IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. O 'U V. ¥ ^0 5?^ y 1.0 I.I 1.25 'JIIM 111112^ - IM " 11116 lUO 22 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 p% AO£ 1 Chapter II.— Fundamental Tp' ins. Our existence, our ability to know with certainty, ind the prir'Mplo of con- tradiction u e called I< undnnicntul Truths— Theae do no^ i. uire proof, they aio jusupposcd— Subjective ond ol>jective truth j—^ivprchension and comprehension 4 Chapter III.— Sources of Certainty. Innerconsciousness— Evidence— Universal consent in that which intiraatelv interests each individual— Testimony of trustworthy witnesses— Each faculty has its legitimate object 7 Chapter IV.— The Subject /. The existence of the subject / cannot be doubted— A sure basis of philoso- phy-Precision of terminology required — Substances and accidents — Simple, compound, and spiritual substances— Necessary substance— pos- sible things 9 Chapter V. — Causa Causarum, or the First Substance. Nobility of this subject— Current of modem thought seems to run back- wara— Absurdity of a denial of God— What we mean by God— What soii.e mean by that name .12 Chapter VI.— The Existence of God. The subject I is certain that it is limited and dependent— Each one musi admit the existence either of eflfects or phenomena— A first action, or a first cause must be admitted; this must be trom itself— The infinite a simple act— Numbers always finite— Reasoning from abstract principles must be admitted— German transcendcntalists- A mixed mode of reason- ing ....... 16 X CONTENTS. Chapter VII.— The Intelligence and TVill of God. Attempts to deny a personal God— God has the plenitude of being, and of knowledge— Ue actud fVcc'v ; hence he has will. . . . page 22 Chapter VIII.— God as learnt from the Physical Order. Beauties of visible creation— Absurdity of supposing an unintelligent cause —Absurdity of supposing matter wltii its properties as a a\ rtlcient ex- ])lanation of the physical order— Physical laws not always constant in their development 26 Chapter IX.— Universal Pelief in the Existence of a God. Belief in the existence of a God constant and universal— Its cause is the evidence of reason— Ignorance of physical laws not the cause of this belief— Tlie greatest minds believe m a personal God— His ruling power always acknowledged 34 Chapter X.— Recapitulatory. Solidity of our position— How the subject / lose to a knowledge of God's existence— Attributes of God— His inllnity 38 Chapter XI.— Pantheism. What it is- It is very insidious— Reasons why— Its various systems— Their common fundamental princii)le — Confusion of destinction with diversity exi)08ed— Various ways in wliich one thing may bo contained in another— Absolute and relative perfections— Admission of Unite perfections not devogatoi7 to the inflnite— Plurality of substances— Pernicious effects of pantheism 41 Chapter XII.— Reality of the Physical Wori^d. Real and ideal deflned— Every substance a reality— Every substance a force — Notion of existence — Perception really in us— Object oi pciv^Ci^^ion must be a teality— Nature of the jihysical world— Two erroneous systems on this head confuted— True system evident ^ . 60 Chapter XIII.— Creation. The ways of error various— Consistency of a true system— Creation defined — Finite substances created by (Joil — Created things not eternal —Time and creation coeval— UnchangealJility of God's essence not effected by crea- tiou— Conservatism— Only God can annihilate — Action of created tlimgs. 69 Chapter XIV.— Providence. Providence deflned— Proved from various heads— It is easily reconciled with ail physical and moral facts 68 Chapter XV.— End of Creation. God had an end in view in creating— It is the external manifestation of his perfectious— How this is obtained despite the malibo of men and devils 73 I CONTENTS. FAET SECOND.— PSYCHOLOGY. XI Chapter I.— Nature of the Subject 7. Know thyself— What is meant by the soul— Its continned indentity with it&elf— Substance and accident dellned— Sensations ex])lained— How ex- cited— Monads— Essence of things unchangeable- Inertia an abscn<-c of a self-determining power— Three classes of monads. . . taue 77 Chai'ter II. — Simplicity of the Soul. Haters of human dignity— Their theory— -Ours— Simplicity of the soul de- monstrated from its jierception of a s({uare — Objection of matcrialiHts answered— Self-determining power of the soul proves its eiraplicity— So does comparsion of ideas 87 Chapter III.— Spirituality of the Soul. Spirituality deliaed— It is no figment of the schools— Traces of this idea found amonjj all nations — Fundamentally it is as old as our race; its present precision due to Christianity — Spirituality of soul demonstrated from actions of intellect and will 06 Chapter IV. — Essence and Origin of the Soul. We have a clear idea of the soul— Limitation of knowledge no proof of its total absence— Various false theories regarding origin of the soul refuted —Its true origin assigned 100 Chapter V.— Faculties of the Soul. Two fn*and faculties, intelligence and will — What memory is-^lmnpination —Intelligence and will not distinct from the soul— P»!rcei)tion— Ideat.— Knowledge, how acquired— Difference between an idea and its perception — Cause and origin of ideas— Theories regarding them — The soul niutit always have some knowledge— Two ideas, at least, coeval with the ex- istence of the soul 105 Chapter VI.— The Will. Two-fold tendency in man— Animal tendencies must be guided by reason — All desire happiness— Liberty of the will explained — Physical and moral liberty, what they mean— Power of erring not necessary to true liberty— Definition US Chapter VII. — ^I.irerty of the Wir.r . It is proved, lut, ^frovi our inner conmousnesn—lnd , from the nature of finite f/oi)dn — ,irti,from the notion of ren»on — i/A, from the vuiunir of mtimj of all maiilHnd — ^'th, from the absurdities which wouUl follow in the c'ontrar» sentence H? Chapter VIII.— Union of the Soul and IJodv. The whole individii'>,l man considered — Union of soul and body, iihysical and substantial— Importance of previous chaplcvB- Facts of psychology I Xll CONTENTS. reconciled with those of physiology— Reciprocal action between soul and bodv— The soul the viviflcr of the body — Organic sanity a condition for healthy intellectual action, not its cause — Sleep, disease, death— perfect- ibility of our intellectual powers I'A'iE 123 Chapter IX.— Immortality of the Soul. Importance of this subject in a social and moral point of view— Desfrading effects of mj;terialisni — Idea of immortality— The soul can exist and act separated from the body— No created force, no natural process can destroy the soul— Goil wishes it to be immortal, as proved from his wisdom and justice— Man's nature considered in itself, and in its relation to society proves the immortality of the .soul— Universal belief of mankind, and ir- dividual feeling eviuce the same truth 133 Chapter X.— Cause of Evil in the World. Evil a negative of good— metaphysical, physical, and moral evil— Only moral evil con^ dered — Absurdity of the manichean system: its insuf- llciency even if admitted— Abuse of human liberty the cause of moral evil— God's concurrence in human actions explamed— Only good the effect of God's action 142 Chapter XI.— Knowledge of God, and Liberty OF Man's Will. God's knowledge ever infinite, ever the same : man's acquired by degrees- Future free actions of man known to God — This knowledge does not effect their freedom — Man does not do them because God knows them, but God knows them because man is about to do them 147 Chai'ter XII.— Future Punishment. Ignorance and presumption of those who deride the teachings of Christian- ity — Selllsm, or animalism strong at denial— Naturally a law has been im- posed on man— Its observers and transgressors cannot obtain the same afler-stttte — Dei)rivation of the enjoyment of the supreme good part of the punishment of tlie impious — Bitterness of tliis punishment — God is just as well as merciful; mercy reigns here, justice will preside in the next me. . 161 Chapter XIII.— Psychological Phenomena. Life — Laws of propagation of sentient things— Vital principle always created by God— Examination of some phenomena that seem to i)rove that one soul can act ou another even in life— Certain class of dreams. 158 Chapter XIV.— Principle of life in the Brute Creation. Degrading tendency of the theory of evolution— Brutes have various sen- sations and distinct sensilde i)erceptions — The subject of these is phys- ically simple, and created by God— Essential difference between the human soul and the vital principle of brutes— Absolute impossibility of the latter developing into the former— Instinct no degree of intelligence — Essential difference between them as seen from the power of roasoning and articulate speech in man— Neither actively nor potentially is i-eason jn brutes- -Cruelty to brutes considered— Man's prerogatives regarding lirutos , 1C4 CONTENTS. XUl Chapter XV.— Darwinism. Hankcrers after notoriety — Darwinism subversive of the common consent of mankind, of morality, and of reason — What it is— Authorities cited by Mr. Darwin prove nothing in Ills favor — His appeal to the reader— He dis- courses with wonderful self-complacency on "changed conditions " and "organism," but tells us nothing new— .some of hi.s dilliculties answered — "Inherited qualities" explained — He rambles and relates, but does not argue very clojicly— His conclusion that "all species may be Irom four or live," or fjerhaps fewer, subjected to e.xamiuation — It is illogical, it is op- posed to facts — Progressive development, if it exists, is the natural effect of innate causes, hence each generation ought to shoiV a change; but this is not so— Metaphysical argument against his theory— Species — Plan and order of creation not diflicult to understand— Mosaic history of creation cannot be refuted— Darv» in and posterity page 179 TART THmD.— QUESTTOXS IIAVIXG AN IKTDIATE CONNECTION WITH ONTOLOGY. in- CiiAPTER I.— Time, Eternity, Space. Time a succession of events—It exists relatively to the finite, not to the in- Unite- Eternity nol made up of year.s— It is relative to the infinite — Space, I)opular notion ot it— Extension a relative i>roperty — It is a relation of one finite being te another — It is a phenomenon arising from our limitation of essence— St. Thomas felt the truth of this theory— Its harmony with cath- olic dogma— neither time nor extension for the infinite. . . . 197 Chapter II. — Certitude. We can be certain of some things— First ])rinciple of certitude is the intellect perceiving— St. Thomas and .St. Augustine quoted— Diflerence between this doctrine and rationalism — It is philosopliic and in harmony witli sound theology 206 Chapter III. — Religion. Religious tendency of some kind ever exhibited bv the human race— What we mean by religion— Its connection with metaphysics. . . , 210 Chapter IV. — Revelation. ' Harmony of the Sciences— Revelation defined— It is possible— Its accept- ance no dcgredation to I'eason 213 Chapter V.— Necessity of Revelation. Literary imposters — Historic view of mank'nd — Great depravity of man, as a general rule, betbre Christ— Morally spe.iking, revelation was necessary to emancipate mankind from their degrading errors. . . . 219 Chapter IV.— Miracles. Difference in proceedings of tin. true and false philosopher— nniversal be- lief in miracles— What they are— No natural law abrogated or suspeuJed —Sublimation of natural lorces possible— Miracles not to remedy an over- Bight ol the Creator; they entered into the pluu of creation. . . 224 xiv CONTENTS. Chapter VII.— Existence of Miracles. Tbey were always -looked upon as a test of a divine mission— Scfentlflo proof of miracles can 1>e obtained even t^om the testimony of ttie ignorant —Canons on this point— Miracles did not cease with the apostolic times- Prophecy : it is a miracle in the intellectual order— Its possibility and Bcientilic proof. page 234 Chapter VIII.— A Divine Revelation has been made. Authenticity of the scriptures assummcd— General belief, in early times, ot the coming of a Redeemer— Historic fact of the coming of the one who claimed to be son of God— How his works prove this— Intellectual beuellts from his teaching— Its expansion and duration 24i Chapter IX.— Religious Indifference. Scientific fops— Their vagaries— Right idea of modem arid free thought— An internul as well as an external order— Religious indifferauce a sign of mental decay— Why we ought to accept revelation 247 Chapter X.— How to seek Revelation. Faith often vilified— Dangers to youth from an infidel atmosphere— Method to be followed in seeking revelation— Not a metho ^ lutelhgeuce is incapable of comprehending every- th.ng. There are two errors which, like Charybdis and bcylla, render dangerous the course along whi<-h tlie metaphysician has to steer. «onie, degrading reason bv maintaining that it is incapable of acquiring truth, havl' been drawn into the vortex of scepticism : others, extoll- lug It too much by asserting that it is capable of discover- ing and comprehending all truth, have been lost in the whirl-pool of rationalism. Each of these errors is danger- ous ; each of them is an insult to human reason. The followers of the first must admit that we know at least one thmg with certainty, viz.: that toe know nothing: the followers of the second insult reason by disregarding its teachings. Our intelligence tells us that we are limited beings; consequently our capacity must be limited: it a PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. it Hi proves, moreover, that there is an unlimited and infinite Being, and as a logical consequence, it tells us that our limited capacity cannot fully comprehend that unlimited Being, that inlinite Truth, Those simple observations arc, of themselves, quite suiricicut to overthrow the bulwarks of scepticism and rationalism. Once that the rampart has fallen the min.irets and turrets of ornamental rhfeoric Avill offer but a I'eeble resistance to the blows of trnth. Any intelligent school-boy who retains these observations in his memory can confute the most gloomy sceptic, or the most inflated rationalist. The two false extremes, scepticism and rntiomdism, ])('ovc conclusively two things : fu'st, that Ave can know .^ome truths, secondly, that our intelligence is limited and liaiile to err in its logical deductions. The sce])tic and the rationalist must both admit at least one certainty ; they nni>her. Let it be under- stood from the outset that we deny the title of Philosopher to the founders of schools of error. 'Tis a sad thing to hear a man called a Philosopher who has spent the talents God gave him, in obscuring the liglit ; 'tis sadder still to hear OUB STARTING POINT. 3 this done by Christians. The man who, as a general rule, blunders in the art he professes to follow, is not called a tradesman, but a botcher : why, then, call meaningless scrib- blers riiilosophers. They are literary fungi. We start in our metaphysical investigations from certainty, or if you will, from three grand truths — viz : our own exist- ence ; our ability to know with certainty some truth ; and that a thing cunnot both be and not be, under the same respect, at the same time. Unless these bo presupposed you can have no science. Sciuuee is the " knowledge of things hy means of their ultimate causes ; " knowledge is such that its contra- dictory cannot be true. If, therefore, Ave do not suppose the existence of the intelligent subject 7, we cannot have know- ledge, or anything else ; equally we cannot have it unless we have an aptitude for knowing with certainty ; and equally we cannot have it imless the principle of contradiction be admitted. Therefore these three truths are the basis of all philosophic science — the starting point of all metaphysical investigations. he oes Id at ich not le- icc er- ler ar f)d ■L'iir CHAPTER 11. I I; FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. HE great philosopliers of the past called the three truths, mentioDcd in the preceding chapter, /undo mental truths. Our own existence was called the first fad: our ability to know with certainty, \\\q first pr{7iciplc; and the axiom, " the same thing cannot both be and not be, under the same respect, at the same time" the i>rinciple of contradiction. We shall call them by the same names : the human mind has strayed long enough from the right path in metaphysics, let us humbly endeavour to return to it. These three truths do not require proof ; because, as we have seen, they must bo presupposed in every scientiiic research. A truth is proved, or demonstrated by a principle more clearly perceived than itself. Hence it follows that every- thing cannot be proved, because there are some things so clearly perceived that nothing can be more so. These things can be simply declared, not demonstrated. Amongst this class of things come the fundamental truths. So self-evident are they, that to attempt to demonstrate them would be as ridiculous as to hold up a rush taper to show the, daylight. The man who attempts to deny his own existence is not to be reasoned with ; a kindly keeper is required : or if he be considered sane, a rude shake might possibly awaken him to the fact that he both exists and feels. He who denies the FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. first principle, affirms it, for lie maintains that he is sure at least, of one thing, viz, — of knowing nothing. The one who denies the principle of contradiction likewise affirms it, because he must invoke it to support his denial ; since, then, these truths are self-evident and cannot be denied, or called in doubt without evident absurdity, they are rightly termed fundamental, and are to be admitted by every sane mind. Truth nuiy be considered suhjecHvehj^ inasmuch as it is an apprehension of the intelligent subj^U't ; or objectively^ that is, in the object itself. Cousidereu objectively, "whatever is is true in as much as it is, *' o;-, it is the conformity of the object to the archetypal idea in the divine mind, about which more will be said hereafter. Subjective truth is the con- formity of our idea of an object to that object itself. If we apprehend it a» it is, we have truth concerning it. It is here to be observed that there is a vast difference between appre- hending, and comprehending. To apprehend, it is sufficient to be cognizant of the existence of an object and of its characteristics : to comprehend, it is necessary to know of the existence of the object, and all its properties. If there be even one only property which we cannot explain, or which is beyond tlic range of our intellect, we do not fully compre- hend the object. Hence we apprehend numberless things ; we comprehend but few. Facts we have in abundance, and hence information is not scarce : the why of facts is rarely known, and hence knowledge is very limited. The commonest facts of every-day life are often insoluble myster- ies ; and still, strange to say, men who cannot solve even these, pretend to explain learnedly the most sublime truths, A moment's reflection ought to convince anyone that our intelligence, whilst on the one hand it knows, and can know much, on the other is limited ; and that there are a thousand and one truths above its grasp — far beyond its province. 6 PHILOSOPHT OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. Until we have mastered this fact, or acquired tliis humility of intellect, it is useless to boj^in scientific researches. Wo would only lose our time and muddle our brains, by straiuiuj after the impossible. f -ar II 'Vw3^gL>^' ■ : 1 1 CHAPTER III. SOURCES OP CERTAINTY. iE have seen that wc can he cortaiti of some thinjrs : it nijiy bo well to say a few words oa some of the chief Tr)lt^ ^^^^' ' ' "^ certainty. c !\' 1st. — Our inner consciousness, or the intellisent subject 7, modified in a certain way, and testifying to its modification. It is self-evident, that this is a source of certainty regarding the intimate affections of the sentient subject. No one can persuade a man that he feels warm so long as his inner consciousness testifies that he feels cold. The same may be said of tlie various affections of the subject /. 2nd. — Evidence or the apprehension, by the intellect, of a necessary connection between a subject and its predicate. The perfection of the intelligence is the acquisition of truth; hence it must be fitted to acquire it. But it could not be fitted to acquire it, were it possible that it could err when it calmly and deliberately apprehends a necessary connection between a subject and its predicate. No means of correct- ing such an error could be found ; consequently the mind would be unfitted for the acquiring of certainty. 3rd. — Universal consent in a thing which intimately interests each individual. This universal consent means that in all ages, under every variety of circumstances, mankind have agreed in recognizing as true, something which inti- 8 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. ] M ^ V ■') matc'ly concerns eacli and tdl. Tlic reuson is, that a constant and universal effect, such as this avouM be, requires a con- stant and universal cause. But, liunianly speakiufjf, there can be no constant and universal cause, except the evidence of reason. Passion, prejudice, fear, education, every other cause imaginable, is local and variable. The evidence of reason only will remain unchanging and unchangeable in sunshine, or in gloom ; in poverty, or in wealth. When the trutii admitted by this universal consent, ought to act rather as a restraint on the passions and pleasures of mankind, than as an incentive to their indulgence, the more forcibly does tills consent strike us as a source of certainty. 4th. — The testimony of persons worthy of faith. Persons are worthy of faith when it is known that they have a know- ledge of what they testily, and a desire to speak truly. As this source of certainty ])ortains more to history, than to metaphysics we shall merely mention it here. Our external s'^nses : sight, touch, &c., are in a certain degree, sources of certainty regarding the' legitimate objects. They enable us to shun many dangers, but tiiey are not fitted, nor intended for the acquisition of metaphysical truth. The eye of the cliemist will serve him in discovering the physical properties of bodies ; but cnco he presumes to cast it beyond its legitimate bounds, and to sweep with it the vast horizon of metaphysics, he can no longer rely on its fidelity. The gross errors of Huxley, Darwin, and Tyndall, have originated in a disregard of the pnnciplo known to every tyro in logic that each faculty is a faithful witness only in regard to its legitimate objects. \ CHAPTER IV. THE SUBJECT J. nLMOST every truth has been denied, or called in doubt, by some one who called himself a philosopher. Cicero tells us there is nothing so absurd but what ^"^ has been maiutuined, at some time, by some would-bo follower of wisdom. This jrrent truth should make us intel- lectually humble and cautious. There is one truth, however, which no one can seriously deny, or doubt — that is, his OAvn existence. Whether he considers himself as thinking truly or falsely, as feeling real or imaginary sensations, he must still admit the fact, I think, I feel. He may call everything else in doubt ; ho may view the world with the eye of a cynic ; he may deny the existence of God ; of right and wrong, but turn as he will, deny what he may, the one great truth, I feel, I think, will force itself contiuuallv ijjou him. St. Augustine, the greatest human mind after Solomon, indi- cates this truth as a most sure basis of philosophy, (L. de liber, arb.) Des Cartes, amongst moderns, took his cue from that great Doctor of the Church. Now this 1 which feels, thinks, and wishes, and whose existence no one denies, will ha called by us the intelligent subject /, or the soul. Precision of terminology is the cream of science. Sophists, and dealers in false scientific coins, delight in obscurity of laigiiage, and iudefinitcness of terms. With them obscure m 10 PniLOSOPIIY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. phraseology holds the place of a military ambuscade ; and want of precision the place of grape-shot. A forest of difficulties can he hewn down by a few sharp defining strokes. W "., this intelligent subject I exists. More than this, it testifies to the existence in itself, of various affections, some pleasing, others disagrcablc. It, likewise, testifies that these affections are often produced by something which is not itself; sometiiing of whose existence it is as certain as what it is of its own ; but whose actions it cannot control, or modify. Hence the inner consciousness of the subject I makes us certain of the existence of numberless other things, distinct, and different from itself, and from one anotiier. We thus arrive at the firm conviction that we are but one of an immense multitude of beings, which surround us on i'.ll sides. Some of these we apprehend as essentially similar to our- selves ; others as essentially different. We accurately dis- tinguish between the affections which are in us and caused by ourselves, and those which are, indeed, in us but not caused by us. Hence the certainty of the existence of ob- jects which form no part of our being, of wiiich we are not modifications, and which are not ]nodifications of us. The inevitable conclusion, then, from inner consciousness and evidence is, that we^ many beings like ourselves, and many unlike exist. Another conclusion from these sources of cer- tainty is, that we are limited in our being, restricted in our capacity, and subject to modifications during our existence. Now we call suhsta7ice that which exists by itself, not requiring another in which to adhere, as in a subject. From this it follows that we know ourselves, and many other things to be substances. The modifications, or affections, which we advert in ourselves, and apprehend in others, we call accidents. These require, humanly speaking, a subject in which to adhere. m THE SUBJECT /. 11 A substance is physically simple when it has no parts into V'hich it can be divided : it is physically compound when it can be divided into parts. A substance is spiritual when it is simple and endowed with intelligence and will, and can exercise these independently of corporeal organs. That sub- stances physically simple exist is easily proved. Compound substances exist ; therefore simple ones exist. The anteced- ent Avill not be denied ; we are certain of the existence of beings distinct from ourselves, and which can be divided into parts. This being granted, the consequence, therefore simple ones exist, is as inevitable as the following: a brick house exists ; therefore each particular brick of which it is composed exists. In a word, composition presupposes sim- plicity. If we have a compound, its component parts must exist. Therefore there are some physically simple substances. A substance is said to be necessary, or to exist necessarily, when it depends from no preceding cause, but contains in itself the reason of its own existence ; otherwise it is con- tingent. A thing is possihle when the notes which form its conception are not mutually destructive : otherwise it is impossible ; or, what is the same, it is au absurdity. CT^i^l^rc) 1 IS CHAPTER V. CAUSA CAUSARUMc; OR THE FIRST SUBSTANCE, ij HE luiman reason is l| in vindicatinf? tlie h ;XJ^ ...I.