^, 
 
 4^ ^Sl^ 
 
 IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
 // 
 
 // 
 
 ^ .^^ 
 
 ^.^ 
 
 
 1.0 V^ lii 
 
 ■tt Uii ■2.2 
 
 u 
 
 1.1 
 
 III 
 
 WUu 
 
 
 HiotogFaphic 
 
 Sciences 
 
 Corporation 
 
 ■^ 
 
 V 
 
 ^N 
 
 V 
 
 <<^. 
 
 ^- V 
 
 23 WBT MAIN STRKT 
 
 WIBSTM,N.Y. MSM 
 
 (7t6)«72-4S03 
 
 
 ;\ 
 
CIHM/ICMH 
 
 Microfiche 
 
 Series. 
 
 CIHM/iCIViH 
 Collection de 
 microfiches. 
 
 Canadian Inttituta for Historical IMicroreproductiona / Inatitut Canadian da microraproductions historiqua 
 
 ;\ 
 
Tachnical and Bibliographic Notaa/Notaa taciiniquaa at bibSiographiquaa 
 
 Tha Instituta haa attamptad to obtain tha baat 
 originai copy avaiiabia for filming. Faaturaa of thia 
 copy which may ba bibiiographieaiiy uniqua, 
 which may altar any of tha imagas in tha 
 raproduction, or which may aignificantiy changa 
 tha uauai mathod of filming, ara ehackad balow. 
 
 SColourad eovara/ 
 Couvartura d^ eoulaur 
 
 p~| Covara damagad/ 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 Couvartura andommagte 
 
 Covara raatorad and/or iaminatad/ 
 Couvartura raataurAa at/ou pailieulAa 
 
 r~| Covar titia miaaing/ 
 
 La titra da couvartura nr.anqua 
 
 Colourad mapa/ 
 
 Cartaa g^ographiquaa an eoulaur 
 
 □ Colourad ink (i.a. othar than blua or black)/ 
 Encra da eoulaur (i.a. autra qua blaua ou noira) 
 
 rn Colourad plataa and/or illuatrationa/ 
 
 Ptanchaa at/ou illuatrationa 1% eoulaur 
 
 Bound with othar matarial/ 
 Rali4 avac d'autraa documi'«nta 
 
 Tight binding may eauaa shadowa or diatortion 
 along intarior margin/ 
 
 Laraliura aarria paut eauaar da I'ombra ou da la 
 diatoraion la tong da la marga intiriaura 
 
 Blank laavaa addad during rastoration may 
 appaar within tha taxt. Whanavar poaaibla. thaaa 
 hava baan omittad from filming/ 
 II aa paut qua cartainaa pagaa blanchaa ajoutioa 
 lora d'una raatauration apparaiaaant dana la taxta, 
 mala, loraqua cala itait poaaibla, caa pagaa n'ont 
 paa «t« filmAaa. 
 
 Additional commanta:/ 
 Commantairaa suppiimantairaa; 
 
 L'Inatitut a microfilm* la maillaur axamplaira 
 qu'il lul a AtA poaaibla da aa procurer. Laa d*taiia 
 da eat axamplaira qui lont paut-4tra un.'quaa du 
 point d» vua bibliographiqua. qui pauvant modif iar 
 una imaga raproduita. ou qui pauvant axigar una 
 modification dana la mAthoda normala da filmaga 
 aont irtdiquia ei-daaaoua. 
 
 Th 
 to 
 
 D 
 
 Colourad pagaa/ 
 Pagaa da eoulaur 
 
 r~n Pagaa damagad/ 
 
 D 
 
 a 
 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 
 Thia itam la fllmad at tha reduction ratio ehackad balow/ 
 
 Ca document aat filmi au taux da rMuction indiqui ei>daaaoua. 
 
