(•'^•v* ^^ "^^y?-

■'Iia-' t'j:^ Ji."-'"" 1-' ■T.r* A :-*■,.

MILITARY

REMINISCENCES OF

THE CIVIL WAR

OTHER BOOKS BT

GENERAL JACOB D. COX

The Battle of Franklin. With maps.
8vo . $z.oo

Atlanta. With maps. [Campaigns of
the Civil fFar] . I zmo . . $i .00

The March to the Sea. Franklin and
Nashville. With maps. [Campaigns of
the Civil fVar], i2mo . . ;gi.oo

Gen. Jacob D. Cox has given proof of his ability as
a military historian. His work is a valuable contri-
bution to our military history and the narrative is told
in a style that combines the knowledge of the warrior
with the skill of the literary artist. — The Dial.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers
153-157 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

■'•^

"■^i -^^Ifes.,

■■-•)!«%■■''■■'''■

<o(«JflR-j,i'WL''^' '

tt~, • '*MW*'''

'S^^'"S.,

JBWf""'"

JACOB D.COX. MA J. GEN,

ae:t 3 4

MILITARY

REMINISCENCES OF

THE CIVIL WAR

JACOB DOLSON COX, A.M., LL.D.

Formerly Major-Gentral commanding Tivenly-Third Army Corpt

Volume I.
APRIL 1861— NOVEMBER 1863

<•/•••

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1900

UNIVERSITY PRESS • JOHN WILSON
AND SON • CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.

PREFACE

MY aim in this book has been to reproduce my own
experience in our Civil War in such a way as to
help the reader understand just how the duties and the
problems of that great conflict presented themselves suc-
cessively to one man who had an active part in it from the
beginning to the end. In my military service I was so
conscious of the benefit it was to me to get the personal
view of men who had served in our own or other wars, as
distinguished from the general or formal history, that I
formed the purpose, soon after peace was restored, to
write such a narrative of my own army life. My relations
to many prominent officers and civilians were such as to
give opportunities for intimate knowledge of their personal
qualities as well as their public conduct. It has seemed
to me that it might be useful to share with others what I
thus learned, and to throw what light I could upon the
events and the men of that time.

As I have written historical accounts of some campaigns
separately, it may be pi oper to say that I have in this book
avoided repetition, and have tried to make the personal
narrative supplement and lend new interest to the more
formal story. Some of the earlier chapters appeared in an

vi PREFACE

abridged form in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,"
and the closing chapter was read before the Ohio Com-
mandery of the Loyal Legion. By arrangements courte-
ously made by the Century Company and the Commandery,
these chapters, partly re-written, are here found in their
proper connection.

Though my private memoranda are full enough to
give me reasonable confidence in the accuracy of these
reminiscences, I have made it a duty to test my memory
by constant reference to the original contemporaneous
material so abundantly preserved in the government pub-
lication of the Official Records of the Union and Confed-
erate Armies. Where the series of these records is not
given, my references are to the First Series, with the
abbreviation O. R., and I have preferred to adhere to the
official designation of the volumes in parts, as each volume
then includes the documents of a single campaign.

J. D. C.

Note. — The manuscript of this work had been completed by General
Cox, and placed in the hands of the publishers several weeks before his
untimely death at Magnolia, Mass., August 4, 1900. He himself had
read and revised some four hundred pages of the press-work. The work
of reading and revising the remaining proofs and of preparing a general
index for the work was undertaken by the undersigned from'a deep sense of
obligation to and loving regard for the author, which could not find a more
fitting expression at this time. No material changes have been made in
text or notes. Citations have been looked up and references verified with
care, yet errors may have crept in, which his well-known accuracy would have
excluded. For all such and for the imperfections of the index, the under-
signed must accept responsibility, and beg the indulgence of the reader, who
will find in the text itself enough of interest and profit to excuse many

shortcomings.

WILLIAM C. COCHRAN.
Cincinnati, October i, 1900.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

The Outbreak of the War

Pagb

Ohio Senate, April 12 — Sumter bombarded — "Glory to God I" —
The surrender — Effect on public sentiment — Call for troops —
Politicians changing front — David Tod — Stephen A. Douglas

— The insurrection must be crushed — Garfield on personal duty

— Troops organized by the States — The militia — Unprepared-
ness — McClellan at Columbus — Meets Governor Dennison —
Put in command — Our stock of munitions — Making estimates —
McClellan's plan — Camp Jackson — Camp Dennison — Gather-
ing of the volunteers — Garibaldi uniforms — Officering the troops

— Off for Washington — Scenes in the State Capitol — Governor
Dennison 's labors — Young regulars — Scott's policy — Alex.
McCook — Orlando Poe — Not allowed to take state commis-
sions.

CHAPTER n

Camp Dennison

Laying out the camp — Rosecrans as engineer — A comfortless night

— Waking to new duties — Floors or no floors for the huts —
Hardee's Tactics — The water-supply — Colonel Tom Worthington

— Joshua Sill — Brigades organized — Bates's brigade — Schleich's

— My own — McClellan's purpose — Division organization —
Garfield disappointed — Camp routine — Instruction and drill —
Camp cookery — Measles — Hospital bam — Sisters of Charity

— Ferment over re-enlistment — Musters by Gordon Granger —
"Food for powder" — Brigade staff — De Villiers — "A Captain
of Calvary" — The "Bloody Tinth" — Almost a row — Sum-
moned to the field.

Vin CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

Page
McClellan in West Virginia 40

Political attitude of West Virginia — Rebels take the initiative —
McClellan ordered to act — Ohio militia cross the river — The
Philippi affair — Significant dates — The vote on secession —
Virginia in the Confederacy — Lee in command — Topography —
The mountain passes — Garnett's army — Rich Mountain position

— McClellan in the field — His forces — Advances against Garnett

— Rosecrans's proposal — His fight on the mountain — McClel-
lan's inaction — Garnett's retreat — Affair at Carrick's Ford —
Garnett killed — Hill's efforts to intercept — Pegram in the wil-
derness — He surrenders — Indirect results important — McClel-
lan's military and personal traits.

CHAPTER IV
The Kanawha Valley 59

Orders for the Kanawha expedition — The troops and their quality —
Lack of artillery and cavalry — Assembling at Gallipolis — District
of the Kanawha — Numbers of the opposing forces — Method of
advance — Use of steamboats — Advance guards on river banks

— Camp at Thirteen-mile Creek — Night alarm — The river chutes

— Sunken obstructions — Pocotaligo — Affair at Barboursville —
Affair at Scary Creek — Wise's position at Tyler Mountain —
His precipitate retreat — Occupation of Charleston — Rosecrans
succeeds McClellan — Advance toward Gauley Bridge — Insub-
ordination — The Newspaper Correspondent — Occupation of
Gauley Bridge.

CHAPTER V
Gauley Bridge 80

The gate of the Kanawha valley — The wilderness beyond — West
Virginia defences — A romantic post — Chaplain Brown — An ad-
venturous mission — Chaplain Dubois — "The river path" —
Gauley Mount — Colonel Tompkins's home — Bowie-knives —
Truculent resolutions — The Engineers — Whittlesey, Benham,
Wagner — Fortifications — Distant reconnoissances — Compari-
son of forces — Dangers to steamboat communications — Allot-
ment of duties — The .Summersville post — Seventh Ohio at Cross
Lanes — Scares and rumors — Robert E. Lee at Valley Mountain

— Floyd and Wise advance — Rosecrans's orders — The Cross
Lanes affair — Major Casement's creditable retreat — Colonel
Tyler's reports — Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton — Quarrels of
Wise and Floyd — Ambushing rebel cavalry — Affair at Bcone

CONTENTS IX

Page
Court House — New attack at Gauley Bridge — An incipient
mutiny — Sad result — A notable court-martial — Rosecrans
marching toward us — Communications renewed — Advance
toward Lewisburg — Camp Lookout — A private sorrow.

CHAPTER VI

Carnifex Ferry — To Sewell Mountain and back . . 105

Rosecrans's march to join me — Reaches Cross Lanes — Advance
against Floyd — Engagement at Carnifex Ferry — My advance
to Sunday Road — Conference with Rosecrans — McCook's
brigade joins me — Advance to Camp Lookout — Brigade com-
manders — Rosecrans's personal characteristics — Hartsuff —
Floyd and Wise again — '• Battle of Bontecou " — Sewell Moun-
tain — The equinoctial — General Schenck arrives — Rough
lodgings — Withdrawal from the mountain — Rear-guard duties

— Major Slemmer of Fort Pickens fame — New positions cover-
ing Gauley Bridge — Floyd at Cot^^n Mountain — Rosecrans's
methods with private soldiers — Progress in discipline.

CHAPTER VII
Cotton Mountain 129

Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge — Effect on Rosecrans — Topog-
raphy of Gauley Mount — De Villiers runs the gantlet — Move-
ments of our forces — Explaining orders — A hard climb on the
mountain — In the post at Gauley Bridge — Moving magazine
and telegraph — A balky mule-team — Ammunition train under
fire — Captain Fitch a model quartermaster — Plans to entrap
Floyd — Moving supply trains at night — Method of working
the ferry — Of making flatboats — The Cotton Mountain affair

— Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham — Vain plans to reach
East Tennessee.

CHAPTER VIII
Winter-Quarters 146

An impracticable country — Movements suspended — Experienced
troops ordered away — My orders from Washington — Rosecrans
objects — A disappointment — Winter organization of the De-
partment — Sifting our material — Courts-martial — Regimental
schools — Drill and picket duty — A military execution — Effect
upon the army — Political sentiments of the people — Rules of
conduct toward them — Case of Mr. Parks — Mr. Summers —
Mr. Patrick — Mr. Lewis Ruffner — Mr. Doddridge — Mr. B. F.
Smith — A house divided against itself — Major Smith's journal

— The contraban'.'s — A fugitive-slave case — Embarrassments
as to military jurisdiction.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX

Fagb

Volunteers and Regulars 165

High quality of first olunteers — Discipline milder ' nan that of
the regulars — Reasons for the difference — Practical efficiency
of the men — Necessity for sifting the officers — Analysis of
their defects — What is military aptitude ? — Diminution of
number in ascending scale — Effect of age — Of former life and
occupation — Embarrassments of a new business — Quick prog-
ress of the right class of young men — Political appointments

— Professional men — Political leaders naturally prominent in a
civil war — " Cutting and trying " — Dishonest methods — An
excellent army at the end of a year — The regulars in 1861 —
Entrance examinations for West Point — The curriculum there

— Drill and experience — Its limitations — Problems peculiar to
the vast increase of the army — Ultra-conservatism — Attitude
toward the Lincoln administration — "Point de zele" — Lack
of initiative — Civil work of army engineers — What is military
art ? — Opinions of experts — Military history — European armies
in the Crimean War — True generalship — Anomaly of a double
army organization.

CHAPTER \
The Mountain Department — Spring Campaign . . . 192

Rosecrans's plan of campaign — Approved by McClellan with
modifications — Wagons or pack-mules — Final form of plan —
Changes in commands — McClellan limited to Army of the
Potomac — Halleck's Department of the Mississippi — Fremont's
Mountain Department — Rosecrans superseded — Preparations
in the Kanawha District — Batteaux to supplement steamboats

— Light wagons for mountain work — Fremont's plan — East
Tennessee as an objective — The supply question — Banks in the
Shenandoah valley — Milroy's advance — Combat at McDowell

— Banks defeated — Fremont's plans deranged — Operations in
the Kanawha valley — Organization of brigades — Brigade com-
manders — Advance to Narrows of New River — The field tele-
graph — Concentration of the enemy — Affair at Princeton —
Position at Flat-top Mountain.

CHAPTER XI
Pope in Command — Transfer to Washington . . . . 217

A key position — Crook's engagement at Lewisburg — Watching
and scouting — Mountain work — Pope in command — Consoli-
dation of Departments — Suggestions of our transfer to the East

CONTENTS XI

Pagb

— Pope's Order No. . i and Address to the Army — Orders to
march across the mountains — Discussion of them — Changed
to route by water and rail — Ninety-mile march — Logistics —
Arriving in Washington — Two regiments reach Pope — Two
sent to Manassas — Jackson captures Manassas — Railway
broken — McClellan at Alexandria — Engagement at Bull Run
Bridge — Ordered to Upton's Hill — Covering Washington —
Listening to the Bull Run battle — 111 news travels fast.

CHAPTER XII

Retreat within the Lines — Reorganization — Halleck

AND HIS Subordinates . 240

McClellan's visits to my position — Riding the lines — Discussing
the past campaign — The withdrawal from the James — Proph-
ecy — McClellan and the soldiers — He is in command of the
defences — Intricacy of official relations — Reorganization begun

— Pope's army marches through our works — Meeting of
McClellan and Pope — Pope's characteristics — Undue depre-
ciation of him — The situation when Halleck was made General-
in-Chief — Pope's part in it — Reasons for dislike on the part of
the Potomac Army — McClellan's secret service — Deceptive
information of the enemy's force — Information from prisoners
and citizens — Effects of McClellan's illusion as to Lee's strength

— Halleck's previous career — Did he intend to take command
in the field? — His abdication of the field command — The
necessity for a union of forces in Virginia — McClellan's inac-
tion was Lee's opportunity — Slow transfer of the Army of the
Potomac — Halleck burdened with subordinate's work — Burn-
side twice declines the command — It is given to McClellan —
Pope relieved — Other changes in organization — Consolidation
— New campaign begun.

CHAPTER XIII
South Mountain 263

March through Washington — Reporting to Burnside — The Ninth
Corps — Bumside's personal qualities — To Leesboro — Strag-
gling — Lee's army at Frederick — Our deliberate advance —
Reno at New Market — The march past — Reno and Hayes —
Camp gossip — Occupation of Frederick — Affair with Hamp-
ton's cavalry — Crossing Catoctin Mountain — The valley and
South Mountain — Lee's order found — Division of his army —
Jackson at Harper's Ferry — Supporting Pleasonton's recon-
noissance — Meeting Colonel Moor — An involuntary warning —
Kanawha Division's advance — Opening of the battle — Carrying

Xll CONTENTS

Fagb
the mountain crest — The morning fight — Lull at noon —
Arrival of supports — Battle renewed — Final success — Death
of Reno — Hooker's battle on the right — His report — Hurn-
side's comments — Franklin's engagement at Crampton's Gap.

CHAPTER XIV

Antietam : Preliminary Movements 295

Lee's plan of invasion — Changed Ijy McCIellan's advance — The
position at Sliarpsburg — Our routes of march — At the An-
tietam - McClellan reconnoitring — Leo striving to concentrate

— Our delays — Tuesday's quiet — Hooker's evening march —
The Ninth Corps command — Changing our positions — McCIel-
lan's plan of battle — Hooker's evening skirmish — Mansfield
goes to support Hooker — Confederate positions — Jackson
arrives — McLaws and Walker reach the field — Their places.

CHAPTER XV
Antietam : The Fight on the Right 312

Hooker astir early — The field near the Dunker Church — Artillery
combat — Positions of Hooker's divisions — Rocky ledges in
the woods — Advance of Doubleday through Miller's orchard
and garden — Enemy's fire from West Wood — They rush for
Gibbon's battery — Repulse — Advance of Patrick's brigade —
Fierce fightuig along the turnpike — Ricketts's division in the
East Wood — Fresh effort of Meade's division in the centre —
A lull in the battle — Mansfield's corps reaches the field — Con-
.?^ict'.ng opinions as to the hour — Mansfield killed — Command
devolves on \\ illiamj. — Advance through East Wood —
Hooker wounde J — Meade in command of the corps — It with-
draws — Gree -'s division reaches the Dunker Church — Craw-
ford's in the East Wood — Terrible effects on the Confederates

— Sumner's corp coming up — Its fonnation — It moves on the
Dunker Church from the east — Divergence of the divisions —
Sedgwick's passes to ripht of Greene — Attacked in flank and
broken — Rallying at the Poffenberger hill — Twelfth Corps
hanging on near the church — Advance of French's division —
Richardson follows later — Bloody Lane reached — The Piper
house — Franklin's corps arrives — Charge of Irwin's brigade.

CHAPTER XVI

Antietam : The Fight on the Left 332

Ninth Corps positions near Antietam Creek — Rodman's division
at lower ford — Sturgis's at the bridge — Burnside's headquar-
ters on the field — View from his place of the battle on the right

CONTENTS XUl

Page

— French's fight — An exploding caisson — Our orders to attack

— The hour — Crisis of the battle — Discussion of the sequence
of events — The Kurnside bridge — Exposed approach — Enfi-
laded by enemy's artillery — Disposition of enemy's troops — His
position very strong — Importance of Redman's movement by
the ford — The fight at the bridge — Repulse • - Fresh efforts —
Tactics of the assault — Success — Formation on further bank

— Bringing up ammunition — Willcox relieves Sturgis — Tne
latter now in support — Advance against Sharpsbuig — Fierce
combat — Edge of the town reached — Rodman's advance on the
left — A. P. Hill's Confederate division arrives from Harper's
Ferry — Attacks Rodman's flank — A raw regiment breaks —
The line retires — Sturgis comes into the gap — Defensive posi-
tion taken and held — Enemy's assaults repulsed — Troops
sleeping on their arms — McClellan's reserve — Other troops
not used — McClellan's idea of Lee's force and plans — Lee's
retreat — The terrible casualty lists.

CHAPTER XVII
McClellan and Politics — His Removal and its Cause 354

Meeting Colonel Key — His changes of opinion — His relations
to McClellan — Governor Dennison's influence — McClellan's
attitude toward Lincoln — Hurnside's position — The Harrison
Landing letter — Compared with Lincoln's views — Probable
intent of the letter — Incident at McClellan's headquarters —
John \V. Garrett — Emancipation Proclamation — An after-
dinner discussion of it — Contrary influences — Frank advice —
Burnside and John Cochrane — General Order 163 — Lincoln's
visit to camp — Riding the field — A review — Lincoln's desire
for continuing the campaign — McClellan's hesitation — His
tactics of discussion — His exaggeration of difficulties — Effect
on his army — Disillusion a slow process — Lee's army not better
than Johnston's — Work done by our Western army — Differ-
ence in morale — An army rarely bolder than its leader —
Correspondence between Halleck and McClellan — Lincoln's
remarkable letter on the campaign — The army moves on
November 2 — Lee regains the line covering Richmond —
McClellan relieved — Burnside in command.

CHAPTER XVIII

Personal Relations of McClellan, Burnside, and Porter 376

Intimacy of McClellan and Burnside — Private letters in the official
files — Burnside's mediation — His self-forgetful devotion —
The movement to join Pope — Burnside forwards Porter's dis-

xiT CONTENTS

Paqb

patches — His double refusal of the command — McClelUn

suspends the organization of wings — His relations to Porter —
Lincoln's letter on the subject — Fault-finding with Burnside —
Whose work ? — Burnside's appearance and bearing in the field.

CHAPTER XIX
Return to West Virginia 391

Ordered to the Kanawha valley again — An unwelcome surprise —
Reasons for the order — Reporting to Halleck at Washington

— Affairs in the Kanawha in September — Lightburn's positions

— Enemy under Loring advances — Affair at Fayette C. H. —
Lightburn retreats — Gauley Bridge abandoned — Charleston
evacuated — Disorderly flight to the Ohio — Enemy's cavalry
raid under Jenkins — General retreat in Tennessee and Ken-
tucky — West Virginia not in any Department — Now annexed
to that of Ohio — Morgan's retreat from Cumberland Gap —
Ordered to join the Kanawha forces — Milroy's brigade also —
My interviews with Halleck and Stanton — Promotion — My
task — My division sent with me — District of West Vi/ginia —
Colonel Crook promoted — Journey westward — Governor Peir-
poir.t — Governor Tod — General Wright — Destitution of
Morgan's column — Refitting at Portland, Ohio — Night drive
to Gallipolis — An amusing accident — Inspection at Point
Pleasant — Milroy ordered to Parkersburg — Milroy's qualities

— Interruptions to movement of troops — No wagons — Supplies
delayed — Confederate retreat — Loring relieved — Echols in
command — Our march up the valley — Echols retreats — We oc-
cupy Charleston and Gauley Bridge — Further advance stopped

— Our forces reduced — Distribution of remaining ':roops —
Alarms and minor movements — Case of Mr. Summers — His
treatment by the Confederates.

CHAPTER XX
Winter Quarters, 1862-63 — Promotions and Politics 420

Central position of Marietta, Ohio — Connection with all parts of
West Virginia — Drill and instruction of troops — Guerilla
warfare — Partisan Rangers — Confederaie laws — Disposal of
phmder — Mosby's Rangers as a type — Opinions of Lee, Stuart,
and Rosser — Effect on other troops — Rangers finally abolished

— Rival home-guards and militia — Horrors of neighborhood
war — Staff and staff duties — Reduction of forces — General
Cluseret — Later connection with the Paris Commune — Hif.
relations with Milroy — He resigns — Political situation —
Congressmen distrust Lincoln — Cutler's diary — Resolutions
regarding appointments of general officers — The number au-

CONTENTS

thorized by law — Stanton's report — Effect of Act of July, 1862

— An excess of nine mujor-generals — The legal questions
involved — Congressional patronage and local distribution —
Ready for a "deal" — Bill to increase the number of generals

— A " slate " made up to exhaust the number — Senate and
House disagree — Conference — Agreement "i last hours of the
session — The new list — A few vacancies by resignation, cic. —
List of those dropped — My own cise — Faults ot" the method

— Lincoln's humorous comments — Curious case of General
Turchin — Congestion in the highest grades — Effects — Con-
federate grades of general and lieutenant-general — Superiority
of our system — Cotemporaneous reports and criticisms — New
regiments instead of recruiting old ones — Sherman's trenchant
opinion.

CHAPTER XXI

Pagb

Farewell to West Virginia

MENl' OF THE OhIO . .

BURNSIDE IN THE DePART-

Desire for field service — Changes in the Army of the Potomac —
Judgment of McClellan at that time — Our defective knowledge

— Changes in West Virginia — Errors in new organization —
Embarrassments resulting — Visit to General Schenck — New
orders from Washington — Sent to Ohio to administer the draft

— Burnside at head of the department — District of Ohio —
Headquarters at Cincinnati — Cordial relations of Governor Tod
with the military authorities — System of enrolment and draft —
Administration by Colonel Fry — Decay of the veteran regiments

— Bounty-jumping — Effects on political parties — Soldiers vot-
ing — Purnsida's military plans — East Tennessee — Rosecrans
aiming at Chattanooga — Burnside's business habits — His
frankness — Stories about him — His personal characteristics —
Cincinnati as a border city — Rebel sympathizers — Order No. 38

— Challenged by Vallandigham — The order not a new departure

— Lincoln's proclamation — General Wright's circular.

442

CHAPTER XXII
The Vallandigham Case — The Holmes County War . 458

Clement L. Vallandigham — His opposition to the war — His
theory of reconstruction — His Mount Vernon speech — His
arrest — Sent before the military commission — General Potter
its president — Counsel for the prisoner — The line of defence
— The judgment — Habeas Corpus proceedings — Circuit Court
of the United States — Judge Leavitt denies the release — Com-
mutation by the President — Sent beyond the lines — Conduct
of Confederate authorities — Vallandigham in Canada — Candi-

XVI CONTENTS

Paob

date for Governor — Political results — Martial law — Principles
underlying it — i'ractical application — Tiic intent to aid the
public enemy — The intent to defeat the draft — Armed resist-
ance to arrest of deserters, Noble County — To the enrolment
in Holmes County — A real insurrection — Connection of these
with Valiandigham's speeches — The Supreme Court refuses to
interfere — Action in the Milligan case after the war — Judge
Davis's personal views — Knights of the Golden Circle — The
Holmes County outbreak — Its suppression — Letter to Judge
Welker.

CHAPTER XXIII
BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS — ThE SuMMER'S DeLAYS . . 473

Condition of Kentucky and Tennessee — Halleck's instructions to
IJurnside — Hlockhouses at bridges — Relief of East Tennessee

— Conditions of the problem — Vast wagon-train required —
Scheme of a railroad — Surveys begun — Burnside's efforts to
arrange co-operation with Rosecrans — liragg sending troops to
Johnston — Halleck urges Rosecrans to activity — Continued
inactivity — Burnside ordered to send troops to Grant — Rose-
crans's correspondence with Halleck — Lincoln's dispatch —
Rosecrans collects his subordinates' opinions — Councils of war

— The situation considered — Sheridan and Thomas — Compu-
tation of effectives — Garfield's summing up — Review of the
situation when Rosecrans succeeded Buell — After Stone's River

— Relative forces — Disastrous detached expeditions — Appeal
to ambition — The major-generalship in regular army — Views
of the President justified — Burnside's forces — Confederate
forces in East Tennessee — Reasons for the double organization
of the Union armies.

CHAPTER XXIV
The Morgan Raid 491

Departure of the staff for the field — An amusingly quick return —
Changes in my own duties — Expeditions to occupy the enemy

— Sanders' raid into East Tennessee — His route — His success
and return — The Confederate Morgan's raid — His instructions

— His reputation as a soldier — Compared with Forrest —
Morgan's start delayed — His appearance at Green River, Ky.

— Foiled by Colonel Moore — Captures Lebanon — Reaches the
Ohio at Brandenburg — General Hobson in pursuit — Morgan
crosses into Indiana — Was this his original purpose? — His

route out of Indiana into Ohio — He approaches Cincinnati —
Hot chase by Hobson — Gunboats co-operating on the river —
Efforts to block his way — He avoids garrisoned posts and cities

— Our troops moved in transports by water — Condition of
Morgan's jaded column — Approaching the Ohio at BufHngton's

CONTENTS xvii

Pack

— Gunboats near the ford — Hobson attacks — Part captured,

the rest fly northward — Another capture — A long chase

Surrender of Morgan with the remnant — Summary of result*

— A burlesque capitulation.

CHAPTER XXV

The Liberation of East Tennessee cio

News of Grant's victory at Vicksburg — A thrilling scene at the
opera— liurnside's Ninth Corps to return — Stanton urges
Rosecrans to advance — The Tuilahoma manoeuvres — Testy

correspondence — Its real meaning — Urgency with Burnside

Ignorance concerning his situation — His disappointment as to
Ninth Corps — Rapid concentration of other troops — Hum-
side's march into East Tennessee — Occupation of Knoxville —
Invests Cumberland Gap — The garrison surrenders — Good
news from Rosecrans — Distances between armies — Divergent
lines— No railway communication — Burnside concentrates to-
ward the Virginia line — Joy of the people — Their intense
loyalty — Their faith in the future.

CHAPTER XXVI
Burnside in East Tennessee 530

Organizing and arming the loyalists — Burnside concentrates
near Greeneville — His general plan — Rumors of Confederate
reinforcements — Lack of accurate information — The Ninth
Corps in Kentucky — Its depletion by malarial disease — Death
of General Welsh from this cause — Preparing for further work

— Situation on i6th September — Dispatch from Halleck — Its
apparent purpose — Necessity to dispose of the enemy near
Virginia border — Burnside personally at the front — His great
activity — Ignorance of Rosecrans's peril — Impossibility of
joining him by the 20th — Ruinous effects of abandoning East
Tennessee — Efforts to aid Rosecrans without such abandon-
ment — Enemy duped into burning Watauga bridge themselves

— Ninth Corps arriving — Willcox's division garrisons Cumber-
land Gap — Reinforcements sent Rosecrans from all quarters —
Chattanooga made safe from attack — The supply question —
Meigs's description of the roads — Burnside halted near Loudon

— Halleck's misconception of the geography — The people im-
ploring the President not to remove the troops — How Long-
street got away from Virginia — Burnside's alternate plans —
Minor operations in upper Holston valley — Wolford's aiTair
on the lower Holston.

Appendix A 547

Appendix B 547

MILITARY REMINISCENCES

THE CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Ohio Senate April 12 — Sumter bombarded — " Glory to God I" — The
surrender — Effect on public sentiment — Call for troops — Politicians
changing front — David Tod — Stephen A. Douglas — The insurrection
must be crushed — Garfield en personal duty — Troops organized by the
States — The militia — Unpreparedness — McClellan at Columbus —
Meets Governor Dennison— Put in command — Our stock of munitions —
Making estimates — McClellan's plan — Camp Jackson — Camp Den-
nison — Gathering of the volunteers — Garibaldi uniforms — Officering
the troops — Off for Washington — Scenes in the State Capitol — Gov-
ernor Dennison's labors — Young regulars — Scott's policy — Alex.
McCook — Orlando Poe — Not allowed to take state commissions.

ON Friday the twelfth day of April, 1861, the Senate
of Ohio was in session, trying to go on in the
ordinary routine of business, but with a sense of anxiety
and strain which was caused by the troubled condition of
national affairs. The passage of Ordinances of Secession
by one after another of the Southern States, and even the
assembling of a provisional Confederate government at
Montgomery, had not wholly destroyed the hope that
some peaceful way out of our troubles would be found ;
yet the gathering of an army on the sands opposite Fort
Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun were fired, we
knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement.
Hoping almost against hope that blood would not be shed,
and that the pageant of military array and of a rebel gov-
ernment would pass by and soon be reckoned among the

VOL. I. — I

"■^^■.'.V>A-^'.-

2 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

disused scenes and properties of a political drama that
never pretended to be more than acting, we tried to give
our thoughts to business; but there was no heart in it,
and the morning hour lagged, for we could not work in
earnest and we were unwilling to adjourn.

Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an ex-
cited way, and catching the chairman's eye, exclaimed,
" Mr. President, the telegraph announces that the seces-
sionists are bombarding Fort Sumter!" There was a
solemn and painful hush, but it was broken in a moment
by a woman's shrill voice from the spectators' seats, cry-
ing, " Glory to God ! " It startled every one, almost as if
the enemy were in the midst. But it was the voice of a
radical friend of the slave, who after a lifetime of public
agitation believed that only through blood could freedom
be won. Abby Kelly Foster had been attending the ses-
sion of the Assembly, urging the passage of some meas-
ures enlarging the legal rights of married women, and,
sitting beyond the railing when the news came in, shouted
a fierce cry of joy that oppression had submitted its cause
to the decision of the sword. With most of us, the
gloomy thought that civil war had begun in our own
land overshadowed everything, and seemed too great a
price to pay for any good ; a scourge to be borne only in
preference to yielding the very groundwork of our re-
publicanism, — the right to enforce a fair interpretation
of the Constitution through the election of President and
Congress.

The next day we learned that Major Anderson had sur-
rendered, and the telegraphic news from all the Northern
States showed plain evidence of a popular outburst of loy-
alty to the Union, following a brief moment of dismay.
Judge Thomas M. Key of Cincinnati, chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, was the recognized leader of the
Democratic party in the Senate,^ and at an early hour

1 Afterward aide-de-camp and acting judge-advocate on McClellan's staff.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

moved an adjournment to the following Tuesday, in order,
as he said, that the senators might have the opportunity
to go home and consult their constituents in the perilous
crisis of public affairs. No objection was made to the
adjournment, and the representatives took a similar re-
cess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense, — the
Republicans to know what initiative the Administration
at Washington would take, and the Democrats to deter-
mine what course they should follow if the President
should call for troops to put down the insurrection.

Before we met again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and
call for seventy-five thousand militia for three months'
service were out, and the great mass of the people of the
North, forgetting all party distinctions, answered with an
enthusiastic patriotism that swept politicians off their
feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning, Judge
Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the rail-
ing in the Senate chamber, broke out impetuously, " Mr.
Cox, the people have gone stark mad ! " "I knew they
would if a blow v/as struck against the flag," said I, re-
minding him of some previous conversations we had had
on that subject. He, with most of the politicians of the
day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current
of public opinion, and partly by the reaction of their own
hearts against the false theories which had encouraged
the secessionists, determined to support the war measures
of the government, and to make no factious opposition to
such state legislation as might be necessary to sustain
the federal administration.

The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others,
and marks one of the most striking features of the time.
On the 8th of January the usual Democratic convention
and celebration of the Battle of New Orleans had taken
place, and a series of resolutions had been passed, which
were drafted, as was understood, by Judge Thurman. In
these, professing to speak in the name of " two hundred

4 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

thousand Democrats of Ohio," the convention had very
significantly intimated that this vast organization of men
would be found in the way of any attempt to put down
secession until the demands of the South in respect to
slavery were complied with. A few days afterward I
was returning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull
County, and meeting upon the railway train with David
Tod, then an active Democratic politician, but afterward
one of our loyal "war governors," the conversation
turned on the action of the convention which had just
adjourned. Mr. Tod and I were personal friends and
neighbors, and I freely expressed my surprise that the
convention should have committed itself to what must be
interpreted as a threat of insurrection in the North if the
administration should, in opposing secession by force,
follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whose honor
they had assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted
the substance of the resolution, saying that we Republi-
cans would find the two hundred thousand Ohio Demo-
crats in front of us, if we attempted to cross the Ohio
River. My answer was, " We will give up the contest if
we cannot carry your two hundred thousand over the
heads of you leaders."

The result proved how hollow the party professions had
been; or perhaps I should say how superficial was the
hold of such party doctrines upon the mass of men in a
great political organization. In the excitement of politi-
cal campaigns they had cheered the extravagant language
of party platforms with very little reflection, and the
leaders had imagined that the people were really and
earnestly indoctrinated into the political creed of Cal-
houn; but at the first shot from Beauregard's guns in
Charleston harbor their latent patriotism sprang into vig-
orous life, and they crowded to the recruiting stations to
enlist for the defence of the national flag and the national
Union. It was a popular torrent which no leaders could

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR S,

resist; but many of these should be credited with the
same patriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivi-
ous of party consistency. Stephen A. Douglas passed
through Columbus on his way to Washington a few days
after the surrender of Sumter, and in response to the
calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke to
them from his bedroom window in the American House.
There had been no thought for any of the common sur-
roundings of a public meeting. There were no torches,
no music. A dark crowd of men filled full the dim-lit
street, and called for Douglas with an earnestness of tone
wholly different from the enthusiasm of common political
gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and
without any light near him, spoke solemnly to the people
upon the terrible crisis which had come upon the nation.
Men of all parties were there: his own followers to get
some light as to their duty; the Breckinridge Democrats
■ready, most of them, repentantly to follow a Northern
leader, now that their recent candidate was in the rebel-
lion;^ the Republicans eagerly anxious to know whether
so potent an influence was to be unreservedly on the side
of the country. I remember well the serious solicitude
with which I listened to his opening sentences as I leaned
against the railing of the State House park, trying in vain
to get more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at
the unlighted window. His deep sonorous voice rolled
down through the darkness from above us, — an earnest,
measured voice, the more solemn, the more impressive,
because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us
literally as "a voice in the night," — the night of our
country's unspeakable trial. There was no uncertainty
in his tone: the Union must be preserved and the insur-
rection must be crushed, — he pledged his hearty support
to Mr. Lincoln's administration in doing this. Other

^ Breckinridge did not formally join the Confederacy till September, but
his accord with the secessionists was well known.

6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

questions must stand aside till the national authority
should be everywhere recognized. I do not think we
greatly cheered him, — it was rather a deep Amen that
went up from the crowd. We went home breathing freer
in the assurance we now felt that, for a time at least, no
organized opposition to the federal government and its
policy of coercion would be formidable in the North.
We did not look for unanimity. Bitter and narrow men
there were whose sympathies were with their country's
enemies. Others equally narrow were still in the chains
of the secession logic they had learned from the Calhoun-
ists; but the broader-minded men found themselves happy
in being free from disloyal theories, and threw them-
selves sincerely and earnestly into the popular move-
ment. There was no more doubt where Douglas or Tod
or Key would be found, or any of the great class they
represented.

Yet the situation hung upon us like a nightmare.
Garfield and I were lodging together at the time, our
wives being kept at home by family cares, and when we
reached our sitting-room, after an evening session of the
Senate, we often found ourselves involuntarily groaning,
" Civil war in our land ! " The shame, the outrage, the
folly, seemed too great to believe, and we half hoped to
wake from it as from a dream. Among the painful re-
membrances of those days is the ever-present weight at
the heart which never left me till I found relief in the
active duties of camp life at the close of the month. I
went about my duties (and I am sure most of those I
associated with did the same) with the half-choking
sense of a grief I dared not think of: like one who is
dragging himself to the ordinary labors of life from some
terrible and recent bereavement.

We talked of our personal duty, and though both Gar-
field and myself had young families, we were agreed
that our activity in the organization and support of the

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Republican party made the duty of supporting the govern-
ment by military service come peculiarly home to us.
He was, for the moment, somewhat trammelled by his
half-clerical position, but he very soon cut the knot. My
own path seemed unmistakably clear. He, more careful
for his friend than for himself, urged upon me his doubts
whether my physical strength was equal to the strain that
would be put upon it. " I, said he, " am big and strong,
and if my relations to the church and the college can be
broken, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting; but you
are slender and will break down." It was true that I
looked slender for a man six feet high (though it would
hardly be suspected now that it was so), yet I had assured
confidence in the elasticity of my constitution; and the
result justified me, whilst it also showed how liable to
mistake one is in such things. Garfield found that he
had a tendency to weakness of the alimentary system
which broke him down on every campaign in which he
served and led to his retiring from the army much earlier
than he had intended. My own health, on the other
hand, was strengthened by out-door life and exposure,
and I served to the end with growing physical vigor.

When Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the
existing laws made it necessary that these should be fully
organized and officered by the several States. Then, the
treasury was in no condition to bear the burden of war
expenditures, and till Congress could assemble, the Presi-
dent was forced to rely on the States to furnish the means
necessary for the equipment and transportation of their
own troops. This threw upon the governors and legisla-
tures of Ihe loyal States responsibilities of a kind wholly
unprecedented. A long period of profound peace had
made every military organization seem almost farcical.
A few independent military companies formed the merest
shadow of an army; the state militia proper was only a
nominal thing. It happened, however, that I held a com-

8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

mission as Brigadier in this state militia, and my inti-
macy with Governor Dennison led him to call upon me
for such assistance as I could render in the first enrol-
ment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arranging to
be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might
be needed upon important legislation, I gave my time
chiefly to such military matters as the governor ap-
pointed. Although, as I have said, my military com-
mission had been a nominal thing, and in fact I had
never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theo-
retic preparation for such work. For some years the
possibility of a war of secession had been one of the
things which would force itself upon the thoughts of re-
flecting people, and I had been led to give some careful
study to such books of tactics and of strategy as were
within easy reach. I had especially been led to read
military history with critical care, and had carried away
many valuable ideas from this most useful means of mili-
tary education. I had therefore some notion of the work
before us, and could approach its problems with less loss
of time, at least, than if I had been wholly ignorant.^

My commission as Brigadier-General in the Ohio quota
in national service was dated on the 23d of April, though
it had been understood for several days that my tender of
service in the field would be accepted. Just about the
same time Captain George B. McClellan was requested
by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for consul-
tation, and by the governor's request I met him at the
railway station and took him to the State House. I think
Mr. Larz Anderson (brother of Major Robert Anderson)
and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with him.
The intimation had been given me that he would prob-
ably be made major-general and commandant of our Ohio
contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan him closely.

* I have treated this subject somewhat more fully in a paper in the "Atlan-
tic Monthly " for March, 1892, " Why the Men of '6i fought for the Union."

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

He was rather under the medium height, but muscularly
formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head,
active and graceful in motion. His whole appearance
was quiet and modest, but when drawn out he showed no
lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain
travelling suit, with a narrow- rimmed soft felt hat. In
short, he seemed what he was, a railway superintendent
in his business clothes. At the time his name was a
good deal associated with that of Beauregard ; they were
spoken of as young men of similar standing in the Engi-
neer Corps of the Army, and great things were expected
of them both because of their scientific knowledge of their
profession, though McClellan had been in civil life for
some years. His report on the Crimean War was one of
the few important memoirs our old army had produced,
and was valuable enough to give a just reputation for
comprehensive understanding of military organization,
and the promise of ability to conduct the operations of
an army.

I was present at the interview which the governor had
with him. The destitution of the State of everything
like military material and equipment was very plainly
put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small
army out of nothing was not blinked. The governor
spoke of the embarrassment be felt at every step from the
lack of practical military experience in his staff, and of
his desire to have some one on whom he could properly
throw the details of military work. McClellan showed
that he fully understood the difficulties there would be
before him, and said that no man coald wholly master
them at once, although he had confidence that if a few
weeks' time for preparation were given, he would be able
to put the Ohio division into reasonable form for taking
the field. The command was then formally tendered and
accepted. All of us who were present felt that the selec-
tion was one full of promise and hope, and that the

lO REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the
time.

The next morning McClellan requested me to accom-
pany him to the State Arsenal, to see what arms and
material might be there. We found a few boxes of
smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to
militia companies and had been returned rusted and
damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other accoutre-
ments were with them. There were two or three smooth-
bore brass fieldpieces, six-pounders, which had been
honeycombed by firing salutes, and of which the vents
had been worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a
heap in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed har-
ness, which had probably been once used for artillery
horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There
had for many years been no money appropriated to buy
military material or even to protect the little the State
had. The federal government had occasionally distrib-
uted some arms which were in the hands of the independ
ent uniformed militia, and the arsenal was simply an
empty storehouse. It did not take long to complete our
inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the build-
ing, McClellan turned, and looking back into its empti-
ness, remarked, half humorously and half sadly, " A fine
stock of munitions on vhich to begin a great war ! "

We went back to the State House, where a room in the
Secretary of State's department was assigned us, and we
sat down to work. The first task was to make out de-
tailed schedules and estimates of what would be needed
to equip ten thousand men for the field. This was a unit
which could be used by the governor and legislature in
estimating the appropriations needed then or subsequently.
Intervals in this labor were used in discussing the general
situation and plans of campaign. Before the close of the
week McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own
views, and forwarded it to Lieutenant-General Scott. He

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR II

read it to me, and my recollection of it is that he sug-
gested two principal lines of movement in the West, — one,
to move eastward by the Kanawha valley with a heavy
column to co-operate with an army in front of Washing-
ton ; the other, to march directly southward and to open
the valley of the Mississippi. Scott's answer was appre-
ciative and flattering, without distinctly approving his
plan ; and I have never doubted that the paper prepared
the way for his appointment in the regular army which
followed at so early a day.^

During this week McClellan was invited to take the
command of the troops to be raised in Pennsylvania, his
native State. Some things beside his natural attachment
to Pennsylvania made the proposal an attractive one to
him. It was already evident that the army which might
be organized near Washington would be peculiarly in the
public eye, and would give to its leading officers greater
opportunities of prompt recognition and promotion than
would be likely to occur in the West. The close associa-
tion with the government would also be a source of power
if he were successful, and the way to a chief command
would be more open there than elsewhere. McClellan
told me frankly that if the offer had come before he had
assumed the Ohio command, he would have accepted it;
but he promptly decided that he was honorably bound to
serve under the commission he had already received and
which, like my own, was dated April 23.

My own first assignment to a military command was
during the same week, on the completion of our esti-
mates, when I was for a few days put in charge of Camp

^ I am not aware that McClellan's plan of campaign has been published.
Scott's answer to it is given in General Townsend's " Anecdotes of the Civil
War," p. 260. It was, with other communications from Governor Dennison,
carried to Washington by Hon. A. F. Perry of Cincinnati, an intimate friend
of the governor, who volunteered as special messenger, the mail service being
unsafe. See a paper by Mr. Perry in " Sketches of War History " (Ohio Loyal
Legion), vol. iii. p. 345.

12 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Jackson, the depot of recruits which Governor Dennison
had established in the northern suburb of Columbus and
had named in honor of the first squelcher of secessionism.
McClellan soon determined, however, that a separate
camp of instruction should be formed for the troops mus-
tered into the United States service, and should be so
placed as to be free from the temptations and inconven-
iences of too close neighborhood to a large city, whilst it
should also be reasonably well placed for speedy defence
of the southern frontier of the State. Other camps could
be under state control and used only for the organization
of regiments which could afterward be sent to the camp
of instruction or elsewhere. Railway lines and connec-
tions indicated some point in the Little Miami valley as
the proper place for such a camp; and Mr. Woodward, the
chief engineer of the Little Miami Railroad, being taken
into consultation, suggested a spot on the line of that
railway about thirteen miles from Cincinnati, where a
considerable bend of the Little Miami River encloses
wide and level fields, backed on the west by gently rising
hills. I was invited to accompany the general in mak-
ing the inspection of the site, and I think we were ac-
companied by Captain Rosecrans, an officer who had
resigned from the regular army to seek a career as civil
engineer, and had lately been in charge of some coal
mines in the Kanawha valley. Mr. Woodward was also
of the party, and furnished a special train to enable us
to stop at as many eligible points as it might be thought
desirable to examine. There was no doubt that the point
suggested was best adapted for our work, and although
the owners of the land made rather hard terms, McClellan
was authorized to close a contract for the use of the mili-
tary camp, which, in honor of the governor, he named
Camp Dennison.

But in trying to give a connected idea of the first mili-
tary organization of the State, I have outrun some inci-

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 3

dents of those days which are worth recollection. From
the hour the call for troops was published, enlistments
began, and recruits were parading the streets continually.
At the Capitol the restless impulse to be doing some-
thing military seized even upon the members of the leg-
islature, and a large number of them assembled every
evening upon the east terrace of the State House to be
drilled in marching and facing, by one or two of their
own number who had some knowledge of company tactics.
Most of the uniformed independent companies in the
cities of the State immediately tendered their services,
and began to recruit their numbers to the hundred men
required for acceptance. There was no time to procure
uniform, nor was it desirable; for these independent
companies had chosen their own, and would have to
change it for that of the United States as soon as this
could be furnished. For some days companies could be
seen marching and drilling, of which part would be uni-
formed in some gaudy style, such as is apt to prevail in
holiday parades in time of peace, whilst another part
would be dressed in the ordinary working garb of citizens
of all degrees. The uniformed files would also be armed
and accoutred ; the others would be without arms or equip-
ments, and as awkward a squad as could well be imag-
ined. The material, however, was magnificent, and soon
began to take shape. The fancy uniforms were left at
home, and some approximation to a simple and useful
costume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy
furnished a useful idea, and the "Garibaldi uniform" of
a red flannel shirt with broad falling collar, with blue
trousers held by a leathern waist-belt, and a soft felt hat
for the head, was extensively copied, and served an excel-
lent purpose. It could be made by the wives and sisters
at home, and was all the more acceptable for that. The
spring was opening, and a heavy coat would not be much
needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good

14 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

blanket in an improvised knapsack, the new company was
not badly provided. The warm scarlet color, reflected
from their enthusiastic faces as they stood in line, made
a picture that never failed to impress the mustering offi-
cers with the splendid character of the men.

The officering of these new troops was a difficult and
delicate task, and so far as company officers were con-
cerned, there seemed no better way at the beginning than
to let the enlisted men elect iheir own, as was in fact
done. In most cases where entirely new companies were
raised, it had been by the enthusiastic efforts of some
energetic volunteers who were naturally made the com-
missioned officers. But not always. There were numer-
ous examples of self-denying patriotism which stayed in
the ranks after expending much labor and money in re-
cruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to
some one supposed to have military knowledge or experi-
ence. The war in Mexico in 1847 was the latest conflict
with a civilized people, and to have served in it was a
sure passport to confidence. It had often been a service
more in name than in fact ; but the young volunteers felt
so deeply their own ignorance that they were ready to
yield to any pretence of superior knowledge, and gener-
ously to trust them3elves to any one who would offer to
lead them. Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were
thus put into responsible places at the beginning, but the
sifting work went on fast after the troops were once in
the field. The election of field officers, however, ought
not to have been allowed. Companies were necessarily
regimented together, of which each could have but little
personal knowledge of the officers of the others ; intrigue
and demagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mis-
takes were made in selection. After a time the evil
worked its own cure, but the ill effects of it were long
visible.

The immediate need of troops to protect Washington

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 5

caused most of the uniformed companies to be united
into the first two regiments, which were quickly de-
spatched to the East. It was a curious study to watch
the indications of character as the officers commanding
companies reported to the governor, and wore told that
the pressing demand from Washington made it necessary
to organize a regiment or two and forward them at once,
without waiting to arm or equip the recruits. Some
promptly recognized the necessity and took the undesir-
able features as part of the duty they had assumed.
Others were querulous, wishing some one else to stand
first in the breach, leaving them time for drill, equip-
ment, and preparation. One figure impressed itself very
strongly on my memory. A sturdy form, a head with
more than ordinary marks of intelligence, but a bearing
with more of swagger than of self-poised courage, yet evi-
dently a man of some importance in his own community,
stood before the seat of the governor, the bright lights of
the chandelier over the table lighting strongly both their
figures. The officer was wrapped in a heavy blanket or
carriage lap-robe, spotted like a leopard skin, which gave
him a brigandish air. He was disposed to protest. " If
my men were hellions," said he, with strong emphasis on
the word (a new one to me), "I wouldn't mind; but to
send off the best young fellows of the county in such a
way looks like murder." The governor, sitting with
pale, delicate features, but resolute air, answered that
the way to Washington was not supposed to be danger-
ous, and the men could be armed and equipped, he was
assured, as soon as they reached there. It would be done
at Harrisburg, if possible, and certainly if any hostility
should be shown in Maryland. The President wanted
the regiments at once, and Ohio's volunteers were quite
as ready to go as any. He had no choice, therefore, but
to order them off. The order was obeyed ; but the obedi-
ence was with bad grace, and I felt misgivings as to the

l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

officer's fitness to command, — misgivings which about a
year afterward were vividly recalled with the scene I
have described.

No sooner were these regiments off than companies
began to stream in from all parts of the State. On their
first arrival they were quartered wherever shelter could
be had, as there were no tents or sheds to make a camp
for them. Going to my evening work at the State House,
as I crossed the rotunda, I saw a company marching in
by the south door, and another disposing itself for the
night upon the marble pavement near the east entrance;
as I passed on to the north hall, I saw another, that had
come a little earlier, holding a prayer-meeting, the stone
arches echoing with the excited supplications of some
one who was borne out of himself by the terrible pres-
sure of events around him, whilst, mingling with his
pathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country,
came the shrill notes of the fife, and the thundering din
of the inevitable bass drum from the company marching
in on the other side. In the Senate chamber a company
was quartered, and the senators were there supplying
them with paper and pens, with which the boys were
writing their farew oils to mothers and sweethearts whom
they hardly dared ' -""i they should see again. A similar
scene was going on in the Representatives' hall, another
in the Supreme Court room. In the executive oflfice sat
the governor, the unwonted noises, when the door was
opened, breaking in on the quiet business-like air of the
room, — he meanwhile dictating despatches, indicating
answers to others, receiving committees of citizens, giv-
ing directions to officers of companies and regiments,
accommodating himself to the wilful democracy of our
institutions which insists upon seeing the man in chief
command and will not take its answer from a subordi-
nate, until in the small hours of the night the noises
were hushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undis-

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 7

turbcd work upon the matters of chief importance, he
could leave the glare of his gas-lighted office, and seek
a few hours' rest, only to renew the same wearing labors
on the morrow.

On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not
more intense character. A minority of unthinking par-
tisans could not understand the strength and sweep of tlie
great popular movement, and would sometimes venture
to speak out their sympathy with the rebellion or their
sneers at some party friend who had enlisted. In the
boiling temper of the time the quick answer was a blow;
and it was one of the common incidents of the day for
those who came into the State House to tell of a knock-
down that had occurred here or there, when this popular
punishment had been administered to some indiscreet
"rebel sympathizer."

Various duties brought young army officers of the regu-
lar service to the state c?pital, and others sought a brief
leave of absence to come and offer their services to the
governor of their native State. General Scott, too much
bound up in his experience of the Mexican War, and not
foreseeing the totally different proportions which this
must assume, planted himself firmly on the theory that
the regular army must be the principal reliance for severe
work, and that the volunteers could only be auxiliaries
around this solid nucleus which would show them the
way to perform their duty and take the brunt of every
encounter. The young regulars who asked leave to accept
commissions in state regiments were therefore refused,
and were ordered to their own subaltern positions and
posts. There can be no doubt that the true policy would
have been to encourage the whole of this younger class to
enter at once the volunteer service. They would have
been the field officers of the new regiments, and would
have impressed discipline and system upon the organiza-
tion from the beginning. The Confederacy really profited

VOL. I. — 2

1 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

by having no regular army. They gave to the officers
who left our service, it is true, commissions in their so-
called "provisional army," to encourage them in the as-
surance that they would have permanent military posi-
tions if the war should end in the independence of the
South; but this was only a nominal organization, and
their real army was made up (as ours turned out practi-
cally to be) from the regiments of state volunteers.
Less than a year afterward we changed our policy, but it
was then too late to induce many of the regular officers
to take regimental positions in the volunteer troops. T
hesitate to declare that this did not turn out for the best ;
for although the organization of our army would have
been more rapidly perfected, there are other considera-
tions which have much weight. The army would not
have been the popular thing it was, its close identifica-
tion with the people's movement would have been weak-
ened, and it perhaps would not so readily have melted
again into the mass of the nation at the close of the war.

Among the first of the young regular officers who came
to Columbus was Alexander McCook. He was ordered
there as inspection and mustering officer, and one of my
earliest duties was to accompany him to Camp Jackson
to inspect the cooked rations which the contractors were
furnishing the new troops. I warmed to his earnest,
breezy way, and his business-like activity in performing
his duty. As a makeshift, before camp equipage and
cooking utensils could be issued to the troops, the con-
tractors placed long trestle tables under an improvised
shed, and the soldiers came to these and ate, as at a
country picnic. It was not a bad arrangement to bridge
over the interval between home life and regular soldiers'
fare, and the outcry about it at the time was senseless, as
all of us know who saw real service afterward. McCook
bustled along from table to table, sticking a long skewer
into a boiled ham, smelling of it to see if the interior of

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR I9

the meat was tainted ; breaking open a loaf of bread and
smelling of it to see if it was sour; examining the coffee
before it was put into the kettles, and after it was made;
passing his judgment on each, in prompt, peremptory
manner as we went on. The food was, in the main, ex-
cellent, though, as a way of supporting an army, it was
quite too costly to last long.

While mustering in the recruits, McCook was elected
colonel of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteers, which
had, I believe, already gone to Washington. He was
eager to accept, and telegraphed to Washington for per-
mission. Adjutant-General Thomas replied that it was
not the policy of the War Department to permit it.
McCook cut the knot in gallant style. He immediately
tendered his resignation in the regular army, taking care
to say that he did so, not to avoid his country's service
or to aid her enemies, but because he believed he could
serve her much more effectively by drilling and leading
a regiment of Union volunteers. He notified the gov-
ernor of his acceptance of the colonelcy, and his cottp-de-
main\v3.s a success; for the department did not like to
accept a resignation under such circumstances, and he had
the exceptional luck to keep his regular commission and
gain prestige as well, by his bold energy in the matter.

Orlando Poe came about the sai j time, for all this was
occurring in the last ten days of April. He was a lieu-
tenant of topographical engineers, and was stationed with
General (then Captain) Meade at Detroit, doing duty
upon the coast survey of the lakes. He was in person
the model for a young athlete, tall, dark, and strong,
with frank, open countenance, looking fit to repeat his
ancestor Adam Foe's adventurous conflicts with the In-
dians as told in the frontier traditions of Ohio. He
too was eager for service; but the same rule was applied
to him, and the argument that the engineers would be
especially necessary to the army organization kept him

I. .'>''.^,:l .'*.

20 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

for a time from insisting upon taking volunteer service,
as McCook had done. He was indefatigable in his
labors, assisting the governor in organizing the regi-
ments, smoothing the difficulties constantly arising from
lack of familiarity with the details of the administrative
service of the army, and giving wise advice to the volun-
teer officers who made his acquaintance. I asked him,
one day, in my pursuit of practical ideas from all who
I thought could help me, what he would advise as the
most useful means of becoming familiar with my duties.
Study the Army Regulations, said he, as if it were your
Bible! There was a world of wisdom in this: much more
than I appreciated at the time, though it set me earnestly
to work in a right direction. An officer in a responsible
command, who had already a fair knowledge of tactics,
might trust his common sense for guidance in an action
on the field; but the administrative duties of the army as
a machine must be thoroughly learned, if he would hope
to make the management of its complicated organization
an easy thing to him.

Major Sidney Burbank came to take McCook'o place
as mustering officer: a grave, earnest man, of more age
and more varied experience than the men I have named.
Captain John Pope also visited the governor for consulta-
tion, and possibly others came also, though I saw them
only in passing, and did not then get far in making their
acquaintance.

CHAPTER II

CAMP DENNISON

Laying out the camp — Rosecrans as engineer — A comfortless night —
Waking to new duties — Floors or no floors for the huts — Hardee's
Tactics — The water-supply — Colonel Tom. Worthington — Joshua S'll
— Brigades organized — Bates's brigade — Schleich's — My own — Mc-
Clellan's purpose — Division organization — Garfield disappointed —
Camp routine — Instruction and drill — Camp cookery — Measles —
Hospital bam — Sisters of Charity — Ferment over re-enlistment —
Musters by Gordon Granger — " Food for powder " — Brigade staff —
De Villiers — " A Captain of Calvary " — The " Bloody Tinth " — Almost
a row — Summoned to the field.

ON the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to
proceed next morning to Camp Dennison, with the
Eleventh and half of the Third Ohio regiments. The day
was a fair one, and when about noon our railway train
reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellent place
for our work. The drawback was that very little of the
land was in meadow or pasture, part being in wheat and
part in Indian corn, which was just coming up. Captain
Rosecrans met us, as McClellan' s engineer (later the
well-known general), coming from Cincinnati with a
train-load of lumber. He had with him his compass and
chain, and by the help of a small detail of men soon laid
off the ground for the two regimental camps, and the
general lines of the whole encampment for a dozen regi-
ments. It was McClellan's purpose to put in two bri-
gades on the west side of the railway, and one on the
east. My own brigade camp was assigned to the west
side, and nearest to Cincinnati. The men of the two
regiments shouldered their pine boards and carried them
up to the line of the company streets, which were close

^ij[.

22 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

to the hills skirting the valley, and which opened into
the parade and drill ground along the railway.

A general plan was given to the company officers by
which the huts should be made uniform in size and shape.
The huts of each company faced each other, three or four
on each side, making the street between, in which the
company assembled before marching to its place on the
regimental color line. At the head of each street were
the quarters of the company officers, and those of the
"field and staff" still further in rear. The Regulations
were followed in this plan as closely as the style of bar-
racks and nature of the ground would permit. Vigorous
work housed all the men before night, and it was well
that it did so, for the weather changed in the evening, a
cold rain came on, and the next morning was a chill and
dreary one. My own headquarters were in a little brick
schoolhouse of one story, which stood (and I think still
stands) on the east side of the track close to the railway.
My improvised camp equipage consisted of a common
trestle cot and a pair of blankets, and I made my bed in
the open space in front of the teacher's desk or pulpit.
My only staff officer was an aide-de-camp, Captain Bas-
com (afterward of the regular army), who had graduated
at an Eastern military school, and proved himself a faith-
ful and efficient assistant. He slept on the floor in one
of the little aisles between the pupils' seats. One lesson
learned that night remained permanently fixed in my
memory, and I had no need of a repetition of it. I found
that, having no mattress on my cot, the cold was much
more annoying below than above me, and that if one can't
keep the under side warm, it doesn't matter how many
blankets he may have atop. I procured later an army cot
with low legs, the whole of which could be taken apart
and packed in a very small parcel, and with this I carried
a small quilted mattress of cotton batting. It would have
been warmer to have made my bed on the ground with a

CAMP DENNISON 2%

heap of straw or leaves under me ; but as my tent had to
be used for office work whenever a tent could be pitched,
I preferred the neater and more orderly interior which
this arrangement permitted. This, however, is antici-
pating. The comfortless night passed without much re-
freshing sleep, the strange situation doing perhaps as
much as the limbs aching from cold to keep me awake.
The storm beat through broken window-panes, and the
gale howled about us, but day at last began to break, and
with its dawning light came our first reveille in camp. I
shall never forget the peculiar plaintive sound of the fifes
as they shrilled out on the damp air. The melody was
destined to become very familiar, but to this day I can't
help wondering how it happened that so melancholy a
strain was chosen for the waking tune of the soldiers'
camp. The bugle reveille is quite different; it is even
cheery and inspiriting ; but the regulation music for the
diums and fifes is better fitted to waken longings for
home and all the sadder emotions than to stir the host
from sleep to the active duties of the day. I lay for a
while listening to it, finding its notes suggesting many
things and becoming a thread to string my reveries
upon, as I thought of the past which was separated from
me by a great gulf, the present with its serious duties,
and the future likely to come to a sudden end in the
shock of battle. We roused ourselves; a dash of cold
water put an end to dreaming; we ate a breakfast from a
box of cooked provisions we had brought with us, and
resumed the duty of organizing and instructing the camp.
The depression which had weighed upon me since the
news of the opening guns at Sumter passed away, never
to return. The consciousness of having important work
to do, and the absorption in the work itself, proved the
best of all mental tonics. The Rubicon was crossed, and
from this time out, vigorous bodily action, our wild out-
door life, and the strenuous use of all the faculties, men-

REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

tal and physical, in meeting the daily exigencies, made
up an existence which, in spite of all its hardships and
all its discouragements, still seems a most exhilarating
one as I look back on it across a long vista of years.

The first of May proved, instead, a true April day, of
the most fickle and changeable type. Gusts of rain and
wind alternated with flashes of bright sunshine. The
second battalion of the Third Regiment arrived, and the
work of completing the cantonments went on. The huts
which were half finished yesterday were now put in good
order, and in building the new ones the men profited by
the experience of their comrades. We were however
suddenly thrown into one of those small tempests which
it is so easy to get up in a new camp, and which for the
moment always seems to have an importance out of all
proportion to its real consequence. Captain Rosecrans,
as engineer, was superintending the work of building,
and finding that the companies were putting floors and
bunks in their huts, he peremptorily ordered that these
should be taken out, insisting that the huts were only in-
tended to take the place of tents and give such shelter as
tents could give. The company and regimental officers
loudly protested, and the men were swelling with indig-
nation and wrath. Soon both parties were before me;
Rosecrans hot and impetuous, holding a high tone, and
making use of General McClellan's name in demanding,
as an officer of his staff, that the floors should be torn
out, and the officers of the regiments held responsible for
obedience to the order that no more should be made. He
fairly bubbled with anger at the presumption of those
who questioned his authority. As soon as a little quiet
could be got, I asked Rosecrans if he had specific orders
from the general that the huts should have no floors.
No, he had not, but his staff position as engineer gave
him sufficient control of the subject. I said I would ex-
amine the matter and submit it to General McClellan,

CAMP DENNISON

and meanwhile the floors already built might remain,
though no new ones should be made till the question was
decided. I reported to the general that, in my judgment,
the huts should have floors and bunks, because the ground
was wet when they were built, — they could not be struck
like tents to dry and air the earth, and they were meant
to be permanent quarters for the rendezvous of troops for
an indefinite time. The decision of McClellan was in
accordance with the report. Rosecrans acquiesced, and
indeed seemed rather to like me the better on finding
that I was not carried away by the assumption of indefi-
nite power by a staff officer.

This little flurry over, the quarters were soon got in as
comfortable shape as rough lumber could make them, and
the work of drill and instruction was systematized. The
men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to
begin too soon with the manual of the musket, and they
were kept industriously employed in marching in single
line, by file, in changing direction, in forming columns of
fours from double line, etc., before their guns were put
in their hands. Each regiment was treated as a separate
camp, with its own chain of sentinels, and the officers of
the guard were constantly busy teaching guard and picket
duty theoretically to the reliefs off duty, and inspecting
the sentinels on post. Schools were established in each
regiment for field and staff and for the company officers,
and Hardee's Tactics was in the hands of everybody who
could procure a copy. It was one of our great inconven-
iences that the supply of the authorized Tactics was soon
exhausted, and it was difficult to get the means of in-
struction in the company schools. An abridgment was
made and published in a very few days by Thomas Wor-
thington, a graduate of West Point in one of the earliest
classes, — of 1827, I think, — a son of one of the first gov-
ernors of Ohio. This eccentric offit had served in the
regular army and in the Mexican War, and was full of ideas,

:..,.j.«j_-'-'"

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

but was of so irascible and impetuous a temper that he was
always in collision with the powers that be, and spoiled
his own usefulness. He was employed to furnish water
to the camp by contract, and whilst he ruined himself in
his efforts to do it well, he was in perpetual conflict with
the troops, who capsized his carts, emptied his barrels,
and made life a burden to him. The quarrel was based
on his taking the water from the river just opposite the
camp, though there was a slaughter-house some distance
above. Worthington argued that the distance was such
that the running water purified itself ; but the men
wouldn't listen to his science, vigorously enforced as it
was by idiomatic expletives, and there was no safety for
his water-carts till he yielded. He then made a reservoir
on one of the hills, filled it by a steam-pump, and carried
the water by pipes to the regimental camps at an expense
beyond his means, and which, as it was claimed that the
scheme was unauthorized, was never half paid for. His
subsequent career as colonel of a regiment was no more
happy, and talents that seemed fit for highest responsi-
bilities were wasted in chafing against circumstances
which made him and fate seem to be perpetually playing
at cross purposes.^

A very different character was Joshua W. Sill, who
was sent to us as ordnance officer. He too had been a
regular army ofificer, but of the younger class. Rather
small and delicate in person, gentle and refined in man-
ner, he had about him little that answered to the popu-
lar notion of a soldier. He had resigned from the army
some years before, and was a professor in an important
educational institution in Brooklyn, N. Y., when at the
first act of hostility he offered his services to the gov-

1 He was later colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio, and became involved in a
famous controversy with Halleck and Sherman over his conduct in the Shiloh
campaign and the question of fieldworks there. He left the service toward
the close of 1862.

CAMP DENNISON

crnor of Ohio, his native State. After our day's work, we
walked together along the railway, discussing the politi-
cal and military situation, and especially the means of
making most quickly an army out of the splendid but
untutored material that was collecting about us. Under
his modest and scholarly exterior I quickly discerned a
fine temper in the metal, that made his after career no
enigma to me, and his heroic death at the head of his
division in the thickest of the strife at Stone's River no
surprise.

The two regiments which began the encampment were
quickly followed by others, and the arriving regiments
sometimes had their first taste of camp life under cir-
cumstances well calculated to dampen their ardor. The
Fourth Ohio, under Colonel Lorin Andrews, President of
Kenyon College, came just before a thunderstorm one
evening, and the bivouac that night was as rough a one
as his men were likely to experience for many a day.
They made shelter by placing boards from the fence tops
to the ground, but the fields were level and soon became
a mire, so that they were a queer-looking lot when they
crawled out next morning. The sun was then shining
bright, however, and they had better cover for their heads
by the next night. The Seventh Ohio, which was re-
cruited in Cleveland and on the Western Reserve, sent a
party in advance to build some of their huts, and though
they too came in a rain-storm, they were less uncom-
fortable than some of the others. Three brigades were
organized from the regiments of the Ohio contingent,
exclusive of the two which had been hurried to Wash-
ington. The brigadiers, beside myself, were Generals
Joshua H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Biites,
who was the senior, was a graduate of West Point, who
had served some years in the regular army, but had re-
signed and adopted the profession of the law. He lived
at Cincinnati, and organized his brigade in that city.

38 EEAflN/SCENCES OF THE CIVIL IV A R

They marched to Camp Dennison on the 20th of May,
when, by virtue of his seniority. General Bates assumed
command of the camp in McClellan's absence. His bri-
gade consisted of the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regi-
ments, and encamped on the e st side of the railroad in
the bend of the river. General Schleich was a Demo-
cratic senator, who had been in the state militia, and was
also one of the drill-masters of the legislative squad
which had drilled upon the Capitol terrace. His brigade
included the Third, Twelfth, and Thirteenth regiments,
and, with mine, occupied the fields on the west side of the
railroad close to the slopes of the hills. My own brigade was
made up of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
regiments, and our position was the southernmost in the
general camp. McClellan had intended to make his own
headquarters in the camp; but the convenience of attend-
ing to official business in Cincinnati kept him in the city.
His purpose was to make the brigade organizations per-
manent, and to take them as a division to the field when
they were a little prepared for the work. Like many
other good plans, it failed to be carried out. I was the
only one of the brigadiers who remained in the service
after the first enlistment for ninety days, and it was my
fate to take the field with new regiments, only one of
which had been in my brigade in camp. Schleich did
not show adaptation to field work, and though taken into
West Virginia with McClellan in June, he was relieved
of active service in a few weeks. He afterward sought
and obtained the colonelcy of the Sixty-first Ohio; but
his service with it did not prove a success, and he re-
signed in September, 1862, under charges.* General
Bates had some reason to expect an assignment to staff
duty with McClellan, and therefore declined a colonelcy
in the line at the end of the three months' service. He
was disappointed in this expectation after waiting some

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 308-310.

CAMP DENNISON 29

time for it, and returned to civil life with the regrets of
his comrades. There were some disappointments, also,
!n the choice of regimental officers who were elected in
the regiments first organized, but were afterward ap-
pointed by the governor. The companies were organized
and assigned to regiments before they came to camp, but
the regimental elections were held after the companies
were assembled. Garfield was a candidate for the colo-
nelcy of the Seventh Regiment, but as he was still en-
gaged in important public duties and was not connected
with any company, he was at a disadvantage in the sort
of competition which was then rife. He was defeated, —
a greater disappointment to me than to him, for I had
hoped that our close friendship would be made still
closer by comradeship in the field. In a few weeks he
was made colonel of the Forty-second Ohio, in the sec-
ond levy.

Up to the time that General Bates relieved me of the
command of the camp, and indeed for two or three days
longer, the little schoolhouse was my quarters as well
as telegraph and express office. We had cleared out
most of the desks and benches, but were still crowded
together, day and night, in a way which was anything
but comfortable or desirable. Sheds for quartermaster's
and subsistence stores were of first necessity, and the
building of a hut for myself and staff had to be postponed
till these were up. On the arrival of General Bates with
two or three staff officers, the necessity for more room
could not be longer ignored, and my own hut was built
on the slope of the hillside behind my brigade, close
under the wooded ridge, and here for the next six weeks
was my home. The morning brought its hour of busi-
ness correspondence relating to the command ; then came
the drill, when the parade ground was full of marching
companies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with
sword exercise and pistol practice. The day closed with

30 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the inspection of the regiments in turn at d/ess parade,
and the evening was allotted to schools of theoretic tac-
tics, outpost duty, and the like. Besides their copies of
the regulation tactics, officers supplied themselves with
such manuals as Mahan's books on Field Fortifications
and on Outpost Duty. I adopted at the beginning a rule
to have some military work in course of reading, and kept
it up even in the field, sendmg home one volume and
getting another by mail. In this way I gradually went
through all the leading books I could find both in Eng-
lish and in French, including the whole of Jomini's
works, his histories as well as his "Napoleon" and his
" Grandes C '--ations Militaires." I know of no intellec-
tual stimulus so valuable to the soldier as the reading
of military history narrated by an acknowledged master
in the art of war. To see what others have done in im-
portant junctures, and to have both their merits and their
mistakes analyzed by a competent critic, rouses one's
mind to grapple with the problem before it, and begets
a generous determination to try to rival in one's own
sphere of action the brilliant deeds of soldiers who have
made a name in other times. Then the example of the
vigorous way in which history will at last deal with those
who fail when the pinch comes, tends to keep a man up
to his work and to make him avoid the rock on which so
many have split, the disposition to take refuge in doing
nothing when he finds it difficult to decide what should
be done.

The first fortnight in camp was the hardest for the
troops. The ploughed fields became deep with mud,
which nothing could remove but the good weather which
should allow them to pack hard under the continued
tramp of thousands of men. The organization of the
camp kitchens had to be learned by the hardest also, and
the men in each company who had some aptitude for
cooking had to be found by a slow process of natural

CAMP DENNISON

selection, during which many an unpalatable meal had
to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of information came to
us in the proof that more than half the men had never
had the contagious diseases of infancy. The measles
broke out, and we had to organize a camp hospital at
once. A large barn near by was taken for this purpose,
and the surgeons had their hands full of cases which,
however trivial they might seem at home, were here ag-
gravated into dangerous illness by the unwonted sur-
roundings and the impossibility of securing the needed
protection from exposure. As soon as the increase of
sickness in the camp was known in Cincinnati, the good
women of that city took promptly in hand the task of
providing nurses for the sick, and proper diet and deli-
cacies for hospital uses. The Sisters of Charity, under
the lead of Sister Anthony, a noble woman, came out in
force, and their black and white robes harmonized pictur-
esquely with the military surroundings, as they flitted
about under the rough timber framing of the old bam,
carrying comfort and hope from one rude couch to an-
other. As to supplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew
how to make out a requisition for rations or for clothing,
and easy as it is to rail at "red tape," the necessity of
keeping a check upon embezzlement and wastefulness
justified the staff bureaus at Washington in insisting
upon regular vouchers to support the quartermaster's and
commissary's accounts. But here, too, men were grad-
ually found who had special talent for the work.

The infallible newspapers had no lack of material for
criticism. There were plenty of real blunders to invite
it, but the severest blame was quite as likely to be vis-
ited upon men and things which did not deserve it. The
governor was violently attacked for things which he had
no responsibility for, or others in which he had done all
that forethought and intelligence could do. When every-
body had to learn a new business, it would have been

32 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

miraculous if grave errors had not frequently occurred.
Looking back at it, the wonder is that the blunders and
mishaps had not been tenfold more numerous than they
were. By the middle of May the confusion had given
place to reasonable system, but we were now obliged to
meet the embarrassments of reorganization for three
years, under the President's second call for troops. We
had more than ten thousand men who had begun to know
something of their duties, and it was worth a serious
effort to transfer them into the permanent service; but
no one who did not go through the ordeal can imagine
how trying it was In every company some discontented
spirits wanted to go home, shrinking from the perils to
which they had committed themselves in a moment of
enthusiasm. For a few to go back, however, would be a
disgrace; and every dissatisfied man, to avoid the odium
of going alone, became a mischief-maker, seeking to pre-
vent the whole company from re-enlisting. The recruit-
ing of a majority was naturally made the condition of
allowing the company organization to be preserved, and a
similar rule applied to the regiment. The growing dis-
cipline was relaxed or lost in the solicitations, the elec-
tioneering, the speech-making, and the other common
arts of persuasion. After a majority had re-enlisted and
an organization was secure, it would have been better to
have discharged the remaining three months' men and to
have sent them home at once; but authority for this could
not be got, for the civil officers could not see, and did not j
know what a nuisance these men were. Dissatisfied with
themselves for not going with their comrades, they be-
came sulky, disobedient, complaining, trying to make
the others as unhappy as themselves by arguing that faith
was not kept with them, and doing all the mischief it
was possible to do.

In spite of all these discouragements, however, the
daily drills and instruction went on with some approach

CAMP DENNISON

to regularity, an. our raw volunteers began to look more
like soldiers. Captain Gordon Granger of the regular
army came to muster the re-enlisted regiments into the
three years' service, and as he stood at the right of the
Fourth Ohio, looking down the line of a thousand stal-
wart men, all in their Garibaldi shirts (for we had not
yet received our uniforms), he turned to me and ex-
claimed : " My God ! that such men should be food for
powder!" It certainly was a display of manliness and
intelligence such as had hardly ever been seen in the
ranks of an army. There were in camp at that time
three if not four companies, in different regiments, that
were wholly made up of undergraduates of colleges who
had enlisted together, their ofiiicers being their tutors
and professors; and where there was not so striking evi-
dence as this of the enlistment of the best of our youth,
every company could still show that it was largely re-
cruited from the best -nurtured and most promising young
men of the community.

Granger had been in the Southwest when the secession
movement began, had seen the formation of military com-
panies everywhere, and the incessant drilling which had
been going on all winter, whilst we, in a strange condi-
tion of political paralysis, had been doing nothing. His
information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost no
opportunity of impressing upon us the fact that the South
was nearly six months ahead of us in organization and
preparation. He did not conceal his belief that we were
likely to find the war a much longer and more serious
piece of business than was commonly expected, and that
unless we pushed hard our drilling and instruction we
should find ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier en-
counters. What he said had a good effect in making
officers and men take more willingly to the laborious
routine of the parade ground and the regimental school;
for such opinions as his soon ran through the camp, and

VOL. I. — 3

34 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

they were commented upon by the enlisted men quite as
earnestly as among the officers. Still, hope kept the
upper hand, and if the question had been put to vote, I
believe that three-fourths of us still cherished the belief
that a single campaign would end the war.

In the organization of my own brigade I had the assist-
ance of Captain McElroy, a young man who had nearly
completed the course at West Point, and who was subse-
quently made major of the Twentieth Ohio. He was sent
to the camp by the governor as a drill officer, and I as-
signed him to staff duty. For commissary, I detailed
Lieutenant Gibbs, who accompanied one of the regiments
from Cincinnati, and who had seen a good deal of service
as clerk in one of the staff departmf ats of the regular army.
I had also for a time the services of one of the picturesque
adventurers who turn up in such crises. In the Seventh
Ohio was a company recruited in Cleveland, of which the
nucleus was an organization of Zouaves, existing for some
time before the war. It was made up of young men who
had been stimulated by the popularity of Ellsworth's
Zouaves in Chicago to form a similar body. They had
had as their drill master a Frenchman named De Villiers.
His profession was that of a teacher of fencing; but he
had been an officer in Ellsworth's company, and was
familiar with fancy manoeuvres for street parade, and with
a special skirmish drill and bayonet exercise. Small,
swarthy, with angular features, and a brusque, military
manner, in a showy uniform and jaunty k^pi of scarlet
cloth, covered with gold lace, he created quite a sensa-
tion among us. His assumption of knowledge and expe-
rience was accepted as true. He claimed to have been a
surgeon in the French army in Algiers, though we after-
ward learned to doubt if his rank had been higher than
that of a barber-surgeon of a cavalry troop. From the
testimonials he brought with him, I thought I was doing
a good thing in making him my brigade-major, as the

CAMP DENNISON

officer was then called whom we afterward knew as in-
ispector-general. He certainly was a most indefatigable
fellow, and went at his work with an enthusiasm that
made him very useful for a time. It was worth some-
thing to see a man who worked with a kind of dash, —
with a prompt, staccato movement that infused spirit and
energy into all around him. He would drill all day, and
then spend half the night trying to catch sentinels and
officers of the guard at fault in their duty. My first im-
pression was that I had got hold of a most valuable man,
and others were so much of the same mind that in the
reorganization of regiments he was successively elected
major of the Eighth, and then colonel of the Eleventh.
We shall see more of him as we go on; but it turned out
that his sharp discipline was not steady or just; his
knowledge was only skin-deep, and he had neither the
education nor the character for so responsible a situation
as he was placed in. He nearly plagued the life out of
the officers of his regiment before thay got rid of him,
and was a most brilliant example of the way we were im-
posed upon by military charlatans at the beginning. He
was, however, good proof also of the speed with which
real service weeds out the undesirable material which
seemed so splendid in the days of common inexperience
and at a distance from danger. We had visits from cleri-
cal adventurers, too, for the " pay and emoluments of a
captain of cavalry" which the law gave to a chaplain
induced some to seek the office who were not the best
representatives of their profession. One young man
who had spent a morning soliciting the appointment in
one of the regiments, came to me in a shamefaced sort
of way before leaving camp and said, " General, before I
decide this matter, I wish you would tell me just what
are the pay and emoluments of a Captain of Calvary ! "

Though most of our men were native Ohioans, General
Bates's brigade had in it two regiments made up of quite

36 REAflXlSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

contrasted nationalities. The Ninth Ohio was recruited
from the Germans of Cincinnati, and was commanded by
Colonel "Bob" McCook. In camp, the drilling of the
regiment fell almost completely into the hands of the ad-
jutant, Lieutenant Willich (afterward a general of divi-
sion), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own
lack of military knowledge, used to say that he was only
"clerk for a thousand Dutchmen," so completely did the
care of equipping and providing for his regiment engross
his time and labor. The Tenth was an Irish regiment,
and its men used to be proud of calling themselves the
" Bloody Tinth. " The brilliant Lytle was its commander,
and his control over them, even in the beginning of their
service and near the city of their home, showed that they
had fallen into competent hands. It happened, of course,
that the guard-house pretty frequently contained repre-
sentatives of the Tenth who, on the short furloughs that
were allowed them, took a parting glass too much with
their friends in the city, and came to camp boisterously
drunk. But the men of the regiment got it into their
heads that the Thirteenth, which lay just opposite them
across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure in filling
the guard-house with the Irishmen. Some threats had
been made that they would go over and " clean out " the
Thirteenth, and one fine evening these came to a head. I
suddenly got orders from General Bates to form my bri-
gade, and march them at once between the Tenth and
Thirteenth to prevent a collision which seemed immi-
nent. My brigade was selected because it was the one
to which neither of the angry regiments belonged, the
others being ordered into their quarters. My little
Frenchman, De Villiers, covered himself with glory.
His horse flew, under the spur, to the regimental head-
quarters, the long roll was beaten as if the drummers
realized the full importance of the first opportunity to
sound that warlike signal, and the brigade-major's some-

CAMP DENNISON

what theatrical energy was so contagious that many of
the companies were assembled and ready to file out of
the company streets before the order reached them. We
marched by the moonlight into the space between the
belligerent regiments; but Lytle had already got his own
men under control, and the less mercurial Thirteenth were
not disposed to be aggressive, so that we were soon dis-
missed with a compliment for our promptness. I ordered
the colonels to march the regiments back to the camps
separately, and with my staff rode through that of the
Thirteenth, to see how matters were there. All was
quiet, the men being in their quarters; so, turning, I
passed along near the railway, in rear of the quartermas-
ter's sheds. In the shadow of the buildings I had nearly
ridden over some one on foot, when he addressed me, and
I recognized an officer of high rank in that brigade. He
was in great agitation, and exclaimed, "Oh, General,
what a horrible thing that brothers should be killing
each other!" I assured him the danger of that was all
over, and rode on, wondering a little at his presence in
that place under the circumstances.

The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like
months in the retrospect, so full were they crowded with
new experiences. The change came in an unexpected
way. The initiative taken by the Confederates in West
Virginia had to be met by prompt action, and McClellan
was forced to drop his own plans to meet the emergency.
The organization and equipment of the regiments for the
three years' service were still incomplete, and the bri-
gades were broken up, to take across the Ohio the regi-
ments best prepared to go. One by one my regiments
were ordered away, till finally, when on the 3d of July I
received orders to proceed to the Kanawha valley, I had
but one of the four regiments to which I had been trying
to give something of unity and brigade feeling, and that
regiment (the Eleventh Ohio) was still incomplete-

38 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

General Bates fared even worse ; for he saw all his regi-
ments ordered away, whilst he was left to organize new
ones from freshly recruited companies that were sent to
the camp. This was discouraging to a brigade com-
mander, for even with veteran troops mutual acquaint-
ance between the officer and his command is a necessary
condition of confidence and a most important element of
strength. My own assignment to the Great Kanawha
district was one I had every reason to be content with,
except that for several months I felt the disadvantage I
suffered from assuming command of troops which I had
never seen till we met in the field.

The period of organization, brief as it was, had been
valuable to the regiments, and it had been of the utmost
importance to secure the re-enlistment of those which had
received some instruction. It had been, in the condition
of the statute law, from necessity and not from choice
that the Administration had called out the state militia
for ninety days. The new term of enrolment was for
"three years or the war," and the forces were now desig-
nated as United States Volunteers. It would have been
well if the period of apprenticeship could have been
prolonged ; but events would not wait. All recognized
the necessity, and thankful as we should have been for
a longer preparation and more thorough instruction, we
were eager to be ordered away.

McClellan had been made a major-general in the regu-
lar army, and a department had been placed under his
command which included the States of Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois, to which was added a little later West Virginia
north of the Great Kanawha.^ Rosecrans was also ap-
pointed a brigadier-general in the regulars, and there
was much debate at the time whether the Administration
had intended this. Many insisted that he was nominated

* McCIellan's Report and Campaigns (New York, 1864), p. 8. McClellan's
Own Story, p. 44. O. R., vol. ii. p. 633.

CAMP DENNISON

for the volunteer service, and that the regular appoint-
ment was a clerical mistake in the bureaus at Washing-
ton. There was no solid foundation for this gossip. A
considerable increase of the regular army was authorized
by law, and corresponding appointments were made, from
major-general downward. It was at this time that Sher-
man was made colonel of one of the new regiments of
regulars. It would perhaps have been wiser to treat the
regular commissions as prizes to be won only by con-
spicuous and successful service in the field, as was done
later; but this policy was not then adopted, and the newly
created offices were filled in all grades. They were, of
course, given to men from whom great services could
reasonably be expected; but when none had been tested
in the great operations of war, every appointment was at
the risk that the officer might not show the special talent
for command which makes a general. It was something
of a lottery, at best; but the system would have been im-
proved if a method of retiring inefficient officers had been
adopted at once. The ostensible reason for the different
organization of volunteers and regulars was that the
former, as a temporary force to meet an exigency, might
be wholly disbanded when the war should end, without
affecting the permanent army, which was measured in size
by the needs of the country in its normal condition.

i"t-Mfrilhii^i' 'iiii'"' •" -1i ^'li

CHAPTER III

MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

Political attitude of West Virginia — Rebels take the initiative — McClellan
ordered to act — Ohio militia cross the river — The I'hilippi affair —
Signilicant dates — The vote on secession— Virginia in the Confederacy —
Lee in command — Topography — The mountain passes — Garnett's
army — Rich mountain position — McClellan in the field — His forces
— Advances against Garnett — Rosecrans's proposal — His fight on the
mountain — McClellan's inaction — Garnett's retreat — Affair at Car-
rick's Ford — Garnett killed — Hill's efforts to intercept — Pegram in
the wildernoss — He surrenders — Indirect results important — McClel-
lan's military and personal traits.

THE reasons which made it important to occupy West
Virginia were twofold, political and military. The
people were strongly attached to the Union, and had gen-
erally voted against the Ordinance of Secession which by
the action of the Richmond Convention had been submitted
to a popular vote on May 23d. Comparatively few slaves
were owned by them, and their interests bound them more
to Ohio and Pennsylvania than to eastern Virginia.
Under the influence of Mr. Lincoln's administration,
strongly backed and chiefly represented by Governor
Dennison of Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize a
loyal Virginia government, repudiating that of Governor
Letcher and the state convention as self-destroyed by the
act of secession. Governor Dennison, in close correspond-
ence with the leading loyalists, had been urging Mc-
Clellan to cross the Ohio to protect and encourage the
loyal men, when on the 26th of May news came that the
Secessionists had taken the initiative, and that some
bridges had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road a little west of Grafton, the crossing of the Mononga-

42 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

hcla River where the two western branches of the road
unite as they come from Wheeling and Parkersburg. The
great line of communication between Washington and the
West had thus been cut, and action on our part was
necessary.*

Governor Dennison had anticipated the need c' more
troops than the thirteen regiments which had been organ-
ized as Ohio's quota under the President's first call, and
had enrolled nine other regiments, numbering them con-
secutively with the others. These last he had put in
camps near the Ohio River, where at a moment's notice
they could occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth
of the Great Kanawha.'' Two Union regiments were also
organizing in West Virginia itself, of which the first was
commanded by Colonel B. F. Kelley of Wheeling. The
left bank of the Ohio was in McClcllan's department, and
on the 24th General Scott, having heard that two Virginia
companies had occupied Grafton, telegraphed the fact to
McClellan, directing him to act promptly in counteracting
the effect of this mo/ement.^

On the 27th Colonel Kcliey was sent by rail from Wheel-
ing to drive off the enemy, who withdrew at his approach,
and the bridges were quickly rebuilt.* Several of the Ohio
regiments were ordered across the river at the same time,
and an Indiana brigade under General Thomas A. Morris of
that State was hurried forward from Indianapolis. As the
Ohio troops at Camp Dennison which had been mustered
into national service were in process of reorganizing for
the three years' term, McClellan preferred not to move
them till this was completed. He also adhered to his plan
of making his own principal movement in the Great Ka-
nawha valley, and desired to use there the Ohio division at
our camp.* Thj Ohio regiments first sent into West Vir-
ginia were not mustered in, and were known as State troops.

1 O. R., vol. ii. p. 44. ^ Id., pp. 46, 47. • Id., p. 648.

« Id., pp. 45, 49, 655. » Id., pp. so, 656, 674.

MCCLELLAN IN PVEST VIRGINIA

General Morris reached Graiton on the ist of June, and
was intrusted with the command of all the troops in West
Vir^'inia. He found that Colonel Kelley had already
planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired
southward to Philippi, about fifteen miles in a straight line,
but some twenty-five by the crooked country roads.^
Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending
another column, under Colonel E. Dumont of the Seventh
Indiana, to co-operate with Kcllcy. Both columns were
directed to make a night march, starting from points on
the railroad about twelve miles apart and converging on
Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak on June
3d. Each column consisted of about fifteen hundred men,
and Dumont had also two smooth six-pounder cannon.
The Confederate force was commanded by Colonel G. A.
Porterfield, and was something less than a thousand strong,
one-i'ourth cavalry.*

The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw
troops had not learned picket duty. The concerted move-
ment against them was more successful than such marches
commonly are, and Porterfield's first notice of danger was
the opening of the artillery upon his sleeping troops. It
had been expected that the two columns would enclose the
enemy's camp and capture the whole ; but, though in dis-
orderly rout, Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness
and courage, in getting them off with but few casualties
and the loss of a few arms. The camp equipage and sup-
plies were, of course, captured. Colonel KclIey was
wounded in the breast by a pistol-shot which was at first
supposed to be fatal, though it did not turn out so, and
this was the only casualty reported on the National side.^

1 O. R., vol. ii. p. 66. " Id., pp. 70, 72.

' Colonel Kelley was a man already of middle age, and a leading citizen
of northwestern Virginia. His whole military career was in that region,
where his services were very valuable throughout the war. He was promoted
to brigadier-general among the first, and was brevet-major-general when
mustered out in 1S65.

44 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

No prisoners were taken, nor did any dead or wounded
fall into our hands. Porterfield retreated to Beverly,
some thirty miles further to the southeast, and the Na-
tional forces occupied Philippi. The telegraphic reports
had put the Confederate force at 2CXX), and their loss at 15
killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and
prisoners, and the newspapers gave it the air of a consid-
erable victory. The campaign thus opened with apparent
^clat for McClellan (who was personally at Cincinnati), and
the " Philippi races," as they were locally called, greatly
encouraged the Union men of West Virginia and corre-
spondingly depressed the Secessionists.*

Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports
that large forces of the enemy were gathered at Beverly,
McClellan determined to proceed in person to that region
with his best prepared troops, postponing his Kanawha
campaign till northwestern Virginia should be cleared of
the enemy.

Military affairs in West Virginia had been complicated
by the political situation, and it is necessary to recollect
the dates of the swift following steps in Virginia's progress
into the Confederacy. Sumter surrendered on Saturday,
the 13th of April, and on Monday the 15th President Lin-
coln issued his first call for troops. On Wednesday the
17th the V^irginia convention passed the Ordinance of
Secession in secret session. On Friday the 19th it was
known in Washington, and on Saturday Lee and Johnston
resigned their commissions in the United States Army,
sorrowfully " going with their State." ^ On the following
Tuesday (23d) the chairman of the Virginia Convention
presented to Lee his commission as Major-General and
Commander of the Virginia Forces. On the same day
Governor Dennison handed to McClellan his commission

* O. R., vol. ii. pp. 64-74.

8 Johnston's Narrative, p. 10. Townsend's Anecdotes of the Civil War,
p. 31. Ix>ng's Memoirs of Lee, pp. 94, 96.

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

to command the Ohio forces in the service of the Union.
Although the Confederate Congress at Montgomery ad-
mitted Virginia to the Confederacy early in May, this was
not formally accepted in Virginia till after the popular
vote on secession (May 23d) and the canvassing of the
returns of that election. Governor Letcher issued on June
8th his proclamation announcmg the result, and transfer-
ring the command of the Virginia troops to the Confeder-
ate Government.* During the whole of May, therefore,
Virginia's position was unsettled. Her governor, by the
authority of the convention, regarded her as independent of
the United States, but by an inchoate act of secession
which would not become final till ratified by the popular
vote. The Virginia troops were arrayed near the Potomac
to resist the advance of national forces ; but Confederate
troops had been welcomed in eastern Virginia as early as
the lOth of May, and President Davis had authorized Lee,
as Commander of the Virginia forces, to assume control of
them.2

It was well known that the prevailing sentiment in West
Virginia was loyal to the Union, and each party avoided
conflict there for fear of prejudicing its cause in the elec-
tion. Hence it was that as soon as the vote was cast, the
aggressive was taken by the Virginia government in the
burning of the bridges near Grafton. The fire of war was
thus lighted. The crossing of the Ohio was with a full
understanding with Colonel Kelley, who recognized Mc-
Clellan at once as his military commander.^ The affair
at Philippi was, in form, the last appearance of Virginia in
the rdle of an independent nation, for in a very few days Lee
announced by a published order that the absorption of the
Virginia troops into the Confederate Army was complete.*

» o. R., vol. ii. p. 91 1. « Id., p. 827.

