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 THE MILITIA OF CANADA 
 
 ->♦-€-• — 
 
 FROM LETTERS TO THE SATURDAY'S SPEOIAL MILITARY 
 COLUMN OF THE EMI'IRE UPON 
 
 • MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
 
 •RcspccttullB DeMcateD be Special pcrmisgion 
 
 TO 
 
 Major-General Ivor Caradoc Herbert, C.B. 
 
 Commanding the Militia of the Dominion of Canada ^ 
 
 BY 
 
 THE ODD KII^E 
 
 PRICE, 25 CENTS, 
 
 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HUNTER, ROSE & COMPANY. 
 
 1892 
 

 i_oS3S 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 TO 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL IVOR JOHN CARADOC HERBERT, C.B., 
 
 Commandiny the Militia of the Dominion of Canada. 
 
 The concise way in which you so clearly laid bare the many de- 
 fects of our Militia System in your first Annual Report, has encouraged 
 us to believe that you will succeed in the arduous task of reforming 
 it, and has led the militia generally to discuss the question of how 
 to improve itself. 
 
 Lectures and discussions at the Royal United Service Institution 
 have been the means of many important improvements in the training 
 and organization of the Regular Army, Navy and Auxiliary Forces of 
 Great Britain, indeed, if it had not been for the advocacy in the Thea- 
 tre of that Institution by that eminent Scotch lawyer, Lord Kingsboro, 
 Lord Justice Clerk of Scotland (better known as the Right Hon. J. H. 
 Macdonald), who is an enthusiastic volunteer and Colonel Command- 
 ant Commanding the Queen's Edinboro' (Volunteer) Rifles, it is doubt- 
 ful if the organization of Volunteers under the Brigade System would 
 have been carried out when it was. 
 
 I am fully aware that in so kindly giving permission for this paper 
 to be dedicated to you, you are in no way endorsing the opinions ex- 
 pressed therein, but that your intention is to promote thought arid 
 discussion upon these subjects by the members of the Canadian Militia 
 within due bounds, and upon similar lines as are carried on at the 
 R.U.S.L 
 
 Thanking y«^)u for the encouragement thus bestowed, 
 
 I am, Sir, 
 Your ol)edient servant, 
 
 THE ODD FILE. 
 
OUR MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 No. T. 
 
 I want now to call attention to our orgaixization, or rathei* want of 
 
 organization, but first let ine say that this year's report of the general 
 
 c»flicer eomnianding the militia has stirred us all up and made us believe 
 
 that a new era is at last coming. It is quite a pleasure to us military 
 
 reformers, if I may use the term, to read his report. Take for instance 
 
 his rejttly grasp of the contention that we have always put forward, 
 
 thot we should have two distinct forces— one the militia, pure and 
 
 simple, under strict military code, and the other a volunteer force 
 with its capitation grant of so much per head for efficients, going into 
 
 the regimental fund, and its semi-civil organization, as has grown up in 
 
 many of the city corps. 
 
 Take for instance the Queen's Own. They are allowed 420 N. C. O. 
 and men, or 42 men per company, for v/hom they draw $6.00 per 
 annum, which, by a civil organization, is taken for a certain fund. 
 Now, as a matter of fact, they have 650 men, or 65 men per company. 
 If, therefore, they only got a capitation gi-ant of $6 per man, and had 
 a legal volunteer organization, they would be on a very much more satis- 
 factory footing, and there would be some encouragement for officers to 
 work their companies up to a proper strength, instead of keeping them 
 .at the strength of half a company, as at present. 
 
 The militia proper would also be on a better ftwting, as they would 
 no longer feel that they were being left in the lurch by their city 
 brethren. On the subject of militia training, I will speak later. 
 I will put a few simple propositions before you. Suppose our country 
 was attacked by, we'll say, Eskimo, to-morrow, and we call out our 
 militia, what organization have we 1 Cavalry, artillery and infantry 
 must be brigaded and fonned into divisions. We may suppose that No. 2 
 district constitutes one division, and the D. A. G. staff take over the 
 command of that division. All right, so far so good. But what is the 
 rest ? A rabble 1 
 
 There are two regiments of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and 
 17 regiments of infantry. Now suppose you say, "Foi*m the infantry into 
 four brigades." All right, go ahead. Where are your brigades' staff? 
 Where are even your Brigadiers 1 Perhaps No. 2 district may be excep- 
 tionally fortunate, and you may find four Brigadiers, but suppose one or 
 
(i 
 
 OUR MILITARY OUCJANMZATION. 
 
 t' o of them die or get killed, where are you then ? And even if you 
 have them, where is your staff? Your organization ? Y(m may have lots 
 of enthusiastic young officers, hut, they are useless witlutut the training. 
 Such duties cannot be picked up in a day, and liowever good a dry 
 go<Kls or hardware num, etc., a fellow may be, he is a long way off from 
 being a ti-ained staff officer or a brigadier. 
 
 No. II. 
 
 " A chain of responsibility, maintained by competent staff officers, 
 must exist, in oi-der that the motive power of one controlling will 
 shall reach '1 ranks." (Vide report of the major-general commanding 
 the militia, .31 st December, 1H91, page 11.) 
 
 I asked how you were going to form brigades without properly 
 trained staff officers. It has been suggested that my contention might 
 be taken as a reflection on the senior officers of the militia. This is 
 not so, by any means. My contention is not that we have not the 
 men with brains capable of filling the positions, but is "that they 
 are not yet trained to the work." 
 
 One gentleman, a Canadian and a graduate of the Il.M.C. to boot, 
 holds the opinion that in the event of it being necessary to defend our 
 homes, the Imperial Government would inniiediately send out army 
 officers to fill tlie staff pasitions. 
 
 I contend that this is not only impossible, but undesirable, if we 
 take time hy tJie forelock. 
 
 It is impossible, because in the event of such a deplorable occurrence 
 the army itself would be fully employed, and could not spare a dozen 
 officers. It is undesirable, because we have plenty of shrewd, capable 
 men, ^\ ho with the proper training would suit our wants a great deal 
 better, as they understand their country and its ways, and have a 
 natural training which enables them to overcome difficulties which ap- 
 pear almost insurmountable to men who lack the bush and rough school- 
 ing which most Canadians have gone through. 
 
 To establish my whole case, I will take a distant point for our mobil- 
 ization, as it will make the difficulties more clear to you, although they 
 equally exist if Toronto was the point of assembly. 
 
 We will suppose the enemy advancing from Hudson's Bay, and the 
 troops of No. 2 district ordered to mobilize at North Bay under the 
 D. A.G. of the district. For the present I will pass over the difficulties 
 of the transport and supply for their mobilization, but will merely take 
 it for granted that every company is raised to its proper fighting 
 
OUU MIIJTAIIV OROANIZATION. 7 
 
 8ti-en«th of 100 N.C.O. and men, and thus inntead of 17 of the pres- 
 ent "skeleton battalions" you will have 15 battalions of 800 men 
 each, and two battalions of 1,000 men each. (I am only dealing 
 with the infantry at present.) This will give 14,000 men, with a 
 staff' of one D.A.G. and one brigade major, one district paymaster. 
 
