SOJ 
 
 %. 
 
 ^^M 
 
 
 IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-S) 
 
 A 
 
 
 'i^ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 y. 
 
 «/^ 
 
 % 
 
 1.0 
 
 I.I 
 
 £ b: 112.0 
 
 1.25 
 
 1.4 
 
 1.6 
 
 Photographic 
 
 Scienctis 
 Corporation 
 
 
 ^v^ 
 
 ^v 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 23 .VEsT MAIN STREET 
 
 WEBSTER, N.y. 14580 
 
 (716) 872-4503 
 
 
% c^. 
 
 CIHM/ICMH 
 
 Microfiche 
 
 Series. 
 
 CIHM/ICMH 
 Collection de 
 microfiches. 
 
 Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut cinadien de microreproductions historiques 
 
!■ 
 
 Technical ano Bibliographic Nptes/Notes techniques et bibliographiquas 
 
 The Institute has attempted to obtain the best 
 original copy available for filming. Features of this 
 copy which may be bibliographically unique, 
 which may alter any of the images in the 
 reproduction, or which may significantly change 
 the usual method of filming, are checked below. 
 
 ■J 
 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 □ 
 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 Coloured covers/ 
 Couverture de coulsur 
 
 Covers damaged/ 
 Couverture endommagde 
 
 Covefs restored and/or laminated/ 
 Couverture restaurde et/ou pellicul6e 
 
 Cover title missing/ 
 
 Le titre de couverture manque 
 
 Coloured maps/ 
 
 Cartes gdographiques en couleur 
 
 Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ 
 Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) 
 
 Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ 
 PlancheF et/ou 'llustrations en couleur 
 
 Buund with other material/ 
 Relid avec d'autres documents 
 
 Tight binding may ca<jse shadows or distortion 
 along interior margin/ 
 
 La reliure serree peut causer de I'ombre ou de la 
 distortion le long de la marge intdrieure 
 
 Blank leaves added during restoration may 
 appear within the text. Whenever possible, these 
 have been omitted from filming/ 
 II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajout^es 
 lor& d'une restauretion apparaissent dans le texte, 
 mafs, lorsque cela itait possible, ces pa^'es n'ont 
 pas 6t6 filmdes. 
 
 Additional comments:/ 
 Commentaires suppldmentaires: 
 
 L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire 
 qu'il lui a kxh possible de se procurer. Les details 
 de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du 
 point de vue hibliographique, qui peuvent modifier 
 une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une 
 modification dans la m6thode normale de filmage 
 sont indiqu6s ci-dessous. 
 
 n 
 
 V 
 
 D 
 
 
 n 
 
 Coloured pages/ 
 Pages de couleur 
 
 Pages damaged/ 
 Pages endommag^es 
 
 Pages restored and/or laminated/ 
 Pages restauries et/ou pellicul6es 
 
 Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ 
 Pages d6color6es, tachet^es ou piqu^es 
 
 Pages detached/ 
 Pages ddtachdes 
 
 Showthrough/ 
 Transparence 
 
 I I Quality of print varies/ 
 
 Quality In^gale de I'impression 
 
 Includes supplementary material/ 
 Comprend du materiel supplementaire 
 
 Only edition available/ 
 Soule Edition disponible 
 
 Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata 
 slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to 
 ensjre the best possible image/ 
 Les pages totalement ou partiellement 
 obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, 
 etc., ont 6ti film^es d nouveau de facon d 
 obtenir la meilieure image possible. 
 
 Thip item i 
 
 s filmed at the 
 
 i-eduction ratio checked below/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ce document est filmd au taux de reduction indiqu6 ci-dessous. 
 
 
 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12X 
 
 
 
 16X 
 
 
 
 
 20X 
 
 
 
 
 24X 
 
 
 
 
 28X 
 
 
 
 
 32X 
 
 
ire 
 
 details 
 es du 
 modifier 
 er une 
 Filmage 
 
 es 
 
 The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks 
 to the generosity of: 
 
 Library of the Public 
 Archives of Canada 
 
 The Images appearing hare are the best quality 
 possible considering the condition and legibility 
 of the original copy and in iceeping with the 
 filming contract specifications. 
 
 Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed 
 beginning with the front cover and ending on 
 the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- 
 sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All 
 other original copies are filmed beginning on the 
 first page with a printed or illustrated impres- 
 sion, and ending on the last page with a pkinted 
 or illustrated impression. 
 
 The last recorded frame on each microfiche 
 shall contain the symbol —«*• (meaning "CON- 
 TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), 
 whichever applies. 
 
 Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at 
 different reduction ratios. Those too large to be 
 entirely included in or.e exposure are filmed 
 beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to 
 right and top to bottom, as many frames as 
 required. The following diagrams illustrate the 
 method: 
 
 L'exempli»ire film* fut reproduit grfice d la 
 g^nArositA de: 
 
 La bibliothdque des Archives 
 publiques du Ccnada 
 
 Les images suivantes ont «t6 reproduites avec le 
 plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et 
 de la nettetd de I'exemplaire film*, et en 
 conformity avec les conditions du contrat de 
 filmage. 
 
 Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en 
 papier est imprim6e sont filmds en commen(;ant 
 par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la 
 derniire page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second 
 plat, salon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires 
 originaux sont fiimis en commen^ant par la 
 premidre page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impression ou d'illustration etc en terminant par 
 la dernidre page qui comporte une telle 
 empreinte. 
 
 Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la 
 derniAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le 
 cas: le symbols — ^ signifie "A SUIVRE", le 
 symbols V signifie "FIN". 
 
 Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent «tre 
 film6s d des taux de reduction diffirents. 
 Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre 
 reproduit en un seul clich«, 11 est film6 i partir 
 de I'angle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d drolte, 
 et de hout en bas, en prenant le nombre 
 d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants 
 illustrent la m^thode. 
 
 arrata 
 to 
 
 pelure, 
 n d 
 
 3 
 
 32X 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 1 2 3 
 
 4 5 6 
 
 II, 
 
mm^ 
 
rrrr 
 
 A LECTURE 
 
 OUirVEMCD AT TH« 
 
 'I 
 
 ilTERAljYAplCIEpFlC.l^^^ 
 
 OTTAWA 
 
 BY 
 
 COL FLETOHBR 
 
 Scots FusUier Guafd»,mitaiy Secretary 
 
 ■FEBK,U^K,-2-, 187S. 
 
 OTTAWA, CANADA. 
 
 •''•" "~ \ T'-':"- v-:~.: _.. X 
 
A LECTURE 
 
 DKLIVEKED AT THE 
 
 LITERARY AND SCIEi\Tiri€ INSTITUTE 
 
 O T T ^^ -W" J^ 
 
 nv 
 
 COL. FLETCHER, 
 
 Scots Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary 
 
 FEBXfXJARY, ISr.^. 
 
 OTTAWA, CANADA, 
 
THE DEFEXCK OF CANADA. 
 
 ^V L IC C X TJ XI K 
 
 DKLlVKIiHD AC lltK 
 
 LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE, OTTAWA 
 
 BV 
 
 COL. FLETCHER, 
 
 SCOTS PUSILIKR GUARDS, 
 
 Military Secretary to His Excellency the Gocenwr General. 
 
 In bringing under your notice the subject of tlie dcibnee of 
 Canada, I hope I maybe allowed te deprecate any idea of suggesting 
 that the matter i-equires considoi-ation, other than that which is duo 
 to the state of militaiy preparation incumbent upon all nations in 
 the present, past, and, unless the milennium arrives, in the future ages 
 of the world. The very fact that money is voted iin- the mainten- 
 ance of defences, shows that in the opinion of the majority of Iho 
 nation such defences arc necessary, and looking from our neighbors 
 point of view, it must be a healthy sign that the protection of our 
 own country is a matter of consideration rather than aggrcssivo 
 tactics against those who live beyond our fi-ontier. 
 
 At no period in the history of Canada were the relations 
 between herself and the United States on a more satisfactory footing 
 than at the present time. At no period have the cau.'^es of even 
 possible disagreement been so \h\y, and at no time have the two 
 countries been so strenuously engaged in the peaceful rivaby of 
 developing their great and as yet unrealized resources. Still, Avilh 
 the teachings of history betbre them, neither nation has dared 
 completely to disarm, and we in Canada might with equal justice 
 resent the care evinced by the majority of tiie several States of, the 
 Union in the mainteuauco of their militia, as they might look 
 askance at us for considering the best method of utilizing our 
 
coinpiii'iilivoly nlight rcwouri'CH for our own ]n\)tcetion. As long as 
 the Stales remain unitod, and niloil by men whose ol)jeets aic to 
 Ava,i;o war witli nature and hrini;- her uncK-r suhjeetion, lather than 
 to extend a territory already almost heyond the control of a eeiilral 
 (Jovei'iiment, so long will Cinada be secure from danger from 
 external foes. But if the central ])(nver should nhow signs of 
 woaknos.s, if Hcction.s of men, or even He))arale States nliouid break ott", 
 and, giving way to hiwless desiros, become turbulent and unruly, thou 
 Canada will have need to loolc to her defences and to lake measures 
 for the ])r()tection of her hearths and homes. To be ]>re|)ared for 
 BMch eventualities is often the best way of ])reventing their (tccur- 
 rcnco, and therelbi'o it wouUl be an allectati(jn of sensibility if wo 
 refrained from consideration of our oavii means of protection in the 
 four lost our I'ricnds and neighbors should consider that any reflection 
 were directeil against, or doubts entertained of their peaceful 
 intentiouH. 
 
 Canada is so situated that as long as she ien)aiMs a part and 
 parcel of Gieat Britain, and so long as Great Britain maintains her 
 maritime sunoriority, she lias no danger to fear from the seaboard, 
 and li'M' laini iVontier alone requires ju-oteetion. Jlore, howovoi", 
 lies a diffieultv which will need much skill and forethought to meet. 
 
 A casual ghmce at the map of the Dominion is sufficient to shew 
 the weak natui'al features of its frontier. Putting aside British 
 Columbia, which in the event of war must bo dealt with separately 
 from the other Province.s, and Manitoba, M-hich also must depend 
 for ])i'otection on resources other than those in immediate connection 
 with Ontario and Quebec, I would direct attention to the long 
 frontier extending from (.Jcorgian liny through Lakes Huron, St. 
 Clair, Erie, and Ontario to the Biver St. Lawrence, and thence- 
 inclining southward to the ]^ay of Fundy, a distance of upwards of 
 2,200 miles. Jf this frontier had at its back a cultivated country 
 of extent jn'oportionate to its length, there would belittle dilliculty 
 in guarding it, but the reverse is the case. Excepting the ])eninsular 
 of Ontario foi'med by Lakes Ilui'on, Erie and Ontai-io, tliej'o is little 
 depth of cultivated land, the Dominion being shut in by the vast 
 northern forest, which together with the sevei-ity of the dinuite 
 foi'cos the tide of emigration wostwai'd. 
 
 The problem to be solved is how Avith a total -^ population of 
 • This docs not inchide P. E. Island, Manitoba or British Columbia. 
 
