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Lui^ti B.B..W«lk«*i. •»^ ' ■- * ~ "' '' ' ' -■ „ y .,.,i- „ ^ I»ua^.*^j»MEMO. BY AUTHORj*^j» The following paper, written for independent publication, was first read before the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, on the 5th of April last, and afterwards incorporated in a series of five articles which appeared in the Canadian Military Gazette, under the title of " The A B C of Imperial Defence," as follows.—" A— The Empire," on the 17th of April; " B— The Navy," on the 15th of May and 5th of June; and " C — The Army," on the 19th of June and 3rd of July. The Editor of the Military Gazette having kindly consented to my using the original articles in any way I chose, the two on the Navy are now published, in their revised and final form, by the Toronto Branch of the Navy League. I have also drawn upon my article on "The Canadian Factor in Imperial Defence," which appeared in the April number of the United Service Magazine. But, as the Navy is only a pai —though always the first part of all— in the whole system of Imperial Defence, and as the great general principles of defence must first be considered before we can appreciate the value of any details whatever, I have also taken my first article— "^~The Empire"— and prefixed a condensed and revised version of it here, in the form of an Introductory Note. William Wood, 25th August, 1900. Captain, Royal Rifles. n^fi^The RecipSent of this Pamphlet is earnestly requested not only to read it carefully himself, but to lend it to his friends. The grasp of the situation which it presents will show him the urgent necessity which exists for educating public opinion in Canada as to the foundation upon which the security of our Empire depends, viz., Sea Power. If we do not wish to be caught napping we must set our house in order. Branches of the League should be formed throughout the Dominion. Read the *♦ Objects of the Navy League in Canada*' at PAGE 41 and JOIN THE NAVY LEAGUE. -4~ ' ' Jntrobuctorie Hote. It has already become a commonplace to say, that the Empire is beginning to realize how much the present war has advanced the great question of Imperial Defence. It is also beginning to dawn on the outside public that the cardinal principle involved is that every part of the Empire has an interest in the whole, and that the whob has an interest in each and every part. And there is even some general recognition of the fact that the loss of South Africa would make the problem of defence twice as hard as it is now, and would shake the very foundation of that Imperial security on which we all rely. We need not stop here to consider our many failures in Imperial organization; bur we must not fail to note in passing that the voting public, and all parties in it, are the prime cause of all the trouble, and all the blame is firstly due to them alone. Our free British common- wealths naturally get the kind of organization they deserve, since they make it themselves; and, as they have all refused to face the problem of Imperial Defence, they only have themselves to thank for the per-, petual breakdown of their own unworkable systems. The whole question is a vast one, and any attempt to enumerate the different points in it would only be confusing and absurd, but the definition and first principle of.it may be given in a single sentence: IMPERIAL DEFENCE IS THE INSURANCE ON THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE EMPIRE; EACH PART HAVING ITS OWN PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE BURDEN AND CONTROL OF A UNIFIED NAVAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION, DECENTRALIZED ACCORD- ING TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT ONL AND IN- DIVISIBLE AS REGARDS SUPREME COMMAND: AND ITS FIRST PRINCIPLE IS TO MAINTAIN IN PEACE THE MINIMUM ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING ALL OUR FORCES UNITED TOGETHER IN ADEQUATE STRENGTH FOR IMPERIAL WAR. The British dominions now comprise nearly a quarter of the whole world, both in area and population; and all the life, and growth, and security of this vast Empire are to-day as entirely de- pendent on the issues of war, by sea and land, as they always have been in the past, and always must be in the future. Of course, this by no means implies that peaceful energies are not equally essential INTROmCTORY NOTE. in building up the greatness and prosperity of empires; but it must always be lemembered that peaceful pursuits can only be carried on successfully when their security is guaranteed by adequate armed strength. We see this at every turn of our Imperial history; but, more especially, from the Seven Years' War to Waterloo, when a fierce competition in empire-making was raging in every part of the globe. The conquests of Canada, the Cape, and our Indian Empir:. all date from these wars, wliich also resulted in the final capture -^f most of oi'r minor possessions. Our present Empire may truly be said to date from Trafalgar; for Waterloo only confirmed the victory which Trafalgar had made inevitable. Every extension since then — even in times of profound peace and in the remotest comers of the earth — has been made possible only by the British ascendency gained in a century of victorious war. Australia and New Zealand owe their existence as British colonies just as much to the British command of the sea as \i they had been fought for by contending fleets again and again — like the West Indies or Malta. Their development has hitherto been peaceful, simply because the Navy had sweot every rival out of the way. The same sea-power has been the determining factor in all the more recent accessions, whether accompanied by war or not: in India, in Burmah; in Singapore, Hong Kong and Wei-hai-Wei; in Borneo and New Guinea; at Lagos, at Aden and in the Fijian Archi- pelago; in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Uganda; in Rhodesia — and in every other part of the Empire, where the hoifting of the Union Jack pro- claims that henceforth that possession will be guarded by the living wall CI British armour and prestige. Yet some of us are so ignorant as to declare that the colonies owe nothing to the Motherland — in spite of the fact tjiat they could never have existed at all unless her strong right arm had protected them by sea; and some so short-sighted as to declaim against those very armaments which are the only real guarantee of all colonial security to-day! The fact is, that the Pax Britannica has been so long taken as a matter of course, that we look upon it as self-exist- ing, and as needing no Imperial effort to keep up. The lessons of history, and the hard facts of the present mail-fisted world, have all been more or less forgotten in our navy-girt Greater Britain; where the relative rate of national war insurance iias diminished in propor- tion as property has increased, until the danger point has everywhere been reached, and, in most places, long since passed. The very obvious remark that, if we are really outgrowing our strength, the march of empire must be stopped at once, is a strong enough objection of its own kind. But can it be put into practice? Not yet, at all events; the force of circumstances is still too strong INTRODUCTORY NOTE. for it, and there seems little chance of stopping expansion, until it meets with outside forces stronger than its own impulse from within. . The growth of empire follows the lines of greatest attraction and least resistance with almost mathematical precision; and, where these two lines coincide, there are such strong compelling interests at work, tha*., sooner or later, the flag must follow them up to the end. Till the present day, the Home Government in general, and the Colonial Office in particular, have rarely encouraged expansion. On the con- trary, they have often accepted any such increase of responsibilities with a very bad grace indeed. Now, however, though not supplying the direct stimulus, they are more alive to securing free entry to such markets as are still open, before it is too hte. In the last 15 years* no less than 3.000,000 of square miles — almost the area of the entire Dominion of Canada — have been brought beneath the British flag. But how that flag is to be maintained there in honour and security, is a question not often asked by the general public. The pioneers go far a-field, in ever-scattering forces; but what is to keep their out- posts in touch with each other, and bind them all together with the centres of Imperial power? The only answer is — The Navy! The British Empire won the power of expansion by maritime war, kept it by naval prestige, and used it diligently before other powers had much superfluous energy to spare from their home aflfairs. We used ' to be almost alone in the race for uncivilized markets and land; but now the course is crowded with eager competitors, and, as the re- maining prizes become fewer, the competition naturally becomes fiercer. Circrmstances are changing all round us; and, with them, the very watchword of our Empire is fast changing, too — it used to b e expansion ; but now we are compelled to say consolidation. The first great reason, then, for Imperial defence is that the Empire, as a whole — though mad*; up of so many ver> 'ifferent poli- tical units, scattered all over the world — has no sinj. system of organizing its) vast resources into an adequate force, whi could be effectively concentrated in defence of any points of attack. An empire gradually built up by statesmanlike design would not be ex- posed to half the dangers we are called upon to face. Of course, there never has been any empire formed upon a strategic plan; cir- cumstances must always prevent that; but Rome, Russia, Germany, Italy and the United States have all expanded, for the most part, along well-thought-out lines of development, every step in advance being backed by the cumulative force of all those preceding it. Thus, each outlying part was always united to the centre by secure lines of communication, passing entirely over friendly ground. On the other hand, we have always expanded just wherever the fortunes of war, —7— INTRODUCTORY NOTE. I f x \\'l or some ncv; opening for trade, may have led us. No consistent plan has ever beeti followed. Trade has nearly always been the main objective, and, wherever it was found to be within the reach of ship- ping in undeveloped countries, there the Empire was sure to follow after. The flag follows the trade wherever it can; and the only certain thing about its wanderings is that they al./ays start from the sea. The Merchant Fleet is thus the builder of our Roman roads; and the Navy is the guardian of roads rind fleets together. This makes our general position rather like those of Athens, Portugal, Spain and Holland. Now, the Athenian and Spanish Empires fell through the loss of their sea power; the Portu^^ese and Dutch through overland invasion at home; and both kind A disaster have their lesson for us to-day. For, while we are more purely maritime than Greece or Spain, we need an army quite as much as Por+ugal or Holland ever did. It is true that the defence of the United Kingdom depends almost entirely on the Navy — ^though there is always the possibility of invasion; but, as we have immense inland territories on three con- tinents, and as every g^eat war requires the co-operation of an army, in places beyond the striking distance of the navy, we must have a . workable plan of combined action both by land and sea — and nothing but an organized system of Imperial Defence can give us the means of putting such a plan into practice. The second reason makes the first absolutely imperative, for it is this: That war is still an inevitable form of the universal struggle for existence. It may seem a little absurd to insist upon what is so self- evident jitst now; but we all tend to rebel against the despotism of fact in some direction ; and, as many good people shut their eyes more particularly against all things military, it is necessary to keep well in sight of the indubitable fad., that we are still passing through the phase of evolution in which war is a great determining factor The third reason points the moral of the other two, and brings us at once into the field of practical policy. It is this : That, while all the Great Powers are just as strong as ever on land, they are now developing a new and challenging strength by sea as well. We must, thercfc/e, organize all our naval strength to prevent the absolute loss of sea-power; and, since so many elements of naval strength are found in Greate." Britain, we must make the new Navy as truly Im- perial in all its resources as it always has been in its field of action. And, ^mong our free British peoples, the only sure way of