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A LECTURE
OUirVEMCD AT TH«
'I
ilTERAljYAplCIEpFlC.l^^^
OTTAWA
BY
COL FLETOHBR
Scots FusUier Guafd»,mitaiy Secretary
■FEBK,U^K,-2-, 187S.
OTTAWA, CANADA.
•''•" "~ \ T'-':"- v-:~.: _.. X
A LECTURE
DKLIVEKED AT THE
LITERARY AND SCIEi\Tiri€ INSTITUTE
O T T ^^ -W" J^
nv
COL. FLETCHER,
Scots Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary
FEBXfXJARY, ISr.^.
OTTAWA, CANADA,
THE DEFEXCK OF CANADA.
^V L IC C X TJ XI K
DKLlVKIiHD AC lltK
LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE, OTTAWA
BV
COL. FLETCHER,
SCOTS PUSILIKR GUARDS,
Military Secretary to His Excellency the Gocenwr General.
In bringing under your notice the subject of tlie dcibnee of
Canada, I hope I maybe allowed te deprecate any idea of suggesting
that the matter i-equires considoi-ation, other than that which is duo
to the state of militaiy preparation incumbent upon all nations in
the present, past, and, unless the milennium arrives, in the future ages
of the world. The very fact that money is voted iin- the mainten-
ance of defences, shows that in the opinion of the majority of Iho
nation such defences arc necessary, and looking from our neighbors
point of view, it must be a healthy sign that the protection of our
own country is a matter of consideration rather than aggrcssivo
tactics against those who live beyond our fi-ontier.
At no period in the history of Canada were the relations
between herself and the United States on a more satisfactory footing
than at the present time. At no period have the cau.'^es of even
possible disagreement been so \h\y, and at no time have the two
countries been so strenuously engaged in the peaceful rivaby of
developing their great and as yet unrealized resources. Still, Avilh
the teachings of history betbre them, neither nation has dared
completely to disarm, and we in Canada might with equal justice
resent the care evinced by the majority of tiie several States of, the
Union in the mainteuauco of their militia, as they might look
askance at us for considering the best method of utilizing our
coinpiii'iilivoly nlight rcwouri'CH for our own ]n\)tcetion. As long as
the Stales remain unitod, and niloil by men whose ol)jeets aic to
Ava,i;o war witli nature and hrini;- her uncK-r suhjeetion, lather than
to extend a territory already almost heyond the control of a eeiilral
(Jovei'iiment, so long will Cinada be secure from danger from
external foes. But if the central ])(nver should nhow signs of
woaknos.s, if Hcction.s of men, or even He))arale States nliouid break ott",
and, giving way to hiwless desiros, become turbulent and unruly, thou
Canada will have need to loolc to her defences and to lake measures
for the ])r()tection of her hearths and homes. To be ]>re|)ared for
BMch eventualities is often the best way of ])reventing their (tccur-
rcnco, and therelbi'o it wouUl be an allectati(jn of sensibility if wo
refrained from consideration of our oavii means of protection in the
four lost our I'ricnds and neighbors should consider that any reflection
were directeil against, or doubts entertained of their peaceful
intentiouH.
Canada is so situated that as long as she ien)aiMs a part and
parcel of Gieat Britain, and so long as Great Britain maintains her
maritime sunoriority, she lias no danger to fear from the seaboard,
and li'M' laini iVontier alone requires ju-oteetion. Jlore, howovoi",
lies a diffieultv which will need much skill and forethought to meet.
A casual ghmce at the map of the Dominion is sufficient to shew
the weak natui'al features of its frontier. Putting aside British
Columbia, which in the event of war must bo dealt with separately
from the other Province.s, and Manitoba, M-hich also must depend
for ])i'otection on resources other than those in immediate connection
with Ontario and Quebec, I would direct attention to the long
frontier extending from (.Jcorgian liny through Lakes Huron, St.
Clair, Erie, and Ontario to the Biver St. Lawrence, and thence-
inclining southward to the ]^ay of Fundy, a distance of upwards of
2,200 miles. Jf this frontier had at its back a cultivated country
of extent jn'oportionate to its length, there would belittle dilliculty
in guarding it, but the reverse is the case. Excepting the ])eninsular
of Ontario foi'med by Lakes Ilui'on, Erie and Ontai-io, tliej'o is little
depth of cultivated land, the Dominion being shut in by the vast
northern forest, which together with the sevei-ity of the dinuite
foi'cos the tide of emigration wostwai'd.
The problem to be solved is how Avith a total -^ population of
• This docs not inchide P. E. Island, Manitoba or British Columbia.