5 
 
 altout tlwco million five IiuihUxmI tliousaiid, and willi a front ior of 
 2,200 miles, the cotintry can bent bo i)rotcc'te(l. Xow, includod in 
 tlie ':;cncral (lotonco oi' Ihc count ly llioie mo two main ol)ici*tH lo be 
 looked to, vi/ : tbo nucossity ol' keeping o|ien communication with 
 Eni^land b}- tlio St. Lawrcnco, and of prt>voiitin<^ the Dominion 
 itself from being eut in two. F(;r the first the maintenance of 
 (Quebec is obviously nece.-sai'y ; for the second the safety of Montreal 
 and of the miriow strij) which extends from Montreal to Kin^^ston, 
 including Ottawa, tlio Capital of tlio Domiiiioji, must bo carefidly 
 looked to. For the j)rescnt 1 would ])ut aside tho Mai-itime Prov- 
 inces, as until tlie Intercolonial Railway is established there can bo 
 little communication for defensive purposes between them and tho 
 two Pi'ovinces of (Quebec and Ontario, whilst Halifax " Xova 
 Scotia," St. Joliiis "Xew Brunswick" and Charlottetown "Prince 
 I'Mward Island," would depend lor protection in a great measure on 
 tho British fleet. 
 
 Tho subjoc*^ therefore under consideration may be subdivided 
 as follows : — The protection of Ontario as tiir as Kingston. Tho 
 defence of tho country between Kingston and Montreal, including 
 Ottawa. Tho defence of Montreal tho commercial capital. Tho 
 keeping open of communication between Montreal and Quebec, 
 The dofonco of Quebec. 
 
 Before however proceeding to details, I would allude to ono 
 problem difficult of solution in all countries, but cspcciall}- difficult 
 in Canada, viz.: — How can tho defence of the country be provided 
 for without too greatly crippling its resources either by. tho 
 expenditure of money or of labor. Military expcr.dituio is tho 
 insurance that a country pays against loss by war, but tho amount 
 of insurance must depend on the value of the property, on the risk 
 insured against, and on the means of tho insurer. In Canada and 
 tho United States the risk, happil}-, is not great, whereas, owing to 
 a variety of circumstances, such as the scarcity of labor in compar- 
 ison with the vast works I'cquisito for opening up ncAV countries, and 
 tho dread of checking, either by taxation or much more by forced 
 sei'vice, the tide of immigi'ation, there is a well-grounded opinion 
 that military efforts ft all commensurate with those of European 
 nations, are neither desirable or even possible. To ask Canada to 
 build and arm fortifications Avhk'h, considered purely from a strate- 
 gical point of view, might be deemed rcqusite, would consequently 
 be to vequiro more than could reasonably be expected. To keep up 
 
a force wliicli military authorities would considor noc'o-«snry for lior 
 protection would also probably bo beyond lior capabilities, and 
 therefore, whoever deals Avith the Hubjoct of tlio defence of the 
 country must, to tise a homely proverb, cut bis coat accoi'dini^ to 
 liis cloth. 
 
 Indirectly in connection with these considerations, I would wish 
 to ofter ftfcw cursory observations on a matter which men res])onsible 
 for the secui'ity of the Dominion should consider with care and atten 
 tion. Thei'o is a ^reat damper lest a country should b<^ misled by 
 numerical statistics, and lest it should find when the day ot trial ari'ivos 
 tliat it has been resting on a pajier army. Thei-e is a danger least 
 it should bo deceived by the outside show of a military force when 
 tho true requisites of military strength are wanting. The accidents, 
 " so to speulc," of an army, sometimes tend to conceal it weakness, in 
 place of adding to its sti-engih by the influence they bring to bear 
 on men's sentiments and feelings. Bright unifoi-ins, stii'i'ing music, 
 and even the assemblage of considerable l)odies of troops io go 
 through a few showy maneeuvrcs do not prove that the real 'requi- 
 sites of an arm}' are present and available. For the military 
 profession, military training is required, and it is better to maintain 
 a small force ho educated as that it may serve as a nucleus for a 
 greater, than to have a largo force which cannot be moved, and in 
 which those who are to command know little more than those 
 who are called on to obey. On an alarm of war a considerable army 
 might be ra^iidly raised in Canada if trained officers and non-commis- 
 sioned ofllcers were ready at hand, and if jilans for .its organization 
 liad been carefully prepared and wore clearly understood : Avhereas, 
 nnaided b}' such ]»roparation, tho troops would be mere mobs of 
 armed men, without knowledge, discipline or cohesion, A chain is 
 weak if one link lacks strength, and nn army fails in efficiency if 
 one of its many requisites are wanting, It needs first tlie nerves, 
 or staff, to ])ut the mass in motion ; then the officers and non" 
 commissioned officers with a fail* knowledge of their respective 
 <luties; then the men, with a supply of arms, clothing, and a 
 sufficiency of ammunition, not to speak of horses for the cavalry 
 and guns, and reserve ammunition for the artillery. Then tho 
 trans]>ort, commissariat and hospital arrangements, and last, but not 
 least, 1 o reserves with their due stipplics. To take a palpable in- 
 stance, tho military stores may bo full of Snider rifles, but unless the 
 supjdy of ammunition is in proportion, these rifles are comparatively 
 useless, as Canada is dependent on England for its breech-loading 
 
 
(•arti'i(l.ii;o>». Not lliat all tlie iTcnihcmciits for oven n .smnll foico 
 iniist eoiitinimlly 1)0 road}, but the ntart' munt know liow tlioy aio 
 1() 1)0 obtaip 'd, a'ld how llio organization can no most roudily 
 ort'eoted. Su])|)lioM tliat cannot bo i)roeui'od in t!io oountiy should I o 
 Htorod in magazines; Muj)|)lios tluit can bo obtaiiu^d, in oa^o of noo<l, 
 from the various distriotH should bo catalogued, and at least an 
 approximate estimate made of theii* <|uantity. As an instance, ^uns 
 and amnniniHon should be kept in magazines, jjossibly alsounitbrms, 
 at all events lor a pro[)ortiou of the Ibroe ; whereas transport, even 
 i'or artillerv ammunition, could bo ni'ovided from the surrouudimr 
 noii^'hborhood, and thereibro need not be retained in stores. Jt 
 would be out of place to do more than to allude to this ])ortion of 
 the subject, especially as stops are boin^ taken to procure lor 
 Canada a means of educatin<:( the officers, and, 1 trust, the non- 
 commissioned officers of her militia ; audit is only to impress on 
 all the importance of this scheme, that these observations Jmvo been 
 hazarded. 
 