solvin** the problem ia to form such an enlightened body of public opinion in Parliament, press and people as can first make ihe subject the greatest of living issues in all part's of the Queen's dominions, and then assist the higher statesmanship of Great and Greater Britain in lifting it —8— INTRODUCTORY NOTE. above the quicksands of party politics and setting it on a firm bas* 3, truly representative of the whole self-ruling Empire. There is noth- ing to lose and everything to gain by spreading the truth as widely as possible. Now, all free governments look to the guidance of public opinion; and we know that public opinion, when ignorant, is a mental mob, in which most individuals are better than the mass; but, when educated, a disciplined body of thought, in which the mass is better than most of its individuals. We are, therefore, again brought back to the natural conclusion, that the first step of all must be the formation of a disciplined body of public opinion which will be to the whole Empire very much what the General Staflf is to an army in the field. In all such undertakings, the first step is naturally a hard one. But here we are fortunate in having this step taken for us so effectually by the formation and vigorous growth of the Navy League. This league of practical patriots knows nothing of party ways or means; but goes about its Empire's business in every quarter of the globe; and, everywhere drawing fresh strength from its many representa- tives of all the different schools of thought and action, everywhere unites all these various forces in its one executive purpose of insuring Imperial stability by maintaining the British Command of the Sea- Various in its membership, but single-minded in its aim, this League forms the natural living bond of union between the public which needs protection and the Navy which needs supplies. It is thus in the best possible position to act as an educative force, being at once the guide of the Public, the philosopher of Empire, and the friend of the Navy. And, now that the half-forgotten factor of Sea- Power has been re-discovered, the Canadian public should try ta understand its meaning before it is too late. Others are learning fast enough; and here, if anywhere in international affairs, knowledge is power. The general public may never know all the greater Naval reasons why; but it can learn to fed them, just as it feels o ther general principles. But the special public who asDire to lead the rest should certainly have a sound understanding of the great guiding principles of Sea-Power. These have always been essentially the same; it is only their application which varies with the time, and place, and pec pie. And the first thing of all to learn is that some day the who » Empire, and every individual in it, will be literally it war; both those at home and those at the front; all alike. This is true of every kind of human activity, from the prayers of the churches to the fluctuations of the money maikets; for nothing escapes the baud of war. And, if we wish to face the future with the determination born of conscious strength, we must never forget that, whilst our fleets and armies are the living implements of war, the head which guides them, the heart which animates them, and the strong right arm which drives them home are, and always must be, the whole united Empire's very own. THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. No Navy, no Empire; that is the A B C of Imperial Defence in its simplest form. It is so simple and so true, that, for these very reasons, it never forces itself on public opinion, except in times of crisis. Now, the present most certainly is a time of organized prepara* tion for crisis; and the actual crisis is postponed chiefly by those organized forces which must eventually meet it. Times are changing with startling rapidity in the naval world. The secret of Sea-Power is now well enough known abroad to make all foreigners eager for its possession. Hitherto, the command of thw- sea has generally been settled by a struggle between two great navies. Thus, the Greeks defeated the Persians, the Romans defeated the Carthaginians, and the Spaniards with their allies defeated the Turks. The English fleet has fought the Spanish, Dutch and French, both singly and in combination ; but there have never been more than three foreign naval powers to reckon with. In the near future there will be six. France and Russia will spend an extra $i35,C/00,ooo on new ships in the next seven or eight years. In the same way, Germany will double her navy in 15 years, at an extra cost of $350,000,000. The United States has no such definite programme; but it is safe to say that the American navy will have doubled its strength within ten years of the Spanish War. The Japanese are hampered by financial considerations and by the concurrent increase of their army ; but they will be half as strong again five years hence as they were in the Chinese War, and twice as strong in another five. Italy, which is the friendliest European power, has been steadily losing its relative naval strength for the last 10 or 15 years. As she is heavily mortgaged, in every sense of the word, she can only expect to be a good last among the seven greater navies. The British navy is still what it isi designed to be— more than a match for any two foreign navies. Its peace personnel numbers 115,000, of all ranks and ratings, and at least half the total are afloat in sea-going squadrons. The world is divided into nine naval ::tations, each of which has its own squadron, ports and coaling depots. The Channel Squadron naturally looks after home waters; AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. the Mediterrsnean fleet n.eets the Channel Squadron outside the Straits of Gibralter, and is responsible for all waters up to the Levant and Black Sea The West Coast and Cape Station includes the whole coast of Afiica, from the Cape Verde Islands, where it meets the Channel Squadron, round by the Cape, Natal, Delagoa Bay and Zanzibar, until it reaches the northern limits of Br^'ish East Africa. The Indian Station includes Madagascar, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and all Indian and Burmese waters, down to the Malay Peninsula, where it meets the China Station. This includes the whole Malay Archipelago and all the f;ir East — Chinese, Japanese and Russian. South of the China comes the Australian Station; and, east of both, the Pacific, which extends along the entire western coast of America, from the Horn to Alaska. The South-American Station starts from the Horn and goes up to the north of Brazil. And the North- American Squadron has charge of all the waters from the West Indies to Labrador. These nine squadrons have 258 men-of-war in commission, the crews of which number over 56,000 men. A tenth squadron, of great strength and always ready for mobilization, forms a general reserve for this first fighting line. One of its most im- portant duties is to fit out a flying squadron for special service any- where, at the shortest notice. Behind the reserve squadron come the men and shijys at depots and dockyards. These are one degree less ready; but they form part of the active peace strength, and may be confidently counted on for rapid mobilization. Behind all these stands the Royal Naval Reserve, which bears somewhat of the same relation to the navy proper that the English militia does to th; regular army. This reserve should nearly equal the peace strength of the navy; but it is less than a third of what it ought to be. Judging by the extraordinary development of foreign navies, and the consequent increase of our own, it is probable that the Empire may have to find an active personnel of 150,000; but we must remember that, 90 years ago — when the population of Great Britain was only half what it is now, and when there was no Greater Britain ito speak of — ^the personnel actually reached this totaL In the near future 150,000 will be sufficient; bijt it must be backed by an effective reserve of 100,000. Great as a total of 250,000 may seem, it is not too much for certain contingencies; and it wculd not be an exhausting drain on a population of over 50,000,000 people. But, above all, the Navy must be continually kept strictly up-to- date in every possible respect; and everything officially styled *' active," or " effective," must be so in reality. Unfortunately, there is often a dangerous discrepancy between the official and the real " effective." Four weak points in our armour, which official eyes see — 11 — .^MUt^ rim^^mt.^^,, n I. Il.,^« .^~.t .^ -^ ^ - .-.y^^y),^,^,. ^. ^,.^^^-!^^^^^^. ^^ . ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^. ^ ^^^ ^ ^ 1 li ' THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, well enotigh, but which official voices dare not talk about, are more particularly worth notice just now. 1. There are still i6 battleships, armed with muzzle-loaders and classed as effectives — and this in 1900! Being obsolete, all money spent on them must be obtained from the public under false pretences ; but the public, having no real knowledge of its own, allows itself to be hoodwinked right and left. So here Is a case admirably illustrating both our official weakness and its antidote. The weakness is, that all free governments are always tempted to cut down the estimates for the great spending departments, and trust to luck when explaining away any consequent loss of efficiency. The general public, being rarely able to tell the difference between the real reason and the official excuse, would thus be entirely at the mercy of their own ignorance and official clap-trap, were it not for such a disciplined body as the Navy League, whose special knowledge gives it weight with the electorate, and whose consequent influence over the voting power gives it weight with the government. If only the public had a longer memory, we should not have to number the Navy League's action in forcing the withdrawal of these 16 " Death-traps " from our first fighting line among the many public " benefits forgot." But the whole thing is, unfortunately, one of those ser-o-comic pieces which hold the public boards all the year round. The stock .characters, too, are always the same: — the gaping public; the official pick-pocket, looking innocent; then the posse of the "fit though few" who raise the hue and cry; then the Public, Furioso; and, last of all, the bland official, in the dual character of Reformer and Reformed. Yet, how can we blame the Executive for a weakness inherent in all free governments? We have many undoubted blessings; but we also have the one undoubted curse of a halting Executive. Whenever the people rush to reform, the officials resemble that disconsolate Frenchman who, on being asked by a friend why he was following the revolutionists to the barricades at all, as he so evidently did not want to, answered sadly " I must follow them — I'm their leader." 2. The strength of the Naval Reserve is alarmingly small. The Navy is manned on a long-service system for the most part; conse- quently, it has nothing like the Army Reserve to fall back upon. The R. N. R. is not nearly half the total active strength; it is not increasing in numbers and efficiency in the LInited Kingdom as it should; and it still has no practical existence in Greater Britain. This is most unsatisfactory; and what mak^s it still worse is that the number of British merchant seamen does no: keep pace with the increase of British-owned tonnage: indeed, the manning of our Im- perial merchants fleets is more foreign now thar-. it ever was before. — 12 — ■," AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. 3. Our naval auxiliary forces are fast becoming as deficient iu material as in men. When the Deutschland's sister ship is afloat and the superior of both is on the slips, we shdl very probably drop behind in the race for ocean flyers, convertible into aux'.iary cruisers. We do not utilize the opportunities we enjoy ?Veady; and we are not creating any new opportunities of our own. There was a good com- mercial chance for inaugurating a fast Canadian Atlantic service in 1898; but we missed it, and are not yet making up lee-way. In the matter of ocean colliers, too, we are hardly alive to our unprepared- ness. It would be a criminal disgrace, if we could not mobilize separate fleets of colliers for every na'; \\ station faster than the Americans promised to mobilize the single flotilla, which was to accompany Commodore W^atson in his projected cruise against the Spanish coast. 