^, 4^ ^Sl^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // // ^ .^^ ^.^ 1.0 V^ lii ■tt Uii ■2.2 u 1.1 III WUu HiotogFaphic Sciences Corporation ■^ V ^N V <<^. ^- V 23 WBT MAIN STRKT WIBSTM,N.Y. MSM (7t6)«72-4S03 ;\ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/iCIViH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Inttituta for Historical IMicroreproductiona / Inatitut Canadian da microraproductions historiqua ;\ Tachnical and Bibliographic Notaa/Notaa taciiniquaa at bibSiographiquaa Tha Instituta haa attamptad to obtain tha baat originai copy avaiiabia for filming. Faaturaa of thia copy which may ba bibiiographieaiiy uniqua, which may altar any of tha imagas in tha raproduction, or which may aignificantiy changa tha uauai mathod of filming, ara ehackad balow. SColourad eovara/ Couvartura d^ eoulaur p~| Covara damagad/ D D D D D D Couvartura andommagte Covara raatorad and/or iaminatad/ Couvartura raataurAa at/ou pailieulAa r~| Covar titia miaaing/ La titra da couvartura nr.anqua Colourad mapa/ Cartaa g^ographiquaa an eoulaur □ Colourad ink (i.a. othar than blua or black)/ Encra da eoulaur (i.a. autra qua blaua ou noira) rn Colourad plataa and/or illuatrationa/ Ptanchaa at/ou illuatrationa 1% eoulaur Bound with othar matarial/ Rali4 avac d'autraa documi'«nta Tight binding may eauaa shadowa or diatortion along intarior margin/ Laraliura aarria paut eauaar da I'ombra ou da la diatoraion la tong da la marga intiriaura Blank laavaa addad during rastoration may appaar within tha taxt. Whanavar poaaibla. thaaa hava baan omittad from filming/ II aa paut qua cartainaa pagaa blanchaa ajoutioa lora d'una raatauration apparaiaaant dana la taxta, mala, loraqua cala itait poaaibla, caa pagaa n'ont paa «t« filmAaa. Additional commanta:/ Commantairaa suppiimantairaa; L'Inatitut a microfilm* la maillaur axamplaira qu'il lul a AtA poaaibla da aa procurer. Laa d*taiia da eat axamplaira qui lont paut-4tra un.'quaa du point d» vua bibliographiqua. qui pauvant modif iar una imaga raproduita. ou qui pauvant axigar una modification dana la mAthoda normala da filmaga aont irtdiquia ei-daaaoua. Th to D Colourad pagaa/ Pagaa da eoulaur r~n Pagaa damagad/ D a D D D D Thia itam la fllmad at tha reduction ratio ehackad balow/ Ca document aat filmi au taux da rMuction indiqui ei>daaaoua. Th po of nil Or Pagaa andommagiaa Pagaa raatorad and/01 Pagaa raatauriaa at/ou pailiculAaa r~l Pagaa raatorad and/or laminated/ Pagaa diacolourad, stained or foxed/ Pagaa dAcoioriaa. tachaties ou piquiaa Pagaa detached/ Pagaa dAtach^s Showthrough/ Tranaparenee Quality of p/int variaa/ QualitA inAgala de I'impreaaion Includaa supplementary material/ Comprand du matiriel supplAmentaira Only edition available/ Seule Adition diaponible Pagea wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissuaa. etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Lea pages totalement ou partieilement obacurciaa par un feuillet d'arrata. una paiure, etc.. ont AtA filmAes A nouveau de faqon A obtenir la mailleure image possible. th sk ot fir ale or Th ah Z M( dll en ba rig rm mi 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X y 12X 16X »X a«x 2IX 32X TIm copy fllm«d hsra haa b««n raproduoMi thankt to tho gonorotitv of: Douglas Ubrairy Quaan's Univaraity L'axamplalra fllmA f ut raproduit grica i la g«n4roalt« da: Douglas Library Quaan's Univaraity Tha Imagaa appaaring hara ara tha baat quality poaalbia oonaMarlng tha condition and laglblNty of tha original copy and In kaaping vvlth tha filming contract apaeif Icatlona. Original copica In printad iMpar c>>vara ara fUmad baglnning wHh tha front covar and anding on tha laat paga with a printad or llluatratod Impraa- sion. or tha back covar whan approprlata. AH othar original coplaa ara fNmad baglnning on tha f Irat paga with a printad or Htuatratad Impraa- slon, and anding on tha laat paga with a printad or llluatratad impraaaton. Tha laat racordad frama on aach microfiche shall contain tha aymbol ^^^ (moaning "CON- TINUED"), or tha aymbol ▼ (moaning "END"), whlchavar appllaa. Laa Imagaa r4ilvantaa ont 4t* raproduhaa avac la plua grand adn, compto tanu da la condition at da la nattati da l'axamplalra film*, at an conformit* avac laa condMona du contrat da filmaga. Laa axamplairt origlnaux dont la couvartura an paplar aat Imprim4a aont fNmte an commandant par la pramlar plat at an tarmlnant aoit par la dartiMra paga qui comporta una ampralnta dImpraaakNi ou dlHuatratlon, adt par la aacond plat, aalon la eaa. Toua laa autraa