 Th 
 po 
 of 
 nil 
 
 Or 
 
 Pagaa andommagiaa 
 
 Pagaa raatorad and/01 
 
 Pagaa raatauriaa at/ou pailiculAaa 
 
 r~l Pagaa raatorad and/or laminated/ 
 
 Pagaa diacolourad, stained or foxed/ 
 Pagaa dAcoioriaa. tachaties ou piquiaa 
 
 Pagaa detached/ 
 Pagaa dAtach^s 
 
 Showthrough/ 
 Tranaparenee 
 
 Quality of p/int variaa/ 
 QualitA inAgala de I'impreaaion 
 
 Includaa supplementary material/ 
 Comprand du matiriel supplAmentaira 
 
 Only edition available/ 
 Seule Adition diaponible 
 
 Pagea wholly or partially obscured by errata 
 slips, tissuaa. etc., have been refilmed to 
 ensure the best possible image/ 
 Lea pages totalement ou partieilement 
 obacurciaa par un feuillet d'arrata. una paiure, 
 etc.. ont AtA filmAes A nouveau de faqon A 
 obtenir la mailleure image possible. 
 
 th 
 sk 
 ot 
 fir 
 ale 
 or 
 
 Th 
 ah 
 
 Z 
 
 M( 
 dll 
 en 
 ba 
 rig 
 rm 
 mi 
 
 10X 
 
 
 
 
 14X 
 
 
 
 
 18X 
 
 
 
 
 22X 
 
 
 
 
 26X 
 
 
 
 
 30X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12X 
 
 16X 
 
 »X 
 
 a«x 
 
 2IX 
 
 32X 
 
TIm copy fllm«d hsra haa b««n raproduoMi thankt 
 to tho gonorotitv of: 
 
 Douglas Ubrairy 
 Quaan's Univaraity 
 
 L'axamplalra fllmA f ut raproduit grica i la 
 g«n4roalt« da: 
 
 Douglas Library 
 Quaan's Univaraity 
 
 Tha Imagaa appaaring hara ara tha baat quality 
 poaalbia oonaMarlng tha condition and laglblNty 
 of tha original copy and In kaaping vvlth tha 
 filming contract apaeif Icatlona. 
 
 Original copica In printad iMpar c>>vara ara fUmad 
 baglnning wHh tha front covar and anding on 
 tha laat paga with a printad or llluatratod Impraa- 
 sion. or tha back covar whan approprlata. AH 
 othar original coplaa ara fNmad baglnning on tha 
 f Irat paga with a printad or Htuatratad Impraa- 
 slon, and anding on tha laat paga with a printad 
 or llluatratad impraaaton. 
 
 Tha laat racordad frama on aach microfiche 
 shall contain tha aymbol ^^^ (moaning "CON- 
 TINUED"), or tha aymbol ▼ (moaning "END"), 
 whlchavar appllaa. 
 
 Laa Imagaa r4ilvantaa ont 4t* raproduhaa avac la 
 plua grand adn, compto tanu da la condition at 
 da la nattati da l'axamplalra film*, at an 
 conformit* avac laa condMona du contrat da 
 filmaga. 
 
 Laa axamplairt origlnaux dont la couvartura an 
 paplar aat Imprim4a aont fNmte an commandant 
 par la pramlar plat at an tarmlnant aoit par la 
 dartiMra paga qui comporta una ampralnta 
 dImpraaakNi ou dlHuatratlon, adt par la aacond 
 plat, aalon la eaa. Toua laa autraa axamplairas 
 origlnaux aont flImAs an commandant par la 
 pramMra paga qui comporta una ampralnta 
 dimpraaalon ou d'iHuatratlon at an tarmlnant par 
 la damMra paga qui comporta una talla 
 ampralnte. 
 
 Un daa aymbdaa auivanta apparaftra sur la 
 darnMra imaga da chaqua microfiche, salon la 
 caa: la aymbola — »• signlfia "A 8UIVRE", la 
 aymbolo ▼ signlfia "FIN". 
 
 IMapa, plataa, charta, ate., may ba filmed at 
 different reduction ratkM. Thoae too large to be 
 entirely included in one expoeure ere filmed 
 iMgIn' ing in the upper left hand comer, left to 
 right and top to bottom, ae many framee aa 
 required. The following diagrams illuatrata the 
 method: 
 
 Lea cartea, planches, taMeeux, etc., peuvent ttre 
 filmto i dee taux da rMuction dlff Arenta. 
 Loraqua la document eet trop grand pour Atra 
 raproduit en un eeul cllch*, il eet film* A partir 
 da I'angle aupiriaur gauche, do gauche i droKe, 
 et do heut en baa, en prenent le nombre 
 d'imegee n*ceeeaira. Lee diagrammee suivants 
 llluatrent le mithode. 
 
