with mud and with hZ canfe Se B^r reserves and up the northern slope erne our own reserve, the Devon Begiment, fit representaUves of thS. « r"" ""/?' *••* ^" ^'°"> 'hem. J the Bifles Gordons, and Light Horse joined in the wild charge which flnaUy cleared the ridge Bat the end was not yet. The Boer had taken a iwwn the hUl he passed, crouching, darting but the sprmts behind him were turned intf swir^ sSams and as he hesitated for an instant upon the brtokThe rdentless sleet of bullets came from behLd Jr^! were swept away down the gorges and into the Klip ^fT'-^M "^ '° ^ "^^^^ fo' in the Hss of thenr field-comet. The majority splashed through found thenr horses in their shelterf and galloSd off a^oss the great Bulwana Plain, as fairly bS^Tn a! fair a fight as ever brave men were yet hJ^" f *"i ?!: ^'"'°'y "' "■* ^^^o"' "'eP' the ridge had heartened the weary men upon Cesar's Camp to a Ct fi ^ Manchesters. Gordons, and Bifleraided by the fire of two batteries, cleared the long-debated position. Wet,oold,weary.andwithoutfJfoftwenS sa hours, the bedraggled Tommies stood yelling aid wavmg, amid the Utter of dead and of dying * „.„.? r * ?T '^"*• ^"^ '•"« "<'8« ''"«° the town must have foUowed, and history perhaps have been changed. In the old stiff-rank Majuba days we shS have been swept m an hour from the position. But the wily man behmdthe rock was now to tod an equaUy ,SJ "• THE GREAT BOEH WAR man in front of him. The loldier had at last learned •omething of the craft of the hunter. He olong to hi. Jhelter he dweUed on hie aim, he ignored hi, dfeesing,. he lud « ,de the eighteenth-century traditions of W, fl?^i ^'^''^' ""^ '"' ^^ *•"> »>«" »'«der than they had been hit yet. No return may ever come to us of theu losses on that occasion; 80 dead bodies were returned to them from the ridge alone, whUe the slopes, the dongas, and the river each had its own separate teJe No ^ssible estimate can make it less than three hundred killed and wounded, whUe many place it at a much higher flgure. Our own casualties were very serious and the pro. f^'t Zf°!.? to wounded unusually high, owing to the fact that the greater part of the wounds were necessarily of the head. In killed we lost 13 officers, 185 men to wounded 28 officers. 244 men-a total of 420. Lord Ava the honoured son of an honoured father, the fiery Diok-Cnnyngham, stalwart MiUer-WaUnutt, the brave h^; sappers Kgby-Jones and Dennis, Adams and Pa«kman of the Light Horse, the chivalrous Lafone-we had to mourn quality as weU as numbers. The grim test of the casualty returns shows that it was to the Imperial Light Horse (ten officers down, and the reel- ment commanded by a junior captain), the Manchesters, the Gordons, the Devons, and the 2nd Bifle Brigade that the honours of the day are due. In the course of the day two attacks had been made upon other points of the British position, the one on Observation Hill on the north, the other on the Helpmakaar position on the east. Of these the latter was never pushed home and was an obvious feint, but m the case of the other it was not until Schntte, their commander, and forty or fifty men had been killed and wounded, that the stormers abandoned their attempt ^tm i' LADYSIOTB 261 At every point the aenilanb found the same scattered but impenetrable fringe of riflemen, and the same energetic batteries waiting for them. It was their first djrect attack upon a British fortified position, and it u likely to be their last. Throughout the Empire the course of this great struggle was watched with the keenest solicitude and with au that pamful emotion which springs from impotent sympathy. By heliogram to Bnller, and so to the farthest ends of that great body whose neryes are the telegraphic wires, there came the announcement of the attack. Then after an interval of hours came 'everywhere repulsed but fightmg continues.' Then, 'Attack continues. Jinemy remforced from the south.' Then 'Attack renewed. Very hard pressed.' There the messages ended for the day, leaving the Empire black with appre- hension. The darkest forecasts and most dreary antici- pations were indulged by the most temperate and best- informed London papers. For the first time the very suggestion that the campaign might be above our strength was made to the public. And then at last there came the official news of the repulse of the assault. Far away at Ladysmith, the weary men and their sorely tned officers gathered to return thanks to God for His muiifold mercies, but in London also hearts wero Btncken solemn by the greatness of the crisis, and lips long unused to pra r joined in the devotions of the absent warri rs. ,1 nil HIE OHEAT BOER WAil CHAPTEB XIV TM COUBBIBO 0PBBATI0M8 fn'tln* fr' ^''-^ ""'''"' '° *« ««'<« I hwe attempted the Or»nge Free State began to invade r«L?T ■mmediatelyto the north of Cape Tom. uid thlfTif ' The invasion of the Colonv vas At t™ ,„• * . the line of fho t»„ ^"'^y wm «t two points along Li f §'\^^'-^0 THB C0LE8BEB0 OPBaunONS S3S Who ima^e that the Britiih entertained any deeign •gwnet the BepnbUcs), and the Boer, jogged elowly Joathw«:d amid a Dutch popuUtion who heeitated between their unity of race and .peech and their know, ledge of just and generous treatment by the Empire. A targe number were won over by the invaders, llnd. hke aU apostetes, distmguished themselves by thei^ wulence and harshness towards their loyal neighbours. ^t?^fl' "f' ." Ladygrey, the farmers met togethe^ S.tl"lt^^°''V\'''^.'"'^'^ puggarees 'round th«r hats, and rode off to join the enemy. Possibly t ZTrtH""* '"'•'^.•"^ '■"'My recognised what 1 was that they were doing. They have found oat ^^L J° •'*°"' °' "''' •»'<"*' ^^o^'^'i' the rebels numbered ninety per cent, of the Dutch population. In the meanwhile, the British leaders had been ^enuously endeavouring to scrape together a few troops with which to make some stand against the enemy. For thu purpose two small forces were necessary-the ZJ°*^^^ '^' '^^"'' *'"°"8h Bethulie and Storm- berg, the other to meet the invaders, who, having passed the rjver at Norval's Pont, had now occupied cSe^sberg The former task was. as ahready shown, committed to General Gatacre. The latter was allotted to GeTer^ French, the victor of Elandslaagte. who had escaped in the very last ram from Ladysmith. and had takerover I^aZ/?'* "^^^' ''"'y- ^"'"'^''' torceassembled at Arundel and Gatacre's at Sterkstroom. It is with the operations of the former that we have now to deal. General French, for whom South Africa has for once proved not the grave but the cradle of a reputation, had before the war gained some name as a smart and ker- getio savahy officer. There were some who. watching (I .f%.t J" -as; "* THE GREAT BOER WAR In thew peaceful ooeratL. .r^'/^" '"^ commanded .ppointmwi tor So^th Afr c. ^'■"""' '•'"'^'^ »"» •nd thick, with a rurac,^^. • ' "x'*""" •"* » •»'<'rt «>« of cold per^s^Z aLTnf r ^'' "'"^'«"«' ^ » » yet audacion, wdShV^ ?• '^ *""«y' ""'"o" "d ont with theChtucte "'"•''"'''"''''"yins'heB r^narkable toTSe't'kJ^f.''^,'^"""^? '*"■•'■ =« « •t • gallop/ a, an «li^er expre^T V'.**" "^"^ "an. alert, lewroroefiil LTIT^. . 8»«'' »aa the along the linei of ihTt ^.}^ °' ">« invaderi wai the/realL^ho:'„tL S.'/^""^' """^ '^•''■"ed. m ttem,tobreako;ff to th°r "7't'' "^^ Dordrecht on nn. .m "■« e"t and west, oocnpyina Nothing of iSn^ J«' ""* Steyn.berg on the otC upontS:„«i„S,ofU!.r°° °"^ "* '^«"""'-» -S-titKnlr;:^:,: xsr't'" -- K^rrrdii:r£dr/^--s the line, taking ^1 C,^""'''' ""* ""' '"«'>«» along forty n^^^^t^ ' ?"°P»°J' »' '^e Black Watcl^ wai^B w':i.'"'rofctB'^Sr:' '^' ^'"' ^-"' aT^wtur-s"-^^^^^^^ vicis.itndee. nn^ the ^ '°' '°°"""' ""''« «"»=; more over No^^'s Por'1"dI?tW ? '"'''' °»- THE COLESBERO OPERATIONS saC »1?°'/'/k "n*"'^*^ "" •"'^ °' D**«nb«r, within w tolMberg Hi. miMion-with hi, pre«nt force.-w„ to prevent the farther «iv.„ce of the enemy into Z Colony, bn he wai not .trong enough yet to make • lenoua attempt to drive them out " ' ' " ""»*• d.!^'"' /u* ."'"'*' *°'^'""^*' °" December 18tb hi. of mounted men, .o that it attained a mobility verv nnn.ual for a Britid, foreo. On December 18th thTre wl^ M attempt upon the part of the Boer, to advice «uth wluch wa. ea«ly held by the British C.va~ Sorw .^S- .^,"^'"■'57 •'-^"•Wch French 7a.ope« L" 1. dotted w,th tho«, ringular kopje, which the B^r love! .^„ . ""y ""•' be due to wme error of refraction when one look, at them. But, on the other hand, between these hdl. there Ue wide stretche. of the gre«, or russet «»vannah, the noblest field that a horsemfnl^ a horse gunner could wish. The riflemen clung to the hUb, French . troopers circled warily upon th! pWn! totT^^r*'*"^! ''"* ^' P°"*"° ^y threatening ™ 1 ^ .!' °/ .'•".' °""^8 kopje, and so the enemy WM .lowly herded mto Colesberg. The small but mobile r. t"; t""/'""'^- ■^'"' O"* ^^P^^"' of infantry (the Berkshire.) to hold the centre, his hard-ridS Twmamans, New-Zealanders. and Australians, with thf f^L T' ^\^°°i'*"""»>. a"d the rarabineer,. formed an elastic but impenetrable screen ), cover the Colony They were aided by two batteries, and B, of and made a close personal examination of the enemy's ji» W' S38 THE CHEAT BOEB WAB the same time Colonel Porter wTttthI ^rt^''- ^' 0, his own resiment tthln t- ^l-hatteij of Zealand MoS flk? leS^^H?' -""^ *^« ^ew day morning and ^1' ^ -f-^^ " *™ "" ""e Mon- a hill, driving a Bo^r njT* i" ^cCracken seized Artillery enfilLd fhTe^' .°J.r'C/ aS fr bnsk artiUery duel succeeded 4 ilSrhls''^' ' Next morning, however (January ^TTL^iJ^'- found that the Boers otU^-i • . ^*'*'^' *' ''»» near their old poSs and flT^^f ' T'* "^^ to hold theman^towrfSmrtci; '" •"'^"'«°' Sd-sho^5'^r±r"' ^.*''. '"«' •-» "-S cordon wliiChS'La'wntLT "^ r'^^ '""^ 4tha determined effort'wtTad'Ty .tut' a ^'°" ^^ oirB"£r:rrdrrr '"^^^ '«=' that they had elu^ ?L *^ ' "" "'""'"y ^nnd 1 # THE COLESBERQ OPERATIONS £37 position. They were shelled off of it, however, by the guns of Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued by the 10th Hussars and by one squadron of the InmskillingB, who cut off some of the fugitives At the same time, De Lisle with his mounted infantry carried the position which they had originally held. In this successful and well-managed action the Boer loss was ninety, and we took in addition twenty-one prisoners. Our own casualties amounted only to six killed, including Major Harvey of the 10th, and to iifteen wounded. Encourage! t this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk Begiment to carry a hill which formed the key of the enemy's position. T' e town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a ring of kopjes, and the poBeession by us of any one of them would have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest should be raised against this devolution of responsibility upon subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our arms we have been delighted to honour our general ; but when our efforts end in failure our attention is called to Colonel Watson, Colonel Long, or Colonel Thomeycroft. It is fairer to state that in this instance General French ordered Colonel Watson to make a night attack upon the hill. The result was disastrous. At midnight four com- panies in canvas shoes or in their stocking feet set forth upon their venture, and just before dawn they found themselves upon the slope of the hiU. They were in a formation of quarter column with files extended to two paces; H Company was leading. When half-way up a warm fire was opened upon them in the darkness. Colonel Watson gave the order to retire, intending as it is believed, that the men should get under the sheiter of LiKiPa:- S38 THE QKEAT BOER WAS the dead ground which they had iust nn;n«j t, » u. death immediately afterwar/sStrtlS^^^^^ Wi t't"-,. ?* °'«" '"" ^^^- *e ground bXn a ro?£s"-"-^^^^^^^^^ sxfuni^iLrzr.5:^rah;=^^^ W under the very rifle« of the'soere! i vTtlen tht' held out for some time, but thev could r ithZlT ' S^'Z^" Burvivorswere compeUed to sj^render aiB ±-ont. Some ekmrnshmg followed, but the 'wm THE COLESBEilG OPERATIONS 339 position WM maintained. On the 16th the Boem thinking that this long extension must have weakened ns made a spinted attack npon a position held by New- Zealanders and a company of the Ist Yorkshires, this repment having been sent up to reinforce French. The attempt was met by a volley and a bayonet charge. Captain Orro the Yorkshires, was struck down; bu Captam Madocks, of the New-Zealanders, who behaved c^LrrT." «''"*"'^ *' " """""^ i°»f °t. took «Z^ •' *" *?« r'"^ "" •"«""'? repulsed. Madocks 17^ T « Po«t-blank rifle duel with the frock-coated top-hatted Boer leader, and had the good fortune to kiU hiB formidable opponent. Twenty-one Boer dead and many wounded left upon the field madea smaU set-off to the disaster of the Suffolks. The next day, however (January 16th), the scales of fortune, which swung alternately one way and the other. Tf^l T '^^ "8"°"* "^- " " •Jiffi""" to give an ^ihgib e account of the details of these operations, because they were carried out by thin fringTof mei^ ^..^Tf "**°^^ ^ "•* ^' ""^ ""«• the Boers ex- tended also to prevent him from outflanking them, and so the httle armies stretched and stretched ^tU the™ rsolvrT'"'"r'^'^^«""«''- TheactionsZeZ resolve themselves into the encounters of smaU bodies ^7 wl T^*""^ "P °' "^^'^ patrols-a game in which the Boer aptitude for guerilla tactics gave them some advantage though our own cavalry quicWy adapted themselves to the new conditions. On L ofcSI patrol of sixteen men from the South Aust^Xs^ and New South Wales Lancers feU into an ambush a^ =10 TJIE GBEAT BOKU WAK eleven were captured. Of the remainder, three made their way back to camp, while one was killed and one wai wonnded. The dael between French on the one side and De Wet, Schoeman, and Lambert on the other was from this onwards one of manoeuvring rather than of fighting. The dangerously extended line of the British at this period, over thirty mil^s long, was reinforced, as has been mentioned, by the Ist Yorkshire and later by the 2nd Wiltuhire and a section of the 87th Howitzer Battery. There was probably no very great difference in numbers between the two little armies, bat the Boers now, as always, were working upon internal lines. The monotony of the operations was broken by the remarkable feat of the Essex Begiment, which succeeded by hawsers and good-will in getting two 15-ponnder guns of the 4th Field Battery on to the top of Coleskop, a hill which rises several hundred feet from the plain and is so precipitous that it is no small task for an unhampered man to climb it. From the summit a fire, which for some days could not be localised by the Boers, was opened upon their laagers, which had to be shifted in consequence. This energetic action upon the part of our gunners may be set off against those other examp'is where commanders of batteries have shown that they had not yetapprecia ted what strong tackle and stout arms can accomplish. The guns upon Coleskop not only dominated all the smaller kopjes for a range of 9,000 yards, but completely commanded the town of Colesberg, which could not however, for humanitarian and political reasons, be shelled. By gradual reinforcements the force under French had by the end of January attained the respectable figure of ten thousand men, strung over a large extent of country. His infantry consisted of the 2nd Berkshires, Ist -^ '^'•^mth-^^^-^ J> >'N THE COLESBERQ OPERATIONS 241 Royal Irish, 2nd WiltBhires, 2nd Worcesters, 1st Essex ^^Jl*J<»^^^: his cavalry, of the 10th Hussars', the 6th Dragoon Guards, the InmskiUings, the New-Zea- landers, the N.S.W. Lancers, some Rimmgton Guides, and the composite Household Eegiment; his artillery the B and batteries of E.H.A., the 4th B.F.A., and » secUon of the 87th Howitzer Battery. At the risk of tedium I have repeated the units of this force, because there are no operations during the war, with the exception perhaps of those of the Ehodesian Column, concerning which It IS so difficult to get a clear impression. The fluctuating forces, the vast range of country covered, and the petty farms which give their names to positions all tend to make the issue vague and the narrative obscure The British still lay in a semicircle extending from Blmgersfontem upon the right to Kloof Camp upon the left, and the general scheme of operations continued to be an enveloping movement upon the right. General Clements commanded this section of the forces, whUe the energetic Porter carried out