- i_ 1- . is never more nobly employed than honour of its Creator. The genius >vhi{;h discovers, and evolves the physical laws by Avhich the planc^s are guided in their orbits; or, which demonstrates some intricate proposition, is hailed, and justly too, as engaged in a noble pursuit. But much more noble is the study of that intellect which rises in its investi- gations far ])eyond the most distant stars, — transcends in its sublime flight the various orbs which whirl through the azure, passes the innumerable orders and grades of created things, and their physical laws, and iixes its attention on Him from whom all these depend. If it be accoiuited great wisdom to know something of the motions of the solar system, how much more wisdom must it not be to know something of the great Author of that system ? And if it be a noble science to investigate the secondary causes which are continually at work in nature, how much more noble will it not be to learn something of the First Cause of all — the great " Causa Causarum " recognized by Socrates, Plato and Cicero. One might have thought that our boasted " progress ** had been such as to render unnecessary a formal proof of the existence of a First Cause — of a Creator, One might CAUSA CAUSARUM, OR THE FIRST SUBSTAN'CE. 13 » \i m have reasoned thus : if the greatest minds of antiquity, with all their disadvantages, clearlv jjcrceived that an intelligent cause must have been at work in the ordering of the world, surely the great minds of to-day, with all their advantages, must be firmly convinced on this point, And so, indeed, all great minds are quite certain of the existence of an intelligent first cause. But there are some minds which pretend to bo great, and which make a huge parade of unmeaning bombast, m order to be considered learned, which endeavour to deny tliat First Cause. It would seem as if that most irregular of streams, the "current of modern thought," as it is eu- phonitusly termed by those who sail adown its tide, had bent backward its course and run, up hill, to the dim ages of the past. Certain it is that the scientific barque, in which many who claim to be advanced thinkers paddle their dangerous way along, is composed of the fragments, and the most shattered ones too, of the old sophistical punts broken cen- turies ago by the blows of Aristotle, Socrates aud Plato. During their pK-asure trip up the '* current of modem thought," our thinkers discovered these stranded and con- demned boats ; wishing probably, to appear singular, they attempted to make wrecks sea-worthy by painting them anew. The brilliant colouring of their word-painting dazzled the eyes of a few who cheered, as the professors sailed along : the heads of the poor professors became dizzy at the sound of the applause ; they claimed as their own the ship which they had merely varnished. Seriously, it is hard to imagine how anyone, laying pre- tentions to sanity, could deny the existence of that, without which, he himself would be an absurdity — viz : an eifect without a cause. We can see only one reasonable explam^ tion of this mental aberration. We do not wish to accuse the teachers of philsophic error, or any one else of moral 14 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. i i i 1 1 1 ) I I Hi deliaquencics, but wc must say that the practical coiichision from any theory which denies either au avenging God, or the liberty of the will, or the immortality of the soul, or the eternity of punishment, is — do as you please, so long as you escape the clutches of the civil law. The human mind is nat- urally logical ; it may not sec, nor care to see, tlie error in the premises ; but it will clearly perceive that, taking any of these systems as its guide, the individual who kills his own mother, or debauches his own sister, may be just as easy in mind, and (piitc as respectable, as the son who toils for the support of his parent, or braves dangers for the honour of his sister. In a few years tliey will be both in the dust; their constituent atoms floating in the " iiiHnitc azure of the past," and no more ! Tlic cultivated mind re- volts at this infamous conclusion : even those who uphold the false theories al)()ve named, would scarcely dare defend, in any resi)ectablc company, these deductions. vStill, they are severely logical ; they are as cogent as any geometi'ical demonstration. Now, it is evident that when the logical conseipience of any premises is absurd, the premises themselves must be faulty. Hence none of these systems can be correct. But the race of men who compose the comnuuiists, will eagerly lend ear to such doctrines. It just suits them. The good man, be he learned or illiterate, rejoices to believe that there exists a Being, innueusc^ eternal, incom- prehensible, supreme and perfect, that does not depend from any cause, but contains in itself the reason of its existence. It is an IJns a .se, a self-existing Being. They believe this Being to be endowed with intelligence and will: its intelligence designed all the glorious works we see, and t- ' laws which govern them ; and its free will created them. .. ., s jijing is one, simple, inlinite act, knowing no change — {, . .i:i;i no knowledge because always infinitely wise — losing f CAUSA CAUSAllUM, OR THE FIBST SUBSTANCE. 15 mr ',VC its m. »4 no power, because always the source of action. This Beiug exercises a watchful Providence over all its works ; it will punish the trans;j;ressor, and reward the doer of its will. It is culled God ; and we rejr of tiie ff*'ntta error, as rejiards the existence of a Hrst and in(h'|K'ndcnt canse. A phenom- enon, or an ellect exists. Thcret'ore there exists a primary uctor. C)f no truth can the dispassionate mind be more tiiorongiily convinced. To r«'jcct it wo must "kill reason," becanse we must nnike om* very reason an absnydity. Lastly the snbject /, as shown bclbre, is firndy convinced that it is not inlinite: tinit it exercises no control over nniny external thin;;s. Hence the necessary being, whose existence the intelli;rent snbject / deihices from the existence of phc- nomeini, or eH'ects, is not the / itself, but something alto- gether distinct from, and independent of it. It would be either a piece ot satire or pride, or sheer nnidnes.s, to pretend that everything is comi)rised in tlie subject /. Tiuit some- thing distinct from the thinking snbject exists, is as clear to the mind as its own existence ; e(pially clear to it is the fact that it is not the primary cause of that something. There- fore outside of itself tlie great primary actor is to be sought. '■r^,'^ =sf*»v- <.J3<^- of ill; CHAPTER VII. THE INTELLIGENCE AND WILL OF GOD. J I T might seem superfluous to many to hold a polemic I dissertation on the Intelligence and Will of God. *^G> ^^^^ wish, however, is to prove by the light of reason, ^ every assertion we make. We trust that these met- aphysical disquisitions, so far as they go, will be complete. Infidelity threatens destruction to the human race, In its mad career it spares nothing. It sends ahead its loathsome precursor — impiety. Hearts must be first depraved before intellects can embrace absurdities. A soul unspotted by sin could never be induced to deny its Creator. The impious systems of a revived paganism that, like noxious weeds, spring up thick and fast, are the sickly products of souls deprived of the light of grace. Wore it possible, then, to prove that God is but a blind force, free rein could be given to our basest passions. Hence the efforts to destroy the idea of a personal God. 'Tis the old, old cry of the wicked ; it was raised in the time of David — God does not understand : non intelligit Deus, It has come down the path-way' of ages, an. has been taken up and screeched in chorus by modern infidels. Being driven, by the force of evidence, to admit some primary actor, who must be independent and supreme, they vainly seek to have him shorn of intelligence. We wish to expose the fallacy of their theories ; to vindicate THE INTELLIGENCE AND WILL OF GOD. 28 ihe glory of our Creator ; to supply arms by which each reader may successfully combat their errors. Hence our intention of contesting each inch of ground. We know that right is on our side, and we are confident of success. We have proved the existence of a Being which exists by necessity of nature — v;hich is independent of everything else, and which is the first c{»use of all. Whatever this being has, it has by the necessity of nature, and consequently it can never have, at any time, anything which it had not always. With it there can be no change ; for it there was no yesterday, neither will it have a to-morrow. It simply is. The definition which that Being gave of itself, as re- corded by Moses, is the self-same as that which right reason must give it — I am what I am — or, in another place — " who is, sent thee." Yes ; this is God ; He who is. Being necessary. He is, as we saw, infinite ; consequently, He has the plenitude of being. "I am what I am." To prove intelligence in God we can £rst use an argument a priori, God is infinite ; therefore perfect. This is self- evident ; for the infinite is that to which nothing can be added ; but something can be added to the imperfect — viz : the perfection it lacks. Hence, since God is infinite He must be perfect. Now intelligence is, undoubtedly, a very great perfection : consequently it must be in God. Intel- ligence is a simple perfection ; it does not include the idea of any defect. Reason supposes a detect — viz : the necessity of deducing conclusions regarding things less clearly known, from ones more known. Hence in God there is intelligence, but no necessity of reasoning. He knows in the same man- ner as He exists, that is — liy necessity of nature. The manner of acting follows the manner of existing. In God existence is by necessity ; so is knowledge : the essence of God necessarily includes existence ; so it, likewise, includes know- 24 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. r.i !i' V. led^e. The essence is infinite ; so is the knowlcdjre. Tlic iuiinite must be a simple act. There cannot be in it any parls, otherwise it could be added to, and subtracted from. Hence in the infinite tiiere is no real distinction between the essence and its attributes. God having the plenitude of being must have the plenitude of knowledge. Everything know- able must be known to Ilim ; and this knowledge is not acquired by parts, nor by deducing conclusions ; but it is all in one simple act, eternal and unchangeable. All this is clear from the fact of His being infinitely perfect. But the doriders of metaphysics may call this too subtile. One would suppose that no reasoning could be too fine spun for the "great minds" of our great age. If their intellectual powers be such as they boast them to be, they ought to delight in abstruse logical investigations. But since the mud, to which they so viciously cleave, unfits them for a lofty mental flight, we will give other proofs. God is as shown above the first cause. Either he acted freely in producing the pheuonieua, or eflH^cts which exist, or he did not. If he were necessitated in acting, then everything exists by necessity. Now that which exists by necessity must be unchangeable, because whatever it has, it has necessarily, and consequently nnist have the sapie always. But the subject 7 testifies that it, and all visible things are subject to modifications. We know to-day something which we did not know yesterday. Therefore we do not exist by necessity of nature, therefore the primary cause acted freely in producing us. We elected to act ; but election supposes an act of intelligence, and freedom of will. Hence from the nature of the subject / and other phenomena, it is conclu- sively proved that God has intelligence and freedom of will. Wo only exist because he freely elected to give us existence. This argument is founded in the essence of contingent things ; IIP TIIK INTELLIGENCE AND WILL OF GOD. 25 the reason is led on to its conclusion by the force of evidence. Pantheism, be it rej^l, ideal, or eniauistic is completely de- stroyed by this reasoning-. It is to be hoped that this ar- gument is not too "subtle," or '^«choIastic," for the ''irrcni minds" which follow the "current of modern thought." ':^rj^' j^^ Bi>ti I- m COAPTER VIII. GOD AS LEARKT FROM THE PHYSICAL ORDER. (I HE cultured mind will, already, have found sufficient I proof of the existence of a personal God, such as W^ christians believe to exist. But all minds are not -^Qp cultured; and some are so much cultured that they seem to have run to seed. Amonjjst these latter must be classed the gushing writer who, in well-written prose, rejects metaphysics. The hey-day of his intellect must be with the *' years beyond the deluge;" no flowers, no matter how brilliant their hues, can attract his gaze. Hard, dry seeds, much akin to acorns, are the only pleasures of his imagina- tion. 'Tis a sad lot, yet, the usual one reserved tor those whom pride has drawn from the path of trutli. For the unlettered, then, as well as for the lovers of phys- ical nature, Ave will trace the footsteps of God in the universe. Physics, being a less sublime science than meta- physics, is more adapted to the understanding of those who care only to sport a moth-like existence of a day. It would be useless to enumerate here the beauties and order of visible things. Each one sees them for oneself. If he is a scholar he can read the glowing pages of Cicero, of Virgil, of Young, or of every writer of note, whether ancient or modern. On no one subject has so much been written, as on the wonder- ful beauty aud order of the universe. On no subject has m GOD AS LEAKNT FROM THE PHYSICAL ORDER. 27 there been so much unanimity of sentiment. The writer of centuries ago, — the writer of to-day, — the writer in the east, as well as in the west, have all proclaimed aloud the same fact, that beauty, harmony, regularity, prevail in the physical order. If one is not a scholar, one has only to step forth into the fields and watch the plants and flowers springing up, producing useful fruits, or delighting the eye, and then form- ing a seed from which another similar plant will, in due season, shoot forth. He will remember that the seasons come round with unfailing regularity ; no matter how great the heat may be to-day he is sure that a cool season will soon come to refresh the parched earth ; no matter how deep the enow may lie on his well-tilled fields he is certain that it will melt, and leave tiie ground fresh and vigcrous, in time for the next crop. Let him then raise his eyes to the heavens and he Avill see the glorious sun continually returning to cheer us with his light, and to fertilize the liclds with his heat. When he sees it sinking, in a blaze of glory, to rest, no fear of its never again api)e;uing disturbs him. He is certain that in a few hours it will return, and he makes his calculations for work or })leasure, accordingly. liy night, he sees tlie heavens studded with innumerable stars, and from observations he has learnt that he can determine the hours of night by the relative positions of some of them. He knows with certainty the phases of the moon, and he, likewise, knows, though ignorant of astronomy, that the moon and the planets have their appointed course ; they wliirl rapidly around ; cross each othei''s path ; draw near, pursue, recede, but never come in contact. If a man be learned in the physical sciences he has groat cause for wonder. He learns that in all the changes, whether eflected by light, heat, or electricity, no one particle is ever made, or destroyed. lie finds the atmosphere to be a vast store-house, in which are w^ iiiii il J: i^ I 11 28 FHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLK VINDICATED. treasured up tlic atoms of decayed matter, to become, in time, the elemeuts of other bodies. A coutinual rouud of production and decay is goin;^ on ; Avell-reguUited hiAvs are observed in all physical phenomena. Now, let a man be what he may, he nmst admit the fact of the existence and regular- ity of i)hysical phenomena, such as we have described. The question at once arises : is there any author of these? If so, who, and what is he? A man who desires knowledge, must not be content to know the mere fact of the existence of a thing ; he must endeavour to learn as mu(;h as possible, its cause. The questions asked above will naturally rise in the mind of any one who considers the phenomena described. Is there any jiuihor of these? No one in his senses, will say that there Is i. cj. . , or author of these striking effects. He may quibble about the nature of that cause, but he nuist admit tluit tin..': ;«" s'^>me i^'vniary actor; otherwise he has a series of phemomena wit hum a first one ; a chain of depen- dent effects without a cause. The first question must be answered affirmatively, yes, there is an author, or a first actor. Who, and what is he? We will not give in detai'. the various erroneous answers to this (piestion. We will say; the author is either intelligent, or he is not. The atheists whether they be materialists, ])antheists, or any other ists, say that the author is not intelligent. They labour, in various ways, to obsciu'e the truth ; still, shorn of their stiq)idity and verbosity, their theoi'ies are reduced to this ; the author of the j)hysical order is not an intelligent cause. I^et youthfid readers bear this well in miiul. Let them not be deceived \>y high-sounding terms, or brilliant expressions. Tlie whole question must be reduced to logical terms : either the cause is intelligent, or it is not. If it is intelligent it must be something distinct from the phenomena ; for no one, it is to be supposed, is so demented as to attribute iutelii- I m I GOD AS LEARNT FROM THE PHYSICAL ORDER. 29 g'cnce to physirnl ])lienoinenn. In the Inpothesis, then, that the cause is intellijrent, it must be tlie infinite God of whom Ave spoke ; because the author of tiie phenomena must be in- dependent, and must exist by necessity of nature, not being from any other cause ; and consecjuently nuist be inlinite. They who take the other iiorn of the dilemma are tossed into the regions of absurdity. They must say the author is not intelligent. Can any man believe that laws, to understand which great human intellects have labored, have come from an unintelligent lawgiver? But let us pursue them more cogently. Your author is cha'^ce. But, pray, who and wdiat is this chance? Is it intelligent? If so, you admit aa intelligent author of the physical order. If it is not, it is nothing : wriggle as you may, if chance is unintelligent it is a mere notliing, a blind for the unwary: it can be nothing more than that you mean pluniomena are the productions of a lottery, a game of hazard. If the right ticket happens to be extracted from the box, the sun will rise to-morrow ; pi-o- vided always, that thousands of other tickets are so extracted that each planet will keep its course, and not come in colli- sion with the earth. And for thousands upon tliousands of days this game of lottery has been going on, and thousands upon thousands of just the right sort of tickets are coming out, from amongst millions upon millions of ones which might just as well be extracted ! Can any absurdity be greater than this? Yet, reduced to its last analysis, such is the theory of chance. Such the stuff which the would-be doughty champions of reason ask us to believe. Place even fifteen numbers into a box, and it is a moral certainty that you will not extract the same number three consecutive times. But what if you had millions of numbers in the box, and had to extract, in the same order, the same hundred numbers, a hundred times? Bah ! it is sickening to have to write against such nonsense ! S' 30 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BliXE VINDICATED. Ilillt i But some will say, you mis-rq>rescnt our theory : wc do not believe in chance, as the author, any more than you : we explain physical phenomena by supposing matter with its properties, and physical laws of attraction, repulsion, &c. This theory has, at first sight, r-.u appearance of learning, and saves its advocates from being immediately laughed at, as bogus lottery agents. In reality, however, it is founded in the old game of chance. Modern atheists saw the absurdity of the casus of the ancients, and abandoned it ; the ship was leaky, so they fled ; but the boat into which they leaped, though more gaudily painted, is not a whit more sea-worthy. Let us overhaul it. They suppose matter with its physical properties. Not a bad supposition to begin Avith ; but it has just this grievous fault — it is only a supposition. Let us make the supposition that we ask them how came this matter •with its properties? Is it from chance? They answer in- dignantly, no ; we do not admit chance as an autlior. Very good ; is it from itself ? If it is, you admit an Ens a se a substance that exists by necessity of nature, and, consequently an infinite one. But, as shown above, the infinite must be simple : hence it is not matter which is always compound. Therefore if you say that the elements arc from themselves, you admit not one, but millions of necessary beings, each infinite, each intelligent, each unchangeable. This absurdity is just as great as chance. If you say that matter is not from itself it must be from another, from, say, B. If B is from it- self we come to our infinite substance God ; if not he is from C, and climbing up the genealogical stem we must finally come to the parent Z. No other preceding him, he must be from himself, and is, therefore, God. Hence when we analyze this learned supposition, its supposers muHt either be content to herd with the ancient charice men, or they must admit a personal God, GOD AS LEARNT FROM THE PHYSICAL ORDER. SI Not to be too Imrd on tlie enlightened tliinkcrs let us leave unquestioned their gratuitous supposition ; let us for a moment, suppose thiit nuitter exists with its various properties and laws : not even then coidd this well-ordered universe arise, without an intelligent cause to dispose, in certain places, certain quantities of matter. If the elements of matter existed independently of God, they would exist by ne- cessity of nature : all their properties and actions would be essential and, as a consequence, unchangeable. The position they first occupied, and the actions tliey first prodnced, Avould be necessary, and therefore should always remain the same. The order and collocation which were in the beginning, would have to continue until the end. Now the science of geology evidently demonstrates that many changes have taken place, and are still going on. This could not be, if matter and its properties arc to be supposed as existing and acting indepen- dently of any supreme cause. If even one part of matter, if even one element of a body should change its site, the whole physical order, with one fell swoop, would fall into chaos, unless there be an intelligent cause that foresaw this change of site, and provided an opportune remedy. It is evident that we can change the relative position of whole masses, and, still, the harmony of nature is undisturbed. Again ; from no other collocation of elements than the act- ul one, could this physical order arise, if it be purely the production of matter and its properties. Now it is self-evident that the number of possible collocations which the particles of the world could have is many millions. Must it not have been a most happy chance which brought about the present one? As Cicero said when refuting this same absurd theory, it is just as credible to suppose that by tossing in the air a number of types they would form, on reaching the ground, the annals of Ennius, as to suppose that this well-ordered m 32 PHILOSOPHY OF THK HIHLE VINDICATKD. globe could b(! the result of eUiuients poHsc.sscd of eertain pliyjsicai proj)ertie,s. Would any upholder of this system be- lieve thiit liis eliil)onite cssay.s could be formed by tosniug in the air all the type and phitit.s of every printing ollice in London. Yet, it is more credible tluit this should take place than that all the beauties, wonders, and harmony of nature should arise merely from matter and its forces. Finally, it Is admitted that various circumstances, such as difference of temperature, relation of site and a thousand others exercise a luodifying effect on matter and its ])roperties. How is it, then, that in man, beast, bird and fish, the eye, for instance, always occupies the same site, in the same race. Why does it not frequently appear on the top of the head, or the arm, back, or neck? The embryo is, certainly, subject to various causes which must modify the properties of matter, still the eye appears in millions of men, for thousands of years, in the same place, and that place, too, the safest and most useful. It must, indeed, be a consistent chance that does all this. Take any one. of the thousand and one phen- omena of every-day life, which occur with equal regularity, though under veiy different circumstances, and you "will find how vain it is to attem})t to explain them by merely supposing matter with its forces. But if you suppose an infinite in- telligence that gave each element its peculiar properties, and foresaw all possible contingences, and so disposed matter as to meet them, and which prepared a ready compensation for each change, or loss, then, and then only, can the physical order be explained. All difficulties vanish ; the mind may- be overcome at the depth of the wisdom of that cause, but it is intimately convinced that only such wisdom could pro- duce such effects. We can here add a fact which must be known to those who are versed in physies — viz : that physical laws are not GOD AS LEARNT FROM THE niYSICAL ORDER. 33 N always constant, or rep:ular in their development. Ouo example is sntlicient : it is a law that the inti'nsity of elec- tricity in a ;;alv{uiic pih; increases with the number of pairs of zinc, copper and cloth saturated in diluted fiulplmric acid. This law liolds good for a limited number of pairs ; finally a certain intensity is reached and, add as many pairs as you will, that intensity will not increase. INIoreover you can so alter the condition of the surrounding atmosphere as to come to this stopping point, sooner or later. Many other laws are subject to like anomalies. We know the explanation of this phenomenon, still, it does not destroy the fact tiuit physical laws are not necessarily alike, at all times, in their evolution. Hence it is nnscientitic to suppose that the various j)henomena could occur with such regularity, even though matter and its properties existed independently of God. From this the read- er will sec how cautious he ought to be, in accepting the dicta of certain scientists, who talk about nature and its laws. The physical order loudly proclaims an Infinite Intelligence. -^^^^3^L>> i CHAPTER IX. I h.: UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD. F we turn down the pages of liistory ; if we rcftd tho annals of any nation, or listen to the tradition of any tribe, we find that all men, at all times, have agreed '{^ in admitting the existence of a being superior to them- selves ; a being whom they ought to adore. Those wlio luivo pretended to disbelieve in a God are so few that they are, ia the moral order, what monstrosities are in the physical. No one for a moment considers that the monstiosities which, from time to time, come into existence, destroy certain physiologi- cal laws ; neither can any one pretend that the few atheists, who reject reason for a time, destroy the universal belief in a God. Of course, many and great re the errors regarding the nature and attributes of God ; but the fact remains lirm that all men have been intimately convinced tluit there exists a being far superior to themselves. No sceptic has attempt- ed to seriously question this universal consent. Ejjicurus admitted it ; Kant, although he alleged that reason could not prove the existence of God, said that we ought to hold his existence by reason of this fact. It is scarcely necessary to transcribe the words of Plutarch against Colotes ; he says : *' If you roam over the earth you may find cities without walls, letters, kings, palaces, wealth, and monies ; cities ig- norant of gymnasiums and theatres ; but a city without i UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 35 *t8. lU •US not his to out temples and jyofTs, which docs not use prayers, oaths and oracles, which does not offer sacrifice to procure favors, and which does not strive to ward off evils by religious rites, no one ever saw. I think it easier to found a city without ground for it, than for a city to be founded and stand, if the idea of a God be destroyed." Plutarch would have been confirmed in this belief had he lived in tlie days of Petroleum and Paris. Now, the Philosopher ought to seek the reason of this universal belief. It is constant and universal ; tliere- fore its cause is constant and universal ; were it not, the effect would be sometimes existing without hny cause. No other constant and universal cause can be assigned except the evidence of reason, the voice of nature heard by all who at- tain the use of reason. Even the blasphemies which come from the mouth of the impious attest their belief. These imprecations are the ravings of a soul r iturally Christian, We have said that no other cause, save the evidence of rea- son can be assigned. All others are either limited, or vari- able. Priest-craft, or any other craft, is not sufficient; it might succeed with some, and in some places, and for a time ; but it could not be constant and universal. Prejudices vary ; ignorance is lessened ; what is advantageous to one is disad- vantageous to another. Thus we can go through the various causes assigned for this fact, and we will find them all inade- quate. The voice of nature alone, always the same, whether by the Ganges, or the Amazon, can explain this universal consent. The great stronghold of modern atheists,* who consider that the acme of knowledge is circumscribed by the narrow limits of their brain, is the ignorance of the people regarding physical laws. This ignorance, they say, explains the uni- versal phenomenon. Of course, all was darkness in the world until the particular atiicist who makes this assertion, «f 3G nilLOSOPIIY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. lionored this mundane sphere by being born in it. This in- tolerable pride is so senseless that Ave would not notice it, only we wish to guard young readers against an error into which they may easily fall, if they read infidel books, or newspapers. Reading continually the stale stock-phrases, of " modern thought,"' and '' progress of the age," on the one hand, and " mcdijcval ignorance," on the other, they may think that only the illiterate believe in the christians' God ; and that only the atheists are learned. Now the case is just the reverse. The most learned in nature's laws were, and are, the iirmcst believers in God as ruler of the universe. Liebnitz, Newton, Linanis, Bonnet and a host of others in the past ; Sccchi and others Avliom each reader can name for Iiimself in the present. The atheists cannot point to a man in their ranks, or who ever belonged to them, that enjoys any solid reputation as a scliolar, or a scientist. A few of them enjoy a manufactured fame, which lasts for a day : but none of them has ever attained that enduring glory which bespeaks great genius. When they will have their names as indelibly stamped on the ])ages of their respective country's history, and as intimately linked with its scientific glory, as the great names above, then will it be time enough for them to prate about " mediaeval ignorance." So far as the ages of the Avorld have run out, all the genius, all the ti'ue nobility of the human race has been on the side Avhich defends a Su- preme Ruler ; rui the other, has l)een the bloated Ej)icurean, the depraved libertine, and the self-c(mceited theorist. This may sound har?h, hut it is the stern fact as ])roved by his- tory. If any one can j)ersua(' iieself that halC-a-do/en pro- fessors, who can write suilic' .ily well to varnish over their gross blunders, comprise the intelligence of the human race, the reader, while pitying his dehusiou, must surely laugh at his folly. UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 37 Finally, the voice of nature, speaking through man, not only proclaims the existence of a God, but, also, his ruling ])ovver. 