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Webb, Junior, near Tetnple- Bar. lyj^g. c/ L (3) THE ADVANTAGES Arifing from the DIFINITIVE TREATY, ^c. IT is an old Obfervation, that we have generally loft by our Heads what we ac- quired by our Sword, the Truth of which I apprehend is founded on this Principle that the like Caufcs will ever pro- duce the like EfFea:s. Good and great Minifteri have feldom made their Appearance on the public Stage in Comparifon of weak and evil ones ; but whenever the Nation has been fo happy as to have the Reins of Go- vcrnment committed to fuch Mens Care we find throughout the Englifi Hiftory that vvhcther Peace or War happened to be^he r Irovince national Credit has always been fnH i^l.'l '"''.^ ^" Proportion to the Worth or War conduced by a weak Adminiftra- tion, never failed of producing a Train of \\\ ^ Confequfnci:-; (4) Confcqucnces to the Public, nnd Difgracc to thcinfclves. Taking it thcrciorc tor grant- ed, tliat this Remark in general is pretty well ibundctl, 1 iliall proceed to confider how far the Treaty which wc have lately concluded is to be meafured by this Maxim. And in the Firji Place it would feem necef- fary to enquire wh.cdier the W.^.r has been coiidufted in fuch :i Manner as was mod likely to anlwcr the Ends for which it was iirft undertaken? viz.^]\\i\ Reparation to our Merchants for th;: Loltes whicii they had fuftained by the Depredations of the Spani- iirds, and a proper Security againfl any Mo- Ictktion of their Trade tor the Time to come ; and finally the Support of the Prag- matic Sandion, which was formerly thought to be fo neccflary for the Prefer vation of the Balance of Power in Europe. 2dly, Whe- ther at the time of making this fatal Treaty, we were under an abfolute Neceffity of fub- mitting to fuch difadvante;?/ous Terms ? If not, whether the Declaration of War made by France againft this Country, did not afford a much more cogent Reafon for the Continuation of the War than any of the preceding Motives, great as they are, cotdd form for the Commencement of it ? As to the Management of the War, I fliall refer the Reader to the Author of the Examination of the Principles vf the two i5 * * rs, in which Piimphlet are produced io many ftrong In- ilancc ' I I ( 5 ) ftanccs (which, I may r.7, almo/l carry Con- VK^tion aluiiir with :hc'n; of their kcrc^ At- tempts from tiiii. to Lhiic, :n undermine th..- .Yuclnrcrcfl of this CuunLry, bv cnclea- yoa; ,ng to render the War unproVperoiis that ,f one half of what is there alledcred can be proved, I will venture to aflinn , hat their warmeft Advoc.lres will not pre end to deny but th;;t any Moderation oC PuniHv ment for f ,ch Cri.nes would be .m Inj.nuce to the Pubhc: I c.n'Miowever omitrikui.- Notice of one or tw:. Pads which feci to have ihppd that AuUior, as they will help to corroborate and confirm what iie h.is en- deavourcd to eftablilli. 13. ir then remem- bered, that at the time Saxm was invaded by Pn^fi,,^ we were in adtuarAiiiancc with the Elector of that Country, and had hncn obliged to him for a confiderabie B )dv of his l^orces ; and farther, had entered into a Treaty with him in one Article, of which we folcmnly promifed and engaged ^)urf;K es to fupport and aflid: him widi -nir u; ,ie Force, ,n cafe he fliould be itcaeked i. ais yominions by any foreign Power, iifr Uii. der thei^ Ciicumlbnces, who would believe that wc fnould have been the very Pz >nle whobctray'dhim? who would have thcuaht that we ihould have been capable o^ iuer. ceding with Ru//ia not to fend any Suc.ours to his A 1,, ana. which but a httle b.foie file had declared her Inteiuions of doin- l,, th( le I A ( 6 ) the ftrongefl: Terms ? If itfhould be i^.l.cd, what could induce us to enter into this trea- cherous Meafurc, when 'tis evident that there was not the Icuft Frofpedt of Advantage to be hoped (or on one