the successive advances The Imes had gradually stretched untU they were nearly fifty mUea in length, and something of the obscurity in which the operations have been left is due to the im- ^sibiUty of any single correspondent having a clear idea of what was occurring over so extended a front On January 25th French sent Stephenson and Brabazon to push a reconnaissance to the north of Colesberg, and found that the Boers were making a fresh position at Eietfontein, nine miles nearer their own border. A small action ensued, in which we lost ten or twelve of the Wiltshire Regiment, and gained some knowledge of the enemy's dispositions. For the re- mamder of the month the two forces remained in a state of equilibrium, each keenly on its guard, and neither ^Hf MS THE GREAT BOER WAR etrcag enough to penetrate the linee of the other. General French descended to Cape Town to aid General Bobertg in the elaboration of that plan which was soon to change the who.e military sitnation in South Africa. Eeinforcements were still dribbling into the British force, Hoad's Australian Eegiment, which had been changed from infantry to cavalry, and J battery E.H.A from India, being the last arrivals. But very much stronger reinforcements had arrived for the Boers— so strong that they were able to take the offensive. Delarey had left the Modder with three thousand men, and their presence infused new life into the defenders of tolesberg. At the moment, too, that the Modder Boers were coming to Colesberg, the British had begun to send cavalry remforcements to the Modder in preparation for the march to Kimberley, so that Clements's Force (as it had now become) was depleted at the very instant when that of the enemy was largely increased. The result was that it was all they could do not merely to hold their own, but to avoid a very serious disaster. The movemente of Delarey and De Wet were directed towards turmng the right of the position. On Febru- ary 9th and 10th the mounted patrols, principally the Tasmanians, the Australians, and the InniskiUinKs came in contact with the Boers, and some skirmishing ensued, with no heavy loss upon cither side. A British patrol was surrounded and lost eleven prisoners Tas- manians and Guides. On the 12th the Boer turning movement developed itself, and our position on the right at Blingersfontein was strongly attacked. The key of the British position at this point was a kopje held by three companiee of the 2nd Worcester Eegiment. Upon this the Boers made a fierce onslaught but were as fiercely repelled. They came up in the dark r ^nc.i Ultir THE COLESBEBG OPERAnONS 243 between the Bet of moon and rue of sun, u they had done at the great aasaolt of Ladysmith, and the first dim light saw them in the advanced -tongarg. The Boer generals do not favour night attacks, but they are exceed- ingly fond of nsmg darkness for taking up a good ^tion and pushing onwards as soon a. it is ^ssibkto ^. Tlus ^ what they did upon this occasioli! and the first mtunafaon which the outposts had o( their presence \iZtr "' i" "^^ '~"° °' ^Knree in the cdd misty hght of dawn. The occupante of the sangars were killed to a man, and the assailants rushed onwards. As the sun topped the line of the veldt half the kopje was in their^possession. Shouting and firing, they jessed on- t^. w?r* ^""^f .**■■ "«" ''ew steady old soldiers, and the battahon contained no less than four hundred and fifty marksmen m its ranks. Of these the companies upon the hUl had their due proportion, and their fi?e was ^ accurate that the Boers fo,id themselves^Xto advance any further Through the long day a desperate duel was mamtamed between the two lines of rifle- men. Colonel Coningham and Major Stubbs were killed whJe endeavourmg to recover the ground which had been ost. Hovel ^d Bartholomew continued to encourage ^ fT »"'' *^ ^*^ ^« "^""^ «> deadly thf? l^H w'p °'"!"*"°^'*'- ^"-J" the dir«:tion o Hacket Pain, who commanded the nearest post, guns ln^!J-^,7i.'?"°«^* ''°' ^^ ""« "I*" "^d shelled the portion of the kopje which was held by the Boers. The Utter were reinfor^d, butcould make no advance agatast the accurate rifle fire with which they were met. The Bisley champion of the battalion, with a bullet through his th'gh, expended ahundred rounds before sinkingfrom lossof blood. It w«» an excellent defence, anTa^^n^ 344 THE GHEAT BOEB WAR ?nr.?'i!°° I'Vu"" '~ '■■*«"'"" «"«• "here u i«J,»ed foe. With the coming of darlmeg. theBoers withdrew with «ome from Clement, that the whole right wtag XnM Pam who moved his force by night in the direction of Med and nearly . hundred wounded or miwing. most of eXriSr' '"" "■' """^ '"• '"'^^ ^'^^ of I^bJ^'J^ ""v- '" '°"8'" °P°° 'b« "t^^^e right ^U i.^ P°""°° '"°"'« •" w^erehadoecuned with much the same result upon the extrBm. i.» u the and Wiltshire EegimentTas sttiS's m'etr pames of this regiment were isolated upon a ZL and surrounded by the Boer riflemen whrthe Z,su,^ upon them was relieved by a desperate attLck b/aS the great .sUnd continent. It is the misfortune of Z historum when dealing with these contingl^t^^lf J?.' tached pa. es m follilling the duties which M to ttt casualty luts but not the pages of the chronicler. Be it said, however once for all that throughout th; whole ttnT n T' r °°*''^« """ the'utmost ad£ t.on for the dash and spirit of the hard-riding. striSt TIIE COLESBaiO OtEnATlONS 345 AooUng »n, of An.tr»l« and New Zealand. In a host wh«h held n.«,y brave men there were none bratr than i,Jl *" •"^«»* froM ttia time onward, thai the tunJng movement bad faUed. and that the enlmv h.l developed aneb .trength th'at we wL on^^f.''^' mimment danger of being turned. The .itS was a ^il^Z "* "^ °.°'^« **» """"P «>« e^e'Dy from ra™!!?!^ • [•'^ """'' ^'° *•"« Free State. Oemen s drew m bis wings hurriedly and concentred hm whole force at Bensburg. It was a difficult operation we« w^l tiL' J" T:^''^*" ^"''""y' •'»' '•>« movements were wrtltmied and admirably carried out. There is always the posribility of a retreat degenerating into a panic, and a panic at that moment would hav! b^n a wwlT""""***': OnemislortmieoccurrythXh .!» v^^.T!""'" °' *" ^^^^'> "giment were captured after a resistance in which a third of theU number was killed and wounded. No ^ I tZ te;™'.*r^-1:.'"'/''r *"* ^^"""^ Carter of the WUWure. (the night of the retreat was the sixth which ^n-"^" »'"?°"' "^P)' '^^ t''* ^ of the two compames « to be set down to one of those accidents which may jdways occur in warfare. Some of the InmskiUing Dragoons and Victorian Mounted Eifles Clements was very fortunate in being able to coneen- frato his scattered army with so few mishaps. The 1^^ k'^ heartbreaking to the soldiers who had S* h?"'' ""f f '°"« ^ *^'«°^^8 tl-e line-, hn* It might be regarded with equanimity by the generals S4A THE GllEAT DOER WAR Who onderitood that the greater itrength the enemy deTeloped at Coleaberg the leu they would have to oppose the critical movements which were about to b« earned out in the west. MoanwhUe Coleskop had also been abandoned, the guns removed, and the whole force on February 14th passed through Bsnsburg and felt back upon Arundel, the spot ftrom which six weeks earhcr French had started upon this stirring series of operations. It would not be fair, however, to suppose that they had faUed because they ended where they began. Their primary object bad been to prevent the farther advance of the Freestaters into the colony, and, during the most critical period of the war, this had been accomplished with much success and little loss. At last the pressure had become so severe that the enemy had to weaken the most essential part of their general position in order to reUeve it. The object of the operations had reaUy been attained when Clements found himself back at Arundel once more. French, the stormy petrel of the war, had flitted on from Cape Town to Modder Biver, where a krger prize than Colesberg awaited him. Clements continued to cover Naauwport, Uie important railway junction, untU the advance of Boberts s sirmy caused a complete reversal of the whole mihtary situation. jm. - f£ CHAPTER XV IPIOM XOP Wbilst Meiboen and Gatacre were content to hold their own at the Modder and at Sterkstroom, and whilst the mobi e and energetic French was herding the Boere into Colesberg, Sir Bedvcra Boiler, the heavy, obdurate inexorable man, wag gathering and organising his forced for another advance upon Ladysmith. Nearly a month had elapsed since the evil day when his infantry had retured, and his ten guns had not, from the frontal attack upon Colenso. Since then Sir Charles Warren's division of infantry and a considerable reinforcement of artillery had come to him. And yet in view of the terrible nature of the ground in front of him, of the fighting power of the Boors, and of the fact that they were always acting upon internal lines, his force even now was, m the opmion of competent judges, too weak for the matter in hand. There remained, however, several points in his favour His eiceUent infantry were full of zeal and of confidence m then: chief. This valiant and imperturbable soldier possessed the gift of impressing and encouraging those around him, and, m spite of Colenso, the sight of his square figure and heavy impassive face conveyed an assurance of ultimate victory to those around him. In artiUery he was very much stronger than before especiaUy in weight of metal. His cavalry was stiU «7 S48 THE onZAT BOKR WAn weak jn proportion to hi. other wrmt. Whan »t liut he moved ont on J.no«y 10th to tttempt to oatflank the Boer., he took with him nineteen thouHuid inluitry, three thonwnd cviUry, .nd .ijty gun., which included ■ix howi .era capable of throwing a 60 lb. Ivddite .hell, wid ten long-range naval piece.. Barton'. Brigade and o her troop, were left behind to hold the haw and line or commnnication.. An Mialy.i. of BuUer'. force show, that iu detail, were a. loUowi : Clery'i Dirition (2nd We.t Surrey Bildyard'. Brigade J ?°^ DeTonshire « 2nd West Yorkshire '2nd Eait Surrey Hart'. Brigade let InDi.kiUing Fnailier. Borderer. lit Connaaght Banger. 2nd Boyal Dublin Fnulier. Field Artaiery, three battorieg, 19th, 28th, 68rd : one «luadron 18th Huwar. ; Boyal Engineer.. Warren'M DMriat i2nd Cameronian. 8rd King's Boyal Bifleg 1st Durham Light Infantry 1st Bifle Brigade /2nd Boyal Lancaster Woodgate'. BrigadeJ 2nd Lancashire Fusilier. 1 Ist South Lancashire 'York and Lancaster. squSSimSir ^''«--'^""'7««>.^8'^= one u*^,^^^^ iiKftj^i^^-7 ^^mmn^. SWON KOP Corpi 7, > Coke'i Brigade]*"'' f " "*• 249 fllst Howitzer B»t'.. y; tv- rt>-l r;iM; eight " li'lh HaasarB ; naval 12-ponndor gun., miu Royal Engineers. Cavah'i J»* BoyaJ DragooM 14tb HniBan Four i^uadrone South African Horse B^ll^^^S" ^^l?™' ^'8ht Horse Bethune's Mounted Infantry Thomeycroffa Mounted Infantry One squadron Natal Carabineers One squadron Natal Police ^"mS'gu'S*'^^'' Bifles Mounted Infantry ^t!^' '""' """"* "P*""'""' I *«« "tt^mpt to About aixteen milea to the westward of Colenao there w«h k. , .^"u^'-P'"" ""■ ^ ««'^« th". together w^th the ferry which runa at thia point, and so to throw h-maelf upon the right flank of the Colenso Boirs Ctace over the rfver there is one formidable Ih^oi hUls to cross, but if this were passed there wouTd hi comparatively easy ground until the Udysm^h hill were reached. With high hoj-es Buller a^d hu men sallied out upon their adventure. Dundonald-s cavahy force pushed rapidly forwards rivTlt S:rii^t ''"«^ » tributaryTtirS nver. at Springfield, and established themselves upon sso THE GREAT BOEE WAB the hiUa which command the drift. Dundonald largely exceeded his instrncUona in going so far, and while we applaud his courage and judgment in doing so, we must remember and be charitable to those lees fortunate officers whose private enterprise has ended in disaster and reproof. There can be no doubt that the enemy intended to hold all this tract, and that it was only the quickness of our initial movements which forestaUed Uiem. Early in the morning a smaU party of the South African Horse, under Lieutenant Carlisle, swam the broad nvcr under fire and brought back the ferry boat an enterprise which was fortunately bloodless, but which was most coolly ptanned and gaUantly carried out. The way was now open to our advance, and could it have been carried out as rapidly as it had begun the Boers might conceivably have been scattered before they could concentrate. It was not the fault of the inflmtry that it was not BO. They were trudging, mud-spattered and jovial, at the very heels of the horses, after a forced march which was one of the most trying of the whole campaign. But an army of 20,000 men cannot be conveyed over a river twenty miles from any base without elaborate pre- parations being made to feed them. The roads were in such a state that the wagons could hardly move, heavy rain had just fallen, and every stream was swoUen into a river; bullocks might strain, and traction engines pant, and horses die, but by no human means could the stores be kept up if the advance guard were aUowed to go at then: own pace. And so, having ensured an ultimate crossing of the river by the seizure of Mount Ahce, the high hiU which commands the drift, the forces waited day after day, watching in the distance the swarms of strenuous dark figures who dug and hauled and worked upon the hillsides opposite, barring the '^^1 8H0N KOP jgj road which they wovJd have to take. Far awav on the homon a UtUe shimng point twinkled .^7 the It WM the hehograph of Ladysmith, explLinRher Joub^a and aUling for help, and from ^T^hte „ b"o^ t^TH-" '"'""'"°« '^ "' ^"^ gHmmerld and Shone, soothing, encouraging, eiplaining. while th« SeeT" 'T "''' '"^ r'"-"' '"' *«^ '«-^- « Between 'We are coming! We are commgl ' cried Sl'rmat'tS;^: "- •^-' -^^ '»"« --^"^1 On Thursday, January 12th, Dundonald seized thp S "S^Ve^4tn^T '•""'•■'*='' '"ecaLryhad fnr;„~, *1 '^*'"' '''«^"»™lgnns were brought up to cover the crossing. On the 15th Coke's Brigade ?Bthl ,'°'*°""y concentrated at the drift. oX 16th the four regiments of Lyttelton's Brigadrwen? Dnft was reaUy a demonstration in order to cover th« ih^^^i! ,?^'' ^"^ °"^*' '° "»« westward. Thus ?R»^- i^^l'^f " ^'■°'" '° ^'°'"' *•■'«« other brigades (Hart s. Woodgate's,andHildyard's)weremarchedraS There, on the 17th. a pontoon bridge had been erected and a strong force was thrown over in such a way wt turn the right of the trenches in front of Pot/etor'r It fas admuably planned and exceUently carrfe^ cS. ' certamly the most strategic movement, if ihe« c^ld i' m THE OKEAT BOEH WAR •aid^ to have been any strategin movement upon the British gide, in the campaign up to that date. On the 18th the infantry, the cavalry, and most of the guns were eafely across vitbont loss of life. The Boers, however, still retained their formidable internal hues, and the only result of a change of position seemed to be to put them to the trouble of building a new series of those terrible entrenchments at which they had become such experts. After all the combinations the British wtoe, it is true, upon the right side of the river, but they were considerably further from Ladysmith than when they started. There are times, however, when twenty miles are less than fourteen, and it was hoped that this might prove to be among them. But the first step was the most serious one, for right across their front lay the Boer position upon the edge of a lofty plateau, with the high peak of Spion Kop forming the left comer of it. If once that main ridge could be captured or commanded, it would carry them halfway to the goal. It was for that essential line of hills that two of the most dogged races upon earth were about to contend. An immediate advance might have secured the position.at once, but, for some reason which is inex- plicable, an aimless march to the left was followed by a retirement to the original position of Warren's division, and so two invaluable days were wasted. We have the positive assurance of Commandant Edwards, who was Chief of Staff to General Botha, that a vigorous turning movement upon the left would at this time have com- pletely outflanked the Boer position and opened a way to liadysmith. A small success, the more welcome for its rarity, came to the British arms on this first day. Dundonald's men had been thrown out to cover the left of the infantry 8PI0N KOP 2M Ar^/°B^ *°''^I.'1'" ^^' "8"°^ *•"« Boer position. A strong Boer patrol, caught napping for oncT rode into an ambuscade of the irregulars. Some esca^ result was a surrender of twenty-four unwounded prisoners and the finding of thirteen S ^ wounded, including de Mentz, the field-cornet of TT^I or -in s "ir ■"' 's T'^'^ wrthets W j^b •* "f-'^^^eed afeir. Dandonald's force Idvant! '""'"" "^°° "" "''«■"* '«« of ^««"« sepStet^S T '""' ri^S "P°» ""« Boers in two Ookes Brigades from Potgieter's Drift, makine what Warr'e^'wlo Z^ ''''^\'"^'' *"« '"^^ ^°^'"2 warren, who had crossed at Trichard's Drift was Bwmgmg round upon the Boer right. Midway Mw™n hetwo movements the formidable bastion otLtTZ Btood clearly outlined against the blue Natal eW The heavy naval guns on Mount AUce (two 4.7's a/d eight twelve-pounders) were so placed as to support ei her to help the frontal attack. For two davs th/nwfl.