8uj)plications and sacrifices for rain, or fair weather, thanksgivings for plentiful crops, all tend to prove the same thing, — belief in the ruling power of God. They must have been convinced that the physical laws were subject to him ; that by an act of his will he could intervene in an extraor- dinary manner. Men have believed, and sad experience has taught us moderns, that hunum society cannot exist without a rec()"rnition of God. There can be no society without the recognition and observance of moral precepts. Take away these and you have a den of thieves, a vast brothel of ini- quity. Now the idea of a moral law, or obligation, neces- sarily supposes a lawgiver, and a vindicator of that law. Hence human society absolutely requires a belief in God. Since, therefore, all men, at all times, have believed in a God, and since without this belief society is impossible, it 18 tlie insanity of absurdity to doubt the existence of God. We will here observe that very many of the traditions of the hu- man race, though disfigured by fables, if considered in their substantial })art, will be seen to point to tliis same universal belief in a God, and even to a primitive revelation. CHAPTER X. i^i RECAPITULATORY. ^i AKING for our starting point the three fundamental 6n| I truths, I exist, I can know witli certainty, and the ((^^ principle of contradiction, we established ourselves Cr^ on a solid foundation. Our camp was so well forti- fied that no assault could make a breach in its walls. Any blow aimed at either of those three truths, only redounds on the aggressor. By denying, or doubting, cither of them, he proves it. Hence the impregnability of our position. From this safe retreat we made an attack on the lines of atheism ; we went forth armed with some certainties, and from these deduced, by the evidence of reason, others. The intelligent subject /did not remain shut up in itself; its reason Avants a wider field in which to seek for trutii. The subject / equal- ly convinced of its own, as of others* existence, sought en- lightenment. It wished to know Avho, and what, is the primary actor of the wonderful phenomena it contemplates. Strong in the conviction of its ability to know with certainty, it began its investigations. It soon discovered that there cannot be a series of phenomena without a first ; or a chain of effects and causes without a primary cause. In either case this primary actor must exist by necessity of nature ; its very idea supposes it. If it is the first, then it is from no other ; therefore by necessity of nature. Thus the subject I I BECAPITULATORY. arrived at the conviction that there exists a necessary Being, independent of others, and from whom all else depends. Proceeding in its investigations it saw that since mundane objects are contingent, the necessary Being must have pro- duced them freely ; but free action supposes intelligence. Therefore it became convinced that this necessary Being is endowed with intelligence and free will. The subjtct / has thus, by the light of its reason, arrived at the knowledge of a personal God. It confirmed this knowledge from the phy- sical order, and from the universal consent of man. The feeble shots fired by the atheists were easily turned aside. Their only refuge was in submission, or in a hibyrinth of absurdity. Chance, chance ! *Twas the " abyss crying to the abyss." The subject / having vindicated the dignity of its reason, finds a ser.se of joy and relief. The wonders of nature are no longer matters of perplexity ; it knows them to be the productions of an infinite Intelligence. Turning again to this necessary Being it finds it eternal, supreme, perfect. There can not be two infinite substances ; the very idea is self-destructive. Hence God must be one substance, and that substance must be simple. It can have no parts, otherwise it could be increased, or decreased. Whatever property is in the infinite, must be infinite, because it is nothing more tluui the essence considered under a cer- tain respect. Being a necessary substance all its properties are necessary ; hence it is unchangeable ; its properties being unchangeable and iufnite it must once, together, and always know and will, whatever it knows and wills. God is thus a simple act, having the plenitude of being, and the fulness of wisdom. Whatever is kuowable must be known to him in that one act. He omprehends himself, because his intelli- gence is infinite ; he cannot be comprehended by anything else, because everytliing net God is finite and of limited capa- m I ii» 40 rniLOsopuY of the bible vindicated. city. Being intcllijreiit, he established an order; being good, he desires its observance ; being wise, lie provided means for this purpose ; being perfect, ho must hate the transgressor ; being powerful, he will punish him. God being infinite, he must comprehend everything. He is more intimately present to each tiling than what that thing is to itself. Still, he is not dittused in parts through matter, because he is simple ; but by reason of his infinity everything which exists must exist in Him, although distinct from II im. He is tiie infinite reality ; outside of Ilim tliere is nothing ; we are living and moving in the ocean of his in- finity, but are always distinct and diverse from Him. This infinity of God, not rightly understood, luis been the occasion, to some, of propagating a pernicious error which we will refute in the next chapter. The subject / is lost in wonder contemplating such a Being, it cannot comprehend it ; but it sees how beautiful and consonant to reason is all this, /;:Js>s?. I CDAPTER XI. PANTHEISM. AXTIIEISM is only masked atlioisni ; its advocates pursue various paths, but the iinal conchisiou from tlu'ir priii('i[)los must inevitably be, tln're is no God. lis erroneous system is very insidious, and its cfTects are most disastrous. It speaks often of God, and with pretended veneration ; in fact, its champions are, ac- cording to themselves, the only true zealots of God's infinite perfection. Hence its danpfer, especially to those who are not much versed in metaphysics. It is pernicious in its con- sequences, In as much as, it destroys the liberty, and coiisc- quently, the responsibility, of human action ; and makes riirht and wrong ec[ually the necessary result of the action of the inlinite. It is thus more impious, perhaj)s, than ()])eu atheism, and quite as absurd. It is a horrible blasphemy to deny the existence of God ; but, in our oj)inion, it is still worse to admit the existence of an infinitely perfect Being, and thou to attribute to him all manner of ini»'<)t })eing able to succeed by open atheism, l)ecause the natural convic- tion of man was, of itself, suflicient to refute that absm'dity, the impious became all at once seized with a great admira- I m 42 PIULOSOPIIY OP THE DIBLE VINDICATED. I 1 I' tion of the inHnity of God, and made God everything, that they might succeed in making hiiu nothing. The reader must always remember that the God mentioned by the pan- theist, is not the God of the christians. Our God is, as wo have shown, an infinite, necessary Bi'ing, snjjrcme, perfect, and endowed witli intelligence and liberty of action ; the God of the pantheist is an aggregation of contradictions : ho is infinite, but likewise finite, because the phenomena we seo are God; he is perfect, but likewise imperfect, because tho cincucious cause of sin; he is intelligent, because he is man's intellect, but he is likewise unintelligent, because he is a otonc. It is scarcely credible that any sane man ever serious- ly maintained such absurdities; unless, indeed, God permit- ted one who denied him with his mouth, to become so blinded, as to be given over to a reprobate sense. 'Tis a sad proof of mental aberration that Spinoza, the modern cham- pion, or perhaps, even the author, of the system, has been applauded as the vindicator of the infinite perfe<'tion, and as a rigorous logician ! Why, the school boy, who in his first logical essay would be guilty of such gross contradiction, would most surely be doomed to lose his first holiday, and obliged to write five hundred times — Idem non potest simul esse et non esse — the same thing cannot both be and not bo at the same time. Yet, such is the itch with some to drug themselves of Christian truth, that they will gulph down anything against it, even though reason be choked in the attempt. Perhaps some may think we are manufacturing accusations against the men who speak so religiously about the Infinite. If so they are deceived. VV^e will advance nothing wiiich we are not prepared to substantiate. A slight knowledge of metaphysics, and a little logic, are all that is required to prove our charges. Our object is to warn the youthful PANTHEISM. 48 rentier of the pretty veil, wliich conceals the hideous features ; and then to lift that veil and .show pantheism to be a stupid monster, the offspring of ignorance and conceit. Pantheism, like all errors, has been split up into various gystoras. The principal ones are Realistic, Idealistic and Emanastic. It is not our purpose to refute these singly. Indeed, we think that christian writers commit a blunder, when they lose their time in writing an elaborate refutation of every erroneous conclusion, from gome false premises. There are some men whom you can never convince ; their intellect is a tangled Avilderness, and their heart a parched mountain ridge. You may labor to cultivate the one, or to clear the other, but your efforts will be vain, unless the dews from heaven irrigate the soil, Any man who will defend conclusions which necessarily follow from a principle that is proved to bo false, is, it would seem, one of these iuconvia- ciblo men. Hence wo will content ourselves with demon- strating the fallacy of the pantheistic principle ; observing that all pantheists, of whatever hue, start from the same proposition — there is but one substance, and that infinite. Spinoza strives hard to prove this ; so do all subsequent pantheists. The fundamental error in t'uir mental wander- ings consists in confounding distinction with diversity. Two things perfectly, alike in all their properties are not diverse, but they are distinct, one is not the other. Two things, with qualities unlike, arc both diverse and distinct. Anyone sees the vast difference between diversity and distinction. Now the reader will, perhaps, hardly believe that the great(!) logician Spinoza ignorantly confounded these two. But here are his words : " There cannot be but one substance. If there were many, they should be known by means of different attributes, and then they would have nothing in common." Therefore, according to this beautiful piece of 44 PIlILOSOniY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. Ill' reasoning, tlicre is no sucli thing as numeric difference : if A and B are <\vo apples alike iu size, color, flavor, &c., A is B. This -is in philosophy, what communism is in society — your house is mine. Thus at the onset we discover the flaw in Spinoza's argument. His train of reasoning is founded on the supposition that there is no such thing as numeric distinction ; this supposition is shown to he false ; hence the airy fahric falls in ruin. The pantheist must first prove that two ohjccts, without any diversity of properties, are not distinct. This he can never do, consecpiently he has no starting point. He is like Archimades, he has no ful- crum on which to rest his lever ; consequently he cannot move the heavens and the earth. The next oracular proposition of the Dutch Apollo is eqiudly absurd: "Two substances of different attributes would have nothing in common, and one could not be the cause of the other ; for, to bo its cause it should contain it in its essence and produce effects on it." Here we find that this boasted genius had no higher idea of the way in which an effect could be contained iu iis cause, than the grovelling material one of water in a basin, or a chicjc in the shell. Certainly if there is no water in the cuj) I cannot pour any out of it ; but there is a more elevated idea of cause and eflf'ect. The intricate piece of machinery was not in the mechanic, but did he not produce it? Try to persuade a man that some j)iece of work which he has just performed, ■was not done- by him ; you will say, it has different attributes from you, therefore it was not iu you ; consequently yoil did not make it. The veriest boor would laugh at you and say : " true it, as it is, was not in me, but there was in mo the -power of producing it." By this simple observation, which the most ignorant workman would make, the great difficulty would bo solved. Truly the sublime genius of the pantheist borders ou the ridiculous. PANTHEISM. 45 The t'.vo errors exposed above are the result of I'lrnorauce of tlie nature of the luliiiitc. God is iniiiiitely perfect; eou- sequeutly every })erfeelion which is found in a finite beiuj^ must be in God in some manner. The pantheist is i'i;<:lit when he says that in God is found every perfection wiiich is in the creature ; but he orrs re;xardin<» the manner in wliich it is in him. There are three ways by which one thin<; may be contained in another: 1st — INIaterially, or formally, as water in a basin : 2iul — Eminently, that is, in a greater degree, or a more nolde nuumer, as the j)Ower of a govei-nor iu the king: 3rd — Virtually, that is, wlien the cause has the power of producing the effect ; thus, the engine is contained in its manuhu'turer. Again ; perfections are either absolute, or relative. In the conc('j)tion of the former there is no idea of a defect in(du !y produce aught else. Those who, perhaps, ucver read a line PANTHEISM. 49 of scholastic philosophy sneer at it ; they start out in their investigations with confused ideas, and with the fixed purpose to destroy, if they can, Christianity. What wonder that such as these should fall into the most stupid errors? What wonder if they make a god of their own ? 'Tis their interest to do so ; but to quote Bruyere : there does not exist a sober, temperate, chaste, jusi man that denies the existence of God. I Rii I 1 1 ii CHAPTER XII. THE REALITY OF THE I'UYSICAL WORLD. P^AL is a term generally used by metapliysiclans iu opposition to ideal. A tiling is said to be ideal, or to exist ideally, Avlieu it exists merely in the mind of the subject /, thus a golden mountain exists ideally. It is to be observed that nothing can have an ideal existence the notes of Avhich are contradictory. Thus a round square cannot have an ideal existence, because the properties of rotundity and squareness are mutually destructive in the same subject. Such things are said to be impossible, absurd, or simply nothing. Wlien there is no repugnance in the notes of a thing, it is possible, although it never existed really, and, peiluij)s, never will. A thing is said to be real, or to exist really, when its notes do not involve a contradic- tion, and when it, moreover, has an existence outside of the miud of the subject /. In order to avoid all cavilling about terms, -we mean by real existence a substance in act ; a being whose existence is as actual as is that of the subject /. Hence, with us, substantial and real, in regard to existence, are convertible terms. Every substance is a reality ; every reality is a substance. Again ; a substance is a force, that is, every substance has necessarily action. The manner in which difl'erent substances act, is different, but each and all have a proper action. The uotiou of existence needs no ex- THE REALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD. 51 planntion ; there is notliing more clearly known than the first fact, I exist, I am. Let the subject / imagine a not I that has the same certainty as itself, so that the not / may say with equal conviction, I exist, I am ; it will thus have as clear a perception of what the existence of a thing outside of itself is, as it is possible to have. Many rail against the *' subtilities of the schools," but it is open to doubt if ever the most subtle school-man, engaged in a more otiose questicm than is that of seeking to elaborately explain the meaning of existence. The most clear-headed philosopher has no more correct, or perspicuous idea of what it is, than has the peasant. The certainty of both is equal in measure, degree, and kind ; neither of them can find a stronger asseveration than — I am as certain of it as I am that I exist. Now it is a fact wliich no skeptic, or idealist attempts to deny, that the subject / has a conviction that it perceives various things which it calls trees, stones, grass, horses, &c., and the aggregation of those it calls tlie physical world, the universe, cication. This conviction is not fleeting; from the cradle to the tomb it perseveres in the subject /. Wo cannot divest ourselves of it ; the sceptic, or idealist, may say that there is no reality corresponding to our perception, still he must and does admit that the perception is really in us. Now it is self-evident that a mere negation cannot be perceived; I perccnve a notiiing, is equivalent to saying, I have no perception at all. The ftict of our having tiie per* ception of the physical world being admitted by all — and it having been sliown tliat whatever we perceive must be a something, it inevitably follows that the object of our percep- tions must be a reality. You may differ as to the nature of that reality ; you may deny that it has the {Properties attribu- ted to it ; you may say that it is produced by God, or by the intrinsic power of the subject /; but you can never deny the 52 PHILOSOrnY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. V' 1 H t'l'ii i '■j reality of the object of our perceptions. Wc thus, at once, distinguish between the nature and the reality of the physical world. Its reality, in the sense explained, that is, in as much as the object of our perception must be a something, cannot be questioned. You may just as well deny the exist- ence of the subject / as deny its perception ; you may just as well deny its perception as assert that the object of its percep- tion is a nothing. Hence the only controversy can be about the nature of the admitted reality. Philosophy seeks the knowledge of things through their C{»uses ; we are not content to know a fact, we desire to know its why. What, then, is the object, Avhat the cause of this universal and constant perception ? For our part we think the question is easily answered ; we do not consider ourselves as possessing what is termed genius, still, we must confess to a feeling of sur- prise that those, who are considered as having had that mental quality, should have fallen into absurdities, when endeavoring to answer this question. Perhaj^s tiio very simplicity of the answer may be the reason that genius did not perceive it. Possibly genius is, in the mental order, what aristocracy is in the social ; it only takes notice of elevated notions, and consequently, like its social counterpart, sometimes proves itself ridiculous. Or it may be that a wish to air some original idea may have caused authors, of un- doubted attainments, to theori w when they ouglit to philoso- phize. Be this as it may, the strange fact remains that some have attributed the sensations which we experience, and which arc commonly thought to he produced by external finite agents, to the immediate action of G(xl ; others to au intrinsic and necessary force of the subject /. All other erroneous system* ou this head, can be reduced to one of these two. Let us first analyze these systems, then we will give the correct one. Th© authors of tho first system recog- THE REALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD. 53 nize, at least, two distinct substances, God and the subject /. They arc not, therefore, pantheists nor atlieists. They admit the multiplicity of substances ; why stop at two? Evidently, accordin^f to them, there is no contradiction in admitting thousands of distinct substances. So far all right. But why attribute to God actions which can, from their own principle of the multiplicity of substances, be otherwise ac- counted for? It is unphilosophic to have recourse to the Infinite to explain phenomena that can be explained other- wise. It savors of that pagan superstition which depicts Jupiter with a gleaming thunderbolt in his hand. We do not deny but what God could, and, perhaps, sometimes does, excite in us sensations which would be produced by the ob- ject to which wo refer them. But these are exceptional cases ; and moreover, there is always a means of knowing with certainty, that the object is dily apparently, not really present. Theology supplies an example in the B. Eucharist, Now what we contend is this : the subject / can know with certainty, as already proved ; its object is truth ; the acquisi- tion of knowledge is a part of its perfection. It must, then, have a natural aptitude for truth, and a natural tendency to it, as well as a means of detecting error. Now the subject / is borne by a natural and invincible tendency to attribute some of its sensations to external and finite objects as the true cause of them. Tho *^:rmer casts a seed into the ground, he sees it growing, h^j cuts it, shells it, grinds it, finally eats it, During the progress of these various actions the subject / by a natural and invincible tendency attributes the various sensations of feeling, sigiit, weariness in cutting and threshing, and refreshment in eating, not directly to God, but to a finite substance. If he be in error, his error is in- vincible : if he be in error, nature has led him into that error : and nature must be hourly leading millions into invincible 1 1 ;i i ■ i ! r 1 54 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. error ; or to put it stronger ; God, the infinite truth, for those who defend this system believe in God, is not only permitting us to fail into error, but is drawing us at every moment into it. The aptitude of the mind for truth ; the ability of detect- ing error, are both destroyed, and the subject / l>ecomes the sport of a continual and necessary delusion. Let it not be said that this delusion can be dispelled ; the few writers, who labor to build up this system, cannot be said to destroy the universal conviction of mankind. Moreover, before their time there was no escape from the error ; millions of intel- lects, during thousands of yeais, Avere liourly led into neces- sary error. Who Avill believe it? Again; as we before ob- served, if there be a perpetual conflict between the idea and the perception, the subject /becomes a continual falsity, or a nonentity. But if we suppose God to be the inunediate cause of our sensations, this perpetual conflict would be verified. Therefore, this system would deny what it aihnits, viz. : the existence of the subject /. Finally, the mind is iutinuitely convinced that many sensations may be produced in itself at pleasure. I will to stretch out my hand and I feel the table ; I will to close my eyes and the lovely scenery fades. Now if the sensations are caused directly by God how can a simple act of my will prevent their reception ? The second false system is very absurd and only merits mention in order to show the reader how cautious we ought to be, and what humility of intellect we ought to have. All the sensations are produced by an intrinsic and necessary force of the soul. Such is the system. Now wo have some sensations Avhich wo suffer against our will ; we wish to avoid them, but Ave cannot ; Ave are certain that the thing which produces them is not the subject 7. No one could convince the Avretch stretched on the rack that it Avas the same subject /that both felt and inflicted the pain. 'Tistho old story, the not /is the /; Kullmaun is Bismurck. 1 - THE REALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD. 55 These two systems being exploded, it remains for us to explain the true one: 'tis simple, lop^ical, harmonious, worthy of the majesty of God, and consonant to liuman reason. We proved against the pantheists tliat, at least, two substances really distinct exist. But not oidy does the subject / pro- nounce infallibly that it is not the not /, but it with equal certainty says B is not C, C is not D. It may be unable to enumerate all the points of distinction, but it knows enough of them to be certain that they are distinct and diverse. In its communication Avith other intelligent subjects, the mind not only discovers its own distinction from them, but, like- wise, their distinction from one another. During the course of its life it finds ])lienomena susceptible of modification at will ; that which it calls a rock will always present the same appearance, and produce identical sensations, unless the sub- ject / choses to seize what it calls a sledge, and effect there- with modifications on it. 'Twould be romancing to the moon to say that these appearances, which respond to my will, have no real cause outside of myself, or are produced by God, who suits his action to my caprice. Bear always in mind that we are metaphysically certain of the existence of, at least, two substances ; hence plurality of substance is, not only not contradictory, but actually exists. Again, we are metaphysically certain that the finite I acts, consequently, that it is capable of causing a sensation, provided there be any object on which to act. Moreover, by communication, we become metaphysically certain that there is a not I which ia finite like ourselves, because it does not know something which we know. Therefore we have the infinite, and, at least, two finite 3ubstances. We can thus proceed, by the evidence of reason, and prove that many finite substances exist. Their existence becomes as certain as our own. Now a substance is a force ; or if it please better, a substance must 56 PHILOSOPHY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. It I have action ; therefore, it can produce sensations. Therefore the various sensations we experience are produced by finite substances ; and our natural and invincible tendency to at- tribute sensations to finite beings is reconcilable with our aptitude for truth. In this system everything is coherent ; God is the primary cause ; finite substances secondary ones. The essential notion of a substance, viz. : force, just fits in ; we prove various substances to exist ; their essential notion implies action, and action is here attributed to them. The greatness and wisdon of God shines more resplendently ; his dignity is better consulted. The subject / is no longer a continually deluded being ; its chain of reasonings harmonizes with its natural propensity. To explain tlie phenomena of daily life we have no need to recur to absurdities ; we have proved the possibility of this system ; reason finds it in harmony with its natural tendency. The system which attributes phenomena to any intrinsic force in the soul, was shown absurd ; the other, if not proved actually absurd, is shown to be most improbable, unphilosophic, and even injurious to God, We thus see that the universal belief is, in this case, more reasonable than the fantastic imaginings of philosophic minds in their moments of aberration. The physical order, then, is real ; there are thousands of substances distinct from us ; by reason of their essential property, force, they act and produce the phenomena which make up the physical world. These substances are finite and contingent, for they are subject to modifications ; they depend from the Infinite, and are only secondary causes. But if we seek still further and ask : when I perceive a stone, what is it? It is an aggregate of simple substances having such relation to one another that they form a whole, which is, consequently, compound ; and properly called matter. Each one of the simple elements, of whioh the stone is iL THE REALITY OP THE PHYSICAL WORLD. 