4. Lastly, we have the enormous waste of money, and jugglery with what s used, which every year follows the voting of the esti- mates. This is a very serious thing, indeed, when it comes to divert- ing millions voted for new constructions, calculated to keep up the standard strength of the fleet, to other purposes of various kinds. Bn* the. fault of this really rests, in the first place, with the electorate; for there is no doubt that the Naval Estimates have to be doctored up, so as to catch the fancy of inexpert voters. With the Army, the case is even worse. Nobody has ever found the royal road to knowledge, but a great many people think they have found a popular one; and, now that every man is his own " naval expert," nothing is easier than to get together enough eager amateurs to run one vote up at the ex- pense of another, utterly regardless of the necessary balance of the whole TOival machine, with all its interdependent parts. And so a War Minister, or his advisers if he does not know enough himself — a very usual occurrence, — has to shuffle his cards about, till the aforesaid " experts " are satisfied that they have all got good hands* Here is another case for the Navy League, in its> role of public educator; for the only sure way of curing such dangerous evils is to make the public see things from the proper naval point of view. And besides, as the connecting link between the Nation and the Navy, the Leagp^e has also to play the very different, but equally important, role of in- terested critic in purely naval affairs. This is a delicate matter, as anyone who knows either service will admit; but really expert criti- cism, accompanied by insight and tact, will always go far to prevent the Navy from hardening off and becoming inaccessible to new ideas, as r'.i professions inevitably become when they are out of touch with the rest of the national lifd around them. But, in spite of these short-comings, the British Navy, like the — »3— ! THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, German Army, has by far the highest professional standing in the World. The weak points are not so much in the Navy itself, as in the public ignorance of naval needs and in administrative failure to organize all the necessary auxiliary forces, which will be so urgently wanted on the outbreak, and during tfte entire course, of the next great war. And what makes these apparently minor points of such prime importance for us is the fact that we cannot risk defeat at sea, like other peoples. For us, defeat means disaster and disaster means ruin. France is still a Great Power, even after the loss of Alsace and Lorraine; Italy has suffered no real loss of power from her Abyssinian) defeat; the United States could easily survive the loss of Maine, and Russia the loss of Poland. All these powers would still have secure lines of communication left, and could recuperate at leisure. But, with the British Empire, the case is entirely different. Our greatest highways pass entirely oversea: and it would be more certainly destructive to cut off Great from Greater Britain, than it would be to permanently cut off St. Petersburg from Moscow, or Paris i'rom Toulon, or Rome from Naples, or Washington from San Francisco. The Navy has three duties of prime importance to perfomi in war: to guard against invasion, to protect British commerce, and to give the Army a safe base of operations, as near as possible to the enemy's most vital points of attack. Each and all of these duties can only be discharged by getting the command of the sea; and this must be won by the concentrated force of battle-fleets. By victory in great fleet-actions we secure control of the ocean highways, whilst the enemy is driven into the b3rways. The victor, therefore, has com- mand of all the roads, whilst the beaten side is forced to go across country. The losing side, too, cannot possibly carry out any great concerted operations after that; and so invasion is out of question, Its commerce, struggling over round-about, cross-country byways, cannot compete with that of the winning side, which passes securely along the regular trade-routes, which are all well patrolled. And, lastly, its coast-line becomes a frontier of the British Empire, be- cause the intervening sea has become as much a British possession as if it had been formally annexed by proclamation, garrisoned by an army of occupation, recognized by all the Powers, and coloured red in every map of the world. The army can then reach this frontier in perfect security, and assume the offensive at its own initiative. All this forms the more professional side of the Navy's work. Now let us turn to the purely business point of view. The present annual cost of the Navy is nearly $150,000,000; and Cobbett — whom no one can accuse of being a Jingo — ^long —14— \ i • ( AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. 1' . ago declared that it must be kept supreme, even at a cost of $500r 000,000. This last sum may seem preposterous, but it would only be a 5 per cent, war insurance on the total Imperial maritime wealth exposed to war risks within a single year — a much lower rate than shipping has often paid before. The mtiitime imports and exports of the Empire amount to $5,000,000,000. If we add to this the British trans-shipment trade, which does not figure in the Admiralty returns; the $1,500,000,000 of foreign com- merce carried in British ships; the value of the shipping itself — over $600,000,000; the marketable documents carried between British ports by British ships — over $1,250,000,000; and the value of ports, dockyards and other property open to naval attack; we get a total maritime wealth of more than $10,000,000,000, which has to run a war risk within the twelvemonth. Now, the naval estimates are the annual premium of war insurance on sea-borne wealtl:; they amount to $150,000,000; therefore, they represent a rate of i>4 per cent, per annum. But this rate is really much lower than it seems; for more than half of it is an insurance on interest, not on capital; though it guar- antees both together. For example; suppose you iake the rental as your basis of calculation, and insure house property yielding $1,000 a-year at ij^ per cent. You' would then pay $15 a-year for insuring the entire property. Now, capitalize this rental at 15 years' pur- chase; and still pay the same premium — $15. You will then insure $15,000 worth of property for $15 a year — that is, at the rate nf i-ioth of one per cent, per annum. As i-5th of one per cent, is a low rate in Canada, it is plain that half as much is a very low pre- mium, indeed, for so sound a policy on so gjeat an Empire- But even if only half the $10,000,000,000 of maritime wealth W2re interest, and were capitalized at only 10 years* purchase, the naval estimates for 1900 would still be a premium of only one-fourth of one per cent, per annum. At this rate, the Navy guarantees the security of every $100 of capitalized British maritime wealth for 25c. a-year. Of course, no attempt at apportioning the relative amounts of capital and interest can be made here: indeed, an exact apportionment, throughout the whole extent of British trade, is not ascertainable from any published returns; and so, is even beyond the reach of Lloyd's, the Statistical Society, the Institute of Actuaries, and all the underwriters and insurance companies in the world. In any case, however, and looked at with the closest scrutiny from any point of view, the British Navy g^ves the best security known, and at the lowest rate in the world. And, as a matter of business, this is undeniably good all round. —15— • THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, But *>oth the professional and business points of view are only two complementary aspects, included within the general scope of naval history; and, if we want to understand what the Navy really means to the Empire, we must, of course, appeal to the historical method. If public opinion would only take a few lessons from navai history, it could work out its own problems with something like the skill of veteran experience: but, as it is, each new gen- eration seems to be the same, old, everlasting raw recruit. It is a truism to say that history is the only safe guide to the problems of the present and future; but it is not generally known that there is nothing in history more consistent, nor drawn from vaster exper- ience, than the practical lessons so clearly taught by the annals of the British Navy. Now, if we first find out the historical reason why, and then take it to g^ide us through present problems, and show us the signs of the times for a step into the future, we shall discover the following chain of cause and effect: I.— THE LIFE OF THE EMPIRE DEPENDS UPON THE COMMAND OF THE SEA: II.— THE COMMAND OF THE SEA DEPENDS UPON BATTLE-FLEETS-IN-BEING: III.— THE MAINTENANCE OF BATTLE-FLEETS-IN- BEING DEPENDS UPON SOUND NAVAL POLICY: IV.- AND SOUND NAVAL POLICY NOW DEMANDS THE INTELLIGENT CO-OPERATION OF DISCIPLINED PUBLIC OPINION, THROUGHOUT GREATER BRITAIN, IN MAKING THE NAVY SO TRULY IMPERIAL IN ALL ITS RESOURCES, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL, THAT IT MAY SOON BECOME THE FIRST COMPLETE FACTOR IN THE UNIFIED SYSTEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. And, furthermore, if we wish to satisfy ourselves that this is one unbroken chain, forming the necessary connection between the certain truth of the past and the inevitable tendency of the ^ future, all we have to do is to test it link by link, from first to last. And the first link is this: I.— THE LIFE OF THE EMPIRE DEPENDS UPON THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. We talk of the) Royal Navy and the Imperial Army; but the epithets would be far more appropriate if we reversed them and said, the Royal Army and Imperial Navy; for the Navy has always been the mainspring of expansion and the mainstay of Empire won. Un- fortunately, most people, even in a maritime State, are apt to over- look this, even while it is going on under their very eyes. The ways of the sea are strange to them, and sailors themselves are always — 16— AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. somewhat of a class apart. Even Englishmen say that a man in the right is " on firm ground," whilst his opponent is " quite at sea." Historians, too, have almost all ben ignorant of the full secret of Sea-Power, and, naturally, have rot been able to impart it to their readers. Green's justly popular history is a poor guide to that all-sustaining Sea-Power, without which he could not have had any English People to write about. Canadian histories do not insist nearly enough on the indispensable aid rendered by the Navy in the Conquest, and, indeed, at every other crisis in our history. Nor do American histories explain how Independence was really won by alliance with the French and Spanish Sea-Powers, at a time when the British was mismanaged at home and distracted by divergent interests abroad. Wasb'n;^on and Rochambeau could never have forced Cornwallis to surrender at Yorktown, unless de Grasse and de Barras had concentrated their Sea-Power in the Chesapeake, and thus overpowered the British sea-force under Graves, whilst nulli- fying the land-force under Clinton. Washington himself thoroughly understood tha situation. In his " Memorandum for concerting a plan of operations with the French Army," dated July 15, 1780, and sent by the hands of Lafayette, he says: " In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be consider- ed as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend ." Our history is indeed eloquent with Sea-Power; but our his- torians are not. It is very instructive to observe how often Sea-Power has been of vital moment to empires, which we generally regard as founded mainly upon strength by land. Four times has the empire of the world been fought for at sea; at Salamis, at Actium, at Lepanto and at Trafalgar, Sound strategy jroverned the conduct of all these four campaigns, and their results were more far-reaching than those of any four land-campaigns in history. The popular impression is that naval campaigns are rather haphazard aflfairs, diversified by pro- miscuous mSl^es. But it was not by accident that East and West met three times within the same strategic theatre of war, at the immense intervals of many centuries; nor by accident that Themis- tocles, Augustus and Don John of Austria were all led to the same general strategic line of action. And it is safe to say that, when Russia becomes a challenging Sea-Power, the East and West will again meet in the same sea battle, and fight again within the same theatre of war, for the same dominion of the World. Strategy repeats itself. Many of the same factors which now determine our own " dominion over palm and pine," and give us —17— ,1 I , h I THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, our " far-flung battle line " — instead of one dangerously near our very doors — were tried in