5
altout tlwco million five IiuihUxmI tliousaiid, and willi a front ior of
2,200 miles, the cotintry can bent bo i)rotcc'te(l. Xow, includod in
tlie ':;cncral (lotonco oi' Ihc count ly llioie mo two main ol)ici*tH lo be
looked to, vi/ : tbo nucossity ol' keeping o|ien communication with
Eni^land b}- tlio St. Lawrcnco, and of prt>voiitin<^ the Dominion
itself from being eut in two. F(;r the first the maintenance of
(Quebec is obviously nece.-sai'y ; for the second the safety of Montreal
and of the miriow strij) which extends from Montreal to Kin^^ston,
including Ottawa, tlio Capital of tlio Domiiiioji, must bo carefidly
looked to. For the j)rescnt 1 would ])ut aside tho Mai-itime Prov-
inces, as until tlie Intercolonial Railway is established there can bo
little communication for defensive purposes between them and tho
two Pi'ovinces of (Quebec and Ontario, whilst Halifax " Xova
Scotia," St. Joliiis "Xew Brunswick" and Charlottetown "Prince
I'Mward Island," would depend lor protection in a great measure on
tho British fleet.
Tho subjoc*^ therefore under consideration may be subdivided
as follows : — The protection of Ontario as tiir as Kingston. Tho
defence of tho country between Kingston and Montreal, including
Ottawa. Tho defence of Montreal tho commercial capital. Tho
keeping open of communication between Montreal and Quebec,
The dofonco of Quebec.
Before however proceeding to details, I would allude to ono
problem difficult of solution in all countries, but cspcciall}- difficult
in Canada, viz.: — How can tho defence of the country be provided
for without too greatly crippling its resources either by. tho
expenditure of money or of labor. Military expcr.dituio is tho
insurance that a country pays against loss by war, but tho amount
of insurance must depend on the value of the property, on the risk
insured against, and on the means of tho insurer. In Canada and
tho United States the risk, happil}-, is not great, whereas, owing to
a variety of circumstances, such as the scarcity of labor in compar-
ison with the vast works I'cquisito for opening up ncAV countries, and
tho dread of checking, either by taxation or much more by forced
sei'vice, the tide of immigi'ation, there is a well-grounded opinion
that military efforts ft all commensurate with those of European
nations, are neither desirable or even possible. To ask Canada to
build and arm fortifications Avhk'h, considered purely from a strate-
gical point of view, might be deemed rcqusite, would consequently
be to vequiro more than could reasonably be expected. To keep up
a force wliicli military authorities would considor noc'o-«snry for lior
protection would also probably bo beyond lior capabilities, and
therefore, whoever deals Avith the Hubjoct of tlio defence of the
country must, to tise a homely proverb, cut bis coat accoi'dini^ to
liis cloth.
Indirectly in connection with these considerations, I would wish
to ofter ftfcw cursory observations on a matter which men res])onsible
for the secui'ity of the Dominion should consider with care and atten
tion. Thei'o is a ^reat damper lest a country should b<^ misled by
numerical statistics, and lest it should find when the day ot trial ari'ivos
tliat it has been resting on a pajier army. Thei-e is a danger least
it should bo deceived by the outside show of a military force when
tho true requisites of military strength are wanting. The accidents,
" so to speulc," of an army, sometimes tend to conceal it weakness, in
place of adding to its sti-engih by the influence they bring to bear
on men's sentiments and feelings. Bright unifoi-ins, stii'i'ing music,
and even the assemblage of considerable l)odies of troops io go
through a few showy maneeuvrcs do not prove that the real 'requi-
sites of an arm}' are present and available. For the military
profession, military training is required, and it is better to maintain
a small force ho educated as that it may serve as a nucleus for a
greater, than to have a largo force which cannot be moved, and in
which those who are to command know little more than those
who are called on to obey. On an alarm of war a considerable army
might be ra^iidly raised in Canada if trained officers and non-commis-
sioned ofllcers were ready at hand, and if jilans for .its organization
liad been carefully prepared and wore clearly understood : Avhereas,
nnaided b}' such ]»roparation, tho troops would be mere mobs of
armed men, without knowledge, discipline or cohesion, A chain is
weak if one link lacks strength, and nn army fails in efficiency if
one of its many requisites are wanting, It needs first tlie nerves,
or staff, to ])ut the mass in motion ; then the officers and non"
commissioned officers with a fail* knowledge of their respective
<luties; then the men, with a supply of arms, clothing, and a
sufficiency of ammunition, not to speak of horses for the cavalry
and guns, and reserve ammunition for the artillery. Then tho
trans]>ort, commissariat and hospital arrangements, and last, but not