 I will now turn to the geographical features of the country, 
 and in doing so propose rather to offer suggestions for thought and 
 consideration than dogmatically to lay down plans which my 
 knowledge of the subject cuuldonly allow me to do most imperfectly. 
 
 Supposing that it were possible to hold entire jssossion of the 
 Lakes, and of the gieat river which under ditferent names flows 
 through them to the sea, there would be but few places at which 
 the Dominion would be assailable, and, as in England, the fii'st and 
 principal lino of dafence might be the navy. But this supposition 
 is evidently basjod on falt-e promises. In the first place the tieaties 
 with the United States prevent vessels of war j ^m navigating the 
 inland waters; in the second place, the grea, trading city of 
 Chicago aff'ords means to the United States, commanding as the}"- 
 do the outlet from Lake Michigan, rapidly to extemporize at the 
 commencement of hostilities out of their fleet of merchantmen and 
 steamers, vessels of war, sufficient to command Lake Huron and 
 probably to force an entry into Lake Erie whore they would be met 
 by vessels from Buff"alo and other large ports. Thus Ontario would 
 bo threatened on its northern, western and south-western frontier, 
 and would in groat measure depend for its defence on a land force. 
 But this land force would run a risk of being isolated and cut off", 
 unless? its left flank wore protected and communication maintained 
 with the Province of Quebec, and through that Province with the 
 
8 
 
 1 
 
 f<ca. Therefore, couie que conte, the command of Lake Ontario must 
 1)0 secured and maintained. Here Canada lies under an advantage, 
 the best harlorfi being situated on her shores and the g.ealer 
 number of tb.o steamers trnding on the Lake being held or m.anned 
 by CanacMans. These harbors would require the protection either 
 of permanent or field fortifications, and above all Kingston would 
 have to bo placod beyond the possibility of capture. The next 
 tlifficulty to bo met is the preservation of the communict'tion 
 between Kingston and Montreal hy the protection of the Gj'and 
 Trunk Eailway, and of the canals which avoid the several rapids of 
 the 8t, Lawrence. Here again gun boats are necessary, but the 
 as^piistance they afford must be supplemented by a considerable 
 niilitaiy force, and by the erection of eartiiworks to cover the 
 several locks on the canals, together with block houses similar to 
 thoHO constructed by tSherman, in his advance from Nashville to 
 Atlanta, to protect his lino of communication. These would probably 
 be erected on the threat of war, arid Avould suffice to guard the 
 canals and the railway from the^enterprise of small bodies of men. 
 In addition to the protection of the frontier line, the defence of 
 Ottawa and of the Eideau canal, together with the Grenville canal 
 on the Otiawa river, must not be neglected. The caj^ture of the 
 Capital of the Dominion would be u serious blow, not only from its 
 moral eftects, but also as cutting off the Province of Ontario from 
 the Province of (Quebec by preventing communication by the 8t. 
 Lawrence, the Grand Trunk Eailwav and the Eideau canal. The 
 fortification and garrison at Kingston would protect the niouth of the 
 Eideau, whilst if a strong garrison were maintained there, and the 
 lake and river hold by gunboats, no attempt, except by a very con. 
 sidei'ablo force, could be made on the Capital. P'jt if these -mditions 
 wore not completely fulfilled, there would be danger loss a compara- 
 tively Hmall nujnber of troops should be able ly a rapid movement 
 against Ottawa, to sever the Province of Ontario from that of Quebec, 
 and from the means of communication with I'^ngland. 
 
 Tho next object of importance is the protection of Montreal, 
 the commercial capital of the Dominion, and the head of the Ocean 
 Xavigalion. The desirability of fortifying this city has been often 
 mooted, and ]dans have been prepared for erecting a line of aofen- 
 sive Avorks at sufficient distance to prevent it fi'om being bom- 
 barded. Thcf^e plans require careful study, and if not carried out 
 estimates should at least be prepared showing the number of men 
 and tho time required to raise field works sufficient to hinder any 
 

 
 nttcmi)t at oaptnro by conp de main. Tho United States possess easy 
 jt.ncl rapid communication to the fi-ontier whidi is only tjbout thirty 
 miles distant trom Montreal, and a woi-k of considerable stren«rth at 
 the head of Lake Ohamplain at!brds a convenient base of opei'ations 
 for any attaelvin_£]f force. At Montreal, therefore, a considerable gai*. 
 ]-ison would be collected on the tlireat of hostilities, this force would 
 watch the frontier and protect from par'^ial cnter])rizes the Beau, 
 harnois canal, whilst it would be suj)port'jil by gurd)oats on tlie river, 
 which would keep open communication vnth Quebec and possibly 
 secure the liichilieu canal. 
 
 Communication by moans of the river being secured, the passes 
 leading through the White mountains and the forests which border 
 on tho fiontier of tho New England States, would require watching. 
 Positions would be taken up to cover Richmond junction, and for 
 the protection of the Grand Ti-unk Railway and the approaches to 
 Quebec. The fortifications of this city on the right bank of the St. 
 Lawrence would be completed on the first symptoms of hostilities, 
 and the place rendered strong enough to stand a siege in the event 
 of Montreal falling, and the main force of tho enemy being 
 brought against her. 
 
 As long as Quebec slioukl hold out Canada would be unconquered ; 
 during the summor'she would receiyo the supplies which so powerful 
 an Empire as (xi'oat Britain would pour in with no sparing hand. 
 During winter the climate and the hanlsnips consequent upon it 
 would in all probability prevent active hostilities from being dijocted 
 against lier. 
 