• I treated the relations of Lee and Virginia to the Confederacy in a paper
in "The Nation," Dec. 23, 1897, entitled " Lee, Johnston, and Davis."
*0. R., vol. ii. p. 912.

46 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

It will be well to understand the topography of the
Virginia mountains and their western slope, if we would
reach the reasons which determined the lines of advance
chosen by the Confederates and the counter moves of
McClellan. The Alleghany range passing out of Pennsyl-
vania and running southwest through the whole length
of Virginia, consists of several parallel lines of mountains
enclosing narrow valleys. The Potomac River breaks
through at the common boundary of Virginia and Mary-
land, and along its valley runs the National Road as well
as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad also follows this natural highway, which is
thus indicated as the most important line of communica-
tion between Washington and the Ohio valley, though
a high mountain summit must be passed, even by this
route, before the tributaries of the Ohio can be reached.
Half-way across the State to the southward, is a high water-
shed connecting the mountain ridges and separating the
streams tributary to the Potomac on the north from those
falling into the James and New rivers on the south. The
Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike follows the line of this
high " divide " looking down from among the clouds into
the long and nearly straight defiles on either hand, which
separate the Alleghany Mountains proper from the Blue
Ridge on the east and from Cheat Mountain and other
ranges on the west. Still further to the southwest the
James River and the New River interlace their headwaters
among the mountains, and break out on east and west,
making the third natural pass through which the James
River and Kanawha turnpike and canal find their way.
These three routes across the mountains were the only
ones on which military o^^^rations were at all feasible,
The northern one was usually in the hands of the National
forces, and the other t^vo were those by which the Confed-
erates attempted the invasion of West Virginia. Beverly,
a hundred miles from Staunton, was near the gate through

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

which the Staunton road passes on its way northwestward
to Parkersburg and Wheeling, whilst Gauley Bridge was
the key-point of the Kanawha route on the westerly slope
of the mountains.

General Lee determined to send columns upon both
these lines. General Henry A. Wise (formerly Governor
of Virginia) took the Kanawha route, and General Robert
S. Garnett (lately Lee's own adjutant-general) marched to
Beverly.^ Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly, Garnett,
who had also been an officer in the United States Army,
was ordered to assume command there and to stimulate
the recruiting and organization of regiments from the
secession element of the population. Some Virginia regi-
ments raised on the eastern slope of the mountains were
sent with him, and to these was soon added the First
Georgia. On the ist of July he reported his force as 4500
men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a
complete failure, only 23 having joined. The West Vir-
ginians, he says, " are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant
and bigoted Union sentiment." ^ Other reinforcements
were promised Garnett, but none reached him except the
Forty-fourth Virginia Regiment, which arrived at Beverly
the very day of his engagement with McClellan's troops,
but did not take part in the fighting.^

Tygart's valley, in which Beverly lies, is between Cheat
Mountain on the east, and Rich Mountain on the west.
The river, of the same name as the valley, flows north-
ward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking
through the ridge, and by junction with the Buckhannon
River forms the Monongahela, which passes by Philippi
and afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The Staun-
ton and Parkersburg turnpike divides at Beverly, the
Parkersburg route passing over a saddle in Rich Moun-
tain, and the Wheeling route following the river to
Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the gap is

1 O. R., vol. ii. pp. 908, 915. » /</., p. 239. 8 /</., pp. 240, 274.

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a
spur of it. Garnett regarded the two positions at Rich
Mountain and Laurel Mountain as the gates to all the
region beyond and to the West. A rough mountain road,

A.Garnett't Puvitlon.
B & C. Pegram's •• I
D.McCluUan's '• J
E. Morris' ••

F.Roseorans' Line ofMarch,

COM U AT AT

RICHJVIOUNTAIN.

\ a ! ! t

barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountain position
with Cheat River on the east, and it was possible to go
by this way northward through St. George to the North-
western turnpike, turning the mountain ranges.

Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much
the stronger and more easily held, and he therefore in-
trenched there about 1300 of his men and four cannon.

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram/ The
position chosen was on a spur of the mountain near its
western base, and it was rudely fortified with breastworks
of logs covered with an abatis of slashed timber along
its front. The remainder of his force he placed in a
similar fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain,
where he also had four guns, of which one was rifled.
Here he commanded in person. His depot of supplies
was at Beverly, which was sixteen miles from the Laurel
Mountain position and five from that at Rich Mountain.
He was pretty accurately informed of McClellan's forces
and movements, and his prepa, tions had barely. been
completed by the 9th of July, wl>en the Union general
appeared in his front. '^

McClellan entered West Virginia in person on the 21st
of June, and on the 23d issued from Grafton a proclama-
tion to the inhabitants.^ He had gradually collected his
forces along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and these,
at the time of the affair at Rich Mountain, consisted of six-
teen Ohio regiments, nine from Indiana, and two from
West Virginia; in all, twenty-seven regiments with four
batteries of artillery of six guns each, two troops of cav-
alry, and an independent company of riflemen. Of his
batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a
company of regulars (Company I, Fourth U. S. Artillery),
was with him awaiting mountain howitzers, which arrived
a little later.* The regiments varied somewhat in strength,
but all were recently organized, and must have averaged at

* 0. R., vol. ii. p. 268. 2 Id., pp. 241, 248. ' /c/., pp. 194, 196.

* As part of the troops were State troops not mustered into the United
States service, no report of them is found in the War Department ; but the
following are the numbers of the regiments found named as present in the
correspondence and reports, — viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth, 13th,
14th, isth, i6th, 17th, iSth, 19th, 20th, and 22d Ohio ; 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth,
nth, 13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and ist and 2d Virginia; also Howe's United
States Battery, Barnett's Ohio Battery, Loomis's Michigan Battery, and
Daum's Virginia Battery; the cavalry were Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and
Barker's Illinois Cavalry.

VOL. 1.— 4

50 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000.
Of these, about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its
bridges for some two hundred miles, under the command
of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia ; a
strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris of Indiana,
was at Philippi, and the rest were in three brigades form-
ing the immediate command of McClellan, the brigadiers
being General W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A , General Newton
Schleich of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L, McCook of
Ohio. On the date of his proclamation McClellan intended,
as he informed General Scott, to move his principal column
to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon
Beverly ; * but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d
that he reached Buckhannon, which is twenty-four miles
west of Beverly, on the Parkersburg branch of the turn-
pike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had
made him estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men,
of which the larger part were at Laurel Mountain in front
of General Morris.* On the 7th of July he moved McCook
with two regiments to Middle Fork bridge, about half-way
to Beverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to march
with his brigade from Philippi to a position one and a
half miles in front of Garnett's principal camp, which was
promptly done.* Three days later, McClellan concen-
trated the three brigades of his own column at Roaring
Creek, about two miles from Colonel Pegram's poi-<ition at
the base of Rich Mountain. The advance on both lines
had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, the
Confederates being aware of McClellan's great superiority
in numbers, and choosing to await his attack in their forti-
fied positions. The National commander was now con-
vinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of v/iiich
about 2000 were before him at Rich Mountain.* A recon-
noissance made on the loth showed that Pegram's position

> O. R., vol. ii. p. 195. « Id., p. aos.

• Id., p. 200. « Id., pp. 203, 204.

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

would be difficult to assail in tront, but preparations were
made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed
to hold firmly his position before Garnett, watching for
the effect of the attack at Rich Mountain. In the evening
Rosecrans took to McClellan a young man named Hart,
whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles
in rear of Pegram, and who thought he could guide a
column of infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around
Pegram's left flank south of the turnpike. The paths
were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but
Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seize
the road at the Hart farm. After some discussion McClel-
lan adopted the suggestion, and it was arranged that
Rosecrans should march at daybreak of the nth with
about 2CXX) men, including a troop of horse, and that
upon the sound of his engagement in the rear of Pe-
gram McClellan would attack in force in front. By a
blunder in one of the regimental camps, the reveille and
assembly were sounded at midnight, and Pegram was put
on the qui vive. He, however, believed that the attempt
to turn his position would be by a path or country road
passing round his right, between him and Garnett (of
which the latter had warned him), and his attention was
diverted from Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought
impracticable.^ The alert which had occurred at midnight
made Rosecrans think it best to make a longer circuit
than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe
marching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm.
The turning movement was made, but he found an enemy
opposing him. Pegram had detached about 350 men
from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered them to
guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with
them a single cannon from the four which constituted his
only battery, and they threw together a breastwork of

* O. R., vol. ii. pp. 215, 256, 260. Conduct of the War, vol. vi. (Rose*
crans), pp. a, 3.

52 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

logs. The turnpike at Hart's runs in a depression of the
summit, and as Rosecrans, early in the afternoon, came
out upon the road, he was warmly received by both mus-
ketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were
for the first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat
varied through two or three hours, when a charge by part
of Rosecrans's line, aided by a few heavy volleys from
another portion of his forces which had secured a good
position, broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements from
Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon ; but
they did not come into action, and the runaway team of
the caisson on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that was
coming up, capsized it down the mountain-side where the
descending road was scarped diagonally along it. Both
guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was in possession
of the field. The march and the assault had been made
in rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan ;
and the enemy, rallying on their reinforcements, made
such show of resistance on the crest a little further on,
that Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms
till next morning. When day broke on the I2th, the
enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rose-
crans, feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's posi-
tion, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon
being spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in
charge of a surgeon. Still nothing was seen of McClellan,
and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyond
Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's
position. Rosecrans's loss had been I2 killed and 49
wounded. The Confederates left 20 wounded on the
field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp, includ-
ing the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was
made.^

The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClel-
lan's camp, and he formed his troops for attack, but the

* O. R., vol. ii pp. 215, 260, 265. C. W., vol. vi. (Rosecrans) pp. 3-5.

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

long continuance of the cannonade and some signs of
exultation in Pcgram's camp seem to have made him think
Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in
accordance with the plan has never been explained.*
Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach McClellan
during the iith, but the sound of the battle was sufficient
notice that he had gained the summit and was engaged ;
and he was, in fact, left to win his own battle or to get
out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward evening
McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring
height, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make
Pegram's position untenable ; but his lines were withdrawn
again beyond Roaring Creek at nightfall, and all further
action postponed to the next day.

About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing
around Rosecrans's right flank during the night and had
gained Beverly. These, with the newly arrived Confed-
erate regiment, fled southward on the Staunton road.
Garnett had learned in the evening, by messenger from
Beverly, that Rich Mountain summit was carried, and
evacuated his camp in front of Morris about midnight.
He first marched toward Beverly, and was within five
miles of that place when he received information (false at
the time) that the National forces already occupied it. He
then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, and, leaving the
turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road
over Cheat Mountain into Cheat River valley, following
the stream northward toward St. George and West Union,
in the forlorn hope of turning the mountains at the north
end of the ridges, and regaining his communications by a
very long detour. He might have continued southward

* C. W., vol. vi. p. 6. McClellan seems to have expected Rosecrans to
reach the rear of Pegram's advanced work before his own attack should be
made ; but the reconnoissance of Lieutenant Poe, his engineer, shows that
this work could be turned by a much shorter route than the long and
difficult one by which Rosecrans went to the mountain ridge. See Poe's
Report, O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 14.

54 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

through Beverly almost at leisure, for McClellan did not
enter the town till past noon on the 12th.

Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started
in pursuit as soon as rations could be issued. He marched
first to Leadsville, where he halted to communicate with
McClellan at Beverly and get further orders. These
reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he
resumed the pursuit. His advance-guard of three regi-
ments, accompanied by Captain H. W. Benham of the
Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column
about noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some
two hours. Garnett himself handled his rear-guard with
skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounter was had.
A mile or two further, at another ford and when the skir-
mishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing
his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he
had used as a barricade. One of his cannon had become
stalled in the ford, and with about forty wagons fell into
Morris's hands. The direct pursuit was here discontinued,
but McClellan had sent a dispatch to General Hill at Graf-
ton, to collect the garrisons along the railroad and block
the way of the Confederates where they must pass around
the northern spurs of the mountains.*

His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek
camp, and the dispatch written in the evening of the I2th
was not forwarded to Hill till near noon of the 13th. This
officer immediately ordered the collection of the greater
part of his detachments at Oakland, and called upon the
railway officials for special trains to hurry them to the
rendezvous. About 1000 men under Colonel James
Irvine of the Sixteenth Ohio were at West Union, where
the St. George road reaches the Northwestern Turnpike,
and Hill's information was that a detachment of these held
Red House, a crossing several miles in advance, by which
the retreating enemy might go. Irvine was directed to
^ Reports of Morris and Benham, O. R., vol. ii. pp. 220, 223.

McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reinforced.
Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to
Oakland with about 500 men and three cannon, reached
his destination at nightfall, and hurried his detachment
forward by a night march to Irvine, ten or twelve miles
over rough roads. It turned out that Irvine did not
occupy Red House, and the prevalent belief that the
enemy was about 8000 in number, with the uncertainty
of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the
little force concentrated till reinforcements should come.
The first of these reached Irvine about six o'clock on the
morning of the 14th, raising his command to 1500; but
a few moments after their arrival he learned that the
enemy had passed Red House soon after daylight. He
gave chase, but did not overtake them.

Meanwhile General Hill had spent the night in trying
to hasten forward the railway trains, but none were able
to reach Oakland till morning, and Garnctt's forces had
now more than twenty miles the start, and were on fairly
good roads, moving southward on the eastern side of the
mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that Hill had the
one opportunity of a lifetime to capture the fleeing army,
and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided
with wagons or extra rations. When however the Union
commander learned that the enemy had fairly turned the
mountains, he ordered the pursuit stopped. Hill had used
both intelligence and energy in his attempt to concentrate
his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the rail-
road to carry them to Oakland before the enemy had
passed the turning-point, twenty miles to the southward.*

During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were
unknown. He had intended, when he evacuated his camp,
to follow the line of retreat taken by the detachment
already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the
night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the moun-

* Report of Hill, O. R., vol. ii. p. 224.

56 REAf/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

tain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rear por-
tion of it, he wandered all day of the I2th, seeking to
make his way to Ga nett. He halted at evening at the
Tygart Valley River, six miles north of Hcverly, and
learned from some country people of Garnctt's retreat.
It was still possible to reach the mountains east of the
valley, but beyond lay a hundred miles of wilderness and
half a dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food
could be found for his men. He called a council of war,
and, by advice of his officers, sent to McClellan, at Beverly,
an offer of surrender. This was received on the 13th, and
Pegram brought in 30 officers and 525 men.* McClellan
then moved southward himself, following the Staunton
road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little force had
escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two
regiments of Confederate troops were hastening from
Staunton to reinforce Garnett. These were halted at
Monterey, east of the principal ridge of the Alleghanies,
and upon them the retreating forces rallied. Brigadier-
General H. R. Jackson was assigned to command in Gar-
nett's place, and both Governor Letcher and General Lee
made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force
sufficient to resume aggressive operations.* On McClel-
lan's part nothing further was attempted till on the 22d
he was summoned to Washington to assume command of
the army which had retreated to the capital after the panic
of the first Bull Run battle.

The affair at Rich Mounta-n and the subsequent move-
ments were among the minor events of a great war, and
would not warrant a detailed description, were it not for
the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the
war, by being the occasion of McClellan's promotion to
the command of the Potomac army. The narrative which
has been given contains the " unvarnished tale," as nearly
as official records of both sides can give it, and it is

1 Report of Pegram, O. R., vol. ii. pp. 265, 266. " Id., pp. 247, 254.

MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA

a curious task to compare it with the picture of the cam-
pai(;n and its results which was then given to the world
in the series of proclamations and dispatches of the young
general, beginning with his first occupation of the country
and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which
he announced that they had " annihilated two armies,
commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, in-
trenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure."
The country was eager for good news, and took it as
literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment,
and when, but a week later, his success was followed by
the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed
out by Providence as the ideal chieftain who could repair
the misfortune and lead our armies to certain victory.
His personal intercourse with those about him was so
kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches,
proclamations, and correspondence are a psychological
study, more puzzling to those who knew him well than
to strangers. Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated pre-
tence did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed
to be composing for stage effect something to be spoken
in character by a quite different person from the sensible
and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation.
The career of the great Napoleon had been the study
and the absorbing admiration of young American soldiers,
and it was perhaps not strange that when real war came
they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bear-
ing. It was, for the moment, the bent of the people
to be pleased with McClcUan's rendering of the rdle;
they dubbed him the young Napoleon, and the photogra-
phers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic
pose. For two or three weeks his dispatches and letters
were all on fire with enthusiastic energy. He appeared
to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. When
he came out of it, he was as genial as ever. The assumed
dash and energy of his first campaign made the disap-

58 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

pointment and the reaction more painful when the exces-
sive caution of his conduct in command of the Army of
the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair,
when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which
became well known later. There was the same over-
estimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret
unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same
hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that
his subordinate was engaged. If Garnett had been as
strong as McClcllan believed him, he had abundant time
and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in
easy striking distance, while the National commander
delayed attacking Pegram; and had Morris been beaten,
Garnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his
opponent, and there would have been a race for the
railroad. But, happily, Garnett was less strong and less
enterprising than he was credited with being. Pegram
was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate
retreat.

CHAPTER IV

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

Orders for the Kanawha expedition — The troops and their quality — I^ck
of artillery and cuvalry — Assembling at Gallipolis — District of the
Kanawha — Numbers of the opposing forces — Method of advance • -
Use of steamboats — Advance guards on river banks — Camp at Thir-
teen-mile Creek — Night alarm — The river chutes — Sunken obstruc-
tions — Pocotaligo — Affair at Harboursville — Affair at Scary Creek
— Wise's position at Tyler Mountain — His precipitate retreat — Occu-
pation of Charleston — Kosecrans succeeds McClellan — Advance
toward Gauley Hridge — Insubordination — The Newspaper Con .spond-
ent — Occupation of Gauley Bridge.

WHEN McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d
of July, the rumors he heard of Garnett's strength,
and the news of the presence of General Wise with a
considerable force in the Great Kanawha valley, made
him conclude to order a brigade to that region for the
purpose of holding the lower part of the valley defensively
till he might try to cut off Wise's army after Garnett
should be disposed of. This duty was assigned to me.
On the 22d of June I had received my appointment as
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, superseding my state
commission. I had seen the regiments of my brigade
going one by one, as fast as they were reorganized for
the three years' service, and T had hoped to be ordered
to follow them to McClellan's own column. The only
one left in camp was the Eleventh Ohio, of which only
five companies were present, though two more companies
were soon added.

McClellan's letter directed me to assume command of
the P"rst and Second Kentucky regiments with the
Twelfth Ohio, and to call upon the governor for a troop

60 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of cavalry and a six-gun battery: to expedite the equip-
ment of the whole and move them to Gallipolis via
Hampden and Portland, stations on the Marietta Railroad,
from which a march of twenty-five miles by country roads
would take us to our destination. At Gallipolis was the
Twenty-first Ohio, which I should add to my command
and proceed at once with two regiments to Point Pleasant
at the mouth of the Kanawha, five miles above. When
all were assembled, one regiment was to be left at Point
Pleasant, two were to be advanced up the valley to Ten-mile
Creek, and the other placed at an intermediate position.
" Until further orders," the letter continued, " remain on
the defensive and endeavor to induce the rebels to remain at
Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by a movement
from Beverly." Captain W. J. Kountz, an experienced
steamboat captain, was in charge of water-transportation,
and would furnish light-draught steamboats for my use.^

* What purports to be McCIellan's letter to me is found in the Records
(O. R., vol. ii. pt. i. p. 197), but it seems to be only an abstract of it, made to
accompany his dispatch to Washington (A/., p. 198), and by a clerical error
given the form of the complete letter. It does not contain the quotation given
above, which was reiterated before the letter was closed, in these words :
'♦ Remember that my present plan is to cut them off by a rapid march from
Beverly after driving those in front of me across the mountains, and do all
you can to favor that by avoiding offensive movements."

After the printing of the earlier volumes of the Records, covering the
years 1861-1S62, I learned that the books and jiapers of the Department of
the Ohio had not been sent to Washington at the close of the war, but
were still in Cincinnati. I brought this fact to the attention of the Ad-
jutant-General, and at the request of that officer obtained and forwarded
them to the Archives office. With them were my letter books and the
original files of my correspondence with McClellan and Rosecrans in 1861
and 1862. Colonel Roliert N. Scott, who was then in charge of the pub-
lication, informed me that the whole would be prepared for printing and
would appear in the supplemental volumes, after the compl'.tion of the rest
of the First Series. Owing to changes in the Board of Puolication in the
course of twenty years, there were errors in the arrangement f the matter
for the printer, and a considerable part of the correspondence Itetween the
generals named and myself was accidentally omitted from the sjpplemental
volume (O. R., vol. li. pt. i.) in which it should have appeared. The oriR'
inals are no doubt in the files of the Archives office, and for the benefit

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

Governor Dennison seconded our wishes with his usual
earnestness, and ordered the battery of artillery and com-
pany of cavalry to meet me at Gallipolis ; but the guns
for the battery were not to be had, and a section of two
bronze guns (six-pounder smooth-bores rifled) was the
only artillery, whilst the cavalry was less than half a troop
of raw recruits, useful only as messengers. I succeeded
in getting the Eleventh Ohio sent with me, the lacking
companies to be recruited and sent later. The Twelfth
Ohio was an excellent regiment which had been some-
what delayed in its reorganization and had not gone with
the rest of its brigade to McClcllan. The Twenty-first
was one of the regiments enlisted ^or the State in excess
of the first quota, and was now brought into the national
service under the President's second call. The two Ken-
tucky regiments had been organized in Cincinnati, and
were made up chiefly of steamboat crews and " longshore-
men " thrown out of employment by the stoppage of
commeice on the river. There were in them some com-
panies of other material, but these gave the distinctive
character to the regiments. The colonels and part of the
field officers were Kentuckians, but the organizations were
Ohio regiments in nearly everything but the name. The
men were mostly of a rough and reckless class, and gave
a good deal of trouble by insubordination ; but tliey did
not lack courage, and after they had been under discipline
for a while, became good fighting regiments. The diffi-
culty of getting transportation from the railway company
delayed our departure. It was not till the 6th of July
that a regiment could be sent, and another followed in
two or three days. The two Kentucky regiments were
not yet armed and equipped, but after a day or two
were ready and were ordered up the river by steamboats.
I myself left Camp Dennison on the evening of Sunday

of investigators I give in Appendix A a list of the numbers missing from
the printed volume, aa shown by comparison with my retained copies.

62 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the 7th with the Eleventh Ohio (seven companies)
and reached Gallipolis in the evening of the 9th. The
three Ohio regiments were united on the lOth and carried
by steamers to Point Pleasant, and we entered the theatre
of war.^

My movement had been made upon a telegram from
General McClellan, and I found at Gallipolis his letter of
instructions of the 2d, and another of the 6th which en-
larged the scope of my command. A territorial district
was assigned to me, including the southwestern part of
Virginia below Parkersburg on the Ohio, and north of the
Great Kanawha, reaching back into the country as I
should occupy it.* The directions to restrict myself to a
defensive occupation of the Lower Kanawha valley were
changed to instructions to march on Charleston and Gau-
ley Bridge, and, with a view to his resumption of the plan
to make this his main line of advance, to " obtain all
possible information in regard to the roads leading toward
Wytheville and the adjacent region." I was also ordered
to place a regiment at Ripley, on the road from Parkers-
burg to Charleston, and advised " to beat up Barboursville,
Guyandotte, etc., so that the entire course of the Ohio
may be secured to us." Communication with Ripley
was by Letart's Falls on the Ohio, some thirty miles
above Gallipolis, or by Ravenswood, twenty miles further.
Guyandotte was a longer distance below Gallipolis, and
Barboursville was inland some miles up the Guyandotte
River. As to General Wise, McClellan wrote : " Drive
Wise out and catch him if you can. If you do catch
him, send him to Columbus penitentiary." A regiment
at Parkersburg and another at Roane Court House on the
northern border of my district were ordered to report to

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 416: my report to McClellan.

' The territorial boundary of McCIellan's Department had been placed
at the Great Kanawha and the Ohio rivers, probably with some political idea
of avoiding the appearance of aggression upon regions of doubtful loyalty.
When warlike operations began, such ideas, of course, were abandoned.

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

<53

me, but I was not authorized to move them from the
stations assigned them, and they were soon united to
McClellan's own column.

At Gallipolis I heard that a steamboat on the Ohio had
been boarded by a rebel party near Guyandotte, and the
news giving point to McClellan's suggestion to " beat up "
that region, I dispatched a small steamboat down the river
to meet the Kentucky regiments with orders for the lead-
ing one to land at Guyandotte and suppress any insurgents
in that neighborhood.^ It was hazardous to divide my
little army into three columns on a base of a hundred miles,
but it was thought wise to show some Union troops at
various points on the border, and I purposed to unite my
detachments by early convergent movements forward to
the Kanawha valley as soon as I should reach Red House,
thirty-t\vo miles up the river, with my principal column.

Before I reached Charleston I added to my artillery one
iron and one brass cannon, smooth six-pounders, borrowed
from the civil authorities at Gallipolis ; but they were with-
out caissons or any proper equipment, and were manned
by volunteers from the infantry.'^ My total force, when
assembled, would be a little over 3000 men, the regiments
having the same average strength as those with McClellan.
The opposing force under General Wise was 4000 by the
time the campaign was fully opened, though somewhat less
at the beginning.*

The Great Kanawha River was navigable for small steam-
boats about seventy miles, to a point ten or twelve miles
above Charleston, the only important town of the region,
which was at the confluence of the Kanawha and Elk rivers.
Steamboats were plenty, owing to the interruption of trade,

> ">. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 417. » Ibid.

* Wise reported his force on the 17th of July as 3500 "efifective " men
and ten cannon, and says he received " perhaps 300 " in reinforcements on
the iSth. When he abandoned the valley ten days later, he reported his
force 4000 in round numbers. O. R., vol. ii. pp. 290, 293( loii.

64 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and wagons were wholly lacking ; so that my column was
accompanied and partly carried by a fleet of stern-wheel
steamers.

On Thursday the iith of July the movement from Point
Pleasant began. An advance-guard was sent out on each
side of the river, marching upon the roads which were near
its banks. The few horsemen were divided and sent with
them to carry messages, and the boats followed, steaming
slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of two
regiments were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to
the men, who were as yet unused to their work, and many
of whom were footsore from their first long march of
twenty-five miles to Gallipolis from Hampden station, where
they had been obliged to leave the railway. The arrange-
ment was also a good one in a military point of view, for
if an enemy were met on either bank of the stream, the
boats could land in a moment and the troops disembark
without delay.

Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it
was the very romance of campaigning. I took my station on
top of the pilot-house of the leading boat, so that I might
see over the banks of the stream and across the bottom
lands to the high hills which bounded the valley. The
afternoon was a lovely one. Summer clouds lazily drifted
across the sky, the boats were dressed in their colors and
swarmed with the men like bees. The bands played na-
tional tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens,
the inmates would wave their handkerchiefs to us, and
were answered by cheers from the troops. The scenery
was picturesque, the gently winding river making beautiful
reaches that opened new scenes upon us at every turn.
On either side the advance-guard could be seen in the dis-
tance, the main body in the road, with skirmishers explor-
ing the way in front, and flankers on the sides. Now and
then a horseman would bring some message to the bank
from the front, and a small boat would be sent to receive

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

it, giving us the rumors with which the country was rife,
and which gave just enough of excitement and of the spice
of possible danger to make this our first day in an enemy's
country key everybody to just such a pitch as apparently
to double the vividness of every sensation. The landscape
seemed more beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the
exhilaration of out-door life more joyous than any we had
ever known.

The halt for the night had been assigned at a little village
on the right (northern) bank of the stream, which was
nestled beneath a ridge which ran down from the hills
toward the river, making an excellent position for defence
against any force which might come against it from the
upper valley. The sun was getting low behind us in the
west, as we approached it, and the advance-guard had
already halted. Captain Cotter's two bronze guns gleamed
bright on the top of the ridge beyond the pretty little town,
and before the sun went down, the new white tents had
been carried up to the slope and pitched there. The
steamers were moored to the shore, and the low slanting rays
of the sunset fell upon as charming a picture as was ever
painted. An outpost with pickets was set on the southern
side of the river, both grand and camp guards were put
out also on the side we occupied, and the men soon had
their supper and went to rest. Late in the evening a
panic-stricken countryman came in with the news that
General Wise was moving down upon us with 4CXX)
men. The man was evidently in earnest, and was a loyal
one. He believed every word he said, but he had in
fact seen only a few of the enemy's horsemen who were
scouting toward us, and believed their statement that an
army was at their back. It was our initiation into an ex-
perience of rumors that was to continue as long as the
war. We were to get them daily and almost hourly;
sometimes with a little foundation of fact, sometimes with
none; rarely purposely deceptive, but always grossly
VOL. I. — 5

66 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

exaggerated, making chimeras with which a commanding
officer had to wage a more incessant warfare than with the
substantial enemy in his front. I reasoned that Wise's
troops were, like my own, too raw to venture a night
attack with, and contented myself with sending a strong
reconnoitring party out beyond my pickets, putting in
command of it Major Hines of the Twelfth Ohio, an officer
who subsequently became noted for his enterprise and
activity in charge of scouting parties. The camp rested
quietly, and toward morning Hines returned, reporting that
a troop of the enemy's horse had come within a couple of
miles of our position in search of information about us and
our movement. They had indulged in loud bragging as to
what Wise and his army would do with us, but this and
nothing more was the basis of our honest friend's fright.
The morning dawned bright and peaceful, the steamers
were sent back for a regiment which was still at Point
Pleasant, and the day was used in concentrating the little
army and preparing for another advance.

On July 13th we moved again, making about ten miles,
and finding the navigation becoming difficult by reason of
the low water. At several shoals in the stream rough
wing-dams had been built from the sides to concentrate
the water in the channel, and at Knob Shoals, in one of
these " chutes " as they were called, a coal barge had
sometime before been sunk. In trying to pass it our
leading boat grounded, and, the current being swift, it was
for a time doubtful if we should get her off. We finally
succeeded, however, and the procession of boats slowly
steamed up the rapids. We had hardly got beyond them
when we heard a distant cannon-shot from our advance-
guard which had opened a long distance between them
and us during our delay. We steamed rapidly ahead.
Soon we saw a man pulling off from the south bank in a
skiff. Nearing the steamer, he stood up and excitedly
shouted that a general engagement had begun. We

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

laughingly told him it could n't be very general till we
got in, and we moved on, keeping a sharp outlook for our
parties on either bank. When we came up to them, we
learned that a party of horsemen had appeared on the
southern side of the river and had opened a skirmishing
fire, but had scampered ofif as if the Old Nick were after
them when a shell from the rifled gun was sent over their
heads. The shell, like a good many that were made in
those days, did not explode, and the simple people of
the vicinity who had heard its long-continued scream told
our men some days after that they thought it was " going
yet."

From this time some show of resistance was made by
the enemy, and the skirmishing somewhat retarded the
movement. Still, about ten miles was made each day
till the evening of the i6th, when we encamped at the
mouth of the Pocotaligo, a large creek which enters the
Kanawha from the north.* The evening before, we had
had one of those incidents, not unusual with new troops,
which prove that nothing but habit can make men crol
and confident in their duties. We had, as usual, moored
our boats to the northern bank and made our camp there,
placing an outpost on the left bank opposite us support-
ing a chain of sentinels, to prevent a surprise from that
direction. A report of some force of the enemy in their
front made me order another detachment to their support
after nightfall. The detachment had been told oflf and
ferried across in small boats. They were dimly seen
marching in the starlight up the river after landing, when
suddenly a shot was heard, and then an irregular volley was
both seen and heard as the muskets flashed out in the
darkness. A supporting force was quickly sent over, and,
no further disturbance occurring, a search was made for an
enemy, but none was found. A gun had accidentally gone
off in the squad, and the rest of the men, surprised and
1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 418.

68 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

bewildered, had fired, they neither knew why nor at what.
Two men were killed, and several others were hurt This
and the chaffing the men got from their comrades was a
lesson to the whole command. The soldiers were brave
enough, and were thoroughly ashamed of themselves, but
they were raw ; that was all that could be said of it.*

We were here overtaken by the Second Kentucky, which
had stopped at Guyandottc on its way up the river, and
had marched across the country to join us after our prog-
ress had sufficiently covered that lower region. From
Guyandotte a portion of the regiment, under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Ncfif, had gone to Barboursville and
had attacked and dispersed an encampment of Confeder-
ates which was organizing there. It was a very creditable
little action, in which officers and men conducted them-
selves well, and which made them for the time the envy
of the rest of the command.

The situation at ' Poca," as it was called in the neighbor-
hood, was one which made the further advance of the
army require some consideration. Information which
came to us from loyal men showed that some force of
the enemy was in position above the mouth of Scary
Creek on the south side of the Kanawha, and about three
miles from us. We had for two days had constant light
skirmishing with the advance-guard of Wise's forces on
the north bank of the river, and supposed that the princi-
pal part of his command was on our side, and not far in
front of us. It turned out in fact that this was so, and
that Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Moun-
tain, a bold spur which reaches the river on the northern
side (on which is also the turnpike road), about twelve
miles above my position, while he occupied the south side
with a detachment. The Pocotaligo, which entered the
river from the north at our camp, covered us against an
attack on that side; but we could not take our steam-

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 421.

THE KANAWHA VALLEY

boats further unless both banks of the river were cleared.
We had scarcely any wagons, for those which had been
promised us could not yet be forwarded, and we must
either continue to keep the steamboats with us, or organize
wagon transportation and cut loose from the boats.* My
urgent dispatches were hurrying the wagons toward us,
but meanwhile I hoped the opposition on the south bank
of the river would prove trifling, for artillery in position at
any point on the narrow river would at once stop naviga-
tion of our light and unarmed transports. On the morning
of the 17th a reconnoitring party sent forward on the
south side of the river under command of Lieutenant-
Colonel White of the Twelfth Ohio, reported the enemy
about five hundred strong intrenched on the further side
of Scary Creek, which was not fordablc at its mouth, but
could be crossed a little way up the stream. Colonel
Lowe of the Twelfth requested the privilege of driving
off this party with his regiment accompanied by our two
cannon. He was ordered to do so, whilst the enemy's
skirmishers should be pushed back from the front of the
main column, and it should be held ready to advance
rapidly up the north bank of the river as soon as the
hostile force at Scary Creek should be dislodged.

The Twelfth and two companies of the Twenty-first
Ohio were ferried over and moved out soon after noon.
The first reports from them were encouraging and full of
confidence, the enemy were retreating and they had dis-
mounted one of his guns; but just before evening they
returned, bringing the account of their repulse in the effort
to cross at the mouth of the creek, and their failure to find
the ford a little higher up. Their ammunition had run
short, some casualties had occurred, and they had become
discouraged and given it up. Their loss was 10 men
killed and 35 wounded. If they had held on and asked
for assistance, it would have been well enough; but,
^ O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 420; dispatch of 17th alia

^0 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

as was common with new troops, they passed from confi-
dence to discouragement as soon as they were checked,
and ihey retreated.

The affair was accompanied by another humiliating in-
cident which gave me no little chagrin. During the
progress of the engagement Colonel Woodruff and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Neff of the Second Kentucky, with Colonel
De Viliiers of the Eleventh Ohio, rode out in front, on the
north bank of the river, till they came opposite the enemy's
position, the hostile party on our side of the stream having
fallen back beyond this point. They were told by a negro
that the rebels were in retreat, and they got the black
man to ferry them over in a skiff, that they might be the
first to congratulate their friends. To their amazement
they were welcomed as prisoners by the Confederates, who
greatly enjoyed their discomfiture. The negro had told
the truth in saying that the enemy had been in retreat ; for
the fact was that both sides retreated, but the Confederates,
being first informed of this, resumed their position and
claimed a victory. The officers who were captured had
gone out without permission, and, led on by the hare-
brained De Viliiers, had done what they knew was foolish
and unmilitary, resulting for them in a severe experience
in Libby Prison at Richmond, and for us in the m* en-
tary appearance of lack of discipline and order v*hich
could not fairly be charged upon the command. I re-
ported the facts without disguise or apology, trusting to
the future to remove the bad impression the affair must
naturally make upon McClellan.

The report of the strength of the position attacked and
our knowledge of the increasing difficulty of the ground
before us, led me to conclude that the wisest course would
be to await the arrival of the wagons, now daily expected,
and then, with supplies for several days in hand, move
independent of the steamers, which became only an em-
barrassment when it was advisable to leave the river road

THE KANAWHA VALLEY 7I

for the purpose of turning a fortified position like that we
had found before us. We therefore rested quietly in our
strong camp for several days, holding both banks of the
river and preparing to move the main column by a country
road leading away from the stream on the north side, and
returning to it at Tyler Mountain, where Wise's camp was
reported to be. I ordered up the First Kentucky from
Ravenswood and Ripley, but its colonel found obstacles
in his way, and did not join us till we reached Charleston
the following week.

On the 23d of July I had succeeded in getting wagons
and teams enough to supply the most necessary uses,
and renewed the advance. We marched rapidly on the
24th by the circuitous route I have mentioned, leaving a
regiment to protect the steamboats. The country was
very broken and the roads very rough, but the enemy had
no knowledge of our movement, and toward evening we
again approached the river immediately in rear of their
camp at Tyler Mountain. When we drove in their pickets,
the force was panic-stric^^en and ran off, leaving their
camp in confusion, and their supper which they were
cooking but did not stop to eat. A little below the point
v;here we reached the river, and on the other side, was the
steamboat " Maffet " with a party of soldiers gathering the
wheat which had been cut in the neighboring fields and was
in the sheaf. I was for a moment doubtful whether it might
not be one of our own boats which had ventured up the
river under protection of the regiment left behind, and
directed our skirmishers who were deployed along the
edge of the water to hail the other side. "Who are
you?" was shouted from both banks simultaneously.
" United States troops." our men answered. " Hurrah for
Jeff Davis ! " shouted the others, and a rattling fire opened
on both sides. A shell was sent from our cannon into the
steamer, and the party upon her were immediately seen
jumping ashore, having first set fire to her to prevent her

72 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

falling into our hands. The enemy then moved away on
that side, under cover of the trees which lined the river
bank. Night was now falling, and, sending forward an
advance-guard to follow up the force whose camp we had
surprised, we bivouacked on the mountain side.

In the morning, as we were moving out at an early hour,
we were met by the mayor and two or three prominent
citizens of Charleston who came to surrender the town to
us. Wise having hurriedly retreated during the night. He
had done a very unnecessary piece of mischief before
leaving, in partly cutting off the cables of a fine suspen-
sion bridge which spans the Elk River at Charleston. As
this stream enters the Kanawha from the north and below
the city, it may have seemed to him that it would delay
our progress ; but as a large number of empty coal barges
were lying at the town, it took our company of mechanics,
under Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio, but a little while
to improvise a good floating bridge, and part of the com-
mand passed through the town and camped beyond it.^
One day was now given to the establishment of a depot
of supplies at Charleston and to the organization of
regular communication by water with Gallipolis, and by
wagons with such positions as we might occupy further
up the river. Deputations of the townspeople were
informed that it was not our policy to meddle with private
persons who remained quietly at home, nor would we make
any inquisition as to the personal opinions of those who
attended strictly to their own business; but they were
warned that any communication with the enemy would be
remorselessly punished.

We were now able to get more accurate information
about Wise's forces than we could obtain before, and this
accorded pretty well with the strength which he reported
officially.^ His infantry was therefore more than equal
to the column under my command in the valley, whilst in

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 425. a Ante, p. 63 note.

THE KANAWHA VALLEY 73

artillery and in cavalry he was greatly superior. Our
continued advance in the face of such opposition is suffi-
cient evidence that the Confederate force was not well
handled, for as the valley contracted and the hills crowded
in closer to the river, nearly every mile offered positions
in which small numbers could hold at bay an army. Our
success in reaching Charleston was therefore good ground
for being content with our progress, though I had to
blame myself for errors in the management of my part of
the campaign at Pocataligo. I ought not to have assumed
as confidently as I did that the enemy was only five hun-
dred strong at Scary Creek and that a detachment could
dispose of that obstacle whilst the rest of the column pre-
pared to advance on our principal line. Wise's force at
that point was in fact double the number supposed.^ It
is true it was very inconvenient to ferry any considerable
body of troops back and forth across the river; but I
should nevertheless have taken the bulk of my command
to the left bank, and by occupying the enemy's attention
at the mouth of Scary Creek, covered the movement
of a sufficient force upon his flank by means of the fords
farther up that stream. This would have resulted in the
complete routing of the detachment, and it is nearly cer-
tain that I could have pushed on to Charleston at once,
and could have waited there for the organization of my
wagon train with the prestige of victory, instead of doing
so at ' Poca' with the appearance of a check.

McClellan recognized the fact that he was asking me to
face the enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as
he heard that Wise was disposed to make a stand he
directed me not to risk attacking him in front, but rather
to await the result of his own movement toward the Upper
Kanawha.'-* Rosecrans did the same when he assumed
command ; but I knew the hope had been that I would
reach Gauley Bridge, and I was vexed that my move-
1 O. R., vol. ii. p. !oii. 9 Dispatches of July i6 and 20.

74 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ment should have the appearance of failing when I was
conscious that we had not fairly measured our strength
with my opponent. As soon, therefore, as the needful
preparations could be made, I decided upon the turning
movement which I have already described, and our reso-
lute advance seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from
which he did not recover till he got far beyond Gauley
Bridge.

At Charleston I learned of the Bull Run disaster, and
that McClellan had been ordered to Washington, leaving
Rosecrans in command of our department. The latter
sent me orders which implied that to reach Charleston
was the most he could expect of me, and directing me to
remain on the defensive if I should succeed in getting
so far, whilst he should take up anew McClellan's plan
of reaching the rear of Wise's army.^ His dispatches,
fortunately, did not reach me till I was close to Gauley
Bridge and was sure of my ability to take possession
of that defile, some forty miles above Charleston. An
additional reason for my prompt advance was that the
Twenty-first Ohio was not yet re-enlisted for the war, was
only a " three months " regiment whose time was about
to expire, and Governor Dennison had telegraphed me
to send it back to Ohio. I left this regiment as a post-
garrison at Charleston till it could be relieved by another,
or till my success in reaching Gauley Bridge should enable
me to send back a detachment for that post, and, on the
26th July, pushed forward with the rest of my column,
which, now that the First Kentucky had joined me, con-
sisted of four regiments. Our first night's encampment
was about eleven miles above Charleston in a lovely nook
between spurs of the hills. Here I was t.'eated to a little
surprise on the part of three of my subordinates which
was an unexpected enlargement of my military experience.
The camp had got nicel)^ arranged for the night and

^ Dispatches of July 26 and 29.

THE KANAWHA VALLEY 75

supper was over, when these gentlemen waited upon me
at my tent. The one who had shown the least capacity
as commander of a regiment was spokesman, and in-
formed me that after consultation they had concluded that
it was foolhardy to follow the Confederates into the gorge
we were travelling, and that unless I could show them
satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion they would
not lead their commands further into it. I dryly asked
if he was quite sure he understood the nature of his com-
munication. There was something probably in the tone
of my question which was not altogether expected, and
his companions began to look a little uneasy. He then
protested that none of them meant any disrespect, but
that as their military experience was about as extensive as
my own, they thought I ought to make no movements but
on consultation with them and by their consent. The others
seemed to be better pleased with this way of putting it,
and signified assent. My answer was that their conduct
very plainly showed their own lack both of military expe-
rience and elementary military knowledge, and that this
ignorance was the only thing which could palliate their
action. Whether they meant it or not, their action
was mutinous. The responsibility for the movement of
the army was with me, and whilst I should be inclined
to confer very freely with my principal subordinates and
explain my purposes, I should call no councils of war,
and submit nothing to vote till I felt incompetent to
decide for myself. If they apologized for their conduct
and showed earnestness in military obedience to orders,
what they had now said would be overlooked, but on any
recurrence of cause for complaint I should enforce my
power by the arrest of the offender at once. I dismissed
them with this, and immediately sent out the formal
orders through my adjutant-general to march early next
morning. Before they slept one of the three had come
to me with earnest apology for his part in the matter, and

76 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

a short time made them all as subordinate as I could wish.
The incident could not have occurred in the brigade
which had been under my command at Camp Dennison,
and was a not unnatural result of the sudden assembling
of inexperienced men under a brigade commander of
whom they knew nothing except that at the beginning
of the war he was a civilian like themselves. These very
men afterward became devoted followers, and some of
them life-long friends. It was part of their military edu-
cation as well as mine. If I had been noisy and bluster-
ing in my intercourse with them at the beginning, and
had done what seemed to be regarded as the "regula-
tion " amount of cursing and swearing, they would prob-
ably have given me credit for military aptitude at least;
but a systematic adherence to a quiet and undemonstra-
tive manner evidently told against me, at first, in their
opinion. Through my army life I met more or less of
the same conduct when assigned to a new command ; but
when men learned that discipline would be inevitably
enforced, and that it was as necessary to obey a quiet
order as one emphasized by expletives, and especially
when they had been a little under fire, there was no more
trouble. Indeed, I was impressed with the fact that after
this acquaintance was once made, my chief embarrass-
ment in discipline was that an intimation of dissatisfaction
on my part would cause deeper chagrin and more evident
pain than I intended or wished.

The same march enabled me to make the acquaintance
of another army "institution," — the newspaper corre-
spondent. We were joined at Charleston by two men
representing influential Eastern journals, who wished to
know on what terms they could accompany the column.
The answer was that the quartermaster would furnish
them with a tent and transportation, and that their letters
should be submitted to one of the staff, to protect us from
the publication of facts which might aid the enemy. This

THE KANAWHA VALLEY 77

seemed unsatisfactory, and they intim-ited that they
expected to be taken into my mess and to be announced
as volunteer aides with military rank. They were told
that military position or rank could only be given by au-
thority much higher than mine, and that they could be
more honestly independent if free from personal obligation
and from temptation to repay favors with flattery. My
only purpose was to put the matter upon the foundation
of public right and of mutual self-respect. The day before
we reached Gauley Bridge they opened the subject again
to Captain McElroy, my adjutant-general, but were in-
formed that I had decided it upon a principle by which I
meant to abide. Their reply was, " Very well ; General
Cox thinks he can get along without us, and we will
show him. We will write him down."

They left the camp the same evening, and wrote letters
to their papers describing the army as demoralized,
drunken, and without discipline, in a state of insubordina-
tion, and the commander as totally incompetent. As to
the troops, more baseless slander was never uttered. Their
march had been orderly. No wilful injury had been done
to private property, and no case of personal violence to
any non-combatant, man or woman, had been even
charged. Yet the printing of such communications in
widely read journals was likely to be as damaging as if
it all were true. My «omination as Brigadier-General
of U. S. Volunteers was then before the Senate for con-
firmation, and " the pen " would probably have proved
" mightier than the sword " but for McClellan's knowledge
of the nature of the task we had accomplished, as he was
then in the flood -tide of power at Washington, and ex-
pressed his satisfaction at the performance of our part
of the campaign which he had planned. By good for-
tune also, the injurious letters were printed at the same
time with the telegraphic news of our occupation of
Gauley Bridge and the retreat of the enemy out of the

78 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

valley. * I was, however, deeply convinced that my position
was the right one, and never changed my rule of conduct in
the matter. The relations of newspaper correspondents
to general officers of the army became one of the crying
scandals and notorious causes of intrigue and demoraliza-
tion. It was a subject almost impossible to settle satisfac-
torily ; but whoever gained or lost by cultivating this means
of reputation, it is a satisfaction to have adhered through-
out the war to the rule I first adopted and announced.

Wise made no resolute effort to oppose my march after
I left Charleston, and contented himself with delaying us
by his rear-guard, which obstructed the road by felling
trees into it and by skirmishing with my head of column.
We however advanced at the rate of twelve or fifteen
miles a day, reaching Gauley Bridge on the morning of
the 29th of July. Here we captured some fifteen hundred
stands of arms and a considerable store of munitions
which the Confederate general had not been able to carry
away or destroy. It is safe to say that in the wild defile
which we had threaded for the last twenty miles there
were as many positions as there were miles in which he
could easily have delayed my advance a day or two, forc-
ing me to turn his flank by the most difficult mountain
climbing, and where indeed, with forces so nearly equal,
my progress should have been permanently barred. At
Gauley Bridge he burned the structure which gave name
to the place, and which had been a series of substantial
wooden trusses resting upon heavy stone piers. My or-

* As one of these correspondents became a writer of history, it is made
proper to say that he was Mr. Willian, Swinton, of whom General Grant has
occasion to speak in his " Personal Memoirs " (vol. ii. p. 144), and whose
facility in changing his point of view in historical writing was shown in his
" McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed," which was pub-
lished in 1864 by the Union Congressional Committee (first appearing in
the "New York Times " of February, March, and April of that year), when
compared with his " History of the Army of the Potomac" which appeared
two yea.rs later. Burnside accused him of repeated instances of malicious
libel of his command in June, 1864. O. R., vol. xxxvi. pt. iii. p. 751.

THE KANAWHA VALLEY 79

ders definitively limited me to the point we had now reached
in my advance, and I therefore sent forward only a detach-
ment to follow the enemy and keep up his precipitate
retreat. Wise did not stop till he reached Greenbrier
and the White Sulphur Springs, and there was abundant evi-
dence that he regarded his movement as a final abandon-
ment of this part of West Virginia.^ A few weeks later
General Lee came in person with reinforcements over the
mountains and began a new campaign ; but until the 20th
of August we were undisturbed except by a petty guerilla
warfare.

McClellan telegraphed from Washington his congratula-
tions,^ and Rosecrans expressed his satisfaction also in
terms which assured me that we had done more than had
been expected of us.^ The good effect upon the com-
mand was also very apparent ; for our success not only
justified the policy of a determined advance, but the offi-
cers who had been timid as to results were now glad to
get their share of the credit, and to make amends for their
insubordination by a hearty change in bearing and con-
duct. My term of service as a brigadier of the Ohio forces
in the three months' enrolment had now ended, and
until the Senate should confirm my appointment as a
United States officer there was some doubt as to my right
to continue in command. My embarrassment in this re-
gard was very pleasantly removed by a dispatch from
General Rosecrans in which he conveyed the request of
Lieutenant-General Scott and of himself that I should re-
main in charge of the Kanawha column. It was only a
week, however, before notice of the confirmation was re-
ceived, and dropping all thoughts of returning home, I
prepared my mind for continuous active duty till the war
should end.

^ Floyd's Dispatches, O. R., vol. li. pt. ii. pp. 208, 213.

2 Dispatch of August i. » Dispatch of Jdly 31.

CHAPTER V

GAULEY BRIDGE

The gate of the Kanawha valley — The wilderness beyond — West Virginia
defences — A romantic post — Chaplain Brown — An adventurous mis-
sion — Chaplain Dubois — " The River Path " — Gauley Mount —
Colonel Tompkins's home — Bowie-knives — Truculent resolutions —
The Engineers — Whittlesey, Benham, Wagner — Fortifications — Dis-
tant reconnoissanccs — Comparison of forces — Dangers to steamboat
communications — Allotment of duties — The Summersville post —
Seventh Ohio at Cross Lanes — Scares and rumors — Robert E. I.ee at
Valley Mountain — Floyd and Wise advance — Rosecrans's orders —
The Cross Lanes affair — Major Casement's creditable retreat — Colonel
Tyler's reports — Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton — Quarrels of Wise and
Floyd — Ambushing rebel cavalry — Affair at Boone Court House —
New attack at Gauley Bridge — An incipient mutiny — Sad result — A
notable court-martial — Rosecrans marching toward us — Communications
renewed — Advance toward Lewisburg — Camp Lookout — A private
sorrow.

THE position at Gauley Bridge was an important one
from a military point of view. It was where the
James River and Kanawha turnpike, after following the
highlands along the course of New River as it comes
from the east, drops into a defile with cliffs on one side
and a swift and unfordable torrent upon the other, and
then crosses the Gauley River, which is a stream of very
similar character. The two rivers, meeting at a right
angle, there unite to form the Great Kanawha, which
plunges over a ledge of rocks a mile below and winds
its way among the hills, some thirty miles, before it be-
comes a navigable stream even for the lightest class of
steamboats. From Gauley Bridge a road runs up the
Gauley River to Cross Lanes and Carnifex Ferry, some-
thing over twenty miles, and continuing northward reaches
Summersville, Sutton, and Weston, making almost the

GAULEY BRIDGE 8 1

only line of communication between the posts then occu-
pied by our troops in northwestern Virginia and the head
of the Kanawha valley. Southwestward the country was
extremely wild and broken, with few and small settle-
ments and no roads worthy the name. The crossing of
the Gauley was therefore the gate through which all
important movements from eastern into southwestern
Virginia must necessarily come, and it formed an impor-
tant link in any chain of posts designed to cover the
Ohio valley from invasion. It was also the most ad-
vanced single post which could protect the Kanawha
valley. Further to the southeast, on Flat-top Mountain,
was another very strong position, where the principal
road on the left bank of New River crosses a high cind
bruad ridge; but a post could not be safely maintained
there without still holding Gauley Bridge in considerable
force, or establishing another post on the right bank of
New River twenty miles further up. All these streams
flow in rocky beds seamed and fissured to so great a
degree that they had no practicable fords. You might
go forty miles up New River and at least twenty up
the Gauley before you could find a place where either
could be passed by infantry or wagons. The little ferries
which had been made in a few eddies of the rivers were
destroyed in the first campaign, and the post at the
Gauley became nearly impregnable in front, and could
only be turned by long and difficult detours.

An interval of about a hundred miles separated this
mountain fastness from the similar passes which guarded
eastern Virginia along the line of the Blue Ridge. This
debatable ground was sparsely settled and very poor in
agricultural resources, so that it could furnish r.othing
for subsistence of man or beast. The necessity of trans-
porting forage as well as subsistence and ammunition
through this mountainous belt forbade any extended
or continuous operations there; for actual computation

VOL. I. — 6

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

showed that the wagon trains could carry no more than
the food for the mule teams on the double trip, going
and returning, from Gauley Bridge to the narrows cf New
River where the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad crossed
upon an important bridge which was several times made
the objective point of an expedition. This alone proved
the impracticability of the plan McClellan first conceived,

GAULEY BRIDGE & VrClNlTY.

._ THUI.-ll.CO

of making the Kanawha valley the line of an important
movement into eastern Virginia. It pointed very plainly,
also, to the true theory of operations in that country.
Gauley Bridge should have been held with a good brigade
which could have had outposts several miles forward in
three directions, and, assisted by a small body of horse
to scour the country fifty miles or more to the front, the
garrison could have protected all the country which we
ever occupied permanently. A similar post at Huttons-
ville with detachments at the Cheat Mountain pass and

GAULEY BRIDGE 83

Elkwater pass north of Huntersville would have covered
the only other practicable routes through the mountains
south of the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.
These would have been small intreuched camps, defen-
sive in character, but keeping detachments constantly
active in patrolling the front, going as far as could be
done without wagons. All that ever was accomplished
in that region of any value would thus have been attained
at the smallest expense, and the resources that were for
three years wasted in those mountains might have been
applied to the legitimate lines of great operations from
the valley of the Potomac southward.

Nothing could be more romantically beautiful than the
situation of the post at Gauley Bridge. The hamlet had,
before our arrival there, consisted of a cluster of two or
three dwellings, a country store, a little tavern, and a
church, irregularly scattered along the base of the moun-
tain and facing the road which turns from the Gauley
valley into that of the Kanawha. The lower slope of the
hillside behind the houses was cultivated, and a hedge-
row separated the lower fields from the upper pasturage.
Above this gentler slope the wooded steeps rose more
precipitately, the sandstone rock jutting out into crags
and walls, the sharp ridge above having scarcely soil
enough to nourish the chestnut-trees, here, like Mrs.
Browning's woods of Vallombrosa, literally " clinging by
their spurs to the precipices." In the angle between
the Gauley and New rivers rose Gauley Mount, the base
a perpendicular wall of rocks of varying height, with
high wooded slopes above. There was barely room for
the road between the wall of rocks and the water on the
New River side, but after going some distance up
the valley, the highway gradually ascended the hillside,
reaching some rolling uplands at a distance of a couple
of miles. Here was Gauley Mount, the country-house
of Colonel C. Q. Tompkins, formerly of the Army of

84 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the United States, but now the commandant of a Con-
federate regiment raised in the Kanawha valley. Across
New River the heavy masses of Cotton Mountain rose
rough and almost inaccessible from the very water's edge.
The western side of Cotton Mountain was less steep, and
buttresses formed a bench about its base, so that in look-
ing across the Kanawha a mile below the junction of the
rivers, one saw some rounded foothills which had been
cleared on the top and tilled, and a gap in the mountain-
ous wall made room on that side for a small creek which
descended to the Kanawha, and whose bed served for
a rude country road leading to Fayette C. H. At the
base of Cotton Mountain the Kanawha equals the united
width of the two tributaries, and flows foaming over
broken rocks with treacherous channels between, till it
dashes over the horseshoe ledge below, known far and
wide as the Kanawha Falls. On either bank near the
falls a small mill had been built, that on the right bank
a saw-mill and the one on the left for grinding grain.

Our encampment necessarily included the saw-mill
below the falls, where the First Kentucky Regiment was
placed to guard the road coming from Fayette C. H.
Two regiments were encamped at the bridge upon the
hillside above the hedgerow, having an advanced post
of half a regiment on the Lewisburg road beyond the
Tompkins farm, and scouting the country to Sewell
Mountain. Smaller outposts were stationed some distance
up the valley of the Gauley. My headquarters tents
were pitched in the door-yard of a dwelling-house facing
the Gauley River, and I occupied an unfurnished room
in the house for office purposes. A week was spent,
without molestation, exploring the country in all direc-
tions and studying its topography. A ferry guided by a
cable stretching along the piers of the burnt bridge com-
municated with the outposts up the New River, and a
smaller ferrv below the Kanawha Falls connected with the

GAULEY BRIDGE 85

Fayette road. Systematic discipline and instruction in
outpost duty were enforced, and the regiments rapidly
became expert mountaineers and scouts. The popula-
tion was nearly all loyal below Gauley Bridge, but above
they were mostly Secessionists, a small minority of the
wealthier slaveholders being the nucleus of all aggressive
secession movements. These, by their wealth and social
leadership, overawed or controlled a great many who
did not at heart sympathize with them, and between
parties thus formed a guerilla warfare became chronic.
In our scouting expeditions we found little farms in
secluded nooks among the mountains, where grown men
assured us that they had never before seen the American
flag, and whole families had never been further from
home than a church and country store a few miles away.
From these mountain people several regiments of Union
troops were recruited in West Virginia, two of them
being organized in rear of my own lines, and becoming
part of the garrison of the district in the following season.
I had been joined before reaching Gauley Bridge by
Chaplain Brown of the Seventh Ohio, who had obtained
permission to make an adventurous journey across the
country from Sutton to bring me information as to the
position and character of the outposts that were stretch-
ing from the railway southward toward our line of
operations. Disguised as a mountaineer in homespun
clothing, his fine features shaded by a slouched felt hat,
he reported himself to me in anything but a clerical garb.
Full of enterprise as a partisan leader of scouts could be,
he was yet a man of high attainments in his profession, of
noble character and real learning. When he reached me,
I had as my guest another chaplairi who had accepted a
commission at my suggestion, the Rev. Mr. Dubois, son-
in-law of Bishop Mcllvaine of Ohio, who had been leader
of the good people at Chillicothe in providing a supper
for the Eleventh Ohio as we were on our way from Camp

86 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Dennison to Gallipolis. He had burned to have some
part in the country's struggle, and became a model chap-
lain till his labors and exposure broke his health and
forced him to resign. The presence of two such men
gave some hours of refined social life in th. intervals of
rough work. One evening walk along the Kanawha has
ever since remained in my memory associated with Whit-
tier's poem " The River Path," as a wilder and more bril-
liant type of the scene he pictured. We had walked out
beyond the camp, leiving its noise and its warlike associa-
tions behind us, for a turn of the road around a jutting
cliff shut it all out as completely as if we had been trans-
ported to another land, except that the distant figure of a
sentinel on post reminded us of the limit of safe sauntering
for pleasure. My Presbyterian and Episcopalian friends
forgot their differences of dogma, and as the sun dropped
behind the mountain tops, making an early twilight in the
valley, we talked of home, of patriotism, of the relation of
our struggle to the world's progress, and other high themes,

when

" Sudden our pathway turned from night,
The hills swung open to the light;
Through their green gates the sunshine showed,
A long, slant splendor downward flowed.
Down glade and glen and bank it rolled ;
It bridged the shaded stream with gold ;
And borne on piers of mist, allied
The shadowy with the sunlit side I "

The surroundings, the things of which we talked, our own
sentiments, all combined to make the scene stir deep emo-
tions for which the poet's succeeding lines seem the only
fit expression, and to link the poem indissolubly with the
scene as if it had its birth there.

When Wise had retreated from the valley, Colonel
Tompkins had been unable to remove his family, and had
left a letter commending them to our courteous treatment.
Mrs. Tompkins was a lady of refinement, and her position

GAULEY BRIDGE 87

within our outposts was far from being a comfortable one.
She, however, put a cheerful face upon her situation,
showed ^reat tact in avoiding controversy with the soldiers
and in conciliating the good-will of the officers, and re-
mained with her children and servants in her picturesque
home on the mountain. So long as there was no fighting
in the near vicinity, it was comparatively easy to save her
from annoyance; but when a little later in the autumn
Floyd occupied Cotton Mountain, and General Rosecrans
was with us with larger forces, such a household became
an object of suspicion and ill-will, which made it necessary
to send her through the lines to her husband. The men
fancied they saw signals conveyed from the house to the
enemy, and believed that secret messages were sent, giving
information of our numbers and movements. All this was
highly improbable, for the lady knew that her safety de-
pended upon her good faith and prudence ; but such camp
rjfpjr becomes a power, and Rosecrans found himself
compelled to end it by sending her away. He could no
longer be answerable for her complete protection. This,
however, was not till November, and in August it was only
a pleasant variation, in going the rounds, to call at the
pretty house on Gauley Mount, inquire after the welfare
of the family, and have a moment's polite chat with the
mistress of the mansion.

For ten days after we occupied Gauley Bridge, all our
information showed that General Wise was not likely to
attempt the reconquest of the Kanawha valley voluntarily.
His rapid retrograde march ended at White Sulphur Springs
and he went into camp there. His destruction of bridges
and abandonment of stores and munitions of war showed
that he intended to take final leave of our region.^ The
contrast between promise and performance in his case had
been ludicrous. When we entered the valley, we heard of

^ My report to Rosecrans, O. R., vol, li. pt. i. p. 40. Wise to Lee, /«/.,
vol. ii. p. I0I2 ; vol, v. p. 769.

88 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

his proclamations and orders, which breathed the spirit of
desperate hand-to-hand conflict. His soldiers had been
told to despise long-range fire-arms, and to trust to bowie-
knives, which our invading hordes would never dare to face.
We found some of these knives among the arms we cap-
tured at the Gauley, — ferocious-looking weapons, made
of broad files ground to a double edge, fitted with rough
handles, and still bearing the cross-marking of the file on
the flat sides. Such arms pointed many a sarcasm among
our soldiers, who had found it hard in the latter part of
our advance to get within even the ioiigest musket-range
of the enemy's column. It was not strange that ignorant
men should think they might find use for weapons less
serviceable than the ancient Roman short-sword ; but that,
in the existing condition of military science, officers could
be found to share and to encourage the delusion was
amusing enough ! With the muskets we captured, we
armed a regiment of loyal Virginians, and turned over the
rest to Governor Peirpoint for similar nse.^

On the 5th of August Lieutenc; it Wagner of the En-
gineers arrived at Gauley Bridge with instructions from
General Rosecrans to superintend the construction of such
fortifications as might be proper for a post of three regi-
ments. I had already with me Colonel Whittlesey,

* In some documents which fell into our hands we found a series of reso-
lutions passed at a meeting in the spring at which one of the companies now
with Wise was organized. It shows the melodramatic truculence which vas
echoed in the exhortations of the general and of other men who should have
had more judgment. The resolutions were these : —

"Resolved: i. That this company was formed for the defence of this
Commonwealth against her enemies of the North, and for no other purpose.

Resolved: 2. That the so-called President of the United States by his
war policy has deliberately insulted the people of this Commonwealth, and
if blood he wants, blood he can have.

Resolved: 3. That we are ready to respond to the call of the Governor
of this Commonwealth for resisting Abraham Lincoln and the New York
stock-jobbers, and all who sympathize with them.

Resolved: 4. That we have not forgotten Harper's Ferry and John
Brown."

GAULEY BRIDGE 89

Governor Dennison's chief engineer, an old West Point
graduate, who had for some years been devoting himself
to scientific pursuits, especially to geology. In a few
days these were joined by Captain Benham, who was
authorized to determine definitely the plans of our de-
fences. I was thus stronger in engineering skill than in
any other department of staff assistants, though in truth
there was little fortifying to be done beyond what the
contour of the ground indicated to the most ordinary
comprehension.^

Benham stayed but two or three days, modified Wag-
ner's plans enough to feel that he had made them his own,
and then went back to Rosecrans's headquarters, where he
was met with an appointment as brigadier-general, and was
relieved of staff duty. He was a stout red-faced man, with
a blustering air, dictatorial and assuming, an army engineer
of twenty-five years* standing. He was no doubt well skilled
in the routine of his profession, but broke down when bur-
dened with the responsibility of conducting the movement
of troops in the field. Wagner was a recent graduate of
the Military Academy, a genial, modest, intelligent young
man of great promise. He fell at the siege of Yorktown
in the next year. Whittlesey was a veteran whose varied
experience in and out of the army had all been turned to
good account. He was already growing old, but was inde-
fatigable, pushing about in a rather prim, precise way,
advising wisely, criticising dryly but in a kindly spirit, and
helping bring every department into better form. I soon
lost both him and McElroy, my adjutant-general, for their
three months* service was up, and they were made, the one
colonel, and the other major of the Twentieth Ohio Regi-

1 The cause of this visit of the Engineers is found in a dispatch sent by
McClellan to Rosecrans, warning him that Lee and Johnston were both actu-
ally in march to crush our forces in West Virginia, and directing that Hut-
tonsville and Gauley Bridge be strongly fortified. O. R., vol. v. p. 555 ; Id.^
vol. li. pt. i. pp. 445, 446.

90 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ment, of which my friend General Force was the lieutenant-
colonel.

We fortified the post by an epaulement or two for can-
non, high up on the hillside cov^t^ring the ferry and the
road up New River. An infantry trench, with parapet
of barrels filled with earth, was run along the margin of
Gauley River till it reached a creek coming down from the
hills on the left. There a redoubt for a gun or two was
made, commanding a stretch of road above, and the infantry
trench followed the line of the creek up to a gorge in the
hill. On the side of Gauley Mount facing our post, we
slashed the timber from the edge of the precipice nearly to
the top of the mountain, making an entanglement through
which it was impossible that any body of troops should
move. Down the Kanawha, below the falls, we strength-
ened the saw-mill with logs, till it became a block-house
loopholed for musketry, commanding the road to Charles-
ton, the ferry, and the opening of the road to Fayette
C. H. A single cannon was here put in position also.

All this took time, for so small a force as ours could not
make very heavy details of working parties, especially as
our outpost and reconnoitring duty was also very labo-
rious. This duty was done by infantry, for cavalry I had
none, except the squad of mounted messengers, who kept
carefully out of harm's way, more to save their horses
than themselves, for they had been enlisted under an old law
which paid them for the risk of their own horses, which risk
' they naturally tried to make as small as possible. My recon-
noitring parties reached Big Sewell Mountain, thirty-five
miles up New River, Summersville, twenty miles up the Gau-
ley, and made excursions into the counties on the left bank of
the Kanawha, thirty or forty miles away. These were not
exceptional marches, but were kept up with an industry
that gave the enemy an exaggerated idea of our strength
2& well as of our activity.

About the lOth of August we began to get rumors

GAULEY BRIDGE 91

from the country that General Robert E. Lee had arrived
at Lewisburg to assume direction of the Confederate move-
ments into West Virginia. We heard also that Floyd with
a strong brigade had joined that of Wise, whose " legion "
had been reinforced, and that this division, reported to
be 10,000 or 12,000 strong, would immediately operate
against me at Gauley Bridge. We learned also of a general
stir among the Secessionists in Fayette, Mercer, and Ra-
leigh counties, and of the militia being ordered out under
General Chapman to support the Confederate movement
by operating upon my line of communications, whilst
Floyd and Wise should attack in front.

The reported aggregate of the enemy's troops was, as
usual, exaggerated, but we now know that it amounted
to about 8000 men, a force so greatly superior to any-
thing I could assemble to oppose it, that the situation
became at once a very grave one for me.^ To resist this
advance, I could keep but two regiments at Gauley Bridge,
an advance-guard of eight companies vigorously skirmish-
ing toward Sewell Mountain, a regiment distributed on the
Kanawha to cover steamboat communications, and some
companies of West Virginia recruits organizing at the mouth
of the Kanawha. By extreme activity these were able to
baffle the enemy, and impose upon him the belief that our
numbers were more than double our actual force.

Small hostile parties began to creep in toward the navi-
gable part of the Kanawha, and to fire upon the steam-
boats, which were our sole dependence for supplying our
depots at Charleston and at the head of navigation. Gen-
eral Rosecrans informed me of his purpose to march a

' On the 14th of August Wise reported to General Lee that he had 2000
men ready to move, and could have 2500 ready in five days ; that 550 of
his cavalry were with Floyd, besides a detachment of go artillerists. This
makes his total force 3100. At that time he gives Floyd's force at 1200 with
two strong regiments coming up, besides 2000 militia under General Chapman.
The aggregate force operating on the Kanawha line he gives as 7800. (O. R.
vol V. p. 787.)

92 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sufficiently strong column to meet that under Lee as soon
as the purpose of the latter should be developed, and en-
couraged me to hold fast to my position. I resolved,
therefore, to stand a siege if need be, and pushed my
means of transportation to the utmost, to accumulate a
store of supplies at Gauley Bridge. I succeeded in getting
up rations sufficient to last a fortnight, but found it much
harder to get ammunition, especially for my ill-assorted
little battery of cannon.

The Twenty-sixth Ohio came into the Kanawha valley on
the 8th through a mistake in their orders, and their arrival
supplied for a few days the loss of the Twenty-first, which had
gone home to be mustered out and reorganized. Some
companies of the newly forming Fourth Virginia were those
who protected the village ot Point Pleasant at the mouth
of the river, and part of the Twelfth and Twenty-sixth Ohio
were in detachments from Charleston toward Gauley Bridge,
furnishing guards for the steamboats and assisting in the
landing and forwarding of supplies. The Eleventh Ohio,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, which still had only
eight companies, had the task of covering and reconnoi-
tring our immediate front, and was the advance-guard
already mentioned. Part of the Twelfth under Major
Hines did similar work on the road to Summersville, where
Rosecrans had an advanced post, consisting of the Seventh
Ohio (Colonel E. B. Tyler), the Thirteenth (Colonel Wtn.
Sooy Smith), and the Twenty-third (Lieutenant-Colonel
Stanley Matthews). On the 13th of August the Seventh
Ohio, by orders from Rosecrans, marched to Cross Lanes,
the intersection of the read from Summersville to Gauley
Bridge, with one from Carnifex Ferry, which is on the
Gauley near the mouth of Meadow River. A road called
the Sunday Road is in the Meadow River valley, and joins
the Lewisburg turnpike about fifteen miles in front of Gau-
ley Bridge.^ To give warning against any movement of

^ See Official Atlas, Plate IX. 3, and map, p. 106, post

GAULEY BRIDGE -93

the enemy to turn my position by this route or to inter-
vene between me and Rosecrans's posts at Summersvillc
and beyond, was Tyler's task. He was ordered to picket
all crossings of the river near his position, and to join my
command if he were driven away. I was authorized to
call him to me in an emergency.

On the 15th Tyler was joined at Cross Lanes by the
Thirteenth and Twenty-third Ohio, in consequence of
rumors that the enemy was advancing upon Summersvillc
in force from Lewisburg. I would have been glad of such
an addition to my forces, but knowing that Rosecrans had
stationed them as his own outpost covering the Sutton and
Weston road, I ordered Tyler to maintain his own posi-
tion, and urged the others to return at once to Summers-
villc.^ The road by which they had expected the enemy
was the Wilderness road, which crossed the Gauley at
Hughes' Ferry, six miles above Carnifex. If attacked
from that direction, they should retire northward toward
Rosecrans, if possible.

Rosecrans gave orders to the same effect as soon as
he heard of the movement, saying that his intention had
been to station Smith and Matthews at Sutton, where
their retreat toward him in case of necessity would be
assured,'^ His orders for Tyler were that he should scout
far toward the enemy, " striking him wherever he can,"
and " hold his position at the ferries as long as he can
safely do it, and then fall back, as directed," toward Gauley
Bridge.^ The incident throws important light upon the
situation a week later, when Tyler was attacked by Floyd.
Floyd and Wise were now really in motion, though
General Lee remained at Valley Mountain near Hunters-
ville, whence he directed their movements. On the 17th
they had passed Sewell Mountain, but made slow prog-
ress in the face of the opposition of the Eleventh Ohio,

1 O. R., vol. 15. pt. i. pp. 449, 453, 454. 3 Dispatch of August 16.

* Dispatch of August 17.

94 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

which kept up a constant skirmish with thcm.^ On the
19th Floyd's advance-guard passed the mouth of the
Sunday Road on the turnpike, and on the 20th made so
determined a push at my advance-guard that I believed
it a serious effort of the whole Confederate column. I
strengthened my own advance-guard by part of the
Twelfth Ohio, which was at hand, and placed them at
Pig Creek, a mile beyond the Tompkins place, where the
turnpike crossed a gorge making a strongly defensible
position. The advance-guard was able to withstand the
enemy alone, and drove back those who assaulted them
with considerable loss. It has since appeared that this
movement of the enemy was by Wise's command making
a direct attack upon my position, whilst Floyd was moving
by the diagonal road to Dogwood Gap on the Sunday
Road where it crosses the old State Road. There he
encamped for the night, and next day continued his
march to the mouth of Meadow River near Carnifex
r^erry.' It was an affair of advance-guards in which Wise
was satisfied as soon as he found serious resistance, and
he retired during the night. On the first evidence of the
enemy's presence in force, I called Tyler from Cross
Lanes to Twenty-mile Creek, about six miles from Gauley
Bridge, where it was important to guard a road passing
to my rear, and to meet any attempt to turn my flank
if the attack should be determinedly made by the whole
force of the enemy.* As soon as the attack was repulsed,
Tyler was ordered to return to Cross Lanes and resume
his watch of the roads and river crossings there.* He was
delayed by the issue of shoes and clothing to his men,
and when he approached his former position on the 24th,
he found that Floyd was reported to have crossed the
Gauley at Carnifex Ferry. Without waiting to recon*

1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 792, 799 ; /</,, vol. li. pt. i. pp. 4SO-453-
' Id., vol. V. p. 800. ' Dispatch of August 20.

* Id; vol. li. pt. i, p. 454.

GAULEY BRIDGE 95

noitre the enemy at all, Tyler retreated to Peters Creek,
several miles. Floyd had in fact succeeded in raising two
small flatboats which Tyler had sunk but had not entirely
destroyed. With these for a ferry, he had crossed and
was intrenching himself where he was afterward attacked
by Rosecrans.

In the hope that only a small force had made the cross-
ing, I ordered Tyler to " make a dash at them, taking care
to keep your force well in hand so as to keep your retreat
safe." ^ I added : " It is important to give them such
a check as to stop their crossing." Meanwhile my
advance-guard up New River was ordered to demonstrate
actively in front and upon the Sunday Road, so as to
disquiet any force which had gone towards Tyler, and
I also sent forward half a regiment to Peters Creek (six
miles from Cross Lanes) to hold the pass there and secure
his retreat in case of need."

But Tyler was new to responsibility, and seemed para-
lyzed into complete inefficiency. He took nearly the
whole of the 25th to move slowly to Cross Lanes, though
he met no opposition. He did nothing that evening or
night, and his disposal of his troops was so improper
and outpost duty so completely neglected that on the
morning of the 26th, whilst his regiment was at breakfast,
it was attacked by Floyd on both flanks at once, and
was routed before it could be formed for action. Some
companies managed to make a show of fighting, but it
was wholly in vain, and they broke in confusion.^ About
15 were killed and 50 wounded, the latter with some
30 others falling into the enemy's hands. Tyler, with
his lieutenant-colonel, Creighton, came into Gauley Bridge
with a few stragglers from the regiment. Others followed
until about 200 were present. His train had reached
the detachment I had sent to Peters Creek, and this

1 Dispatch of August 24. a O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 457.

• /«/., pp. 458, 459, 461.

96 liEM/NISCENCES OF THE CIl^IL WAR

covered its retreat to camp, so that all his wagons came
in safely. He reported all his command cut to pieces
and captured except the few that were with him, and
wrote an official report of the engagement, giving that
result.

On the 28th, however, we heard that Major Case-
ment had carried 400 of the regiment safely into Charles-
ton. He had rallied them on the hills immediately after
the rout, and finding the direct road to Gauley Bridge
intercepted, had led them by mountain paths over
the ridges to the valley of Elk River, and had then
followed that stream down to Charleston without being
pursued.* This put a new face on the business, and Tyler
in much confusion asked the return of his report that
he might re-write it. I looked upon his situation as
the not unnatural result of inexperience, and contented
myself with informing General Rosecrans of the truth as
to the affair. Tyler was allowed to substitute a new
report, and his unfortunate affair was treated as a lesson
from which it was expected he would profit.^ It made
trouble in the regiment, however, where the line officers
did not conceal their opinion that he had failed in his
duty as a commander, and he was never afterward quite
comfortable among them.

The lieutenant-colonel, Creighton, was for a time in
the abyss of self-reproach. The very day they reached
Gauley Bridge in their unceremonious retreat, he came
to me, crying with shame, and said, " General, I have
behaved like a miserable coward, I ought to be cashiered,"
and repeated many such expressions of remorse. I com-
forted him by saying that the intensity of his own feeling
was the best proof that he had only yielded to a surprise
and that it was clear he was no coward. He died after-
ward at the head of his regiment in the desperate charge
up the hills at Ringgold, Georgia, in the campaign follow-

1 O. R., vol. U. pt. i. p. 462c 3 Rosecrans's dispatch, Id., p. 460.

GAULEY BRIDGE 9/

ing that of Chickamauga in the autumn of 1863, having
had the command for two years after Tyler became a
brigadier. During those two years the Seventh had been
in numberless engagements, and its list of casualties in
battle, made good by recruiting, was said to have reached
a thousand. Better soldiers there were none, and Crcigh-
ton proved himself a lion in every fight.

Casement, who rallied and led the most of the regiment
from Cross Lanes over the mountains to Charleston,
became afterward colonel of the One Hundred and Third
Ohio. He came again under my command in East Ten-
nessee In the winter of 1863, and continued one of my
brigade commanders to the close of the war. He was
a railway builder by profession, had a natural aptitude
for controlling bodies of men, was rough of speech but
generous of heart, running over with fun which no doleful-
ness of circumstance could repress, as jolly a comrade
and as loyal a subordinate as the army could show.

After the Cross Lanes affair I fully expected that the
Confederate forces would follow the route which Case-
ment had taken to Charleston. Floyd's inactivity puzzled
me, for he did no more than make an intrenched camp
at Carnifex Ferry, with outposts at Peters Mountain and
toward Summersville. The publication of the Confederate
Archives has partly solved the mystery. Floyd called
on Wise to reinforce him ; but the latter demurred, insist-
ing that the duty assigned him of attacking my position
in front needed all the men he had. Both appealed to
Lee, and Lee decided that Floyd was the senior and
entitled to command the joint forces.^ The letters of
Wise show a capacity for keeping a command in hot
water v\ hich was unique. If he had h'^en half as trouble-
some to me as he was to Floyd, I should indeed have
had a hot time of it. But he did me royal service by
preventing anything approaching to co-operation between
» o. R., vol. V. pp. 155-165, 800, 802-S13.

VOL. I. — 7

98 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the two Confederate columns. I kept my advance-guards
constantly feeling of both, and got through the period till
Rosecrans joined me with nothing more serious than
some sharp affairs of detachments.

I was not without anxiety, however, and was constantly
kept on the alert. Rosecrans withdrew the Twelfth Ohio
from my command, excepting two companies under
Major Hines, on the 19th of August,^ and the imperative
need of detachments to protect the river below me was
such that from this time till the middle of September my
garrison at Gauley Bridge, including advance-guards and
outposts, was never more than two and a half regiments
or 1800 m'^n. My artillerists were also ordered back to
Ohio to reorganize, leaving the guns in the hands of
such infantry details as I could improvise.^ I was lucky
enough, however, to get a very good troop of horse under
command of Captain Pfau in place of the irregular squad
I had before."

On the 25th my advance-guard under Lieutenant-Colo-
nel Frizell very cleverly succeeded in drawing into an
ambuscade a body of Floyd's cavalry under Colonel
A. G. Jenkins. The principal body of our men lined a
defile near the Hawk's Nest, and the skirmishers, retreat-
ing before the enemy, led them into the trap. Our men
began firing before the enemy was quite surrounded, and
putting their horses upon the run, they dashed back,
running the gantlet of the fire. Wise reported that he
met men with their subordinate officers flying at four miles'
distance from the place of the action, and so panic-
stricken that they could not be rallied or led back.* Jen-
kins was hurt by the fall of his horse, but he succeeded in
getting away ; for, as we had no horsemen to pursue with,
even the wounded, except one, could not be overtaken.

1 My dispatch to Rosecrans of August 19; also O. R., vol. li. pt.Lp. 454-
* Id., p. 462. » Id., p. 464.

< Id., vol. V. p. 816; Id., vol. IJ. pt. i. p. 457.

GAULEY BRIDGE 99

Hats, clothing, arms, and saddles were left scattered along
the road in as complete a breakneck race for life as was
ever seen. The result, if not great in the list of casualties,
which were only reported at lo or 15 by the enemy,
was so demoralizing in its influence upon the hostile cav-
alry that they never again showed any enterprise in harass-
ing our outposts, whilst our men gained proportionally
in confidence.

About the 30th of August we heard of an encampment
of Confederate militia at Boone C. H. which was so
situated, southwest of the Kanawha River, as to menace
our communications with the Ohio. I sent Lieutenant-
Colonel Enyart with half of the First Kentucky Regiment
to beat up this encampment, and he did so on the 2d of
September, completely routing the enemy, who left 25
dead upon the field. Enyart's march and attack had been
rapid and vigorous, and the terror of the blow kept that
part of the district quiet for some time afterward.^

We had heard for some days the news of the assembling
of a considerable force of Confederate militia at Fayette
C. H. under General Chapman and Colonel Beckley.
They were reported at 2500, which was a fair estimate
of the numbers which answered to the call. On the 3d
of September a pretty well combined attack was made
by Wise and this force ; Wise pushing in sharply upon the
turnpike, whilst Chapman, assisted by part of Wise's cav-
alry, drove back our small outpost on the Fayette road.
Wise was met at Pig Creek as in his former attack, the
eight companies of the Eleventh Ohio being strengthened
by half of the Twenty-sixth Ohio, which was brought
from below for this purpose. The effort was somewhat
more persistent than before, and Wise indulged in consid-
erable noisy cannonading; but the pickets retreated to
the creek without loss, and the whole advance-guard,
keeping under good cover there, repelled the attack with

1 O. R., vol. H. pt. i. pp. 465, 468, 472.

lOO REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

less than half a dozen casualties on our side, none being
fatal. Wise retreated again beyond Hawk's Nest.^ The
irregular troops on the Fayette road were more boldly
led, and as there was no defensible position near the river
for our outposts, these fell slowly back after a very warm
skirmish, inflicting a loss, as reported by prisoners, of
6 killed among the enemy. I expected Floyd to move
at the same time, and was obliged to continue upon
the defensive by reason of his threatening position up
the Gauley River ; I, however, sent Major Hines with his
two companies in that direction, and Floyd appeared
to be impressed with the idea that my whole force was
moving to attack him and attempted nothing aggressive.
As at this time Wise, in his letters to General Lee, puts
Floyd's force at 56(X), and his own at 2200,^ I had good
reason, therefore, to feel satisfied with being able to keep
them all at bay.

In the midst of the alarms from every side, my camp
itself was greatly excited by an incident which would have
been occasion for regret at any time, but which at such a
juncture threatened for a moment quite serious conse-
quences. The work of intrenching the position was going
on under the direction of Lieutenant Wagner as rapidly
as the small working parties available could perform it.
All were overworked, but it was the rule that men should
not be detailed for fatigue duty who had been on picket
the preceding night. On August 28th, a detail had been
called for from the Second Kentucky, which lay above the
hedge behind my headquarters, and they had reported
without arms under a sergeant named Joyce. A supply
of intrenching tools was stacked by the gate leading into
the yard where my staff tents were pitched, and my aide,
Lieutenant Conine, directed the sergeant to have his
m^vi take the tools and report to Mr. Wagner, the en-

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 468, 470. Wise's Report, Id., vol. v. p. 124.
* Id,, vol. V. p. 840.

GAULEY BRIDGE 10 1

gineer, on the line. The men began to demur in a half-
mutinous way, saying they had been on picket the night
before. Conine, who was a soldierly man, informed them
that that should be immediately looked into, and if so,
they would be soon relieved, but that they could not argue
the matter there, as their company commander was re-
sponsible for the detail. He therefore repeated his order.
The sergeant then became excited and said his men should
not obey. Lieutenant Gibbs, the district commissary,
was standing by, and drawing his pistol, said to Joyce,
"That's mutiny; order your men to take the tools or
I '11 shoot you." The man retorted with a curse,
*' Shoot ! " Gibbs fired, and Joyce fell dead. When the
sergeant first refused to obey, Conine coolly called out,
" Corporal of the guard, turn out the guard ! " intending
very properly to put the man in arrest, but the shot fol-
lowed too quick for the guard to arrive. I was sitting
within the house at my camp desk, busy, when the first
thing which attracted my attention was the call for the guard
and the shot. I ran out, not stopping for arms, and saw
some of the men running off shouting, " Go for your
guns, kill him, kill him ! " I stopped part of the men,
ordered them to take the sergeant quickly to the hospital,
thinking he might not be dead. I then ordered Gibbs in
arrest till an investigation should be made, and ran at
speed to a gap in the hedge which opened into the regi-
mental camp. It was not a moment too soon. The men
with their muskets were already clustering in the path,
threatening vengeance on Mr. Gibbs. I ordered them
to halt and return to their quarters. Carried away by
excitement, they levelled their muskets at me and bade
me get out of their way or they would shoot me. I man-
aged to keep cool, said the affair would be investigated,
that Gibbs was already under arrest, but they must go
back to their quarters. The parley lasted long enough
to bring some of their officers near. I ordered them to

102 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

come to my side, and then to take command of the men
and march them away. The real danger was over as
soon as the first impulse was checked.^ The men then
began to feel some of their natural respect for their com-
mander, and yielded probably the more readily because
they noticed that I was unarmed. I thought it wise to
be content with quelling the disturbance, and did not
seek out for punishment the men who had met me at the
gap. Their excitement had been natural under the cir-
cumstances, which were reported with exaggeration as a
wilful murder. If I had been in command of a larger force,
it would have been easy to turn out another regiment to
enforce order and arrest any mutineers ; but the Second
Kentucky was itself the only regiment on the spot. The
First Kentucky was a mile below, and the Eleventh Ohio
was the advance-guard up New River. Surrounded as
we were by so superior a force of the enemy with which
we were constantly skirmishing, I could not do otherwise
than meet the difficulty instantly without regard to per-
sonal risk. '

The sequel of the affair was not reached till some weeks
later when General Rosecrans assembled a court-martial
at my request. Lieutenant Gibbs was tried and ac-
quitted on the plain evidence that the man killed was in
the act of mutiny at the time. The court was a notable
one, as its judge advocate was Major R. B. Hayes of the
Twenty-third Ohio, afterwards President of the United
States, and one of its members was Lieutenant-Colonel
Stanley Matthews of the same regiment, afterwards one of
the Justices of the Supreme Court.'^

The constant skirmishing with the enemy on all sides

1 Dispatch to Rosecrans, August 29.

' Some twenty years later a bill passed the House of Representatives
pensioning the mother of the man killed, under the law giving pensions
to dependent relatives of those who died in the line of duty I It could
only have been smuggled through by concealment and falsification of facts,
and was stopped in the Senate.

GAULEY BRIDGE 103

continued till the loth of September, when General
Rosccrans with his column reached Cross Lanes and had
the action at Carnifex Ferry which I shall describe in
the next chapter. I had sent forward half a regiment
from my little command to open communication with
him as soon as possible. On September 9th a party
from this detachment had reached Cross Lanes and
learned that Floyd was keeping close within his lines
on the cliffs of Gaulcy above Carnifex Ferry. They,
however, heard nothing of Rosecrans, and the principal
body of their troops heard no sound of the engagement
on the loth, though within a very few miles.^ On the
1 2th communication was opened, and I learned of Floyd's
retreat across the Gauley. I immediately moved for-
ward the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth Ohio to attack Wise,
who retreated from Hawk's Nest to the mouth of the
Sunday Road, and upon my closer approach retired to
Scvvell Mountain.^ At the Sunday Road I was stopped
by orders from Rosecrans, who thought it unwise to
advance further till he had made a ferry at the Gauley and
succeeded in getting his command over; for Floyd had
again sunk the flatboats within reach, and these had to be
a second time raised and repaired. At his request I visited
the General at Carnifex Ferry, and then got permission
to move my column forward a few miles to Alderson's, or
Camp Lookout as we dubbed it, where a commanding
position controlled the country to the base of Sewell
Mountain.^ I was now able to concentrate the Seventh
Ohio at Gauley Bridge, and ordered forward the Second
Kentucky to join me in the new camp.

The period of my separate responsibility and of struggle
against great odds was not to close without a private grief
which was the more poignant because the condition of the
campaign forbade my leaving the post of duty. On the
day I visited General Rosecrans at Carnifex Ferry I got
1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 478. 2 /</., pp. 479, 481. » Id., p. 482.

Jsfe.',

104 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

news of the critical illness ol my youngest child, a babe of
eight months old, whom I had seen but a single day after
his birth, for I had been ordered into camp from the leg-
islature without time to make another visit to my family.
The warning dispatch was quickly followed by another
announcing the end, and I had to swallow my sorrows
as well as I could and face the public enemy before us,
leaving my wife uncomforted in her bereavement and all
the more burdened with care because she knew we were
resuming active operations in the field.

'^«w,

CHAPTER VI

CARNIFEX FERRY

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK

Rosecrans's march to join me — Reaches Cross Lanes — Advance against
Floyd — Engagement at Carnifex Ferry — My advance to Sunday Road

— Conference with Rosecrans — McCook's brigade joins me — Advance
to Camp Lookout — Brigade commanders — Rosecrans's personal char-
acteristics — Hartsuff — Floyd and Wise again — *' Battle of Bontecou "

— Sewell Mountain — The equinoctial — General Schenck arrives —
Rough lodgings — Withdrawal from the mountain — Rear-guard duties

— Major Slemmer of Fort Pickens fame — New positions covering Gau-
ley Bridge — Floyd at Cotton Mountain — Rosecrans's methods with
private soldiers — Progress in discipline.

/GENERAL ROSECRANS had succeeded McClellan
^^ as ranking officer in West Virginia, but it was not"
until the latter part of September that the region was
made a department and he was regularly assigned to
command. 1 Meanwhile the three months' enlistments
were expiring, many regiments were sent home, new ones
were received, and a complete reorganization of his forces
took place. Besides holding the railroad, he fortified the
Cheat Mountain pass looking toward Staunton, and the
pass at Elkwater on the mountain summit between Hut-
tonsville and Huntersville. My own fortifications at
Gauley Bridge were part of the system of defensive works
he had ordered. By the middle of August he had estab-
lished a chain of posts, with a regiment or two at each,
on a line upon which he afterwards marched, from Wes-
ton by way of Bulltown, Sutton, and Summersville to
Gauley Bridge.

