cV^(^" /y^o.'rTT^n^/ mprcs^ ;i Cl5Mm(I<.f. 5^ :^ioor material in the Town Council; hard to get the best men — the able men — to run; general politics introduced into municipal matters; the hail-fellow-well-met style of wird politician gets the big pull always; coun- cOlors spend more time in wrangling ond jawing one another than in attend- ing to town business in a business-like way. Result, slipsthod methods and gen- eial inefficiency. One day a few of the leading men of the town met in an informal way to taJk the matter over, in view of a coming municipal election, and to try and find a remedy. The first propositi )n vas the one that most of us are fami- liar with; namely, "Let us make a determined effort to get good men in the c«.ancil irrespective of party." Said one citizen, "Now, here i« our friend, Mr. Backbone; he would make a 8- erance vote on his side. Why not run in your ward, Mr. Tippelknct?" TippelK-not shook his head. "What good would the Temperance vote do me tiiere?" said he. "If I could get a fair proportion of the Temperance vote of the whole town, it would be all right; but the Temperance vote in my own ward is not enough. You know that Goodbar, who is the council now, has the whole liquor interest with him. Besides, he is on the other side of i)olitics, and it would be made a political matter, and his side has a A PRETTY FAIR MUNICIPAL STORY. niajority in oar ward. No, it won't ■WiKTk.** Mr. Clefircut, Mr. Square, Mr. Foot- down and Mr. Goodhead, were succetis- i\eiy appealed to, with a like result. None of them would become candi- dutes. "It seems to me," remarked Cleirjut, **that no immediate remedy is possible. The root of the difficulty is in the w.ird system, along with our plan of electijn, whiclh gives every facility for the in- troduction of party politics where they are only mischievous. You all know that it is not the better class of party men who introduce party politics, bonie narrow-minded partizans nominate can- didates of one political stripe all along the line, and then the other side fol- low enit in self-defence; or, perhaps each side nominates to head off the other side." Square looked at him thoughtfally. "The ward system is a very poor one; but can you get anything better in its place? If you had voting at large all over the town, it would mean that the party which had even a narrow m.i- i jority would put in aJ'l the councillors, j They have tried that plan in the United States." Goodhead now joined in the discus- sion. "You are right, Square; but vot- ing at large is not the only way. We have about twelve hundred voters in the town— at least, that is the aver- age number who vote — and we retain tvrelve councillors. Divide one by the other, and you get a hundred votee to each councillor. Now, suppose yoa had a system by which any hundred voters in any part of the town could elect A councilman to represent them; how would that work? Say. Back- bone, couldn't you be dead sure of a hundred votes jf you were running, and had the whole town to draw from?" "He could get double th»t number without canvasaing a single elector," broke in Footdown, with emphasis. "And j'ou.Tippelknot.'* pursueil Good- head, "couldn't you get considerably over a hundred votes, if you were not pinned down to one ward for your Tem- perance supporters?" "No doubt of that," answered Tipp*l- knot. "The idea looks good- But wouldn't you waste a great many v pie of that section could get a can.li- dute specially to represent their in- tereets. if they were strong enougb in numbers; they woald not be confined to any hard and fast ward boundaries; and tliey might draw scattering votes trjm sympathisers ail over town." After an animated discussion of de- tails, there appeared to be a gene.-al agreement with the ideas of Clear.'ut and Goodhead. -..f v.; :t '- / -X'^iy, - ' .:.,s ■'\'-TJi h: y i ^ '. 'i.r- A J, .,fi^^:^ '■* l/H ■;■*• V-i:' -t' = ^■ S.i-i, ^j :■ f ' r ' ; ',ij <* ' . ■ i z i ; : CHAPTER II. WARDS AND THE MULTIPLE VOTE. The very foundation of good mniwci- jxal goveminent is a fair and scientific Bysitem of votiiig; because all popuhix government is based on tbe popular vote, and if the system of voting is bad, the mnnicip'al government cannot be good. "Proportional Representation" is a fair and scientific system that is being much advocated now-a-days. An essen- tial part of ihie system, as applied to municipal government, is to abolish the existing ward divisions. In this direc- tion a large step was taken at the 1.^97-8 session of the Ontario Legislature. T?ie provisions are briefly as follows: WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS. 1. The Council of every township sball consist of one reeve, who siiall be the head thereof, and four councillors, who shall be elected by a general vot-.'. (61 Victoria, chapter 23, section 4.) • 2. Precisely the same words apply to villages. Every vfllage is to have its reeve, and the election of its four coun- ciHore is to be by "a general vote"— which means no wards. (61 Vic, chap. 23. sec. 3.) 3. The Council of every town having a population of not more than five thou- sand by the last Canadian census sihall consist of a Mayor, who shall be the head thereof, and of six councillors to be elcted by a general vote. (61 Vic-, chap. 23. sec. 2.) So that municipalities with less than five thousand of a population are not allowed to have wards, and must eleot all their councillors on a general vote of the whole municipality — which is a very good thing, as far as it goes. Then, when we come to towns with more than five thousand of a population, and ci iis of fifteen thousand or less, we find that if they want to abolish their wards they must do it by a referendum vote, thus: 4. The Council of any town having a population of more than 5,000, and of any city having a population of 15,000 or less, may by a by-law provide that the Council of such town or city shall be composed of a Mayor and of one alderman for each 1,000 of population, to be elected by general vote; but suOh by-law must be submitted to a vote of the electors before it can come into force. (61 Vic, chap. 23, sec. 2.) None of the foregoing provisions affect the Councils for the current year, ISJS. IklEETINO APPROVAL. That the foregoing legislation is meet- ing with popular approval is shown by the steps which are being taken to give it effect. CJiatham, Peterboro', Lindsay, Belle- ville, Brantford and Owen Sound have all taken referendum votes on ward abolition bylaws. Brantford is the only place where the electors sustained the ward system. In the other five places named, the bylaws were passed and the wards abolished. Other municipalities are taking similiar action. ONLY A STEP. Whilst the abolition of the wards is a large step towards a reasonable and proper system of voting, yet it is ooly a step. Those who earnestly desire really good municipal government will be bit- terly disappointed if they rely on tbe mere abolition of the wards to bring WARDS AND THE MULTIPLE VOTE. about ittAt result. In itself, we caimot expect mucli from tliis measnre. Bit combined with the Hare system of Pro- portional Ref>reee«)tation, it would opeo a wide door to the ^eat and wisest de- vel(^ments of modem municipal govern- ment. Let ufl then accept this legislation as an instalment of Proportional Repre- sentation, and work persistently to get the fnrtbeT step which ig necessciry. That step is a cbange in the method of voting. MULTIPLE VOTING. The ordinary way of voting is by the "multiple vote," that is, each voter has as many votes as there are councillors to be elected. In a city electing ten aldermen, each elector has ten votes; so that if a thousand electors go to the polls, something under ten thousand votes will be cast, because the full fran- chise is not ordinarily used by every voter. Then the ten candidates having the highest number of votes are declar- ed elected. This method of voting is so nniversiJ tiiat it has all the force of law. altiiousih a lji.vm«n's search in the statutes has faih'd to discover any enactment of the Visin. Perhaps some friendly lawyer will throw more light