action, and proved sufficient, by the Ro'nians in the Punic wars. And it is the very difference between the Roman and British Empires which points the moral of the tale so well, and gives us such a direct insight into practical empire-building. The Romans were essentially landsmen; they despised sailors and dis- liked the sea. Yet, by adapting excellent military material to naval purposes, they utterly defeated the immense armed mercan- tile marine of the Carthaginians; and, by doing so, *jave one of the innumerable proofs of the dangers of having a great civil sea power without a Navy to defend it. But how was Hannibal himself defeated? The answer is the same — by the Roman Navy I He had three bases, in Macedonia, Carthage, and Spain; but, having no command of the sea, he was forced to march on Italy through France, losing half his army in this arduous task set him by the Roman Navy, which, meanwhile, was putting its own Army in position to cut his communications and act on interior lines. Thus, whilst Hannibal was painfully marching round the circumference of the circle, with one flank al- ways) open, . the Romans, moving easily at the centre, were every- where checkmating him. His defeat by exhaustion was, conse- quently, made as certain as Napoleon's, and by the same cause — ^the hostile Command of the Sea. The parallel between Hannibal and Napoleon is a striking one ; but there is an equally striking one, of wider application, between the Roman and British Empires. Without the command of the sea, the Roman was confined to Italy for five centuries; with it, a world-empire was won in three more. For five centuries — from the Conquest to the Armada — England maintained herself at home by Sea- Power; but, in the three last centuries, her I^avy, having completely won the command of the sea, has made the British Em- pire of to-day. Now, the Romans recognized the value of Sea- Power in a way that every citizen could understand. For, when Duilius returned from his victory at Mylae, the Columna Rostrata was erected in the Forum, and decked with the beaks of captured ships — hence the name of the world-famous Rastra. Is our own Nelson Monument in Trafalgar Square quite equivalent to that? We must always remember that Sea-Power is not a thing apart, but rather that thread of life which has run through all our inter- national history from the beginning, and which will run through it to the end. The Command of the Sea — that mighty dominion, as Thucydides so justly called it, — first began to affect British history when Carausius, in 287, proclaimed himself Emperor —18— AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. of Britain, and swept the narrow seas from Brest to the Rhine. By Sea- Power, OflFa foiled the projected invasion of Charlemag^ne. By Sea-Power, again, and not by accident, he — and Alfred, Athelstan and ^.dgar after him — stopped the incursions of the Norsemen. Both William the Conqueror and William III. succeeded, because unopposed by Sea-Power; and the last days of Edward III. — like all those of the American Revolution — were years of ill-success, because British Sea-Power had sunk too low. That great leader, Henry V., thoroughly appreciated Sea-Power. When the French, adding the Genoese and Spanish fleets to their own, blockaded Harfleur and attacked Southampton and the Isle of Wight, he acted, as the Admir- alty repeatedly did in the Napoleonic wars, by concentrating a battle- fleet, which destroyed their organized fighting force afloat. The command of the sea followed, and, with it, the rapid and certain conquest of France. Warwick was another naval-minded statesman; and Henry VII., who built the first real men-of-war and regularly manned them, may be called the father of the present Navy. The Armada, one would suppose, would be an object-lesson in naval policy for all succeeding generations. Unfortunately, there is no event in British history so much misunderstood; the defeat being attributed to the elements, and every other cause but the true one — which was English Sea-Power, pure and simple- Sea- Power and international status grew together under Cromwell, whose threat of sending ships across the Alps was known to be anything but an idle jest. They declined together, as they always must, under Charles IT. The Battle of the Four Days, in 1666, fought with the doggedness characteristic of all contests with the Dutch, down to the present Boer war, was a British defeat which reflected the great- est discredit on the Admiralty. Then came the revival under William III. and Queen Anne, when British Sea-Power, rising rapidly through- out the War of the Spanish Succession, stood unrivalled at the Treaty of Utrecht. From that day to this — except during the mis- managed war of the American Revolution — the Command of the Sea has been in British hands alone. It was the prime cause of the great Imperial expansion from the Seven Years' War to Waterloo. It put the Army in a position to conquer India under Clive and to save it under Clyde; to hold Gibraltar; to take Malta, Minorca and the Ionian Islands; to save Egjrpt and Syria from Napoleon, and take the Cape from the Dutch; and it alone commanded the West Indies at all times. It caused the fall of Louisbourg, Quebec and Montreal in three successive years; its decisive influence being well illustrated, on a small scale, when Wolfe's army, floating up and down with the tide, was thus given —19— li THE UKITIMri COMMAND OF THE SKA, the initiative of attack, and, at the same time, the power of cutting the enemy's lines of communication along the St. Lawrence. The whole New World, indeed, owes nearly every critical change in it to the influence of Sea-Power. The British Command of the Sea not only drove the French dominion away from Canada, but even compelled Napoleon, 40 years later, to sell Louisiana — which then included the whole of the Middle West — to the United States, for the paltry sum of $16,000,000. For, being an oversea possession, it could not be held by an inferior Navy. The Americans gained temporary command of the sea, by the aid of the French and Span- ish fleets, just long enough to secure Independence; but, not learn- ing from experience, and allowing their mercantile marine to go uninsured by an adequate Navy, they lost over 90 per cent, of their sea-borne trade after the war of 18 12. Even now, they have nothing like regained their former relative position at sea. But, no matter to whom the fleets belonged — to Spain, or France, or England or the States — the fate of every part of all the two Americas has always hung upon the issues of naval action. The Spanish-American War turned entirely on the struggle between the opposing fleets; and the whole peaceful trade of the New World to-day depends abso- lutely upon the ready strength of the British and American Navies. Anyone who wants an ideal object-lesson in the influence of Sea-Power upon thai course of history, may be recommended to study the Trafalgar campaign. For never have the issues of war- fare been more clearly attributable to Sea-Power, than in the decline and fall of Napoleon's Empire of the land. Napoleon quite under- stood this. Just after Campo Formio, when France was rising on the full spring tide of military glory, he wrote : " Let us concen- trate all our activity on the Navy and destroy England." Again, he sought the naval support of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and even the Turks, at different times; but was always foiled by British Sea-Power. After Trafalgar, he tried to " conquer the sea by the land '' ; but even the Berlin Decrees could not seal the continent to British trade, and his own soldiers at Eylau wore boots and uniforms imported from England! Trafalgar really caused his downfall, because it compelled him either to give up thjg struggle against England altogether, or else force his yoke upcm all Europe. Thus, it -was really his defeat at sea that eventually raised up against him those overwhelming hosts of enemies which defeated him on land. And Sea-Power has had a corresponding influence on every suc- ceeding phase of the century. On the Crimean War, where the Allies operated from a secure sea-base, and thus exhausted the — 20— AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. Russians, who wasted their strength along interminable lines of communication by land. On the Indian Mutiny, from first to last. In the Far East, from the Opium War to the " Open Door " and the rebellion of the " Boxers." In the Near East, from Navarino to the end of i8 years of Anglo-Egypt. And in the present war, where the silent resistance of the British Navy has barred the way to foreign interference; where the Admiralty have sent tens of thousands of soldiers, over thousands of miles of sea, to concentrate at many dif- ferent places, 1 undreds of miles apart by land; and where a most dis- astrous loss oi men, material and prestige was only just averted by the timely anival of the Naval guns at Ladysmith. This is the strategical aspect of Sea-Power. To complete the view, we must look at the business side of the question as wel'. We have already seen that the gigantic fabric of British maritime trade could not exist at all without the protection of the Navy. But a, closer scrutiny of well-proved facts shows us more than this. . It shows, that whilst naval defeat always means disaster to any mari- time trade — and absolute ruin to our own — the command of the sea has always increased British trade during* war, and insured its conitinued Supremacy throughout the subsequent peace. British trade sank rapidly during the stress of the American Revolution; because, though the allied fleets could not secure command of the sea themselves, they prevented the British Navy from doing so. On the other hand, trade increased 29 per c«it. between 1757 and 1761 — that is, during the greatest stress of the Seven Years* War. It increased again, no less than 65 per cent., between 1792 and 1800; and, during the whole of the Napoleonic wars, it more than doubled. We must add to this the value of prizes taken from the enemy; which was a diminishing value, because very soon the enemy had nothing worth taking. In t8oi the entire maritime trade, under the French flag, from the v/hole of Asia, Africa, North and South America, amounted to only $360,000! Moreover, British trade in- creased more and more as war went on, whilst the enemy's prac- tically disappeared from every sea; and the return of peace, which gave ours a renewed stimulus, found the enemy too much exhausted to even begin the competition. During all these wars, the average annual British loss by capture was only 2^2 per cent. In view of this fact, the high rates charged for war-risks become simply preposterous. Yet, good business com- munities are fleeced again and again; because, though they are sharp enough in getting full value for^their money in other things, they fail to understand the peculiar conditions of war. The British rates in the last great war were neither justified by previous exper- - -21 — THE BRITISH COMf^AND OF THE SEA, ience, nor confirmed by the exi>erience then acquired; but they were willingly paid by people, who would have refused i-ioth as nmch for the far safer and cheaper insurance of a supreme Navy. The same sort of mistake was made by the Americans during the Civil War, and again at the outbreak of the war with Spain. The<-e is no insurance like a strong Navy. Make it supreme, and you reduce the chances of even being attacked to a minimum; and, if you are attacked, you ga'n the Command of the Sea, which means the destruction of the enemy s commerce and the preservation and increase of your own. And remember that every dollar spent on the Navy, during peace, will save you many more spent on insurance, during war. More than this, too, we must remember that the loss of the Command; of the Sea must neces- sarily cause the downfall of the British sea-borne trade; and then all the insurance companies in the World could not revive it — even if they could escape insolvency themselves. There is no instance known where a lost maritime trade has ever been regained within even two or three, much less a single generation. And as our Empire, and the prosperity of every individual within it, alike de- pend upon maritime trade, which, in its turn, depends upon the Navy, it is self evident that the life of the Empire depends uoon the Command of the Sea. The other three Mnks in our chain of naval cause and effect, being of the same nature as the first, are to be tested in the same way; but, as tfiey are already more than half proved by im- plication, we need only mention them very briefly, one by one, and refer to the same historical method for purposes of verification. II.