IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 2 Iti liM 112.5 ■ ■ a 2.2 ■ m ^ i.i lu m° 2.0 1.8 1.25 1 1.4 1.6 6" <$^ % /i ^l e. %• Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST (V\AIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-41,03 ^^^^ %^ ?b^ .t' "!%' ^.. 1 V,^' v^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian institute for Historirai Microreproductions / institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliogr'. I ! : 1 ii fll ■ AKTILLERY EETROSPECT OF THE LAST GREAT WAR, 1870. By Lt.-Coi-. T. B. STRANGE, Dominion Inspectoii of Artillkbt. (A Paper read before the Lit. and His. Society of Quebec, A[rU 3rd, 1872.) " Pends-toi^ Crillion ; nous novs sonmes battns et iu w'y etais pas,'" was the laconic letter of the royal soldier Henri Quatre to his comrade,— the same soldier-king who gave the right ro)al response, when asked for a standard : '« Where'er- ye see my white plume shine, " Amid tlie ranks ot war, *' Then be your oritlamme to-day '^ The helmet of Navarre." A treat war — alas ! I fear, by no means the last great war'-has passed into history ; and as I was not there to see, how can I venture on a retrospect wit'iout craving your indulgence.? — which yoii may be more likely to give when I tell you that, to gratify no idle curiosity, but simply as a soldier to learn, I asked and obtaincj the sanction of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge to join either ol the contending armies but was given to understand that political reasons forbad me or any of my brother-officers availing ourselves of the permission, even at our own risk and cost. Permission was subsequently granted to a few as newspaper correspondents ; but no Kngiish artillery officer was present at the great drama of the Prussian siege of Paris. W > were disappointed, but not inclined to follow the advice of Henri to his friend. At the conclusion of peace I visited the remains of both armies and many of their baltK-fields. 1 had some friends among the officers of the French artillery, acquaintances made in happier days at Chalons I never saw them again ; and in spite of the contempt heaped upon the unsuccessful by the unthinking, I c nnot but feel, from what I saw and heard from their enemies, thi^ they did their duty. '■I I {■ I 2 ARTILLERY KETR03PECT or Without further apology I will aim at rny object, antl try, like a good gunner, io hit it. My subject clividt-s itself into : 1st — Salient artillery operations in the field, and the lessons we may draw from them ; 2nd — The artillery personnel and materiel of the contending' armies ; 3rd — The sieges and their lessons ; 4th — The general deductions we may draw. SALIENT ARTILLERY OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD, It is commonly supposed that the snperioriiy of the Prussian artillery was the principal cause of the German success, and, indeed, the r.raperor N*apoleon himself attributed his final disaster at Sedan to the preponderating inliuonce of the German field-artillery; but it was not altogether so : the artillery was bu. the keystone of that arcb of triumph under which the German Emperor marched to victory. It is easier to blame ihe grooves of a gun than the heart of a great nation. The French })eople (for I hold people responsible lor their government) preferred a standing army and a system of .substitutes to a national force and universal service ; therefore, they were utterly outnumbered ; and their centralized system of dealing with war material, of which the English control is a bad copy,* rendered it impossible for ihem to equip and mobilize their armies as quickly as the Germans, who habitaaliy decentralize and delegate the resnonsihility of equipment to the commanders of their local corps (J^armee ; and lastly, they were oui-generalied, because their eluf. major an^l system of military instruction were inferior to the Prussian. Notwithstanding the war-cry, ''a Berlin,^^ they found themselves on the defensive, extended over a long arc from Thionville and Metz to Strasbourg ; while the Germans operated on the shorter cord of that arc by ihe valley of ihe ^-iiar and Wissenburg. The French .advanced posts, too far from their supports, hugging the frontier, yet not leeling beyond it, knew not of the vast * Sir William Tilunsfielil calls " the control a system for nneducating General.-," and 1 ivduhi juid Artillery olticers, wlio are scientifically and pnicticully iii.-lrnctt.'d m the nianufuctare, repair, and care of war material; and jet, yon take Irom llicm the most imjiortiuit part of their duties, to be handed over to civ:li!\i:.s. PL A jject, an-J trf, s itseif into : ield, and tiie the contending- ioriiy of the >f the Germaa •leon himself reponderaling it was not le of that arcb )r marched to n the heart of liold people tanding army ind universal 'd ; and their ia!, of which m possible for aickly as the delegate the of their local lied, because •uction were war-cry, "a ve, extended » Strasbourg ; d of that arc The French hugging the of the vast for nn educating icientifically and f vvar material; leir daties; to be :'. THE LAST GREAT WAR. German conoenrration in the wooded counlry close lo their front. Il is very difficult to unravel the thread of artillery action from the tangled web of battle, because artillery plays a double part in the great game— 1st, divisional, or merely supporting and acting with the other arms; 2nd, c-cn-^enlrating and sitriking terrible and decisive blows as a separate arm. Moreover, the first accounts of bailies reach us Crom the pens of journalists, generally men of great energy and ability, but tall taliv is their metier, and they are obliged to supply public demand for blood-and-thcnder alsomuch aline. Even soldiers, themselves engaged, are thv^ poorest narrators of the oullinc "of an action, being so entirely engrossed with what passes in their immediate front. Waterloo veterans still wrangle as to whether the final repulse of the last French column was due to the advance of the 52nd or the Guards. Comparing small things with great, f have been unable to recognize the official accounts of actions in which I had the honor to be. engaged. The fir.?t great battle of the last great war was at Wissen- burty. We cannot linger over the historic reminiscences of the old fortress that once rolled back the tide of war under Marlborough. In tki! same localiiy the Crown Prince of Prusj^ia, witli more than forty thousand men, ^»ur|)rised and destroyed the corps of General Douay, only 8,000 strong. Whde the French were cooking their morning soup, the mass of Prussian guns, having gained the heights of Schweigen, suddenly opened a heavy fire on the enemy'scamp and the village of VVissenburg, With the old impetuosity of their race, the French sprang to arms but were ordered by Gtmeral Douay to remain as much as possible behind Wisstmburg, The precaution was usi'less; the Prussian guns, from ineir commanding position, rained death upon them, whether they advanced or sought shelter. I he French artillery, consistmg only of three light field-batteries and one of iiiitrailleurs, was soon overwhehued ; and according to the German ollicial account, " the tnitrailleurs tired only a few rounds, and were easily silenced by the Prussian guns." The overwhelming numbers of the Crown Prince outflanked and lo:)k the hill of tieisbmg; ihe outnumbered French, still pursued by the deadly Prussian shells, and harrassed by the eavalry, turned retreat to rout. Wissenburg was quickly followed by Wcerih. The French position was salient, almost semicircular; thus dfiermg to the Prussians the opportunity ever coveted by artillerists, } 1 '! i 1 1 1 t J 1 ''.ii ARTILLERY RETROSPECT OF viz., the clianoc of enfilading both winga from a point nearly opposiU; llie centre, I'he Prussian guns were thus massed on the heights south of Gorsdorf and north-west of Giinsladt, and, as usual, they were felt before they were seen. Those on the Gorsdorf heights commenced the action by enfilading the whole Frencli left, and compelling Marshal MacMahon to change the front ol' the first division : the manoeuvre was brilliantly executed by the French. Later in the day, fourteen German batteries (84 guns), near Gunsiadi, were launched upon the French right wing, enfilading it in the line of its greatest depth ; and not only the fourth division, but also tlie unfortunate second, which stood behind them, and had already borne the brunt of battle at Wissenburg. A battery of the 5th corps, north of Spacbach, occupied the French guns; these latter are said to have beer, well served but poorly- handled, for the gallant French artillery seem to have forgotten the tactical lessons of their great artillery chief. Napoleon I. They, however, nobly sacrificed themselves at the close of the action in endeavoring to save their broken infantry. At this battle, also, the French were greatly outnumbered, and failed to receive assistance from De Failly's corps, MacMahon's position was strategically good, as fairly covering the two important railway communications with Strasbourg through Hagenau, and with Metz via Bitsche. ' On the same d^y thattlie Crown Prince thus severed the French army and cut off its right wing, some forty miles distant, in a north-westerly direction from the field of Woerth, the first Prussian army, usjder Steinmetz, assisted by part of the second, also cut the French line at Spichern, thus hopelessly dividing MacMahon and Bazaine. The ridge of Spichern overlooks the villag" of Siiarl)ruck, the scene of the &fl/;femg rfe/sM of the Prince Imperial. As usual, the French were surprised by the opening of the Prussian artillery, six batteries, from a hill overlooking the valley from which a part of Krossard's force had not been withdrawn. The leading artUlery features of the battle are the rapid bringing-up and concentration of guns, in some instances galloping along the roads to the front, while the infar-try of their divisions were partially sent on by rail. Tliis mobility of lieM-artillery is possible only to the Prussians — not to the French, from a defective system on which I shall touch. It is said that the Prussian guns, after advancing over the plain, produced little impression, firing up-hill on the French infantry extended on the ridge, from the fact that shells fired '■''■(«msjL,5Bj^Sii<-i'^*&'*t PI. c guns from a point were thus rupt s^lope or Hew harmless over the heads of the deleiiders The French guns massed on the left to oppose the flanking movement on Siering, dislodged the mass of Prussian cavalry who were sent under cover to the other flank. This should have been a great gain, because the road to Forbach was the strategic line of Fiemli retreat and support. But the crowning artillery achievement was the daring "dvar-'e of two batieries of German guns up a sleep mountain-track, on to the summit of a ridge on the French right, where they enfiladed the whole line. I was informed, through a Prussian general, that ihe h rench line, who had rffisted so gallantly, were first shaken by this fire, which drove them from their entrenchment, anil rendered possible the final advance of the German infantry, whose ()revinus losses, while supported only by direct artillery-fire, had be n terrible ; also, at this critical juncture' a mass of G.- -man -^^uiis advanced, and, firing across thf^ road and rail, enfiladed the Freneh left, and threatened to cut oft" tile line of retreat. In the earlier part of this battle the French had the superiority in numbers and position ; but they were left by their generals with a most inadecjuate supply of arti lery — one of those unaccountable mistakes which marked French generalship. While Frossard's force fought splendidly all day, seven divisions of Bazaine's stood inactive ten miles from the valley ol the "^iiar. The Germans, having turned the h'rench left by Forbach, the 2nd division, sent by Bazaine, could not cover tne retreat of Frossard's utterly disorganized force, which retreated to the south-west, leaving open the road to Nt. Avoid and Melz. Then the German armies, with a cloud of cavalry in their front, gradually brought up their lefi flank. The small fortresses of Phalsburg and Bitsche, especially the latter, whose guns commanded the line of rail to the west, compelled them to make a considerable detour, and leave behind a masking force. They held out for a long time, and shew the advantage of even a small fort on a strategic line of road or rail.* The French commanders proposed to abandon the line of the Moselle, leaving a garrison in Metz with orders to defend or die, — the scattered divisions concentrating at Chalons (the only safe point for concentration), • Phalsburg, with 60 old gunners, 1500 Mobiles, and a handful of Zouaven an 1 niixtd-up regulars, was tiombarded, but held out six naoothi^ until want ot gait, it is said, caused surrender. f i ii! AM1LLEEY nKTROSl'ECT OF ili^i' lliore lo figlil on their well-known ox(>r{'i."n the divided Ih olMetz ; but ■s and Pont A attention of the s an obstinate play of tactical at all : having » Verdun, he his rear to the irrny astride of ! to detain him. eoted to blow I", though they [Jazaine's first /• an enormous m lor delay in ol department, ithoui telling =id themselves ermans time ; h cavalry and dvance, also 3h prepared to I their guns, guns to work 'rench retreat. nilar manner, nd held by ne up. The ittributed by ng, as usual, lary mobility ' their systern in-axle-seats, illery action, ated system 'hem behind •i^."'