least, 1 o reserves with their due stipplics. To take a palpable in-
stance, tho military stores may bo full of Snider rifles, but unless the
supjdy of ammunition is in proportion, these rifles are comparatively
useless, as Canada is dependent on England for its breech-loading
(•arti'i(l.ii;o>». Not lliat all tlie iTcnihcmciits for oven n .smnll foico
iniist eoiitinimlly 1)0 road}, but the ntart' munt know liow tlioy aio
1() 1)0 obtaip 'd, a'ld how llio organization can no most roudily
ort'eoted. Su])|)lioM tliat cannot bo i)roeui'od in t!io oountiy should I o
Htorod in magazines; Muj)|)lios tluit can bo obtaiiu^d, in oa^o of noo<l,
from the various distriotH should bo catalogued, and at least an
approximate estimate made of theii* <|uantity. As an instance, ^uns
and amnniniHon should be kept in magazines, jjossibly alsounitbrms,
at all events lor a pro[)ortiou of the Ibroe ; whereas transport, even
i'or artillerv ammunition, could bo ni'ovided from the surrouudimr
noii^'hborhood, and thereibro need not be retained in stores. Jt
would be out of place to do more than to allude to this ])ortion of
the subject, especially as stops are boin^ taken to procure lor
Canada a means of educatin<:( the officers, and, 1 trust, the non-
commissioned officers of her militia ; audit is only to impress on
all the importance of this scheme, that these observations Jmvo been
hazarded.
I will now turn to the geographical features of the country,
and in doing so propose rather to offer suggestions for thought and
consideration than dogmatically to lay down plans which my
knowledge of the subject cuuldonly allow me to do most imperfectly.
Supposing that it were possible to hold entire jssossion of the
Lakes, and of the gieat river which under ditferent names flows
through them to the sea, there would be but few places at which
the Dominion would be assailable, and, as in England, the fii'st and
principal lino of dafence might be the navy. But this supposition
is evidently basjod on falt-e promises. In the first place the tieaties
with the United States prevent vessels of war j ^m navigating the
inland waters; in the second place, the grea, trading city of
Chicago aff'ords means to the United States, commanding as the}"-
do the outlet from Lake Michigan, rapidly to extemporize at the
commencement of hostilities out of their fleet of merchantmen and
steamers, vessels of war, sufficient to command Lake Huron and
probably to force an entry into Lake Erie whore they would be met
by vessels from Buff"alo and other large ports. Thus Ontario would
bo threatened on its northern, western and south-western frontier,
and would in groat measure depend for its defence on a land force.
But this land force would run a risk of being isolated and cut off",
unless? its left flank wore protected and communication maintained
with the Province of Quebec, and through that Province with the
8
1
f<ca. Therefore, couie que conte, the command of Lake Ontario must
1)0 secured and maintained. Here Canada lies under an advantage,
the best harlorfi being situated on her shores and the g.ealer
number of tb.o steamers trnding on the Lake being held or m.anned
by CanacMans. These harbors would require the protection either
of permanent or field fortifications, and above all Kingston would
have to bo placod beyond the possibility of capture. The next
tlifficulty to bo met is the preservation of the communict'tion
between Kingston and Montreal hy the protection of the Gj'and
Trunk Eailway, and of the canals which avoid the several rapids of
the 8t, Lawrence. Here again gun boats are necessary, but the
as^piistance they afford must be supplemented by a considerable
niilitaiy force, and by the erection of eartiiworks to cover the
several locks on the canals, together with block houses similar to
thoHO constructed by tSherman, in his advance from Nashville to
Atlanta, to protect his lino of communication. These would probably
be erected on the threat of war, arid Avould suffice to guard the
canals and the railway from the^enterprise of small bodies of men.
In addition to the protection of the frontier line, the defence of
Ottawa and of the Eideau canal, together with the Grenville canal
on the Otiawa river, must not be neglected. The caj^ture of the
Capital of the Dominion would be u serious blow, not only from its
moral eftects, but also as cutting off the Province of Ontario from
the Province of (Quebec by preventing communication by the 8t.
Lawrence, the Grand Trunk Eailwav and the Eideau canal. The
fortification and garrison at Kingston would protect the niouth of the
Eideau, whilst if a strong garrison were maintained there, and the
lake and river hold by gunboats, no attempt, except by a very con.
sidei'ablo force, could be made on the Capital. P'jt if these -mditions
wore not completely fulfilled, there would be danger loss a compara-
tively Hmall nujnber of troops should be able ly a rapid movement
against Ottawa, to sever the Province of Ontario from that of Quebec,
and from the means of communication with I'^ngland.