^ Pressed slowly but s.eadUy on to tl ters tde" TZf 1u T'""'* "■"" °' »•'«"«■ Dour and long- expose their great guns to the chance of injury to brina V "'■'■V^','' ^^'"■""'^ '""'"8 •""vement began bring him into closer touch with the enemy, his thirW u field guiis and the six howitzers which had retu n^d to him crushing down the opposition which faced hta ^e ground in front of him was pleated into long fd"' ^i his advance meant the carrying of ridge after rXe' •• THE GREAT BOEB WAR In the earlier steges of the war this wonld have entailed a murderous loss ; bat we had learned our lesson, and the in&ntay now, with intarals of ten paces, and every man choosing His own cover, went up in proper Boer form, carrying position after ijcsition, the enemy always retiring with dignity and decorum. There was no victory on one side or rout on the other— only a steady advance and an orderly retirement. That night the infantry slept in their lighting line, going on again at three m the morning, and light broke to find not only nfles, but the long-silent Boer Runs aU biasing at the British advance. Again, as at Colenso, the brunt of the fighting fell upon Hart's Irish Bngade, who upheld that immemorial tradition of valour w^ wnich that name either in or out of the British service, has invariably been associated. Upon the Lancaabjie Fusiiiera and the York and Lancasters came also a large share of the Kssses and the glory. Slowly but surely the ineiorable lane of the British lapped over the gronna which the enemy had held. A gaUant eoloniai, Tobin or the South African Horse, rode up one hill and signalled with hia hat that it was clear. Hia comrades foiiowed closdy at hia heels, and occupied the position with tht loss of Childe, their Major.' During this action Lyaelton had held the Boers in tbmz trenches opposite to liim by advancing to within 1,500 yards of them, out the attacK was not pushed further. On the evening of this aay, January 20th, the British had gained sane miies of ground, and the total losses had been about three hnnared killed and wounded. The troops were in good heart, and all n. J.ll'n °^°"f f"""'™'"' <" oominB *Mb may bf added to tlie mwiy well..tlf sted eiampleB ot .uch proMiwx. He diuoued it with h,. oomrad™ on the niRh. before, r^u«i»g. a. a fl^j^ri, Z„ hi. own name Shat the iD«!riplioi> • U ,t «,ll with th, ohild? iH well, .hould be pl«»d upon his giave. It ma done ™™""' " ■• SPION KOP j^ promJBed wcU for the future. Again the men lay where they had fought, and ag»in the dawn heard the Irash of the great guns and the rattle of the musketry The operations of this dav bemn »;fi, . . • , cannonade from the field baUeZ an^'^LV^^*'""''' About eleven the infantry heann ty, „« f T .,f ™y* ^vance which would haC^ nShfd tZLZl "of Aldershot, an irreonlnr f«n™ » , ""^'"le™ ol writhers. irouch'^^S'coSrd luZi"^^"' no points in this grim game of death mf'' "^ the officers with their'^stinctSe Ls^and 7 T" .words, where the valiant rushrotrthe o" wf the men who were too proud to Me down ? thl?' r . three months ago seeded as otol tTarSs/orjhe middle ages. AU day the line undulat^ forwlrd and by evening yet another strip of rock-strewn S haJ hospitals at Frere. It was on Hildvard^LtJ^ T eft that the fi«btingandthelofsfso'?Sda"^L°;;:;' fell. By the morning of January 22n-l ihL^l-? were clustering thickfy all rouK^, :f Te" main position, and the day was spent L resUn^t^^ weary men, and in determining at That ^.nr.^ ^« 1 assault should be delivered. On the Lr/ *' summit the Boer voortrekkers had first in iml gazed down upon the promised land of nI al If tw bravemanishewho'vrtrrrC^^f; SM THE GREAT BOER WAR rush and the master-key of all these looked doort might be in our keeping. That evening there came a telegram to London which left the whole Empire in a hush of anticipation. Spion Kop was to be attacked that night. The troops which were selected for the task were eight companies of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, six of the 2nd Royal Lancasters, two of the 1st South Lancaahires, 180 of Thorneycroft's, and half a company of Sappers. It was to be a North of England job. Under the friendly cover of a starless night the men, in Indian file, Uke a party of Iroquois braves upon the war trail, stole up the winding and ill-defined path which led to the summit. Woodgate, the Lancashire Brigadier, and Blomfield of the FusilierH led the way. It was a severe climb of 2,000 feet, coming after arduous work over broken ground, but the aflair was well-timed, and it was at that blackest hour which precedes the dawn that the last steep ascent was reached. The Fusiliers crouched down among the rocks to recover their breath, and saw far down in the plain beneath them the plaeid lights which showed where their com- rades were resting. A fine rain was falling, and rolling clouds hung low over their heads. The men with un- loaded rifles and fixed bayonets stole on once more, their bodies bent, their eyes peering through the mirk for the first sign of the enemy— that enemy whose first sign has usually been a shattering volley. Thorney- croft's men with their gallant leader had threaded their way up into the advance. Then the leading files found that they were walking on the level. The crest had been gained. With slow steps and bated breath, the open line of skirmishers stole across it. Was it possible that it had SPION KOP jjy BpJutter of :ZXl and tlTih' F " ^'' *''«° » onward, with their bayonets C R "'"" "P^'-S burghers clattered anZrl JJtf,"^'' °f^7heM and a. cheer that roused hof hii^^ i ^ ""* darkneBg, the surprise had ^n co^^u T.u « ""^'^^ '°'« '»«» »d- end of which%hey Cd eal "d 5 "If* '''^ P'*""^*"' them, but it was weakff hlu ■ ^"° *"'' *'"«'"='^ '"^^d the men, nnce^^^I rl ■Z\^^''''^'""'^- Then waited for fuJI iZ to sel T "if '^^°"''' ^'^^^ ""d work was which lay JoJ^r "^ """• '"''* 'J"" ">« re8ultproyed,andyet one J ?~? ^*"" '"'"■ «» 'he blame ^he okc^r ^l^^eT^ itdLf ?'"'' '" hare seemed more cnlimblelZ I ul''' ''^ "''^' andsolo.ttheadv^tSfXchh^,^''''' ''""'"y "• About eight o-clMklTrh 1 , *?'^**''y8»med. General Wo^gate saw how m ?.' "'T^^ °' '''^ """t- oneendolwhichheheTd e7JdJd? '"^■- ^'"' ""««' for some mUes. Had h« ftf f T'^' """8 and falling and had he p^s.?^if; ?'* °' ""* '""^ P'"'**" the position.^; he heM „nr.*°„T°""'^ ">« '^^' » the further end of iUhe ^ ^ '^' '^' P''"^'"'' "^^ »' The ridge took a cu' ^' were strongly entrenched. BummitwasBomewhariLhiS't^" "" '^ ^P'"" ^'°'' a« our men faced the B^, .Itt^*"*"' ""° °' "• and from their left. BevonT- ^!'' ' "°" «™ """e sheltered strings ^^7' r^' *""°<'»'=«» which plateau which the Britih h-u '*'"'*' 8^"- T''^ than was usuall/repr s^nSirr^^ -"''b narrower places the possibk front wa^J '''^ ^T I" many -d-ide, and the tr^rr :iX''torn'ct i^^Mmi^.? Wt THE GREAT BOEH WAR together, as there wai not room for a aingle company to take an extended formation. The cover upon thi< plateaa waa scanty, far too scanty for the force upon it, and the sheU fire— especially the fire of the pom-poms- soon became very mnrderous. To mass the troops under the cover of the edge of the plateau might natnraUy suggest itself, but with great tactical skill the Boer advanced line from Commandant Frinsloo'a Heidelberg and Carolina commandos kept so aggressive an attitude that the British could not weaken the lines opposed to them. Their skirmishers were creeping round too in such a way that the fire was really coming • from three separate points, left, centre, and right, and every comer of the position was searched by their bullets. Early in the action the gaUant Woodgate and many of his Lancashire men were shot down. The others spread out and held on, firing occasionally at the whisk of a rifle-barrel or the glimpse of a broad-brimmed hat. From morning to midday, the shell, Maxim, and rifle fire swept across the kop m a continual driving shower. The British guns in the plain below failed to localise th» position of the enemy's, and they were able to vent their concentrated spite upon the exposed infantry. No blame attaches to the gunners for this, as a hill intervened to screen the Boer artillery, which consisted of five big guns and two pom-poms. Upon the fall of Woodgate, Thomeycroft, who bore the reputation of a determined fighter, was placed at the suggestion of BnUer in charge of the defence of the hill, and he was reinforced after noon by Coke's brigade, the Middlesex, the Dor ets, and the Somersets, together with the Imperial Light Infantry. The addition of this force to the defenders of the plateau tended to increase the casualty returns rather than the strength of the 8PI0N KOP jj, «vere upon the shilowtlhes ^^7 T T^ W been abandoned by the S ai^j S eS b!t e S^notLnlfTead 27^^^^^ ''^«'»^ .bakenthetroopebadly. Spectator. fro>ntrort saw M THE GREAT BOER WAR the ihelli pitching at the rate of Mven a minnte on to the crowded platean marvelled at the endurance which held the devoted men to their poet. Men were wounded and wounded and wounded yet again, and still went on fighting. Never rinoe Inkerman had we had lo grim a soldier's battle. The company ofScers were superb. Captain Muriel of the Middlesex was shot through the cheek while giving a cigarette to a wounded man, con- tinued to lead his company, and was shot again through the brain. Scott Moncrieff of the same regiment was only disabled by the fourth bullet which hit him. Orenfell of Thorneycroft's was shot, and exclaimed, • That's all right. It's not much.' A second wound made him remark, ' I can get on all right." The third killed him. Boss of the Lancasters, who had crawled from a sick- bed, was found dead upon the furthest crest. Young Murray of the Scottish Bifles, dripping from five wounds, still staggered about among his men. And the men were worthy of sach officers. ' No retreat ! No retreat ! ' they yelled when some of the front line were driven in. In all regiments there are weaklings and hang-backs, and many a man was wandering down the reverse slopes when he should have been facing death upon the top, but as a body British troops have never stood firm througb & nrore fiery ordeal than on that fatal hill. The {Kijition was so bad that no efforts of officers or men could do anything to mend it. They were in a murderous dilemma. If they fell back for cover the Boer riflemen would rush the position. If they held their ground this horrible shell fire must continue, which they had no means of answering. Dowu at Gun Hill in front of the Boer position we had no less than five batteries, the 78th, 7th, 78rd, 68rd, and Blst howitaer, but a ridge intervened between them and the Boer guns 'mM^Jt'' jrJPI^^ SPtON K0t> isl which were shelling Spion Kop. and this ridge was •trongly entrenched. The naval gans from distant Moant AHce did what they coold. but the range ^ very long and the position of the Boer gons uncertain. There remains the deba'ted question whether the Bntisih guns could have been taken to the top. Mr. Win- •ton Churchill, the soundness of whose judgment has been frequently demonstrated during the war, asserts that it might have been done. Without venturing to contradict one who was personally present, I venture to think that there is strong evidence to show that it could not have been done without bUsting and other measures, for tT. ™? » vT °° •"■""* *™«- Captain Hanwell,' of the 78th BJ.A., upon the day of the battle had the very utmMt difficulty with the help of four horses in getting a hght Maxim on to the top, and his opinion, with that of other artillery officers, is that the feat was an impos- mght fell Colonel Sim was despatched with a party of sappers to clear the track and to prepare two emplacementa upon the top, but in his advance he met the reiirmg infantry. t»,.K^**°*^?.' the day reinforcements had pushed up the hUlnnti two full brigades had been draw^ into the fight From the other side of the ridge Ly ttelton sent up the Scottish Bifles, who reached the summit, and added their share to the shambles upon the top. As the shades of night closed m, and the glare of the bursting shells «rl'ySNov.'lSr'^„'„^fS ""' T'^'T'' "'» "■"'*> «' V.nt.r.barg ^^ "'■5w^, •''^•ooiwf moumoK tbt cmait (ANSI ond ISO TEST CHAUT No. 2) E 144 ^ I.I LS |2.0 1.8 K^iu 1^ j4 1853 EotI Mob StrMt KpchMlcr. N«w Yofk 14eoS US* (710) 2a8-SW»-Fai MS THE GREAT BOEK WAB became more lurid, the men lay extended upon the rocky groond parched and exhausted. They were hopelegely jumbled together, with the exception of the DMeei.. whose cohcBion may have been due to superior discipline, or to the fact that their khaki differed somewhat in coIom from that of the others. Twelve hoars of so terrible an experience had had a strange effect upon many of the men. Some were dazed and battle-struck, incaiible of clear understanding. Some were as incoherent as drunkards. Some lay in an overpowering drowsiness. The most were doggedly patient and long-suffering, with em™S '°°8U"g for water obUterating every other .h1^!^'1 7'^^T " "™' S"^*"* "'' successful attempt had been lAade by the third battalion of the Kings Eoyal Eifles from Lyttelton's Brigade to relieve the pressure upon their comrades on Spion Kop. In order to draw part of the Boer fire away they ascended from the northern side, and carried the hilU which formed a continuation of the same ridge. The movement was meant to be no more than a strong demonstration, but the riflemen pushed it unta. breathless but victorious, they stood upon the very crest of the position, leaving nearly a hmidred dead or dying to show the path which they had taken. Their advance being much further —"T^tl"^' ?'y ''" '*"»"«<'' »°d »' ^ at the moment ttat Buchanan Eiddell. their brave Colonel, stood up to read Lyttelton's note that he fell with a Boer Met through his brain, making one more of those gallant leaders who died as they had Uved. at the head of their regiments. Chishohn. Dick-Cunyngham, Downman WUford. Gunning. Sherston. Thackeray. Sit- weU. MacCarthy O'Leary, AirHe-they have led their men up to and through the gates of death. It was a fine SPION KOP 263 e^loit of the Srd Bifles. < A finer bit of Bkinmshmg, a finer bit of climbing, and a finer bit of fighting, I btve ?T,r";' f^ ^^'" ^"S*"""- I* « oertairT that a Lj^telton had not thrown his two regiments bto the hght the presBure upon the hiU-top might have become unendnrable; and it seems also certain that if he had only held on to the position which the Eifles had gained, tbe Boers would never have reoccupied Spion Kop. sheUs buretmg thickly over the plateau, the much-tried Thomeycroft, wounded and wearied, hacl to make up his mind whether he should hold on for another such day as he had endured, or whether now, in the friendly darkness, he should remove his shattered force. Could he have seen the discouragement of the Boers and the preparations which they had made for retirement, he would have held his ground. But this was hidden from him, while the horror of his own losses was but too appM-ent. Forty per cent, of his men were down. Thnrteen hundred dead and dying are a grim sight upon a wide-spread battle-field, but when this numberis heaped upon a confined space, where from a single high rock the whole Utter of broken and shattered bodieslS be seen, aiid the groans of the stricken rise in one lonir dronmg chorus to the ear, then it is an iron mind indeed which can resist such evidence of disaster. In a harder age Wellington was able to survey four thousand bodies pUed in the narrow compass of the breach of Badajos. but his resolution was sustained by the knowledge that the mihtary end for which they feU had been accomphshed. Had his task been unfinished it is doubt- ful whether even his steadfast soul would not have flmched from its completion. Thomeycroft saw the frightful havoc of one day, and he shrank from the set THE GREAT BOER WAR thought of such another. -Better six battdions safely down the hill than a mop up in the morning,' said he and he gave the word to retire. One who had met the troops as they staggered down has told me how far they were from being routed. In mized array, but steadily and in order, the long thin line trudged through the darkness. Their parched lips would not articulate, but they whispered 'Water! Where is water?' as thev toiled upon their way. At the bottom of the hUlthey formed mto regiments once more, and marched back to the camp In the morning the blood-spattered hill-top. withits piles of dead and of wounded, were in the hands of Botha and his men, whose valour and perseverance deserved the victory which they had won. There is no frf .,"Ti "'u"? *•*• °' '^''' """""K Botha, knowing that the Bifles had carried Burger's position, regarded the affair as hopeless, and that no one was more astonished than he when he found, on the report of two scouts that It was a victory and not a defeat which had come to him. How shall we sum up such an action save that it was a gallant attempt, gallantly carried out. and aa gallantly met ? On both sides the results of artiUery fire durmg the war have been disappointing, but at Spion Kop beyond all question it was the Boer guns which won the action for them. So keen was the disappointment at home that there was a tendency to criticise the batUo wiUi some harshness, but it is difScult now. with the e-^denceat our command, to say what was left undone jhioh 8 the boulder.. A few Btacken Boer., five unwouna^' priwner., and » thoee »nd the arid hUl fiom which «> nmoh had been hoped, and u Uttle wa. to be gained It wa. during thi. advance that an incident occurred of a more p.oture«,ue character than i. usual in mS warfare. The in,d.ibiUty of comoaUnt. a^ ^n^Z the absorptjon of tht, individual in the mL W- fut off h tK i" • !