— THE. COMMAND OF THE SEA DEPENDS UPON BATTLE-FLEETS-IN-BEING. The question we have just been considering was — What does the life of the Empire depend on? And the answer was — ^The Com- mand of the Sea. The present question is — How must this Com. mand of the Sea be obtained? And the Answer is — By Battle-fleets- in-being. A fleet-in-being is a mobilized squadron, whose presence within the theatre of war is a continual menace to all the enemy's exposed interests, and, more especially, to his lines of communication. Such a feet paralyzes all the oversea operations of any enemy — ^how- ever strong — who remains on the defensive; for it has the initiative, and so the enemy cannot tell when or where the blow will fall. Even a very inferior fleet-in-being can give a great deal of trouble, and waste much valuable time at the beginning of a war, unless it is quickly run to earth. Cervera's ill-found squadron could hardly 22— AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. be said to have ever been a genuine fleet-in-being at all; but it kept a far superior sea-force very busy for a long time, and, until after it had shut itself up in Santiago, it neutralized a large land-force alto- jjfether. The safest and .«oundest line of action, therefore, is to assume the oflfensive at once with an adequate battle flet :-in-being. A battle- fleet-in-being is a mobilized squadron, complete in all its de- tails, but particularly strong in first-class battle-ships. Such a squad- ron crn sweep all predatory fleets-in-being out of the ocean high- ways, and either neutralize the enemy's concenjtrated forces by blockade, or destroy them in open battle. This is the only way of giving security to one's own commerce. Ini fact, the case of an enemy's fleet-in-being is analagous to that of the predatory border tribes, whom we are compelled to annex in order to guarantee the security of our frontier populations. For the sea is a common bor- derland, shaied by the two contending nations; and, of course, th^re can be no lasting security foi one till the organized fighting force of the other is destroyed. When this is done, the frontier of the winning side is advanced to the coasts of the losing side, and the intervening seas are patrolled by the victorious navy. Ami here^ again the analogy holds good; for the future gcod behaviour of the losing side is guaranteed at sea, by what would be annexationi of territory on land. The Trafalgar campaign is the most brilliant example of the overwhelming influence of battle-fleet action. But the three years' struggle, from the battle of the First of June to that of Cape St. Vincent, proves our case even better; because British supremacy was then in t he act of being assen ted, and the enemy's Sea-Power i n the act of withering away. The French started with a good many advantages. A few years before, they had held their own against the British Navy, and kept the Command of the Sea hanging in the balance. They were, also, full of enthusiasm for their cause — though their red republicanism ruined the dis- cipline of the personnel, and was responsible for many a defeat in battle. But in spite of everything else the first British battle-fleet victory began to turn the whole course of the war against them — in spite of their alliance with the Dutch and Spanish fleets; in spite of the strategic error by wh'ch Montagu's squadron failed to sup- port Lord Howe; in spite of the consequent escape of their great American convoy into Brest, with its $25,000,000 of food-stuff aboard; in spite of the gallant way in which they fought the famous Vengeur and other ships; in spite of the feebleness of the British Mediterranean Squadron before 1797; in spite of the British mutinies —23— )'/ THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, on the Home stations; in spite of the ill-planned and worse-executed British land-campaign in the Netherlands; in "pite of their own suc- cess in turning the British out of Toulon; ir spite of their brilliant victories in Italy and elsewhere; in spite of their plentiful harvest of 1794 — in spite of all put together, these three years of naval war, which began with the incomplete victory of Lord Howe and ended with the decisive vicory of Lord St. Vincent, resulted in denying the French and their allies any further chance of contesting the Com- mand of the Sea on anything like equal terms. In three years more the French flag had disappeared from every trade-route in the World 1 The naval reason why of all this majr be very easily explained in terms of land- warfare : The sea itself is a desert; its trade-routes are the trails across it; and its harbours are oases. Now, if the stronger of two desert powers commands every large oasis and every principal trail, the caravans of the weaker power must take to the desert itself and ultimately perish: for, to make the comparison exact, » these caravans can no more leave the desert or its oases, than ships can leave the sea or its harbours. Or, put it in another way, and imagine what would be the fate of a country, whose towns were invested, •whose high-roads were watched, whose rivers were navigated and whose railways were run, entirely by an army of occupation! Of course, you sec at once what a desperate plight that country would be in; how its army would be reduced to guerilla warfare, and how its commerce would have to go across country, at the imminent risk of capture. But look into naval history, and you will see how all these evils are brought home to every country whose seaboard is commanded by the enemy. And, more than this, remember that, other things being equal, it is harder to transport a single ton of goods by land than half-a-dozen tons by sea. So that, whichever way we take it, we see how the Command of the Land depends upon that of the Sea, and both upon the concentrated force of battle-fieets-in-being . The next link in our chain is this: III.— THE MAINTENANCE OF BATTLE-FLEETS-IN- BEING DEPENDS UPON SOUND NAVAL POLICY. And, as we have just seen that the Empire depends on the Command of the Sea, which, can only be won by battle-fleets, we need not discuss the self-evident fact that a sound naval policy must take care to keep our squadrons always ready for mobilization. But, a3 there are always plenty of false policies circling round the true one — and sometimes hiding it from the public eye — we must note the chief of them in passing, even if only to bring out the truth in ai clearer light by contrast. h i i ;/ AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. I. The craze for FIXED DEFENCES always recurs at every crisis, and always will. In the first place, it appeals to the instinct of self-preservation; in the second place, it appeals to the ignorant idea, that the best way to defend our illimitable coast-lines is to lock up the army in isolated forts; and, in the third place, it does appeal so very directly to the evidence of the untrained senses — and the more imposing fortificationa appear the more worthless they usually are: and so it always comes as an irresistible appeal tv^ the whole panicky mob or old women of both sexes and all ages. Of course, strategic points must be fortified, both for their own defence and to prevent the Army and Navy from being tied down to them. But no per- manent fortifications should ever be built, if they can possibly be dispensed with; and the benefit of every doubt should be given to mobile forces, and, preferably to the Navy. Men without forts are always useful ; but forts without men are no good at all — except to the enemy. If an enemy can command the sea he must win in the end. If he gets the British Lion into the pit, he will not be such a fool as to jump in himself, in order to have a second life-and-death struggle. All he will have to do is to keep guard while the Lion starves to death inside. 2. A cognate error is the belief in PUBLIC GRANARIES. They might stave off disaster for a time; but they could not prevent it. Once the Command of the Sea is lost, everything is lost. Imports and exports cease; therefore manufactures must stop, and so the wage fund is cut off at the root. Consequently, those who advcxate public granaries must also advocate free food. The expense of this must be borne by Government; but, as the country's means of paying taxes will Have also disappeared, universal collapse must follow. The only true policy is to keep the sea-ways open, so that the raw material and food- stuffs may enter freely. And the best way to secure a steady supply of both in time of war is to prom'^te int.2r Imperial trade by all legitimate means in time of peace. Canada, for instance, has raw material and food-stuflFs in abundance; England has money in equal abundance; it is naturally to the advantage of both, to exchange in peace, and it might well be of vital importance ta both to be able to exchange in war. 3. The idea of DRAFTING CIVILIAN SEAMEN INTO THE NAVY still finds some favour, though it is an absurd and dangerous fallacy. In the days of the press-gang, the difference between merchantmen—which were often well-armed — and men-of-war was not nearly so great as it is now-a-days. The material of naval war- fare is now so complex, and so different from anything in civil life, that you might just as well complete your Horse Artillery with -25— Pi;!! THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, farmers and stable boys, as fill up a ship's company with ordinary deck-hands. 4. VOLUNTEER SEDENTARY FORCES, LAND-DRILL- ED AND HARBOUR-TRAINED, are just as bad. The worthless- ness of the Sea Fencibles at the beg^inning of the century and the Naval Artillery Volunteers at the end of it ought to settle this ques- tion out of hand. 5. SEPARATE COLONIAL NAVIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FAILURES, from the time of fhe Greeks — who always squabbled over their naval coalitions in the time of danger — to our own day, when the Australians, after literally sinking millions in the sea, have had to sell or lay up every ton of naval shipping they possessed. A single Navy is, of course, far stronger than any coali- tion, which, though equally effective in every other way, is under divided control. A colonial addition to the integral strength of the Navy would help to keep the Command of the Sea, and so insure the safety of colonial interests in the very best of all possible ways; but any force which could defeat a British squadron could afterwards crush the life out of any colonial Navy without the slightest difficulty. 6. COMMERCE-DESTROYING, as a primary means of war- fare, can do us nothing but harm. As the enemy's commerce withers away after British battle-fleet victories, it is manifestly useless to fit out squadrons of predatory cruisers — especially as this would divide our forces, instead of concentrating them. And as for the protection of our own commerce, it is equally manifest that the best plan is to destroy the enemy's means of destroying us; and this can only be carried out by battle-fleet action. This, however, does not mean that we should not make use of the individual or collective action of swift commerce-destroyers, which might play a secondary role to great advantage, whilst also being of great service as scouts for the battle- fleets. 7. THE POLICY )F ULTERIOR OBJECTS IS ALWAYS FUTILE, AND GENERALLY FATAL. For instance, Brueys' ulterior object was to secure Napoleon's line of retreat from Egypt. The only way to do so was, of course, to get command of the Medi- terranean by destroying the British fleet. Instead of this, he tried to save his own fleet by evading Nelson's. He stood on the defensive, was run to earth, as defensive forces always are, was defeated in battle, and so lost his fleet and ulterior object together. On the other hand, Nelson gained his immediate object — ^the Command of the Sea, and his ulterior object — the destruction of Napoleon's army, naturally and inevitably followed. 8. It is sometimes urged that the COLONIES would se-ve their — 26 — AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. own interests better by DECLARING INDEPENDENCE, AND TRADING UNDER A NEUTRAL FLAG of their own on the out- break of war. This is radically wrong; because it ignore? the helpless- ness of all weak maritime neutrals. All neutrals, trading within the theatre of war, are as much under martial law as camp followers; and no enemy will let its legitimate prey escape, by the transparent ruse of a change from old colours in peace to new ones in war. There is no sea-room left for the petty neutral. As the seas become more and more crowded, with stronger and more eager competitors, he becomes less and less able to trade in time of war. All neutrals who have tried to carry on their trade, without being backed by a strong navy, have invariably lost it altogether. The Phoenician ships were swept from every sea; the Dutch lost land-trade and maritime together, and the American trade of $250,000,000 suddenly sank to $25,000,000. Be- sides, as neutral trade inevitably gravitates towards the stronger Sea- Power, the weak colonies, who left the Empire as equals, would have to cringe as inferiors, if the British Navy kept the command of the seas; whilst they would be ruined if any other Navy won it.