57 composed, has its force and acts on the organs of vision : each element, having a different rcUitioa to us, acts difl >rent- ly, or in a different direction, and hence we di^tioguish ri,'i;ht and left, up and down, in the stone. Each simple elemei^t of the stone retains its individuality, so to speak ; tiiough the relation of the elements to one another is such, as to cause them to exercise a mutual action from which results adhesion, and a compound whole ; still no element is, as it were, swallowed up. It is scarcely correct to say ^' com- pound substance ;" substance is essentially simple. A certain relation of a number of simple substauccH produces what is called a compound substance ; but this composition does not affect the essence of the substance ; it only betokens an external relation. The components must be prior to the compounds ; just as the individual soldiers must be prior to the brigade. Hence materialism involves a radical contra- diction, and argues ignorance of the most obvious principles. To sum up : many finite substances exist ; substance essen- tially supposes action : in reality it acts. A certain relation of various simple substances produces what is called matter, or compound substances. These necessarily have action : if we have a certain relation to them they act on us and produce sensations. From expericTice we find that certain portions of matter produce identical sensations, hence we classify them under one head, calling them stones, &c. •When but a few substances make up a compound whole we may feel the action of the compound although we do not see it ; thus the odor from the flowers, although invisible, produces a sensa- tion. The reason may be, the imperfect sensibility of th'^ visual organs. There is no doubt but the odor, being com- posed of various simple substances, acts on our organs of sight ; but its components being few in number, their action is weak, and makes no noticeable impression on the eye. 68 PIIILOSOPIIV OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. li h • -I- Wero the sonsilMlity of our organs very much increased, we conhl see vuriouH thinpjs which are now invisible. Ahhonj]^h, therefore, a thinjr is invisible, it does not at all follow that It is not actinj;^ on our eye ; it is like a j^eutlc tap on the knocker, a real actir»n, but one too weak to produce the desired effect. Another reason may be assigned : the combination of forces in the invisible odor being that of only a few, the relation which each one has to us may be so nearly identical, that we cannot distinguish a diversity of direction, or camiot collocate them to the right, or left. Our system gives a rational proof of the reality of the ])hysical world, and a satisfactory explanation of its jdienomeua. ill i 1^ CHAPTER XIII. CREATION. HE ways of error arc muiiv and stranijc ; tlioy arolike llie wakes made by ships traversin;^ an nnknown sou. As the noble barque passes pvoudly on, a f^littering ^l^ trail appears ; the passengers gaze on it with silent delight ; they watch the curling and rippling of the disturbed water with deep interest. Innumerable prisms are formed •which divide, reflect, refract the rays of light in so many difl'erent ways that the most fantastic and, at times, gorgeous colorings illume the track. It would seem to the gazer that ail illuminated pathway was formed along which lie might, at least, return to his starting point if he could not reach his destination. But lo ! a few moments elapse ; the swaying of the watery elements ceases ; the fleeting ])risms dissolve ; the illumination dies out, and the erst glittering trail becomes conlbunded with the great mass of dull, sluggish brine. Other vessels will cross that track and not observe it ; the same barque that formed it, seeing breakers ahead, will turu about and cross and re-cross it a dozen of times, while the man at the wheel innigines that he is steering back along the original course. Thus the propagators and defenders of false systems, exploring the vast field of metaphysics, will present a theory clad with beautiful expressions, and decked yilh all the glory of oruameutal rhetoric. Its outward beauty 60 PIIILOSOniY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. Ill I » I : oxcites the sympathy of the liearer ; he ima^^iuos it tlic truest "cvohitioii of modem thought;" surely this brilliant system is the way of truth. If, however, he he a man of thoui)ment unfolds some new rrr 66 rUILOSOPIIY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. III I i hi charm, — oARm's some new ?atisfactioi) to the mitid. No obscurity, no «^roj)in;^ in llie dark: startinj,' from certainty, it Avulk.s straight on, aofjuiring f'refh lij^ht and new vij^or at each step. Truth after truth is added to the store ; it follows the fifoMen chain that links each to the other and all to God. Th(! needle does not ])oint as unerrin;^ly to the |)()le as does ri;iht reason, when investigating the physical wcjrld, point to God. It is worthy of note that the account <:iven Ijy Moses, of the creation, is just what right reason and geological research lind it to be. Moses is, we think, the oidy Hiici'Mit philoso- pher who speaks of creation. Is this fuct not strong pre- sumptive evidence of inspiration ? When we call God the Creator, and pri:v..iry cause of the physical order, wo do not ex(;lude the action ot creati.'d things. On the contrary, \\i\ Indd tli.t every std)stance acts, in some v/ay or other. God create d nnmmeral)le monads ; he endowed them with various ))ro|)erties ; essentially they had action. His inlinite wisdom designed an ordered universe in which planets should revolve, plants grow, seasons succeed each other, &.C. : but this sublime machinery was to be kept in motion in virtue of the various properties given to created things. Strata were to be formed— minerals to coalesce — fossils to accumulate, during lapsing centuries, through the action of created things. Hence what are called " physical laws," are the foreseen and intended results of the properties given bv (Jod to the sui)stances he ci'eated. Certain conditions being verified, certain results must h)llow. Had God wished he (joidd have given ditl'erent properties to the monads ; ditterent physical laws would have been the residt ; he might have given a repellent, instead of an attractive property, to two balls of lead. In u word, all (M-eated things being con- tiugeut, then* creation and accideutui properties depeud from CREATION. 67 M the free will of God. God, tlicn, de>Mier, are necessary, and he {)rej)ares them. lie disposes ihem in proper positions ; tlie spring moves, the machinery is set in motion. 'Tis \vjuit he foresaw and intended, liy a 'light alteration he could make the wheel turn to the left iustcad of the right. Unlike God, he cannot j)rovide a com- pensation for disturbances, and the machinery must eventuall/ istop. the ical •ties ions ned ids ; ght [, to 'on- 'om CnAPTER XIV. 71 I ' |i|^:i I PROVIDENCE. T is generally supposed tliat an author thinks more of his literary propressian made upon my mind, hy an incident of which I was an eye-witness. Some companions and myself cailetl at a grocery, in a little town in Italy. We were glutting edibles for a lunch of which we would partake, on the hank of a beautiful lake near by. Oiie of the necessary articles of an JtarKiii mcroxfa is jin's- ciuttOj ham. We askee cheaj)er tlian wrapping pnper. Gn look- ing at the leaves in whidi our jiresciutto was infolded, judge of our surprise to find them to be from the mifortuiuite Passaglia's great work, *' I>e Immaculatu Cuuceptionc,"" rKOVIDKNCE. How vain appeared the aspirations of au author after fame, if his works were to receive such usuage as this ! Yet, with- out doubt, tlie productions of otlier groat writers have, at times, suffered simihir treatment. Tlieir authors, however, will treasure them up ; (hist them carefully; arrange thorn neatly. Every intelligent workman, if his works prove good, likes and cares for them. Now God is, as we showed above, the creator of the phy>ical order ; we and every visible thing are the works of his hand. The natural conclusion is, he loves and (^res for us : the contrary would bo as unnatural ns it is false. God was free to create ; having resolved to operate he must have intended his work for some purpose, otherwise he would bo a foolish God : being all-powerful he is able to attain the desired end. Hence tho wisdom of God absolutely requires that he should dispose and direct all things so as to obtain the end desired. This disposition and directiou is called Providence ; therefore the providence of God is to be admitted. 80 self-evident is this fact that few, very few, either ancient or modern, ever doubted of it. The epicureans did, for the gross reason that God being happy ia himself, would not mar that happiness by troubling himself with mundane affairs. Some moderns deny it ; possibly ia order to give free rein to their passions. As was before remarked, every means is tried in order to destroy the idea of an avenging God. Not being able to deny his existence, they seek to make him blind ; he created, they say, but he cares no more about us ; he has left us to ourselves ; he will not require an account of our actions. The impious said the same in David's time — non requiret Deus. Of course we do not deny the liberty of action enjoyed by mau ; we do not say that he does always what would be most pleasing to God ; far from it ; but we say that God created the world for a purpose ; Ut disposed and directed it to that end ; and he 70 pniLOSorny of the bible vindicated. U f '. l\m will have that ond despite tlic malice of men and devils. We do not say that every event is directly brou;^ht about hy God ; but we say that every event was foreseen by him, and that he so disposed thinj^s as to make each event finally subservient to the jrreat intended end. To deny this would be to deny the intelli^rence of God in not knowiu^j^ the future : or his power in not bciini^ able to attain the desired end by reason of created obstacles. Frf)m this there is no escape. We proved the existence of God from the duration and regularity of the physical order ; we dct«'cted his foot-prints on all sides. Tlicrelbrc we proved his Provideiice. Again, the universal belief of man can be invoked. The history of every nation has no fact so prominently brought into view, as its belief in a (iod, and in his j)rovidence. SatM'itices for rain, before battle, before barguins ; prayers and ottV-ring.s were made at all times by the pagans. The Jewish and Christian religion directly teach the j)r()videnceof God. We luu'e thus the whole of mankind with a few excc))ti()ns, so few that they no more destroy the universal testimony, than do the solar specks imjxule the glorious sunlight. These latter swim in an ocean of brightness but remain opaque, au expressive image of that lunuan intelligence which is blind to the existence and proviilencc of God, thougli bathed in a 8oa of evidence. Whether, then, we consider the wisdom and power of God, or the physical order, or the histO!*y of the human race, we must be convinced that God did not ereato his works and then abandon them ; but that he disposes and directs them to the end for which he brought them into existence. It seems altogether credible that many of those learned iu physical science, who deny the Providence of God, do so from not rightly understanding: what sound metaphysics teaches on this head. They imagine that we take all acliou PROVIDENCE. 71 from pliysionl tliinps: that wc atlribute every phenomenon, that is a little unusual, to the immediate action of God, Now we condemn the t'ooli.sh theory ot" " occasionalism,'' or a destroyiii^r of secondary causes ; we contend, and what is more we prove, (hat every substance is essentially active, and that, ^renerally spcakinjr, physical phetiomcna are the results of the action of physical things. We combat, and we tliink, successfully, the superstitious idea of recurring to the Divinity for an explanation of these phenomena, as a general rule. At the same time we contend that these etfects were foreseen and intended by God ; that he gave action to created things to produce these etfects, and that he provides, daily and hourly, a ready compensation for all incidental distur- bances, so that the physical order may coritinue until he shall please to permit a final catastro])he. This is his providence as regards the ])hysical world. No man of science, unless he wishes to deny (iod, can deny this. It is as idle to talk about the absolute immutability of the properties of a con- tingent being, as what it is to talk about its necessity. The properties of a being are co-extensive with its nature ; the nature being finite, contingent and, consequently, dependent, the properties must be the same. Moveover, we gave an exami)le to prove that physical laws are not regular in their development, and are influenced by various circumstances. Therefoi'e there nnist have been an intelligence that foresaw and provided for all these varieties of circumstances, in order that the harmony of nature might not be destroyed. The man Avho fails to sec this is but a tyro in the science of nature. Those who make a study of physical things become enamoured of the order, beaiitv and harmonv therein discov- ered Tiiey behold crystals following, in their formation, certain fixed laws ; the salts of the earth's surface producing, by chemical action, the various minerals we prize ; the thermo- f 72 PIIILOSOl'IIV OK THE itlBLE VINDICATED. V i electric currents of the earth, caused by the luieciual hcatluji^ of its surltKre, action to frustrate the schemes of that man, he would be destroying the order established by himself. Out of the injustice of that wretch he will finally have his glory ; but being eternal, he can be patient. Again, there is none so bad but has, at some time, done a good ftctiou. Each good action will get its reward ; the impious IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // {■/ '<7 <• fe /*' C^x ^, £-?< #■. (/, 1.0 I.I 1.25 3« IIP 1^ % m 12.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 *i- <^ '-y /i '/a '^A e. ei m // "^y /<<^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^^ ^q\^ \ \ ^9) V o' <^ ri> 6^ ^^ <5> Z.o i^.r ^ \ \ ^ «, 6^ ^^^ A«' %^ I. t k 7G nilLOSOrHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. ,;, that is, the properties without wliich a thiti;j: cannot be imagined, are jjroportioncd to the essence, f^rouncled in it, and conso(piently, absolutely unchanjjjeable. Hence it is evident that the pectuliar essential force }^iven to a monad, at its creation, must remain essen- tially unchanjjTcd, so lou"! as that monad exists. We have here, as will be shown in another place, a nu'taj)hysical priiiciple that ])roves the absjolnlercpuLrnance of the Darwinian theory of development i'rom ihe monkey to the man. It may be thonujht that Ave arc makinj^ a mere <5ratuitous supposition regarding the existence of monads. Sui)i)ositiou is an article in which the true philosopher does not deal ; he leaves that unprolitable branch of speculation to philosojdiic quacks, such as Hegel, Kant, Darwin and id (jeniis omne. Facts are our wares, and the-i- demonstration our advertise- ment. We have proved tlie existence of various substances ; all admit compound ones such as stones, wood and iron. It was shown before that a compound thing })resupposes the parts of which it is compounded. Just as the whole house presupposes the existence of each brick, so each brick pre- supposes the exist'^nco of the parts of Avhich it is made up. It is true that some imagined divisibility of matter to proceed indefinitely ; but this, probably, arose from following with the eye each successive division. Take a brick : it is a finite object and necessarily nnule up of a finite number of parts ; we do not mean atorns^ for these are compound, also, but a certain determined number of simple parts must be in that compound object. Now wo cannot by any chemical means completely disintegrate the brick, consequently, physically speaking, wc are batlled in the division. But our reason says, the parts being finite in number if I go ou taking away NATURE OF THE 8U1JJECT /. 85 one part at a time, I must filially nrrivo at tlie last ono. If there arc but teti buckets of water m the well I caiuiot draw twelve therefrom : if the uuuiber of parts is definite, the divi- siou must end. If, therefore, wo use our reason, and not our seiiM(!S, we inevitably lind that a compourul sui)stauce is made up nf many siini)le ones ; these are what we call monads ; therefore monads exist. Sinct* monads exist, and are simple, they must have come into existence by creation ; because it is evident from their physical simplicity that they are not the result of a process of formation ; they are not from themselves, because they are finite ; therefore they were created by God, and each has, ami must always retain, such essential proper- ties only as were bestowed upon it by the creator. Hence 8im])le substances exist ; but all substances essentially have action ; therefore simi)le substances act. Materialists must be pressed hard on this point. Though these simple sub- stances do not fall under the notice of our senses, they are not to be looked upon as mere nothings ; possibly if our senses were more acute we might experience their action. In any case, they have action as an essential requirement. In order to avoid misconception we must explain a term which is often taken in a wrong sense, viz : inertia. Inertia does not mean an absence of all action ; nor does it mean a state of rest : it simply implied an indifference in the object to either rest or motion ; consequently, it bespeaks the absence of a self-determining power. Put a stone in motion ; it is inert ; put it at rest, it is inert, because it would keep forever either of these states unless some extrinsic cause should intervene. But wliether in motion, or at rest, the stone, though inert, was acting. There are, then, monads created by God and endowed with such properties that by their various relations they might, generally speaking, produce all visible objects and jft s Hi f ill 1 1 i 86 riiii.osopiiY OF Tii:: bible vindicatkd. plionomona. Reason can discover three classes, at least, of monads in visible creation. The essential diflerenci! be- tween these classes consists in the nioiuids of each class imitating the divine essence in a difl'erent degree. The dirterenco being thus essential, a moiuid of one class cao never be developed into one of a higher, nor can it degi-nerate into one of a lower. The simple substances that are the components of matter, constitute the lowest class of monads. They have action but not self-determining power. The principle of life and feeling in the brute creation comprises a higher class ; in addition to action they have sensaiion and life. The subject / of each man, the principle that knows and wills, or human souls make up the highest class. These have action, life, self-stance, an active being: moreover wo clearly showed the possibility of simple substances, that is, such as have no physical parts. We will now undertake to prove that the soul is a simple substance. No one can say a jiriori that it is absurd ; because simple substances can exist and act Our proofs will show it to bo a metaphysical certainty. (©1 ^@) CIIArXER II. SIMPLICITY OF TUE SOUL. ^i\ '^ '^^ generally supposed that man inclines to pride ; ,j)\l that he will rather seek to exalt than to duji^rade cff^rf himself. He boasts of his ancestry if, perr-hanco, 3'fjj any of them may have been distinguished ; sometii..ja even when they have not >» en distinguished b\it only notorious for their rascality. " Blue blood " is a weaknes.^ that runs pretty well through the veins of the human family. By one of these huge delusions under which a people labor at times, the United States are supposed to be the very paradise of democrats, or rather, the nursery of kings ; for every man of them thinks himself a sovereign. Let the foreigner, who is simple enough to cherish this idea, land in America and proclaim himself poor, sprung of obscure parents, but still equal, socially, to the bulls and bears of Wall street. A crowd of boys might proclaim him a " brick " — a policeman would cal! him a " flat" and warn him to beware of "sharks," while a raw native might say "that's the lingo." But the aristocratic circle would simply ignore him. If we turn our gaze backward and look up the stream of time, we will see that some of the great ones of antiquity were not satisfied with having a long human pedigree, they aimed still higher, and boasted descent from the gods. These facts go to prove that man seeks to exalt himself by dignity of origin. Some t , ■; I'i' -iifl i -r ■ 88 PIIILOSOrilY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. i r" 1 111^ ii ll ;^- i IP tlioiiirlit that this arose from an inward consciousness of a dignity that strove to vindicate itself. Be this as h may, it is pretty evident that the generality of mankind arc not in- different to the glory of ancestry. Latterly some notable exceptions have appeared on the stage. They seem to hate, •with a bitter hate, the dignity of human origin and of our present state. "We are, they say, but ingenious pieces of . mechanism, set in motion in some strange way. Our feelings, thoughts and wishes, — all our noble aspirations — our heroic resolves — our most sublime conceptions, that wliich we call om* soul, all these are but the unsubstantial quiverings of the human mechanism. The machinery will run for a time, and then, — that which thought, loved, felt, longed for bliss will be no more ; the broken machinery Avill fall to dust, and everlasting nothing will be man's only doom. It must be admitted that this theory is not calculated to flatter human pride, nor to conduce to generous actions. Humiliating though it is, it is not the offspring of humble parents ; it is an excrescence rather of human pride ; or the figment of guilty minds. A man imagines himself learned ; he hankers after notoriety ; he cannot obtain it by following the beaten track, for his genius is not suflicient to give now expression to old truths. He delves in his own brain ; the mine is not very rich, but he strikes upon a crude idea. In die clothing of this with expression he carefully interweaves threads of pure gold ; a jumbled mass of truth and falsehood is the re- sult. The uncautious note only the glittering of the dress, they do not see the utter Avorthlessness of the idea. The, operator becomes noted ; sometimes ke knows well that he is only obtaining applause under false pretences ; sometimes he persuades himself he is right, either from pride, or from a wish that there was no hei-eafter, as he has reason to fear it. Some again who see the wondrous structure of the body, its great adaptability to its end, and not properly understand- SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL. 89 is ho a it. ing wliat sound metaphysics teaches ahoiit the soul, and its union with the body, *' SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL. 98 must bo in the human system ; tliero must be one simple substance endowed with superior ([ualities, with determining power. Only in this way could there be harn\ony of action in man. Imagine a person climbing a dangerous cliff as the only means of escape from death. The eyes are ciigerly seeking a root, or branch that may aiVord support ; the hands convulsively clutch it ; the feet nervously })ress against the rock toget some slight support from its uneven surface; every joint is quivering, every fibre is vibrating, every muscle is strained — all, all these actions are conspiring to the one end ; one is subordinate to the other, and all work harmoni- ously. Can any rational being convince hinvself that the subject / which is all the time conscious of the danger and dilliculties of the situation, which sees the means of escape, and directs the action of the whole frame-work of man, is nought but a sensation of the brain, a nervous phenomenon, or a mass of matter? Again ; the soul compares two ideas and judges concern- ing them. This o})eratiou can only take place in a subject which is physically simple. In i'act ; either the two ideas co-exist formally in the soul ; or one of them exists with a remembrance of the other ; or the remembrance of both exists. One of these three hypotheses nuist be verified, otherwise there could be no comparison instituted. Therefore, in the act of comparing, there are two distinct, and widely different representations in the sold, at the same point of time. Now this could not be possible were the soul physically compound ; the parts of the one woidd become confused with the parts of the other ; neither wo ild be true ; an ideal monstrosity, so to speak, would be the result. If you say that one repre- sentation would be in one part of the subject, the other in another part, you do not escape the diiliculty. In that sup- position there could be no comparison ; each part of the soul would have its own idea, but could not compare it with the f li I w rl A I 94 PniLOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. one in another part ; no more than Peter can compare an idea of his own with one that is in the mind of John. Both ideas mnst be in the self-same subject, at the same moment, otherwise comparison is impossible. If our ideas and affec- tions are but physiological phenemona, but the quivering of the fibres, it would be the height of madness to talk of com- parision. As well might you suppose that a bell could com- pare its various sounds, as that nuui could compare his ideas, unless you admit in the latter a substance physically simple and intelligent, Avhich is the subject of all ideas and sensa- tions, and which, by reason of its self-determining power, can excite feelings formerly had, and compare them with the present ones. This is so self-evident tliat it is hard to inuigine that a rational being could seriously impugn it. Finally ; the subject I is, as we before observed, identical with itself, from the first moment of its earthly course to the last. Now all material things are undergoing continual change ; few, if any, of the particles of our bodies are identical with those wo called ours ten vears ago. Several times during the allotted three score and ten our corporeal elements are renewed, but our soul remains alwavs the same. Were it physically compound it would, undoubtedly, be subject to the same change. From the foregoing arguments it will be seen that our soul whose existence, as an intelligent and sentient subject, all must admit, is a substance physically simple, distinct and different from the body, and consequently, that the dissolution of the latter does not necessarily include the destruction of the former. Moreover, material substances are absolutely incapable of thought, because the whole idea must be in an indivisible unity. Parts physically distinct can conspire to produce one external action ; but they can never conspire to produce an internal one ; if they could all their forces would have to be transfused into one of the parts. CHAPTER III. SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL. EIIHAPS no philosophic truth so commends itself to the feelings of our nature as the one we are going to demonstrate. We all feel this truth ; we all are glad '^'^ to feel it. We recognize in ourselves a nobility and dignity superior to that in other visible things. We admire the delicacy and wonderful structure of our body, still we are intimately convinced that there is something in us more wonderful still ; something which is not necessarily dependent on this tangible organism in the exercise of its powers, although united to it. This conviction more or less plainly shadowed forth in conversation, points to the spirituality of the soul. We call a spiritual substance a simple substance endowed with will and intelligence, and capable of exercising these independently of corporeal organs. Our soul, as shown above, is the subject of will and intelligence ; it is, also, a simple substance ; consequently if we prove that it can exercise its faculties independent of sensorial organs it will be spiritual. The spirituality of the soul is no figment of the scholastics, as certain ones, who only lack the one thing to le learned, viz : knowledge, pretend. The idea is traceable in the philosophy of every nation, from ]\roses to our own time. Its dress may be as varied as the costumes at a mas- querade ; but as surely as a human being is enshrouded iu II 96 PniLOSOPIIY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. Hi I ■ 'I'i in I I •J'' each of these fantastic masks, just so surely is the idea of the spirituality of tlie soul, hidden under all the ridieulous expressions about genii, the Klysiuu tields, Thor, Manitou, and all the ;^ods and iroddesses tiiat ever obtained a niche in Koine's great Pantheon. The legends generally ran, that these had fonneriy been men renowned during life, and clianged into gods. The conviction of these peojjle, then, was that v,eath did not destroy all of man — 7inn omnis moriar — but that a something of him triumi)hed ovei- the wreck of the body and thought and willed, although hidden from mortal gaze. It is true that often they made the soul a body of more refined moidd, still there renuiins tlie iunda- mental idea of a distinction and diversity between ih.e soul and body, and of the life of tlic soul after its separation from its grosser companion. No nation, or tribe, ever yet con- foinided the soul with the body in such a manner, as to deny to the former the power of acting independently of the latter. They were considerably in advance of our modern pagans. They made the soul of the nature of fire, or air, or thrice refined matter. Now we maintain that this is an idea of spirituality in the embryo. The light of the christian reli- gion illumed men's minds ; their thoughts turned into purer channels ; they ceased to be the " aninuil man," of Avhich St. Paul speaks, and became more spiritualized. Hence their philosophy became clearer ; their expressions more precise ; their ideas more refined, Hence they proved that the soul cannot be matter, not even the most subtle; it must be physically simple ; at the same time they held with the ancients that it can and does act independently of the corporeal organs. Fuiulamentally the idea of spirituality is as old as the human race ; the precision it now enjoys is the effect of Christianity. It is mere trickery to quibble about terminology once your adversary has plainly stated the seuse SPIRITUALITY OP THE SOUL. 97 he nttarhes to it. A vast deal of philosophic precision is due to scholastic philosophy, aud its trenchaut form of argumen- tation — the syllogism. It is a philosophic axiom that the " manner of acting follows the manner of existing," or a thing acts in accordance with its nature. Hence sensible organs can only be affected by sensible things. That which is entirely above and beyond the range of physical nature cannot, it is evident, be conceived by a subject whose perceptions are entirely dependent on corporeal organs. The thick plate of an iron-dad ship of war is not more impervious to an arrow that what our organs of sense are to the conveyance of purely intellectual ideas. Now we have ideas that are altogether outside the spiiere of sensible things ; we have abstract notions ; we apprehend perfections, relations, and dependencies ; we contemplate virtue and truth. In a word, our intelligence rises far above all material things, and reasons about trutiis which have no material property. Were our intellect but the slave of organic iustruments, were it but the tremor of our nervous system, or a mere sensation of the brain, it could not have even one abstract idea ; it could not deduce conclusions ; it would be insensible to heroic actions ; to glory, fame, or the judgment of posterity. If, therefore, we wish to have a rational explanation of our intellectual operations, and of the feelings which sway many of our noblest actions, we must recognize in our soul the ability to exercise its intelligence independently of sensible organs. If we consider the actions of our will we shall perceive, even more clearly, the spirituality of the soul. Corporeal organs, like mechanical arrangements, act necessarily aud in a uniform manner, provided the conditions of action be fullilled. Our eye must see, if open in the light ; our ear must hear sound that strikes on it — all our senses must be 8 (l: 98 riiiLOSoniY OF the bible vindicated. I V affected by external objects under certain comlitious. More- over our senses, by reason of their sensitive ten«lency, seek to avoid that wliicli causes them pain. The eye instinct- ively closes in a filarin^ li^''^ — ^^'^ hands are iier>on8ly ■withdi'awn from objects which are too hot, or too cold. Kow any one can prove for oneself that our will can resist this sensitive tendency. Despite the sull'erin^s caused by keepinj^ our hand in freezin*; water, we can keep it there. Our sense of feelinj; craves to be released, but our will cau lord it over the sensation and hold it captive. Do you sup- pose that Scan'ohi did not experience bitter })ain while hohl- inji^ his hand in the camp-fire of Porsenna? Aye, surely lie did, and all his sensations rose in rebellion and demanded its withdrawal ; but his will was inflexible ; it acted not only not in accordance Avith his sensations, but in direct opposition to them. Thercifore the will must be capable of beinjr exer- cised independently of corporeal organs. Take the actions of every day life. How many continually repel the sugj^estious of the sense ; some throu and nought else ; the most learned metaphysicians, if yon divest their propositions of technicali- ties, assert this ; our inner consciousness conUrms it. "\\'heu ■we speak of the miion of tlie soul with the body we will ex- plain some apparent dilliculties. Regarding the origin of the soul, some fanciful theories have been projiounded. Pythagoras and some of the stoics atlirmed that it was a part of the divinity : some " modern tliinkers," who, by the way, are not modern in thought, j)ro- fess the same absurdity. In fact all pantheists must hold some such opinion, for if there bo but one substance, tlie soul must be that substance, or a part of it, or a moditication of it. In order that the reader may clearly perceive the impo- sition of these " modern thinkers," who dress up in modern attire the stale and oft-refuted errors of antiquity, and seek ESSENCE AND OUIGIN OF THE SOUL. 103 odorn vseck to palm them off as orii P! '. !l ' . 