- ) 11 I %■ ,iS t' : t ;'! ■"t . PI. """"MiiiiiiiMii Pil TUB LAST URKAT WAB 7. The Prussian covalry sacrificed themselves with the same heroic gallantry as the English at Balaclava, with the dill't'rt'nce thai their self-sncrifice had a strategic object and result, viz., holding the French for their comrades to come up. One terrible charge was made through two French butteries with bodies of infantry in their rear, to be finally met by the hostile cavalry. A little more than a fourth of the horsemen responded to the regimental call at that night's bivouac. The French fought with the determined fury of their race, and indicted terrible losses on their enemies, con!»idering that they had gained a victory ; but as corps after corps came into position on the left, and wheeled up, the German army, which at first looked northward, finished the fight with its front to the Rhine; while Biivcaine had been compelled to figfil with his face towards Chalons, and Paris his line of retreat, just a forlnight f''om the opening affair at Siiarbruck. After these bloody struggles at Mars-la-Tours, Vionviile, and Rezonville, Baxaine look up a position at Gravelotte. He had been nearly taken prisoner by the rapid German advance, whose guns had actually opened fire on the rear of the Emperor's escort as he left the army with his son. The tactical advantages of Gravelotte as a defensive position shewed skill ia the selection of ground, for which Marshal Bazaine is famous It is a long ridge, the top of ■which forms an open natural glacis; the crest was strongly intrenched, and his artillery there posted; the left rested on densely-wooded ravines, running down to the Mosellej and one of these, parallel to the face of the position, is difficult to cross except by the road running at right angles to the French front, which was swept with guns and the fire of a fortified farm-house. The Prussians lost terribly in repeated attempts to attack by this central road. And it was a terrible waste of life, as it was only necessary for the Prussians to hold the French in this part of the field until the strategic key of the position was turned upon them. The Verdun road, on the French right, in the direction of St. Privat, was that key, Bazaine's line of communication with France. The difficulties of assault on the left of the position (together with the fact that the reserve of the French Guards, who were posted in a valley on the left rear, supported by the forts of St. Quinten and Phlappeville, would have rendered German advance in this direction a barren and bloody honor,) made this part of the fight on the Prussian 8 ARTFLLERY BETROSPECT OF right ulmnst entirely an arliliery action, where the corps artillery, 84 Prussian guns, were deijloyed by a most spirited mancBuvre. With Husi^ar escorts they i:alloped up a lane through one of these ravines, which concealed them till they refjched the plateau south of Graveloite, sending their amrnunitKin-wagon^ bv another road parallel and leading to the rear oi the intended position on which the 14 batteries deployeiJ in succession. The guns were crowded, to avoid drawing fire by extending in front ot the villnge, which was used as a field-hospital ; and the l(»s of the Prussian artillery here is evident fro n the mounds of earth that mark iheir resting-place — " man and Imr^e in one red burial blent." Thf three leading batteries were met by the fire of lour mitrailleurs ; but, concentrating their whole fire on the nearest, there remained nothing but wreck after a single round. The second and third were treated to a similar dose of concentration, and the fourth retired precipitately to avoid annihilation. This concentration of fire, to be produced in the heat of battle, must be inculcated and practiced in oeace. The whole 8*, thus concentrated on the French guns, silenced them in succession This sort of advance of the rjght men, at the right time, 'o the right place, was, in a great measure, due to the excellent maps served out to artillery-con;manders by the Prussian War-office. I was favored with the loan of one of these that belonged to a Prussian captain of artillery it was a photograph-copy of the map of the French survey. They were turned out in Prussia by thousands long bel'ove the war ; and, though it folded up so as to fit the pocket, it was so clear that by its aid any average artillery-commander could act with trenchant certainty, Among the sayings of soldiers worth remenibering is that of Marshal Saxe, that " the first requirements of an army were legs, the 2nd legs, and the 3rd legs." It is equivalent to that of Wellington, who reiterated "boots." With us it might possibly be " snow-shoes." Prussian officers reiterate " maps," accurate maps, distributed to stafl-ofRcers, squadron-leaders, and battery-commanders. The infantry, working in larger units, do not require so many, except on outposts. The French resisted every assault until the ammunition of Canrobert, who commanded their right, failed. They were, as usual, outflanked by the Prussians (the Guards and Saxons'), whose artillery, occupying the hill oi St. Privat, at right angles to the French position, enfiladed it, and rendered THE LAdT GREAT WAR. 0. tvhere the corps y a most spiriterl jped up a lane ed them till they sending their lie! and leading the 14 batteries owded, to avoid ' vilhge, which of the Prussian unds of earth lii»r^e in one ies were met by ing their whole t wreck after a ted to a similar precipitately to ed in the heat in peace. The guns, silenced le right men, at it measure, due onimanders by he loan of one n of artillery • [''rench survey. ids long before fit the pocket, ry-commander f the sayings hal Saxe, that «, the 2nd legs, of VVellington, t possibly be ipi 7) accurate -leaders, and n larger units, The French of Canrobert, 're, as usual, and Saxons), ivat, at right and rendered possible the steady advance of the infantry, whose previous attack in column without sufficient artillery preparation had been such a sanguinary failure. It is worthy of note also that the isolated attempts of German artillery to advance in the open to close range, 600 yards, against infantry in shelter trenches, resulted in artillery destruction. On one of these occasions, a single gun, one officer, and three gunners alone remained ; and when ordered to retire, the young subaltern's reply, from the midst of his dying comrades, was : "Tell General Steinmetz that where guns have advanced, there also can infantry. Let him send supports to me ; I will not retire to them; rather will I die on my gun-carriage, and rest here with my comrades." He did not retire from his position until he had expended his last shot, and brought his gun, which he had worked with the assistance of his three g-mners, safely out of action, for the infantry did not come forward here until much later. The final catastrophe of Sedan was the greatest triumph of the German artillery. When that fatal morning dawned, the unfortunate French saw, from every gentle hill of the amphitheatre that surrounded them, the white puffs that shewed the trial-shots of German guns. Their concentrated fire was unendurable, and enfiladed each face of ihe old fortress situated in a basin ; and thus a fortress and army fell before the field-guns of an army wielded with strategic skill. Of course, we must not forget that it was political interference that dictated a movement on a line that ended in a fight with a neutral instead of a friendly territory in the rear. Not much artillery-incident of value is to be gained by following the struggles of the brave but ignorant and undisciplined levies, en masse, who, organized by eloquent avocalSy tried in vain to oppose the national army of a people who for half a century had patiently practised the art of war in peace, and were not too effeminate to ignore the duty of personal service, without exception, for peasant, peer, or prince. Now for the artillery lessons we have to learn. The erticiency of artillery must bt considered as Scientific, Technical^ and Tactical. SCIENTIFIC. Comparing the French and German artillery officers under the first head, I am inclined to think the French artillery 1« ARTILLERY RETROSPTECT OF officer, being a competiti . :; 4leve of the 6cole Pohjteciiniqnej was more highly trained to pure mathematics than the German, to the exclusion of more practical artillery knowledge ; for an instance is recorded of an arlillery-olficer of the French Imperial Guard expressing himself ignorant of the fact that rifling produced derivation or constant deflexion on the projectile of his piece. This neglect of practical artillery is farther shewn in the fact that the French artillery drill-books contained no gunnery rules, while the Germans are carefully instructed. We may infer, therefore, that there may be high scientific training in pure mathematics without corresponding practical training; indeed, the means is often substituted for the end. Mathematics may be looked at as a species of mental gymnastics ; yet some professors would lead us to suppose they are the end and aim of life, civil and military, _ , , "'. TECHNICAL.. „ ,, J; ■.,...,,-.' From a technical artillery point of view, we must consider both the gun and the gunner. The much-abr.sed rifle-gun of France, it must be remembered, is the oldest in Europe. The rjarch of the artillery of the first Napoleon was muffled from Austrian ekrs by hay-bands round the wheels. The astute nephew introduced rifle-guns, and, after passing them over the Alps in packing-cases, marked "glass, with care," startled Europe and shattered the Austrian reserves at Magenta and Solferino. There was some excuse for reposing on laurels thus gained; and we must not forget that the last British muzzle-loading rifle field-gun, the hardest-hitting, farthest-ranging, most Accurate gun in the world, is but a modification of the French system applied to steel and wrought-iron instead of bronze. iThe magnitude of misfortune must not lead us to ignore the military sagacity of Napoleoq HI, and the French artillery in tlie earlier davs of the empire. It only shews that laurels lire not to be rested upon ; and there is, alas ! no truce to preparation for the great game of war. It was principally a matter of economy that compelled the officersof the French artillery to rest content with their old guns (in very many instances snjooth-bores rifled up), without ever being recast. And when re-cast, our experience at Woolwich would tend to shew that the older bronze is better than the new. 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OQ 11. b as oiit»ht up, at a low figi're, tiie discarded breecli-loading Briti>< would scarcely cross the Atlantic to iiaunl their detestors iit liume. With axle-seats, the backs of which would form bullet-proofRhields, the a Ivaiitage of cover for the gun-detachment, inherent to breech-loaders, would have been developed; while the intelligence of Canadians would not, I think, have been at fault in keeping tbem in order. ^ o „ o « t/- s £ re 5 ro n <0 3 8 o S n i ■s O z> i o -^ -■^ r-> s 5 9 S i iM J o '5 t 'rfi ?J JN ) 3 ^ C» C* > ? o § 1 rf «* C» IN I 5 p ■O -5 IN 3 - = 1(5 3 '& U5 — — £ ? o > fN n O o o oo CO o o 3 lO •r 1 •<* 1 ) D 1 o 1 o « I a> e ^^ "* t-t rH 1 o o O ■s f^ p^ t- o « O n N CO w . w ,^^ i c . o • a; t u ; ^ * c 1 en « 3 a- : •2 5 -=s J • J - ^:^ ? 5s G.*" £» -o J. S d <^ , z fthe English gun : indeed, many British artillerists regret that the projectile was not elongated so as to weigli 12 lbs , which would give a much more effective capacity of shell ; and though the initial velocity would be less, yet the terminal velocity would be greater at "JOOO yards and upwards, even if fired with the same charge, — because the 9 and I'i-pounder shells exposing only the same sectional areaof resistance to air, the latter has greater weight to overcome that resistance. The Prussian gun which throsvs a 15-lb. shell, and only weighs 85 cwt., was found an effective and mobile gun ; the French 12-cwt. gun, throwing a 25-lb. projectile, being cumbersome in the field, I fear the English FioM-Artillery will be too heavily handicapped with their new 16>pounder of 13 cwt., which is a powerful gun ; but the weight of •hell being great, very lew rounds can be carried into action. The Prussians, during the war, confined themselves to the use of common ehell. The pradice of the nuack, who uses only one kind of pill for the destruction of m«n, is adn .ae>l by the Prussians themselves to be inapplicable to the varying circumstances of war, which demand the occasional use of shrapnel as well as common shell. With the introduction of the former, for which a time-fuze is most suitable, the Pru88iii..s must follow the English through the ditBcullies they bare orercome. / ill, 12 ARTILLERY RETROSPBCt OF liiBi The Prussians used only n percussion-fuze requiring no adjustment. The French time-fuzes were almost invariably short-set, and the projectile comparatively harmless. But I am of opinion the main difference lay in the man and his training. Was the French gunner educated up to his weapon ? The Prussian system of universal service forces into the ranlis of their artillery a very large proportion of highly-educated, intelligent men. It was an easy task to select those who combined intelligence with natural quick sight and steadiness of nerve, and entrust the pointing of guns to these men only. .. , . i,,,-.^^ ■ i ^ .. The French nrmy, like the English, being recruited mainly from the poorer and lees-educated classes, it is more difficult to get tbis selection of marksmen. In the British service it has not yet been attempted, and thousands of pounds sterling are fired away by men who may be short-sighted or too illiterate to read the figures on a tangent scale cr time fuse. Iv, the French sfirvice there was an effort to remedy this by selecting pointeurs ; but the character of the modern French seems to place them at a disadvantage in the use of arms of precision, and the old Fureur-Frangaisc of historic chivalry has a tendency to waste ammunition, ■ ■■,';• i' If I may venture to form an opinion, and be permitted to express it, it appears to me that Canadians are naturally good gunners : those of English descent are well educated ; the agriculturists, good drivers ; and the lumbering populations, athletic, hardy, self-reliant, and full of shifty expedients. The French hahitan, also, whether it be that he is more directly descended from the old Norse-Norman type, or that two centuries of residence ander the rigours of a climate as severe as that of Scandinavia, the original cradle of his race, have cooled down his excitability and given him the character as well as something of the jphysique of the Teuton — wlmtever be the cause, he makes a good soldier : he is very amenable to discipline when he believes in his officers ; and I cannot but have confidence in the military future of a force in which are happily blended the descendants of those who fought under Wolfe and Montcalm. Past fields of victory, gained by combined French and EJiiglish Canadians on this continent, point to the same conclusion. TACTICAL. '^ The first Artillery tactical consideration is mobility, withont which there can be no application of tactics in the field. How long since Marmont wrote, *' Le premier m6riie de I'artillerie, aprds la bravourio des canonniers et la justesse du tir, c'est la mobilite"? And yet the French had no practical mobility for modern war. They had no means of carrying the gunners (except for the few horse-artillery of the guard). Their light guns, well horsed, could move with 1. THE LAST GREAT WAR. U ring no adjustment, sbort-set, and the the man and his his weapon? The the ranks of their ed, intelligent men. I intelligence with entrust the pointing ted mainly from the to get tbis selection et been attempted, y by men who may igures on a tangent was an effort to icter of the modern le use of arms of toric chivalry has a rmitted to express ood gunners : those rists, good drivers ; jlf-reliant, and full hether it be that he orman type, or that imate as severe as , have cooled down veil as something of , he makes a good 1 he believes in his military future of a of those who fought ictory, gained by lis continent, point lity, without which How long since apr^s la bravourie b"? And yet the 'ar. They had no few horse-artillery could move with facility ; bnt the men were carried on ammnniticn-wagons, which hod to ijc left far in the rear, out of fire. A gun without gunners ia a body without a soul. . Until the present year the English and French were the only two powers who retained tliis antiquated system. The Prussians carry sufficient gunners to work the gun on axle-seats and liraber-boxts. The Bengal IIorse-Artilleiy system of carrying gunners on the off-horses might, with advantage, be introduced into Canada. No horst-holders being rpquired, a minimum of men and horses are brought under fire— casualties in either being supplied from the ammunition-teams and detachments in rear. Space will not permit me to go into details of artillery tactical lessons ; suffice it to say, generally, that the last is the only war in which both sides have been completely armed with breech-loading small arms and rifled cannon. Previous struggles shew us chiefly what to avoid ; and though general principles remain unaltered, their application must not be iellered by the old stereotyped idea that artillery must conform to its infantry — for, as a rule, the limit of infanty-fire is the commencement of modern artillery efficacy. Field-artillery tactics may be broadly considered under two heads : 1st. Divisional, or supporting the infantry or cavalry division, paving the way fr its advance or covering its retreat ; 2nd. Army Corps, or Reserve, acting and striking en masse on the key of a position, in obedience to the will nt a master-mind. Artillery action, therefore, more than ever, requires an artillery head. DIVISIONAL ARTILLBRT. In the Prussian army four field-batteries are attached to each ■division of infantry, and two Horse- Artillery batteries to each cavalry division ; but half the above might be sufficient in a wooded country, with bad roads, especially when the artillery is as bad as the roads. The Lt.