* Any- way you take it, it most decidedly pays to be on the all-Imperial side in war. 9. A favorite apprehension with dilettante critics is, that we should COPY EVERY DETAIL OF FOREIGN CONSTRUC- TION — ^just by way of homoeopathic precaution! Some foreign battleships have such pronounced sponsons, that their broadsides look like a row r»f bow-windows. Foreign cruisers sometimes have more end-on fire ; and, as for military tops, we are nowhere, compared with some of their little citadels aloft. But why copy them? It is true enough, that, up to the middle of the century, most of our hulls were after fafeign models; and, in Nelson's day, British captains eagerly comi>eted for the command of prizes, which were better built and faster sailers than our own men-of-war. But, now that Sir William White's new navy is afloat, the advantage lies with us. Our ships are designed, in every possible way, for sea-worthiness under every con- dition of naval war; the foreigptiers aim too much at the ideal of a floating battery; they are generally over-gunned, and often top- hampered as well — and, for all-round work at sea, the floating fort is no match for the handy ship. 10. A second misapprehension is, that a FUTURE FLEET con- sisting of a few gunboats, FIRING AERIAL TORPEDOES WILL ABOLISH BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE-FLEETS TO- GETHER. It is quite possible that high explosives wi ' abolish leviathan battleships, just as gunpowder abolished the knight-in- armour in favour of the rifleman. But amies are now larger a,nd more —27— I' I ti THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, highly-organized than ever, and their success depends as much as ever on ordered and concentrated masses. So it will be with navies; and the concentrated force of great battle-fleets — no matter what the in- dividual ships are like — will always be the main determining factor in all naval wars. Torpedo and submarine boats, at present, are for coast defence only. They are, therefore, powerless to keep the command of the high seas; and, unless the high seas are open, there can be no maritime trade. What is the good of the best naval defence in the world, if it has to hug the shore so closely that the merchant ships it has to protect cannot leave port, much less carry on theii oversea ex- change? 11. A third misapprehension L, chat SOME CHEAP AlTD SIMPLE SUBSTITUTE CAN BE FOUND FOR THE PRE- SENT EXPENSIVE FLEETS AND ARMIES. This is utterly futile. Expensive arms of either service — if necessary — must be kept up; lest the break-down of any one organ should cause the death of the whole naval or military body to which it belongs. But, if they are not necessary, their places will soon be filled up by such increase in cheaper arms as will raise the cost to its former level. It must never be forgotten that international competition is carried on with money as well as with particular armaments, with men as much as with material — ^in short, with every possible form of organizable resources. You may have a few expensive ships, or many cheap ones; but you must always pay the full insurance — or take your chance of ruin. 12. There are other fancy kinds of Imperial Defence; but none of them affect the one true plan of campaign: MOBILIZE OVER- POWERING BATTLE-FLEETS AT ONCE; WATCH THE ENEMY EVERYWHERE, AND CONCENTRATE UPON HIM ANYWHERE. Coast-defence, commerce-destroying and convoys all have their place in naval war; but the only sure guarantee of maritime security is the COMMAND OF THE SEA, and that must always remain with the victorious battle-fleet. And now we come to the last link of all, which is as follows: IV. SOUND NAVAL POLICY NOW DEMANDS THE IN- TELLIGENT CO-OPERATION OF DISCIPLINED PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT GREATER BRITAIN, IN MAKING THE NAVY SO TRULY IMPERIAL IN ALL ITS RE- SOURCES, ORGANIZATION, AND CONTROL, THAT IT MAY SOON BECOME THE FIRST COMPLETE FACTOR IN THE UNIFIED SYSTEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. Here is the crux of the whole question; but it is by no means an —28— Wi'! AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. insoluble riddle. From what we have seen already, it is evident that the Command of the Sea has "nabled Great Britain to give birth, life, growth and continual security to the infancy of the whole of Greater Britain. Now-a-days, our Greater Britain has grown up into vigorous youth, and all its sovereign states are quite independent in their civil life. We are not a little proud of being able to walk, alone ; but not one single step can we take anywhere, outside the charmed circles drawn round us by a guardian Navy. Anyone who preaches inde- pendence, or even supposes that Canada could keep any real semblance of it for a moment, in the present state of the armed world, must be either a knave, or a fool, or both. No! — neither Canada, nor Australasia, nor any other part of Greater Britain, can think of standing alone; and, as we have just seen how futile it is to depend on separate colonial navies, we have to come back to the Royal Navy as our only defence by sea, and the comer-stone of our defence on land. But Great Britain alone bears the burden of it — though Greater Britain shares all the benefits; and, as the chief growth of the Empire now takes place in Greater Britain, it is plain that the present state of things cannot go on forever. A navy draws strength from the national resources in the form of men, money and material, and returns it in the form of maritime security. Now, from natural causes alone it is impossible to keep up an indefinite naval increase, proportionate to the civil increase of the whole Empire, from the resources of only one part — especially when the resources of that part, however great, are continually decreasing in their relative proportion to those of the others. It is easy to see, from this, that Greater Britain must begin to take an active share in the naval part of Imperial Defence; far selfish motives alone, if for nothing else. In other words, we are bound to make the Navy so Imperial in fact, as well as name, that, from this time forward, we may truly speak of it as ours. Any reasonable contribution to an Imperial Navy would be an r excellent investment from a business point of view. The whole financial credit of the Empire, in the last resort, must always depend upon the Navy. Thanks to the Navy, the Fashoda affair passed over ' without a panic on the stock exchange. Thanks to the Navy, Canada can float a loan, a little below par, at 25^. Without the Navy, she would be no better off than Greece was a couple of years ago, before the joint guarantee of the Powers. "With the new Imperial Navy, her security would be sounder than ever, and Dominion stocks would assuredly be listed for English trustee investments of all kinds on an equal footing with consols. Thanks to the Navy, we have a total annual movement of tonnage, amounting to 50,000,000 by water and —29— fii^XBSSEZssat ,;iu THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, 30 000,000 by rail. This is not all exteraal trade, of course, but most of our inland and coasting trade is distributive from, and dependent on, external trade, which is mostly by sea; and most of our railway tonnage moves to or from the sea. Whichever way our trade-routes turn, they must eventually seek the sea; and there the one prote* tjoti they have is the Navy. As t»^ the amount of our own contribution to the Imperial Navy, it is impossible to do more here than to note the principal data we have to go upon. Roughly speaking, we possess about 4 per cent, of the whole sea-borne wealth of the Empire; less than half as much as Australasia. But, for obvious reasons, we could not pay 4 per cent, of the whole Imperial war-insurance at sea. Neither could we pay anything like our share as represented! by population, for the United Kingdom is only seven times more populous than Canada. Nor yet our share as calculated by comparative revenue — in which case we should have to pay nearly a tenth. We are a new country, and the contribution would be a new tax on our resources and, for both these reasons our share should be still further reduced. But, as we form one tenth of the population of the whole self-ruling portion of the Empire, perhaps we could hardly pay much less than one-hundredth of the cost of the new Navy. For the Navy must always be a homo- geneous force, in every sense of the word, maimed entirely by the ruling races. India and other dependencies should only be called on for an equitable contribution of money. In any case, we shall get a, good return for our outlay, both, of money and of men. The British Navy is by far the cheapest in the world, in proportion to the magnitude of the interests- it protects. The mercantile marine is ten times larger than the Navy; and so every ten tons of it are guarded by otie ton of naval shipping. No foreign powers have anything like this preponderance of civil over warlike shipping, and, consequently, though they have much smaller navies, their rates of naval insurance are very, much higher. Every British ton is protected at a cost of $to, whilst every American ton costs $40 in naval expenditure, every French ton $60, and every Russian ton no less than $80! But this is not our only business ad- vantage. So gfreat is the all-round superiority of British ship-building, that the equivalent of every $100 spent on construction in the United States or Russia can be bought in the United Kingdom for less than half the price. And so we need hardly go out of the Empire to find better Naval bargains, at all events 1 Nor is it very easy to see how we could possibly better ourselves, in regard to the personnel. For what can be sounder policy, from the strategical aspect of scientific warfare, than the fine old service tradition which impels the British Navy to strike directly at the enemy's head and heart, by forcing decisive battle-fleet action at every opportunity? Or how could we better begin to unify our scattered Imperial forces for the common defence of one and all, than by add- ing our quota of seamen to that great branch of the United Service, which is at once the most important, the mc«t efficient, the most free from ignorant outside interference — ^and the only one which has — 30 — AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. yet been placed on a truly national basis, beyond the reach of party politics? The time has now come for an infusion of new blood from Greater Britain. And, as Canada is the elder scion of the origii.al stock, why should not we Canadians be the first to return to the iNavy some portion of that guardian strength, which we have drawn from it these many gdierations since? Why not a training-ship for our boy- blue-jackets, and a Royal Marine recruiting depot for our full-grown men? And why not the same proportion of Canadian officers m the Navy as in the Army? The Home Authorities already meet us half way, by holding examinations out here for admission to the Britannia. There is nearly always a small surplus population along every coast, for people increase beyond their means of subsistence faster there than inland. This is the case, to a small extent, in Labrador and Newfoundland, and, if we add this surplus to those others who would always enlist if opportunity offered, we should get a few hundred men who would be much better off in the Navy than any- where else. But we could, probably, do better in the way of an Imperial Naval Reserve, localized among our sea-faring population. It is unfortunate that orr merchant seamen, like those elsewhere, are very hard to drill and discipline, because their calling makes any continuous training very difficult and the formation of any large organized body almost impossible. But our fishermen should answer every requirement. They are very fine raw material, they are localized in a way that merchant-seamen never are, and they always have slack seasons which could be turned to great advantage. Our yachtsmen, too, should be encouraged to come forward, and the pick of them ought to be turned into very good officers for the R. N. R. Down the River and Gulf, throughout the Maritime Provinces, along the Great Lakes, and out on the Pacific ^ Coast, we have many men who should make firstrate ABs. Organize them; and such a trained reserve