 12 3 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 

 ■4^ 
 
 IZ^^' 
 
The EDITH and LORNE PIERCE 
 COLLECTION of CANADI ANA 
 
 ^eerfs University at Kingston 
 
 W'- 
 
L (ffllMii, Vf^fiJ' 
 
 fo. 
 
 ):^/<f6^ 
 
 Political Economy and Large Armies. 
 
 :m 
 
 (Reprinted from the " Montreal Gazette") 
 
 ■ x>:rt 
 
 III the article which commences the number of the 
 Saturday Review for January 29th, entitleil " Armed 
 Peace,'' we find the subject treated in a manner which 
 shows that the writer of the article has endeavoured to 
 rise above popular prejudice and to look at the beneii- 
 cial as well as the baneful consequences entailed by the 
 large armies now supported by certain of the European 
 nations. He has, however, as we opine, omitted alto- 
 gether one of the most important elements belonging to 
 an impartial consideration of the case, and, consequently, 
 his conclusion, if not altogether wrong, must be pro- 
 nounced undemonstrated and not entitled to acceptance 
 as a sound application of political economy to the 
 actual circumstances. 
 
 The conclusion to which we refer and object, is stated 
 at the commencement of the second part of the article" 
 in these words : " It is, however, so painful to think of 
 the waste of money and energy and happiness which 
 large armies involve, that, etc.'' This statement, taken 
 together with those which precede it, seems to show 
 that the writer has succumbed to the popular prejudice 
 which looks upon a large army as a necessary evil; 
 necessary as a weapon of offence and defence, but in 
 itself extremely costly and injurious. Now, what we 
 are desirous to do in this relation, is briefly to indicate 
 the application to this subject of the views recently 
 explained by us, in your journal, on the labour question. 
 . Let us take one of the European countries, for exq,mn 
 
T 
 
 6 National Economy. 
 
 plo England, und suppose it tu be decided by Failiument 
 that the standing army of England shall be one million 
 soldiers. A large proportion of this force to be sustained 
 by subjection to compulsory military service of the 
 whole population.. The ordinary militia soldier to pass 
 three years in fulf octive service ; to be afterwards sub- 
 ject to occasional service for the purpose of keeping up 
 his efficiency, and liable to be culled upon to take part 
 in the defence of his country. 
 
 It is certain that, at the present time, such a propo- 
 sition would be met by an adverse judgment on the part 
 of a great many persons supposed to understand tlie 
 principles of political economy. " A million men," it 
 would be said, " subtracted from the wealth-producing 
 power of the nation ; that is, virtually, so much of the 
 wealth of the nation wasted and lost ; and for what f To 
 keep the neighbouring countries under a continual 
 menace and oblige them to commit the same frightful 
 waste. And, besides this, look at the actual outlay; the 
 enormous cost of thus keeping a vast multitude of men 
 in idleness, and so on." Now in respect to the subtrac- 
 tion from the wealth-producing power of the nation, the 
 first question the political economist is require<Tto con- 
 sider carefuUy, in this relation, is : — ^What are the circum- 
 stances of the country in respect to its capacity of fully 
 employing all its labourers ? If we suppose the actual 
 number of labourers to be two millions in excess of the 
 number required to do all the work the country can fur- 
 nish, it is evident that the withdrawal of one million 
 men would, instead of subtracting from the wealth- 
 producing power of the country, assist in removing an 
 element of disturbance, and in mitigating the evils 
 occasioned by the over-competition of labourers in excess 
 of work. In the next place, the men have in any case 
 CO live. Each of the ^superfluous labourers must be sup- 
 ported ; for the country is too far advanced in civilization 
 