-Colonel commanding divisional Artillery should, as a rule, remain with the divisional general, with whom he ought to be en rapport, and transmit orders to battery commanders by his field-aides, the divisional Artillery Adjutant and Quartermaster, keeping a trumpeter with him. Army-signalling by lancer escorts has not yet been tried for directing concentration of fire in the field.* ' Practical Artillery R. U. S. Institution Papers, 1871. Hi 14 ARTILLERY RJBTROSPECT OF It may be desirable for the Lt.-Col. in command, after receiving definite instrnctions from the diTisional General, to place himself at th« head of the two or more batteries of dirisional Artillery, and work them as one powerful battery under his own supervision ; or it may be preferable to detach n battery to e-ich flank, and so obtniu a cross-fire orcoticetitratioti from widely sepnrated butleriesi. A battery on each flunk is more conveident, also, to cover n deployment or change of front ; dnrinp which, it must bo romemhered, the infantry-fire is dead. Wliile the buttery on the pivot-flunk can continue its fire without inteimisHion, thai on the reverse flank shuuid trot into a new po.sition to do so, lon^ before the infantry columns have deployed to deliver fire, or melted into skirniisheis. Hui at all tiuies considerable freedom of action should be j^iven lo a battery-commander, who, it must not be forjrotten, hoMs a tactical unit . and, if he is a man of decision, will not let slip golden opportuiiities of action by any undue waiting lor orders which may have miscarried in the confusion of battle. He should, however, remember t!ie golden rule of'raubert, i.e.: "Divisional Artillery, like Divisional Cavalry, is merely an auxdiiary arm, and that tiie infantry, and not the artillery, is the chief t lenient in an action. It is, therefore, the duty of that artillery to cora|iri hend tiie object momentarily in view, with quicknes* and accuracy, and powerfully to support the infantry in combat." The following simple practical rules mny be of assistance to battery-'^omnianders and others whom it may .concern : Int. If ynu cannot march you will never fight. A few galled, lame, or broken-down horsef amonjj voar teams, mean the disgrace of abendoning » gun or ammiiniiion-Wftgon.* hi tliie case prevention is the onlj remedj, which a sleHin-power commander cannot ensun', unless in time of peace he Ots forged a chain ot rHcponsibility, every liali of which bears a shure of steady ■train, from "he (»ubiiltfrn8 commanding divigione, the sergeant in charge of sub-divisions, down to the individual driver, 2nd. Your collar-maker, shoeing-smith. and wheeler, are very important personae;es, and should be well supplied with tools and materials. Misfitting harness, that would produce many gulls, seems to be inevitable with Volunteer batteries turned out suddenly. 3rd. Yoor limber-gunners must be able to lay their hands on every article in the limber-boxes, 2^nd 3 greasing wheels, scrcwing-up bolts, &c. 4th. As you generally have to commence the fight, never lose an opportunity of getting your guns iitar the head of the column of march except in a wooded or close country. Under all circumstances, in addition to tbe eclaireurs in your front, have a couple of intelligent mounted markers, non-commissioned officers, well in advance, to seek out passages over ditches, Bwampy ground, ^c. ' Not 80 with cavalry, whea a sore back meane only a disfflOButid trooptr. THE LAST GREAT WAR. l& d, after receiving place himself ac rtillery, and work vision ; or it may and fio obtain a lies. A l)attery on raent or change of fantrj-fire is dead, lie its fire without to a new position Uf'loyed to deliver IK'S considerable mmander, who, it i^ he is a man lies of action by niscurried in the nl)er the jjoldeu )i visional Cavalry, trv, and not the is, therefore, the Mieiitiirijy in view, port the infantry of assistance to ew galled, lame, or ice of abendoning* p the only rtsmedy, ^ime o( peace he B«8 r'H a share ol Hteady sergeant in charge are very important iterials. Misfitting iWe with Volunteer r handi on every ig-up bolts, Ac. hf, never loae an column of march, tuncea, in addition ntelligent mounted out paesages over fflOHQtid troop«r. 6th. Procure maps, even when familiar with the country, — they are Mcessary tor directing oihers, — and habitually use them, folded the size ot your sabretache. 6th. Note carefully everi/ crois-road or lane, as a means of br»'nkinp; away to u flank, inJui which you will beet be able to assist your lulantry deplo3>mt'iu by paiiiully enfilading the enemy's line. 7th. Avoid the eonver.ie of Ihe above, that is, getting jammed up behind the leading batialiouf ol inlaiilry, wliose deployment will protmblj be checked nUlesH you cover it, while the rear baltaliuns press up aud crowd round you, restricting your uclioii. 8(b. Keep an eye on your neighbouring infantry, with a Tiew to mutual loppoi't ill oftfe of a iiir^h i>ji iiic .neray. K-corl-Uui.y of gunw Iss distasteful, aniens there in a slroiiu; lee.liiig i)f caiiierailerio for the artillery. Infantry are UOable to keep up, and, losing xigln, pt-rhaps, of both llie guns and their own battalion, wander off, di.^giisled. Oaviilry are little use agaiuKl a resolute lire of Rkirmishers. Canadian militia-batteries have only 4 guns. Two gatlings tor Iring infantry-ammunition would make them self-supporting, and take the !»lace of the almost obcolote case-fire. The proper escort for guns would he he coming cavalry ! — the loiiii-talked-ot mounted rifleman; and their place, the exposed flank ol the battery, disinounied and under cover wiien practicable. If they form'd part ot the eHiaUlisnineui of the baitiiy, ihey would he doubly valuable filling casu'tlties >it tb<' guns, or g"Miiig ilieni out of dilficuUies wtlb breast harness, which they should carry on ih<'ir riding-horses. 9th. Leave your ammunition-wagons under charge of the Quart*rm mier Sergeant, to loilow .it i diKiiuiit-. lakiii^; .ivuiiwi^t' I'l ac> id li .• >4 kir>'Uiid, and leplauinii expeml^'d iimmuuiiion bs sendiiiL; up wi 'oi>-limiieM< ii> be exchanged for the empiy iiU'i-liiU'i"r, whi'-h. wtieu nUlled. caB ni; nn •ynir up. 10th. In advancing into action, Ihe communder riUen several hundrtd yards in front, to select a position .md ;iv(»;d a i-u -d- -s ic ; he i' accompanied by his iruin|i>'>ei mid a inouijied in .rk' ■ iioineaeli divi-ion to assist as rannt-flinlerr-, cair>in.: ii p< ck l-sexiMin and a m a.-und piec of fiwhiug-line on a reel, lo tak' h ba>t' on Cilmiel Dm . son's pltn. The battery Is brouu'hi up, silently iliieMed u\ ihe swotd- m--iitiiiU of the commander, who will ende^ivo'O' lo bring up guns irithout being .vee?) b> ilie enemy, unliinbermg in reai ol a slope to avoid ihe teams ippuriiin on the Bky line, and running the guns up by hand when practicable. lllh. The points for consideration of a position are, in oider of importance : (a) Efficacy of fire; {b) Cover for ihe pieces and limbers, if possible, ibe reverse of a gentle slope peimltline i>uns to he withdrawn till the muzzles only can be seen ; best luHil this condition, or 20 minutes with the entrenching-tools will give cover 11 no hedge or bank is available ; a screen not even bullet-proof gives confidence ; (e) Position of the other troops, your own, and the enemy ; (d) Facility of advance ; (e) Facility of retirement. These conditions are seldom united in an equal degree. The commander must, at once, decide which is the most important lo secure the object of the engagement and which to give up as least essential. No pofiition can be called a good one that does not fnlfil the first condition. 16 ARTILLERY RETROSPECT OF 12th. Avoid unmaBking the pnnition by opening fire until a worthy object if within range, which Fhould not be above !i,600 yardH, th« liinlt of eeld-glasKCB by which Mie results of lire can be aBcertaiued. Every Artillery officer should carry u fleid-gUse, as the stntt do. 13tb. Open fire deliberately from the leewnrd gun, firing a Utile shori ol ihf estimated range, iuoreasing and correcting the eluTation of the remainng guno, firing more rapidly ua the range is aBcertuined or the foe cdrai'B 10 close quarters ; but never waste amntunitioti, which e7irottrage$ an enemy, unstendies your men, and is difflcult to replace. " If ordered to fire (uselessly, in your own jndgment), obey; but fire uh slowly as posslole."* Opening tire at too long ruoges is the vice of all arms and all armief> ; restrained fire rHi^eR the confidence of those who practice it, and none can do so more steadily than the EngliBh, while it depresses tbose who have to advance on a comparatively silent ice. I4th. •' Guns should bear on that arm of the enemy^s force which thrtatent n)oM — as a rule, the enemy's infantry uud cavulry, rather than their artillery." Wlien you do lire on an opposing batlerj, not in B^lf-df fence, but to save your own intantry being wbalien before a coi tHinpla(ed nscault by the enemy, let it be understood in your own battery that you concentrate on their centre gun (common shell and percusiiioii luzes) ; and when silenced, turn attentioa to that on its right, then left, and so on. Ifitb. Guns being useless while limbered up, and a change of position necessitating a fresh CHtiniate of range, the number of changes of position in action should be a minimum and the pace a maximum, provided it is steady. 16th. Having a favourable position, keep it until the enemy retires beyond 2,500 yards or your own troops mask your fire ; in either case, advance to within 800 yards ot the enemy, and press his retreat.f Should he advance within 800 yards, it is, in most cases, advisable to retire to about 2000, if the ground otters a Kccond favourable position. 800 yards, or thereabouts, being the effective limit of inlantry-flre, is the commencement ot artillery efficiency. It may be necessary to sacrifice guns and gunners to save a broken infantry, , ,, ■ , • ' . ■ V'' * ■■ ' 17 th. The subalterns command of two guns should never be separated: they are battle-comrades, and lorm as complete a unit as an inJautry company. They are often detached from the battery for advn,nced guards or quasi outposts. It is not good for a gun to be alone : alternate fire is eksential. ♦ Orders of Frederick the Great to his Artillery. ' t Horse-Artillery can readily follow in hot pursuit, except when the action has been a very severe one, as was the case at Waterloo, where Capt. Mercer's gallant troop were too crippled to reply to the " tally-ho!" of a sporting Btafi-officer. n^mmv i -^ ^ ^^-r^-fif i ^ e until a worthy object jardH, tba litnlt of •iued. Everjr Artillery , flring a little abort tlie eleviition of tba ascertuintd or the foe , w/iich enrourages an e. "If ordered to fire slowly as posBible,'" dull armies; restrained none can do so more have to advance on a force which thrtaieni r tlian tbeir artillery." f-flffcnce, but to save i«88auU by the enemy, titrate on their centra ileuced, turn attention 1 change of position hanges of position in rovided it is steady. enemy retires beyond ither case, advance to Should he advance retire to about 2000, yards, or thereabouts, encement of artillery d gunners to save a ler be separated .• they an infantry company, ced guards or guati fire ia essential. lept when the action where Capt. Mercer's r-ho !" of a sporting APPENDIX. ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY CORPS AND RESERVE ARTILLERY. l8t. Besides the divisional Artillery, each army corps should have, under the artillery commander on the stafl of the army corps, a force ot 4 or C batteries, according to oircuinatances, such as character of the country, discipline and training of the infantry. Raw troops require a large Erpportion of good artillery : bad artillery or good artillery »dly handled is only an encumbrance. 2nd. A general army reserve of guns under the artillery aommanding-officer on (he stali of the commander-in-chief, to strengthen the artillery of any special army oorps, lor a decisive blow, or to be held in read'ness (not immediately in tear, but to a ilank) to advance and occupy the point of attack, and if carried to press retreat. A portion o<" the divisional guns may be taken to strengthen the army corps or reserve; but ihey must be a most self-reliant inlantry who can with indifference see the removal of their guns to support another corps. We are all familiar with the phrase common to peace parades, " take those dash'd guns out ol the road" ; and some of us have heard the war-cry, " for God's-sake taring up the guns." A General who fails to bring his reserve artillery into action gains an indecisive victory, is deleated, or retires •ncumbered with useless guns, unless he has a very inferior enemy to contend with. " With regard to the employment of reserve artillery, and artillery generally (especially horse), it must never be forgotten that no arm is capable of bringing such rapid and Important assistance as field-artillery." * * * ' ** Let us suppose the case of an army engaged in battle %ith the enemy, and that an army corps a day's march or so distant is on the march to its assistance : the infantry of this toorps can obviously take no essential part in that day's battle ; the horses of the cavalry will arrive too lired for an effective charge; but light field-artillery, particularly horse-artillery, iean give efficient assistance ; for, directly the guns reach their |K>8itioD, the horses get time to take breath and rest while 4mnfiT%. XYiri. !iti (lie jfuns are in action. For the same reason no arm can take more rapid advantijge of any lanll commilU'd by th** onetny than light field-arlillcry, as it can move as quickly as cavalry to Iht; spot where it is wanted^ and, having tinlimbered,can throw its projectilea rapidly into the enemy's ranks." A vigorous artillery initiative has the advantage of not only covering and gaining time for the deployment of your own troops, but obliges the enemy to display his position and probably his intentions. " In the Prussian service, since 1868, the reserve artillery has been termed corps artillery. Far from being a reserve, this artillery is really like the divisional artillery, an advanced guard. Its duties are really those of an advanced guard. The duty of an advanced guard is to see the enemy first and come first into action. Artillery, from its range, ought to be the first arm to attack an enemy; an advanced guard cannot perform its duty of covering the deployment of the army unless it be powerfully supported by artillery." i^'iH? " The greatest fault a Geni val can commit is to have reserve artillery at all: the preparation ol attack is the function of artillery. Looking to the enormous power of its fire, nothing should prevent the concentration of all available means: every battery, every gun, should be in position ; one gun may even make a difference. It is by acting in accordance with these principles, and placing in line as many batteries as possible, that we have won all our victories." This is the Prussian opinion of Von Becker, which is more a question of Ih'.: meaning of the word reserve than of the principles, i-orae in upon him probably as much by the mistakes of the Prussian artillery, who were too far to the rear in 1866, as well as from the success of shoving to the front as they did in 1870. The practice may be comparatively new in Europe ; it is old in the east, where the British artillery ^n India have practiced it for more than a quarter of a century, — possibly because artillery officers have not there been excluded from their share of the command of divisions of all arms. The dictum of the first Napoleon, that " he who has the address to bring suddenly and unknown to the enemy an <^ xvfrr. APPENDIX. nson no arm can I committed by it can move as ntt'd^ and, having r into the enemy's ridvantago