 Such sketched very roughly is an outline of the general 
 principles which appear adapted to the defence of the Provinces of 
 Ontario and Quebec, and it is now proposed to consider what steps 
 should bo taken to enable the Dominion Avllh as littlo confusion as 
 possible — if unhappily so unfortnnate an occurrence should evei- uj-ise 
 — to pacs from a state of jjeaco to one of war. 
 
 In the first place it must be presumed that a sum of money is 
 3'oar1y voted for purposes of defence, i. e., for the maintenance of a 
 militia and of certain fortified placc^ The expenditure of this money 
 is in the hands of tho ]\Iinister of Militia assisted" by the- advice of 
 experienced oflScers. lie has to determine the number of men who 
 are to be jearlv trained and the amount of efiicienfv to which they 
 
ill 
 
 10 
 
 li 
 
 r.i 
 
 iiii 
 
 aro to attain. To work tliis problem correctly is the test of a good 
 adminintrator, as its solution depends on a careful consideration and 
 a just appreciation of the principles of war. To drill and discipline 
 in peaco time, an army at all commensurate with the need of Canada 
 if she were ()l)lii>*ed to undertake a serious war, is evidently out of 
 the question. ( consequently all that can be attempted is to maintain 
 in a fair state of efficiency a small force whicii would <m the threat 
 of hostilities servo as a neucleus and a training school of one much 
 larger. With this object in view it would in my opinion bo better 
 that with a given sum of money the efficiency should be increased 
 even at the expense of a reduction in numbers. A short period of 
 warning must always preceod the outbreak of hostilities, and to form 
 an army the employment of a comparatively small number of trained 
 men would be of greater service than the assistance which could bo 
 afforded by a larger number who merely possessed the rudimonts of 
 militaiy instructions. The next question is the composition of this 
 force, including the proportions whicIi the artillery, engineers and 
 cavalry should bear to the infantry. This should be determined 
 partly by the experience of other nations, especially in recent wars, 
 partly in reference to the character of the country in which the 
 army would be i cquired to act. For instance in the greater portion 
 of Canada there is little ground tor the action of cavalry organized 
 similarily to that of European armies, although for mounted infantry 
 there might bo considerable scope, and this question of the best 
 method of organizing antl arming horsemen requires deep considera- 
 tion and a careful study of recent campaigns^ especially of those of 
 the great American civil war. It is, I believe, the opinion of Cxeneral 
 Sheridan, an officer of the highest reputation in the United States 
 army, f(n"med from his personal experience during the civil war in 
 all branches of his profession, checked and supplemented by what 
 ho observed during the time he was u spectator from the Gorman 
 side oi the war with Fi-ance, that the teachings of modern campaigns 
 shew the desiral)ility of augmenting the mounted infantry, or cavalry 
 armed with good rifles and taught to fight on foot, at the expense of 
 the artillery. No doubt there is much that may be urged oii the 
 other side, but this instance is given Avith the view of shv)wing that 
 modern niilitary history together with a just estimate of the probable 
 theatre of war should influence the decision of those whoso duiy it is 
 to organize an army. 
 
 With regard to artillery there can bo no question but that 
 guns are of great value, especially as giving confidence to 
 
11 
 
 incxpericncofl and young troops l)ut on the other hand they 
 impede the march of an army and are difficult to move alont^ 
 the roads Avhich often form the only moans of communication 
 through Canadian forests. This was ohsorvcd in the earlier campaigns 
 of the American war, and lead nltin-iately to a consi(loral)le diminu- 
 tion in the proportionate number of guns as compai-ed with infantry. 
 For siege trains there would he little need in a Caiuidian arm}', as 
 happily there are few fortifications to beseige ; but on the other 
 hand there appears to be sco]ie for garrison artillery which may be 
 and, I believe, is organized with great success in the towns and villages 
 on the Lakes and seaboard of the Dominion. A knowledge of 
 gunner}' supplemented with but sliglit and easily acquired instruc- 
 tion in field fortifications and with the assistance of good plans, 
 would enable the population of these towns ."ud villages in great 
 measure to provide on the threat of war for their safety against 
 predatory and unsystematic attacks. 
 
 The exigencies of the settlor's life and especially the needs of 
 the lumbermen tend to the cultivation of rudimentary, but most 
 useful enginering knowledge, which a little teaching would render 
 available for military purposes, thus imin'ovising a corps of engineers 
 for service in the field. 
 
 Of infar.trj', the mainstay of an army, there is little to be said 
 especially applicable to Canada, except that for wood fighting and 
 for working in extended order greater knowledge is required from 
 officers, and higher discipline and more pei'fect steadiness from the 
 men, than when manojuvring in the oi)en. The officers should l)o 
 able rapidly to avail themselves of the advantages of ground, and 
 those of junior rank should be capable of acting independently, whilst 
 the men must have confidence in each other, and possess the 
 steadiness and discipline which will lead them to individual exertion, 
 and to a careful system of husbanding thei'* ammunition. 
 
 The proportion of the several arms in each military district 
 having been dotormiued, their relative proportion in peace and war 
 should be approximately fixed, and the best method ascertained of 
 rapidly augmenting the active force on the threat of hostilities. 
 Hero experience iiulicates, and nctably the knowledge gaine<l in the 
 American war, digested, and so to speak, codified by <ioneral 
 Sherman, in his very able recently published memorandum, that to 
 increase and recruit regimonis already existing, is a far more 
 efficient method of angmonting and keeping up an army, than by 
 replacing with new regiments those that may liave suffered by 
 
12 
 
 
 aclivo .service in the field. Tic especially instances the value attached 
 to the Wisconsin regiments, which in contradiction to those fur- 
 nished by other States were supplied by fresh recruits, in place of 
 being replaced 1)} 
 
 ncvv regiments. 
 