axamplairas origlnaux aont flImAs an commandant par la pramMra paga qui comporta una ampralnta dimpraaalon ou d'iHuatratlon at an tarmlnant par la damMra paga qui comporta una talla ampralnte. Un daa aymbdaa auivanta apparaftra sur la darnMra imaga da chaqua microfiche, salon la caa: la aymbola — »• signlfia "A 8UIVRE", la aymbolo ▼ signlfia "FIN". IMapa, plataa, charta, ate., may ba filmed at different reduction ratkM. Thoae too large to be entirely included in one expoeure ere filmed iMgIn' ing in the upper left hand comer, left to right and top to bottom, ae many framee aa required. The following diagrams illuatrata the method: Lea cartea, planches, taMeeux, etc., peuvent ttre filmto i dee taux da rMuction dlff Arenta. Loraqua la document eet trop grand pour Atra raproduit en un eeul cllch*, il eet film* A partir da I'angle aupiriaur gauche, do gauche i droKe, et do heut en baa, en prenent le nombre d'imegee n*ceeeaira. Lee diagrammee suivants llluatrent le mithode. 12 3 1 2 3 4 6 6 ■4^ IZ^^' The EDITH and LORNE PIERCE COLLECTION of CANADI ANA ^eerfs University at Kingston W'- L (ffllMii, Vf^fiJ' fo. ):^/<f6^ Political Economy and Large Armies. :m (Reprinted from the " Montreal Gazette") ■ x>:rt III the article which commences the number of the Saturday Review for January 29th, entitleil " Armed Peace,'' we find the subject treated in a manner which shows that the writer of the article has endeavoured to rise above popular prejudice and to look at the beneii- cial as well as the baneful consequences entailed by the large armies now supported by certain of the European nations. He has, however, as we opine, omitted alto- gether one of the most important elements belonging to an impartial consideration of the case, and, consequently, his conclusion, if not altogether wrong, must be pro- nounced undemonstrated and not entitled to acceptance as a sound application of political economy to the actual circumstances. The conclusion to which we refer and object, is stated at the commencement of the second part of the article" in these words : " It is, however, so painful to think of the waste of money and energy and happiness which large armies involve, that, etc.'' This statement, taken together with those which precede it, seems to show that the writer has succumbed to the popular prejudice which looks upon a large army as a necessary evil; necessary as a weapon of offence and defence, but in itself extremely costly and injurious. Now, what we are desirous to do in this relation, is briefly to indicate the application to this subject of the views recently explained by us, in your journal, on the labour question. . Let us take one of the European countries, for exq,mn T 6 National Economy. plo England, und suppose it tu be decided by Failiument that the standing army of England shall be one million soldiers. A large proportion of this force to be sustained by subjection to compulsory military service of the whole population.. The ordinary militia soldier to pass three years in fulf octive service ; to be afterwards sub- ject to occasional service for the purpose of keeping up his efficiency, and liable to be culled upon to take part in the defence of his country. It is certain that, at the present time, such a propo- sition would be met by an adverse judgment on the part of a great many persons supposed to understand tlie principles of political economy. " A million men," it would be said, " subtracted from the wealth-producing power of the nation ; that is, virtually, so much of the wealth of the nation wasted and lost ; and for what f To keep the neighbouring countries under a continual menace and oblige them to commit the same frightful waste. And, besides this, look at the actual outlay; the enormous cost of thus keeping a vast multitude of men in idleness, and so on." Now in respect to the subtrac- tion from the wealth-producing power of the nation, the first question the political economist is require<Tto con- sider carefuUy, in this relation, is : — ^What are the circum- stances of the country in respect to its capacity of fully employing all its labourers ? If we suppose the actual number of labourers to be two millions in excess of the number required to do all the work the country can fur- nish, it is evident that the withdrawal of one million men would, instead of subtracting from the wealth- producing power of the country, assist in removing an element of disturbance, and in mitigating the evils occasioned by the over-competition of