 ^ 
 
Naiiontd Economy: 7 
 
 to allow him to actually starve ; so that the direct qo»t 
 and outlay is reduced to the difference between the 
 expense of keeping a soldier, and the expense of keep- 
 ing an unemployed or half-starved labourer, or pauper. 
 Against this difference in expense, whatever it may be, 
 is, independently of the sense of security conferred upon 
 the nation by the possession of a large and efficient army, 
 the difference between a man who has had the advanta- 
 ges which an enlightened system of military training for 
 three years or longer can confer upon him, and the 
 crude untrained labourer or peasant. Now, this differ- 
 ence, if it be admitted that there is a difference in favour 
 of the well-trained soldier, is a gain in wealth to the 
 nation of so much per man; it is an economical product, 
 so to speak, which the nation obtains for its outlay. We 
 are not proposing now to enter into the general question, 
 which is a very large one, nor are we to be understood 
 ^■. as positively advising that England should keep an aver- 
 
 age number of a million soldiers. Our object in writing 
 this notice is to point out, as already stated, the impor- 
 tance of taking the actual circumstances of the country, 
 in respect to the proportion between the labourers and 
 the quantity of productive or useful work to which their 
 labour can be applied, as cne of the essential elements in 
 the consideration of the case. 
 
 Nearly at the close of the same article a subject of an 
 entirely different character is brought particularly under 
 consideration, and in regard to which, also, the judg- 
 ment expressed by the writer is, we opine, open to grave 
 objection. That subject is the question whether Eng- 
 land ought, or ought not, und^r particular circumstances, 
 to protect and help a weak state against aggression and 
 injustice on the part of a stronger nation. To decide 
 this question with certainty in its application to any 
 particular case, there would have to be a sufficient and 
 correct knowledge as to the circumstances, and if such 
 
mm^mmmmm 
 
 ^rw^ 
 
 i 
 
 Nati&nal Bmowr. 
 
 sufficient knowledge cannot be obtained, ihe decision or 
 conclusion must be a matter of opinion. The case, how- 
 ever, which is here presented, is not whether the special 
 circumstances justiKed such and such a decision, but 
 whether England, having come to a certain decision, ought 
 or ought not to act on that decision. 
 
 The following quotation states the assumed, condi- 
 tions of the case, and expresses the judgment to which 
 wo object : — " The only case, in fact, in which the 
 writer thiiiks we ought to have gone to war when we 
 did not, was in 1804, when Denmark was threatened by 
 Prussia. lie says the aggression of Prussia was with- 
 out the shadow of a pretext. This is, perhaps, a mere 
 matter of opinion, although we believe that, if Parlia- 
 ment had been really invited to sanction a war on behalf 
 of Denmark, and the question had been fairly debated, the 
 English public would have been much surprised at the 
 strength and validity of the German case. However, as 
 it happened, in this case the English ministry was will- 
 ing to go to war, but it had a juster sense of what was 
 possible than to undertake the struggle without an ally ; 
 and, as France would not co-operate except on the 
 understanding that victory was to give it an extension of 
 territory, England, disliking this, was obliged to abandon 
 Denmark to its fate." We have herein an opinion 
 expressed that the public of England was not so well 
 acquainted with the actual merits of the case as it sup- 
 posed itself to be. But that, however this might be, the 
 public of England had come to a decision on the case, 
 adverse to Germany, and that, moreover, the English 
 ministry had come to the same decision so strongly that 
 they were willing to go to war. Why, then, did they not 
 go to war ? Because they considered it more prudent not 
 xo do so, or, in other words, because they were afraid of 
 the possible consequences to England of doing so. Now 
 we are not about to argue as to the facts, nor to offer an 
 
 f 
 
NaHondl ffonour. 
 