*{ "•. °° "■" ~'"»'<"'' • Boer gun ^iinH -f * ^' ,!* '"'™°'*' <••" °°* ""'Jdenly from behmd It. cover, like o hare from ite tuBBock, and r»3 for .afety aero., the plain. Here and there ft wowd toe horee. .tretched to their utmost, the driver .Ztag to le t. behind and before, the British .heU. biu. lyddite and .hrapnel, crashing and riving. Over iZ^; of a hollow, the gallant gun vaniriied, and withYn a few mmute. wm bangmg away once more at the British ~ivance W th oheer. and riiout. and laughter the Bntjsh infantrymen watched the race for shelter, hei sportmgspintri.mg high above aU racial hat-.ed, and hadmg with a 'gone to ground ' whoop the final disap- pearance of the gun. " The Durhams had cleared the path, but the other regiments of Lyttelton'B Brigade foUowed hard at their rhl'l . .1 "i^*" *'''y '""' fi™>y established themselves upon the hill. But the fatal slowness which had marred General Buller's previous operations again prevented him from completing his success. His spirit appears to be lethargic, but tenacious, and for the sake ktW,^°'1J^ we are content to forgive much of the lethargy. But twice at least in the comm of these 179 THE GREAT BOER WAR operaUoni there ii evidence of ludden impulM to drop bii tooli in the roidit of his tiuk and to do no more for the day. So it waa at Coleneo, where an order wai given at an early hour for the whole force to retire, and the guni which might have been covered by infantry flre and withdrawn after nightfall were abandoned. So it wai aleu at a critical moment at this action at Vaalkrani. In the original scheme of operations it bad been planned that an adjoining hill, called the Green Hill, which partly commanded Vaalkrantz, should be carried also. The two together made a complete position, while singly each was a very bad neighbour to the other. On the aide-de-camp rMing up, however, to inquire from General BuUer whether the time had come for this advance, he replied, ' We have done enough for the day,' and left out this essential portion of his original scheme, with the result that all miscarried. Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan successfully. So it most always be with the attack. The defence does not know where the blow is coming, and has to distribute men and guns to cover miles of ground. The attacker knows where he will hit, and behind a screen of outposts he can mass his force and throw his whole strength against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But in order to do so he must be quick. One tiger spring must tear the centre out of the line before the flanks can come to its assistance. If time is given, if the long line can concentrate, it the scattered guns can mass, if lines of defence can be reduplicated behind, then the one great advantage which the attack p ossesses is thrown away. Both at the second and at the third attempts of Buller the British movements were so slow that had the enemy been the slowest instead of the most mobile of armies, they could still always have VAALKBAKZ gf^ n>»<3e kny dupcitioni which they ohoie W.™n-. Jwdhng to the flret d.y. of th. mo'e-^enTwhl „Ted •t Spion Kop might with m effort be condoni on J-couat ro«ibl. difficultic. of .apply, but it wouM .X" ' .• "'^'"' " "' "'• "««' ohariteblecrU ic to toda ■wrmea the hiU at two, and nothina more wu ^«n. ^rrheir'i.nrr'to'r' trt'thTt^ *" "'"■« Srthe z 'ft: "7'"*' " '^^^ " *"> '•'" ™i uie way was not qu te so easy aa it had be«n One^».ght have dedaced the fact wfthout the aid^f" The brigade then occupied Vaalkranz and or^»»j «ngan. «d dug trenche.. to the raoZg^nX ""' °' SP'"" Kop- Again they had some thousandb nf ttem. In one or two points the situation was modZl tolfvoW ht T" ^^^f^ P^'"°° *'«'"«'» tho infantry The original plan was that the taking of Vaalkran. Sn^ *'%^r' "^''P "'""'''■ ""eUflantn^Tf But after the first move the British attitude becal one of defence rather than of attack. Whatever T general and ultimate effect of these op^Zn? m^y* m THE GBEAT SO£It WAS have been, it is beyond question that their contempla- tion was annoying and bewildering in the extreme to those who were present. The position on February 6th was this. Over the river upon the hill was a single British brigade, exposed to the fire of one enormona gun— a 96-pound Creusot, the longest of all Long Toms — which was stationed upon Doomkloof, and of several smaller guns and pom-poms which spat at them from nooks and crevices of the hills. On our side were seventy-two guns, large and small, all very noisy and impotent. It is not too much to say, as it appears to me, that the Boers have in some ways revolutionised our ideas in regard to the use of artillery, by bringing a fresh and healthy common-sense to bear upon a subject which had been unduly fettered by pedantic rules. The Boer system is the single stealthy gun crouching where none can see it. The British system is the six brave guns coming into action in line of full interval, and spreading out into accurate dressing visible to all men. ' Always remember,' saysone of our artillery maxims, ' that one gun is no gun.' Which is prettier on a field-day, is obvious, but which is business — let the many duels between six Boer gnns and sixty British declare. With black powder it was useless to hide the gun, as its smoke must betray it. With smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only by the detection with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on the recoil that the officers were ever able to localise the gnns against which they were fighting. But if the Boers had had six guns in Une, instead of one behind that kopje, and another between those distant rocks, it would not have been so difficult to say where they were. Again, British tradi- tions are all in favour of phmting gnns close together. At this very action of Vaalkranz the two largest gunp VAALKKANZ 27« were bo placed that a single shell bursting between them would have disabled them both. The officer who placed them there, and so disregarded in a vital matter the most obvious dictates of common-sense, would probably have been shocked by any want of technical smartness, or irregularity in the routine drill. An over-elaboration of trifles, and a want of grip of common-sense, and of adaptation to new ideas, is the most serious and damaging criticism which can be levelled against our army. That the function of infantry is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in the middle ages ; that the first duty of artillery is so far as is possible to be invisible— these are two of the lessons which have been driven home so often during the war, that even our hidebound conservatism can hardly resist them. Lyttelton's Brigade, then, held Vaalkranz j and from three parts of the compass there came big shells and little shells, with a constant shower of long-range rifle bullets. Behind them, and as useful as if it had been on Woolwich Common, there was drawn up an imposing mass of men, two infantry divisions, and two brigades ol cavahry, all straining at the leash, prepared to shed their blood until the spruits ran red with it, if only they could win their way to where their half-starved comrades waited for them. But nothing happened. Hours p..Bsed and nothing happened. An occasional shell from the big gun plumped among them. One, through some freak of gunnery, lobbed slowly through a division, and the men whooped and threw their caps at it as it passed. The guns on Swartz Kop, at a range of nearly five miles, tossed shells at the monster on Doornkloof, and finally blew up his powder magazine amid the applause of the infantry. For the army it was a picnic and a spectacle. But it was otherwise with the men up on Vaalkranz 176 THE OUEAT BOEll WAR In spite of sangar and trench, that cross fire was flndine them out ; and no feint or demonstration on either side came to draw the concentrated fire from their position. Once here was a sudden alarm at the western end of In^^'/r °°P'°8 ^"^'^ ^8ures with slouch hata and bandohers wererightupon the ridge before they could te stopped, so cleverly had their advance been conducted. a<^n t'J-r °' """i"""' ■""* ^^*« «>«''«'' the crest ,?Z' T? "TJ'""^ """^ """'^ ^"^ ""-ch stronger IS the defence than the attack. NightfaU found the posUion unchanged, save that another ^ntoon bridgt h^ been constructed during the day. Ow this HUdyard^ Their r "• 1' ?" ""''' °' "»« Swart. Kop guns. and fifty, a trifle if any aim were to be gained, but excessive for a mere demonstration. m JA*' "i^',?"''^"'*''' ""^^ supplemented the defences made by Lyttelton, and tightened their hold upon the hill. ^LZfC "'^5' ?'**"'' """"^^ *•>«•» fo' aTinstanttc^ change the spade for the rifle. When in the morning rt was found that the Boers had, as they naturallyTuld brought up hdr outlying guns, the tired soldier^s dM not th.t..v r"""""" " *''^8 ^ " severe shell fire, if theposition be an extended one with chances of cover brigade was the result of a long day under an incS thTthe " ^' *''° "* -Sl-'f'^ ca-^ the c ncS that the guns were too many, that the way was too harT Tr^/t! K ■?°™ /"^ss that accursed river. Vaal- with mdignation, was ordered back once more to its camp CHAPTEB XVII BCLLBB'8 raiili ADVANOB Thb heroic moment of the siege of Ladyamith was that which witaessed the repulse of the great a Lk The lu fi™ p"'^"^.'.: ^"l^gl't^^d horses, and sporato sheU fire. For another six weeks of inactivity thrbrave ^rmon endared aU the sordid evUs which had st«tX thn„T , »T'.- ^'"y ^ *•■« '""I' t»>ey heard the thunder of Boiler's guns, and from the hills round the town they watehed with pale faces and bate^ breath the tragedy of Spion Kop, preserving a firm convi^n that a very httle more would have transformed it Sto thenr salvation. Their hearts sank with the sintog of wl^' ?"* J»»""-an^ also failed tiiem. and they ZstrTh.,' "^-t*^ °' '''^^ ••""««' '"'' their weak! ness for the help which was to come. .lJl^'^*°.^"'^y """"''^^ how General BuUer tt^r/^fr'* •'•'""' '"''•'*' J"" *hree attempts for' the rehef of the city. Undismayed by these successive ^^s and mspirited by the cheering news from Lord Eoberts on the Kimberley side, the Colenso armyn?, kTth itself for its supreme effort. This tim^^ least, the soldierb .oped that they would be permitted to ?77 m THE GREAT BOER WAR bnwt their way to the help of their starving oomradeB or leave their bones among the hills which had faced them BO long. All they asked was a fight to a finish, and now they were about to have one. _ General Buller had tried the Boers' centre, he had tried their extreme right, and now he was about to try their extreme left. There were some obvious advantages on this side which make it sorprising that it was not the first to be attempted. In the first place, the enemy's main position upon that flank was at Hlangwane moun- tain, which ia to the south of the Tugela, so that in case of defeat the river ran behind them. In the second, Hlangwane mountain was the one point from which the Boer position at Colenso could be certainly enfiladed, and therefore the fruits of victory would be greater on that flank than on the other. Finally, the operations could bo conducted at no great distance from the raUhead, and the force would be exposed to little danger of having its flank attacked or its communications cut, as was the ease in the Spion Kop advance. Against these potent considerations there is only to be put the single fact that the turning of the Boer right would threaten the Free- staters' line of retreat. On the whole, the balance of advantage lay entirely with the new attempt, and the whole army advanced to it with a premonition of success. Of aU the examples which the war has given of the enduring quaUties of the British troops there is none more striking than the absolute confidence and whole- hearted delight with which, after three bloody repulses^ they set forth upon another venture. On February 9th the movements were started which transferred the greater part of the force from the extreme left to the centre and right. By the 11th Lyttelton's (formerly Clery's) second division and BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE 379 Warren's fifth division hod come eastward, leaving Bam Murdoch's oavahy brigade to guard the Western side. On the lath Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavaby, two battaUons of infantry, and a battery, made a strong reconnaissance towards Hussar Hill, which is the nearest of the several hiUs which would have to be occupied m order to turn the position. The hill was taken, but was abandoned again by General BuUer after he had used it for some hours as an observatory. A long-range action between the retiring cavahry and the Boers ended in a few losses upon each side. What Buller had seen during the hour or two which he had spent with his telescope upon Hussar HiU had evidently confirmed him in hir views, for two days later (February 14th) the whole army set forth for this point. By the morning of the 15th twenty thousand men were concentrated upon the sides and spurs of this eminence. On the 16th the heavy guns were in position, and all was ready for the advance. Facing them now were the formidable Boer 'ines of Hlangwane HiU and Green Hill, which would certainly cost several thousands of men if they were to take them by du-ect storm. Beyond them, upon the Boer flank, were the hills of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which appeared to be the extreme outside of the Boer position. The plan was to engage the attention of the trenches m front by a terrific artillery fire and the threat of an assault, while at the same time sending the true flank attacK far round to carry the Cingolo ridge, which must be taken before any other hill could be approached. On the 17 th, in the early mornmg, with the first tinge of violet in the east, the irregular cavalry and the second division (Lyttelton's) with Wynne's Brigade started upon their widely curving flanking march. The I ' "O THE GHEAT BOEB WAS tl°°tl""°7^ :t^ *'"'y ^"^ "^ 'O broken that ht™ J '*/!.'"' *?'" ^'"'"' ^ "^Ble file, and would have foond themselves helpless in face of any resistance Fortunately Cingolo HiU was very weakly held. aTd by evening both our horsemen and our infantry had a firm Pip upon It. thus tummg the extreme left flank of the Boer position. For once their mountainous fortresses were a^nst them, for a mounted Boer force is so mobile that m an open position, such as faced Methuen It IS very hard and requires great celerity of movement ever to find a flank at all. On a succession of hills however, it wag evident that some one hiU must mark the extreme end of their line, and Buller had found it at thTi°' UK,' '""'*'■ *•* ^^'' "»<>^«">«' was to throw their flank back so as to face the new position Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not reahsed that this was the main attack"^" U possibe that the intervention of the river made it difficult for them to send reinforcements. However thai may be, it is certain that the task which the British found awaitmg them on the 18th proved to be far easier than ttey had dared to hope. The honours of the day rested with Hildyard's Enghsh Brigade (East Surrey, West Surrey, West Yorkshires, and 2nd Devons). fc oZ order and with a rapid adva.ce, taking every advantage of the cover-which was better than is usual in South African warfare-they gained the edge of the Monte Chnsto ndge, and then swiftly cleared the crest. One at least of the regiments engaged, the Devons, was nerved by the thought that their own first battalioi IZ hiU made tte hue of trenches which faced BuUer un- tenable, and he was at once able to advance with Barton's FusUier Brigade and to take possessi n of the whole BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE asi Boer pMition of Hlangwane and Green HiU. It was not a great tactical victory, for they had no trophies to show Bave the worthless debri, of the Boer camps But it wm c very great strategical victory, for it not only gave them toe whole south sWe of the Tugela. but also the'meansTf commandmg w.th their guns a great deal of the north side, mcludmg those Colenso trenches which had blocked ^oJZ ?, T ^ ^°°f *'' '"'' '«™'"y killed and wounded (of whom only fourteen were killed) was a S ^i;'"' u'"w'' "'"''• -^'■"^ fr°» the captured ndges the exul ant troops could see far away the haze wluch lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the besieged, with hearts beatmg high with hope, turned their glasses upon the distant mottled patches which told them thaJ tneir comrades were approaching. th JL?'""r ^°!