fide, or the lead i*ie- tcncc of Provocation on the other, I can only anfwer that the Fadt is io: let others jud;;e how far it is a Pioof of a premeditated Rcfjlution of the Minidry to facrifice the War. The Time lias been when the bare Word nf Gri\7t Bricahi would have been foonerrcly'd on by any foreign Potentate then the mod fokmn Treaty of fome other Princes ; but what will the World think of us after having been guilty of fuch Perfidy? Will not Britijh Faith be more infamous then ever Punic Faith was? Will any thing we can fay or do after this, wipe out that foul Stain which fuclj underhand Dealing muft of courfe leave on national Credit ? But as this may poffibly become the Subjecl of Enquiry in another Place, I will leave it to thole to confider whofe Duty it is to examine more particularly into this ever-memorable Tranfadtion. And now not to fiy any thing of Martinico or Bcllc-IJle, both which Places .1 am alTured might have been eafily caken, if we had been in earned; j and if taken would have greatly diftreded the Enemy : What can be urged in excufe of the Miniffry's not fupporting the People of Nav Enghmd in the Redu<5tion of Canaihi^ which they had proje'^k'd r i 1 ( 7) projcdcil ? The InJiun Nations we know were at that time ready to liavc declared for us J and llich mighty l*rcparaiions w^ne ac- tually made by the F'eople of NriV Ktjgland for this Purpofe, that had the Attempt been made by Land with ever lo little Allillance of Ours, 'tis morally impofllble that it could failed of Succefs. What Infatuation then polFefb'd us as not to furniHi a few Troops and a little Money on fuch an Occafion ? Was it deem'd to have been a wild and an extravagant Projedt ? or was it not worth our Attention ? Again, why did we poflponc, or rather refuC lO reimburie thofe brave Peo- ple the Expence which they had adually made in the Reduction of a Place attended with much more Difficulty then probably the Conquefl of Caitada would have been j a Place too of the lad: Importance to Great- Britain and themfelves, 'till fuch Time as the Preliminaries were fign'd ? 'Tis to be hoped we were not afraid that if they had received their Money th.ey would have been hardy enough to have made an Attempt on Canada without us. In flioit, if this War had been honcftly conduv^U'd, if it h.id been frugally miUriged, if cv^iy Meafure had been taken to fttenethen the Confedera- cy, and to obtain the Enils expccfled from it by this Country, tho' we had been unfuc- ccfsfuljt would have been fome Confolatioii to our Misfortunes; but when to a bad Mead Head a bad Heart has been added, when 'n's piam that this Country has been treache- roufly dealt with, and its true Jntere/1 has . been facnficed either to foreign or topri vate Views, when 'tis evident that whil/l the Qneen of Hungary has been fupported at he Expence of this Countr., almoft, f may lay, to the Ruin of this Country, both fhe and our Allies have been hetray'd by the Councils of this Country. Is it not master of Aftonifhment to think that the Authors of fuch Misfortunes fliould not only not be call d to account, but be aliovv'd, as'it were to triumph over their Country, and to con-' tinue peaceably in the Enjoymeut of Places of the higheft Trud, Honour and Emolu- mentin the Kingdom. U to hold Corref. pondence with his Majeflf, Enemies is deemd to be Treafon, of how much higher Natui^is that Oifcnce where a Perfon bein-' entrufted with the Management of publi? Affairs, during a Time of War, knowinelv endeavours to render ine Jedual every Mea- sure whereby we could hope to make the War profperous ? In what Light can fuch a Perfon be look'd upon by his Countrymen othertficnasan Accomplice of the Enemies > Wad It hrippen'd in a nciglibouring Country that there had been the tythe Part of the fame Proof againli any Men there, as has been made out againfl fome among^ us here attempting