would do much more than add directly to the naval strength of the Empire. It would, indirectly, be the means of giving all of us a truer insight into naval problems; and we should graduallv learn the most important thing of all for the public to know— that navies cannot possibly be improvised, but that men and material alike must be long and carefully prepared in peace, if they are ever to stand the test of war. We need not be in the least alarmed about the enormous numbers of our qucta to the personnel. Reckoning our maritime popula- tions at a fifth of our total, taking only ^-hundredth of this fifth for all naval purposes, we might contribute i,ooo to the active peace-strength of the Navy and 10,000 to the localized Canadian Imperial Reserves. Those last would, of course, stay at home, except in case of war, when they would be drafted for service afloat as required. Such an addition as this to the indivisible strength of the Navy, would go far towards maintaining the British Command of the Sea, on which we all depend, whilst it would by no means strain our resources, or check their peaceful development. —31— THE BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA, As a beginning, we could not do better than second the pioneer- ing work of the Toronto Branch of the Navy League in its efforts to get a force of S,ooo men — less than a thousandth part, of our whole population — brought at once into training under the present Cana- dian Militia Act. We should aim at eventually rising to the fuU measure of our resources and responsibilities; but, in the meantime., it might be highly dangerous to neglect the small and^ost imperfect means which lie more immediately at hand. But, when all else is said and done, there still remains the one clear call of Imperial patriotism, from which no one of us can turn away. For who can offer any substantial reason against a Navy strong enough to keep the Command of the Sea? Not the sincerest friends of peace ; because the stronger the Navy the less the likelihood of war. Not the extremest labour parties; because naval disaster would inevitably entail the loss of their earning and purchasing powers together. Not the business community; becaus*^ trade de- pends upon exchange, and exchange upon safe transit, and — since the sea is three times larger than the land and ten times better for the carriage of merchandise — most of the greater traffic of the world must always go by sea, and so depend upon th<^ Navy for protection. Not the advocates of increasing armaments on land; because the Army cannot defend the heart of the Empire by staying at home, nor attack the enemy until the Navy has secured its communications over sea and made a safe base for it abroad. In short, no one who desires to freely order his own affairs, much less anyone who aspires to shape Imperial destiny, can reach his end, except by means of a strong de- fence at sea. This requires that all should pay their tithe to loyalty, and that sufficient men and money and material should always be forthcoming. Public Opinion, too, must learn that it is only by disciplined effort that an;/ great Imperial object can ever be obtained; and that the very essence of all discipline is not blind obedience, but self-sacrifice wisely and willingly made for a great and noble purpose. And the purpose which lies before us to-day is to hand down to our posterity that British Command of the Sea, which our forefathers have won for us throughout so many generations of great naval war. What longer roll of honour does all history contain than the one which records our conquest of the sea? For in the year 287 Carausius held the Channel against all comers; in the year 1897 Queen Victoria re- viewed there another British Fleet, which also was the wonder and th« envy of the World; and, in all the 1,600 years between, whenever the Nation was true to the Navy, its tnist was never put in vain. And now, whenever — as at the Diamond Jubilee — ^we pride our- selves on our Imperial purple; let us remember how it was, and is, and must be, woven for us, by all our myriad merchant craft, which hasten to and fro forever, like restless shuttles within the mighty loom of all the Seven Seas ; and, remembering this, let us give the Navy Imperial strength enough to guard that loom from being broken, so that our purple may still be woven there, r.nd we ourselves may still be fit to wear it. —32— THE NAVY LEAGUE IN CANADA. (TORONTO BRANCR) (Copy of Memorial outlining scheme for Canadian Naval Force pre- sented to His Excellency the Governor-General of Canada in Council.) To His Excellency, &c., &c. In Council. The Memorial of the Navy League in Canada, Toronto Branch: Sheweth : 1. YOUR MEMORIALISTS, for the past two years have advo- cated, by means of the distribution of literature and in other ways, the establishment by the Dominion of Canada of a Naval force to supplement our present Militia system. 2. The general question of Naval forces for the Colonies, to co- operate with the Royal Navy in war has of late received considerable attention from public men. It is submitted, that although no scheme has yet been devised which is free from objection, yet sufficient light has been thrown upK>n the subject to demonstrate that it is safer, at the present stage of political development, to extend and improve existing organizations, rather than make any new depar- ture which would involve direct contribution by the Colonies to the Royal Navy, unaccompanied by constitutional representation. 3. In the proposals which ^our Memorialists now make for the consideration of your Excellency, it has been sought by the adap- tation of such of those methods and regfulations as have been already tried by the Admiralty in the Mother Country, and as are suitable to the special conditions, of the sea-faring population of Canada, to create a Colonial force which shall be, in all respects, equal in point of efficiency to the Royal Naval Reserve, and capable of acting side by side with thai force, under the direct control of the Admiralty in war, in accordance with the provisions of the Colonial Naval Defence Act (Imp.), 1865. 4. Naval reformers in the Mother Country are insisting that old methods of drilling reserve men with obsolete weapons are next to useless, and the Admiralty have lately replaced some of the obsolete ships and guns with modem cruisers armed with guns of recent make. Further reforms are being instituted, and a scheme now being promoted by the Navy League, for largely increasing the numbers of the Royal Naval Reserve is being brought into oper- ation by the Home authorities. 5. Your memorialists, therefore, submit the following proposals: —33— THE BRITISH COMMAND OF IHE SEA. (a) That a Canadian Naval force shall be raise! under the pro- visions of the Militia Act of Canada to be composed exclu- sively of seamen, sailors and persons (officers and men), whose usual occupation is upon any steam or sailing craft navigating the waters of Canada. , ... (6) That for the purpose of assimilatmg such a force m pomt o! efficiency with the Royal Naval Reserve, the Admiralty regu- lations from time to time in force for the Royal Naval Reserve as to age, physical and other qualificaltions, drill, pay and pen- sions, be adopted by the Canadian Govermnent for the Cana- dian Naval force so to be raised with such modifications only as the peculiar conditions of our maritime population demand. (c) That for the purpose of drilling and training such a force an arrangement be made between the Dominion of Canada and the Home authorities by which some of the Reserve ships shall be laid up at Canadian ports instead of in the home dock- yards, and that these ships be provided with such crews (officers and men), of the Royal Navy as may be necessary for perform- ing the special duty of drilling such Canadian force, and that arrangements be also made for the reception of a certain num- ber of officers and men belonging to such Canadian force, from time to time, upon vessels of war composing the North American and West Indian and Pacific Squadrons, to put in sea-time, as is the case with the Royal Navjd Reserve. (d) That all expense in connection with such Canadian Naval force be borne by the Dominion of Canada, and that for the use of such reserve ships and other training facilities afforded by the Home authorities, the Dominion Governmenlt pay such annual sum of money as may be deemed equitable. («) That if necessary, the Militia Act (Canada), be amended to conform with the requirements of such a Naval force as is herein proposed* 6. Your Memorialists desire to point out the following advan- tages in connection with the foregoing proposals. The reserve ships to be V\d up in Canadian ports as above- menitioned being modern cruis-rs with modem armaments may be taken into account by the British Admiralty in apportioning the eflfective force necessary for the Atlantic and Pacific Naval Stations, and that being the case, little or no extra expense would be entailed on the Home Government beyond the expense now incurred. It would save the Dominion Government from a large initial expenditure, which expenditure would be largely wasted since ships and guns now-a-days soon become obsolete. The officers and men of the! Canadian Naval force would be brought into contact with the officers and men) of the Royal Navy, and thus each force would get to know one another, which would ensure their Harmonious working in time of war. The fishermen of Canada, engaged for the most part at their avocation during the summer months, might put in part of the winter —34— AND WHAT IT MEANS TO CANADA. on a reserve ship at Bermuda, or in vessels of war in the West Indies. The drill instructors provided by the Admiralty would be changed at intervals thus ensuring the most recent technical knowledge on their part. Such Canadian Naval force would be on hand to man the reserve ships mentioned on an emergency. 7. Your Memorialists submit that along the lines of these pro- posals, Colonial Naval forces may be established with a system com- mon to the whole Empire, but with such modifications in regula- tions as may be necessary to meet local conditions, and it is most respectfully recommended that your Excellency do take sucli mea- sures as will bring about the consideration of these proposals by the Canadian and Home authorities, and that the other self-govemi.>;; Colonies be invited to co-operate in establishing a common system. 8. It may be observed, that the means of training reserve men above indicated, are nothing more or less than the adaptation of methods in vogfue in Great Britain, Canada paying for instruction and training afforded by the Home authorities instead of making a large initial expenditure on her own account- It may be stated for the information of your Excellency, that the average cost of the Royal Naval Reserve consisting of 27,600 (officers and men), is £10 per head per annum, whilst the average cost of the Australian Auxiliary Naval forces is £10 6s. per head per annum. The maintenance by the Dominion of Canada of a naval force of 5,000 men, which it is submitted would be a reasonable num- ber for the premier? Colony of the Empire, would thus involve an annual expenditure of about $250,000. 