^ *''!B"««l' had finnly established ttemselves along the whole south bank of the river H^s brigade had occupied Colenso, and the heavy guns had been pushed up to more advanced positions The crossmg of the nver was the next operation, and the ques- tion arose where it should be crossed. The wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would have been mfimtely better to have crossed on their extreme left flank, as by an .advance upon this line we should have turn^ their strong Pietere position just as we had ah-eady turned their Colenso one. With an absolutely master card m our hand we refused to play it, and won the game by a more tedious and perilous process. The assumption seems to have been made (on no other hypo- thesis can one understand the facts) that the enemy weredemorahsed a^d that the positions would not be strongly he d. Our flanking advantage was abandoned A*.^"^' "1^*""' '^' "'dered from Colenso, involving a frontal attack upon the Pieters position. ■• THE GREAT BOER WAR On February 2l8t Boiler threw h« pontoon bridge over the river near Colenro, and the same evening Us army began to cron. It wae at once evident that the Boer resistance had by no means collapsed. Wynne's Lancashire Brigade were the first across, and found them- selves hotly engaged before nightfaU. The low kopjes m front of them were blazing with musketry fire The brigade held its own. but lost the Brigadier (the second in a month) and 160 rank and file. Next morning the main body of the mfantry was passed across, and the armv was absolutely committed to the formidable and, as some lo Lad^r""^ "^*^"^'^ °' ^«''"°« "" ™y "'"^8''* The force in front had weakened, however, both in numbers Md m morale. Some thousands of the Free- staters had left in order to defend their own country from the advance of Roberts, while the rest were de- pressed by as much of the news as was aUowed by their leaders to reach them. But the Boer is a tenacious fighter, andmany a brave man was stiU to faU before Buher and White should shake hands in the High Street Of JjaaysQutb. The first obstacle which faced the army, after crossing the river was a belt of low rolhng gromid, which was gra- dually clewed by the advance of our infantry. As n^t os3d m the advance lines of Boers and BriUsh were^ close to each other, that incessant rifle fire was main- twned untU morning, and at more than one point smaU bodies of desperate riflemen charged right up to the bayonets of our infantry. The morning found us still holdLig our positions all along the line, and as more and more of our mfantry came up and gun after gun roared into action we began to push om stubborn enemy northwards. On the 21st the Dorsets, Middlesex, and BULLEB-S FINAL ADVANCE 28S SomerieU had borno the heat of the day. ^n the a2nd It was the Eoyal Lanoastera, followed by the South Lancaahiree, who took np the running. It would take the patienoe and also the space of a Kinglake in this scrambling broken fight to trace the doings of those groups of men who strove and struggled through the rifle fire. AU day a steady advance was maintained over the low kopjes, untU by evening we were faced by the more serious line of the Pieter's Hills. The opera- tions had been carried out with a monotony of gallantry Always the same extended advance, alwaya the same rattle of Mausers and clatter of pom-poms from a ridge always the same victorious soldiers on the barren crest! with a few crippled Boers before them and many crippled comrades behind. They were expensive tr:umphs, and yet every one brought them nearer to their goal. And now, like an advancing tide, they hipped along the base of Pieter's Hill. Could they gather volume enough to carry themselves over? The issue of the long-drawn battie and the fate of Ladysmith hung upon the question. Brigadier Fitzroy Hart, to whom the assault was entrusted, is in some ways as singular and pic- turesque a type as has been evolved in the war A dandy soldier, always the picture of neatness from the top of his hehnet to the heels of his well-pohshed brown boots, he brings to miUtary matters the same precision which he affects in dress. Pedantic in his accuracy, he aotuaUy at the battle of Colenso drilled the Irish Brigade for half an hour before leading them into action, and threw out markers under a deadly fire in order that his change from close to extended formation might be academically correct. The heavy loss of the Brigade at t^s action was to some extent ascribed to him and affected his popuIfttiVi but as his men came to know Ml THE GREAT BOER WAR him better hi8 romantic bravery, hii whimsical eoldiorlr humour their didike changed into admirluon 2 per«,nal disregard for danger wa. notorio^ «d Vepr^ ^ fl^H V n °°i "f° ''™' »'"* ^ k-"* "here you will Bee hmi etandmg on a took.' wa< the anewer He bore a cH,n„^ „, j, ^„ ^ ^^ ^ w». ^ Whom are you going to?' 'General Hart/ mud the «de-de.cmp. • Then good-bye I ■ cried hi. mZl A gnm humour ran through hi. nature. It i, gravely record*^ «.d widely believed that he lined up a reSt Z ^I 2 "',''" ^ *^^ """" °°' to .hrinHm fire. Amid the laughter of hi. Irishmen, he walked through the open file, of his firing line holdi^galZLI by he ear. Thi. wa. the man who had put .3^, -pmt into the Irish Brigade that amid that X of Their rushe. were the quickest, their rushe. were the tongeet. and they .tayed the shortest time under Iver' B^i a shrewd military observer. To Hart anrhii bngade was given the task of clearing the way to Lady The regiments which he took with him on his perilous enterprise were the 1st Inniskilling FurilieM the and Dublin Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught iLgertrd he Impenal Light Infantry, the whole forilg tte famous 6th Brigade They were already in the ertreme British advance, and now, a. they moved forwards, the Durham Light Infantry and the 1st Bifle Brigade from Lyttelton's Brigade came up to take their pC Z, compeUed to pass in ringle file under a heavy fire for more than a mde until they reached the spJt which BULLEKB FINAL ADVANCE jga •jemed be.tfor their entorpri... There, short Blr«»d» of iixty of their comrade., they aasembled and began a oautiou, «lv^ce open the line, of ttenohe. and Zgar. which warned the brown dope above them. th- "u""* '''*' '*" »'■'« '" ^^P »ome co/er, and the caanaltie. were comparatiyely few. But now at last, "the evening .an throw a long .hadow from the hUl. the leading regiment, the Inniekillings. found themselvc at the utmo.t fnnge of boulders with a clear slope tetween them and the main trench of the enemy, vl Ivd^SfjTn "" u."P"*' "■" 'P""»8 »»«J '•>« peat ^dite sheU. crashing they could dimly ««, a line of ^th ^u "r"'' *'"' "'"'' ^°^ ^« "J<>"«»> hats. r!^th ^fi ♦^ Inn^Wltogs sprang out, carried with a th. Ji ^ T^' ""* "•'"8"'* desperately onwards for a suT™ 1°°"; i *" " ""P"""'"' ''""°8 ""*=•' "gainst Si?T ^ '^"^l "»"'*»°««- '<» among all their gallant d^ads the Boers have never fought better than oVtha rebrnary evenmg. Amid ouch a smashing sheU fire T.J'^^ T^^^ ^'"' °*'" y«» «""lured they stood doggedly, these hardy men of the veldt, and fired fast Kid true mto the fiery rank, of the Irishmen. The yeU of the .tormers was answered by the remorselew roar of th4 Mansers and the deep-chested shouts of the farmers ?^.? 7/""'^ '''* infantry, falling, rising, dashing l^'t'^t 'i l^" """'^S '^« "'the trlh. But stiU the bearded faces glared at them over the edge, and StiU the sheet of lead pelted through their ranks. The regiment staggered, came on, staggered again, was overtaken by supporting companies of the Dublins and the Connaughts, came on, staggered once more, and flnaUy dissolved mto shreds, who ran swiftly back for cover, threadmg their way among their stricken com rades. Never on this earth was there a retreat of which •" THE GREAT BOER WAR the rorvlvon had 1«m rtMon to be uhuied. Th«y bad held on to the ntmoit capwity ol human ondnranc. Their Colonel, ten offlcera, and more than half the reri- ment were lying on the fatal hill. Honour to thea. and honour alK to the gallant Dutchmen who, rooted in the trenohei, had faced the rnih and fury of inch an on. •laught I To-day to them, to-morrow to oi— but it ia for a aoldier to thank the Ood of battle* for worthy foet. It M one thing, however, to repulae the Britiah aoldier and It 18 another to rout him. Within a few hundred yarda of their horrible ordeal at Magersfontein the High- landers reformed into a military body. Bo now the Inahmen fell back no further than the nearest cover, and there held grimly on to the ground which they had won. If yon would know the advantage which the defence haa over the attack, then do you come and ansauli this line of tenacious men, now in your hour of victory and exultation, friend Boer I Friend Boer did attempt it. and skilfully too, moving a flanking rarty to sweep the position with their fire. But the brigade, though sorely hurt, held them off without difficulty, and was found on the raommg of the 28rd to be stiU lying upon the ground which they had won. .u ^" ??^? ^^ ''**° ^"7 heavy. Colonel Thackeray of the InniskiUings, Colonel SitweU of the Dnblins, three majors, twenty officers, and a total of about six hundred out of 1,200 actually engaged. To take sioh punish- ment and to remain undemoraUsed is the supreme test to which troops can be put. Could the loss have beer avoided ? By following the original line of advance from Monte Christo, perhaps, -vhen we should have turned the enemy's left. But otherwise no. The hill was m the way and had to be taken. In the \,ar game WtLEB'8 FINAL ADVANCR jg7 yoB MDnot rl.y without » iti^,. Yon Iom and you pav forfwt, and where the game i. lair tb« best player i. he who pay. with the bc.t grace. The atlaek wai well prepared. weU deUvered. and only miKjarritd on account of the exoellence of the defence. We proved once more L-i Z'^, ?;'°'*i..'° •'"*° '^'o™' that all Talonr and all dueiphne will not avail in a frontal attack agamet brave ooolheaded men armed with quick-firing .. ""J^J^* "* ^"8*^« aesaulted Railway Hill an attack bad been made upon the left, which was probably meant m a demonstration to keep the Boers from reinforcing their comrades rather than as an actual attempt upon their lines. Such a. it wu«, however, it eost the hfeofat least one brave «,ldier. for Colonel ?Jo[od' Th I '''"'" f "I"'-"' "" """»« '•"» f-^'-' Thorold. Thackeray, and SitweU in one evening. Who Mn tty that British colonels have not given their men a The army was now at a deadlock. Railway Hijl barred the way. and if Harfs men could not carr- it by ■«ault It was hard to say who could. The 28rd found the two armies facing each other at this critical point, he frishmen still clinging to the slopes of the hill and the Boers Unmg the top. Fierce rifle firing broke out between them during the day. but each side was well covered and lay low. The troop, in support suffered romewhat however, from a random sheU fire. Mr Wmston Churchill has left it upon record that within his own observataon three of their shropnel sheUs fired at a venture on to the reverse slope of a hUl accounted for nineteen men and four horses. The enemy can never have known how hard those three shells had hit 388 THE GREAT BOEK WAR U8, and 80 we may also hope that our artillery fir« h.. often been less futUe than it appeared. ^ '"" General Duller had now realised that it was no tonceplion, finely carried on(. The 24th JI^ a. an armxstice was prcK=laimed. and the erX^eeS of tt' of our soldiers sank within them as they saw the sd ^Vhat were they foiled again ? Was the blood of these BOLLEB'S nNAL ADVANCK S89 llVZT ^r,^ tf ^ ^"^ ' They ground their teeth at the thought The higher strategy was not for them but back was back and forward was forward, and S troons whfnh "" °""Tf ^^ "•* '"«« movements of tS til *."°'"^'''" V'"^"^ tactics necesBi- Rrif/Jh V"^;' ^I"* '"««" of a heavy artiUery fire, the Bntidi right became the left and the left the right A la«e force »' Hl»°8'an3, and over it was passed a torge force of mfantry. Barton's Fusilier Briirade ssra^rjTtrY''^'^"'^^^**'^^"^^^^ T v^u '?t ■ ? ''»«'^o°3 of Norcott's (fomerly £^l™™nt^ "^t- <^«^'=BrigadewasleftatColenso to prevent a counter attack upon our left flank and communications. In this way^ while Hart ^th the SThe^'-^ti^' ^^* Brigade held the Boers S front the mam body of the army Tas rapidly swnn^ rcmnd on totheir left flank. By the morning of the 27th aU were m place for the new attack were three Boer hills; one, the nearest, may for con- venience sake be caUed Barton's Hill. As the army had hZt^ main ''r """" "P°° '^'« ^^U -S nave been a matter of extreme difficulty : but now with ^^^T^T'^'^'r^ *°"^^'' comm'lliding p^^itln' B^nV lJ r '"'^'^"'ge. In the mornmg sunUght wentan^un / T'^T^ '"'°^^ °^ «''«"=• Up they went and up, darting and crouching, until their aleamina bayonets sparkled upon the suLit The £"3 artiUery had done its work, and the first long sSp taken >n this last stage of the relief of Ladysmith' The loss *» THE GREAT BOER WAR had been slight and the advantage enormouB. After they had gained the summit the Fusiliers were stnng and "tnng again by clouds of skirmishers who clung to the flanks of the hiU, but their grip was firm and gr^-v firmer witn every hour. Of the three Boer hills which had to be «ken the nearest (or western one) was now in the hands of the Bntidi. The furthest (or eastern one) was that on which the Irish Brigade was still crouching ready at any moment for a final spring which would like them over the few hundred yards which separated them from the trenches. Between the two intervened a central hill, as yet un- touched. Could we carry this the whole position would be ours. Now for the final effort! Turn every gun upon It, the guns of Mohte Christo, the guns of Hlang- wane ! Turn every rifle upon it-the rifles of Barton's men the rifles of Hart's men, the carbines of the distant caralryl Scalp its crown with the machine-gun fire. Ana now up with you, Lancashire men, Norcott's men ! ine summit or a glorious death, for beyond that hill yonrsuffermg comrades are awaiting you! Put every bullet Mid every man and all of fire and spirit that you are worth mto this last hour ; for if you faU now you have fwled for ever, and if you win, then when your hairs are white your blood will still run warm when you think of that mommg's work. The long drama had drawn to an end, and one short day's work is to show what that end was to be. ■ .