Tho next object of importance is the protection of Montreal,
the commercial capital of the Dominion, and the head of the Ocean
Xavigalion. The desirability of fortifying this city has been often
mooted, and ]dans have been prepared for erecting a line of aofen-
sive Avorks at sufficient distance to prevent it fi'om being bom-
barded. Thcf^e plans require careful study, and if not carried out
estimates should at least be prepared showing the number of men
and tho time required to raise field works sufficient to hinder any
nttcmi)t at oaptnro by conp de main. Tho United States possess easy
jt.ncl rapid communication to the fi-ontier whidi is only tjbout thirty
miles distant trom Montreal, and a woi-k of considerable stren«rth at
the head of Lake Ohamplain at!brds a convenient base of opei'ations
for any attaelvin_£]f force. At Montreal, therefore, a considerable gai*.
]-ison would be collected on the tlireat of hostilities, this force would
watch the frontier and protect from par'^ial cnter])rizes the Beau,
harnois canal, whilst it would be suj)port'jil by gurd)oats on tlie river,
which would keep open communication vnth Quebec and possibly
secure the liichilieu canal.
Communication by moans of the river being secured, the passes
leading through the White mountains and the forests which border
on tho fiontier of tho New England States, would require watching.
Positions would be taken up to cover Richmond junction, and for
the protection of the Grand Ti-unk Railway and the approaches to
Quebec. The fortifications of this city on the right bank of the St.
Lawrence would be completed on the first symptoms of hostilities,
and the place rendered strong enough to stand a siege in the event
of Montreal falling, and the main force of tho enemy being
brought against her.
As long as Quebec slioukl hold out Canada would be unconquered ;
during the summor'she would receiyo the supplies which so powerful
an Empire as (xi'oat Britain would pour in with no sparing hand.
During winter the climate and the hanlsnips consequent upon it
would in all probability prevent active hostilities from being dijocted
against lier.
Such sketched very roughly is an outline of the general
principles which appear adapted to the defence of the Provinces of
Ontario and Quebec, and it is now proposed to consider what steps
should bo taken to enable the Dominion Avllh as littlo confusion as
possible — if unhappily so unfortnnate an occurrence should evei- uj-ise
— to pacs from a state of jjeaco to one of war.
In the first place it must be presumed that a sum of money is
3'oar1y voted for purposes of defence, i. e., for the maintenance of a
militia and of certain fortified placc^ The expenditure of this money
is in the hands of tho ]\Iinister of Militia assisted" by the- advice of
experienced oflScers. lie has to determine the number of men who
are to be jearlv trained and the amount of efiicienfv to which they
ill
10
li
r.i
iiii
aro to attain. To work tliis problem correctly is the test of a good
adminintrator, as its solution depends on a careful consideration and
a just appreciation of the principles of war. To drill and discipline
in peaco time, an army at all commensurate with the need of Canada
if she were ()l)lii>*ed to undertake a serious war, is evidently out of
the question. ( consequently all that can be attempted is to maintain
in a fair state of efficiency a small force whicii would <m the threat
of hostilities servo as a neucleus and a training school of one much
larger. With this object in view it would in my opinion bo better
that with a given sum of money the efficiency should be increased
even at the expense of a reduction in numbers. A short period of
warning must always preceod the outbreak of hostilities, and to form
an army the employment of a comparatively small number of trained
men would be of greater service than the assistance which could bo
afforded by a larger number who merely possessed the rudimonts of
militaiy instructions. The next question is the composition of this
force, including the proportions whicIi the artillery, engineers and
cavalry should bear to the infantry. This should be determined
partly by the experience of other nations, especially in recent wars,
partly in reference to the character of the country in which the
army would be i cquired to act. For instance in the greater portion
of Canada there is little ground tor the action of cavalry organized
similarily to that of European armies, although for mounted infantry
there might bo considerable scope, and this question of the best
method of organizing antl arming horsemen requires deep considera-
tion and a careful study of recent campaigns^ especially of those of
the great American civil war. It is, I believe, the opinion of Cxeneral
Sheridan, an officer of the highest reputation in the United States
army, f(n"med from his personal experience during the civil war in
all branches of his profession, checked and supplemented by what
ho observed during the time he was u spectator from the Gorman
side oi the war with Fi-ance, that the teachings of modern campaigns
shew the desiral)ility of augmenting the mounted infantry, or cavalry
armed with good rifles and taught to fight on foot, at the expense of
the artillery. No doubt there is much that may be urged oii the
other side, but this instance is given Avith the view of shv)wing that
modern niilitary history together with a just estimate of the probable
theatre of war should influence the decision of those whoso duiy it is
to organize an army.