1 ) Hi i I! ' iHi partly a sensitive, aiid partly an intellcotiuil operation, Avliilst memory is purely intellectual. Inisigination aids the nvniory, because by recall in^j; the circumstances of place, position of objects, &c., the concatenation of ideas ■will be more perfect. A delicacy of organization occasions a liveliness of imagina- tion, l)eing more sensitive to im])ressions than a coarser one. It seems too near an ajjproacli to materialism to mako memory consist in resuscitating: in the nervous libres, or in the l)rain, the sensations had at a former period. Something like this hapjiens in imagination ; but we can remember purely intellectual ideas — what we thought about God, justice, truth. From this it is apparent that memory is the intelli- gence scanning itself. Hence memory remains after the separation of the soul from the Ijody. Now we say that the two grand faculties of the soul, viz : intelligence and will, are the soul itself: they are not a part of the soul, or anything in it distinct from itself. Intelligence is the soul considered inasmuch as it thinks, com|)ares, analyzes, i!cc : Avill is the soul assenting to something, or determining itself to present or future action. This is evi- dent from the fact that the soul is a simple and spiritual force. The one agent may act under various conditions and seem to be many ditferent agents. Thus positive and negative electricity are the one agent; light, heat, and electricity are, accoi'ding to some, the self-same agent though acting so dilferently. We shul' here treat of the Intelligence. Each one understands what is meant by perceiving, by knowing: no ex})lanation could give us a clearer idea of this operation than we already have. We might, possibly, mys- tify some and cause them to thitdc us learned by entering into an obscure treatise on this simple operation of the soul : wo prefer, however, to make metaj)hysics, what it really is, clear and concise, even at the risk of being cousidered super- -I; ! FACULTIES OF THE SOUL. 107 1 , 4 )iircs, ,-5 or cvi- 'itual >s and irative V are, ficial. One thin"; i.s very certain to our niiu'l.i and it is that many philosophers have <^onc too deep ; in fact they luvve h>st tliemselvcs in the profundity of their exco^^itations. A desiro to aj)poar a deep and orijriiud thinker will sometimes take possession even of the cool l>rain of a metaphysician, and cause him to write paf^cs of unintelli<^il)le matter, on the most intelli^fible sul)ji'ct. Each one is fullv cojiuizaut of what it is to know. This ojjcration of knowina: is an act of .inti.'lligence, or it is, in other words, the soul ])erceiving. Truth and good are the two objects of the soul ; inasmuch a3 the soul is seeking, or contemplating truth, it is the intelli- gence ; inasmuch as it pursues good, it is the will. To know is the great and natural desire of the soul ; we perceive many things ; we know a great deal, still we fain would add to our store. Each new truth we learn gives pleasure to tht; soul. When we perceive a thing we are said to ac(piire an idea of it. Hence an idea is a representation of a thing in the mind ; not a sensible, but an intellectual representation. A great deal has been written about the nature of ideas, and the manner of ac([uiriiig them. If we consider attentively the nature of truth, and the nature of the soul, wc will not fuid great difficulty on this point. Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is ti'ue. As before explained, all things Vvhicli exist, or which are possible in tliemselves considered, imitate in a certain degree the Divine Essence. In it tlu'y have the rea- son of their intelligibility ; in it they intidligibly shine. Abstract from that essence and reality ceases, and, as a consequence, truth. Objectively considered, all truth is ia God. As regards the soul, we are to bear in mind that it ia a spiritual force of limited power : one of it>; objects is truth ; hence essentially it has an aptitude to acfjuire it. The Su})reme Intelligence sees all truth in itself once, always, and altogether ; but a created iutelligeuce, like the soul, ,l'»* •a I fl'flpi ■ SBBH 108 riiiLOsoriiY OF the bible vindicated. 'fti acquires its corrnitions by the exorcise of its power. All iialuriil knowledge which we acquire, is but the outcome of the action of the soul, in its pursuit after truth. Now since there are visil^le and invisible thiiiirs, it follows that truth may be refei'red to a double order, the sensible and the intellectual. Our soul being intimately united to our body perceives some things through the instrumentality of the senses, others purely through the idea itself. The knowledge of liistcn-ic facts (by this we mean all sensible facts past or present) is acipiired through the instrumentality of our senses : we read them ; see them ; hear them narrated ; feel their existence. AH knowledge deriv(Ml I'rom reasoning, compar- ing, analogy, analysis, sythesis, or any kindred operation, is accpiired through the idea, and is intellectual. When we listen to the reasoning of another we ac(piire anew cognition ; but it has not been transfused into us from the reasoner : his words merely served to call our attention to some manner of considering a(jnestion in which we never before looked at it. Our own soul turned its inborn {)ower in the direction indi- catiMl and ac(iuired the truth. INIasters or books, in the strict sense of the word, never teach us intellectual truth ; they only admonish our soul to fix its attention on snch a chain of reasoning; the evidence of the argument is seen by both souls, but how? Let St. Augustine answer: " If we both see to be true what thou sayest, and what I say, where, I would say, do we see it? I certainly do not see it in thee, iiur thou in me, but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds," (L. xii. Conf. cap. 25.) By the accjuisition of knowledge no new being is added to the soul ; its latent i-n-er is developed, or brought into play. By stud ■'■ >i! • souls in relation with a variety of objects, ixwc .':■■.-■':■ c its field of action: we ransack history to gleau .1 M . .; . of the reasoning of the ancients; or we FACULTIES OF THE SOUL. 109 jects, \y to read the wrltin^^s of our contemporaries. In caoli ease the soul develops its power ; study is to the soul what gyuuiastic exercises arc to the body ; or it is like the breath of air ■which, while adding nothing to the essence of a live coal, still, makes it glow more brightly. While, then, we acquire a cognition of many facts through means of the senses, all knowledge, properly so called, is the effect of the internal action of the soul. Ilence it follows that the soul, if sepa- rated from the body, could, by internal action, acquire knowledge. It would be conscious of its own existence, and from that it could prove the existence of God, and his great perfections. It could then speculate on justice, truth, good- ness, and innumerable other subjects fraught with intellectual ideas. There is a difference between an idea and the perception of it. Perception is the consciousness which the soul has that it is contemplating a truth ;. the idea is the object of contemplation. Perception is, then, a modification of the soul ; the intelligibility of a thing, or its idea, is not a modi- fication of the soul ; neither does it pertain to the soul, for even if my soul never existed, the intelligibility of, say a triangle, would still be. Cause and Origin of Ideas. That we have various ideas no one denies ; but regarding the cause and origin of them much has been written. Mate- rialists and all those whose minds are of a gross mould, pretend that in some way or other, all our ideas arise from the senses. We have already said enough to show the absurdity of this baseless theory. Purely intellectual ideas, whose existence no one can deny, are altogether beyond the sphere of the senses, and completely independent of them. But let us take a soul fresh from the creating hand of God, and see how it acquires its ideas. Some have looked upon stances, and a rational survey of man's actions and thoughts, easily effect a reconcih'atiou between the facts of jjsychology and those of physiology. A knowledge of both these sciences is necessary, if wc wish to learn all that can be learnt of our U'es. Some metaphysicians have ignored too much the re ^cal action of soul and body ; they have, apparently, been stricken with a dread of materialism, and havt' almost flown to the opjjositc pole. A great many physiologists have never learnt metaphysics ; enamored of their own branch of study, they neglect, or despise, other branches ; they develop their intellect oidy in one way, viz : through the senses ; hence they begin to think that nought is to be admitted except what falls under the sense. In their anatomical investigations, they do not see, or feel, the soul ; upon this they conclude, it does not exist. A very illogical conse- quence, but one too commonly deduced. If they used their reason a little, they could prove satisfactorily, that notwith- standing the beauty and adaptation of the body, it is merely a machine without a motive power. Its parts, however delicate, could never be a principle of thought and will ; its 10 m ii' .1. 130 PHILOSOPHY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. Mi t III fiubtle fluids, and net-work of nerves and fibres, can be only conditions^ not causes, of communication Avith other tLings. Tlie miserable sophisms that are flaunted in our face as facts, the grotescjue theories regarding man which many delve from their uncultivated brains, could never mislead the medical student who had made a good course of metaphysics. We have now established the fact of a reciprocity of action bctAveen the soul and body : it might still be asked : " but liow does the soul act on the body, and vice-versa?" We know the fact, can we know its how f It must be borne in mind that even if we cannot answer this question, the truth of what has been proved above remains intact. There are innumerable facts which science, in its present state, at least cannot explain. Materialists would profit nothing by our ignorance, because we would ask them to explain how any one force acts on another. We can answer our ([uestion equally as well as they can that. It is a fact that at the will of the soul our muscles contract and expand. Why so? The soul is a force ; the body is an aggregate of forces ; the former is of a superior nature and domineers over the inferior ones. Volition acts on the subtle, but inferior forces,' of whicli the brain fluid is composed ; these act upon the fibres and muscles and thus set the whole nuichinery in motion. Volition is something like the discharge of an electric bat- tery ; the electricity discharged will act upon an object and be carried over it to a distance ; so the self-determining force of the soul, being naturally ordained to act on the un-self- determining forces of the body with which it is united, sets them in motion, and guides their course Since our soul is a finite being it can only have imm^ . .le relation with a limited number of inferior forces ; i^^nce it can only act immediately on our bodies ; through means of the body it can place itself in mediate relation with other objects, aud ! UNION OP THE SOUL AND BODY. 131 Perfectibility of our Intellectual Powers. There are some facts known to all which might here be examined: 1st, Some persons are naturally more apt to acquire science than others ; 2(1, Cultivation perfects the intellect. The explanation of the first is this : man is to acquire knowledge, naturally, by the exercise of the powers of his soul. While in life we are not to view the soul sepa- rately, we must consider it united to a body. Although, as shown above, the soul can, by abstraction, have intellectual ideas, such as could never fall under the sense, and is con- sequently, spiritual, still the matter, we may call it, of most of Its ideas, is derived through the senses. We use our eyes to read, our ears to listen to the professor, our phantasy to re()resent ideas. Hence it follows that our impressions will partake of the nature of the organs, through which they are conveyed to the soul. An organic change will produce a corresponding change in the matter of our ideas. A fine, delicate organization will be more sensitive to the impressions of external things, and will convey them more faithfully than a coarser one. Lively, subtle fluids will be quicker in their operation than sluggish ones. The ditference of organization, then, is the reason of the difference of natural aptitude for learning. It is a consequence of the intimate union of soul and body. Regarding the second fact, that cultivation per- fects our intellectual powers, the explanation is obvious. The object of the intellect is truth ; it has, coevally with its existence, a certain amount of truth, and the power and aptitude of acquiring more. By the exercise of this power it increases its store of knowledge. Cultivation of the intel- lect is but a bringing into play its power ; an opening up for it of a wider range of action, and, as a consequence, an ad- ding to its ideas. As before observed, it is the gymnasium of the soul. This perfectibility of the intellect is another proof of its spirituality, Were we nought but well-regulated 1 i : J'f : m ' 'nil 132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. machines, kept, in motion by some force akin to electricity — were our thoughts and affections only organic plienomena, there would be no possibility of advancing in science. A power to analyze, to judge, to compare various facts or im- pressions, and a power to recall former ones, are necessary in order to increase in knowledge. Now no one who has not abdicated one's reason, will pretend that such a power could, by any possibility, belong to mere sensations, or nervous affections, or any other of the materialistic substitutes for a spiritual soul. One affection, or plienomenon, would have no connection with the others ; it would come, and pass away forever, like the trembling of a lute. Without a per- manent principle of life and intelligence, there could be no perception, or remembrance of an affection. Tliis explanation of the diifcrence of intellectual power in individuals, is more satisfactory, and more in accordance with anatomical observations, than that of relative weight of brain ; or anterior and posterior development ; or facial angle. Each of these theories is contradicted by actual fact. No doubt certain forms of head, certain developments of physiognomy, are often found associated with great, or poor talents in the person. It only follows from tliis that a system well or ill adapted to receive impressions, shows certain characteristic marks ; it does not follow that these marks are causes. Again, we believe that, to a certain extent, the natural tendency of a person may be known from anatomical, or physiognomic observations ; but, since the will is free, we can never conclude that the person is addicted to the passions towards which, natin-ally, he is inclined. A pronness to any vice, or virtue may be checked, and altogether overcome by the will. Hence phrenology, or the reading of character from the development of certain bumps, may, perhaps, tell the natural tendency of an individual ; but it can never tell vbat his conduct really is, because of his liberty of will. ■icity — omena, ce. A or im- scessary has not r could, nervous 3S for a 1(1 have lid pass t a per- i be no owcr in jordance eight of >r facial iial fact. ueiits of or poor I system certain arks are eiit, the tomical, free, we passions ss to any )iue by laracter laps, tell ever tell will. (•( CHAPTER IX. IMMORTALITY OF THE SODL. hitherto e not, S^ V9 i N a social and moral point of view, what has hi (^ j i been proved, would be of little avail could wi k(>r: likewise, prove that our soul is immortal. If our ^'{L soul were to perish with its earthly companion, our final end would be in this world ; no hope of a life beyond the grave would cheer the gloom of the just man in affliction ; no fear of a stern judge would deter the impious. Our life here would be the greatest boon of existence, because with- out it we could not enjoy anything ; hence its preservation would be at once our chief good, and primary duty. He who would expose it to danger would be a fool ; he who would not remorselessly break down and trample upon all ties of friendship and blood, in order not to endanger it, would be the laughing stock of a community. What social chaos would result from this. The mother would cast thei diseased babe from her breast, lest she might bocome affected thereby ; the husband would shun the house in whicii lay stretched the wasted form of his wife, smitten by some con- tagious disease. The soldier would desert his post, and leave the city to perish, if thus he could jirolong his life. Our final end being, in this supposition, in this world, all the pleasures we could cull would be our chief pursuit. If a man were an obstacle to the attainment of t-jme gratification, i (I t' MRi 134 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. to strike him down relentlessly Avould be our inalienable right. Darwin's process of selection would go on beautifully' in such a state of society. Now let it not be objected, that a moral sense, or natural love, or reason, would be sufficient to prevent sucii consequences. These stimulants to civilized life exist only because the soul is immortal. If we were to end with death, our moral sense, our love, our reason, would all cry out : — " take all you can ; enjoy yourself as much as possible ; " eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die.'* This would, necessarily, be the promptings of a nature doomed to only a brief existence. Did reason tell me to consider another before myself, in the supposition of our souls being mortal, it would be unreasonable. Life is the greatest temporal boon, since it is the foundation of all others ; hence it would be madness to expose it for the sake of another, unless there were an hereafter. From this it can be seen what a degrading, selfish, anti-social doctrine materialism is ; what a misshapen brood of social evils it would engender ; it can, likewise, be seen what services the Catholic church has rendered to humanity ; by ordering all teachers of philosophy in universities, to refute the errors of an author read, regard- ing the immortality and unity of the soul, and similar errors, since, so the words run, — these are all soluble — (Act. Cone. Labbaei Tom. xiv. p. 187.) Does anyone know whether the enemies of our church call tliis a degradation of reason? The idea of immortality includes the idea of perpetual existence and life. Hence when Ave say the soul is immortal we mean that it Avill exist forever, and exercise vital actions. It is not the kind of immortality attributed to it by some physical scientists, who make it, after death, an unintelligent substance floating in the azure, like electricity ; our idea of immortality is at once more noble, and more philosophic ; the soul will exist, and wiU be, as in life, intelligent. "VVe IMMORTALITY OP THE SOUL. 135 will proceed in our proof by steps : 1st, The soul can exist and act when separated from the body. 2d, No created force, no natural j)rocess can destroy the soul. 3d, God only could destroy it, but he will not, he wisiies it to be immortal. Regarding tlie first proposition, that the soul can exist and act when disunited from the body, we merely need 'recall that we proved the soul to be a substance distinct and diverse from the body: althouglj united in life they are not merged in one, but eadi remains a distinct substance. Hence the dissohition of the body does not involve the necessity of the destruction of the so\d, no more than the death of one person involves the death of his neighbor. Tiie soul can, therefore, exist after the deca/ of the body. It can also act ; it is a substance, or force ; all substances necessarily act, and act according to their nature. Therefore tlie soul acts as long as it exists, and arts as a spiritual sid>stance, viz : by exer- cising acts of intelligence and will. But it can exist separate from the body ; therefore, also, it can act as an intelligent being. It will not want for ideas on which to exercise its power; apart from its rcmeml)rance of the ones acquired iu life, it will always have the knowledge of its own existence, from which it cou.d deduce the existence of God and his great perfections. The second proposition says, that no created force, no natural process cai destroy the soul. There arc only two ways by wliich a *hing can be destroyed, either by dissolu- tion of its parts, rr by unnihihition. Now we proved the soul to be physicaly simple ; hence it cannot perish by dis- solution, for only compound substances can be dissolved. The only way, tlen, by which the soul can perish is by annihilation, Bu; we showed in theoh)gy, that as only God can create, so ou^y he can annihilate, for annihilation is a suspension of the creative act. Moreover, all scientists i ■I ■ \ \\ m It .t , ft p Ml 136 PHiLOSopnr OF the bible vindicated. agree, that by no natural power can any particle of matter be made, or destroyed. Tlierefore the soul, which is a sub- stauce, cannot be destroyed by any created power. Its properties of thought and will cannot be destroyed, because they are essential. That which cannot destroy the essence of a simple being cannot destroy its essential properties. There remains, then, but one Avay by which the soul can perish, viz : by the action of its creator. Now, absolutely speaking, God could annihilate the soul ; but looking at things as they are constituted by him, and not at the manner in which they might have been created, tvc can prove that not only he will not destroy the soul, but that he positively wishes and intends it to be immortal. We proved that all things were created for the glory of God ; he is the end of man ; his external glory is the object of creation. Again, we proved man to be rational and free. Now since God is infinitely wise he must have provided metujs suthcient and suitable to the nature of each thing, to enaMe it to attain its end. These means, as regfirds a ratioua. and free being, must be certain laws, or directions, according to which it should conform its actions. An intelligeutbeing is not to be dragged to its end ; its dignity requires that it be directed to it by laws in keeping with its nature. ThiB we find a priori that God must have imposed certain laws en man : this con- clusion is confirmed a posterion. Every jation, each indi- vidual, has, at all limes, held certain actbns to be lawful and obligatory, such as to reverence parents, and to obey God ; and have looked upon others as unhuvful, as crimes. This constant universal fact can only be explained, by saying that it arises from the evidence of reason. N^ other sufficient cause could be assigned. Education, sujierstition, social intercourse and any thing of that sort is dumgeable : not only is it different among different uatiout, but it varies IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 137 araonf^ the same nation durinfjf the hipse of ages ; while the judgment of men, regarding these actions, remains unchanged. Therefore it is from the evidence of reason : therefore natur- ally a law has been imposed on man. Now God must have affixed a sufficient sanction to that law, otherwise he would be a foolish legislator. He must have determined a reward sufficiently great, and must have threatened a punishment sufficiently severe, to warrant a rational being in observing it at any cost. His wisdom requires this. Now, if we abstract from a future life, there is no motive sufficient to induce a man to observe this law at all times. Were there any such motive it would have to be one of these three : 1st, the good and evil of this life : 2d, the love of vii'tue and hatred of vice : 3d, the congruity of the law with the light of reason. Now it is evident that the lirst is insufficient ; for the goods and miseries of this world are indiscriminately enjo.