on this point. Meanwhile, let us turn a searchligiht upon the multiple rote, and we shill find it a very poor tool by which to con- struct a good municipal council. MONOPOLY OF REPRESENT A TTON. The multiple vote favors a monopoly of representiation. That is the first de feet that we find, and it is a pretty bad one. KetT>ing to our illustration of ten aldermen ejected by a thousand vote^i-s, see thas: If 501 voters unite on six candidates tho^e 501 voters can elect the whole of the city council, and leave the other 490 voters without any representation at all "Oh. that is an extreme illustration." say you. Quite so. Although entirely cor- rect, it is not likely to occur just in that form. I^t us then take an illustra- tion which is very likely to occur, where politics are introduced into munieii>al affairs; and we will take it in round numbers, which are more easily grasped. If six hundred voters unite tm a ticket of ten candidates, they can ele»?t the whoJe council, and the other four hundred voters will not be able to el^zt anybody to represent them. Each of these six hundred voters has ttn votes, and this enables them to place their ten candidates in the te.i places at the top of the poll, by giving each candidate about six hundred votes. The remaining four hundred electors may unite on another ticket if they like, but they are powerless. They can only gave each of their candidates four hun- dred votes, so that these are all placed below the candidates of the six hun- dred. Consequently, these four hundred voters are disfranchised and unrepre- sented, although beingr two-fifths of the electorate, they are entitled to elect four out of the ten councillors. Is that fair, or even decent? You know it is not. POLITICS ENCOURAGED. The foregoing illu'5tration is a very moderate one, and affords ample margin to allow for scattering votes and for the introduction of independent candidates. Where general politics are rampant in municipal matters, and the two parties are pretty evenJy divided, the party tickets will sweep the vote, and inde- pendent candidates will get very few votes, because yo-ur average voter hates to throw away his vote on a man with a slim chance. WARDS AND THE MULTIPLE VOTE. Here we put our finger en ooe disid- TJintage of abolishing the wards withoat providing a better plan of voting. It offers a strong inducement to introduce g*»^neral politics into municipaJ affairs. This disadvantage is offset by getting rid of narrow ward politics and by the election of larger men: but it ig there a I] the same. A SURE REMEDY. How would the Hare plan of Pro- p<;.rtional Representation work in the above case? It simply renders inv!>o«- aible such a result as we have pointed out. The six hundred electors, having prac- tically only one vote each.have to divide their vot:?s amongst the candidates thoy want, and eanpot therefore elect more than six. This would allow the four hundred to elect the four aldermen that they are entitled to. A «hort study of the Hare system will show how this works out. TAKING CHANCES. Another grave objection to the multi- ple vote is that it mixes and muddles things, and brings in a large elemput of dha/ice. It is something like thro.v- ing dice. There is no telling which side will come to the top. Many curious ccrmhinations of the ten-fold vote take place. Monopolization of nil the repre- sentatives by a mere majority of the voters may result from the inherent cussedness of the method itself, and not from a deliberate or organized attempt on the part of the majority. A ONE-TENTH INTEREST. Then, instead of your being repre- sented in a dear and definite way by one distinct alderman in the council, you have, so to speak, only a one-tenth interest m ten different aldermen, who are persons necessarily of diverse vie-vs and opinions on >»vme subjects that you are interested in. Which ideq of re- presentation is most in accord with com- mon sense? AS MUCH VOTING POWER- Some persons have the idee that a man's voting power is lessened by giving him only one vote instead of ten. This is a fallacy. When everybody else has ten rotes as well as you, your additional votw are swamped and neutralized by the additional votes of the other fel- lows; so that you get all the disadvaat- age« of the multiple vote without any inorefise of your votinir power. ' MAJORITY AND ailNORinr. It is sometimes said, "O-h, the ma- jority must govern." But to apply that remark to an election is to suffer from confusion of thought- Representation is one thing; government and legislation is another. First get a fair renresentation of the voters, in your council, then h't a majoiity of the representatives decide Avhen it comes to a decision, Yes or No, on any measure. And there Is mneh to be done in any governing or execu- tive body besides the mere Yes and No vote. An intelligent minority of repre sentatives has great weight and influ- ence; its voice can be heard; it can fully and fairly present the views of tie voteire whom it represents; and it can watch the majority and keep them straight if need be. These things are the dear rights of the minority, and tJ-.ey are denied by the use of the mul- tiple vote. THE GOLDEN RULE- Take another illustration. A hundred voters in the city are particularly desir- ous to have a certain man — say Mr. Smith— nin the council. The other nine hundred are indifferent or hostile to Smith, or p -efer somebody else. These one hundred voters are one-tenth of the electorate, and therefore they are en- WARDS AND THE MULTIPLK VOTE. titled by right to one-teoth of the wpre- di^a^. the greater is likely to be tbe ecDtation; that is, to one alderman out waeted votes- u{ the ten. Under the multiple vote; Take as an example the Toaronto thev are deprived of that right; that ij,, ' »"UMcii)al eiection of January, 1808. In they are disf ranchised-deprived of each of six wards fo«r aldermen were thctr voting power. Under ProportioDil e^^c*«^ ^^ » multiple or general vote; ReiM-esentatioo any candidate having a °« exactly the same plan as the foar hundred votes would be elected. Under c«i«<*"o" of a township or village, the multiple vote, there is a tyrannous "*^ ^'^ *^ ^^""^"^ '^' ^^^« «' <*• usurpation by the majority. i ^^^«' ^^^^^ ^^« * ^' ~°»P^^- Third ward — Total vote foe succes^fal THE L-XIT OF REPRESENT ATI O.N. <»^dat«. eight thousand: for defeated It may be asked, Why have not one- candidajtes, over seven thousand. Only twelfth of the voters a right to indepeni- 56 per cent, of the votee— a little mo*e dent representation, as well as one-tenth? than half — elected all the aldermen! Because only ten members are being thus wasiting 44 per cent. This is about elected, and the right of snch represen- the average. tation is limit«^ by the number of mem- l^^fth v ard — Neariy seven thousADd bers. If twelve members were beanj? votes for winning candidates, and ne-ariy elect f^J, then one-twelfth of the voters four thousand votes for the losing ones. wonM have the right to independently This ward showed the least waste of elect one member. They would then .any, yet the efifeotive votes were only be what is called "the Unit of Rcpre- 62 per cent, and the lost votes were H8 sentation" per cent. The case we are taking is an election Sixth ward— This is the worst show- in which the unit of representation \b ing of the lot. The elected aldermen one-tenth of the etectors. Although in [ received over 3,500 votes, whilst the this case a smaHer number cannot ole-.rt 1 defeated candidates got over four thou- theor own particular man, yet the Pro- ' sand votes! So that the aldermen m portional vote gives them considerable ; this ward were elected by a minority Ir.titude of choice otherwise, as anyone j qj the votes, or 47 per cent. The ma- Treil knows who is familiar with the j(„rity of the votee, amounting to .53 per cent., were thrown away on defeate-l candidates. Is it not time that we changed a me- Hare system. WASTED VOTES. The plan of multiple voting causes a ^ , . ,^reat wast^ of votes, because so many thod so stupid as to render such things are thrown away on defeated eandi- 1 possible? No