 Having thus briefly glanced at the composition of a defensive 
 force, I propose to turn to a most important matter connected with 
 the military organization of the country, viz. : — the duties of the 
 staff, and es])ecially of the offtcers of the higher grades. Irrespec- 
 tive of their ordinary work of commanding and inspecting the 
 militia, on the Deputy Adjutant ifenerals and their assistants must 
 devolve the duty of procuring, and systematizing rej)orts on all 
 that would relate to the defensive capabilities of their several 
 districts. The head quarters at Ottawa should be in possession of 
 the most accurate information, in order to compensate by the facility 
 with which plans of defence could bo prepared, and organization 
 carried out, f)r the ^^ery imperfect defensive condition of the 
 country. All places that it would be desirable to fu'tify in case 
 of war, should be designated, and plans of suitable works with 
 estimates as to the amount of labor, and of time necessary for 
 raising +hom should be ready at hand. Not a block house, or coast 
 battery should be omitted, and in cases Avhei-e scarcity of earth or 
 other considerations would prevent the construction of earth works, 
 the fact should be noted, in view of the need of more jiermanent 
 fortifications. These plans and specifications would be carefully 
 examined at headquarters, where the defence of particular localities 
 should be subordinated to the general plan for the protection of the 
 Dominion. The Deputy Adjutant Generals should al.^o select the 
 best places for the position of troops in the event of an outbi-eak of 
 hostilities, together with schemes for offensive and defensive opera- 
 tions in the several districts. Accurate rolls of the mmiber of able 
 bodied Inen, of hor.ses, of carts and waggons, should also be 'n 
 their possession, together with the quantity of rolling stock on the 
 several railways, their capabilities for transport of cavalry, artillery 
 and infantiy, especially in regard to the fitness of the stations, and 
 platforms for entrj' and depaiture. All roads, bridges, ferries, and 
 fords should be well examined, the character of the roads, whether 
 metalled or merely country roads shewn, the strength of the 
 bridges calculated, and the fords explored. Then again estimates 
 should be made of the amount of provisions which the several 
 districts could furnish, and of the number of men and hor.^os 
 that might be raised for military purposes without destroying hopes 
 
13 
 
 of hurve.'ttt. Tlieso iire mutter.s aUnit which intormutlou could ho 
 roadUy obtained and arranged in peace time to the advantage ot 
 the staff oflieoi's eniploj'od, and to the great economy of time a vl 
 labor when threats of "war might necessitate hurried j)reparation. 
 They are the detail.i, tlie masterj- of which by the start' is said so 
 greatly to have assisted the German commanders in their invasion 
 of France, and which from being more easily collected, could bo 
 even better systematized for defensive than for offensive purposes. 
 Not that information of the power and means of attack on the part 
 of ouv neighbors should be neglected : in a most friendly and 
 l)hilosophical spirit, their capabilities of aggression, and the weak 
 points in their defensive preparation should be guaged by our statf, 
 so that if need arise and opportunity offei", the theatre of war might 
 be transferred across the frontier, an arrangement which would 
 suit the people of Canada far better than fighting on their own 
 soil. 
 
 Such sketched very broadly and without any attempt at detail, 
 appear to be the subjects towards which those who ave interested in 
 the military condition of the country might direcc their attention. 
 One important consideration has, however, been omitted, viz. : — how 
 would the marine department be able to meet the strain which war 
 v/ould immediately put upon it ? As has been shown, the dei'^mce 
 of the country depends in great measure on its capability for 
 maintaining command of the water way of the St. Lawrence, at all 
 events as far as the western end of Lake Ontario, (lun boats 
 would therefore have to be quickly imjirovised, river and lake 
 steamers would have to be altered and adapted to warlike purposes, 
 as was done during the American Civil War. Whichever power 
 could be first on the water would jjrobably secure most important 
 advantages, in fact the defence of Ontario may be said mainly to 
 depend on securing the command of the Lakes, wliilst ou the safety 
 of the canals and the secm-ity of their locks would hinge the possi- 
 bility of gun boats sent from England being able to reach the 
 waters above the St. Lawrence rapids. Consequently plans should 
 in time of peace be prepared of the best method of converting the 
 fleet of river and lake steamers into vessels of war. Their armament 
 !-hould be ready, and means at hand for coating at l.asi some of them 
 with extemporized armoui piates. A marine force might witli gve.-ifc 
 jjropriety be enrolled in time of peace as a supplement to tho land 
 force, whilst every detail in respect to the inland navigation, and ot 
 the class of vessels best suited for the defence of the various rivers, 
 
J4 
 
 canals, unci lakes should be ill tlie luiiids of tho Adniirulty in \\.u<^' 
 land. To tho command of the inland waters was the suece.ss of the 
 Northern Armies in the American War in great measure duo, 
 especially at its commencement, and this lesson should not be lost 
 on those who have charge of the defence of Canada. JEow nearly 
 the "Merimac" hastily equipped at Xorfolk, annihilaled the 
 Northern fleet, and prevented the landing of Maclellan's army in 
 the York Town Peninsular, will be in the remembrance of all who 
 took an interest in that great struggle, and thei-cs is little doubt but 
 that a repetition of a similar event might make or mar the most 
 carefully prej)ared schemes of Canadian defence. 
 
 I will now conclude this very imperfect sketch of tho subjects 
 which appear to me to be worthy of consideration in reference to 
 the defence of Caruida by an attempt at realizing what wouUl 
 probabl}'^ occur in the event of anticipated hostilities. Suppose, and 
 here again I would in*ge that my supposition refers to an evciit 
 which, judging by recent appearances, is as unlikely as the disrup- 
 tion of the States themselves, that onr neighbors and ourselves fell 
 out, that intelligence of very disagreeable diplomatic note, had 
 reached Canada, and that we had heard that unprecedented activity 
 prevailed on the one hand at Portsmouth and Chatham, on the 
 other, at New York, Philadelphia, antl other naval stations in the 
 United States. 
 