labourers in excess of work. In the next place, the men have in any case CO live. Each of the ^superfluous labourers must be sup- ported ; for the country is too far advanced in civilization ^ Naiiontd Economy: 7 to allow him to actually starve ; so that the direct qo»t and outlay is reduced to the difference between the expense of keeping a soldier, and the expense of keep- ing an unemployed or half-starved labourer, or pauper. Against this difference in expense, whatever it may be, is, independently of the sense of security conferred upon the nation by the possession of a large and efficient army, the difference between a man who has had the advanta- ges which an enlightened system of military training for three years or longer can confer upon him, and the crude untrained labourer or peasant. Now, this differ- ence, if it be admitted that there is a difference in favour of the well-trained soldier, is a gain in wealth to the nation of so much per man; it is an economical product, so to speak, which the nation obtains for its outlay. We are not proposing now to enter into the general question, which is a very large one, nor are we to be understood ^■. as positively advising that England should keep an aver- age number of a million soldiers. Our object in writing this notice is to point out, as already stated, the impor- tance of taking the actual circumstances of the country, in respect to the proportion between the labourers and the quantity of productive or useful work to which their labour can be applied, as cne of the essential elements in the consideration of the case. Nearly at the close of the same article a subject of an entirely different character is brought particularly under consideration, and in regard to which, also, the judg- ment expressed by the writer is, we opine, open to grave objection. That subject is the question whether Eng- land ought, or ought not, und^r particular circumstances, to protect and help a weak state against aggression and injustice on the part of a stronger nation. To decide this question with certainty in its application to any particular case, there would have to be a sufficient and correct knowledge as to the circumstances, and if such mm^mmmmm ^rw^ i Nati&nal Bmowr. sufficient knowledge cannot be obtained, ihe decision or conclusion must be a matter of opinion. The case, how- ever, which is here presented, is not whether the special circumstances justiKed such and such a decision, but whether England, having come to a certain decision, ought or ought not to act on that decision. The following quotation states the assumed, condi- tions of the case, and expresses the judgment to which wo object : — " The only case, in fact, in which the writer thiiiks we ought to have gone to war when we did not, was in 1804, when Denmark was threatened by Prussia. lie says the aggression of Prussia was with- out the shadow of a pretext. This is, perhaps, a mere matter of opinion, although we believe that, if Parlia- ment had been really invited to sanction a war on behalf of Denmark, and the question had been fairly debated, the English public would have been much surprised at the strength and validity of the German case. However, as it happened, in this case the English ministry was will- ing to go to war, but it had a juster sense of what was possible than to undertake the struggle without an ally ; and, as France would not co-operate except on the understanding that victory was to give it an extension of territory, England, disliking this, was obliged to abandon Denmark to its fate." We have herein an opinion expressed that the public of England was not so well acquainted with the actual merits of the case as it sup- posed itself to be. But that, however this might be, the public of England had come to a decision on the case, adverse to Germany, and that, moreover, the English ministry had come to the same decision so strongly that they were willing to go to war. Why, then, did they not go to war ? Because they considered it more prudent not xo do so, or, in other words, because they were afraid of the possible consequences to England of doing so. Now we are not about to argue as to the facts, nor to offer an f NaHondl ffonour. '» II opinion one wuy or the other about them ; but we are ' going to Bay a few words on the case thus presented by the writer in the Review. England, as a nation, comes to a decision that Denmark is in the right, and Germany in the wrong. England feels that it is her duty to pro- tect