such results could follow dates. The larger the number of can- the Hare system. CHAPTER III. A PRETTY FAIR TOWN ELECTION. Some Particulars Thereof, Show- ing: How the Citizens of the Town of Prettyfair Elected Their Nine Councillors, How John Smith Marked His Bal- lot and How Mr. Countwell Did His Work. Come with me to the good colony of South Australia, and look with prophetic eye ux)on the finst election under the Hare-Spence Proportional Voting Sys- tem in the illustrative town of Precty- fair. The people of tihe town naturally felt a keen interest in this first election, an 1 tfcere was an exceptionally strong list of candidates. Some of the best citizens of the town had allowed themselves to be put in nomination. The local newspapera had thoroughly explained the new system, abundance of olticial placards had been posted, and t'..ere had been a good deal of talk; so that even the most illiterate of the elec- tors understood pretty well how to vote. llie candidates for a seat in the coun- cil numbered fourte«i; nine of whocn were to be elected for the whole town; JOHN SMITH'S BALLOT. A. B. Backbone C. Buzzer D. E. Olearcut F. Goodbar G. H. Jawsmith I. Noeshow J. K. Singletaks L. Sydewaux M. Swiveltop O. p. Square Q. Tenpercent R. Tippelknot S. T. Vakantlot W. Windigasser 4 7 5 i 8 I I 2 II I 1 II I 3 It 6 I I, What is the meaning of this ballot? Well, it means that John Smith says: "The man of my first ctoodce is Mr. L. Sydewaux; so I mark him No. 1, and I want my vote to count for him if he needs it But if he has enough bal- lots to elect him without mine, or if he has no chance of being elected, then I want my vote to count for J. K. gingle- taks, whom I have marked No. 2. If Singletaks does not need my vote, thcQ It is to count for Mr. Square, marked No. 3; and so on, down to Swiveltop, No. 9- if necessary to go so far." Mr. Countwell had been appoin«te.l ^ returning officer. When the poMs dosed ..,.^ vw ^.vv-vx.^ .wx «xc T,^wic tvYv.x, ^Qj ^^ counting of the votes hAo-o,, the ward system having been abolished, i Mv rv»«^ •> I uT ^ ^ . ^^ . . ,.- '^^^- *-ountwell described each st«n in The nimes of these fourteen candidates were on one official ballot. Each voter was instructed to mark nine names, or fewer, with the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., in the order of his choice, and was also told that his vote would only count fori C<.l.nt^^'elI said": "The firet Itep^'iV to one man. As a sample, here is a bal- 1 sort all the ballots in accoo-danoe with lot which was cast by a voter whom we ; the names that are marked first^aice w^ call John Sma,th. It will al.^ se.-ve upon them, paying no heed to the other to show the names of the candidates: figures. each step in the process for the benefit of a large audience which wa- present by arrange- ment to see the working of the ne^ plan. After a few preliminary remarks, Mr. A PRETTY FAIR TOWN ELECTION. II "This has already been done in the varioiiis polling t>ub-divisdons, and I hav^e before me the packages of ballots sorted in this way, which have been sent to me. together vvLth a tally oo* statement, from eacii »ub-divisaon. "I have also before me fourteen files or compartments labelled with the nftmes of the fourteen candidates, one file for each candidate. I proceed to sort the packages of ballots into these c* mpartments, untying each as I do so. Thus I bring together, into the com- partment of each candidate, all the No. 1 votes that have been given to him in all the subdivisions- Whilst I am doing this, my two tally-clerks are ad- ding up the tallies which have been sent from the sub-divisions." On the completion of this process Mr. Countwell said: "I find that there have bct-n 1,245 good ballots cast; that is the total. Dividing that number by nine, the number of councillors required to be elected, I find that a 'quota' of 138 votes is required to elect any one candidate. Now the following first- choice votes have been given. Backbone 153 Tippelknot 150 Goodbar 149 Windigasser 105 Singletaks 95 Olearcut 94 Sydewaux 89 Jawsmith 82 Buzzer 80 Square 7n Vakantlot 50 Tenpercent 49 Swiveltop 44 Noeshow 30 Total 1,245 "Mossrs. Backbone. TSppelknot and Goodbar have each more than a qu>>*a of 138 votes, and I therefore declare them duly elected. (Cheers and counter cheers.) I shall now proceed to put aside the quota of these three gentle- men, and to distribute their surplus ballots- •*Mr. Backbone has fifteen more bal- lets than he requires; Mr. Tippelknot twelve; and Mr. Goodbar eleven. I C(>unt fifteen ballots from the top of Mf. Backbone's pMe, and seal up the remaining 138, marking the latter •Backbone's quota.' These are the votes which have elected ?Ir. Back- bone. I then take his fifteen surplus ballots, and distribute them into the compartments of the candidates not yet elected. The first one which I take up is marked 'Backbone, 1; Clearcut, 2.' I put the ballot on Mr. Clearcut's file, and that counts him a vote. Tiie next ballot I take up is marked 'Back- b(ne, 1; Goodbar, 2; Windigasser, ."i.' .\s Mr. Goodbar is already elected, he does not need this vote, so I pass him over, and put the ballot on Mr. Windi- gasser's pile. I distribute all of Mr- Backbone's surplus votes on the same principle. "Then I seal up the quota of M.*. Tippelknot and distribute his surplus ballots in a simdlar manner. The same is done in the case of Mr. Goodbar. "I find that the distribution of these surplus ballots has not yet increased the votes for any other candidate enougli to elect him. I shall, therefore, begin at the other end. Mr. Xoeshow is at the bott>m of tihe poll with 30 first- ohodce votes. He cannot be elected; so I take all his ballots and distribute them amongst the candidates who are marked next choice thereon. "Still no one else gets a quota, so I take Mr. Swiveltop's ballots and dis- tribute them in the same way. Mr.' Windigasser is marked second choice on many of these ballots. I am not yet thror^h with them, but the chief 12 A PRETTY FAIR TOWX ELECTION. tally derk tells me that Mr. Windlgas- fier hea now a quota, so I stop the dis- tribution in order to declare Mr. Wiadi- gasser elected, and to seal up his quota. (Great cheering from the friends of Mr. Wiudigasser.) I then resume the dis- tribution of Mr. SwiveltopV surplus, but its conclusion does not bring another quota." We need not follow Mr. CJountwell any further in these details, for it would only lead to repetition. It will be sufficient to give the greneral course of the counting as it affected the respec- tive candidates. Tenpercent and Vak- antlot being next at the bottom of the poll, were successavely cut off, with the result of giving a quota each to Singlo- tulas, Clearcut and Sydewaux. Two more councillors were yet wanted, and the only candidates left were Jawsiiiith, Buzzer and Square, none of whom had a quota. On the first count Square ha 1 been below the other two, but enough votes were transferred to him subse- quently to place him considerably ahead of both the others, thus showing him to be more soiidly grounded in popular favor. Jawsmith. however, kept his lead on Bazzer, so Square and Jan- smith were declared elected, as coming nearest to a quota. The assembled people of Prettyfair passed a hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Countwell for the ability with which he had handle! the ballots and made the explanations. As they dispersed many remarks were made about the accurate way in which the . ew council appeared to reflect the public opinion of the town upon leading issues. FURTHER POINTERS. Although in the form of a story the foregoing has been written so as to show in detail the working of the Hare- Spence system, and will rep«y a care- ful study. In the event of a tie in eliminating candidates, the one having the figure "1" on his ballots the least number of times should be eiiminated. If the tied candidates are equal in this respect, thon eliminate the one having the figure "2"^ the least number of times, and so on in regular numerical order. This is on the principle that when it c»>mes to a tie a transferred baliot is not at* good