 '» 
 
 II 
 
 opinion one wuy or the other about them ; but we are ' 
 going to Bay a few words on the case thus presented by 
 the writer in the Review. England, as a nation, comes 
 to a decision that Denmark is in the right, and Germany 
 in the wrong. England feels that it is her duty to pro- 
 tect and assist Denmark, the weaker, which is in 
 the right, against Germany, the stronger, which is 
 in the wrong. But England abstains from doing 
 so, because she is not sure what the result and 
 consequences to herself of her interference might be. In 
 the manner of presenting the case to the reader and in 
 the remarks by which it is accompanied, there appears to 
 be a mode of commending national neglect of a recog- 
 nized duty, on the ground of prudence. But prudence 
 is on the side of a courageous performance of duty. If 
 there had been no room for doubt as to the result of 
 going to war, because success was quite assured and 
 certain, it would have required no exercise of courage to 
 go to war. There was no such apparent disproportion 
 of strength against England as to justify her, supposing 
 her convinced she ought to go to war if strong enough, 
 in abstaining from doing so. Whether she was^ in fact, 
 so convinced ; whether she was satisfied th-^^ she so 
 understood the merits of the case as to come to any clear 
 decision, are questions which, as we have already said, 
 we are not arguing, and upon which we do not desire 
 to offer an opinion. But do not let us try to agree that, 
 having known as a nation we ought to act in a particular 
 manner under certain circumstances, we did right in ab- 
 staining from so acting. Because to wilfully abstain from 
 doing right, .is to do wrong, in the life of a nation just as 
 much aB in the life of an individual man. It is not politic 
 and expedient, but impolitic and inexpedient. To do right 
 is to do what the man or the nation, after diligent en- 
 quiry, reasonably believes to be right. Wiien " England 
 expects every man to do his duty. " She expects every 
 
IVMPllH 
 
 10 
 
 NcUional Honouri 
 
 man to do whbt he reasonably believes to be his duty. Kel- 
 son was not deterred from fighting a battle which he believ- 
 ed it his duty to fight because the number of ships and 
 guns arrayed against him was greater than of those he 
 had to confront them with. But, however, let us, if 
 this episode in the life of the nation is to be brought up 
 again and iigain for consideration, remember tliat the 
 record of history has been written for our learning, and 
 we I' ?ve everything to gain by reading it fairly. If, on 
 the occasion alluded to, we, us a nation, made a great 
 and lamentable mistake, let us aciiuowledge to ourselves 
 that such is the fact. The argument as to a dispropor- 
 tion of strength so great as to malce it, in the opinion of 
 the reviewer, reasonably impossible fur England to have 
 acted alone, should be considered and estimated by itself. 
 On this point we do not hesitate to express a conditional 
 opinion. If it would have been right, under the circum- 
 stances, for England to have acted in conjunction with 
 France, it would have been right for England to have 
 acted, and would have been better for her to have acted, 
 alone. The supposition that the condition of England 
 compared with tliat of armed Germany (or with a part 
 of Germany) was of such weakness tliat slie could not rea- 
 sonably venture to interfere, will not, we think, if 
 directly stated, be entertained or even patiently lis- 
 tened to by many Englishmen. But, if we assume for 
 a moment that such was actually the case, the question 
 immediately presents itself: Has England, the nation 
 claiming to be foremost in the ranks of civilization, a 
 right to be in such a condition of weakness ? 
 
 If, again, we take the reviewer's second assumption, 
 that the public of England came to a wrong decision 
 and actually did what was best through ignorance and 
 by endeavouring to avoid what they ignorantly supposed 
 their duty, it is one which c nnot be contemplated with 
 satisfaction by those who take a pride in England's his- 
 
 . 
 
 i 
 
T 
 
 ■91 
 
 National llouotir. 
 
 11 
 
 tory. Or, onco ngain, if wo fall btwik on a third possiblo 
 usBumption, that the public mind of £ng1und was bo ilU 
 iuformod, mystified and confused on the subject as to be 
 incapable of forming any distinct decision or taking 
 action in the matter, this can scarcely be considered 
 more creditable th-'n the preceding. 
 
 A mistake, even a great mistake, may be utilized by 
 a nation as well as by an individual, and become of much 
 value. If it be cleui '..at on a great occasion, England 
 acted wrongly, or, through ignorance, did not know how 
 to act, surely it will be well for her to see to it that on 
 the next great occasion she is well informed of the cir- 
 cumstances, and strong enough to do what she, being 
 well informed, reasonably believes it right for her to do. 
 
 KUKLOS. 
 
 ai 
 
ma