of not ployment of your lay his position reserve artillery 1 being a reserve, lery,an advanced advanced guard. I the enemy first ts range, ought to advanced guard jployment of the rtillery." is to have reserve : is the function 3wer of its fire, of all available in position ; one is by acting in gin line as many II our victories." ;r, which is more srve than of the as much by the ere too far to the shoving to the actice may be 3 east, where the for more than a artillery officers of the command le who has the o the enemy an tpiexpectcd amount of artillery to bear upon the most Iinporlant points is sure to carry them," remains correct in iilinciplo, hut is to be acted upon not in a spirit of servile linitaiion, by an agglomeration ol guns at close range, but by Hconcniraiion of fire from numnrous batteries echelioned at considerable intervals, but not so wide apart as to lose unity of action under one hea«'. The echellqti provides against «nfila(le, fiiciliiates change of front, bewilders an enemy as to range, and is convenient for advance or fighting B|lirement. » The point to be played upon, and a breach in the faemy's line efi'ecied lor the assault of the infantry, should lather things being equal) be selected with the view of driving him from his communications with his base, and ao gaining a decisive victory. Prince Hohenloho Ingelfingen, Commandant of Artillery of the Prusiian Guard, and many of our own artillerists, consider conceniration ol fire from widely extended batteries Impracticable. It w Mild be presumptuous in me to express an opinion to the contrary after the Oracles had spoken : unfortunately, I broach the subj'^ci before the conclusion of the war, in a paper belorc^ the lloyal United Service institution in London, February, 1871. My readers must judge for themselves whether on ihijj much-wooded continent the u'assing of guns in i the batteries ::4 -in. APPENDIX. ^fore." Henoe the necessity of intelligent artillery organization. An artillery organism without a herd, evolving itself out of a conglomeration of atoms and protoplasms, Wt)uld puzzle Professor Tyndal. The following is from a prtds of modern tactics, by Major Home^ Royal Engineers : AUTILLBRT OROAN'IZATION. Tlie artillery of nn army is commanded by a general oflBcer.who Ib styled the cominiinlinK-oflScer of artillery. He has !o «i»*\si h'm a staff wbicb is ■oorapo-ed o( two hriuiches, one being cbarg^rt with the duty of AiijiilaoJ- Qeoeral, or personnel, the other being charged with the tna'^riei ; the head of the materiel branch \fi termed the director of the Park; both these snbordin.ites are, if requisite, helped by other officers of artillery. The artillery of an army-corps is commanded by a Major-General, or Brigadier-General, assisted bj a similar staff. The artillery of a division is commanded by a field-officer, who bag a slnff 4>flScer charged with both the personnel and mai^riel of the division. The coinraandinjr-offlcer of prtillery wUh an army is charged not only with 4he command of all the artillery, liut also with the supply ol the 1st and 2nd reserves of smuil atid great gun ammunition, as well aa with the important duties which devolve on that corps at sieges. JOMINI. The most suitable means of obtaining the greatest advantage from the •rtillery is by giving the chief command of thai aim to an artillery-general iWho is not only an artillerist, but a good tactician and strategist. This General disposes not only of the general artillery reserve, but also of one-half of the gans attached to the division and army-corps. He can thus, in concert with ithe general-oommanding-ia-chief, determine the moment and pUce where large masses of artillery can best contribut" to victory. But such a massing of ■rtillery must never be made except by order of the Geneial-Commauding-in- Ohief. The commandants of artillery and engineers have always made a portion of the staff of the army. vow MILLER . The commandant of artillery should he endowed with grnai coolness and Intelligence. H*' should be close to the commanding-officer of tht division, so long as his presence with his batteries i« not al)8olutely requisite, in order that he may follow the course oi the action and subordinate the artillery to its movements. NAPOLBOK. It is the duty of the ooromandant of artillery to know the whole of the operations of the army, since it i« his duly to FUpply arms and ammunition to ibe different divi-inns composing it. His connection with the commanding officers of artillery at the advanced posts nboald keep him aware ot all the movements of the army, and ibe direction ol the Great Park is subordinate to tisese movements. LB BouRffl. .■•:'■■:';■'.'■;:■:••".■,'.; The General commanding the artillery has anthority over all the troop* of the arm. He may, wit'i the apprnv.«l of the General eonimandliig, make all «uch changes in the personnel Hnion >1 artillery receive orders from the Generals commanding the divisions to wliicb they are attached as rt gards their marches «nd tbe military ponition they should occupy ; but as retards interior econon'y and materiel, they receive orders from the commanding officer o.' prtil " whom they keep acquainted with changes from day to day, tbe etate '' t ■ «upplies, and tLeir wants. GKRMAN ARMT. Although tbe cannon s the arm of ^ll artillery, yet the diversity •of oiiject and meaner of ( .nployment, as well as the different kinds of guns dppeiideiii thereon and the various modes ol seiviusf them, have necessitated a different insirucuon lor the men, and a division of all into two categories — fuege-at tillery and field-artillery, which last is divided into field and horie, tbe latter provided with mounted gunners. This division, however, concerns the men of the corps, not the officers. The artillery officer is not destined for one only of the categories mentioned above, but rather for employment in either, and is educated accordingly. He is, as it were, a universal artilleryman. MAT. - The leader of the artillery of an army should be a General of tbe first clast. "(W Everything points to the fact that of all arms field-artillery is not a force to be exiemporized on emergency ; and Prussian experience of artillery failure in 1866 (for there has been Pruissian lailure as well as French failure) shews, in the words of Captain Hozier, that " a large infusion of raw element inio field-artillery, to strengthen it, defeated its object by crippling the efficiency of batteries." The war of 1870 has, perhaps, been already over-written ; but I have sifted rtly lacts on the very ground of the theatre of war, aiTiong the actors themselves; and I have not neglected to avail myself of all the sources of information at my disposal. The following writers and works have been more or less consulted, and in some caees quoled, especially in the mm Mil, eive orders only from Ij, he Bees to the iupplji altiick an enemy he ill order lo select the 118 close to the General be movernenla of tbe a( corpa and divlsiong •ergonnel und materiel, er of artillery and the barged with the supply >r exchanges, if these arks. He keeps the J of arainuniiion. The ers from the Generals ri gards their marches ards interior econon^y ing officer o.' prtil ■ ay, the gtate :••■ v- 7, yet the diversity Afferent kinds of guns I, have necessitated a into two categories ■ ulista Uatapulia ir. e spot by Sullaii i;, in 1451, were, imitated (fig. 4, Straits of the skill and enerj^v Europe, who still of the predator) cupy more of a listory, being, for its consequences), )und in the fertile and the natural biral sites of free are not, as yet, too an, however, wiili d standing armies, fence of frontiers, 5, serving also a:< ing territory. The to be sunk and tches were given 1 and flanked by ine of Vauban's le great engineer attacking his own of direct fire, — so on doit surtout in 1697, Vauban system gave the !ting batteries oh J salients, using a PRODUCED nV MODERN WKAPON8. 21 fidncecl charge and high elevation, ihe shot were made to bound along the line ol" the enemy's works, destroying material and men. When the guns on these long faces were dismounted or silenced, he made his zig-zag approaches, directed outside the neighboring salients, on the cnpiials of those he was attacking ; so that these boyaux could not be seen into or enfiladed, as the long lines of the fortresses had previously been. Gradually, as the trenches reached the escarp or wall of the ditch, breaching-balteries were established there. A breach and lodgment was efTecled, and each captured out-work became, in ils turn, a point (Viippui for the attack 4>f the next; so the fall of the place, under ordinary circumstances, became a question of time, unless in such naturally strong positions that the prolongation of the faces fell on marshes or rocky soil unsuit -le for the excavation of trenches or batteries. In the days of Le Grand Monarque sieges were so prolonged, and the reduction of a fortress considered of such consequence as to become the object of and occupy the energies of a whole campaign. The rapid fall of French fortresses has made us forget that Sevastopol was the sole trophy of united French and English effort during the Crimean campaign, and ih^t the quadrilateral of northern Italy stayed the tide of conquest of Napoleon III. and Victor Emmanuel. Before these days, however, the military genius of Prussia, under Frederick the Great, and France, under Napoleon I., had learned to mask fortresses and decide the fate of empires in the field. i There are some who argue, from the rapid downfall of f'rench fortresses, that all fortifications are useless ; that the cruel effects of bombardment, complete investments, and famine, have relegated sieges to the history of the past ; and that fortification is a useless provocative of human suffering. I wish, with all my heart, that I could S8 SIEGES, AND THK CHANGES think it were so. But there are circuraslances wlieri no amount of disarmament and self-abasement \vil purchase for a people immunity from suffering, even thouol they hold lightly their own manliood and the surrender of ili: birthright of their children, purchased with the bloot of their forefathers. They must endure, in pocket am person, the rapacity of their invaders- and contribute i( the support of war for their own conquest ; whereas little foresight, a litttle self-denial in peace, will product that preparedness for war which is the palladium national security. It is not safe to jump at conclusions without dm consideration of the causes that have produced certaii: results. The practical answer of the Germans, after their experience is to strengthen the most important strongholds they hav- wrested from the French, building detached forts, whici: keep an eu2my at a c'.stance.* Let us hear a French opinion, even in the bitterness of defeat : " La resistance souvent courte et inefRcace de nos places, *' dans la guerre que nous venons de soutenir contre les " Allerands, a dll necessairement frapper I'opinion publiquc, " ei il est I. ;raindre que I'on ne soil tente d'en conclure ;i *' I'impuisoance de la forlilicaiion. Cependant la cause de *' ces faits se trouve bien plutot dans le manque des elements • Note. — There are at tliia moment 10,000 workmen employeil on the forts at Strasbourg and a lar^ number at Metz. Tlie smaller fortresses in places of no strategic importance are to be dismantled. A useless number of fortresses absorbs an army of defenders, who must surrender if the more important places fall. Sedan was a mere trap for the Frencli army, from its situation in a basin (plate 4, figure 10), its usel-^es armament of smooth-bore gun?, and the political madness which necessitated a line of operations inevitably ending in a battle, with the line of retreat cut oil' by ueutral territory. H 'i<. ^r"!. X X.^ aPijx ii <^^x^ ^ — ^ L> >__i < ilCy, >i s = 2<:< = = ~> 72,3 No. of Pes. §3 'I <*? t.»; 5 •- : c =- S" c — n » 0=1 3 (9 f — tS " IC K; .^ (■; ^ ^ ^ r 1 l.f s< ) CO o c c _ I 1 *. li - o ~ o c t c r- c c 92 (4 (( O I PKODUCKD BY MODERN VVKAP0N9. 23 «* n^cessaires pour uliliser convenablement nos forteresses " que dans la nature merne de lenr r6!e et des services " qu'elles peuvenl rendre. Pour qu'nne place paralyse un «' grand nombre d'eunemis et rosiste longtemps, il lui faut, " en plus de ses remparts, des approvisionnements et tine "garni?on suffisanle. 11 if ut, en un mot, qu'oa veuille, " qa'on sache et qu'on puisne la defendrc." ^he most notable captures of fortified towns were those of Paris, Strasbourg, Belfort, Metz, Thionville, Toul, New Brejsach, Schelestadt, and Sedan. .There were two sieges of Paris : the fir^t, by the Germans, '^^ a complete and enormously extended investment, producing scarcity of provisions, combined with bombardment of the town, and a not very successful elTort at breaching from a distance a few of tne detached forts. Fort Issy, on the south side, was made the focus of gun-fire attack, 46 pieces converging upon it from the terrace and woods of Meudon, the plateau of Chatillon, and the moulin-en-pierre batteries. Tabt.h I. of the German attack on the southern forts if Paris gives the position of the batteries; shews the iUmber and nature of the guns, range, relative level batteries, the amount of ammunition expended, and the object of fire. The guns and mortars were all rifled except four 50-pounder mortars. There were in the _e-train also four rifled 21-centimeti'e mortars, throwing projectile of 180 lbs.; but no guns heavier than our spounders were mounted. it must be borne in mind that the Prussian B. L. rifled 4-pounder throws a shell 10 lbs. 6 " « " 15 " £12 " « " 30 " |t4 " « «« GO " m 14 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES There were no regular parallels or approaches attack. Circumstances of groun I generally decided i! position of each battery, rather than the old rules I placing batteries especially to enfilade, counter-batter, i breach. ■.'.";r;''.. ■'■ • -. ■ > /"■/;"■ Indeed, the first point of diflference between the late siege and those of former wars was, that the regular approaci until breaching-batteries were erected on the escarp, wj no longer necessary, Ironi the greater accuracy, rangf and shell-power of rilled guns, the curved trajeclor of which, just clearing the crest of the glacis, could i long range effect a breach (plate 3, figures 6 and 8) ; whil the large arc, of two thousand yards radius, or thereabouii offered a great choice of position. / The Germans generally chose the reverse slope of hig' ground, so that a slight excavation in rear left the natura surface of the ground for the body of the parapet more solk than any elevated construction (plate 4, fig. 9). Traverse; were not dug out to be again filled in, but emplacement' for guns cut out of the reverse slope of the hill; tht intervening space left as a traverse, sometimes excavated ic contain an expense magazine. Whenever available, the batteries were built a little distance within woods and orchards, which concealed thei; construction and armament. At the desired moment the trees iu the line of fire were half-cut through ; the firsi discharge blew them down, and such as did not impedf fire were left on the ground as abbatis, their pointed branches towards the front forming an obstacle to coup-de-main (plate 4, figure 9). When necessarily in t^*« open, a sham-battery or screen, when no natural one was available, was thrown up in front of the real battery, at 50 or 60 yards from it, to deceive the JRS or approaches lerally decided li the old rules | counter-batter, i ween the late siegf regular approac: 'n the escarp, ws accuracy, range curved trajeclor e glacis, could i -es 6 and 8) ; whi|. us, or thereabouii erse slope of higi ar left the natura parapet more solk fig- 9). Traverse; I but emplacemenii of the hill; tbf times excavated li ere built a littlf h concealed thei: ired moment the irough ; the first ' did not impede pointed branciiej mp-de-main (plate •attery or screen, irown up in from t, to deceive the ■l-' i;^;?' 