1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 604, 616, 647.

io6

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

As soon as he received the news of Floyd's attack upon
Tyler at Cross Lanes, he hastened his preparations and
began his march southward from Clarksburg with three
brigades, having left the Upper Potomac line in com-
mand of General Kcllcy, and the Cheat Mountain region

in command of General J. J. Reynolds. His route (al-
ready indicated) was a rough one, and the portion of it
between Sutton and Summersville, over Birch Mountain,
was very wild and difficult. He crossed the mountain on
the 9th, and left his bivouac on the morning of the loth
of September, before daybreak. Marching through Sum-

CARNIFEX FERRY 107

mersville, he reached Cross Lanes about two o'clock in
the afternoon.* Floyd's position was now about two
miles distant, and, waiting only for his column to close
up, he again pressed forward. General IJcnham's bri-
gade was in front, and soon met the enemy's pickets.
Getting the impression that l-'loyd was in retreat, Jien-
ham pressed forward rather rashly, deploying to the left
and coming under a sharp fire from the right of the
enemy's works. Floyd had intrenched a line across a
bend of the Gauley River, where the road from Cross
Lanes to Lewisburg finds its way down the cliffs to
Carnifcx Ferry. His flanks rested upon precipices ris-
ing abruptly from the water's edge, and he also in-
trenched some rising ground in front of his principal
line, lienham's line advanced through dense and tan-
gled woods, ignorant of the enemy's position till it was
checked by the fire from his breastworks. It was too
late for a proper reconnoissance, and Rosecrans could only
hasten the advance and deployment of the other brigades
under Colonels McCook and Scammon.* Benham had
sent a howitzer battery and two rifletl cannon with his
head of column at the left, and these soon got a posi-
tion from which, in fact, they enfiladed part of Floyd's
line, though it was impossible to see much of the situa-
tion. Charges were made by portions of Bcnham's and
McCook' s brigades as they came up, but they lacked
unity, and Rosecrans was dissatisfied that his head of
column should be engaged before he had time to plan an
attack. Colonel Lowe of the Twelfth Ohio had been
killed at the head of his regiment, and Colonel Lytle of
the Tenth had been wounded ; darkness was rapidly com-
ing on, and Rosecrans ordered the troops withdrawn from
fire till positions could be rectified, and the attack re-
newed in the morning. Seventeen had been killed, and

* O. R., vol. V, p. 129.

* For organization of Rosecrans's forces, see /</., vol. li. pt. i. p. 471.

I08 HEM/XrSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

141 had been wounded in the sharp but irregular combat.*
Floyd, however, had learned that his position could be
subjected to destructive cannonade; he was himself
slightly wounded, and his officers and men were dis-
couraged. He therefore retreated across the Gauley in
the night, having great difficulty in carrying his artillery
down the cliffs by a wretched road in the darkness. He
had built a slight foot-bridge for infantry in the bit of
smooth water known as the Ferry, though both above
and below the stream is an impassable mountain torrent.
The artillery crossed in the fiatboats. Once over, the
bridge was broken up and the ferry-boats were sunk.
He reported but twenty casualties, and threw much of
the responsibility upon Wise, who had not obeyed orders
to reinforce him. His hospital, containing the wounded
prisoners taken from Tyler, fell into Rosecrans's hands.*
General Rosecrans found the country so difficult a one
that he was in no little doubt as to the plan of campaign
it was now best to follow. It was out of the question to
supply his column by wagon trains over the mountainous
roads from Clarksburg, and the Kanawha River must
therefore be made the line of communication with his
base, which had to be transferred to Gallipolis. In antici-
pation of this, I had accumulated supplies and ordnance
stores at Gauley Bridge as much as possible with my
small wagon trains, and had arranged for a larger depot
at the head of steamboat navigation. I was ready there-
fore to turn over the control of my supply lines to
Rosecrans's officers of the quartermaster and commissary
departments as soon as his wagon trains could be trans-

1 O. R., vol. V. p. 146.

* A very graphic description of this engagement and of Floyd's retreat
fell into my hands soon afterward. It w;is a journal of the campaign written
by Major Isaac Smith of the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment, which he
tried to send through our lines to his family in Charleston, W. Va., but
which was intercepted. A copy is on file in the War Archives. See also
Floyd's report, Id., vol. v. pp. 146-148.

CARNIFEX FERRY 109

ferred. It was to consult in regard to these matters, as
well as in regard to the future conduct of the campaign,
that the general directed me to visit his headquarters at
Carnifex Ferry. I rode over from my camp at the Sunday
Road junction on the morning of the 15th, found that one
of the little flatboats had been again raised and repaired
at Carnifex Ferry, and passing through the field of the
recent combat, reached the general's headquarters near
Cfvoss Lanes. I was able from personal observation to
assure him that it was easy for his command to follow
the line of march on which Floyd had retreated, if better
means of crossing the Gauley were provided; but when
they should join me on the Lewisburg turnpike, that
highway would be the proper line of supply, making
Gauley Bridge his depot. He hesitated to commit him-
self to either line for decisive operations until the
Gauley should be bridged, but on my description of the
commodious ferry I had made at Gauley Bridge by means
of a very large flatboat running along a hawser stretched
from bank to bank, he determined to advance, and to have
a bridge of boats made in place of my ferry. McCook's
brigade was ordered to report to me as soon as it could be
put over the river, and I was authorized to advance some
six miles toward the enemy, to Alderson's or Spy Rock,
already mentioned beyond which Big Sewell Mountain
is fourteen miles further to the southeast. ^

At Cross Lanes I met the commanders of the other
brigades who were called in by General Rosecrans for an
informal consultation based upon my knowledge of the
country and the enemy. I naturally scanned them with
some interest, and tried to make the most of the oppor-
tunity to become acquainted with them. General Ben-
ham I knew already, from his visit to me at Gauley
Bridge in his capacity of engineer officer. I had met
Colonel Robert McCook at Camp Dennison, and now that

* O. R., vol. V. p. 602.

no REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

it was intimated that he would be for some days under my
command, I recalled a scene I had witnessed there which
left many doubts in my mind whether he would prove
an agreeable subordinate. I had gone, one morning, to
General Bates's office, and as I entered found McCook
expressing himself with more vigor than elegance in re-
gard to some order which had been issued respecting his
regiment. My presence did not seem to interfere with
t'\e fluency of his remarks or the force of his expletives,
but after a moment or two he seemed to notice a look of
surprise in my face, and his own broadened humorously
as his manner changed from vehemence to geniality.
General Bates and he were familiar acquaintances at the
bar in Cincinnati, and McCook had evidently presumed
upon this as a warrant for speaking his mind as he
pleased. When he reported to me at this later period,
I found a hearty and loyal character under his bluff ex-
terior and rough speech, with real courage, a quick eye
for topography, and no lack of earnest subordination when
work was to be done. Although our service together was
short, I learned to have real respect for him, and sin-
cerely mourned his loss when, later in the war, he met
his tragic death. The other brigade commander was
Colonel E. P. Scammon of the Twenty-third Ohio. He
had graduated from West Point in 1837, ^"cl had served
in the Topographical Engineers of the regular army and
as instructor in the Military Academy. In the MrJcan
War he had been aide-de-camp to General Scott. He
had been out of the army for some years before the re-
bellion, and was acting as professor of mathematics in
St. Xavier's College, Cincinnati, when he was appointed
to the colonelcy of the Twenty-third Ohio upon Rose-
crans's promotion. Like Rosecrans, he was a Roman
Catholic, though himself of Puritan descent. It seems
that at the time of the Puseyite movement in England
and in this country there had been a good many conver-

CARNIFEX FERRY III

sions to Romanism among the students and teachers at
West Point, under the influence of the chaplain of the
post, and Scammon, among a number of young men who
subsequently became distinguished officers, was in this
number. It need hardly be said that Scammon was
well instructed in his profession. He was perhaps too
much wedded to the routine of the service, and was
looked upon by his subordinates as a martinet who had
not patience enough with the inexperience of volunteer
soldiers. He was one of the older men of our army,
somewhat under the average height and weight, with a
precise politeness of manner which reminded one of a
Frenchman, and the resemblance was increased by his
free use of his snuff-box. His nervous irritability was
the cause of considerable chafing in his command, but
this left him under fire, and those who had been with
hirn in action learned to admire his courage and conduct.
He was with me subsequently at South Mountain and
Antietam, and still later had the misfortune to be one
of those prisoners in the Confederates' hands who were
exposed to the fire of our batteries in front of Charles-
ton, S. C.

But being a subordinate, I was most interested in the
characteristics of our commander. Our Camp Dennison
acquaintance had been a pleasant one, and he greeted me
with a cordiality that was reassuring. His general ap-
pearance was attractive. He was tall but not heavy,
with the rather long head and countenance that is some-
times called Norman. His aquiline nose and bright
eyes gave him an incisive expression, increased by rapid
utterance in his speech, which was apt to grow hurried,
almost to stammering, when he was excited. His im-
pulsiveness was plain to all who approached him; his
irritation quickly flashed out in words when he was
crossed, and his social geniality would show itself in
smiles and in almost caressing gestures when he was

112 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

pleased. In discussing nrilitary questions he made free
use of his theoretic knowledge, often quoted authorities
and cited maxims of war, and compared the problem
before him to analogous cases in military history. This
did not go far enough to be pedantic, and was full of a
lively intelligence; yet it did not impress me as that
highest form of military insight and knowledge which
soives the question before it upon its own merits and
without conscious comparison with historical examples,
through a power of judgment and perception ripened and
broadened by the mastery of principles which have ruled
the great campaigns of the world. He was fond of con-
viviality, loved to banter good-humoredly his staff officers
and intimates, and was altogether an attractive and com-
panionable man, with intellectual activity enough to make
his society stimulating and full of lively discussion. I
could easily understand Garfield's saying, in his letter to
Secretary Chase which afterward became the subject of
much debate, that he "loved every bone in his body." ^

Rosecrans's adjutant-general was Captain George L.
Hartsuff, an officer of the regular army, who was well
qualified to supplement in many ways the abilities and
deficiencies of his chief.^ He was a large man, of heavy

1 An anecdote told at my table in 1890 by the Rev. Dr. Morris, long
Professor in Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, is so characteristic of
Rosecrans that it is worth repeating. After the battle of Stone's River
(January, 1863) ^^r- Morris, who was then minister of a Presbyterian church
in Columbus, was made by Governor Tod a member of a commission sent
to look after the wounded soldiers. He called on General Rosecrans at
his headquarters in Murfreesboro, and among others met there Father Tracy,
the general's chaplain, a Roman Catholic priest. During the visit Rosecrans
was called aside (but in the same room) by a staff officer to receive informa-
tion about a spy who had been caught with-V. the lines. The general got
quite excited over the information, talked loudly and hurriedly in giving
directions concerning the matter, using some profane language. It seemed
suddenly to occur to him that the clergymen were present, and from the
opposite side of the room he turned toward them, exclaiming apologetically,
" Gentlemen, I sometimes sivear, but I never blaspheme I "

8 Hartsuff was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers in the next year

CARNTFEX FERRY 1 13

frame ; his face was broad, and his bald head, tapering
high, gave a peculiar pyramidal appearance to his figure.
He was systematic and accurate in administrative work,
patient and insistent in bringing the young volunteer
officers in his department into habits of order and good
military form. His coolness tempered the impulsiveness
of his chief, and as they were of similar age and had
about the same standing in the army before the war, the
familiarity between them was that of comrades and equals
more than of commander and subordinate.

My intercourse with these officers on the occasion of
my visit to Cross Lanes was only the beginning of the
acquaintance on which I based the estimate of them
which I have given; but it was a good beginning, for
the cordial freedom of thought and speech in the confer-
ence was such as to bring out the characteristics of the
men. I rode back to my camp in the evening, feeling a
sense of relief at the transfer of responsibility to other
shoulders. The command of my brigade under the orders
of Rosecrans seemed an easy task compared with the
anxieties and the difficulties of the preceding three
months. And so it was. The difference between chief
responsibility in military movements and the leadership
even of the largest subordinate organizations of an army
is heaven-wide ; and I believe that no one who has tried
both will hesitate to say that the subordinate knows little
or nothing of the strain upon the will and the moral facul-
ties which the chief has to bear.

McCook's brigade joined me on the i6tb, and we im-
mediately marched to Alderson's, where we made a camp
afterward known as Camp Lookout.^ I was able to bring
up the Second Kentucky Regiment from Gauley Bridge,

and was severely wounded at Antietam, after which he was made major-
general and commanded the Twenty-third Army Corps in Burnside's cam-
paign of East Tennessee.
* O. R., vol. H. pt. i. p. 481.
VOL. I. — 8

114 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

giving me in hand three regiments of my own brigade.
I sent forward Major Hines with five companies as an
advance-guard, and with these he scouted the country as
far as the top of Big Sewell Mountain, and was able to
give us definite information that Floyd had retreated as
far as Meadow Bluff, where the WilderncoS road joins the
turnpike. Wise halted at Big Sewell Mountain and per-
sisted in keeping his command separate from Floyd, who
ordered him to join the rest of the column at Meadow
Bluff. 1 On the 20th September my advance-guard oc-
cupied the crest of the mountain, whilst Wise withdrew
to a parallel ridge a mile beyond, and loudly insisted that
Floyd should join him there instead of concentrating the
Confederate force at Meadow Bluff. General Lee reached
the latter place in person on the 21st, but found Wise's
headstrong and captious spirit hardly more amenable to his
discipline than to Floyd's. He shared Floyd's opinion
that it was better to await Rosecrans's advance at Meadow
Bluff, throwing upon the National forces the burden of
transportation over the extended line, whilst guarding
against a possible turning movement by the Wilderness
road. But Wise was so noisy in his assertions that his
was the only position in which to fight, that Lee hesi-
tated to order him back peremptorily, and finally yielded
to his clamor and directed Floyd to advance to Wise's
position.'* The scandal of the quarrel between the two
officers had, however, become so notorious that the Rich-
mond government had authorized Lee to send Wise else-
where, and, probably on his advice, the Confederate War
Department ordered Wise to report at Richmond in per-
son. The last scene in the comedy was decidedly amus-
ing. Wise appealed passionately to Lee to say whether
his military honor did not require that he should disobey
the order till the expected battle should be fought, and
Lee, no doubt in dismay lest he should still fail to get

1 o. R., vol. V. pp. 854, 85s, 862. 3 Id., pp. 868, 874, 878, 879.

..,i->'-_V.*_'.i*r'. .

TO SEW ELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II5

rid of so intractable a subordinate, gravely advised him
that both honor and duty would be safe in obeying
promptly the order. ^

Whilst waiting at Camp Lookout for authority to move
forward, an incident occurred which gave us a little ex-
citement and amusement, and which shows, better than
much explanation could do, the difficult and intricate
character of the country in which we were operating. A
wagon-master from our camp had gone out hunting for
forage, which was very scarce. He soon came back in
excitement, reporting that he had come upon an encamp-
ment of a regiment of the enemy between our camp and
New River and somewhat in our rear. His report was
very circumstantial, but was so improbable that I was
confident there was some mistake about it. He was,
however, so earnest in his assertions that he could not
be mistaken, that McCook, in whose brigade he was, sent
out an officer with some men, guided by the wagon-mas-
ter, to verify the report. The story was confirmed, and
the matter was brought to me for action. Puzzled but
not convinced, and thinking that as McCook's command
was new to the country, it would be better to send some
one who was used to scouting in the mountain?, I ordered
a lieutenant named Bontecou, of the Second Kentucky
Regiment, to take a small party and examine che case
anew. Bontecou had done a good deal of successful work
in this line, and was regarded as a good woodsman and an
enterprising scout. He too came back at nightfall, say-
ing that there could be no mistake about it. He had
crept close to the sentinels of the camp, had counted the
tents, and being challenged by the guard, had made a run
for it through the thicket, losing his hat. The position
of the enemy was, by all the reports, about three miles
from us, diagonally in rear of our right flank. It now
seemed that it must be true that some detachment had

» o. R., vol. V. p. 879.

Il6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

been delayed in joining the retreating column, and had
found itself thus partly cut off by our advance. I there-
fore ordered McCook to start at earliest peep of day, upon
the Chestnutburg road (on which the wagon-master had
been foraging), and passing beyond the hostile detach-
ment, attack from the other side, it being agreed by all
the scouting parties that this would drive the enemy
toward our camp. My own brigade would be disposed
of to intercept the enemy and prevent escape. McCook
moved out as ordered, and following his guides came by
many devious turns to a fork in the road, following
which, they told him, a few minutes would bring him
upon the enemy. He halted the column, and with a
small skirmishing party went carefully forward. The
guides pointed to a thicket from which the Confederates
could be seen. His instinct for topography had made
him suspect the truth, as he had noted the courses in
advancing, and crawling through the thicket, he looked
out from the other side upon what he at once recognized
as the rear of his own camp, and the tents of the very
regiment from which he had sent an officer to test the
wagon-master's report. All the scouts had been so de-
ceived by the tangle of wooded hills and circling roads
that they fully believed they were still miles from our
position; and, bewildered in the labyrinth, they were
sure the tents they saw were the enemy's and not ours.
The march had been through rain and mist, through
dripping thickets and on muddy roads, and the first im-
pulse was wrath at the erring scouts; but the ludicrous
side soon prevailed, and officers and men joined in hearty
laughter over their wild-goose chase. They dubbed the
expedition the "Battle of Bontecou," and it was long be-
fore the lieutenant heard the last of the chaffing at his
talents as a scout. ^

Major Hines's reports of the strength of the position on

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 484, 485.

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II7

Sewell Mountain which the enemy had occupied, and my
own reconnoissance of the intervening country, satisfied
me that if we meant to advance on this line, we ought
not to give the enemy time to reconsider and to reoccupy
the mountain top from which he had retreated. On rep-
resenting this to General Rosecrans, he authorized me
to advance twelve miles to the Confederate camp on Big
Sewell, directing me, however, to remain upon the de-
fensive when there, and to avoid bringing on any engage-
ment till he could bring up the rest of the column. ^ His
means of crossing at Carnifex Ferry were so poor that
what he had thought would be done in two or three days
from the time McCook joined me, took a full fortnight to
accomplish.

I marched with my own and McCook' s brigades on the
23d September, but when I reached the Confederate camp
where Hines with the advance-guard awaited me, it was
evident at a glance that we must go further. ^ The posi-
tion was a very strong one for resisting an approach from
our direction, but was commanded by higher ground be-
yond. The true crest of the mountain was two miles fur-
ther on, and there alone could we successfully bar the
way against a superior force coming from the east. I
therefore marched rapidly forward and occupied the crest
in force. It was impossible to hide the whole of our
camp from view and properly hold the position, but we
made use of such cover as we could find, and prepared to
defend the pass against all comers, since it was vain to
attempt to mystify the enemy as to our advance in force.
On the 24th we had a lively skirmish with Wise's legion
in front, and forced it to retire to a ridge out of range of
our artillery. We dismounted one of his howitzers in the
engagement, but contented ourselves with making him
yield the ground which would interfere with our easy
holding of our own position and the spurs of the moun-

1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 484, 486. a Id., p. 487.

Il8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

tain directly connected with it. Wise had learned that
Rosecrans was not with my column, and on the supposi-
tion that the advance was made by my brigade only, Lee
concluded to order Floyd to Wise's camp, being now sat
isfied that no movement of our troops had been made by
way of the Wilderness road. It was at this time that
Wise was relieved of command and ordered to Richmond,
and Lee found it advisable to unite his forces and take
command in person.

The relations of these three distinguished Virginians
had not begun with this campaign, but dated back to the
capture of John Brown at Harper's Ferry. Wise was then
the governor of his State, and received from Lee the pris-
oner whose execution at Charlestown was to become an
historical event. Floyd, who himself had once been gov-
ernor of Virginia, was then Buchanan's Secretary of
War, and ordered Lee with the detachment of marines to
Harper's Ferry, where they stormed the engine-house
which Brown had made his fort. Dealing with such men
as his subordinates, and with such a history behind them,
it can easily be understood that Lee would feel no ordi-
nary delicacy in asserting his authority, and no common
embarrassment at their quarrels.

Rosecrans was at first disturbed at my going further
than had been expected;^ but he was soon satisfied that
nothing better could have been done. It is true that I
was thirty-five miles from the supports in the rear,
whether at Camifex Ferry or Gauley Bridge; but the
position was almost impregnable in front, and by watch-
fulness I should know of any attempt to turn it in time
to make safe ray retreat to Camp Lookout. On the 26th
Scammon's brigade came within easy supporting dis-
tance, and General Rosecrans came in person to my
camp. He had not been able to bring up his headquar-
ters train, and was my guest for two or three days, shar-

1 Rosecrans's Dispatches, O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 486, 487.

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II9

ing my tent with me. Cold autumnal rains cf^t in on the
very day the general came to the front, and continued
almost without intermission. In the hope of still hav-
ing some favorable weather for campaigning, the other
brigades were brought forward, and the whole force was
concentrated at the mountain except the necessary garri-
sons for the posts in the rear. Brigadier-General Robert
C. Schenck reported for duty in the evening of a fearfully
stormy day whilst Rosecrans was still my tent-mate. He
had heard rumors of fighting at the front, and had hur-
ried forward with a couple of staff officers, but without
baggage. My staff officers were sharing their shelter
with the gentlemen who had accompanied Rosecrans, but
the new-comers were made heartily welcome to what we
had. In my own tent General Rosecrans occupied my
camp cot ; I had improvised a rough bunk for myself on
the other side of the tent, but as General Schenck got in
too late for the construction of any better resting-place,
he was obliged to content himself with a bed made of
three or four camp-stools set in a row. Anything was
better than lying on the damp ground in such a storm ;
but Schenck long remembered the aching weariness of
that night, as he balanced upon the narrow and unstable
supports which threatened to tumble him upon the ground
at the least effort to change the position of stiffened body
and limbs. One could not desire better companionship
than we had during our waking hours, for both my guests
had had varied and interesting experience and knew how
to make it the means of delightful social intercourse
and discussion. The chilly temperature of the tent was
pleasantly modified by a furnace which was the successful
invention of the private soldiers. A square trench was
dug from the middle of the tent leading out behind it;
this was capped with flat stones three or four inches
thick, which were abundant on the mountain. At the
end of it, on the outside, a chimney of stones plastered

I20 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IV A R

with mud was built up, and the whole topped out by an
empty cracker-barrel by way of chimney-pot. The fire
built in the furnace had good draught, and the thick
stones held the heat well, making, on the whole, the best
means of warming a tent which I ever tried. The objection
to the little sheet-iron stoves furnished with the Sibley
tent is that they are cold in a minute if the fire dies out.

The rains, when once they began, continued with such
violence that the streams were soon up, the common fords
became impassable, and the roads became so muddy and
slippery that it was with the utmost difficulty our little
array was supplied. The four brigades were so reduced
by sickness and by detachments that Rosecrans reported
the whole as making only 5200 effective men. Every
wagon was put to work hauling supplies and ammu-
nition, even the headquarters baggage vagons and the
regimental wagons of the troops, as well those stationed
in the rear as those in front. We were sixty miles from
the head of steamboat navigation, the wagon trains were
too small for a condition of things where the teams could
hardly haul half loads, and by the ist of October wo had
demonstrated the fact that it was impossible to sustain
our army any further from its base unless we could rely
upon settled weather and good roads.

Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Lor-
ing, his subordinate, on the Staunton l*.ne, to test the
strength of the posts under Reynolds a* Cheat Mountain
and Elkwater, and lively combats had resulted on the
1 2th and 14th of September. ^ Reynolds held firm, and
as Rosecrans was not diverted from his plans and was
pushing forward on the Lewisburg line, Lee ordered
Loring to report to him with most of his command.
Reynolds, in return, made a forced reconnoissance upon
the Confederate position at Greenbrier River on October
2d, but found it too strong to be carried. The reinforce-

J O. R., vol. V. pp. 185-193.

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 121

ment by Loring gave Lee a very positive advantage in
numbers, but the storms and foundering roads paralyzed
both armies, which lay opposite each other upon the crests
of Big Sewell separated by a deep gorge. On the 5th of
October the condition of the Kanawha valley had be-
come such that Rosecrans felt compelled to withdraw his
forces to the vicinity of Gauley Bridge. The freshet had
been an extraordinary one. At Charleston the Kanawha
River usually flows in a bed forty or fifty feet below the
plateau on which the town is built ; but the waters now
rose above these high banks and flooded the town itself,
being four or five feet deep in the first story of dwelling-
houses built in what was considered a neighborhood safe
from floods. The inundation almost stopped communica-
tion, though our quartermasters tried to remedy part of
the mischief by forcing light steamers up as near to the
Kanawha Falls as possible. But it was very difficult to
protect the supplies landed upon a muddy bank where
were no warehouses, and no protection but canvas covers
stretched over the piles of barrels and boxes of bread and
sacks of grain. There was enormous waste and loss, but
we managed to keep our men in rations, and were better
off than the Confederates, in regard to whom Floyd after-
ward reported to his government that the eleven days of
cold storms at Sewell Mountain had " cost more men, sick
and dead, than the battle of Manassas Plains. "

It has been asserted by Confederate writers that Lee
was executing a movement to turn Rosecrans's left flank
when the latter marched back from Sewell Mountain. If
so, it certainly had not gone far enough to attract our
attention, and from my own knowledge of the situation,
I do not believe it had passed beyond the form of discus-
sion of a possible movement when the weather should be-
come settled. Such plans were discussed on both sides,
but the physical condition of the country was an impera-
tive veto upon aggressive action.

132 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

During the 5th of October our sick and spare baggage
were sent back to Camp Lookout. Tents were struck at
ten o'clock in the evening, and the trains sent on their
way under escort at eleven. The column moved as soon
as the trains were out of the way, except my own brigade,
to which was assigned the duty of rear-guard. We re-
mained upon the crest of the hill till half-past one, the
men being formed in line of battle and directed to lie
down till the time for them to march. Our sentinels had
been posted with extra precaution, so that they might be
withdrawn an hour or two after the brigade should move.
Extra reserves were assigned to them, and Major Hines
put in command of the whole detachment, with orders to
keep in communication with me at the extreme rear of
the marching column. It was interesting to observe the
effect of this night movement upon the men. Their im-
agination was excited by the novelty of the situation, and
they furnished abundant evidence that the unknown is
always, in such cases, the wonderful. The night had
cleared off and the stars were out. The Confederate
position was eastward from us, and as a bright star rose
above the ridge on which the enemy was, we could hear
soldiers saying in a low tone to each other, "There goes
a fire balloon — it must be a signal — they must have dis-
covered what we are doing ! " The exaggerated parallax at
the horizon made the rising star seem to move rapidly for
the first few minutes, and men, ignorant of this, naturally
mistook its character. In a similar way an occasional
shot on the picket line would be the cause of a subdued
excitement. I doubt if soldiers ever make a night move-
ment in an enemy's presence without being under a
nervous strain which exaggerates the importance of every-
thing they see and hear, and this gives uncertainty and
increases the difficulty of such duty. It is no small part
of the duty of officers, in such cases, to allay this ten-
dency to excitement, to explain the situation, and by a

TO SEW ELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 1 23

wise mixture of information and discipline to keep the
men intelligently cool and in full command of their
faculties.

General Rosecrans had gone with the head of the col-
umn, and had left with me Major Slemmer, his inspector-
general, to bring him word when the rear of the column
-hould be in march. Slemmer was the officer who, as a
lieutenant, had distinguished himself by holding Fort
Pickens in Pensacola harbor at the outbreak of the rebel-
lion. He was a man of marked character, and in view of
his experience it may easily be understood that we had
no lack of interesting matter for conversation as we paced
in rear of the reclining men during the midnight hours.
His failing health prevented his taking the prominent
part in the war that his abilities warranted, but I have
retained, from that evening's work together, a pleasing
impression of his character and a respect for his military
knowledge and talents. In impressing on me the fact
that my position was the one of special honor in this
movement, he expressed the wish that Rosecrans had
himself remained there ; but the result showed that hardly
less than the commanding general's own authority and
energy could have got the column forward in the mud and
darkness. The troops had marched but a mile or two
when they overtook part of the wagon train toiling slowly
over the steep and slippery hills. Here and there a team
would be " stalled " in the mud, and it looked as if day-
light would overtake us before even a tolerably defensive
positiun would be reached. Rosecrans now gave his per-
sonal supervision to the moving of the wagons and artil-
lery, — wagon -master's work, it may be said, but it was
work which had to be done if the little army was not to
be found in the morning strung out and exposed to the
blows of the enemy if he should prove enterprising.

We who were at the rear did not know of the difficulty
the column was having, and when my messenger reported

124 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the rear of the preceding brigade a mile or more from the
camp, I gave the order to march, and my men filed into
the road. Slemmer went forward to inform the general
that we were in movement, and I remained with Major
Hines till all was quiet, when he was directed to call in
his pickets and sentinels and follow. I had gone hardly
a mile when wc were brought to a halt by the head of the
brigade overtaking those who had preceded us. Word
was brought back that the artillery was finding great
difficulty in getting over the first considerable hill west
of the mountain. We ourselves were upon the downward
road from the mountain crest, but our way led along the
side of a spur of the mountain which towered above us
on our left. We were in a dense wood that shut out the
stars, and in darkness that could almost be felt. I rode
back a little to meet Hines and to keep s '^ distance
between the column and his little rear-guard. We sent
a chain of sentinels over the hill commanding the road,
and waited, listening for any evidence that the enemy had
discovered our movement and followed. An hour passed
in this way, and the column moved on a short distance.
Again there was a halt, and again a deployment of our
sentries. When at last day broke, we were only three or
four miles from our camp of the evening before; but we
had reached a position which was easily defensible, and
where I could halt the brigade and wait for the others to
get entirely out of our way. The men boiled their coffee,
cooked their breakfast, and rested. Early in the forenoon
a small body of the enemy's cavalry followed us, but were
contented with very slight skirmishing, and we marched
leisurely to Camp Lookout before evening. Such night
marches from the presence of an enemy are among the
most wearing and trying in the soldier's experience, yet,
in spite of the temptation to invest them with extraordi-
nary peril, they are rarely interfered with. It is the un-
certainty, the darkness, and the effect of these upon men

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK

125

and officers that make the duty a delicate one. The risk
is more from panic than from the foe, and the loss is more
likely to be in baggage and in wagons than in men. I
have several times been in command of rear-guards on
such occasions, and I believe that I would generally pre-
fer an open withdrawal by day. It is not hard to hold
even a bold enemy at bay by a determined brigade or
division, and a whole army may be saved from the ex-
haustion and exposure whicl. rapidly i^ill the hospitals,
and may cost more than several combats between rear and
advance guards.

My brigade remained two or three days at Camp Look-
out, where we were put upon the alert on the 7th by a
reported advance of the enemy, but it amounted to noth-
ing more than a lively skirmish of some cavalry with our
outposts. Lee was glad to move back to Meadow Bluff
to be nearer his supplies, and Rosecrans encamped his
troops between Hawk's Nest and the Tompkins farm,
all of them being now within a few miles of Gauley
Bridge.* Part of my brigade garrisoned the post at the
bridge, but by Rosecrans' s direction my own headquarters
tents were pitched near his own upon the Tompkins farm.
Both parties now remained in observation till near the
end of October. Floyd, more enterprising in plans than
resolute or skilful in carrying them out, had obtained
Lee's consent to make an attempt to render our position
untenable by operations on the opposite side of New
River. Lee had intended to co-operate by moving against
us with the rest of his force, but on the 20th of October
the reports from the Staunton region were so threaten-
ing that he determined to send Loring back there,^ and
this, of course, settled it that Lewisburg would be cov-
ered in front only by Wise's Legion, commanded by
Colonel Davis. Although Floyd complained of this
change of plan, he did not abandon his purpose, but

» O. R., vol. V. p. 253. Sec also Official Atlas, PI. IX. ^ Id., p. 908.

126 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ordering the militia on that side of the river to reas-
semble, he marched to Fayette C. H,^

Rosecrans had distributed his brigades in echelon along
the turnpike, — Schenck's, the most advanced, being ten
miles from Gauley Bridge; McCook's eight miles, where
the road from Fayette C. H. by way of Miller's Ferry
comes in across New River; Benham's six miles, whilst
of my own one regiment at the Tompkins farm guarded
headquarters, and the rest were at Gauley Bridge and
lower posts where they could protect the navigation of
the Kanawha.'^ McCook by Rosecrans's direction marched
to Fayette C. H. about the 2Cth of October, and on his
return reported that only guerilla parties were abroad in
that vicinity. Rosecrans seems to have expected that at
least a foothold would be kept on the other side o' New
River at Miller's Ferry, but McCook left nothing there,
and when he tried to place a detachment on that side
about the 25th, the shore and cliffs were found to be held
by a force of sharpshooters. This marked the advance
of Floyd, who established his camp in front of P^ayette
C. H. at the forking of the roads to Miller's Ferry and
to Gauley Bridge.^ For a few days he made no serious
demonstration, and Rosecrans hastened forward the work
of clothing and paying his men, recruiting his teams and
bringing back to the ranks the soldiers whom exposure
had sent to the hospital. He had heard in a trustworthy
way of Lee's intention to move against us by the turn-
pike whilst Floyd advanced on the other side of the river,
but he had not yet learned of the withdrawal of Lee with
Loring's troops. He therefore remained quiet and ex-
pectant, awaiting the definite development of events.

As this had been my first service in the field as part of
a larger command, I was keenly alive to the opportunity
of comparing the progress we had made in discipline and
instruction with that of other brigades, so that I might

» o. R., vol. V. p. 286. « Id., p. 253. 8 /«/., p. 285.

TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 12/

cure defects in my own methods and improve the sol-
dierly character as well as the administratis of my own
command. I was gratified to see in my t. ops evidence
of a pride in their own organization and a wholesome
emulation, which made them take kindly to the drill and
discipline which were necessary to improvement. I was
particularly interested in observing Rosecrans's methods
with the men. His standard of soldierly excellence was
high, and he was earnest in insisting that his brigadiers
and his staff officers should co-operate vigorously in try-
ing to attain it. His impulsiveness, however, led him
sometimes into personal efforts at discipline where the
results were at least doubtful. He would sometimes go
out through the camps in the evening, and if he saw a
tent lighted after "taps," or heard men singing or talk-
ing, he would strike loudly on the canvas with the flat of
his sword and command silence or the extinguishment of
the light. The men, in good-humored mischief, would
try different ways of "getting even " with him. One that
gave much amusement to the camp was this : the men in
a tent thus attacked pretended to believe that their regi-
mental wagon-master was playing a practical joke on
them, and shouted back to him all sorts of rough camp
chaff. When the exasperated general appeared at the
door of the tent, they were, of course, overwhelmed with
the most innocent astonishment, and explained that that
wagon-master was in the habit of annoying them, and
that they really had not heard the "taps." I have been
with the general in approaching a picket, when he would
hotly lecture a sentinel who showed ignorance of some of
his duties or inattention to them. I thought I could see
in all such cases that it would have been wiser to avoid
any unnecessary collision with the privates, but to take
the responsible officer aside and make him privately
understand that he must answer for such lack of instruc-
tion or of discipline among his men. An impulsive man

128

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

is too apt to meddle with details, and so to weaken the
sense of responsibility in the intermediate officers, who
hate to be ignored or belittled before the soldiers. But
if Rosecrans's method was not an ideal one, it was at
least vigorous, and every week showed that the little
army was improving in discipline and in knowledge of
duty.

CHAPTER VII

COTTON MOUNTAIN

Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge — Effect on Rosecrans — Topography of
Gauley Mount — De Villiers runs the gantlet — Movements of our
forces — Explaining orders — A hard climb o" the mountain — In the
post at Gauley Bridge — Moving magazine and telegraph — A balky
mule-team — Ammunition train under fire — Captain Fitch a model
quartermaster — Plans to entrap Floyd — Moving supply trains at night
— Method of working the ferry — of making flatboats — The Cotton
Mountain affair — Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham — Vain plans to
reach East Tennessee.

ON the 1st of November the early morning was fair
but misty, and a fog lay in the gorge of New
River nearly a thousand feet below the little plateau at
the Tompkins farm, on which the headquarters tents were
pitched. General Rosecrans s tents were not more than a
hundred yards above mine, between the turnpike and the
steep descent to the river, though both our little camps
were secluded by thickets of young trees and laurel
bushes. Breakfast was over, the fog was lifting out of
the valley, and I was attending to the usual morning
routine of clerical work, when the report and echo of a
cannon-shot, down the gorge in the direction of Gauley
Bridge, was heard. It was unusual, enough so to set me
thinking what it could mean, but the natural explanation
suggested itself that it was one of our own guns, perhaps
fired at a target. In a few moments an orderly came in
some haste, saying the general desired to see me at his
tent. As I walked over to his quarters, another shot was
heard. As I approached, I saw him standing in front of
his tent door, evidently much excited, and when I came

VOL. I. — 9

130 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

up to him, he said in the rapid, half-stammering way
peciliar to him at such times: "The enemy has got a
battery on Cotton Mountain opposite our post, and is
shelling it ! What d' ye think of that ? " The post at the
bridge and his headquarters were connected by telegraph,
and the operator below had reported the fact of the open-
ing of the cannonade from the mountain side above him,
and added that his office was so directly under fire that
he must move out of it. Indeed he was gone and com-
munication broken before orders could be sent to him or
to the post. The fact of the cannonade did not disturb
me so much as the way in which it affected Rosecrans.
He had been expecting to be attacked by Lee in front,
and knew that McCook was exchanging shots across the
river with some force of the enemy at Miller's Ferry;
but that the attack should come two miles or more in
our rear, from a point where artillery had a plunging fire
directly into our depot of supplies and commanded our
only road for a half-mile where it ran on a narrow bench
along New River under Gauley Mountain cliffs, had been
so startling as to throw him decidedly off his balance.
The error in not occupying Cotton Mountain himself was
now not only made plain, but the consequences were not
pleasant to contemplate. I saw that the best service I
could render him for the moment was to help him back
into a frame of mind in which cool reasoning on the
situation would be possible. I have already stated the
contrast between my own sense of care when in sole com-
mand and the comparative freedom from it when a senior
officer came upon the field; and I now realized how much
easier it was for a subordinate to take things coolly. I
therefore purposely entered into a discussion of the proba-
bilities of the situation, and drew it out at length enough
to assist the general in recovering full control of himself
and of his own faculties. We could not, from where we
stood, see the post at Gauley Bridge nor even the place

COTTON MOUNTAIN 131

on Cotton Mountain where the enemy's battery was
placed, and we walked a little v;ay apart from our staff
officers to a position from which we could see the occa-
sional puffs of white smoke from the hostile guns. From
our camp the road descended sharply along the shoulders
of steep hills covered with wood for a mile and a half,
till it reached the bottom of the New River gorge, and
then it followed the open bench I have mentioned till it
reached the crossing of the Gauley. On the opposite side
of New River there was no road, the mass of Cotton
Mountain crowding close upon the stream with its pic-
turesque face of steep inclines and perpendicular walls of
rock. The bridge of boats which Rosecrans had planned
at Gauley Bridge had not been built, because it had been
found impossible to collect or to construct boats enough
to make it. We were therefore still dependent on the
ferry. Whilst the general and I were talking, Colonel
De Villiers galloped up, having crossed at the ferry and
run the gantlet of skirmishers whom he reported as lin-
ing the other side of New River opposite the unsheltered
part of our road. He had recently reported for duty, hav-
ing, as he asserted, escaped in a wonderful way from cap-
tivity in Libby Prison at Richmond.^ His regiment
was at the bridge and he was the senior officer there;
but, in his characteristic light-headed way, instead of
taking steps to protect his post and re-establish the tele-
graph communications, he had dashed off to report in
person at headquarters. As he was willing to take the
risks of the race back again, he was allowed to go, after
being fully instructed to set up a new telegraph office in
a ravine out of range of fire, to put the ferry-boat out of
danger as soon as he should be over, and prepare the ord-
nance stores to be moved into the valley of Scrabble

^ The Confederates claimed that he had been allowed to act as hospital
attendant on parole, and that he violated his obligation in escaping. WTe had
no means of verifying the facts in the case.

132 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Creek at night. I begged the general to be allowed to
go back with De Villiers, as the thing I most feared was
some panic at the post which might result in the destruc-
tion of our stores in depot there. He, however, insisted
on my staying at headquarters for a time at least.

Information of the attack was sent to the brigades up
the river, and Schenck, who was farthest up, was directed
to push out scouting parties and learn if there was any
advance of the enemy from Sewell Mountain. Benham,
who was nearest, was ordered to send down part of his
brigade to meet the efforts of the enemy to stop our com-
munication with Gauley Bridge. The battery of moun-
tain howitzers under Captain Mack of the regular army
was also ordered to report at headquarters, with the in-
tention of placing it high up on Gauley cliffs, where it
could drop shells among the enemy's skirmishers on the
opposite bank of the river. An hour or two passed and
the detachment from Benham 's brigade approached. It
was the Thirteenth Ohio, led by one of its field offi-
cers, who halted the column and rode up to General
Rosecrans for orders. The general's manner was still
an excited one, and in the rapidity with which his direc-
tions were given the officer did not seem to get a clear
idea of what was required of him. He made some effort
to get the orders explained, but his failure to comprehend
seemed to irritate Rosecrans, and he therefore bowed and
rode back to his men with a blank look which did not
promise well for intelligent action. Noticing this, 1
quietly walked aside among the bushes, and when out of
sight hurried a little in advance and waited at the road-
side for the column. I beckoned the officer to me, and
said to him, " Colonel, I thought you looked as if you did
not fully understand the general's wishes." He replied
that he did not, but was unwilling to question him as it
seemed to irritate him. I said that was a wrong prin-
ciple to act on, as a commanding officer has the greatest

COTTON MOUNTAIN 133

possible interest in being clearly understood. I then
explained at large what I knew to be Rosecrans's pur-
poses. The officer thanked me cordially and rode away.
I have ventured to give this incident with such fulness,
because subsequent events in Rosecrans's career strength-
ened the impression I formed at the time, that the excit-
ability of his temperament was such that an unexpected
occurrence might upset his judgment so that it would be
uncertain how he would act, — whether it would rouse
him to a heroism of which he was quite capable, or make
him for the time unfit for real leadership by suspending
his self-command.^

Soon after noon I obtained permission to go to Gauley
Bridge and assume command there ; but as the road along
New River was now impracticable by reason of the in-
creased fire of the enemy upon it, I took the route over
the top of Gauley Mountain, intending to reach the Gauley
River as near the post as practicable. I took with me
only my aide. Captain Christie, and an orderly. We
rode a little beyond the top of the mountain, and sending
the orderly back with the horses, proceeded on foot down
the northern slope. We soon came to the slashing which
I had made in August to prevent the enemy's easy ap-
proach to the river near the post. The mist of the morn-
ing had changed to a drizzling rain. We had on our
heavy horsemen's overcoats with large capes, cavalry
boots and spurs, swords and pistols. This made it toil-
some work for us. The trees had been felled so that they
crossed each other in utmost confusion on the steep de-
clivity. Many of them were very large, and we slid over
the great wet trunks, climbed through and under branches,
let ourselves down walls of natural rock, tripped and ham-
pered by our accoutrements, till we came to the end of

^ See Crittenden's testimony in Buell Court of Inquiry, O. R., vol. xvi.
pt. i. p. 578 Cist's account of Chickamauga, Army o£ the Cumberland,
p. 226, and chap, xxvii., post.

134 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the entanglement at what we supposed was the edge of
the river. To our dismay we found that we had not kept
up stream far enough, and that at this point was a sheer
precipice some thirty feet high. We could find no crev-
ices to help us climb down it. We tried to work along
the edge till we should reach a lower place, but this ut-
terly failed. We were obliged to retrace our steps to the
open wood above the slashing. But if the downward
climbing had been hard, this attempt to pull ourselves

up again, —

"... superasque evadere ad auras," —

was labor indeed. We stopped several times from sheer
exhaustion, so blown that it seemed almost impossible to
get breath again. Our clothes were heavy from the rain
on the outside and wet with perspiration on the inside.
At last, however, we accomplished it, and resting for a
while at the foot of a great tree till we gained a little
strength, we followed the upper line of the slashing till
we passed beyond it, and then turned toward the river,
choosing to reach its banks high up above the camp rather
than attempt again to climb through the fallen timber.
Once at the water's edge we followed the stream down
till we were opposite the guard post above the camp, when
we hailed for a skiff and were ferried over.

It was now almost dark, but the arrangements were
soon made to have wagons ready at the building on the
Kanawha front used as a magazine, and to move all our
ammunition during the night to the place I had indicated
in the ravine of Scrabble Creek, which runs into the
Gauley. The telegraph station was moved there and
connection of wires made. We also prepared to run the
ferry industriously during the night and to put over the
necessary trainloads of supplies for the troops above. A
place was selected high up on the hill behind us, where I
hoped to get up a couple of Parrott guns which might
silence the cannon of the enemy on Cotton Mountain. I

COTTON MOUNTAIN 1 35

was naturally gratified at the expressions of relief and
satisfaction of the officers of the post to have me in person
among them. They had already found that the plunging
fire from the heights across the river was not a formidable
thing, and that little mischief would happen if the men
were kept from assembling in bodies or large groups
within range of the enemy's cannon.

The fatigues of the day made sleep welcome as soon as
the most pressing duties had been done, and I went early
to rest, giving orders to the guard at my quarters to call
me at peep of day. The weather cleared during the
night, and when I went out in the morning to see what
progress had been made in transferring the ammunition
to a safe place, I was surprised to find the train of wagons
stopped in the road along the Gauley in front of the
camp. General Rosecrans's ordnance officer was of the
regular army, but unfortunately was intemperate. He
had neglected his duty during the night, leaving his ser-
geant to get on without guidance or direction. The
result was that the ordnance stores had not been loaded
upon the waiting wagons till nearly daylight, and soon
after turning out of the Kanawha road into that of the
Gauley, the mules of a team near the head of the train
balked, and the whole had been brought to a standstill.
There was a little rise in the road on the hither side of
Scrabble Creek, where the track, cr.tting through the crest
of a hillock, was only wide enougrh for a single team, and
this rise was of course the place v/here the balky ani-
mals stopped. The line of the road was enfiladed by the
enemy's cannon, the morning fog in the valley was be-
ginning to lift under the influence of the rising sun, and
as soon as the situation was discovered we might reckon
upon receiving the fire of the Cotton Mountain battery.
The wagon-drivers realized the danger of handling an
ammunition train under such circumstances and began to
be nervous, whilst the onlookers not connected with the

136 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

duty made haste to get out of harm's way. My pres-
ence strengthened the authority of the quartermaster in
charge, Captain E. P. Fitch, helped in steadying the
men, and enabled him to enforce promptly his orders.
He stopped the noisy efforts to make the refractory
mules move, and sent in has*^e for a fresh team. As
soon as it came, this was put in place of the balky ani-
mals, and at the word of command the train started
quickly forward. The fog had thinned enough, however,
to give the enemy an inkl'ng of what was going on, and
the rattling of the wagons on the road completed the
exposure. Without warning, a ball struck in the road
near us and bounded over the rear of the train, the report
of the cannon following instantly. The drivers involun-
tarily crouched over their mules and cracked their whips.
Another shot followed, but it was also short, and the last
wagon turned the shoulder of the hill into the gorge of
the creek as the ball bounded along up the Gauley valley.
It was perhaps fortunate for us that solid shot instead of
shrapnel were used, but it is not improbable that the
need of haste in firing made the battery officer feel that
he had no time to cut and adjust fuses to the estimated
distance to our train ; or it is possible that shells were
used but did not explode. It was my first acquaintance
with Captain Fitch, who had accompanied Rosecrans's col-
umn, and his cool efficiency was so marked that I applied
for him as quartermaster upon r y staff. He remained
with me till I finally left West Virginia in 1863, and I
never saw his superior in handling trains in the field.
He was a West Virginian, volunteering from civil life,
whose outfit was a good business education and an indom-
itable rough energy that nothing could tire.

During the evening of the ist of November Genen.l
Benham's brigade came to the post at Gauley Bridge to
strengthen the garrison, and was encamped on the Ka-
nawha side near the falls, where the widening of the valley

COTTON MOUNTAIN 1 37

put them out of range of the enemy's fire. The ferry
below the falls was called Montgomery's and was at the
mouth of Big Falls Creek, up which ran the road to Fay-
ette C. H. A detachment of the enemy had pushed
back our outposts on this road, and had fired upon our
lower camp wi.a cannon, but the position was not a
favorable one for them and they did not try to stay long.
After a day or two we were able to keep pickets on that
side with a flatboat and hawser to bring them back, cov-
ered by artillery on our side of the Kanawha.

During November 2d Rosecrans matured a plan of op-
erations against Floyd, who was now definitely found to
be in command of the hostile force on Cotton Mountain.
It was also learned through scouting parties and the
country people that Lee had left the region, with most of
the force that had been at Sewell Mountain. It seemed
possible therefore to entrap Floyd, and this was what
Rosecrans determined to attempt. Benham was ordered
to take his brigade down the Kanawha and cross to the
other side at the mouth of Loup Creek, five miles below.
Schenck was ordered to prepare wagon bodies as tempo-
rary boats, to make such flatboats as he could, and get
ready to cross the New River at Townsend's Ferry, about
fifteen miles above Gauley Bridge. McCook was ordered
to watch Miller's Ferry near his camp, and be prepared
to make a dash on the short road to Fayette C. H. I
was ordered to hold the post at Gauley Bridge, forward
supplies by night, keep down the enemy's fire as far as
possible, and watch for an opportunity to co-operate with
Benham by way of Montgomery's Ferry. ^ Benham 's bri-
gade was temporarily increased by 1500 picked men
from the posts between Kanawha Falls and Charles-
ton. He was expected to march up Loup Creek and cut
off Floyd's retreat by way of Raleigh C. H., whilst
Schenck should co-operate from Townsend's Ferry. On

» O. R., vol. ▼. p. 254.

138 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the 5th the preparations had been made, and Benham was
ordered to cross the Kanawha. He did so on the night
of the 6th, but except sending scouting parties up Loup
Creek, he did nothing, as a sudden rise in New River
made Rosecrans suspend the concerted movement, and
matters remained as they were, awaiting the fall of the
river, till the loth.

For a week after the ist, Floyd's battery on Cotton
Mountain fired on very slight provocation, and caution
was necessary in riding or moving about the camp. The
houses of the hamlet were not purposely injured, for
Floyd would naturally be unwilling to destroy the prop-
erty of West Virginians, and it was a safe presumption
that we had removed the government property from build-
ings within range of fire, as we had in fact done. Our
method of forwarding supplies was to assemble the wagon
trains near my lower camp during the day, and push them
forward to Gauley Mount and Tompkins farm during the
night. The ferry-boat at Gauley liridge was kept out of
harm's way in the Gauley, behind the projection of Gauley
Mount, but the hawser on which it ran was not removed.
At nightfall the boat would be manned, dropped down to
its place, made fast to the hawser by a snatch-block, and
commence its regular trips, passing over the wagons.
The ferries, both at the bridge and at Montgomery's, were
rnder the management of Captain Lane of the Eleventh
Ohio and his company of mechanics.^ We had found at
points along the Kanawha the gunwales of flatboats,
gotten out by lumbermen in the woods and brought to
the river bank ready to be put into boats for the coal-
trade, which had already much importance in the valley.
Ihese gunwales were single sticks of timber, sixty or
eighty feet long, two or three feet wide, and say six
inches thick. Each formed the side of a boat, which was
built by tying two gunwales together with cross timbers,

^ Captain P. P. Lane of Cincinnati, iater colonel of the regiment

COTTON MOUNTAIN 139

the whole being then planked. Such boats were three
or four times as large as those used for th^ country fer-
ries upon the Gaulcy and New rivers, and enabled us to
make these larger ferries very commodious. Of course
the enemy knew that we used them at night, and would
fire an occasional random shot at them, but did us no
harm.

The enemy's guns on the mountain were so masked by
the forest that we did not waste ammunition in firing at
them, except as they opened, when our guns so quickly
returned their fire that they never ventured upon continu-
ous action, and after the first week we had only occasional
shots from them. We had planted our sharpshooters
also in protected spots along the narrower part of New
River near the post, and made the enemy abandon the
other margin of the stream, except with scattered senti-
nels. In a short time matters thus assumed a shape in
which our work went on regularly, and the only advan-
tage Floyd had attained was to make us move our supply
trains at night. His presence on the mountain overlook-
ing our post was an irritation under which we chafed, and
from Rosecrans down, everybody was disgusted with the
enforced delay of Benham at Loup Creek. Floyd kept
his principal camp behind Cotton Mountain, in the posi-
tion I have already indicated, in an inaction which
seemed to invite enterprise on our part. His courage
had oozed out when he had carried his little army into
an exposed position, and here as at Carnifex Ferry he
seemed to be waiting for his adversary to take the
initiative.

To prepare for my own part in the contemplated move-
ment, I had ordered Captain Lane to build a couple of
flatboats of a smaller size than our large ferry-boats, and
to rig these with sweeps or large oars, so that they could
be used to throw detachments acro.os the New River to
the base of Cotton Mountain, at a point selected a little

140 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

way up the river, where the stream was not so swift and
broken as in most places. Many of our men had become
expert in managing such boats, and a careful computa-
tion showed that we could put over 500 men an hour
with these small scows.

From the 5th to the loth Rosecrans had been waiting
for the waters to subside, and pressing Benham to exam-
ine the roads up Loup Creek so thoroughly tha*- he could
plant himself in Floyd's rear as soon as orders should be
given. Schenck would make the simultaneous movement
when Benham was known to be in march, and McCook's
and my own brigade would at least make demonstrations
from our several positions.* From my picket post at
Montgomery's Ferry I had sent scouts up the Fayette
road, and by the 9th had discovered such symptoms of
weakness in the enemy that I thought the time had come
to make an effort to dislodge the battery and get com-
mand of the crest of Cotton Mountain overlooking my
camp. On the loth I made a combined movement from
both my upper and lower camps. Colonel De Villiers
was ordered to take all of the Eleventh Ohio fit for duty
(being only 200 men), and crossing by the small boats,
make a vigorous reconnoissance over the New River face
of Cotton Mountain, reaching the crest if possible. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Enyart of the First Kentucky was directed
to cross below the falls with a similar force, and push a
reconnoissance out on the Fayette road, whilst he also
should try to co-operate with De Villiers in clearing the
enemy from the heights opposite Gauley Bridge. The
place at which De Villiers crossed was out of sight and
range from the enemy's battery. His first boat -load of
forty men reached the opposite shore safely, and dividing
into two parties, one pushed up the New River to a ravine
making a somewhat easy ascent toward the crest, whilst
the others skirmished up the almost perpendicular face

1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 255, 261-265.

COTTON MOUNTAIN 141

of the rocks where they landed. The remainder of the
men of the Eleventh were put over as fast as possible,
and joined their colonel in the ravine mentioned, up
which they marched to a little clearing high up the hill,
known as Blake's farm, where the advanced party had
found the enemy. The battery was withdrawn as soon
as De Villiers' approach at the Blake farm was known,
supports being sent to the outpost there to check our
advance. The men of the Eleventh, led by Major Cole-
man, attacked sharply, drove back the enemy, and suc-
ceeded in extending thei • right to the crest above the
recent position of the battery. They were of course
stretched out into a mere skirmish line, and I directed
them to hold the crest without advancing further till
Enyart should be heard from. He also found the enemy
indisposed to be stubborn, and skirmished up the oppo-
site side of the mountain till he joined hands with De
Villiers on the top. The enemy seemed to be increasing
before them, and our men held their position as directed,
having relieved us from the hostile occupation of ground
commanding our camps. Enyart's reconnoitring party
sent toward Fayette advanced a mile on that road and
remained in observation, finding no enemy. I reported
our success to Rosecrans, and doubtful whether he wished
to press the enemy in front till Benham and Schenck
should be in his rear, I asked for further instructions.
General Rosecrans authorized me to take over the rest
of my available force and press the enemy next day, as
he was very confident that Benham would by that time
be in position to attack him in rear. Accordingly I
passed the Second Kentucky regiment over the river
during the night and joined them in person on the crest
at daybreak. The remainder of the First Kentucky,
under Major Lieper, was ordered to cross at Montgomery's
Ferry later in the day, and advance upon the Fayette
road as far as possible. My climb to the crest of Cotton

142 REMINISCEACES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Mountain was a repetition of the exhausting sort of work
I had tried on Gauley Mount on the ist. I took the short
route straight up the face of the hill, clambering over
rocks, pulling myself up by clinging t'^ the laurel bushes,
and often literally lifting myself from one great rocky
step to another. This work was harder upon officers who
were usually mounted than upon the men in the line, as
we were not used to it, and the labor of the whole day
was thus increased, for of course we could take no horses.
Resuming the advance along the mountain crest, the
enemy made no serious resistance, but fell back skir-
mishing briskly, till we came to more open ground where
the mountain breaks down toward some open farms where
detachments of Floyd's forces had been encamped. Their
baggage train was seen in the distance, moving off upon
the Fayette turnpike. As we were now in the close
neighborhood of the whole force of the enemy, and those
in our presence were quite as numerous as we, I halted
the command on the wooded heights commanding the open
ground below, till we should hear some sound from Ben-
ham's column. Toward evening Major Lieper came up
on our right to the place where the Fayette road passes
over a long spur of the mountain which is known in the
neighborhood as Cotton Hill.^ Here he was halted, and
nothing being heard from co-operating columns, the troops
bivouacked for the night,

Rosecrans had informed Benham of my advance and
ordered him to push forward; but he spent the day in
discussing the topography which he was supposed to have
learned before, and did not move.^ Schenck had not
been put across New River at Townsend s Ferry, because
Rosecrans thought it hazardous to do this whilst Floyd

1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 272-275, and map, p. 82, ante. The greater mass in the
angle of the rivers was not aniformly called Cotton Mountain then, and in
my report I spoke of passing along those crests toward Cotton Hill, mean-
ing this elevation on the Fayette road.

» Id., pp. 266-268.

COTTON MOUNTAIN I43

was near that point in force, and he intended that when
Floyd should be forced to attack Benham (whose com-
mand was now equal to two brigades), it would withdraw
the enemy so far that Schenck would have room to oper-
ate after crossing. But as Benham had not advanced,
toward evening of the nth Rosecrans sent him orders to
march immediately up the Kanawha to my position and
follow Major Lieper on the road that officer had opened
to the top of Cotton Hill, and as much further toward
Fayette C. H. as possible, taking Lieper's detachment
with him; meanwhile I was ordered to keep the re-
mainder of my troops on the mountain in the position
already occupied. Benham was expected to reach Lie-
per's position by ten o'clock that evening, but he did not
reach there in fact till three o'clock in the following after-
noon (i2th).^ After some skirmishing with an outpost of
the enemy at Laurel Creek behind which Major Lieper
had been posted, nothing more was done till the evening
of the 13th. Floyd's report shows that he retired be-
yond Fayette C. H. on the 12th, having conceived the
mistaken idea that Benham's column was a new rein-
forcement of 5000 men from Ohio.^ Abandoning the
hope of using Schenck's brigade in a movement from
Townsend's Ferry, Rosecrans now ordered him to march
to Gauley Bridge on the 13th, and joining Benham by a
night march, assume command of the moving column.
Schenck did so, but Floyd was now retreating upon Ra-
leigh C. H. and a slight affair with his rear-guard was
the only result. Fayette C. H. was occupied and the
campaign ended. It would appear from official docu-
ments that Floyd did not learn of Benham's presence at
the mouth of Loup Creek till the 12th, when he began
his retreat, and that at any time during the preceding
week a single rapid march would have placed Benham's
brigade without resistance upon the line of the enemy's

1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 256, 273. « A/., p. 287.

144 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

communications. Rosecrans was indignant at the balk-
ing of his elaborate plans, and ordered Benham before
a court-martial for misconduct;^ but I believe that
McClellan caused the proceedings to be quashed to avoid
scandal, and Benham was transferred to another depart-
ment. It is very improbable that Schenck's contem-
plated movement across New River at Townsend's Ferry
could have been made successfully; for his boats were
few and small, and the ferrying would have been slow
and tedious. Floyd would pretty surely learn of it
soon after it began, and would hasten his retreat in-
stead of waiting to be surrounded. It would have been
better to join Schenck to Benham by a forced march
as soon as the latter was at the mouth of Loup Creek,
and then to push the whole to the Fayette and Raleigh
road, Rosecrans leading the column in person. As
Floyd seems to have been ignorant of what was going
on in Loup Creek valley, decisive results might have fol-
lowed from anticipating him on his line of retreat. Cap-
turing such a force, or, as the phrase then went, " bagging
it," is easier talked of than done; but it is quite probable
that it might have been so scattered and demoralized as
to be of little further value as an army, and considerable
parts of it might have been taken prisoners.

Rosecrans had ^ gun the campaign in August with
the announced p ipose of marching to Wytheville and
Abingdon in the Holston valley, and thence into East
Tennessee. McClellan had cherished the idea of making
the Kanawha line the base of operations into the same
region; still later Fremont, and after him Halleck did
the same. Looking only at the map, it seemed an easy
thing to do; but the almost wilderness character of the
intervening country with its poor and sparsely scattered
people, the weary miles of steep mountain-roads becom-
ing impassable in rainy weather, and the total absence of

1 o. R., vol. V. p. 669.

COTTON MOUNTAIN

forage for animals, were elements of the problem which
they all ignored or greatly underestimated. It was easy,
sitting at one's office table, to sweep the hand over a few
inches of chart showing next to nothing of the topog-
raphy, and to say, '* We will march from here to here ; "
but when the march was undertaken, the natural obstacles
began to assert themselves, and one general after another
had to find apologies for failing to accomplish what ought
never to have been undertaken. After a year or two, the
military advisers of the War Department began to realize
how closely the movements of great bodies of soldiers
were tied to rivers and railways; but they seemed to learn
it only as the merest civilian could learn it, by the expe-
rience of repeated failures of plans based on long lines
of communication over forest-clad mountains, dependent
upon wagons to carry everything for man and beast.

Instead of reaching Wytheville or Abingdon, Rosecrans
found that he could not supply his little army » jn at Big
Sewell Mountain ; and except for a few days, he occupied
no part of the country in advance of my positions in
August, then held by a single brigade in the presence of
the same enemy. It was not Floyd's army, but the phys-
ical obstacles presented by the country that chained him
to Gauley Bridge. I shall have occasion hereafter to
note how the same ignoring of nature's laws came near
starving Burnside's command in East Tennessee, where
the attempt to supply it by wagon trains from Lexington
in Kentucky or from Nashville failed so utterly as to
disappear from the calculation of our problem of exist-
ence through the winter of 1863-64.

VOL. i. — 10

CHAPTER VIII

WINTER-QUARTERS

An impracticable country — Movements suspended — Experienced troops
ocdered away — My orders from Washington — Rosecrans objects — A
disappmntment — Winter organization of the Department — Sifting our
material — Courts-martial — Regimental schools — Drill and picket duty
— A military exerution — Effect upon the army — Political sentiments
of the people — Rules of conduct toward them — Case of Mr. Parks —
Mr. Summers — Mr. Patrick — Mr. Lewis Ruffner — Mr. Doddridge —
Mr. B. F. Smith — A house divided against itself — Major Smith's jour-
nal — The contrabands — A fugitive-slave case — Embarrassments as to
military jurisdiction.

FLOYD'S retreat was continued to the vicinity of
Newberne and Dublin Depot, where the Virginia
and East Tennessee Railway crosses the upper waters of
New River. He reported the country absolutely destitute
of everything and the roads so broken up that he could
not supply his troops at any distance from the railroad.'
Rosecrans was of a similar opinion, and on the 19th of
November signified to General McClellan ^ his purpose to
hold Gauley Bridge, Cheat Mountain, and Romney as the
frontier of his department, and to devote the winter to
the instruction and discipline of his troops, and the sift-
ing out of incompetent officers. About the 1st of De-
cember he fixed his headquarters at Wheeling,' assigning
the District of the Kanawha to my command, with head-
quarters at Charleston.* This gave me substantially the

» O. R, Tol. V. pp. 287, 288. a /«/., p. 657.

* Fd^ pp. 669, ^5. On January 21 I called attention to the anomaly
of boomUng the department by the Kanawha River on the south, and cor-
rectioa was at once made by General McClellaii. /</., p. 706.

« Id., pp. 670, 691.

WINTER-QUARTERS

147

same territorial jurisdiction I had in the summer, but
with a larger body of troops.

Before we left Gauley Bridge, however, I received orders
direct from army headquarters at Washington to take my
three oldest Ohio regiments and report to General Buell
in Kentucky. This was exactly in accordance with my
own strong desire to join a large army on one of the prin-
cipal lines of operation. I therefore went joyfully to
Rosecrans, supposing, of course, that he also had received
orders to send me away. To my intense chagrin I found
that he not only was without such orders, but that he was,
naturally enough, disposed to take umbrage at the send-
ing of orders direct to me. He protested against the
irregularity, and insisted that if his forces were to be re-
duced, he should himself indicate those which were to go.
He carried his point on the matter, and was directed to
send eight regiments to Buell.^ He insisted that I should
stay, and whilst the reasons he gave were sufficiently com-
plimentary, it was none the less a great disappointment to
have to abandon the hope of service in a more important
field.^ There was nothing to be done but to summon
philosophy to my aid, and to hope that all would turn
out for the best. Before Rosecrans left Gauley Bridge
four more regiments were added to the eight already
ordered away, together with four batteries of artillery.
Some new regiments had joined us, and the aggregate of
troops remaining was perhaps not much below the num-
ber present when Rosecrans reached Carnifex Ferry in
September; but most of them were freshly organized
regiments, with whom the work of drill and discipline
had to begin at first lessons. Three of the batteries taken
away were regulars, and the other was Loomis's Michigan
battery, one of the oldest and best instructed of our
volunteer batteries. The places of these were not sup-
plied. The good policy of these reductions is not to be

1 O. R., vol. V. p. 671.

a Id., pp. 259, 6s7-

148 REAf/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

questioned ; for it was agreed that nothing aggressive
could be done in the mountains during the winter, and
it was wise to use part of the forces elsewhere. Yet for
those of us who had hoped to go with the troops, and now
found ourselves condemned to the apparently insignificant
duty of garrisoning West Virginia, the effect was, for the
time, a very depressing one.

General Schenck had left us on account of sickness, and
did not return. His brigade was again commanded by
Colonel Scammon, as it had been at Carnifex Ferry, and
was stationed at Fayette C. H. One regiment was at
Tompkins farm, another at Gauley Bridge, two others
at intervals between that post and Charleston, where were
three regiments out of what had been my own brigade.
Three partially organized West Virginia regiments of in-
fantry and one of cavalry were placed at recruiting stations
in the rear, and one Ohio regiment was posted at Barbours-
ville. The chain of posts which had been established in
the summer between Weston and Cross Lanes was not
kept up; but the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Colonel George
Crook, was stationed at Cross Lanes, reporting to me, as
did all the other troops enumerated above.

The Cheat Mountain district continued in command of
General Milroy, his principal posts being at Beverly and
Huttonsville, with small garrisons holding the mountain
passes. General Kelley remained also in command of the
railroad district covering the communication with Wash-
ington by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. General J. J.
Reynolds was assigned to command a new division organ-
izing at Romney, but was soon transferred to another
department.

Such was the general organization of the department
for the winter, and we soon settled down to regular work
in fitting the troops for the next campaign. Courts-
martial were organized to try offenders of all grades, and
under charges of conduct prejudicial to good order and

H 'INTER-QUA R TERS

149

military discipline, worthless officers were driven from
the service and negligent ones disciplined. Regimental
schools were opened, and strenuous efforts were made to
increase the military knowledge and skill of the whole
command. Careful drill was enforced, and picket and
outpost duty systematically taught. Each post became
a busy camp of instruction, and the regiments repeated
under more favorable circumstances the work of the
original camp in Ohio.

The work of the military courts gave me one very un-
pleasant duty to perform, which, happily, was of rare
occurrence and never again fell to my lot except on a
single occasion in North Carolina near the close of the
war. A soldier of the First Kentucky Volunteers was
condemned to death for desertion, mutiny, and a mur-
derous assault upon another soldier. The circumstances
were a '.ude peculiar, and gave rise to fears that his regi-
ment might resist the execution. I have already men-
tioned the affair of Captain Gibbs, ^ who had shot down a
mutinous man of the Second Kentucky at Gauley Bridge
in the summer, and who had been acquitted by a court-
martial. The camp is very like a city in which popular
impressions and rumors have quick circulation and large
influence. The two Kentucky regiments were so closely
related as to be almost one, and were subject to the same
influences. A bitter feeling toward Captain Gibbs pre-
vailed in them both, and camp demagogues busied them-
selves in trying to make mischief by commenting on the
fact that the officer was acquitted whilst the private was
condemned. There was not a particle of justice in this,
for the one had simply suppressed a mutiny, whereas the
other was inciting one. But it is not necessary for com-
plaints to be just among those who are very imperfectly
informed in regard to the facts, and very unpleasant re-

^ Appointed Captain and Assistant Commissary of Subsistence, U. S.
Vols., October i.

150 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ports were received as to the condition of things in the
regiment to which the condemned man belonged.

It is the military custom, in executions by shooting, to
select the firing party from the regiment to which the
condemned man belongs. To have changed the rule
would have looked like timidity, and I determined that
it must not be done, but resolved upon an order of pro-
cedure which would provide, as far as possible, against
the chances of interference. On such occasions the troops
are usually paraded upon three sides of a hollow square,
without arms, the place of execution being in the middle
of the open side, where the prisoner kneels upon his coffin.
The place chosen was in the meadows on the lower side
of the Elk River, opposite Charleston, a short distance
from the regimental camp. The camps of two other
regiments at the post were half a mile from the place of
execution. These regiments were, therefore, marched to
the field with their arms. That to which the prisoner
belonged was marched without arms to its position as the
centre of the parade, and the others were formed on their
right and left at right angles, thus forming the three sides
of the enclosure. The arms of these last regiments were
stacked immediately behind them where they could be
seized in a moment, but the parade was formed without
muskets. Captain Gibbs was on duty as commissary at
my headquarters, and his appearance with the staff would
have been unpleasant to himself as well as a possible cause
of excitement in the Kentucky regiment. To solve the
difficulty without making a significant exception, I ordered
only the personal staff and the adjutant-general with the
chief surgeon to accompany me, leaving out the adminis-
trative officers of both quartermaster's and commissary's
departments.

When the parade was formed, I took my place with my
staff at the right of the line, and, as upon a review, rode
slowly down the whole line, on the inside of the square.

WINTER'QUA R TERS 1 5 1

In going along the front of the First Kentucky, I took
especial pains to meet the eyes of the men «3 they were
turned to me in passing, desirous of impressing them with
my own feeling that it was a solemn but inevitable duty.
Immediately after we returned to our places, the music of
the dead-march was heard, and an ambulance was seen ap-
proaching from the camp, escorted by the provost-marshal
and the execution party with the music. The solemn
strains, the slow funereal step of the soldiers, the closed
ambulance, the statue-like stillness of the paraded troops
made an impression deeper and more awful than a battle
scene, because the excitement was hushed and repressed.
The ambulance stopped, the man was helped out at the
back, and led by the provost-marshal to his place upon
the coffin, where he was blindfolded. The firing party
silently took its place. The muskets were cocked and
aimed, while the noise of the retiring ambulance covered
the sound. The provost-marshal, with a merciful deception,
told the prisoner he must wait a moment and he would
return to him before the final order, but stepping quickly
out of the range of the muskets, he gave the signal with
his handkerchief, and the man fell dead at the volley,
which sounded like a single discharge. The detail of
soldiers for the firing had been carefully instructed that
steadiness and accuracy made the most merciful way of
doing their unwelcome duty. The surgeon made his
official inspection of the body, which was placed in the
coffin and removed in the ambulance. The drums and
fifes broke the spell with quick marching music, the regi-
ments took their arms, sharp words of command rattled
along the lines, which broke by platoons into column and
moved rapidly off the field.

I confess it was a relief to have the painful task ended,
and especially to have it ended in the most perfect order
and discipline. The moral effect was very great, for our
men were so intelligent that they fully appreciated the

152 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

judicial character of the act, and the imposing solemnity
of the parade and execution made the impression all the
more profound. As it was accompanied and followed by
a searching test of the capacity and character of their
officers, of which they daily saw the effects in the retire-
ment of some from the service and in the increased indus-
try and studious devotion to duty of all, it gave a new tone
to the whole command. I spared no effort to make the
feeling pervade every regiment and company, that the
cause o.' the country, their own success and honor, and
even their own personal safety depended upon their enter-
ing the next campaign with such improved discipline and
Mistructioii as should make them always superior to an
equal number of the enemy. Leaves of absence and fur-
loughs were limited as closely as possible, and I set the
example of remaining without interruption on duty, though
there were many reasons why a visit home was very desir-
able. My wife made me a visit at Charleston in n^ id-
winter, and this naturally brought me into more frequent
social relations to the people, and led me to observe more
closely their attitude to the government and its cause.

Before the secession of Virginia a very large majority
of the inhabitants of the Kanawha valley were Unionists ;
but the attachment to the state organization had become
so exaggerated in all slave-holding communities, that most
of the well-to-do people yielded to the plea that they must
'• go with their State." The same state pride led this class
of people to oppose the division of Virginia and the
forming of the new State on the west of the mountains.
The better class of society in Charleston, therefore, ar in
other towns, was found to be disloyal, and in sympathy
with the rebellion. The young men were very generally
in the Confederate army; the young women were full of
the most romantic devotion to their absent brothers and
friends, and made it a point of honor to avow their senti-
ments. The older people were less demonstrative, and

WINTER-QUARTERS 1 53

the men who had a stake in the country generally pro-
fessed acquiescence in the position of West Virginia within
the Union, and a desire to bring back their sons from the
Confederate service. The necessity of strict watch upon
the communications sent through the lines brought to my
notice a great deal of family history full of suffering and
anxiety, and showed that that was indeed a fearful situa-
tion for a family when its young men were not only sepa-
rated from them by military service in the field, but could
only be heard from by the infrequent chances of com-
munication under flags of truce, and with all the restric-
tions and reserves necessary to the method. The rule I
adopted in dealing personally with non-combatants of
either sex was to avoid all controversy or discussion, to
state with perfect frankness but courteously my own atti-
tude and sense of duty, and to apply all such stringent
rules as a state of war compels with an evenness of temper
and tone of dispassionate government which should make
as little chafing as possible. Most intelligent people, when
they are not excited, are disposed to recognize the obli-
gations imposed upon a military officer in such circum-
stances, and it was rarely the case that any unpleasant
collisions occurred.

The followMg incident will illustrate some of the embar-
rassments likel'y to occur. When I reached Charleston in
July previous, I v/as visited by the wife of a gentleman
named Parks, who told me that her husband had left the
valley with General Wise, but not in any military capacity,
being fearful that he might suffer arrest at our hands on
account of his sympathy with the Confederates. I told
her, what I had told to a formal deputation of citizens,
that I did not propose to meddle with non-combatants
if they in good faith remained at honve, minding their own
business, and carefully abstaining from giving aid or infor-
mation to the enemy. I had, on general principles, a dis-
like for test oaths, and preferred to make conduct the test,

154 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and to base my treatment of people on that, rather than
on oaths which the most unscrupulous would be first to
take. Had her husband known this, she said, he would
not have left home, and begged that she might be allowed
to send an open letter through the lines to him to bring
him back. I allowed her to do so at the first proper
opportunity, and Mr. Parks at once returned. In the
latter part of September, however, Governor Peirpoint of
West Virginia thought it necessary to arrest some promi-
nent citizens, known as Secessionists, and hold them as
hostages for Union men that the Confederate troops had
seized and sent to Richmond. It happened that Mr.
Parks was arrested as one of these hostages, without any
knowledge on the part of the civil authorities of the cir-
cumstances under which he had returned home. I was
ignorant of his arrest till I received a letter from the lady,
complaining bitterly of what seemed to her a breach of
faith. I was at SevvcU Motmtain at the time, but lost no
time in writing her a careful explanation of the complete
disconnection between his arrest by the civil authorities as
a hostage, and a promise of non-interference with him on
my part as an officer of the United States army. I also
showed her that the arrest of non-combatant Union men by
the Confederate forces was the real cause of her husband's
unpleasant predicament. In view of the circumstances,
however, I thought it right to request the Governor to
substitute some other hostage for Mr. Parks, so that there
might not be the least question whether the letter or the
spirit of my military safeguard had been broken, and the
result was that the gentleman was very soon at home again.
The most prominent citizen of the valley was the Hon.
George Summers, who had represented it in the Congress
of the United States, and had opposed secession in the
Virginia Convention with a vigor that had brought him
into personal peril. When, however, secession was an
accomplished fact, his ideas of allegiance to his State so

WINTER-QUARTERS 155

far influenced him that he was unwilling to take active
part in public affairs, and sought absolute retirement at
his pleasant home a little below Charleston on the Kanawha.
His house was on a hill overlooking the beautiful valley,
broad enough at this point to give room for ample fields in
the rich bottom lands. I had called upon him, as I passed
with my troops when I went up the valley. He was a dig-
nified and able man, just past middle life, but in full
physical and mental force, and capable of exerting a very
great influence if he could have thrown himself heartily
into public activity. But he was utterly saddened and de-
pressed by the outbreak of civil war, and deliberately chose
the part of suffering in seclusion whatever it might bring,
unable to rouse himself to a combative part. As a slave-
holder, he was bitter against the anti-slavery movement,
and as a Unionist he condemned the Secessionists. He
was very glad to have the Kanawha valley in the posses-
sion of the National troops, now that Wise had made the
effort to occupy it for the Confederacy; though he had
tried to procure the adoption of a policy which should
leave it neutral ground, — a policy as impossible here as in
Kentucky. The result was that he was distrusted by both
sides, for in civil war each acts upon the maxim that *' he
that is not for us is against us." I renewed my acquaint-
ance with him in the winter, making his house the limit of
an occasional ride for exercise. I appreciated his feelings,
and respected his desire to set an example of obedient
private citizenship with renunciation of all other or more
active influence.

There were other men of social prominence who had
less hesitition in throwing themselves actively upon the
National side. Mr. Patrick was an elderly man, of con-
siderable wealth, whose home was a very similar one
to Mr. Summers', a little nearer to Charleston upon
the same road. His wife was of old Virginia stock,
a relative of Chief Justice Marshall, and a pronounced

I $6 REAfJNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Southern woman, though too good a wife to make her
sympathies give annoyance to her husband or his guests.
Lewis Ruffner was also a prominent Union man, and
among the leaders of the movement to make West Vir-
ginia a separate State. Mr. Doddridge, long the cashier
and manager of the Bank at Charleston, whose family
was an old and well-known one, was an outspoken Union-
ist, and in the next year, when the war put an end for
the time to banking in the valley, he became a paymaster
in the National army. Colonel Benjamin F. Smith was
a noteworthy character also. He was a leading lawyer,
a man of vigorous and aggressive character, and of tough
fibre both physically and mentally. He shared the wish
of Summers to keep West Virginia out of the conflict if
possible, but when we had driven Wise out of the valley,
he took a pronounced position in favor of the new state
movement. A little afterward he was appointed District
Attorney for the United States. Although the loyal
people had such competent leaders, the majority of the
i: of wealth and of the families recognized as socially
eiTiii.int were avowed Secessionists. They were a small
minority of the whole people, but in all slave-holding
communities social rank is so powerful that their influence
was out of proportion to their numbers. Even the lead-
ers of the Unionists found their own "house divided
against itself," for scarce one of them but had a son in
Wise's legion, and the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment
was largely composed of the young men of Charleston
and the vicinity. I have already referred to the journal
of Major Smith which fell into my hands as *• captured
rebel mail,'* and its pages are full of pathetic evidence
of the conflicting emotions which such a situation excited.
He was the son of B. F. Smith, whom I have just men-
tioned, and whilst in Floyd's camp in front of us at
Sewell Mountain he wrote : " My source of constant
trouble is that my father will be in danger. Wicked and

WINTER-QUARTERS 1 57

unscrupulous men, with whom he has lived in friendship
for years, absolutely thirst for his blood, as I truly be-
lieve. He and Summers, as one of their friends remarked
to me to-day, are especial objects of hatred and aversion
to men here. I am actually leading a set of men one
of whose avowed objects is the arrest and the judicial
or lynch murder of my father ! " In the next month he
heard "the startling news" that his father had fully
identified himself with ihe new state movement, and
writes: "Those with whom I was connected, call and
curse him as a traitor, — and he knew it would be so !
Why my dear father has chosen to place me in this
terrible situation is beyond my comprehension. I have
been shocked beyond description in contemplating the
awful consequences to the peace, safety, and happiness
of both of us ! " The family distress and grief revealed
by accident in this case is only an example of what was
common in all the families of prominent Union men.
In some cases, as in that of Major Smith, the young men
resigned their commissions and made their way home,
finding the mental and moral strain too great to bear;
but in many more, pride and the influence of comrades
kept them in the Confederate service with the enlisted
men who could not resign, and with hearts sorely torn
by conflicting duties, they fought it out to the end.

The slavery question was the vexed one which troubled
the relations of the army and the people in all the border
States. My own position was that of the party which
had elected Mr. Lincoln. We disclaimed any purpose
of meddling with the institution in the States which re-
mained loyal to the Union, whilst we held it to be within
the war powers of the government to abolish it in the
rebellious States. We also took satisfaction in enforc-
ing the law which freed the " contrabands " who were
employed by their masters in any service within the
Confederate armies. These principles were generally

IS8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

understood and acquiesced in by the West Virginians;
but it was impossible to come to any agreement in
regard to fugitive slaves who took refuge in our camps.
The soldiers and many of the officers would encourage
the negroes to assert their freedom, and would resist
attempts to recapture them. The owners, if Union men,
would insist that the fugitives should be apprehended
and restored to them by military authority. This was
simply impossible, for the pubUc sentiment of the army
as a whole was so completely with the slaves that any
such order would have been evaded and made a farcical
dead letter. The commanders who made such orders
uniformly suffered from doing it; for the temper of the
volunteer army was such that the orders were looked upon
as evidence of sympathy with the rebellion, and destroyed
the usefulness of the general by creating an incurable
distrust of him among his own men. Yet nearly all the
department commanders felt obliged at first, by what
they regarded as the letter of the law, to order that fugi-
tive slaves claimed by loyal citizens should be arrested,
if within the camps, and delivered up.

Within the district of the Kanawha I tried to avoid
the difliculty by stringent orders that slaves should be
kept out of the camps; but I declined to order the
troops to arrest and return them. I had two little con-
troversies on the subject, and in both of them I had to
come in collision with Colonel Benjamin Smith. After
they were over we became good friends, but the facts
are too important an illustration of the war-time and its
troubles to be omitted.

The first raised the question of " contraband." A
negro man was brought into my camp by my advance-
guard as we were following Floyd to Sewell Mountain in
September. He was the body-servant of Major Smith,
and had deserted the major, with the intention of getting
back to his family at Charleston. In our camp he soon

WINTER-QUARTERS 1 59

learned that he was free, under the Act of Congress, and
he remained with us, the servants about headquarters
giving him food. When I returned to Gauley Bridge,
Mr. Smith appeared and demanded the return of the
man to him, claiming him as his slave. He, however,
admitted that he had been servant to Major Smith in
the rebel army with his consent. The man refused to
go with him, and I refused to use compulsion, inform-
ing Mr. Smith that the Act of Congress made him free.
The claimant then went to General Rosecrans, and I was
surprised by the receipt, shortly after, of a note from
headquarters directing the giving up of the man.^ On
my stating the facts the matter was dropped, and I
heard no more of it for a month, the man meanwhile
disappearing. Soon after my headquarters were moved
to Charleston, in December, I received another note from
headquarters, again directing the delivery of the fugitive.^
Again I gave a temperate and clear statement of the
facts, adding that I had reason to believe the man had
now taken advantage of his liberty to go to Ohio. Mr.
Smith's case thus ended, but it left him with a good
deal of irritation at what he thought a wrong done to
him as well as insubordination on my part.

In March following, another case arose, and I received
a paper from headquarters containing an alleged state-
ment of the facts, and referred to me in usual course
for report. I had been absent from Charleston when
the incidents occurred, but made careful inquiry satis-
fying myself of the truth, and perhaps cannot give an
intelligent explanation better than by quoting the report
itself, for its tone shows the sort of annoyance I felt,
and it exhibits some of the conditions of an army com-
mand involving administrative duties that were far from
pleasant.

' Letter of Major Darr, acting A. A. G., November i8.
* Letter of Captain H- rtsuff, A. A. G., December 13.

l6o REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

I said: "The document is in the handwriting of
B. F. Smith, Esq., U. S. District Attorney, residing here,
though signed only by John Slack, Jr., and William
Kelly; the former an acting deputy U. S. marshal, the
latter the jailer at the county jail. Its composition is so
peculiar that it is difficult to tell what part of the statement
is Slack's or Kelly's and what is Colonel Smith's, and
therefore I do not know whom to hold responsible for the
mis-statements contained in it.

" Mr. Slack is a respectable young man, who I believe
would do his duty as far as he understands it, but who has
not energy enough to keep him from being the tool of
others. Mr. Kelly, the jailer, is sufficiently described when
I state the fact that he has attempted to add to his profits
as turnkey by selling bad whisky to soldiers put in his
calaboose, at the rate of five dollars per pint bottle. Mr.
Smith, the District Attorney, has lost no opportunity of
being annoying to the military officers here, since the
controversy about the negro man captured from his
son. Major Isaac Smith of the rebel army. This refer-
ence to the parties concerned is necessary to enable the
commanding general to understand the animus of their
complaints.

"The facts are substantially as follows: Henry H.
Hopkins is a notorious Secessionist living near Coal River,
and a man of considerable property. Some time before
his arrest he sent the negro man mentioned in the com-
plaint Soutli, in charge of some Logan County 'bash-
whackers.' On his way and in McDowell County the
man managed to escape and returned into Hopkins's
neighborhood, near Boone C. H., where he took his wife
and three children alleged to have been the property of
a woman named Smoot, and brought them to this post.
Upon his representation that he had escaped from armed
rebels in McDowell County, and without further knowl-
edge of the facts, the Post Quartermaster set him at work.

WINTER-QUARTERS l6l

About the 19th of F'ebruary Hopkins came to town with
Mrs. Smoot, and without notice to the quartermaster
or any color of authority by any civil process, procured
the aid of Kelly, the jailer, seized the negro and took him
to Wright's hotel. The provost-marshal, knowing that
Hopkins was an active Secessionist and that he had been
personally engaged in the combat at Boone C. H. last fall,
ordered iiis arrest. Shortly after, he was waited upon by
B. F. Smith, Esq., U. S. District Attorney, who stated
that he had known Mr. Hopkins for a good many years
and was confident he was a good Union man, although in
fact the deputy-marshal at the very time held a warrant
for the arrest of Hopkins for treason and conspiracy,
under an indictment found in the U. S. Court, of which,
to say the least of it, it is very strange Mr. Smith should
have been ignorant. At the request of the provost-
marshal, the warrant was served on Hopkins, who was
admitted to bail in the sum of $2000, which is most inad-
equate security for the appearance of a man of Hopkins's
wealth and influence, accused of such a crime. After the
arrest of Hopkins, the negro being left to himself returned
to his quarters, but sometime during the night stole a
skiff and attempted to escape with his family down the
Kanawha River. The circumstances of his accident in the
river, the drowning of his family and his subsequent cap-
ture, I have not been able to investigate fully.

"The only matter of controversy now is in regard to
the horse. The bar-keeper at the tavern denies that he
has said it was taken by Wagon-master West (a man who
has since been discharged by the Post Quartermaster),
and I have been unable to trace it, although every effort
has been made in perfect good faith to do so. The man
West was put under arrest, to see if that would make him
admit anything with regard to it, but without effect. I
advised Slack to procure some one who knew the horse
to pass through the government stables and teams, and if

VOL. I. — 1 1

1 62 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

he recognized the <inimal to let me know at once, and I
would give an order to him to obtain it. The statement
that ' Slack says he told Cox he could not find him, that
a soldier or employee in his command got him, and if
proper measures were taken he could be had,' is both
impudent and false, and I respectfully submit that it is
not, in matter or manner, such a complaint as the Com-
manding General should call upon me to reply to.

" The statement of these civil officials at once gives me
the opportunity and makes it my duty to state to the
Commanding General that the only occasions on which
these gentlemen show any vitality, is when some Seces-
sionist's runaway negroes arc to be caught. For any pur-
pose of ordinary municipal magistracy they seem utterly
incompetent. I have urged the organization of the county
and of the town, but to no effect. Every street that is
mended, every bridge that is repaired, or wharf that is
put in order, must be done by the army at the expense
of the U. S. government. They will not elect officers to
look after the poor, but leave us to feed the starving near
our camps. They will establish no police, and by force
of public opinion keep suitors out of the courts ordered
to be held by Governor Peirpoint. Yet a U. S. Commis-
sioner, without any warrant or even pretended jurisdiction,
will stop any vagrant negro, drive him through the streets
in person, and say that he does it as a U. S. officer ! Of
course we simply look on and have had no controversy
with them, unless driven to it by direct efforts on their
part to interfere with our necessary regulations.

" The simple fact is that a few men of property who are
avowed Secessionists control the town and make its public
sentiment. By this means they practically control these
officers also. Many of the negroes employed ^t the salt-
works, and under hire in other capacities in the vicin-
ity, are the slaves of rebels who are either in the rebel
army or fled with it from the valley. The great problem

WINTER-QUARTERS 163

upon which the Secessionists remaining here are exercis-
ing their ingenuity is to find the means of using the U. S.
Commissioner and Marshal to secure to them the services
of these persons without cost or legitimate contract of
hiring, for the present profit of these gentlemen here,
and the future advantage of their compatriots across the
lines.

" Colonel Smith and Mr. Slack say that they made
the statement at the express request of Major Darr of the
Commanding General's staff. A simple inquiry by the
Major would have saved me the necessity of writing this
long letter."

It is due to General Rosecrans to say that although he
had been anything but an anti-slavery man before the
war, he made no pressure upon me to violate my own
sense of right in these or similar cases, and they ended
with my reports of the facts and of my reasons for the
course I pursued. The side lights thrown upon the situa-
tion by the letter last quoted will be more instructive than
any analysis I could now give, and the spice of flavor
which my evident annoyance gave it only helps to revive
more perfectly the local color of the time. In the case
of Mr. Smith's " negro boy Mike," I had the satisfaction
of finding in the intercepted correspondence of his son
the major, the express recognition of the man's right to
liberty by reason of his use in the enemy's service, and
could not dfeny myself the pleasure of calling attention
to it in my letters to headquarters.

My experience during the winter begot in me a rooted
dislike for the military administration of the border dis-
tricts, and strengthened my wish to be in the most active
work at the front, where the problems were the strictly
military ones of attack and defence in the presence of the
armed enemy .^ Not that the winter was without compen-

' I did not lack evidence that a steady rale, based on principles frankly
avowed and easily understood, was rapidly bringing the people to be content

1 64 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sating pleasures, for we were recipients of much social
attention of a very kindly and agreeable sort, and carried
away cherished memories of refined family circles in which
the collision of opinions and the chafing of official rela-
tions were forgotten in hearty efforts to please. With the
unconditionally loyal people our sympathies were very
deep, for we found them greatly torn and disturbed in the
conflict of duties and divided affections, where scarce a
single household stood as a unit in devotion to the cause,
and where the triumph of either side must necessarily
bring affliction to some of them.

to be in the Union, even those most inclined to secession. This result I am
gratified to find attested by General Lee and General Floyd, who in dis-
patches very lately printed confessed the effect my administration had in
quieting the valley during the first months of my occupation. O. R., vol. li.
pt. ii. pp. 230, 225.

CHAPTER IX

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS

High quality of first volunteers — Discipline milder than that of the regulars

— Reasons for the difference — Practical efficiency of the men — Neces-
sity for sifting the officers — Analysis of their defects — What is military
aptitude? — Diminution of number in ascending scale — Effect of age —
Of former life and occupation — Embarrassments of a new business —
Quick progress of the right class of young men — Political appointments

— Professional men — Political leaders naturally prominent in a civil war

— "Cutting and trying" — Dishonest methods — An excellent army at
the end of a year — The regulars in 1861 — Entrance examinations for
West Point — The curriculum there — Drill and experience — Its limita-
tions — Problems peculiar to the vast increase of the army — Ultra-
eonservatism — Attitude toward the Lincoln administration — " Point de
zele " — Lack of initiative — Civil work of army engineers — What is
military art ? — Opinions of experts — Military history — European armies
in the Crimean War — True generalship — Anomaly of a double army
organization.