to countera'ft the beil-cuncerted Plans 1 ; i M (9 ) Plans which could poifibly have been form'd to bring the Enemy to Reafon, in order to eftablidi little narrow iclf-interefled Schemes of their own at home, would they have efcaped being dewitred ? I will venture to anfwer, No. Thole People have too much Spirit to lliffor themfelvcs to be {o abufed. But for our Parts we feem to be fo entirely regardlefs whether Things are well or ill managed, that one would think the People of Efigla?id did not fo much as dream of their mod effential Rights and Priviledges being to be fettled by this Treaty. To what this general Defpondency is owing, whether it is Jo be imputed to the Spirit of the People bc^ng broke by long Oppreflion, or to the dire Effedts of corruption, which feems to have prevailed over all Ranks and Degrees of Men, I am at a Lofs to afccrtain. If to the firft only it is owing, we are to remem- ber that the Republic ought never to be def- paired of: As long as we have any Strength left, we are bound to exert it in Favour of the Common Wealth. There is no Excufe for not doing our Duty in this Refped:. 'Tis no Argument to iay, that it avails not for a Handful! of Men to flruggle againfta Mul- titude : Nor can it be pleaded by any but by Men of un found Principles ; for was this to be admitted as an Excufe for any Man's not adling with Vigour and Spirit, how many might remain unadive under the falfe Pretence ( lo ) Pretence of Defpondency in others, when perhaps the true Caiifc of their own mii^ht proceed from private Conliderations, which probably are not the more honourable for being- kept fecret. If to the laft it is owing, I would recommend it to thofe whom it concerns, to confider what a rotten Support they truft to, who rely on Men of fuch narrow Prin- ciples, profefTing only their own Intercih As Reward indeed is their great Objecft, per- haps you'll fay 'tis indifferent to them from w^hat Hand it comes -, but fuch is the Na- ture of all thefe Mercenaries, that as foon as they find their Maifer a httle preffed, they are the firft to defert him ; of which we have had many Inftancesi and to the fame unhappy Turns of Fortune muft thofe Mi- nifters exped to be ever liable who prefume to govern by Corruption alone, without having real Abilities to carry on the public Service. But to return to the Matter in hand, with regard to the three great Ends for which this War was firfl undertaken, and which I promifcd to confider, viz. A juft Satistlidion to our Merchants for the Lolfes which they hadfuftained by tlie Depredati- ons of the Spaniards, and a oroper Security for their Trade for the future*; and finally the Support of the Pragmatic Sandion ; every one of which Articles ought to have been ajine qua 7ion. I flicLld be gi^ri to know if any one of them has been iuliflcd upon I in ( ti ) in making this 'TVcatv. On the contrari" is not figning a JVnai in which there is no Provilion made I'or tlie future Security of onr Trade, elpecially as the very Rcafons of declaring War were that we found Sf^aift did hut trifle with us on the Subject of our Demands in all our previous Negociations : is not then I fay the Reference of a Thing of this Nature to fubfequent Negociations after having had fo much Experience of the Crown of Spahi\ Non-Intention of ever fct- hng this Matter, in Effed giving up the future Rights and Privileges of our IVIercliants to a free and uninterrupted Trade : for can it be thought that we fliall enter into a ntw War if thefe Rights fhall not be admitted, when upon the Conclufion of anold War begun for this very End they have never been infifled upon. As to the 95000 /. acknowledged to be due to our Merchants, perhaps it has been looked upon by our Miniflry as an Objea of no great Confideration to a Set of People in thofe flourishing Circumftances, that any Body of Merchants of this Counl' try