60 6303^1 <* rt rt o . o-S -1 -^ -% S" fP fft tt> II w X. - - i? <« O n: a I a n '9 f to 5 a' 'A re r/;M 3 -^ 05 a? M P O ir. :i o a! o > H ■<1 X s s S •<<;;:: ~ Oi *- ii* o\ d a Oi ^ GooiOoo^OdW i3 to n> No. of Pes. ftStJ >r5 OOC>QaiOSC'-4iC.(/lo ' + ; . COO O 1 O W *0 **. 05 ^ 03 « ^.o i^"^ ?oc=r > t> ij eco c - 5' 5 ^ :- S SO Bo C3 a ■ o o o o o o ® GD H H o I I I 03 o 5 c p 'I Su B !S en- O © rt> ft OB » 7i -1 PRUSSIAN si: CONVERGENCE OF FIRE FROM SIEGE BATTERIES ON lUSSIAN SIEGE OF PARIS. PiE. E BATTERIES ON THE PLATEAU D'AVRON, .FORTS ROSNY AND NOGENT. PL E. I CONVERGENCE OF FIB AND NOGENT. PI E. ■' S '■V, PRODUCED BY MODEBW WEAPONS. fQ have been for 1800 years more or less feebly trying (o imilato, and He look His human nature Irom his mother only, « ■ ■ - • '.■ -r . .... ^ To turn to the German bombardment of the north forts of Paris, by about 80 siege and 30 field-guns, which were chielly dirt'oied Irom three poinl.s (see Table K.) on the " double Couronne," at ranges from 2,000 to 4,000 metres. Fort La Bri(;lie was also ailacked by some 60 pieces. Tlie double Couronno did not sutler much; bul part of ihe town of St. Dennis*, in roar, was ruined. Mount Valerien, on the west, seemed (juite intact; and, indeed, its command was such that very few bhells are said to liave reaciied ihe plateau. The most interesting feature of the German artillery attack on the east was the plateau ol Averon, which had been occupied with French outworks. I was much struck with the Grerman sunken batteries, masked by trees, and enfilading the French salient from the reverse slopes of the opposite hilh-, in close proximity to the line ol rail from Strasbourg bringing up armament and munitions. The Prussian commandant of artillery (to whom I had a letter of introduction, through the kindness of Colonel Roerdentz, of the Prussian artillery) informed me that those batteries had been armed under cover ol the trees, and regulated their tire to a great extent by signals Irom an otTicer, who, with a sergeant and a couple of men, ensconced himself in an abandoned French villa in line with their works, keeping the Venetian blinds closed towards the French, and signalling to his comrades fram the back windows. Their fire necessarily became riost accurate, as they were also guided by very complete plans of the place on which the lines of fire were drawn and the ranges measured. The same distinguished artillery-officer, General '( f so SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES Von Decker, who directed Ihe attack at Strasbourg, most courteously shewed me the plans he had used. He seemed to attach the greatest importance to such a use of plans for the direction of artillery-fire. I only wish I had found some Departments, with which I have closer relations, as facile on the subject of plans as the commandant of Prussian artillery. With these few remarks on what I think important points, 1 must close this outline-sketch of German artillery-altack on Paris. Time and space do not admit of my describing the lines of investment, 60 miles in circumference, or the various sorties and the great battles around Paris in her efforts to break the fiery circle of her foes. SKCONO SIBOE OF PABTS. The most important batteries are given in Table III. ; but, in addition, the old German batteries at " Meudon," " Clamert," s.n.1 " Chatillon," were rearmed by the French with the smooth-bore bronze converted rifled guns before mentioned, embrasures being, of necessity, cut for the low French carriages and ropp mantlets, resembling those used in the Crimea, affording but partial protection to the gunners. The gaps cut in the enceinte for exit by the main roadfs, during peace. f(»rmed the "hief points of attack ; and the temporary barricades were almost swept away by artillery-fire The Porte d'Auteuil and the houses aiound Point-du-Jour suffered very rnuch, and give some idea of the destruction produced by modern artillery ; yet, from all I could gather, the actual loss of life among the non-combatants w. exceedir y small : they remained tolerably secure, if not comfortable, in the cellars of their houses. Woods, composed of trep?« large enough to explode percussion-luse on impact, aiford almost complete immuiutv 71 )locle imuiii'-v 8^ : r se to M 6 + + + ; l^. -1 ti £ ' 3 ? I- 2. a (I X -- £ X c r n. ai X 2 r > -3 2 c; PJ »_ n 1 £!» ) W2 « ?3 1 ^ ^ •ai + + + + a. e u, o B Q. B' ^» A -c c « o c g. • a. ■33 r 5 * a a 99 7 n j: r: , Ano fW^ 4fikif&PM rbtind's ; thai on the right face of ba»>' P3 XJl P4 •? ^ "s ^ c§ 0:5 UQ IS '&> := o QQ 05 m (/2 00 (M CQ T. c. p, ep CO "oJ 2 5 2 M CO CQ d ,-J .*_» -*J ** 8 CO ■* r-i 00 t 00 6 Tl •as When Tl PRObUCED BY MODERN WKAPON8. 33 When this cut is supposed to be effected by a series of sliotH, vertical cuts upwards are tlen madf from the oxtrertiities of the horizoiiial ono, ar intermediato cuts made until the wall comes down (plate 3, figures 7 and 8); but this extreme ilieoretical accuracy is not obtained in practice, especially when the completion of the first horizontal cut can only be conjectured from certain phenomena, viz. : (Ist.) The concussion and explosion of a shell has a hard, sharp sound, if it hits solid masonry ; on the other hand, it has a hollow and faint s -nnd if it hits masonry either wholly or part broken through — in this latter case, the shell exploding in the earth behind the wall. (2nd.) F^ragments of stone are hurled into the air as long as the masonry resists. (3rd.) The smoke from the explosion of the projectile soon rises above the wall, is of a i 'uish tinge, and forms a " ball" if the masonry remains mtact. If the masonry has been broken through, the smoke appears after some delay, is of a darkish grey colour, and rises slowly, as if coming from a chimney-pot. The determination of the range, Lunette No. 53, took a long time, as the range-party in a trench between Ihe second (2nd) and third (3rd) parallels could see the glacis, but not the wall to be breached ; and as there was no telegraphic communication, the report of each shot had to be sent by a chain of posts along the trenches to the batteries (plate 2, iig. 5). The elevation varied on iffereni days, on account of heavy rains and meteorological causes, when the horizontal cut was hal.-completed. A system of counter-mines in /ront of the Lunette was penetrated from the third (3rd) parallel "Mm IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // m ^j Q- % LO I.I 1.25 IIM 112.5 «16 12.2 12.0 1.8 1-4 IIIIII.6 ^^ //A %, >m ^>M i3 V' S' ei^ o1 V ^>¥#/ m v//. Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^J i^. &?- ^ -v 34 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES through a gallery driven by the German engineers. From the opening of this gallery in the counter-scarp the eflect of fire could be accurately obtained and reported to the batteries. The horizontal cut was found far from perfect : many shells, striking above the intended line, gradually shook the whole wall ; while the lower part was cut through, until great masses came down, followed by earth, so that it was not found necessary to make vertical cuts. A great number of the shells, with large bursting-charges, were finally fired into the earth of the parapet to bring it down. The breach had a slope of 35 * . It was not defended, though there was a wet ditch at its foot. There is a very interestirg description of the passage of the di'ch in front of Lunette No. 52 given in the Royal Engineer Papers, by Colonel Lennox, Royal Engineers ; and i^ the Royal Artillery Institution Papers, a translation by Captain F. C. H. Clarke, Royal Artillery, from General Von Decker's Report, containing a description of the above operations, together with the partif*l destruction by curved fire of the unseen sluices which retained the waters of the ditch and inundation, which added to the difficulties of the siege of Strasbourg.* • It would be interesting, if time permitted, to go into the reasons why no breach was defended in the late war by the troops of a> nation celebrated for the obstinate, bloody, and often successful defence of breaches assaulted by as dogged an enemy as any known to history, namely, the British infantry. • NoTE.—My acknowledgments are also due to the professional papers of Colonel Smytli, R.A., and Captain Parnell and Lieut. Frazer, R. E. j of Col. Denfort Rocherau, Corps du Genie ; ae well as to German official accounts, Ac, translated by tlie War-Office. TRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. S5 The change in weapons, especially the introduction of mitrailleuses^ since the Peninsular war, was thought by many to be favorable to the defence of a breach by resolute soldiers. SIEGE OF BEL FORT. The garrison of Belfort consisted almost entirely of Mobiles : only a vevy small proportion were troops of the line ; among these, the 43rd regiment distinguished itself, &3 it did al«o at the subsequeni siege of Paris. To make the preliminary preparations of defence, there was only a half-battery of regular artillery and 4,300 Mobiles, without instruction or sufficient instructors, — there being only three officers of the Corps du Genie and two civil engineers acting as auxiliary. To ihese, four battalions of Mobiles, e» blouse^ badly armed and totally uninslructed, were subsequently added ; and some 5000 Franc-tireurs^ commanded by an energetic captain of artillery, held outposts. The attacking force was supported by the army of General Von Werder, but threatened by Bourbaki. Bombardment was first attempted, with but so little success that a regular attack was commenced. The north sid« was the most favorable for the operation ; but, as the citadel on a hill dominated the country to that side, a second special siege of the citadel would have to be undertaken after the capture of the town atid outworks. On the south, the twin-hills of les Perched rose to a height about equal to the ciladel-hill, and about twelve hundred metres from it : they were occupied by temporary field-works (redoubts), with a garrison of four hundred men each (plate 7, fig. 13). tkfore comraencing ihe allack 96 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES on these redoubts, it was necessary to capture the villageg of Daujoutin and Perouse. The fornner was taken by a night surprise. Two German companies passing along the railway-embankment unperceived, the French Moblots guarding this point having been left by their officers, ■who were passing the evening in a tavern, their men, it can easily be understood, were not over-vigilant, and took a panic, which was rapidly communicated to their comrades. The appendix to the journal of the siege by the commandant of the place. Colonel Denfort Rocherau (a brave and reliable French officer of the Corps du Genie), contains a mass of mutual recriminations by the officers so disgracefully negligent, who make aW sorts of accusations against the commander of the post, which are only another proof of the worihlessness and want of discipline of these irregulars. An officer of the Royal Engineers, who was present during the siege, speaks of the pitiable spectacle presented by the panic-stricken mob in the garb (but without the feelings) of soldiers. It must be remembered that a large proportion of the German altacking-force were not regulars, but Land wehr-men; but the Prussian militia (every man of whicn has served three years in the regular army, or one year as a volunteer of superior education, who has passed a military examination) is a very different force from the hasty levies of the French Republic, fed for the most part on bombast, clothed in shoddy, served out, in too many instances, with brown paper shoes, and commanded by eloquent avocats. The Grerman batteries against les Perches redoubts were screened by the woods of I3osmont. The first parallel was opened at 1,000 yards. The first assault, which advanced on a moonlight night over a light fall of snow, was repulsed, \ of the r-men; three unteer ilitary hasty art on many id by were si was anced ilsed, I "*'■■ ; ■/ ■,-<*■■"•- t^ iV PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. 37 Many Germans were taken prisoners in the ditch of the redoubt, the escarp of which they were not prepared to escalade, and could not climb. Regular approaches were then commenced, and flying sap used for the close attaclc (plate 7, figure 13). When the works approached the redoubts they were abandoned by the garrison. A line of German batteries was then constructed along the ridge, about 1,000 metres from the chateau, at about the same level. The labor of bringing up the guns was enormous, as many as 100 men being required to drag each gun up the steep slope. The fire of the batteries on the ridge soon silenged that of the place. The guns on the open parapets below had suffered considerably. The Haxo casemates at the top of the citadel remained fairly serviceable, when the place capitulated. I have bapn told by the officer of Royal Engineers before quoted, who was with the German army, that the German commander had actually determined to abandon the siege, and that some of the investing force had actually been ordered to withdraw, when the place surrendered to a stafT-ofiicer sent to demand terms which he knew his commander was not in a position to enforce ; but it is difficult for an outsider to be certain .of the intentions of a general. , THIONVILLE. The capture of Thionville may be regarded as typical of that of the minor French fortresses, similar causes producing similar results. It is a small fortified town, of about 5,000 inhabitants, in a basin about two miles in diameter. It commands the Moselle, several roads, and two lines of railway. It is just one of those cases where geological formation gives birth to a city, necessity for its fortifiaation, incentive to its sieges^ .and, finally (with a change in weapons), the means for its li 38 SIEGKS, AND THK CIIANGKS capture by establishing batteries on the surrounding hills commanding the forlificalions, and aHording every facility for enfilading the long faces of the Vauban trace. It was, in the first instance, invested by a handful of troopers (600) and a dozen or so of the engineer corps, who multiplied themselves by using a four-horsed coach to carry them from one threatened point to another, hastily fortifying various farm-houses.* By these means (what the Yankees w^ould call a " bogus force") they imprisoned a garrison of 1,000 regular infantry and several thousands of Garde Mobiles, who the commandant declared to be unformed and unreliable to break the investment, which was maintained until the arrival of the investing force of 12,t)00 men, with 75 siege-guns, oaly 50 of which and 30 field-guns were put in position, firing princinally on the barracks and arsenals, none of which were bombproof. They opened a steady fire at a rate of one round every quarter of an hour, day and night. The shells, with percussion-fuses, descending from the heights, and concentrated on the town, told with effect on th3 buildings, but with little loss of life to the besieged, viz., eight killed and 66 wounded, two only of these being civilians. I was much surprised to hear the loss was so small, on walking through the damaged streets of the town a short time after its capture, in company with a brother- officer. We had been refused access to the parapets by the brusque Teuton sentries. This was aggravating, as we had only a few hours to spare. Happy thought ! — the high steeple-tower of a central church was conveniently loopholed with shell-bursts. We made for it, but hero again were refused access, in spite of a silver key. The church was undergoing repairs ; the custodian turned his back for an instant to superintend the • Lieutenant-Colonel Smytli, li. A., lloyal Artillery Institution Papers. PRODUCED BY MODKRN WEAPONS. 