 In England the volunteers are formed into brigades by counties or 
 adjoining counties, and thus, besides the general commanding the dis- 
 tricts with his full staff, and the officer commanding the regimental 
 districts, they have their volunteer infantry brigades' staff. The head- 
 quarters office is fully set out in the army orders, also " the place of 
 assembly " is laid down, and a staff of five to each brigade appointed, 
 viz., brigadier, his A.D.O., brigade-majc supply and transport officer, 
 and brigade surgeon. Thus, when any volunteer brigade takes the 
 field, or goes out to camp, it does so with its own staff, and all the 
 ordinary business of the battalions forming each brigade is done 
 through its own brigade office, so that the brigade staff becomes fam- 
 iliar with their work, and the regimental officers are in touch with and 
 familiar with working under them, and, to use the words of General 
 Herbert quoted alx)ve, " one controlling will shall reach all ranks." 
 
 I am aware that such a small district staff as ours would be insuffi- 
 cient to command the brigades formed by the 14,000 men composing 
 the fighting strength of the 17 battalions whose organization I pro- 
 pose to discuss later, and I cannot do better than give you a list 
 of the district staff in England, so that you may be fully aware of the 
 actual requirements, irrespective of the brigade organization which we 
 are now discussing. It is as follows : 
 
 1, General commanding ; 2, his A.D.C.; 3, assistant adjutant-gen- 
 eral ; 4, deputy assistant adjutant-general ; 5, deputy assistant adjutant- 
 general for instruction ; 6, district inspector of musketry ; 7, officer 
 commanding artillery (colonel on staff') ; 8, officer commanding engine- 
 ers (colonel on staff) ; 9, senior ordnance store officer; 10, district pay- 
 master ; 11, principal medical officer. 
 
 I will now ask you to turn to page 10 in the militia list, as it is to 
 that page I must now devote myself. 
 
 No. III. 
 
 '' This can only be accomplished by organization and a sound admin- 
 istrative system."— Vide report of the Major-General Commanding Can- 
 adian Militia, page 11, 31st December, 1891. 
 
 ^pon page 10 of the Militia List you will find the commencement of 
 
8 
 
 OUll MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 11 
 
 r 
 
 a brigade organization. Each military district is there divided into 
 brigade divisions. Why "divisions" I do not know, but for our pur- 
 poses I will treat them as brigades. 
 
 I do not propose to enter into the question as to whether these brig- 
 ades are formed in the most convenient groups of counties for mobiliza- 
 tion, but take them- as they are. 
 
 In No. 2 district the Third Brigade is composed of the battalions in 
 the counties of Brant, Kaldimand, Hamilton (city) Monck, Niagara, 
 Norfolk, Welland, Wentworth and Lincoln, in which at present there 
 are seven battalions, viz., the 13tli 9th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 44th, 77th. 
 The Fourth Brigade has Cardwell, Urey, On .rio, Peel, Simcoe, Hal ton 
 and York (Algoma with the 96th has been transferred to No. 10 dis- 
 trict, I believe), which makes a brigade composed of the 12th, 20th, 
 31st, 34th, 35th and 36th battalions. The Fifth Brigade is composed 
 of the city of Toronto battalions, viz., the 2nd, 10th and 48th. 
 
 But I venture to assert that not one of these battalions knows to 
 which brigade it belongs. Indeed, I venture to say that not half a 
 dozen officers in the militia know anything at all about this paper 
 organization. 
 
 The most important points of the English system are here left out. 
 To make the system workable, and to facilitate mobilization, a " place 
 of assembly " should be named for each brigade, and a brigade staff ap- 
 pointed now, and each brigade should lie called out to its training " as 
 a brigade," and should be accustomed " to assemble at the place named" 
 and with its brigade staff, through whom all orders from the officer 
 commanding the district should go, and through whom all appointments 
 should be made. 
 
 It has been said that in time of necessity these bi'igades' staff could 
 readily be j^ppointed from the most capable officers in the district ; but 
 think for a minute what would be the effect of such a course. In the 
 first place the officers so appointed would be, for the most part, unac- 
 quainted with their duty. Then again, there is hardly a battalion whicV- 
 has its full complement of officers, and you would still further weaken 
 them in one of their greatest wants ; further, by taking the most cap- 
 able from their battalions at a time of necessity, you would place those 
 battalions so deprived of their head in a most unenviable and unfai^ 
 position. 
 
 If, on the other hand, these appointments were made " now," and 
 allowed to really command their brigades, they would not only get 
 much of the requisite training, but other men, taking their places in 
 
OUR MILITARY <)K(JANIZATION. 
 
 9 
 
 their battalions, would get trained in their positions and accustomed to 
 work in their brigades. 
 
 It therefore appears to me that the first essential work (to use the 
 general's words) "in accomplishing our organization" is to make our 
 paper brigades " real and effective " : 
 
 First— by re-arranging them where necessary. 
 
 Second — By appointing a " place of assembly " for each, and letting 
 them always assemble there and thus get iised, in time of peace, to a 
 most trying duty. 
 
 Third — By appointing at once a brig.ade staff for each brigade. 
 
 I do not pretend to be advocating the general's scheme of organiza- 
 tion, as I know nothing of it ; neither can I attempt to put our ideas 
 in a complete form, 'is it would make these letters occupy too much 
 space, but I am trying to show you, in a rough sketch, how, without 
 expense, our organization (and, therefore, our usefulness) could l)e ren- 
 dered workable. And now we come to the important question of 
 transport and supply. 
 
 No. lY. 
 
 I have been asked to justify the statement that it is undesirable 
 "to fill the staff positions, in the event of trouble, with Imperial 
 officers." 
 
 Permit me to point out that I (jualified that by saying " if we take 
 time by the forelock," in other words, " if we trained our own staff 
 beforehand." 
 
 Moreover, I was speaking of brigades' staff, and not the superior 
 positions where trained strategians and tacticians are required, upon the 
 principle of every man to his trade ; just as a tailor is necessary instead 
 of an amateur to make a coat, so is a trained soldier tactician necessary 
 in his place. 
 
 As I said, we have plenty of clever, shrewd men, who, with training, 
 would make first-rate officers on the brigades' staff, and we might 
 utilize some of the younger men on the retired list, of known and tried 
 abilitj^, duch as the Toronto chief of police. I pointed out in that 
 letter that almost every Canadian (by birth or adoption) has had a 
 certain amount of valuable rough bush training which enables him to 
 overcome difficulties in a rough and ready way, and for some of our 
 work would give him an advantage over his confrere of tlie army. 
 