as an original first-c4ioi*e, nor a third-choice as good as a second, and so on. When the tied candidates are equal in the above respect, then the casting of lots must be resorted to, or the decision may be left with the returning officer. If the seat of any member shall be- come vacant before the next election, then the unsuccessful candidate having the highest numbei* of votes shail suc- ceed to the vacant position. CHAPTER IV. THE HARE-SPENCE VOTING SYSTEM. Its Able and Kminent Advocates —Where it is Used in Actual Elections — Proportional Re- presentation in TasmaniH. Switzerland, San Fiancisco and Klse where — Objections Stated and Answered— Large and Small Elections. Hftviug got a pretty dear idea of the principle and operation of the Haro- Spence system of Proportional Rep-resen- tation, the practical reader will be ask- ing some questions. Is this system dn aotuaJ u«e anywhere? To what extent has it been tested in practice? Has it been endorsed by any persons of pro- minence? What objections have been hroug'ht ag^ainst it, and what the en, of Boston: Professor Felix Adiler, of New York: Hon. Jajies G. Maguire, of San Francisco: and Professor John R. Com- mons, of the Indiana University — the last named of whom has written a book on the subject. Most able and success- ful practical piropaganda work has been done by Alfred Cridge, of 429 Mont- gomery street, San Francisco, who is a strong advocate of the Hare system, and an expert authority thereon. Now for instances of practical work- ing tests. These are numerous, and a few of the more prominent >riH suffice. In the British colony of Tasmania, on January 20th, 1897, ten members were elected to Parliament by mlean^j oi. the Hare system, being six from the city of Hobart, and four from Launces- ton. A bill providing for the use of the Hare system in th me two cities had been introduced in i le Lower Hoise by Hon. A. 1. Clark, then Attorney- General, and passed, but was thrown out by the Upper House. Finally, the Upper House assented to the bill on the express condition that the Hare system should be used only for the one dec- tion. in each of the cities named. After the elections a pamphlet was pahiiahod by Mr. R. M. Johnston, F.L.S., Govern- ment Statistician of Tasmania, in 14 THE HARE-SPENCE VOTING SYSTEM. which he analysed the election opera- tions in Habart and Launceston, and hi;r4ily commended the workinjr of the Hare system. There was also much faAtVrabie comme»it in newspaijers and cthcrwise. In the republic of Switzerland, ten of the cantons elect their legislative re- preeentaliyes by meana of a system of Proportional Representation known as the Swiss Free List. The number of cantons using this system has grown stoadily during late years. The tbree cases cited are of Legis- lative or Parliamentary elections. The present writer is not aware of any actual municipal use of the Hare sys- tem, but two cases that come nearest to it are the English school boards and the San Francisco Mechanics' Institute. In England, the governing bodies of the public schools have for more than twenty years been elected by a plan of apt^roximate proportional representation. kiiOwn as cumulative voting. This, al- thougih better than the ordinary multi- ple method, is a crude and defective plan. Its adoption is probably one strong reason why proportional rep ve- st ntatioa has not made more headway in England. l"lie case of the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco is one which comes very near to municipal conditions. Every year its membership elects a governing board of seven trustees, and the votersJ vary from abooit eight hundred tx) a thousand in numbei. Therefore the el<^- tion is not unlike that of a small town governed by a Town Council of seven members. For six successive years the Mechanics' Institute haS elected its trustees by the Hare-Spence system, with entire smccess and complete satis- faction. A growing number of smaller or- ganizations use the proportional plan in their elections. A Toronto example of this is the Trades and Labor Council. We now turn to objections and their answers. Only one point is the subject of vigorous attack, namely, the method of transferring ballots from those can- didates wfco have a surplna. These are taken at random from the top of the pile, the ballots having previously been thoroughly mixed. It is urged that it other ballots had been taken the Tefl:ilt might have been different, and that an important part of the process of count- ing ought not to be left to mere chance. On the face of it. this objection has wedght. and we will deal with it some- what fully. 1. T^e law of chances is strongly in favor of a iair average sample of second choices coming to the top; and the larger the election the greater is the probaibility. A pertinent illustration :s given by Mr. Alfred Cridge, thus: Put five hundred marbles, one hundred of each of five colors, in a bag; shake them all up; then take out fifty haphazard and the probabilities are that there will be about ten of each color in the fifty.' I'ut fifty thousand marbles, ten thou- sand of each color, and mix them sim lar- ly. The probabilities then become near- ly overwhelming that if you take out five hundred at random there will be fifty of each. This diflference between laige and small edeetions is imix)rtant to note, because small elections at meet- ings are a valuaWe means of diffusing a knowledge of Proportional Kepreseata- tion. Where the voters axe very few, it is well for each to vote in duplicate or perhaps triplicate — that is, each voter to put in two or sometimes even three Iwil lots— which gives the same advantT, age in counting as if there were twice or three times the number of voters. 2. In an average municipal election the chances are overwhelming against any candidate being prejudiced by tak- ing the sairplus at random. Mr. Cridge made a careful analysis of the 853 bal- lets east in the Mechanics' Institute at *THE HARE-SPENCE VOTING SYSTEM. 15 the 1894 ejection. He made various dw- ti-ibutions of tthe surplus, including one distribution that was mathemfitioally proportionate and exact The reanlt was the same, in eaoh case, as it had been at the election. 3- The really important transfer of votes is that from cancHdaies at the bottom of the pdl, whose votes have to be all distributed, so that the ele- ment of chance does not enter there. Tliese votes are usually much more numerous than the surfdus votes, and sometimes there are no surplus votes at all. 4. Granting for the sake of argument the fullest possible force to this "chance" objection, the Hare system is yet so much superior to the ordinary method that the merits of the system far outweigh its drawbacks, and that is really the point. 5. Finalliy, there are two methods by which surplus ballots may be distribut- ed with mathematical accuracy, by any person familiar with the common rules of arithmetic as far as fractions or the "rule of three." One of the«e was used at the Tasmanian Parikunen- tary elections already mentioned; and the other is usee by Miss Spence in South Australia. "Oh! why, then, make no exhaurtire a defence of the 'chance' method?" Simply because it takes less time and trouble, and we believe it to be good ei:ouifh for all practical purposes. "Does not the counting of votes take a very long time in the Hare system?** No. At the San Francisco Me- chanics' Institute in 1896,the votes cast were 9.58 in number, and the count waa completed in two hours and fifteen minutes. That is good enough. "Would it not be inconvenient and per- hj-Tw dangerous to have the ballots brought to one central point to complete the counting?'