With regard to artillery there can bo no question but that
guns are of great value, especially as giving confidence to
11
incxpericncofl and young troops l)ut on the other hand they
impede the march of an army and are difficult to move alont^
the roads Avhich often form the only moans of communication
through Canadian forests. This was ohsorvcd in the earlier campaigns
of the American war, and lead nltin-iately to a consi(loral)le diminu-
tion in the proportionate number of guns as compai-ed with infantry.
For siege trains there would he little need in a Caiuidian arm}', as
happily there are few fortifications to beseige ; but on the other
hand there appears to be sco]ie for garrison artillery which may be
and, I believe, is organized with great success in the towns and villages
on the Lakes and seaboard of the Dominion. A knowledge of
gunner}' supplemented with but sliglit and easily acquired instruc-
tion in field fortifications and with the assistance of good plans,
would enable the population of these towns ."ud villages in great
measure to provide on the threat of war for their safety against
predatory and unsystematic attacks.
The exigencies of the settlor's life and especially the needs of
the lumbermen tend to the cultivation of rudimentary, but most
useful enginering knowledge, which a little teaching would render
available for military purposes, thus imin'ovising a corps of engineers
for service in the field.
Of infar.trj', the mainstay of an army, there is little to be said
especially applicable to Canada, except that for wood fighting and
for working in extended order greater knowledge is required from
officers, and higher discipline and more pei'fect steadiness from the
men, than when manojuvring in the oi)en. The officers should l)o
able rapidly to avail themselves of the advantages of ground, and
those of junior rank should be capable of acting independently, whilst
the men must have confidence in each other, and possess the
steadiness and discipline which will lead them to individual exertion,
and to a careful system of husbanding thei'* ammunition.
The proportion of the several arms in each military district
having been dotormiued, their relative proportion in peace and war
should be approximately fixed, and the best method ascertained of
rapidly augmenting the active force on the threat of hostilities.
Hero experience iiulicates, and nctably the knowledge gaine<l in the
American war, digested, and so to speak, codified by <ioneral
Sherman, in his very able recently published memorandum, that to
increase and recruit regimonis already existing, is a far more
efficient method of angmonting and keeping up an army, than by
replacing with new regiments those that may liave suffered by
12
aclivo .service in the field. Tic especially instances the value attached
to the Wisconsin regiments, which in contradiction to those fur-
nished by other States were supplied by fresh recruits, in place of
being replaced 1)}
ncvv regiments.
Having thus briefly glanced at the composition of a defensive
force, I propose to turn to a most important matter connected with
the military organization of the country, viz. : — the duties of the
staff, and es])ecially of the offtcers of the higher grades. Irrespec-
tive of their ordinary work of commanding and inspecting the
militia, on the Deputy Adjutant ifenerals and their assistants must
devolve the duty of procuring, and systematizing rej)orts on all
that would relate to the defensive capabilities of their several
districts. The head quarters at Ottawa should be in possession of
the most accurate information, in order to compensate by the facility
with which plans of defence could bo prepared, and organization
carried out, f)r the ^^ery imperfect defensive condition of the
country. All places that it would be desirable to fu'tify in case
of war, should be designated, and plans of suitable works with
estimates as to the amount of labor, and of time necessary for
raising +hom should be ready at hand. Not a block house, or coast
battery should be omitted, and in cases Avhei-e scarcity of earth or
other considerations would prevent the construction of earth works,
the fact should be noted, in view of the need of more jiermanent
fortifications. These plans and specifications would be carefully
examined at headquarters, where the defence of particular localities
should be subordinated to the general plan for the protection of the
Dominion. The Deputy Adjutant Generals should al.^o select the
best places for the position of troops in the event of an outbi-eak of
hostilities, together with schemes for offensive and defensive opera-
tions in the several districts. Accurate rolls of the mmiber of able
bodied Inen, of hor.ses, of carts and waggons, should also be 'n
their possession, together with the quantity of rolling stock on the
several railways, their capabilities for transport of cavalry, artillery
and infantiy, especially in regard to the fitness of the stations, and
platforms for entrj' and depaiture. All roads, bridges, ferries, and
fords should be well examined, the character of the roads, whether
metalled or merely country roads shewn, the strength of the
bridges calculated, and the fords explored. Then again estimates
should be made of the amount of provisions which the several
districts could furnish, and of the number of men and hor.^os
that might be raised for military purposes without destroying hopes
13
of hurve.'ttt. Tlieso iire mutter.s aUnit which intormutlou could ho
roadUy obtained and arranged in peace time to the advantage ot
the staff oflieoi's eniploj'od, and to the great economy of time a vl
labor when threats of "war might necessitate hurried j)reparation.