 When I wrote this I had in my mind two instances that occurred 
 under my own eye. In the first it was necessary for a swift, broad 
 river to be crossed by troops and transport, and there were no materisal 
 
10 
 
 OUR MILITARY ORfJANIZATlON. 
 
 ov pontoon to be had for a bridge. A clever and energetic, English 
 staff officer tried to rig a cable ferry, but for several days was unable 
 to get it to work. At last he permitted a man with extensive bush 
 and prairie experience to take it in hand with the result that within 
 an hour it was working successfully. 
 
 In the other case a colunni hastening in pursuit of the enemy was 
 delayed whilst an R. E. staff officer built a bridge over a swamp. He 
 was a capital staff officer, capaljle, and knew his staff work, but this 
 valuable time was wasted, as the transport and guns, led by an old bush 
 hand, went round by an easier spot which they fixed in a few minutes 
 with a few boughs in the ordinary bushwhacking style. Thus you see 
 in two cases practical every day rough bush experience had the advan- 
 tage over the theoretical training of the highest order. We must not, 
 however, fall into the gross error of despising the latter. 
 
 Unfortunately most of our militia officers are so narrow-minded that 
 they are content to go on from year to year with the single ambition of 
 trying to " best " some rival corps in cup competitions or such like. 
 We want to stir up such men ** to think." 
 
 Does the force exist simply to gratify their petty ambition in such a 
 direction, as they appear to think ? Or does it really exist for the 
 country's defence, as we believe ? If we are right, what is the good of 
 a force that exists only as a "mob," without oi-ganization ? If these 
 men ever read, I would ask them to read " Modern War," by Col. 
 Derrecagaix ((Chapman & Co). Those in Toronto can get it in the 
 Public Library (" Dl 192-3)." If they will read this book carefully they 
 will find the advantage of organization fully set out and the disastrous 
 effects of the want of it. More than that, they will find it fully proved 
 that, other things being equal, a country with a superior organization 
 will beat a country with an inferior one. A connnon error about the 
 Franco-Crerman war is that the Germans won V.ecause they were better 
 soldiers. Let anyone so thinking read Col. Lonsdale Hale's article 
 upon the battle of Woerth in the June number of The Contemporary 
 Review. Indeed most military students agree that "the French 
 soldier was the superior of the two," but that France was "beaten from 
 the word ' go ' by the superior German organization." • When once we 
 can get our countrymen to read for themselves, and recognize the fact 
 that no matter how brave our individual men may be, we are absolutely 
 nothing without "organization," then they may put aside their little 
 petty conceits and jealousies and set to work in earnest to put our 
 house in order so as to bs prepared to meet any attack upon our home 
 with all the availul)le means in our power, instead of an armed mob. 
 
(UTR MILITARY <)H(;ANIZATION. 
 
 11 
 
 It is for this reason that having looked at our executive organization, 
 it is now necessary to consider our means for mobilization and transpoi't. 
 What is necessary for one district is necessary for another, and I have 
 only taken No. 2 district as an illustration of the whole, and North 
 Bay as a mobilization point moderately accessible and yet far enough 
 off, to enable an example of the necessary proceedings to be made. 
 
 Owing to the transfer of the 96th from No. 2 district to No. 10, we 
 have now to consider how to move only 13,200 infantry to North Bay. 
 
 In a complete scheme of organization the question of railway trans- 
 port would, of course, have to be fully considered, and the routes laid 
 down for the different brigades to various defensive points, so that the 
 staff may study it in conjunction with the railway officials, and in case 
 of emergency that each may do their duty accurately and mechanically. 
 A delay in assembling a brigade would mean a delay in entraining, 
 which would delay, in its turn, the whole mobilization ; for the disastrous 
 results of which read Derrecagaix. Each officei' and x'ailway officer 
 should know his particular place and duty, and then things would work 
 like clock-work. 
 
 I have calculated four wagons and teams with four tons of regimen- 
 tal baggage, tents and 100 rounds of ammunition per man with each 
 (H)mpany of 100 men. This is a very minium allowance and would not 
 ai^mit of the supply and transport train being far off. 
 
 In order to promote the harmonious working of military with the 
 officials in England a certain number of officei's are yc?arly permitted to 
 be attached to the establishment of one of the lai gest railways in the 
 kingdom, and in time of mobilization their training would be of immense 
 value to the military force. This example might be worked in with 
 the R.M.C. and long course officers, with great advantage to our force. 
 
 A high official in the G. T. R. has most kindly worked out the fol 
 lowing scheme by which the whole of the force we are now discussing 
 could be assembled at North Bay in four days. I cannot do better 
 than quote his letter in full. He says : 
 
 "I have found time to work out the calculations you wanted in refer- 
 ence to your proposition as to moving men from the different points on 
 the Grand Trunk to North Bay. 
 
 " In making my calculations I have considered that the force is going 
 to disembark from the cars at North Bay, and that all the rolling stock, 
 etc., will be at once available to return and bring up fresh troops. 
 
 " I liave calculated that I can take 400 men, 16 tons of baggage aiul 
 
 three horses in each train. In this division of numbers I tind ' -ill 
 
 re 33 traitis and I have estimated, that although at first a few 
 
12 
 
 OUR MILIlAllY OIUiANlZATEON. 
 
 :itl 
 
 trains could be handled at North Bay pretty <iuickly, yet, as the trains 
 on the sidinjjs up thei-e Itegau to accumulate, and as the single track 
 railway U'ading to North Bay began to be tried to its utmost capacity 
 in getting up trains and bringing the empties back, it would not be .safe 
 to calculate that the trains could arrive there much, if any, faster than 
 an avei-age of one an hour. In this way, if we had a sufficient number 
 of trains available to do the work, the force could be got there from 
 the points you mention in say, 36 hours from the time the first coi'ps 
 arrived. Howevei', I have estimated that 1 1 trains would be as many 
 as could lie got together nt short notice without materially interrupting 
 the general traffic of the railway, and with these ti-ains it would take 
 72 hours from the time of the arrival of that first train to the ari-ival 
 o^ the last, the time from staiting the first train beiiig 84 hours until 
 they^were all on the gn>unri. 
 
 " I have, in arranging the starting of the trains from the different 
 points, taken int(» consideration the facilities there would be in the 
 event of an immediate order for the transport to be given, and I have 
 prepared a table, which I enclo.se, showing the proposed time and 
 departure of each half battalion of 400 men, from the different points. 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 o 
 
 § 
 
 » c 
 
 1 
 
 
 i 
 
 s 
 
 2nd ... . 
 
 400 
 
 2nd.... 
 
 405; 
 
 34th,... 
 
 400 
 
 34th.... 
 
 400 1 
 
 13th.... 
 
 400 ; 
 
 3Sth.... 
 
 400 
 
 39th.... 
 
 40J 
 
 30th.... 
 
 400 
 
 38th.... 
 
 400 
 
 2nd .... 
 
 209 
 
 10th.... 
 
 200 
 
 18th .. 
 
 400 
 
 31st.... 
 
 400 
 
 3l8t.... 
 
 400 
 
 35th.... 
 