mu/1 needs be in at prefenc but fuch a Sum to an Eledor of Hanover confidered as Eleftor of iy^;z r was undoubtedly a great Objed ; it is no Wonder therefore if our Merchants Claim was pafTc-d over in Si- lence J at the Ihme Time that an old Debt arrionnting to near the fame Sum a;] our Merchants Debt was, is ftipularcd for the C Uct^ni J 12 ) Eledlor of Han — r. With Refped to the Pragmatic Sandion, by which the hercdi-- tary Dominions of the Houle of Aujlria were to have been preferved intire to the Queen of Hung-ry to talk of Guarantying them to her after having carved out of 'em for the Friends of France in the Manner we have confented to, and obhging the Em- prefs to cede Silcfia^ Glatz^ Parma^ Placen- tiay Guaftalla^ 6cc. is fuch an Affront to common Senfe, that one would think the Word Guarantee had been inferted in the Treaty with no other View but to mock andinfult that unfortunate Princefs. If it {hould be urged tliat the abfojute Ceflion of Parma, Placentia, 6cc, is only an eventual thing, thofe Places being to be rcftored up- on the Succefllon of Don Philips either to the Crown of Sicily^ or to the Crown of Spain y give me leave to ask if one or the other of thefe Cafes fliould ever happen, which of the contradiing Parties is to put this Part of the Treaty in force. If the Crown of Sicily fhould devolve on Don Philips will not Spain be likely to interefl herfeif in a Brother's Caufe ? On the other hand, if Don Philip fliould fucceed to the Crown o£ Spain, will that Circumllance render this Article of the Treaty more leazible ? Will France cars todifoblige6'/'tf/«at fuch ajundure? Will the King of Sardinia care to difbblige either ? Shall WG care to enter into a new War alone, Ik i to the heredi" iujlria to the ntying of 'em ler we ; Em- ^ lac en- owl to nk the in the mock If it lion of /entual ed up- :her to )wn of or the appen, to put Crown />, will ;if in a if Don Spain, tide of %ce cars ? Will either ? ■ alone, ij*. ( »3 ) in order torcftore totht- Qneen of Hun-'y to thefe her undoubted Rights? Lafllv, if any of the contrading Parties were fo unwife as to inrermeddle in ihis Aflp.j'r, is it noi laying theFoundation of future Broils and Quarrels? As to France and the reft of the Powers having guaranteed it, ha^e we not had Ex- perience enough to learn that the Words of Princes are no further to be rely'd on then the Performance of them concerns their immediate Interefts ? I come now to confider whether at the Time of making this fatal Treaty we were under a Neceifuy of ac- cepting Peace upon any Terms. And to fay that we were not in a Condition of con- tinuing the War another Year, when the Money was a6tually raifed, and the Ex-r pence muft: have been near as great to us, whether the War was continued or not j for our Allies were to be paid, and our own Troops maintained abroad is Inch an Abfur- dity, that I can hardly reirain laughter when I find People would impofe fuch a Thoucrht on Mankind. But fuppole even at the End of another Campaign had the War been car- ried on, everything had not been completed to our WIfties, and that it had been necef- fary for us to have ftill cr)ntinued the War, it is likely that when fo many Millions were raifed thelaft Year at four and a half/w Lent. only that Money could not be found, even at a higher Rate, whatever Occafi on we C 2 might ( 14) might have had for it : Was it imponiblc by means of OEconon-^y at home to have found out proper Friends for tins Parpofc without opprclTiog Trade or impofing any heavier Burthen on landed Interell? Was itimpolTi- ble by rrieans of OEconomy abroad to have reduced tJie Expence of the War within a narrower Compafs. 