^".'i^"! "^^ "^^^'^ * ^°"''' of "• Hardly for one instant did the advance waver at any point of its extended line. It was the supreme instant of the Natal campaign. «w. wave after wave, the long lines of infantry went Bhimmermg up the hill. On the left the Lancasters, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the South Lancashires, the York and Lancasters, with a burr of north country oaths. It I BULLEI'S FINAL ADVANCE ggl went racing for the sammit. Spion Kop and a thousand comrades were caUing for vengeance. ' Bemember, men w t^V, f ?"."'y ^^''"y- "^^^ °W 40th "wept on but his dead body marked the way which they had taken On the right the East Surrey, the CamefonuLs^'th ' 8rd Eiiies. the 1st Eifle Brigade, the Durhams, ani he gaUant Irishmen, so sorely stricken and yet so eager were aU r issmg upwards and onwards. The Boer fire luUs, It ■;tase8-they are runnmg! Wild hat-waving men upon the Hlangwane uplands see the silhouette of the active figures of the stormers along the skyline and know that the position is theirs. Exultant soldiers dance and cheer upon the ridge. The sun ia setting in glory over the great Drakenaberg mountaina, and so also that night set for ever the hopea of the Boer invaders of Natal. Out of doubt and chaos, blood and ^Z' f 'T V^'^ *•"* J^-'S™*"' *'"" th« lower should not Bwallow the higher, that the world is for the man of the twentieth and not of the seventeenth century After a fortmght of fighting the weary troops threw themae vea down that night with the assurance that at last the door was ajar and the light breakmg through One more effort and it would be open before them Behmd the line of hiUs which had been taken there extended a great plain as far as Bulwana-that evil neighbour who had wrought such harm upon Ladysmith. More than half of the Pietera position had fallen into Bullers hands on the 27th, and the remainder had be- come untenable. The Boera had lost some five hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.' It seemed to the British ' Aoonralo igorcs will probablv never be obtained h„t . ».ii i. Boer in Pretoria Informed me that Pietera wa»tl,.™L. '"?'"""«> to them of the whole war. "^' '°°'" «pen«T. fight SP3 THE'onEAT BOER WAR General and hig men that one more action would brina them Bafely into Ladysmiih. ^ But here they miBoalculated. and bo often have we miBca^culated on the optimistic side in this camlil that It Mpleasmg to find for once that our hopes were UsB than the reaUty. The Boers had been beaten-Wr y beaten and d^heartened. It will always be » subject for n?r r f **''«'.*•'«? '"'« "o ontMy on the strength of the Natal campaign, or whether the news of the Cronje disaster from the western side had warned them S they must draw m upon the east. For my own part I beheve hat the honour lies with the gallant menTf Natel and that movmg on these Unes, they would. Cronje or no Cronje have forced their way in triumph to LadysSth! Caut^urTj?' long-drawn story draws to a swift close. Can lously feehng then: way with a fringe of horse the there by the crackle of musketry, but findingalways that Liv J ",«««'?«^'='«" to Dundonald that there really was no barrier between his horsemen and the Meaguered city. With a squadron of Imperial Light Horse and a squadron of Natal Carabineers he rode on o"hI}L'°i l^"""'™* *""^8ht, the Ladysmith picket challenged the approaching cavalry, and the gLlan town was saved. a-^au. It is hard to say which had shown the greater endurance, the reftued or their rescuers. The tovra mdeible, fens lurking in a hollow under commanding hdls, had held out for 118 days. They had enCl ZZ^T "^A '".""=«=='"' bombardment, to which, towards the end. owing to the failure of heavy ammu' nition, they were miable to make any adequate reply. It was calculated that 16.000 shells had fallen wi^to the town. In two successful sort-'es thoy had des- ilULLEE'S FINAL ADVANCE 203 troyod three of the enemy's heavy guns. They had l^en pressed by hunger, horseflesh was^lready runnS lillK^m^l^','^:'^'^'''^ "^ diseafe~rf tnan 2 000 cases of enteric and dysentery had been m hosp.tel at one time, and the total number of admfs" Bions had been nearly as great as the total numte of the garrison One-tenth of the men had actuaU/died of wounds or disease. Bagged, bootless, and emadated there stUl lurked in the gaunt soldiers the marM spirit rf warnors On the day after their rehef 2.000 of hem set f .th to pursue the Boers. One who helned to St'lhTt'h" T " °" '"""' '•"'' the mos'X 8 ght that he has ever seen was these wasted men Btoopmg under their rifles and gasping with the pressure' of their accoutrements, as they staggered after th^ir TtreS^o^uvrr '''^*" ^^' ^^^^^^^^^ m inese ^000 mdomitable men with their emaciated tbaTthr';"^"? ." '"""'"""^ "^- " " God-rc^y that they failed to overtake them. ^ If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the rehevmg army was no less so. Through the b lackeet depths of despondency and failure they had struggS to absolute success. At Colenso they had lost 1 20O rn«n tti Tr f°P i'™°' "' VaalkraL 400. LdTow fn his last long-drawn effcrt. 1.600 mor;. Their totl" losses were over 6.000 men, more than 20 per ce^t of the whole army. Some particular regiments ha^' Buffered horribly. The Dublin' Fusiliers heSthe roU of honour with only five officers and 40 per cent of Ih. men left standing. Next to them the InnTski^^B tSe Lancashire Fusiliers, and the Eoyal Lanca7t3'hL been the hardest hit. It speais weU for BuCtpoS of winning a^d holding the confidence of his men thll m the ace of repulse after repulse the soldiers ^ U wen into battle as steadily as ever under his command SM THE GREAT BOER WAR .utf iJf "^ '^^ BuUer'B force entered Ladyemith in state between the lines of the defenders. For their heroiem the Dublin Fusilier, were put in the van of the procession, and it is told how. as the soldiers who lined the streets saw the five officers and smaU clump of men. the remains of what had bpen a strong battalion, reahsmg. for the first time perhaps, what their relief had ^st. many sobbed like children. With cheer after cheer f„r ST """^i^^" fl<"'e'l fo' tours between banks formed by men as brave. But for the purposes of war the garrison was useless. A month of rest and food would be necessary before they could be ready to take the field once more. So the riddle of the ^ugela had at last been solved. Even now. wUh all the light which has been shed uZ To the cheerful optimism of Symons must be laid some of toe blame of the ongmal entanglement ; but man is mortal, and he laid down his life for his mistake. White who had been but a week in the comitry, could not, if he He did his best, committed one or two errors, did brJhantly on one or two points, and finally conducted the defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which are ±Im T'- V '''i"°'' '°^'^^^y. develop into^ Opnnf K^^^'P'f**' ''^''^' ^' ^'"««°'''« defence of ^! J^ fl * •* ^^ ^'™°° "^"^^ °«^» have hoisted tb. white flag He was fortunate in the troops whom he commanded-half of them old soldiers from fcdia '-and flULLEB'S FINAL ADVANCE SM exceedingly fortunate in hia officers, French (in the Rations before the siege), Archibald Hunter, Ian HamUton, Hedworth Lambton, Dick-Cnnyngham, Knox De Courcy Hamilton, and aU the other good men and true who stood (as long as they could stand) by his side. Above all, he was fortunat- in his commissariat cffloers, and it was m the offices of Colonels Ward and Stoneman as much as m the trenches and sangars of Cesar's Camp that the siegu was won. Buller, like White, had to take the situation as he found It. It IS well known that his own belief was that toe hne of the Tugela was the true defence of Natal. When he reached Africa, Ladysmith was already be- leaguered, and he, with his troops, had to abandon the Bdieme of direct invasion and to hurry to extricate White's division. Whether they might not have been more rapidly extricated by keeping to the c.-iginal plan is a question which will long furnish an exoeUent subject for military debate. Had Buller in November known that Ladysmith was capable of holding out until March, is it conceivable that he, with hia whole army corps and as many more troops as he cared to summon from England, would not have made such an advance in four months through the Free State as would necessitate the abandonment of the sieges both of Kimberley and of Ladysmith ? If the Boers persisted in these sieges they could not possibly place more than 20,000 men on the Orange Eiver to face 60,000 whom BuUer could have had there by the first week in December. Methuen's force, French's force, Gatacre's force, and the Natal force, with the exception of garrisons for Pieter- maritzbnrg and Durban, would have assembled, with a reserve of another sixty thousand men in the colony or on the sea ready to flU the gaps in his advance. Moving 29a THE GREAT BOER WAR J \ ^r^T^^ " '^^ ^•»' Bi'«^ '•to « January M ha" been til' r '. '""^".'' *" * """^ «"««. would nave been he least eipenBive means of fighting them • lon/ltnf , 'MT ^ '^ <""°« Bomewhere. !nd tte ^:irSthSre-nSn2-2^ .!». TfS " !»• lin,, B,il., „i ,|„, fi, ij^ BULLERS FINAL ADVANCE an •V, ?h^„ ?. "'' " *" *°'^"« '»<'»'? punishment, even er Ltn °'>'°PO'-ary faUore, were oonaistent oh«r terutios of his generalship. The Vaalkranz ooeration,. .ro part^arly difficult to defend from the Xrto havmg been needlessly slow and half-heart^ n?a exceedmgly sensitive about the lives of hi. ™1„ :> T^e' thrL"" n'' -"' *»■- - ioTwi:^ success might havn nndo.) tt,. t> . . ''''*' * andthflKlT » . ™ ^°** invasion of Natal, a ven^Lt T? °'" '°°J^"> ''°»M ^ "ell spent in such r«tm • ""'"''"y " °°' ^ •>« '">«'» in pursuing a retiring enemy encumbered with much baggage, th^lts day IS mdeed past. However, when all islaid we come back to the fact that General BuUer carried ou Til appomted task with success, said that this task was the most onerous one of the whole campaign. En,n^! ""^^^.^ ^"'Jys'ni"' stored the people of the SmZ^ '«'?''"8'»^« P^'l-aP' the subsequent re he? sow nn"^'*^*'/?"' ''"™8 °" generation. Even sober unemotional London found its soul for once and fluttered with joy. Men, wumen. and children rich and poor clubman and cabman, joined in the unurersal dehght. The thought of our garrison; of their . ^7°'.°' T r^^''"'' *° '«'•«'« them of th^ for'^^v^ ""^f""" ^ '^"" '^^ *° »«■ '^'"i ^^ dark for many months across our spirits. It had weighed i k KM THE QREAT BOER WAS upon 01, nnta the mbjaot, thoagh ever pntant in onr thooghta, was too pkinful tor general talk. And now, in an instant, the ibadow waa lifted. The outbnrat of rejoicing wai not a triomph over the gallant Boen. But it was our own eeoape from humiliation, the knowledge that the blood of our soni had not been ahed in vain, above all the conviction that the darkest hour had now passed and that the light of peace was dimly breaking far away— that was why London rang with joy bells that March morning, and why those bells echoed back from every town and hamlet, in tropical sun and in Arctic snow, over which the flag of Britain waved. CHAPTEB XVIU TBI mOB AND SlLOr or miBBBLIT It has already been narrated how, upon the arrival of the army oorpa from England, the greater part was drafted to Natal, whUe some went to the western side, and started under Lord Methuen upon the perilous enterprise of the relief of Kimberley. It has also been shown how, after three expensive victories, Lord Methuen's force met with a paralysing reverse, and was compelled to remain inactive within twenty miles of the town which they had come to succour. Before de- scribing how that succour did eventually arrive, some attention must be paid to the incidents which had occurred within the city. 'I am directed to assure you that there is no reason for apprehending that Kimberley or any part of the colony either is, or in any contemplated event will be, in danger of attack. Mr. Schreiner is of opinion thit your fes-s are groundless and your anticipations in the matter eutirely without foundation.' Such is the official reply to the remonstrance of the inhabitants, when, with the shadow of war dark upon them, they appealed for help. It is fortunate, however, that a progressive British town has usually the capacity for doing things for itself without the intervention of officials. Kimberley was particularly lucky in being the centre of the wealthy and alert De Beers Company, which had laid in sufficient «w THE GREAT flOEH WAB ^i ammunition and lupplie. to prevent the town fmm i^i helplee. in the pre«,no, of the enemy CtS «^ ' TnTth'^r"''""''' ••'■'"'-"• -heir Ja" h'o;t rr and the garnwn contained only «,ven hundred rLS whe the remainder were moeUy untrained S..Td artisan.. Among thorn, however, there wai aTr^H n- of dangerous men from the norther "war^.„?n""^ nerved by a knowledge that tl'^gr^and whiS JT defended was eaeential to the Emnire """° "'""" "V encouragement to the Boere enormow smmsm Btand, for its past. hae,Lh "\ltt^ S'l^ ll' racter. some traits which may withnnf ? •"" becaUed Napoleonic. The "XteV^/Sl' rLK?^„2iJr;:;«s'-'aT" want of scruple where an amiition is toSi'^L' mentary support, and in the storv of thl T ^^V TIIE 8IE0E AND HELIEF OF KIMDEnLEy 101 th6 development of the coantry in ovory conceivable re •pect. from the building of a railway to the imporUtion of a pedigree bull, engages hU unremitting attention. inhobitanta of Kimberley first heard the voice of war. It ton and fell in a suooeMion of horrible acream. and groMi which travelled far over the veldt, and the ouUymg farmers marvelled at the dreadful clamour Thoje who have endured all-the rifle, the cannon, and the hunger-have said that those wild whoops from the •irens were what had tried their nerve the most. The Boers in scattered bands of horsemen were thick troana the town, and had blocked the railroad. Thov raided cattle upon the outskirts, but made no attempt to rush the defence. The garrison, who, civilian and mihtary. approached four thousand in number, lay close 11 ''ril'""' '?*''"''" '""^K fo' "-^ attack whi, U never came. The perimeter to be defended was ibout eiRht mUes, but the heaps of taiUngs made admirable fortifica- hTk. .'.'