 40) 
 
 35lh.... 
 
 40D 
 
 10th.... 
 
 40) 
 
 20th.... 
 
 400 
 
 10th.. .. 
 
 400 
 
 48th.... 
 
 400 
 
 20th.... 
 
 400 
 
 48th.... 
 
 40) 
 
 12th.... 
 
 4T0 
 
 12th.... 
 
 4)0 
 
 19th 
 
 4C0 
 
 19th.... 
 
 40) 
 
 38th.... 
 
 400 
 
 4tth.... 
 
 40) 
 
 44th.... 
 
 400 
 
 seth.... 
 
 400 
 
 77th.... 
 
 400 
 
 77th.... 
 
 400 
 
 37th .. . . 
 
 400 
 
 37th .. . . 
 
 400 
 
 
 1S.800 
 
 Date, i Place of Departure. 
 
 l8t.. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 18 .. 
 1-t.. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 l8t.. 
 
 l8t.. 
 
 Ist. 
 
 l8t.. 
 
 1 1st.. 
 
 l8t. 
 
 l8ii;.. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 Snd 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd, 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 3rd. 
 
 Snd. 
 
 Snd. 
 
 3rd. 
 
 3rd. 
 
 Srd. 
 
 8rd. 
 
 3rd 
 
 Srd. 
 
 4th. 
 
 4th. 
 
 Toro ilo 
 
 Bowmanvillc . . 
 BowmanviUc . 
 Hamilton. .... 
 
 Brantf ord 
 
 Siracoe 
 
 Siincoe 
 
 Brantfo d 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Hamilton 
 
 Owen Sound . . . 
 Owen Sjund. . . 
 
 Birrie 
 
 Barr.j 
 
 Toronto 
 
 M Iton 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Milton 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Toronto 
 
 St. Cathirinea. 
 St. Catharines. 
 
 Brampton 
 
 St. Cathariues. 
 St. Citharines. 
 
 Brampton 
 
 Hamilton 
 
 Hamilton 
 
 Bran'ford 
 
 Brantford 
 
 .3 
 
 Is 
 
 "S 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 
 Date. 
 
 I 
 
 o 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 6 a.m.. 
 
 6 
 
 p.m. 
 
 1st.. 
 
 7 a.m.. 
 
 7 
 
 p.m. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 2 
 
 6 a.m.. 
 
 8 
 
 p.m. 
 
 1st.. 
 
 8 
 
 7 a.m.. 
 
 
 
 p.m. 
 
 1st.. 
 
 4 
 
 8 a.m.. 
 
 10 
 
 p.m. 
 
 Is',.. 
 
 6 
 
 6 a.m.. 
 
 U 
 
 p.m. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 6 
 
 6 a.m.. 
 
 12 
 
 mid. 
 
 Ist.. 
 
 7 
 
 7 a.m.. 
 
 1 
 
 a.m. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 8 
 
 8 a.m.. 
 
 2 
 
 a.m. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 
 
 3 p.m.. 
 
 3 
 
 a.m. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 10 
 
 3 p.m.. 
 
 4 
 
 a.m. 
 
 2Dd. 
 
 11 
 
 12 no >n. 
 
 11 
 
 a.m. 
 
 Snd. 
 
 1 
 
 12 noon. 
 
 12 
 
 nooa 
 
 2nd. 
 
 2 
 
 6 a.m.. 
 
 2 
 
 p.m. 
 
 Snd. 
 
 8 
 
 6 a.m.. 
 
 3 
 
 p.m. 
 
 2nd. 
 
 4 
 
 12 noo.i. 
 
 12 
 
 mid. 
 
 2od. 
 
 6 
 
 1 p.m.. 
 
 1 
 
 a.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 6 
 
 8 pm.. 
 
 2 
 
 ■.m. 
 
 3rd,. 
 
 7 
 
 8 p.m.. 
 
 8 
 
 a.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 8 
 
 4 p.m.. 
 
 4 
 
 a.m. 
 
 3'd.. 
 
 9 
 
 6 p.m.. 
 
 5 
 
 a.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 10 
 
 6 p.m.. 
 
 6 
 
 a.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 11 
 
 1 a.m.. 
 
 I 
 
 p.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 1 
 
 8 p.m.. 
 
 2 
 
 p.m. 
 
 3rJ.. 
 
 9 
 
 8 p.m.. 
 
 4 
 
 p.m. 
 
 Srd.. 
 
 3 
 
 4 a.m.. 
 
 6 
 
 p.m. 
 
 3rd.. 
 
 4 
 
 10 a.m.. 
 
 1 
 
 a.m. 
 
 4th.. 
 
 6 
 
 10 a.m.. 
 
 3 
 
 a.m. 
 
 4th.. 
 
 
 
 4 p.m.. 
 
 5 
 
 a.m. 
 
 4th.. 
 
 7 
 
 4 p.m.. 
 
 6 
 
 a.u]. 
 
 4th . 
 
 8 
 
 7 p.m . 
 
 9 
 
 a.m. 
 
 4th.. 
 
 9 
 
 1 a.m.. 
 
 4 
 
 p.m. 
 
 4th.. 
 
 10 
 
 2 a.m.. 
 
 6 
 
 p.m. 
 
 
 11 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Via Allandale. 
 
 Via Aihnlale. 
 
 Via Whi by & Atlierley. 
 
 Via Whitby & Atherley. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 Vii QeorkOtown. 
 
 Via Oeorjfetown. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 ViaAIUndale. 
 
 Via G. orgetowD. 
 
 ) Via sir to Parry Sound, 
 
 f thence train, bra'chline 
 
 Via All mdale. 
 
 Vi t Georgetown. 
 
 Via Allandale. 
 
 /ia Allandale. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 Via Allandale. 
 
 Via Allandale. 
 
 Via Allandale. 
 
 Via steamer to Toronto. 
 
 Via stsamar to Toronto. 
 
 Via Toronto. 
 
 Via steam jr to Toronto. 
 
 Via steamer to Toronto. 
 
 Via Toronto 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 Via Ge^rjretown. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
 Via Georgetown. 
 
OUR MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 13 
 
 '• I have no doubt if I had more leisure to think it out I could make a 
 bettei' arrangement, and it is, I think, a good idea of yours to work up 
 something of this kind. 
 
 " A railway staff corps, composed of managers of railways, such as 
 there is in England, would, I think, be of service i>i Canada also. 
 
 " If you have any question to ask or explanation required I shall be 
 glad to do what I can." 
 
 I have very few remarks to add to this most valuable contribution 
 from the fountain-head. It is complete and shows a master-hand. 
 
 It will be noticed that every available route is used and the vvater- 
 ways where possible. For instance, the 31st go by steamer to Parry 
 Sound, and thence by the new bi'anch line. The 19th and 44th b} 
 steamer to '^'oronto, etc. 
 
 The suggestion for a railway staff corps is one that I hope the 
 authorities will immediately adopt. 
 