1 who have feen foiiie of the Bills of the prefent War, and have compared them with the Accounts of the late War, cannot help thinking this very feazible. But as the Money was adually raifed for another Year, would not any body have tried the Fate of another Campaign fooner than have fubmitted on fuch Terms, "when too we had fo great a Superiority both by Sea and Land ? If it was true that we had been in that weak Condition as we have been induftrioufly reprefentcd, was it not as true that the French tlieinfelves were re- duced to the lad Extremity ; and can we doubt but that they would have been glad to have given us as good a Peace at the End of another Campaign as now ; or rather let nie ask if it would have been polTible for them to have given us a worfe ? Shall it then be pleaded, that we were drove into'thefe infamous Meafurcs thro' a want of Money, which in the Sinew of War, when 'tis no- torious that the Subfcriptions laft Year were given to People who were known not to be worth a Croat j at the fame Time that mo- neyed ( Wbk by J found vithout heavier mpolTi- to have ithin a n fome id have of the )is very idually ly body mpaiga Terms, ty both hat we ve have it not ere re- can we m glad he End ther let ble for it then D ' thefe VIonev, 'tis no- r were )t to be lat mo- neyed I I f ( ^5) ney'd Men who were willing to have fub- fcribed, were refufed, which was a Piece of minifterial Artifice, purpofely and wickedly contrived to flrike a Damp on public Credit, in order to enduce People to believe that we were under an abfolute Neceflity of accept- ing Peace upon any Terms, which God knows was far from being our Cafe ? But to give theutmofl: ScopetotheArgumentofNc- ceility,fuppofe that we had been fo far reduced as to be obliged to have abandon'd the War on the Continent had we no Refuge left, had we not a fufficicient Number of Ships not only to have defended our own Coafts, but even to have made ourfelves terrible to the Enemy ? what had we then to fear ? who ever is Mafter at Sea, faid the Great Pompey, rnufl: befo likewife at Land ; and it is a Max- im everlaftingly true ; for what is any Coun- try without Trade ? can Ihe fend forth and maintain great Armies ? can (lie fortify her- lelf ? can ihe obtain neceflary Intelligence > can Oac procure herfelf Allies': can flie pre- tend to any thing more than to remain upon the Defenfive .? will any one then tell mc that it is not in the Power of a Country, ha- ving a fuperior Fleet, to extinguilh ifflie pleafcs, and put an entire flop tr» the Trade of any other Country, not having; a fufficient Marine to proted and defend her Trade ? But Sea Affairs we never attended to ; on the contrary, our Ignorance and Neglect on this Occalion ( i6 ) Occafion have been fo great, that tho during the War with Frafice^ vvc have had a greater Fleet than ever Europe faw before ; we ne- ver once knew how to ufe it, or to make a right and a proper Difpofition of it : If we had I will venture to affirm, that inftead of capturing about an 8th of theEncmiesTrade, as we have done wc might ascafily have def- troyed and put a Stop to 8 Parts in ten of her Trade. 'Tis further to be confidered that the whole Expence of a Naval Force centers in ourfelves, fo that fiich a War we might have continued to Eternity, without impo-- verifhing our Country. But pofiibly it might be faid, could you with any Honour have deferted your Allies, to this I think it might be anfwer'd, that as to the Qu^een of Hun—y^ if you had delivered her up bound into the Hands of her Enemies, they could never have thought of exnding harder Conditions from her than what we have obliged her to accept. And as to the States General, I have no doubt but that they might at any Time, have ob- tained a Neutrality for themfelvcs, if not two of their Provinces of the greateft Confe- quence j and indeed, the only Provinces of Oonfequence, viz. Holland znd Zcclarid^^TQ fo ftrong by Nature, that they are capa- ble of defending themfelves againil the whole World 5 as a Proof of this ws may remem- ber that when Lewis the XlVtIi had