and assist Denmark, the weaker, which is in the right, against Germany, the stronger, which is in the wrong. But England abstains from doing so, because she is not sure what the result and consequences to herself of her interference might be. In the manner of presenting the case to the reader and in the remarks by which it is accompanied, there appears to be a mode of commending national neglect of a recog- nized duty, on the ground of prudence. But prudence is on the side of a courageous performance of duty. If there had been no room for doubt as to the result of going to war, because success was quite assured and certain, it would have required no exercise of courage to go to war. There was no such apparent disproportion of strength against England as to justify her, supposing her convinced she ought to go to war if strong enough, in abstaining from doing so. Whether she was^ in fact, so convinced ; whether she was satisfied th-^^ she so understood the merits of the case as to come to any clear decision, are questions which, as we have already said, we are not arguing, and upon which we do not desire to offer an opinion. But do not let us try to agree that, having known as a nation we ought to act in a particular manner under certain circumstances, we did right in ab- staining from so acting. Because to wilfully abstain from doing right, .is to do wrong, in the life of a nation just as much aB in the life of an individual man. It is not politic and expedient, but impolitic and inexpedient. To do right is to do what the man or the nation, after diligent en- quiry, reasonably believes to be right. Wiien " England expects every man to do his duty. " She expects every IVMPllH 10 NcUional Honouri man to do whbt he reasonably believes to be his duty. Kel- son was not deterred from fighting a battle which he believ- ed it his duty to fight because the number of ships and guns arrayed against him was greater than of those he had to confront them with. But, however, let us, if this episode in the life of the nation is to be brought up again and iigain for consideration, remember tliat the record of history has been written for our learning, and we I' ?ve everything to gain by reading it fairly. If, on the occasion alluded to, we, us a nation, made a great and lamentable mistake, let us aciiuowledge to ourselves that such is the fact. The argument as to a dispropor- tion of strength so great as to malce it, in the opinion of the reviewer, reasonably impossible fur England to have acted alone, should be considered and estimated by itself. On this point we do not hesitate to express a conditional opinion. If it would have been right, under the circum- stances, for England to have acted in conjunction with France, it would have been right for England to have acted, and would have been better for her to have acted, alone. The supposition that the condition of England compared with tliat of armed Germany (or with a part of Germany) was of such weakness tliat slie could not rea- sonably venture to interfere, will not, we think, if directly stated, be entertained or even patiently lis- tened to by many Englishmen. But, if we assume for a moment that such was actually the case, the question immediately presents itself: Has England, the nation claiming to be foremost in the ranks of civilization, a right to be in such a condition of weakness ? If, again, we take the reviewer's second assumption, that the public of England came to a wrong decision and actually did what was best through ignorance and by endeavouring to avoid what they ignorantly supposed their duty, it is one which c nnot be contemplated with satisfaction by those who take a pride in England's his- . i T ■91 National llouotir. 11 tory. Or, onco ngain, if wo fall btwik on a third possiblo usBumption, that the public mind of £ng1und was bo ilU iuformod, mystified and confused on the subject as to be incapable of forming any distinct decision or taking action in the matter, this can scarcely be considered more creditable th-'n the preceding. A mistake, even a great mistake, may be utilized by a nation as well as by an individual, and become of much value. If it be cleui '..at on a great occasion, England acted wrongly, or, through ignorance, did not know how to act, surely it will be well for her to see to it that on the next great occasion she is well informed of the cir- cumstances, and strong enough to do what she, being well informed, reasonably believes it right for her to do. KUKLOS. ai ma