}cd by the observers of the law and by its transgressors. Very often, indeed, the just have more of the miseries, and a smaller share of the goods of life. Again, in the case of killing a man and usurping his possessions, the breaking of the law would confer a temporal good. It could not be the love of virtue and hatred of vice ; if we were to end n'ith death virtue would lose its charm, and vice its horror. Again, our perception of the beauty of virtue is not so very keen, especially when our interest in life, and our passions, solicit us to pursue a contrary course. Vice at first sight is liateful, but alas ! how soon does it lose its horror ! Pope truly says : " Vice is a monster of such ludeons mein. That to be hated needs but to be seen ; If seen too oft, grown familiar vvitli its face, We tirst endure, then pity, then ('nil)race.'' Finally, the congruity of the law with the light of reason would not suffice. Without an hereafter the final end of ■lit M r .'1 5| I'l' M L i., ! r I 4- I 188 rniLOSOPHT OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. i '3 man would be in this life ; consequently reason would tell him that tlie law was not to be observed whenever it clashed with his present enjoyment or gain. Therefore unless the soul is to exist and live after its separation from tlie body, God would not have affixed a sufficient sanction to tlie law imposed by him on man. But this would be absurd. There- fore the soul does not perish with the body. But the justice of God, no less tljan his wisdom, demands that the soul should survive the wreck of the body. Being just he must wish and provide that the lot of the observers of his law be better than that of its breakers. Now It is abundantly evident that in this life the lotof the just is often worse than that of the wicked. Therefore there must be another life in which due portions will be meted out to all. If we consider the nature of man, either in itself, or in its relation to society, we will see, with equal clearness, the necessity of admitting another life. Man naturally and invincibly desires perfect happiness ; all his actions prove it ; he never performs the slightest turn, he nevir determines himself to action, without seeking either present, or future happiness of some kind. This longing after felicity is com- mon to all ; it cannot be explained without admitting that it is inherent to, and inborn of our nature. Therefore it has God for its author. But that which has God for an author can never be useless, or vain ; consequently this ardent desire of felicity can be satiated. Now it is clear that it never can be satisfied in this life ; no one would pretend that man can ever have all the desires of his heart gratified in this world. Therefore there must be another life, in which this happiness, so ardently desired, can be obtained. Moreover, reason tells us that our happiness is linked to an observance of the moral law ; now in order to observe that law we must often under- go great sufferings ; we must often deprive ourselves of many IMMOBTALITY OP THE SOUL. 139 worlflly benefits. If, then, there be no other life, reason is a false guide ; it is worse ; it is a traitor ; our conseienee is a vain prejudice ; our probity of life a weakness ; God him- self would be making us enemies to ourselves ; he would be our heartless tyrant. Such a tissue of absurdities is repug- nant to natural reason. Therefore another life must be admitted. Again, the brute creation have all their desires gratified in this world ; they only seek sensible good, and they get it. Now since man can never, under any circum- stances, obtain perfect satisfaction of his desires whilst here, it would follow that unless there be an hereafter, his lot would be much worse than that of the brute creation. It would be better for man to degenerate iuto a monkey, than to go on developing intellectuality. If Darwin seeks man's good, he ought to turn his attention to the finding of some process of " natural selection," by which the human family can, as soon as possible, become idiotic gorillas, to be happy like those that now chatter unintelligibly along the banks of the Nile. St. Augustine, as usual, in a few well-chosen words, proves our immortality : " If we were brate animals, we would love only a carnal life, and that which was sensible ; this would be a sufficient good for us, and therefore, since it would be such, we would not seek anything else." (De. Civ. Dei L. cap. 28.) Considering man relatively to society his nature demands an after life. Man is sociable by nature ; society is an out- come of our natural tendency. The individual has duties towards the state of which he is a citizen. It is sometimes an imperative duty for the citizen to expose his life to certain danger for the good of the commonwealth, Now this duty necessarily supposes a future life ; as often observed already, if we abstract from immortality, the present life would be our greatest good, the foundation of all other good. There % II i -._■ i . : 'M 1C t 140 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. m : »i ; I I'l i I I! i would, tlien, be uo duty ho consonant to reason as tlie pre- servatiou of life : hence tiie individual could never find himself obliged, by the dictates of reason, to expose it to certain danger for the preservation of the state, or for any other purpose. Again, in society, only public offences can be punished. Without the tliought of a future state there would be no restraint on the secret actions of the citizens. How long would society last in such a case? About as long as good-fellowship appears to exist between a pen of pigs, viz : until the appearance of the swill-tub ; then it is each pig for himself, and woe to the weak. A final and cumulative argument can be drawn from the universal belief of mankind. Every tribe and nation, ancient or modern, has believed in a future state of some sort or other, It may be the Elysian fields, and shady groves of the poetic Greeks ; it may be the avernus of the stern Romans ; it may be the sensual heaven of the Moslem ; it may be the happy hunting ground of the Red-man ; or it may be some- thing more refined or coarser, but look where you will, you •will always find in the history of nations the fundamental idea of a future life. " Non omnis moriar," was as common with the mass, as with the cultured. More than this, there was joined with this belief of after existence, a belief that different lots aw^aited the just and impious. In the case of each nation an observance of certain general principles of morality, was the condition necessary to ensure a happy seat. Now this constant universal belief, like all other facts of a similar nature, can only be explained by attributing it to the evidence of reason. Therefore nature is the author of this belief: ther<'fore it is true. Again, each individual feels within him that he is not cjfomed to perish ; he recoils from the thought ; why? because it is unnatural. Truly, as well as beautifully, Addison wrote : — Hi. I IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 141 III " It must b(^ so, Plato, thou roasoiiost well, Klse whence this pleasin;:; hope, this fond desire, This loii^insa .; *l '^ li I!' CHAPTER X. CAUSE OF EVIL IN THE WORLD. O lenf^thy ar^riimcnt is required to prove that there is much evil iu the world. No very fine-drawn defini- tion of it is required: each one is convinced that ^^ certain things are to be left undone ; if tiicy be done they are said to be evil, sinful. However, in may not be so generally understood that evil is a negation of good, a deflection from it. Just as cold is the negation of heat, so evil is of good. The action from which evil follows may bo positive, but evil will always remain something negative ; the object of the actor is always real, or apparent good ; but inasmuch as his action deflects from the rule of rectitude, it is said to produce evil. There are three species of good : metaphysical, physical and moral ; corresponding to these there are three species of evil so-called. A defect of greater perfection iu a being is what is called metaphysical evil ; but in reality it is no evil ; it is the necessary consequence of a finite nature. Every created thing must be deficient of some higher perfection of essence, but this is, strictly, no evil. Physical evil is a defect of the normal physical good of a being ; thus blindness, ill-health, &c., are physical evils. Moral evil is, as said, a defect of due moral good, a departure from the rule of rectitude. The question concerning the cause of evil is an ancient one ; like many simple questions, CAUSE OF EVIL IN THE WORLD. 143 SO '•e; it seems to have puzzled some wise heads. Perhaps the very Hiin|)licity of it may have been the reason of its apparent dilliciihy. Great minds, sometimes, overlooi< an easy exjihuuition of a ph«'nomenon, and bucome nnnhlled, in seek- ing to render satisliu'lory their own wild conceits. It is singniar that nniny who are by no means noted for their virtne and ^HK immSu 146 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. i' J I of grumbliDg at his bounty for not bestowing more. Grod could have confirmed us (fo in good that we would never sin ; had he done so, he would not have been any better in him- self; he would only have been more bountiful towards us; he did not choose to do this, neither was he obliged to do it. The question can be summed up thus : the manichseaa system is absurd, and insufficient if admitted. Evil arises from an abuse of the liberty of will ; liberty is, in itself^ something good, but being misused it produces evil. God^ in giving man liberty of will, bestowed upon him a favor ; he is not obliged to impede man in misusing it, for he 8ati»' fied his goodness in conferring good on man ; and he satisfied his justice and wisdom by giving him means suffi<»ent to attain to his final end. From the fact that evil exists, and is caused by a misuse of human liberty, we can deduce a strong argument to prove that a stern retribution awaits the impious in another life. By how much they have been delinquents, by so much will they be punished. UUii. Ood Bin ; lim- us; it. asan rises selfy >od» I'or ; atift- sfied It to and ce a the been I CHAPTER XI. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND LIBERTY OF 1IAN*S WILL. HE question to be considered in this chapter is a ixed one ; it embraces some of the priaciples estab- lis^hed in natural theology, and some psychological CQf facts; heuce we deferred its consideration until the present. God is a being infinite in all his perfections ; theiefore his knowledge has no limits ; it is incapable of increase, or dimiuution. He knows no more to-day than he this it follows that for God there is no past, nor future ; be i^> an infinite, simple act, once, always, and together, willing and knowing what- eoever he wills and knows. Everything that will come to pass, or that could take place, is a reality, and consequently, is knowable ; the reason of its reality and cognoscibility is in the divine essence ; therefore it is known to God. Man's knowledge, by reason of his limitation, is acquired by d^ ^rees ; being fiuite, we can have that relatiou to ihiugs. 148 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. I 'il through which our knowledge is chiefly obtained, only with a limited number of beings ; according as we put ourselves, or are put, in that relation with other objects, we acquire a knowledge concerning them ; thus it is that there is a future relatively to us ; and thus it is that our knowledge is not all in one act, but is acquired by degrees. Some, judging of G oa s knowledge as they do of man's, fall into the grevious blunder of making his knowledge a piece of patch-work, instead of a whole and seamle.ss robe. From what has been said, it is evident that God knows everything knowable, the future as well as the past. On he other hand, we proved that man enjoyed liberty of will ; we saw that he can, at pleasure, determine himself to action, or to rest ; he can choose this or that finite good. The question arises : " does God know the future free actions of man? does he know what I will choose to-morrow?" Most certainly ; these actions, although uot yet exercised, are possibilities, or, in other words, realities, and consequently, knowable ; in God's essence is the reason of their reality and cognoscibility ; hence they must be known to him. This reasoning is metaphysically certain ; but an apparent difficulty occurs. Put into form it is this : either God does not know the future free actions of man, or man is not free ; for what God knows is about to be, must come to pass, as he cannot be deceived ; therefore it necessarily happens ; consequently, we must either deny God's knowledge, or man's free will. This difficulty, at first sight, has a formidable appearance. Cicero thought it so insoluble, that he denied God's know- ledge of the future free actions of man ; ho was intimately convinced of the existence of liberty of the will, and, to quote St. 'Augustine, *' he made us sacriligious, that he might make us free." Others have admitted God's knowledge, but denied oui liberty. Now the true philosopher will never .'M., KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND LIBERTY OF MAN's WILL. 149 deny either of two conflicting facts ; once that he has proved both to be facts, he is sure that there can be no real contra- diction between them ; he will seek to reconcile them if possible ; if he cannot succeed in this, he will lay them by, and label them, " unreconciled facts;" he will put them in the same catalogue with innumerable facts of a similar nature. This is the mode of procedure of true science ; the couuter- feit article, conscious of its own worthlessuess, is afraid to acknowledge ignorance of anything, lest its total absence of knowledge might be suspected. Hence it will boldly deny some well-established truth, or it will propound some ridicu- lous theory. Regarding the present question, a little meta- physical refinement will suffice to harmonize facts which seem discordant. God knows what choice Peter will make to-morrow, still that choice will be perfectly free. Peter will not do the action because God knows it ; but God knows it because Peter will do it. The fure-knowledge of God, like any other cognition, supposes its object, it does not make it. It is merely a speculative knowledge, and has no influence whatsoever on the action. It has the same relation to Peter s actions, as my sense of hearing has to the noise he makes ; each is speculative ; each supposes its object. Physi- cally speaking, God's foreknowledge is prior to human action, but logically it is not. Every action, being somethitjg real, must have existed representatively in the divine mind from all eternity, as an object of God's knowledge. There can be no knowledge without the knowable ; hence logically the determinatiou of the free agent to action, is prior to the fore- knowledge of it ; the action is, therefore, unaffected by this knowledge. Once that we master the idea that all reality has its reason in the divine essence, and that everything knowable must be known to an infinite intelligence, and that logically knowledge is posterior to the knowable, the difiiculty H^fi' hi til < ' I ii ■ ' -ii Tip itti ii 150 PHILOSOPHT OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. disappears ; because the various circumstances in which a created will would be placed, and its choice in each cane, are realities, and consequently, known to God ; but since the choice is something knowable it must be prior, logically, to- the knowledge had of it ; hence it is not caused by that knowledge. From the foregoing it is obvious that as regards God, there is no such thing as chance. A chance event does not mean an effect without a cause, for that would be an absurdity ; but it means an unforseen and an unlooked for one. Thus, two friends have been separated for yeai-s. Each, without acquainting the other, sets out for a certain spot, and both arrive at the same moment. The meeting is called a chance one ; but it was not without its cause. The act of each friend determining himself to go to the particular spot, on a stated day, caused the nieeting ; but since this mutual deter- mination was unknown, and unthonght of, the encounter is called one of chance. Now since God knows the every future determination of free agents, no eifeet of their actions can be unforseen by him. Knowing the constitution of physical things, and their laws, he knows all their effet of a 8<:lieme of oppression. These two souls, so differently pre- pared, the one so conscious of good works perlormed, the otljer so polluted with iniquity, enter upon another life. C«« any wme man pretend that the lot of both will be alike? Hi' the just soul enters into a state of luippiness, what will become of the imf)ious one? Evidently it cannot be happy: more tlian this, the tratisgressious against the eternal law miist be «venged ; it mut^t suffer. Were one to inquire si ill further, and seek to find out in what that suffering would consist, it would be no difiicult task to show that part of it, at least, would consist iu being deprived of the enjoyment of the supreme good. It was shown that our will has an indefinite capacity for good; nothing that we can inuigine in this world, no aggregate of earthly plea'^ures could ever satiate our longing for happiness. Since this longing has been ingrafted on our nature, if must have God for its author ; hence there are means provided by FOTURB PUNISHMENT. 155 which it may be eatlslied. Now only the enjoyment of the supreme good, of God, can Bfttisfy our cravinj^ after felicity : therefore there are means provided, through the use of which the human soul can arrive at this enjoyment. Keason tells us that !?ome of these means are tho observance of the natural law. It is clear that the soul which enters on the next life in the friendship of God will have its longing after happiness satisfied, by being put in enjoyment of the supreme good : on the other hand, the soul which leaves this world in enmity with God, cannot be placed in the enjoyment of that good; for then it would be equally happy with God's friends. It will, therefore, be deprived of that good, the only one which can give it perfect hajpiness. That deprivation will cause an indescribable suffering : the soul, freed from its union with the body, will no longer have an appetite for sensible pleasure ; by an overpowering tendency of nature it will be driven on to long and long for the enjoyment of the supreme good. It will see that it could easily have been happy for- ever, but that for a few degrading pleasures of earth, it foreswore its creator, and forfeited its felicity. Not even the fleeting satisfactions of life will remain for it to enjoy ; it will be incapable of enjoying anything, save that ^\hich it has lost forever. It will tend to God by an impulse of nature, but stern justice, with uplifted sword, will banish it from the presence of the only object on which it desires to look. One sight of that object will be vouchsafed it, but not as a pleasure ; the remembrance, of that sight will only bring additional bitterness to the desolate soul, for it will then under«;tand how much it has lost, and how easily it could have gained its happiness. An awful feeling of desolation will come over it ; never, never to have one moment's rest ; never, never to have even the shadow of a satisfaction, or enjoyment ; ever, ever to crave, and never, no, never to ' sf 'i«H fit i I: w 1 ■ 156 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. obtain. Sullen gloom, and grim despnir will be its cruel tormentors; its accomplices in sin will be its loathsome com- paniuns ; curses on its own foolishness, and useless upbraidings of its friends in iniquity will be at once its occupation and its torment. That the impious will suffer, at least this mucli, reason clearly proves. No one who reflects on this could think it light, or easily borne. Were one to suffer all the miseries imaginable in this world, such as disease, cold, hunger, pains, &c., they would not be so insupportiible as the loss of the impious ; because, in life, we have always some little comfort, some enjoyments in the midst of our afflietions ; and, above all, the certainty that they will end soon, and the hope of future hajjpiness. But the soul, deprived in the next world of the enjoyment of the supreme good, will not have one solitary satisfaction, and it will have an invincible certainty that it never will have any. It is not uncommon to hear the impious prate flippantly about God's goodness ; without goodness themselves, and often very demons of cruelty in satisfying themselves, it is somewhat strange that they should attribute so much mercy to God. In fact they make him all mercy, and no justice. Now it should be remembered that God is infinite in all his perfections ; his mercy is intinite, but so, also, is his justice. These two can never come in collision ; the first is daily exercised towards his creatures by bestowing fresh blessings on them, even while they are insulting him ; his justice will be exercised in punishing if in spite of all his favors and warnings, a soul will continue to outrage him. Mercy reigns over all his works in this world ; but justice will pre- side in the next. You may as well deny the existence of God, as deny that he will punish the wicked : a God shorn of justice is no God ; he who would impose a law and not reward its observers, and punish its transgressors, could not FUTURE PUNISHMENT. 157 be an infinite being. Hence it is more logical, but not les impious, to deny God's existence, limn to admit it and deny his justice. But some will exclaim : there is no puni.shment ; God never made man to send him to hell. Quite true God did not make man for that purpose, nevertheless ho will send many thither ; because man, by abusing his liberty of will, will force God, by reason of his justice, to condemn him to eternal punishment. It is not, then, God who is to blame, but man himself. It will not do to invoke God's mercy as a reason for still further offending him. It is sometimes urged that we suffer in this world for our transgressions, by remorse of conscience. True, sin brings with itself bitterness ; but only in the case of pretty good people is this bitterness miich experienced. This punishment of sin decreases with the increase of vice, until the hardened wretch knows scarcely what conscience is. Were this the only punishment of sin, it would fall more lightly on the hoary sinner, than on the youth guilty of only, one crime. iA 'M I m I :|P 1 wr CHAPTER XIII. tSTCnOLOQICAL PHENOMENA. IIK soul is evidently the principle of life arc' actiou in man ; this has been fully established. We may go Cop;^ fdrther, and postulate what will be hefeafter demon- Cfc3 stmted^ vizj that in all ':cntient beings there is a simple substance, or principle of life, which is» likewise, the subject of sensation. There is, as will also be shown, an essential difference between the vital principle of the brute creation, and the human soulj although they have some things in common, such as physical simplicity and sensibility. A considerable amount of learned lore has been expended, from time to time, especially in England, on the question of *' spontaneous generation." It has been maintained that certain sentient beings come into existence without genera- tion ; the germ of life was enclosed witliin, or rather, waa a part of tite putrid mass, and spoutancously burst forth into full life. The conclusion sought to be drawn by some is, that tlie vital principle of sentient beings is only matter, and, consequently, the human soul can be a particle of matter. Altliough we proved beyond all doubt that the human soul is physically simple and essentially diverse from matter, ■till a few words on the question of " spontaneous generation," may not be amiss. The works of the creator are innumerable Rud varied; turn where we will) we fiud everything teeming PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA. 159 with life ; the earth, air, water are vast conservatories of liviiij; beings. They differ in size^ physical organization, and perfection, but all have one note, at least, in common, that ifi, life. In each there is a vital principle distinct and diverse from the material part which is seen by the eye, or discov- ered by the microscope. From age to age these innumerable species of living beings are preserved and propagated ; the ' power and wisdom ot the creator are manifested continually by their existence. Certain fixed laws e.stablish the mode of their propagation. In the productio'n of their physical parts heat is always an active agent ; under its influence the relative position of the parts of the seed is changed ; a new comb nation of elements results. Now the fixed law for the coming into existence of a sentient being is this ; whenever certain elements are combined and grouped in a determinate manner, the vital principle is created and infused into thai mass ; it is then no longer a corrupted heap, it in a sentient being in embryo. Under ;>!uitable circumstances it will be developed ; in the case of some beings, rapidly, in the case of others, slowly. It matters not how this combiiation of elements is brought 'about ; the law is fixed ; whenever the necessary grouping and combination are verified, the vital principle will be created and infused. The chicken will come forth from the egg heated artificially, equally as well as from the one warmed by the natural process of incubation. Now in the case of those beings which seem to come into existence by spontaneous generation, the exphmatinn is simple enoiigh. There is a heap of matter ; in it are all the elements required for the organization of a certain class of beings, but they are not in proper relation to each other. By some natural pro- cess, such as the action of light, heat, or electricity, the mas* of matter is decomposed ; part is set free as gas ; parts which .have uu affinity for one another are drawu more closelj m ssrmsmi^mmm 160 PIIILOSOPnY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. together ; the former grouping of elementary particles is changed, and a new one succeeds. After various changes of position, and diflfereut combinations, the particles required for the organization of a certain sentient being are brought into proper relations; the condition for an exercising of the established law for the coming into existence of that being is verified ; the vital principle is created, and vivifies the embryo organism. This explains the origin of life under any cir- cumstances whatsoever. The only exception that can be taken to it is, that we suppose the vital principle to be created immediately by God, and infused into the organism. We do suppose this ; but we ^vill prove in the next chapter that this is really the case. In fact, what we said r^bout the origin of the human soul would be sufficient. This much will do on the question '»{ life; it is not an abstruse one ; to fully undc;rstund it, if is only necessary that the philosopher should have no prejudice against christian teaching wljen investigating it. If he set out with the fixed purpose of endeavoring to establish materialism, he will make many mental splurges, and propound many specious theorie?', and still will not master a* very simple, though beautiful, law for the existence of sentient beings. There are some phenomc la observable in every-day life, which might here occupy a moment's consideration. We approach the subject with ditfidence, rather seeking light than bearing it. The opinion about to be given regarding these phenomena, may be very wide of the mark, but we think there is something of truth in it. We will first take the old saying: "speak of the and he is sure to appear." No one can have failed to observe that, often as he has been speaking about, or thinking very much about, a person, that person has appeared. Each one can remember scores of times when this circumstance happened. Now an PSYCHOLOGICAL PIIENCMKNA. 161 we ike to as ,a bcr aa event which, in every age, frcqueiiily happens in certain circumstances, must have some connection with these circum- stances. It seems most anti-philosophic to entirely disconnect the two. Taking it for granted then, that t!iere is some link between the event and the comlitions, the philosopher ought to endeavor to discover what it is. The following explanation is sti invest ed : the friend who nppears intended to call on you ; he tliought about you, about calling on you; and pt 'ably, on the way thought often about you, and ini.igined himself speaking with you. This internal action of his, this deep consideration of the soul, acted somehow on your soul, and '■'irred up thou;:,lits of him ; and so you began to speak of tiim. The objection at once is : how could his soul act on mine? Even if tlu' how cannot be shown it would nn* f How that it did not act. That the active sub- stance, ;>r fv 'ce called the soul, acts bn the force of which the body is composed, has been fully established ; now wc <;an see no valid reason for saying that one spiritual force, or soul, cannot act on another, to some extent, at least. Analogy would rather say that it could ; and experience seems to contirm the argmnent from ainilogy. It may appear egotistic to appeal to personal experience : but the writer, from the time he Hr^t read psychology, thought that one soul could act on another even in life, lie took note of the occur- rence, or veritication of the saw quoted above, and found some remarkable coincidences. Each one might, perhaps, be sutJiciently explained by saying it was merely accidental, if it ah)ne were considered ; but it would appear to the mind of ;he writer, highly improbable, and mojt unphilosophic, to assign them all to the theory of chanre coincidence*?. Again ; if you look intently on the side-face, or head of a person, that person, unless engaged in conversation, or buried iu deep thought, will turn towards you : nay, more ; look 1? 1G2 PHILOSOPHY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. intently on one asleep and that one will awake. Now something ninst have acted on these persona; it was not your body, because you were not in physical contact with them ; it was soul acting on soul. A good many phenomena, such as those culled '' presentiments," and others which are often lightly relegated to the sphere of real superstitious, might thus find a rational explanation. Finally, another psychologic phenomenon worthy of con- sideration, is a certain chiss of dreams, — not those fantastic notions that often pass through a sleeper's mind, and which are di^jointed and mixed fragments of waking experiences — but those dreams in which you see places and persons never before seen, but which are at once recognized when after- wards viewed. That such dreams are not unfrequent is, it may be said, undoubted. How can they be explained? Sleep is a partial suspension of the commerce between soul and body. May it not be supposed that, in that state, the spirituality of the soul conies more fully into play? More fidly disengaged than in its waking moments, from the trammels of the body, the operations of the soul may bo more spiritualized ; in its regard space will, for the lime at least, be partially annihilated. The sleeper may be resting his weary form on the plains of central America, and his soul, though united to it, may be contemplating the Boulevards of Paris, liow does it do this? The soul is not of the same order of beings as the body ; we are not to exclaim impossible for soul, because impossible for the body. The soul is ever active, ever acting; the supposed invincible reasons of Locke to the contrary, cannot stand against syllogistic rigor: ft substance necessarily luns, and acts in accordance with itif nature ; the soul is a spiritual substance ; therefore it must always act by thought of some kind, and by will of happiness, «at least. Now the soul disentangled, in part, from its PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA. 168 grosser companion, may perceive created things without the help of corporeal organs, by their essence. This would explain how it happens that some perceptions during sleep are so vivid, photographed almost on the mind. ■ ' J ^ I* \ m'L 'I J 1 UK CHAPTER XIV. -^ i f,^. PRINCIPLE OF LIFE IN THE BRUTE CREATION. P3RE the vag;arics of " modern thouglit " of a noble turn, we would not have much need to dwell lon;^ on ^ty%. this subject. But it happcms that our would-be ; fj emancipators from the ''superstitions of the past," belong to an ignoble race. Unlike most weak mortals, Ihey are not ashamed of the fact ; they rather boast of it. Their genealogical tree, like the spruce and juniper, has its roots firm set in the ground. The first link of the heathen poet's chain was fixed (o the foot of Jupiter ; but the spongy roots of our gi^at " thinkers' " parent tree has a more lowly fastening. True, their progenitors are an antique stock ; but ancient blood is, with them, no stimulant to pride. Our •* thinkers " are humble; they only ima.'ine themselves better than those who have noble ideas of man ; these they pity, or despise ; while they fondle the chimpanzee, or ourang- outang, as an undeveloped brother. It is scarcely fair, however, for them to claim the wiiole human family as vassals of their house. Tnose barons of the middle ages, whom no doubt they heartily despise, only claimed, as* vassals, a few families: our "thinkers," on the contrary, seek to subjugate all mankind. If they are themselves but cultured apes, why insist that we should profess ourselves their kinsmen ? Is it because they have given themselves PRINCIPLE OP LIFE IN THE feRUTE CREATION. 