almoffc over-run the Low Countries with his Vicfto- rious Aimy, the Spirit of the Pcoole at that TiLip ( 17) Time \tas fuch that they cut down their Dykes, and it was with the greateft Difficul- ty that that brave Army was faved from pe- rilling. IF the fame Spirit is wanting in thofe People, now are wc therefore obliged to truc- kle to France and to accept of a Peace which cannot fail of bringing irretrievabJe Ruin on our Country. But fuppofe France was Mailer of Holland, ^c, the Time has been, when we have beat their united Fleets, at a Time too when their Fleets were much more formidable than what they are at pre- fent, and I dont queftion but if proper En- couragement was given to our Sailors, the fame Thing might be effeded again. But is another Realon why we ought not to there have been afraid of oppofing France upon this Account, and that is, we may be alTu- red that the States would never flourifli un- der an abfolute Monarchy as they do under a fiee Government. 'Tis the Liberty which they enjoy at prefent, which is the Soul of their Induftry and Trade j take away their Liberty, and that Country, which now wears fuch a profperous Face, will immediately moulder away, and revert to its Original, an uninhabited Bog. this I think is fo full an Anfwer to thofe, who would willingly inti- midate us with the Danger , of //c//,?;;^^' falling into the Hands of France, that I need not give myfelf the Trouble of ffiewing from the Probability, there is q{ France becoming a great maritime Power, that /fc//jAWis juft at i ( i8) as likely to be fubjedl to French Influence and Diitdioii now the Peace is concludid as (he would have been, had not the Peace been made, h then wc wcic not under an ablblute Nccefiity of making Peace, let us m the next Place conlidcr if it would not have been greatly for our Intereft to have contuiued the War againft France, In or- der to brnig this Matter to a fair Dccifiion, It will be neceilary to take a fliort Retro- fpea of our commercial Affairs before the Commencement of the War. It is to be ob- ferved then that Fraf?ce was grown fo for- midable a Rival to us in Trade, that had ihe been fuffercd to carry on her Trade much longer, unmolefted, fhe probably would, in a few Years more, have totally ruined ours, by underfclling us at Foreign Markets. As it was, /lie had in a Manner beat us out of our Lcva?it Trade, our Fill- ing Trade, and our Sugar Trade : For tho It has been flud that our Colonies vend now i]caras much Sugar as they did formerly; which neverthelefs I cannot admit to be a Fa(5t, yet as that Circumftance, if true, a« riles from the Ufe of Sugar becoming more general than it was formerly, it is fo far irom being a negative to what I have allcdged m regard to the Dimunition of the Sugar Trade, that it is in fome Meafure a Confir- mation of it. For our Trade ought to have cncrealed in proportion, and ncceflarly mull have f ;ff ifliicnce ; Peace luler an , let us iild not to have In or- xifiion, Retro- ore the be ob- fo for- at had Trade obably totally 'orcign lanner r Fiili- or tho d now nerly ; 3 be a ue, a« ; more fo far Icdged Sugar 'onfir- ) have muit have ( 19 ) hive (lone \l\ had not thcMarkets abroad been fupplicd with i^hv/t/zCuiDinodicies. Lut i is nt-t tjitlc three great Auitlf: ordy o*" T ,,. that aic to be C'M.li.icjcd ir, t .1 O ,,n. but m;my oihci BraiicI'CL o . ablolutciy di-pend upon tlicr . . -.