* Not usTially. The tally of fir^- choice votes can be telephoned from the polling sub-divisions, so as to check the figures sent by messengers. If diffi- culty appeOiTs in an exceptional case, the Gove system can be used. We shall desyTTibe it later. S^ff *»ff ■i > CHAPTER V. PUBLIC INDIFFERENCE IN ELECTIONS, ThouirfitfuJ men deplore the wide- si»'ead carelesftnees and indifference to good municipal Koveimment, manifested eK>ecdaJly at elecdon time, when one wocLld suppose that evsry good citizen would take time and trouble in an im- portant public matter, instead of hav- ing to be persistently canvassed by can- didates and their agents, and perhaps ecmxed to go to tiie polls. Various suDerfidaJ and penal remedies bave been pro«ed, amongst them Compulsory Votlnir and the legal Aboli- tion of Oanvaafling. Such methods are objectionable and inefficient. GET TO THE ROOT OF IT. But wbat are we to do? Is there no way of caring these evils? Certainly there is. For every wrong act there is a motive. When the wrong act is a common thing amongst many respectable people, then there must be an underlying motive common to all these people, which leads them to act a-s they do. To find out and remove that motive^ and to supply a stimulus in the oiposite direction, is far better than your prohibitions and pains and penaJ- ties. It is the old story that prevention is better than cure — especially when the cure does not cure. What, then, is the motive, the reason, for public indifference at municipal elec- tions? Its root is in a system which re- stricts the choice of the elector to can- didates that he does not care about, or gives him occasionally the privilege of throwing away his vote on a man he is interested in, but wfio cannot be elect- ed. No wonder the voters are indif- ferent. Let us remove stupid obstacles to thrtr doing the ri^ht thtnjr iM'fore wf try to imnish them for not etition of not less than a hundred resident freeholders and ten- ants. R.S.O., chap. 223, section 11. This is a mandatory initiative without any referendum. THE INITIATIVE AS A LEVER. 19 Again, a petitlor. signed by 150 quaJi ged electors of auy town or villagefBskini; for annexation to er adjacent town or plied to particular matters. One direct quired is a wider extension of the prin- ciple, eitiier in a general way, r- a» ap- village, compels the council to submit a by^aw for that purpose to ti'e elec- tors. (Rensed Statutes, Ontario, chapter 22.*J, section 26, sub-section 4.) This ii the initiative followed by a referendum. The number of petitioners is a fixed one, so that the pe-rcemtage is high for a small village, and low^ far a la^-ge town. The third instance we mentioned is in section 71, sub-section 2. It provides for an initiative of 100 olectora. follow- ed by a referendum, and is in relation to the repeal of a by-law fixing the number of municipal councillors in town wartle. the details of which I need not trouble you with. Then the recent Municipal Ame»d- mcut Act provides as follows: In a t(>wn of not more than five thousand popula- tion, if twonty per cent, of the electors petition for a by-law dividing the town into wards, the Town Council must sub- mit the proposition to the electors, and it goes into effect if a majority of the eleotoTB vote yes. (61 Vict-, chap. 23, section 2, sub-section 2.) This is the initiative and referendum again. The I>ercentiige is very high, evidtutly be- cause the Legislature thought the "gen- eral vote" a good thing, and wanted to discourage a division of the town into wards. But it shows how easy it is to enact the initiative in an inefficient fcrm, whether with a good or bad ab- ject, because to get a petition signed by twenty per cent, of the electors is in most cases so hard and expensive a job as to be almost prohibitory. GOOD PRECEDENTS. Iliere, therefore, exist good precedents for the use of the municipal initiative, followed by a referendum. What is re- benefit would certainly follow, the rou»- ini; of a stronger interest in municipal affairs. Each elector would increasintHj feel that he had influence as a factor in the governmeat of his municipality. TESTING REFORMS. Ilhe initiative affords the least ob- jectionuble method of testing proposed reforms in municipal government. A few progressive citizens become convinc- ed of the value of a reform, and willing to take the responsibility of asking their fellow citizens to put it into operation. ITiey prove their sincerity by taking the time and trouble of circulating the neces- sary initiative petition. If they can con- vince a reasonable percentage of the electors that the reform is one which ought to be tried, then it goes to the referendum, in order to receive the sanc- tion of a majority of the electors. This sanction, being given, the reform goes into effect — or rather, is put on' trial, because the same power that enacted it can repeal it. Valuable experiments in ni(unicip>al government may thus be put to the conclusive test of practical experience. The Provincial Legislature would right- ly object to compel municipalities to try exi/orimenita or introduce suggested re- ft rms, but surely the citizens of a pro- gressive municipality should have the pC'Wer to do this if they wish. T^e door would thus be opened to progress In good municipal government- Progress must be mainJy along the line of experiment. How can people find out whether a theory is good unless they are allowed to try it? First theory, then experimentaJ practice, then adop> tion — these are the three upward stepts to better things. CHAPTER VII. ELECTING A MAYOR OR REEVE. How to Secure a Clear Majority With One Ballotingr When Several Candidates are in the Field— Adaptation of the Hare System to the Election of a Sias^le Officer. Let us dearly realize the distinction in principle between the election of councillore and the election of a adujjle officer, audi a« a mayor. In the former ca«e. the object is to represent all the Vetera, aa neerly as you can come at it. In the aecond case, the main point 18 that thf man c^leoted sftiould have a cdear majority of the votes cast, and should not be elected by a minority. So far aa the election itself is con- cerned, the ordinary system of voting for ainjde officers is all right when only two candidates run for each office, but where three or more candidates are runnim?! the succeeeful one may be, and often ia. elected by a minority of the voters — ^which is not right- Another disadvantage of the present method ia that it reetdcts the choice of candidates. When two fairly strong ineii are nominated, others dislike to eiiter the firid, because they might in- jure the ctoances of one or other of the candidates by cutting into his vote, and because many electors will not vote for a man. however good, unless they think he is one of the strongest candi- dates. Orsranlzatlona such as political con- veutiwis take several ballots in order ultimately to secure a majority. The friends of the weaker candidates give up the man of their first choice and cast their votes for the one they like next beiit: and the process is ooudnued until some one gets a clear majority. But ttis plan is open to serious objection. It consumes much time, and tends to log-rollin«r and other evils. The order of the voter's pretference for the can- didate ought to be fixed at the time of the first votes, not left to subsequent iLtiuenoes. In several European countries what is called the second ballot Is in force; that is. that when there are three or more candidates, and none of them gets a clear majority of the whole vote cast, there must be a second election. lliese roundabout and expensive me- thods are needless. There is a simple and scientific way of getting a majority by one balloting. Use the "elimination" feature of the Hare system, as foUowe: Suppose that Smith, Brown, Jones and Robinson are running for a city mayoralty. Eadi voter marks his ballot for all the candidates in the order in which he prefers them. For instance, take a voter who wants Smith to be elected and who thinks Robinson the moat objectionable of the candidates,^ aud who prefers Brown to Jones. The voter will mark his ballot thus: I Brown | 2 I I Jones I 3 j I Robinson | 4 ( I Smith I 1 I At the close of the poll the votes are sorted out according to tiie "number one" votes for each candidate. Tthen ELECTING A MAYOR OR REEVE. 