 There are just two points on which I must ask your serious considera- 
 tion, as they include my whole argument. This scheme is complete 
 " only for one district." What about the other 11? If it would tax 
 our resources to this extent, and take four days to mobilize the infantry 
 alone of No. 2 district, after due time and consideration, think what it 
 would be to mobilize the whole force and " without organization ? " 
 
 No. V. 
 
 In 1885 we had no transport or supply service, and over 3,000 waggons, 
 teams and teamsters had to be picked up, and in any condition and at 
 any price they liked to ask. A transport service should be at once or- 
 ganized under a Quartermaster-General at headquarters in Ottawa, and 
 corps organized by the appointment of suitable oflicers at each district 
 headquarters. They should be organized as " District Corps," just the 
 same as any other volunteer militia regiment. Their business should 
 l)e to confer with the railway and steamboat corps, if there is one, and 
 find out exactly the capacity of each road, also the number of horses 
 and vehicles available in their respective districts, and to formulate a 
 scheme, on paper, ready to be carried out instantly in case of need, for, 
 as you are aware, under the Militia Act we possess the power of im- 
 pressment. We require the heads, both at Ottawa and in the districts, 
 upon whom this duty would fall, and we require them now, so that they 
 may gather the knowledge and study the subject, and know exactly 
 what t<3 do on receiving a memo, that such and such a force is to move 
 at such a time to such a place. 
 
14 
 
 OUR MILITAUY OUOANIZATION. 
 
 I should like to see a system of registration of fanners' teams suitable 
 or the purposes. 
 
 The best way to do it would be to apportion to each district so many 
 waggons, teams and teamsters under the district officers, and let them 
 appoint a N.C.O. to each division of 10 waggons. These should be dis- 
 tributed over the country, and the farmers should be encouraged " to 
 compete " for registration by prizes to the best and most competent. 
 
 Every team entered upon the register should he paid a retaining fee, 
 of say .$6, and the driver sworn in for three years. 
 
 When the D.A.G. or B.M. is going to a place to inspect an armory 
 the competitive teams for registration should be notified and parade 
 before him. 
 
 We will suppose the D.A.G. or B.M. is to inspect the armory of the 
 Bond Head company of the 36th Battalion, and that there is a Cooks- 
 town division of 10 waggons, a Bond Head division of 10 waggons and 
 a Bradford division of 10 waggons. Their annual parade for inspection 
 and registration should be advertised for the most convenient place of 
 assembly for the three divisions, and a prize of $10 offered for the best 
 outfit and $10 for the best Division. The District Transport officers 
 should accompany the D.A.G. and assist at the inspection and registra- 
 tion, and after the enrolment he should select the N.C.O. and use the 
 rest of the day for instruction in the simple formations of line 
 and column of route by word of command. This would, I think, prove 
 imuiensely popular with the farmers and give us a splendid equipment 
 in case of need, at a very minimum annual cost. 
 
 Each city volunteer regiment should be encouraged to organize a 
 regimental transport upon the English volunteei- system, and when they 
 march out once or twice a year (but certainly upon inspection), their 
 waggons should accompany them with rations, camp utensils, tents and 
 ammunition. 
 
 There is no doubt that our farmers' waggons are most .suitable for 
 this service, and they themselves are, as a class, active, inventive men, 
 whose wits are fully alive to such work by constant practice. They are 
 used to overcoming difficulties such as meet a Transport corps, and by 
 adopting such a system as this we might secure as efficient a Transport 
 corps as there is in the world, at a paltry cost of say $17,000 to $50,000 
 pel" annum. 
 
 No. VI. 
 
 In answer to the two objections, viz., that I have not stated the 
 number of transport waggons required, and that we could not get the 
 
oni MIFJTAllV OIMIAXIZATIOX. 
 
 15 
 
 money, permit me to reply that, rouglily speaking, Lord Wolseley, in 
 his " Pocket Book," calculates the transport service necessary for an 
 infantry division of 10,000 at 250 carts and waggon , Ijesides a regi- 
 mental transport of 17 carts and waggons to each battalion of 1,000 
 men. 
 
 Upon such a basis we would require 432 regimental and divisional 
 transport waggons in No. 2 district. Thi.s, at $6 per annum each, 
 gives a total cost of $2,582 yev annum, and allowing $830 for prizes, 
 as suggested, a total cost of $3,412. As No. 2 district furnishes about 
 one-fifi;h of the effective strength of thf whole force, an equal propor- 
 tion of transport service to each would give a total cost of $17,060. 
 
 But Lord Wolseley only allows 28 rounds of ammunition per man, 
 whereas we could not do with less than 100. He also makes no pro- 
 vision for carrying the men's valises, as we have to do. He also allows 
 only 1\ blankets per man, about one-tliird of what is necessary for us, 
 and if you also follow our custom in the North-west in 1885, and cal- 
 culate for three days' rations, you will bring our transport •lecessary 
 for each battalion of 800 men up to 32 waggons, making a total of 
 560 for No. 2 district and the divisional transport to 750 waggons. 
 This would bring the cost for No. 2 district to $7,800, and a total cost 
 for the whole 12 districts, at the same proportion, of $39,000, and 
 allowing $11,000 for prizes, the very outside cost would be $50,000. 
 
 These are the details of the paltry cost I correctly spoke of as l)eing 
 between $17,000 for the smaller establishment, to $50,000 for t'le 
 larger. 
 
 As for not getting the money. This is an agricultural country, and 
 let a rural member get up and propose a vote for this purpose, explain- 
 ing that the money will go direct into the farmers' pocket.s, and how 
 many men do you think will dare to oppose it ? 
 
 I would say, if you like, by all means try the smaller establishment 
 first, at the trifling cost of $17,000 per annum. 
 
 For their uniforms I would recommend a suit (tf Karki and broad felt 
 hat, with some cocks' feathers in it. 
 
 I propose to speak now of the rural militia, which would form the 
 bulk of the fighting force in the event of trouble. 
 
 I imagine th ' every true well-wisher of the militia is agreed upon 
 the necessity ot training all the corps every year instead of biennially, 
 and that the only drawback is the expense. 
 
 I propose to show that you can do this upon the present expenditure, 
 or, at all events, up(m a very slight increase. The war sti-ength of a 
 
1<) 
 
 OUR MILITARY' ()R(JANIZATION. 
 
 c(»inpany, '^ must be" 100, of course. With the present constituted 
 strength of 42 N.C.O. and men, including buglers, etc., what is a com- 
 pany l)ut "rt skeleton" when formed up in its full strength, and when 
 you deduct guards, picquets, cooks and fatigue men from a ccmipany in 
 camp, did you or any one else ever see a company which was not "« 
 skeleton of a skeleton " ? 
 