9. The proposal for laying up Reserve ships in Colonial ports for the purpose of training Colonial forces has already been advocated by Rear Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, R.N., C.B. Your Memorialists desire to point out that such a force as is herein advocated, may be used to man the class of vessels, vi/... Sub- sidized Mercantile Cruisers, advocated in a former memorial address- ed by this branch of the Navy League to your Excellency dated 14th of December, A.D., 1896. Signed on behalf of the Navy League ini Canada, Toronto Branch, this fourteenth day of October, 1898. [Sgd.] W. BARCLAY McMURRICH, Chairman. [Sgd.] H. J. WICKHAM, Honorary Sf cretary. —35- The Canadian Bank of Commerce HEAD OFFICE TORONTO PAID-UP CAPITAL, REST, $6,000,000 1,250,000 DIRECTORS HON. QBO. A. COX, PncMent. ROBERT KILOOUR, Bm|.. VlM-PrMldcnt* nATTHEW LEaOAT. B«|. W. B. HAHILTON. Eaq. JAHSS CRATHBRN. Ban. J. W. PLAVELLE. Bm|. JOHN nOSKIN, Eiq.. Q.C.. LL.D. W. B. H. MASSEY, Bm]. A KINQHAN, Esq. B. E. WALKER, Qen. Hgr. J. H. PLUMMER, Afst. Qen. Mgr, A. H. IRELAND, loipector and Snperintonduit «f BranckM. BRANCHES OF THE BANK IN CANADA ONTARIO Ayr Paris Strathroy Barrie Dunnville ParkhiU Toronto (8 offices) Toronto Junction BelleviUe Fort Frances Petcrboro* Berlin Gait Port Perry Walkerton Blenheim Gv>derich St. Catharines Waike ^iUe Brantford Guclph Sarnia Waterloo Cayugra Hamilton Sault Ste. Marie Windsor Chatham London Seaforth Woodstock CoUingrwood Orangreville Simcoe Dresden OtUwa « Stratford QUEBEC MANITOBA YUKON DISTRICT Montreal Winnipeg^ Dawson White Horse B[::tish coluhbia Atlin Cranbrook Fernie Greenwood Vancouver IN THE UNITED STATES NEW YORK, Alex. Laird & Wm. Gray, Agents, i6 Exchange Place NEW ORLEANS SKAGWAY, Alaska SEATTLE, Wash. Commercial Credits issued for use in Europe, the East and West Indies, China, Japan, South America, Australia, and New Zealand. TRAVELURS' LEHERS OF CREDIT ISSUED AVAiLAILE IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. Sterling and American Exchange Bought and Sold. BANKERS AND CHIEF CORRESPONDENTS GraaA Britain, The Bank of Scotland ; India. China and Japan, The Chartered Bank of India, Australia end China ; Pranca, Credit Lyonnais. Lazard, Freres & Cie ; Qannany, Deutsche Bank ; Balglaai, J. Matthieu 8c Fils, Brussels ; HcMland, Disconto, Maatachappii, Rotterdam ; 5onth Africa, BanT- of Africa, Standard Bank of South Africa ; Aastralla and New Zealand, Union Bank of Aus- traliu South America, London and Brazilian Bank, Ltd., British Bank of South America, Ltd.; Weet iMIIefl, Bank of Nova Scotia, Kinsston, Jamaica ; Colonial Bank and Branches ; Hexlco, Banco de Londres, y Mexico: Beraiuda, Thw Bank of Bermuda, Hamilton: New Yoric, The American Ex- change National Bank ; Cblcago, The Noi-th- Western National Bank ; Ssa Prandaco, The Bank of British Columbia. -36- •IMPERIAL BANK- OF CANADA Capital Rest - $2,500,000 1,700,000 DIRECTORS H. S. HOWLAND, President T. R. MERRITT, Vice-President WILLIAM RAMSAY ROBERT JAFFRAY ELIAS ROGERS T. SUTHERLAND STAYNER WILLIAM HENDRIE HEAD OFFICE D. R. WILKIE, General Manager TORONTO E. HAl', Inspector BRANCHES IN ONTARIO Essex Fergns Gait Hamilton Ingersoll Listowel Niagara Falls Ottawa Port Colborne Rat Portage Si. Catharines Sault Ste. Marie St. Thomas Toronto Welland Woodstock BRANCH IN QUEBEC Montreal. Bi^ANCHES IN MANITOBA, NORTH-WEST AND BRITISH COLUMBIA Portage La Prairie, Man- Calgary, Alta. Edmonton, Alta. Winnipeg, Man. Golden, B.C. Vancouver, B.C. Revelstoke, B.C. Brandon, Man. Prince Albert, Sask. Strathcona, Alta. Nelson, B.C. AGENTS London, Hng Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. New York— Bank of Montreal, Bank of America. Paris, France— Cr^it Lyonnais. DRAFTS SOLD available at all points In Canada, United States and Europe. LETTERS OF CREDIT issued negotiable at Branches of the Standard Bank of South Africa, Limited, in Transvaal, Cape Colony, Natal, Rhodesia. —37— INCORPORATED I855« The Bank of Toronto TORONTO, CANADA. President ViCE-PRESinaNT GEORGE GOODERHAM W. H. BEATTY Paid-up Capital Reserve Assets over $2,000,000 00 1,900,000 00 18,000,000 00 BRANCHES Barrie Brockville Cobourg CoUingwood Gananoque Ont. London Ont. Peterboro' " Petrolia " Port Hope " St. Catharines, " Stayner Ont. Toronto " King St West Montreal Que Point St. Charle Rossland B C HEAD OFFICE - - TORONTO AGENTS LONDON, ENG.— The London City and Midland Bank, Limited NEW YORK— National Bank of Commerce. CHICAGO— First National Bank. Correspondents in every Banking Town in Canada. Drafts and Letters of Credit issued available anywhere in Canada United States or Europe. Every description of Banking Business transacted. interest allowed on Deposits. J. HENDERSON Inspector -38- DUNCAN COULSON General Manager ¥• The Standard Bank OF CANADA CAPITAL (Authorized by Act of Parliament) - $a,OO0,000 OO CAPITAL (Paid-up) 1,000,000 00 RESERVE FUND 700,000 00 UNDIVIDED PROFITS aptSoS 60 DIRECTORS W. F. COWAN, President JOHN BURNS, Vice-President FRED. WYLD A. J. SOMERVILLE W. F. ALLEN T. R. WOOD JAMES SCOTT Head Office - - - TORONTO, ONT. GEORGE P. REID, General Manager J. S. LOUDON, Assistant General Manager and Inspector C. A. DENISON, Accountant AQENCIES Ailsa Craig - D. A. McKel'AR, Agent Durham J. Kelly Bowmanville W. J. Jones Forest W. C. BODDY Bradford John Elliott Harriston J. E. Gray Brantford C. Cook Kingston W. D. Hart Brighton S. B. Gearing ' Markham F. A. Reesor Brussels J. N. Gordon Parkdale H. T. McMillan Campbellford E. A. Bog Picton W. T. Shannon Cannington J. Houston Richmond Hili J. F. Rowland Chatham G. P. SCHOLFIELD " Stouflfville H. J. MORDEN Colbome C. Larke BAN KERS \ Agent MONTREAL THE CANADIAN BANK OF COMMERCE NEW YORK THE IMPORTERS AND TRADERS NATIONAL BANK LONDON, ENQ. THE NATIONAL BANK OF SCOTLAND -39- ClK eanaaa Pennattetit ana Olestern Canada mongage Corporation Incorporated A.D. 1899 HEAD OFFICE CANADA PERMANENT BUILDING - - - BRANCH OFFICES WINNIPEG, MAN. VANCOUVER, B.C. TORONTO ST. JOHN, N.B. Capital Paid-up - Reserve Fund - - Assets - - - .- $6,000,000 1,500,000 23,000,000 President- GEORGE GOODERHAM xst Vice-President and Chairman of Executive Committee— J. HERBERT MASON 2nd Vice-President- W. H. BEATTY General Manager— WALTER S. LEE DEBENTURES.— Interest paid half-yearly on debentures issued for three, five or seven years. The debentures can be had in such sums not less than $100 as may be agreed upon, and are registered at the Company's Offices. Interest accrues from the date on which the money is received by the Company. SAVINGS DEPARTMENT.— Interest is allowed on savings deposits of $1.00 and upwards, paid or compounded half-yearly. Deposits may be withdrawn on such short notice as may be arranged. LOAN DEPARTMENT.— Loans made upon first mortgage on real estate at current rates, and on favorable terms. Call or time loans made upon muni- cipal debentures, bonds and stocks. —40 — THE NAVY LEAGUE IN CANADA (TORONTO BRANCH) EXBCUTIVE COMMITTBE W. BARCLAY McMURRICH, Esq.. Q.C, Chairman CAPTAIN F. C. LAW, R.N. F. E. HODGINS. Esfi. C. F. HAMILTON, Esg. NICOL KINGSMILL, Esq.. Q.Ci A. McLean Howard, esq. ALFRED WILLSON, Esq. H. J. WICKHAM. Esq.. (Hon. Sec.) OBJECTS OF THE LEAGUE IN CANADA Why the League Should be Supported by All Loyal Canadians. The Navy League is in no sense a political organization. It works for the welfare of the Empire, the preservation of peace, and the pros- perity of the British Community. Here in Canada its objects are : 1. To bring home to Canadians a sense of their dependence on and in- terest in the Naval strength of the Empire. 2. To press upon public attention the need for a Canadian Naval De- fence force. 3. To show how Canada can best help the Royal Navy — locally — in time of war. 4. As "knowledge is power," so want of knowledge is weakness. This League seeks to remedy the prevailing lack of information on Naval matters by distributing literature on the subject to its members and the public press, and by promoting the teaching of Naval history in schools. Address for further information the Hon. Secretary, H. J. WICKHAM. Rooms 701-2 Temple Building, TORONTO. Annual Membership Fee for Toronto Branch (which includes sub- scription to The Navy League Journal), $2.00. -41- (OVER) . •1'! p. The Navy League Journal OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OFFICES— 13 Victoria Street LONDON, S.W., ENGLAND A Monthly publication, edited by Mr. H. W. Wilson (the well-known author of Ironclads in Action, etc.) The Navy League Journal contains interesting articles on current Naval topics written expressly by the best writers of the day. Events taking place in the Naval world abroad are fully recorded. The Journal is freely illustrated by half-tone cuts. ALEX. DOWNEY CHARTERED STENOGRAPHIC REPORTER Commissions to take Evidf.nce in Canada or the United States Promptly Executed. TELEPHONES— Office 431 Residence 8090 tUl (Official Reporter for H. J. Wickham, Esq., Special Examiner) MEDICAL BUILDING Cor. Bay and Richmond Streets (Jst floor) TORONTO The History of the Union Jacli By barlow CUMBERLAND, M.A. SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED In One Volume, 300 pages, with Nine Colored Lithograph Plates and Seventy Engravings. PRICE - - $L50. POSTPAID That Mr. Cumberland's work has found popular favor is evidenced by the early demand for a second edition. To this the author has added several new chapters, containing mucii valuable data, and has included also nearly thirty new engravings of great interest. WILLIAM BRIQQS, Publisher 29-33 Richmond Street West TORONTO ^ Ocean Steamship and Tourist Tickets ^ ISSUED TO ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, VIA Canadian, New York and London Steamship Lines. DRAFTS, MONEY ORDERS AND CHEQUES ISSUED. Canadian Representative of " THE TIMES " of London, England. R M. MELVILLE THE TORONTO GENERAL STEAMSHIP AGENCY Phone aoio Cor. Toronto and Adelaide Sts., opp. Qeneral P.O., TORONTO —42— TORONTO CONSERVATORY OF MUSIC •NcenpoRATro lase DR. EDWARD FISHER. Musical Director Affiliated with the University of Toronto and Trinity University. OldMt, Largest and Best Music School and Strongest Faculty in Canada. Unequalled Equipment and Facilities, Elegant Buildings. Complete Faculty. Splendid New Pianos, Two Pipe Organs, Well Equipped Library, String Orchestra. AHENDANCE 1,160 LAST SEASON I4TH SEASONIQPENS SEPTEMBER 3RD MAUDE MASSON, Principal Elocution School. CALENDAR and SYLLABUS FREE MUSIC If you wish to buy ANY- THING in the MUSIC LINE, whether it be SHEET MUSIC, MUSIC BOOKS or MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.rememberwe ari^ Manufacturers, Publishers and General Dealers in everything- per- taining to a I FIRST-CLASS MUSIC SUPPLY HOUSE Manufacturers of the " Imperial " Band Instruments, Drums, Quitars, Mandolins, Banjos, Flutes, Clarionets, etc Send for Catalogue rientloning Goods Required. If irAerested do not purchase without examiningf the WHALEY-ROVeE PIANOS They are examples of all that is Latest and Best in the realm of PIANO CONSTRUCTiOIS. Correspondence invited. WHALET-ROYCE & CO., 188 ToDge Street, TORONTO, Ont. —43— BY ROYAL WARRANT ' TO HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA ** Canadian Club '' Whisky ♦'Imperial" Whisky DISTILLED AND BOTTLED IN BOND BY HIRAM WALKER & SONS, Limited WALKERVILLE, Canada Loodon - New York - Chicago - Atlanta - Victoria, B.C. -44— •• SPORTING GOODS •• BASEBALL LACROSSE GOLF TENNIS CRICKET QUOITS LAWN BOWLS s u p p I E 5 GUNS RIFLE5 AJVD AMMUNITION RICE LEWIS & SON UMITED TORONTO —45— THE ONTARIO BANK CAPITAL PAID-UP - - - - - REST - PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT - f 1 ,000,000 00 aoo,ooo 00 17,687 37 Head Office - - TORONTO DIRECTORS O. R. R. COCKHURN, Bta-. PrMldent DONALD MACKAY. B«4m VIcoPrMident A. S. IRViNQ. B«q. R. D. PBRRY. Bsq. HON. J. C. AIKIN5 D. ULLYOT. Esq. CHARLBS McQILL, Qencral Manager Alliston Aurora Bowmanville Buckingham, Que. Cornwall Ottawa Peterboro Port Arthar Sudbury Tweed BRANCHES Fort William Kingston Lindsay Montreal Mount Forest Newmarket Toronto — Scott and Wellington Streets '* Queen and Portland Streets '• Yonge and Richmond Streets AGENTS LONDON. BNQ —Parr's Bank. Limited. FRANCE AND BUROPB-Credtt Lyonnals. NBW YORK— Fourth National Bank and The Agents Bank of Montreal. BOSTON— Bitot National Bank. FOR A PREMIUM OF One Dollar a Week. To be paid for 20 years or less if you die before then, you can get a Policy guaranteeing the same sum of ONE DOLLAR A WEEK to your wife and children for 20 years, and then $J,000 in one sum. A man of thirty would have to pay for only 15 years, but his family would receive the same guaranteed income. Liberal Surrender Values Guaranteed. G. GOODERHAM, President J. F. JUNKIN, Managing Director Manufacturers Life Insurance Co, Head Office— TORONTO -46- BANK OF HAMILTON CAPITAL (All Paid-up) RESERVE FUND - ■ $1,700,000 $1,235,000 HEAD OFFICE— HAMILTON DIRBCTORS JOHN STUART, Esq., President A. G. RAMSAY, Esq., Vice-President John Proctor, Esq. George Roach, Esq. A. T. Wood, Esq., M.P. Wm. Gibson, Esq., M.P. A. B. Lee, Esq. (Toronto) J. TURN BULL, Cashier H. S. STEVEN, Assistant Cashier AQENCIES Beamsville Berlin Blyth Brandon, Man. Carman, Man. Chestey Delhi, Ont. Georgetown Grimsby Hamiota, Man. Jarvis, Ont. Listowel Hamilton, Barton Street East End Branch Lucknow Manitou, Man. Milton Morden, Man. Niagara Falls, Ont. Orangeville Owen Sound Palmerston Plum Coulee, M. Correspondents in Britain Port Rowan Port Elgin Simcoe Southampton Toronto Vancouver, B.C. Wingham Winkler, Man. Winnipeg, Man. National Provincial Bank of England (Limited), London. Correspondents in United States ' _ New Yoric— Fourth National Bank and Hanover National Bank. Boston— International Trust Co. Buffalo— Marine Bank. Chicago— Union National Bank. Detroit— Detroit National Bank. Kanaaa City— National Bank of Commerce. St. Louia— National Bank of Commerce. John Kay, Son & Co. LIMITED 36 and 38 King Street West TORONTO KEEP THE LARGEST AND BEST STOCK IN CANADA OF Carpets, Oil=Cloths, Linoleums, Curtains and Draperies — AND — oeotaeFINE FURNITURE, ETC.aeoe^ —47— -48- , . -Jf. I.IJIi'lllp" wmmm Western Assurance Co. PIRB Al^ IIARINB %-¥ >^.:1i;fet 1 I • Pi?#^'^.... 1 K ■- 1 1 ) '■ \ 4 tj t Weffiiigton and Scott Sts^ Tforontb .. , ov«r ■-5H*!*^<5^ it*(»fe I*.* . % .H 11 i 1 'r I. 1 imm--'