21 the c&ndiclftte who has the snmJlost number of these first-choice rotee It declared "out of the count," and hii balloti are distributed amoncHt the other three cajididates in accordance with the tsecond-chotcee thereon — that ifl. the names marked **2." Then the lowest of these three re- maining candidates is eliminated, as was the fourth, and his ballots are similariy traa«ferred. Then whichever of the remaining two is found to have the icreateet number of votes, transferred or originaJ, is declared eiected. An iiluatration will show how fully the voter's choice is idven effect to: Suppose that when the ballots are sort- ed. Smith is at the bottom of the poll w\tti the smallest number of first-choice votes. The voter whose ballot Is shown above cannot have his vote count for Smith, because Smith is "out of it;" but the ballot is still effective to give a lift to Brown, the man whom the voter likes better than Jones and Rob- imson. and for whocn he would have vtted if Smith had not been running- Then suppose Brown be eliminated, our voter's ballot is "not dead yet"; it still takes a hand in, by counting one for Jcnes and against Robinson, the man meet objected to by our voter. Finally the contest is narrowed down to the two best men in the opinion of the majority of the voters; and the better of these two men gets it by a dear majority. In the British colony of Queensland.thc law provides that the above s.vstem is to bs ased in Parliamentary elections w\hen there are more than two candi- dates for the seat in a singie-memiber district Yoa wiij notice how the foregoing plan fdvors the full and free choice of the electors, by encouraging the nominadon of more than two candidates. In the il- lustration above given. Smith's friends are not afraid to give him their first- choice votes, because they know that this will not injure the chances of any other candidate if Smith cannot be elect- ed. They know that in that event their votes will go to a stronger candidate whom they have marked as next or next choice on their ballots. To ensure a clear majority in every CFse, it is desirable to have a rule that any voter who does not mark every candidate on his ballot with the num- bers signifying his preference, will spoil his ballot — or rather, every candidate except one, because it would be under- stood that the one omitted candidate was intended to be the last of the lot. It will perhaps be objected that this might lead to a good many spoiled bal- lots. The obvious answer is that the spoiled ballots would be those of the least intelligent and least desirable class of voters — those who were too in- different or too dull to understand the system under which they were exercis- ing their franchise. Such a voter does a service to the public by spoiling his ballot. APPENDIX, I.— ^OME MATHEMATICAL METHODS. When ahowlnjf how to distribute the mirplus votes of candidates in elections under the Hare system, we mentioned •two other methods by which the surplus ccuJd be distributed with mathematicai a<*curacy. These we will now briefly describe, couimencing with the metiUod invented by Miss Martin, of South Aus- truUii. and takin«r as an illustration the ci.*«e of a meeting-room election in which forty ballots are cast for the election of five committeemen, so that anyone hav- itkg a quoita of eipht votes is electeil. MISS MARTINS METHOD. Ihe qrioto being eight, suppose th it Smith gets sixteen first -choice vot-»s. Whut then? Smifth cannot possibly use mere than eight %-otes, yet he has re- ceived sixteeo. Eic;ht is half of sixteen, so that Smith can only use half of his total vote. And if he can only use half his total vote, then he can only use half of each ballot taken separately. Therefore, on eacji separate ballot, half the voting power of the voter is available for the Crudidate whom the voter has markod as his second choice oo' that pairticular ballot. In other words, each ballot gives half a vote to Smith and half a vote to the No. 2 man on it. Do you see the point? Smith gets sixteen of these half vote^, which is the same as edgiht vi-hole votes, . making his quota: and the other sixteen half votes form the surplus to be dis- tributed. It is done in this way: After declaring Smith duly elected, the returning officer takes Smith's nix- t(en bailots and marks each of them "1-2" witth a coJored pencil. The sixteen baJlots are then distributed amongst the candidates who are marked second choice upon them. Any candidate get- ting two of these "1-2" ballots will be credited with one complete vote. Now for a simple rule which will ap- p'y this principle to all sorts of sur- pluses, big and little. It is this: TVike the candidate's surplus and his tital vot^ and make a fraction of thetn, with the surplus for the top half of the fraction, and the tdtai vote for the bot- tom half. Then reduce the fraction to its lowest terms by means of a "com- mon divisor," which every schoolboy understands- Take all the ballots of Ifce candidate, mark the fraction on euch ot them, and distribute them all as above directed. Applying this to the ease of Simith's sixteen balhjts, the process is this: Surplus, eight. Total ballots, sixteen. Fraction, eight-scxteenths. Common divisor, eight. Reduced fractioa, one-half. Ekich ballot counts 1-2 a vote for who- ever is second choice in it- Take another example. Suppose Smith had ten votes, the quota being eight. Dight from ten gives his surplus. Then the proceee is this: Surplus two. Total ballots, ten. Fraction, two^tenths. Common division. two- Reduced fraction, one-fifth. Each ballot counts one-fifth of a vote for the secx)nd choice on it, and it takes five of these transferred' ballots to make one complete vote. Now, take a complicated looking iii- stjince. If Smith has eleven votes, the quota still being eight, his surplus would be three. Then we have this process: Surplus, three. Total ballots, eleven- Fraction, three-elevenths. Common divisor, none. Fraction cannot be reduced. Each ballot therefore counts three- elevenths of a vote, and they count this way for the second choices: Four ballots, one vote. Eight ballots, two votes. Eleven ballots, three- votes. 24 lAPPENDIX. You see that the surplus does not ani- ount to much in these last instances. Tli<» only dis5id\'Bntage I can see in tiiis plan is that the tally-sheets havp to be made a little larger, so as to leave room for putting downi tbe fractions, and the tally tlcrks would have to be fatniliar with fnictional addition. They may use decimals if they like. It would be well to' have space left at the left hand of the n«mefl in ^sliich rtie fractions could be jotted down as t-nlled o«t, and then added together before being transferred to the body of the tally-shoi»t. THE TASMANIAN METHOD. At the last parliamentary election h\ Ts.sinania, the returuirvg officer, a^^sted by the Grovernment statistician, adopt- ed a method similar in principle to the above, but dififerinjr in practice. The TasmanJan plaoi is briefly this: A rule of-three-suni is workeil out in the case of each second-choice candidate who is on the baHots of tiie man having a surplus. Supi»ose that Mr. S^^mith has a surplus, and that several dififerent candidates arc niiuked second choice on his ballots, Mr. Brown being one of these. Then the rule of three-sum in Brown's case would be this: ' i u ' » «. , • < • •f .. ) As Smith's total vote is to second choices for Brown, so Smith's surplus is to the voe of any use. I'uder the Gove system each candidate publishes, at a certain time before the election, and in a certain formal way, a list of the candidates to whom he will transfer (1) his surplus votes if he gets ; mere than a quota, or (2) all his votes if he does not get votes enough to he elected. The order of preference of suoih transfer is determined by the com- ivjirative number af votes cast for the I othere whom he nnme««; that is to say, the man having the largest number of vo<(es on his own account, has the first claim on transferred votes, if he needs them. It is, therefore, only necessary for the ! voter to mark one name on his ballot, I and tlie result of the ejection can be ob- ' tained by dealing with statements furn-' APPKNDIX. 