THE work of sifting the material for an army which
went on through the winter of 1861-62, naturally
suggests an analysis of the classes of men who composed
both parts of the military force of the nation, — the vol-
unteers and the regulars. I need add nothing to what I
have already said of the unexampled excellence of the
rank and file in the regiments raised by the first volun-
teering. Later in the war, when "bounty jumping" and
substitution for conscripts came into play, the character
of the material, especially that recruited in the great
cities and seaports, was much lower. I think, however,
that the volunteers were always better men, man for man,
than the average of those recruited for the regular army.
The rigidity of discipline did not differ so much between
good volunteer regiments and regulars, as the mode of

1 66 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

enforcing it. There were plenty of volunteer regiments
that could not be excelled in drill, in the performance of
camp duty, or in the finish and exactness of all the forms
of parades and of routine. But it was generally brought
about by much milder methods of discipline. A captain
of volunteers was usually followed by his neighbors and
relatives. The patriotic zeal of the men of the company
as well as their self-respect made them easily amenable
to military rule so far as it tended to fit them better to
do the noble work they had volunteered for, and on which
their hearts were as fully set as the hearts of their colo-
nels or generals. In the regular army, officers and men
belonged to different castes, and a practically impassable
barrier was between them. Most of the men who had
enlisted in the long years of domestic peace were, for
one cause or another, outcasts, to whom life had been a
failure and who followed the recruiting sergeant as a last
desperate resource when every other door to a livelihood
was shut.^ The war made some change in this, but the
habits and methods of the officers had been formed before
that time and under the old surroundings. The rule was
arbitrary, despotic, often tyrannical, and it was notorious
that the official bearing and the language used toward the
regular soldiers was out of the question in a volunteer
organization. Exceptions could be found in both parts
of the service, but there could be no doubt as to the cus-
tom and the rule. To know how to command volunteers
was explicitly recognized by our leading generals as a
quality not found in many regular officers, and worth
noting when found. A volunteer regiment might have a
"free and easy" look to the eye of a regular drill ser-
geant, but in every essential for good conduct and ready

^ Since inducements to enlist have been increased by offering the chance
to win a commission, I believe the quality of the rank and file of the regu-
lars has been much improved, and as a natural consequence the officers have
found it easy to enforce discipline by less arbitrary methods.

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 167

manoeuvre on the field of battle, or for heroic efforts in
the crisis of a desperate engagement, it could not be
excelled if its officers had been reasonably competent and
faithful. There was inevitable loss of time in the organ-
ization and instruction of a new army of volunteers; but
after the first year in the field, in every quality which
tends to give victory in battle to a popular cause, the
volunteer regiment was, in my judgment, unquestionably
superior. It is necessary to say this, because there has
been a fashion of speaking of regular regiments or bri-
gades in the civil war as though they were capable of
accomplishing more in proportion to their numbers or
on some occasion of peculiar peril than the volunteers.
I did not find it so.

The material in the line, then, was as good as could
be ; the weakness was in the officers, and it was here that
the sifting was necessary. Most of these officers had
themselves enlisted as privates, and their patriotic zeal
was not to be questioned. They had been chosen to be
lieutenants, captains, and even colonels by their men
because of faith in their ability to lead, or to recognize
their influence in raising the troops. Yet a consider-
able part of them proved incompetent to command. The
disqualifications were various. Some lacked physical
strength and stamina. Some had or quickly developed
intemperate habits. Some lacked the education and in-
telligence needful for official responsibility. Some were
too indolent to apply themselves to the work of disciplin-
ing themselves or their men. Fitness for command is a
very general term, yet it implies a set of qualities which
intelligent people easily understand and attach to the
phrase. Self-command is proverbially one of the chief.
Courage and presence of mind are indispensable. Abil-
ity to decide and firmness to stick to a decision are
necessary. Intelligence enough to understand the duties
demanded of him and to instruct his subordinates in

1 68 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

theirs is another requisite. But beside all these, there
is a constitution of body and mind for which we can find
no better name than military aptitude. For lack of it
many estimable, intelligent, and brave men failed as offi-
cers. Again, not every good captain made a good colonel,
and not every good brigade commander was fit for a
division or a larger command. There was a constantly
widening test of capacity, and a rapid thinning of the
numbers found fit for great responsibilities until the
command of great armies was reached, when two or three
names are all that we can enumerate as having been
proven during the four years of our civil strife to be fully
equal to the task.

Besides the indications of unfitness for the subordinate
commands which I have mentioned, another classifica-
tion may be made. In an agricultural community (and
the greater part of our population was and is agricul-
tural), a middle-aged farmer who had been thrifty in
business and had been a country magistrate or a repre-
sentative in the legislature, would be the natural leader
in his town or county, and if his patriotism prompted
him to set the example of enlisting, he would probably
be chosen to a company office, and perhaps to a field
office in the regiment. Absolutely ignorant of tactics,
he would find that his habits of mind and body were too
fixed, and that he could not learn the new business into
which he had plunged. He would be abashed at the
very thought of standing before a company and shouting
the word of command. The tactical lessons conned in
his tent would vanish in a sort cf stage-fright when he
tried to practise them in public. Some would overcome
the difficulty by perseverance, others would give it up in
despair and resign, still others would hold on from pride
or shame, until some pressure from above or below would
force them to retire. Some men of this stamp had per-
sonal fighting qualities which kept them in the service in

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 69

spite of their tactical ignorance, like brave old Wolford
of Kentucky, of whom it used to be jocosely said, that
the command by which he rallied his cavalry regiment
was "Huddle on the Hill, boys!"

A man wholly without business training would always
be in embarrassment, though his other qualifications for
military life were good. Even a company has a good
deal of administrative business to do. Accounts are to
be kept, rations, clothing, arms, accoutrements, and am-
munition are to be receipted and accounted for. Returns
of various kinds are to be made, applications for furlough,
musters, rolls, and the like make a good deal of clerical
work, and though most of it may fall on the first ser-
geant, the captain and commissioned officers must know
how it should be done and when it is well done, or they
are sure to get into trouble. It was a very rare thing for
a man of middle age to make a good company officer. A
good many who tried it at the beginning had to be elimi-
nated from the service in one way or another. In a less
degree the same was found to hold true of the regimental
field officers. Some men retain flexibility of mind and
body longer than others, and could more easily adapt
themselves to new circumstances and a new occupation.
Of course such would succeed best. But it is also true
that in the larger and broader commands solidity of
judgment and weight of character were more essential
than in the company, and the experience of older men
was a more valuable quality. Such reasons will account
for the fact that youth seemed to be an almost essential
requisite for a company officer, whilst it was not so in
the same degree in the higher positions.

It was astonishing to see the rapidity with which well-
educated and earnest young men progressed as officers.
They were alert in both mind and body. They quickly
grasped the principles of their new profession, and with
very little instruction made themselves masters of tactics

170 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and of administrative routine. Add to this, bravery of
the highest type and a burning zeal in the cause they
were fighting for, and a campaign or two made them the
peers of any officers of their grade in our own or any
other army.

Another class which cannot be omitted and which is
yet very hard to define accurately, is that of the "politi-
cal appointments."

Of the learned professions, the lawyers were of course
most strongly represented among officers of the line.
The medical men were so greatly needed in their own
professional department that it was hard to find a suf-
ficient number of suitable age and proper skill to sup-
ply the regiments with surgeons and the hospitals with
a proper staff. The clergy were non-combatants by
profession, and a few only were found in other than
chaplain's duty. Civil engineers, railroad contractors,
architects, and manufacturers were well represented and
were valuable men. Scarce any single qualification was
more useful in organizing the army than that of using
and handling considerable bodies of men such as me-
chanics and railway employees.

The profession of the law is in our country so closely
allied to political activity that the lawyers who put on
the uniform were most likely to be classed among politi-
cal appointments. The term was first applied to men
like Banks, Butler, Baker, Logan, and Blair, most of
whom left seats in Congress to serve in the army. If
they had not done so, it would have been easy for critics
to say that the prominent politicians took care to keep
their own bodies out of harm's way. Most of them won
hard-earned and well-deserved fame as able soldiers be-
fore the war was over. In an armed struggle which grew
out of a great political contest, it was inevitable that
eager political partisans should be among the most active
in the new volunteer organizations. They called meet-

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS \^\

ings, addressed the people to rouse their enthusiasm,
urged enlistments, and often set the example by enrolling
their own names first. It must be kept constantly in
mind that we had no militia organization that bore any
appreciable proportion to the greatness of the country's
need, and that at any rate the policy of relying upon
volunteering at the beginning was adopted by the gov-
ernment. It was a foregone conclusion that popular
leaders of all grades must largely officer the new troops.
Such men might be national leaders or leaders of country
neighborhoods; but big or little, they were the necessity
of the time. It was the application of the old Yankee
story, " If the Lord ivill have a church in Paxton, he
must take seek as tlicr be for deacons."

I have, in a former chapter, given my opinion that the
government made a mistake in following CJeneral Scott's
advice to keep its regular army intact and forbid its offi-
cers from joining volunteer regiments; but good or bad,
that advice was followed at the beginning, and the only
possible thing to do next was to let popular selection
and natural leadership of any sort determine the company
organizations. The governors of States generally fol-
lowed a similar rule in the choice of field officers, and
selected the general officers from those in the state
militia, or from former officers of the army retired to
civil life. In one sense, therefore, the whole organiza-
tion of the volunteer force might be said to be political,
though we heard more of "political generals*' than we
did of political captains or lieutenants. When the
organization of the United States Volunteers took the
place of the state contingents which formed the "three
months' service," the appointments by the President were
usually selections from those acting already under state
appointment. The National Government was more con-
servative than the Confederacy in this respect. Our ser-
vice was always full of colonels doing duty as brigadiers

172 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and brigadiers doing duty as major-generals, whilst the
Southern army usually had a brigadier for every brigade
and a major-general for every division, with lieutenant-
generals and generals for the highest commands. If
some rigid method had been adopted for mustering out
all officers whom the government, after a fair trial, was
unwilling to trust with the command appropriate to their
grade, there would have been little to complain of; but
an evil which grew very great was that men in high rank
were kept upon the roster after it was proven that they
were incompetent, and when no army commander would
willingly receive them as his subordinates. Nominal
commands at the rear or of a merely administrative kind
were multiplied, and still many passed no small part of
the war "waiting orders." As the total number of gen-
eral officers was limited by law, it followed, of course,
that promotion had to be withheld from many who had
won it by service in the field. This evil, however, was
not peculiar to the class of appointments from civil life.
The faults in the first appointments were such as were
almost necessarily connected with the sudden creation of
a vast army. The failure to provide for a thorough test
and sifting of the material was a governmental error. It
was palliated by the necessity of conciliating influential
men, and of avoiding antagonisms when the fate of the
nation trembled in the balance; but this was a political
motive, and the evil was probably endured in spite of its
well-known tendency to weaken the military service.

A few months' campaigning in the field got us rid of
most of the "towr -meeting style" of conducting military
affairs in the army itself, though nothing could cure the
practice on the part of unscrupulous men of seeking repu-
tation with the general public by dishonest means. The
newspapers were used to give fictitious credit to some
and to injure others. If the regular correspondents of
the press had been excluded from the camps, there would

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 73

no doubt have been surreptitious correspondence which
would have found its way into print through private and
roundabout channels. But this again was not a vice
peculiar to officers appointed from civil life. It should
be always remembered that honorable conduct and de-
voted patriotism was the rule, and self-seeking vanity
and ambition the exception; yet a few exceptions would
be enough to disturb the comfort of a large command.
To sum up, the only fair way to estimate the volunteer
army is by its work and its fitness for work after the
formative period was passed, and when the inevitable
mistakes and the necessary faults of its first organization
had been measurably cured. My settled judgment is
that it took the field in the spring of 1862 as well fitted
for its work as any army in the world, its superior excel-
lences in the most essential points fully balancing the
defects which were incident to its composition.

This opinion is not the offspring of partiality toward
the volunteer army on the part of one himself a volunteer.
It was shared by the most active officers in the field who
came from the regular service. In their testimony given
in various ways during the war, in their official reports,
and in *heir practical conduct in the field which showed
best of all where their reliance was placed, these officers
showed their full faith in and admiration for the volun-
teer regiments. Such an opinion was called out by the
Committee on the Conduct of the War in its examination
of General Gibbon in regard to the Gettysburg campaign,
and his judgment may fairly be taken as that of the bet-
ter class of the regular officers. He declared of some of
these regiments in his division, that the^ were as well
disciplined as any men he ever wished to see; that
their officers had shown practical military talent ; that a
young captain from civil life, whom he instanced, was
worthy to be made a general. He named regiments of
volunteers which he said were among the finest regi-

174 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ments that ever fought on any field, and in which every
officer was appointed from civil life.^ He added the
criticism which I have above made, that no proper
method of getting rid of incompetent officers and of
securing the promotion of the meritorious had been
adopted; but this in no way diminishes the force of his
testimony that every kind of military ability was abun-
dantly found in our volunteer forces and needed only
recognition and encouragement. It would be easy to
multiply evidence on this subject. General Grant is a
witness whose opinion alone may be treated as conclu-
sive. In his Personal Memoirs^ he explicitly and un-
qualifiedly says that at the close of the Vicksburg
campaign his troops fulfilled every requirement of an
army, and his volunteer officers were equal to any duty,
some of them being in his judgment competent to com-
mand an independent army in the field. Sherman fully
shared this opinion.^

In trying to form a just estimate of the officers of the
regular army in 1861, we have to consider not only their
education, but the character of their military life and
experience up to that time. It is, on the whole, a salu-
tary popular notion that " professionals " in any depart-
ment of work are more likely to succeed than amateurs.
At the beginning of the Civil War our only professional
soldiers were the officers of our little regular army,
nearly all of whom were graduates of the West Point
Military Academy. Since the Mexican War of 1848,
petty conflicts with Indians on the frontier had been
their only warlike experience. The army was hardly
larger than a single division, and its posts along the
front of the advancing wave of civilization from the
mouth of the Rio Grande to the Canada border were so

^ Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. iv. pp. 444-446.
^ Personal Memoirs of U. S Grant, vol. i. p. 573.
• Letter to Halleck, O. R., vol. xxxix. pt. iii. p. 413.

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS I75

numerous that it was a rare thin^; to see more than two
or three companies of soldiers together. To most of the
officers their parade of the battalion of cadets at West
Point was the largest military assemblage they had ever
seen. Promotion had been so slow that the field officers
were generally superannuated, and very few who had a
rank higher than that of captain at the close of i860 did
any active field work on either side during the Civil
War. The total number of captains and lieutenants of
the line would hardly have furnished colonels for the vol-
unteer regiments of the single State of New York as they
were finally mustered into the National service during
the war; and they would have fallen far short of it when
their own numbers were divided by the '•ebellion itself.

Our available professional soldiers, then, were cap-
tains and subalterns whose experience was confined to
company duty at frontier posts hundreds of miles from
civilization, except in the case of the engineers, the
staff corps, and some of the artillery in sea-coast forts.
With the same exceptions, the opportunities for enlarg-
ing their theoretic knowledge had been small. It was
before the days of post libraries, and books of any sort
were a rarity at the garrisons. In the first year of the
war, I expressed to General Gordon Granger my surprise
at finding how little most line officers had added to the
theoretic reading they got at the academy. "What
could you expect," he said in his sweeping way, "of
men who have had to spend their lives at a two-company
post, where there was nothing to do when off duty but
play draw-poker and drink whiskey at the sutler's shop,^"
This was, of course, meant to be picturesquely extrava-
gant, but it hit the nail on the head, after all. Some of
the officers of the old regime did not conceal their con-
tempt for books. It was a stock story in the army that
when the Utah expedition was fitting out in 1856, Gen-
eral Henry Hunt, chief of artillery of the army of the

176 REMhWISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IV A R

Potomac, then a young artillery officer, applied to Gen-
eral Twiggs, from whose command part of the expedition
was making up, for leave to take a little box of military
books. "No, sir," was the peremptory response; "no
room in the train for such nonsense." Hunt retired
chop-fallen ; but soon after another officer came in, with
"General, our mess has a keg of very nice whiskey we
don't want to lose; won't you direct the quartermaster
to let it go in the wagons ^ " " Oh yes, sir. Oh yes,
anything in reason!" If not true, the story is good
enough to be true, as its currency attests; but whether
true or no, the "fable teaches" that post-graduate study
in the old army was done under difficulties.

The course of study at West Point had narrower limi-
tations than most people think, and it would be easy to
be unfair by demanding too much of the graduates of
that military college. The course of study was of four
years, but the law forbade any entrance examinations on
subjects outside of the usual work done in the rural com-
mon schools. The biographies of Grant, of Sherman, of
Sheridan, of Ormsby Mitchell, and of others show that
they in fact had little or no other preparatory education
than that of the common country school.^ The course of
study and amount of education given must necessarily be
limited, therefore, to what boys of average ability and
such preparation could accomplish in the four years.
They were no further advanced, on entering, than they
would have to be to enter any ordinary fitting school for
one of our first-class colleges, or the high schools in the
graded systems of public schools in our cities. Three
years of study would put them abreast of students enter-

1 Grant, in his Personal Memoirs (vol. i. p. 24), says of the school in his
early Ohio home, that the highest branches taught there were " the three
R's, — Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rithmetic. I never saw," he says, " an algebra
or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until
after I was appointed to West Point. I then bought a work on algebra in
Cincinnati, but having no teacher it was Greek to me."

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 77

ing college elsewhere, and four years would carry them
about as far as the end of the Freshman year in Yale,
Harvard, or Princeton. The corps of professors and
teachers at West Point has always deservedly ranked
high as instructors, but there is no " royal road " to
knowledge, and it cannot be claimed that three or four
years at the Military Academy would count for more, as
general education, than the same period spent in any
other good school. A very few men of high standing in
the classes supplemented their education by obtaining
appointments as temporary instructors in the academy
after graduating, but most of them left their books be-
hind them and began at once the subaltern's life at the
distant frontier post.

If we analyze the course of study they pursued, we find
that it covered two years' work in mathematics, one in
physics and chemistry, and one in construction of fortifi-
cations. This was the scientific part, and was the heav-
iest part of the curriculum. Then, besides a little
English, mental philosophy, moral philosophy, and ele-
mentary law, there were two years' study of the P""rench
and one of Spanish. This was the only linguistic study,
and began with the simplest elements. At the close of
the war there was no instruction in strategy or grand
tactics, in military history, or in what is called the Art
of War. The little book by Mahan on Out-post Duty was
the only text-book in Theory, outside the engineering
proper. At an earlier day they had used Jomini's intro-
duction to his "Grandes Operations Militaires," and I
am unable to say when its use was dropped. It is not
my wisn to criticise the course of study; on the other
hand, I doubt if it could be much improved for boys who
had only the preparation required by the law. But since
we are trying to estimate its completeness as professional
education fitting men to command armies in the field, it
is absolutely necessary to note the fact that it did not

VOL. I. — 12

178 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

pretend to include the military art in that sense. Its
scientific side was in the line of engineering and that
only. Its prize-men became engineers, and success at
the academy was gauged by the student's approach to
that coveted result.

That the French which was learned was not enough to
open easily to the young lieutenant the military litera-
ture which was then found most abundantly in that lan-
guage, would seem to be indicated by the following
incident. In my first campaign I was talking with a
regular officer doing staff duty though belonging in the
line, and the conversation turned on his West Point
studies. The little work of Jomini's mentioned above
being casually referred to as having been in his course,
I asked him if he had continued his reading into the
History of the Seven Years' War of Frederick the Great,
to which it was the introduction. He said no, and added
frankly that he had not read even the Introduction in the
French, which he had found unpleasantly hard reading,
but in the English translation published under the title
of the Art of War. This officer was a thoroughly esti-
mable, modest, and intelligent man, and seemed in no .
way inferior to other line officers of his age and grade.
It would of course be true that some men would build
industriously upon the foundation laid at the academy,
and perfect themselves in those things of which they had
only acquired the elements; but the surroundings of
frontier life at a post were so unfavorable that I believe
few in fact did so. The officers of the engineer corps
and the ordnance were specifically devoted to scientific
careers, and could go steadily forward to expertness in
their specialties. Those who were permanently attached
to the staff corps or to bureaus at Washington had also
opportunity to enlarge their professional knowledge by
study if they were so inclined. But all these were ex-
ceptionally situated, and do not help us answer the ques-

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 179

tion What kind and amount of military education was
implied in the fact that a man had graduated at West
Point and been sent to serve in the line? I have pur-
posely omitted for the present to consider the physical
training and the practical instruction in tactics by means
of drill, because the question is in terms one of science,
not of practice; that will come later. The conclusion is
that the inteP actual education at the Military Academy
was essentially the same, as far as it went, as that of any
polytechnic school, the peculiarly military part of it
being in the line of engineering. In actual warfare, the
laying out and construction of regular forts or the con-
duct of a regular siege is committed to professional en-
gineers. For field work with an army, therefore, the
mental furnishing of the West Point man was not supe-
rior to that of any other liberally educated man. In
some of our volunteer regiments we had whole companies
of private soldiers who would not have shunned a com-
petitive examination with West Point classes on the
studies of the Military Academy, excepting the technical
engineering of fortifications.^

Let us look now at the physical and practical training
of the cadet. The whole period of his student life at
West Point had more or less of this. He was taken as
a raw recruit would be, taught the school of the soldier
in marching, in the manual of arms, and in personal car-
riage. He passed on to the drill of the squad, the pla-
toon, the company. The tactics of the battalion came
last, and the cadet might become a corporal, sergeant,
lieutenant, or captain in the corps if he showed aptitude

^ It must not be forgotten that my criticisms are strictly confined to the
condition of military education in our Civil War period. Since that time
some excellent work has been done in post-graduate schools for the different
arms of the service, and field manoeuvres have been practised on a scale never
known in our army prior to 1861. A good beginning has also been made,
both here and in England, toward giving the young soldier a military library
of English books.

l8o REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

for drill and tactics. It is noticeable, however, that
Grant and Sheridan remained privates during their whole
cadetship, and Sherman, though once he became ser-
geant, was put back in the ranks. The fair conclusion
is that this part of the cadet discipline is not very closely
connected with generalship, though it is important as
preparation for the ready handling of a company or a
battalion. Sherman tells us, in his Memoirs, that he
studied evolutions of the line out of the books, as a new
subject, when he was in camp \.\ front of Washington,
after the first battle of Bull Run.^ The tactical educa-
tion of the cadet stopped at the evolutions of the bat-
talion, and for nearly all of them it was, even in that
respect, the education of the soldier in the ranks and not
of the officer, since a very small proportion became offi-
cers in the cadet corps.

This practical drill was, of course, the same as that
which was used in organized militia regiments, and the
famous Ellsworth Zouaves of Chicago, the New York
Seventh Regiment, with a number of other militia regi-
ments in different States, were sufficient proof that this
training could be made as exact outside of the cadet
corps as in it. It certainly was enough for the practical
handling of the company and the regiment under the
simplified tactics which not only prevailed during the
war itself, but, with Upton's Manual as a basis, has been
authoritatively adopted as an improvement upon the older
and more complicated methods. It must not be forgot-
ten that although our militia system had fallen into scan-
dalous neglect, the voluntary efforts of citizen soldiers
had kept many good independent companies organized
everywhere, as well as lull regiments in most of the older
States; so that there were in fact more well-drilled regi-
ments in the militia than there were in the little regular
army. It was the small ratio all these, of both classes,

1 Memoirs, toI. i. p. 220.

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS l8l

bore to the demands of the gigantic war that was upon
us, which made the problem so troublesome. The offi-
cers of the organized militia regiments, before the end of
the three months' service, did what I have said it was
desirable that those of the regular regiments should have
done, — they scattered from their original commands and
were active in organizing the new volunteer regiments.
General De Trobriand, who went out as Colonel of the
Fifty-fifth New York, says that the New York Seventh
Regiment furnished three hundred officers to volunteer
regiments.^ In a similar way, though not to the same
extent, the other organized and disciplined militia, in
both Eastern and Western States, furnished the skeletons
of numerous new regim'^nts.

The really distinguishing feature in the experience of
the regular officers of the line was their life in garrison
at their posts, and their active work in guarding the fron-
tier. Here they had become familiar with duty of the
limited kind which such posts would afford. This in
time became a second nature to them, and to the extent
it reached, was, as other men's employments are, their
business. They necessarily had to learn pretty thor-
oughly the army regulations, with the methods and forms
of making returns and conducting business with the ad-
jutant-general's office, with the ordnance office, the quar-
termaster's and subsistence departments, etc. In this
ready knowledge of the army organization and its methods
their advantage over the new volunteer officers was more
marked, as it seemed to me, than in any and all other
things. The routine of army business and the routine of
drill had to be learned by every array officer. The regu-
lar officer of some years' standing already knew, as a
matter of course, what a new volunteer officer must spend
some time in learning. There is something of value also
in the habit of mind formed in actual service, even if

i De Trobriand, Four Years with Potomac Army, p. 64.

1 82 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the service is in subaltern grades and on a petty scale.
Familiarity with danger and with the expectation of danger
is acquired, both by the Indian wars of the frontier and by
the hunting and field sports which fill more or less of the
leisure of garrison life.

But there were some drawbacks upon the value of the
preparation for war which these officers possessed. There
was a marked conservatism as to military methods and
arms, and an almost slavish reverence for things which
were sanctioned by Europv-^an authority, especially that of
the second French Empire. American invention was
never more fruitful than when applied to military weap-
ons. Repeating and magazine small arms, breach-load-
ing cannon, and Gatling guns with other repeating
artillery, were brought out or improved with wonderful
variety of form and of demonstrable excellence. The
regular army influence was generally against such inno-
vations. Not once, but frequently, regular army officers
argued to me that the old smooth-bore musket with
"buck and ball " cartridge w ts the best weapon our troops
could desire. We went through the war with a muzzle-
loading musket, the utmost that any commander could do
being to secure repeating rifles for two or three infantry
regiments in a whole army. Even to the end the " regu-
lar" chiefs of artillery insisted that the Napoleon gun,
a light smooth-bore twelve-pounder cannon, was our best
field-piece, and at a time when a great campaign bad re-
duced our forces so that a reduction of artillery was advis-
able, I received an order to send to the rear my three-inch
rifled ordnance guns and retain my Napoleons. The
order was issued by a regular officer of much experience,
but T procured its suspension in my own command by &
direct appeal to the army commander. There was no
more doubt then than there is to-day of the superiority
of rifled guns, either for long-range practice with shells
or in close work with canister. They were so much

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 83

lighter that wo could jump them across a rough country
where the teams could hardly move a Napoleon. We
could subdue our adversaries' fire with them, when their
smooth-bores could not reach us. Yet we were ordered
to throw away our advantages and reduce ourselves to
our enemy's condition upon the obstinate prejudice of a
worthy man who had had all flexibility drilled out of
him by routine. Models of automatic rapid-fire and re-
peating field-pieces were familiar objects "at the rear,"
but I saw none of them in action in any army in which
I served. The conservatism of the old army must be held
responsible for this.

The question of zeal and devotion to the cause for
which we fought cannot be ignored in such a war as ours
was. It is notorious that comparatively few of the regu-
lar officers were political friends of Mr. Lincoln's admin-
istration at the beginning. Of those who did not "go
with the South " but remained true to the National flag,
some were full of earnest patriotism, like the young offi-
cers whom I have mentioned as volunteering to assist the
governors of States in organizing their contingents and
as seeking places in volunteer regiments. There were
others who meant to do their duty, but began with little
hopefulness or zeal. There were still others who did not
hesitate to predict defeat and to avow that it was only for
professional honor or advancement that they continued to
serve under the National flag. These last were con-
fessedly soldiers of fortune. The war was an education
for all who were in it, and many a man began with reluc-
tance and half-heartedness who was abundantly radical
before the conflict was over. There was, however, a con-
siderable class who practised on Talleyrand's diplomatic
motto, "point de zele," and limited their efforts to the
strict requirement of duty. Such men would see disaster
occur for lack of a little spontaneity on their part, and
yet be able to show that they literally obeyed every order

1 84 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

received. I was once ordered to support with my com-
mand a movement to be made by another. It was an
important juncture in a campaign. Wondering at delay,
I rode forward and fo md the general officer I was to sup-
port. I told him I was ordered to support him in doing
what we both saw was needing to be done; but he had no
explicit orders to begin the movement. I said that m •
orders to support him were sufficient to authorize his
action, and it was plain that it would be unfortunate
if the thing were not done at once. He answered
cynically, "If you had been in the army as long as I
have, you would be content to do the things that are
ordered, without hunting up others." The English
regulars, also, have a saying, "Volunteering brings bad
luck."

There was altogether too much of this spirit in the
army, and one who can read between the lines will see
it in the history of many a campaign. It did not neces-
sarily mean wavering loyalty. It was sometimes the
mental indecision or timidity which shrinks from respon-
sibility. It was sometimes also the result of education
in an army on the peace establishment, where any spon-
taneity was snubbed as an impertinence or tyrannically
crushed as a breach of discipline. I v.^ould not be under-
stood to make more of these things than is necessary to
a just estimate of the situation, but it seems to me an
entirely fair conclusion that with us in 1861 as with
the first French republic, the infusion of the patriotic
enthusiasm of a volunteer organization was a necessity,
and that this fully made up for lack of instruction at the
start. This hasty analysis of what the actual preparation
for war was in the case of the average line officer of the
regular army will show, to some extent, the basis of my
judgment that there was nothing in it which a new vol-
unteer officer, having what I have called military apti-
tude, should not learn in his first campaign.

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 185

How far the officers of the engineers and of the staff
corps applied themselves to general military study,
would depend upon their taste and their leisure. Their
opportunities for doing so were much better than those
of line officers, but there was also a tendency to immerse
themselves in the studies of their special department of
work. Very eminent officers of engineers have told me
since the war that the pressure of their special profes-
sional work was such that they had found no time to read
even the more noteworthy publications concerning the
history of our own great struggle. The surveys of the
great lakes and the coast, the engineering problems of
our great rivers, etc., have both formerly and in recent
years absorbed their time and their strength. The ord-
nance and the staff corps, also, had abundant special
duties. Still it may reasonably be assumed that officers
of the classes mentioned have usually made themselves
somewhat familiar with the best writings on military art.
If we had in the country in 1861 a class of men who
could be called educated soldiers in the scientific sense,
we certainly should find them in the several corps just
referred to.

Here, however, we have to meet the question What is
military art as applied to the problem of winning battles
or campaigns.^ We are obliged to answer that outside of
the business administration and supply of an army, and
apart from the technical knowledge of engineering and
the construction of fire-arms and ammunition, it consists
in the tactical handling of bodies of men in accordance
with very few and very simple principles of strategy.
The literature of the subject is found in the history of
wars analyzed by competent men like Napoleon, Jomini,
the Archduke Charles, Sir William Napier, Clausewitz,
Moltke, Hamley, and others ; but it may be broadly said
that the principles of this criticism and analysis may be
so briefly stated as to be printed on the back of a visiting-

1 86 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

card.* To trace the campaigns of great soldiers under
the guidance of such a critic as Jomini is full of interest
to any intelligent person, and there is nothing in the
subject of the slightest difficulty of comprehension if full
and authentic topographical maps are before the reader.
To make much instructive use of military history in this
way demands a good deal of voluminous reading and the
command of charts and maps extensive enough to allow
the presentation of the face of a country on a large scale.
With these advantages all wars, both ancient and modern,
are full of instructive examples of the application of the
simple principles of strategy under innumerable varying
circumstances and situations; and this union of simple
theory in ever-changing practical application is what
constitutes the theoretic knowledge of the general as dis-
tinguished from the tactical and administrative duties of
the subordinate.^ It was the very simplicity of the
principles that made many successful generals question
whether there was any art in the matter, except to use
courage and natural sagacity in the actual situation in
which the commander found himself and the enemy.
Marshal Saxe asserted in his "Reveries" that down to
his time there had been no formulation of principles, and
that if any had been recognized as such in the minds of
commanders of armies, they had not made it known.'

* Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, in his admirable " Letters on Strategy,"
states them in five brief primary axioms. Letters on Strategy, vol. i. pp.
9, 10.

* Jomini expresses it thus : " J'en conclus que I'histoire militaire raisonn^e
de plusieurs campagnes, scront la nieilieure £cole pour apprendre et par con*
sequent pour enseigner la grande guerre : la science des giniraux." Grandes
Operations Militaires, vol. i. p. 7.

8 Jomini, in the work already cited, quotes Marshal Saxe thus: "Que
toutes Ics sciences avaient des principes, mais que la guerre seule n'en avait
point encore : si ces principes ont exists dans la t€te de quelques g^neraux,
nulle part ils n'ont et^ indiqu<5s ou d^velopp^s." The same idea has been
put quite as trenchantly by one of the most recent writers of the English
Army, Colonel J. F. Maurice, R. A. Professor in the Farnborough Staff Col-

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 8/

It was precisely in this department of military history
"raisonnd-e" that frontier garrison lite shut the young
army officer out from the opportunities of profiting by his
leisure. The valuable books were all foreign publica-
tions in costly form with folio atlases, and were neither
easy to procure nor easily carried about with the limited
means and the rigid economy of transportation which
nuiri<ed army life in the far West. That this was iruc
even in the artillery is indicated by General Gibbon be-
fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War when ques-
tioned in reference to the relative amount of artillery
used at Gettysburg as compared with great European
battles; that distinguished officer having himself been in
the artillery when the Civil War began.*

If then the officers of the regular army, as a body, were
not in fact deeply read in what, as we have seen, Jomini
calls "the science of generals," their advantage over
equally well-educated civilians is reduced to a practical
knowledge of the duties of the company and the petty
post, and in comparison with the officers of well -drilled

lege. In the able article on " War " in the last edition of the " Encyclopaedia
liritannica," he says, " it must be emphatically asserted that there docs not
exist, and never except by pedants of whom the most careful students of war
arc more impatient than other soldiers, has there ever been supposed to
exist, an * art of v»ar ' which was something other than the methodic study
of military history."

* " Question. You have studied the history of battles a great deal : Now,
in the battles of Napoleon, had they at any time half as many artillery en-
gaged as there were at Gettysburg ? Answer. I am not sufficiently conver-
sant with military history to tell you that. I think it very doubtful whether
more guns were ever used in any one battle before. I do not believe
Napoleon ever had a worse artillery fire." Testimony of General John
Gibbon, Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. iv. p. 444. At Gettysburg
the whole number of cannon employed was about two hundred. Compare
this with Leipzig, for instance, the "battle of the giants," where two thou-
sand were employed ! Thiers says, " de Leipzig i Schonfeld au nord, de
Schonfeld \ Probstheyda k I'est, de Probstheyda ^ Connewitz au sud, une
cannonade de deux mille bouches \ feu termina cette bataille dit des grants,
et jusqu'ici la plus grande, certainement, de tous les si^cles." Thiers, Con-
sulat et I'Empire, vol. xvi. p. 607.

1 88 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIl^IL WAR

militia companies it amounted to little more than a bet-
tor knowledge of the army regulations and the adminis-
trative processes. It is no reproach to them that this
was so, for it resulted from the operation of law in the
course of education at the Military Academy and the
insignificant size of our army in times of peace. It had
been the peculiar blessing of our country that a great
standing army was unnecessary, and it would be foolish
to regret that our little army could not have the experi-
ence with great bodies of troops and the advantages of
theoretical instruction which are part of the life of officers
in the immense establishments of Continental Europe.
My only purpose is to make an approximately true bal-
ance sheet of the actual advantages of the two parts of
our National army in 1861. Whilst on the subject, how-
ever, I will go a little further and say that prior to our
Civil War, the history of European conflicts proves that
there also the theoretic preparation of military men had
not, up to that time, saved them from the necessity of
learning both generalship and army administration in
the terrible school of experience, during their first year
in the field when a new war broke out after a long inter-
val of peace.

The first volume of Kinglake's "Crimean War" ap-
peared in 1863, and I immediately and eagerly devoured
it for the purpose of learning the lesson it could teach.
It was one of the memorable sensations of a lifetime, to
find that the regular armies of England, of France, and
of Russia had had to learn their lesson anew when they
faced each other on the shore of the Euxine, and that,
whether in matters of transportation, of subsistence, of
the hospital, of grand tactics, or of generalship, they
had no advantage over our army of volunteers fresh from
their peaceful pursuits. The photographic fidelity to
detail on the part of the historian, and his apparent un-
consciousness of the sweeping conclusions to be drawn

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS 1 89

from his pictures, made the lesson all the more telling.
I drew a long breath of relief, and nothing which hap-
pened to me in the whole war so encouraged me to hope-
ful confidence in the outcome of it, as the evidence I saw
that our blunders at the beginning had been no greater
than those of old standing armies, and that our capacity
to learn was at least as quick as theirs. Their experi-
ence, like ours, showed that the personal qualities of a
commanding officer counted for much more than his theo-
retic equipment, and that a bold heart, a cool head, and
practical common-sense were of much more importance
than anything taught at school. With these, a brief ex-
perience would enable an intelligent man to fill nearly
any subordinate position with fair success; without them
any responsibility of a warlike kind would prove too
heavy for him. The supreme qualification of a gencral-
in-chief is the power to estimate truly and grasp clearly
the situation on a field of operations too large to be seen
by the physical eye at once, ^ and the undaunted temper
of will which enables him to execute with persistent
vigor the plan which his intellect approves. To act upon
uncertainties as if they were sure, and to do it in the
midst of carnage and death when immeasurable results
hang upon it, — this is the supreme presence of mind
which marks a great commander, and which is among
the rarest gifts even of men who are physically brave.
The problem itself is usually simple. It is the confus-
ing and overwhelming situation under which it must be
solved that causes timidity or dismay. It is the thought
of the fearful consequences of the action that begets a
nervous state of hesitation and mental timidity in most
men, and paralyzes the will. No education will ensure
this greatest and most essential quality. It is born in a
man, not communicated. With it his acquired knowl-

* Wellington said the great task of his military life was "trying to make
out what was behind the hill."

IQO REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

edge will be doubly useful, but without it an illiterate
slave-trader like Forrest may far outshine him as a sol-
dier. Nor does success as a subordinate give any certain
assurance of fitness for supreme command. Napoleon's
marshals generally failed when trusted with an independ-
ent command, as Hooker did with us; and I do not doubt
that many men, like McClellan, who failed as generals-
in-chief, would have made brave and good subordinates.
The test of quality is different in kind, and, as I have
said, the only proof of its possession is in the actual
trial. It is safe to say that a timid subordinate will not
be a good commander, but it cannot he affirmed that a
bold one will, though there are more chances in his
favor.

The education of peril is so powerful in bringing out
the qualities that can master it, and for any one who has
true military courage the acquirement of skill in the
more mechanical part of his duty in war is so rapid, that
my experience has led me to reckon low, in the compari-
son, the value of the knowledge a soldier gains in times
of peace. I say "in the comparison." Tactics are essen-
tial to the handling of large bodies of men, and must be
learned. But the zealous young soldier with aptitude for
his work will learn this part of his duty so fast that a
single campaign will find him abreast of any. At the
beginning of a great war and in the organization of a
great army, the knowledge of routine and of details un-
doubtedly saves time and saves cost both of treasure and
of life. I am therefore far from arguing that the knowl-
edge which was found in the regular army should not be
made the most of. I have already said that it should
have been scattered through the whole volunteer organi-
zation. So I also say that it was quite right to look for
the higher qualities for command in those who had the
technical information and skill. But I reckon patriotic
zeal and devotion so high that I have no hesitation in

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS

191

adding, that our army as a whole would have been im-
proved if the distinction between regular and volunteer
had been abolished, and, after the first beginnings, a
freer competition for even the highest commands had
been open to all. To keep up the regular a: my organi-
zation was practically to say that a captaincy in it was
equivalent to a brigade command in the volunteers, and
to be a brigadier in it was a reward which regular officers
looked forward to as a result of the successful conduct of
a great campaign as general-in-chief of an army. The
actual command in war was thus ridiculously belittled in
the official scale in comparison with grades of a petty
peace establishment, and the climax of absurdity was
reached when, at the close of hostilities, men who had
worthily commanded divisions and corps found them-
selves reduced to subordinate places in regiments, whilst
others who had vegetated without important activity in
the great struggle were outranking them by virtue of
seniority in the little army which had existed before the
Rebellion !

CHAPTER X

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT — SPRING CAMPAIGN

Rosecrans's plan of campaign — Approved by McCIellan with modification

— Wagons or pack-mules — Final form of plan — Changes in commands

— McCIellan limited to Army of the Potomac — Halleck's Department
of the Mississippi — Fremont's Mountain Department — Rosecrans
superseded — Preparations in the Kanawha District — Batteaux to sup-
plement steamboats — Light wagons for mountain work — Fremont's
plan — East Tennessee as an objective — The supply question — Banks
in the Shenandoah valley — Milroy's advance — Combat at McDowell —
Banks defeated — Fremont's plans deranged — Operations in the Kan-
awha valley — Organization of brigades — Brigade commanders — Ad
vance to Narrows of New River — The field telegraph — Concentration
of the enemy — Affair at Princeton — Position at Flat-top Mountain.

AS the spring of 1862 approached, the discussion of
plans for the opening of a new campaign was re-
sumed. Rosecrans had suggested, early in February,
that he would prefer to attempt reaching the Virginia
and East Tennessee Railroad by two columns moving
simultaneously upon Abingdon in the Holston valley.
One of these would start from Gauley Bridge and go by
way of Fayette, Raleigh, and Princeton ; the other would
leave some point in the Big-Sandy valley on the common
boundary of Kentucky and Virginia, and march by most
direct route to Abingdon. ^ If this plan were approved,
he asked that the west side of the Big-Sandy valley be
added to his department. He proposed to depend largely
upon pack-mule trains in place of wagons, to substitute
the French shelter tent for the larger tents still in use,
and to carry hand-mills by which the soldiers might
grind into meal the Indian corn to be found in the coun-

1 O. R., vol. V. p. 721.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 193

try. McClellan, as general in-chief, gave his approval,
suggesting a modification in regard to the column to
move from the Big-Sandy valley. His information led
him to believe that the Big-Sandy River could be rehed
upon as navigable to Prestonburg, which was seventy
miles from Abingdon by what was supposed to be a good
road. He thought, therefore, that it would be easier to
make Prestonburg the base and to use wagons. * On in-
vestigation Rosecrans reported that the most feasible
route in that region was by steamboat transportation to
Pikeville, twenty-five miles above Prestonburg, in the
Big-Sandy valley, and thence up the Louisa Fork of the
Big-Sandy by way of Pound Gap to the Holston valley;
but there would still be eighty-eight miles of marching
after leaving the steamboats, and navigation on the Big-
Sandy was limited to brief and infrequent periods of high
water.

On the I2th of March he submitted his modified plan
to the adjutant-general of the army.^ It had grown more
complex with the passage of time. The eastern line of
the department had been moved forward so as to bring
the South Branch of the Potomac and the Cow-pasture
branch of the James River under Rosecrans 's command.
He now planned four separate columns. The first was
to move up the south branch of the Potomac with a view
to turn and to capture the enemy's position at Alleghany
Summit or Monterey on the Staunton turnpike. The
second and third were to be in my district, and to move
toward the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad on the two
sides of New River. The fourth should march from the
Big-Sandy valley on the line indicated above. Rose-
crans seems to have limited his plan to the occupation
of the mountain valleys as far east as the Blue Ridge, and
did not submit any scheme for uniting his columns for
further work. He asked for reinforcements to the extent

* o. R., vol. V. p. 722. ' Id., p. 744.

VOL. 1. — 13

194 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of six regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and two
field batteries to enable him to perform his task. The
use of pack trains was given up, as they required a
greater number of animals than could be procured. In
fact, it was never found to be an economical use of mule
power, and important movements were always confined to
lines upon which wheel vehicles could be used. A rapid
cavalry raid could be thus supplied, but heavy columns of
infantry and artillery demanded wagon trains.

The weakness of Rosecrans's scheme is found in the
wide separation of parallel columns, which could never
have co-operated with success, and which had no common
object had success been possible. To be sure, it was
presumed that McClellan with the Army of the Potomac,
and Banks in the Shenandoah valley, would be operating
in eastern Virginia; but as McClellan was already bent
on making Chesapeake Bay his base, and keeping as far
as possible from the mountains, there was no real con-
nection or correlation between his purposed campaign
and that of the others. Indeed, had he succeeded in
driving Lee from Richmond toward the west, as Grant
did three years later, the feeble columns of National
troops coming from West Virginia would necessarily
have fallen back again before the enemy. If the general
scheme had been planned by Lee himself, it could not
have secured for him more perfectly the advantage of
interior lines. Yet it was in substance that which was
tried when the spring opened.

When Rosecrans's letter, enclosing his final plan,
reached Washington, McClellan had taken the field, and
President Lincoln had made use of the occasion to re-
lieve him from the direction of all other forces, so that
he might give undivided attention to his campaign with
the Potomac army. This was done by an executive
order on March ii,^ which assigned General Halleck to

1 O. R., vol. V. p. 54.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 1 95

the command of everything west of a line drawn north
and south through Knoxville, Tennessee, and formed the
Mountain Department from the territory between Halleck
and McClellan. This last department was put under the
command of Major-General John C. Fremont. General
Banks was commanding in the Shenandoah valley, but
he was at this time subordinate to McClellan. These
changes were unexpected to both McClellan and Rose-
crans. The change in McClellan's relations to the
whole army was the natural result of his inactiv'i-y dur-
ing the autumn of 1861, and the consequent loss of
confidence in him. The union of Buell's and Halleck's
commands in the west was the natural counterpart to the
concentration of Confederate armies under A. S. John-
ston at Corinth, Miss., and was a step in the right direc-
tion. There was, however, a little too much sentiment
and too little practical war in the construction of the
Mountain Department out of five hundred miles of moun-
tain ranges, and the appointment of the " path-finder " to
command it was consistent with the romantic character
of the whole. The mountains formed a natural and
admirable barrier, at which comparatively small bodies
of troops could cover and protect the Ohio valley behind
them; but, for reasons which I have already pointed out,
extensive military operations across and beyond the Alle-
ghanies from west or east were impracticable, because a
wilderness a hundred miles wide, crossed by few and
most difficult roads, rendered it impossible to supply
troops from depots on either side.

Such assurances of other satisfactory employment seem
to have been given Rosecrans that he acquiesced without
open complaint, and prepared to turn over his command
to Fremont when the latter should arrive in West Vir-
ginia. Political motives had, no doubt, much to do
with Fremont's appointment. The President had lost
faith in his military capacity as well as in his adminis-

196 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

trative ability, but the party which elected Mr. Lincoln
had not. The Republicans of the Northern States had
a warm side for the man they had nominated for the
Presidency in 1856, and there was a general feeling
among them that Fremont should have at least another
opportunity to show what he could do in the field. I
myself shared that feeling, and reported to him as my
immediate superior with earnest cordiality.^

In my own district, preparations had been made dur-
ing the winter for the expected advance in the spring.
I had visited Rosecrans at Wheeling, and he had con-
versed freely upon his plans for the new campaign.
Under his directions the old piers of the turnpike bridge
across the Gauley had been used for a new superstruc-
ture. This was a wire suspension bridge, hung from
framed towers of timber built upon the piers. Instead
of suspending the roadway from the wire cables by the
ordinary connecting rods, and giving stiffness to it by a
trussed railing, a latticed framing of wood hung directly
from the cables, and the timbers of the roadway being
fastened to this by stirrups, the wooden lattice served
both to suspend and to stiffen the road. It was a ser-
viceable and cheap structure, built in two weeks, and
answered our purposes well till it was burned in the next
autumn, when Colonel Lightburn retreated before a
Confederate invasion.^

The variable position of the head of steamboat naviga-
tion on the Kanawha made it impossible to fix a perma-
nent depot as a terminus for our wagon trains in the
upper valley. My own judgment was in favor of placing
it at Kanawha Falls, a mile below Gauley Bridge, and
within the limits of that post. To connect this with
the steamboats wherever the shoaling water might force
them to stop, I recommended the use of batteaux or keel-
boats, a craft which a natural evolution had brought into

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 35. « Id., p. 99.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 1 97

use in the changeable mountain rivers. They were a
canoe-shaped open boat, sixty feet long by eight wide,
and were pushed up the stream by quants or poles. They
required a crew of five men, — four to do the poling, and
a steersman. In the swiftest " chutes " they carried a
line ashore and made fast to a tree, then warped the boat
up to quieter water and resumed the poling. Each boat
would carry eight tons, and, compared with teaming over
roads of which the "bottom had dropped out," it proved
a most economical mode of transport. The batteaux
dropped alongside the steamer wherever she had to stop,
the freight was transferred to them directly, covered with
tarpaulins, and the boats pushed off. The number of
hands was no greater than for teaming, and the whole
cost of the teams and their forage was saved. I had
built two of these early in the winter and they were in
successful operation. Two more were partly done when
Fremont assumed command, and I urgently recommended
a fleet of fifteen or twenty as an auxiliary to our trans-
portation when active operations should be resumed. By
their use Gauley Bridge could be made the practical
depot of supply, and from ten to twenty miles of wretched
and costly wagoning be saved. ^

I became satisfied, also, that the regulation army
wagon was too heavy for the difficult mountain roads,
and recommended a strong but much lighter farm wagon,
in which four mules could draw nearly or quite as much
as six usually drew in the heavier wagon. This became
a matter of great consequence in a country where forage
could not be found, and where the wagon had to be
loaded with the food for the team as well as the rations
and ordnance stores for the men.

It had already been determined to substitute the shel-
ter tent for other forms in the principal armies, and the
change soon became general. We, however, had to wait

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 45-48

198 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

our turn after more important columns were supplied,
and our turn did not come till the campaign was over.
Even our requisitions for ammunition were not filled,
our artillery was not reduced to uniformity, and we could
not secure muskets enough of any one calibre for a single
regiment. We made the best of the situation, and whilst
keeping "headquarters " informed of our lack, were ready
to do our best with the means we had. No attention
was paid, perhaps none could be paid; to our recom-
mendations for any special supplies or means adapted to
the peculiar character of our work. We received, in
driblets, small supplies of the regulation wagons, some
droves of unbroken mules, some ordnance stores, and a fair
amount of clothing. Subsistence stores had never been
lacking, and the energy of the district quartermaster
and commissary kept our little army always well fed.

The formal change in department commanders took
place on the 29th of March, Fremont having reached
Wheeling the day before.^ Mr. Lincoln's desire by
some means to free the loyal people of East Tennessee
from the oppressive sway of the Confederates showed
itself in the instructions given to all the military officers
in the West. He had been pressing the point from the
beginning. It had entered into McClellan's and Rose-
crans's plans of the last campaign. It had been the
object of General George H. Thomas's organization of
troops at Camp Dick Robinson in Kentucky. For it
General Ormsby Mitchell had labored to prepare a
column at Cincinnati. It was not accomplished till the
autumn of 1863, when Rosecrans occupied Chattanooga
and Burnside reached Knoxville; but there had never
been a day's cessation of the President's urgency to have
it accomplished. It was prominent in his mind when he
organized the Mountain Department, and Fremont was
called upon to suggest a plan to this end as soon as he

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. i. p. 4.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 199

was appointed. His choice was to assemble the forces
of his department in Kentucky at the southern terminus
of the Central Kentucky Railroad, at Nicholasville, and
to march southward directly to Knoxville, upon what was
substantially the line taken by Burnside a year and a
half later. ^ Fremont was mistaken, however, in saying
that from Nicholasville to Knoxville supplies could be
"transported over level and good roads." General Buell
had, on the ist of February,^ reported that line to be
some two hundred miles long from the end of the railway
to Knoxville, the whole of it mountainous, and the roads
bad. He estimated a train of a thousand wagons, con-
stantly going and returning, as needful to supply ten
thousand men at Knoxville after allowance was made for
what could be gathered from the country. General Buell
was unquestionably correct in his view of the matter, but
the strong political reasons for liberating East Tennessee
made the President unwilling to be convinced that it was
then impracticable. He, however, could not furnish the
transportation required for the movement proposed by
Fr6mont, and hesitated to interfere further with the con-
duct of military affairs within Buell's territorial limits.
Besides this, Rosecrans's plan had found such favor with
the Secretary of War. that it was laid before Fremont
with official approval.^ The stripping of West Virginia
of troops to make a column in Kentucky seemed too
hazardous to the government, and Fremont changed
his plan so as to adopt that of Rosecrans with some
modifications.

He proposed to leave General Kelley with sufficient
troops to protect the line of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, and with Blenker's division (which was taken
from the Army of the Potomac and given to him) to
advance from Romney in the valley of the South Branch

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. i. p. 7. * /</., vol. vii. p. 931.

3 Id.f vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 8.

20O REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of the Potomac, ascending this valley toward the south,
picking up Schcnck's and Milroy's brigades in turn, the
latter joining the column at Monterey on the great
watershed by way* of the Cheat Mountain pass. From
Monterey Fremont purposed to move upon Staunton, and
thence, following the southwestern trend of the valleys,
to the New River near Christiansburg. Here he would
come into communication with me, whose task it would
have been to advance from Gauley Bridge on two lines,
the principal one by Fayette and Raleigh C. H. over
Flat-top Mountain to Princeton and the Narrows of
New River, and a subordinate one on the turnpike to
Lewisburg. His plan looked to continuing the march
with the whole column to the southwest, down the Hol-
ston valley, till Knoxville should be reached, the last
additions to the force to be from the troops in the Big-
Sandy valley.^

General Garfield (then colonel of the Forty-second
Ohio) had already been sent by General Buell with a bri-
gade into the Big-Sandy valley, and General George W.
Morgan was soon to be sent with a division to Cumber-
land Gap. Although these were in Fremont's depart-
ment, the War Department issued an order that they
should continue under General Buell's command at least
until Fr6mont should by his operations come into their
vicinity and field of work.^ They would, of course,
co-operate with him actively if he should reach the Hol-
ston valley. When he should form his junction with
me, he expected to supply the whole column from my
depots in the Kanawha valley, and when he reached
Knoxville he would make his base on the Ohio River,
using the line of supply he first suggested, by way of
central Kentucky.

The plan was an improvement upon Rosecrans's in
arranging for a progressive concentration of his forces

» O. R., vol. xii. pt. i. p. 7. ' Id., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 14, 119.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTAfENT 201

into one column led by himself; but it would probably
have failed, first, from the impossibility of supplying the
army on the route, and second, because the railroads cast
of the mountains ran on routes specially well adapted to
enable the enemy quickly to concentrate any needed
force at Staunton, at Lynchburg, at Christ iansburg, or
at Wytheville, to overpower the column. The Union
army would be committed to a whole season of marching
in the mountains, while the Confederates could concen-
trate the needed force and quickly return it to Richmond
when its work was done, making but a brief episode in
a larger campaign. But the plan was not destined to be
thoroughly tried. Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat by
Kimball at Kernstown, March 23d, had retired to the
Upper Shenandoah valley with his division, numbering
about 10,000 men; Ewell, with his division, was wait-
ing to co-operate with him at the gaps of the Blue Ridge
on the east, and Edward Johnson was near Staunton with
a similar force facing Milroy. In April General N. P.
Banks, commanding the National forces in the Shenan-
doah valley, had ascended it as far as Harrisonburg, and
Jackson observed him from Swift-Run Gap in the Blue
Ridge, on the road from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville.
Milroy also pushed eastward from Cheat Mountain summit,
in which high region winter still lingered, and had made
his way through snows and rains to McDowell, ten miles
east of Monterey, at the crossing of Bull-Pasture River,
where he threatened Staunton. But Banks was thought
to be in too exposed a position, and was directed by the
War Department to fall back to Strasburg. On the 5th
of May he had retired in that direction as far as New-
Market. Blanker' s division had not yet reached Fremont,
who was waiting for it in Hardy County at Petersburg.
Jackson saw his opportunity and determined to join Gen-
eral Johnson by a rapid march to Staunton, to overwhelm
Milroy first, and then return to his own operations in the

302 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Shenandoah. Moving with great celerity, he attacked
Milroy at McDowell on the 8th, the latter calling upon
Fr<l*mont for help. Schenck was .sent forward to support
him, and reached McDowell after marching thirty-four
miles in twenty-four hours. Jackson had not fully con-
centrated his forces, and the Union generals held their
ground and delivered a sharp combat in which their
casualties of all kinds numbered 256, while the Con-
federate loss was 498, General Johnson being among the
wounded. Schenck, as senior, assumed the command,
and on the 9th began his retreat to Franklin, abandoning
the Cheat Mountain road. Franklin was reached on the
nth, but Jackson approached cautiously, and did not
reach there till the 12th, when, finding that Frcimont
had united his forces, he did not attack, but returned to
McDowell, whence he took the direct road to Harrison-
burg, and then marched to attack Banks at Strasburg,
Ewell meeting and joining him in this movement.

Fremont resumed preparations for his original cam-
paign, but Banks's defeat deranged all plans, and those
of the Mountain Department were abandoned. A month
passed in efforts to destroy Jackson by concentration of
McDowell's, Banks's, and Fremont's troops; but it was
too late to remedy the ill effects of the division of com-
mands at the beginning of the campaign. On the 26th
of June General John Pope was assigned to command all
the troops in northern Virginia, Fremont was relieved at
his own request, and the Mountain Department ceased to
exist.

My own operations in the Kanawha valley had kept
pace with those in the northern portion of the depart-
ment. The early days of April were spent by Fremont
in obtaining reports of the condition of the several parts
of his command. My report of the condition of affairs
in the Kanawha valley was made on the 5th of April.^

^ O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 45.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 203

In it I called attention to the necessities of my troops
and to the equipment necessary for any extended cam-
paigning. Requisitions for supplies and transportation
had been sent to the proper staff departments during the
winter, but had not yet been filled. My forces consisted
of eleven regiments of Ohio infantry, three new and
incomplete regiments of West Virginia infantry, one
regiment of cavalry (the Second West Virginia) with
three separate cavalry troops from other commands, and,
nominally, three batteries of artillery. One of the bat
teries was of mountain howitzers, and the other two of
mi.\ed smooth-bore and rifled guns of different calibres.
My force at the opening of the campaign numbered
8500 present for duty. ^ Detachments were at the mouth
of the Big-Sandy River, at Guyandotte, at the mouth
of the Kanawha on the Ohio River, at several points in
the Kanawha valley below Gaulcy Bridge, at Summers-
ville on the upper Gauley, at Gauley Bridge, at Gauby
Mount or Tompkins farm on New River, and at Fayette
C. H. The last-named post had the only brigade organi-
zation which had been retained in winter quarters, and

' O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 121. The regiment.s of the command were the
iith, I2th, 23CI, 28th, 30th, 34th, 36th, 37th, 44th, 47tli Ohio, the 4th, 8th,
9th West Virginia, the 2d West Virginia Cavalry. Of these the nth Ohio
had only nine companies and did not get the tenth till the autumn following.
The 8th West Virginia passed from the command before active operations.
The batteries were McMullin's Ohio battery, Simmonds's Kentucky battery,
and a battery of mountain howitzers at Gauley Mount, manned by a detach-
ment of the 47th Ohio Infantry. Simmonds's company was originally of the
iNt Kentucky Infantry assigned by me to man the guns I first took into the
Kanawha valley, and subsequently transferred to the artillery service by
the Secretary of War. The guns were two 20-pounder Parrott rifles, five
lo-pounder Parrotts, two bronze lo-pounder rifles altered from 6-pounder
smooth-bores, three bronze and one iron 6-pounder smooth-bores, and ten
mountain howitzers 'o Ije packed on mules. Some of these guns were left
in position at posts, and three small field batteries were organized for the
marching columns. Besides the regiment of freshly recruited West Virginia
cavalry, there were Schambeck's Independent troop of Illinois cavalry, and
Smith's (originally Pfau's) Independent troop of Ohio cavalry, both German
troops

204 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

was commanded by Colonel Scammon of the Twenty-
third Ohio. The post at Summersville had been brought
into my command for the winter, and was garrisoned by
the Thirty-sixth Ohio under Colonel George Crook. At
Gauley Bridge was the Twenty-eighth Ohio (a German
regiment), under Colonel August Moor.

When the decision of General Fremont to have my
command advance on both sides of the New River was
received, I immediately submitted my plan of organiza-
tion to that end.* I proposed to leave the West Virginia
Infantry regiments with half the Second West Virginia
Cavalry to guard the Kanawha valley and our depots of
supply, with Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn of the Fourth
West Virginia in command. The Ohio regiments were
to be moved forward so that the Eleventh, Forty-fourth,
and Forty-seventh could be quickly concentrated on the
Lewisburg turnpike in front of Gauley Bridge, where
Colonel Crook could join them with the Thirty-sixth by
a diagonal road and take command of this colun^in. I
assigned to him a mixed battery of field-pieces and
mountain howitzers. Colonel Scammon 's brigade was to
advance from Fayette C. H. to Flat-top Mountain as
soon as the weather would permit, and thus secure the
barrier covering our further movement southward. The
brigade consisted of the Twelfth, Twenty-third, and
Thirtieth Ohio, with McMullin's battery, cad one half
the Second Virginia Cavalry. When Scamr -advanced,
the remaining Ohio regiments (Twenty-eighth, Thirty-
fourth, and Thirty-seventh), with Simmonds's battery
should concentrate at Fayette C. H. and form a new
brigade under Colonel Moor. This organization was
approved by Fremont, and the preliminary steps were
quietly taken. By the 20th of April Scammon 's brigade
was at Raleigh, only awaiting the settling of the roads to
advance to Flat-top. A week later he held the passes

1 O. R., vol. zii. pt. iii. p. 127.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 205

of the mountain, with a detachment on the New River
at the mouth of the Blue-stone, where he communicated
with the right of Crook's brigade. The front was thus
covered from Summersville to Flat-top Mountain, and
the regiments in rear were moving into their assigned
positions.

My brigade commanders were all men of marked char-
acter. Colonel Moor was a German of portly presence
and grave demeanor, a gentleman of dignity of character
as well as of bearing, and a brave, resolute man. He
had been long a citizen of the United States, and had, as
a young man, seen some military service, as was reported,
in the Seminole War in Florida. He was a rigid dis-
ciplinarian, and his own regiment was a model of accuracy
in drill and neatness in the performance of all camp
duties. He was greatly respected by his brother officers,
and his square head, with dark, smooth-shaven face, and
rather stern expression, inspired his troops with some-
thing very like awe, insuring prompt obedience to his
commands. At home, in Cincinnati, he was a man of
influence among the German residents, and his daughter
was the wife of General Godfrey Weitzel of the regular
army. My association with him was every way agreeable
and satisfactory.

Colonel Crook was an officer of the regular army who
had taken early advantage of the relaxation of the rule
preventing such from accepting a volunteer appointment.
A man of medium size, with light hair and sandy beard,
his manner was rather diffident and shy, and his whole
style quiet and reticent. His voice was light rather
than heavy, and he was so laconic of speech that this,
with his other characteristics, caused it to be commonly
said of him that he had been so long fighting Indians on
the frontier that he had acquired some of their traits and
habits. His system of discipline was based on these
peculiarities. He aimed at a stoical command of himself

206 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

as the means of commanding others, and avoided noisy
bluster of every sort, going, perhaps, to an excess in
brevity of speech and in enforcing his orders by the con-
sequences of any disobedience. His subordinates recog-
nized his purpose to be just, and soon learned to have the
greatest confidence in him as a military officer. Unless
common fame did him injustice, he was one of those
officers who had, at the beginning, no deep sympathy
with the National cause, and had no personal objection
to the success of the Rebellion. But he was a Northern
man, and an ambitious professional soldier who did not
mean to let political opinions stand in the way of mili-
tary success.^ In his case, as in many others, I believe
this attitude was modified by his service under the flag,
and that in 1864 he voted for Mr. Lincoln's re-election;
he, with General Sheridan, casting at the improvised
army ballot-box, what was understood to be their first
vote ever cast in a civil election.

Colonel Lightburn was one of the loyal West Vir-
ginians whose standing and intelligence made him natu-
rally prominent among his people. He was a worthy
man and an honorable officer, whose knowledge of the
country and of the people made him a fit selection to
preserve the peace and protect our communications in
the valley during our forward movement. As his duties
thus separated him from the principal columns, I saw
less of him than of ; he other brigade commanders. The

^ A romantic story is told of his experience a little later. He was in
command on the Upper Potomac with headquarters at Cumberland, where he
fell in love with the daughter of the proprietor of the hotel at which he had
his headquarters, and whom b*" subsequently made his wife. The family
was of secession proclivities, and the son of the house was in the Confederate
army. This young man led a party of the enemy who were able, by his
knowledge of the surroundings of his home, to capture General Crook in
the night, and to carry him away a prisoner without any serious collision
with the troops encamped about. Crook was soon exchanged, and in the
latter part of the war served with distinction as division commander undei
Sheridan.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT

207

two West Virginia regiments which remained in the
district were freshly organized, and were distributed in
camps where they could practise company drill and
instruction whilst they kept the country in order. Of
Colonel Scammon, my senior brigade commander, I have
already spoken in a former chapter.^

Fremont limited our advance to the line of Flat-top
Mountain until he should himself be ready to open the
campaign in the north. ^ Blenker's division had been
given to him from the Potomac army when McClellan
began his movement to the peninsula, but on the 12th
of April it had only reached Salem, a station on the
Manassas Gap Railway between the Bull-Run Mountains
and the Blue Ridge. ^ The War Department now sent
General Rosecrans to conduct the division with speed to
Fremont, but extraordinary delays still occurred, and the
command did not reach Fremont at Petersburg till the
I ith of May, when he immediately moved forward with
it to the support of Schenck and Milroy at Franklin.*
This delay was one of a series of misfortunes; for could
Fremont have been at McDowell with this strong rein-
forcement added to Schenck's and Milroy's brigades,
there can be no reasonable doubt that Jackson's attack,
if delivered at all, would have proven a disaster for the
Confederates. This, however, would not have ensured
success for the general campaign, for Banks might still
have been driven back in the Shenandoah valley, and
Fremont's position would have been compromised. N'>«-h-
ing but a union of the two columns would have me, the
situation.

At the beginning of May, the additional transporta-
tion necessary for my advance beyond Flat-top had not
arrived, but we did not wait for it.® The regiments were

* Ante, pp. no, III.
« Id., p. 71. ._., ,

* Id., pt. iii. pp. 108, 112, 114, 127,

2 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 89, 108.
< Id., pp. 168, 177, pt. i. pp. 8, 9.
14, 127.

208 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ordered to leave tents behind, and to bivouac without
shelter except such as they could make with "brush," for
the expected shelter tents also were lacking. The whole
distance from the head of navigation to the railroad at
Newberne was one hundred nd forty miles. Flat-top
Mountain and Lewisburg were, respectively, about half-
way on the two routes assigned to us. Some two thou-
sand of the enemy's militia were holding the mountain
passes in front of us, and a concentration of the regular
Confederate troops was going on behind them. These
last consisted of two brigades under General Henry Heth,
as well as J. S. Williams's and Marshall's brigades, under
General Humphrey Marshall, with the Eighth Virginia
Cavalry. General Marshall appears to have been senior
when the commands were united. Lookmg south from
Flat-top Mountain we see the basin of the Blue-stone
River, which flows northeastward into New River. This
basin, with that of the Greenbrier on the other side of
New River, forms the broadest stretch of cultivated land
found between the mountain ranges, though the whole
country is rough and broken even here. The crest of
Flat-top Mountain curves southward around the head
waters of the Blue-stone, and joins the more regular
ranges in Tazewell County. The straight ridge of East-
River Mountain forms a barrier on the southern side of
the basin, more than thirty miles away from the summit
of Flat-top where Scammon's camp was placed on the
road from Raleigh C. H. to Princeton, the county-seat
of Mercer. The Narrows of New River were where
that stream breaks through the mountain barrier 1 have
described, and the road from Princeton to Giles C H.
passes through the defile. Only one other outlet from
the basin goes southward, and that is where the road
from Princeton to Wytheville passes through Rocky Gap,
a gorge of the wildest character, some thirty miles south-
westward from the Narrows. These passes were held by

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 209

Confederate forces, whilst their cavalry, under Colonel
W. H. Jenifer, occupied Princeton and presented a skir-
mishing resistance to our advance-guard.

On the 1st of May a small party of the Twenty -third
Ohio met the enemy's horse at Camp Creek, a branch
of the Blue-stone, six miles from the crest of Flat-top,
and had a lively engagement, repulsing greatly superior
numbers. On hearing of this, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B.
Hayes marched with part of the Twenty-third Ohio and
part of the West Virginia cavalry, and followed up the
enemy with such vigor that Jenifer was driven through
Princeton too rapidly to permit him to remove the stores
collected there. ^ To avoid their falling into our hands,
Jenifer set fire to the town. Hayes succeeded in sav-
ing six or eight houses, but the rest were destroyed.
Jenifer retreated on the Wytheville road, expecting us
to follow by that route; but Hayes, learning that the
Narrows were not strongly held, and being now rein-
forced by the rest of his regiment (the Twenty-third),
marched on the 6th to the Narrows which he held,^
whilst he sent Major Comly with a detachment into
Pearisburg, the county-seat of Giles. The affair at
Camp Creek had cost Jenifer some twenty in killed and
wounded, and an equal number were captured in the
advance on Giles C. H. Our casualties were i killed
and 20 wounded. Our line, however, was getting too
extended, and the utmost exertions were needed to sup-
ply the troops in their present positions. Princeton,
being at the forking 01 the roads to Pearisburg and
Wytheville, was too important a point to be left un-
guarded, and I at once sent forward Colonel Scammon
with the Thirtieth Ohio to hold it.* On the 9th of May

' O R., vol. xii. pt. i. pp. 449, 450.

* Id., pt. iij. p. 140.

' James M. Comly, later Brevet Brigadier-General, and since the war at
one time United States minister to the Sandwich Islands.

* Id., p 148.
VOL. 1.— 14

210 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the Twelfth Ohio was put in march from Raleigh to join
him, and Moor's brigade was approaching the last-named
place where my headquarters were, that being the ter-
minus, for the time, of the telegraph line which kept me
in communication with Fremont.* The same day the
department commander informed me of the attack by
Jackson on Milroy on the 7th, and ordered me to suspend
movements in advance until my forces should be concen-
trated.^ The weather was rainy, and the roads suffered
badly from cutting up by the wagons, but I had hoped to
push forward a strong advanced guard to the great rail-
way br'dge near Newberne, and destroy it before the
enemy had time to concentrate there. This made it neces-
sary to take some risk, for it was not possible to move
the whole command till some supplies could be accumu-
lated at Raleigh and at Flat-top Mountain.

As fast as the supplies would permit. Moor went for-
ward, taking no tents beyond Raleigh, and all of the
troops on this line now faced the continuing rains with-
out shelter. Guerilla parties were set actively at work
by the Confederates in the region of the Guyandotte and
at other points in our rear. Colonel Lightburn was
directed to keep his forces actively moving to suppress
these outbreaks, and the forward movement was pressed.
On the loth of May Heth's two brigades of the enemy
attacked our advance-guard at Pearisburg, and these,
after destroying the enemy's stores, which they had cap-
tured there, retired skirmishing, till they joined Scam-
mon, who had advanced from Princeton to their support. ^
Scammon's brigade was now together, a mile below the
Narrows of New River, with the East River in front of
him, making a strong, defensible position. The tele-
graph reached Flat-top Mountain on the 13th,* even this
being delayed because wagons to carry the wire could

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p 157. ^ Id., p. 158.

» Id., p. 176. * Id., p. 184.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 211

not be spared from the task of supplying the troops with
food. I moved my headquarters to Princeton on this
day, and pressed forward Moor's brigade in the hope of
being able to push again beyond the barrier at the Nar-
rows of New River, where Heth's brigades had now
taken position.^ Neither Scammon nor Moor was able
to take with him ammunition enough for more than a
slight engagement, nor was any accumulation of food
possible. We were living "from hand to mouth," no
additional transportation had reached us, and every
wagon and pack-mule was doing its best. As fast as
Moor's regiments reached Princeton they were hurried
forward to French's Mill, five miles in rear of Scammon,
on the road running up East River, and intersecting the
Wytheville road so as to form a triangle with the two
going from Princeton. During the 14th and 15th Moor's
regiments arrived, and were pushed on to their position,
except one half regiment (detachments of the Thirty-fourth
and Thirty-seventh Ohio), under Major F. E. Franklin,
and one troop of cavalry, which were kept at Princeton as
a guard against any effort on the enemy's part to inter-
rupt our communications. Moor was ordered to send a
detachment up the East River to the crossing of the
Wytheville road, so as to give early warning of any
attempt of the enemy to come in upon our flank from
that direction.^ My purpose was to attack Heth with
Scammon 's and Moor's brigades, drive him away from
the Narrows of New River, and prevent him, if pos-
sible, from uniting with Marshall's command, which was
understood to be somewhere between Jeffersonville
(Tazewell C. H.) and Wytheville. If we succeeded in
beating Heth, we could then turn upon Marshall. ^

On the afternoon of the 15th Moor threw a detach-
ment of two companies over East River Mountain

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 188. « Id., pt. ii. p. 505.

• Id., pt. iii. pp. 197-199.

212 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

■■■ ■ ■ ■■■ ^^M— II 1^—11 I II ■ ■■ ■ I ■ ^ I ■ .1. I..-. . - — - -■ lllll -■ ■■ -I I . I.I. Ill H

as a rcconnoissance to learn whether the roads in
that direction were practicable for a movement to turn
the left of Heth. It attacked and handsomely routed a
post of the enemy on Wolf Creek.* The few wagons
and pack-mules were hurrying forward some rations and
ammunition; but the 17th would be the earliest possible
moment at which I could lead a general advance. The
telegraph wire would reach Princeton by the evening of
that day, and I waited there for the purpose of exchang-
ing messages with Fremont before pushing toward New-
berne, the expected rendezvous with the other troops of
the department. But all our efforts could not give us
the needed time to anticipate the enemy. They had rail-
way communication behind a mountain wall which had
few and difficult passes. Marshall and Williams were
already marching from Tazewell C. H. to .strike our line
of communications at Princeton, and were far on the
way.^

About noon of the i6th Colonel Moor reported that
his detachment on the Wytheville road was attacked by
a force of the enemy estimated at 1500.^ This seems to
have been the command of Colonel Wharton, marching
to join Marshall, who was coming from the west by a
road down the head-waters of Iiast River. Of this, how-
ever, we were ignorant. I ordered Moor to take the
remainder of his command (leaving half a regiment only
at P'rench's) to drive off the force at the cross-roads, and
if he were overpowered to retreat directly upon Princeton
by the western side of the triangle of roads, of which
each side was twelve or fifteen miles long. Colonel
Scammon reported no change in Heth's positions or force
in front of him. Patrols were sent out on all the roads
west and south of Princeton, our little force of horsemen
being limited to Smith's troop of Ohio cavalry which was

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 505. '^ Id., pt. iii. p. 199.

8 /</., pt. ii, pp. 505, 509.

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT

213

acting as headquarters escort. About two o'clock the
patrol on the Wyoming road, five miles out of Princeton,
was fired upon by the enemy's cavalry, and came rapidly
in with the report. The four companies of infantry
under Majors Franklin and Ankele were moved out on
that road, and soon developed the infantry of Marshall's
command.^ He and Williams had marched across from
the Tazewell to the Wyoming road, and were coming in
upon our flank and rear. I reconnoitred them personally
with care, and satisfied myself of their overwhelming
superiority to the little detachment I had in hand.
Franklin and Ankele were ordered to deploy their whole
force as skirmishers and to hold the enemy back as long
as possible. Some of our troopers were shown on the
flanks, and so imposing a show was made that Marshall
advanced cautiously. Our men behaved beautifully,
holding every tree and rock, delaying the enemy for
more than three hours from reaching the crests of the
hills looking down upon the town. I had sent orderlies
to stop and turn back our wagon trains on the way from
Flat-top, and had directed headquarters baggage and the
few stores in Princeton to be loaded and sent on the
road toward Moor and Scammon. Our only tents were
three or four wall tents for headquarters (the adjutant-
general's, quartermaster's, and commissary's offices), and
these I ordered to be left standing to impose upon the
enemy the idea that we did not mean to retire. As even-
ing approached, the hostile force occupied the summits
of surrounding hills, and directing the infantry slowly
to fall back and follow me, I galloped with my staff to
bring back Scammon and restore our broken communi-
cations. At French's, twelve miles from Princeton, I
found that Moor had not had time to execute the orders
of the afternoon, and that ten companies from the
Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh Ohio were all that

> O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 506.

214 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

he had been able to send to Wytheville road crossing.
These, we learned later in the night, had succeeded in
re-occupying the cross-roads. They were ordered to
hold fast till morning, and if the enemy still appeared
to be mainly at Princeton, to march in that direction and
attack them from the rear. Scammon was ordered to
send half a regiment to occupy Moor's position at
French's during the night, and to march his whole
command at daybreak toward Princeton. There was but
one and a half regiments now with Moor, and these were
roused and ordered to accompany me at once on our
return to Princeton. It was a dark and muddy march,
and as we approached the town we deployed skirmishers
in front, though they were obliged to move slowly in the
darkness. Day was just breaking as we came out of the
forest upon the clearing, line ot battle was formed, and
the troops went forward cheering. The enemy made no
stubborn resistance, but retired gradually to a strong
position on rough wooded hills about a mile from the
village, where they covered both the Wytheville and the
Wyoming road. They had artillery on both tianks, and
could only be reached over open and exposed ground.
We recovered our headquarters tents, standing as we
had left them. We had captured a few prisoners and
learned that Marshall and Williams were both before
us. Whilst pushing them back, Lieutenant-Colonel Von
Blessingh with the ten companies of Moor's brigade
approached on the Wytheville road and attacked; but the
enemy was aware of their approach and repulsed them,
having placed a detachment in a very strong position to
meet them. Von Blessingh withdrew his men, and later
joined the command by a considerable detour. With
less than two regiments in hand, and with the certainty
of the enemy's great superiority, there was nothing for
it but to take the best position we could and await
Scammon 's arrival. We made as strong a show of force

THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 215

as possible, and by skirmishing advances tempted the
enemy to come down to attack ; but he also was expect-
ing reinforcements, and a little artillery firing was the
only response we provoked.^ As some evidence of the
physical exhaustion from the continuous exertions of
the preceding day and night, I may mention the fact
that during the artillery firing I threw myself for a little
rest on the ground, close beside the guns; and though
these were firing at frequent intervals, I fell asleep and
had a short but refreshing nap almost within arm's
length of the wheels of a gun-carriage.

Toward evening Scammon arrived with his brigade,
reporting that Heth's force had followed his retiring
movement as far as French's, ?nd confirming the infor-
mation that four brigades of the enemy were before us.
Shortly after dark the officer of the day, on the right, re-
ported the noise of artillery marching around that flank.
Our last day's rations had been issued, and our animals
were without forage. Small parties of the enemy had
gone far to our rear and cut the telegraph, so that we
had had no news from the Kanawha valley for two days.
The interruption was likely to create disturbance there
and derange all our plans for supply. It was plain that
we should have to be content with having foiled the
enemy's plan to inflict a severe blow upon us, and that
we might congratulate ourselves that with two brigades
against four we had regained our line without .serious
loss. I therefore ordered that the troops be allowed to
rest till three o'clock in the morning of the i8th, and
that the column then retire behind the Blue-stone River.
The movement was made without interruption, and a
camp on Flat-top Mountain was selected, from which the
roads on every side were well guarded, and which was
almost impregnable in itself.* Our casualties of all
kinds in the affairs about Princeton had been only 113,

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 506, 507. ' Id., pt. iii. p. 209.

2l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

as the enemy had not delivered any serious attack, and
the contest on our side had been one of manoeuvre in
which our only chance of important results was in attack-
ing cither Heth or Marshall when they were so far sepa-
rated that they could not unite against us on the field of
battle. After the 15th this chance did not exist, and
wisdom dictated that we should retire to a safe point
from which we could watch for contingencies which
might give us a better opportunity. Our experience
proved what I have before stated, that the facility for
railway concentration of the enemy in our front made this
line a useless one for aggressive movements, as they
could always concentrate a superior force after they re-
ceived the news of our being in motion. It also showed
the error of dividing my forces on two lines, for had
Crook's brigade been with me, or my two brigades with
him, we should have felt strong enough to cope with the
force which was actually in our front, and would at least
have made it necessary for the enemy to detach still
more troops from other movements to meet us. Our cam-
paign, though a little one, very well illustrates the char-
acter of the subordinate movements so often attempted
during the war, and shows that the same principles of
strategy are found operating as in great movements.
The scale is a reduced one, but cause and effect are
linked by the same necessity as on a broader theatre of
warfare.

CHAPTER XI

POPE IN COMMAND — TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON

A key position — Crook's engagement at Lewisburg — Watching and scout-
ing — Mountain work — Pope in command — Consolidation of Dgpart-
ments — Suggestions of our transfer to the East — Pope's Order No. 1 1
and Address to the Army — Orders to march across the mountains —
Discussion of them — Changed to route by water and rail — Ninety-mile
march — Logistics — Arriving in Washington — Two regiments reach
Pope — Two sent to Manassas — Jackson captures Manassas — Railway
broken — McClellan at Alexandria — Engagement at Hull Run Bridge —
Ordered to Upton's Hill — Covering Washington— Listening to the
Bull Run battle — 111 news travels fast.

OUR retreat to Flat-top Mountain had been made
without loss of material, except one baggage-
wagon, which broke down irreparably, and was burned
by my order. At the crossing of Blue-stone River we
were beyond the junction of roads by which our flank
could be turned, and we halted there as the end of the
first march. As the men forded the stream, the sun
broke through the clouds, which had been pretty stead-
ily raining upon us, the brass band with the leading
brigade struck up the popular tune, "Are n't you glad to
get out of the wilderness?" and the soldiers, quick
to see the humorous application of any such incident,
greeted it with cheers and laughter. All felt that we
were again masters of the situation. Next day we moved
leisurely to the mountain summit, a broad undulating
table-land with some cultivated farms, where our camp
was perfectly hidden from sight, whilst we commanded a
most extensive view of the country in front. Outposts
at the crossing of the Blue-stone and at Pack's Ferry
on New River, with active scouting-parties and patrols

2l8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

scouring the country far and wide, kept me fully informed
of everything occurring near us. We had time to organ-
ize the new wagon-trains which were beginning to reach
us, and, while waiting till Fremont could plan new
co-operative movements, to prepare for our part in such
work.

The camp on Flat-top Mountain deserved the name of
a "key point" to the country in front as well, perhaps,
as that much abused phrase ever is deserved. ^ The nam j
of the mountain indicates its character. The northern
slope is gentle, so that the approach from Raleigh C. H.
is not difficult, whilst the southern declivity falls off
rapidly to the Blue-stone valley. The broad ridge at the
summit is broke.i into rounded hills which covered the
camp from view, whilst they still per "ted manoeuvre to
meet any hostile approach. The mountam abutted on the
gorge of the New River on the northeast, and stretched
also southwestward into the impracticable wilderness
about the headwaters of the Guyandotte and the Tug
Fork of Sandy. The position was practically unassail-
able in front by any force less than double our own, and
whilst we occupied it the enemy never ventured in force
beyond the passes of East River Mountain. We built
a flying-bridge ferry at Pack's, on Nevv River, near the
mouth of the Blue-stone, where a passable road up the
valley of the Greenbrier connected us with Colonel
Crook's position at Lewisburg. The post at Pack's
Ferry was lield by a detachment from Scammon's brigade
in command of Major Comly of the Twenty-third Ohio.
On the 6th of August a detachment of the enemy con-
sisting of three regiments and a section of artillery
under Colonel Wharton made an effort to break up the

1 Clausewitz says of the phrases " covering poaition," " key of the coun-
try," etc., that they are for the most part mere words without sense when t! ey
indicate only the material advantage which is given by the elevation of the
land. " On War," part ii. chap. xvii.

POPE IN COMMAND

219

ferry by an attack from the east side, but they accom-
plished nothing. Major Comly was quickly supported
by reinforcements from Scammon's brigade, and drove off
his assailants.^

I have not yet spoken of the movements of Colonel
Crook's brigade on the Lewisburg route, because circum-
stances so delayed his advance that it had no immediate
relation to our movements upon Pearisburg and Prince-
tun. As the march o" my own column was beginning.
General Fremont, upon information of guerilla raids
north of Summersville, directed that Crook be sent into
Webster County to co-operate with troops sent south-
ward from Weston to destroy the lawless parties. This
involved a march of more than seventy miles each way,
and unforeseen delays of various kinds. Two of the
guerillas captured were tried and convicted of murder,
and Colonel Crook was obliged to remain in that region
to protect the administration of justice till the execution
of the murderers and the dispersion of the guerilla
bands.' The organization and movement of his brigade
upon Lewisburg was by this means put back so far that
his column could not get within supporting di.stance of
mine. He reached Lewisburg on the day of our affair at
Princeton. He had been energetic in all his movements,
but the diversion of parts of his command to so distant
an enterprise as that into Webster County had been fatal
to co-operation. The Confederate General Heth had
been able to neglect the Lewisburg route and to carry
his brigade to the assistance of Marshall in his opposi-
tion to my advance. As it turned out, I should have
done better to have waited at Flat-top* Mountain till I
knew that Crook was at Lewisburg, and then to have
made a fresh combination of movements. Our experi-
ence only added another to the numerous proofs the

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 127 ; pt. iii. pp. 541, 54*.
« /</., pp. 127. 159-

220 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

whole campaign furnished, of the futility of such com-
bined operations from distant bases.

Major-General Loring took command of all the Con-
federate forces in southwestern Virginia on the 19th or
20th of May, and Heth was already in march to oppose
Crook's forward movement On the 23d Heth, with
some 3000 men, including three batteries of artillery,
attacked Crook at Lewisburg, soon after daybreak in the
morning. Crook met him in front of the town, and after
a sharp engagement routed him, capturing four cannon,
some 200 stand of arms and 100 prisoners. His own loss
was 13 killed and 53 wounded, with 7 missing. He did
not think it wise to follow up the retreating enemy, but
held a strong position near Lewisburg, where his commu-
nications were well covered, and where ue was upon the
same range of highlands on which we were at Flat -top,
though fifty miles of broken country intervened. ^ Mean-
while Fremont had been ordered to Banks's relief, and
had been obliged to telegraph me that we must be left
to ourselves till the results of the Shenandoah cam-
paign were tested. ^ Rumors were rife that after Jackson
retired from Fremont's front at Franklin, Johnson's
division was ordered to march into our part of West
Virginia. We were thus thrown, necessarily, into an
expectant attitude, awaiting the outcome of Fremont's
eastward movement and the resumption of his plans.
Our men were kept busy in marching and scouting by
detachments, putting down guerilla bands and punishing
disorders. They thus acquired a power of sustained exer-
tion on foot which proved afterward of great value.

There was, in a way, a resemblance in our situation
and in our work to that of feudal chiefs in the middle
ages. We held a lofty and almost impregnable position,
overlooking the country in every direction. The distant
ridges of the Alleghanies rose before us, the higher

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 804-813 » Id., pL iii. p. 264.

POPE IN COMMAND 221

peaks standing out in the blue distance, so that we
seemed to watch the mountain pas'' fifty miles away
without stirring from our post. T e loyal people about
us formed relations to us not unlike those of the feudal
retainers of old. They worked their farms, but every
man had his rifle hung upon his chimney-piece, and by
day or by night was ready to shoulder it and thread his
way by paths known only to the natives, to bring us
news of open movement or of secret plots among the
Secessionists. They were organized, also, in their own
fashion, and every neighborhood could muster its com-
pany or its squad of home-guards to join in quelling
seditious outbreaks or in strengthening a little column
sent against any of the enemy's outposts. No consider-
able hostile movement was possible within a range of
thirty miles without our having timely notice of it.
The smoke from the camp-fires of a single troop of horse
could be seen rising from the ravines, and detachments
of our regiments guided by the native scouts would be
on the way to reconnoitre within an hour. Officers as
well as men went on foot, for they followed ridges where
there was not even a bridle-path, and depended for safety,
in no small degree, on their ability to take to the thickets
of the forest-clad hillside if they found themselves in the
presence of a body of the Confederate cavalry. Thirty
miles a day was an easy march for them after they had
become hardened to their work, and taking several days
together they could outmarch any cavalry, especially
when they could take "short cuts" over hills and away
from travelled roads. They knew at what farms they
could find "rations," and where were the hostile neigh-
borhoods from which equally enterprising scouts would
glide away to carry news of their movements to the
enemy. At headquarters there was a constant going
and coming. Groups of home-guards were nearly always
about, as picturesque in their homely costume as Leather-

222 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Stocking himself, and many of our officers and men were
hardly less expert as woodsmen. Constant activity was
the order of the day, and the whole command grew hardy
and self-reliant with great rapidity.

General Pope was, on the 26th of June, assigned to
command the Army of Virginia, including the forces
under McDowell and Banks as well as those in the
Mountain Department.* Fremont was relieved from
command at his own request, and the Mountain Depart-
ment ceased to exist. ^ Pope very wisely determined to
unite in one army under his own command as many as
possible of the troops reporting to him, and meanwhile
directed us to remain on the defensive.* I ventured on
the 3d of July to suggest by telegraph that my division
would make a useful reinforcement to his active army
in the field, and reiterated it on the 5th, with some ex-
planation of my views.* I indicated Fayetteville and
Hawk's Nest as points in front of Gauley Bridge where
moderate garrisons could cover the valley defensively, as
I had done in the preceding year. Getting no answer,
I returned to the subject on the I3th.^ Pope, however,
did not issue his address upon assuming active command
till the 14th, when his much ridiculed manifesto to the
army appeared.^ Since the war General Pope has him-
self told me that this, as well as the other orders issued
at that time and which were much criticised, were
drafted under the dictation, in substance, of Mr. Stanton,
the Secretary of War. He admitted that some things
in them were not quite in good taste; but the feeling
was that it was desirable to infuse vigor into the army
by stirring words, which would by implication condemn

» O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 435- ^ ^<i'< P- 437-

« Id., p. 471. ♦ Id., pp. 451, 457.

» Id., p. 471.

* He had announced his assignment and his headquarters at Washington
on June 27 (/</., p. 436), but he now issued the address as he was about to
take the field {Id., p. 473).

POPE IN COMMAND 223

McClellan's policy of over-caution in military matters,
and over-tenderness toward rebel sympathizers and their
property. The Secretary, as he said, urged such public
declarations so strongly that he did not feel at liberty to
resist. They were unfairly criticised, and were made
the uCv?asion of a bitter and lasting enmity toward Pope
on the part of most of the officers and men of the Potomac
Army. It seems that Mr. Lincoln hesitated to approve
the one relating to the arrest of disloyal persons within
the lines of the army, and it was not till Pope repeated
his sense of the need of it that the President yielded, on
condition that it should be applied in exceptional cases
only. It was probably intended more to terrify citizens
from playing the part of spies than to be literally
enforced, which would, indeed, have been hardly pos-
sible. No real severity was used under it, but the Con-
federate government made it the occasion of a sort of
outlawry against Pope and his army.^ Only two days
later he issued an oider against pillaging or molestation
of persons and dwellings, as stringent as any one could
wish.'

On the 5th of August Pope suggested to Halleck that
I should be ordered to leave about 2500 men intrenched
near Gauley Bridge, and march with the remainder of
my command (say nine regiments) by way of Lewisburg,
Covington, Staunton, and Harrisonburg to join him.
Halleck replied that it was too much exposed, and
directed him to select one more in the rear. Pope very

* It is only fair to recollect that in the following year Halleck found it
necessary to repeat in substance Pope's much abused orders, and Meade,
who then commanded the Potomac Army, issued a proclamation in accord-
ance with them. (O. R., vol. xxvii. pt. i. p. 102 ; pt. iii. p. 786.) For Pope's
submission of Order No. n to Mr. Lincoln and the limitation placed on it,
see Id., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 500, 540. For general military law on the subject,
see Birkhimer's " Military Government and Martial Law," chap. viii. For
the practice of the Confederates, see the treatment of the Hon. George Sum-
mers, chap. xix. post.

'^ O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 573.