39 Workmen ; we boiled up llie stairs, and ensconoed ourselves annong the rafters of the belfry, from wlience the shell-holes in the roof gave us a complete bird's-eye view of the fortifications and the position of every German battery. We had sold the watchful Teuton. We were, however, startled on our perch by the tremendous vibrations of the huge betl, just above us, which warned us we had barely time to catch the train for Metz. Descending, we found ourselves, to our disigusi, locked in, and the workmen gone. As a last hope, looking through the key-hole, we saw our obdurate friend locking the outer gate, and called to him. He opened the Sesame with violent abuse of our perfidy, declaring us " not true men, but spies," who would bring ruin upon him and his innocent family. He refused all douceur, begging us, in frightened accents, with many a look over his shoulder, to be gone and tell no one, ^^ pour Vamour de Dieu.''^ SEDAN. In the old fortress of Sedan, situated in an almost exactly similar basin of hills to those around Thionville (plate 4, fig. 10), crowned by the German field-artillery, whose shells flashed upon the pavements and through the roofs of the old town at their feet, the chivalry of France laid down their arms, after gallant but fruitless efforts to break the circle of fire and steel that surrounded them. METZ. A court-martial has declared that the surrender of Metz and the splendid army under its walls was due to the political treachery of its chief, who basely falsified the proud boast of brave men, that " La Garde meurt, mats ne se rends pas.^^ 40 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES Without going into the details of the minor sieges, I wil/^ if your patience permits, recapitulate what I think to be the leadinf^ points of difference in the attack and defence^ consequent upon the intwduclion of rifled guns and breach-loading' small arms : 1st. It is no longer necessary, nor desirable, to carry on regular attack until breaching-balteries are established on the escarp. 2nd. The long range of rifled guns has given a wide scope for the selection of the sites of batteries, fceneflly on the reverse slopes of distant hills, behind woods, SfC, and in close proximiii/ to railroads or good roads, facilitating armament and supply of ammunition. 3rd. Breaching by curved fire, or distant but concentrated bombardment, requires greater skill on the part of the gunners, and, consequently, higher training. 4th, Embrasures, except in a few peculiar positions, being found to be shot-funnels for directing an enemy's fire to your own destruction, a barbette system becomes a necessity. 6th. A system of range-finders, combined with accurate plans, on which the lines of fire can be laid down, as well as a system of telegraphing results of fire from a good point of observation, are also necessary. 6 th. Complete tables of range and elevation for curved fire, with any given angle of descent deduced from the combined results of theory and practice, are a great want. 7th. The general introduction of rijted mortars, firing also vertical shrapnel, with a fixed charge and varying elevation.* * Note.— Propoeed by Captain Orde Browne, Uoyal Artillery. PRODUCED nV MODKRN WEAPONS. 41 8tli. The concenlffdinn of fire from dispersed batteries, admitting a large supplement of field artillery : the whole under the unftttered direction of an artillery chief. 9th. The complete investment in a very wide circle is a necessity which is practicable in Uie case of an inland fortress, besieged by an overwhelming force, but not in the case of a nrnritime fortress, unless the besiegers are masters on botli land and sea. lOlh. The cruel bombardment of a comparatively defenceless city in preference to attack, restricted to the fortifications, calls to mind the recommendation given in the book written for all time, as to the advisability of non-combatants leaving Jerusalem before the siege. DEFENCE. These considerations lead us to the first principle of modern defence : 1st. The necessity of keeping a besieger at arm's-length by superior artillery, so disposed and protected as to retain its power to the last. To my mind this seems practicable principally by a system of detached Moncrieff gun-pits^ supporting each other and connected by troops in the field, who should cov r themselves by temporary entrenchment, being physically and morally supported, fed, and relieved from the fortified city of whicli they formed the first line of defence. 2nd. The accumulation of munitions de guerre and munitions de bouche in fortified places of strategical importance, and the abandonment of the defence of such places as are not of vital itnportance. 3rd. An effective permanent garrison of trained artillery, familiar ivith the locale, the armament, and the stores on 42 SieOES, AMD THE CIMNGR9 which theji have to depend. They should be largely snpplemented by an auxiliary volunlecr citizen-artillery and infantry under discipline. 4lh. The advantages of such commanding positions as Gibraltar and Quebec, especially where the sea renders complete investment dilficult against a maritime power. 5th. The great importance of bombproof cover, expense magazines, traverses, ample means of repairing Tuaterial, and cxtemjtorizing cover. 1 would now consider how the above principles apply to the ancient fortress in which we live. As artillery is obviously the most effective element of modern defence, its application should be developed to the ntniost, and fortifications made subservient to it, — defence consisting, '-'■not of an armed system of forlijication, hut of a fortified, system of artillery.^' A besieger must be kept at arm''s-lenjth, which can only be done by superior artillery, so disposed and protected as to retain its power against attack, if not indefinitely, tmlil such time as relief is at hand. As long as " Britannia rules the- wave.*," such a period would not, I trust, be indefinitely prolonged. Inland continental fortresses differ materialh; from the maritime strongholds of Great Britain. I can recall no instance in our history, since the loss of Calais, where the old flag has been lowered at the bidding of a besieger for want of succour from the sea, oar great base of operations. Especially does it hold good in the case of a maritime fortress such as Quebec, where " Field-Marsha • Frost" prevents the possibility of a longer investment than five summer inonilis ; and even in summer, the migity sweep of the St. Lrivvrence would render complete investment almost an impossibility to an invader, who could not transport very heavy guns and their enormous weight of ammunition fur a 1 )ng di>tance over diffic ' country, with . t ■ i m» hi PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. 43 few and bad roads, impassable in the spring and fall.* The defe.~?der, holding the river within the circle of forts, could throw his lohole force on a section of the enemy divided by the St. Lawrence and separated by it from their base of operation and line of retreat. The com|)leie railway systems at the command of Prussia did not enable her to bring heavier guns than 60-pounders in her siege-train. There are certain physical •data which do not alter, viz., the strength of men and horses ; the badness of country-roads ; and railroads, from the numerous other calls upon them in war, have been found incapable ol transporting very heavy artillery. It is hardly to be ■supposed that the mistress of the seas and her eldest daughter, Canada, who already ranks third among the commercial ■navies of the world, would permit the siege-train destined for the attack of Quebec to be conveyed by sea. The armament, therefore, of Quebec miglit easily be i-uperior to that brought against if, even by hostile iron-clads, whose unarmoured decks would b? exposed to the Citadel fire, which, with the addition of a few torpedoes, would secure the St, Lawrence, if those upon whom the responsibility devolves considered the subject of sufficient importance to warrant a comparatively trifling expenditure. It is not for me to comment on the acts of legislators holding the reins of Imperial or Dominion Governments ; but the past legislation of defunct governments has gone into the region of history, and may be discussed. As a mere soldier, • Note.— The coming -.vinter will be llie centenary of llie expedition of Generals Montgomery an 1 Arnold againbt Quebec. Tiie former, witii jncredible hardship.'^, came through the State of Maine, but returned not with his life ; and the latter withdrew the shattered remnant of tiieir force. Better had it been for his honor that he liad shared IMuntgomery'.s fate ere lie soiled his name by treason to hij '■elf- elected allegiance. The new forts at Levis coinpletly command the inien -ction of roadd and railways ca^t, west, and south, as well as the valley of the Cluuidiere and Iveunebec road, jby which the ill-fated Montgomery luauhed, and occupy the ground from wliich Wolfe ehcUeJ the town. 44 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES I was struck with amazement at v/hat you probably diil not notice, viz., the repeal, last year, with the concurrence of boih the Imperial and Dominion Governments, of an Act oi Confederation entitled the " Canada Defence Act," which provided for the transfer of the guaranteed loan of c£l,000,000 for the defence of Montreal (the tilterly defenceless commercial capital of Canada) to that political rneelstrom, the Pacific Railway. At the same time, the Canadian Government declined Xhefree gift of a new armament for the Quebec and Levis forts, provided for by the Canada Defence Act. The wisdom of declining to examine the dental development of an equine gift is proverbial ; but the refusal of such a gift as the above was never dreamt of in my poor proverbial philosophy^ nor in that of Mr. Martin Tupper, as far as I remember. I have not yet been able to discover the epoch when Quebec ceased to be the key to navigation, by which British succour can come to Canada, or a hostile fleet of gunboats enter its inland waters, unless Reciprocity compels us to enlarge the Caughnawaga Canal, &c. In any case, unpleasant as the truth may appear to the valiant and self-reliant yeomanry of Ontario, Quebec would remain the only one possible stronghold upon which our militia, rolled up by an invading force from the west, could retreat, and wait for that help which never could be denied from the raother-land.* • Note. — Successful initiative in war is everything. Both nations are lorbidden by treaty to build gunboats on the lakes ; but gunboats can and have, with the first note ot war, passed up the St. Lawrence by the Lachine Canal, and on to the lakes. The Beauharnois Canal, on the South Shore (that monument to dead patriotism), would be rendered useless at the commencement of hostilities by the United State?. But the necessities of commerce, with us stronger than any consideration of national defence, point to the probable enlargement of the old Canal on the North Shore, from the Cedar Rapids to Coteau Landing. The defenceless emporiums of commerce ou the lakes would theu be at the mercy of those who held Quelec. PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPON!*. 49 Halifax is an open harbour, and useful a? a coaling-station for the West-IntJian fleet ; but the treaty which handed over our connpatriots of the State of Maine sends a wedge of territory up to within a few miles of the Intercolonral Railroad, which a handful of troopers could at any moment render unserviceable in a night, culling ofl' retreat to Halifax or succour from thence to the upper Provinces. 'Tis true that small detachments were sent from Halifax during i^>e Trent difficulty, but the United Slates had " other fish to fry." Assuming, then, a certain sum of money to bo granted by the State for purposes of defence,— and a very large sum, in the shape of rents- of Imperial property, has been granted, (hough not, I believe, applied to that purpose, — the maximum reasonable proportion of it should, I think, be appropriated to the application of protected artillery in the five important strategical points, viz., St. John, N.B., Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and Esquimalt (ihe proposed terminus of the Pacific Railway in British Columbia).* I am not singular in supposing that detached gun-pits on Major Moncrierf's system are the best means of meeting modern attack on an effective and sufficiently economical principle. With great admiration foi the sister-service of the Royal Engineers, F cannot divest myself of the idea that they inherit not only the talent but the fancy for building in Louis d^ors, atiributed to the French engineers by Louis Quatorze. * NuTE. — For Ontario, trusting in the loyal strengtli of her militia, to be ini]iffercnt to the defence of Lower Canada, and especially of Montreal, resembles a warrior with a good helmet being indifferent about a cuiraes for his stomach as lon^ as his head was protected ; or the much-maligneil ostrich, who, on the approach of an enemy, stuck his beak in tiie ?and and "left his posterior exposed, believing it invisible. As for Montreal, it is said that modern Dan.ne is only too eager to embrace the irans-Atlantic bird of Jove, believing, as of old, that he wilt come in a shower of gold, which, iiowever, may take the disagreeable form oiiuflalion. Ill 46 SIEGE!-', AND THE CHANGES ♦ Laying aside costly iron shields, granite struciiires, and the ingenious devices for doing away with the destructive effects of recoil, Monerieff simply trusts to the broad bosom of raother-earth, digs a hole for his gun, and chains the destructive giant of recoil an obedient slave to his gun-wheels. Time does not permit me to explain the system. I trust plate 6, fig, 12, and the models, will render it intelligible to those who are not already familiar with it. As to its advantages, Chey are self-evident, — protection from direct fire while It gives an all-round tire, thus enitrriiously increasing the value of a single gun, and its inexpen^iveness, compared to the toastioned or polygonal trace, with ravelins, caponiers, &c. Its only vulnerable point is liability to vertical fire ; fcut you who are riflemen may judge for yourselves of the comparative value of such an objection by considering the difference between hitting a visible upright target and dropping a shot upon the same target when laid flat on the ground. Besides, we mast remember the saying of the first Napoleon : " On ne pent /aire iP omelettes sans casser des oeufs.^^ From no system of fortification can we expect entire immunity from danger in war. The actual expenses of the pits would be comparatively little. The principal outlay lies in the Moncrieff gun-?,arriage ; but as (by the Act so lately repealed) the British Grovernment offered to arm the forts the Dominion Government would build, I thought the keen commercial intellect of Canada might have realized and adhered to the wise arrangement which left the principal burden on the richer mother-country. It i'j not, however, to be supposed, in speaking of detached works in such positions as recommended by Colonel Jervois, Royal Engineers (as shewn in plate 8, fig. 14), with the view of keeping an enemy at a distance, that all the comparatively old fortifications are useless, from some inherent vice of construction ; quite the contrary. The fall of the French PI. 6 MONCRIEF SYSTEM OF MOUNTING HEAVY ORDNANCE Fig. 12 ' PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. 