°*" '"^ °°"« "' ^^°^ inconvenient heights around It which bad been such bad neighbours to Ladysmith. Picturesque surroundings are not favour- able to defence. On October 24th the garrison, finding that no attack was made, determined upon a reconnaissance. The mounted force, upon which most of the work and of the loss feU, consisted of the Diamond Fields Horse, a small anT^'i^ CaP« Police, a company of Mounted Infantry, and a body called the Kimberley Light Horse. With two hundred and seventy volunteers from this force Major Scott-Turner, a redoubtable fighter, felt his way to the north until he came in touch with the Boers. ine latter, who were much superior in numbers 803 THE GREAT BOEK WAH ^: manoeuvred to cut him off. but the arrival ol two compamea of the North Lancashire Begiment turned the scale m our favour. We lost three killed and twenty-one wounded in the sUrmish. The Boer loss is unknown, uut their commander Botha was slain. On November 4th Commandant Wessels formaUy summoned the town, and it is asserted that he gave Colonel Kekewieh leave to send out the women and children. That officer has been blamed for not takins advantage of the permission-or at the least for not communicating it to the civil authorities. As a matter of fact the charge rests upon a misapprehension. In Wessels letter a distinction is made between Africander and Enghsh women, the farmer being offered an asylum in his camp. This offer was made known, and half a dozen persons took advantage of it. The suggestion however in the case of the English carried with it no promise that they would be conveyed to Orange Biver and a compliance with it would have put them as help^ less hostages into the hands of the enemy. As to not publishing the message it is not usual to publish such officii documents, but the offer was shown to Mr lihodes. who concurred in the impossibility of accept- It is difficult to aUude to this subject without touch- ing upon the painful but notorious fact that there existed durmg the .siege considerable friction between the mJitaiy authorities and a section of the civilians, of whom Mr. Bhodes was chief. Among other character- istics Bhodes bears any form of restraint very badly and chafes mightUy when unable to do a thing in the exact way which he considers best. He may be a Napoleon of peace, but his warmest friends could never descnbe him as a Napoleon of war, for his military THE SIEGE AND Pf, i^p OF KiMBEilLEV E03 forecasts have been err necna, aiid f'., management of the Jameson fiasco ceiai-ly inspire, no confidence in thejadgmentof anyonevo:.xr:- (J. That his intentions were of the best, and that he had the good of the Empire at heart, may be freely granted ; but that these motives should lead him to cabal against, and even to threaten, the mihtary governor, or that he should attempt to force Lord Boberts's hand in a mihtary operation, is most deplorable. Every credit may be given to him for aU . his aid to the mUitary-he gave with a good grace what the garrison would otherwise have had to commandeer- but it ,s a fact that the town would have been more united, and therefore stronger, without his presence. Colonel Kekewich and his chief staff officer. Major Meara, were as much plagued by intrigue within as by the Boers without. On November 7th the bombardment of the town com- menoed from nine 9-pounder guns to which the artiUery of the garrison could give on adequate reply. The result, however, of a fortnight's fire, during which seven hundred shells were discharged, was the loss of two non-combatants. The question of food was recognised as bemg of mere importance than the enemy's fire An early relief appeared probable, however, as the advance Of Methuen s force was already known. One pound of bread, two ounces of sugar, and half a pound of meat Tm ?w .u^' ^"^- ^' ""^ "n'y °° the smaU children that the scarcity of milk told with tragic effect. At Ladysmith, at Mafeking, and at Kimberley hundreds of these mnocents were sacrificed November 25th was a red-letter day with the garrison l^TfrT'^'rJ''' '""^ ■'"P««"°° t^^"' Methuen tions. The attack was made upon one of the Boer SM THE GREAT BOER WAR N positions by a force consiBting of a detachment of the Light Horse and of the Cape Police, and their work was brilliantly sncoessful. The actual storming of the redoubt was carried out by some forty men, of whom but four were killed. They brought back thirty-three prisoners as a proof of their victory, but the Boer gun. as usual, escaped us. In this brilliant affair Scott-Turner was wounded, which did not prevent him, only three days later, from leading another sortie, which was as disastrous as the first had been successful. Save under very exceptional circumstances it is in modern warfare long odds always upon the defence, and the garrison would probably have been better advised had they refrained from attacking the fortifications of their enemy— a truth which Baden-Powell learned also at Game Tree Hill. As it was, after a temporary success the British were blown back by the fierce Mau.er fire, and lost the indomitable Scott-Turner, with twenty-one of his brave companions killed and twenty-eight wounded, all belong- ing to the colonial corps. The Empire may reflect with pride that the people in whose cause mainly they fought showed themselves by their gallantry and their devotion worthy of any sacrifice which has been made. Again the siege settled down to a monotonous record of decreasing rations and of expectation. On December 10 there came a sign of hope from the outside world. Far on the southern horizon a little golden speck shimmered against the blue African sky. It was Methuen's balloon gleaming in the sunshine. Next morning the low grumble of distant cannon was the sweetest of music to the Ustening citizens. But days passed without further news, and it was not for more than a week that they learned of the bloody repulse of Magersfontein, and that help was once more indefinitely postponed. Helio- 9j:1S¥W^Mj^ I THE SIEGE AND BELIEF OF KIMBERLEV «« number of a horse W.-th T • ^nest'on about the haa been cUed as an^l™^"""?''''"* "tupidity this incapacity. Of "^0 h^tt oft'"' J""^ ""^ test as to whether they were reallv in '"'°''°" ""' " with the garrison It rn,«ft % " communication Beenas to lave ^ntaS.ed le ""v ?' ?"' ""^ '°™ reasonable people. ^ ^ querulous and un- to 't^z o?r ;:3 ^.-etrr ^'^ -•'-^ health of the inhaC?= W ' P" ^«»^' ^^ile the their confinement Se^' S," 'l '''^'"' "'"'" ""der aroused by the attempt made Sh; n'^r'' ""' ''^^"'^ to build a gun which mighrreacJ'tf-'''''"'^'^"''' This remarkable piece of L ^"' °PPo°enfs. an American nam^Latam "bT^Tf "r "^ manufactured for the nnrL=! j ,. '"^'P of tools town took the ^haj: S Il^of a^t^ "/f ''' which proved to be a most effic!«nf ?®"'- "^^^ gun, With grim humour Mr bL! ■ r"' °' "'"'«'?• inscribed upon Z ^uflfZT^^^'"''- '"^^ ''^- openly expressed threat of iL 1 1 "" '''*'' °f ""e capture t^ey .oJZ^^^lZX ^rZ:' '' e^pe^tiS^Sant'^n^' "T^^ - to it. 0nFebraarv7?h ^^*'*'' * '""'"^ answer 961b. BheU^XTfr m Kamrr«""'*'''°"'"S ^ miles from he centre om ^r '^^'^' which is four the evil precedent oT the airT ^'^ "'^"'' '"""'^-S not at the forts, but toto the tS' "^ J^TO, were fired and night thes; hugV n^lai e->^^''^ i'" °"'- ^"^ ^ou.sandoc.sion^,rrg^r£-tt:;i^^^ 806 THE GREAT BOER WAH ■ / h Some thousands of the women and chUdren were convoyed down the mines, where, in the electric-lighted tunnels, they lay in comfort and safety. One surprising revenge the Boers had, for by an extraordinary chance one of the few men killed by their gun was the ingenious Labram who had constructed the 28-ponnder. By an even more singular chance, Leon, who was responsible for bringing the big Boer gun, was struck immediately afterwards by a long-range rifle-shot from the garrison. The historian must be content to give a tame account of the siege of Kimberley, for the thing itself was tame. Indeed ' siege ' is a misnomer, for it was rather an investment or a blockade. Such as it was, how- ever, the inhabitants became very restless under it, and though there were never any prospects of surrender the utmost impatience began to be manifested at the protracted delay on the part of the relief force. It wag not till later that it was understood how cunningly Kimberley had been used as a bait to hold the enemy until final preparations had been made for his destruc- tion. And at last the great day came. It is on record how dramatic was the meeting between the mounted outposts of the defenders and the advance guard of the relievers, whose advent seems to have been equally unexpected by friend and foe. A skirmish was in progress on February 15th between a party of the Kimberley Light Horse and of the Boers, when a new body of horsemen, unrecognised by either side, appeared upon the plain and opened fire upon the enemy. One of the strangers rode up to the patrol. ' What the dickens does K.L.H. mean on your shoulder-strap ? ' he asked. ' It means Kimberley Light Horse. Who are you ? ' ' I am one I .^^^^^m. 4 • THE SIEGE AND BELIEF OP KIMBERLEY 8t7 Of the New-Zealanders.' Maoaulayin his wildestdream lu^J^r"' the mnch-quoted NewZealander neve^ pictured h.m as heading a rescue force for the relief of a British town in the heart of Africa. M„ ^''%P°P»If«°nhad assembled to watch the mighty cloud of dust which rolled along the south-eastrn horizon What was it which swept westwards with n Its reddish heart ? Hopeful and yet fearful they sTwre the' whole oJT "'"'■" ""■' °='"*'- ^" "««"'" fro» ™.J^ff 0' Cronje-s army was the thought !.h passed through many a mind. And then thedust-cloud and Tn ;^* "f ? ^A°' °' '"'"«^'=" ''p""^'^ ""t from it; hLn *^;'^^''f'^ f"-fl»« "°k8 the gUnt of spear- heads and the gleam of scabbards told of the Hussars and Lancers, while denser banks on either flank maXd w^r'l"'".°V''*-:''''""8 e^B. Wearied and spent ™ltin. r -"^ "f"' "''' '•"« ''"^'y "^«'= "d the th^^rLT""? ^"*' ^^ ^'"^ •"««' as they saw the broad city before them, and swept with martial rattle and jmgle towards the cheering crowds. Amid shouts and tears French rode into Kimberley while his troopers encamped outside the town launched, the narrative must go back to the beginning of the month. At that period Methuen and his men were stUl faced by Cronje and his entrenched foZ who in spite of occasional bombardments, held their position between Kimberley and the reKeving army. French, having handed over the operations at Colesberg to Clements had gone down to Cape Town to confer with Boberts and Kitchener. Thence they all three m^e heir way to the Modder Eiver, which was evidenHy about tobe.thebase of a more largely conceived series of operations than any which had yet been undertaken. R-,«i'-V.i' lW^'^Xk. ao8 THE OHEAT BOER WAR "^i In order to draw the Boer attention away from the thunuerbolt which was about to fall upon their left flank a strong demonstration ending in a brisk action was' made early in February upon the extreme right of Cronje's position. The force, consisting of the Highland Brigade, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, No 7 Co Eoyal Engineers, and the 62nd Battery, was under the command of thfl famous Hector Macdonald. 'Fight- ing Mao ■ as he was called by his men, had joined his regiment as a private, and had worked through the grades of corporal, sergeant, captain, major, and colonel until now, still in the prime of his manhood, he found himself riding at the head of a brigade. A bony craggy Scotsman, with a square fighting head and a bull- dog jaw, he had conquered the exclusiveness and routine of the British service by the same dogged quaUties which made him formidable to Dervish and to Boer With a cool brain, a steady nerve, and a proud heart he 13 an ideal leader of infantry, and those who saw him manoeuvre his brigade in the crisis of the battle of Omdurman speak of it as the one great memory which they carried back from the engagement. On the field of battle he turns to the speech of his chUdhood, the jagged raspmg, homely words which brace the nerves of the northern soldier. This was the man who had come from India to take the place of poor Wauchope, and to put fresh heart into the gallant but sorely stricken brigade. The four regiments which composed the infantry of theforce-the Black Watch, the Argyll and Sutherlands, the Seaforths, and the Highland Light Infantry— left Lord Methuen's camp on Saturday, February 8rd, and halted at Fraser's Drift, passing on next day to" Koodoos- berg. The day was very hot, and the going very heavy and many men fell out, some never to return. The \ M %£.€^ THE SIEOB AND HELIEK OF KIMBERLEV ,o» on the south aide' cite wi '^n^ r"=''"« ™"" across the drift to sei.e and entr n h L HZdr^"' and some adjacent kopjes whieh I- ^°°^°°^^<'''g .FeSX^, Vb«'S" .rrsL'' 'r •' companies of the Black Wfttoh on^T , , "^ '^° Light Infantry into the St Th« p"" °' '^/ ^'^hland forths, had his carotirl o„i jl u *"^' °* *''* Sea- «2I^,^^ no TlIE GHEAT BOER WAU ,7 h the action came to a tame conclnaion, the Boers retiring nnpnraned from their attack. On Thursday, February 8th, they were found to have withdrawn, and on the same even- ing our own force was recalled, to the surprise and dis- appointment of the public at home, who had not realised that in directing their attention to their right ilank the column had already produced the effect upon the enemy for which they had been sent. They could not be left there, as they were needed lor those great operations which were pending. It was on the 9th that the brigade returned ; on the 10th they were congratulated by Lord Boberts in person; and on the Hth those new disposi- tions were made which were destined not only to relieve Kimberley, but to inflict a blow upon the Boer cause from which it was never able to recover. Small, brown, and wrinkled, with puckered eyes and alert manner. Lord Boberts in spite of his sixty-seven years preserves the figure and energy of youth. The active open-air life of India keeps men at for the saddle when in England they would only sit their club arm- chairs, and it is hard for any one 'who sees the wiry figure and brisk step of Lord Boberts to realise that he has spent forty-one years of soldiering in what used to be regarded as an unhealthy climate. He had carried into late life the habit of martial exercise, and a Eussian traveUer has left.it on record that the sight which surprised him most in India was to see the veteran commander of the army ride forth with his spear and carry off the peg with the skill of a practised trooper. In his early youth he had shown in the Mutiny that he possessed the fighting energy of the soldier to a remark- able degree, but it was only in the Afghan War of 1880 that he had an opportunity of proving that he had rarer and more valuable gifts, the power of swift resolution THE SIEOE AND BELIEF OF KmBEHLEY 311 and hig army dmppcarod entirely from the public ten only to emerge drar-atfcal'y as viotorB at a point three hundred miles distan* from where they had vln"shed n.d *" " °°'^ '' * '°'^«'"' •*"' " » ™»n. that Lord Woberts possesses wme remarkable characteristics. He T.^ a «»?'«««> degree that magnetic quality which Sow hTm T ?.""' "r''' ''"* «■« '"-^ "' 'hose who know him In Chaucer's phrase, he is a very perfect gentlekmght. Soldiersand regimental offlcers'ka^tr tioltBriZ 1 "T"" '"'^"="°" ^°'='^ - the unemo' tional British Army has never had for any leader in the course of our h story. His cl-ivalrous courtesy his unm-ng tact his kindly nature, his unselfi h and him to those rough loyaJ natures, who would foUowhim with as much confidence and devotion as the ,rogna7. of he Guard had in the case of the Great Emperor. There were some who feared that inEoberts'scase as in "ightT'T '"^ " ■•"'' -•' ''°Pi« °f South S might form the grave and headstone of a military tently shown a wide sweep of strategy and a power of conceiving the effect of scattered movements o'^eTa aamirers. In the second week of February his dis- posUions were ready, and there followed the swift ser^s of blows which brought the Boers upon their i^ees ILd the war eventually to a termination. Of thesTwe sWl on^describe here theexploitsof the fine forceTcavaS which, after a ride of a hundred miles, broke out of the heart of that reddish dust-cloud a'nd swept the Boer besiegers away from hard-pressed Kimberley In order to strike unexpectedly, Lord Boberts had .«.,„ ,* n< HIE ailEAT BOEn wah a tho other end of ti.e Boer Jinc, but he Lad wUi^rZ. from the begmnmg of the war. Eimmgton'e Scouts and two brigades of rnounted infantry undfr Colonels BidleJ mere Bkirm sh on its way to the rendezvous and lost « y or sixty in kUled, wounded, and missing. Fiv" other batteries of Horse Artillery were added to the fort Jingineers. The total number of men was about five housand. By the night of Sunday, -ebruary 11 °h tWs moved off over the shadowy veldt, the beat of twenty thousand hoofs, the clank of steel, aiJd the rumMe oS ttigruSeX? '"'^ " '-'' '°' -""« Two mers, the Eiet and the Modder. intervened :%.-»•• * TOE 8IEGK AND BEIJEP OP KrMHEm.EY 3,3 them, French passed hi. men over DekicVs Hr^ Son"' T.*"™'""''""' '""P' 'he enemjou Xn position. This considerable force of Bo«r« h. 1 from Jacobsdal. and were iZ tl , ♦ ! ^ """"^ position to ress'the cros'n^ nlf '\«'' '"'° sSr tV-' Tf -'" -ttn'':..:rmrre sMes of fh« f . I"".'-'" " '"y ''°«'" »°"« he held both one more horseman. It was Eoberts himself who had r^den over to give the men a send-off, and thelf/ht of his w,ry erect figure and mahogany face sent thTm fuU of fire and confidence upon their way. But the march of this second day (February lq(^,^ was a miUtary operation of some difficulty ^S ih!^ '.''« Modder. and it was possible that even then drift The weather was very hot, and through the long d.y the sun beat down from an unclouded sky. whUe thf S A broad and plain, swelling into stony hJls. surrounded them on every side. Here and there w the extreme distance, mounted figures moved over ment7hVSr'~^,T.."'°"*' "'"' «'«''«<» ^ ^ale' ment the advance of this great array. Once or twice these men gathered together, and a sputter of rifle fire broke out upon our left flank, but the'^great tide swept »u THE OnEAT BOEB WAR /> % on «nd carried them with it. Often in thii deeoUU ^d the herd, of mottled ipringbok »nd of grey rek- bok could be Men aweeping over the pUin, or .topping with that cunouty upon which the hunter tradei, to ttare at the unwonted spectacle. nv.r^^iT" ''•!