224 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

rightly answered that there was no other route which
would not make a great circuit to the rear. Halleck saw
that Jackson's army near Charlottesville with a probable
purpose of turning Pope's right flank might make a
junction impossible for me, and stated the objection,
but concluded with authority to Pope to order as he
deemed best, "but with caution."^

On the 8th of August Pope telegraphed me, accord-
ingly, to march by way of Lewisburg, Covington, Warm
Springs, and Augusta Springs to Harrisonburg, and there
join him by shortest route. He indicated Winchester or
Romney as my secondary aim if I should find the junc-
tion with him barred. ^ This route avoided Staunton,
but by so short a distance that it was scarcely safer, and
the roads to be travelled were much harder and longer.
At this time several detachments of considerable size
were out, chasing guerilla parties and small bodies of
Confederate troops, and assisting in the organization or
enlistment of Union men. The movement ordered could
not begin for several days, and I took advantage of the
interval to lay before General Pope, by telegraph, the
proof that the march would take fifteen days of uninter-
rupted travel through a mountainous region, most of it
a wilderness destitute of supplies, and with the enemy
upon the flank. Besides this there was the very serious
question whether the Army of Virginia would be at
Charlottesville when I should approach that place. On
the other hand, my calculation was that we could reach
Washington in ten days or less, by way of the Kanawha
and Ohio rivers to Parkersburg, and thence by the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the capital.^ My dis-
patches were submitted to General Halleck, and on the
nth of August General Pope telegraphed a modified

» O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 534, 540, 543.

• Id., pp. 460, 462. 551.

• Id., vol. xiii. pt. iu. pp. 555, 559.

POPE IN COMMAND 22$

assent to my suggestions. He directed that 5000 men
should remain in West Virginia under my command,
and the remainder proceed to Washington by river and
rail.^ An incursion of the enemy's cavalry into Logan
County on my right and rear was at the moment in
progress, and we used great activity in disposing of it,
so that the change in our dispositions might not be too
quickly known to our adversaries nor have the appearance
of retreat.^

It is a natural wish of every soldier to serve with the
largest army in the most important campaign. The
order to remain with a diminished command in West
Virginia was a great disappointment to me, against
which I made haste to protest. On the 13th I was
rejoiced by permission to accompany my command to the
East.^ Preliminary orders had already been given for
making Fayetteville and Hawk's Nest the principal
advanced posts in the contracted operations of the dis-
trict, with Gauley Bridge for their common depot of
supply and point of concentration in case of an advance
of the enemy in force. I organized two small brigades
and two batteries of artillery for the movement to Wash-
ington. Colonels Scammon and Moor, who were my
senior colonels, were already in command of brigades, and
Colonel Lightburn was in command of the lower valley.
The arrangement already existing practically controlled.
Scammon 's brigade was unchanged, and in Moor's the
Thirty-sixth Ohio under Crook and the Eleventh were
substituted for the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-fourth.
The organization therefore was as follows; namely, First
Brigade, Colonel Scammon commanding, consisted of
the Twelfth, Twenty-third, and Thirtieth Ohio and

I ^ O. R., vol. xiii. pt. iii. p. 560.

' I at one time supposed that the orders to march across the country
originated with General Halleck, but the Official Records of the War fix the
history of the matter as is above stated.
' M, pp. 567, S70.
VOL. I. — 15

226 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

McMullin's Ohio Battery; Second Brigade, Colonel Moor
commanding, consisted of the Eleventh, Twenty-eighth,
and Thirty-sixth Ohio and Simmonds's Kentucky Battery.
One troop of horse for orderlies and headquarters escort,
and another for similar service, with the brigades, also
accompanied us. The regiments left in the Kanawha
district were the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-
fourth, and Forty-seventh Ohio, the Fourth and Ninth
West Virginia Infantry, the Second West Virginia Cav-
alry, a battery, and some incomplete local organizations.
Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn of the Fourth West Virginia
was in command as senior officer within the district.*

Portions of the troops were put in motion on the 14th
of August, and a systematic itinerary was prepared for
them in advance.^ They marched fifty minutes, and then
rested the remaining ten minutes of each hour. The
day's work was divided into two stages of fifteen miles
each, with a long rest at noon, and with a half day's
interval between the brigades. The weather was warm,
but by starting at three o'clock in the morning the heat
of the day was reserved for rest, and they made their
prescribed distance without distress and without strag-
gling. They went by Raleigh C. H. and Fayetteville
to Gauley Bridge, thence down the right bank of the
Kanawha to Camp Piatt, thirteen miles above Charleston.
The whole distance was ninety miles, and was covered
easily in the three days and a half allotted to it.^ The
fleet of light-draft steamboats which supplied the district
with military stores was at my command, and I gave
them rendezvous at Camp Piatt, where they were in
readiness to meet the troops when the detachments
began to arrive on the 17th. In the evening of the 14th
I left the camp at Flat-top with my staff and rode to

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 567, 570 ; vol. 11. pt. I. pp. 738, 742, 754.
a Id., vol. U. pt. i. p. 738.
> Id^ vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 629.

THANSFER TO WASHINGTON 22/

Raleigh C. H. On the 15th we completed the rest of
the sixty miles to Gauley Bridge. From that point j
was able to telegraph General Meigs, the Quartermaster-
General at Washington, that I should reach Parkersburg,
the Ohio River terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, on the evening of the 20th, and should need
railway transportation for 5000 men, two batteries of six
guns each, 1 100 horses, 270 wagons, with camp equipage
and regimental trains complete, according to the army
regulations then in force. ^

At Gauley Bridge I met Colonel Lightburn, to whom
I turned over the command of the district, and spent the
time, whilst the troops were on the march, in complet-
ing the arrangements both for our transportation and for
the best disposition of the troops which were to remain.
The movement of the division was the first in which
there had been a carefully prepared effort to move a con-
siderable body of troops with wagons and animals over a
long distance within a definitely fixed time, and it was
made the basis of the calculations for the movement of
General Hooker and his two corps from Washington to
Tennessee in the next year. It thus obtained some
importance in the logistics of the war. The president
of the railway put the matter unreservedly into the hands
of W. P. Smith, the master of transportation ; Mr. P.. H.
Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, represented the
army in the management of the transfer, and by thus
concentrating responsibility and power, the business was
simplified, and what was then regarded as a noteworthy
success was secured. The command could have moved
more rapidly, perhaps, without its wagons and animals,
but a constant supply of these was needed for the eastern
army, and it was wise to take them, for they were organ-
ized into trains with drivers used to their teams and
feeling a personal interest in them. It turned out that

* O. R., vol. xii. pt iii. pp. 577, 619, 629; vol. li. p. 754.

228 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

our having them was a most fortunate thing, for not only
were the troops of the Army of the Potomac greatly
crippled for lack of transportation on their return from
the peninsula, but we were able to give rations to the
Ninth Army Corps after the battle of Antietam, when
the transportation of the other divisions proved entirely
insufficient to keep up the supply of food.

From the head of navigation on the Kanawha to Parkers-
burg on the Ohio was about one hundred and fifty miles;
but the rivers were so low that the steamboats proceeded
slowly, delayed by various obstacles and impediments.
At Letart's Falls, on the Ohio, the water was a broken
rapid, up which the boats had to be warped one at a
time, by means of a heavy warp-line made fast to the
bank and carried to the steam-capstan on the steamer.
At the foot of Blennerhassett's Island there was only
two feet of water in the channel, and the boats dragged
themselves over the bottom by " sparring," a process some-
what like an invalid's pushing his wheel-chair along by
a pair of crutches. But everybody worked with a will,
and on the 21st the advanced regiments were transferred
to the railway cars at Parkersburg, according to pro-
gramme, and pulled out for Washington.* These were
the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Crook, and the Thirtieth
Ohio, Colonel Ewing. They passed through Washing-
ton to Alexandria, and thence, without stopping, to
Warrenton, Virginia, where they reported at General
Pope's headquarters. 2 The Eleventh Ohio (Lieutenant-
Colonel Coleman) and Twelfth (Colonel White), with
Colonel Scammon commanding brigade, left Parkersburg
on the 22d, reaching Washington on the 24th. One
of them passed on to Alexandria, but the other (Eleventh
Ohio) was stopped in Washington by reason of a break
in Long Bridge across the Potomac, and marched to

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 619, 629.
3 Id., pp. 636, 637, 668, 676.

TKANSFER TO WASHINGTON 229

Alexandria the next day.* The last of the regiments
(Twenty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Moor, and Twenty-third,
Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes), with the artillery and cavalry
followed, and on the 26th all the men had reached Wash-
ington, though the wagons and animals were a day or two
later in arriving.*

In Washington I reported to the Secretary of War,
and was received with a cordiality that went far to remove
from my mind the impression I had got from others, that
Mr. Stanton was abrupt and unpleasant to approach.
Both on this occasion and later, he was as affable as
could be expected of a man driven with incessant and
importunate duties of state. In the intervals of my con-
stant visits to the railway offices (for getting my troops
and my wagons together was the absorbing duty) I found
time for a hurried visit to Secretary Chase, and found
also my friend Governor Dennison in the city, mediat-
ing between the President and General McClellan with
the gcjd-will and diplomatic wisdom which peculiarly
marked his character. I had expected to go forward
with three regiments to join General Pope on the even-
ing of the 26th; but Colonel Haupt, the military superin-
tendent of railways at Alexandria, was unable to furnish
the transportation by reason of the detention of trains at
the front.^ Lee's flank movement against Pope's army
had begun, and as the latter retreated all the railway cars
which could be procured were needed to move his stores
back toward Washington. On the afternoon of the 26th,
however, arrangements had been made for moving the
regiments at Alexandria early next morning.* The
wagons and animals were near at hand, and I ordered
Colonel Moor with the Twenty-eighth Ohio to march
with them to Manassas as soon as they should be un-
loaded from the railway trains. But during the night

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 650, 677. '■' Id., p. 698.

' /</., pp. 625, 677. * Ibid, and pp. 678, 679.

230 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

occurred a startling change in the character of the cam-
paign which upset all our plans and gave a wholly un-
expected turn to my own part in it.

About nine o'clock in the evening Colonel Haupt
received at Alexandria the information that the enemy's
cavalry had attacked our great depot of supplies at
Manassas Junction. The telegrapher had barely time to
send a message, break the connection of the wires, and
hurry away to escape capture.^ It was naturally sup-
posed to b" only a cavalry raid, but the interruption of
communication with Pope in that crisis was in itself a
serious mishap. The first thing to be done was to push
forward any troops at hand to protect the railway bridge
over Bull Run, and by authority of the War Department
Colonel Haupt was authorized to send forward, under
Colonel Scammon, the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio with-
out waiting to communicate with me. They were started
very early in the morning of the 27th, going to support
a New Jersey brigade under General George W. Taylor
which had been ordered to protect the Bull Run bridge.^
Ignorant of all this, I was busy on Wednesday morning
(27th), trying to learn the whereabout of the trains with
my wagon teams, which had not yet reached Washing-
ton, and reported the situation as to my command to the
Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson.* I then
learned of' Scammon's sudden movement to the front,
and of the serio's character of the enemy's movement
upon Manassas. I marched at once with the two regi-
ments still in Washington, expecting to follow the rest
of the command by rail as soon as we should reach Alex-
andria. Arriving there, I hastened to the telegraph
office at the railway station, where I found not only
Colonel Haupt, but General McClellan, who had come
from Fortress Monroe the night before. Of the Army of

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 680. ' C. W., vol. i. pp. 379, 381.

• O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p, 698.

TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON

231

the Potomac, Heintzclman's and Porter's corps were
already with Pope, Franklin's was at Alexandria, and
Sumner's was beginning to arrive. As soon as it was
known at the War Department that McClellan was pres-
ent, General Halleck's correspondence was of course
with him, and we passed under his orders.^ It had
already been learned that ' Stonewall ' Jackson was with
infantry as well as cavalry at Manassas, and that the IJull
Run bridge had been burned, our troops being driven
back three or four miles from it. McClellan thought it
necessary to organize the two corps at Alexandria and
such other troops as were there, including mine, first to
cover that place and Washington in the possible contin-
gency that Lee's whole army had interposed between
General Pope and the capital, and, second, to open com-
munication with Pope as soon as the situation of the
latter could be learned. Couch's division was still at
Yorktown, and orders had been issued by Halleck to
ship 5000 new troops there to relieve Couch and allow his
veteran division to join the Potomac Army.^

McClellan directed me to take the two regiments with
me into camp with Franklin's corps at Annandale, three
miles in front of Alexandria, and to obey Franklin's
orders if any emergency should occur.* I found, at the
post-quartermaster's office, an officer who had served in
West Virginia a year before, and by his hearty and effi-
cient good-will secured some supplies for the regiments
with me during the days that were yet to pass before we
got our own trains and could feel that we had an assured
means of living and moving in an independent way. We
bivouacked by the roadside without shelter of any sort,
enveloped in dense clouds of dust from the marching
columns of the Army of the Potomac, their artillery and
wagons, as they passed and went into camp just in front

' O. R., vol. xii, pt. iii. pp. 6S8, 689, 691.
" Id., p. 692.

« Id., p. 68.%

232 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of us. About noon, on Thursday (28th), Colonel Scam-
mon joined mc with the two regiments he had taken
toward Manassas, and we learned the particulars of the
sharp engagement he had at the railway bridge.

The train carrying the troops approached the bridge
over Bull Run about eight o'clock in the morning on
Wednesday, and Colonel Scammon immediately pushed
forward the Twelfth Ohio (Colonel White) to the bridge
itself and the bank of the stream. He met the New
Jersey brigade of four regiments coming back in confu-
sion and panic. The commander, General Taylor, had
taken position on the west side of the creek, covering
the bridge; but he had no artillery, and though his
advance was made with great spirit (as Jackson recog-
nized in his report*), his lines had been subjected to a
heavy artillery fire from the batteries of A. P. Hill's and
Jackson's own divisions, and broke, retreating in dis-
order to the eastern side of the stream. General Taylor
himself fell severely wounded whilst trying to rally
them. It was at this moment that Scammon reached
the field with the Twelfth Ohio. He had heard the
artillery fire, but little or no musketry, and was aston-
ished at seeing the retreat. He sent his adjutant-gen-
eral, Lieutenant Robert P. Kennedy,^ to communicate
with General Taylor and to try to rally the fugitives.
Meanwhile he ordered Colonel White to line the bank
of the creek with his men and try to protect the bridge
structure. Kennedy found General Tay?,or in a litter
being carried to the rear, and the general, though in
anguish from his wound, was in great mental distress at
the rout of his men. He begged every one to rally the
flying troops if possible, and sent his own adjutant-
general, Captain Dunham, to turn over the general
command to Scammon. All efforts to rally the panic-

> O. R., vol. zii. pt. ii p. 644.

' Member of Congress (1890), and recently Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio.

TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON 233

stricken brigade were fruitless, and Scammon resisted
the advance of Hill's division through nearly a whole
day with the two regiments alciie. A Lieutenant
Wright of the Fourth New Jersey, with ten men, re-
ported to Colonel Scammon and begged assignment in
the line. Their names are honorably enrolled in Scam-
mon's report,* and these, with Captain Durham, did
heroic service, but were all of the brigade that took any
further part in the fight. Dunham succeeded in rallying
a portion of the brigade later in the day, but too late to
enter the engagement.

Taking advantage of the bridges near the stream,
Scammon kept his men covered from the artillery fire as
well as possible, driving back with his volleys every
effort to pass by the bridge or to ford the .stream in his
front. Hill moved brigades considerably to right and
left, and attempted to surround White and the Twelfth
Ohio. But Coleman, with the Eleventh, had come up
in support, and Scammon ordered him to charge on the
enemy's right, which was passing White's left flank.
Coleman did so in splendid style, driving his foe
before him, and crossing the bridge to the west side.
The odds, however, were far too great where a brigade
could attack each regiment of ours and others pass be-
yond them, so that Scammon, having fully developed
the enemy's force, had to limit himself to delaying their
advance, retiring his little command in echelon from one
ridge to another, as his wings were threatened. This
he did with perfect coolness and order, maintaining the
unequal struggle without assistance till about half-past
three in the afternoon. The enemy's efforts now re-
laxed, and Scammon withdrew at leisure to a position
some three miles from the bridge. Hill still showed a
disposition to surround the detachment by manoeuvres,
and Scamm'^n retired toward Annandale in the night.

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 407.

234 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

He himself underestimated the enemy's force in infan-
try, which Jackson's report puts at "several brigjades."*
His loss in the two Ohio regiments was io6 in killed,
wounded, and missing.^ Those of the New Jersey bri-
gade are not reported. The combat was a most instruc-
tive military lesson, teaching what audacity and skill
may do with a very small force in delaying and mystify-
ing a much larger one, which was imposed upon by its
firm front and its able handling.

Some of Scammon's wounded being too badly hurt to
be removed, he detailed a surgeon to remain with them
and care for them till they should be exchanged or other-
wise brought within our lines. This surgeon was taken
to Jackson's headquarters, where he was questioned as to
the troops which had held the Confederates at bay. Gen-
eral J. E. B. Stuart was with Jackson, and on the sur-
geon's stating that the fighting during most of the day
had been by the two Ohio regiments alone, Stuart's racy
expressions of admiration were doubly complimentary as
coming from such an adversary, and, when repeated, were
more prized by the officers and men than any praise from
their own people. ^

Toward evening on Thursday, a thunderstorm and gale
of wind came up, adding greatly to the wretched discom-
fort of the troops for the moment, but making the air
clearer and laying the dust for a day or two. I found
partial shelter with my staff, on the veranda of a small
house which was occupied by ladies of the families of
some general officers of the Potomac Army, who had
seized the passing opportunity to see their husbands in
the interval of the campaign. We thought ourselves

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 644. ' Id., p. 262.

' The history of this engagement was currently published with curious
inaccuracies. Even Mr. Ropes in his " Campaign under Pope " does not
seem to have seen the official reports on our side, and supposed that Taylor's
brigade was all that was engaged. See O. R., vol. xii. pt. it pp. 405-411;
also pt. iii. pp. 698, 699; also C. W., vol. i. pp. 379-382.

TRAASFER TO WASHINGTON

235

fortunate in getting even the shelter of the veranda roof
for the night. On Friday morning (29th), Captain Fitch,
my quartermaster, was able to report his train and bag-
gage safe at Alexandria, and we were ready for any ser-
vice. Orders came from General McClellan during the
forenoon to move the four regiments now with me into

Soiltof BlIc*

12 3

Forts Ramsey and Buffalo, on Upton's and Munson's
hills, covering Washington on the direct road to Cen-
treville by Aqueduct Bridge, Ball's Cross-Roads, and
Fairfax C. H.^ General McClellan had established his
headquarters on Seminary Ridge beyond the northern
outskirts of Alexandria, and after putting my command

* O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 712, 726. For this he had Halleck's authority,
i& Tiew of the danger of cavalry raids into the city. IJ., p. 722.

236 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

in motion I rode there to get fuller instructions from
him as to the duty assigned me. His tents were pitched
in a high airy situation looking toward the Potomac on
the east; indeed he had found Sem a little too airy in
the thunder-squall of the previous evening which had
demolished part of the canvas village. It must have
been about noon when I dismounted at his tent. The
distant pounding of artillery had been in our ears as
we rode. It was Pope's battle with Jackson along the
turnpike between Bull Run and Gainesville and on the
heights above Groveton, thirty miles away.

General Franklin had ridden over from Annandale and
was with McClellan receiving his parting directions
under the imperative orders which Halleck had sent
to push that corps out to Pope. McClellan 's words I
was not likely to forget. "Go," he said, "and whatever
may happen, don't allow it to be said that the Army of
the Potomac failed to do its utmost for the country."
McClellan then explained to me the importance of the
position to which I was ordered. The heights were the
outer line of defence of Washington on the west, which
had been held at one time, a year before, by the Con-
federates, who had an earthwork there, notorious for
a while under the camp name of "Fort Skedaddle."
From them the unfinished dome of the Capitol was to be
seen, and the rebel flag had flaunted there, easily distin-
guishable by the telescopes which were daily pointed at
it from the city. McClellan had little expectation that
Pope would escape defeat, and impressed upon me the
necessity of being prepared to cover a perhaps disorderly
retreat within the lines. Some heavy artillery troops
(Fourth New York Heavy Artillery) were in garrison at
one of the forts, and these with the forces at Falls
Church were ordered to report to me.* Assuring me that
he would soon visit me in my new quarters, McClellan

^ O. R., vol* ziL pt. iii. p. 726.

TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON 237

dismissed me, and I galloped forward to overtake my
troops.

I found the position of the forts a most commanding
one, overlooking the country in every direction. West-
ward the ground sloped away from us toward Fairfax
Court House and Centreville. Northward, in a pretty
valley, lay the village of Falls Church, and beyond it a
wooded ridge over which a turnpike road ran to Vienna
and on to Leesburg. Behind us was the rolling country
skirting the Potomac, and from Ball's Cross-Roads, a
mile or two in rear, a northward road led to the chain-
bridge above Georgetown, whilst the principal w^^ went
directly to the city by the Aqueduct Bridge. Three
knolls grouped so as to command these different direc-
tions had been crowned with forts of strong profile. The
largest of these. Fort Ramsey, on Upton's Hill was
arrSed with twenty-pounder Parrott rifles, and the heavy-
artillery troops occupied this work. I had a pair of
guns of the same kind and calibre in my mixed battery,
and these with my other field artillery were put in the
other forts. Lines of infantry trench connected the
works and extended right and left, and my four regiments
occupied these. ^ A regiment of cavalry (Eighth Illinois,
joined later by the Eighth Pennsylvania) was ordered to
report to me, and this, with Schambeck's squadron which
had come with me, made a cavalry camp in front of
Falls Church and picketed and patrolled the front.^

We pitched our headquarters tents on Upton's Hill,
just in rear of Fort Ramsey, and had a sense of luxury
in "setting our house in order" after the uncomfortable
experience of our long journey from West Virginia. The
hurry of startling events in the past few days made our
late campaign in the mountains seem as far away in time

* O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 777, 779; vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 176.
^ See my order assigning garrisons to the forts. O. R., vol. li. pt. i.
p. 771.

238 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

as it was in space. We were now in the very centre of
excitement, and had become a very small part of a great
army. The isolation and the separate responsibility of
the past few months seemed like another existence in-
definitely far away. I lost no time in making a rapid
ride about my position, studying its approaches in the
gathering twilight and trying to fix in mind the leading
features of the topography with their relation to the pos-
sible retreat of our army and advance of the enemy.
And all the while the rapid though muffled thumping of
the distant cannon was in our ears, coming from the
field in front of Groveton, where Lee, having now united
his whole army against Pope, was sending part of Long-
street's divisions against McDowell's corps along the
Warrenton turnpike.

On Saturday the 30th ambulances began coming
through our lines with wounded men, and some on foot
with an arm in a sling or bandages upon the head were
wearily finding their way into the city. All such were
systematically questioned, their information was collated
and corrected, and reports were made to General Halleck
and General McClellan.^ The general impression of all
undoubtedly was that the engagement of Friday had been
victorious for our army, and that the enemy was probably
retreatir at dark. During the day the cannonade con-
tinued with occasional lulls. It seemed more distant
and fainter, requiring attentive listening to hear it.
This was no doubt due to some change in the condition
of the atmosphere; but we naturally interpreted it accord-
ing to our wishes, and believed that the success of Friday
was followed by the pursuit of the enemy. About four
o'clock in the afternoon the distant firing became much
more rapid; at times the separate shots could not be
counted. I telegraphed to McClellan the fact which in-

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt, ii, p. 405; pt. iii. pp. 748, 789; vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 170:
vol. Ii. pt. i. p. 777.

TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON

239

dicated a crisis in the battle.* It was the fierce artillery
duel which preceded the decisive advance of Longstreet
against Pope's left wing. This was the decisive turning-
point in the engagement, and Pope was forced to retreat
upon Centreville.

Early in the evening all doubt was removed about the
result of the battle. Ill news travels fast, and the retreat
toward us shortened the distance to be travelled. But as
.Sumner's and Franklin's corps had gone forward and
would report to Pope at Centreville, we were assured
that Pope was " out of his scrape " (to use the words of
McClellan's too famous dispatch to the President 2), and
that the worst that could now happen would be the con-
tinuance of the retreat within our lines. The combat at
Chantilly on the evening of September ist was the last
of Pope's long series of bloody engagements, and though
the enemy was repulsed, the loss of Generals Kearny
and Stevens made it seem to us like another disaster.

^ O. R., vol. xii. pt iii. p. 748.

' Id., vol. xL pt. i. p. 98.

CHAPTER XII

RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES — REORGANIZATION —
HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES

McClellan's visits to my position — Riding the lines — Discussing the past
campaign — The withdrawal from the James — Prophecy — McClellan
and the soldiers — He is in command of the defences — Intricacy of offi-
cial relations — Reorganization begun — Pope's army marches through
our works — Meeting of McClellan and Pope — Pope's characteristics —
Undue depreciation of him — The situation when Halleck was made
General-in-Chief — Pope's part in it — Reasons for dislike on the part of
the Potomac Army — McClellan's secret service — Deceptive informa-
tion of the enemy's force — Information from prisoners and citizens —
Effects of McClellan's illusion as to Lee's strength — Halleck's pievious
career — Did he intend to take command in the field ? — His abdication
of the field command — The necessity for a union of forces in Virginia —
McClellan's inaction was Lee's opportunity — Slow transfer of the Army
of the Potomac — Haileck burdened with subordinate's work — Burnside
twice declines the command — It is given to McClellan — Pope relieved
— Other changes in organization — Consolidation — New campaign
begun.

ON Sunday, the 31st, McClellan rode over to Upton's
Hill and spent most of the day with me. He
brought me a copy of the McDowell map of the country
about Washington, the compilation of which had been
that officer's first work at the beginning of hostilities.
It covered the region to and beyond the Bull Run battle-
field, and although not wholly accurate, it was approxi-
mately so, and was the only authority relied upon for
topographical details of the region. McClellan's primary
purpose was to instruct me as to the responsibilities that
might fall upon me if the army should be driven in. A
day or two later I received formal orders to prepare to
destroy buildings in front within my lines of artillery

RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES 24I

fire, and to be ready to cover the retreat of our army
should any part be driven back near my position.* All
this, however, had been discussed with McClcllan him-
self. We rode together over all the principal points in
the neighborhood, and he pointed out their relation to
each other and to positions on the map which we did not
visit. The discussion of the topography led to reminis-
cences of the preceding year, — of the manner in which
the enemy had originally occupied these hills, and of
their withdrawal from them, — of the subsequent con-
struction of the forts and connecting lines, who occupied
them all, and the system of mutual support, of telegraphic
communication, and of plans for defence in case of attack.
McClellan had received me at Alexandria on the 27th
with all his old cordiality, and had put me at once upon
our accustomed footing of personal friendship. On my
part, there was naturally a little watchfulness not to
overstep the proper line of subordination or to be in-
quisitive about things he did not choose to confide to
me; but, this being assumed, I found myself in a circle
where he seemed to unbosom himself with freedom. I
saw no interruption in this while I remained in the Poto-
mac Army. He was, at this time, a little depressed in
manner, feeling keenly his loss of power and command,
but maintaining a quiet dignity that became him better
than any show of carelessness would have done. He
used no bitter or harsh language in criticising others.
Pope and McDowell he plainly disliked, and rated them
low as to capacity for command; but he spoke of them
without discourtesy or vilification. I think it necessary
to say this because of the curious sidelight thrown on his
character by the private letters to his wife which have
since been published in his "Own Story," and of which
I shall have more to say. Their inconsistency with his
expressions and manner in conversation, or at least their

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 802, 805.

242 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IVAR

great exaggeration of what he conveyed in familiar talk,
has struck me very forcibly and unpleasantly.

He discussed his campaign of the peninsula with ap-
parent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall
him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing
to do in that emergency was to reinforce his army there
and make it strong enough to go on with its work and
capture Richmond. He said that if the government had
lost confidence in his ability to conduct the campaign to
a successful end, still it was unwise to think of anything
else except to strengthen that army and give it to some
one they could trust. He added explicitly, " If Pope was
the man they had faith in^ then Pope should have been
sent to Harrison's Landing to take command, and how-
ever bitter it would have been, I should have had no just
reason to complain." He predicted that they would yet
be put to the cost of much life and treasure to get back
to the position left by him.

On Monday, September ist, he visited me again, and we
renewed our riding and our conversation. The road from
his headquarters encampment near Alexandria to Upton's
Hill was a pleasant one for his "constitutional " ride, and
my position was nearest the army in front where news
from it would most likely be first found. The Army
of the Potomac had all passed to the front from Alexan-
dria, and according to the letter of the orders issued, he
was wholly without command; though Halleck person-
ally directed him to exercise supervision over all detach-
ments about the works and lines. He came almost alone
on these visits, an aide and an orderly or two being his
only escort. Colonel Colburn of his staff was usually
his companion. He wore a blue flannel hunting-shirt
quite different from the common army blouse. It was
made with a broad yoke at the neck, and belt at the
waist, the body in plaits. He was without sash or side
arms, or any insignia of rank except inconspicuous shoul-

RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES

a43

der-straps. On this day he was going into Washington,
and I rode down with him to the bridge. Bodies of
troops of the new levies were encamped at different points
near the river. In these there seemed to be always some
veterans or officers who knew the general, and the men
quickly gathered in groups and cheered him. He had a
taking way of returning such salutations. He went be-
yond the formal military salute, and gave his cap a little
twirl, which with his bow and smile seemed to carry a
little of personal good fellowship even to the humblest
private soldier. If the cheer was repeated, he would
turn in his saddle and repeat the salute. It was very
plain that these little attentions to the troops took well,
and had no doubt some influence in establishing a sort
of comradeship between him and them. They were part
of an attractive and winning deportment which adapted
itself to all sorts and ranks of men.

On Tuesday he came a little later in the day, and I
noticed at once a change in his appearance. He wore
his yellow sash with sword and belt buckled over it, and
his face was animated as he greeted me with "Well, Gen-
eral, I am in command again ! " I congratulated him
with hearty earnestness, for I was personally rejoiced at
it. I was really attached to him, believed him to be, on
the whole, the most accomplished officer I knew, and was
warmly disposed to give him loyal friendship and ser-
vice. He told me of his cordial interview with Presi-
dent Lincoln, and that the latter had said he believed
him to be the only man who could bring organized shape
out of the chaos in which everything seemed then to be.
The form of his new assignment to duty was that he was
to "have command of the fortifications of Washington,
and of all the troops for the defence of the capital."*
The order was made by the personal direction of the
President, and McClellan knew that Secretary Stanton

» O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 807.

244 /lEAf/JV/SCEACES OF THE CIVIL WAR

did not approve of it. General Hallcck seemed glad to
be rid of a great responsibility, and accepted the Presi-
dent's action with entire cordiality. Still, he was no
doubt accurate in writing to Pope later that the action
was that of the President alone without any advice from
him.^ McClellan was evidently and entirely happy in
his personal relation to things. He had not been re-
lieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac,
though the troops had passed temporarily to Pope's army.
As commandant of all within the defences, his own army
reported to him directly when they came within our
lines. Pope's army of northern Virginia would, of
course, report through its commander, and Burnside's
in a similar way. The first thing to be done was to get
the army in good condition, to strengthen its corps by
the new regiments which were swarming toward the
capital, and to prepare it for a new campaign. McClellan
seemed quite willing to postpone the question who would
command when it took the field. Of the present he was
sure. It was in his own hands, and the work of reorgani-
zation was that in which his prestige was almost sure to
increase. This attitude was plainly shown in all he said
and in all he hinted at without fully saying it.

Halleck had already directed Pope to bring the army
within the fortifications, though the latter had vainly
tried to induce him to ride out toward Centreville, to
see the troops and have a consultation there before de-
termining what to do.^ We were therefore expecting the
head of column to approach my lines, and I arranged that
we should be notified when they came near. McClellan
had already determined to put the corps and divisions of
the Army of the Potomac in the works, at positions sub-
stantially the same as they had occupied a year before, —
Porter near Chain Bridge, Sumner next, Franklin near
Alexandria, etc. I was directed to continue in the posi-

» O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 820. « Id., p. 796.

RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES

»45

tion I already occupied, to be supported by part of
McDowell's corps.

About fDur o'clock McClellan rode forward, and I
accompanied him. We halted at the brow of the hill
looking down the Fairfax road. The head of the column
was in sight, and rising dust showed its position far be-
yond. Pope and McDowell, with the staff, rode at the
head. Their uniform and that of all the party was cov-
ered with dust, their beards were powdered with it; they
looked worn and serious, but alert and self-possessed.
When we met, after brief salutations, McClellan an-
nounced that he had been ordered to assume command
within the fortifications, and named to General Pope the
positions the several corps would occupy. This done,
both parties bowed, and the cavalcade moved on. King's
division of McDowell's corps was the leading one. Gen-
eral Hatch, the senior brigadier, being in command by
reason of King's illness. Hatch was present, near Pope,
when McClellan assumed command, and instantly turn-
ing rode a few paces to the head of his column and
shouted, "Boys, McClellan is in command again; three
cheers!" The cheers were given with wild delight, and
were taken up and passed toward the rear of the column.
Warm friend of McClellan as I was, I felt my flesh
cringe at the unnecessary affront to the unfortunate com-
mander of that army. But no word was spoken. Pope
lifted his hat in a parting salute to McClellan and rode
quietly on with his escort.^

McClellan remained for a time, warmly greeted by the
passing troops. He then left me, and rode off toward
Vienna, northward. According to my recollection, Colo-

' General Hatch had been in command of the cavalry of Banks's corps
up to the battle of Cedar Mountain, when he was relieved by Pope's order
by reason of dissatisfaction with his handling of that arm of the service.
His assignment to a brigade of infantry in King's division was such a reduc-
tion of his prominence as an officer that it would not be strange if it chafed
him.

246 REAf/N/SCK.yCES OF THE CIVIL W/iR

iicl Colhurii was the only member of his staff with him;
they had a small cavalry escort. My untlerstancUnj^ also
was that they proposed to return by Chain liridj^e, avoid-
ing the crowding of the road on which they had cume
out, and on which McDowell's corps was now moving.
In his "Own Story" McClcllan speaks of going in that
direction to see the situation of Sumner's troops, sup-
posed to be attacked, and intimates a neglect on I'ojMi's
part of a duty in that direction. I am confident he is
mistaken as to this, and that I have given the whole in-
terview between him and Pope. The telegraphic connec-
tion with my hcad(|uartcrs was such that he could learn
the situation in front of any part of the line much more
promptly there than by riding in person. Lee did not
pursue, in fact, beyond l^'airfax C. 11. and Centreville,
and nothing more than small bodies of cavalry were in our
vicinity. I had kept scouting-partics of our own cavalry
active in our front, and had also collects J news from
other sources. On the ist of Sei)tcmber I had been able
to send to army headquarters authentic information of the
expectation of the Confederate army to move into Mary-
land, and every day thereafter addetl to the evidence of
that puqwsc, until they actually crossed the Potomac on
the 5th. »

Hatch's division was put into the lines on my left with
orders to report to me in case of attack. I'atrick's bri-
gade of that division was next day placed near l''alls
Church in support of my cavalry, reporting directly to
me. My two regiments which had been with jk* re-
joined the division, and made it complete again. The
night of the 2d was one in which I was on the alert all
night, as it was probable the enemy would disturb us
then if ever; but it passed quietly. A .skirmish in our
front on the Vienna ro-id on the 4th was the oiily enliv-

* O. R., vol. xii, pt. ii. pp. 404, 405 ( vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 170; vol. li. pt. L
p. 777-

REOKGANIXA J ION

247

cuing event till we bc^un the campaign o. South Moun-
tain and Antietam on the 6th.

Tope's proposed reorganization of his army,* which
would have put me with most of Sigel's corps under
Hooker, was prevented by a larger change which relieved
him of command and consolidated his army with that of
the I'otoniac on September 5lh.'** I had a very slight
acquaintance with i'ope at the beginning of the war, but
110 opportunity of increasing it till he assumed command
ill Virginia and 1 reported to iiim as a subordinate.
The events just sketched had once more interfered with
my expected association with him, and I did not meet
him again till long afterward. Then I came to know
him well. His wife and the wife of my intimate friend
(icneral Force were sister.s, and in I-'orce's house we often
met. He was then broken in health and softened by
personal afllictions." llis reputation in 1861 was that of
an able and energetic man, vehement and positive in
character, apt to be choleric and even violent toward
those who displeased him. I remember well that I
shrunk a little from coming under his immediate orders
through fear of some chafing, though I learned in the
army that choleric commanders, if they have ability, are
often warmly appreciative of those who serve them with
soldierly spirit and faithfulness. No one who had any
right to judge questioned Pope's ability or his zeal in
the National cause. liis military career in the West had
been a brilliant one. The necessity for uniting the col-
umns in northern Virginia into one army was palpable;
hut it was a delicate question to decide who should com-

' (). R., vol. xll. pt. ili. p. 810. • ///., p. «i V

* Mrs. I'ope and Mrs. Force were dai^ihli-rji of tin- lion. V. H. Ilorton,

of l*omvroy, Ohio, a public man of solid inllucnce and character, and prom*

inunt in the development of the coal and salt industries of the Ohio valley.

I leave the text us I wrote it some years l>efore (icneral Pope's death.

Since he died, the friendship of our families has culminated in a mai riagu

Ix-twecn our children.

248 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

mand them. It seems to have been assumed by Mr. Lin-
coln that the commander must be a new man, — neither
Fremont, McDowell, nor Banks. The reasons were prob-
ably much the same as those which later brought Grant
and Sheridan from the West.

Pope's introduction to the Eastern army, which I have
already mentioned, was an unfortunate one; but neither
he nor any one else could have imagined the heat of par-
tisan spirit or the lengths it would run. No personal
vilification was too absurd to be credited, and no charac-
terization was too ridiculous to be received as true to the
life. It was assumed that he had pledged himself to take
Richmond with an army of 40,000 men when McClellan
had failed to do so with 100,000. His defeat by Lee
was taken to prove him contemptible as a commander,
by the very men who lauded McClellan for having
escaped destruction from the same army. There was
neither intelligence nor consistency in the vituperation
with which he was covered ; but there was abundant proof
that the wounded amour propre of the officers and men of
the Potomac Army made them practically a unit in in-
tense dislike and distrust of him. It may be that this
condition of things destroyed his possibility of useful-
ness at the East; but it would be asking too much of
human nature (certainly too much of Pope's impetuous
nature) to ask him to take meekly the office of scapegoat
for the disastrous result of the whole campaign. His
demand on Hallcck that he should publish the approval
he had personally given to the several steps of the move-
ments and combats from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly
was just, but it was imprudent.* Halleck was irritated,
and made more ready to sacrifice his subordinate. Mr.
Lincoln was saddened and embarrassed; but being per-
suaded that Pope's usefulness was spoiled, he swallowed
his own pride and sense of justice, and turned again

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 812, 821.

REORGANIZATION 249

to McClellan as the resource in the emergency of the
moment.

Pope seems to mc entirely right in claiming that Jack-
son's laid to Manassas was a thing which should have
resulted in the destruction of that column. He seems
to have kept his head, and to have prepared his combina-
tions skilfully for making Jackson pay the penalty of his
audacity. There were a few hours of apparent hesitation
on August 28th, but champions of McClellan should be the
last to urge that against him. His plans were deranged
on that day by the accident of McDowell's absence from
his own command. This happened through an excess of
zeal on McDowell's part to find his commander and give
him the benefit of his knowledge of the topography of
the country; yet it proved a serious misfortune, and shows
how perilous it is for any officer to be away from his
troops, no matter for what reason. Many still think
Porter's inaction on the 29th prevented the advantage
over Jackson from becoming a victory.* But after all,
when the army was united within our lines, the injuries
it had inflicted on the enemy so nearly balanced those
it had received that if Grant or Sherman had been in
Halleck's place, Lee would never have crossed the Poto-
mac into Maryland. McClellan, Pope, and Burnside
would have commanded the centre and wings of the
united and reinforced army, and under a competent head
it would have marched back to the Rappahannock with
scarcely a halt.

That Halleck was in command was, in no small meas-
ure, Pope's own work. He reminded Halleck of this in
his letter of September 30th, written when he was chafing
under the first effects of his removal.'* "If you desire,"
said he, "to know the personal obligation to which I refer,

* I have treated this subject at large in "The Second Battle of Bull Run
as connected with the Fitz-John Porter Case."
• ^ O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 816, etc.

250 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

I commend you to the President, the Secretary of War, or
any other member of the administration. Any of these can
satisfy your inquiries." This means that he had, before
the President and the cabinet, advocated putting Halleck
in supreme command over himself and McClellan to give
unity to a campaign that would else be hopelessly broken
down. McClellan was then at Harrison's Landing, be-
lieving Lee's army to be 200,000 strong, and refusing to
listen to any suggestion except that enormous reinforce-
ments should be sent to him there. He had taught the
Army of the Potomac to believe implicitly that the Con-
federate army was more than twice as numerous as it was
in fact. With this conviction it was natural that they
should admire the generalship which had saved them
from annihilation. They accepted with equal faith the
lessons which came to them from headquarters teaching
that the "radicals" at Washington were trying for politi-
cal ends to destroy their general and them. In regard to
the facts there were varying degrees of intelligence among
officers and men; but there was a common opinion that
they and he were willingly sacrificed, and that Pope, the
radical, was to succeed him. This made them hate Pope,
for the time, with holy hatred. If the army could at that
time have compared authentic tables of strength of Lee's
army and their own, the whole theory would have col-
lapsed at once, and McClellan's reputation and popular-
ity with it. They did not have the authentic tables, and
fought for a year under the awful cloud created by a
blundering spy-system.

The fiction as to Lee's forces is the most remarkable
in the history of modern wars. Whether McClelian was
the victim or the accomplice of the inventions of his
"secret service," we cannot tell. It is almost incredible
that he should be deceived, except willingly. I confess
to a contempt for all organizations of spies and detec-
tives, which is the result of my military experience.

REORGA NIZA TION 2 5 1

The only spies who long escape are those who work for
both sides. They sell to each what it wants, and suit
their wares to the demand. Pinkerton's man in the
rebel commissariat at Yorktown who reported 119,000
rations issued daily, laughed well in his sleeve as he
pocketed the secret service money.*

A great deal of valuable information may be got from
a hostile population, for few men or women know how to
hold their tongues, though they try never so honestly. A
friendly population overdoes its information, as a rule. I
had an excellent example of this in the Kanawha valley.
After I had first advanced to Gauley Bridge, the Seces-
sionists behind me were busy sending to the enemy all
they could learn of my force. We intercepted, among
others, a letter from an intelligent woman who had tried
hard to keep her attention upon the organization of my
command as it passed her house. In counting my can-
non, she had evidently taken the teams as the easiest
units to count, and had set down every caisson as a gun,
with the battery-forge thrown in for an extra one. In a
similar way, every accidental break in the marching col-
umn was counted as the head of a new regiment. She
thus, in perfect good faith, doubled my force, and taught
me that such information to the enemy did them more
harm than good.

As to the enemy's organization and numbers, the only
information I ever found trustworthy is that got by con-
tact with him. No day should pass without having some
prisoners got by "feeling the lines." These, to secure
treatment as regular prisoners of war, must always tell
the company and regiment to which they belong.
Rightly questioned, they rarely stop there, and it is not
difficult to get the brigade, division, etc. The reaction
from the dangers with which the imagination had in-
vested capture, to the commonly good-humored hospi-

^ For Pinkerton's reports, see O. R., vol. xL pt. i. pp. 264-273.

252 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

tality of the captors, makes men garrulous of whom one
would not expect it. General Pope's chief quartermas-
ter, of the rank of colonel, was captured by Stuart's cav-
alry in this very campaign ; and since the war I have read
with amazement General Lee's letters to President Davis,
to the Secretary of War at Richmond, and to General
Loring in West Virginia, dated August 23d, in which he
says:* "General Stuart reports that General Pope's chief
quartermaster, who was captured last night, positively
asserts that Cox's troops are being withdrawn by the way
of Wheeling." Of course Lee suggests the importance
of "pushing things" in the Kanawha valley. Stuart
thus knew my movement on the day I left Parkersburg.

Even when the captured person tells nothing he is
bound to conceal, enough is necessarily known to enable
a diligent provost-marshal to construct a reasonably
complete roster of the enemy in a short time. In the
Atlanta campaign I always carried a memorandum book
in which I noted and corrected all the information of
this sort which came to me, and by comparing this with
others and with the lists at General Sherman's headquar-
ters, there was no difficulty in keeping well up in the
enemy's organization. It may therefore be said that
every commanding officer ought to know the divisions
and brigades of his enemy. The strength of a brigade
is fairly estimated from the average of our own, for in
people of similar race and education, the models of
organization are essentially the same, and subject to the
same causes of diminution during a campaign. Such
considerations as these leave no escape from the conclu-
sion that McClellan's estimates of Lee's army were abso-
lutely destructive of all chances of success, and made it
impossible for the President or for General Halleck to
deal with the military problem before them. That he
had continued this erroneous counting for more than a

1 0. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 940-941.

REORGANIZA TION

253

year, and through an active campaign in the field, de-
stroyed every hope of correcting it. The reports of the
peninsular campaign reveal, at times, the difficulty there
was in keeping up the illusion. The known divisions in
the Confederate army would not account for the numbers
attributed to them, and so these divisions occasionally
figure in our reports as "grand divisions."^ That the
false estimate was unnecessary is proven by the fact that
General Meigs, in Washington, on July 28th, made up an
estimate from the regiments, brigades, etc., mentioned
in the newspapers that got through the lines, which was
reasonably accurate. But McClellan held Meigs for an
enemy.* When I joined McClellan at Washington, I had
no personal knowledge of either army except as I had
learned it from the newspapers. My predilections in
favor of McClellan made me assume that his facts were
well based, as they ought to have been. I therefore
accepted the general judgment of himself and his inti-
mate friends as to his late campaign and Pope's, and
believed that his restoration to command was an act of
justice to him and of advantage to the country. I did
not stay long enough with that army to apply any test of
my own to the question of relative numbers, and have
had to correct my opinions of the men and the cam-
paigns by knowledge gained long afterward. I how-
ever used whatever influence I had to combat the ideas

1 In his dispatch to Halleck on the morning after South Mountain (Sep-
tember 15), D. H. HiU's division is called a corps. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii.
p. 294.

^ General Meigs found ninety regiments of infantry, one regiment of
cavalry, and five batteries of artillery designated by name in the " Confed-
erate" newspaper reports of the seven days' battlrs. Comparing this with
other information from similar sources, he concluded that Lee had about
one hundred and fifty regiments. These, at 700 men each, would make
105,000, or at 400 (which he found a full average) the gross of the infantry
would be 60,000. General Webb, with official documents before him, puts
't at 70,000 to 80,000. Does one need better evidence how much worse than
useless; was McClellan's secret service ? See O. R., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 340.

a54 KEM/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAH

in McClellan's mind that the administration meant to do
him any wrong, or had any end but the restoration of
National unity in view.

Whether Hallecic was appointed on Pope's urgent rec-
ommendation or no, his campaign in the West was the
ground of his promotion. The advance from the Ohio to
Fort Donelson, to Nashville, to Shiloh, and to Corinth
had been under his command, and he deservedly had
credit for movements which had brought Kentucky and
Tennessee within the Union lines. He had gone in per-
son to the front after the battle of Shiloh, and though
much just criticism had been made of his slow digging
the way to Corinth by a species of siege operations, he
had at any rate got there. Mr. Lincoln was willing to
compromise upon a slow advance upon Richmond, pro-
vided it were sure and steady. Halleck's age and stand-
ing in the army were such that McClellan himself could
find no fault with his appointment, if any one were to be
put over him.

Everything points to the expectation, at the time of
his appointment, that Halleck would assume the per-
sonal command in the field. He visited McClellan at
Harrison's Landing on July 25th, however, and promised
him that if the armies should be promptly reunited, he
(McClellan) should command the whole, with Burnside
and Pope as his subordinates.^ That he did not inform
Pope of this abdication of his generalship in the field is
plain from Pope's correspondence during the campaign.
It is made indisputably clear by Pope's letter to him of
the 25th of August.^ He probably did not tell the Presi-
dent or Mr. Stanton of it. He seems to have waited
for the union of the parts of the army, and when that
came his prestige was forever gone, and he had become,
what he remained to the close of the war, a bureau officer

1 McC. Own Story, p. 474; O. R., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 360.
8 /(/,, vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 65, 66.

HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES 255

in Washington. He had ordered the transfer of the
Potomac Army from the James to Acquia Creek, intend-
ing to unite it with Burnside's at Falmouth, opposite
Fredericksburg, and thus begin a fresh advance from the
line of the Rappahannock.* He believed, and apparently
with reason, that ten days was sufficient to complete this
transfer with the means at McClellan's disposal, but at
the end of ten days the movement had not yet begun.*
He was right in thinking that the whole army should be
united. McClellan thought the same. The question
was where and how. McClellan said, " Send Pope's men
to me." Halleck replied that it would not do to thus
uncover Washington. McClellan had said that vigorous
advance upon the enemy by his army and a victory would
best protect the capital.* Again he was right, but he
seemed incapable of a vigorous advance. Had he made
it when he knew (on July 30) that Jackson had gone
northward with thirty thousand men to resist Pope's
advance, his army would not have been withdrawn.* He
was then nearly twice as strong as Lee, but he did not
venture even upon a forced reconnoissance. The situa-
tion of the previous year was repeated. He was allowing
himself to be besieged by a fraction of his own force.
Grant would have put himself into the relation to
McClellan which he sustained to Meade in 1864 and
would have infused his own energy into the army.
Halleck did not do this. It would seem that he had
become conscious of his own lack of nerve in the actual
presence of an enemy, and looked back upon his work at
St. Louis in administering his department, whilst Grant
and Buell took the field, with more satisfaction than upon
his own advance from Shiloh to Corinth. He seemed

* O. R., vol. xil. pt. \\. p. 5 ; vol. xl. pt. i, pp. 80-84 ; Id., pt. iii. p. 337.

' The order was given August 3; the movement began August 14. Id.,
pt. i. pp. 80, 89.

* /(/., vol. xii. pt ii. pp. 9, la * /</., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 34a.

256 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAK

already determined to manage the armies from his office
in Washington and assume no responsibility for their
actual leadership.

When the Army of the Potomac was arriving at Alex-
andria, another crisis occurred in which a single respon-
sible head in the field was a necessity. McClcllan had
been giving a continuous demonstration, since August
4th, how easy it is to thwart and hinder any movement
whilst professing to be accomplishing everything that is
possible. No maxim in war is better founded in experi-
ence than that a man who believes that a plan is sure to
fail should never be set to conduct it. McClcllan had
written that Pope would be beaten before the Army of
the Potomac could be transferred to him, and Pope was
beaten.* The only chance for any other result was for
Halleck himself to conduct the transfer. If Hallcck
meant that franklin should have pushed out to Manassas
on the 27th of August, he should have taken the field
and gone with the corps. He did not know and could
not know how good or bad McClellan's excuses were,
and nothing but his own presence, with supreme power,
could certainly remove the causes for delay. He wrote
to Pope that he could not leave Washington, when he
ought not to have been in Washington.^ He woritcd
and worried himself ill trying to make McClellan do
what he should have done himself, and then, over-
whelmed with details he should never have burdened
himself with, besought his subordinate to relieve him of
the strain by practically taking command.'

As soon as McClellan began the movement down the
James, Lee took Longstreet's corps to Jackson, leaving
only D. H. Hill's at Richmond.* From that moment
McClellan could have marched anywhere. He could

1 Halleck to McClellan, August 10 and 12, and McClellan's reply : O. R.,
vol. xi. pt. i. pp. 86-88. See also O. S., p. 466.

* (). R., vol. xii. pt. iti. p. 797. » Id., p. 691 ; vol. xi. pt. I. p. 103.

* JJ., pt. U. pp. 177, 552.

HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES 257

have marched to Fredericksburg and juined Pope, and
Halleck could have met them with Uurnsidc's troops.
Hut the vast imaginary army of the Confederacy para-
lyzed everything, and the ponderous task of moving the
Army of the Potomac and its enormous material by water
to Washington went on. The lifeless and deliberate
way in which it went on made it the ist of September
when Sumner and Franklin reached Centreville, and the
.second battle of Dull Run had ended in defeat on the
evening before.

Hut the army was at last reunited, within the fortifica-
tions of Washington, it is true, and not on the James or
on the line of the Rappahannock. There was another
opportunity given to Ilalleck to put himself at its head,
with McClellan, Pope, and liurnside for his three lieu-
tenants. Again be was unequal to his responsibility.
Mr. Lincoln saw his feebleness, and does not seem to
have urged him. Halleck was definitely judged in the
President's mind, though the latter seems to have clung
to the idea that he might be useful by allowing him to
assume the r61e oe chose, and confine himself to mere
suggestions and to purely routine work. Pope's unpopu-
larity with the army was adopted by popular clamor,
which always finds a defeated general in the wrong. The
President, in real perplexity, compromised by assigning
McClellan to coni.nand for the purpose of organizing, a
work in which he was admitted by all to be able. The
command in the field was a second time offered to Burn-
side, who declined it, warmly advocating McClellan's
claims and provii g his most efficient friend.* Within
three days from tie time I had ridden with McClellan
to meet the retreating army, the enemy had crossed the
Potomac, and dec sion could not be postponed. The
President met McCK^llan, nnd told him in person that he
was assigned to command in the lield.^

' C. W., vol. i. p. 650. ' Id., p. 453 ; O. R., vol. xi. pt. i. p. 103.

VOL. I. — 17

258 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

On the 5th of September Halleck had sent to McClellan
a confidential note, telling of the President's action reliev-
ing Pope, and anticipating the issue of formal orders:^
"The President has directed that General Pope be re-
lieved and report to the War Department; that Hooker
be assigned to command of Porter's corps, and that
Franklin's corps be temporarily attached to Heintzel-
man's. The orders will be issued this afternoon. Gen-
erals Porter and Franklin are to be relieved from duty
till the charges against them are examined. I give you
this memorandum in advance of orders, so that you may
act accordingly in putting forces in the field." Later in
the same day Halleck sent to McClellan the opinion that
the enemy was without doubt crossing the Potomac,
and said, " If you agree with me, let our troops move
immediately." The formal order to Pope was: "The
armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated,
you will report for orders to the Secretary of War."^
Pope had caused charges to be preferred against Porter
and Franklin, and had accused McClellan of wilfully
delaying reinforcements and so causing his defeat. His
indignation that the interpretation of affairs given by
McClellan and his friends should be made into public
opinion by the apparent acquiei^ f nee of Halleck and the
administration overcame his ^.udence. Had he con-
trolled his feelings and schooled himself into patience,
he would hardly have been relieved from active service,
and his turn would probably have come again. As it
stood, the President saw that McClellan and Pope could
not work together, and the natural outcome was that he
retired Pope, so that McClellan should not have it
to say that he was thwarted by a hostile subordinate.
McClellan himself was so manifestly responsible for
Franklin's movements from the 27th to the 30th of
August, that it was a matter of course that when the

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 182. 2 Id., p. 183.

HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES 259

chief was assigned to command the condonation should
cover the subordinate, and at McClellan's request Frank-
lin was allowed to take the field at once.^ A few days
later he urged the same action in Porter's case, and it
was done. Porter joined the army at South Mountain
on the 14th of September.* The same principle de-
manded that McDowell, who was obnoxious to McClellan,
should be relieved, and this was also done. As an osten-
sible reason for the public, McDowell's request for a
Court of Inquiry upon his own conduct was assumed to
imply a desire to be relieved from the command of his
corps. 3 But the court was not assembled till the next
winter. McDowell had been maligned almost as un-
scrupulously as Pope. A total abstainer from intoxicat-
ing drinks, he was persistently described as a drunkard,
drunken upon the field of battle. One of the most loyal
and self-forgetting of subordinates, he was treated as if
a persistent intriguer for command. A brave and com-
petent soldier, he was believed to be worthless and un-
trustworthy. As between Halleck, McClellan, and Pope,
the only one who had fought like a soldier and manoeu-
vred like a general was sent to the northwestern frontier
to watch the petty Indian tribes, carrying the burden of
others' sins into the wilderness. Mr. Lincoln's sacrifice
of his sense of justice to what seemed the only expe-
dient in the terrible crisis, was sublime. McClellan
commanded the army, and Porter and Franklin each
commanded a corps. If the country was to be saved,
confidence and power could not be bestowed by halves.

In his " Own Story " McClellan speaks of the cam-
paign in Maryland as made "with a halter round his
neck,"* meaning that he had no real command except of
the defences of Washington, and that he marched after
Lee without authority, so that, if unsuccessful, he might

* 0. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 190, 197. ' Id., pp. 190, 254, 289.

' Id., pp. 188, 189, 197. « O. S., p, 551.

260 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

have been condemned for usurpation of command. It
would be incredible that he adopted such a mere illu-
sion, if he had not himself said it. It proves that some
at least of the strange additions to history which he
thus published had their birth in his own imagination
brooding over the past, and are completely contra-
dicted by the official records.^ The consolidation of the
armies under him was, in fact, a promotion, since it
enlarged his authority and committed to him the task
that properly belonged to Halleck as general-in-chief.
For a few days, beginning September ist, McClellan's
orders and correspondence were dated " Headquarters,
Washington," because no formal designation had been
given to the assembled forces at the capital. When he
took the field at Rockville on the 8th of September, he
assumed, as he had the right to do in the absence of
other direction from the War Department, that Burn-
side's and Pope's smaller armies were lost in the larger
Army of the Potomac by the consolidation, and resumed
the custom of dating his orders and dispatches from
"Headquarters, Army of the Potomac," from the com-
mand of which he had never been removed, even when its
divisions were temporarily separated from him.^ The
defences of Washington were now entrusted to Major-
General Banks, strictly in subordination, however, to
himself. 8 The official record of authority and command

1 This illusion, at least, is shown to be of later origin by his telegram to
his wife of September 7. " I leave here this afternoon," he says, " to take
command of the troops in the field. The feeling of the government towards
;me, I am sure, is kind and trusting. I hope, with God's blessing, to justify
the great confidence they now repose in me, and will bury the past in
oblivion." O. S., p. 567.

^ On August 31st Halleck had written to him, " You will retain the com-
mand of everything m this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's
army in the field ; " and in the general order issued August 30, McClellan's
command of the Army of the Potomac is affirmed. O. R., vol. xi. pt. i»
p. 103; Id., vol. li. pt. i. p. 775,

" O. R., vol. xix. pt, ii. pp. 202, 214.

HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES 26l

is consistent and perfect, and his notion in his later
years, that there was anything informal about it, is
proven to be imaginary.^ Halleck's direction, which I
have quoted, to "let our troops move immediately,"
would be absurd as addressed to the commandant of the
Army of the Potomac into which the Army of Virginia
was consolidated, unless that commandant was to take
the field, or a formal order relieved him of command as
Pope was relieved. Certainly no other commander was
designated, and I saw enough of him in those days to
say with confidence that he betrayed no doubt that
the order to " move immediately " included himself.
McClellan's popularity with the Army of the Potomac
had seemed to Mr. Lincoln the only power sufficient to
ensure its prompt and earnest action against the Con-
federate invasion. His leadership of it, to be success-
ful, had to be accompanied with plenary powers, even if
the stultification of the government itself were the con-
sequence. When the patriotism of the President yielded
to this, the suggestion of McClellan twenty years after-
ward, that it had all been a pitfall prepared for him,
would be revolting if, in view of the records, the absurd-
ity of it did not prove that its origin was in a morbid
imagination. It is far more difficult to deal leniently
with the exhibition of character in his private letters,
which were injudiciously added to his "Own Story" by
his literary executor. In them his vanity and his ill-will
toward rivals and superiors are shockingly naked; and
since no historian can doubt that at every moment from
September, 186I5 to September, 1862, his army greatly
outnumbered his enemy, whilst in equipment and supply
there was no comparison, his persistent outcry that he
was sacrificed by his government destroys even that
character for dignity and that reputation for military
intelligence which we fondly attributed to him.

1 Ante, p. 257.

262 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

The general arrangement of the campaign seems to
have been settled between Halleck and McClellan on
the 5th of September. General Sumner with the Second
and Twelfth corps moved up the Potomac by way of
Tenallytown, Burnside with the First and Ninth corps
moved to Leesboro with a view to covering Baltinr.ore,
the front was explored by the cavalry under Pleasonton,
and the Sixth Corps, under Franklin, constituted a
reserve.* The preliminary movements occupied the 5th
and 6th, but on the 7th the positions were as I have
stated them. The principal bodies were designated,
respectively, as right and left wings instead of armies.
The two corps from the Army of Virginia were sepa-
rated, one being assigned to the right wing under Burn-
side, and the other to the left under Sumner.

^ Confusion in the numbers of the First and Twelfth corps is found in
the records and dispatches, owing to the fact that in the Army of Virginia
the corps numbers were not those given them by the War Department.
Sigel's, properly the Eleventh Corps, had been called First of that army.
Banks's, properly Twelfth, had been called Second, and McDowell's, properly
First, had been called Third. In the Maryland campaign Hooker was
assigned to McDowell's, and it sometimes figures as First, sometimes as
Third ; Mansfield was assigned to Banks's. The proper designations after
the consolidation were First and Twelfth. Reno had been assigned to the
First, but McClellan got authority to change it, and gave it to Hooker, send-
ing Reno back to the Ninth. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 197, 198, 279, 349.

CHAPTER XIII

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

March through Washington — Reporting to Burnside — The Ninth Corps —
Burnside's personal qualities — To Leesboro — Straggling — Lee's army
at Frederick — Our deliberate advance — Reno at New Market — The
march past — Reno and Hayes — Camp gossip — Occupation of Fred-
erick — Affair with Hampton's cavalry — Crossing Catoctin Mountain —
The valley and South Mountain — Lee's order found — Division of his
army — Jackson at Harper's Ferry — Supporting Pleasonton's recon-
noissance — Meeting Colonel Moor — An involuntary warning —
Kanawha Division's advance — Opening of the battle — Carrying the
mountain crest — The morning fight — Lull at noon — Arrival of
supports — Battle renewed — Final success — Death of Reno — Hooker's
battle on the right — His report — Burnside's comments — Franklin's
engagement at Crampton's Gap.

LATE in the night of the 5th I received orders from
McClellan's headquarters to march from my posi-
tion on Upton's Hill through Washington toward Lees-
boro, ^ as soon as my pickets could be relieved by troops
of McDowell's corps.^ My route was designated as by
the road which was a continuation northward of Seventh
Street, and I was directed to report to General Ambrose
E. Burnside, commanding right wing, whose headquar-
ters were in the suburbs of the city on that road. This
was in accordance with my wish, expressed to McClellan
that I might have active field work. For two or three
days we were not attached to a corps, but as the organi-
zation of the army became settled we were temporarily
assigned to the Ninth, which had been Burnside's, and

^ I.eesboro, a village of Maryland eight or ten miles north of Washing-
ton, must be distinguished from Leesburg in Virginia.
' O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 183; vol. li. pt. i. p. 789.

264 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

had been with him in North Carolina. During this cam-
paign it was commanded by Major-General Jesse L.
Reno, who had long had a division in it, and had led the
corps in the recent battle. We marched from Upton's
Hill at daybreak of the 6th, taking the road to George-
town by Ball's Cross-Roads. In Georgetown we turned
eastward through Washington to Seventh Street, and
thence northward to the Leesboro road. As we passed
General Burnside's quarters, I sent a staff officer to report
our progress. It was about ten o'clock, and Burnside
had gone to the White House to meet the President and
cabinet by invitation. His chief of staff. General J. G.
Parke, sent a polite note, saying we had not been ex-
pected so soon, and directed us to hrJt and bivouac for
the present in some fields by the roadside, near where
the Howard University now is. In the afternoon I met
Burnside for the first time, and was warmly attracted by
him, as everybody was. He was pre-eminently a manly
man, as I expressed it in writing home. His large, fine
eyes, his winning smile and cordial manners, bespoke a
frank, sincere, and honorable character, and these indica-
tions were never belied by more intimate acquaintance.
The friendship then begun lasted as long as he lived. I
learned to understand the limitations of his powers and
the points in which he fell short of being a great com-
mander; but as I knew him better I estimated more and
more highly his sincerity and truthfulness, his unselfish
generosity, and his devoted patriotism. In everything
which makes up an honorable and lovable personal char-
acter he had no superior. I shall have occasion to speak
frequently of his peculiarities and his special traits, but
shall never have need to say a word in derogation of the
solid virtues I have attributed to him. His chief -of-staff,
General Parke, was an officer of the Engineers, and one
of the best instructed of that corps. He had served with
distinction under Burnside in North Carolina, in com-

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 26$

mand of a brigade and division, I always thought that
he preferred i>taft' duty, especially with Burnside, whose
confidence in him was complete, and who would leave to
him almost untrammelled control of the administrative
work of the command.

On September 7th I was ordered to take the advance of
the Ninth Corps in the march to Leesboro, following
Hooker's corps. It was my first march with troops of
this army, and I was shocked at the straggling I wit-
nessed. The "roadside brigade," as we called it, was
often as numerous, by careful estimate, as our own column
moving in the middle of the road. I could say of the
men of the Kanawha division, as Richard Taylor said of
his Louisiana brigade with Stonewall Jackson, that they
had not yet learned to straggle.^ I tried to prevent their
learning it. We had a roll-call immediately upon halt-
ing after the march, and another half an hour later, with
prompt reports of the result. I also assigned a field
officer and medical officer to duty at the rear of the
column, with ambulances for those who became ill and
with punishments for the rest. The result was that, in
spite of the example of others, the division had no strag-
glers, the first roll-call rarely showing more than twenty
or thirty not answering to their names, and the second
often proving every man to be present. ^ In both the
Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia
the evil had become a most serious one. After the battle
of Antietam, for the express purpose of remedying it,
McClellan appointed General Patrick ProA'ost-Marshal
with a strong provost-guard, giving him very extended
powers, and permitting nobody, of whatever rank, to
interfere with him. Patrick was a man of vigor, of

* See Taylor's " Destruction and Reconstruction," p. 50, for a curious
interview with Jackson.

* See letters of General R. B. Hayes and General George Crook,
Appendix B.

266 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

conscience, and of system, and though he was greatly
desirous of keeping a field command, proved so useful,
indeed so necessary a part of the organization, that he
was retained in it against his wishes, to the end of the
war, each commander of the Army of the Potomac in
turn finding that he was indispensable. ^

The Confederate army suffered from straggling quite
as much, perhaps, as ours, but in a somewhat different
way. At the close of the Antietam campaign General
Lee made bitter complaints in regard to it, and asked
the Confederate government for legislation which would
authorize him to apply the severest punishments. As
the Confederate stragglers were generally in the midst
of friends, where they could sleep under shelter and get
food of better quality than the army ration, this grew to
be the regular mode of life with many even of those
who would join their comrades in an engagement. They
were not reported in the return of ** effectives " made by
their officers, but that they often made part of the killed,
wounded, and captured I have little doubt. In this way
a rational explanation may be found of the larger dis-
crepancies between the Confederate reports of casualties
and ours of their dead buried and prisoners taken.

The weather during this brief campaign was as lovely
as possible, and the contrast between the rich farming
country in which we now were, and the forest -covered
mountains of West Virginia to which we had been ac-
customed, was very striking. An evening march, under
a brilliant moon, over a park-like landscape with alterna-
tions of groves and meadows which could not have been
more beautifully composed by a master artist, remains
in my memory as a page out of a lovely romance.
On the day that we marched to Leesboro, Lee's army
was concentrated near Frederick, behind the Monocacy

* I have discussed this subject also in a review of Henderson's Stonewall
Jackson, "The Nation," Nov. 24, 1898, p. 396.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 267

River, having begun the crossing of the Potomac on the
4th. There was a singular dearth of trustworthy infor-
mation on the subject at our army headquarters. We
moved forward by very short marches of six or eight
miles, feeling our way so cautiously that Lee's reports
speak of it as an unexpectedly slow approach. The
Comte de Paris excuses it on the ground of the dis-
organized condition of McClellan's army after the recent
battle. It must be remembered, however, that Sumner's
corps and Franklin's had not been at the second Bull
Run, and were veterans of the Potomac Army. The
Twelfth Corps had been Banks's, and it too had not
been engaged at the second Bull Run, its work having
been to cover the trains of Pope's army on the retrograde
movement from Warrenton Junction. Although new
regiments had been added to these corps, it is hardly
proper to say that the army as a whole was not one which
could be rapidly manoeuvred. I see no good reason why
it might not have advanced at once to the left bank of
the Monocacy, covering thus both Washington and
Baltimore, and hastening by some days Lee's movement
across the Blue Ridge. We should at least have known
where the enemy was by being in contact with him,
instead of being the sport of all sorts of vague rumors
and wild reports.^

The Kanawha division took the advance of the right
wing when we left Leesboro on the 8th, and marched to
Brookville. On the 9th it reached Goshen, where it lay
on the loth, and on the nth reached Ridgeville on the
railroad. The rest of the Ninth Corps was an easy march
behind us. Hooker had been ordered further to the
right on the strength of rumo's that Lee was making a
circuit towards Baltimore, ard his corps reached Cooks-

^ McClellan was not wholly responsible for this tardiness, for Halleck
was very timid about uncovering Washington, and his dispatches tended to
increase McClellan's natural indecision. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 280.

268 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ville and the railroad some ten miles east of my position.
The extreme left of the army was at Poolesvillc, near the
Potomac, making a spread of thirty miles across the
whole front. The cavalry did not succeed in getting far
in advance of the infantry, and very little valuable infor-
mation was obtained. At Ridgeville, however, we got
reliable evidence that Lee had evacuated Frederick the
day before, and that only cavalry was east of the Catoctin
Mountains, Hooker got similar information at about
the same time. It was now determined to move more
rapidly, and early in the morning of the I2th I was
ordered to march to New Market and thence to Frederick.
At New Market I was overtaken by General Reno, with
several officers of rank from the other divisions of the
corps, and they dismounted at a little tavern by the road-
side to see the Kanawha division go by. Up to this
time they had seen nothing of us whatever. The men
had been so long in the West Virginia mountains at hard
service, involving long and rapid marches, that they had
much the same strength of legs and ease in marching
which was afterward so much talked of when seen in
Sherman's army at the review in Washington at the
close of the war. I stood a little behind Reno and
the rest, and had the pleasure of hearing their involun-
tary exclamations of admiration at the marching of the
men. The easy swinging step, the graceful poise of the
musket on the shoulder, as if it were a toy and not a
burden, and the compactness of the column were all
noticed and praised with a heartiness which was very
grateful to my ears. I no longer felt any doubt that the
division stood well in the opinion of my associates.

I enjoyed this the more because, the evening before, a
little incident had occurred which had threatened to
result in some ill-feeling. It had been thought that we
were likely to be attacked at Ridgeville, and on reaching
the village I disposed the division so as to cover the

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 269

place and to be ready for an engagement. I ordered the
brigades to bivouac in line of battle, covering the front
with outposts and with cavalry vedettes from the Sixth
New York Cavalry (Colonel Dcvin), which had been
attached to the division during the advance. The men
were without tents, and to make beds had helped them-
selves to some straw from stacks in the vicinity. Toward
evening General Reno rode up, and happening fir.t to
meet Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, command-
ing the Twenty third Ohio, he rather sharply inquired
why the troops were not bivouacking "closed in mass,"
and also blamed the taking of the straw. Colonel Hayes
referred him to me as the proper person to account for
the disposition of the troops, and quietly said he thought
the quartermaster's department could settle for the straw
if the owner was loyal. A few minutes later the general
came to my own position, but was now quite over his
irritation. I, of course, knew nothing of his interview
with Hayes, and when he said that it was the policy in
Maryland to make the troops bivouac in compact mass,
so as to do as little damage to property as possible, I
cordially assented, but urged that such a rule would not
apply to the advance-guard when supposed to be in pres-
ence of the enemy ; we needed to have the men already
in line if an alarm should be given in the night. To
this he agreed, and a pleasant conversation followed.
Nothing was said to me about the straw taken for bed-
ding, and when I heard of the little passage-at-arms
with Colonel Hayes, I saw that it was a momentary dis-
turbance which had no real significance. Camp gossip,
however, is as bad as village gossip, and in a fine volume
of the "History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regi-
ment," I find it stated that the Kanawha division coming
fresh from the West was disposed to plunder and pillage,
giving an exaggerated version of the foregoing story as
evidence of it. This makes it a duty to tell what was

2/0 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the small foundation for the charge, and to say that I
believe no regiments in the army were less obnoxious to
any just accusation of such a sort. The gossip would
never have survived the war at all but for the fact that
Colonel Hayes became President of the United States,
and the supposed incident of his army life thus acquired
a new interest.^

1 This incident gives me the opportunity to say that after reading a good
many regimental histories, I am struck with the fact that with the really
invaluable material they contain when giving the actual experiences of the
regiments themselves, they also embody a great deal of mere gossip. As a
rule, their value is confined to what strictly belongs to the regiment; and
the criticisms, whether of other organizations or of commanders, are likely
to be the expression of the local and temporary prejudices and misconcep-
tions which are notoriously current in time of war. They need to be read
with due allowance for this. The volume referred to is a favorable example
of its class, but its references to the Kana.vha division (which was in the
Ninth Corps only a month) illustrate the tendency I have mentioned. It
should be borne in mind that the Kanawha men had the position of advance-
guard, and I believe did not camp in the neighborhood of the other divisions
in a single instance from the time we left Leesboro till the battle of South
Mountain. What is said of them, therefore, is not from observation. The
incident between Reno and Hayes occurred in the camp of the latter, and
could not possibly be known to the author of the regimental history but by
hearsay. Yet he affirms as a fact that the Kanawha division " plundered
the country unmercifully," for which Reno " took Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes
severely though justly to task." He also asserts that the division set a " very
bad example " in straggling. As to this, the truth is as I have circumstantially
stated it above. He has still further indulged in a "slant" at the " Ohio-
ans " in a story of dead Confederates being put in a well at South Mountain,
— a story as apocryphal as the others. Wise's house and well were within
the camp of the division to which the Twenty-first Massachusetts belonged,
and the burial party there would have been from that division. Lastly,
the writer says that General Cox, the temporary corps commander, " robs
us [the Twenty-first Massachusetts] of our dearly bought fame " by naming
the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania as the regiments which
stormed the bridge at Antietam. He acquits Burnside and McClellan of the
alleged injustice, saying they " follow the corps report in this respect." Yet
mention is not made of the fact that my report literally copies that of the
division commander, who himself selected the regiments for the charge 1
The " Ohioan " had soon gone west again with his division, and was probably
fair game. There is something akin to provincialism in regimental tiprit
de corps, and such instances as the above, which are all found within a few
pages of the book referred to, show that, like Leech's famous Staffordshire

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 27 1

From New Market we sent the regiment of cavalry off
to the right to cover our flank, and to investigate reports
that heavy bodies of the enemy's cavalry were north of
us. The infantry pushed rapidly toward Frederick. The
opposition was very slight till we reached the Monocacy
River, which is perhaps half a mile from the town.
Here General Wade Hampton, with his brigade as rear-
guard of Lee's army, attempted to resist the crossing.
The highway crosses the river by a substantial stone
bridge, and the ground upon our bank was considerably
higher than that on the other side. We engaged the
artillery of the enemy with a battery of our own, which
had the advantage of position, whilst the infantry forced
the crossing both by the bridge and by a ford a quarter
of a mile to the right. As soon as Moor's brigade was
over, it was deployed on the right and left of the turn-
pike, which was bordered on either side by a high and
strong post-and-rail fence. Scammon's was soon over,
and similarly deployed as a second line, with the
Eleventh Ohio in column in the road. Moor had with
him a troop of horse and a single cannon, and went for-
ward with the first line, allowing it to keep abreast of
him on right and left. I also rode on the turnpike
between the two lines, and only a few rods behind Moor,
having with me my staff and a few orderlies. Reno was
upon the other bank of the river, overlooking the move-
ment, which made a fine military display as the lines
advanced at quick-step toward the city. Hampton's
horsemen had passed out of our sight, for the straight
causeway turned sharply to the left just as it entered the
town, and we could not see beyond the turn. We were
perhaps a quarter of a mile from the city, when a young
staff officer from corps headquarters rode up beside me

rough in the Punch cartoon, to be a " stranger " is a sufficient reason to
" 'eave 'arf a brick at un." See letters of President Hayes and General
Crook on the subject, Appendix B.

2/2 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and exclaimed in a boisterous way, "Why don't they go
in faster? There's nothing there! " I said to the young
man, " Did General Reno send you with any order to
me?" "No," he replied. "Then," said I, "when I
want your advice I will aslc it." He moved off abashed,
and I did not notice what had become of him, but, in
fact, he rode up to Colonel Moor, and repeated a similar
speech. Moor was stung by the impertinence which he
assumed to be a criticism upon him from corps head-
quarters, and, to my amazement, I saw him suddenly
dash ahead at a gallop with his escort and the gun. He
soon came to the turn of the road where it loses itself
among the houses ; there was a quick, sharp rattling of
carbines, and Hampton's cavalry was atop of the little
party. There was one discharge of the cannon, and
some of the brigade staff and escort came back in dis-
order. I ordered up at " double quick " the Eleventh
Ohio, which, as I have said, was in column in the road,
and these, with bayonets fixed, dashed into the town.
The enemy had not waited for them, but retreated out
of the place by the Hagerstown road. Moor had been
ridden down, unhorsed, and captured. The artillery-men
had unlimbered the gun, pointed it, and the gunner stood
with the lanyard in his hand, when he was struck by a
charging horse; the gun was fired by the concussion, but
at the same moment it was capsized into the ditch by the
impact of the cavalry column. The enemy had no time
to right the gun or carry it off, nor to stop for prisoners.
They forced Moor on another horse, and turned tail as
the charging lines of infantry came up on right and left
as well as the column in the road, for there had not been
a moment's pause in the advance. It had all happened,
and the gun with a few dead and wounded of both sides
were in our hands, in less time than it has taken to
describe it. Those who may have a fancy for learning
how Munchausen would tell this story, may find it in the

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 2/3

narrative of Major Heros von Borke of J. E. B. Stuart's
staff.^ Moor's capture, however, had consequences, as
we shall see. The command of his brigade passed to
Colonel George Crook of the Thirty-sixth Ohio.

Frederick was a loyal city, and as Hampton's cavalry
went out at one end of the street and our infantry came
in at the other, and whilst the carbine smoke and the
smell of powder still lingered, the closed window-shut-
ters of the houses flew open, the sashes went up, the
windows were filled with ladies waving their handker-
chiefs and national flags, whilst the men came to the
column with fruits and refreshments for the marching
soldiers as they went by in the hot sunshine of the Sep-
tember afternoon. 2 Pleasonton's cavalry came in soon

1 Von Borke's account is so good an example of the way in which

romance may be built up out of a little fact that I give it in full. The

burning of the stone bridge half a mile in rear of the little affair was a

peculiarly brilliant idea ; but he has evidently confused our advance with

that on the Urbana road. He says ; " Toward evening the enemy arrived

in the immediate neighborhood of Monocacy bridge, and observing only a

small force at this point, advanced very carelessly. A six-pounder gun had

been placed in position by them at a very short distance from the bridge,

which fired from time to time a shot at our horsemen, while the foremost

regiment marched along at their ease, as if they believed this small body of

cavalry would soon wheel in flight. This favorable moment for an attack

was seized in splendid style by Major Butler, who commanded the two

squadrons of the Second South Carolina Cavalry, stationed at this point as

our rear-guard. Like lightning he darted across the bridge, taking the piece

of artillery, which had scarcely an opportunity of tiring a shot, and falling

upon the regiment of infantry, which was dispersed in a few seconds, many

of them being shot down, and many others, among whom was the colonel

in command, captured. The colors of the regiment also fell into Major

Butler's hands. The piece of artillery, in the hurry of the moment, could

not be brought over to our side of the river, as the enemy instantly sent

forward a large body of cavalry at a gallop, and our dashing men had only

time to spike it and trot with their prisoners across the bridge, which, having

been already fully prepared for burning, was in a blaze when the infuriated

Yankees arrived at the water's edge. The conflagration of the bridge of

course checked their onward movement, and we quietly continued the

retreat." Von Borke, vol. i. p. 203. Stuart's report is very nearly accurate :

0. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 816.

'^ Although at the head of the column, the "truth of history " compels

VOL. I. — 18

274 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

after by the Urbana road, and during the evening a large
part of the army drew near the place. Next morning
(13th) the cavalry went forward to reconnoitre the passes
of Catoctin Mountain, Rodman's division of our corps
being ordered to support them and to proceed toward
Middletown in the Catoctin valley. Through some mis-
understanding Rodman took the road to Jefferson, lead-
ing to the left, where Franklin's corps was moving, and
did not get upon the Hagerstown road. About noon I was
ordered to march upon the latter road to Middletown.
McClellan himself met me as my column moved out of
town, and told me of the misunderstanding in Rodman's
orders, adding that if I found him on the march I should
take his division also along with me.^ I did not meet
him, but the other two divisions of the corps crossed
Catoctin Mountain that night, whilst Rodman returned
to Frederick. The Kanawha division made an easy
march, and as the cavalry was now ahead of us, met no
opposition in crossing Catoctin Mountain or in tf e valley
beyond. On the way we passed a house belonging to a
branch of the Washington family, and a few officers of
the division accompanied me, at the invitation of the
occupant, to look at some relics of the Father of his
Country which were preserved there. We stood for some
minutes with uncovered heads before a case containing a
uniform he had worn, and other articles of personal use
hallowed by their association with him, and went on our
way with our zeal strengthened by closer contact with

me to say that I saw nothing of Barbara Frietchie, and heard nothing of
her till I read Whittier's poem in later years. When, however, I visited
Frederick with General Grant in 1869, we were both presented with walking-
sticks made from timbers of Barbara's house which had been torn down,
and, of course, I cannot dispute the story of which I have the stick as
evidence; for Grant thought the stick shut me up from any denial and
established the legend.

1 As is usual in such cases, the direction was later put in writing by his
chief of staff. O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 827.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 275

souvenirs of the great patriot. Willcox's division fol-
lowed us, and encamped a mile and a half east of Middle-
town. Sturgis's halted not far from the western foot of
the mountain, with corps headquarters near by. My own
camp for the night was pitched in front (west) of the vil-
lage of Middletown along Catoctin Creek. Pleasonton's
cavalry was a little in advance of us, at the forks of the
road where the old Sharpsburg road turns off to the left
from the turnpike. The rest of the army was camped
about Frederick, except Franklin's corps (Sixth), which
was near Jefferson, ten miles further south but also east
of Catoctin Mountain.

The Catoctin or Middletown valley is beautifully in-
cluded between Catoctin Mountain and South Mountain,
two ranges of the Blue Ridge, running northeast and
southwest. It is six or eight miles wide, watered by
Catoctin Creek, which winds southward among rich farms
and enters the Potomac near Point of Rocks. The Na-
tional road leaving Frederick passes through Middletown
and crosses South Mountain, as it goes northwestward,
at a depression called Turner's Gap. The old Sharps-
burg road crosses the summit at another gap, known as
Fox's, about a mile south of Turner's. Still another,
the old Hagerstown road, finds a passage over the ridge at
about an equal distance north. The National road, be-
ing of easier grades and better engineering, was now the
principal route, the others having degenerated to rough
country roads. The mountain crests are from ten to
thirteen hundred feet above the Catoctin valley, and the
"gaps" are from two to three hundred feet lower than
the summits near them.^ These summits are like scat-
tered and irregular hills upon the high rounded surface
of the mountain top. They are wooded, but along the
southeasterly slopes, quite near the top of the mountain,
are small farms, with meadows and cultivated fields.

* These elevations axe from the official map of the U. S. Engineers.

276 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

The military situation had been cleared up by the
knowledge of Lee's movements which McClellan got
from a copy of Lee's order of the day for the loth.
Ihis had been found at Frederick on the 13th, and it
tallied so well with what was otherwise known that no
doubt was left as to its authenticity. It showed that
Jackson's corps with Walker's division were besieging
Harper's Ferry on the Virginia side of the Potomac,
whilst McLaws's division supported by Anderson's was
co-operating on Maryland Heights.^ Longstreet, with
the remainder of his corps, was at Boonsboro or near
Hagerstown. D. H. Hill's division was the rear-guard,
and the cavalry under Stuart covered the whole, a de-
tached squadron being with Longstreet, Jackson, and
McLaws each. The order did not name the three sepa-
rate divisions in Jackson's command proper (exclusive of
Walker), nor those remaining with Longstreet except
D. H. Hill's; but it is hardly conceivable that these
were not known to McCleilan after his own and Pope's
contact with them during the campaigns of the spring
and summer. At any rate, the order showed that Lee's
army was in tv;'<, parts, separated by the Potomac and
thirty or forty mik"? of road. As "oon as Jackson should
reduce Harper's Ferry they would reunite. Friday the
1 2th was the day fixed for the concentration of Jackson's
force for his attack, and it was Saturday when the order
fell into McClellan's hands. Three days had already
been lost in the slow advance since Lee had crossed
Catoctin Mountain, and Jackson s artillery was now
heard pounding at the camp and earthv/orks of Harper's
Ferry. McLaws had already driven our forces from
Maryland Heights, and had opened upon the ferry with
his guns in commanding position on the north of the
Potomac.'^ McClellan telegraphed to the President that
he would catch the rebels " in their own trap if my men

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 281, 603. * /^.^ p, 607.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 2.T7

are equal to the emergency."^ There was certainly no
time to lose. The information was in his hands before
noon, for he refers to it in a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln at
twelve. If his men had been ordered to be at the top
of South Mountain before dark, they could have been
there; but less than one full corps passed Catoctin
Mountain that day or night, and when the leisurely
movement of the 14th began, he himself, instead of
being with the advance, was in Frederick till after
2 P.M., at which hour he sent a dispatch to Washington,
and then rode to the front ten or twelve miles away.
The failure to be " equal to the emergency " was not in
his men. Twenty-four hours, as it turned out, was the
whole difference between saving and losing Harper's
Ferry with its ten or twelve thousand men and its unes-
timated munitions and stores. It may be that the com-
manders of the garrison were in fault, and that a more
stubborn resistance should have been made. It may be
that Halleck ought to have ordered the place to be evac-
uated earlier, as McClellan suggested. Nevertheless, at
noon of the 13th McClellan had it in his power to save
the place and interpose his army between the two wings
of the Confederates with decisive effect on the campaign.
He saw that it was an "emergency," but did not call
upon his men for any extraordinary exertion. Harper's
Ferry surrendered, and Lee united the wings of his
army beyond the Antietam before the final and general
engagement was forced upon him.

At my camp in front of Middletown, I received no
orders looking to a general advance on the 14th ; but
only to support, by a detachment, Pleasonton's cavalry
in a reconnoissance toward Turner's Gap. Pleasonton
himself came to my tent in the evening, and asked that
one brigade might report to him in the morning for the
purpose. Six o'clock was the hour at which he wished

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 281.

278 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

them to march. He said further that he and Colonel
Crook were old army acquaintances and that he would
like Crook to have the detail. I wished to please him,
and not h inking that it would make any difference to my
brigade commanders, intimated that I would do so. But
Colonel Scammon, learning what was intended, protested
that under our custom his brigade was '^ntitled to the
advance next day, as the brigades had taken it in turn.
I explained that it was only as a courtesy to Pleasonton
and at his request that the change was proposed. This
did not better the matter in Scammon's opinion. He
had been himself a regular officer, and the point of pro-
fessional honor touched him. I recognized the justice
of his demand, and said he should have the duty if he in-
sisted upon it. Pleasonton was still in the camp visiting
with Colonel Crook, and I explained to him the reasons
why I could not yield to his wish, but must assign Scam-
mon's brigade to the duty in conformity with the usual
course. There was in fact no reason except the personal
one for choosing one brigade more than the other, for
they were equally good. Crook took the decision in
good part, though it was natural that he should wish for
an opportunity of distinguished service, as he had not
been the regular commandant of the brigade. Pleason-
ton was a little chafed, and even intimated that he
claimed some right to name the officer and command to
be detailed. This, of course, I could not admit, and
issued the formal orders at once. The little controversy
had put Scammon and his whole brigade upon their
mettle, and was a case in which a generous emulation
did no harm. What happened in the morning only in-
creased their spirit and prepared them the better to per-
form what I have always regarded as a very brilliant
exploit.

The morning of Sunday the 14th of September was a
bright one. I had my breakfast very early and was in

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

279

the saddle before it was time for Scammon to move.
He was prompt, and I rode on with him to see in what
way his support was likely to be used. Two of the

Ninth Corps batteries (Gibson's and Benjamin's) had
accompanied the cavalry, and one of these was a heavy
one of twenty -pounder Parrotts. They were placed upon

280 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

a knoll a little in front of the cavalry camp, about half a
mile beyond the forks of the old Sharpsburg road with
the turnpike. They were exchanging shots with a battery
of the enemy well up in the gap. Just as Scammon and I
crossed Catoctin Creek I was surprised to see Colonel
Moor standing at the roadside. With astonishment I
rode to him and asked how he came there. He said that
he had been taken beyond the mountain after his capture,
but had been paroled the evening before, and was now
finding his way back to us on foot. " But where are you
going.'" said he. I answered that Scammon was going
to support Pleasonton in a rcconnoissance into the gap.
Moor made an involuntary start, saying, " My God ! be
careful!" then checking himself, added, "But I am pa-
roled ! " and turned away. I galloped to Scammon and
told him that I should follow him in close support with
Crook's brigade, and as I went back along the column I
spoke to each regimental commander, warning them to
be prepared for anything, big or little, — it might be a
skirmish, it might be a battle. Hurrying to camp, I
ordered Crook to turn out his brigade and march at once.
I then wrote a dispatch to General Reno, saying I sus-
pected we should find the enemy in force on the moun-
tain top, and should go forward with both brigades
instead of sending one. Starting a courier with this, I
rode forward again and found Pleasonton. Scammon had
given him an inkling of our suspicions, and in the per-
sonal interview they had reached a mutual good under-
standing. I found that he was convinced that it would
be unwise to make an attack in front, and had deter-
mined that his horsemen should merely demonstrate upon
the main road and support the batteries, whilst Scammon
should march by the old Sharpsburg road and try to
reach the flank of the force on the summit. I told him
that in view of my fear that the force of the enemy might
be too great for Scammon, I had determined to bring

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

281

forward Crook's brigade in support. If it became neces-
sary to fight with the whole division, I should do so, and
in that case I should assume the responsibility myself as
his senior officer. To this he cordially assented.

One section of McMullin's six-gun battery was all that
went forward with Scammon (and even these not till the
infantry reached the summit), four guns being left be-
hind, as the road was rough and steep. There were in
Simmonds's battery two twenty-pounder Parrott guns, and I
ordered these also to remain on the turnpike and to go into
action with Benjamin's battery of the same calibre. It was
about half-past seven when Crook's head of column filed
off from the turnpike upon the old Sharpsburg road, and
Scammon had perhaps half an hour's start. We had
fully two miles to go before we should reach the place
where our attack was actually made, and as it was a
pretty sharp ascent the men marched slowly with fre-
quent rests. On our way up we were overtaken by my
courier who had returned from General Reno with ap-
proval of my action and the assurance that the rest of the
Ninth Corps would come forward to my support.

When Scammon had got within half a mile of Fox's
Gap (the summit of the old Sharpsburg road),^ the enemy
opened upon him with case-shot from the edge of the
timber above the open fields, and he had judiciously
turned off upon a country road leading still further to the
left, and nearly parallel to the ridge above. His move-
ment had been made under cover of the forest, and he
had reached the extreme southern limit of the open fields
south of the gap on this face of the mountain. Here I
overtook him, his brigade being formed in line under
cover of the timber, facing open pasture fields having a

^ The Sharpsburg road is also called the Braddock road, as it was the
way by which Braddock and Washington had marched to Fort Duquesne
(Pittsburg) in the old French war. For the same reason the gap is called
Braddock's Gap. I have adopted that which seems to be in most common
local use.