^ this pc.haps v^•oald noi have '■ t;,» u ; j. a warrp.n.able Cuufj, .igrecab e :o thi- Luv.' of Na:ions, for declaring VVaragidnft /';j/,r?, yet, as France had declared \V.,r againft us, it was (o ftrong a Ilea Ton in the iJicaft oi' tvery honed E/igJiJ/jman for continuing the War, which Fra^ice had begun, that I believe there was not a Man" but v. ho thought it a lucky Incident, France having declared War againft us, and was in Hopeg War being declared, that we lliould have carried it on by Sea at Itali, 'till we had fo eff.aually reduced the Enemy, that it would never have been in her Power agaia to have interfered with our Trade. W1iat KncQuragement there was to hope, that this might have be^n done, one may ealily judge by what has been already effeded by our Fleet, Their Le^^an: Trade, which they had gained fiom us, we totally de- ilroyed: Their Fiili'ng Trade 11; tiered no lels, and thei'- l-ugar Tradt- was greatly upon the Decline. Had we purfued our Blow, had wc not ailowea tnem a breathing Time, what might we not have done ? Canada was at our Mercy. All tlie French Settlements, loth in the Eaji and PVrl-^ ^ Indies^ # ( ao) IndifSy were tit our Mercy : Her whole Trade was at our Mercy: France miift have fubinittcd on any Terms. But this golden Opportunity is now loft. Let us then confuicr what arc likely to be the Confcqucnces of making this ovcr-hafty and precipitate Peace. Acquainted as France now is wiih the Nature of Tiade, having more- over fettled and eftablifhcd Correfpondencea abroad, bcfides havin? Oiaftered all other Diliicuities attending Trade in its infant State, how l<.Mig do we imagine it will be e'er flie recovers her priftine Vigour ? Will {lie not in all human Probability be foon in a better Condition than ever to give Law to Europe ? and fliall we not be in a worfe to oppofe her Defigns? what then have we not to apprehend Iromthis infecure Treaty ? efpecially if we confider how clofe a Ccnncd:ion there ever mull be between our Naval Power and our Commerc.?al Interefts. France has in a great Mcafure already gained her Point on the Continent j all flie wants at prefent is to be able to difputc with us, our Prerogative on the Ocean j and if ever flic ftiould be in a Condition of doing it, there is an End to ourTrade and of All that i^ vn'.uable and dear to us. For we may He a'^ured ius^ will not remain inadive, as we have fooliftily done, and I heartily wifti we may never have caufe to lament when it is too late, the fatal Confequences of our pufiU ■ j i • whole 'e miift But this Let us be the u fly and nee now g morc- ndencea II other s infant will be /"igour ? ihty be to give be in a at then infecure / clofc a ecn our nterefts. gained 2 wants 'ith us, [ if ever )ing it, Ml that 'e may tive, as ly wifli when 3 of our pufil* { 21 ) pufillanimousConaua. and incxcufablcNeg- fc(ft. It remiiins th:it I take notice of a few Paiticiilars contained in the Treat/, which I (hill be as brief in doing as pofTiblc, As to the Treaty, it confifts ciiicfly of two Parts, viz. The Ceffions which are to b-* made by the Queen of H/^^— v, Great Britain and her Mies to the Frencby and the Ailies of France on one Part: And the CeOions which are to be made by France to the Queen of Hun—y and her Allies on the other Part. Blu if we compare what ij to be given up on one fide, with what is to be given up on the other, we fliall find the Advantages ac- cruing to the King of Fra/ice and his Allies by this Treaty arc fo much greater and more valuable then what the Queen of Hun—y and the Dutch are to receive (for as to Great Britain I don't find (he gets any thing, un- lefs it be the Remnant of the Ajfiento Con- trad, which is not worth our Merchants Ac- ceptance) that the one hardly defcrves naming in comparifon of the other. For inihnce, the Countries which are to be given up by the Queen o^Hun—y to the Friends of France, are fomc of the fined and richeft Parts of her Dominions ; whereas what is to be redored to her is a Country from which (lie iievcr received a Shilling before the War, and is now reduced to that miferabls State from the Calamities of the War, which fne has felt the Brunt of mod j that in all Probability it D 2 will V- \ /. " * ( 22 ) Will not be £[)le to recover iifdf Ir ^n- tl>er Age : Ami yet even this rii.h ' {l^Z js no to be ucrtowed till the poor I^r.efe Q.een h., , not only ample Sat,,.; .ctio* wu Relpcct to ms Ciairnj in //„;p,.