 Let us accept this fact, and it clears the ground at once, and we will 
 speedily decide to drill " all " the corps every year, all the coi-ps, not 
 necessarily the full establishment of each corps. The cavalry and the 
 artille y should be nuiintainec as strong as possible, stronger, in fact, 
 than they now are - but as regards the rural infanti-y all our means 
 should, I submit, he devoted to " traininy the officers and N. 'C. officers"; 
 and for that purpose it is not necessary to bring out more rank and 
 tile than are required for the skeleton on which officers may exercise, 
 say 8 or 10 N.C.O. and men per company. We could recruit it up to 
 its full strength in two days in case of trouble, if we had this bac!,')one 
 thoroughly efficient. 
 
 I am very well aware of all the objections that are and may be 
 urged against this. Some commanding officers, and officers command- 
 iii;:, companies, say that they wish to take out ^^ full bodies, not skeletons,' 
 and that with this reduction they would not have " any men to com- 
 mand." In reply, I say that they " have not men mnv," and there is 
 not, indeed, a " rural regiment in Canada to-day, except as a skeleton''; 
 and that if an oi'der were given to them to turn out to-morrow, enlist- 
 ments would have to begin de novo. 
 
 Little more than a tithe of the men who were drilled in our last 
 camps are available to-day in the corps in which they were then enrol- 
 led. The main weakness of our rural regiments lies in the insufficiency 
 and inefficiency of the officers and N.C.O. That defect is the one 
 which ought lirst to engage attention, and till that is removed it is use- 
 less to hope for anything reliable or creditable. 
 
 But no matter what the opinions or wishes of individual officers, 
 whose vanity may cloud their judgments, the plan proposed is, I submit, 
 the one best calculated to secure a state of efficiency commensurate 
 without means. 
 
 If Canada had well trained officers and N.C.O. for 100 regiments it 
 would be strong compared with its neighbor, for it would then have the 
 means of organizing and mobilizing the raw material. If, on the other 
 hand, it had 500,000 men merely enrolled, but without " trained officers," 
 it would be comparatively weak, for it would have but an inert and • 
 useless mass, in fact, as it is now, " an armed mob." 
 
 [ ! 
 
oru MILITAUY oRdANIZATION. 
 
 17 
 
 Tho pr<)jM»Hitit)ii to briiij^ out fewer men p(!r couipany is not, however, 
 HO unpopular as at tiivt .si;^ht it nii;(lit aeem. OHicers recognize the 
 importance! of moi-e frequent trainings Ihan they now receive, and 
 though they wouUl like to take out their corps fuU Ixxlied on all occasions, 
 yst most prefer to come out annually with the ft^" than biennially 
 ,v'th the many, especially wlien they consider that the former if. better 
 for themselves as individuals. 
 
 Though ai\ odd one here and thon; may <.bject to my pioposition, it 
 will be found that those men who are worth considering, who, in fact, 
 take interest in their work, and are anxious for real improvement 
 rather than parade and show, will recognize the advantage afforded by it. 
 
 The discouragement wliich officers experience under the biennia^ 
 system is very great ; the encouragement "Inch they would derive from 
 a return to the annual system would givt«» increased vitality to that 
 portion of the body which >)nly has vitality, and which only the country 
 need at present consider. 
 
 As for cost, the great saving which this plan would effect in pay, 
 rations, clothing, transport, etc., woukl 1 contend, enable the country 
 to train annually the complete backbone of the militia, viz., the officers 
 and N.C.O. of two' battalions, where it only half trains one now. 
 
 No. VIT. 
 
 On the two chief points in the rural nulitia training we ought all to 
 combine and fight the hai-dest, viz., 1st, "For annual training." 
 When we -have obtained that we should strike for the 2nd, viz., "At 
 least three full weeks in camp." 
 
 So hjng as we go on as at present it is sheer waste of money 
 Neither the country nor militia are getting any good out of it. 
 
 More attention sL/uld also be paid to the training of the officers 
 and non-commissioned officers. No man shouid be granted an R.S.I. 
 certificate uutil he is " really " qualified to do his work. At present 
 too often young men will " cram " for two or three weeks and fudge 
 through.. Consequently they quickly forget what they have learnt. 
 
 I saw some volunteers inspected last fall and the subalterns tested 
 in giving detail of drill. Of four whom I saw thus examined I 
 believe not one could answer without mistake, and conse(|uently the 
 official report upon them says they " evidently get little practice at 
 drill." As a matter of fact, I know these young officers had <^>nly 
 obtained their R.S.I, certificate shortly before having just finished 
 their short course, the fault lay, therefore, not with their command- 
 
IS 
 
 OUR MILITARY OROANI/ATION. 
 
 I!-; 
 
 ing officers or coinmarulants of schools, but with the systein which 
 jMirinitted thein to pass after a week or so " crainminj^." 
 
 I most sti-otif^ly endorse the repoi-t of the D.A.G. of No. 1 district 
 in 1888, of whicli the followinj^ is an extract : 
 
 " That there are defects in the system, and great lack of efficiency 
 amongst officers and men, must be clear to even an ordinary observer. 
 The chief cause of this inefficiency is tlu; shortness of the time allowed 
 for training. That seven or eight days drill every two years is utterly 
 insufficient goes without saying. It scarcely suffices to preserve the 
 organization, much less to mak(! it in any way r(Oiabl(^ As a remedy, 
 I would take the liberty of urging that each rural corps be drilled 
 every year. If, through lack of means, it cannot Ix! taken out 'full- 
 bodied,' let it, by all means, come as a skeleton. Much better that the 
 skeleton, the 'framework,' should turn out, than that the whole body 
 .should be left at home to die of inanition. Officers and N. C. officers 
 are the framework of even the most complete regiment ; in a Canadian 
 militia regiment they are something more. They are its very life ; of 
 necessity they are its trainers as well as its leaders. If they are not 
 fairly good, the corps is worth little, and if they are bad, t() retain them 
 is a positive evil. Their efficiency, then, is the first thing to be secured, 
 and it is infinitely more important that they should be brought together 
 every year with comparatively few men, than that the biennial aystem 
 should be continued with double, treble or even quadruple the number 
 of rank and file. It must not be understood, however, that I advise a 
 reduction of the force. On the contrary, I feel that tae organization 
 should be extended, and that an infantry corps should be maintained 
 in each county, but maintained in such a way as to have a greater 
 feeling of reality infused into it. For many years to come our militia 
 must be our main defence, and it should be placed on the best possible 
 footing as to both efficiency and numbers of corps rather than numbers 
 of men." 
 
 Do not think for a minute that I advocate drilling a thinner skeleton 
 than we do now. No, by no means ; but if we are only to spend the 
 same amount in drill pay as at present, then I say drill the important 
 part of it, the backbone, upon which you can quickly build your body ; 
 " the frame," which, if perfect, can quickly be clothed with the covering, 
 is the part which we ought to do our utmost to bring to perfection. 
 
 It is all a question of money. The total drill pay of an eight-com- 
 pany battalion, including its full staff, allowance for horses, etc., is 
 $3,111.36. One-half of that amount is i$ 1,555. 68. Now the cost of 
 
 !1 -i 
 II 
 
OCR MHJTAJIY omiANIZATION. 
 