282 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

stone wall along the upper side, with the forest again
beyond this. On his left was the Twenty-third Ohio
under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes, who had been
directed to keep in the woods beyond the open, and to
strike if possible the flank of the enemy. His centre
was the Twelfth Ohio under Colonel Carr B. White,
whose duty was to attack the stone wall in front, charg-
ing over the broad open fields. On the right was the
Thirtieth Ohio, Colonel Hugh Ewing, who was ordered
to advance against a battery on the crest which kept up
a rapid and annoying fire It was now about nine o'clock,
and Crook's column had come into close support. Bay-
onets were fixed, and at the word the line rushed forward
with loud hurrahs. Hayes, being in the woods, was not
seen till he had passed over the crest and turned upon
the enemy's flank and rear. Here was a sharp combat,
but our men established themselves upon the summit and
drove the enemy before them. White and Ewing charged
over the open under a destructive fire of musketry and
shrapnel. As Ewing approached the enemy's battery
(Bondurant's), it gave him a parting salvo, and limbered
rapidly toward the right along a road in the edge of the
woods which follows the summit to the turnpike near the
Mountain House at Turner's Gap. White's men never
flinched, and the North Carolinians of Garland's brigade
(for it was they who held the ridge at this point) poured
in their fire till the advancing line of bayonets was in
their faces when they broke away from the wall. Our
men fell fast, but they kept up their pace, and the
enemy's centre was broken by a heroic charge. Gar-
land strove hard to rally his men, but his brigade was
hopelessly broken in two. He rallied his right wing on
the second ridge a little in rear of that part of his line,
but Hayes's regiment was here pushing forward from our
left. Colonel Ruffin of the Thirteenth North Carolina
held on to the ridge road beyond our right, near Fox's

SOUTH MOUNTAm 283

Gap. The fighting was now wholly in the woods, and
though the enemy's centre was routed there was stubborn
resistance on both flanks. His cavalry dismounted (said
to be under Colonel Rosser ') was found to extend beyond
Hayes's line, and supported the Stuart artillery, which
poured canister into our advancing troops. I now
ordered Crook to send the Eleventh Ohio (under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Coleman) beyond Hayes's left to extend
our line in that direction, and to direct the Thirty-
sixth Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Clark) to fill a gap be-
tween the Twelfth and Thirtieth caused by diverging
lines of advance. The only remaining regiment (the
Twenty-eighth, Lieutenant-Colonel Becker) was held in
reserve on the right. The Thirty-sixth aided by the
Twelfth repulsed a stout effort of the enemy to re-estab-
lish their centre. The whole line again sprung forward.
A high knoll on our left was carried. The dismounted
cavalry was forced to retreat with their battery across the
ravine in which the Sharpsburg road descends on the
west of the mountain, and took a new position on a sepa-
rate hill in rear of the heights at the Mountain House.
There was considerable open ground at this new position,
from which their battery had full play at a range of about
twelve hundred yards upon the ridge held by us. But
the Eleventh and Twenty-third stuck stoutly to the hill
which Hayes had first carried, and their line was nearly
parallel to the Sharpsburg road, facing north. Garland
had rushed to the right of his brigade to rally them when
they had broken before the onset of the Twenty-third
Ohio upon the flank, and in the desperate contest there
he had been killed and the disaster to his command made
irreparable. On our side Colonel Hayes had also been
disabled by a severe wound as he gallantly led the Ohio
regiment.
I now directed the centre and right to push forward

1 Stuart's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 817.

284 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

toward Fox's Gap. Lieutenant Croome with a section of
McMullin's battery had come up, and he put his guns in
action in the most gallant manner in the open ground near
Wise's house. The Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth changed
front to the right and attacked the remnant of Garland's
brigade, now commanded by Colonel McRae, and drove
it and two regiments from G. B. Anderson's brigade
back upon the wooded hill beyond Wise's farm at Fox's
Gap. The whole of Anderson's brigade retreated further
along the crest toward the Mountain House. Meanwhile
the Twelfth Ohio, also changing front, had thridded its
way in the same direction through laurel thickets on the
reverse slope of the mountain, and attacking suddenly
the force at Wise's as the other two regiments charged
it in front, completed the rout and brought off two hun-
dred prisoners. Bondurant's battery was again driven
hurriedly off to the north. But the hollow at the gap
about Wise's was no place to stay. It was open ground
and was swept by the batteries of the cavalry on the open
hill to the northwest, and by those of Hill's division
about the Mountain House and upon the highlands north
of the National road; for those hills run forward like a
bastion and give a perfect flanking fire along our part of
the mountain. The gallant Croome with a number of
his gunners had been killed, and his guns were brought
back into the shelter of the woods, on the hither side of
Wise's fields. The infantry of the right wing was
brought to the same position, and our lines were re-
formed along the curving crests from that point which
looks down into the gap and the Sharpsburg road,
toward the left. The extreme right with Croome's two
guns was held by the Thirtieth, with the Twenty-eighth
in second line. Next came the Twelfth, with the Thirty-
sixth in second line, the front curving toward the west
with the form of the mountain summit. The left of the
Twelfth dipped a little into a hollow, beyond which the

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

285

Twenty-third and Eleventh occupied the next hill facing
toward the Sharpsburg road. Our front was hollow, for
the two wings were nearly at right angles to each other;
but the flanks were strongly placed, the right, which was
most exposed, having open ground in front which it could
sweep with its fire and having the reserve regiments
closely supporting it. Part of Simmonds's battery which
had also come up had done good service in the last com-
bats, and was now disposed so as to check the fire of the
enemy.

It was t^me to rest. Three hours of up-hill marching
and climbing had been followed by as long a period of
bloody battle, and it was almost noon. The troops began
to feel the exhaustion of such labor and struggle. We
had several hundred prisoners in our hands, and the field
was thickly strewn with dead, in gray and in blue, while
our field hospital a little down the mountain side was
encumbered with hundreds of wounded. We learned
from our prisoners that the summit was held by D. H.
Hill's division of five brigades with Stuart's cavalry, and
that Longstreet's corps was in close support. I was
momentarily expecting to hear from the supporting divi-
sions of the Ninth Corps, and thought it the part of wis-
dom to hold fast to our strong position astride of the
mountain top commanding the Sharpsburg road till our
force should be increased. The two Kanawha brigades
had certainly won a glorious victory, and had made so
assured a success of the day's work that it would be folly
to imperil it.^

General Hill has since argued that only part of his
division could oppose us;* but his brigades were all on
the mountain summit within easy support of each other,
and they had the day before them. It was five hours
from the time ot our first charge to the arrival of our first

1 For official reports, see O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 458-474.
" Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 559, etc.

286 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

supports, and it was not till three o'clock in the afternoon
that Hooker's corps reached the eastern base of the moun-
tain and began its deployment north of the National road.
Our effort was to attack the weak end of his line, and we
succeeded in putting a stronger force there than that
which opposed us. It is for our opponent to explain how
we were permitted to do it. The two brigades of the
Kanawha division numbered less than 3000 men. Hill's
division was 5000 strong,^ ever, by the Confederate
method of counting their effectives, which should be in-
creased nearly one-fifth to compare properly with our
reports. In addition to these Stuart had the principal
part of the Confederate cavalry on this line, and they
were not idle spectators. Parts of Lee's and Hampton's
brigades were certainly there, and probably the whole of
Lee's.^ With less than half the numerical strength which
was opposed to it, therefore, the Kanawha division had
carried the summit, advancing to the charge for the most
part over open ground in the storm of musketry and artil-
lery fire, and held the crests they had gained through the
livelong day, in spite of all efforts to retake them.

In our mountain camps of West Virginia I had felt dis-
contented that our native Ohio regiments did not take as
kindly to the labors of drill and camp police as some of
German birth, and I had warned them that they would
feel the need of accuracy and mechanical precision when
the day of battle came. They had done reasonably well,
but suffered in comparison with some of the others on
dress parade and in the form and neatness of the camp.
When, however, on the slopes of South Mountain I saw
the lines go forward steadier and more even under fire
than they ever had done at drill, their intelligence mak-
ing them perfectly comprehend the advantage of unity in
their effort and in the shock when they met the foe —
when their bodies seemed to dilate, their step to have

'^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 1025. ' Id., p. 819.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

287

better cadence and a tread as of giants as they went
cheering up the hill, — I took back all my criticisms and
felt a pride and glory in them as soldiers rnd comrades
that words cannot express.

It was about noon that the lull in the battle occurred,
and it lasted a couple of hours, while reinforcements
were approaching the mountain top from both sides.
The enemy's artillery kept up a pretty steady fire, an-
swered occasionally by our few cannon; but the infantry
rested on their arms, the front covered by a watchful
line of skirmishers, every man at his tree. The Confed-
erate guns had so perfectly the range of the sloping fields
about and behind us, that their canister shot made long
furrows in the sod with a noise like the cutting of a
melon rind, and the shells which skimmed the crest and
burst in the tree-tops at the lower side of the fields made
a sound like the crashing and falling of some brittle sub-
stance, instead of the tough fibre of oak and pine. We
had time to notice these things as we paced the lines
waiting for the renewal of the battle.

Willcox's division reported to me about two o'clock,
and would have been up earlier, but for a mistake in the
delivery of a message to him. He had sent from Mid-
dletown to ask me where I desired him to come, and find-
ing that the messenger had no clear idea of the roads by
which he had travelled, I directed him to say that Gen-
eral Pleasonton would point out the road I had followed,
if inquired of. Willcox understood the messenger that I
wished him to inquire of Pleasonton where he had better
put his division in, and on doing so, the latter suggested
that he move against the crests on the north of the
National road. He was preparing to do this when Burn-
side and Reno came up and corrected the movement,
recalling him from the north and sending him by the old
Sharpsburg road to my position. As his head of column
came up, Longstreet's corps was already forming with its

288 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

right outflanking my left. I sent two regiments^ to ex-
tend my left, and requested Willcox to form the rest of
the division on my right facing the summit. He was
doing this when he received an order from General Reno
to take position overlooking the National road facing
northward. 2 I can hardly think the order could have
been intended to effect this, as the turnpike is deep be-
tween the hills there, and the enemy quite distant on the
other side of the gorge. But Willcox, obeying the order
as he received it, formed along the Sharpsburg road, his
left next to my right, but his line drawn back nearly at
right angles to it. He placed Cook's battery in the
angle, and this opened a rapid fire on one of the enemy's
which was on the bastion-like hill north of the gorge
already mentioned. Longstreet's men were now pretty
•well up, and pushed a battery forward to the edge of the
timber beyond Wise's farm, and opened upon Willcox's
line, enfilading it badly. There was a momentary break
there, but Willcox was able to check the confusion, and
to reform his lines facing westward as I had originally
directed; Welch's brigade was on my right, closely sup-
porting Cook's battery and Christ's beyond it. The
general line of Willcox's division was at the eastern edge
of the wood looking into the open ground at Fox's Gap,
on the north side of the Sharpsburg road. A warm skir-
mishing fight was continued along the whole of our line,
our purpose being to hold fast my extreme left which was
well advanced upon and over the mountain crest, and to
swing the right up to the continuation of the same line
of hills near the Mountain House.

At nearly four o'clock the head of Sturgis's column
approached.^ McClellan had arrived on the field, and he

1 In my official report I said one regiment, but General Willcox reported
that he sent two, and he is doubtless right. For his official report, sec
O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 428.

3 Ibid.

* Sturgis's Report, Id., pt. i. p. 443.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 289

with Burnside and Reno was at Pleasonton's position at
the knoll in the valley, and from that point, a central
one in the midst of the curving hills, they issued their
orders. They could see the firing of the enemy's battery
from the woods beyond the open ground in front of Will-
cox, and sent orders to him to take or silence those guns
at all hazards. He was preparing co advance, when the
Confederates anticipated him (for their formation had now
been completed) and came charging out of the woods
across the open fields. It was part 01 their general ad-
vance and their most determined effort to drive us from
the summit we had gained in the morning. The brigades
of Hood, Whiting, Drayton, and D. R. Jones in addition
to Hill's division (eight brigades in all) joined in the
attack on our side of the National road, batteries being
put in every available position.^ The fight raged fiercely
along the whole front, but the bloodiest struggle was
around Wise's house, where Drayton's brigade assaulted
my right and Willcox's left, coming across the open
ground. Here the Sharpsburg road curves around the
hill held by us so that for a little way it was parallel to
our position. As the enemy came down the hill forming
the other side of the gap, across the road and up again to
our line, they were met by so withering a fire that they
were checked quickly, and even drifted more to the right
where their descent was continuous. Here Willcox's line
volleyed into them a destructive fire, followed by a charge
that swept them in confusion back along the road, where
the men of the Kanawha division took up the attack and
completed their rout. Willcox succeeded in getting a
foothold on the further side of the open ground and driv-
ing off the artillery which was there. Along our centre
and left where the forest was thick, the enemy was equally
repulsed, but the cover of the timber enabled them to
keep a footing near by, whilst they continually tried to

' Longstreet's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 839.
VOL. I. — 19

290 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

extend so as to outflank us, moving their troops along a
road which goes diagonally down that side of the moun-
tain from Turner's Gap to Rohrersville. The batteries
on the north of the National road had been annoying to
Willcox's men as they advanced, but Sturgis sent forward
Durell's battery from his division as soon as he came up,
and this gave special attention to these hostile guns,
diverting their fire from the infantry. Hooker's men, of
the First Corps, were also by this time pushing up the
mountain on that side of the turnpike, and we were not
again troubled by artillery on our right flank.

It was nearly five o'clock when the enemy had disap-
peared in the woods beyond Fox's Gap and Willcox
could reform his shattered lines. As the easiest mode
of getting Sturgis's fresh men into position, Willcox
made room on his left for Ferrero's brigade supported by
Nagle's, doubling also his lines at the extreme right.
Rodman's division, the last of the corps, now began to
reach the summit, and as the report came from the ex-
treme left that the enemy was stretching beyond our
flank, I sent Fairchild's brigade to assist our men there,
whilst Rodman took Harland's to the support of Willcox.
A staff officer now brought word that McClellan directed
the whole line to advance. At the left this could only
mean to clear our front decisively of the enemy there,
for the slopes went steadily down to the Rohrersville
road. At the centre and right, whilst we held Fox's
Gap, the high and rocky summit at the Mountain House
was still in the enemy's possession. The order came to
me as senior officer upon the line, and the signal was
given. On the left Longstreet's men were pushed down
the mountain side beyond the Rohrersville and Sharps-
burg roads, and the contest there was ended. The two
hills between the latter road and the turnpike were still
held by the enemy, and the further one could not be
reached till the Mountain House should be in our hands.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

291

Sturgis and Willcox, supported by Rodman, again pushed
forward, but whilst they made progress they were baffled
by a stubborn and concentrated resistance.

Reno had followed Rodman's division up the mountain,
and came to me a little before sunset, anxious to know
why the right could not get forward quite to the summit.
I explained that the ground there was very rough and
rocky, a fortress in itself and evidently very strongly
held. He passed on to Sturgis, and it seemed to me he
was hardly gone before he was brought back upon a
stretcher, dead. He had gone to the skirmish line to
examine for himself the situation, and had been shot
down by the enemy posted among the rocks and trees.
There was more or less firing on that part of the field till
late in the evening, but when morning dawned the Con-
federates had abandoned the last foothold above Turner's
Gap and retreated by way of Boonsboro to Sharpsburg.
The casualties in the Ninth Corps had been 889, of
which 356 were in the Kanawha division. Some 6ck) of
the enemy were captured by my division and sent to the
rear under guard.

On the north of the National road the First Corps under
Hooker had been opposed by one of Hill's brigades and
four of Longstreet's, and had gradually worked its way
along the old Hagerstown road, crowning the heights in
that direction after dark in the evening. Gibbon's bri-
gade had also advanced in the National road, crowding
up quite close to Turner's Gap and engaging the enemy
in a lively combat. It is not my purpose to give a de-
tailed history of events which did not come under my
own eye. It is due to General Burnside, however, to
note Hooker's conduct toward his immediate superior and
his characteristic efforts to grasp all the glory of the
battle at the expense of truth and of honorable dealing
with his commander and his comrades. Hooker's offi-
cial report for the battle of South Mountain was dated at

292 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Washington, November 17th, when Burnsidcwas in com-
mand of the Army of the Potomac, and when the in-
trigues of the former to obtain the command for himself
were notorious and near their final success. In it he
studiously avoided any recognition of orders or directions
received from Burnside, and ignores his staff, whilst he
assumes that his orders came directly from McClellan
and compliments the staff officers of the latter, as if they
had been the only means of communication. This was
not only insolent but a military offence, had Burnside
chosen to prosecute it. He also asserts that the troops
on our part of the line had been defeated and were at the
turnpike at the base of the mountain in retreat when he
went forward. At the close of his report, after declaring
that "the forcing of the passage of South Mountain will
be classed among the most brilliant and satisfactory
achievements of this army," he adds, "its principal
glory will be awarded to the First Corps."*

Nothing is more justly odious in military conduct than
embodying slanders against other commands in an official
report. It puts into the official records misrepresenta-
tions which cannot be met because they are unknown,
and it is a mere accident if those who know the truth are
able to neutralize their effect. In most cases it will be
too late to counteract the mischief when those most in-
terested learn of the slanders. All this is well illus-
trated in the present case. Hooker's report got on file
months after the battle, and it was not till the January
following that Burnside gave it his attention. I believe
that none of the division commanders of the Ninth Corps
learned of it till long afterward. I certainly did not till
1887, a quarter of a century after the battle, when the
volume of the official records containing it was published.
Burnside had asked to be relieved of the command oi the
Army of the Potomac after the battle of Fredericksburg

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 214-215.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN 293

unless Hooker among others was punished for insubordi*
nation. As in the preceding August, the popular senti-
ment of that army as an organization was again, in Mr.
Lincoln's estimation, too potent a factor to be opposed,
and the result was the superseding of Burnside by Hooker
himself, though the President declared in the letter
accompanying the appointment that the latter' s conduct
had been blameworthy. It was under these circum-
stances that Burnside learned of the false statements in
Hooker's report of South Mountain, and put upon file
his stinging response to it. His explicit statement of
the facts will settle that question among all who know
the reputation of the men, and though unprincipled am-
bition was for a time successful, that time was so short
and things were "set even" so soon that the ultimate
result is one that lovers of justice may find comfort in.*

' The text of Hurnside's supplemental report is as follows : —

"When I sent in my report of the part taken by my command in the
battle of South Mountain, (General Hooker, who commanded one of the
corps of my command (the right wing), had not sent in his report, but it has
since been sent to me. I at first determined to pass over its inaccuracies as
harmless, or rather as harming only their author ; but upon reflection I have
felt it my duty to notice two gross misstatements made with reference to the
commands of Generals Reno and Cox, the former officer having been killed
on that day, and the latter now removed with his command to the West.

"General Hooker says that as he came up to the front, Cox's corps was
retiring from the contest. This is untrue. General Cox did not command
a corps, but a division ; and that division was in action, fighting most gal-
lantly, long before General Hooker came up, and remained in the action all
day, never leaving the field for one moment. He also says that he discovered
that the attack by General Reno's corps was without sequence. This is also
untrue, and when said of an officer who so nobly fought and died on that
same field, it partakes of something worse than untruthfulness. Every offi-
cer present who knew anything of the battle knows that Reno performed a
most important part in the battle, his corps driving the enemy from the
heights on one side of the main pike, whilst that of General Hooker drove
them from the heights on the other side.

"General Hooker should remember that I had to order him four separate
times to move his command into action, and that I had to myself order his
le-ding division (Meade's) to start before he would go." O. R., vol. xix.
Pt- i. p. 422.

294 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

The men of the First Corps and its officers did their duty
nobly on that as on many another field, and the only spot
on the honor of the day is made by the personal unscru-
pulousness and vainglory of its commander.

Franklin's corps had attacked and carried the ridge
about five miles further south, at Crampton's Gap, where
the pass had been so stubbornly defended by Mahone's
and Cobb's brigades with artillery and a detachment of
Hampton's cavalry as to cause considerable loss to our
troops. The principal fighting was at a stone wall near
the eastern base of the mountain, and when the enemy
was routed from this position, he made no successful rally
and the summit was gained without much more fighting.
The attack at the stone wall not far from Burkettsville
was made at about three o'clock in the afternoon. The
Sixth Corps rested upon the summit at night.

CHAPTER XIV

antietam: preliminary movements

Lee's plan of invasion — Changed by McClellan's advance — The position
at Sharpsburg — Our routes of march — At the Antietam — McClellan
reconnoitring — Lee striving to concentrate — Our delays — Tuesday's
quiet — Hooker's evening march — The Ninth Corps command — Chang-
ing our positions — McClellan's plan of battle — Hooker's evening skir-
mish — Mansfield goes to support Hooker — Confederate positions —
Jackson arrives — McLaws and Walker reach the field — Their places.

BEFORE morning on the 15th of September it be-
came evident that Lee had used the night in with-
drawing his army. An advance of the pickets at daybreak
confirmed this, and Pleasonton's cavalry was pushed for-
ward to Boonsboro, where they had a brisk skirmish with
the enemy's rear-guard. At Boonsboro a turnpike to
Sharpsburg leaves the National road, and the retreat of
the Confederate cavalry, as well as other indications,
pointed out the Sharpsburg road as the line of Lee's
retreat. He had abandoned his plan of moving further
northward, and had chosen a line bringing him into surer
communication with Jackson. His movements before the
battle of South Mountain revealed a purpose of invasion
identical with that which he tried to carry out in 1863
in the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet, with two divi-
sions and a brigade (D. R. Jones, Hood, and Evans), had
advanced to Hagerstown, and it seems that a large part of
the Confederate trains reached there also. D. H. Hill's
division held Boonsboro and the passes of South Moun-
tain at Turner's and Fox's Gaps. McLaws invested
our fortifications on Maryland Heights, .supported by

296 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

R. H. Anderson's division. Jackson, with four divi-
sions (A. P. Hill, Ewcll, and Starke of his own corps,
with Walker temporarily reporting to him), was besieg-
ing Harper's Ferry.

On Saturday, the 13th, Lee determined to draw back
Longstreet from his advanced position, in view of the
fact that Jackson had not yet reduced Harper's Ferry
and that McClellan was marching to its relief. Long-
street's divisions therefore approached Boonsboro so as
to support D. H. Hill, and thus it happened that they
took part in the battle of South Mountain. Hill again
occupied the summit where we found him on the 14th.
From all this it is very plain that if McClellan had has-
tened his advance on the 13th, the passes of South Moun-
tain at Turner's and Fox's gaps would not have been
occupied in force by the enemy, and the condition of
things would have been what he believed it was on the
morning of the 14th, when a single brigade had been
thought enough to support Pleasonton's reconnoissance.
Twenty-four hours had changed all that.

The turnpike from Boonsboro to Sharpsburg continues
southward a couple of miles, crossing the Potomac to
Shepherdstown, which lies on the Virginia side of the
river. A bridge which formerly carried the road over
the stream had been burned; but not far below the
ruined piers was a ford, which was a pretty good one in
the present stage of water. Shepherdstown was the natu-
ral place of junction for Lee and Jackson; but for Lee
to have marched there at once would have exposed Jack-
son to attack from the northern side of the Potomac.
The precious stores and supplies captured at Harper's
Ferry must be got to a place of safety, and this was
likely to delay Jackson a day or two. Lee therefore
ordered McLaws to obstruct Franklin's movement as
much as he could, whilst he himself concentrated the
rest of Longstreet' s corps at Sharpsburg, behind the

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 297

Antietam. If McClellan's force should prove over-
whelming, the past experience of the Confederate general
encouraged him to believe that our advance would not be
so enterprising that he could not make a safe retreat into
Virginia. He resolved therefore to halt at Sharpsburg,
which oflfered an excellent field for a defensive battle,
leaving himself free to resume his aggressive campaign
or to retreat into Virginia according to the result.

McClellan had ordered Richardson's division of the
Second Corps to support the cavalry in the advance, and
Hooker's corps followed Richardson.* It would seem
most natural that the whole of Sumner's wing should
take the advance on the 15th, though the breaking up of
organizations was so much a habit with McClellan that
perhaps it should not be surprising that one of Sumner's
divisions was thus separated from the rest, and that
Burnside's right wing was also divided.* The Ninth
Corps was ordered to follow the old Sharpsburg road
through Fox's Gap, our line of march being thus parallel
to the others till we should reach the road from Boons-
boro to Sharpsburg.

But we were not put in motion early in the day. We
were ordered first to bury the dead, and to send the
wounded and prisoners to Middletown It was nearly
noon when we got orders to march, and when the head
of column filed into the road, the way was blocked by
Porter's corps, which was moving to the front by the
same road. As soon as the way was clear, we followed,
leaving a small detachment to complete the other tasks
which had been assigned us. In the wooded slope of
the mountain west of the gap, a good many of the Con-
federate dead still lay where they had fallen in the fierce

' Hooker's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 216.

' We must not forget the fact, however, ihat the order dividing the army
into wings was suspended on that morning, and that this gives to the inci-
dent the air of an intentional reduction of the wing commanders to the con-
trol of a single corps. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 297.

298 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

combats for the possession of the crest near Wise's
house. Our road led through a little hamlet called
Springvale, and thence to another, Porterstown, near the
left bank of the Antictam, where it runs into the Boons-
boro and Sharpsburg turnpike. Sumner's two corps had
taken temporary position on cither side of the turnpike,
behind the line of hills which there borders the stream.
Porter's corps was massed in rear of Sumner, and
Hooker's had been moved off to the right, around
Kecdysville. I was with the Kanawha division, assum-
ing that my temporary command of the corps ended with
the battle on the mountain. As we came up in rear of
the troops already assembled, we received orders to turn
off the road to the left, and halted our battalions closed
in mass. It was now about three o'clock in the after-
noon. McClcllan, as it seemed, had just reached the
field, and was surrounded by a group of his principal
officers, most of whom I had never seen before. I rode
up with General Burnside, dismounted, and was very
cordially greeted by General McClellan. He and Burn-
side were evidently on terms of most intimate friendship
and familiarity. He introduced me to the officers I had
not known before, referring pleasantly to my service
with him in Ohio and West Virginia, putting me upon
an easy footing with them in u very agreeable and genial
way.

We walked up the slope ot the ridge before us, and
looking westward from its crest, the whole field of the
coming battle was before us. Immediately in front the
Antietam wound through the hollow, the hills rising
gently on both sides. In the background, on our left,
was the village of Sharpsburg, with fields enclosed by
stone fences in front of it. At its right was a bit of
wood (since known as the West Wood), with the little
Dunker Church standing out white and sharp against it.
Farther to the right and left, the scene was closed in by

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 299

300 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

wooded ridges with open farm lands between, the whole
making as pleasing and prosperous a landscape as can
easily be imagined.

We made a large group as we stood upon the hill, and
it was not long before we attracted the enemy's atten-
tion. A puff of white smoke from a knoll on the right
of the Sharpsburg road was followed by the screaming of
a shell over our heads. McClellan directed that all but
one or two should retire behind the ridge, while he con-
tinued the reconnoissance, walking slowly to the right.
I think Fitz-John Porter was the only general officer who
was retained as a companion in this walk. I noted with
satisfaction the cool and business-like air with which
McClellan made his examination under fire. The Con-
federate artillery was answered by a battery of ours, and
a lively cannonade en.sued on both sides, though with-
out any noticeable effect. The enemy's position was
revealed, and he was evidently in force on both sides of
the turnpike in front of Sharpsburg, covered by the
undulations of the rolling ground which hid his infantry
from our sight.

The examination of the enemy's position and the dis-
cussion of it continued till near the close of the day.
Orders were then given for the Ninth Corps to move to
the left, keeping off the road, which was occupied by
other troops. We moved through fields and farm lands,
an hour's march in the dusk of evening, going into
bivouac about a mile south of the Sharpsburg bridge, and
in rear of the hills bordering the Antietam,

The village of Sharpsburg is in the midst of a plateau
which is almost enclosed by the Potomac River and the
Antietam. The Potomac bounds it on the south and
west, and the Antietam on the east. The plateau in
general outline may be considered a parallelogram, four
miles in length from north to south, and two and a half
miles in width inside the bends of the river. The

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 301

northern side of this terrain appears the narrowest, for
here the river curves sharply away to the west, nearly
doubling the width of the field above and below the
bend. From the village the ground descends in all
directions, though a continuous ridge runs northward, on
which is the Hagerstown turnpike. The Boonsboro turn-
pike enters the village from the northeast, crossing the
Antietam on a stone bridge, and continuing through
Sharpsburg to the southwest, reaches Shepherdstown by
the ford of the Potomac already mentioned. The Hagers-
town turnpike enters the town from the north, passing
the Dunker Church a mile out, and goes nearly due
south, crossing the Antietam at its mouth, and continu-
ing down the Potomac toward Harper's Ferry.

The Antietam is a deep creek, with few fords at an
ordinary stage of water, and the principal roads cross it
upon stone bridges. Of these there were three within
the field of battle ; the upper one in front of Keedysville,
the middle one upon the Boonsboro turnpike, and the
lower one on the Sharpsburg and Rohrersville road, since
known as Burnside's bridge. McCIellan's staff was
better supplied with oflficers of engineers than the staff
of most of our separate armies, and Captain Duane, his
chief engineer, systematized the work of gathering topo-
graphical information. This was communicated to the
general officers in connection with the orders which were
given them. In this way we were instructed that the
only fords of the Antietam passable at t -at time were
one between the two upper bridges named, and another
about half a mile below Burnside's bridge, in a deep
bend of the stream. We found, however, during the
engagement of the 17th, another practicable crossing for
infantry a short distance above the bridge. This was
not a ford in common use, but in the low stage of water
at the time it was made available for a small force.

It was about noon of the 15th of September that Lee

302 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

placed the forces which he had in hand across the turn-
pike in front of Sharpsburg. D. H. Hill's division was
on the north of the road, and on the south of it Long-
street's own old 'ivision (now under General D. R.
Jones), Hood's division, and Evans's independent bri-
gade. Stuart's cavalry and the reserve artillery were
also present. The rest of the army was with Jackson at
Harper's Ferry, or co-operating with him in the neigh-
borhood of Maryland Heights. Out of forty-four bri-
gades, Lee could put but fourteen or fifteen in line that
day to oppose McClellan. He was very strong in artil-
lery, however, and his cannon looked grimly over the
hill-crests behind which his infantry were lying. Cutts's
and Jones's battalions of the reserve artillery were
ordered to report to Hill for the protection of the left
of the Confederate line, and gave him in all the sixty or
seventy guns which he speaks of in his report, and which
have puzzled several writers who have described the
battle. Whenever our troops showed themselves as they
marched into position, they were saluted from shotted
cannon, and the numerous batteries that were developed
on the long line of hills before us no doubt did much to
impress McClellan with the belief that he had the great
bulk of Lee's army before him.

The value of time was one of the things McClellan
never understood. He should have been among the first
in the saddle at every step in the campaign after he
was in possession of Lee's order of the 9th, and should
have infused energy into every unit in his army. Instead
of making his reconnoissance at three in the afternoon of
Monday, it might have been made at ten in the morning,
and the battle could have been fought before night, if,
indeed, Lee had not promptly retreated when support
from Jackson would thus have become impossible. Or
if McClellan had pushed boldly for the bridge at the
mouth of the Antietam, nothing but a precipitate retreat

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 303

by Lee could have prevented the interposition of the
whole National army between the separated wings of
the Confederates. The opportunity was still supremely
favorable for McClellan, but prompt decision was not
easy for him. Nothing but reconnoitring was done on
Monday afternoon or on Tuesday, whilst Lee was strain-
ing every nerve to concentrate his forces and to correct
what would have proven a fatal blunder in scattering
them, had his opponent acted with vigor. The strongest
defence the eulogists of the Confederate general have
made for him is that he perfectly understood McClellan's
caution and calculated with confidence upon it; that he
would have been at liberty to perfect his combinations
still more at leisure, but for the accident by which the
copy of his plan had fallen into our hands at Frederick
City.

During the i6th we confidently expected a battle, and
I kept with my division. In the afternoon I saw General
Burnside, and learned from him that McClellan had
determined to let Hooker make a movement on our
extreme right to turn Lee's position. Burnside's man-
ner in speaking of this implied that he thought it was
done at Hooker's solicitation, and through his desire,
openly evinced, to be independent in command. I urged
Burnside to assume the immediate command of the corps
and allow me to lead my own division. He objected
that as he had been announced as commander of the
right wing of the army, composed of the two corps, he
was unwilling to waive his precedence or to assume that
Hooker was detached for anything more than a tempo-
rary purpose. I pointed out that Reno's staff had been
granted leave of absence to take the body of their chief
to Washington, and that my division stafif was too small
for corps duty; but he met this by saying that he would
use his staff for this purpose, and help me in every way
he could till the crisis of the campaign should be over.

304 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Sympathizing with his very natural feeling, I ceased
objecting, and accepted with as good grace as I could
the unsatisfactory position of nominal commander of the
corps to which I was a comparative stranger, and which,
under the circumstances, naturally looked to him as its
accustomed and real commander. Burnside's intentions
in respect to myself were thoroughly friendly, as he
afterward proved, and I had no ground for complaint
on this score; but the position of second in command
is always an awkward and anomalous one, and such I
felt it.

The i6th passed without serious fighting, though we
had desultory cannonading and picket firing. It was
hard to restrain our men from showing themselves on the
crest of the long ridge in front of us, and whenever they
did so they drew the fire from some of the enemy's bat-
teries, to which ours would respond. McClellan recon-
noitred the line of the Antietam near us, and the country
immediately on our left, down the valley. As the result
of this we were ordered to change our positions at night-
fall, staff officers being sent to guide each division to
its new camp. The selected positions were marked by
McClellan's engineers, who then took members of Burn-
side's staff to identify the locations, and these in turn
conducted our divisions. There was far more routine of
this sort in that army than I ever saw elsewhere. Corps
and division commanders should have the responsibility
of protecting their own flanks and in choosing ordinary
camps. To depend upon the general staff for this is to
take away the vigor and spontaneity of the subordinate
and make him perform his duty in a mechanical way.
He should be told what is known of the enemy and his
movements so as to be put upon his guard, and should
then have freedom of judgment as to details. The
changes made were as follows : Rodman's division went
half a mile further to the left, where a country road led

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 305

to the Antietam ford, half a mile below the Burnside
bridge. Sturgis's division was placed on the sides of
the road leading to the stone bridge just mentioned^
Willcox's was put in reserve in rear of Sturgis. My
own was divided, Scammon's brigade going with Rod-
man, and Crook's going with Sturgis. Crook was ordered
to take the advance in crossing the bridge in case we
should be ordered to attack. This selection was made
by Burnside himself as a compliment to the division for
the vigor of its assault at South Mountain. While we
were moving we heard Hooker's guns far off on the right
and front, and the cannonade continued an hour or more
after it became dark.

What, then, was the plan of battle of which the first
step was this movement of Hooker's.? McClellan's dis-
positions on the 15th were made whilst Franklin's corps
was still absent, and, under the orders he received, was
likely to be so for a day at least* Sumner's two corps
had been treated as the centre of the army in hand. Burn-
side's had been divided by putting Hooker on the extreme
right and the Ninth Corps on the extreme left, and
Porter's corps was in reserve. This looked as if a gen-
eral attack in front with this organization of the army
were intended. But the more McClellan examined the
enemy's position the less inclined he was to attack the
centre. He could cross the bridge there and on the right,
and deploy ; but the gentle slopes rising toward Sharps-
burg were swept by formidable batteries and offered no
cover to advancing troops. The enemy's infantry was
behind stone fences and in sunken roads, whilst ours
must advance over the open. Lee's right rested upon
the wooded bluffs above the Burnside bridge, where it
could only be approached by a small head of column
charging along the narrow roadway under a concentrated
fire of cannon and small arms. No point of attack on

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 29.

VOL. I. — 20

306 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the whole field was so unpromising as this. Then, as
Jackson was still at Harper's Ferry, there was the con-
tingency of a.i attack in rear if anything less than the
mass of our army were pushed beyond Lee's right.

On our right, in front of Hooker, it was easy to turn
the Confederate line. The road from Keedysville through
Smoketown to the Hagerstown turnpike crossed the
Antietam in a hollow, out of the line of fire, and a march
around Lee's left flank could be made almost wholly
under cover. The topography of the field therefore sug-
gested a flank attack from our right, if the National com-
mander rejected the better strategy of interposing his
army between Lee and Jackson as too daring a move-
ment. This flank attack McClellan determined to make,
and some time after noon of the i6th issued his orders
accordingly. In his preliminary report of the battle,
made before he was relieved from command, McClellan
says : —

"The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's
left, — at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack,
with the hope of something more, by assailing the enemy's right, —
and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully
successful, to attack their centre with any reserve I might then
have in hand." *

His report covering his whole career in the war, dated
August 4, 1863 (and published February, 1864, after
warm controversies had arisen, and he had become a
political character), modifies the above statement in some
important particulars. It says : —

" My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack
the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield supported
by Sumner's and if necessary by Franklin's, and as soon as matters
looked favorably there, to move the corps of Bumside against the
enemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and

1 O R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 3a

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 307

rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position to press along
the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank
movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all
the forces then disposable." *

The opinion I got from Burnside at the time, as to the
part the Ninth Corps was to take, was fairly consistent
with the design first quoted, namely, that when the attack
by Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin should be progressing
favorably, we were "to create a diversion in favor of the
main attack, with the hope of something more." It is
also probable that Hooker's movement was at first in-
tended to be made by his corps alone, the attack to be
taken up by Sumner's two corps as soon as Hooker
began, and to be shared in by Franklin if he reached the
field in time, thus making a simultaneous oblique attack
from our right by the whole army except Porter's corps,
which was in reserve and the Ninth Corps, which was to
create the " diversion " on our left and prevent the enemy
from stripping his right to reinforce his left. It is
hardly disputable that this would have been a better plan
than the one actually carried out. Certainly the assump-
tion that the Ninth Corps could cross the Antietam alone
at the only place on the field where the Confederates had
their line immediately upon the stream which must be
crossed under fire by two narrow heads of column, and
could then turn to the right along the high ground occu-
pied by the hostile army before that army had been
broken or seriously shaken elsewhere, is one which would
hardly be made till time had dimmed the remembrance
of the actual position of Lee's divisions upon the field.
It is also noticeable that the plan as given in the final
report leaves no " centre " with which to " advance "
when either of the flank movements should be successful,
Porter's corps in reserve being the only one not included
'n the movement as described.

> O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 55.

308 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Further evidence that the plan did not originally in-
clude the wide separation of two corps to the right to
make the extended turning movement is found in Hooker's
incomplete report, and in the wide interval in time be-
tween the marching of his corps and that of Mansfield.
Hooker was ordered to cross the Antietam at about
t'vo o'clock in the afternoon of the i6th by the bridge in
front of Keedysville and the ford below it. He says that
after his troops were over and in march, he rode back to
McClellan, who told him that he might call for reinforce-
ments, and that when they came they should be under
his command. Somewhat later McClellan rode forward
with his staff to observe the progress making, and
Hooker again urged the necessity of reinforcements.*
Yet Sumner did not receive orders to send Mansfield's
corps to his support till evening, and it marched only
half an hour before midnight,' reaching its bivouac,
about a mile and a half in rear of that of Hooker, at
2 A.M. of the 1 7th. 3

After crossing the Antietam, Hooker had shaped his
course to the westward, aiming to reach the ridge on
which the Hagerstown turnpike runs, and which is the
dominant feature in the landscape. This ridge is about
two miles distant from the Antietam, and for the first
mile of the way no resistance was met. However, his
progress had been observed by the enemy, and Hood's
two brigades were taken from the centre and passed tc
the left of D. H. Hill. Here they occupied an open
wood (since known as the East Wood) northeast of the
Dunker Church. Hooker was now trying to approach
the Confederate positions, Meade's division of the Penn
sylvania Reserves being in the advance. A sharp skir-
mishing combat ensued, and artillery was brought into
action on both sides. I have mentioned our hearing the

* O. R., vol. xiz. pt. i. p. 217. s /</., p. 275

« Id., p. 475.

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 309

noise of this engagement from the other extremity of
the field in the fading light of evening. On our side
Seymour's brigade had been chiefly engaged, and had
felt the enemy so vigorously that Hood supposed he had
repulsed a serious effort to take the wood. Hooker was,
however, aiming to pass quite beyond the flank, and kept
his other divisions north of the hollow beyond the wood,
and upon the ridge which reaches the turnpike near the
largest re-entrant bend of the Potomac, which is only
half a mile distant. Here he bivouacked upon the slopes
of the ridge, Doubleday's division resting with its right
upon the turnpike, Ricketts's division upon the left of
Doubleday, and Meade covering the front of both with
the skirmishers of Seymour's brigade. Between Meade's
skirmishers and the ridge were the farmhouse and barn
of J. Poffenberger, on the east side of the road, where
Hooker made his own quarters for the night. Half a
mile further in front was the farm of D. R. Miller, the
dwelling on the east, and the barn surrounded by stacks
on the west of the road.* Mansfield's corps (the
Twelfth), marching as it did late in the night, kept
further to the right than Hooker's, but moved on a nearly
parallel course, and bivouacked on the farm of another
J. Poffenberger, 2 near the road which, branching from
the Hagerstown turnpike at the Dunker Church, inter-
sects the one running from Keedysville through Smoke-
town to the same turnpike about a mile north of Hooker's
position.^

On the Confederate side, Hood's division had been so
roughly handled that it was replaced by two brigades of

' Hooker's unfinished report says he slept in the bam of D. R. Miller,
but he places it on the east of the road, and the spot is fully identified as
Poffenberger's by General Gibbon, who commanded the right brigade, and
by Lieutenant-Colonel Rufus R. Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin (afterward Brevet
Brigadier-General), both of whom subsequently visited the field and deter-
mined the positions.

' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 275, 475. " See map, p. 299.

3IO REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Ewell's division (commanded by Lawton), which with
Jackson's own (commanded by J. R. Jones) had been led
to the field from Harper's Ferry by Jackson, reaching
Sharpsburg in the afternoon of the i6th. These divi-
sions were formed on the left of D. H. Hill, and in
continuation of his line along the turnpike, out with a
brigade advanced to the East Wood, which was held as a
salient. Hood's division, on being relieved, was placed
in reserve near the Dunker Church, and spent part of
the night in cooking rations, of which its supply had
been short for a day or two.^ The combatants on both
sides slept upon their arms, well knowing that the dawn
would bring bloody work.

During the evening McClellan issued orders looking
toward the joining of a general engagement at daybreak.
McLaws's Confederate division, which had been oppos-
ing Franklin, crossed the Potomac at Maryland Heights,
and marched by way of Shepherdstown, reaching Sharps-
burg on the morning of the I7th.^ Walker's division,
which had come from Harper's Ferry on the i6th, ex-
tended Lee's right down the Antietam, covering the ford
at which Rodman, on our side, was expected to cross.'
A. P. Hill's division was the only force of the enemy
completing the work at Harper's Ferry, and Franklin
was ordered to leave Couch's division to observe Hill's
movements from our side of the Potomac, and to bring
the remainder of his corps on the field early in the morn-
ing.* In the respite given him since Sunday, Lee had
therefore concentrated all his army but one division, and
was better ready for the battle than McClellan, for
Franklin's corps could come upon the field only after a
considerable march, and he did not, in fact, reach it till
ten o'clock or later. Sumner was ordered to have the
Second Corps ready to march an hour before day, but he

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 923. 9 Id., pp. 855, 856.

«/</., p. 914. •/(/., p. 376.

ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 311

had no authority to move till explicit orders to that effect
should reach him. I have said that Hooker claims in
his report that the promise was made him that Mans-
field's c^rps, when it cakne to reinforce him, should be
under his orders. If this were so, it would unite all the
troops now present which had fought in Pope's Army of
Virginia. I find no trace, however, in the reports of the
battle, that Hooker exercised any such command. He
seems to have confined his work to the independent
action of his own corps until Mansfield's death, and was
himself disabled almost immediately afterward. As there
were commanders of wings of the army duly designated,
and two corps were now separated by a long interval
from the rest in an independent turning movement, it
can hardly be debated that that was th^ place of all others
where one of them should have been, unless McClellan
were there in person. Had Burnside's two corps been
kept together as the right wing, the right attack could
have been made a unit. If Sumner had then been
directed to keep in communication with Burnside, and
to advance when the latter did, nobody will doubt that
Sumner would have been prompt in sustaining his com-
rades. But both Sumner and Burnside were made to
feel that they were reduced from their proper rank, and
however conscientious they might be in carrying out
such orders as reached them, it was not in human nature
that they should volunteer suggestions or anticipate com-
mands. McClellan had thus thrown away the advan-
tages, if there were any, in holding only two or three
men directly responsible for the co-ordination of his
movements, and had assumed the full personal responsi-
bility of watching each phase of the battle and suiting the
proper orders to each conjuncture as it should arise.

CHAPTER XV

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT

Hooker astir early — The field near the Dunker Churca — Artillery combat

— Positions of Hooker's divisions — Rocky ledges in the woods — Ad-
vance of Doubleday through Miller's orchard and garden — Enemy's
fire from West Wo -d — They rush for Gibbon's battery — Repulse —
Advance of Patrick's brigade — Fierce fighting slong the turnpike —
Ricketts's division in the East Wood — Fresh effort of Meade's division
in the centre — A lull m t'^ '"-ttle — Mansfield's corps reaches the field

— Conflicting opinions as i^ he hour — Mansfield killed — Command
devolves on Williams — Advance through East Wood — Hooker
wounded — Meade in command of the corps — It withdraws — Greene's
division reaches the Dunker Church — Crawford's in the East Wood —
Terrible eflfects on the Confederates — Sumner's corps coming up — Its
formation — It moves on the Dunker Church from the east — Diver-
gence of the divisions — Sedgwick's passes to right of Greene — Attacked
in flank and broken — Rallying at the Poffenberger hill — Twelfth Corp-
hanging on near the church — Advance of F'rcnch's division — Richard-
son follows later — Kloody Lane reached — The Piper house — Franklin's
corps arrives — Charge of Irwin's brigade.

BEFORE the break of day on Wednesday the 17th,
it was discovered that Doubleday's division of
Hooker's corps lay exposed to artillery fire from batteries
of the enemy supposed to be in position on their front
and right. In rousing the men and changing their place,
the stillness of the night was so far broken that the Con-
federates believed they were advancing to attack, and a
lively cannonade and picket firing anticipated the dawn.'
The chance for getting their breakfast was thus de-
stroyed, and Hooker prepared his whole command for
action as soon as it should be light enough to move.
Looking south from the Pofifenberger farm along the
turnpike, he then saw a gently rolling landscape of which

^ R. R. Dawes, Service with the Sixth Wisconsin, p. 87.

ANTJETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 313

the commanding point was the Dunker Church, whose
white brick walls appeared on the right of the road,
backed by the foliage of the West Wood, which came
toward him filling a hollow that ran parallel to the turn-
pike, with a single row of fields between. On the east
side of the turnpike was the Miller house, with its barn
and stack-yard across the road to the right, and beyond
these the ground dipped into a little depression. Still
further on was seen a large cornfield between the East
Wood and the turnpike, rising again to the higher level,
and Hooker noticed the glint from a long line of bayonets
beyond the corn, struck by the first rays of the rising sun.
There was, however, another little hollow at the further
•jide of the cornfield, which could not be seen from
Hooker's position; and on the farthest ridge, near the
church and extending across the turnpike toward the
East Wood, were the Confederate lines, partly sheltered
by piles of rails taken from the fences. They looked to
Hooker as if they were deployed along the edge of the
corn, but an open sloping field lay between the corn and
them, after passing the second hollow. It was plain that
the high ground about the little white church was the
key of the enemy's position, and if that could be carried.
Hooker's task would be well done.

The enemy's artillery had opened early from a high
hill nearly east of the Miller house in a position to strike
our forces in flank and rear as they should go forward,
and Hooker placed batteries on the equally commanding
height above Poffenberger's and detached Hofmann's bri-
gade from Doubleday's division to support it and to pre-
vent the enemy from turning our extreme right.* This
force maintained its position during the day, and was the
nucleus about which both Hooker's and Sedgwick's men
rallied after their fight. The enemy's artillery referred
to were several batteries under Stuurt's command sup-

> O. R., vol. ziz. pt. i. p. 224.

314 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ported by his cavalry and by Early's brigade of infantry
which Jackson detached for that purpose.^

Doublecay's division (except Hofmann), was in two
lines, Gibbon's and Phelps's in front, supported by Pat-
rick's. Of Meade's division Seymour's brigade, which
had sustained the combat of the evening before, had con-
tinued to cover the frcnt with skirmishers during the
night, and remained on the northeast side of the East
Wood. The other brigades (Anderson and Magilton)
were placed in reserve behind Doubleday.^ The Tenth
Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves was sent from Ander-
son's to a strong position west of the turnpike near the
extremity of the strip of wood northwest of the Miller
house. It was among ledges of rock looking into the
ravine beyond which were Stuart and Early. The ravine
was the continuation northward to the Potomac of a little
watercourse which headed near the Dunker Church and
along one side of which the West Wood lay, the outcrop
of rock making broken ledges along its whole length.
Indeed, all the pieces of wood in the neighborhood
seemed to be full of such rocks, and for that reason had
been allowed to remain in forest. The regiment was
ordered to cover its front with skirmishers and to hold
its position at all hazards. Ricketts's division had biv-
ouacked in a wood east of Doubleday's. Its three
brigades (Duryea's, Hartsuff's, and Christian's) were
deployed on the left of Doubleday, and were to march
toward the Dunker Church through the East Wood, pass-
ing the line of Seymour's brigade, which was then to
become its support.

The Confederates opened a rapid artillery fire from the
open ground in front of the Dunker Church as well as
from Stuart's position, and Hooker answered the chal-
lenge by an immediate order for his line to advance.
Doubleday directed Gibbon, who was on the right, to

1 O. R. vol. zix. pt. i. p. 819. ' Id., p. 269.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 315

guide upon the turnpike. i^atrick remained for a time
in the wood north of the liller house, till he should be
needed at the front. ^ Doubleday and his brigade com-
manders seem to have supposed that Meade's men occu-
pied part at least of the West Wood, and that they would
cover Gibbon's flank as he advanced. This belief was
based on the stationing of the Tenth Pennsylvania Re-
serves; but that regiment was fifteen or twenty rods
north of the northern end of the West Wood, and Gibbon's
right flank, as he advanced, was soon exposed to attack
from Ewell's division (Lawton in command), which held
the wood, hidden from view and perfectly protected by
the slope of the ground and the forest, as they looked
over the rim into the undulating open fields in front.
Part of Battery B, Fourth United Statet; Artillery (Gib-
bon's own battery), was run forward to Miller's barn and
stack-yard on the right of the road, and fired over the
heads of the advancing regiments. ^ Other batteries were
similarly placed, more to the left, and our cannon roared
from all the hill crests encircling the field. The line
moved swiftly forward through Miller's orchard and
kitchen garden, breaking through a stout picket fence on
the near side, down into the moist ground of the hollow,
and up through the corn which was higher than their
heads and shut out everything from view.^ At the
southern side of the field they came to a low fence, be-
yond which was the open field already mentioned, and the
enemy's line at the further side of it. But the cornfield
only covered part of the line, and Gibbon's right had
outmarched the left, which had been exposed to a terrible
fire. The direction taken had been a little oblique, so
that the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin (the flanking
regiment) had crossed the turnpike and was suddenly
assailed by a sharp fire from the West Wood on its flank.

' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 224. s Id., pp. 229, 248.

^ Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 88.

3l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

They swung back into the read, lying down along the
high, stout post-andrail fence, keeping up their fire by
shooting between the rails.*

Leaving this little band to protect their right, the
main line, which had come up on the left, leaped the
fence at the south edge of the cornfield, and charged up
hill across the open at the enemy in front. But the con-
centrated fire of artillery and musketry was more than
they could bear. Men fell by scores and hundreds, and
the thinned lines gave way and ran for the shelter of the
corn. They were rallied in the hollow on the north side
of the field. The enemy had rapidly extended his left
under cover of the West Wood, and now made a dash at
the right flank and at Gibbon's exposed guns. His men
on the right faced by that flank and followed him bravely,
though with little order, in a dash at the Confederates
who were swarming out of the wood.^ The gunners
double-charged the cannon with canister, and under a
terrible fire of artillery and rifles Lawton's division
broke and sought shelter. ^

Patrick's brigade had now come up in support of Gib-
bon, and was sent across the turnpike into the West Wood
to cover that flank, two regiments of Gibbon's going
with him.* His men pushed forward, the enemy retir-
ing, until they were in advance of the principal line in
the cornfield upon which the Confederates of Jackson's
division were now marching to attack. Patrick faced his
brigade to the left, parallel to the edge of the wood and
to the turnpike, and poured his fire into the flank of the
enemy, following it by a charge through the field and up
to the fence along the road. Again the Confederates
were driven back, but their left came forward in the
wood again, attacking Patrick's right, forcing him to
resume his original direction of front and to retire to the

1 Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 89. • Id., p. 91.

• O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 248. * Id., p. 243.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 317

cover of a rocky ledge in the open at right angles to the
turnpike not far from the northern end of the timber.
Phelps's brigade had gone forward with Gibbon's, push-
ing tiearly to the Confederate lines, and being driven
back with great loss when they charged over open ground
against the enemy.

Ricketts's division advanced from the wood in which
it had spent the night, passed through Seymour's skir-
mishers and entered the East Wood, swinging his left for-
ward as he went. This grove was open, but the rocks
made perfect cover for Jackson's men, and every stone
and tree blazed with deadly fire. Hartsuff endeavored to
reconnoitre the ground, but was wounded and disabled
immediately. Ricketts pushed on, suffering fearfully
from an enemy which in open order could fall back from
rock to rock and from tree to tree with little comparative
loss. He succeeded at last in reaching the west edge of
this wood, forming along the road and fences that were
just within its margin. Here he kept up a rapid fire till
his ammunition was exhausted. ^

When Doubleday's men had been finally repulsed, our
line on the right curved from the ledge where Patrick
took refuge, forward in front of Miller's orchard and gar-
den, part of Gibbon's men lying down along the turnpike
fence facing to the west. Meade's two brigades in re-
serve were sent forward, but when they reached Gibbon
and Phelps, Ricketts was calling for assistance in the
East Wood and Magilton's brigade was sent to him, leav-
ing a gap on the left of Anderson. Another gallant
effort was now made, Seymour's depleted brigade striv-
ing to cover the opening, but the enemy dashed at it as
Anderson came up the slope, and the left being taken in
flank, the whole broke again to the rear.^ Ricketts's
right was also imperilled, and he withdrew his exhausted
lines to reorganize and to fill their empty cartridge-boxes.

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 258. * Id., pp. 269, 270.

31 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

There was a lull in the battle, and the combatants on
both sides were making desperate efforts to reform their
broken regiments.

Mansfield had called the Twelfth Corps to arms at the
first sound of Hooker's battle and marched to his aid.*
It consisted of two divisions, Williams's and Greene's,
the first of two and the other of three brigades. There
were a number of new and undrilled regiments in the
command, and in hastening to the front in columns of
battalions in mass, proper intervals for deployment had
not been preserved, and time was necessarily lost before
the troops could be put in line. Indeed, some of them
were not regularly deployed at all. They had left their
bivouac at sunrise which, as it was about the equinox,
was not far from six o'clock. They had marched across
the country without reference to roads, always a very
slow mode of advancing, and doubly so with undrilled
men. The untrained regiments must, in the nature of
things, have been very much like a mob when their so-
called columns-in-mass approached the field of battle.
It is impossible to reconcile the statements of the re-
ports as to the time they became engaged. General
Williams says they were engaged before seven o'clock.*
General Meade says they relieved his men not earlier
than ten or eleven.^ It seems to be guesswork in both
cases, and we are forced to judge from circumstantial
evidence. Ricketts thinks he had been fighting four
hours when he retired for lack of ammunition, and the
Twelfth Corps men had not yet reached him.* Patrick,
on the extreme right, says that his men had made their
coffee in the lull after his retreat to the sheltering ledge
of rocks, and had completed their breakfast before the
first of Mansfield's men joined him there. ^ The circum-

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 475. a Id., p. 476.

8 Id., p. 270. * Id., p. 259.

6 Id., p. 244.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 319

stantial details given by several officers make the interval
between the attack by the Twelfth Corps and the arrival
of Sumner a very short one. It may be regarded as prob«
able, therefore, that Hooker's battle covered the larger
part of the time between six o'clock and the arrival of
Sumner at about ten.

On reaching the field, Mansfield had a brief consulta-
tion with Hooker, resulting in his ordering Williams to
form his division nearly as Doubleday's had been, and to
advance with his right upon the turnpike. He himself
led forward the left of Crawford's brigade, which was the
first to arrive, and pushed toward the East Wood. The
regiments were still in columns of companies, and though
Williams had ordered them deployed, the corps com-
mander himself, as Crawford says, countermanded this
order and led them under fire in column.* He evidently
believed Ricketts's men to be still holding the East
Wood, and tried to keep his own from opening fire upon
the troops that were seen there. At this moment he was
mortally wounded, before the deployment was made.

General Alpheus S. Williams, on whom the command
devolved, was a cool and experienced officer. He has-
tened the deployment of Crawford's and Gordon's bri-
gades of his own division, sending one of the new and
large regiments to assist the Pennsylvania regiment in
holding the important position covering the right beyond
the turnpike. As Greene's division came up, he ordered
him to form beyond Gordon's left, and when deployed
to move on the Dunker Church through the East Wood,
guiding his left by the cloud of smoke from the Mumma
house, which had been set on fire by D. H. Hill's men.*
At Doubleday's request, he detached Goodrich's brigade
from Greene, and sent it to Patrick on the right with
orders to advance into the West Wood from its northern
extremity. Patrick says the regiments came separately

^ O. R., Tol. xix. pt. i. p. 484. * Id., pp. 475, 1033.

320 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and at considerable intervals,^ and it is not unlikely that
the older regiments were sent in to relieve Hooker's men
as fast as they were ready, and the more disorganized
ones were obliged to delay till they could be got into
some sort of shape. Williams made his first disposition
of his troops according to Hooker's suggestion, but the
latter received a serious wound in the foot, as it would
seem, before the attack by the Twelfth Corps had begun.
Hooker turned over the command to Meade, and a formal
order confirming this was issued from McClellan's head-
quarters later in the day.'

So many of the regiments were carried under fire while
still in column that not only was the formation of the
line an irregular one, but the deployment when made was
more diagonal to the turnpike than Hooker's had been,
and the whole line faced more to the westward. But
they advanced with a courage equal to the heroism al-
ready shown on that field. The Confederates who now
held the open space at the Dunker Chruch were Hood's
two brigades, and the rest of Jackson's corps extended
into the West Wood. Stuart had found his artillery posi-
tion on the hill too far from Jackson's line, and the fight-
ing was so near the church that he could not fire upon
our men without hurting his own.^ He therefore moved
further to the south and west, and Early carried his
brigade (except the Thirteenth Virginia) back toward
Ewell's division, which now came under his command
by the disabling of General Lawton in the fight.*

Williams's first line was a good deal shortened, and
the divisions, guiding as well as they could upon Greene,
crowded so far to the south that even Crawford's brigade,
which was on the right of all, went partly through the
East Wood advancing on a line nearly at right angles to
the turnpike. The enemy had followed Ricketts's retir-

* O. R., Tol. xix. pt. i. p. 2J^ * Id., pt. H. p. 31 5.

> /</., pt. i. p. 820. « Id., pp. 968, 9691

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 321

ing battalions and were again in occupation of the East
Wood. His work was to be done over again, though the
stubborn courage of Hood's depleted brigades could not
make up for the numbers which the National officers now
led against him. But the rocks, the ledges, and the trees
still gave him such cover that it was at a fearful cost that
the Twelfth Corps men pushed him steadily back and then
by a final rush drove him from the roads which skirted
the grove on west and south. What was left of Jack-
son's corps except Early's brigade had come out of the
West Wood to meet Crawford's division, and the stout
high fences along the turnpike were the scene of fright-
ful slaughter.* The Confederates tried to climb them,
but the level fire of our troops swept over the field so
that the top of the fence seemed in the most deadly line
of the leaden storm, and the men in gray fell in windrows
along its panels. Our own men were checked by the
same obstacle, and lay along the ground shooting be-
tween the rails and over the fallen bodies of the Confed-
erate soldiers which made a sort of rampart.

In obedience to his original orders, Greene took ground
a little more to his left, occupying a line along a fence
from the burning Mumma house to the road leading from
the East Wood directly to the Dunker Church.^ The two
brigades with thinned ranks barely filled this space, and
Crawford's division connected with them as well as it
could. Batteries came forward on Greene's left and
right, and helped to sweep the grove around the church.
Hill attempted to hold him back, and a bold dash was
made at Greene, probably by Hill's left brigades which
were ordered forward to support Hood. Greene's men
lay on the ground just under the ridge above the burning
house till the enemy were within a few rods of them,
then rose and delivered a volley which an eyewitness
(Major Crane, Seventh Ohio) says cut them down " like

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 485, 487. ' Id., p. 505.

VOL. I. — 21

322 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

grass before the mower."* Those who escaped sought
refuge in the wood behind the church, where the crown-
ing ridge is some distance back from the road. Greene
now dashed forward and gained the grove immediately
about the church, where he held on for an hour or two.
Crawford's division, after several ebbs and flows in the
tide of battle, was holding the western skirt of the East
wood with one or two of its regiments still close to the
turnpike fence on his right.

Meanwhile Goodrich had been trying to advance from
the north end of the West Wood to attack the flank of the
enemy there; but Early with his own brigade held the
ledges along the ravine so stubbornly that he was making
little progress.

Greene was calling for support about the Dunker
Church, for he was close under the ridge on which Hill
and Jackson w.^'re forming such line as they could, and
he was considerably in advance of our other troops.
Williams withdrew one regiment from Goodrich's bri-
gade and sent it to Greene, and directed Crawford to
send also to him the Thirteenth New Jersey, a new and
strong regiment which had been left in reserve, as we
have seen, in a bit of wood northeast of the field of
battle.* Gordon's brigade was withdrawn by Crawford
to enable it to reorganize in rear of the East Wood, and
Crawford's own brigade held the further margin of it.
It will thus be seen that the Twelfth Corps was now
divided into three portions, — Greene's division at the
church, Crawford's in the East Wood, and Goodrich's
brigade near the north end of the West Wood.

Meade had withdrawn the First Corps to the ridge at
Poffenberger's, where it had bivouacked the night before,
except that Patrick's brigade remained in support of
Goodrich. The corps had suffered severely, having lost
2470 in killed and wounded, but it was still further de-

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 506. • /</., pp. 476, 505.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 323

pleted by straggling, so that Meade reported less than
7000 men with the colors that evening.* Its organiza-
tion had been preserved, however, and the story that it
was utterly dispersed was a mistake. The Twelfth Corps
also had its large list of casualties, increased a little
later by its efforts to support Sumner, and aggregating,
before the day was over, 1 746.

But the fighting of Hooker's and Mansfield's men,
though lacking unity of force and of purpose, had also
cost the enemy dear. J. R. Jones, who commanded Jack-
son's division, had been wounded ; Starke, who succeeded
Jones, was killed; Lawton, who commanded Ewell's divi-
sion, was wounded.^ Lawton's and Trimble's brigades
had been fearfully crippled in the first fight against
Hooker on the plateau between the Dunker Church and
the East Wood, and Hood was sent back to relieve them.'
He, in turn, had been reinforced by the brigades of Rip-
ley, Colquitt, and McRae (Garland's) from D. H. Hill's
division.* When Greene reached the Dunker Church,
therefore, the Confederates on that wing were more
nearly disorganized than our own troops. Nearly half
their numbers were killed and wounded, and Jackson's
famous "Stonewall" division was so completely broken
up that only a handful of men under Colonels Grigsby
and Stafford remained, and attached themselves to
Early's command.* Of the division now under Early,
his own brigade was all that retained much strength,
and this, posted among the rocks in the West Wood and
vigorously supported by Stuart and the artillery on that
flank, was all that covered the left of Lee's army. Could
Hooker and Mansfield have attacked together, or, still
better, could Sumner's Second Corps have marched be-
fore day and united with the first onset, Lee's left must

* O. R,, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 349.

* Id., p. 923.

* !<!•, p. 969-

' Id., pt. i. p. 956.
* /</, p. 1022.

324 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

inevitably have been cruslied long before the Confeder-
ate divisions of McLaws, Walker, and A. P. Hill could
have reached the Beld. It is this failure to carry out
any intelligible plan which the historian must regard as
the unpardonable military fault on the National side.
To account for the hours between daybreak and eight
o'clock on that morning, is the most serious responsi-
bility of the National commander.^

Sumner's Second Corps was now approaching the scene
of action, or rather two divisions of it, Sedgwick's and
French's, for Richardson's was still delayed till his place
could be filled by Porter's troops. Although ordered to
be ready to move at daybreak, Sumner emphasizes in his
report the fact that whilst his command was prepared to
move at the time ordered, he " did not receive from head-
quarters the order to march till 7. 20 A. M." ^ By the time
he could reach the field, Hooker had fought his battle
and had been repulsed. The same strange tardiness in
sending orders is noticeable in regard to every part of
the army, and Richardson was not relieved so that he
could follow French till an hour or two later.*

Sumner advanced, after crossing the Antietam, in a
triple column, Sedgwick's division in front, the three
brigades marching by the right flank and parallel to each
other. French followed in the same formation. They
crossed the Antietam by Hooker's route, but did not
march so far to the northwest as Hooker had done. On
the way Sumner met Hooker, who was being carried from
the field, and the few words he could exchange with the
wounded general were enough to make him feel the need
lOf haste, but not enough to give him any clear idea of

1 A distinguished officer (understood to be Gen. R. R, Dawes) who visited
the field in 1866 has published the statement that at the Pry house, where
McClellan had his headquarters, he was informed that on the morning of the
17th the general rose at about seven o'clock and breakfasted leisurely after
that hour. (Marietta, Ohio, Sentinel.)

' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 275. ' Ibid.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 325

the situation. When the centre of the corps was opposite
the Dunker Church, and nearly eaot of it, the change of
direction was given ; the troops faced to their proper
front, and advanced in line of battle in three lines, fully
deployed and sixty or seventy yards apari:, Sumner him-
self being in rear of Sedgwick's first line and near its
left.^ As they approached the position held by Greene's
division at the church, French kept on so as to form on
Greene's left,' but Sedgwick, under Sumner's immediate
leading, diverged somewhat to the right, passing through
the East Wood, crossing the turnpike on the right of
Greene and of the Dunker Church, and plunged into the
West Wood.' Th*^ fences there had been destroyed by
the Confederates before the battle began, for the purpose
of making room for their own manoeuvres as well as to
make barricades in front of the cornfield. Sedgwick's
right did not extend far enough north to be obstructed by
the fences where the Twelfth Corps men had lain along
them in repulsing Jackson. When he entered the wood,
there were absolutely no Confederate troops in front of
him. The remnants of Jackson's men, except Early's
brigade, were clustered at the top of the ridge immedi>
ately in front of Greene, and Early was further to the
right, opposing Goodrich and Patrick; Early, however,
made haste under cover of the woods to pass around Sedg-
wick's right and to get in front of him to oppose his
progress.* This led to a lively skirmishing fight in
which Early was making as great a demonstration as pos-
sible, but with no chance of solid success. Sedgwick
pushed him back, and his left was coming obliquely into
the open at the bottom of the hollow beyond the wood,
when, at the very moment, McLaws's and Walker's Con-
federate divisions came upon the field. The former had
only just arrived by rapid marching from Shepherdstown

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 305.
» Id., p. 305.

a /</., p. 323.
♦ Id.y p. 97a

326 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

beyond the Potomac; the latter had been hastily called
away by Lee from his position on the lower Antietam
opposite the left wing of Burnside's Ninth Corps.*

Walker charged headlong upon the left flank of Sedg-
wick's lines, and McLaws, passing by Walker's left, also
threw his division diagonally upon the already broken and
retreating brigades. Taken at such a disadvantage, these
had never a chance; and in spite of the heroic bravery
of Sumner and Sedgwick with most of their officers
(Sedgwick being severely wounded), the division was
driven off to the north with terrible losses, carrying
along in their rout Goodrich's brigade of the Twelfth
Corps which had been holding Early at bay. Goodrich
was killed, and his brigade suffered hardly less than the
others. Patrick's brigade of Hooker's corps was in good
order at the rocky ledges north of the West Wood which
are at right angles to the turnpike, and he held on stub-
bornly till the disorganized troops drifted past his left,
and then made an orderly retreat in line toward the Pof-
fenberger hill.^ Meade was already there with the rem-
nants of Hooker's men. Here some thirty cannon of
both corps were quickly concentrated, and, supported by
everything which retained organization, easily checked
the pursuers and repulsed all efforts of Jackson and Stu-
art to resume the offensive or to pass between them and
the Potomac.^

Sumner did not accompany the routed troops to this
position, but as soon as it was plain that the division
could not be rallied, he galloped off to put himself in
communication with French and with headquarters of the
army and to try to retrieve the situation. From the flag
station east of the East Wood he signalled to McClellan,
" Reinforcements are badly wanted ; our troops are giving
way."* Williams was in that part of the field, and Sum-

* O. R., Tol. xix. pt. i. pp. 857, 914. « Id., p. 245.

» Id, p. 306. * Id., p. 134.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 327

ncr sent a stafiF officer to him ordering that he should
push forward to Sedgwick's support anything he could. ^
Williams in person ordered Gordon's brigade to advance,
for this, as we have seen, had been reorganized behind
the East Wood, He sent the same order to Crawford for
the rest of that division. Crawford had withdrawn his
men in the East Wood to let Sedgwick pass diagonally
along his front, and now advanced again to the west mar-
gin of the grove.' Gordon was ahead of him in time and
further to the right, and again charged up to the turn-
pike fences. But the routed troops were already swarm-
ing from the wood across his front, and their pursuers
were charging after them. Ag^in the turnpike was made
the scene of a bloody conflict, and the bodies of many
more of the slain of both armies were added to those
which already lined those fences. Gordon's men were
overpowered and fell back in the direction they had
come.' The enemy's attack spread out toward Greene
and toward Crawford, who was now at the edge of the
East Wood again ; but both of these held firm, and a couple
of batteries on the rise of gjround in front poured canister
into the enemy till he took refuge again in the wood be-
yond the church. It was between nine and ten o'clock,
probably about ten,* when Sumner entered the West Wood,
and in fifteen minutes or a little more the one-sid^d com-
bat Was over.

Sumner's principal attack was made, as I have already
indicated, at right angles to that of Hooker. He had
thus crossed the line of Hooker's movement in both the
advPiice and the retreat of the latter. This led to some
miaconceptions on Sumner's part. Crawford's division
had retired to the right and rear to make way for Sedg-

* O. R., vol. xxx. pt. L p. 477. * Id., p. 485. • Id., p. 495.

* The reports on the Confederate side fix ten o'clock as the time McLaws
and Walker reached the field, and corroborate the conclusion I draw from
all other available evidence.

328 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

wick as he came up. It thus happened that Greene's
division was the only part of the Twelfth Corps troops
Sumner saw, and he led Sedgwick's men to the right of
these. Ignorant as he necessarily was of what had oc-
curred before, he assumed that he formed on the extreme
right of the Twelfth Corps, and that he fronted in the
same direction as Hooker had done. This misconcep-
tion of the situation led him into another error. He had
seen only stragglers and wounded men on the line of his
own advance, and hence concluded that Hooker's Corps
was completely dispersed and its division and brigade
organizations broken up. He not only gave this report
to McClellan at the time, but reiterated it later in his
statement before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War.^ The truth was that he had marched westward
more than a mile south of the Poffenberger hill where
Meade was with the sadly diminished but still organized
First Corps, and half that distance south of the Miller
farm buildings, near which Goodrich's brigade had
entered the north end of the West Wood, and in front
of which part of Williams's men had held the ground
along the turnpike till they were relieved by Sedgwick's
advance. Sedgwick had gone in, therefore, between
Greene and Crawford, and the four divisions of the two
corps alternated in their order from left to right, thus:
French, Greene, Sedgwick, Crawford, the last being
Williams's, of which Crawford was in command.

It was not Sumner's fault that he was so ill-informed
of the actual situation on our rigtu ; but it is plain that
in the absence of McClellan from that part of the field
he should have left the personal leadership of the men to
the division commanders, and should himself have found
out by rapid examination the positions of all the troops
operating there. It was his part to combine and give
intelligent direction to the whole, instead of charging

1 c. w., vol. i. p. 368.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 329

forward at haphazard with Sedgwick's division. Both
Meade and Williams had men enough in hand to have
joined in a concerted movement with him; and had he
found either of those officers before plunging into the
West Wood, he would not have taken a direction which
left his flank wholly exposed, with the terrible but
natural results which followed. The original cause of
the mischief, however, was McClcllan's failure to send
Sumner to his position before daybreak, so that the three
corps could have acted together from the beginning of
Hooker's attack.

But we must return to Sumner's divisions, which were
advancing nearer the centre. The battle on the extreme
right was ended by ten o'clock in the morning, and there
was no more serious fighting north of the Dunker Church.
The batteries on the Poffenberger hill and those about
the East Wood swept the open ground and the cornfield
over which Hooker and Mansfield had fought, and for
some time Greene was able to make good his position at
the church. The Confederates were content to hold the
line of the West Wood and the high ground back of
the church, and French's attack upon D H. Hill was
now attracting their attention. French advanced toward
Greene's left, over the open farm lands, and after a fierce
combat about the Rullett and Clipp farm buildings,
drove Hill's division from them.* At what time the
Confederates made a rush at Greene and drove him back
to the edge of the East Wood is uncertain ; but it must
have been soon after the disaster to Sedgwick. It seems
to have been an incident of the aggressive movement
against Sedgwick, though not coincident with it. It
must certainly have been before French's advance reached
the Rullett and Clipp houses, for the enemy's men hold-
ing them would have been far in rear of Greene at the
church, and he must by that time have been back near

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. I. p. 323^

330 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the burnt house ' Mumma and the angle of the East
Wood.*

Richardson's division followed French after an hour or
two,^ and then, foot by foot, field by field, from fence to
fence, and from hill to hill, the enemy was pressed back,
till the sunken road, since known as "Bloody Lane,"
was in our hands, piled full of the Confederate dead who
had defended it with their lives. Richardson had been
mortally wounded, and Hancock had been sent from
Franklin's corps to command the division. Colonel
Barlow had been conspicuous in the thickest of the fight,
and after a series of brilliant actions had been carried
off desperately wounded. On the Confederate side equal
courage and a magnificent tenacity had been exhibited.
Men who had fought heroically in one position no sooner
found themselves free from the struggle of an assault
than they were hurried away to repeat their exertions,
without even a breathing-spell, on another part of the
field. They exhausted their ammunition, and still grimly
held crests, as Longstreet tells us, with their bayonets,
but without a single cartridge in their boxes. ^ The
story of the fight at this part of the field is simpler than
that of the early morning, for there was no such variety
in the character of the ground or in the tactics of the
opposing forces. It was a sustained advance with con-
tinuous struggle, sometimes ebbing a moment, then gain-
ing, but with the organization pretty well preserved and
the lines kept fairly continuous on both sides. Our
men fought their way up to the Piper house, near the

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 505. Greene says that he held the ground at
the church for two hours, and that his men were in action from 6.30 a. m. to
1.30 P. M. The length of time and hours of the day are so irreconcilable as
given in different reports that we are forced to trust more to the general
current of events than to the time stated.

* Hancock says the division crossed the Antietam about 9.30. O. R.i
vol. xix. pt. i. p. 277.

a /</., p. 840

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 33 1

turnpike, and that position marks the advance made by
our centre. * The crest of the ridge on which the Hagers-
town turnpike runs had been secured from Piper's north
to Miller's, and it was held until the Confederate retreat
on the 19th.

The head of Franklin's Corps (the Sixth) had arrived
about ten o'clock, and had taken the position near the
Sharpsburg bridge, which Sumner had occupied in the
night.^ Before noon Smith's and Slocum's divisions
were both ordered to Sumner's assists nee. As they
passed by the farm buildings in front of the East Wood,
the enemy made a dash at Greene and French. Smith
ordered forward Irwin's brigade to their support, and
Irwin charged gallantly, driving the assailants back to
the cover of the woods about the church.^ Franklin's
men then formed under the crest already mentioned, from
"Bloody Lane" by the Clipp, Rullett, and Mumma
houses to the East Wood and the ridge in front.
The aggressive energy of both sides seemed exhausted.
French and Richardson's battle may be considered as
ended at one or two o'clock. There was no fighting later
but that on the extreme left, where Bumside's Ninth
Corps was engaged, and we must turn our attention to
that part of the field.

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 279.

* /(/., pp. 402, 409.

« Id., p. 376.

CHAPTER XVI
antietam: the fight on the left

Ninth Corps positions near Antietam Creek — Rodman's division at lower
ford — Sturgis's at the bridge — Kurnside's headquarters on the field —
View from his place of the battle on the right — French's fight — An ex
ploding caisson — Our orders to attack — The hour — Crisis of the battle

— Discussion of the sequence of events — The Uurnside bridge — Ex-
posed approach — Enfiladed by enemy's artillery — Disposition of enemy's
troops — His position very strong — Importance of Rodman's movement
by the ford — The fight at the bridge — Repulse — Fresh efforts — Tac-
tics of the assault — Success — Formation on further bank — Bringing
up ammunition — Willcox relieves Sturgis — The latter now in support

— Advance against Sharpsburg — Fierce combat — Edge of the town
reached — Rodman's advance on the left — A. P. Hill's Confederate di-
vision arrives from Harper's Ferry — Attacks Rodman's flank — A raw
regiment breaks — The line retires — Sturgis comes into the gap — De-
fensive position taken and held — Enemy's assaults repulsed — Troops
sleeping on their arms — McClellan's reserve — Other troops not used —
McClellan's idea of Lee's force and plans — Lee's retreat — The terrible
casualty lists.

TTT'E have seen that the divisions of the Ninth Corp?
^^ were conducted by staff officers of Burnside's
staff to positions that had been indicated by McClellan
and marked by members of his staff. The morning ol
Wednesday the 17th broke fresh and fair. The men
were astir at dawn, getting breakfast and preparing for a
day of battle. The artillery fire which opened Hooker's
battle on the right spread along the whole line, and the
positions which had been assigned us in the dusk of
evening were found to be exposed, in some places, to the
direct fire of the Confederate guns. Rodman's division
suffered more than the others, Fairchild's brigade alone
reporting thirty-six casualties before they could find
cover.* My own tents had been pitched at the edge of

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 451.

ANTIETAMt THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 333

a little grove of forest trees, and the headquarters mess
was at breakfast at sunrise when the cannonade began.
The rapid explosion of shrapnel about us hastened our
morning meal; the tents were struck and loaded upon
the wagons, horses were saddled, and everything made
ready for the contingencies of the day. It was not till
seven o'clock that orders came to advance toward the
creek as far as could be done without exposing the men
to unnecessary loss.^ Rodman was directed to acquaint
himself with the situation of the ford in front of him,
and Sturgis to seek the best means of approach to the
stone bridge. All were then to remain in readiness to
obey further orders.

When these arrangements had been made, I rode to the
position Burnside had selected for himself, which was
upon a high knoll northeast of the Burnside bridge, near
a haystack which was a prominent landmark. Near by
was Benjamin's battery of twenty-pounder Parrotts, and
a little further still to the right, on the same ridge,
General Sturgis had sent in Durell's battery.' These
were exchanging shots with the enemy's guns opposite,
and had the advantage in range and weight of metal. At
this point I remained until the order for our attack came,
later in the day. We anxiously watched what we could
see at the right, and noted the effect of the fire of the
heavy guns of Benjamin's battery. We could see noth-
ing distinctly that occurred beyond the Dunker Church,
for the East and West Woods with farm-houses and
orchards between made an impenetrable screen. A
column of smoke stood over the burning Mumma house,
marking plainly its situation.

As the morning wore on, we saw lines of troops advanc-
ing from our right upon the other side of the Antietam,
Jind engaging the enemy between us and the East Wood.
The Confederate lines facing them now also rose into

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 424. » Ibid.

334 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

view. From our position we looked, as it were, down
between the opposing lines as if they had been the sides
of a street, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men
carried to the rear and stragglers making off. Our lines
halted, and we were tortured with anxiety as we specu-
lated whether our men would charge or retreat. The
enemy occupied lines of fences and stone walls, and their
batteries made gaps in the National ranks. Our long«
range guns were immediately turned in that direction,
and we cheered every well -aimed shot. One of our
shells blew up a caisson close to the Confederate line.
This contest was going on, and it was yet uncertain
which would succeed, when one of McClellan's staff rode
up with an order to Bumside. The latter turned to me,
saying we were ordered to make our attack. I left the
hill-top at once to give personal supervision to the move-
ment ordered, and did not return to it. My knowledge
by actual vision of what occurred on the right ceased.

The question at what hour Burnside received this
order, has been warmly disputed. The manner in which
we had waited, the free discussion of what was occurring
under our eyes and of our relation to it, the public receipt
of the order by Burnside in the usual and business-like
form, all forbid the supposition that this was any reit-
eration of a former order.* If then we can determine

* I leave this as originally written, although the order itself has since

come to light; for the discussion of the circumstantial evidence may be

useful in determining the value of McClellan's report of 1863 where it

differs in other respects from his original report of 1862 and from other

contemporaneous documents.

"Hkad-Quartkhs, Akmv op thk Potomac,

Major-General Burnside : September 17, 186a, —9.10 a. m.

General, — General Franklin's command is within one mile and a half
of here. General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as
you shall have uncovered the upper stone bridge yoo will be supported, and,
if necessary, on your own line of attack. So far all is going well.

Respectfully, Geo. D. Ruogles, Colonel, etc"
This order appears in the supplementary volume of the Official Records,
vol. li. pt. i. p. 844. From Pry's house, where McClellan's headquarters were

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 335

whose troops we saw engaged, we shall know something
of the time of day ; for there has been a general agree-
ment reached as to the hours of movement of Sumner's
divisions during the forenoon on the right and right
centre. The official fiiap settles this. No lines of our
troops were engaged in the direction of Bloody Lane and
the Rullett farm-house, and between the latter and our
station on the hill, till French's division made its attack.
We saw them distinctly on the hither side of the farm
buildings, upon the open ground, considerably nearer
to us than the Dunker Church or the E^st Wood. In
number we took them to be a corps. The place, the cir-
cumstances, all fix it beyond controversy that they were
French's men or French's and Richardson's. No others
fought on that part of the field until Franklin went to
their assistance at noon or later. The incident of their
advance and the explosion of the caisson was illustrated
by the pencil of Mr. Forbes on the spot, and was placed
by him at the time Franklin's head of column was ap-
proaching from the direction of Rohrersville, which was
about ten o'clock.*

It seems now very clear that about ten o'clock in the
morning was the great crisis in this battle. The sudden
and complete rout of Sedgwick's division was not easily
accounted for, and, with McClellan's theory of the enor-
mous superiority of Lee's numbers, it looked as if the
Confederate general had massed overwhelming forces on
our right. Sumner's notion that Hooker's corps was
utterly dispersed was naturally accepted, and McClellan
limited his hopes to holding on at the East Wood and the

that day, to Bomside's, was over two miles as the crow flies. This establishes
the accuraqr of the original reports of both, which stated the hour of
receipt at ten o'dock. It corroborates also the time of Franklin's arrival
on the field, and the connection of this with Bumside's advance.

* Forbes's sketch is reproduced in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War," vol. ii. p. 647, and is of historical importance in connection with the
facts stated above.

336 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Poffenberger hill, where Hooker's batteries were massed
and supported by the troops that had been rallied there.
Franklin's corps, as it came on the field, was detained to
support the threatened right centre, and McClellan deter-
mined to help it further by a demonstration upon the
extreme left by the Ninth Corps. At this time, there-
fore, he gave his order to Burnsidc to cross the Antietam
and attack the enemy, thus creating a diversion in favor
of our hard-pressed right. His preliminary report of the
battle (dated October i6, 1862) explicitly states that the
order to Burnside to attack was " communicated to him
at ten o'clock a.m." This exactly agrees with the time
stated by Burnside in his official report, and would ordi-
narily be quite conclusive.^

In the book published in 1864 as his official report of
his whole military career, McClellan says he ordered
Burnside to make this attack at eight o'clock. The
circumstances under which his final published state-
ments were made take away from them the character of
a calm and judicial correction of his first report. He
was then a general set aside from active service and a
political aspirant to the Presidency. His book was a
controversial one, issued as an argument to the public,
and the earlier report must be regarded in a military
point of view as the more authoritative unless good
grounds are given for the changes. When he wrote his
preliminary report he certainly knew the hour and the
condition of affairs on the field when he gave the order
to Burnside. To do so at eight o'clock would not accord
with his plan of battle.* His purpose had been to move
the Ninth Corps against the enemy " when matters looked
favorably" on our right, after an attack by Hooker,
Mansfield, and Sumner, supported, if necessary, by Frank-
lin. But Sumner's attack was not made till after nine,
and Franklin's head of column did not reach the field till

* See note, p. 334,a«/f. C. W., pt. i. p. 41 ; O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 31, 4'6-
« Id., pp. 30, 55.

ANTIETAMt THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 337

ten. McClellan's book, indeed, erroneously postpones
Franklin's arrival till past noon, which, if true, would
tend to explain why the day wore away without any
further activity on the right; but the preliminary re-
port better agrees with Franklin's when it says that
officer reached the field about an hour after Sedgwick's
disaster.^

Still further, matters had at no time "looked favor-
ably" on the right up to ten o'clock. The condition,
therefore, which was assumed as precedent to Burnside's
movement, never existed; and this was better known to
McClellan than to any one else, for he received the first
discouraging reports after Mansfield fell, and the subse-
quent alarming ones when Sedgwick was routed. Burn-
side's report was dated on the 30th of September, within
two weeks of the battle, and at a time when public dis-
cussion of the incomplete results of the battle was ani-
mated. It was made after he had in his hands my own
report as his immediate subordinate, in which I had
given about nine o'clock as my remembrance of the time.^
As I directed the details of the action at the bridge in
obedience to this order, it would have been easy for him
to have accepted the hour named by me, for I should
have been answerable for any delay in execution after
that time. But he then had in his possession the order
which came to him upon the hill-top overlooking the
field, and no officer in the whole army has a better estab-
lished reputation for candor and freedom from any wish
to avoid full personal res;>onsibility for his acts. It was
not till his report was published in the Official Records
(1887)8 that I saw it or learned its contents, although I
enjoyed his personal friendship down to 'lis death. He
was content to have stated the fact as he knew it, and
did not feel the need of debating it. The circum.«»tances

' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 30, 61, 376. • Id,, p. 424. • Id., p. 416.
VOL. I. — 22

338 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

have satisfied me that his accuracy in giving the hour
was greater than my own.*

It will not be wondered at, therefore, if to my mind
the story of the eight o'clock order is an instance of the
way in which an erroneous recollection is based upon the
desire to make the facts accord with a thcor3^ The actual
time must have been as much later than nine o'clock as
the period during which, with absorbed attention, we had
been watching the battle on the right, — a period, it is
safe to say, much longer than it seemed to us. The
judgment of the hour which I gave in my report was
merely my impression from passing events, for I hastened
at once to my own duties without thinking to look at my
watch; whilst the cumulative evidence seems to prove,
conclusively, that the time stated by Burnside, and by
McClellan himself in his original report, is correct.
The order, then, to Burnside to attack was not sent at
eight o'clock, but reached him at ten; it was not sent to
follow up an advantage gained by Hooker and Sumner,
but to create, if possible, a strong diversion in favor of
the imperilled right wing when the general outlook was
far from reassuring.

McClellan truly said, in his original report, that the
task of carrying the bridge in front of Burnside was a
difficult one.' The hill on which I have placed the sta-
tion of General Burnside was the uolder and more promi-
nent crest of the line of hills which skirted the Antietam
on the east, and was broken by depressions here and
there, through which the country roads ran down to the
stream. Such a hollow was just at the south of Bum-
side's position at the haystack on the Rohrback farm.
In rear of him and a little lower down were the farm

* Upon reflection, I think it probable that the order from McClellan was
read to me, and that I thus got the hour of its date connected in my mind
with the beginning of our attack.

• O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 31.

ANTIETAhf: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 339

buildings, and from these a road ran ii'>wn the winding
hollow to the Antietam, but reached the stream several
hundred yards below the bridge. Following the road,
therefore, it was necessary to turn up stream upon the
narrow space between the hills and the water, without
any cover from the fire of the enemy on the opposite side.
The bluffs on that side were wooded to the water's edge,
and were so steep that the road from the bridge could not
go up at right angles to the bank, but forked both ways
and sought the upper land by a more gradual ascent to
right and left. The fork to the right ran around a
shoulder of the hill into a ravine which there reaches the
Antietam, and thence ascends by an easy grade toward
Sharpsburg. The left branch of the road rises by a simi-
lar but less marked depression.

These roads were faced by stone fences, and the depth
of the valley and its course made it impossible to reach
the enemy's position at the bridge by artillery fire from
the hill -tops on our side. Not so from the enemy's posi-
tion, for the curve of the valley was such that it was
perfectly enfiladed near the bridge by the Confederate
batteries at the position now occupied by the National
Cemetery. The bridge itself was a stone structure of
three arches with stone parapets on the sides. These
curved outward at the end of the bridge to allow for the
turn of the roadway. On the enemy's side, the stone
fences came down close to the bridge.

The Confederate defence of the passage was intrusted
to D. R. Jones's division of six brigades,* which was the
one Longstreet himself had disciplined and led till he
was assigned to a larger command. Toombs's brigade
was placed in advance, occupying the defences of the
bridge itself and the wooded slopes above, while the
other brigades supported him, covered by the ridges
which looked down upon the valley. The division bat-

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 804.

340 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

teries were supplemented by others from the enemy's
reserve, and the valley, the bridge, and the ford below
were under the direct and powerful fire of shot and
snell from the Confederate cannon. Toombs's force,
thus strongly supported, was as large as could be dis-
posed of at the head of the bridge, and abundantly large
for resistance to any that could be brought against it.
Our advance upon the bridge could only be made by a
narrow column, showing a front of eight men at most;
but the front which Toombs deployed behind his defences
was three or four hundred yards both above and below
the bridge. He himself says in his report : * " From the
nature of the ground on the other side, the enemy were
compelled to approach mainly by the road which led up
the river near three hundred paces parallel with my line
of battle and distant therefr tn from fifty to a hundred
and fifty feet, thus exposing his flank to a destructive
fire the most of that distance." Under such circum-
stances the Confederate position was nearly impregnable
against a direct attack over the bridge; for the column
approaching it was not only exposed at almost pistol-
range to the perfectly covered infantry of the enemy and
to two batteries which were assigned to the special duty
of supporting Toombs, having the exact range of the
little valley with their shrapnel ; but, if it should succeed
in reaching the bridge, its charge ross it must be made
under a fire ploughing through its length, the head
of the column melting away as it advanced, so that,
as every soldier knows, It could show no front strong
enough to make an impression upon the enemy's breast-
works, even if it should reach the other side. As a
desperai >; sort of diversion in favor of the right wing,
it might be justifiable; but I believe that no officer or
man who knew the actual situation at that bridge thinks
that a serious attack upon '..-. was any part of McClellan's

> O. R., vol. xiz. pt. i. p. 890.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 34I

original plan. Yet, in his detailed report of 1863, in-
stead of speaking of it as the difficult task the original
report had called it, he treats it as little different from
a parade or march across which might have been done in
half an hour.

Burnside's view of the matter was that the front attack
at the bridge was so difficult that the passage by the ford
below must be an important factor in the task; for if
Rodman's division should succeed in getting across there,
at the bend of the Antietam, he would come up in rear
of Toombs, and either the whole of D. R. Jones's divi-
sion would have to advance to meet Rodman, or Toombs
must abandon the bridge. In this I certainly concurred,
and Rodman was ordered to push rapidly for the ford.
It is important to remember, however, that Walker's
Confederate division had been posted during the earlier
morning to hold that part of the Antietam line, support-
ing Toombs as well,* and it was probably from him that
Rodman suffered the first casualties that occurred in his
ranks. But, as we have seen. Walker had been called
away by Lee only an hour before, and had made the
hasty march by the rear of Sharpsburg to fall upon Sedg-
wick. If therefore Rodman had been sent to cross at
eight o'clock, it is safe to say that his column, fording
the stream in the face of Walker's deployed division,
would never have reached the further bank, — a con-
tingency that McClellan did not consider when arguing,
long afterward, the favorable results that might have
followed an earlier attack. As Rodman died upon the
field, no full report for his division was made, and we
only know that he met with some resistance from both
infantr)' and artillery; that the winding of the stream
made his march longer than he anticipated, and that, in
fact, he only apprc^ched the rear of Toombs's position
from that direction about the time when our last and

> O. R^ voL six. pt. i. p. 914.

342 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

successful charge upon the bridge was made, between
noon and one o'clock.