They are the detail.i, tlie masterj- of which by the start' is said so
greatly to have assisted the German commanders in their invasion
of France, and which from being more easily collected, could bo
even better systematized for defensive than for offensive purposes.
Not that information of the power and means of attack on the part
of ouv neighbors should be neglected : in a most friendly and
l)hilosophical spirit, their capabilities of aggression, and the weak
points in their defensive preparation should be guaged by our statf,
so that if need arise and opportunity offei", the theatre of war might
be transferred across the frontier, an arrangement which would
suit the people of Canada far better than fighting on their own
soil.
Such sketched very broadly and without any attempt at detail,
appear to be the subjects towards which those who ave interested in
the military condition of the country might direcc their attention.
One important consideration has, however, been omitted, viz. : — how
would the marine department be able to meet the strain which war
v/ould immediately put upon it ? As has been shown, the dei'^mce
of the country depends in great measure on its capability for
maintaining command of the water way of the St. Lawrence, at all
events as far as the western end of Lake Ontario, (lun boats
would therefore have to be quickly imjirovised, river and lake
steamers would have to be altered and adapted to warlike purposes,
as was done during the American Civil War. Whichever power
could be first on the water would jjrobably secure most important
advantages, in fact the defence of Ontario may be said mainly to
depend on securing the command of the Lakes, wliilst ou the safety
of the canals and the secm-ity of their locks would hinge the possi-
bility of gun boats sent from England being able to reach the
waters above the St. Lawrence rapids. Consequently plans should
in time of peace be prepared of the best method of converting the
fleet of river and lake steamers into vessels of war. Their armament
!-hould be ready, and means at hand for coating at l.asi some of them
with extemporized armoui piates. A marine force might witli gve.-ifc
jjropriety be enrolled in time of peace as a supplement to tho land
force, whilst every detail in respect to the inland navigation, and ot
the class of vessels best suited for the defence of the various rivers,
J4
canals, unci lakes should be ill tlie luiiids of tho Adniirulty in \\.u<^'
land. To tho command of the inland waters was the suece.ss of the
Northern Armies in the American War in great measure duo,
especially at its commencement, and this lesson should not be lost
on those who have charge of the defence of Canada. JEow nearly
the "Merimac" hastily equipped at Xorfolk, annihilaled the
Northern fleet, and prevented the landing of Maclellan's army in
the York Town Peninsular, will be in the remembrance of all who
took an interest in that great struggle, and thei-cs is little doubt but
that a repetition of a similar event might make or mar the most
carefully prej)ared schemes of Canadian defence.
I will now conclude this very imperfect sketch of tho subjects
which appear to me to be worthy of consideration in reference to
the defence of Caruida by an attempt at realizing what wouUl
probabl}'^ occur in the event of anticipated hostilities. Suppose, and
here again I would in*ge that my supposition refers to an evciit
which, judging by recent appearances, is as unlikely as the disrup-
tion of the States themselves, that onr neighbors and ourselves fell
out, that intelligence of very disagreeable diplomatic note, had
reached Canada, and that we had heard that unprecedented activity
prevailed on the one hand at Portsmouth and Chatham, on the
other, at New York, Philadelphia, antl other naval stations in the
United States.
"What would the Government of Canada at once do ? First, em'
body the active Militia. Then complete to war strength the several
batteries and regiments of cavalry, adding guns, troops and battalions,
so as at least to treble the strength of the present active Militia :
bringing up, at the very commencement of hostilities, the number
U) above 100,000 men. Secondl}-, steps woukl be taken, by
utilizing the trained officers and non-commissioned officers togc her
with the nioi-e intelligent of the privates, to disipline and f I'ill
the newly raised force, Avhich would already have been asso^abled
in yiaces convenient us regards the several districts, and valuable
for their stratigical positions. Then Quebec, Montreal, Kingston,
and possibly Toronto and Ottawa would bo fortified, nud proper
armaments placed in the several works. The h;everal garrison
companies of artillery would also raise batteries on the shores
of the lakes, of the St. Lawrence and along the sea coast, to keep ott'
any isolated attacks. Block houses would bo erected to protect the
(rj'and Trunk Eaihvay in places Avhere it runs near the frontier, antl
15
Ki.--
lo defend the loclcisoii the St. Liiwivni-e, >«ia^ara unci Otiawa canals.