 19 
 
 (Irilliiij,' tlu! wlioh^ of i\w tAYwcru and 10 N.C.O. uiul men p«r company, 
 together with th«! full start'iuid th(! saineallowance, is $1,05^,00; therefore, 
 you can drill the full staff, all tlie otticcrs and 10 N.C.O. and men of 
 two battalions f(»r exactly th(! same money that " tme " now costs, and 
 that half <»f the $3,1 1 \.'M\ now spent upon .'J2 men per company is clean 
 thrown away with the pi-esent biennial system. 
 
 I only propose tliis change in case of it being absolutely impossible 
 to get sufficient money to drill annually the whole force as at present 
 constituted. But there ought to be no difficutty in getting sufficient. 
 Last year there were left undrilled 40 battalions, containing 265 com- 
 panies, the total drill pay and allowance for which amounts to $106,- 
 117.60. 
 
 Some city officers are in favor of doing away with a certain number 
 of these battalions. Such men cannot have thought the matter out. 
 Either we want to be prepared with the nucleus of a sufficiently large 
 force to defend our country, or we do not want any at all. I am a 
 believer in the former state of things, and instead of reducing the num- 
 ber of battalions, I say we ought to increase them, but I contend that, 
 as I have already said, we must di'ill them every year, and inuHt have a 
 thorough efficient nucleus, instead of annually wasting a certain sum 
 on inefficient battalions. If it is an absolute fact that the country 
 cannot afford the additional $106,000 annual expenditure upon the 
 militia (personally I do not believe that the country is so poverty 
 stricken as that), but if our legislators decide that it is so, then far 
 better adopt this plan of drilling tlie whole officers and N.C.O. every 
 year, and have them thoroughly efficient, than to go on as at present 
 wasting money. I only offer it as an alternative, but I am convinced 
 it is a far better plan than the present. 
 
 As for increasing the permanent coi'ps. These only exist as schools 
 for the purpose of training the officers, N.C.O. and men of the active 
 militia, and the needs of the latter are the most important. Some of 
 these permanent corps schools give the country full value for their 
 money ; others, from current reports, do not appear to do so, and as 
 they are a great expense to the country they all ought to do so or they 
 are not worth retaining at the cost of the militia. 
 
 I find the amount expended upon these schools, numbering about 
 1,000 men (exclusive of artillery), is $281,119. Whereas the amount 
 spent upon the 40,000 active militia "for drill" is only $27. ,098. The 
 schools are a very valuable adjunct to the militia, and as their cost is 
 so proportionately heavy they ought to do all their work completely. 
 
20 
 
 (>ni« MIIJTARY <>U(!AN!/ATI()X. 
 
 I am atixioUN not t<» l)(! iniHUiKlcrstuod in tliJH iniittoi'. I do iKtt Ujliovt^ 
 w« can <lo without these scIum>1h. I U^lieve them to Ikj eHHontial t«» tlie 
 militia, hut I hold that the appointments tliereto should ii(»t he mmU; 
 throu<^h poHtical intlueiico, l)ut nhouhl he entirely in thci hands of the 
 General C(»mmandin<;, in onh^i- that In* mi^ht exercise the full power of 
 selection from particularly <|ualiti(>d olHcjirs of the militia and U. M.C. 
 Catlets. If the General Commaiidinir had his hands free in this matter 
 I feel sure the appointment to these lectureships (as one may really call 
 thiem), would iu-l he of the kind they freiimuitly are now, and the work 
 would he thorouji^hly done, and the ountry would j^et the worth of its 
 money, and the nulitia would not have to complain as it does now that 
 some of these schools are a burden instead of a help. 
 
 At all events, before any further sum is expended upon them, the 
 great and pressing wants of the active; militia ought to be atUMuled to. 
 Out of a total expenditure upon its behalf of .fl, 279,503, the active 
 militia draws, dir(;ctly, a very small proportion and appears often a 
 secondary consideration, although the rest of the organization would 
 not exist except to administer to its requirements. 
 
 We cannot possibly all agree upon these important subjects of which 
 I have been writing, but when men will j-ead and think and talk and 
 write, there are hopes for them. 
 
 I am fully aware that T am not a "Sir John A.," and cannot carry 
 the country immediately upon my " national poi;cy," but a mouse may 
 help a lion, and I can keep on cjuietly digging and digging, and am 
 bound to make some impression in time. Tf I succeed in inak'my half a 
 dozen men "THINK" upon the subject T shall have acccmiplished 
 something. 
 
 It seems to me that the militia has two strong enemies within itself. 
 One is mostly to be found in rural corps. It joins apparently in order 
 to astoni.'^h its country friends now and then with its gorgeous apparel, 
 or in order to go upon a cheap ten days' picnic biennially. 
 
 The other is mostly in city corps. It is a supei'cilious thing wrapped 
 up in its own importance. It goes about thinking " You can't find 
 much fault with us. We are the stuft'. We are." It forgets that even 
 if its own unit is as perfect as it thinks — which, by the bye, it never 
 is — it is still one very, very small unit in the line of national defence. 
 It omits to " think " outside its own little circumference, and it has 
 joined the militia apparently for its " self-glorification." 
 
 U I 
 
(H'H MII-ITAKV (HUJANI/ATION. 
 
 •21 
 
 No. VIII. 
 
 A great frleiid whose tli«>ughiH jmiij) with ininc wiis recently diHeUHH- 
 ing with me the traiiiiii<; of oiir I'unil militia, and I think it will he no 
 breach of eontidencn^ to ^'ivi' you his exact words. They weiu? as follows : 
 
 " Not the least difhcult (jucistion in (!onnection with military training,' 
 is that of rifle shootinj,', or the inakinj^ the m<ui skilful in the use of 
 what nuiy now be considered their only wc^apon. Tt must In; apparent 
 to anyone that cares to f^ivo a moment's tlutught to th(^ subject, that it 
 is almost useless to train men to move into {M>sition if tlmy are not able 
 when there to use with fair ett'ect the arm placed in their hands. In- 
 tleed he power of man' • 'ng is secondary to the power to do extH'U- 
 tion with the weapon. .in things, in fact, if not the only things, 
 
 now required to l)e tar, M trtH)ps, especially ' militia ' troops, are 
 dhcipliiie (ind fire diticipline. If we juld to these the power to march, 
 then the moving of the men on the chess l)oar(l will take care of itself. 
 Even the best armies are not trained to the possibility of their weapons, 
 and the main reason of this is that they are limited t(» their amum- 
 nition supply. Rifle sh«M)ting is expensive, as those well know who in- 
 dulge nmch in it. The llnited States regular army is, perhaps, in that 
 respect, i)etter off than any other, ior the supply to them is practically 
 unlimited and the results are corresp:'ndingly good. In our own Jiritish 
 regular army a change for the better has taken plac(! within late years, 
 still there is much room for improvement. Looking at home here in 
 Canada we cannot find much to boast of. Amongst city coi'ps a cer- 
 tain amount of practice is done, but it is too nmch limited to the few. 
 The great mass of the eni'olled do not tire, they are not required to do 
 •■^o, and they could not be trusted to handle their i-ifles in anger until 
 they had some preliminary practice. Something is done in this direc- 
 tion by rural corps during the annual drill, but with rather unsatis- 
 factory results. It can scarcely be expected that any good can come 
 from the tiring of 20 rounds in a hurried manner and without any pre- 
 liminary instruction, once in two years. Indeed, the only satisfaction 
 that is derived from it is the knowledge that a certjiin number of men 
 have loaded and tired their rifles at a fixed object. It is folly to sup- 
 pose that any lasting benefit can result from such a course. In the 
 interest of the country then, it is desirable that some other and more 
 continuing system should be adopted for securing efficiency with the 
 weapon. Just what that system should be is a moot point. It has 
 been urged that more time should be devoted to the practice during 
 