165 over to animalism, that they want to degrade all to their own level? Whether they differ much or little, praetically, from the lower aiiimiils, should be best known to themselves ; that essentially they are ditferent and diverse we are prepared to substantiate. No elaborate piece of reasonitig is required to prove that the brute creation feel, see. hear, taste, and smell. They are subject to various sensations ; they are not indifferent to the infliciion of a wound. They exhibit all the outwaid and sensitive si«ns of pain, which are exhibited by man ; hence, .since we cannot transform ourselves into one of them, we judge of their sensations, just as we do of those of human beings, viz : by their actions. Brutes are not, then, mere insensitive pieces of machinery ; they have a sentient principle which is the subject of their various sensations. Undoubt- edly they perceive exteriuil bodies ; they turn aside from the barrier that crosses their path, just as surely as a man would do it. Their perceptions cannot be mere confused represen- tations, because they distinguish between an object seen before, and a strange one. We do not think it necessary to enter into a fuither proof of the proposition that brutes have distinct sensihlc perceptions. Any one who will give the subject a moment's thought will at once admit it. There is, then, in brutes a subject of per'^eption. This subject must be })liysically simple. We use the same argument as was evolved in proving the simplicity of the human soul. If the perceiving subject were compound, either the whole percep- tion would be in one of its parts, or a part in each part, oP all in each part. If it were all in one part, aiul if that part be supposed simple, then the perceiving subject is simple : if if be compound, again we say that one of the three above hypotheses must be verified, and we would repeat the argu- meut uutil it would have to be admitted that that part was >- ';•; ''.I 'K >- ii '■A -n 166 PHILOSOPHT OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. it- ! simple. If a part of the perception be said to be in each part of the subject, no one part could have a full perception of anything; there would be no distinct perception, and no power of distinguishing between objects. Finally, if the whole perception be in each part, the brute would see not one, but a dozen or more objects instead of one. Now their action proves that they see only the one object, when there is only one. Neither, therefore, of the three supposi- tions can be admitted ; we must, then, conclude that the subject of perception in brutes is physically simple. It is so evident that feeling and perception require a subject devoid of physical parts that Condillac arguing against Biiffon said we must cither deny brutes to have real sensations, or we must grant that their subject of sensation is immaterial. In fact, it this subject be made up of parts there would be in a lamb many subjects of sensation, or many individuals ; be- cause suppose each feeling part endowed with reason, it could say I feel ; hence what is called one lamb would be, in reality, many lambs. The force of nonsense could not go much further. There is, then, in brutes a principle of life and sensation which is physically simple ; it is called, by analogy, their soul ; btit the reader must bear well in mind that it is essen- tially difterent from the human vsoul. It is now evident that, in the coming into existence of all sentient beings, a direct action of the creator concurs. The body may be formed in embryo by the action of finite causes ; but the sentient prin- ciple, being immaterial, must come into existence by creation. It is not a part of any pre-existing matter, because essentially different from it ; it is not from itself, because it is finite ; therefore it is immediately created by God. When the Creator determined to create this visible world, and all that it contains, he gave to many creatures reproductive organs 4 PRINCirLE OF LIFE IN THK URUTE CUEATION. 167 SO that the species miman. Now the defenders of true philosophy often, in chai-ity, per- iiaps, or through inadvertence, endeavor to define the required limits. They attempt more than they are called .upon to do — more than they can do. In order to deline the precise difference between any two given objects, it is ncces- aary to have au adequate idea of both, ^'ow we have not 11;;. »;•( ill m m ■ ■ V-, "{ ,1 :1! 'If! , ;ifj i -'I 1G8 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UIULK VINDICATED. in an adequate idea eitlier of reason, or of instinct ; hence it i« unfair and ridieiilons, to re(|iiii'e the exact ditFereiice between them. IJut we can show that there is an e.-iseritial difference ; the one has es.«e:ilial propeities whi(rh are not found in the Otiier ; hetjce there U a diversity of exseiure, at)d not merely o:'e of de;^ree. Oii(!C this is demonstrated wo can quietly rest on our oars ; all the examples of j^airacity a> Ca. jj^ -m T o / Photographic Sciences Corporation ^^ V :\ \ .^ ^ %^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (716) 872-4503 <^ I (P.- CPr i/l > 170 PIIILOSOI'IIY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. 'I protection. After a time, from an observation of the boughs of trees covered with leaves, tliey drive f-takes into the earth, and stret^'li over tliem the hides of wihl beasts. A step in advance has been made in the matter of habitation. They rove less, owing to the proximity of a hostile tribe ; they feel the want of sometliiiig more histing than (he tent of goat skins. Tramping through a boggy soil they note its property of adhesion ; they find it hardens by exposure to the sun. What if a pile of it were laised around the tent? They try an expei'iment, and rejoice to find a solid wall, impervious to rain and wind. Tliis is an impi'ovemeiiton the tent. Their habits becorfic more agricultural ; the mud wall is found to be damp and gloomy : wood split and fastened together would be more airy and drier. They try it, and thus from year to year they go on, making expeiiments, compai-ing, culling here and there. A city springs up; neat wooden cottages are succeeded by substantial buildings of brick and stone ; these are superseded by magnificent palaces of mai'ble ; the nomadic tribe has given birth to a mighty ruition. Now anyone who wonld follow out, in his iunigination, the pro- gress of various tribes, and note their ever-advancing strides of improvement ; and who would then turn his attention to the total want of progress in works, or form of society, amongst brutes ; and who, after that, would assert that brutes actively reasoned, is unfit for argument, lie is simply insane. Another, and a more obvious proof of want of reasoning in brutes is this : Everyone who has travelled during the winter season, when the snow is very deep, has been atmoyed by meeting cattle on the road. \\'hen you are within sight of a gate you see an intelligent looking cow coming forth ; yhe stops, looks dinvn the road, sees you, sees the deep snow, but, nevertheless, advances. 8he meets your horse; she f PRINCIPLE OP LIFE IN THE BRUTE CREATION. 171 cannot pass but must turn and retrace her steps until she arrives back at the gate, through which she bolts to escape. Now did she actively use reason, she woidd have waited at the gate until you passed ; the smallest child would have done it. By reasoning she would have seen that she could not do better than remain. This fact, trifling and perhaps, little thought of, is quite sufficieut to convince any sound intellect that brutes are devoid of the adtive use jf reason. Equally evident is it, that they have not got it potentially, or in the germ. If they had, it must, through time, become active, else why the power? Now it is certain that domestic animals, such as the horse, cow, sheep, and dog, live in the same manner as they did thousands of ytfars ago Their society is no different ; their actions are the same ; a total want of progress marks all their descendants ft would surely be unreasonable to say that they have reason poten- tially, and yet m vke no advancement in refinement. For centuries the horse has been the slave of man ; with bit and halter he is led about by a little child ; beaten, half-starved, ill-housed, he still remains docile as belbre. He never attternpts to stir up his fellows to a rebellion against man. Yet had he but an infinitesimal part of the intelligence of the most degraded human slave, he could soon free himself from liis state of bondage ; he could soon trample upon iiis cruel master, and dictate terms of peace to mankind. An uprising- of the horses, dogs, mules, and oxen, which would be quite possible had they a spark of reason, would be something more dreadful than the rebellion of the slaves in ancient Rome. We may justly conclude that tiie existence, in brutes, of a faculty which for several thousai.d years has never been exorcised, is as mythical as that of the ghosts which haunt lonely church-yards on dark nights. 2d, Language: Rational speech is an essential attribute of man ; in a {q\w rare casci.-, by reason of sone physical defect, I !-l! H i n ffW 172 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. \-m w the use of this faculty may be Impeded ; still it is possessed potentially, even by the mute. With the rapidity of liixlitiiing, with unerring precision, we can make known our feelings, affeciions, and our most profound ideas. We are endowed witli a mechanism so wonderful iu construction that, at will, we can modify onr voice ; we can prodnce a variety of sounds ; we can imitate strange ones ; reproduce past ones, and express, by these means, thoughts and feelings in rapid succession. We make no excuse for translating from Balmes — (Kleui Phil) the following beautifid passage* "The mechanism of the voice, the great facility with which it obeys the orders of the will, clothing thought with a sensible form, is one of the most wonderful things imaginable. Who caa measure the time which passes between the conception of an idea and its outward expression? Consider the orator from whose lips there flows, like a golden t«'ature has given them the means of expressing, instinctively, some natural feelings, for their preservation and propagation ; hence the necessity of vocal organs. Again ; man instinctively cries out Mhen suffering pain ; so will a brute ; but there is this notable diflei ence : man can restrain his cries because endowed with reason and free will ; but the brute cannot, because its cries are an impulse of nature, and it lacks an intelligence to control them. Ftom the foregoing we can conclude that brutes are utterly devoid of intelligence either in act, or in power. Moreover, the characteristic of reason is progress, that of instinct, stagnation. The former, by an innate power of self-determination, develops and waxes wise ; the latter, being a mere impulse of Jaature, is never changed, or moditied. Therefore between instinct and reason there is a difference of kind ; the former is no degree of the latter, otherwise it would inevitably advance. A quality which is essential to the subject of reason, is wanting in the subject of instinct; hence essentially they are distinct and diverse ; one can never develop into the other, for the essence of things is immutable. The workings of instinct are, at times, wonderful, and should make us recognize the wisdom of the Creator who provided so well for the preservation of his creatures ; but if we exa- mine closely these workings we at once discover the absence of a reason which foresees danger, and provides against it. The ant will construct its store-house with great skill, PRINCIPLE OF LIFE IN THE BUUTE CREATION. 175 because prompted bj nature ; but, because (levoi(^ of intelli- gence, it foresees no danger from man, and builds ou the roadside, soon to be rudely disturbed. Untaught by this disaster it will rebuild in a similar spot and sufler a similar misfortune. The bee will store away its honey in well- contrived cells, disregarding the preseuec of man who will soon rob it of the fruits of its lalK)r. Man constructs his habitations and store-houses with a foresight of danger, again'^t which he provides. If he has unconsciously built ia the vici'iity of a hostile tribe, he either abandons the dtvn- gerous locality, or strongly fortifies his dwelling. lie foresees danger from fire, flood and sword, and takes preeautioua, in as much as he can, against them. The work of in,stinct may be neat and skilful, but it will ever lack the provision, against fortuitous danger, observable iu the rudest pi'oducts of reason. This difference invincibly proves the absence of an intellectual faculty in brutes — a faculty which not merely notes present wants and conveniences, but which, also, specu- lates upon, and provides against, future contingencies. Admire, then, if you ^"ill, the works of the imhistrious brute creation ; praise their neatness i-nd finish ; be delighted with their adaptation for their necessary pur^poses. Your doing this ought to be but another motive to adore the infinite wisdom and goodness of God who has provided so wisely, and so well, for his dumb creatures. But as you value a reputation for common sense, do not confoimd the cause of these works with that of the wonderful achievements of man. The bee-hive, beavers'-dam and store-house of ants may be ingenious, but a natural impure, or instinct, is sutRcient to explain them ; only, bowever, a power of com- paring, analyzing, combining and foreseeing, can be a sufficient cause of the noble war-ships of Eingland— of the pyramids of Egypt — of St. Peter's at Rome — of the bridges which span .-it ■r fM ..^ ;1 17G PlIILOSOniY OP THE niBLK VINDICATED. iii! I rnpM Ptronms — of the railways a\ liicli infcr8cct ffieatcoiintrics, aniiiliilatin^' space — of the telej^raplis wliicli brinj; rt^gioiin i'ur remote into instant coinmiinicatioii, ariniliilalin;; time — ol llie tlioiisanil and one j^reut woik.>5 wliicli are the issue and eml)()(liincnt of laiman reason It would be a childish weakness, after such eonsidertitions, to attribute one particle of reasoning power to brutes. Cruehy to Brutes. There arc some natures prone to gross contradictions: to-day they show a cruel callousness to human misery, and, pei'haps, to-morrow they will melt in morbid sympathy over a derelict cat. Here they lui-n with loathing from a scarred and suffering child ; there they catch up and hug a limping dog, that has been worsted in a scuffle with a neighboi'ing cur. The starving mother may plead in vain at their doors, for food for lier starving babe ; but the whine of a hungry spaniel is answered with the half of a six-penny loaf. They express no liorror at the sight of human beings crowded into filthy huts — huddled together, ten in a room not large enough for two ; but a cry of indignation, loud, long and deep, issues from their throats, at the sight of a car-load of swine, some- what uncomfcJrtably bestowed. Thoy form associations to applaud and perpetuate, if possible, cruel laws ; and they join societies to prevent cruelty to brutes. Is this an out- come of " modern thought ?" Now we are far from wishing to sneer at a compassionate nattu-e keenly alive to every form of suffering; but we confess to no sympathy with that maudlin sentiment, too common, alas ! of Avithdrawing all pity from human misery to bestow it on the fancied ills of brutes. We may safely assert, as a general rule, to which, of course, there are exceptions, that tliose who parade most pity for suffering brutes, have least for suffering man. It was reported some years ago, we know not with what foiin- ling very that all of lich, most It oun- PUINCIPLB OF LIFE IN THE BRUTE CREATION. 177 dation in ftipt, that an old huly in London, bequeathed her estate for the foundation of an asylum for abandoned cats. It is to be hoped that the Judge of Probate declared her insane, and directed the property to be handed over to an orphanage. England seems to be the hot-bed of a sickly sentiment of charity to brutes ; and England seems to be a country much in need of love for her suffering children. Even those in England who ought to know better, find it hard to divest themselves of the ludicrous idea in vogue, regarding the treatment of brutes. If we consider the rela- tion in which the lower creation stands to man, we will easily arrive at a rational conclusion on this question. 1st — Brutes have no rights, properly so called ; right is a " power morally inviolable ;" hence it supposes reason in its subject. There being no right in brutes, there can be no duty on the part of man, towards them. 2d — Brutes were created for the benefit of man ; hence man can use, and slay them when it conduces to his comfort, or legitimate convenience to do so. 3d — Brutes being a benefit conferred by God on man, it follows that man has duties towards God concerning the use of said benefit. From these principles which are evident, it follows that no matter what man may do to a brute, he never infringes any right of the brute ; if he wantonly destroy cattle, fish or fowls, he is misusing God's benefits. He who knowingly and unnecessarily ill-treats a dumb animal, manifests an evil disposition which it is well to curb, even by fines and imprisonment ; but it ought to be clccTrly proved that the ill- usage was conscious, deliberate, not in a moment of anger, and unnecessary, otherwise the real right of man is infringed to vindicate an imaginary one of a brute. It is quite within man's prerogatives to inflict pain on brutes, when any end» 13 I* ! ■|l ■I! ^ m 178 I'lIILOSOI'HY OF TIIK UIHLE VINDICATED. [ , i li advantageous to liimself, is to he obtained. Vivisection, for purposes of cxperinicnt, is licit, even when there is only a probability of its being useful. In a word, common sense tells us that since brutes were created for our use and benelit, we can destroy them if troublesome, or subject them to pain if advantageous. Hence few experience any quiilnis of conscience, in remorselessly crushing those proverlually nimble little creatures which skip over the sleeper's form, causing him to dream of pins, needles, and other sharp instruments. It would be well if societies for the '' preven- tion of cruelty to animals," were to turn their attention to the sufferings of humanity, and alleviate a trifle of human "WTetchedncss. We do not advocate free license for a brutal nature to vent its spleen on a poor dumb animal : but we would prefer charity to man first, and then prevention of cruelty to beasts. The suffering endured by brutes is not so great as, at first sight, it might seem to be. It is only physical, and only the pain of the moment. Devoid of reason, they can have no mental anguish, nor can they fore- see and dread a future suffering. <:w^' CHAPTER XV. V DARWINISM. IlEllE are various ways of arriving at the temple of fame, if by "fame" be meant a notoriety, whether eiivial)le or not. Trtie, the statues of but few find r^ permanent niches in that temple ; ihongh many may, for a season, be exalted to the honors of its altars, and smothered, ahnost, in a cloud of iiu-eiise I'aised by an admiring and luithinking crowd. The adulations of the moment are the ambition of many ; hence the innumerable artilices to secure this fleeting satisfaction. The hill of science, oa whose summit stands the temple of fame, is steep and high ; it has a secure road hedged with firmly rooted trees, which yield not beneath the climber's grasp ; but there are various other paths along a shelly ledge ; one false step, one nervous movement of the body, is sutlicient to precipitate the unwary toiler from these treacherous ways. A motley crowd of writers jostle against each other, on those insecure roads ; the ascent, along them, is shorter than by the royal road ; but amidst the confusion and rude pushing of author against author, many a daring adventurer slips downward into the dark gulf which yawns beneath ; one by one they fall with sullen plash ; a wavy motion of the dark surface succeeds, and the aspirant for popular adulation is buried in the black waters of oblivion. In the meantime, the pains-taking i* 1 180 PIIIL0?01MIV OP THK BIBLE VINDICATED. L •a ::i J ;. climber by tlie secure road mounts slowly, but surely, till he reaches the reward of true inerit-eiuluring fame. Persona who Hcek for literary, or scientific notoriety, without any nobler object in view, are re;^ardles3 of the intrinni'! merits, or demeriia, of their writings They desire to make a dis- play ; to dazzle the common herd ; to say something that has an air of ori^^inality, oo it ever so old in substance, or absurd in itself. Hence the mania for founding " schools of thought ;** those who inveigh most against masters, are striving to be- come the great teachers of our age ; possibly they imagine that never, until now, has there appeared one among raea capable of being a master. In fact, one is inclined to think that modern unbelievers, if one give ear to their words, possess, embody and express the total of human wisdom. The great philosophers of antiquity, and the great writers of Christianity, are drivelling idiots in the estimation of these modest theorizers. Fie.c^ly as did the Iconoclasts rush against the christian churches to break the images of the saints, do these aspirants assail the temple of fame, to cast down, smash and trample under foot the statues of great pagan and christian philosophers, M^hich have so long adorned • its niches. Their motive is easily understood : so long as these masters are honored, the vagaries, crude notions, illogical deductions of modern pagans can never come into repute. We do not say that all our contemporary theorizers are actuated by these motives ; but we do think that a childish vanity of wishing to propound something startling, has led many a thinker from the right path. But our object is not to ridicule silly aspirants to fame. They will soon be forgotten. Something must, however, be said respecting what is known as " Darwinism." We do not undertake to say by what motives Mr. Darwin was prompted to propound and defend his wild theory. This DARWINISM. 181 Lme. do I was :hii much, however, may be said of the theory itself, — it is sub- versive of the common eonneiit of uiiiiikiiid, of morality, and of reason Mankind has always placed an essential differ- ence between man and the lower creation ; it is ditricuit to imagine how morality can co-exist with belief in a system, which recognizes no essential dilforence between a hnnuiQ soul and the vital principle of brutes; and reason is at once subverted if it bo made a degree of instinct. RiMluced to its ultimate analysis '' Darwinism " is a theory which supposes a natural progression, or development, from species of a lower, to species of a higher order. According fn it. num is but an evolution of this physical proj^rossion ; the rli;iftering ape developed into the speaking man ; the great wheel of nature's mill is whirlitig round, and each r« lotion tunu out a new, an|J III i to Mr. Darwin's aiithoritirs. Their opinions will be worth just as much as the arguments they adduce to support them, and no more. Tiiis Uiiy seem scant reverence to these gentlemen ; still it is all we can aifoi-d to show them in the present case. Most of them, probably, would laugh at the idea of admitting the authority of the most learned society on earth.; we claim, therefore, the privilege of scouting their dicta, uidess their arguments will stand a philosophic test. This is a fair fight against our adversaries on their owa ground ; they will have small reason to claim the champion- ship in pure reasoning, ere this review be ended. Claiming then, the undoubted right of rejecting the hcUcfs^ thoufjhU, and opinions of Mr. Darwin's densely arrayed band of authors, when not supported by convincing reasons, we approach the ranks drawn out to overawe us poor mortals. Not one Bolitary argument do we find ; not one single reason adduced ; nothing but assertions more or less explicit, which show that these men had some kind of a belief, in some kind of natural process of progression, gradation, or natural selection. This grand army, then, placed as outposts to tVighten persons off from Mr. Darwin's airy castle, vanishes ; the brou^od armor is turned to lead ; the polished weapons bsconu wooden spears. The cited authoi's are 'Ike pasteboard sentinels set up to scare the boys ; from afar they look fiurce ; their bran- dished swords threaten destruction ; but if the urchins evince a little courage, and advance a few paces, they shout with glee to seethe fierce mustachios shrink into the upper lip; the upraised sword cleave to the arm ; the stern eye vacant and unmeaning. The value of the citations made by Mr. Darwin is not equal to the value of the paper whereon they are written ; because they contain no arguments ; they show simply what the pectdiar opinion of these gentlemen was. This unsupported opinion loses weight when we reflect on DARWINISM. 183 the saying of Cicero — that there is no absurdity so great but what has had some philosopher for its supporter. So much for Mr. Darwin's famed authorities. But what savs the man liimsi^H? Has he any arj^unient to evolve in support of his theory? By no maans. In the introduction we are told the causes of the publication of his " abstract." He kindly requests the reader to repose confidence in his accuracy, when he dors not quote authorities. He atTecta great candor, and a total freedom from prejudices. It may be here observed, that when once a man has thrown down the gauntlet to the Catholic church, he immediately preiends that he is altogether untrammeled by vulgar prejudices ; in short, that he, and he only, is capable of pronouncing a dis- passionate judgment. Unfortutuitely many are deceived by this quiet assumption of impartiality ; they little think that no greater slave to prejudice can be imagined than the man who loftily rejects the authority and science of ages ; and who acknowledges that he sets out with the conviction that the opposite of his theory i.s false. In fact, such persons have alieady pronounced judgment in their own favor ; how then, can they lay claim to impartiality? B.it to return: the introduction is so written as to disposi^ the unreflecting to consider Mr. Darwin a laborious student of nature, and a most dispassionate judge. He, thus, enlists at once the sympathies of his readers, and disposes them to believe him very h^arned 111 liis first chapter, headed " Variation under Domestica- tion," Darwin makes to his sympathetic readers a huge display of erudition. He discourses on " changed conditions," ''organism," and '"reproductive system," with such an amount of self-complacency, as would lead one to suppose that he was imparting much information. But wliat is the fact? He tells us nuthiiig that we. did not / —^ow long ago. lie ! ^i •i II I ^Ifi 184 PHILOSOPHY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. says that descendants from the same parent stock undergo variations ! that variations may be moi-e or less ! that they depend on various causes. Now it rnay be safely asserted that any boy, or n;irl either, who has come to the use of reason, is fully aware of the fact that accidental varintious are verified in the descenduiits of Organic beings ; and anyone who has merely skimmed with the tips of his lips the stream of chemical lore, will not be at a loss to explain the causes of these variations. The difference of hue in the feathers of domestic fowls, from the same stock, which seems to Mr. Darwin to be almost inexplicable to common mortals, unless we suppose, *' natural selection," atid a law of progress be admitted — and the difference of length in the horns of cattle, — which is no doubt an anjumentum corrnitum, al- though the horU' be too soft to inflict an injury on the luckless wight who might fall on them — are readily explained by boys learning the rudiments of cheirastry. A forward young urchin would reply to the great ditliculty : " nothing easier of explanation. All bodies organic and inorganic, are composed of various elements : the proportion of these elements, and their relative grouping determine the nature of the body ; the slightes^t change of proportion, or grouping, will cause a change more or less marked in the resulting body. Now since organic bodies receive their increment partly from internal, and partly from external stratification, it follows that the nature of the soil must exert an influence on plants in determining their size and accidental properties ; and the nature of the food must do the same in the case of living beings ; whilst the state of the atmosphere must have an influence on both. Sow wheat in poor soil, the growth will be slight ; put lime on the same land and sow the same kind of wheat, the growth will be luxuriant ; because lime contains an abundance of the elements of which the stalk is ^ DARWINISM. 