 "What would the Government of Canada at once do ? First, em' 
 body the active Militia. Then complete to war strength the several 
 batteries and regiments of cavalry, adding guns, troops and battalions, 
 so as at least to treble the strength of the present active Militia : 
 bringing up, at the very commencement of hostilities, the number 
 U) above 100,000 men. Secondl}-, steps woukl be taken, by 
 utilizing the trained officers and non-commissioned officers togc her 
 with the nioi-e intelligent of the privates, to disipline and f I'ill 
 the newly raised force, Avhich would already have been asso^abled 
 in yiaces convenient us regards the several districts, and valuable 
 for their stratigical positions. Then Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, 
 and possibly Toronto and Ottawa would bo fortified, nud proper 
 armaments placed in the several works. The h;everal garrison 
 companies of artillery would also raise batteries on the shores 
 of the lakes, of the St. Lawrence and along the sea coast, to keep ott' 
 any isolated attacks. Block houses would bo erected to protect the 
 (rj'and Trunk Eaihvay in places Avhere it runs near the frontier, antl 
 
15 
 
 Ki.-- 
 
 
 lo defend the loclcisoii the St. Liiwivni-e, >«ia^ara unci Otiawa canals. 
 All Hteamors and transjiorts on the lakes and rivei's would be taken 
 for Govermncnt purposes, the former bein^ transformed as far as 
 might be possible into vessels of war, and used as training ships for 
 the newlv raised maritime force. A dockiiuard and luival arsenal 
 would be established at Kingston and ])ossibly also at CJollingwood, 
 Owen, or Pariy Sound, or at the terminus of the Midland ]{ailw,".y, 
 so as to secure, and if possible maintain the comnnmd of Georgian 
 Bay, and thus ]>roteet the right flank of the force raised for the 
 defence of Ontario. The main lines of communication by rail and 
 river would be appropriated for the convej'^ances of troo])8 and 
 stores, the passenger traffic being greatly i-estricted. The telegraphs 
 would be in the hands of (Jovernmont, and the press would be 
 warned to abstain from ])ublishing news likely to bo of use to the 
 enemy, llospitals would be organized in convenient situations, 
 slight wooden structures easily i-aised, being preferred to the larger 
 and more substantial buildings. Magazines and supj)lies for the 
 troops would be established in socurc posititions, probably in jnirts 
 of the back country accessible by rail or by steamers, but easily 
 protected by being in great measure surrounded by forests.* These 
 would, of course, be in addition to the magazines collected in the 
 fortified towns. 
 
 Such given very generally would be the preparations that 
 would immediately precede the commencement of hostilities, 
 and it is needless to point out how much tiioir success would 
 dei)end on the amount of information j; \d I'Mowledge collected 
 in time of peace by the staff, and by them transmitted to the 
 head-quarters at Ottawa. With such assistance, the commanding 
 General would at once be able to lay belbre the Government a ])lan 
 of operations, and to state clearly the requirements for the defence of 
 the country, whilst the local stalt' would be in a position, without 
 dalay, to utilize the many able heads and hands which patriotism 
 and zeal woukl immediately place at their disposal : and hei-e 1 would 
 observe that the organization, command, and provisioning of the largo 
 gangs of lumberers resembles in nuiny particulars the foi-mation of 
 an army, consequently many men possessing singidar capability for 
 this description of work would be available in time of threatened wai-. 
 
 •Note.— There is a good summer and winter road lunning from Renfrew To 
 Braicebridge. Thia would form a most important means of interior eommunica- 
 tion, far removed from the frontier, and yet easily accessible from the more 
 important towns on the St. Lawrence, and on Lake Ontario, by cxistinK railroad 
 and water ways. 
 
16 
 
 lit;- ■ ; 
 
 During those i)i'eIiiiiiiiarios tho plans of tli enemy would in 
 some moiisuro have developed themselves, and the preparations tor 
 defence would conseqiiontly he modified to meet them, hut, l')okin«]j 
 to hroad outlines, the picture presented h}- the Provinces of Quebec 
 and Ontario wouM probably be somewhat as follows : 
 
 If the naviu^ation of the St. Lawrence were 0])en, and, except 
 during that period of the year, the ditiiculties of otlensive warfare 
 consequent on (rlimate would be very great, the base of operations 
 would be J^jngland. Quebec, therefore, would be the primary 
 receptacle of stores, and her defence Avould bo ju'ovided for by tho 
 completion in earth works of her encrinte of detached forts. Hero 
 tho re<jjimonts from the eastern poition of the province, and from tho 
 neighborhood of the city would have been assembled for drill, and to 
 act as working parties for the construction of the fortifications. Tho 
 river between Quebec and Montreal would be patrolled by gunboats 
 and it is to be hoped that a north shoi-e railwaj^ would be in working 
 order, so as to provide a more secure mode of communication with 
 Mont'-eal than that afforded by the Grand Trunk'. A strong force 
 would be assembled somewhere ia the neighborhood of Richmond 
 and Shorbrooke to jwotect the (xi'and Trunk Eaihvay, and possibly 
 to leu a hand to any British force advancing from Portland. 
 Montreal would be garrisoned and eai'th works raised by the militia 
 of the neighborhood, Avho would also furnish strong patrols towards 
 the frontier and either guard or destroy the locks on the Richelieu 
 Canal. The main force would j)robably be pushed forward some 
 dista nee in front of Montreal, having the fortifications of that city to 
 fall back upon. These fortifications would embrace a large area 
 which the configuration of the ground, of the river, and of the lakes 
 Avould render necossaiy and comparatively easy to hold. If possible, 
 the ]5eauharnois Canal should be preserved intact, as on it would 
 depend the navigation of the St. Lawrence, but the short distance of 
 this canal from the American frontier would render its protection a 
 matter of some difliculty, and for the same reasons the preservation 
 of the Cornwall and "Williamsburg Canals would be equally impor- 
 tant, but equall}^ hard to maintain. The locks on the Grrenville 
 Canal would be zealously guarded so as to preserve water communi- 
 cation with Ottaw^a, and, by means of the Rideau Canal, with 
 Kingston and Lake Ontario. A considerable body of trooj^s would 
 probably be concentrated at Prescott, covering the rail to Ottawa, 
 thi'oatening Ogdensbuj'g and connecting, by means of w^ater and rail, 
 with the forti'oss, arsenal, and dockyard at Kingston. Here 
 