All Hteamors and transjiorts on the lakes and rivei's would be taken
for Govermncnt purposes, the former bein^ transformed as far as
might be possible into vessels of war, and used as training ships for
the newlv raised maritime force. A dockiiuard and luival arsenal
would be established at Kingston and ])ossibly also at CJollingwood,
Owen, or Pariy Sound, or at the terminus of the Midland ]{ailw,".y,
so as to secure, and if possible maintain the comnnmd of Georgian
Bay, and thus ]>roteet the right flank of the force raised for the
defence of Ontario. The main lines of communication by rail and
river would be appropriated for the convej'^ances of troo])8 and
stores, the passenger traffic being greatly i-estricted. The telegraphs
would be in the hands of (Jovernmont, and the press would be
warned to abstain from ])ublishing news likely to bo of use to the
enemy, llospitals would be organized in convenient situations,
slight wooden structures easily i-aised, being preferred to the larger
and more substantial buildings. Magazines and supj)lies for the
troops would be established in socurc posititions, probably in jnirts
of the back country accessible by rail or by steamers, but easily
protected by being in great measure surrounded by forests.* These
would, of course, be in addition to the magazines collected in the
fortified towns.
Such given very generally would be the preparations that
would immediately precede the commencement of hostilities,
and it is needless to point out how much tiioir success would
dei)end on the amount of information j; \d I'Mowledge collected
in time of peace by the staff, and by them transmitted to the
head-quarters at Ottawa. With such assistance, the commanding
General would at once be able to lay belbre the Government a ])lan
of operations, and to state clearly the requirements for the defence of
the country, whilst the local stalt' would be in a position, without
dalay, to utilize the many able heads and hands which patriotism
and zeal woukl immediately place at their disposal : and hei-e 1 would
observe that the organization, command, and provisioning of the largo
gangs of lumberers resembles in nuiny particulars the foi-mation of
an army, consequently many men possessing singidar capability for
this description of work would be available in time of threatened wai-.
•Note.— There is a good summer and winter road lunning from Renfrew To
Braicebridge. Thia would form a most important means of interior eommunica-
tion, far removed from the frontier, and yet easily accessible from the more
important towns on the St. Lawrence, and on Lake Ontario, by cxistinK railroad
and water ways.
16
lit;- ■ ;
During those i)i'eIiiiiiiiarios tho plans of tli enemy would in
some moiisuro have developed themselves, and the preparations tor
defence would conseqiiontly he modified to meet them, hut, l')okin«]j
to hroad outlines, the picture presented h}- the Provinces of Quebec
and Ontario wouM probably be somewhat as follows :
If the naviu^ation of the St. Lawrence were 0])en, and, except
during that period of the year, the ditiiculties of otlensive warfare
consequent on (rlimate would be very great, the base of operations
would be J^jngland. Quebec, therefore, would be the primary
receptacle of stores, and her defence Avould bo ju'ovided for by tho
completion in earth works of her encrinte of detached forts. Hero
tho re<jjimonts from the eastern poition of the province, and from tho
neighborhood of the city would have been assembled for drill, and to
act as working parties for the construction of the fortifications. Tho
river between Quebec and Montreal would be patrolled by gunboats
and it is to be hoped that a north shoi-e railwaj^ would be in working
order, so as to provide a more secure mode of communication with
Mont'-eal than that afforded by the Grand Trunk'. A strong force
would be assembled somewhere ia the neighborhood of Richmond
and Shorbrooke to jwotect the (xi'and Trunk Eaihvay, and possibly
to leu a hand to any British force advancing from Portland.
Montreal would be garrisoned and eai'th works raised by the militia
of the neighborhood, Avho would also furnish strong patrols towards
the frontier and either guard or destroy the locks on the Richelieu
Canal. The main force would j)robably be pushed forward some
dista nee in front of Montreal, having the fortifications of that city to
fall back upon. These fortifications would embrace a large area
which the configuration of the ground, of the river, and of the lakes
Avould render necossaiy and comparatively easy to hold. If possible,
the ]5eauharnois Canal should be preserved intact, as on it would
depend the navigation of the St. Lawrence, but the short distance of
this canal from the American frontier would render its protection a
matter of some difliculty, and for the same reasons the preservation
of the Cornwall and "Williamsburg Canals would be equally impor-
tant, but equall}^ hard to maintain. The locks on the Grrenville
Canal would be zealously guarded so as to preserve water communi-
cation with Ottaw^a, and, by means of the Rideau Canal, with
Kingston and Lake Ontario. A considerable body of trooj^s would
probably be concentrated at Prescott, covering the rail to Ottawa,
thi'oatening Ogdensbuj'g and connecting, by means of w^ater and rail,
with the forti'oss, arsenal, and dockyard at Kingston. Here
17
would be a stronj^ garrison, as from its harbor woulil issue the
fleet which should protect the towns on Lake Ontario, threaten the
opposite shore, and secure th ^ left flank of the main army of Ontario,,
which, facing south-west, would endeavor to cover Hamilton and
Toronto from the advance of an enemy from Buffalo or Detroit. The
position of this army would probably be such as to cover, at all
events at the commencement of hostilities, the lino oC railway,
which, traversing the ^centre of Ontario, connects Lake Huron with
Lake Erie. The frontier at Sarnia, Chatham,, and Windsor would
be watched by detachments, and London would be covered by a
stron*' body of troops. The flankt wou ' require to bo zealously
looked to, both from the direction of Buffiiio, where a strong detach-
ment would protect, or, if need be, destroy the Wolland Canal, and
from the danger of an expeditioncry force landing from Lake ILiron,
The stores for the immeiiate supply of the army might be collected
at Paris, Brantford and Gruelph, in which direction the army would
retreat in the event of uoing outnumbered, or of its flanks being
turned. A second line, taken up with reference to the • ground,
would cover the shorter communication between Toronto and Colling-
wood, in which case the left flank of the army would rest on Lake •
Ontario.