25 Wied by the deputy-returning officers from the poUlufi^ subdivisions, imstead of the actual ballots being sent to the re- turning officer. Then the process is this: 1. The fttatements of the deputies are added together, and the total vote for e;"Ided by the mitnil>er of candidates to be elected. This gives the "quota," or nfuml>er of votes necessary for elec- tion. 3. Any candidate ♦^•ho has a quota or more than a quota is declared elected- and his surplus votes, if any, are trans- ferred to the credit of that man on Ms puhlished list, not yet elected, who h\e at this stage the largest number of votes. 4. Anyone getting a quota in this way is declared electwl. and no more traiKS- f erred votes are credited to him. The process is contimied until all the sur- plus votes are tnmsferreil to men on the lists w^ho need tihem. \ 5. The returninir officer then begins at thP bottom of the poll. The candi- date having the lowest number of votes is declared "out of the cmmt," and all his votes are tran.sf erred to those on \ his list who n^ed them, in the way in- dicated above. 6. This process is continued hv cuttini" off, one by this ohjection the answer is that the voter takes into consideration both the candidate ajid his list of proposal tri'nsferees. Those whom a csindid'ite puts on his list are usually men of the same gem'rai views as himself, and these are just the persons whooi in m-st njses the voter would chose. The mak- ing of an imppoi>er list would seri(>u:sly injure a cuudida.te's chances; whilst the very making of a list is useful informa.- tion to the ^•oter as to the opinions and atniiations of the cantidate. Al.so. the vc4ers themselves indirectly decide the order of ti"ansference on every candi- date's Hat, because it is the largest num- ber of original votes which give** the first claim to transferred votes, when these are needed to make up a quota. For meeting-rootm eleations, the Gove system presents difficulties. At illusf.-a- tive "mock-elections'' or "trial ballots," where well-known public men are sup- pcsed to be candidates, the lecturer would have the difficult and invidious task of making up a. list of transferees for each: whilst at actual elections of <-oimmittees and delegates some candi- dates would also find the task an In- vid'ous one. Takinjg now the manifest advnnta;res of the Gove system, they are these: I'he voter has only to mark hiK ballot for one candidate- Th& counting is much quicker and the bjtllots have not to be taken to a central place to be counted. Any citiiien, when the vote is an- w-uniced, can figure out the transfer of votes for himself. At every election a thtusand checking pencils would pre- vent even the suspicion of fraud in the Tra nsfers. 26 APPENDIX. 3.— TWO DEFECTIVE SYSTEMS. In seeking to decide on an efficient and au.it;.ible metbod of Effective Tot- ing, it is well to know what to avoid. Therefore we give a brief description of two systems which have been adopted in some pJaces. but which are very de- fective. These axe the Cumnla/tive Vote and the Limited A^ote. Both of them are operated in districts returning . sev- erai membera. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. Each elector is given as many vo*es as there are members to be elected. Suppose you are a voter, and seven members are to be elected, then you have seven votes; and you may distribute your votes around in any way you please. You may give all seven of them to one man, or four to one man and three to another, or give one to each of seven candidates. For instance, in a Tcionto ward you now have four votes at a municipal election^ but you must not cumulate them. If you want to "plump" for a man you can only give him one vote. Under the cumulative f^ystem you could give him all your four votes. This is a decided improvement on the present plan, but far behind the sys-tems already described. The two great objections to Ouma- Iftive voting are: (1) That it causes a grt-at waste of votes; and (2) that by careful and thorough organization a majority of the representatives in an electoral district can be got by a min- ority of the electors. This is done by arranging for certain divisions of voters to vote in such a way that each candi- date of that side may have only enough votes to make his election safe. With- out itihis careful and thorough organiza- tion the waste of votes is very great- A member requiring only a thousand votes to elect him may have nearly an- other thousand thrown away on him in order to make hi.s election sure, be- cause the electors do not know how many votes he is going to get. Speaking generally, it is not well to give several votes to one elector. It really diminishes his voiting power, in- stead of increasing it. Cumulative voting has been in opera- ton for more than twenty years in Eng- land, in electing members of Seh>3ol Boards. Alfred Cridge thinks that the cjiTise of proportional representation would have made much greater head- way in England if this imperfect me- thod had not been in operation. In the State of Illinois, the Legisla- ture is elected on the cumulative plan from districts returning only three mem- bers. Such a burlesque on proportional representation oniy retards progress- THE LIMITED VOTE. The Limited Vote merely gives each elector a few votes less than the num- ber of members to be elected. It waa tried for a time in Toronto elections, by giving each elector two votes, whilst three members were to be elected- In New York, seven votes were given, there being twelve members to elect. The plan was abandoned in both places. APPENDIX. 27 4.— ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES. Proportional Representation is of I mucii value in tlie election of the oflBcers «nd crvmmittees of clubs, lodges, friendly s<.4-ieties and similar social and business 01 ganiziations. It has many advantages over the old method of "multiple voting," the defects of which toave already been referred to. The introduction of propoi-tional rep''e- sentation into such organizations is also ! one of the luoet effective means to spread a kiu>wletlge of the principle. ^rhe question is brouirbur municipal council or the legislature, or some other suitable public body. The evening can hardly fail to be a success, because peopile are almost always in- terested in an election when they know the candidates. Be sure to explain every «tep of the process in the clearest w«y you can. DOUBLING THE BALLOTS. The working of the Hare system in "meeting-room elections" may sometimes be unsiatisfactory if the nuCiber of vot- ers is too small. This diffleivlty can be entirely obviated by letting each vo^er mark two separate and distinct ballots, thus doubling the total number of vot*-^. So far as the counting is concerned, this is just as good as if twice the num- ber of voters were present. Usually each voter will mark his two ballo:s alike — that is, in duplicate; but there is no harm in his varying them if he is undecided which candidate he likes best. For satisfactory working the number of ballots should not be less than the nuniiber of candidates multiplied by it- self, thus, for 5 candidates, 25 ballots; y> candidates 36 ballots; and so on. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE. A novel and interesting application of the methods above rec-ommended was made early in the year by the work- men in the establishment of Wm. & J. G. (ireey, mill furnishers, Toronto- In order to decide the location for the summer picnic, a vote was to be takeoi amongst the employees. Eighteen differ- ent places were to be voted on, and in order to get a clear majority— not a m.ve plurality— for one particular place, it was decided that the balloting be ac- cording to the preferential 'plan of the Hare system of proportional represent' a- tion. The ballots— about eighty in number —were prepared by a suitable dnplicat- ing machine, the use of which was got from the office of the firm. Each work- man, as he got his time check one m^ m- ing, received also a blank ballot for the picnic vote, which he marked and re- I tuirned at noon vrvth Ms check. The committee counted the ballots the same evening, and although tihej' had no pre- vious knowledge of the Hare system, their woi-k was done very satisfactorily- We print herewith one of the ballots, as a sample, showing the form of ballot and the w^,y of marking: PICNIC BALLOT. (Mark 1 after your first choice and 2 after your second, and so on till the ballot is tilled in.) Osbawa— Rail 13 Oshawa— Boat 12 Erin 17 .Tackson's Point 18 Rosebank H Lome Park 10 OakvUle & Burlington Beach . . . . ^ ... 