17 
 
 would be a stronj^ garrison, as from its harbor woulil issue the 
 fleet which should protect the towns on Lake Ontario, threaten the 
 opposite shore, and secure th ^ left flank of the main army of Ontario,, 
 which, facing south-west, would endeavor to cover Hamilton and 
 Toronto from the advance of an enemy from Buffalo or Detroit. The 
 position of this army would probably be such as to cover, at all 
 events at the commencement of hostilities, the lino oC railway, 
 which, traversing the ^centre of Ontario, connects Lake Huron with 
 Lake Erie. The frontier at Sarnia, Chatham,, and Windsor would 
 be watched by detachments, and London would be covered by a 
 stron*' body of troops. The flankt wou ' require to bo zealously 
 looked to, both from the direction of Buffiiio, where a strong detach- 
 ment would protect, or, if need be, destroy the Wolland Canal, and 
 from the danger of an expeditioncry force landing from Lake ILiron, 
 The stores for the immeiiate supply of the army might be collected 
 at Paris, Brantford and Gruelph, in which direction the army would 
 retreat in the event of uoing outnumbered, or of its flanks being 
 turned. A second line, taken up with reference to the • ground, 
 would cover the shorter communication between Toronto and Colling- 
 wood, in which case the left flank of the army would rest on Lake • 
 Ontario. 
 
 These suppositions in regard to preparations for hostilities pie-- 
 suppose that communications with England are open, and that 
 stoi'es, and possibly reinforcements are arriving to assisit in th^ 
 defence of the Dominion ; but operations, if but on a minor scale, are • 
 not impossible, especially as against the western portion of Ontario, 
 when the lower portion of the St. Lawrence is still closed with ice. 
 Even as regards Lower Canada, and at a time when communi- 
 cations were far more difficult than they are at present, Arnold's 
 expedition against Quebec showed that winter operations were ■ 
 possible ; whilst it must not be forgotten that the net work of rail- 
 ways concentrating on our frontier might enable ■ an army to bo' 
 assembled without great hardships and in a condition to commence 
 a campaign, before the waters of the St. Lawrence had broken through 
 their ice bamers. Under these circumstances the means for the* 
 equipment of a considerable force ought to be in the possession of 
 the military authorities of the Dominion. These equipments cannot 
 be rapidly extemporized ; the perfection of modem arms preventM 
 Ihem from being manufactured except by skilled workmen and by 
 means of the best machinery, whilst their ammunition is equall}'^ 
 difficult to make. Canada should, therefore, have supplies of the 
 
i(, 
 
 III 
 
 i!i 
 
 material of wju* which cannot bo ])rocured on hor own soil, in con- 
 hicleniblo cxccsh of the .strength of hor active militia. Economy in 
 uniformH, in transport, in on<;ineorin<j; works, may be practi.sod, but 
 a Hufficioncy of arms and ammunition in roquiHite for the security of 
 the country. 
 
 To sum up the military needs of the Dominion, many of which 
 are doubtlosn met. First, a small force bo oi'ganized as that it may 
 serve as a noucleus for one much larger, to bo raised in the event of 
 war. This condil ion includes and pro-supposes instructed officers and 
 noncommissioned officers for this small force. 
 
 Seconly, carefully prepared organization on paper of the reserves. 
 
 Thirdly, full information and accurate details on all points con- 
 nected with the defence of the country, to be collected by the 
 divisional staff, and systematized at head-quarters. 
 
 Fourthly, supplies of arms and ammunition for about 100,000 
 
 men. 
 
 Whilst last, but not least, a maritime organization for tlie 
 inland waters. This last condition is of vital importance ; tha more 
 the map of the country is studied, the more does its defence appaar to 
 depend on the superiority of her naval force acting on the St. Law- 
 rence, and at all events on the most eastern of the great lakes. 
 
 In conclusion I would urge those to whom the people of this 
 great country look for leadership, to whatever political party they 
 may belong, to build up with the nation's growth a sound system of 
 defensive organization. The system need not bo expensive, the 
 great point being that money should not be wasted, that time should 
 be economized by careful previous organization, and that matters 
 which might be foreseen and provided for in peace time, should not 
 be left to be hurriedly, excitedly and extravagantly performed on a 
 prospect of hostilities. The defence of Canada de]>end,s on the pos- 
 silbility of holding certain stragetical positions, and on the mainten- 
 ance of her means of communication with England. Her strength 
 lies in her vigorous, manly, and orderly population, peculiarly fitted 
 by character and habits of life for sustained and patriotic efforts. 
 
19 
 
 ller WcukiiOHs coufilsts in hor lcii<^th of frouticr, and in the iiairow- 
 iioss of the cultiviited district. The foronts which ch)so her in on the 
 north, couhl i^ive no shelter to a heaten arni}", and no retreat to a 
 flying popuhition. Mountainous districts have enabled small nations 
 to withstand far superior numbers, but, as in Switzerland, the Tyrol, 
 and even among the Atlas Mountains, those mountains contained 
 vallies, capal)le of supplying food, whereas the (Canadian forests ani 
 desert and uninhabitable. 
 
 A sound system of defonce, on v/hich a niilitary organi/.atioii 
 may bo based is the ground-work of luitional security. This system 
 Canada partialK- possesses, and I have little doubt l)Ut that in the 
 hands of her patriotic statesmen, assisted by the able officer placed 
 by ir. R. II., the Commander-in-chief, at the disposal of the Donjinion 
 Government it will be improved and perfected. 
 
 Law*