47 fortresses is attributable to many causes which may seem far-fetched to you, — for instance, the geological formatiorr of the Paris basin, which repeats itself at Sedan, Thionville, and elsewhere. These valleys caused confluence of rivers^ as before remarked, the convergence of roads, and the growth of towns, to be in the future fortified by Vauban. The diameter of these basins was so large as to render ther surrounding hills unavailable for the old artillery attack ; not so for modern guns, whose fire commanded and could converge upon the helpless town. No such reasoning can be applied to the fortifications of Quebec, which, however, painfully remind me, in their dilapidation, their obsolete armament, and their scanty artillery garrison, of the state of some of the French fortresses at the commencement of the late war, when it was too late, as regards preparation, to obviate t'le apathy of peace, strangely co-existent with the delusive cry, "a Berlin .'" For the comparatively small sum of about ^40,000 (£8,000) an effective armament of rifled guns, as heavy as any that were brought against Paris, could be supplied to Quebec by selling some of the obsolet>^ ones, gelling the converted fl Palliser rified gnn^ for wh^''',h the old carriages and stores would serve.* Any other system would necessitate the •Note.— The same reasoning applies to the armaments at Kingston, Montreal, Toronto, and elaewliere, as I have pointed out in official Reports; and no very heavy armament is required at present in Quebec, as there are no cis-Atlantic iron-clads capable of resisting a 7-inch M, L. R. projectile, nor even a 64-pounder, which, if fired from the Citadel command, would penetrate the light-armoured deck and knock a hole through the unarmoured bottom, unless it was thought preferable to burst the shell between decks. Thongh Dommion Inspector of Artillery, my '•ieita have been officially restricted to the Province of Quebec. I must, therefore, be pardoned if my views have unconsciously taken too local a coloring. I have not, however, lost pight of the fact that the unprecedented development of Ontario and the self-reliant character of its people hi.ve modified the conditions set forth in the Report of Colonel Jervois, E. E., submitted ten years ago. 46 StEGEP, AND THE CHANGES purobase of now carrlaj^es and other material, wliicli would cost probably ten-timps ilio above snm. The Govcrnrnen* of India and thai ol Melbourne in Australia have purchased t\n arrnarnenl of converted Pailiser guns at comparatively pmalj co«»t, puch as I recommended two years ago for Quebec. 1 s»**e they have been largely used at the miserable srege of Carihagena, in Spain, from which, however, we can learn little but the miseries entailed by ihe weak government of the clamorous many. , In its present unarmed state, a roving Alabama might run into such a position at Quebec as would enal)le her, under threat of bombardment, to demand from his honor the Mayor and gentlemen of the Corporation a sum that would far exceed anything they are likely to realize by the trarjsfer r of the late Imperial ordnance property from the purpose for which it was given. It is not desirable that I should point out our vulnerable points; suffice it to say that the lower lines, regarded by many as picturesque ruin?, are of more importance than are dreamt of in your philosophy. CONCLUSION. " Cui bono'^ these pages? Official reports have one of Iwa fates — to be pigeon-holed, perhaps deservedly, or printed in a blue-book, which is but little read and never acted upon ; its main result being to produce in England the remarkable liallucination that Canada has an efficient army of 600,00^ men. There has been a profusion of pamphlets and articles on militia matters, mostly by militia oflScers, shewing deep dissatisfaction with their present slate, on the part of the militia itself. In the multitude of counsellors we have been waiting for wisdom ; but perhaps the " prophets prophesy falsely," because " the people love to have it so." No one has had pluck to probe the wound. The militia law, like other laws, depends (or its eflfeet upon its administration. t*noDUdF,D nv moOkr.v weapons. 49 Willi some modifications it would not be a bad law ; but it did not anticipate the reirioval of the IJritish troops, and made no provision to sapi)ly their place with a Canadian regular force. The plan ol selecting as Ministers of Militia representatives from the only Province where a British garrison remains, wa-^, I presuini , a precaution against any pressure from tbci. «?onslitnents being b» ought to bear upon them to induce them to stretch the law in favor of establishing any nucleus of regular troops, though in other respects some of its provisions have been violated and some not put in force. The law provides for filling up corps by ballot in those districts where volunteers fail; it is not needed among the Anglo-Saxon population ol Ontario and the Maritime Provinces, who inherit an ancestral preference for voluntary service and ihat dislike to conscription which, since the introduction of national armies, has effaced Great Britain (except iti A«ia and Africa) from the military Powers of the world. Onlario and the Maritime provinces, with their . 25,000 stalwart volunteers, have no need of conscription at present : they have as large a force as we can afford to train, even as militia; and the first note of danger would, doubtless, increase that number to any extent that might be required. But though equal in physique and intelligence to any soldiers in the world, I do not believe that twelve days' drill per annum, or eight days in camp, as last year, can give solidarity and discipline. On the other hand, the Latin races neither in the old world nor in the Province of Quebec take kindly to volunteering : it does not suit their idiosyncracy ; but they are not averse to pay that debt due by every free man to his country, viz., personal service by conscription, as they proved before, when necessary. The advantages of introducing the thin end of the ballol-wedge in the rural districts, where it is mostly required, and would not, I believe, be resisted, are : 1st, That it immediately produces discipline by relieving G 50 SIEGES, AND THE CHANOKSr ! the oflTicprs from personal obligation to their men for consenting to attend drill. 2nd. Ft would very soon do away with the necessity for its application by removing opposition to volunteering on the part of employers of labor, whose personal dread of the ballot would induce them to encourage volunteers. 3rd. It would consolidate and give real discipline to existing corps, over whom it would hang suspended. 4th. The essence of an effective military system is that it contains the germ of indefinite expansion without the introduction of any new feature. It is futile to suppose that a struggle for national existence of 4,000,000 against 40,000,000, even with the aid of Great Britain (in money and ships — soldiers we cannot expect), could for a moment be maintained without recourse to the ballot, for which the law provides, making the exception, as it does, in favor of Quakers, Mennonites, Tunkers, and other non-fighting persuasions, whose dollars would not, therefore, depart from our shores, where they would be guarded by their less scrupulous fellow-citizens. But is it worth while balloting men for twelve days' drill in twelve months, or eight days in camp, two of which are used in going and coming? Sunday, intervening, leavesyzve days for musketry and drill instruction in a language foreign to the men, the majority of whom also are recruits. " Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelleJ*^ The law leaves a loop-hole to any man, who, by giving six months' notice at his first enrolment, can avoid all subsequent trainings, and, therefore, in some corps, results in a fresh set of men for each year. When corps do not train simultaneously, the same men may muster in several corps. But is it advisable that the populous and strategically exposed Province of Quebec should, for all practical purposes, be dropped out of the military system of the Dominion ? It is very noble of the people of Ontario to PRODUCED BY MOOCRN WKAI'UNS. 61 'undertake the defence of the sister-province as well as ihvjir own ; but is this contemplated by the French-Canadians, generally supposed to be no degenerate descendants of a proud and warlike race ? I trow not, judging by their history in the past, and taking the interesting brochure of Colonel D'Orsennens as an exponent of their present sentiments. A hard and fast system of camps, and the same number of ■drills for all arms, has been laid down, which suits admirably some rural districts in Ontario, but is utterly unsuitable to the busy maritime cities of Quebec. The long, dull winter-season should be utilized ; and city volunteers, especially artillery, who require infinitely more instruction than the other arms, should not be given twelve days' pay, which is apt to restrict them to twelve days' drill, but a handsome capitation-grant, according to the number of efficients in the corps. By this system British artillery volunteers can be got to put in as many as 100 or 150 morning or evening drills in the course of the year, producing genuine efficiency as well as regimental feeling, which I should say is impossible to men who meet as soldiers only twelve days in the year. In any case, it would be preferable to reduce the number of volunteers by one-half, and give to the remainder double the amount of training. . With all due respect, I am of opinion that the late order, raising the rate of daily pay, and at the same time reducing the number of days' drill, is a dangerous step, from which it will be difficult to recede; the total amount of pay (sixty cents a day and a full ration) for one training, twelve days at headquarters of corps, or eight days in camp, received by the Canadian militiaman (already the best paid soldier in the world), bSing nearly the same as heretofore, viz., fifty cents per day and a full ration for sixteen days, while the efficiency purchased for it is less. Raising the rate of pay for the rank-and-file is a grave consideration. Keeping a force enrolled on h\g\\ pay for 62 8IROKS, AND TIIK CIIANOKS such length of time as necessity rnii^ht dietuto would boggar the treasury of a richer couiilry than Canada ; wliile reducing the pay at the moment men aro called upon to snller hardships and put forth their best energies, would be a severe trial lor any but the Angelic host. If the foregoing pages prove anything, they prove that, against the lightning-strokes of modern war, hasty levies, en masse, however brave, are uselesr". Danger would, doubtless, bring thousands of skilful Canadian rifle-shots, hardy backwoodsmen, and yeoman-farmers, to defend their frontiers, as Ihey have done before; but no amount of enthusiasm will produce scientific olficcrs, in whom they could have that confidence which is the parent of success. The Hon. Mr. Mackenzie, the present Prime Minister, has gained the gratitude of the future Canadian nation by initialing a Military College, which he appears to have evolved from his inner consciousness without enlightenment from military pamphleteers. In the House of Commons, while he was still leader of the Oppo^ilion, he recommended a Canadian Military College ; and in the Militia Report of 1872 may be found the following remarks (page 34j, which the Report for 1873 (page 54) reiterates: — ''The most " obviously advantageous method of utilizing scientifically " trained officers, during peace, is that adopted in the United " States, where a large proportion of those educated at West " Point can be employed on public works. The gigantic " railroad, canal, and boundary surveys undertaken by the " Canadian Government give "ample scope for the " employment of assistant military surveyors and engineers, " who would thus form the nucleus of a practically " scientific Staff Corps, whose intimate knowledge of their " own country and the maps diey would construct would " be of incalculable value in the event of war, and useful " in peace. These services are, at present, in some instances, *' done for us (and, I have no doubt, with great ability) by • l>RODUCBD liY MODKRK \VKAP0N9. 53 *' forc'ignors, whose knowledge of onr country might not " tilways be to our advantaj^e." Hiving been for the last eight years eng'igcd in military instruction, five years as Supcrinteach'nt of the Gunnery School at Woolwich (part of llie time as an independent Examiner on Artillery at the Uoyal Military Academy, appointed by the Direnior-Geneiul of Military Education), all ufHcers of the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery consequently passed through luy hands on joining, as wll as all otticers of Cavalry and Infantry from the Staff College, and many officers of Militia and Volunlfers. To this experience has been added that of nearly three years in the formation and command of a Gunnery School at Quebec, more trying than any previous duty. It may be seen by the sijllobus (a copy of which is annexed to the preface of ihese papers) that an effort has been made, without aid from professors, to tsach (with what success it is not for me to say) all the subjects of practical value to Canadian othcers that form the course at the Stall' College of the Hritish army. I ventured to suppose, therefore, that I might be of some little service in forming the Canadian Military College. With that view I visited W^est-Point, and offered to send in a report, which I was officially informed, however, was not re({uired, an ample one having been subsequently furnished by Lieut. -Colonel Fletclier, Scots Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary to His Excellency. I, therefore, volunteer no opinions on the subject, beyond the hope that the following may not be lost sight of. Though of no importance now, the day must come, sooner or later, when to the scientific soldiers of Canada must be coniided the destinies of a nation territorially greater than the United States. Such comparison of our wilderness may well raise the sneer of incredulity ; but if Buckle's History of Civilization points any practical moral, it shews that no matter how rapid the growth of powerful States in more favored regions, yet the Nemesja SS^S^iJF^ 54 -SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES m of a soft climate and vast wealth enervates a people, while it may fairly be hoped that tiie old Norse race will recuperate in a hard Canadian climate similar to that which cradled our forefathers, — the same fierce, yet chivalrous, barbarians that Tacitus tells of, with blue eyes and gigantic stature, before whom the Roman legionaries trembled as they slid down the snow-slopea of the Alps on their broad shields, in wild and warlike glee, till they surged against the walls of Rome;* and because the old Viking energy, no longer employed in sacicing cities, but wresting gold from the fastnesses of nature, keenly trading with his fellows, felling the forests and subduing the prairie, no longer thinks of arms, and votes down its salaried soldiers to the lowest figure, — so all the more responsibility will fail upon the few educated by the State to wield the sword. Woe to that people whose scientific soldiers are not the gentlest, most chivalrous and liberal-minded of -^en, educated to a broad Dominion patriotism, and free from provincial or sectarian fanaticism. (•.,.';: ? • It would be well to insist on military training and discipline being introduced by law into every Canadian School or College ; the mental, moral and physical advantages to be derived from it are self-evideni, especially on this continent, where youth, seldom taught to obey, rarely ripens into manhood capable of self-control or fit to command others. No nationality can exist without physical force to support the majesty of law, international or domestic, — for the latter, the constable's baton, which the rowdy occasionally treats with the contempt bred of familiarity, save where the less familiar bayonet is known to be in reserve g| * Note. — Our young Canadians shew their Berserker origia in their delight for such sports as sUding down the frozen cone of Moutmoreucy.