22 
 
 (>('|{ MILITARY OIUJANI/ATFON. 
 
 m 
 
 ifii 
 
 the camp, some goiiif? so far'as to say that the time could be more pro 
 fitahly spent in riHe shootiiii^ than in any other way. Tlie (hillmaster, 
 however, contends that then; is ah-eady too nuich of the time taken for 
 shooting, or rather that tlien; is not enough taken for th(5 inarching and 
 setting up of the men. I)oul)th?ss, here, as in many other things, the 
 happy mean might l)e struck with profit, especially if the men were 
 marched to and from the ranges with regularity, and were kept under 
 strict control while there, and did a large amount of section volley fir 
 ing with a view to securing fire discipline. Another plan suggested to 
 me by an officer of my accjuaintance, is to have a rifle camp on each 
 district, at a time other than that set for the annual drill. This, he 
 said, every n)i!itiaman in the district should be invited to attend, on 
 the undersuanding that he would not there be required to compete with 
 crack shots, but be required only to obtain a certain number of points 
 which would entitle him to a marksman's badge and a certain sum of 
 money. He thought that this would enc»)urage practice (the main 
 object) by men who have cimfidence in their ability to reach a certain 
 standard, but who would shrink from a competition with Bisley winners 
 .and others who have greater opportunities. Another plan I have heard 
 has been advocated by a staff officer, and it is this : Let the men of a 
 company be got together at the ccmipany head<iuarters on the occasitm 
 of the brigade-major's inspection and have them shoot in his presence, 
 and have him certify as to the result. Upon his report, or that of the 
 deputy adjutant-general of the district, have the district paymaster in- 
 structed to [)ay the sums earned. This, no doubt, would be a good 
 plan if there were a suitable range at each coi lany headijuarters ; but 
 at very few does a proper antl safe one exist. Another proposition is 
 to give a larger rate of pay per day to those who make good shooting 
 [n camp. Which of these different plans wt)uld be the best it is difli- 
 cult to determine, but that something is needed tliere can be no (jues- 
 tion, and it would be well, I think, if those who are conversant with 
 the subject, and take an interest in it, would give their ideas as to what 
 system would be the most convenient for the men who compose the 
 force, and at the same time be the best calculated to secure satisfactory 
 results." 
 
 So says my friend, and I agree with him, but, as I believe in advo- 
 cating a positive plan, I may say that I am in favor of compelling the 
 men to do half an hour's aiming and position drill every morning in 
 camp, and of firing at least 100 rounds of ammunition during their 
 training, and of that amount, 80 rounds should be by word of command 
 to teach them fire discipline. 
 
OUR MfUTARY OROANIZATION. 
 
 23 
 
 I confess tlie old bugbear "expense" stares you in the face again 
 here, but once more may I ask ; is our force to be a reality or a sham 1 
 
 If it is a reality, is it not the one point at which we are aiming, to 
 teach meft to shoot what they are aiming at? If, therefore, we leave 
 out the training for tlie one great essential, what is the us? of all the 
 rest? 
 
 Prince Kraft Hohenlohe, ii» his work upon artillery, lays clown tfn'ee 
 (jreat principks. The first is to HIT, the second to HIT, and the 
 third to HIT. 
 
 Are not those the three great principles we shtmld also aim at? If 
 so, what is the use of all the other expenditure if we neglect this ? 
 
 These remarks apply ecpially to city corps. When they get what I 
 hope to see them with, viz., a true volunteer organization with a capi- 
 tation grant, they will have to earn that gi-ant by putting in a per- 
 centage of drills and firing so many rounds of amjimnition. This 
 number will be at least 100, I hope, and the same rule for firing by 
 word of conmiand applied. 
 
 The city corps are our first lim; of defence, and we should spare no 
 pains or expense to bring them into a thoroughly efticient state. Of 
 course, in this matter of rifle shooting qualification, our old ghost ex- 
 pense appears. To begin with, annnunifion costs something. Then, 
 again, if you oblige men to do so nmch firing, you are oblufed to trans- 
 port them to the range. If the rangv; is 10 or 20 miles out from their 
 headquarters you cannot oblige them to pay theii- own fare out there, 
 you must carry them free. This is a point which I happen to know 
 was urged upon the authorities when the Toronto Rifle Rrnges were 
 given up to the city, and the city should have been compelled to give 
 free transport to the new ranges. It is too late now, however, and 
 the country must face the music in Tortaito, Montreal and elsewhere, 
 wherever the ranges are beyond walking distance. 
 
 The obligatory firing of every man in the ranks is one great good, 
 I hope to see come out of a legal volunteer organization for our city 
 corps. 
 
 I have heard only one objection to such a change in their constitu- 
 tion, and that is to the name Volunteer instead of Militia. I heard a 
 Canadian born and bred say that in England they think more of the 
 militia than of the volunteers, and for that reason he objected to the 
 change of name. That will be news to most old countrymen in 
 these times. But, seriously, should such an ol)jection prevent so neces- 
 sary a reform from being carried out ? 
 
t^mi^tmmntm 
 
 24 
 
 OUK MILITAUV OROANIZATION. 
 
 Bcisidos, why alter the name ? You can still call them Volunteer 
 Militia, and give them the legal organization they now udopt vol- 
 untarily. 
 
 I am not going to add much more, but in conclusittn, I would go 
 back to where T began and say, connnence on militia reforms by legal- 
 izing our city volunteers' semi-civil funding pay organization. Give 
 them the old country organization, with ;i ca})itation grant instead of 
 pay, and make them eai'n it, never forgetting that they are our first 
 line of defence, and at once organize them into brigades. Remember 
 the words of the great Field Marshal, Von JNIoltke, which he wrote in 
 1890: "A general staff cannot be improvised on the outbreak of 
 war. It must be prepared l.ng before, during peace, and nmst be 
 practical, wc^rking in constant touch with the troops." 
 
 I respectfully submit that the scheme I have roughly outlined is 
 feasible, and a great improvement upon the present system.