These suppositions in regard to preparations for hostilities pie--
suppose that communications with England are open, and that
stoi'es, and possibly reinforcements are arriving to assisit in th^
defence of the Dominion ; but operations, if but on a minor scale, are •
not impossible, especially as against the western portion of Ontario,
when the lower portion of the St. Lawrence is still closed with ice.
Even as regards Lower Canada, and at a time when communi-
cations were far more difficult than they are at present, Arnold's
expedition against Quebec showed that winter operations were ■
possible ; whilst it must not be forgotten that the net work of rail-
ways concentrating on our frontier might enable ■ an army to bo'
assembled without great hardships and in a condition to commence
a campaign, before the waters of the St. Lawrence had broken through
their ice bamers. Under these circumstances the means for the*
equipment of a considerable force ought to be in the possession of
the military authorities of the Dominion. These equipments cannot
be rapidly extemporized ; the perfection of modem arms preventM
Ihem from being manufactured except by skilled workmen and by
means of the best machinery, whilst their ammunition is equall}'^
difficult to make. Canada should, therefore, have supplies of the
i(,
III
i!i
material of wju* which cannot bo ])rocured on hor own soil, in con-
hicleniblo cxccsh of the .strength of hor active militia. Economy in
uniformH, in transport, in on<;ineorin<j; works, may be practi.sod, but
a Hufficioncy of arms and ammunition in roquiHite for the security of
the country.
To sum up the military needs of the Dominion, many of which
are doubtlosn met. First, a small force bo oi'ganized as that it may
serve as a noucleus for one much larger, to bo raised in the event of
war. This condil ion includes and pro-supposes instructed officers and
noncommissioned officers for this small force.
Seconly, carefully prepared organization on paper of the reserves.
Thirdly, full information and accurate details on all points con-
nected with the defence of the country, to be collected by the
divisional staff, and systematized at head-quarters.
Fourthly, supplies of arms and ammunition for about 100,000
men.
Whilst last, but not least, a maritime organization for tlie
inland waters. This last condition is of vital importance ; tha more
the map of the country is studied, the more does its defence appaar to
depend on the superiority of her naval force acting on the St. Law-
rence, and at all events on the most eastern of the great lakes.
In conclusion I would urge those to whom the people of this
great country look for leadership, to whatever political party they
may belong, to build up with the nation's growth a sound system of
defensive organization. The system need not bo expensive, the
great point being that money should not be wasted, that time should
be economized by careful previous organization, and that matters
which might be foreseen and provided for in peace time, should not
be left to be hurriedly, excitedly and extravagantly performed on a
prospect of hostilities. The defence of Canada de]>end,s on the pos-
silbility of holding certain stragetical positions, and on the mainten-
ance of her means of communication with England. Her strength
lies in her vigorous, manly, and orderly population, peculiarly fitted
by character and habits of life for sustained and patriotic efforts.
19
ller WcukiiOHs coufilsts in hor lcii<^th of frouticr, and in the iiairow-
iioss of the cultiviited district. The foronts which ch)so her in on the
north, couhl i^ive no shelter to a heaten arni}", and no retreat to a
flying popuhition. Mountainous districts have enabled small nations
to withstand far superior numbers, but, as in Switzerland, the Tyrol,
and even among the Atlas Mountains, those mountains contained
vallies, capal)le of supplying food, whereas the (Canadian forests ani
desert and uninhabitable.
A sound system of defonce, on v/hich a niilitary organi/.atioii
may bo based is the ground-work of luitional security. This system
Canada partialK- possesses, and I have little doubt l)Ut that in the
hands of her patriotic statesmen, assisted by the able officer placed
by ir. R. II., the Commander-in-chief, at the disposal of the Donjinion
Government it will be improved and perfected.
Law*