„ ,,,d Sir n "'^ "^^^^ '''"*= '^=^ Adv..nr:,.es th,. Arr^le of the Treaty in point of Tr.d" Po£ of r " P'^''r" E'bl,lilhn>e„t to the uave inevvn nt-r in R >:iirn oil ^-^ t? ««^ r> r V ■^-^"in all tiie favour and Preference ,th:u can be /hewn her h point of Trade for the fiuure, eirU vvi ^A.,™ or any Part of /v/;, n^oer h, n; o -ricLt (ever famous tor our Minifters not knowing thnt it belonged tod.e A , nd of all that thev poff (r-l h..-^-, -y-'"'-; ana >^J.x.m Dutch Fhm Jen, Brafaut.i^c \ acknovvlcdn;e tnv.vbeoffo,-i-r ■ ^^y.iK.^ open f;.thc/vv.rA to approach even to tiieir very Doors xvmI ,- ./ r r ttleTown fr'-^''"'' ^^'-^P^ f^'"'"^'"'« °-" ^uccs, wL.ch are iww d:;.ioliih..J, may in time I t f ' Jii ano- •:y Voon tsliCtion Moikna 2ry and . ,' ^' t' I rem as Do a t to the :ped- to Favour her in r with ling to Dutch -Ts not ■:h) and irclcnt ^c. I I ;c:ice inlwer I : Ward is the broach ''rench i with on of : ihefo :iy in time ( 23 ) time be rcfortified, confider how likdy it is when probably the Expence of it would a- mount to more then tlie wliole Country a- boiit them i^ at prcfent worth. But it the Charge was 1 fs, who would undertake it ^- Can theQuetii ofllm-^y afford it ; or would the Inh.hita. ts of the refpeaive Towns, who don't k.ow To-day who may be their Mafters To-morrow, put themfelvcs to that EYpence? Finally, ii ic was to beattemoted would^tiie r encb luffer it ? As to niinuter Artic(f!s, {v as the 15th of the Treaty whcr.hy ^ > Country taken PolTefTion ot" and torrit..^ ;,/ h^rance before the War, or any Fj. i h.a;i.ms or Stages eroded, if any luch \hc.c aie .;n NewfoundLind, contrary to tnc i\nor of former Treaties are ratified contirmed an:^ al owed of, I ih.ill pafs thein ^y^'*%^l^''' '^''"^ ^^^^ ^h-y ''^''e and might be. oi- mnni^e Conf que-nce, otherwifc theF/wc-/; would not have ihou^hc it worth their while to have taken Pollcifion of, and fortified the one, nor would the other have been fo ftrongly provi^led agalnft in former Treaties But as to the Ccffion of the Royal lilc, com- monly cT.lkd CapeBrrton, I cannot to cMilv pais that over without offeiing fome Rcaibn'r, why I tlimk we ought nevcr^o have paired vvun that Place, The only tiling 1 think lircai-Britam has to apprehend of Francd is her bccommg a mari ime Power, which asu IS never to be cliedcd by any other \'« *o ne ( a+ ) ■ . Means but by a great and flourlihing Trade, whilft we were Mafters of Cape Breton we had no Reafon to fear ; for Poflcffion of this Place, would not only have deprived them of their fiOiing Trade, but commanded thtir Trade to Canada ; and here I cannot forbear lamenting the glo- rious Opportunity which we have mifs'd by not making ourfelvcs Mafters of this Coun- try. Good God! what an immenfc Profit would it have been to us to have fupply'd all North America with Britijh Manufadtures, and in return to have received their rich Furs ? Such a Trade would have made us a rich People for Ages to come, and would have enabled us to have freed ourfelves from all our immediate Hardfliips. There is not a Man, except the Hudfotfs-Bay Company, or one who has Money there, who would not have partaken of the Advantages of fuch an Enterprize; but, for aught I know, it might have been worth any one of that Com- pany's While to have b d a M r to confound fuch a Projc<5l. Another Confi- deration which ought to have induced us to have kept this Place, is it's being fo good a Nurferyfor Seamen, efpecially as we have difcover'd there a rich Coal Mioe, which in all Probability will, in a few Years, employ 1500 Sail of Merchant Ships. Again, the Profits which would have arifen to us from an Encrcafe of our fiihing Trade, Cape Breton n lourlihing of Cape fear ; for not only ig Trade, Canada ; I the glo- mifs'd by lis Coun- ife Profit ipply'd all iifa