185 ting lent ion, fence of -e rth line ime la > composed. Color, being only au affection of the soul caused by the reflection of light from an object, — and since light is reflected this way or that, according as the particles of the object have this or that relation, it follows that the slightest change of proportion, or position of elements will effect a change of color. Hence since each domestic fowl cannot, physically speaking, be ever subject to precisely the same conditions of life, a variation of size and plumage must be the result ; this variation cotilirms the theory of elementary proportion and grouping." Thus would the boy solve the great Darwinian difficulty. Organic chemistry fully demon- strates the trutb of his solution. We are well aware that the state of the reproductive system aflecis the dchcendauts ; but every breath of air, every morsel of food, every excite- ment, or depression of spirits — in a word, each of tiie thousand and one changes to which finite beings are necessarily subject, has a certain influence on the reproductive system ; conse- quently the \eiYy essence and nature of things finite must cause a slight variation in their offspring. The striking similarity often noticeable in twins arises from the ova having a similar chemical combination ; and the dissimilarity some- times seen is explained by a difference of chemical nature in them. The color of hair, size and such like accidental variations, present no dilficulty, and argue no gradation; they necessarily follow from the theory of grouping and proportion. Mr. Darwin thinks it a poser to exj lain how a porson will sometimes exhibit the peculiarities, not of his parents, bi.t of some remote ancestor. The explanation is not i'ar to be sought. The quality is in' • ited, that is, hande«l down by the reproductive system ; it is in the whole line of descendants, but is latent in many ; its manifestation being impeded by a variety of circumstaaces, such as the presence of a greater if i ! I h- i 18G PIULOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATEn. I' ii 5 , Hi ■:\ ?ff,, fjnatility of antaj^otiistic elements. Some remote (Icsoeiidant cornea into existence, under a change of conditions, vvliich lessen tliese elements and, at once, the quality peculiar to tlie far oft ])rofrenitor, being unimpeded, manifests itself. Ijcre the reinark made by Dr. Johnson about Pope's '" Essay on Man," might be applied to Mr. Darwin's work so far. The great critic said that in the essay, where true, there was iioihiiig but the commonest truths, but told in such melodious numbers that persons reading the work fancied they learnt what they did not previously know ; so with Darwin's work ; it treats in such mysterious terms the most obvious and easily explained variations, that one might almost thiidc one read something new, — something to explain which nothing shoi-t of •' natural selection," " gradation," and laws of pro- gross would sulHce. It would l)e a useless task to follow him through his weary pages, in the hope of lighting on a logical argument, "'i proof of his theoi-y. We find many facts, useful to be known, bui useless as ])roofs oi a system to which they are antagonistic. There is greater dilliculty in confuting an author who merely rambles and relates, than one who closely reasons. Hence all modern teachers of error eschew svHoiristic arguments, and waywars through the stages of infancy, childhood and youth, may have made the world with the traces of a gradual growth. In his concluding remarks Mr. Darwin glances into futurity ; he evidently sees the flickering of that glory which is to form a halo round his name. Although he may be derided now, he feels serenely content that posterity will recognize his genius ; he has been, clearly, born before hi» age ; the law of development has acted too quickly " ^ hig u t I'i ■'■>: I 1 > ;; 3 i:i I' ^ i . 194 rniLOSornY of the bible vindicated. case. lie feels tlmt liis contemponiries will not emanfipnto themselves from their prejudices at his biddiii;^ ; but his modesty sii^f^ests, as a buhn, that great men are always met with coiitradic'tioD, He, as well as Newton, must suffer this : but hope points to a risitig generation who will listen to his voice. Now, we will also act the prophet, and peer cautiously into the uncertain future. Our glance sees the twilight of Darwin's glory ; he saw its dawn ; this generation saw its noon-tide; its setting is not far off. A handful of physicists, ignorant of the elements of metaphysics, and an unthinking crowd charmed by novelty of theory, and grace of style, kindled the smoky torches of his short-lived glory. The scientific world was sliding, for some time, down an inclined plane ; Darwin, Huxley and Tyndall gave the last push, and plopped it into the " stagnant pool." The plash and shock were the only warnings it would heed ; those who wore not intellectually killed are scrambling up and returning slowly, but surely, to the firm citadel built by St. Thomas. 6 -~^% ,0. PART THIRD. QUESTIONS HAVING AN INTIMATE CONNECTION WITH ONTOLOGY. 1 r\lO ('/f I ^J^^^^^'- '^'^ various questions, very interesting to tlic c J I cultivated, which, being of a mixed nature, we have jfpj^"^ not sought to phiee under distinct headings, but will L(c/ group them all under the above title. Some of them are merely spcculanve, others practical ; these will be of service in this age of fluctuating .systems ; those will enlarge the mind, and open up vast fields for thought. A well- disciplined mind enjoys pu'-e delights in investigating such subjects: the ill-trained intellect is a torment to itself, and a source of laughter to others, when it treats of great truths. Its vague assertions, its aimless analysis, its piteous calls for light, with something of the desperation of Aeneas calling his lost Creusa, move to smiles 'mid our tears. Of all the race of untrained thinkers German transcendentalists are the most ludicrous. Their ignorance of self-evident truths is often intense ; their intellectual pride, generally, stupendous. They stoutly denounce dogmatizing, and straightway begin to " evolve " all manner of dogmatic nonsense, from their '* inner consciousness ;" they sneer at the credulity of those who believe well-established truths, and theu swallow unutter- 1 1' 196 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. ^■•"ilf-;' ^^ 7 able absurdities. From the beginning of our race until the present day, the same fearful retribution has always swiftly followed the sin of intellectual pride. Mere conceit, or foolish vanity, regarding dress and personal appearance, although ineffably silly, is not of a kind with the pride of which we speak, nor is it subjected to such dire punishments. When a created intelligence disclaims all subjection to a higher power ; when it sets up its own poor light in opposition to a divinely guided guardian of revealed truth ; when it throws down the gauntlet to sixty generations of christians, and proclaims itself superior to them all, it is a masler-stroke of retributive justice to leave it to itself, and to its ridiculous errors. Sooner or later it will discover, as did our mother Eve, that it has not become wise, but rather that it has been sadly duped. It may not make that discovery this side of the tomb ; it may not make it until, startled from its dream of wisdom by the never ceasing cry of lost souls, it, too, will swell the infernal chorus of — " v;e fools ! we thought their lives madness and their end without honor." Yes, intellec- tual pride, or that unreasonable preference of one's own opinions to the decisions of a divinely instituted guide, is a tilting passport to the gloomy regions of him who thought to be like unto the Rlost High. It is the murky vapor which has obscured the light of many a glowing star ; it is the ttorm-cloud which has uprooted many an oak of the forest. It is often a consequence of a deficient, or ill-regulated education : sometimes it is the eiTect of an indulgence of evil passions. In every case it is punished by being left to its own helplessness. In the following scientific speculations the head-lights of revelation are steadily kept in view, while the mind, illumed by these, pushes vigorously on the search after philosophic truth. CHAPTER I. TIME, ETERNITY, SPACE. E all speak about time ; we complain of its tardy passage, or sigh over its quick fleeing moments. K Our promises, appointments, hopes, schemes of aggrandizement or pleasure, all have reference to time. Fc.v stop to inquire in what it consists ; few seek to have any definite idea of its import. Those who speculate on its nature are often perplexed ; yet its comprehension is not very difficult. If we mark the order of events we say, such or such a time passed between their trans})iration. John came an hour after Joseph; Peter. lived five years. In these examples the succession of events is the measure of time, whilst the events themselves are its extremes. Between the transpiration of the two events, viz : the arrival of John and that of Joseph, an hour passed, or a pendulun. oscillated sixty times sixty. From this we gather that our idea of time is engendered by the succession of events. Some phenomena, being of constant recurrence, are naturally taken as measures of time. The sun appears and disappears, then appears again, and so on, day after day. This is our great division of time-— day whilst we perceive the rays of the sun, — night when they are withdrawn. Were the sun to shine uninter- ruptedly our idea of time would be vastly modified ; there would be still a succession of other events, and consequently, V, (•r F "1 198 nnLOSoriiY of the uiiilk vindicatkd. "I * I l-!'i 4 a. time, but it would uot be llic ])robleui it now is. Now since time ne('cs8iivily im|)ort.s tlio 'nWii of succession, or tiie acquisition of new perceptions, it follows that time can only be oomelliing relative to Hnite boin<;8. liecausc the infinite acquires no new ideas ; because he is intimately present to everythinf;, there can be no succession for him, and, in consequence, no time. We can understand this more clearly if we reflect, that because we are of limited capju'ity, we cannot have inunediate relations to everything, we cannot know all things. According as we come into certain relations with objects, we perceive something which wc did not see before ; a succession is verilied, an idea of time is engendered. The intellect acquires a kuowl 'dge not had previously ; it experiences a succession ; compaiing its present, with its previous, state, it says: there was a time \\\\cn I did not know this. Now since the inliiiite is a simple act, knowing all, being intinuitely i)resent to all, he cannot acquire new knowledge, he caniu)t undergo any change, hence ibr him there is no time. We can have a faint idea of this by observing that when we keep our minds intently fixed on one subject, for example, on s(une ma*, hematical problem, we are unconscious of time, and are surprised, when roused, to perceive what a succession of movements have taken place, in the meantime, in our watch. Perhaps, what appeared to us as a moment, was what others call two hours. The more our Avants are lew, and our minds at rest, the shorter does time appear; the fretful or inqjatient sufierer imagines it much longer. From this it can be gathered (hat, in Heaven, the blessed have a widely diU'erent notion of time from ours. Eternifif. The idea of Eternity can be gained from that of time ; the latter is not a part of the former ; eternity does not consist of an iufiuile series of years. It is continual cxisteuce with- TIME, ETERNITY, SPACE. 199 we I out succession. Time is existence with succession. Now since only the infinite is witiiout succession, because only he is iu)(;luiiigeable, it follows that eternity is relative to the infinite only. If we would seek to have an idea of eternity, we must divest ourselves of our material notion of thiiii^s ; wc must iniaui;irie God, an infinite, simple act, once, always and together knowing and willing what he knows and wills. For him there is no rising, or setting sun to form a constant recurrence of phenomena ; he is ever intinnitcly present to the sun ; tliere is no acquisition of ideas, for he knows everything knowable ; there is no longing after anything, for he is supremely happy. Unchanging, and unchangeable in essence or wish, he exists, free from the limits of space, and ever without time. Space. We approach a very knarTcd question : what is space? is it real? what is its extent? Whilst in life our vision is shrouded ; we see appearances ; our judgments are formed, naturally, from the impressions received. Each one knows wluit is understood by distance, in the popular mind. Bodies are said to be extended, that is, to have parts outside of parts, and, consequently, to occupy a portion of space. Space itself is said to be the capacity of containing bodies. At first sight this seems quite plain and correct; we, for all practical purposes, understand sutlicient by this. Poets sing of the vastnesa of space : geometricians cut it up, and enclose portions of it with lines of various imaginary proportions: natural philosophers enumerate extension among the essential properties of bodies. It would seem from this, that our notion of space and extension was sufficiently satisfactory, ♦Such, indeed, it is in a practical point of view. If, however, we raise our minds to speculate on what really constitutes extension, or to find in what it finally consists, the question iJ 200 PHILOSOPHY OP THE BIBLE VINDICATED. I 1 ii 1 i \ II becomes beset with greater dilliculties. We hold, and have proved, the objective reality of bodies ; no amount of sophistry can impose on mankind the absurdity that only the suhject / exists as a substance. As seen, there are innumerable substances in creation, some visible and compound, such as wood and stone ; others invi^ible and simple, such as the human soul. The objective rei.lify of the corporeal world is not less firmly established in the following theory regard- ing extension, than what it is in the popular one. It is to be observed that our ideas of extension are entirely relative, or more properly, extension is a rehifive property. We say an object is ten feet in length ; ihat is, compared with a foot rule it is ten times longer than that measure. There is no absolute stai dard of measurement ; all that the intellect can do is to compare the proportion an object bears to some conventional unit of comparison, as perceived through the senses. Hence if we suppose that on some night, whilst all are buried in sleep, the world should diminish to the size of a pea-nut, and we. and all things else should decrease in the same proportion, on awaking no one would be aware of the change. Our usual standards of weiglit and measure when iipplied to objects, would letain the same p: oportion as on the previous day. In reality the yard measure would be incalculably less, but relatively to surrounding objects it would be the same. Peter was six f»'et high yesterday ; he is six feet to-day ; how coidd wo know that the foot of yes- terday was greater than it is to-day? The animalcula that exist in a drop of water, if we imagine them endowed with reason, would think the passing from one extreme of that drop to the other an achievement as great, as we the walking round our world. From these considerations we can acquire a tolerably correct notion of extension ; it is a relation of one finite beinj^ to another. As was observed when speakiag of TIME, ETERNITY, SPACE. 201 time, by reason of our Hmitcation we cannot be in immediate relation with every bein<^. Tliose tliiiij^s which are more remotely related to us, are said to be distant ; by various physical contortions we change our relation to those things, and we are said to approach, or to recede. That vacuum^ which seems to intervetie between us and those distant objects, is an absence of any sensible reality. Hence space is a nothiu;:^ ; it is the privation of perceptible reality, just as darkness is the privation of li;^ht. From this it follows that since God is the iiiiiriito reality, being intimately present to everytliMig, there can be, for him, no extended plains, nor lofty mountains to explore. Again ; since our soul is a simple, spiritual svd)stance, its relation to corporeal things is not to be restricted by oiu* ideas of relation between two visible objects. When we consider the union of soul with body, we must remember that the soul belongs to one order of beings, and the body to another ; consequently no contra- diction can be shown in the assertion that the soul, though simple and inextended, is present, or has immediate relation with every part of thecon^pound body. Place and extension being terms relative only to sensible olijects, we must guard against applying them to simple and spiritual ones. That extension is but a phenomenon arising from our limitation of essence, can be «lemonstrated with nuithemalical rigor. All matter is composed of simple substances, or forces : a iinite object must bo exhausted by a tinite number of divisions. Now a simple substance, or force, is evidently without extension ; it has no parts, consequently no relation of distance. The question at once arises : how can you so connect, or dispose a certain number of inextended forces, go as to produce an extended one? Evidently, no way can be found except the one, viz : you must leave a space between them. But this supposes what is to be proved, vi^: that ■I m i \4 202 PHILOSOPHY OF thk ihule vindicatkd. extension is reul ; moreover what is that pparc? What is between the force A and the force B? Either a reality, or uothin^r ; if nothing, then there is no di'^tance between them ; if a reality, what is it? is it extended? if not, s ill no dis- tance ; if it is, then what are between the component forces of which if is constituted? We cannot, in finite things, go on ad infill itaiii ; hence we must sooner or later come to a stop ; what is between the ultimate particles* of the last intervening body? Nothing; then it must be inextended ; but if it be inextended the particles of the penultinnite body, between which it is supposed to intervene, cannot be really distant from one another ; hence that body is, likewise, inex- teinlcd iSo must the anti-penultimate, for the same I'eason ; so must each preceding one. The whole explanation of the phenomenon of extension is contained in this ; we are finite; our relation to other objects must be of various degrees ; a compound substance, such as a tree, has \arious components ; to each of these we have a dilferent relation; we express these various relations by saying the right and left, the bottom and top, and thus form extension. From the above reflections it can be seen that the saying of the followers of Aristotle, that the soul is all in the whole body, and all in each part of it, though ridiculed by some, is in no way absurd. In fact, it is the only reasonable explan- ation of physiological phenomena. God, though eminently simple, is all in the whole world, and all in each part of it, still he is inextended. The soul, being finite, cannot be thus intimately j)reseut to everything, but it can be so to a limited number of things, such as are the various parts of the body. hit. Thomas saw the dawning of the theory expounded r^ ->ve. liis mighty intellect outran many centuries, and ;...r *»<.'ipated in the light and development of future ages. la (; .k'», ^rim. quest. 7G, ud. 8) he proves the soul to be all ia TIME, ETERNITY, SPACE. 203 a the whole body, and all in each part of it ; and in (Tcrtia quest. 76) explaining the real presence, lie feels, rather than comprehends the truth of this system. Had he the advantage of the profiress made in physical science since hivS day, he would have left us a luminous treatise on the dynamic theory, and a satisfactory explanation of all ditlicultics I'cgarding extension. There is a harmony and connection between all truths. Althoujrli it is not the duty of the phihjsopher to expound revealed truths, we may observe that the true idea ot' extension given above, beautifully harmonizes with the Catholic dojma of the real presence. Once tlnit we mastei' the idea that extension is a mere relation, the dilHcnlties drawn from the apparent contradiction of placin;j: Christ, whole and entire, under tlie appearance of a si dl iiost, vanish, like the *' unsubstantial pageant of a dream" Thus jis science goes on, developing and progressing, instead of coming in collision with the tt'achings of the Church, as demented scriltblers Iiowl it must, it but serves to coulirm, if that were necessary, many of her doctrines, and to reveal the inner beauty of God's holy fane. Here just yne question might be asked of "modern thinkers:" how does it conje to pass that Catholic philosophers and theologians, centuries ago, proponndi'd and defended a theory regarding extension, substantially the same, as that which you must now tardily admit to be true? They were not, then, grossly contradictory in their assertions ; th^ " subtilities of the schools," against which many of your herd sneer, are here proved to be founded in right reason. Time and Extension are, then, the inevitable phenomena of a limited nature ; a succession of perceptions causes tho foi.ner ; a diversity of relation the latter. IJoth argue a want of ulterior perfection in us ; for the infinite, in whom is the p'euitude of perfection, they cannct exist. The soul, 8: I St m 't (1 w I :! !-hi 204 PIITLOSOPIIY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. being of an order superior to that of the body, must approach more nearly the attributes of God. Hence, when separated from the body, its ideas of time and extension must be wonderfully modified. It will not have to fly upward, or downward, to meet its judge. Imagine a man immured in a cave ; through the chinks some straggling rays enter ; from these he judges that far, far olf there is great light ; an earthquake hurls down his piison walls ; without having to move a step he is in the glorious sunlight. So too when death has torn aside our earthy veil which permits some rays to enter, the freed soul, without motion, will be in the presence of its maker ; for in Him we live and move and have our being. \ i !! t 'i « I: \\ ^: *- fir -^^ II li^ CHAPTER II. CEUTITUDE. I ■ irp CIENCE necessarily bej^ets certitude ; if we have the (^^M^ former, we must possess tlie hitter. Again, as shown \^C ^" *'i^ beginning', our minds are capable of attaining t^^ certainty ; either we must say with the sceptic that science is impossible, and then follows the curious consequence that, whilst steadfastly denying the possibility of certainty, we are strenuously upholding its existence, by reiterating that we are certain we know nothing : or we must admit with sane humanity that there are many things of which Ave arc certain. As a matter of fact, tlien, certitude exists ; there is no contradiction between a limited intelligence and certain knowledge. The human mind has an aptitude for certainty. It is idle, then, to inquire, " is science possible?" The question is as childish as this other one : is it possible for the subject J to exist? The very questions contain their own answers ; if you ask, is science possible? you suppose * . is ; for you will be satisfied with either yes or no ; whichever you accept you confirm the possibility, nay the existence of one cognition, at least. It is a piece of hyper-transcendental foolery to speculate on the possibility of that, of the existence of which we are, and must necessarily be certain, A question may be raised as to how we know ; but there can be no question about the fact that we know many things. HeQc« M' m 'V m 200 rillLOSOPIIY OF TIIK niBT-K VINDTCATED. i although one iimy not be able to explain by what prooos.s tlio intellect acqiiire.s knowle(l;i:e, still, the Hccptie would ;iain no victory. The reasonin;; : '' yon don't know how yonr soul apprehends snch an idea ; theiefore it does not Jty)prehend it at nil," would scarcely pass unquestioned by the veriest tyro in lo;:ie. From this we can .iud;,^' how sad are the abei-rations of hiunan intellect, in those conceited ])hilosophizers who maintained that no science could be had unless we had first fouiul and proved its base. Generally each of them placed a new base, and, conse([uently, it would follow that nothing was known till Mr. A. placed his <'otnidati(jn ; people, then, thouirht they knew soinelliin;x, but Mr. IJ. arises, di;^s up A's base and lays a new one, loudly asserting that nothing could have been known until his time. Thus the comedy goes on ; C. springs a mine under the foundation placed by B., and begins anew. One hardly knows whether to laugh at the folly of such (fcrmaii base-digging, or to be angry at the amazing conceit of those philosophic fiedglings who imagine that there was no science until they came to place its base. No one human intellect has a monopoly of knowledge ; the mighty men of the past knew many things ; the mighty mcu of to-day know, perhaps, more ; but a still greater luimber of things kuowable are now unknown Avhich the mighty men of the future will know. We are certain that there is a limit to human understanding, but whether there be many, or few undiscovered truths, as yet, within that limit, we know not ; of this much we are sure, the limit has not yet been reached. Perhaps it never will, in life ; but under the fostering and guiding cure of holy church, in the future as in the past, the human intellect will go on developing ; now an Augustine, now a Thomas, now a Raphael, now a IMichael-Angelo will lead his age, and make advances on future ones. Each devoted student may add one small stone, at least, to the edifice of human science. !i! CKnTITUDE. 207 Iliiviiic^ (lisfiinl(Ml, ns uHoltss, all qncstioti ns to the possi- bility of cuilitudo, we muy iiiqtiire in what docs the tirst priiu'ii)le of certitude coiifsirit. Since there is certitude for the iiilelU'ct, there must be ii priiniiry crilerion by which the mind may know with certainty the motives which dettrmine it to prcmounce jiMJ^^ment, and, also, the necessary connexion of thes(; motives with tiie truth. This is wiuit we mean by the lirst principle of certitude. Now it is evident that that principle must be one known without demonstration, and intrinsic to I'ach individual. Since it is the tirst it cjtiuiot be demonstrated by any preceding one ; and since each individual mind is capable of certitude, each must have, in itself, a rule, or criterion by which it exj)ends all motives of credibility. Uidess this principle be in each mind there could never be certainty amon^ men ; if you suppose the principle to be extrinsic, before a mind can be certain, it must tirst determine within itself — does that motive exist? is it credible? Therefore any extrinsic principle cannot be first, for it must be jiidired by an interior one ; hence the lirst principle of certitude is intrinsic to each mind. Individual reason, or the intellect pi'rceivini^, is that principle ; the intellect cannot be ij^nnrant of its existence, ueither can it be ignorant of the objective reality of its acts ; therefore it is certain of the existence of certainty, inasmuch as it is certain of these. St. Thomas (de. Verit, qs. 1 1 art. 1 ad. 13 an.) says : " Certitude of science arises from certainty of principles. .... hence it is from the light of reason divinely bestowed within, by which God s])eaks in us, not from man teaching without, that a thing is known with certainty." And (Lib. 3 cont. gent. cap. 154). " By natural light the intellect is made certain of the things which it knows by "that light." St. Augustine, writing against the sceptics of his ifl li-JMi If ill: ^ ; I ■ if' \ ■i 208 PHILOSOPHY OF TIIK BIBLK VINDICATKL time, turtuHl the tables on them with a venpfcnnce ; (do Vcrn. R('ll.*'i'.j). 39 1) 73) he writes: *' lie who |)er('eiverf him.self doiil)tiii;r, perceives whnt is true, mid h certain of that which he perceives ; therefore he is certain of what is true." Per- haj)s the whole rau^e of philosophy does not atl'ord a more trenchant ar;,nnnent than this. It j)roves two things : tirst, 8ce[)ti('isni is impossible ; secondly, the principle of certainty is intrinsic — it is the mind perceivin;.'. This doctrine is wichdy ditl'erent from that tau^^^ht by rationalists. It merely asserts that reason is the rule of truth in the luitural order, and a requisite in the suj)ernatural to know the motive of faith. It maintains the (li;j^nity of reason, while it recognizes its limitation. On the other hand, rationalists pretend that nothing should be believed except what can be demonstrated by reason. If this means anything, it means that human reason is infinite, or at least, that there exists no being suj)erior to itself. For, if a superior nature exists, it cannot be fully grasped by an inferior one ; there must be in it some reality outside the reach of its inferior. This reality will be a truth which may be known, with certainty, by some other means. Again, this docti'ine is truly philosophic. It asserts that nothing is to be considered as certain except that which reason either directly perceives, or that which it knows to have a motive of certainty. If the intellect were never td pronounce judgment until it perceived the essential relations of things, or some motive for their certainty, it would never fall into error ; it would invarisj.bt) acquire true science. Passions, preconceived notions, intellec'ual pride — all con- spire to lead man astray. The world spins round and hustlea men along ; a craze to keep ahead of all, causes many to pronounce judgment ere they have examined the case in all its bearings. Hence the crude and absurd theories that CEUTITUDE. 209 confuse men*3 bruiiij^. Reason is invoked aa the nutlioress otHysttais whieh involve nintual destruction ; these systems do not exist because produeetl by reason, but because she was absent ihiriii;; their incubation. Were one just recover- ing from a severe iUness to attempt to walk tar one would fall by the way, not beiitusc of one's return\n;^ health, but because it had not fully returned ; so, too, when one a