The attacks at the Burnside bridge were made under
my own eye. Sturgis's division occupied the centre of
our line, with Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division
on his right front, and Willcox's division in reserve, as
I have already stated. Crook's position was somewhat
above the bridge, but it was thought that by advancing
part of Sturgis's men to the brow of the hill, they could
cover the advance of Crook, and that the latter could
make a straight dash down the hill to our end of the
bridge. The orders were accordingly given, and Crook
advanced, covered by the Eleventh Connecticut (of Rod-
man's) under Colonel Kingsbury, deployed as skir-
mishers.^ In passing over the spurs of the hills. Crook
came out on the bank of the stream above the bridge and
found himself under a heavy fire at short range. He
faced the enemy and returned the fire, getting such cover
for his men as he could and trying to drive off or silence
his opponents. The engagement was one in which the
Antietam prevented the combatants from coming to close
quarters, but it was none the less vigorously continued
with musketry fire. Crook reported that his hands were
full and that he could not appioach closer to the bridge.
Later in the contest, his men, lining the stream, made
•experiments in trying to get over, and found a fordable
place a little way above, by which he got over five com-
panies of the Twenty-eighth Ohio at about the same time
as the final and successful charge. But on the failure of
Crook's first effort, Sturgis ordered forward an attacking
column from Nagle's brigade, supported and covered by
Ferrero's brigade, which took position in a field of »;orn
on one of the lower slopes of the hill opposite the head
of the bridge. The whole front was carefully covered
with skirmishers, and our batteries on the heights over-

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 419, 424.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 343

head were ordered to keep down the fire of the enemy's
artillery. Nagle's effort was gallantly made, but it
failed, and his men were forced to seek cover behind the
spur of the hill from which they hid advanced.* We
were constantly hoping to hear something from Rod-
man's advance by the ford, and would gladly have waited
for some more certain knowledge of his progress, but at
this time McClellan's sense of the necessity of relieving
the right was such that he was sending reiterated orders
to push the assault. Not only were these forwarded to
me, but to give added weight to my instructions, Burn-
side sent direct to Sturgis urgent messages to carry the
bridge at all hazards.

I directed Sturgis to take two regiments from Ferrero's
brigade, which had not been engaged, and make a column
by moving them together by the flank, the one left in
front and the other right in front, side by side, so that
when they passed the bridge they could turn to left and
right, forming line as they advanced on the run. He
chose the Fifty-first New York, Colonel Robert B.
Potter, and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel John F.
Hartranft (both names afte. ward greatly distinguished),
and both officers and men were made to feel the necessity
of si'ccess.2 At the same time Crook succeeded in bring-
ing a light howitzer of Simmonds's mixed battery down
from the hill-tops, and placed it where it had a point-
blank fire on the further end of the bridge. The howitzer
was one we had captured in West Virginia, and had been
added to the battery, which was partly made up of heavy
rifled Parrott guns. When everything was ready, a
heavy skirmishing fire was opened all along the bank,
the howitzer threw in double charges of canister, and in
scarcely more time than it takes to tell it, the bridge was
passed and Toombs's brigade fled through the woods and
over the top of the hill. The charging regiments were

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 444. » Ibid.

344 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

advanced in line to the crest above the bridge as soon as
they were deployed, and the rest of Sturgis's division,
with Crook's brigade, were immediately brought over to
strengthen the line. These were soon joined by Rod-
man's division, with Scammon's brigade, which had
crossed at the ford, and whose presence on that side of
the stream had no doubt made the final struggle of
Toombs's men less obstinate than it would otherwise
have been, the fear of being taken in rear having always
a strong moral effect upon even the best of troops.

It was now about one o'clock, and nearly three hours
had been spent in a bitter and bloody contest across the
narrow stream. The successive efforts to carry the bridge
had been as closely following each other as possible.
Each had been a fierce combat, in which the men with
wonderful courage had not easily accepted defeat, and
even, when not able to cross the bridge, had made use of
the walls at the end, the fences, and every tree and stone
as cover, while they strove to reach with their fire their
well-protected and nearly concealed opponents. The
lulls in the fighting had been short, and only to prepare
new efforts. The severity of the work was attested by
our losses, which, before the crossing was won, exceeded
500 men, and included some of our best officers, such as
Colonel Kingsbury of the Eleventh Connecticut, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bell of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman of the Eleventh Ohio, two
of them commanding regiments.- The proportion of
casualties to the number engaged was much greater than
common; for the nature of the combat required that
comparatively few troops should be exposed at once, the
others remaining under cover.

Our next task was to prepare to hold the heights we
had gained against the return assault of the enemy which
we expected, and to reply to the destructive fire from

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 427.

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 345

the enemy's abundant artillery. Light batteries were
brought over and distributed in the line. The men were
made to lie down behind the crest to save them from the
concentrated cannonade which the enemy opened upon us
as soon as Toombs's regiments succeeded in reaching
their main line. But McClellan's anticipation of an
overwhelming attack upon his right was so strong that he
determined still to press our advance, and sent orders
accordingly. The ammunition of Sturgis's and Crook's
men had been nearly exhausted, and it was imperative
that they should be freshly supplied before entering into
another engagement. Sturgis also reported his men so
exhausted by their efforts as to be unfit for an immediate
advance. On this I sent to Burnside the request that
Willcox's division be sent over, with an ammunition
train, and that Sturgis's division be replaced by the
fresh troops, remaining, however, on the west side of
the stream as support to the others. This was done as
rapidly as was practicable, where everything had to pass
down the steep hill-road and through so narrow a defile as
the bridge.^ Still, it was three o'clock before these
changes and preparations could be made. Burnside had
personally striven to hasten them, and had come over to
the west bank to consult and to hurry matters, and took
his share of personal peril, for he came at a time when
the ammunition wagons were delivering cartridges, and
the road at the end of the bridge where they were was
in the range of the enemy's constant and accurate fire.
It is proper to mention this because it has been said that
he did not cross the stream. The criticisms made by
McClellan as to the time occupied in these changes and
movements will not seem forcible if one will compare
them with any similar movements on the field ; such as

^ As a mode of ready reckoning, it is usual to assume that a division
requires an hour to march past a given point by the flank. With the cross-
ing of an ammunition train, the interval of time is more than accounted for.

346 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Mansfield's to support Hooker, or Sumner's or Frank-
lin's to reach the scene of action. About this, however,
there is fair room for difference of opinion: what I per-
sonally know is that it would have been folly to advance
again before Willcox had relieved Sturgis, and that as
soon as the fresh troops reported and could be put in line,
the order to advance was given. McClellan is in accord
with all other witnesses in declaring that when the move-
ment began, the conduct of the troops was gallant beyond
criticism.

Willcox's division formed the right, Christ's brigade
being north, and Welsh's brigade south of the road lead-
ing from the bridge to Sharpsburg. Crook's brigade of
the Kanawha division supported Willcox. Rodman's
division formed on the left, Harland's brigade having the
position on the flank, and Fairchild's uniting with Will-
cox at the centre. Scammon's brigade was the reserve
for Rodman at the extreme left.^ Sturgis's division re-
mained and held the crest of the hill above the bridge.
About half of the batteries of the divisions accompanied
the movement, the rest being in position on the hill-tops
east of the Antietam. The advance necessarily followed
the high ground toward Sharpsburg, and as the enemy
made strongest resistance toward our right, the move-
ment curved in that direction, the six brigades of Jones's
Confederate division being deployed diagonally across
our front, holding the stone fences and crests of the
cross-ridges and aided by abundant artillery, in which
arm the enemy was particularly strong.

The battle was a fierce one from the moment Willcox's
men showed themselves on the open ground. Christ's
brigade, taking advantage of all the cover the trees and
inequalities of surface gave them, pushed on along the
depression in which the road ran, a section of artillery
keeping pace with them in the road. The direction of

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 425, 43a

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 347

movement brought all the brigades of the first line in
Echelon, but Welsh soon fought his way up beside Christ,
and they together drove the enemy successively from the
fields and farm-yards till they reached the edge of the
village. Upon the elevation on the right of the road was
an orchard in which the shattered and diminished force
of Jones made a final stand, but Willcox concentrated his
artillery fire upon it, and his infantry was able to push
forward and occupy it. They now partly occupied the
town of Sharpsburg, and held the high ground command-
ing it on the southeast, where the National Cemetery
now is.^ The struggle had been long and bloody. It
was half-past four in the afternoon, and ammunition had
again run low, for the wagons had not been able to
accompany the movement. Willcox paused for his men
to take breath again and to fetch up some cartridges;
but meanwhile affairs were taking a serious turn on the
left.

As Rodman's division went forward, he found the
enemy before him seemingly detached from Willcox's
opponents, and occupying ridges on his left front, so
that he was not able to keep his own connection with
Willcox in the swinging movement to the right. Still,
he made good progress in the face of stubborn resistance,
though finding the enemy constantly developing more to
his left, and the interval between him and Willcox wid-
ening. The view of the field to the south was now ob-
structed by fields of tall Indian corn, and under this cover
Confederate troops approached the fliank in line of battle.
Scammon's oflficers in the reserve saw them as soon as
Rodman's brigades Echeloned, as these were toward the
front and right. This hostile force proved to be A. P.
Hill's division of six brigades, the last of Jackson's force
to leave Harper's Ferry, and which had reached Sharps-
burg since noon. Those first seen by Scammon's men

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 431.

348 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

were dressed in the National blue uniforms which they
had captured at Harper's Ferry, and it was assumed that
they were part of our own forces till they began to fireJ
Scammon quickly changed front to the left, drove back
the enemy before him, and occupied a line of stone
fences, which he held until he was afterward withdrawn
from it.' Harland's brigade was partly moving in the
corn-fields. One of his regiments was new, having been
organized only three weeks, and the brigade had some-
what lost its order and connection when the sudden
attack came. Rodman directed Colonel Harland to lead
the right of the brigade, while he himself attempted to
bring the left into position. In performing this duty he
fell, mortally wounded. Harland's horse was shot under
him, and the brigade broke in confusion after a brief
effort of its right wing to hold on. Fairchild also now
received the fire on his left, and was forced to fall back
and change front.'

Being at the centre vhen this break occurred on the
left, I saw that it would be impossible to continue the
movement to the right, and sent instant orders to Will-
cox and Crook to retire the left of their line, and to
Sturgis to come forward into the gap made in Rodman's.
The troops on the right swung back in p>erfect order;
Scammon's brigade hung on at its stone wall at the
extreme left with unflinching tenacity till Sturgis had
formed on the curving hill in rear of. them, and Rod-
man's had found refuge behind. Willcox's left then
united with Sturgis, and Scammon was withdrawn to a
new position on the left flank of the whole line. That
these manoeuvres on the field were really performed in
good order is demonstrated by the fact that although the
break in Rodman's line was a bad one, the enemy was
not. able to capture many prisoners, the whole number of
missing, out of the 2349 casualties which the Ninth

1 O. R., vol. xiz. pt i. p. 468. > /</., p. 466. * /</., pp. 451, 453*

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 349

Corps suffered in the battle, being 115, which includes
wounded men unable to leave the Aeld.'

The enemy were not lacking in bold efforts to take
advantage of the check we had received, but were re-
pulsed with severe punishment, and as the day declined
were content to entrench themselves along the line of
the road leading from Sharpsburg to the Potomac at the
mouth of the Antietam, half a mile in our front. The
men of the Ninth Corps lay that night upon their arms,
the line being one which rested with both flanks near the
Antietam and curved outward upon the rolling hill-tops
which covered the bridge and commanded the plateau
between us and the enemy. With my staff, I lay upon
the ground behind the troops, holding our horses by the
bridles as we rested, for our orderlies were so exhausted
that we could not deny them the same chance for a little
broken slumber.

The Ninth Corps occupied its position on the heights
west of the Antietam without further molestation, except
an irritating picket firing, till the Confederate army re-
treated on the 19th of September. But the position was
one in which no shelter from the weather could be had,
nor could any cooking be done; and the troops were
short of rations. My division wagon-train, which I had
brought from the West, here stood us in good stead, for
the corps as a whole was very short of transportation.
The energy of Captain Fitch, my quartermaster, forced
the train back and forth between us and the nearest de-
pot of supplies, and for several days the whole corps had
the benefit of the provisions thus brought forward. Late
in the afternoon of Thursday the i8th, Morell's division
of Porter's corps was ordered to report to Burnside to
relieve the picket line and some of the regiments in the
most exposed position. One brigade was sent over the
Antietam for this purpose, and a few of the Ninth Corps

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 200, 427.

350 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

regiments were enabled to withdraw far enough to cook
some rations, of which they had been in need for twenty,
four hours. ^ Harland's brigade of Rodman's division
had been taken to the east side of the stream to be re-
organized, on the evening of Wednesday the 17th. The
sounds heard within the enemy's lines by our pickets
gave an inkling of their retrograde movement in the
night of Thursday, and at break of day on Friday morn-
ing the retreat of Lee's whole army was discovered by
advancing the picket line. Reconnoissances sent to the
front discovered that the whole Confederate army had
crossed the Potomac.

The conduct of the battle on the left has given rise to
several criticisms, among which the most prominent has
been that Porter's corps, which lay in reserve, was not
put in at the same time with the Ninth Corps. It has
been said that some of them were engaged or in support
of the cavalry and artillery at the centre. This does not
appear to have been so to any important extent, for no
active fighting was going on elsewhere after Franklin's
corps relieved Sumner's about noon. McClellan's reports
do not urge this. He answered the criticism by saying
that he did not think it prudent to divest the centre of
all reserve troops. No doubt a single strong division,
marching beyond the left flank of the Ninth Corps, would
have so occupied A. P. Hill's division that our move-
ment into Sharpsburg could not have been checked, and,
assisted by the advance of Sumner and Franklin on the
right, would apparently have made certain the complete
rout of Lee. As troops are put in reserve, not to dimin-
ish the army, but to be used in a pinch, I am convinced
that McClellan's refusal to use them on the left was the
result of his rooted belief, through all the day after Sedg-

» General Porter in his report •ays Morell took the place of the whole
Ninth Corps. In this he is entirely mistaken, as the reports from Morell's
division, as well as those of the Ninth Corps, show.

ANTlETAMt THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 35 1

wick's defeat, that Lee was overwhelmingly superior in
force, and was preparing to return a crushing blow upon
our right flank. He was keeping something in hand to
fill a gap or cover a retreat, if that wing should be driven
back. Except in this way, also, I am at a loss to account
for the inaction of the right during the whole of our
engagement on the left. Looking at our part of the
battle as only a strong diversion to prevent or delay
Lee's following up his success against Hooker and the
rest, it is intelligible. I certainly so understood it at the
time, as my report witnesses, and McClellan's original
report sustains this view.* If he had been impatient to
have our attack delivered earlier, he had reason for
double impatience that Franklin's fresh troops should
assail Lee's left simultaneously with our assault of his
other wing, unless he regarded action there as hopeless,
and looked upon our movement as a sort of forlorn hope
to keep Lee from following up his advantages.

But even these are not all the troublesome questions re-
quiring an answer. It will be remembered that Franklin's
corps, after forcing Crampton's Gap, had remained in
Pleasant Valley between Rohrersville and Boonsboro until
Tuesday night (i6th September). McClellan then ordered
Couch's division to be sent to occupy Maryland Heights
and observe the enemy in Harper's Ferry, whilst Frank-
lin with Smith's and Slocum's divisions should march to
the battle-field at daybreak of Wednesday. Why could
not Couch be called up and come on our left as well as
A. P. Hill's division, which was the last of the Con-
federate troops to leave the ferry, there being nothing to
observe after it was gone? Couch's division, coming
with equal pace with Hill's on the other side of the river
would have answered our needs as well as one from Por-
ter's corps. Hill came, but Couch did not. Yet even
then, a regiment of horse, watching that flank and scour-

» O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 31, 426.

352

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

•^,

ing the country as we swung forward, would have devel-
oped Hill's presence and enabled the commanding general
either to stop our movement or to take the available
means to support It. The cavalry was put to no such
use. It occupied the centre of the whole line, only its
artillery being engaged during the day. It would have
been invaluable to Hooker in the morning, as it would
have been to us in the afternoon.

McClellan had marched from Frederick City with the
information that Lee's army was divided, Jackson being
detached with a large force to take Harper's Ferry. He
had put Lee's strength at 120,000 men. Assuming that
there was still danger that Jackson might come upon our
left with his large force, and that Lee had proven strong
enough without Jackson to repulse three corps on our
right and right centre, McClellan might have regarded
his own army as divided also for the purpose of meeting
both opponents, and his cavalry would have been upon
the flank of the part with which he was attacking Lee;
Porter would have been in position to help either part in
an extremity or to cover a retreat; and Burnside would
have been the only subordinate available to check Lee's
apparent success. Will any other hypothesis intelligibly
account for McClellan's dispositions and orders.? The
error in the above assumption would be that McClellan esti-
mated Lee's troops at nearly double their actual numbers,
and that what was taken for proof of Lee's superiority in
force on the field was a series of partial reverses which re-
sulted directly from the piecemeal and disjointed way in
which McClellan's morning attacks had been made.

The same explanation is the most satisfactory one that
I can give for the inaction of Thursday, the ^th of Sep-
tember. Could McClellan have known the desperate
condition of most of Lee's brigades, he would also have
known t:b?t his own were in much better case, badly as
they had suffered. I do not doubt that most of his sub-

ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 353

ordinates discouraged the resumption of the attack, for
the belief in Lee's great preponderance in numbers had
been chronic in the army during the whole year. That
belief was based upon the inconceivably mistaken reports of
the secret-service organization, accepted at headquarters,
given to the War Department at Washington as a reason
for incessant demands of reinforcements, and permeating
downward through the whole organization till the error was
accepted as truth by officers and men, and became a factor
in their morale which can hardly be overestimated. The
result was that Lee retreated unmolested on the night of
the 1 8th of September, and that what might have been a
real and decisive success v/as a drawn battle in which our
chief claim to victory was the possession of the field.

The numbers engaged and the losses on each side have
been the subject of unending dispute. If we take the
returns of Lee at the beginning of his campaign against
Pope, and deduct his acknowledged losses, he crossed the
Potomac with over 72,000 men. ^ If we take his returns
of September 22, and add the acknowledged losses of the
month, he had over 57,000.2 McClellan's 87,000 present
for duty is accepted by all, though various causes consider-
ably reduced the number he brought into action. The best
collation of reports of casualties at Antietam gives 12,410
as those on the National side, and 1 1, 172 on the Confeder-
ate.s Longstreet, comparing the fighting in the fiercest
battles of the war, says " on no single day in any one of
them was there such carnage as in this fierce struggle."*

^ See my review of Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, " The Nation,"
Nov. 24, 1898, p. 396.

* See my review of Allan's Army of Northern Virginia, '• The Nation,"
Feb. 2, 1893, P- ^' Also reply to General Fitzhugh Lee, Id., Dec. 20, 1894,
p. 462 ; Confederate Statistics, Id., Jan. 24, 1895, p. 71 ; Review of Ropes's
Story of the Civil War, Id., March 9, 1899, p. 185.

' Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 603.

* From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 239.
VOL. I. — 23

^•'

CHAPTER XVII

MCCLELLAN AND POLITICS — HIS REMOVAL AND ITS

CAUSE

Meeting Colonel Key — His changes of opinion — His relations to Mc-
Clellan — Governor Dennison's influence — McClellan's attitude toward
Lincoln — Burnside's position — The Harrison Landing letter — Com-
pared with Lincoln's views — Probable intent of the letter — Incident at
McClellan's headquarters — John W.Garrett — Emancipation Proclama-
tion — An after-dinner discussion of it — Contrary influences — Frank
advice — Burnside and John Cochrane — General Order 163 — Lincoln's
visit to camp — Riding the field — A review — Lincoln's desire for
continuing the campaign — McClellan's hesitation — His tactics of
discussion — His exaggeration of difliculties — Effect on his army —
Disillusion a slow process — Lee's army not better than Johnston's —
Work done by our Western army — Difference in morale — An army
rarely bolder than its leader — Correspondence between Halleck and
McClellan — Lincoln's remarkable letter on the campaign — The army
moves on November 2 — Lee regains the line covering Richmond
— McClellan relieved — Burnside in command.

WHEN I rode up with Burnside on the afternoon
of the 15th September, in the group around
McClellan I met Judge Key, whom I had not seen since
we parted in the Ohio Senate in April of the preceding
year. He was now aide-de-camp on the headquarters
staff with the rank of colonel, and doing duty also as
judge-advocate. When McClellan directed us to leave
the ridge because the display of numbers attracted the
enemy's fire, Colonel Key took my arm and we walked a
little way down the slope till we found a fallen tree, on
which we sat down, whilst he plunged eagerly into the
history of his own opinions since we had discussed the
causes of the war in the legislature of our State. He
told me with earnestness that he had greatly modified his
views on the subject of slavery, and he was now satisfied

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 355

that the war must end in its abolition. The system was
so plainly the soul of the rebellion and the tie which
bound the seceded States together, that its existence must
necessarily depend upon the success of the revolutionary
movement, and it would be a fair object of attack, if
doing so would help our cause. I was struck by the zeal
with which he dashed into the discussion, forgetful of
his actual surroundings in his wish to make me quickly
understand the change that had come over his views since
we parted at Columbus. He was so absorbed that even
when a shell burst near us, he only half gave it atten-
tion, saying in a parenthetical way that he would change
his position, as he would " rather not be hit in the back
by one of those confounded things." We had been so
sitting that in facing me his back was toward the front
and the line of fire.

Colonel Key has been regarded by many as McClellan's
evil genius, whose influence had been dominant in the
general's political conduct and who was therefore the
cause of his downfall. His influence on McClellan was
unquestionably great, and what he said to me is an im-
portant help in understanding the general's conduct and
opinions. It accords with other statements of his which
have been made public by Judge William M. Dickson of
Cincinnati, who at one time was Colonel Key's partner
in the practice of the law. *

General McClellan urged me to come to his headquar-
ters without ceremony, and after the battle of Antietam
I had several opportunities of unrestrained discussion of
a£fairs in which he seemed entirely frank in giving me
his opinions. It was plainly evident that he was sub-
jected to a^ood deal of pressure by opponents of the
administration to make him commit himself to them.

^ I have failed in my efforts to find a communication on the subject in a
newspaper, written by Judge Dickson, which he showed to me, reiterating
bis statements in it

356 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

On the other hand, Governor Dennison of Ohio, who was
his sincere friend, took every opportunity to counteract
such influences and to promote a good understanding be-
tween him and Mr. Lincoln. McClellan perfectly knew
my own position as an outspoken Republican who from
the first had regarded the system of slavery as the stake
ventured by the Secessionists on their success in the war,
and who held to John Quincy Adams's doctrine that the
war powers were adequate to destroy the institution which
we could not constitutionally abolish otherwise. With
me, the only question v«ras when the ripe time had come
for action, £md I had looked forward to Mr. Lincoln's
proclamation with some impatience at the delay.

The total impression left upon me by the general's
conversation was that he agreed with Colonel Key in
believing that the war ought to end in abolition of slav-
ery ; but he feared the effects of haste, and thought the
steps toward the end should be conservatively careful and
not brusquely radical. I thought, and still think, that
he regarded the President as nearly right m his general
views and political purposes, but overcrowded by more
radical men around him into steps which as yet were
imprudent and extreme. Such an attitude on his part
made Governor Dennison and myself feel that there was
no need of any political quarrel between him and the
administration, and that if he would only rebuff all po-
litical intriguers and put more aggressive energy into his
military operations, his career might be a success for the
country as well as for himself. The portions of his cor-
respondence with Burnside which have become public
show that the latter also bad, as a true friend, constantly
urged him to keep out of political controvers]^ Burnside
himself, like Grant and Sherman, began with a dislike
of the antislavery movement; but, also like them, his
patriotism being the dominant qualify, the natural effect
of fighting the Secessionists was to beget in him a hearty

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 357

acceptance of the policy of emancipation to which Mr.
Lincoln had been led by the same educational process.

At the time I am speaking of, I knew nothing of
McClellan's famous letter to the President from Harri-
son's Landing, of July 7, but since it has come to light, I
have interpreted it much less harshly than many have
done. Reading it in the light of his talk during those
Antietam days, I think it fair to regard it as an effort to
show Mr. Lincoln that they were not far apart in opinion,
and to influence the President to take the more conserva-
tive course to which he thought him inclined when taking
counsel only of his own judgment. McClellan knew that
his " change of base" to the James River in June was not
accepted as the successful strategy he declared it to be,
and that strong influences were at work to remove him.
Under the guise of giving advice to the President, he
was in fact assuring him that he did not look to the
acknowledgment of the Confederacy as a conceivable out-
come of the war; that the "contraband" doctrine applied
to slaves was consistent with compensated emancipation ;
that he favored the application of the principle to the
border States so as to make them free States; that con-
centration of military force as opposed to dispersion of
effort was the true policy; that he opposed the rules of
warfare which he assumed were announced in General
Pope's much criticised orders; and lastly, that he would
cordially serve under such general-in-chief as Mr. Lincoln
should select.

Compare all this with Mr. Lincoln's known views. It
was notorious that he was thought to be too conservative
by many of his own party. He had urged a system of
compensated emancipation for the border States. He had
said that he held the slavery question to be only a part,
and an absolutely subordinate part, of the greater ques-
tion of saving the Union. He had disapproved of a
portion of Pope's order regarding the treatment of

358

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

'■■'■'?ft.

non-combatants. However ill-advised McClellan's letter
was, it may be read between the lines as an attempt to
strengthen himself with the President as against Stanton
and others, and to make his military seat firmer in the
saddle by showing that he was not in political antagonism
to Mr. Lincoln, but held, in substance, the conservative
views that were supposed to be his. Its purpose seems
to me to have been of this personal sort. He did not
publish it at the time, and it was not till he was removed
from his command that it became a kind of political man-
ifesto. This view is supported by what occurred after the
publication of the Emancipation Proclamation, which I
shall tell presently ; but, to preserve the proper sequence,
I must first give another incident.

A few days after the battle of Antietam a prominent
clergyman of Hagerstown spent the Sunday in camp, and
McClellan invited a number of officers to attend religious
services in the parlors of the house where headquarters
were. The rooms were well filled, several civilians being
also present. I was standing by myself as we were wait-
ing for the clergyman to appear, when a stout man in
civilian's dress entered into conversation with me. He
stood at my side as we faced the upper part of the suite of
rooms, and taking it to be a casual talk merely to pass the
time, I paid rather languid attention to it and to him as
he began with some complimentary remarks about the
army and its recent work. He spoke quite enthusias-
tically of McClellan, and my loyalty to my commander
as well as my personal attachment to him made me assent
cordially to what he said. He then spoke of the politi-
cians in Washington as wickedly trying to sacrifice the
general, and added, whispering the words emphatically in
my ear, " But you military men have that matter in your
own hands, you have but to tell the administration what
they must do, and they will not dare to disregard it!"
This roused me, and I turned upon him with a sharp

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 359

"What do you mean, sir!" As I faced him, I saw at
once by his look that he had mistaken me for another;
he mumbled something about having taken me for an
acquaintance of his, and moved away among the company.

I was a good deal agitated, for though there was more
or less of current talk about disloyal influences at work,
I had been sceptical as to the fact, and to be brought face
to face with that sort of thing was a surprise. I was a
stranger to most of those who were there, and walked a
little aside, watching the man who had left me. I soon
saw him talking with General Fitz-John Porter, on the
opposite side of the room, evidently calling attention to
me as if asking who I was. I made inquiries as to who
the civilian was, and later came to know him by sight
very well. He was John W. Garrett, President of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

Mr. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was pub-
lished on the 24th of September, and within a very few
days I was invited to meet General Burnside and Gen-
eral John Cochrane of New York at a camp dinner
in McClellan's tent. General Cochrane was a "War
Democrat" in politics, and had been active as a politician
in his State. He was also the son-in-law of Gerrit
Smith, the well-known abolitionist, and had advocated
arming the slaves as early as November, 1861. McClellan
told us frankly that he had brought us there for the pur-
pose of asking our opinions and advice with regard to the
course he should pursue respecting the Proclamation.
He said that he was urged to put himself in open opposi-
tion to it by politicians not only, but by army officers
who were near to him. He named no names, but inti-
mated that they were of rank and influence which gave
weight to their advice. He knew that we were all friends
of the administration, and his object seemed to be to
learn whether we thought he should say anything or
should maintain silence on the subject; for he assumed

36o REMfMSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

that we would oppose any hostile demonstration on his
part.

This naturally led to inquiries as to his actual attitude
to the slavery question, and he expressed himself in sub-
stance as I have before indicated; repeating with even
stronger emphasis his belief that the war would work out
the manumission of the slaves gradually and ultimately,
and that as to those who came within our lines as we
advanced the liberation would be complete and immedi-
ate. He thought, however, that the Proclamation was
premature, and that it indicated a change in the Presi-
dent's attitude which he attributed to radical influences
at Washington.

There had been no previous understanding between us
who were his guests. For my part, I then met General
Cochrane for the first time, and had conversed with
McClellan himself more freely on political subjects than
I had with Burnside. We found ourselves, however, in
entire accord in advising him that any declaration on his
part against the Proclamation would be a fatal error.
We could easily understand that he should differ from us
in his way of viewing the question of public policy, but
we pointed out very clearly that any public utterance by
him in his official character criticising the civil policy of
the administration would be properly regarded as a usur-
pation. He intimated that this was his own opinion, but,
by way of showing how the matter was thrust at him by
others, said that people had assured him ihat the army
was so devoted to him that they would as one man enforce
any decision he should make as to any part of the war
policy.

I had so recently gone through the little experience on
this subject which I have narrated above, that I here
spoke out with some emphasis. I said that those who
made such assurances were his worst enemies, and in my
judgment knew much less of the army than they pre-

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 36 1

tended; that our volunteer soldiers were citizens as well
as soldiers, and were citizens more than soldiers; and
that greatly as I knew them to be attached to him, I
believed not a corporal's guard would stand by his side
if he were to depart from the strict subordination of the
military to the civil authority. Burnside and Cochrane
both emphatically assented to this, and McClellan added
that he heartily believed both that it was true and that
it ought to be so. But this still left the question open
whether the very fact that there was an agitation in camp
on the subject, and intrigues of the sort I have men-
tioned, did not make it wise for him to say something
which would show, at least, that he gave no countenance
to any would-be revolutionists. We debated this at some
length, with the general conclusion that it might be well
for him to remind the army in general orders that what-
ever might be their rights as citizens, they must as
soldiers beware of any organized effort to meddle with
the functions of the civil government.

I left the Army of the Potomac before McClellan 's
general order on this subject, dated October 7, was pub-
lished, but when I read it in the light of the conference
in his tent, I regarded it as an honest effort on his part to
break through the toils which intriguers had spread for
him, and regretted that what seemed to me one of his
most laudable actions should have been one of the most
misrepresented and misunderstood. ^

^ The order is found in Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 395, and is
as follows ; —

" General Orders. ) Hbad-Quartkrs Army of thk Potomac, Camp nbar

No. 163. ) Sharpsburg, Md., October 7, i86a.

The attention of the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac is
called to General Orders No. 139, War Department, September 24, i86z,
publishing to the army the President's proclamation of September 22.

A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, officially com-
municated to the army, affords to the general commanding an opportunity
of defining specifically to the officers and soldiers under his command the

362

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

I have always understood that the order was drafted by
Colonel Key, who afterward expressed in very strong
terms his confidence in the high motives and progressive
tendencies of McClellan at the time he issued it.

General Cochrane, some time after the close of the war,
in a pamphlet outlining his own military history, made
reference to the visit to McClellan which I have nar-
rated, and states that he was so greatly impressed by the

relation borne by all persons in the military service of the United States
toward the civil authorities of the Government.

The Constitution confides to the civil authorities — legislative, judicial,
and executive — the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing
the Federal laws. Armed forces are raised and supported '.imply to sustain
the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordination theieto in all
respects. This fundamental rule of our political system is essenti.d to the
security of our republican institutions, and should be thoroughly understood
and observed by every soldier. The principle upon which and the object
for which armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion, must be
determined and declared by the civil authorities, and the Chief Executive,
who is charged with the administration of the national affairs, is the proper
and only source through which the needs and orders of the Government can
be made known to the armies of the nation.

Discussions by of&cers and soldiers concerning public xr easures deter-
mined upon and declared by the Government, when carried at all beyond
temperate and respectful expressions of opinion, tend greatly tc impair and
destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops, by substituting the spirit of
political faction for that firm, steady, and earnest support of the authorities
of the Government, which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The
remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the
action of the people at the polls.

In thus calling the attention of this army to the true relation between the
soldier and the government, the general commanding merely adverts to an
evil against which it has been thought advisable during our whole history
to guard the armies of the Republic, and in so doing he will not be con-
sidered by any right-minded person as casting any reflection upon that
loyalty and good conduct which has been so fully illustrated upon so many
battle-fields.

In carrying out all measures of public policy, this army will of course be
guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ''ver controlled
its conduct toward the defenceless.

By Command of Major-General McClellan,

Jas. a. Hardie,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-camp, and Act'g Ass't Adj't Gen'l."

AfcCLELLAN AND POLITICS 363

anti-slavery sentiments avowed by the general, that he
made use of them in a subsequent effort to bring him and
Secretary Chase into more cordial relations.* It is pos-
sible that, in a friendly comparison of views in which we
were trying to find how nearly we could come together,
tne general may have put his opinions with a liberality
which outran his ordinary statements of belief; but I am
very sure that he gave every evidence of sincerity, and
that none of us entertained a doubt of his being entirely
transparent with us. He has since, in his "Own Story,"
referred to his taking counsel of Mr. Aspinwall of New
York at about the same time, and there is evidence that
General W. F. Smith also threw his influence against
any opposition by McClellan to the Emancipation Procla-
mation.* McClellan's letters show that his first impulse
was to antagonism ; but there is no fair reason to doubt
that his action at last was prompted by the reasons
which he avowed in our conversation, and by the honor-
able motives he professed. He immediately sent a copy
of his order to Mr. Lincoln personally, and this indicates
that he believed the President would be pleased with it.

The reference which he made to suggestions that the
army would follow him in a coup d'etat is supported by
what he formally declared in his memoirs. He there
tells us that in 1861 he was often approached in regard to
a "dictatorship," and that when he was finally removed
many in the army were in favor of his marching upon
Washington to take possession of the government.^ It
would seem that treasonable notions were rife about him
to an extent that was never suspected, unless he was
made the dupe of pretenders who saw some profit in what
might be regarded as a gross form of adulation. He
must be condemned for the weakness which made such

* The War for the Union, Memoir by General John Cochrane, pp. 29-31.
' Nicolay and Hay's Lincoln, vol. vi. p. 180.
' Own Story, pp. 85, 652.

364 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

approaches to him possible; but we are obliged to take
the fact as he gives it, and to accept as one of the strange
elements of the situation a constant stream of treasonable
suggestions from professed friends in the army and out
of it. An anecdote which came to me in a way to make
it more than ordinarily trustworthy was that in the sum-
mer of 1861 McClellan was riding with an older officer
of the regular army,* and said to him, "I understand
there is a good deal of talk of making a dictatorship."
"Ah!" said the other, "Mr. Lincoln, I suppose."
"Oh, no," replied McClellan, "it's me they're talking
of." Bits of evidence from many sources prove that
there had been from the first too much such talk about
Washington, and whilst McClellan cannot be held re-
sponsible for it, there is no proof that he rebuked it as
he should have done. It was part of the fermenting
political and military intrigue which is found at the seat
of government in such a time, if anywhere, and I take
satisfaction in testifying that away from that neighbor-
hood I never even heard the thing mentioned or referred
to, that I can recollect. Washington vould be spoken
of in a general way as a place of intrigues, but I never
knew this to have a wider meaning given to it than the
ordinary one of political schemes within lawful limits
and personal ambitions of no criminal character.

Mr. Lincoln visited our cimp on the ist of October,
and remained two or three days. 1 was with the party of
officers invited by McClellan to accompany the President
in a ride over the route which Sumner had followed in
the battle. We crossed the Antietam in front of Keedys-
ville, followed the hollows and byways to the East
Wood, and passed through this and the cornfields which
had been the scene of Hooker's and Mansfield's fierce
fighting. We visited the Dunker Church and then re-
turned to camp by Bloody Lane and the central stone

» General McCall.

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 365

bridge. The President was observant and keenly inter-
ested in the field of battle, but made no display of sen-
timent. On another day he reviewed the troops which
were most accessible from headquarters. As my own
corps was among the first on the list, I did not join the
escort of the President at the general's quarters, but was
with the troops attending to the details of the parade.
We were ordered to be under arms at eight o'clock, but
it was more than two hours after that when the reviewing
cortege came on the ground. The officers were very
hilarious over some grotesque story with which Mr.
Lincoln had seasoned the conversation, and which seemed
to have caused some forgetfulness of the appointment
with the troops. We were reviewed by divisions, and I
met the party with my staff, riding down the lines with
them, and answering the inquiries of the President and
the general as to the history and the experience of the
different organizations as we passed them. The usual
march in review was omitted for lack of time, the Presi-
dent contenting himself with riding along the lines
formed in parade. I had missed seeing the President in
Washington when I paid my respects at the White
House, and this was my first meeting with him after
his inauguration. His unpretending cordiality was what
first impressed one, but you soon saw with what sharp
intelligence and keen humor he dealt with every subject
which came up. He referred very pleasantly to his
knowledge of me through Secretary Chase, showing the
kindly instinct to find some compliment or evidence of
recognition for all who approached him.

This geniality in Mr. Lincoln made him avoid per-
sonal criticism of the campaign, and gave an air of
earnest satisfaction to what he said of the work done by
McClellan. There was enough to praise, and he praised
It heartily. He was also thankful that the threatened
invasion of the North had been defeated, and showed his

366 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sense of great relief. He had adopted the rule for him-
self to limit his direct influence upon his generals to the
presentation of his ideas of what was desirable, often
taking pains even in his written communications to say
that he made no order, and left the definite direction to
General Halleck. McClellan gave the most favorable
interpretation to all that the President said, but could
not ignore the anxiety Mr. Lincoln showed that an ener-
getic campaign should be continued. He wrote home:
"I incline to think that the real purpose of his visit is to
push me into a premature advance into Virginia." ^

The President had coupled his earliest telegraphic
congratulations with the question, "Can't you beat them
some more before they get off.!*" and McClellan's pri-
vate correspondence shows that he, on his part, chafed at
every suggestion of haste. As early as the 22d of Sep-
tember, the general had written that he looked upon the
campaign as substantially ended, and intended to give
some time to the reorganization of the army before
beginning a new one. The vicinity of Harper's Ferry
or Frederick seemed to him the proper place for the
camp meanwhile, and he wished for a rise in the Potomac
River which should make it impracticable for Lee to ford
it again. He delayed in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg,
waiting for this. To those of us with whom he talked
freely, he spoke of the necessity of incorporating into the
Army of the Potomac at least a hundred thousand of the
new levies to make it really fit for an aggressive cam-
paign, and argued that it would save time in the end to
use some of it now in the work of reorganizing.

Mr. Lincoln was plainly troubled with the apprehen-
sion that the delays of 1861 were to be repeated, and
that the fine October weather of that region would be
again wasted and nothing done till the next spring.
There were men enough about him at Washington to

■m »0. S.,p.6s4.

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS

1^7

remind him of this in irritating ways, and to make him
realize that as he had personally restored McClellan to
the command he would be personally responsible for
keeping him moving. McClellan rightly understood Mr.
Lincoln's visit as meaning this. He did not refuse to
move ; on the other hand, he professed to be anxious to
do so at the earliest moment when it should be really
practicable. His obstinacy was of a feminine sort. He
avoided open antagonism which would have been a hal-
lenge of strength, but found constantly fresh obstacles in
the way of doing what he was determined from the first
not to do. The need of clothing for the men and of
horses for the cavalry was a fruitful subject for debate,
and the debate, if sufficiently prolonged, would itself
accomplish the delay that was desired.

The official correspondence shows that the President
went back to Washington determined to cut the knot in
a peremptory way, if he was forced to do so. McClellan
could not have been blind to this. His private letters
show that he thought it not improbable that he would be
relieved from command. His desire for military success
was a ruling one with him on both public and private
grounds. We are forced, therefore, to conclude that he
actually lacked faith in success, and regarded the cross-
ing of the Potomac as too perilous until he should re-
organize the army with the additional hundred thousand
recruits. In this we see the ever-recurring effect of his
exaggeration of the enemy's force. We now know that
this over-estimate was inexcusable, but we cannot deny
that he made it, nor, altogether, that he believed in it.
It constituted a disqualification for such a command, and
led to what must be regarded as the inevitable result, —
his removal. The political questions connected with the
matter cut no important figure in it. If he had had faith
in his ability to conquer Lee's army, we should never

have heard of them.

«/

368 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

W i)ilst I mean what I say in speaking of McClellan's
exaggeration of his enemy as constituting incompetence
for such a command, it has reference to the necessity in
which we were that our army should be aggressively
handled. Few men could excel him in strictly defensive
operations. He did not lack personal courage, nor did
his intellectual powers become obscured in the excite-
ment of actual war. He showed the ordinary evidences
of presence of mind and coolness of judgment under fire.
His tendency to see his enemy doubled in force was,
however, a constitutional one, and no amount of experi-
ence seemed to cure it. Had it not been so he would
have devised checks upon the reports of his secret-
service agents, and corrected their estimates by those
more reliable methods which I have already spoken of.
McClellan was, even in those days, often compared to
Marshal Daun, whose fair ability but studiously defen-
sive policy was so in contrast with the daring strategy
of the great Frederick. The comparison was a fair one.
The trouble was that we had need of a Frederick.

It may seem strange that his subordinates so generally
accepted his view and supported him in his conduct; but
it was a natural result of forces always at work in an
army. The old maxim that "Councils of war never
fight " is only another way of saying that an army is
never bolder than its leader. It is the same as the old
Greek proverb, " Better an army of deer with a lion for
leader, than an army of lions with a deer for leader."
The body of men thus organized relies upon its chief for
the knowledge of the enemy and for the plan by which
the enemy is to be taken at a disadvantage. It will
courageously carry out his plans so long as he has faith
in them himself and has good fortune in their execu-
tion. Let doubt arise as to either of these things and
his troops raise the cry "We are sacrificed," "We are
slaughtered uselessly." McClellan's arts of military

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 369

popularity were such that his army accepted his estimate
of the enemy, and believed (in the main) that he had
shown great ability in saving them from destruction in a
contest at such odds. They were inclined, therefore, to
hold the government at Washington responsible for sac-
rificing them by demanding the impossible. Under such
circumstances nothing but a cautious defensive oolicy
could be popular with officers or men. If McClellan's
data were true, he and they were right. It would have
been folly to cross the Potomac and, with their backs to
the river, fight a greatly superior enemy. Because the
data were not true there was no solution for the problem
but to give the army another commander, and painfully
to undo the military education it had for a year been
receiving. The process of disillusion was a slow one.
The disasters to Burnside and Hooker strengthened the
error. Meade's standstill after Gettysburg was very
like McClellan's after Antietam, and Mr. Lincoln had
to deal with it in a very similar way. When Grant took
command the army expected him to have a similar fate,
and his reputation was treated as of little worth because
he had not yet "met Bobby Lee." His terrible method
of " attrition " was a fearfully costly one, and the flower
of that army was transferred from the active roster to the
casualty lists before the prestige of its enemy was broken. ^

But it was broken, and Appomattox came at last. /?»

It will not do to say that the Confederate army in < '
Virginia was in any sense superior to their army in the
West. When the superior force of the National army
was systematically applied, General Lee was reduced to
as cautious a defensive in Virginia as was General John-
ston in Georgia. Longstreet and Hood had no better
success when transferred to the West than the men who
had never belonged to the Army of Virginia. In fact,
it was with Joseph E. Johnston as his opponent that
McClellan's career was chiefly run. Yet the Confederate

VOL. I. — 24

370 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

army in the West was broken at Donelson and at Vicks-
burg. It was driven from Stone's River to Chattanooga,
and from Missionary Ridge to Atlanta. Its remnant was
destroyed at Franklin and Nashville, and Sherman's
March to the Sea nearly completed the traverse of the
whole Confederacy. His victorious army was close in
rear of Petersburg when Richmond was finally won.
Now that we have got rid of the fiction that the Confed-
erate government gave to Lee an enormously larger army
than it gave to Bragg or to Joseph Johnston, we have to
account for the fact that with much less odds in their
favor our Western army accomplished so much more. As
a military objective Richmond was in easier reach from
the Potomac than Nashville from the Ohio. From Nash-
ville to Chattanooga was fully as difficult a task. The
vulnerable lines of communication multiplied in length
as we went southward, and made the campaign of Atlanta
more difficult still. Vicksburg was a harder nut to crack
than Richmond. We must put away our esprit de corps,
and squarely face the problem as one of military art
with the official reports and returns before us. Our
Western army was of essentially the same material as the
Eastern. Regiments from nearly all the States were
mingled in both. Wisconsin men fought beside those
\ from Maine in the Army of the Potomac, as men who

had fought at Antietam and at Gettysburg followed Sher-
man through the Carolinas. The difference was not in
the rank and file, it was not in the subordinates. It was
the difference in leadership and in the education of the
armies under their leaders during their first campaigns.
That mysterious thing, the morale of an army, grows out
of its belief as to what it can do. If it is systematically
taught that it is hopelessly inferior to its adversary, it
will be held in check by a fraction of its own force. The
general who indoctrinates his army with the belief that it
is required by its government to do the impossible, may

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS

371

preserve his popularity with the troops and be received
with cheers as he rides down the line, but he has put any
great military success fr.r beyond his reach. In this
study of military morale, its causes and its effects, the
history of the Army of the Potomac is one of the most
important and one of the gravest lessons the world has
ever seen.

I have to confess that at Antietam I shared, more or
less fully, the opinions of those among whom I was. I
accepted McClellan as the best authority in regard to the
enemy's numbers, and, assuming that he was approxi-
mately right in that, the reasonable prudence of waiting
for reinforcements could not be denied. I saw that he
had lost valuable time in the movements of the cam-
paign, but the general result seemed successful enough
to hide this for the time at least. My own experience,
therefore, supports the conclusion I have already stated,
that an army's enterprise is measured by its commander's,
and, by a necessary law, the army reflects his judgment
as to what it can or cannot accomplish.

Mr. Lincoln had told McClellan during his visit to the
army that his great fault was " overcautiousness. " He
had intimated plainly enough that he must insist upon
the continuance of the campaign. He had discussed the
plans of advance, and urged McClellan to operate upon
Lee's communications by marching south on the east
side of the Blue Ridge. He had disclaimed any purpose
of forcing a movement before the army was ready, but
saw no reason why it should take longer to get ready
after Antietam than after Pope's last battle. Soon after
his return to Washington, Halleck sent a peremptory
order to McClellan to cross the Potomac.^ It was dated
October 6th, and said : " The President directs that you
cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive
him South. Your army must move now while the roads

1 O. R., vol. xix, pt. i. p. 10.

372 REAfimSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAH

are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and
Washington, and cover the latter by your line of opera-
tions, you can be reinforced with 30,cxx> men. If you
move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than
12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President
advises the interior line between Washington and the
enemy, but does not order it." It also required him to
report immediately which line he adopted. Halleck, as
General-in-chief, ought to have given his own decision
as to the line of operations, but his characteristic inde-
cision was shown in failing to do so. He did not even
express an opinion as to the relative merits of the two
lines, and limited himself to his concurrence in the order
to move in one way or the other.

McClellan replied on the 7th,^ saying that he had
determined to adopt the Shenandoah line, though he
wished to "state distinctly" that he should only use that
line till the enemy should retire beyond Winchester, as
he did not expect to be able to supply his army more
than twenty or twenty-five miles beyond a railway or
canal depot. If the enemy retreated, he would adopt
some new and decisive line of operations. He objected
to the interior line because it did not cover Maryland and
Pennsylvania from a return of Lee's army, and because
(as he said) the army could not be supplied by it. He
indicated three days as the time within which he could
move. At the end of that time he complained of still
lacking clothing. On the 12th he found it "absolutely
necessary " that the cavalry should have more horses.
The discussion over these things ran on till the 21st.

Mr. Lincoln made a strong effort to save McClellan
from the effects of his mental deficiencies. He ex-
hausted advice and exhortation. He even ventured upon
mild raillery on the idleness of the army. On the 13th
he had written a remarkable letter to McClellan, in

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. II.

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 373

which he reminded him of what had occurred between
them at the Antietam and argued in favor of the interior
line A movement.* He showed that Lee at Winchester
supplied his army twice as far from his railway depot as
McCIellan thought possible for the Army of the Potomac.
Wk". urged the recognized advantage of operating by a
line which attacked the enemy's communications. He
pointed out that if Lee should try to cross the Potomac,
our army could be in his rear and should destroy him.
He showed that McCIellan at Harper's Ferry was nearer
to Richmond than Lee: "His route is the arc of a
circle of which yours is the chord." He analyzed the
map and showed that the interior line was the easier for
supplying the army : " The chord line, as you see,
carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg,
and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the
Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from
Washington." He even gave the figures in miles from
gap to gap in the mountains, which would enable
McCIellan to strike the enemy in flank or rear; and this
was of course to be done if Lee made a stand. " It is all
easy," his letter concluded, " if our troops march as well
as the enemy ; and it is unmanly to say they cannot do
it." Yet he expressly disclaimed making his letter an
order. ^

As a mere matter of military comprehension and judg-
ment of the strategic situation, the letter puts Mr.
Lincoln head and shoulders above both his military sub-
ordinates. Halleck saw its force, but would not order it
to be carried out. McCIellan shrank from the decisive
vigor of the plan, though he finally accepted it as the
means of getting the larger reinforcements. On the 2ist

• O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 13.

* Since writing this, I have had occasion to treat this subject more fully,
as bearing upon Mr, Lincoln's military judgment and intelligence, in a review
of Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, "The Nation," Nov. 24, Dec. i, 1898,

374 RElUlNlSCEf/CES OF THE CIVIL WAK

of October the discussion of cavalry horses was pretty
well exhausted, and McClellan telegraphed Hallcck * that
in other respects he was nearly ready to move, and
inquires whether the President desired him to march on
the enemy at once or to wait the arrival of the new
horses. Halleck answered that the order of the 6th
October remained unchanged. "If you have not been
and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able
to show such want of ability. The President does not
expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all
this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity.
Telegraph when you will move and on what lines you
propose to march." This dispatch was plainly a notice
to McClellan that he would be held responsible for the
failure to obey the order of the 6th unless he could exon-
erate himself by showing that he could not obey it. In
his final report, however, he says that he treated it as
authority to decide for himself whether or not it was
possible to move with safety to the army;* "and this
responsibility," he says, "I exercised with the more con-
fidence in view of the strong assurance of his trust in me,
as commander of that army, with which the President
had seen fit to honor me during his last visit." Argu-
ment is superfluous, in view of the correspondence, to
show that orders and exhortations were alike wasted.

The movement began in the last days of October, the
Sixth Corps, which was in the rear, crossing the Potomac
on the 2d of November. McClellan had accepted Mr.
Lincoln's plan, but lack of vigor in its execution broke
down the President's patience, and on the 5th of Novem-
ber, upon Lee's recrossing the Blue Ridge without a
battle, he ordered the general to turn over the command
to Burnside, as he had declared he would do if Lee's was
allowed to regain the interior line. The order was pre-
sented and obeyed on the 7th, and McClellan left the

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 81. » /Ud.

McCLELLAN AND POLITICS.

375

army. The fallen general brooded morbidly over it all
for twenty years, and then wrote his "Own Story," a
most curious piece of self-exposure, in which he uncon-
sciously showed that the illusions which had misguided
him in his campaigns were still realities to him, and that
he had made no use of the authentic facts which Con-
federate as well as National records had brought within
his reach. He had forgotten much, but he had learned
nothing.

CHAPTER XVIII

PERSONAL RELATIONS OF McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND

PORTER

Intimacy of McClellan and Burnside — Private letters in the official files —
Bumside's mediation — His self-forgetful devotion — The movement to
join Pope — Burnside forwards Porter's dispatches — His double refusal
of the command — McClellan suspends the organization of wings — His
relations to Porter — Lincoln's letter on the subject — Fault-finding with
Burnside — Whose work? — Bumside's appearance and bearing in the
field.

McCLELLAN and Burnside had been classmates at
West Point, and had been associated in railway
employment after they had left the army, in the years
immediately before the war. The intimacy which began
at the Academy had not only continued, but they had
kept up the demonstrative boyish friendship which made
their intercourse like that of brothers. They were " Mac"
and " Burn" to each other when I knew them, and al-
though Fitz-John Porter, Hancock, Parker, Reno, and
Pleasonton had all been members of the same class, the
two seemed to be bosom friends in a way totally different
from their intimacy with the others. Probably there was
no one outside of his own family to whom McClellan
spoke his secret thoughts in his letters, as he did to
Burnside. The characteristic lack of system in business
which was very noticeable in Burnside, made him negli-
gent, apparently, in discriminating between official letters
and private ones, and so it happens that there. are a num-
ber in the official records which were never meant to reach
the public. They show, however, as nothing else could.

McCLELLAN, BURNSWE, AND PORTER 377

the relations which the two men sustained to each other,
ant! reveal strong traits in the characters of both.

After Burnside had secured his first success in the
Roanoke expedition, he had written to McClollan, then
in the midst of his campaign of the peninsula, and this
was McClellan's reply on the 21st of May, 1862:* —

" My Dear Burn, — Your dispatch and kind letter received.
I have instructed Seth [Williams] to reply to the official letter, and
now acknowledge the kind private note. It always does me good,
in the midst of my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched old
scrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend with, but have met
them with a good heart, liki: >our good old self, and have thus far
sUiiggled through successfrlly. ... I feel very proud of York-
town : it and Manassas will be my brightest chaplets in history, for
I know that I accomplished everything in both places by pure mili-
tary skill. I am very proud, and very grateful to God that he
allowed me to purchase such great success at so trifling a loss of
life. . . . The crisis cannot long be deferred. I pray for Gcd's
blessing on our arms, and rely far niore on his goodness than I do
on my own poor intellect. I sometimes think, now, that I can
almost realize that Mahomet was sincere. When I see the hand
of God guarding one so weak as myself, I can almost think myself
a chosen instrument to carry out his schemes. Would that a better
man had been selected. . . Good-bye and God bless you, Bum.
With the sincere hope that we may soon shake hands, I am, as
ever.

Your sincere friend, McClellan."

When McClellan reached the James River after the
seven days' battles, the first suggestion as to reinforcing
him was that Burnside should bring to his aid the bulk of
his little army in North Carolina. This was determined
upon, and the Ninth Corps was carried by sea to Fortress
Monroe. As soon as the movement was started, Burnside
hastened in advance to Washington, and on returning to
the fortress wrote McClellan as follows:* —

* O. R., vol ix. p 392.

2 O. S., p. 472-

378 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

"Old Point, July 15, 1862.
My dear Mac, — I have just arrived from Washington, and
have not time to get ready to go up this morning, but will to-mor-
row. I 've much to say to you and am very anxious to see you.
. . . The President has ordered me to remain here for the present,
and when I asked him how long, he said five or six days. I don't
know what it means ; but I do know, my dear Mac, that you have
lots of enemies. But you must keep cool ; don't allow them to
provoke you into a quarrel. You must come out all right ; I *11 tell

you all to-morrow.

Your old friend, Burn."

He went up the river to Harrison's Landing and stayed
a couple of days, consulting with McClellan as to the
situation. He returned to Old Point Comfort on the
1 8th, and immediately telegraphed to the War Depart-
ment for leave to go to Washington and present the
results of his conference with McClellan.^ This was
granted, and he again presented himself before the Pres-
ident and Secretary Stanton as the friend of McClellan.
He urged the increase of McClellan's army to an extent
which would make the general resume the aggressive
with confidence. Halleck visited McClellan at once after
assuming command as general-in-chief, but satisfied him-
self that the government could not furnish the thirty
thousand additional troops which McClellan then de-
manded. ^ This led to the decision to bring the Army of
the Potomac back by water, and to unite it with Pope's
army on the Rappahannock.

On this visit to Washington the President and Secre-
tary of War had offered to Burnside himself the command
of the Army of the Potomac. He had refused it, earnestly
asserting his faith that McClellan was much fitter for the
command than he, and trving hard to restore confidence
and a mutual good understanding between his friend and
the government. He was discouraged at the result, and

O. R., vol. xi, pt. ill p. 326. " Id., p. 337.

McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER

379

after he returned to his command wrote a letter, every
line of which shows his sadness and his disinterested
friendship, for he does not mention, much less take credit
to himself for, the refusal to supersede his friend.^

" Fort Monroe, Aug. 2, 1862.
My dear Mac, — I 'm laid up with a lame leg, and besides am
much worried at the decision they have chosen to make in regard
to your army. From the moment I reached Washington I feared
it would be so, and I am of the opinion that your engineers ' had
much to do with bringing about the determination. When the
conclusion was arrived at. I was the only one who advocated your
forward movement. I speak now as if a positive decision had
been arrived at, which I do not know, and you of course do ; my
present orders indicate it. But you know what they are and all
about it, so I will accept it as something that is ordered for the
best. Let us continue to give our undivided support to the cause
and all will be well. It looks dark sometimes, but a just God will
order everything for the best. We can't expect to have it all as
we wish. I 'm off for my destination, and will write you a long
letter from there. The troops are nearly all embarked. Good-
bye. God bless you !

Your old friend, A. E. Burnside."

Burnside was sent with the Ninth Corps to Falmouth
on the Rappahannock. Porter's corps joined him there,
and both the corps were sent forward to Warrenton to
join Pope. When Pope's communication with Wash-
ington was cut, it was only through Burnside that the
government could hear of him for several days, and in
response to the calls for news he telegraphed copies of
Porter's dispatches to him. Like McClellan's private
letters, these dispatches told more of the writer's mind
and heart than would willingly have been made public.

* O. S., p. 472.

^ This hints at General Barnard's unfavorable criticisms of McClellan's
management, which led to a request by the latter to have another officer
^signed as chief engineer. See Halleck to McClellan, Aug. 7, 1862. O. R,
vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 359.

38o

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Burnside's careless outspoken frankness as to his own
opinions was such that he probably did not reflect what
reticences others might wish to have made. Perhaps he
also thought that Porter's sarcasms on Pope, coming from
one who had gained much reputation in the peninsula,
would be powerful in helping to reinstate McClellan.
At any rate, the dispatches were the only news from the
battle-field he could send the President in answer to his
anxious inquiries, and he sent them. They were the
cause of Mr. Lincoln's request to McClellan, on Septem-
ber I St, that he would write Porter and other friends
begging them to give Pope loyal support. They were
also the most damaging evidence against Porter in his
subsequent court-martial.

Before the Maryland campaign began, Mr. Lincoln
again urged upon Burnside the command of the army,
and he again declined, warmly advocating McClellan's
retention as before. * His advocacy was successful, as I
have already stated,* The arrangement that Burnside
and Sumner were to command wings of the army of
at least two corps each, was made before we left Wash-
ington, and Burnside's subordinates. Hooker and Reno,
were, by direction of the President, assigned to corps
commands through orders from army headquarters.^
McClellan did not publish to the Army of the Potomac
this assignment of Burnside and Sumner till the 14th of
September, though it had been acted upon from the be-
ginning of the campaign.* On the evening of the same
day Porter's corps joined the army at South Mountain,
and before the advance was resumed on the following
morning, the order was again suspended and Burnside
reduced to the command of a single corps.* I have
already suggested Hooker's relation to this, and only

» c. W., vol. i. p. 650.

» O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. i88, 197.

6 Id., p. 297.

2 Ante., p. 257.
« /</., p. 290.

McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER

381

note at this point the coincidence, if it was nothing
more, that the first evidence of any change in McClellan's
friendship toward Burnside occurs within a few hours
from Porter's arrival, and in connection with a complaint
made by the latter.

McClellan and Burnside had slept in the same house
the night after the battle of South Mountain. Porter
seems to have joined them there. During the evening
McClellan dictated his orders for the movements of
the 15th which were communicated to the army in the
morning. That Porter should be unfriendly to Burnside
was not strange, for it had by this time become known
that the dispatches of August 27th to 30th were relied upon
by General Pope's friends to show Porter's hostile and
insubordinate spirit in that campaign. The court-martial
was still impending over Porter, and he had been allowed
to take the field only at McClellan's special request.
Although Burnside had not dreamed of doing Porter an
ill service, his transmittal of the dispatches to the Presi-
dent had made them available as evidence, and Porter, not
unnaturally, held him responsible for part of his peril.
The sort of favoritism which McClellan showed to Porter
was notorious in the army. Had the position of chief of
staff been given him, it would have sanctioned his per-
sonal influence without offending the self-respect of other
general officers; but that position was held by General
Marcy, the father-in-law of McClellan, and Porter's mani-
fest power at headquarters consequently wore the air of
discourtesy toward others. The incident I have narrated
of the examination '^^ Lee's position at Sharpsburg from
the ridge near Pry's house was an example of this. It
was Porter who in the presence of the commandants of
the wings of the army was invited by McClellan to con-
tinue the examination when the others were sent below
the crest of the hill. Governor Sprague testified before
the Committee on the Conduct of the War to the notoriety

382 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of this from the beginning of the peninsular campaign
and to the bad feeling it caused.^ General Rosecrans
testified that in the winter of 1861-62, on his visit to
Washington, he found that Porter was regarded as the
confidential adviser of McClellan.* It was matter of com-
mon fame, too well known to be questioned by anybody
who served in that army. Mr. Lincoln had discussed it
to some extent in his correspondence with McClellan in
the month of May, and had warned the general of the
mischiefs likely to ensue, even whilst authorizing pro-
visional corps to be organized for Porter and Franklin.
He had used such exceptional plainness as to say to the
general ' that " it is looked upon as merely an effort to
pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade
their supposed rivals. The commanders of these corps
are of course the three highest officers with you, but I
am constantly told that you have no consultation or com-
munication with them ; that you consult and communi-
cate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and
perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints
are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should
know of their existence."

McClellan's dealing with the division of the army into
wings was part of the same persistent method of thwart-
ing the purpose of the administration while ostensibly
keeping the letter. It was perfectly easy to advance
from South Mountain upon Sharpsburg, keeping Sum-
ner's and Burnside's commands intact. The intermin-
gling of them was unnecessary at the beginning, and was
mischievous during the battle of Antietam. No military
reason can be given for it, and the history of the whole
year makes it plain that the reasons were personal.

The offer of the command of the army to Burnside,
though refused, was a sufficiently plain designation of

1 C. W., vol. i. p. 566. a /</., vol. vi. (Rosecrans) p. 14.

■ O. R., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 154.

AfcCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER 383

McClellan's successor in case he should be relieved or be
disabled. It needed a more magnanimous nature than
McClellan's proved to be, to bear the obligation of Burn-
side's powerful friendship in securing for him again the
field command of the army. When he was in personal
contact with Burnside, the transparent sincerity of the
latter's friendship always brought McClellan to his better
self, and to the eye of an observer they were as cordially
intimate as they had ever been. Yet unfriendly things
which had been done officially could not easily be undone,
and the friendship was maintained by the subordinate
condoning the sins against it. Hooker was allowed to
separate himself from Burnside's command on the morn-
ing of the 15th, against the protest of his commander; the
order announcing the assignment of the wing command
was suspended and was never renewed, though McClellan
afterward gave Burnside temporary command of several
corps when detached from the rest of the army.

Burnside spent several hours with his chief on Monday
morning (15th), and was disturbed and grieved at the
course things had taken. It is possible that his pre-
occupation of mind made him neglect the prompt issue
of orders for moving the Ninth Corps, though I know
nothing definite as to this.^ Porter's corps was to follow
us through Fox's Gap, and when his head of column
came up the mountain at noon, we certainly were not in
motion. My own division was the rear one of the column
that day, by way of change, as I had had the advance all
the way from Washington. General Porter reported at
McClellan's headquarters that the movement of his troops
was obstructed by Burnside's, and got at his own special

* My own recollection is that part of the corps had marched without ra-
tions on the preceding day, and had sent back during the night for them.
Burnside took the responsibility of allowing the corps to wait until these
sopplies came and the men could be fed before marching again. It will be
remembered that McClellan made no effort to bring on an engagement that
day, nor during the whole of the next day.

384

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

request an order to push by them.^ The written order
Porter preserved, and put upon it an endorsement adding
to what it contains the accusation that " Burnside's corps
was not moving three hours after the hour designated for
him."* No doubt there was many a delay in that cam-
paign in divers corps. The significant thing in this one
was the pains taken to " make a record " of it against
Burnside, and the inclusion in this of unofficial matter by
means of the endorsement.

On the i6th another vexatious incident of a similar
character occurred. After McClellan's reconnoitring on
our left, he orally directed that the divisions of the Ninth
Corps should be moved to positions designated by mem-
bers of his staff. When Burnside had taken his position
on a hill-top from which the positions could be seen and
the movement accurately directed, another staff officer
from McClellan came and requested that the movement
be delayed for further consideration by the commanding
general. It was this that occasioned a halt and our sub-
sequent march in the dusk of evening, as has been nar-
rated in its place. That evening the following note
was written at McClellan's headquarters, but it was not
delivered to Burnside till the next day, the day of the
battle:* —

" Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
September i6, 1862.

Major-General Burnside, Commanding Ninth Corps, etc.

General, — The General commanding has learned that although
your corps was ordered to be in a designated position at 12 m.
to-day, at or near sunset only one division and four batteries had
reached the ground intended for your troops. The general has
also been advised that there was a delay of some four hours in the
movement of your command yesterday. I am instructed to call
upon you for explanations of these failures on your part to comply
with the orders given you, and to add, in view of the important

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 296.

» Id., p. 308.

a Ibid.

McCLELLAN, BURNSIDEy AND PORTER

385

military operations now at hand, the commanding general can-
not lightly regard such marked departure from the tenor of his
instructions.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

i»

Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-camp, and Act'g Ass't Adj! Gen!

To this missive Burnside dictated the following answer
on the field during the battle : ^ —

" Headquarters, September 17, 1862.

Brig. Gen. S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General.

General, — Your dispatch of yesterday this moment received.
General Burnside directs me to say that immediately upon the receipt
of the order of the general commanding, which was after twelve
o'clock, he ordered his corps to be in readiness to march, and in-
stead of having Captain Duane * post the divisions in detail, and
at the suggestion of Captain Duane, he sent three aides to ascer-
tain the position of each of the three divisions, that they might
post them. These aides returned shortly before three o'clock, and
they immediately proceeded to post the three columns. The gen-
eral then went on an eminence above these positions to get a good
view of them, and whilst there, during the progress of the move-
ment of his corps, an aide from General McClellan came to him
and said that General McClellan was not sure that the proper posi-
tion had been indicated, and advised him not to hasten the move-
ment until the aide had communicated with the general command-
ing. He (General Burnside) at once went to General McClellan's
headquarters to inform him that he had seen large bodies of the
enemy moving off to the right. Not finding the general command-
ing, General Burnside returned to his command, and the move-
ment was resumed and continued as rapidly as possible. General
Burnside directs me to say that he is sorry to have received so
severe a rebuke from the general commanding, and particularly
sorry that the general commanding feels that his instructions have
not been obeyed ; but nothing can occur to prevent the general

^ 0. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 314.

' Captain Duane was senior engineer officer in the field, on the stafi of
McClellan, and had conducted the reconnoitring o£ the Antietam.
VOL. I. — 25

386 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

from continuing his hearty co-operation to the best of his ability

in any movement the general commanding may direct.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient

servant,

Lewis Richmond,

Assistant Adjutant-General."

The answer was of course conclusive, but it leaves the
difficult problem, how came the reprimand to be written
which General McClellan could not have dictated, as tht
interruption of Burns ide's movement was caused by a
message from himself? The blank for the name cf a
staff officer who was to sign it, and the indication of nis
rank and position point to Lieutenant-Colonel James A.
Hardie as the one for whom it was prepared, but Colonel
Hardie must have demurred to signing it, since Colonel
Richmond's answer implies that General Seth Williams's
name was finally attached. All of us who knew General
Williams and his methods of doing business will be slow
to believe that he volunteered a paper of that kind. He
afterward served on Burnside's own staff and had his
confidence. The responsibility must fall upon General
Marcy, the chief of staff, and most of the officers of that
army will be likely to conclude that he also would act
only by the direction of McClellan or of some one whom
he regarded as having decisive authority to speak for him
in his absence.

I have already referred to an error contained in General
Porter's report of the battle of Antietam, where he says
that " Morell's division in reporting to General Burnside
relieved his corps, which was at once recalled from its
position in front of Antietam bridge."* I mention it
again only to say that since this was not only contrary to
the fact, but is unsupported by the records, to accept it
and to embody it in his official report certainly indicates
no friendly disposition toward Burnside. To that extent

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 339.

McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER

387

it supports any other circumstances which point to Porter
as the hostile influence which becomes so manifest at
McClellan's headquarters after the 14th of September.

I know by many expressions uttered by Burnside dur-
ing those days and afterward, that though he was deeply
grieved at some things which had occurred, he did not
waver in his loyal friendship to McClellan. He uttered
no unkind word in regard to him personally, either then
or ever in my hearing. He sometimes spoke of what he
believed to be mischievous influences about McClellan
and which he thought were too powerful with him, but
was earnest and consistent in wishing for him the per-
manent command of that army till success should give a
glorious end to the war. It was after the irritating inci-
dents I have narrated that the visit to McClellan to dine
with him occurred, and I saw them frequently together
till I left the army on the 5th of October. Their man-
ner toward each other was more than cordial, it was
affectionately intimate. Burnside never mentioned to
me, although I was next him in command, the reprimand
which is copied above. His real unwillingness to su-
persede McClellan, even when the final order came in
November, is abundantly attested. McClellan only by
degrees gave outward evidence of the souring of his own
feelings toward Burnside, but his private letters show
that the process began with the battle of South Mountain.
By the time that he wrote his final report in the latter
part of 1863 it had advanced far enough to warp his
memory of the campaign and to make him try to transfer
to Burnside the responsibility for some of his mishaps.
When his "Own Story" was written, the process was
complete, and no kindly remembrance dictated a word
which could give any indication of the friendship that
had died.

Those who are not familiar with the customs of mili-
tary service might see little significance in the fact that

388 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the fault-finding with Burnside was put in the form of
official communications which thus became part of the
permanent documentary history of the war. To military
men, however, it would be almost conclusive proof of a
settled hostility to him, formally calling his military
character in question in a way to make it tell against
him for ulterior purposes. Nothing is more common in
an active campaign than for a commanding officer to send
messages hurrying the movement of a part of his army
These are usually oral, and even when delays are com-
plained of, the commander, in the interests of cordial co-
operation and cheerful alacrity, awaits a full opportunity
for personal explanation from his immediate subordinates
before administering a reprimand. It goes without say-
ing that where intimate friendship exists, still more
delicate consideration is used. To send such a letter as
that of September i6th, and in the course of such deliber-
ate movements as were McClellan's during those days,
would be scarcely conceivable unless there had been a
formal breach of personal relations, and it was equivalent
to notice that they were henceforth to deal at arm's-length
only.

McClellan's " Own Story " shows that in regard to the
alleged delay on the morning of the iSth, he had a per-
sonal explanation from Burnside.* Yet in the night of
the 1 6th the same querulous inquiry was repeated as if
it had not been answered, with the addition of the new
complaint of a delay on the i6th which was caused by
McClellan's personal request, and the whole accompanied
by so formal a reprimand that the ordinary reply to it
would have been a demand for a court of inquiry. The
occurrence was unexampled in that campaign and stands
entirely alone, although McClellan's memoirs show that
he alleged delays in other cases, notably in Hooker's
march that same afternoon to attack the enemy, of which

1 o. s., p. 586.

McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER 389

no recorded notice was taken.* Considering the personal
relations of the men before that time, and as I myself
witnessed them from day to day afterward, it is simply
incredible that McClellan dictated the letters which went
from his headquarters.

Before ending the discussion of matters personal to
these officers I will say a few words regarding Burnside's
appearance and bearing in the field. He was always a
striking figure, and had a dashing way with him which
incited enthusiasm among his soldiers. Without seem-
ing to care for his costume, or even whilst affecting a
little carelessness, there was apt to be something pictur-
esque about him. He had a hearty and jovial manner, a
good-humored cordiality toward everybody, that beamed
in his face as he rode through the camps or along the
lines. When not on parade, he often discarded his uni-
form coat, wearing a light undress jacket, with no indica-
tion of his rank except the yellow silk sash about his
waist which showed that he was a general officer. On one
occasion when I accompanied him in a change of position,
we passed the Ninth Corps column in march, and it was
interesting to see how he was greeted by the troops which
had been with him in his North Carolina campaign. He
wore that day a "Norfolk jacket," a brown knit round-
about, fitting close to his person ; his hat was the stiff
broad-rimmed, high-crowned regulation hat, worn rather
rakishly, with gold cord, acorn-tipped ; his pistol-belt was
a loose one, allowing the holster to hang on his hip instead
of being buckled tight about the waist ; his boots were the
high cavalry boots reaching to the knee ; his large buckskin
gauntlets covered his forearm ; he rode a large bony horse,
bob-tailed, with a wall-eye which gave him a vicious look,
and suited well the brigandish air of his rider's whole
appearance. Burnside's flashing eyes, his beard trimmed
to the "Burnside cut" with the mustache running into

» O. S., p. 590.

390

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the side whiskers whilst the square, clean-shaven chin
and jaws gave a tone of decision and force to his features,
made up a picture that at once arrested the eye. As we
went along the roadside at a fast trot, his high-stepping
horse seemed to be keeping his white eye on the lookout
for a chance to lash out at somebody. The men evidently
enjoyed the scene, cheering him loudly. I was particu-
larly amused with one group of soldiers at rest by their
stacked muskets. They sat upon their haunches, and
clapped their hands as he passed, exclaiming and laugh-
ing, "Just see the old fellow! just look at him ! " Burn-
side laughed at their fun as jollily as they did themselves,
and took no offence at the free-and-easy way in which
they showed their liking for him. There was no affecta-
tion in all this, but an honest enjoyment in following his
own whim in style and in accoutrement. His sincere
earnestness in the cause for which he was fighting was
apparent to all who met him, and no one in his presence
could question the single-hearted honesty and unselfish-
ness of the man. His bearing under fire was good, and
his personal courage beyond question. He shrank from
responsibility with sincere modesty, because he ques-
tioned his own capacity to deal with affairs of great mag-
nitude. He was not only not ambitious to command a
great army, but he honestly sought to put it aside when
it was thrust upon him, and accepted it at last from a
sense of obligation to the administration which had nom-
inated him to it in spite of his repeated disclaimers. It
came to him finally, without consulting him, as a military
order he could not disobey without causing a most awk-
ward dead-lock in the campaign.

CHAPTER XIX

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

Ordered to the Kanawha valley again — An unwelcome surprise — Reasons
for the order — Reporting to Halleck at Washington — Affairs in the
Kanawha in September — Lightburn's positions — Enemy under Loring
advances — Affair at Fayette C. II. — Lightburn retreats — Gauley
Bridge abandoned — Charleston evacuated — Disorderly flight to the
Ohio — Enemy's cavalry raid under Jenkins — General retreat in Ten-
nessee and Kentucky — West Virginia not in any Department — Now
annexed to that of Ohio — Morgan's retreat from Cumberland Gap —
Ordered to join the Kanawha forces — Milroy's brigade also — My inter-
views with Halleck and Stanton — Promotion — My task — My division
sent with me — District of West Virginia — Colonel Crook promoted —
Journey westward — Governor Peirpoint — Governor Tod — General
Wright — Destitution of Morgan's column — Refitting at Portland, Ohio

— Night drive to Gallipolis — An amusing accident — Inspection at
Point Pleasant — Milroy ordered to Parkersburg — Milroy's qualities —
Interruptions to movement of troops — No wagons — Supplies delayed

— Confederate retreat — Loring relieved — Echols in command — Out
march up the valley — Echols retreats — We occupy Charleston and
Gauley Bridge — Further advance stopped — Our forces reduced — Dis-
tribution of remaining troops — Alarms and minor movements — Case
of Mr. Summers — His treatment by the Confederates.

IN war it is the unexpected that happens. On the 4th
of October my permanent connection with the Army
of the Potomac seemed assured. I was in command of
the Ninth Corps, encamped in Pleasant Valley, await-
ing the renewal of active operations. My promotion to
the rank of Major-General had been recommended by
McClellan and Burnside, with the assurance that the per-
manent command of the corps would be added. On that
evening an order came from Washington directing me to
return to the Kanawha valley, from which our troops had
been driven. I was to report in person at Washington

392 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

immediately, and would there get detailed directions.
The order was as much a surprise to my immediate
superiors as it was to me, and apparently as little wel-
come. We all recognized the necessity of sending some
one to the Kanawha who knew the country, and the
reasonableness, therefore, of assigning the duty to me.
McClellan and Burnside both promised that when matters
should be restored to a good footing in West Virginia
they would co-operate in an effort to bring me back, and
as this was coupled with a strong request to the War
Department that my promotion should be made imme-
diate,* I acquiesced with reasonably good grace.

Going to Washington on the 6th, I received my orders
and instructions from Halleck, the General-in-Chief.
They were based upon the events which had occurred in
the Kanawha valley since I left it in August. The
information got by General Stuart from Pope's captured
quartermaster had led to a careful examination of the
letter-books captured at the same time, and Lee thus
learned that I had left 5000 men, under Colonel Light-
burn, to garrison the posts about Gauley Bridge. The
Confederate forces were therefore greater than ours in
that region, and General Loring, who was in command,
was ordered to make at once a vigorous aggressive cam-
paign against Lightburn, to "clear the valley of the
Kanawha and operate northwardly to a junction " with
the army of Lee in the Shenandoah valley. ^ Loring
marched, on the 6th of September, with a column which
he reported about 5000 strong, expecting to add to it by
organizing recruits and militia as Floyd had done in the
previous year. His line of operations was by way of
Princeton, Flat-top Mountain and Raleigh C. H. to

» McClellan to Halleck, O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 383.

" O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 1069; Id., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 940-943, 946.
This correspondence fully justifies Pope's suspicion that Lee then planned
to operate by the Valley of Virginia.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

393

Fayette C. H. His forces do not seem to have been
noticeably increased by recruiting till ours had retreated
out of the valley.

Lightburn's advanced positions were two, — a brigade
under Colonel Siber of the Thirty-seventh Ohio being at
Raleigh C. H. and another under Colonel Gilbert of the
Forty-fourth Ohio, near the Hawk's Nest, and at Alder-
son's on the Lewisburg road. A small post was kept up
at Summersville and one at Gauley Bridge, where Light-
burn had his headquarters, and some detachments guarded
trains and steamboats in the lower valley. Gauley
Bridge was, as in the preceding year, the central point,
and though it was necessary to guard both the Lewisburg
and the Raleigh roads on the opposite sides of the New
River gorge, a concentration on the line the enemy
should take was the plain rule of action when the oppos-
ing armies were about equal. Or, by concentrating at
Gauley Bridge, my experience had proved that we could
hold at bay three or four times our numbers. In either
case, fighting in detail was to be avoided, and rapid con-
centration under one leader to be effected.

On the approach of the enemy Siber was withdrawn
from Raleigh C. H. to Fayette, and Gilbert to Tomp-
kins farm, three miles from Gauley Bridge, but the
brigades were not united. On the loth of September
Loring attacked Siber at Fayette, in the intrenchments
made by Scammon in the winter. Siber repulsed the
efforts of Loring to drive him out of his position, and
held it during the day. Three companies of the Fourth
Virginia under Captain Vance, and a squad of horse were
sent by Lightburn from Gauley Bridge to Siber's assist-
ance, but the latter, being without definite orders and
thinking he could not hold the position another day,
retreated in the night, setting fire to a large accumula-
tion of stores and abandoning part of his wagons. He
halted on the ridge of Cotton Hill, covering the road to

394

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Gauley Bridge, and was there joined by five companies
of the Forty-seventh Ohio, also sent to his assistance by
Lightburn. Loring followed and made a partial attack,
which was met by the rear-guard under Captain Vance
and repulsed, whilst Siber's principal column marched on
to Montgomery's ferry on the Kanawha.

Meanwhile Lightburn had called in Gilbert's force to
Gauley Bridge during the night of the loth, and placed
them opposite the ferry connecting with Siber, which
was just below Kanawha Falls and in the lower part of
the Gauley Bridge camp. On Siber's appearance at the
ferry, Lightburn seems to have despaired of having time
to get him over, and directed him to march down the left
bank of the river, burning the sheds full of stores which
were on that side of the stream. When Captain Vance
with the rear-guard reached the ferry, the buildings were
blazing on both sides of the narrow pass under the bluff,
and his men ran the gantlet of fire, protecting their
heads with extra blankets which they found scattered
near the stores. Vance easily held the enemy at bay at
Armstrong's Creek, and Siber marched his column, next
morning, to Brownstown, some twenty-five miles below
Kanawha Falls, where steamboats met him and ferried
him over to Camp Piatt. There he rejoined Lightburn.

Gilbert's artillery was put in position on the right
bank at Montgomery's Ferry, and checked the head of
Loring's column when it approached the Kanawhr ":
pursuit of Siber. Lightburn had ordered the detachment
in post at Summersville to join him at Gauley, and
Colonel Elliot of the Forty-seventh Ohio, who com-
manded it, marched down the Gauley with his ten com-
panies (parts of three regiments) and a small wagcn
train. He approached Gauley Bridge on the nth, but
Lightburn had not waited for him, and the enemy were
in possession. Elliot burned his wagons and took to the
hills with his men, cutting across the angle between the

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA 395

Gauley and the Kanawha and joining Gilbert's column
near Cannelton. A smaller detachment, only a little
way up the Gauley, was also left to its fate in the pre-
cipitate retreat, and it also took to the hills and woods
and succeeded in evading the enemy. It was about ten
o'clock in the morning when Loring's head of column
approached the Kanawha and drew the fire of Gilbert's
guns. After about an hour's cannonade across the river,
Lightburn gave the order to retreat down the right bank,
after burning the stores and blowing up the magazine at
Gauley Bridge. Loring found men to swim across the
river and extinguish the fires kindled on the ferry-boats,
which were soon put in use to ferry Echols's brigade
across. This followed Lightburn down the right bank,
whilst Loring himself, with Williams's and Wharton's
brigades, marched after Siber down the left. The over-
hanging cliffs and hills echoed with the cannonade, and
the skirmishers exchanged rifle-shots across the rapid
stream; but few casualties occurred, and after Elliot
joined the column, it nxarched with little interruption to
Camp Piatt, thirteen miles from Charleston, where Siber
met them, and the steamboats he had used passed down
the river to the Ohio.

Siber' s brigade continued its retreat rapidly to Charles-
ton, passed through the town and crossed the Elk River.
Gilbert's brigade also retired, but in better order, and it
kept up a skirmish with the advance-guard of Echols's
column which was following them. When Gilbert
reached the outskirts of Charleston, he checked the
advance of the enemy long enough to enable the quarter-
masters at the post to move their trains across the Elk ;
but the haste of the evacuation was so great that the
stores in depot there were not removed, and were burned
to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. Gilbert
retired across the Elk, and the suspension bridge was
destroyed. Loring's artillery made a dash for a hill on

396

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the left bank of the Kanawha, which commanded the
new position taken up by Lightburn's troops, and the
Confederate battery soon opened an enfilade fire across
the river, taking the line of breastworks along the Elk
in flank and in reverse. The trains and the stragglers
started in direst confusion on the road to Ravenswood on
the Ohio, which offered a line of retreat not subject to
the enemy's fire. Siber's brigade followed, Gilbert's
continued to bring up the rear. The road down the
Kanawha was abandoned because it was in range of artil-
lery from the opposite side of the river throughout its
whole course down the valley. The road to Ripley and
Ravenswood was therefore taken, and the flying troops
were met at those towns on the Ohio by steamboats
which conveyed part of them to Point Pleasant at the
mouth of the Kanawha, where the whole command was
concentrated in the course of a few days.* Siber's loss
was i6 killed, 87 wounded, and over 100 missing. Gil-
bert reported 9 men killed and 8 wounded, with about 75
missing; but as the enemy do not enumerate any cap-
tured prisoners in their reports except a lieutenant and
10 men, it is evident that the missing were mostly men
who outran the others. Loring's losses as reported by
his surgeon were 18 killed and 89 wounded. The enemy
claim to have captured large numbers of wagons, horses,
mules, and stores of all kinds which Loring estimated at
a million dollars' worth, besides all that were burned.

It was a panicky retreat after the hot little fight by
Siber's brigade at Fayette C. H., and it is not worth
while to app?y to it any military criticism, further than
to say that either of the brigades intrenched at Gauley
Bridge could have laughed at Loring. The river would
have been impassable, for all the ferry-boats were in the
keeping of our men on the right bank, and Loring would
not dare pass down the valley leaving a fortified post on

1 O. R., vol. xix. pt i. pp. 1058-1060.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA 397

the line of communications by which he must return.
The topography of the wild mountain region was such
that an army could only pass from the lower Kanawha to
the headwaters of the James River by the road Loring
had used in his advance, or by that leading through the
post of Gauley Bridge to Lewisburg and beyond. The
Confederate War Department seem to have thought that
their forces might have passed from Charleston to the
Ohio, thence to Parkersburg, and turning east from
this town, have made their way to Beverly and to the
Valley of Virginia by the route Garnett had used in the
previous year. They would have found, however, as
Loring told them, that it would have been easy for the
National forces to overwhelm them with numbers while
they were making so long and so difficult a march in a
vast region most of which was a wilderness.

Lightburn's position had been made more embarrassing
by the fact that a cavalry raid under Brigadier-General
Jenkins was passing around his left flank while Loring
came upon him in front. Jenkins with a light column
of horse moved from Lewisburg by way of the Wilder-
ness Road to northwestern Virginia, captured posts and
destroyed stores at Weston, Buckhannon, and Roane
C. H., and made a circuit to the lower Kanawha, re-
joining Loring after Lightburn's retreat. Little real
mischief was done by this raid, but it added to the con-
fusion, and helped to disturb the self-possession of the
commanding officer. In this way it was one of the causes
oi the precipitate retreat.

Several circumstances combined to make Lightburn's
disaster embarrassing to the government. West Vir-
ginia had not been connected with any military department
after Pope's command had been broken up. McClellan's
authority did not extend beyond his own army and its
theatre of operations. Halleck could hardly take per-
sonal charge of the affairs of remote districts. Thus the

398

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Kanawha valley had dropped out of the usual system and
was an omitted case. The embarrassment was increased
by the fact that Buell was retreating out of Tennessee
before Bragg, Morgan had evacuated Cumberland Gap
and was making a painful and hazardous retreat to the
Ohio, and the Confederate forces under Kirby Smith
were moving directly upon Cincinnati. Lightburn's
mishap, therefore, was only the northern extremity of a
line of defeats extending through the whole length of
the Ohio valley from Parkersburg to Louisville. The
governors of West Virginia and Ohio were naturally
alarmed at the events in the Kanawha valley, and were
earnest in their calls upon the War Department for troops
to drive Loring back beyond the mountains and for an
officer to command them who knew something of the
country.

Halleck seems to have been puzzled at the condition
of things, not having realized that Pope's retirement had
left West Virginia "in the air." It took ?■. week, appar-
ently, to get satisfactory details of the actual situation,
and on the 19th of September the first important step
was taken by annexing the region to the Department of
the Ohio, then commanded by Major-General Horatio G.
Wright, whose headquarters were at Cincinnati.^ Wright
was directed to provide for the recovery of lost ground
in West Virginia as rapidly as possible, but the cam-
paign in Kentucky was the more important and urgent,
so that no troops could be spared for secondary operations
until the Confederates had ceased to threaten Cincinnati
and Louisville.

On the I St of October Halleck again called General
Wright's attention to the need of doing something for
West Virginia. Governor Peirpoint, of that State, rep-
resented the Confederates under Loring as about 10,000
in number, and this reflected the opinion which Light-

* O. R., vol. xvi. pt. ii. p. 528^

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

399

burn had formed during his retreat. It became the basis
of calculation in the campaign which followed, though it
greatly exaggerated Loring's force. Three days later
Brigadier-General George W. Morgan was known to have
reached the Ohio River with the division he had brought
from Cumberland Gap, and General Halleck outlined a
plan of action. He ordered Morgan's division to be
sent to Gallipolis to take part in the advance into the
Kanawha valley, where some new Ohio regiments were
also to join them.^ He at the same time called me
to Washington to receive instructions under which I
was to take command of the whole force operating on the
Kanawha line. Brigadier-General Milroy had already
(September 25th) been ordered to proceed thither with
his brigade, which was in Washington and was part of
Banks's forces garrisoning the capital. ^ He was moved
through Pennsylvania to Wheeling by rail, and thence
down the Ohio River to Point Pleasant at the mouth of
the Kanawha.

My order to leave the Army of the Potomac reached
me on Saturday evening. Much business had to be
closed up before I could properly turn over the command
of the Ninth Corps, but I was able to complete it and
make the journey to Washington so as to report to Gen-
eral Halleck on Monday morning. He received me very
kindly, and explained the necessity they were under to
send some one to the Kanawha valley who knew the
country. He was complimentary as to my former ser-
vice there, and said my return to that region would meet
the earnest wishes of the governors of West Virginia and
Ohio, as well as the judgment of the War Department
and of himself. To compensate for separating me from
the command of the Ninth Corps, it had been decided to
make my promotion at once and to put the whole of West
Virginia under my command as a territorial district.

» O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 381. « Id., pp. 355, 359.

400

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

He inquired into some details of the topography of the
Kanawha valley and of my experience there, and con-
cluded by saying that reinforcements would be sent
to make the column I should lead in person stronger
than the 10,000 attributed to Loring. My task would
then be to drive back the enemy beyond the mountains.
When that was accomplished, part of the troops would
probably be withdrawn. The actual position of Milroy's
brigade was not definitely known, and Governor Peirpoint
of West Virginia had asked to have it sent to Clarks-
burg. This gave me the opportunity to urge that my
own Kanawha division be detached from the Ninth Corps
and sent back to Clarksburg, where with Milroy they
would make a force strong enough to take care of that
part of the State and to make a co-operative movement
toward Gauley Bridge. This also was granted, and im-
mediate promotion was given to Colonel Crook so that he
might command the division, and a promise was made to
do the like for Colonel Scammon, who would then be
available for the command of the division still under
Lightburn, whose retreat was strongly condemned as pre-
cipitate. No soldier could object to an arrangement so
satisfactory as this, and though I still preferred to re-
main with the Army of the Potomac, I could only accept
the new duty with sincere thanks for the consideration
shown me. The General-in-Chief accompanied me to the
room of the Secretary of War, and Mr. Stanton added to
my sense of obligation by warm expressions of personal
good-will. His manner was so different from the brusque
one commonly attributed to him that I have nothing but
pleasant remembrances of my relations to him, both then
and later. My own appointment as major-general was
handed me by him, the usual promotions of my personal
staff were also made, and directions were given for the
immediate appointment of Crook to be brigadier.

I called to pay my respects to the President, but he

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

401

was in Cabinet meeting and could not be seen. I had a
short but warmly friendly visit with Mr. Chase later
in the day, and was ready to leave town for my new post
of duty by the evening train. The Secretary of War
directed me to visit Wheeling and Columbus on my way,
and then to report to General Wright at Cincinnati before
going to the Kanawha valley. This was in fact the
quickest way to reach the mouth of the Kanawha River, for
the fall rains had not yet come to make the Ohio navi-
gable, and from Columbus to Cincinnati, and thence by
the Marietta Railway eastward, was, as the railway routes
then ran, the best method of joining my command. The
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was interrupted between
Harper's Ferry and Hancock (about fifty miles) by the
Confederate occupation of that part of Virginia.* General
Crook was ordered to march the division from its camp in
Pleasant Valley to Hancock, where trains on the west-
ern division of the railway would meet him and transport
the troops to Clarksburg. For myself and staff, we took
the uninterrupted railway line from Washington to Pitts-
burg, and thence to Wheeling, where we arrived on the
evening of October 8th. The 9th was given to con-
sultation with Governor Peirpoint and to communication
with such military officers as were within reach. We
reached Columbus on the loth, when I had a similar
consultation with Governor Tod and his military staff in
regard to new regiments available for my use. Leaving
Columbus in the afternoon, we arrived at Cincinnati late
the same night, and on Saturday, the nth, I reported to
General Wright.

He was an officer of the engineer corps of the regular
army, a man of fine acquirements and of a serious and
earnest character, whose military service throughout the
war was marked by solidity and modesty. If there
seemed at first a little hauteur in his manner, one soon

» O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 393, 394.
VOL. I. —26

402 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IVAR

saw that it was a natural reserve free from arrogance.
The sort of confusion in which everything was, is indi-
cated by the fact that he knew nothing of my whereabouts
when informed from Washington that I would be ordered
to the Kanawha, and on the same day (6th October) ad-
dressed a dispatch to mc at Point Pleasant whilst I was
receiving instructions from General Halleck in Washing-
ton.^ Our personal consultation established a thoroughly
good understanding at once, and as long as I remained
under his orders, I found him thoroughly considerate of
my wishes and appreciative of my suggestions and of
the conduct of my own part of the work to be done.