^ of PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. The responsibilities of self-government logically include ho:?e of self-defence. The withdrawal of the Imperial troops gave rise to the necessity for a small regular Canadian national force as a nucleus, a pattern and school for the Militia. The Militia Report for 1872, pages 36 and 37, and that for 1873, pages 52, 53, and 54, as well as the ab'e brochures of Lieut.-Col. Fletcher and Lt.-Col. D'Orsonnens (1874), go into the details of this subject ; but neither of the officers mentioned provide fur the adequate training of the scientific corps, Engineers and Artillery. To acquire a practical knowledge of the mounted branch of the latter, the most difficult arm of the service^ a permanent instructional F^ield-Batlery is necessary for each Provincial Gunnery School, as well as for the Military College; while the General Order (24) of 20th October, 1871, paragraph 21, providing for a Gunnery School at New Brunswick, might well be put in force, as well as the conversion of the permanent battery at Winnipeg, Manitoba, into a Field-Battery of Instruction, available for active service in the event of the police ceasing to perform artillery duty, or being more than five or six hundred miles distant from the point where their services might be required. As Canada swarms with skilled riflemen, who, in emergency, under trained officers, would soon acquire all they want to make them excellent infantry — viz., discipline, — it is manifest that the largest proportion of these permanent nuclei should be Artillery (Field and Garrison), with a smaller proportion of Cavalry, as well as a small corps of Engineers and Artificers at each fortress to execute petty repairs, on the " stitch-in-time" principle. We want no military " loafers" around our cities. The Prussian army is a national school, such as we are not likely to have in Canada ; but, in these days, a soldier who is not kept burnished by instructing others is apt to rust. The officers 60 SIEGES, ANn THE CHANGES and non-commissipnetl ofTicers of lliese corps must hd perraaneat instructors of liieir own men, of the Militia, and of such lads not necessarily belonging to the Militia, who might advantageously be admitted (especially during the winter season) for short courses of drill, duty, and discipline, during that period between leaving school and entering business, which, with advantage to the State and to the individual, might be devoted to that moral and physical culture which true military training under a genuine soldier is sure to develop. The rank-and-file of the permanent corps, after serving three (3) year'*, might be drafted into militiry colonies in the i\ortli-West, still liable for military service on an emergency, or employed as guards for depots of stores, or in the construction of railroads or other puWic works, at a * fixed rate of working-pay, under the direction of the future graduates of the Canadian West-Point ; but as the natives of a new country have already so many profitable openings for a H'^ing, and are, as a rule, averse to military discipline, the Canadian system of military service and colonization might be affiliated to one of military emigration, — not very palatable, perhaps, at first sight, to the British military authorities. But as returns prove that tue short-service men do not go into Mr. Cardwell's proposed reserve, they might as well become Canadian soldiers, and finally military colonists, as dribble off to the United States or join the dangerous classes at home. Short-service men of good character (and no others need be taken) are well worth an assisted passage, having been just sufficiently long in the service to acquire habits of discipline, making them good soldiers and valuable citizens, especially in a frontier-country, without their having reached that stage of old-soldier who makes an indifferent colonist from having run in a groove all his life, and, perhaps, acquired intemperate and idle habits. This rule is, however, by no PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPOMS. 57 means without many exceptions. My experience as to the facility of recruiting for " B" Battery, in which there is no prospect of a permanent career, leads me to suppose there would be no difficulty in maintaining a comparatively large force in the manner I propose. There have also been a considerable number of intelligent French and Alsatian soldiers who prefer becoming Canadians to being Prussified. But why have any soldiers, or guns, or forts? "The best defence of Canada is no defence" — that oft-repeated paradox of unsexed intellects, so dear to hearts that dwell in the trousers-pocket ; " for, where the treasure is, there will the heart be also." The peace-at-any-price paradox-repeaters may be found criers of " peace ! peace ! when there is no peace ;" and the sordid may regret, in the end, that they did not insure against the sword as well as against fire and shipwreck. Of those who consider the Washington Treaty, the payment of the Alabama award, the yielding of our frontiers, oar fisheries, and the Fenian claims, as the advent of the millennium of peace, or a proof that England has abandoned all idea of helping us or enabling us to defend ourselves, I would ask : When did the payment of tribute ever shield the weak and pusillanimous from the strong ? Did the gold of the degenerate Roman keep the Barbarian from her gates until the sword of the soldier was flung into the scale? But we live under the Christian dispensation,' and our polished and friendly, though powerful, neighbouri are not barbarians. As to Christianity rendering war impossible, its Divine founder said He " came not to send peace, but a sword ;" H 66 SIEGES, AND THE CHANGES and His last advice to His followers was : " Let him that hath no sword sell his garment and buy one." Time has proved the soundness of the advice. With all due respect for our cousins, but without that ^abject adoration of success and power to which we are prone, seek in history for a more severe reprisal than that of placing their conquered brothers under the political thraldom of their negro slaves. True, our neighbours are at present burdened with a debt for, and sick of thr memories of, a fratricidal war, into which they rushed with the light-heartedness of amateurs. But, is there no possibility of any future /e-distribution of this continent ? Will there never be a desire on the part of any neighbouring republican section of Ihe great English-speaking family to join a federated Empire or return to ancient institutions ? and if co, what part will a disarmed Canada play ? Of those Candians who desire annexation, I ask : What sort of terms will our smart cousins give to those who have not the " ultima ratio regis ant populi ?" Though forewarned, and yet unarmed, peaceful annexation might be found tronblesome through the stubbornness of a possible minority ; for, " Ontario men are stern of mood, Canadian rifles true and good, Voyageur woodmen ataunch, thougii rude; O'er foreat hills the trails are steep, , St. Lawrence waters broad and deep; ^ , , And many a banner will be torn, And many a man to earth be borne, And many a pouch of cartridge ep«Dt, • - ' Ere Stars and Stripes shall cross our Trenti" ' ' I hope ray hearers and readers will excuse the travestie of the Scottish border bard. PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. 59 I •OF those who think that commercial relations will Tender war impossible, producing a sort of mutually inconvenient Siamese-twin nationality, x h that bond of proverbially pie-crusty promises on parchment which diplomatists delight in and call "treaties," but which men of the sword have to support or see torn up, I would ask if trade-interests have never been subjects of dispute, especially between the weak and the strong ? Was it a question of a tax on tea that set aflame the War of Independence between the two great branches of our race ? Was not the tariff the main cause of the severance of the North and the South, though subsequently the shibboleth, slavery, was prominently brought forward, and became a war-cry between brothers in blood who had quarrelled in their trade? Are there still no burning questions in the South for the North to answer? Are there no Granges in the West? — and are all parties in England pleased at what some consider the prospect of partial exclusion of her commerce with Canada, in favor of the United States, as a natural sequence of reciprocity ? Though it is natural to suppose that Imp?rial Parliaments, past and present, being more occupied with the parish politics of a people too absorbed in the Tichborne trial to notice the cotemporaneous Treaty of Washington, have little inclination to interfere in any course Canada might think fit to follow, English diplomatists having treatied away her cis-Atlantic Empire as soon as it was v/on by her soldiers and sailors, beginning as early as 1633 : U\. When Quebec was captured by English ships, in 1629, under Sir David Kertz (or Kirke), a French refuge , who carried Champlaln a prisoner to England, a treaty with France, in 1632, restored to her Quebec, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Isle Royal (Cape Breton), Champlain returning to Quebec and resuming the government, and restoring New France for a fresh struggle 60 SIEGES, AND THE CHANOES between the two great rival powers under Wolfe and Montcalm, who might have spared their blood and that of many brave men had they known that the verdict pronounced upon their death in the boudoir of a French king's mistress {de Pompadeur) — ** nous avons perdu quelques arpents de neige en Amerique" — would, in substance, be re-echoed in the British Parliament a century later by les Philosophes emascules^ who belie vo that commerce will remain when Empire is abandoned. 2nd. By the treaty of 1763, England acquired ail French possessions in America*. the (( •*- 3rd. By that of 1783, she abandoned to the United States r immense tracts of territory, unsettled, and, in fact, unexplored and unknown." The boundary was fixed from the north-west angle of the Lake of the Woods, due west to the source of the Mississippi, an impracticable line, for the sources of the Mississippi are many hundred miles to the south. 4th. Consequently, by Jay's Treaty of 1794 and the Convention of 1815, the boundary was changed to 49th of northern parallel, driving Canada into the Arctic regions, to be subsequently sandwiched by the purchase of Alaska from the accommodating Kuss. 5th. By the treaty of Ghent, in 1814, "though England was actually in possession" (chiefly through the gallantry of native Canadians) "of the fortress of Mackinaw, of Lake " Michigan, of the site of the present city of Chicago, and *' of a line of territory terminating at the fort of Prarie du " Chien, on the Mississippi, — had won back, in fair fight, and " held, by right of war, the whole of the territory conceded in " 1783, and which now constitutes Michigan and the more " northern States of Wisconsin and Minnesota," and of a fort 450 miles down the Mississippi, captured and held by PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPON3. m Colonel McKay, a Sco'jh-Canadian, and Captain RoUelte, a well-known French-Canadian adventurer, with a force of Indians, half-breeds, Orkney-men, and voijageursy—lhe whole territory was ceded to the United Slates, as also the State of Maine, ours, " not only by right of war, but with the « consent and content of the population." •< On the Pacific Ocean we gave up Astoria, on the south " shore of the River Columbia, actually, at the time : ** of surrender, in possession of British subjectg. On the " other hand, the Americans gave up nothing, for they had *' nothing to give, and had not even a sentry on the Canadian « shore." Had it been otherwioe, England retaining her conquests for the cost of war, Canada would have had unfrozen seaports on the Atlantic coast, instead of being in the position of a growing lad, obliged to breathe through his nose because a stout neighbour sits on his mouth ; and the Canadian Pacific Railway "would have been some 1500 miles shorter."* 6th. The Ashburton Treaty of 1842 ratified these inconveniences. 7th. In 1846 the United States got Oregon, it is said, mainly because the sporting commander of a British man-of-war reported that the salmon of the Columbian River would not rise to a fly. Common rumor is not invariably a common liar. 8th. And finally, the last Treaty of Washington (1871) has left the spread-eagle gorged. That bird is distended, but not Inclined to doze. He who said, " I care not who writes the history of a people, provided I write its ballads," would have been •Note.— "Quirks of Diplomacy," by Lieut. -Col. Coffin, Commissioner of Orduauce aud Adtoiralty Lands, Cauada. 62 'S1EOKS, AND THE CHANGES pleased with the sententious exposition of policy conveyed in the refrain of the sweet singer of Uncle Sam : " If I was legislator of iheae 'ere United States, I'd settle tiie fish-queelioii accordin' — Gire the Yankees all the meat, g And tlie British ull the bones, And put the boundary t'other side of Jordan." At last, under the reign of King Cashbalance, England withdrew her troop;*, sold her guns and shot to Yankee contractors, and shipped home —perhaps for tropical service in her black empire — her snow-shoes and sentry-boxes, apparently considering Canada incapable of being helped, and unlikely to help herself, having turned out her own Government on the Militia Bill. Those who blame England must bear in mind that the last Canadian Parliament endorsed the lastTreaty of Washington, and asked the Imperial Government to withdraw their gift of armament and transfer the guaranteed loan of £1,000,000, sterling, from forts, to swell the Pacific scandal, the net result being that we have, as yet, neither forts, guns, nor railroad; and as for British help, who "in Heaven above, or in the earth beneath," helps those who will not help themselves? I cannot suppose that any unwise words of a soldier, asking the solution of a few simple questions on which rests the apparent possibility of war, could be productive of serious results, except to himself, who, if he thinks it a duty to speak, must endure the unpleasantness of saying things some folks don't want to hear. The soldier who has seen war and yet desires it, for personal ends, must be a fool or a rufii m — probably both. The cultivated classes in the United States are a truly noble people, generously disposed towards Canada, and not k (1 PRODUCED BY MODERN WEAPONS. 6S i\ a desirous ofour forcible annexation; nor would they grudge her the military institutions necessary for the social order of all communities, which are also the best guarantee against hostile acts, into which they might be forced a some future date, as heretofore, by the necessUie^ of v.olen demagogues, who require a sensational plank for their political platform. The eminent, yet modest, soldiers who lead the United States army are notably chivalrous gentlemen, tempered in the fiery trial of war to a true nobility of character that would disdain to strike a weaker kinsman. Unfortunately. Republics are not invariably guided by the noblest classes ; nor are all our American cousins quite so enamoured of the success of their own institutions as candidly to advise us voluntarily to accept them, except, perhaps, from the pardonable weakness attributed to the tailless fox. Note ^The conclusion of this paper was not read before the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, and ts not, therefore, printed in their Tkansactions ; nor are they tn any way responsible for its contents. mmm