{ ""7 «J^e.huMar., dragoone, and lancen, ^fuiJ""'*"'* ''*''"• °""' '"•° '"d »«>"»• drooped with the heat and the exertion. A front of nearly two miles was kept, the regimenta moving two abreast in open order ; and the tiuH of this magnificent cloud of horsemen sweeping over the great barren plain was a glorious one. The veldt had caught fire upon the right, and a black cloud of smok( with a lurid heart to it covered he flank. The beat of the sun from above and the swelter of dust from below were overpowering. Gun horses fcU in the traces and died of pure exhaustion. The men, parched and silent, but cheerful, strained their eyes to pierce the continual mirage which played Modder. At last, as the sun began to slope down to the rwi\ ."!u^* ?' ^^° '" discerned, the bushes which skirt the banks of that ill-favoured stream. With renewed heart the cavalry pushed on and made for the drift. whUe Major Bimington, to whom the onerous duty of guidmg the force had been entrusted, gave a Bigh of rehefaahesawthat he had indeed struck the very point at which he had aimed. The essential thing in the movements had been speed-to reach each point before the enemy could concentrate to oppose them. Upon this it depended whether they would find five hundred or five th^sand waitmg on the further bank. It must have been with anxious eyes that French watched his first regiment ride down to Klip Drift. If the Boers should have had ."..•41 THE 8IE0E AND IlEUEF OF KIMUERLEY Sl« notice of his coming »nd have transferred some of their 40-poanders, he might lose heavily before he forced the stream. Bat this time, at last, he had completely outmanoDuvred them. He came with the news of hii coming, and Broadwood with the 12th Lancers rushed the drift. The small Boer force saved itself by flight, and the camp, the wagons, and the supplies remained with the victors. On the night of the 18th he had secured the passage of the Modder, and np to the early morning the horses and the guns were splashing throagh its coffee-coloured waters. French's force had now come level to the main position of the Boers, but had struck it upon the extreme left wing. The extreme right wing, thanks to the Koodoosdrift demonstration, was fifty miles off, and this line was naturally very thinly heM, save only at the central position of Magersfontein. Cronje could not denude this central position, for he saw Methuen stUl waiting in front of him, and in any case Klip Drift is twenty-five miles from Magersfontein. But the Boer left wing, though scattered, gathered into some sort of cohesion on Wednesday (February 14th), and made an effort to check the victorious progress of the cavalry. It was necessary on this day to rest at KUp Drift, untU Kelly-Kenny should come up with the infantry to hold what had been gained. All day the small bodies of Boers came riding in and taking np positions between the column and its objective. Next morning the advance was resumed, the column being stiU forty miles from Kimberley with the enemy in unknown force between. Some four miles out French came upon their position, two hills with a long low nek between, from which came a brisk rifle fire supported by artillery. But French was not only not to be stopped, SI8 THE OnEAT BOER WAB 'J walkmg to ease his horse, but oarryinR nart of Hi monstrous weight of saddle gear. b7 ^jL ", fatigue the force pressed on untU in T. ?f, ^ ' distant view was Ln. acrl tt' r^ddS ^TiC bnck houses and corrugated roofs ofTmS"; t1 fF^brXTthf tr "'r'"""' •" "• -^ ^'' "^S nl^-n f ^ f ^ ***■ '^*''*''°8 <=°'""^ camped on the rir™ s^ur "^^^ ^--^ -^ ^ «^ °^et The war has been a cruel one for the cavalrv »i.„ certainly the branch of the service wWch has hafl ! patrolling « the most dangerous which a soldier can «fl£: _. ^m. 1«C THE SIEGE AND RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY 317 wways wi h the big battalionB, and there never wai . campaign in which there was more unrecordXrlL tB ™rw°' '^«'P'<"'«"»'«8 Pl»n of campaign might be dis^ located. It was very annoying to lost, a hundred and eighty wagons, but it only meant a temporary incon- venience The plan of campaign was The essential thmg. Therefore he sacrificed his convoy and hurried his troops upon their original mission. It was with heavy hearts and bitter words that those who had fought 80 long abandoned their charge, but now at least there ere probably few of them who do not agree in the wisdom of the sacrifice. Our loss in this affair was be- tween fifty and suty killed and wounded. The Boers were unable to get rid of the stores, and they were eventuaUy dutributed among the local farmers and re- covered agam aa the British forces flowed over the country. i p tM THE QAEAT BOKR WAR Another siball disaster occarred to as on the preceding day in the loss of fifty men of E company of Kitchener's Horse, which had been left as a gaard to a well in the desert. But great events were coming to obscare those small uhecks which are incidental to a war carried out over immense distances against a mobile and enterprising enemy. Cro^je had suddenly become aware of the net which was closing round him. To the dark fierce man who had striven so hard to make his line of kopjes im- pregnable it must have been a bitter thing to abandon his trenches and his rifle pita. But he was crafty as well as tenacious, and he had the Boer horror of being cut off— an hereditary instinct from fathers who had (ought on horseback against enemies oh foot. If at any time during the last ten weeks Methnen had con- tained him in front with a thin line of riflemen with machine guns, and had thrown the rest of his force on Jacobsdal and the east, he would probably have attained the same result. Now at the rumour of English upon his flank Croryo instantly abandoned his position and his plans, in order to restore those communications with Bloemfontein upon which he depended for his supplies. With furious speed he drew in his right wing, and then, one huge mass of horsemen, guns, and wagons, he swept through the gap between the rear of the British cavalry bound for Kimberley and the head of the British infantry at Klip Drift. There was just room to pass, and at it he dashed with the furious energy of a wild beast rush- ing from a trap. A portion of his force with his heavy guns had gone north round Kimberley to 'Warrenton ; many of the Freestaters also had slipped away and returned to their farms. The remainder, number- ing about six thousand men, the majority of whom PAARDEBERO ,j, *.re^Tnin.va.ler.. .wept through between the BriUsh This movement wae owried out on the nioht of February 15th .nd had it been » little quicker imgh have been concluded before we were aware of it. Bu the lumbenng wagons impeded it. and on the Friday mornmg February 16th, a huge rolling cloud of du^t on the northern veldt, moving from west to east, told our out ^ts at Khp Drift that Cronje's army had ^mlsSd through our fingers. Lord Kitchener, who was in Tom mand at Klip Drift at the moment, in'stently unkashTd hM mounted infantry in direct piusuit, wWk Ss bngadesped along the northern bank of The riS^to chng on to the right haunch of the retr Jtag o „mn Cronjesmen had made a night march of thbtymUe from Magersfontein, and the wagon bullocks werrex donm»; ' r '"'^'■"'"*' '''"'°"* »■> absolule abl: frrhupits^"" "' ■'""''• '"' '■^ "^ ««' -y This was no deer which they were chasing, however bn^ rather a grim old Transvaal wolf, with his 7.7(1; flashmg ever over his shoulder. The sight of tho^ d»tant white-tilted wagons fired the Moid of eve^ the West B.dmgs. and the Gloucesters racing along the ^r ^t t"^ ''' ^'''"T '"'"' "^^ »' »" African mo™! mg But there were kopjes ahead, sown with fierce Dopper Boers, and those tempting wagons were only to which the English were hurrying was suddenly s^e^I m ha storm of bullets. The lon| infantry line LTdfd yet farther and lapped round the flank of Ihe Boer post thetee^Metford was sung while the 8Ut field battery THE GRSAT BOKR WAB hnniMl np in time to add iti deep row to their higher ohonu. With fine judgment Croqje held on to the iMt moment of rafety , and then with a twift morement to the rear leized a further line two milei off, and again mapped baok at his eager pureaeri. All day the grim and weary rearguard stalled off the fiery advance of the infantry, and at nightfall the wagons were itill untaken. The pursuing force to the north of the river was, it must be remembered, numerically inferior to the pursued, so that in simply retarding the advance of the enemy and in giving other British troops time to come up, Knox's brigade was doing splendid work. Had Cronje been well advised or well informed, he would have left his guns and wagons in the hope that by a swift dash over the Modder he might still bring his army away in safety. He seems to have underrated both the British numbers and the British activity. On the night then of Friday, February 16th, Cronje lay upon the northern bank of the Uodder, with his stores and guns still intact, and no enemy in front of him, though Knox's brigade and Hannay's Mounted Infantry were behind. It was necessary for Cronje to cross the river in order to be on the line for Bloemfontein. As the river tended to the north the sooner he could cross the better. On the south side of the river, however, were considerable British forces, and the obvious strategr was to hurry them forward and to block every drift at whioh he could get over. The river runs between very deep banks, so steep that one might almost describe them as small cliffs, and there was no chance of a horseman, lar less a wagon, crossing at any point save those where the convenience of traffic and the use of years had worn sloping paths down to the shallows. The British knew exactly therefore what the places were which had to be PAARDEBEBO fgf WoolMd. On the OM lude of the next few honn the •neeea or faUnre of the whole operation must depend. The newMt drift to Cronje wsi only a mile or two dutant, Klipkraal the name ; next to that the Paarde- berg Drift ; next to that the Wolveskraal Drift, each about teren milei from the other. Had Croiye piuhed on instantly after the action, he might have got aoron at Klipkraal. But men, hotaei, and buUooka were equally exhausted attar a long twanty-fonr hours' marching and fighting. He gave his weary soldiers some hours' reet, and then, abandoning seventy-eight of his wagons, he pushed on before daylight for the farthest off of the three fords (Wolveskraal Drift). Could he reach and cross it before his enemies, he was safe. The Klipkraal Drift had in the meanwhile been secured by the Buffs, the West Bidings, and the Oxfordshire Light Infantry after a spirited little action which, in the rapid rush of events, attracted less attention than it deserved. The brunt of the fighting feU upon the Oxfords, who lost ten killed and tliirty-nine wounded. It was not a waste of life, however, for the action, though small and hardly recorded, was really a very essential one in the campaign. But Lord Boberts' energy had infused itself into hit divisional commanders, hie brigadiers, his colonels, and so down to the humblest Tommy who tramped and stumbled through the darkness with a devout faith that 'Bobs' was going to oatch' old Cronje' this time. The mounted infantry had galloped round from the north to the south of the river, crossing at Klip Drift and securing the southern end of Klipkraal. Thither also came Stephenson's brigade from Kelly-Kenny'g Division, whUe Knox, finding in the morning that Cronje was go^^ marched along the northern bank to the same spot As KUpkraal was safe, the mounted infantry pushed on at <*oe and secured the southern end of the Paardeberg ■• THE GREAT BOEB WAS Drift, whither they w«n fallowed the eame evening by 8te!>henion uid Knox. There renuUned only the Wolveekrul Drift to block, and thii had already bean done by ai imart a pieoe of work ai any in the war. Whererer French hai gone be hai done well, bnt hie crowning glory waa the morement from Kimberley to head off Cronje'a retreat. The exertione which ; le moonted men had made in the relief of Kimberley have been already recorded. They arrived there on Tharsday with their horaei dead beat. They were afoot at three o'clock on Friday morn- ing, and two brigadei out of three were bard at work all day in an endeavour to capture the Dronfleld position. Yet when on the same evening an order came that French ■hould start again instantly from Kimberley and en- deavour to head Cronje's army off, he did not plead inability, as many a commander might, but taking every man whose horse was still fit to carry him (something under two thousand out of a column which bad been at least five thousand strong), be started within a few hours and pushed on through the whole night. Horses died under their riders, but still the column marched over the shadowy veldt under the brilliant stars. By happy chance or splendid calculation they were beading strai^t for the one drift which waa still open to Croi^e. It was a close thing. At. midday on Saturday the Boer advance guard waa already near to the kopjes which command it. But French's men, still full of fight after their march of thirty miles, threw themselves in front and seized the position before their very eyes. The last of the drifts was closed. If Gronje was to get across now, he n)nst crawl out of his trench and fight under Boberts's conditions, or be might remain under his own conditions until Boberts's forces closed round him. With him lay the alternative. In the meantime, still ignorant of the . PAARDEBERO nf toroM abont him, bnt finding htmialf beaded off by Fwnoh. he nude bis way down to the river and ocoapied • long itreioh of it between PaarJeberg Drift and w.uwekraal Drift, hoping to force hii way aoroH. Thii wai the lituation on the night of Saturday. February 17th In the ooune of that night the Britiih brigade! Btaggering with latigne but indomitably reeolnte to croih Zf" •T'V"*"''' ""^ oonverging upon Paardeberg. The Highland Brigade, eihauted by a heavy march over ioft land from Jacobedal eo Klip Drift, were nerved to freeh exertions by the word • Magergfontein,' which flew from hp to Up along the ranlu, and pushed on for another twelve milea to Paardeberg. Close at their heels came Smith-Dorrien's 19th Brigade, comprising the Shropshires, the Comwalls. the Gordons, and the Canadians, probably the very finest brigade in the whole army. They pushed across the river and took up their position upon the north bank. The old wolf was now fairly surrounded. On the west the Highlanders were south of the river, and Smith-Dorrien on the north. On the east KeUy-Kenny's Division was to the south of the nver, and French with his oavnh-y and mounted infantry were to the north of it. Never wag a general in a more hopdes* phght. Do what he would, there was no possible loophole for escape. There was only one thing which apparenUy should not have been done, and that nag to attack him. His position was a formidable one. Not only were the banks of the river fringed with his riflemen under e;tcellent cover, but from these banks there extended on each side a number of dongas, which made admirable natural trenches. The only possible attack i n either side must be across a level plain at least a thousand or fifteen hundred yards in width, where our numbers wpuld only BweU our losses. It must be a bold soldier If' ( ISO THE GBEAT BOER WAB :}' and a far bolder oivilian, who would ventnie to qnesiion an operation carried oot under the immediate personal djreotion of Lord Kitchener ; bat the general ooMenmia ofopuaon among critiog may justify that which might be temerity in the individual. Had Cronje not bLi tightly Burronuded. the action with its heayy loise. nu^t have been justified as an attempt to hold him unhl his investment should be complete. There seemi howevw. to be no doubt that he was already entirely Bur- ronuded uid that, as experience proved, we had only to sit round h.m to insure his surrender. It i^ not given to the greatest man to have every soldierly gift eqnaUy ^vetoped and it may be said without offence that Lord ^tohener b cool judgment upon the actual field of battle aw not yet been proved as conclusively as his long- headed power of organisation and his iron determina- Putting aside the question of responsibiUty, what ^ppened on the morning of Sunday, February 18th, was that from every quarter an assault was urged across the level plams, to the north and to the south, upon the lines of desperate and invisible men who lay Ui the dongsB and behind the banks of the river. Everywhere there was a terrible monotony about the eiperiences of the TOnous regiments which learned once again the grim lessons of Colehso and Modder Biver. We surely