8 Dundum Park 7 Mountain View Park 14 Brant House 15 NiagJirn-on-the-Lake 3 Paradise Grove 16 Youngstown 5 I/ewiston 4 Quoenston Dock 2 Queenston Heights 1 Rumsey Park 6 28 APPENDIX. In thiB sami>le ballot the voter's first- son's Point, The best way out, the«re- ^Jhoke is Queenston Heijdits, his second fore, was to take a second ballot, as be- ohoice Queenston Dock, his third ehoif'e Niagard-on-tlie-Lake, and so on as !n- dk-'ftted by tlie tij?T.res. The result of the voting was a tie be- t> ten Qaeenstown Heights and .Ta.^k- tween Queenston Heights and Jack- scon's Point. This was done, resulting in a victory for Jackson's Point by six votes. 5.— AN OBJECT LESSON. To master the principles of the Hare- Si)ence system of Proportional Repre- sentation, there is no better way than to see a meeting-room ele.-tion, and fol- low its details by having a spare taJly- sfeeet and acting as extra "tally-clerk" on your own account- F«Liiing this opportunity, the next best way is 10 give a little study to the details of some actual election. It if Ijieasanter and more effectual than the reading of instrnctions for working the system. We present here\Nith the tally sheet and details of an election which took piac<» on Thursday, July 28th, at ?nts pjoperly labelled. You commence the count by sorting the ballots into these compartments, according to the first choice votes, p ly- ing no heed just now to the second and subsequent choices. As you call out the names, two of your fellow-scruti- neers are keeping tally of them* Each frf these "tally clerks'' has a iwo-perly ruled tally sheet, and they prevent mis- takes by checking each other. Column "a" shows the tallien, one by one. as put down. They are in groups of five, which enables the eye to follow them more correctly in counting. The fifth stroke of each group should be struck forward across the preceding four; but it would take a special en- ffi«>ing to show this. That is the wuy to make a proper tally. Coiumn "b" has the totals of eavA man's vote, got by adding up the tollies in column "a." At the foot of column "b" is the total vote cast, namL^ ly, 61. I'he tally clerks divide the total vote (01) by the number of the committee- men required (5): and the result gives the quota (12), ar number of votes necessary to elect. There is a remaind- er of 1, which is ignored, as it does not afifect the result Armstrong and Gallagher have each a quota, and each a surp^lus. Each has the same number of votes, namely. sixteen. Therefotre, each has a wrplas of four vote*. The' scrutineer declaree Armstrong and Gallagher duly elected, and Hie tally-sheet is marked accordingly. Armstrong's ballots having been tihor- on^'hly mixed, four are taken from tJhe top of his pile, and the reniaindug twelve are set aside as being the baJ- icts which elected him- His surplus of four is then distributed. Gallagher's ballots are treated in the same way. Column "c"' shows the distributioo of the inyht bal'lots of the two elected candidates, llorwood is second choict* Du four of the surplus ballots, which are put in his compartment one by on«. These four ballots complete his quota of twelve, and be is therefore eleited- This takes place befo-re the surplus is all distributed, and the distribution ifl accoirdlngly stopped in order to de«:;l:i'e Horwood's election, mark it on the tally sl'eet and remove his ballots. It then proceeds. The remaining ballots go to Wheat. Morsn and Dowling. One of the ballots transferred to Wheat is marked "Armstrong 1, G£ agher 2, Wheat 3," but Gallagher was passed over, because he was already elected, red Wheat gets it as beinc: third choice. Coiumin "d" gives a freeh «et of totals, with the surplus ballots added in. It shows W'heat's total increased to .^, Moran's increased to 5, and Dow- ling's increased to 4. Dowling is now the candidate with the lowest number of votes. The scrutineer, therefore, de- clares him "out of the count"; the tally sheet is s^ marked; and the wholo otf Dowling's ballots are distributed to other candidates. Column "e" shows the distribution of Dowling's ballots. One of them goes to Corney and three to \Alieat. Of these last, one is marked "Armstrong 1, Dowling 2, Wheat 3," etc It came to Dowling in Armstrong's surplus, stayed with Dowling until he had no use for it, and then %vent on to Wheat, and helped to elect him, as you will see presently. Column "f" gives the totals as altered by the distribution of Dowling's ballots; showing? that Wheat is increased to edgbt. and Corne.v to seven; also that W.'^g'ho'm and Moran are at the bottom 30 APPENDIX. of the poll with five each. At first gluLce, this appears to be a tie. But on closer examination of the tally • sheet, we find that the votes of Waghom are original first choices, whilst one of Moran's ballots is a transfer. So we declare Moran "out," because we have a nUe that when it comes to a tie, a transferred vote is not as good as an original 1 first-choice, nor a third-choice OH good as a second, etc. Golunm "g" shows the distribution of four of Moran's ballots. Where is the fifth? It has become null and void, be- cauj^ the voter had ooly marked four names on it, as follows: Gallagher 1, Armstrong 2, Moran 3, Dowling 4. Now, as Gallagher and Armstrong are al- ready elected, and Moran and Dowling are "out" for want of sufficient vot-is, it ia evident that that ballot must drop out. It nnght have been effective if the voter had mirked another name on it; but he haa the satisfaction of knowing that his two best choices have been *ie- sentation for the Section of aldermen and councillors; THEREFORE HER MAJESTY, by and with the consent of the Legisla- tive Assembly of the Province of On- tario, enacts as follows: 1. In every city, town, village and townsthip where the council is elected by APPENDIX. 3» a general vote, the council of such city, town, village or township may pass a bylaw providing for the adoption of pro- portional representation in the elertiou of aldermen of such city, or council- lors of such town, village or township, by any method that will result in the electiofi of any qualified candidate who obtains at the electioo a quota of valid votes, the said quota being found by dividing into the number of valid votes the number of councillors or aldermen to be elected, ignoring fractions, if any; but such bylaw, before the final passing thereof, shall receive the assent of the electors of the municipality in the man- ner provided for :n section 338 and foJ- Icwing sections of the Municipal Act, 2. Any council providing by such by- law for the said elections upon said principle of proportional representation shall adopt the system of voting by ballot and all other provisions of the said Municipal Act foi the election of such aldermen and councillors, so far as the same can be made for the pur- pose operative; and it shall he compe- tent for the said council in the(r aaid bylaw to supplement the said provisions by such further directionfl and provi' sions as may be found desirable and ne- cessary efficiently to carry out the meth- od adopted for electing such aldermeu or councillors in accordance with said principle of proportional representation. 3. It shall be competent for any sucii council by such bylaw to provide for vacancies as follows: (1) A vacancy may be filled or left unfilled. (2) A vacancy may be filled by de- claring elected the candidate who at the last general election, received the highest number of votes next after the elected candidate receiving the lowest nunuber of votes. (3) Other vacancies may be filled to like manner by takm^ the candidates in the order of their number of votes from the remaining highest to lowest* (4) Or vacancies may be filled by a new election for the whole city, town, village or township. ■utt •»lt