Morgan's division, after reaching the Ohio River, had
been moved to Portland on the Marietta Railroad, the near-
est point to Gallipolis, which was twenty-five miles away
and nearly opposite the mouth of the Great Kanawha.
His retreat had been through a sparsely settled country,
much of which was a wilderness, rugged and broken in
the extreme. His wagons had broken down, his teams
were used up, his soldiers were worn out, ragged, and
barefoot.^ Many arms and accoutrements had been lost,
and the command was imperatively in need of complete
refitting and a little rest. The men had been largely
recruited in East Tennessee and Kentucky, and were
unwilling to serve in any other theatre of war. The Ten-
nesseans, indeed, were reported to be mutinous at the
news that they were to be sent to the Kanawha valley.
General Wright issued orders for the refitting of the
command, and promised such delay and rest as might be
found practicable. He detached three regiments to serve
in Kentucky, and directed their place to be made good
by three new Ohio regiments then organizing. The divi-
sion was permitted to remain at Portland till imperatively
needed for my movement.

There were no trains running on the railroad on Sun-

1 O. R., vol. xvi. pt. ii. p. 579. « Id., pt. i. p. 99a

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

403

day, and Monday morning, the 13th October, was the
earliest possible start on the remainder of my journey.
I left Cincinnati at that time, and with my personal staff
reached Portland in the afternoon. Morgan's division
was found to be in quite as bad condition as had been
reported, but he was in daily expectation of the new
equipments and clothing, as well as wagons for his
baggage-train and fresh horses for his artillery. It was
stated also that a paymaster had been ordered to join the
division, with funds to pay part at least of the large
arrears of pay due to the men. This looked hopeful, but
still implied some further delay. Uneasy to learn the
actual condition of affairs with Lightburn's command, I
determined to reach Gallipolis the same night. Our
horses had been left behind, and being thus dismounted,
we took passage in a four-horse hack, a square wagon on
springs, enclosed with rubber-cloth curtains. Night fell
soon after we began our journey, and as we were pushing
on in the dark, the driver blundered and upset us off the
end of a little sluiceway bridge into a mud-hole. He
managed to jump from his seat and hold his team, but
there was no help for us who were buttoned in. The
mud was soft and deep, and as the wagon settled on its
side, we were tumbled in a promiscuous heap into the
ooze and slime, which completely covered us. We were
not long in climbing out, and seeing lights in a farm-
house, made our way to it. As we came into the light of
the lamps and of a brisk fire burning on t^ ^ open hearth,
we were certainly as sorry a military spectacle as could
be imagined. We were most kindly received, the men
taking lanterns and going to our driver's help, whilst we
stood before the fire, and scraped the thick mud from our
uniforms with chips from the farmer's woodyard, making
rather boisterous sport of our mishap. Before the wagon
had been righted and partly cleaned, we had scraped and
sponged each other off and were ready to go on. We

404

/lEAf/JV/SCEACES OF THE CIVIL WAR

noticed, however, that the room had filled with men,
women, and children from 'he neighborhood, who stood
bashfully back in the shadows, and who modestly explained
that they had heard there was a " live general " there, and
as they had never seen 01.2, they had " come over." They
must have formed some amusing ideas of military per-
sonages, and we found at least as much sport in being the
menagerie as they did in visiting it. Our mishap made
us wait for the moon, which rose in an hour or so, and we
then took leave of our entertainers and our audience and
drove on, with no desire, however, to repeat the perform-
ance. We made some ten miles more of the road, but
found it so rough, and our progress so slow, that we were
glad to find quarters for the rest of the night, finishing
the journey in the morning.

On reaching my field of duty, my first task was to in-
spect the forces at Point Pleasant, and learn what was
necessary to make a forward movement as soon as Mor-
gan's troops should reach me. General Wright had ori-
ginally expected that inclusive of Milroy's and Morgan's
troops, I should find at the mouth of the Kanawha, on
arriving there, some 20,000 men.^ In fact, however,
Lightburn's diminished command had only been rein-
forced by three new Ohio regiments (the Eighty-ninth,
Ninety-first, and Ninety-second) and a new one from West
Virginia (the Thirteenth), and with these his strength
was less than 7300, officers and men, showing that his
original command was sadly reduced by straggling and
desertion during his retreat.* The new regiments were
made up of good material, but as they were raw recruits,
their usefulness must for some time be greatly limited.

Two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry
with a howitzer battery were at Guyandotte, under Colonel
Jonathan Cranor of the Fortieth Ohio, and the Fifth West
Virginia was at Ceredo near the mouth of the Big Sandy

^ O. R., vol. xiz. pt. ii. p. 402.

* Id., p. 522.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

405

River. They had been stationed at these points to pro-
tect the navigation of the Ohio and to repel the efforts of
the Confederate Cavalry General Jenkins to " raid " that
region in which was his old home.' They formed, a little
later, the Third Brigade of the Kanawha division under
Crook.

I found General Milroy in command as the ranking offi-
cer present, and he had sent Cranor's command down the
river. When Governor Peirpoint learned that Milroy 's
brigade had passed Wheeling on his way to the Kanawha,
he applied urgently to General Wright to send him, in-
stead, from Parkersburg by rail to Clarksburg to form the
nucleus of a column to move southward from that point
upon the rear of Loring's forces. Wright assented, for
both he and Halleck accepted the plan of converging col-
umns from Clarksburg and Point Pleasant, and regarded
that from the former place as the more important.^ If
directions were sent to Milroy to this effect, they seem to
have miscarried. Besides his original brigade, some new
Indiana regiments were ordered to report to him. He had,
with characteristic lack of reflection and without authority,
furloughed the Fifth West Virginia regiment in mass
and sent the men home. I gave him a new one in place
of this, ordered him to reassemble the other as soon as
possible, and to march at once to Parkersburg, proceed-
ing thence to Clarksburg by rail. The new troops added
to his command enabled him to organize them into a
division of two brigades, and still other regiments were
added to him later. Milroy was a picturesque character,
with some excellent qualities. A tall man, with tren-
chant features, bright eyes, a great shock of gray hair
standing out from his head, he was a marked personal
figure. He was brave, but his bravery was of the excit-
able kind that made him unbalanced and nearly wild on
the battle-field. His impulsiveness made him erratic in

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 459, 522.

* Id. p. 402.

4o6

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

all performances of duty, and negligent of the sy.it.en
without which the business of an army cannot go on.
This was shown in his furlough of a regiment whilst ,"w
route to reinforce Lightburn, who was supposed to be in
desperate straits. It is also seen in the absence of official
reports of the organization of his command at this time,
so that we cannot tell what regiments constituted it when
his division was assembled at Clarksburg. He is de-
scribed, in the second Battle of Bull R.un, as crazily career-
ing over the field, shouting advice to other officers instead
of gathering and leading his own command, which he said
was routed and scattered.^ Under the immediate control
of a firm and steady hand he could do good service, but
was wholly unfit for independent responsibility. His
demonstrative manner, his boiling patriotism, and his
political zeal gave him prominence and made him a
favorite with the influential war-governor of Indiana,
Oliver P. Morton, who pushed his military advancement.
The Kanawha division left the Army of the Potomac on
the 8th of October and reached Hancock on the loth.
There it crossed the track of a raid of the Confederate
cavalry into Pennsylvania, under Stuart. By McClel-
lan's order one brigade was sent to McConnelsville to
intercept the enemy, and the other v/as halted. * By the
13th Crook had been allowed to concentrate the division
at Hancock again, but was kept waiting for orders, so
that he was not able to report to me his arrival at Clarks-
burg till the 20th. Colonel Scammon was on a short
leave of absence during this march, and was promoted.^
He reported to me in person in his new rank of brigadier
a little later. The brigades of the Kanawha division
were commanded by the senior colonels present.

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 342, 362-364.
« Id., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 62-78.

* His new rank dated from 15th October, that of Crook from 7th Sep-
tember. Army Register, 1863.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

407

The increase of troops in the district made immediate
need of transportation and munitions and supplies of all
kinds. The Kanawha division had not been allowed to
bring away with it its admirably equipped supply train,
but its energetic quartermaster, Captain Fitch, came with
the troops, and I immecfiately made him chief quarter-
master of the district. Milroy's division had no wagons,
neither had Morgan's. The fall rains had not yet raised
the rivers, and only boats of lightest draught could move on
the Ohio, whilst navigation on the Kanawha was wholly
suspended.^ Four hundred wagons and two thousand
mules were estimated as necessary to supply two moving
columns of ten thousand men each, in addition to such
trains as were still available in the district. Only one
hundred wagons could be promised from the depot at Cin-
cinnati, none of which reached me before the enemy was
driven out of the Kanawha valley. I was authorized to
contract for one hundred more to be built at Wheeling,
where, however, the shops could only construct thirty-
five per week, and these began to reach the troops only
after the ist of November.* We hoped for rains which
would give us navigation in the Kanawha in spite of the
suffermg which wet weather at that season must produce,
and I ordered wagons and teams to be hired from the
country people as far as this could be done. Similar
delays and trouble occurred in procuring advance stores
and equipments. Part of Morgan's men were delayed at
the last moment by their new knapsacks coming to them
without the straps which fasten them to the shoulders.
General Wright blamed the depot officers for this, and
took from me and my subordinates all responsibility for
the delays;^ but the incidents make an instructive lesson
in the difficulty of suddenly organizing a new and strong
military column in a region distant from large depots of

' O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p 433.
* ^''•. PP- 438, 475-

• /-/., pp. 535-537.

408 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

supply. It also shows the endless cost and mischief that
may result from an ill-advised retreat and r struction of
property at such posts as Gauley Bridge ? j Charleston.
To put the local quartermasters at Gallipolis and other
towns on the Ohio side of the river under my command,
General Wright enlarged the boundaries of my district
so as to include the line of Ohio counties bordering on
the river. ^

On visiting Lightburn's command at Point Pleasant, I
ordered a brigade to be sent forward next day (15th) to
Ten-mile Creek, repairing the road and bridges, whilst
a scouting party of experienced men started out at once
to penetrate the country by circuitous ways and to col-
lect information. 2 In two or three days bits of news
began to arrive, with rumors that Loring was retreating.
The truth was that he in fact withdrew his infantry, leav-
ing Jenkins with the cavalry and irregular forces to hold
the valley for a time, and then to make a circuit north-
ward by way of Bulltown, Sutton, etc., gaining the Bev-
erly turnpike near the mountains and rejoining the
infantry, which would march to join Lee by roads inter-
secting that highway at Monterey. Such at least was
the purpose Loring communicated to the Confederate War
Department; but he was not allowed to attempt it. His
instructions had been to march his whole command by the
route Jenkins was taking and at least to hold the valley
stubbornly as far as Charleston. On receipt of the news
that he was retreating, orders were sent him to turn over
the command to Brigadier-General John Echols, the next
in rank, and to report in person at Richmond.' Echols
was ordered immediately to resume the positions which
had been abandoned, and did so as rapidly as possible.
Loring had in fact begun his retreat on the nth, three
days before f reached Gallipolis, but the first information

^ O. R., vol. xiz. pt ii. pp. 381, 421. * Id., p. 433.

• /</., pp. 661, 667.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

409

of it was got after the scouting had been begun which is
mentioned above. By the i8th I was able to give Gen-
eral Wright confirmation of the news and a correct outline
of Loring's plan, though we had not then learned that
Echols was marching back to Charleston.^ We heard of
his return two or three days later. As evidence of the
rapidity with which information reached the enemy, it is
noteworthy that Lee knew my command had left the
Army of the Potomac for West Virginia on the i ith Octo-
ber, three days after Crook marched from camp in Pleas-
ant Valley. He reported to Richmond that four brigades
had gone to that region, which was accurate as to the
number, though only half right as to identification of the
brigades. 2 On the 13th he sent further information that
I had been promoted and assigned to command the
district.

By the 20th there had been a slight rise in the Kana-
wha River, so that it was possible to use small steamboats
to carry supplies for the troops, and Lightburn was
ordered to advance his whole division to Red House,
twenty-five miles, and to remove obstructions to naviga-
tion which had been planted there.' One brigade of
Morgan's division was in condition to move, and it was
ordered from Portland to Gallipolis. The rest were to
follow at the earliest possible moment. The discontent
of the East Tennessee regiments had not been lessened
by the knowledge they had that powerful political influ-
ences were at work to second their desire to be moved
back into the neighborhood of their home. On the loth
of October a protest against their being sent into West
Virginia was made by Horace Maynard, the loyal repre-
sentative of East Tennessee in Congress, a man of marked
character and ability and deservedly very influential with
the government.* Maynard addressed Halieck a second

1 O. R., vol. xiz. pt. ii. p. 449.
• Id; pp. 4S6, 459-

« /</., pp. 662, 663.

♦ /</., vol. xvi. pt. ii. pp. 604. 63s, 651.

410 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

time on the subject on the 22d, and on the 29th Andrew
Johnson, then military governor of Tennessee, wrote to
President Lincoln for the same purpose. It hardly need
be said that the preparation of those regiments would
proceed slowly, pending such negotiations. Their distant
homes and families were at the mercy of the enemy, and
it seemed to them intolerable that their faces should be
turned in any other direction. I suggested an exchange
for new Ohio regiments, but as these were not yet filled
up, it could not be done. General Wright assured them
that they should be sent to Kentucky as soon as we were
again in possession of West Virginia. Most of these
regiments came under my command again later in the
war, and I became warmly attached to them. Their
drill and discipline were abvays lax, but their courage and
devotion to the national cause could not be excelled.

It was not till the 23d that any of Morgan's men really
entered into the forward movement in the valley.* On
that day the brigade of Colonel John F. DeCourcy (Six-
teenth Ohio), composed of Ohio and Kentucky troops,
reached Ten-mile Creek and was ordered to march to Red
House the day after.' Lightbum was busy clearing the
river of obstructions and preparing to move to Pocataligo
River as the next step in advance. Of the other brigades
belonging to Morgan, that of Brigadier-General Samuel
P. Carter, composed partly of Tennesseans, was at Gal-
lipolis, intending to enter the valley on the 24th. The
remaining brigade, under Brigadier-General James G.
Spears, was entirely Tennessean, and was still at Portland
where the paymaster had just arrived and was giving the
regiments part payment.

My purpose was to concentrate the force at Pocataligo,
assume the command in person, and attack the enemy in

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 474, 475.

3 Colonel DeCourqr was an Irishman of good family, who took service
in our army, and was a good officer. He afterwards inherited an Irish
baronage.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

411

the positions in front of Charleston, in which Wise had
resisted me in the previous year. I should have been
glad to make the expected movement of a column from
Clarksburg under Crook and Milroy co-operate directly
with my own, but circumstances made it impracticable.
The operations of the Confederate cavalry under Jenkins
were keeping the country north of the Kanawha in a
turmoil, and reports had become rife that he would work
his way out toward Beverly. The country was also full
of rumors of a new invasion from East Virginia. Mil-
roy's forces were not yet fully assembled at Clarksburg
on the 20th, but he was ordered to operate toward Bev-
erly, whilst Crook, with the old Kanawha division, should
move on Summersville and Gauley Bridge. Both had to
depend on hiring wagons for transportation of supplies.^
Separated as they were, they would necessarily be cau-
tious in their movements, making the suppression of guer-
illas, the driving out of raiders, and the general quieting
of the country their principal task. Their r61e was thus,
of course, made subordinate to the movement of my own
column, which must force its own way without waiting for
results from other operations.

Half of Carter's brigade was, at the last moment, de-
layed at Gallipolis, the clothing and equipments sent to
them there being found incomplete. Just half of Morgan's
division with two batteries of artillery were in motion
on the 24th. On that day Lightburn was moved to Poca-
taligo, about forty miles from the river mouth, where I
joined him in person on the 27th. A cold storm of min-
gled rain and snow had made the march and bivouac very
uncomfortable for a couple of days. General Morgan
accompanied me, and during the 28th the active column
of three and a half brigades was concentrated, two or
three other regiments being in echelon along the river
below. Tyler Mountain behind Tyler Creek was, as

1 O. R., vol. zix. pt. ii. pp. 459, 481, 482.

412

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

formerly, the place at which the enemy was posted to
make a stand against our further progress, though he had
no considerable force on the south side of the river at the
mouth of Scary Creek. Reconnoissances showed nothing
but cavalry in our immediate front, and it afterwards
appeared that Echols began a rapid retreat from Charles-
ton on that day.^ He had called to him Jenkins with the
greater part of the cavalry, and entrusted to the latter the
duty of holding us back as much as possible. Suspecting
this from evidence collected at Pocataligo, I determined
to put Siber's brigade and a battery, all in light march-
ing order, on the south side of the river, accompanied by
a light-draught steamboat, which the rise in the river
after the storm enabled us to use as far as Charleston.
This brigade could turn the strong position at Tyler Moun-
tain, and passing beyond this promontory on the opposite
side of the river, could command with artillery fire the
river road on the other bank behind the enemy in our
front. The steamboat would enable them to make a rapid
retreat if the belief that no great force was on that side of
the river should prove to be a mistake. Siber was also
furnished with a battery of four mountain howitzers,
which could be carried to the edge of the water or any-
where that men could march. ^

On the right bank of the river (north side) the princi-
pal column of two brigades (Toland's and DeCourcy's)
advanced on the turnpike near the stream, having one
six-gun battery and a section of twenty-pounder Parrots
with them. What was present of Carter's brigade was
sent by the mountain road further from the stream, to
cover our left and to turn the flank of the Tyler Mountain
position, if j. stubborn stand should be made there. A
light six-gun battery accompanied it. All moved forward
simultaneously on the morning of the 29th.^ The disposi-

2 Id., pp. 504, 509, 530.

* O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 685.

« md.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

413

tions thus made rendered it vain for the enemy's cavalry
to offer any stubborn resistance, and Jenkins abandoned
Tyler Mountain on our approach, thus giving us certain
knowledge that he was not closely supported by the in-
fantry. Our advance-guard reached the Elk River oppo-
site Charleston in the afternoon, and I made personal
reconnoissance of the means of crossing. The suspension
bridge had been ruined in Lightburn's retreat, and the
enemy had depended upon a bridge of boats for commu-
nication with their troops in the lower valley. These
boats had been taken to the further bank of the river and
partly destroyed, but as the enemy had continued his re-
treat, we soon had a party over collecting those that could
be used, and other flatboats used in the coal trade, and a
practicable bridge was reconstructed before night of the
30th. ^ Meanwhile I entered the town with the advance-
guard as soon as we had a boat to use for a ferry, and
spent the night of the 29th there. We had friends enough
in the place to put us quickly in possession of all the
news, and I was soon satisfied that Echols had no
thought of trying to remain on the western side of the
mountains.^

The column crossed the Elk late in the afternoon of the
30th, and I pushed Toland's and Carter's brigades to
Maiden and Camp Piatt that evening, Siber's brigade ad-
vancing to Brownstown on the other side of the Kanawha
River. Lightburn's division was ordered forward next
day to Gauley Bridge, Carter's brigade at Maiden was
ordered to send strong parties southward into Boone
County, to reconnoitre and to put down guerilla bands. ^
DeCourcy's brigade was halted at Charleston, and Spears'
Tennessee brigade was directed to remain at Gallipolis
till further orders. Communication was opened with
Crook, who was ordered to press forward via Summers-

2 Id., pp. 515, 52a

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 530.
• Id., p. 530.

414

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ville to Gauley Bridge as quickly as possible.* The
retreating enemy had burned the bridges, obstructed the
roads with fallen timber, and cut and destroyed the flat-
boats along the river; so that the first and most pressing
task was to reopen roads, make ferries and bridges, and
thus renew the means of getting supplies to the troops.*
The river was still low, unusually so for the season, and
the water was falling. Every energy was therefore neces-
sary to get forward supplies to Gauley Bridge and the
other up-river posts, for if the river should freeze whilst
low, the winter transportation would be confined to the
almost impassable roads.* I reported to General Wright
the re-occupation of the valley, our lack of wagon-trains
for further advance, and all the facts which would assist
in deciding whether anything further should be attempted.
I did not conceal the opinion which all my experience had
confirmed, that no military advantage could be secured by
trying to extend operation by this route across the moun-
tains into the James River valley.

On the 2d of November Brigadier-General Scammon
reported for duty, and I ordered him to Gauley Bridge to
assume command of the division which was then under
Colonel Lightburn, who resumed the command of his
brigade.* Scammon was directed to inspect carefully
all our old positions as far as Raleigh C. H., to report
whether the recent retreat of troops from Fayetteville had
been due to any improper location of the fortifications
there, to examine the road up Loup Creek, and any others
which might be used by the enemy to turn our position at
Gauley Bridge, to state the present conditions of build-
ings at all the upper posts, and whether any storehouses
had escaped destruction. In short, we needed the mate-
rial on which to base intelligent plans for a more secure
holding of the region about the falls of the Kanawha, or

1 O. R., vol. xbt. pt. if. p. 520.
• Id., p. 537.

a Id., p. 536.
« Ibid.

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

415

for a further advance to the eastward if it should be
ordered.

The information which came to me as soon as I was in
actual contact with the enemy, not only satisfied me that
Loring's forces had been greatly exaggerated, but led me
to estimate them at a lower figure than the true one. In
reporting to General Wright on ist November, I gave
the opinion that they amounted to about 3500 infantry,
but with a disproportionate amount of artillery, some
twenty pieces. The cavalry under Jenkins numbered
probably icxx) or 1500 horse. ^ About the first of October
Loring, in a dispatch to Richmond, stated his force at
"only a little more than 4000,"* which probably means
that the 5000 with which he entered the valley were some-
what reduced by the sick and by desertions. He seems to
refer to his infantry, for Jenkins's command had been an
independent one. It would be reasonable, therefore, to
put his total strength at some 6000 or a little higher. On
our side, the column with which I actually advanced was
just about 9000 men, with 2(XX) more of Morgan's com-
mand within reach, had there been need to call them up
from the Ohio River.

On the 8th of November Hal leek telegraphed to General
Wright that no posts need be established beyond Gauley
Bridge, and that about half of my command should be
sent to Tennessee and the Mississippi valley.* On the
same day General Wright formally approved my views as
submitted to him, and ordered Morgan's division to be
sent to Cincinnati at once.* It was thus definitively settled
that my task for the winter would be to restore the condi-
tion of affairs in West Virginia which had existed before
Loring's invasion, and organize my district with a view
to prompt and easy supply of my posts, the suppression
of lawlessness and bushwhacking, the support of the State

^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 531.
• Id., pp. 556. SS7.

a /«/., p. 635.
* Id.y P 537-

4i6

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

authorities, and the instruction and discipline of officers
and men. My first attention was given to the question of
transportation, for the winter was upon us and wagons
were very scarce. The plan of using the river to the
utmost was an economy as well as a necessity, and I re-
turned to my former arrangement of using batteaux for
the shallow and swift waters of the upper river, connect-
ing with the movable head of steamboat navigation. A
tour of inspection to Gauley Bridge and the posts in that
vicinity satisfied me that they were in good condition for
mutual support, and for carrying on a sy.stem of scouting
which could be made a useful discipline and instruction
to the troops, as well as the means of keeping thoroughly
informed of the movements of the enemy.

The line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was kept
under the control of General Kelley, and his authority
extended to active co-operation with the Army of the
Potomac in keeping open communication with Washing-
ton. In case of need, the commander of that army was
authorized to give orders to General Kelley direct, with-
out waiting to transmit them through my headquarters.
General Milroy was established on the Beverly front,
communicating on his left with General Kelley and on
his right with General Crook, at Gauley Bridge. Gen-
eral Scammon had his station at Fayette C. H., covering
the front on the south side of New River, whilst Crook
watched the north side and extended his posts in Milroy's
direction as far as Summersville. Colonel Cranor re-
mained on the Ohio near Guyandotte, scouting the val-
ley of the Guyandotte River and communicating with
Charleston and other posts on the Kanawha.

On the 1 2th of November reports were received from
General Kelley that authentic information showed that
Jackson was advancing from the Shenandoah valley upon
West Virginia. Similar information reached army head-
quarters at Washington, and in anticipation of possible

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA 417

necessity for it, I directed Milroy to hold himself in
readiness to march at once to join Kcllcy, if the latter
should call upon him. I telegraphed General Wright
that I did not think the report would prove well founded,
but it put everybody upon the alert for a little while.
Kclley had beaten up a camp of Confederates under
Imboden about eighteen miles above Moorcfield on the
south branch of the Potomac, causing considerable loss
to the enemy in killed and wounded and capturing fifty
prisoners.* Some movement to support Imboden probably
gave rise to the story of Jackson's advance, but Lee kept
both corps of his army in hand and moved the whole down
the Rappahannock soon afterward, to meet Burnside's
advance upon Fredericksburg.

The invasion of the Kanawha valley by Loring had
stirred up much bitter feeling again between Union men
and Confederates, and was followed by the usual quarrels
and recriminations among neighbors. The Secessionists
were stimulated to drop the prudent reserve they had
practised before, and some of them, in the hope that the
Confederate occupation would be permanent, persecuted
loyal men who were in their power. The retreat of the
enemy brought its day of reckoning, and was accompanied
by a fresh emigration to eastern Virginia of a consider-
able number of the more pronounced Secessionists. I
have said ^ that Mr. George Summers, formerly the lead-
ing man of the valley, had studiously avoided political
activity after the war began; but this did not save him
from the hostility of his disloyal neighbors. Very shortly
after my re-occupation of Charleston he called upon me
one evening and asked for a private interview. He had
gone through a painful experience, he said, and as it
would pretty surely come to my ears, he preferred I
should hear it from himself, before enemies or tale-
bearers should present it with such coloring as they might

» O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 572, 573, 578, 585, 586. » AnU, p. 154.

VOL. I. — 27

41 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL H^AR

choose. During the Confederate occupation he had
maintained his secluded life and kept aloof from contact
with the military authorities. Their officers, however,
summoned him before them, charged him with treason to
Virgin. a and to the Confederate States, and demanded of
him that he take the oath of allegiance to the Southern
government. He demurred to this, and urged that as he
had scrupulously avoided public activity, it would be harsh
and unjust to force him to a test which he could not con-
scientiously take. They were in no mood to listen to
argument, and charged that his acquiescence in the rule
of the new state government of West Virginia was, in
his case, more injurious to the Confederate cause than
many another man's active unionism. Finding Mr.
Summers disposed to be firm, they held him in arrest;
and as he still refused to yield, he was told that he should
be tied by a rope to the tail of a wagon and forced to
march in that condition, as a prisoner, over the mountains
to Richmond.

He was an elderly man, used to a refined and easy life,
somewhat portly in person, and, as he said, he fully be-
lieved such treatment would kill him. The fierceness of
their manner convinced him that they meant to execute
the threat, and looking upon it as a sentence of death, he
yielded and took the oath. He said that being in duress
of such a sort, and himself a lawyer, he considered that
he had a moral right to escape from his captors in this
way, though he would not have yielded to anything short
of what seemed to him an imminent danger of his life.
The obligation, he declared, was utterly odious to him
and was not binding on his conscience; but he had lost
no time in putting himself into my hands, and would
submit to whatever I should decide in the matter. It
would be humiliating and subject him to misconstruct'cn
by others if he took conflicting oaths, but he was willing
to abjure the obligation he had taken, if I demanded it,

RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA

419

and would voluntarily renew his allegiance to the United
States with full purpose to keep it.

He was deeply agitated, and I thoroughly pitied him.
My acquaintance with him in my former campaign gave
me entire confidence in his sincerity, and made me wish
to spare him any fresh embarrassment or pain. After a
moment's reflection, I replied that I did not doubt any-
thing he had told me of the facts or of his own sentiments
in regard to them. His experience only confirmed my
distrust of all test oaths. Either his conscience already
bound him to the National government, or it did not.
In either case I could not make his loyalty more sure by a
fresh oath, and believing that the one he had taken under
duress was void in fact as well as in his own conscience,
I would leave the matter there and ask nothing more of
him. He was greatly relieved by my decision, but bore
himself with dignity. I never saw any reason to be sorry
for the course I took, and believe that he was always
afterward consistent and steady in his loyalty to the
United States.

CHAPTER XX

WINTER QUARTERS, 1 862-63 — PROMOTIONS AND

POLITICS

Central position of Marietta, Ohio — Connection with all parts of West
Virginia — Drill and instruction of troops — Guerilla warfare — Parti-
san Rangers — Confederate laws — Disposal of plunder — Mosby's
Rangers as a type — Opinions of Lee, Stuart, and Rosser — Effect on
other troops — Rangers finally abolished — Rival home-guards and
militia — Horrors of neighborhood war — Staff and staff duties — Re-
duction of forces — General Cluseret — Later connection with the Paris
Commune — His relations with Milroy — He resigns — Political situa-
tion — Congressmen distrust Lincoln — Cutler's diary — Resolutions
regarding appointments of general officers — The number authorized by
law — Stanton's report — Effect of Act of July, 1862 — An excess of
nine major-generals — The legal questions involved — Congressional
patronage and local distribution — Ready for a "deal" — Bill to in-
crease the number of generals — A "slate" made up to exhaust the
number — Senate and House disagree — Conference — Agreement in
last hours of the session — The new list — A few vacancies by resignation,
• etc. — List of those dropped — My own case — Faults of the method—
Lincoln's humorous comments — Curious case of General Turchin —
Congestion in the highest grades — Effects — Confederate grades of
general and lieutenant-general — Superiority of our system — Co-
temporaneous reports and criticisms — New regiments instead of r^
cruiting old ones — Sherman's trenchant opinion.

EARLY in December I established my winter head-
quarters at Marietta on the Ohio River, a central
position from which communication could be had most
easily with all parts of the district and with department
headquarters. It was situated at the end of the railway
line from Cincinnati to the Ohio River near Parkersburg,
■where the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad met the Cincin-
nati line. The Baltimore road, coming from the east,
forked at Grafton in West Virginia and reached Wheel-
ing, as has been described in an earlier chapter.^ The

1 AhU, pp. 40, 42.

WINTER QUARTERS, 1862-63

421

river was usually navigable during the winter and made
an easy communication with Wheeling as with the lower
towns. I was thus conveniently situated for most speed-
ily reaching every part of my command, in person or other-
wise. It took but a little while to get affairs so organized
that the routine of work ran on quietly and pleasantly.
No serious effort was made by the enemy to re-enter the
district during the winter, and except some local out-
breaks of "bush-whacking" and petty guerilla warfare,
there was nothing to interrupt the progress of the troops
in drill and instruction.

A good deal of obscurity still hangs about the subject
of guerilla warfare, and the relation of the Confederate
government to it. There was, no doubt, a good deal of
loose talk that found its way into print and helped form
a popular opinion, which treated almost every scouting
party as if it were a lawless organization of "bush-
whackers." But there was an authoritative and sys-
tematic effort of the Richmond government to keep up
partisan bodies within our lines which should be soldiers
when they had a chance to do us a mischief, and citizens
when they were in danger of capture and punishment.
When Fremont assumed command of the Mountain
Department, he very early called the attention of the
Secretary of War to the fact that Governor Letcher was
sending commissions into West Virginia, authorizing the
recipients to enlist companies to be used against us in
irregular warfare.^

The bands which were organized by the Confederate
Government under authority of law, but which were free
from the control of army commanders and unrestrained by
the checks upon lawlessness which are found in subordi-
nation to the operations of organized armies, were called
"Partisan Rp^^ers," and protection as legitimate soldiers
was promis. . them. They were not required to camp

1 O. R., vol. xii. pt iii- p. 75.

422 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

with the army, or to remain together as troops or regi-
ments. They wore uniforms or not, as the whim might
take them. They remained, as much as they dared, in
their home region, and assembled, usually at night, at
a preconcerted signal from their leaders, to make a " raid. "
They were not paid as the more regular troops were, but
were allowed to keep the horses which they captured or
"lifted." They were nominally required to turn over the
beef-cattle and army stores to the Confederate commis-
sariat, but after a captured wagon-train had been looted
by them, not much of value would be found in it. Their
raids were made by such numbers as might chance to be
got together. Stuart, the brilliant Confederate cavalry
commander, whilst crediting Mosby with being the best
of the partisans, said of him, " he usually operates with
only one-fourth of his nominal strength. Such organ iza*
tions, as a rule, are detrimental to the best interests of the
army at large."' General Lee, in forwarding one of
Mosby's reports, commended his boldness and good man-
agement, but added : " I have heard that he has now with
him a large number of men, yet his expeditions are under-
taken with very few, and his attention seems more
directed to the capture of sutlers* wagons, etc. , than to
the injury of the enemy's communications and outposts.
... I do not know the cause for undertaking his expedi-
tions with so few men ; whether it is from policy or the
difficulty of collecting them. I have heard of his men,
among them officers, being in rear of this army, selling
captured goods, sutlers' stores, etc. This had better be
attendee to by others. It has also been reported to me
that many deserters from this army have joined him.
Among them have been seen members of the Eighth Vir-
ginia Regiment."^ In the "Richmond Examiner" of
August 1 8, 1863 (the same date as General Lee's letter),
was the statement that "At a sale of Yankee plunder

1 O. R., vol. xxziii. p. 1083. * Id^ TOl xxiz. pt. tk p. 652.

WINTER QUARTERS, 186S-6S

423

taken by Mosby and his men, held at Charlottesville last
week, thirty-odd thousand dollars were realized, to be
divided among the gallant band." ^

The injury to the discipline of their own army grad-
ually brought leading officers of the Confederates to the
conviction that the " Partisan Rangers " cost more than
they were worth. In January, 1864, General Rosser, one
of the most distinguished cavalry officers of the South,
made a formal communication to General Lee on the sub-
ject. "During the time I have been in the valley," he
said, "I have had ample opportunity of judging of the
efficiency and usefulness of the many irregular bodies of
troops which occupy this country, known as partisans, etc,
and am prompted by no other feeling than a desire to
serve my country, to inform you that they are a nuisance
and an evil to the service. Without discipline, order, or
organization, they roam broadcast over the country, a
band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering, and
doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a
terror to the citizens and an injury to the cause. They
never fight; can't be made to fight. Their leaders are
generally brave, but few of the men are good soldiers, and
have engaged in this business for the sake of gain."^
After classifying the mischiefs to the regular service, he
continues : " It is almost impossible to manage the differ-
ent companies of my brigade that .ire from Loudoun, Fau-
quier, Fairfax, etc. , the region occupied by Mosby. They
see these men living at their ease and enjoying the com-
forts of home, allowed to possess all that they capture,
and their duties mere pastime pleasures compared with
their own arduous ones, and it is a natural consequence,
in the nature of man, that he should become dissatisfied
under these circumstances. Patriotism fails, in a long
and tedious war like this, to sustain the ponderous bur-
dens which bear heavily and cruelly upon the heart and

* O. R., vol xxix. pt. ii. p. 653. « /</., voJ. xxxiii. p. 1081.

424 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

soul of man." ^ General Rosser recommended the absorp-
tion of the partisan bodies into the ordinary brigades,
using their supposed talents for scouting by sending them
on expeditions as regular patrols and reconnoitring par-
ties, reporting to their proper command as soon as the
duty was done.

It was upon Rosser's communication that Stuart made
the endorsement already quoted, and Lee sent it forward
to the War Department, further endorsed thus : " As far
as my knowledge and experience extend, there is much
truth in the statement of General Rosser. I recommend
that the law authorizing these partisan corps be ab 1-
ished. The evils resulting from their organization more
than counterbalance the good they accomplish." The
Secretary of War, Mr. Siddon, drafted a bill to abolish
them, and it passed the Confederate House. Delay
occurring in the Senate, the matter was compromised by
transferring all the Rangers except Mosby's and McNeill's
to the line.* As it was to Mosby's that the reported facts
applied, and all agreed that his was the best of the lot,
we may imagine what must have been the character of
the rest.

In the first two winters of the war, these organizations
were in the height of their pernicious activity, and the
loyal West Virginians were their favorite victims. We
knew almost nothing of their organization, except that
they claimed some Confederate law for their being. We
seldom found them in uniform, and had no means of dis-
tinguishing them from any other armed horse-stealers and
" bush-whackers. " We were, however, made unpleasantly
certain of the fact that in every neighborhood where seces-
sion sentiments were rife, our messengers were waylaid
and killed, small parties were ambushed, and all the
exasperating forms of guerilla warfare were abundant
Besides all this, the Confederate authorities assumed to

1 O. R., vol. xxziii. p. io8i. ' Id., pp. 1082, 1253.

WiMlE^i C'J^RTF.RS, ISC ?t 425

call out the militia of coii-iiieb i^^tj which ^hey were in-
tending to make an e:'pe<'it»."n, 30 t^hat they might have
the temporary co-opera* ion *:: local troops. They claimed
the right to do this ue^ause they had not recognized the
separation of West ^^irginia, and insisted that the whole
was subject to the laws of Virginia. The result was that
the Union men formed companies of " Home Guards " for
self-protection, and the conflict of arms was carried into
every settlement in the mountain nooks and along the
valleys. In this kind of fighting there was no quarter
given, or if prisoners were taken, they were too often re-
ported as having met with fatal accidents before they
could be handed over to the regular authorities. As all
this could have no effect upon the progress of the war,
the more cool and intelligent heads of both sides opposed
it, and gradually diminished it. Severe measures against
it were in fact merciful, for the horrors of war are always
least when the fighting is left to the armies of responsible
belligerents, unprovoked by the petty but exasperating
hostilities of irregulars. The trouble from this source
was less during the winter of 1862-63 than it had been the
year before, but it still gave occupation to small movable
columns of our troops from time to time.

The organization of my staff was somewhat increased
with the enlargement of responsibilities. Lieutenant-
Colonel McElroy, who had been my adjutant-general in the
campaign of 1861, returned to me as inspector-general
and took the whole supervision of the equipment, drill,
and instruction of the troops of the district. Major Bas-
com, who had received his promotion at the same time
with mine, continued to be adjutant-general. The in-
creased work in looking after supplies made more force in
the commissariat a necessity, and Captain Barriger of
the regular army was sent to me, my former commissary.
Captain Treat, continuing on the staff. Barriger was a
modest, clear-headed officer of admirable business qualifi-

426 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

cations, whom I had the good fortune to be again assock-
ated with late in the war. Three principal depots of
supply were established at the bases of the principal lines
of communication in the district, — Wheeling, Parkers-
burg, and Gallipolis. At each of these, depot commis-
saries and quartermasters were located, and the posts and
commands at the front drew their supplies from them.
Captain Fitch, my quartermaster, supervised his depart-
ment in a similar way to that of the commissariat. My
aides were Captain Christie and Lieutenant Conine, as
before, and I added to them my brother, Theodore Cox,
who served with me as volunteer aide without rank in the
battles of South Mountain and Antietam, and was then
appointed lieutenant in the Eleventh Ohio Infantry. He
was my constant companion from this time till peace was
established. The medical department remained under
the care of Major Holmes, Brigade-Surgeon, who com-
bined scientific with administrative qualities in a rare
measure.

There was no military movement during the winter of
sufficient importance to be told at length. Constant
scouting and reconnoissances were kept up, slight skir-
mishes were not infrequent, but these did not prevent our
sense of rest and of preparation for the work of the next
spring. General Crook, with a brigade, was transferred
temporarily to the command of Rosecrans in Tennessee,
and Kelley, Milroy, and Scammon divided the care of the
three hundred miles of mountain ranges which made our
front. My own leisure gave me the opportunity for
some systematic and useful reading in military history
and art. An amusing interlude occurred in a hot contro-
versy which arose between General Milroy and one of his
subordinates which would not be worth mentioning ex-
cept for the fact that the subordinate had afterward a
world-wide notoriety as military chief of the Paris Com-
mune in 1870.

PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS 427

Gustave Cluseret was a Frenchman, who was appointed
in the spring of 1862 an aide-de-camp with the rank of
colonel upon the staff of General Fremont, who (with
questionable legality) assigned him to command a brigade,^
and recommended his appointment as brigadier for good
conduct in the May and June campaign against Jackson.
The appointment was made on October 14th,* and during
the fall and winter he had a brigade in Milroy's division.
Milroy was, for a time, loud in his praises of Cluseret as
the be.iu ideal of an officer, and their friendship was fra-
ternal.* In the winter, however, their mutual admiration
was nipped by a killing frost, and a controversy sprung
up between them which soon led to mutual recrimination
also in the superlative degree. They addressed their
complaints to General Hal leek, and as the papers passed
through my headquarters, I was a witness of their berat-
ing of each other. They made a terrible din, on paper,
for a while, but I cannot recall anything very serious in
their accusations. Halleck pigeon-holed their corre-
spondence, but Milroy had powerful political friends, and
Cluseret, learning that his appointment would not be
confirmed by the Senate, anticipated their action, and ter-
minated his military career in the United States by resign-
ing two days before the close of the session of Congress.*

This brings me to the subject of Congressional action
in the matter of the promotions and appointments in the
army during this winter session which closed the Thirty-
seventh Congress. By it I was myself to suffer the one
severe disappointment of my military career. The time
was one of great political excitement, for the fall elections
had resulted in a great overturning in the Congressional
delegations. The Democrats had elected so many repre-

^ O. R., vol. xii. pt. i. pp. 9, 35. * Anny Register, 1863, p. 95.

• O. R., vol. xxi. p. 779.

* Army Register, 1863, p. loi. His name does not appear in the lists
in the body of the Register, because he was not in the Army April i, 1863,
the date of publication.

428 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sentatives for the Thirty-eighth Congress that it was doubt-
ful whether the administration would be able to command
a majority in the House. The retirement of McCIellan
from the command had also provoked much opposition,
and in the lack of full knowledge of the reasons for dis-
placing him, political ones were imagined and charged.
Public policy forbade the President to make known all his
grounds of dissatisfaction with the general, and many of
his own party openly questioned his wisdom and his
capacity to govern. Men whose patriotism cannot be
questioned shared in this distrust, and in their private
writings took the most gloomy view of the situation and
of the future of the country. This was intensified when
Burnside was so bloodily repulsed at Fredericksburg at
the close of the first week of the session. *

As is usual in revolutionary times, more radical meas-
ures were supposed by many to be the cure for disasters,
and in caucuses held by congressmen the supposed con-
servatism of Mr. Lincoln and part of his cabinet was
openly denounced, and the earnestness of the army leaders
was questioned.^ Much of this was a misunderstanding

1 Mr. W. p. Cutler, Representative from Ohio, a modest but very intel-
ligent and patriotic man, wrote in his diary under December i6th : " This is
a day of darkness and peril to the country. . . . Lincoln himself seems to
have no nerve or decision in dealing with great issues. We are at sea, and
no pilot or captain. God alone can take cari? jf us, and all his ways seem to
be against us and to favor the rebels and their allies the Democrats. Truly
it is a day of darkness and gloom." " Life and Times " of Ephraim Cutler,
with biographical sketches of Jervis Cutler and W. P. Cutler, p. 296.

' Mr. Cutler reports a caucus of the House held January 27th, in which

" Mr. stated that the great difficulty was in holding the President to

anything. He prided himself on having a divided cabinet, so that he could
play one against the other. . . . The earnest men are brought to a deadlock
by the President. The President is tripped up by his generals, who for the
most part seem to have no heart in their work.** Id., p. 301. Mr. Cutler
himself expresses similar sentiments and reiterates: " It really seems as if
the ship of state was going to pieces in the storm." " How striking the
want of a leader. The nation is without a head." " The true friends of the
government are groping around without a leader," et& Id., pp. 297, 301,
302.

PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS 429

of the President and of events which time has corrected,
but at the moment and in the situation of the country it
was natural. It strongly affected the conduct of the fed-
eral legislators, and must be taken into the account when
we try to understand their attitude toward the army and
the administration of military affairs.

In the Senate, at a very early day after the opening of
the session, Mr. Wilson, chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs, offered a resolution (which passed with-
out opposition) calling upon the Secretary of War for " the
number and names of the major-generals and brigadier-
generals in the service of the United States, and where
and how they are employed."^ This was, no doubt, the
offspring of an opinion in vogue in Congress, that the
President had gone beyond the authority of law in the
number of these officers he had appointed. If this were
true, the course taken was not a friendly one toward the
administration. The whole list of appointments and
promotions would be submitted to the Senate for confir-
mation, and if the statutory number had been exceeded,
that body could stop confirming when it reached the legal
limit. There were, of course, frequent consultations be-
tween the Congressional committees or the individual
members and the Secretary of War ; but whatever efforts
there may have been to reach a quiet understanding
failed. On the 21st of January, che Secretary not having
responded to Mr. Wilson's resolution, Mr. Rice of Min-
nesota offered another (which also passed by unanimous
consent), directing che Secretary of War "to inform the
Senate whether any more major and brigadier generals
have been appointed and paid than authorized by law; and
if so, how many; give names, dates of appointment and
amounts paid."*

Two days later the Secretary sent in his reports in re-

1 Senate Journal, 3d Session, 37th Congress, Dec. 8, i86a.
« Id., Jan. 21, 1863.

430 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sponse to both resolutions. To the first he replied that the
interests of the public service would not permit him to
state " where and how " the general officers were employed,
but he gave the list of names. He gave also a separate
list of six major-generals who were not assigned to any
duty.* To the second resolution he replied that " It is
believed by this Department that the law authorizing the
increase of the volunteer and militia forces necessarily
implied an increase of officers beyond the number speci-
fied in the Act of July 17, 1862, to any extent required
by the service, and that the number of appointments is
not beyond such limit." If the limit of the statute
named were strictly applied, he said there would be found
to be nine major-generals and forty-six brigadier-generals
in excess. There had been no payments of increased
salary to correspond with the increased rank, except in
one instance.* The list submitted showed fifty two
major-generals in service, and one (Buford) was omitted,
so that if forty should prove to be the limit, there would
be thirteen in excess. This, however, was only appar-
ently true, for the Secretary's list included the four major-
generals in the regular army, whose case was not covered
by the limitation of the statute. This seems to have
been overlooked in the steps subsequently taken by mem-
bers of Congress, and as the action was unwelcome to the
President, he did not enlighten the legislators respecting
their miscalculation. The business proceeded upon the
supposition that the appointments in the highest rank
were really thirteen in excess of the number fixed by the
statute.

^ These were McClellan, Fremont, Cassias M. Clay, Buell (ordered
before a military commission), McDowell, and F. J. Porter (both before
military courts in connection with the second battle of Bull Run).

' Executive Documents of Senate, 3d Session, 37th Congress, Nos. 21
and 22. The nine major-generals were Schuyler Hamilton, Granger, Cox,
Rousseau, McPherson, Augur, Meade, Hartsoff, and N. B. Buford. If the
number were thirteen, it would include Foster, Parke, Schenck, and Hurlbut.

PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS 43*

The state of the law was this. The Act of July 22,
1861, authorized the President to call for volunteers, not
exceeding half a million, and provided for one brigadier-
general for four regiments and one major-general for
three brigades. The Act of 25th July of the same year
authorized a second call of the same number, and provided
for "such number of major-generals and brigadier-generals
as may in his (the President's) judgment be required for
their organization. " In the next year, however, a " rider "
was put upon the clause in the appropriation bill to pay
the officers and men of the volunteer service, which pro-
vided " that the President shall not be authorized to ap-
point more than forty major-generals, nor more than two
hundred brigadier-generals," and repealed former acts
which allowed more.* This limit just covered those who
had been appointed up to the date of the approval of the
appropriation bill. Two questions, however, were still
open for dispute. First, whether a "rider" upon the
appropriation should change a general law on the subject
of army organization, and second, whether the new limit
might not allow appointments to be thereafter made to the
extent of the numbers stated. The report of Mr. Stanton
evidently suggests such questions.

The matter was now in good shape for what politicians
call "a deal," and negotiations between members of
Congress and the executive were active. The result
appears to have been an understanding that a bill should
be passed increasing the number of general officers, so
as not only to cover the appointments already made, but
leaving a considerable margin of new promotions to be
filled by arrangement between the high contracting par-
ties. On the 1 2th of February, 1863, the Senate passed
a bill providing for the appointment of twenty major-

* The several acts referred to may be found in vol. xii. U. S. Statutes, at
Large, pp. 268, 274, 506. The appropriation bill was passed July S, 1862.
The date July 17, 1862, in the Secretary's report seems to be a misprint.

432 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

generals of volunteers and fifty brigadiers. This was not
acceptable to the House. The battle of Stone's River
had lately been fought in Tennessee, and representatives
from the West were urgent in arguing that affairs near
Washington unduly filled the view of the administration.
There was some truth in this. At any rate the House
amended the bill so as to increase the numbers to forty
major-generals and one hundred brigadiers, to be made
by promotions, for meritorious service, from lower grades.
As soon as it was known that the Military Committee of
the House would report such an amendment, it was as-
sumed that the Senate would concur, and a "slate" was
made up accordingly. On the hypothesis that the list of
major-generals was thirteen in excess of the forty fixed by
statute, a new list of twenty-seven was made out, which
would complete the forty to be added by the new bill.
A similar list was prepared for the brigadiers and pre-
cisely similar negotiations went on, but for brevity's sake
I shall confine myself to the list for the highest rank, in
which I was personally concerned.

The House passed the amended bill on the 27th of Feb-
ruary, and it went back to the Senate for concurrence in
the amendments. But now an unexpected difficulty arose.
The Senate refused to concur in the changes made by the
House. It matters little whether the senators were
offended at the determination of the lower House to have
so large a share in the nominations, or desired to punish
the President for having gone beyond the letter of the
law in his promotions of 1862; the fact was that they
voted down the amendments. A committee of conference
between the two houses was appointed, and a compromise
report was made fixing the additional number of major-
generals at thirty and of brigadiers at seventy-five. Both
Houses finally concurred in the report, the bill went to
the President on the ist of March, and he signed it on
the next day.

PROMOTIONS AND POUTICS

*33

There was but a single working-day of the session left,
for the session must end at noon of the 4th of March.
The list must be reduced. The manner in which this was
done clinches the proof, if there had been any doubt
before, that the list of twenty-seven was the result of
negotiations with congressmen. No meddling with that
list was permitted, though the use of patronage as
"spoils" had some very glaring illustrations in it. The
President had to make the reduction from his own promo-
tions made earlier, and which were therefore higher on
the list and in rank, instead of dropping those last added,
as had seemed to be demanded by the earlier action of
Congress. The only exception to this was in the case
of General Schofield, whose even-handed administration
of the District of Missouri and army of the frontier had
excited the enmity of extreme politicians in that State
and in Kinsas, led by Senator "Jim" Lane, the prince
of "jay-hawkers." Schofield was dropped from the
twenty-seven.

A few changes had occurred in the original roster
of officers^ making additional vacancies. Governor Mor-
gan of New York, who had a complimentary appoint-
ment as major-general, but had never served, resigned.
Schuyler Hamilton also resigned, and Fitz-John Porter
was cashiered.

The number to be sacrificed was thus reduced to six,
and the lot fell on Generals N. B. Buford, G. W. Morell,
W. F. Smith, H. G. Wright, J. M. Schofield, and myself.
The last four won their promotion a second time and were
re-appointed and confirmed at varying intervals; but of
that later. Of course, in such a scramble it was only a
question as to who had or had not powerful friends on the
spot who would voluntarily champion his cause. No one
at a distance could have any warning. The passage of the
bill and action under it came together. For myself, I
had gone quietly on in the performance of duty, never

VOL. I. — 28

434

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL W AR

dreaming of danger, and it was long years after the war
before I learned how the thing had in fact been done.
My place had been near the top of the list, the commands
which I had exercised and the responsibilities intrusted
to me had been greater than those of the large majority of
the appointees, and I had conclusive evidence of the
approval of my superiors. The news was at first, there-
fore, both astonishing and disheartening. As a result of
political "influences," it is sufficiently intelligible. I
had at that time a barely speaking acquaintance with
Senator Wade of Ohio. It was the same with Senator
Sherman, but with the added disadvantage that in the
senatorial contest of i860 between him and Governor
Dennison I had warmly espoused the cause of the latter,
Mr. Hutchins, the representative from my district, had
not been renominated, and Garfield, who was elected in
his place, had not yet taken his seat, but was still in the
military service in the field. Mr. Chase had been a con-
stant friend, but this was just the time when his differ-
ences with Mr. Lincoln had become acute, and since the
20th of December the President had in his hands the
resignations of both Seward and Chase, which enabled him
to refuse both, and to baffle the party in the Senate which
was trying to force him to reorganize his cabinet by ex-
cluding Seward ana those who were thought the more
conservative. As he expressed it. "he had a pumpkin in
each end of his bag, and could now ride."* If, on the
theory of apportioning the promotions to States, it were
held that Ohio must lose one. of the six nominated, it
was easy to see where the balance of influence would be.
General Halleck was well known to be persistent in
favoring appointments from the regular army, and would
urge that the reduction should be made from those orig-
inally appointed from civil life. These were Schenck
and myself. But General Schenck was a veteran member

* Hay and N'colay's " Lincoln," vol. vl. p. 871.

PROMOTIONS AND POUTICS 435

of the House of Representatives and had now been elected
to the next ^e, in which it was known he would be a
prominent c ;. ^cter. It goes without saying, therefore,
that on such a basis the black ball would come to me.'
To complete the story of the promotions made at this
time, it may be added that a short executive session of
the Senate was held after the regular adjournment of
Congress on the 4th of March, and that the President sent
in the names of Carl Schurz and Julius Stahel to be made
major-generals. For one of these a vacancy was made by
the arrangement that Cassius M. Clay was reappointed
minister to St. Petersburg and resigned the military rank
which he had never used. The other seems to have been
made by a resignation to take effect the next month.
General Sumner died on the 21st of March, making
another vacancy, but it is difficult to fix with accuracy
the exact date of the changes which occurred.* In the
case of the last two promotions Mr. Lincoln openly de-
clared that he made them in recognition of the German
element in the army and in politics.'

It would be unjust to assume that members of Con-
gress and the President were not guided by patriotic
motives. The reform of the public service in matters
of appointment had not then attracted much attention.
Patronage was used for political purposes with complete
frankness and openness. In civil offices this custom was
boldly defended and advocated. There was some con-

* The promotions of Ohio officers then pending, besides my own, were
of Schenck, McCook, Rosecrans, Stanley, McPherson, and Sheridan.

' The reason for this difficulty is in part found in the frequent assignment
of rank to officers from an earlier date than their appointment, and as the
official lists are arranged according to rank, they are sometimes misleading
as to date of appointment. Thus Rosecrans dates in the register from
March 21, 1862, but he was not appointed till some six months later. So
also Schofield wnen reappointed in May, 1S63, was made to rank as in his
first appointment, from Nov. 29, 1862.

* For an illustration of Mr. Lincoln's way of putting things in such
see " Military Miscellany" by Colonel James B. Fry, p. 281.

436 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

sciousness shown that promotions in the army ought to
be controlled by a somewhat different rule, but it seemed
to be thought that enough was done in the way of safe-
guard when the choice was confined to officers already in
service, and appointments for the highest grades were not
given to entirely new men from civil life. Each aspirant
could find friends to sound his praises, and it was easy
to assert that it was only giving preference to one's
friends among officers of equal merit. Many excellent
appointments were in fact made, and the proportion of
these would have been greater if the judgment of mili-
tary superiors had been more controlling in determining
the whole list. Mr. Lincoln's humorous way of explain-
ing his actions may give an impression of a lower stand-
ard than he actually acknowledged; but it cannot be
denied that he allowed himself to be pressed into making
military promotions, at times, upon purely political or
personal reasons.^

It did not seem to occur to the authorities that the
judgment of superior officers in the field should be called
for and carefully considered when it was a question of
promoting one of their subordinates. An instance which
occurred in General Buell's army carried this beyond the
verge of the grotesque. Colonel Turchin, of an Illinois
regiment, was a Russian, an educated officer who had
served in the Russian staff corps. An excellent soldier
in many respects, his ideas of discipline were, unfortu-
nately, lax, and in the summer of 1862 he was court-
martialled for allowing his men to pillage a town in

* Colonel Fry, who was assistant adjutant-general at Washington and in
personal intercourse with the President, gives the following as a memoran-
dum made by Mr. Lincoln himself in reference to an application to have a
re^/ular-army officer made a brigadier-general of volunteers. " On this day

Mrs. called upon me : she is the wife of Major — ^ of the regular

army. She 1 1 a saucy little woman, and I think she will torment me till I
have to do iL" Colonel Fry adds, " It was not long till that little woman's
husband was appointed a brigadier-general." Miscellany, pp. aSo, 281.

PROAfOTIONS AND POLITICS 437

Tennessee. The court was an intelligent one, of which
General Garfield was president. The story current in
the army at the time, and which I believe to be true, is
that after the court had heard part of the testimony it
became apparent that they must convict, and Mrs. Tur-
chin, who usually accompanied her husband in the field,
started to the rear to procure political " influences " to
save him. With various recommendations she went to
Washington, and was so successful that although the
sentence of the court lismissing him from the service
was promulgated on the 6th of August, he had been
appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers on the 5th,
and he was not one of those who were dropped from the
list on March 3, 1863.^ The trial was one of consider-
able notoriety, yet it is probable that it was overlooked
by the President and Secretary of War at the time the
appointment was made; but it cannot need to be said
that whatever grounds for leniency might have existed,
it turns the whole business into a farce when they were
made the basis of a promotion in the revised list six
months later. To add to the perfection of the story,
Mrs. Turchin had acted on her own responsibility, and
the colonel did not know of the result till he had gone
home, and in an assembly of personal friends who called
upon him ostensibly to cheer him in his doleful despond-
ency, his wife brought the little drama to its denouement
by presenting him with the appointment in their presence.
One of the worst features of the method of appointment
by "slate" made up between congressmen and the execu-
tive was that it filled up every place allowed by law, and
left nothing to be used as a recognition for future ser-
vices in the field, except as vacancies occurred, and
these were few and far between. The political influ-
ences which determined the appointment were usually
powerful enough to prevent dismissal. Whoever will

* O. R., vol. xvi. pt. ii. p. 277.

438 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

trace the employment of officers of the highest grades m
the last half of the war, will find large numbers of these
on unimportant and nominal duty, whilst their work in
the active armies was done by men of lower grade, to
whom the appropriate rank had to be refused. The sys-
tem was about as bad as could be, but victory was won in
spite of it. It was fortunate, on the whole, that we did
not have the grades of lieutenant-general and general
during the war, as the Confederates had. They made the
one the regular rank of a corps commander and the
other of the commtinder of an army in the field. With
us the assignment of a major-general by the President to
command a corps gave him a temporary precedence over
other major-generals not so assigned, and in like manner
for the commander of an army.* If these were relieved,
they lost the precedence, and thus there was a sort of
temporary rank created, giving a flexibility to the grade
of major-general, without which we should have been
greatly embarrassed. Grant's rank of lieutenant-general
was an exceptional grade, made for him alone, when,
after the battle of Missionary Ridge, he was assigned to
the command of all the armies.

These opinions of mine are not judgments formed after
the fact. The weak points in our army organization
were felt at the time, and I took every means in my
power to bring them, to the attention of the proper author-
ities, State and National. At the close of 1862 a com-
mission was appointed by the Secretary of War to revise
the articles of war and army regulations. Of this com-
mission Major-General Hitchcock was chairman. They
issued a circular calling for suggestions as to alterations
supposed to be desirable, and a copy was sent to me
among others. I took occasion to report the results of

* Our •ystem was essentiaily that of the first French Republic and tb«
Consulate, under; which any general of division was assignable to an anaf
command in chief.

PROMOTIONS AND POUTICS 439

my own experience, and to trace the evils which existed
to their sources in our military system. I called atten-
tion to the striking parallel between our practices and
those that had been in use in the first French Republic,
and to the identical mischiefs which had resulted.
Laxity of discipline, straggling, desertion, demagoguery
in place of military spirit, giving commissions as the
reward of mere recruiting, making new regiments instead
of filling up the old ones, absence of proper staff corps,
— every one of these things had been suffered in France
till they could no longer be endured, and we had faith-
fully copied their errors without profiting by the lesson.

In the freedom of private correspondence with Mr.
Chase I enlarged upon the same topics, and urged him to
get the serious attention of the President and the cabinet
to them. I gave him examples of the mischiefs that
were done by the insane efforts to raise new regiments
by volunteering when we ought to apply a conscription
as the only fair way of levying a tax on the physical
strength of the nation. I said : " I have known a lieu-
tenant to be forced by his captain (a splendid soldier) to
resign on account of his general inefficiency. I have
seen that same lieutenant take the field a few months
later as lieutenant-colonel of a new regiment, whilst the
captain still stood at the head of his fraction of a com-
pany in the line. This is not a singular instance, but an
example of cases occurring literally by the thousand in
our vast army during the year past. . . . Governor Tod
(of Ohio) said to me some time ago, with the deepest
sorrow, that he was well aware that in raising the new
regiments by volunteerin-^ !^he distribution of offices to
the successful recruiter as filling the army with incom-
petent men whom we should have to sift out again by
such process as we could! . . . Have we time for the
sifting process? Even if we had, how inefficient the
P''ocess itself when these officers have their commissions

440

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

in their pockets, and cannot be brought before a court or
a military commission till much of the mischief they
can do is accomplished, bad habits amongst the soldiers
formed, and the work of training them made infinitely
more difficult than with absolutely raw recruits. It was
in view of such probable results that I expressed the
hope that no more new regiments would be raised by
volunteering, when, in July last, the levy of an addi-
tional force was mooted. It seemed to me that the Presi-
dent could well say to the world, * Our people have shown
abundant proof of their enthusiasm in support of the
government by volunteering already to the number of
more than half a million, a thing unprecedented in the
world's history: we now, as a matter of military expedi-
ency, call for a draft to fill up the broken battalions. ' " *

I urged with equal frankness the need of giving unity
to the army by abolishing the distinction between regu-
lars and volunteers, and by a complete reorganization of
the staff. I said it seemed absurd that with nearly a
million of men in the field, the Register of the Army of
the United States should show an organization of some
twenty regiments only, of which scarce a dozen had
been in active service. " If a volunteer organization is fit
to decide the ^yeat wars of the nation, is it not ridiculous
to keep an expensive organization of regulars for the
petty contests with Indians or for an ornamental appen
dage to the State in peace? " The thing to be aimed at
seemed to me to be to have a system flexible enough to
provide for the increase of the army to any size required,
without losing any of the advantage of character or effi-
ciency which, in any respect, pertained to it as a regular
army. Circumstances to which I have already alluded,
probably prevented Mr. Chase from taking any active
part again in the discussion of army affairs in the cabi-
net. Probably many of the same ideas were urged upon

1 From private letter of Jan. i, 1863.

PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS

441

the President from other quarters, for there was much
agitation of the subject in the army and out of it. But
nothing came of it, for even the draft, when it became
the law, was used more as a shameful whip to stimulate
volunteering than as an honorable and right way to
fill the ranks of the noble veteran regiments. General
Sherman found, in 1864, the same wrong system thwart-
ing his efforts to make his army what it should be, and
broke out upon it in glorious exasperation.^

> letter to Halleck, Sept. 4, 1864. " To-morrow is the day for the draft,
and I feel more interested in it than in any event that ever transpired. I
do think it has been wrong to keep our old troops so constantly ander fire.
Some of these old regiments that we had at Shiloh and Corinth have been
with me ever since, and some of them have lost seventy per cent in battle
It looks hard to put these brigades, now numbering less than 800 men, into
battle. They feel discouraged, whereas, if we could have a steady influx of
recruits, the living would soon forget the dead. The wounded and sick are
lost to us, for once at a hospital, they become worthless. It has been a
Tery bad economy to kill off our best men and pay full wages and bounties
to the drift and substitutes." O. R., vol. xxzviii. pt. v. p. 793.

CHAPTER XXI

FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA — BURNSIDE IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO

Desire for field service — Changes in the Army of the Potomac — Judgment
of McClellan at that time — Our defective linowledge — Changes in West
Virginia — Errors in new organization — Embarrassments resulting —
Visit to General Schenck — New orders from Washington — Sent to
Ohio to administer the draft — Burnside at head of the department —
District of Ohio — Headquarters at Cincinnati — Cordial relations of
Governor Tod with the military authorities — System of enrolment and
draft — Administration by Colonel Fry — Decay of the veteran regiments

— Bounty-jumping — Effects on political parties — Soldiers voting —
Burnside's military plane — East Tennessee — Rosecrans aiming at
Chattanooga — Burnside's business habits — His frankness — Stories
about him — His personal characteristics — Cincinnati as a border city

— Rebel sympathizers — Order No. 38 — Challenged by Vallandigham

— The order not a new departure — Lincoln's proclamation — General
Wright's circular.

MY purpose to get into active field service had not
slept, and soon after the establishment of a
winter organization in the district, I had applied to be
ordered to other duty. My fixed conviction that no use-
ful military movements could be made across the moun-
tain region implied that the garrisons of West Virginia
should be reduced to a minimum and confined to the duty
of defending the frontier of the new State. The rest of
the troops might properly be added to the active columns
in the field. McClellan had been relieved of command
whilst I was conducting active operations in the Kanawha
valley, and Burnside suffered his repulse at Fredericks-
burg within a few days after I was directed to make my
headquarters at Marietta and perfect the organization of

FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA

443

the district. I was therefore at a loss to choose where I
would serve, even if I had been given cartt blancht to
determine my own woric. Enough was known of the
reasons for the President's dissatisfaction with McClcllan
to make me admit that the change of command was an
apparent necessity, yet much was unknown, and the full
strength of the President's case was not revealed till the
war was over. My personal friendship for McClellan
remained warm, and I felt sure that Hooker as a com-
mander would be a long step downward. In private I
did not hesitate to express the wish that McClellan
should still be intrusted with the command of the Poto-
mac army, that it should be btrongly reinforced, and that
by constant pressure upon its commander his indecision
of character might be overcome. Those who were near
to McClellan believed that he was learning greater self>
confidence, for the Antietam campaign seemed a decided
improvement on that of the Chickahominy. The event,
in great measure, justified this opinion, for it was not
till Grant took command a year later that any leadership
superior to McClellan' s was developed. Yet it must be
confessed that we did not know half the discouragements
that were weighing upon the President and his Secretary
of War, and which made the inertia of the Eastern army
demand a desperate remedy.

My personal affairs drifted in this way: the contest
over the lists of promotions, of which I knew next to
nothing, prevented any action on the request for a change
of duty, and the close of the session of Congress brought
the official notice that the promotion had expired by legal
limitation.* The first effect was naturally depressing,
and it took a little time and some philosophy to over-
come it ; but the war was not ended yet, and reflection
made the path of duty appear to be in the line of con-
tinued active service.

March 24th ; received the 30th.

444

KEAf/NrSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

To form a new department for General Schenck, West
Virginia was detached from the Department of the Ohio
and annexed to Maryland.* This was a mistake from a
military point of view, for not only must the posts near
the mountains be supplied and reinforced from the Ohio
as their base, toward which would also be the line of
retreat if retreat were necessary, but the frequent ad-
vances of the Confederate forces, through the Shenandoah
valley to the Potomac, always separated the West from
any connection with Baltimore, and made it impossible
for an officer stationed there (as General Schenck was) to
direct affairs in the western district at the very time of
greatest necessity.

Another important fact was overlooked. The river
counties of Ohio formed part of the district, and the
depots on the river were supplied from Cincinnati. Not
only was Gallipolis thus put in another department from
the posts directly dependent on that depot as a base of
supplies and the principal station for hospitals, but the
new boundary line left me, personally, and my head-
quarters in the Department of the Ohio. I at once called
the attention of the War Department to these results,
sending my communication in the first instance through
General Wright. He was in the same boat with myself,
for his rank had also been reduced on the 4th of March,
but he thought the intention must have been to transfer
me with the district to the Eastern Department. On
this I wrote to Washington direct, asking for definite
orders. I also wrote to General Schenck, telling him of
General Wright's supposition that I was transferred with
the district, and inquiring if he had any definite decision
of the question.'

About the 3d of April I was directed to report in per-
son to General Schenck at Baltimore,' and reached that
city on the 4th. My relations with General Schenck had

> O. R., vol. XXV. pt. ii. p. 145. * Jd^ pp. 159, i6a * Id., p. \^\

FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA 445

been, personally, cordial, and our friendship continued
till his death, many years after the war. Whatever plans
he may have had were set aside by orders from Washing-
ton, which met me at his headquarters, ordering me to
report at Columbus, Ohio, to assist the governor in
organizing the troops to be called out under the new
enrolment and conscription law. This was accompanied
by the assurance that this duty would be but temporary,
and that my desire to be assigned to active field duty
would then be favorably considered. It is not improb-
able that my report on army organization, which has
been mentioned, had something to do with this assign-
ment; but I did not ask permission to visit Washington,
though within a couple of hours' ride of the capital, and
hastened back to my assigned post. Besides my wish to
cut my connection with West Virginia on general mili-
tary theories of its insignificance as a theatre of war, my
stay there would have been intolerable, since General
Milroy, in whose judgment I had less confidence than in
that of any of my other subordinates, was, by the curious
outcome of the winter's promotions, the one of all others
who had been put over my head. I could not then fore-
see the cost the country would pay for this in the next
summer's campaign in the Shenandoah, but every instinct
urged me to sever a connection which could bode no
good. The reasonableness of my objection to serving
as a subordinate where I had been in command was
recognized, and the arrangement actually made was as
acceptable as anything except a division in an active
army.

It greatly added to my contentment to learn that Gen-
eral Bumside had been ordered to the Department of the
Ohio, and would be my immediate superior. I hastened
back to Marietta, closed up the business pending there,
and went to Columbus on the 9th of April. The arrange-
ment between Governor Tod and General Burnside proved

446 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

to be the formation of the Military District of Ohio,
including the whole State. I was placed in command of
this district, reporting directly to the general, who him-
self conferred with the governor. My own relations to
my superiors were thus made strictly military, which
was a much pleasanter thing for me than direct connec-
tion with the civil authorities would be; for this in-
volved a danger of cross-purposes and conflicting orders.
Brigadier-General John S. Mason, an excellent officer,
was ordered to report to me as my immediate subordinate
in command of the camps and the post at Columbus, and
before the end of the month Burnside directed me to fix
my own headquarters at Cincinnati, where I could be in
constant communication with himself. All this was
done with the most cordial understanding between Bum-
side and the governor. Indeed, nothing could be more
perfect than the genial and reasonable tone of Governor
Tod's intercourse with the military officers stationed in
Ohio.

My duties under the Enrolment Act turned out to be
very slight. The Act (passed March 3, 1863) made, in
general, each congressional district an enrolment dis-
trict under charge of a provost-marshal with the rank of
captain. A deputy provost-marshal supervised the en-
rolment and draft for the State, and the whole was
under the control of the provost-marshal -general at
Washington, Colonel James B. Fry. The law provided
for classification of all citizens capable of military duty
between the ages of twenty and forty-five, so as to call
out first the unmarried men and those not having fami-
lies dependent on them. The exemptions on account of
physical defects were submitted to joard of three, of
which the local provost-marshal waL chairman, and one
was a medical man. Substitutes might be accepted in
the place of drafted men, or a payment of three hundred
dollars would be taken in place of personal service, that

FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA 447

sum being thought sufficient to secure a voluntary re-
cruit by the government. The principal effect of this
provision was to establish a current market price for
substitutes.

The general provisions of the law for the drafting were
wise and well matured, and the rules for the subordinate
details were well digested and admirably administered
by Colonel Fry and his bureau. It was a delicate and
difficult task, but it was carried out with such patience,
honesty, and thoroughness that nothing better could be
done than copy it, if a future necessity for like work
should arise. There was no good ground for complaint,
and in those cases where, as in New York, hostile polit-
ical leaders raised the cry of unfairness and provoked
collision between the mob and the National authorities,
the victims were proved to be the dupes of ignorance and
malice. The administration of the law was thoroughly
vindicated, and if there were to be a draft at all, it could
not be more fairly and justly enforced.

There was room for difference of opinion as to some of
the provisions of the law regarding exemption and sub-
stitution, but the most serious question was raised by the
section which applied to old regiments and which had
nothing to do with the enrolment and draft. This sec-
tion directed that when regiments had become reduced in
numbers by any cause, the officers of the regiment should
be proportionately diminished. As new regiments were
still received and credited upon the State's liability
under the draft, it of course resulted that the old regi-
ments continued to decay. A public sentiment had been
created which looked upon the draft as a disgrace, and
the most extraordinary efforts were made to escape it.
Extra bounties for volunteering were paid by counties and
towns, and the combination of influences was so powerful
that it was successful in most localities, and very few
ioen were actually put in the ranks by the draft.

448

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

The offer of extra bounties to induce volunteering
brought into existence "bounty-jumping," a new crime
analogous to that of " repeating " at elections. A man
would enlist and receive the bounty, frequently several
hundred dollars, but varying somewhat in different places
and periods. He would take an early opportunity to
desert, as he had intended to do from the first. Chang-
ing his name, he would go to some new locality and
enlist again, repeating the fraud as often as he could
escape detection. The urgency to get recruits and for-
ward them at once to the field, and the wide country
which was open to recruiting, made the risk of punish-
ment very small. Occasionally one was caught, and he
would of course be liable to punishment as a deserter.
The final report of the provost-marshal-general mentions
the case of a criminal in the Albany penitentiary, New
York, who confessed that he had " jumped the bounty "
thirty-two times. ^

Another evil incidental to the excessive stimulus of
volunteering was a political one, which threatened seri-
ous results. It deranged the natural political balance of
the country by sending the most patriotic young men to
the field, and thus giving an undue power to the dis-
affected and to the opponents of the administration.
This led to the State laws for allowing the soldiers to
vote wherever they might be, their votes being certified
and sent home. In its very nature this was a makeshift
and a very dubious expedient to cure the mischief. It
would not have been necessary if we had had at an early
day a system of recruiting that would have drawn more
evenly from different classes into the common service of
the country.

The military officers of the department and district
had nothing to do with the enrolment and drafting,
unless resistance to the provost-marshals should make

1 Provost-Marshal-General's Report, p. 153.

DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO

4A9

military support for these officers necessary. We had
hoped to have large camps of recruits to be organized
and instructed, but the numbers actually drafted in Ohio,
in 1863, were insignificant, for reasons already stated.
Three or four very small post garrisons were the only
forces at my command, and these were reduced to the
minimum necessary to guard the prison camps and the
depots of recruiting and supply.

General Burnside had not come West with a purpose
to content himself with the retiracy of a department out
of the theatre of actual war. His department included
eastern Kentucky, and afforded a base for operations in
the direction of East Tennessee. Mr. Lincoln had never
lost his eagerness and zeal to give assistance to the loyal
mountaineers, and had arranged with Burnside a plan of
co-operation with Rosecrans by which the former should
move from Lexington, Ky., upon Knoxville, whilst the
latter marched from Muifreesboro, Tenn., upon Chat-
tanooga. This was better than the impracticable plan
of 1 861, which aimed at the occupation of East Ten-
nessee before Chattanooga had been taken, and the task
was at last accomplished by the method now used. It
was by no means the best or most economical method,
which would have been to have but one strong army till
Chattanooga were firmly in our hands, and then direct a
subordinate column upon the upper Holston valley. It
was utterly impossible to keep up a line of supply for an
army in East Tennessee by the wagon roads over the
mountains. The railroad through Chattanooga was in-
dispensable for this purpose. But Mr. Lincoln had not
fully appreciated this, and was discontented that both
Buel) and Rosecrans had in turn paid little attention, as
it seemed, to his desire to make the liberation of East
Tennessee the primary and immediate aim of their cam-
paigns. He had therefore determined to show his own
faith in Burnside, and his approval of the man, by giving

VOL. I. — 29

450

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

him a small but active army in the field, and to carry out
his cherished purpose by having it march directly over
the Cumberland Mountains, whilst Rosecrans was allowed
to carry out the plan on which the commanders of the
Cumberland army seemed, in the President's opinion, too
stubbornly bent.

Burnside's old corps, the Ninth, was taken from the
Army of the Potomac and sent to Kentucky, and a new
corps, to be called the Twenty-third, was soon author-
ized, to contain the Tennessee regiments which had been
in General Morgan's command, and two divisions made
up of new regiments organized in Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois under the last call for volunteers. To these were
added several Kentucky regiments of different ages in
service. General Parke, so long Burnside's chief of staff,
was to command the Ninth Corps, and Major-General
George L. Hartsuff was assigned to the Twenty-third.
In a former chapter I have spoken of Hartsuff' s abilities
as a staff officer in West Virginia.^ His qualities as a
general officer had not been tri-^d. He was wounded at
the beginning of the engagement at Antietam, where he
commanded a brigade in Hooker's corps. ^ That was his
first service under his appointment as brigadier, and he
had necessarily been out of the field since that time.
My own expectation was that he would make an excellent
reputation as a corps commander, but it was not his
fortune to see much continuous field service. His health
was seriously affected by his wounds, and after a short
trial of active campaigning he was obliged to seek more
quiet employment.

The establishment of my headquarters at Cincinnati
threw me once more into close personal relations with
Burnside, and enabled me to learn his character more
intimately. His adjutant-general's office was on East
Fourth Street, and most of the routine work was done

1 Chap, vi., ante.

* Chap. XV., ante.

DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 45 1

there. The general had his own quarters on Ninth
Street, where he had also an office for himself and his
aides-de-camp. My own office and the official head-
quarters of the district were or Broadway below Fourth,
in the house now occupied by the Natural History Soci-
ety. There was thus near half a mile between us, though
I was but a little way from the adjutant-general of the
department, through whose office my regular business
with the general went. Burnside, however, loved to dis-
cuss department affairs informally, and with the perfect
freedom of unrestrained social intercourse. When he
gave his confidence he gave it without reserve, and en-
couraged the fullest and freest criticism of his own plans
and purposes. His decisions would then be put in offi-
cial form by the proper officers of the staff, and would
be transmitted, though I was nearly always personally
aware of what was to be ordered before the formal papers
reached me. He had very little pride of opinion, and
was perfectly candid in weighing whatever was contrary
to his predilections; yet he was not systematic in his
business methods, and was quite apt to decide first and
discuss afterward. He never found fault with a subordi-
nate for assuming responsibility or acting \. ithout orders,
provided he was assured of his earnest good purpose in
doing so. In such cases he would assume the responsi-
bility for what was done as cheerfully as if he had
given the order. In like manner he was careless of
forms himself, in doing whatever seemed necessary or
proper, and might pass by intermediate officers to reach
immediately the persons who were to act or the things
to be done. There was no intentional slight to any
one in this : it was only a characteristic carelessness of
routine. Martinets would be exasperated by it, and
would be pretty sure to quarrel with him. No doubt it
was a bad business method, and had its mischiefs and
inconveniences. A story used to go the rounds a little

452

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

later that soldiers belonging to the little army in East
Tennessee were sometimes arrested at their homes and
sent back as deserters, when they would produce a fur-
lough written by Burnside on a leaf of his pocket memo-
randum-book, which, as they said, had been given by
him after hearing a pitiful story which moved his sym-
pathies. Such inventions were a kind of popular recog-
nition of his well-known neglect of forms, as well as of
his kind heart. There waw an older story about him, to
the effect that, when a lieutenant in the army, he had been
made post-quartermaster at some little frontier garrison,
and that his accounts and returns got into such confusion
that after several pretty sharp reminders the quarter-
master-general notified him, as a final terror, that he
would send a special officer and subject him and his
papers to a severe scrutiny. As the story ran, Burnside,
in transparent honesty, wrote a cordial letter of thanks
in reply, saying it was just what he desired, as he had
been trying hard to make his accounts up, but had to
confess he could do nothing with them, but was sure
such an expert would straighten them. In my own ser-
vice under him I often found occasion to supply the
formal links in the official chain, so that business would
move on according to "regulations;" but any trouble
that was made in this way was much more than com-
pensated by the generous trust with which he allowed
his name and authority to be used when prompt action
would serve the greater ends in view.

My habit was to go to his private quarters on Ninth
Street, when the regular business of the day was over,
and there get the military news and confer with him on
pending or prospective business affecting my own dis-
trict. His attractive personality made him the centre of
a good deal of society, and business would drop into the
background till late in the evening, when his guests
voluntarily departed. Then, perhaps after midnight, he

DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 453

would take up the arrears of work and dictate letters,
orders, and dispatches, turning night into day. It not
unfrequently happened that after making my usual official
call in the afternoon, I had gone to my quarters and to
bed at my usual hour, when I would be roused by an
orderly from the general begging that I would come up
and consult with him on some matter of neglected busi-
ness. He was always brij;^,ht and clear in those late
hours, and when he buckled to work, rapidly disposed
of it.

He did not indulge much in retrospect, and rarely re-
ferred to his misfortunes in the Army of the Potomac.
On one or two occasions he discussed his Fredericksburg
campaign with me. The delay in sending pontoons from
Washington to Falmouth, which gave Lee time to con-
centrate at Fredericksburg, he reasonably argued, was
the fault of the military authorities at Washington ; but
I could easily see that if his supervision of business had
been more rigidly systematic, he would have made sure
that he was not to be disappointed in his means of cross-
ing the Rappahannock promptly. As to the battle itself
he steadily insisted that the advance of Meade's division
proved that if all the left wing had acted with equal
vigor and promptness, Marye's heights would have been
turned and carried. It is due to him to repeat that in
such discussions his judgment of men and their motives ^

was always kind and charitable. I never heard him say
anything bitter, even of those whom I knew he distrusted. *

At the time I am speaking of, Cincinnati was in a
curious political and social condition. The advance
through Kentucky of Bragg and Kirby Smith in the pre-
ceding year had made it a centre for " rebel sympathizers."
The fact that a Confederate army had approached the
hills that bordered the river had revived the hopes and
the confidence of many who, while wishing success to the
Southern cause, had done sc in a vague and distant way.

454 HEM/N/SCEA'CES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Now it seemed nearer to them, and the stimulus to per.
sonal activity was greater. There was always, in the
city, a considerable and influential body of business men
who were of Southern families; and besides this, the
trade connections with the South, and the personal
alliances by marriage, made a ground of sympathy which
had noticeable effects. There were two camps in the
community, pretty distinctly defined, as there were in
Kentucky. The loyal were ardently and intensely so.
The disloyal were bitter and not always restrained by
common prudence. A good many Southern women,
refugees from the theatre of active war, were very open
in their defiance of the government, and in their efforts
to aid the Southern armies by being the bearers of intel-
ligence. The " contraband mail " was notoriously a large
and active one.

Burnside had been impressed with this condition of
things from the day he assumed command. His prede-
cessor had struggled with it without satisfactory results.
It was, doubtless, impossible to do more than diminish
and restrain the evil, which was the most annoying
of the smaller troubles attending the anomalous half-
military and half-civil government of the department.
Within three weeks from his arrival in Cincinnati, Burn-
side was so convinced of the widespread and multiform
activity of the disloyal element that he tried to subdue it
by the publication of his famous General Order No. 38.
The reading of the order gives a fair idea of the hostile
influences he found at work, for of every class named by
him there were numerous examples.^ It was no doubt

1 The text of the order is as follows : . U -:

" General Orders. I Headquarters Department of th'? Ohio.

No. 38. ) • Cincinnati, Ohio, April 13, 1863.

The con.\manding general publishes, for the information of all concerned,
that hereafter all persons found within our lines who commit acts for the
benefit of the ciiej:.-.iv.-3 of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and,
if convicted, wil' suffer death. This order includes the following classes of
persons : Carriers of secret mails ; writers of letters sent by secret mails '•

DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 455

true that the Confederate authorities had constant corre-
spondence with people in the Northern States, and that
systematic means were used to pass information and con-
traband merchandise through the lines. Quinine among
drugs, and percussion caps among ordnance stores were
the things they most coveted, and dealers in these car-
ried on their trade under pretence of being spies for each
side in turn. But besides these who were merely mer-
cenary, there were men and women who were honestly
fanatical in their devotion to the Confederate cause. The
women were especially troublesome, for they often seemed
to court martyrdom. They practised on our forbearance
to the last degree ; for they knew our extreme unwilling-
ness to deal harshly with any of their sex. Personally, I
rated the value of spies and informers very low, and my
experience had made me much more prone to contempt
than to fear of them. But examples had to be made
occasionally; a few men were punished, a few women
who belonged in the South were sent through the lines,
and we reduced to its lowest practical terms an evil and
nuisance which we could not wholly cure. The best
remedy for these plots and disturbances at the rear
always was to keep the enemy busy by a vigorous aggres-
sive at the front. We kept, however, a species of
provost court pretty actively at work, and one or two

secret recruiting officers within the lines ; persons who have entered into an
agreement to pass our lines for the purpose of joining the enemy ; persons
found concealed within our lines, belonging to the service of the enemy;
and, in fact, all persons found improperly within our lines who could give
private infcmation to the enemy; and all persons within our lines who
harbor, protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies of our
country. The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed
in this department. Persons committing such offences will be at once
arrested with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines
into the lines of their friends. It must be distinctly understood that treason,
expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department. All officers
and soldiers are strictly charged with the execution of this order.
By command of Major-General Burnside,

Lewis Richmond, Assistant Adjutant GeneraL"

45^ REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

officers were assigned to judge-advocate's duty, who ran
these courts under a careful supervision to make sure that
they should not fall into indiscretions.

So long as the hand of military power was laid only on
private persons who were engaged in overt acts of giving
aid and comfort to the rebellion in the ways specified
in Order No. 38, there was little criticism. But the
time came when General Burnsidc seemed to be chal-
lenged by a public character of no little prominence to
enforce his order against him. The Vallandigham case
became the sensation of the day, and acquired a singular
historical importance. The noise which was made about
it seemed to create a current opinion that Burnside's
action was a new departure, and that his Order No. 38
was issued wholly on his own responsibility. This was
not so. In the preceding year, and about the time of his
Emancipation Proclamation, the President had also pro-
claimed against treasonable practices in very emphatic
terms. He had declared that " all rebels and insurgents,
their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and
all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting
militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, afford-
ing aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the
United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable
to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military
commission." ^

Burnside's order was in strict accordance with this
authority, and he had no ultimate responsibility for the
policy thus proclaimed. He was simply reiterating and
carrying out in his department the declared purpose of
the administration. Even in the matter of newspaper
publications, his predecessor. General Wright, had felt
obliged, upon Bragg and Kirby Smith's invasion of Ken-

1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi. p. 98. See also Order
No. 42 of General Burbridge, commanding District of Kentucky. O. R.,
vol. xxxix. pt. ii. p. 27.

DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO

457

tucky, to put a stop to treasonable editorials and to the
publication of military information likely to benefit the
enemy. He issued a circular on September 13, 1862,
notifying the publishers of the Cincinnati papers that
the repetition of such offence would be immediately fol-
lowed by the suppression of the paper and the arrest and
confinement of the proprietors and writers.^ It is neces-
sary to keep these facts in mind if we would judge fairly
of Burnside's responsibility when it was his fortune
to apply the rule to a case attracting great public
attention.

1 O. R., vol. xTi. pt. ii. p. 514. See a characteristic letter by Sherman on
this subject, Id., vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 765: " Now I am again in authority
over you, and you must heed my advice. Freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, precious relics of former history, must not be construed too
largely. You must print nothing that prejudices government or excites
envy, hatred, and malice in a community. Persons in office or out of office
must not be flattered or abused. Don't publish an account of any skirmish,
battle, or movement of an army, unless the name of the writer is given in
full and printed. I wish you success; but my first duty is to maintain
' order and harmony.' " (To editors of " Memphis Bulletin.")

r-^

CHAPTER XXII

THE VALLANDIGHAM CASE — THE HOLMES COUNTY WAR

Clement L. Vallandigham — His opposition to the war. — His theory of
reconstruction — His Mount Vernon speech — His arrest — Sent before
the military commission — General Potter its president — Counsel for
the prisoner — The line of defence — The judgment — Habeas Corpus
proceedings — Circuit Court of the United States — Judge Leavitt denies
the release — Commutation by the President — Sent beyond the lines —
Conduct of Confederate authorities — Vallandigham in Canada — Candi-
date for Governor — Political results — Martial law — Principles under-
lying it — Practical application — The intent to aid the public enemy
— The intent to defeat the draft — Armed resistance to arrest of de-
serters, Noble County — To the enrolment in Holmes County — A real
insurrection — Connection of these with Vallandigham's speeches — The
Supreme Court refuses to interfere — Action in the Milligan case after
the war — Judge Davis's personal views — Knights of the Golden Circle
— The Holmes County outbreak — Its suppression — Letter to Judge
Wclker.

CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM had been repre-
sentative in Congress of the Montgomery County
district of Ohio, and lived at Dayton. He was a man of
^> .^ intense and saturnine character, belligerent and denuncia-

tory in his political speeches, and extreme in his views.
He was the leader in Ohio of the ultra element of oppo-
sition to the administration of Mr. Lincoln, and a bitter
opponent of the war. He would have prevented the
secession of the Southern States by yielding all they de-
manded, for he agreed with them in thinking that their
demands for the recognition of the constitutional invio-
lability of the slave system were just. After the war
began he still advocated peace at any price, and vehe-

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 459

mently opposed every effort to subdue the rebellion.
To his mind the war was absolutely unconstitutional on
the part of the national government, and he denounced
it as tyranny and usurpation. His theory seemed to be
that if the South were "let alone," a reconstruction of
the Union could be satisfactorily effected by squelching
the anti-slavery agitation, and that the Western States,
at any rate, would find their true interest in uniting with
the South, even if the other Northern States should
refuse to do so. Beyond all question he answered to the
old description of a " Northern man with Southern prin-
ciples," and his violence of temper made it all a matter of
personal hatred with him in his opposition to the leaders
of the party in power at the North. His denunciations
were the most extreme, and his expressions of contempt
and ill-will were wholly unbridled. He claimed, of
course, that he kept within the limits of a "constitutional
opposition," because he did not, in terms, advise his
hearers to combine in armed opposition to the government.
About the first of May he addressed a public meeting
at Mount Vernon in central Ohio, where, in addition to
his diatribes against the Lincoln administration, he de-
nounced Order No. 38, and Burnside as its author. His
words were noted down in short-hand by a captain of
volunteers who was there on leave of absence from the
army, and the report was corroborated by other reputable
witnesses. He charged the administration with design-
ing to erect a despotism, with refusing to restore the
Union when it might be done, with carrying on the war
for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of
the whites. He declared that the provost-marshals for
the congressional districts were intended to restrict the
liberties of the people; that courts-martial had already
usurped power to try citizens contrary to law; that he
himself would never submit to the orders of a military
dictator, and such were Burnside and his subordinates;

46o REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

that if those in authority were allowed to accomplish
their purposes, the people would be deprived of their
liberties and a monarchy established. Such and like ex-
pressions, varied by "trampling under his feet" Order
No. 38, etc., made the staple of his incendiary speech.

When the report was made to Burnside and he had
satisfied himself of its substantial truth, he promptly
accepted the challenge to test the legality of his order,
and directed the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. It was
characteristic of him that he did not consult with his
subordinates or with lawyers. He did not even act
through my district organization, but sent his own aide-
de-c?imp with a guard to make the arrest at Dayton. My
recollection is that I did not know of the purpose till it
was accomplished. His reason for direct action, no doubt,
was that if there were many links in the chain of routine,
there were multiplied chances of failure. He did not
want to be baffled in the arrest, or to give the opportu-
nity for raising a mob, which there would be if his pur-
poses were to become known in advance.

The arrest was made in the early morning of the 5th
of May, before dawn, and the prisoner was brought to
Cincinnati. He was at first taken under guard to the
Burnet House, where he breakfasted, and was then put
in the military prison connected with the houses used as
barracks for the troops in the city. A military commis-
sion had been ordered on the 21st of April from Depart-
ment Headquarters for the trial of the classes of offenders
named in Order No. 38, and of this commission Brigadier-
General R. B. Potter of the Ninth Corps was President.
General Potter was a distinguished officer throughout the
war. He was a brother of Clarkson N. Potter, the promi-
nent lawyer and Democratic member of Congress later,
and both were sons of the Episcopal Bishop Potter of
Pennsylvania. The character of the whole court was
very high for intelligence and standing. Before this

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 46 1

court Mr. Vallandigham was arraigned on the charge of
publicly expressing sympathy with those in arms against
the government, and uttering disloyal sentiments and
opinions with intent to weaken the power of the govern-
ment in its efforts to suppress the rebellion.

Vallandigham consulted with the Hon. George E.
Pugh and others as his counsel, and then adopted the
course of protesting against the jurisdiction of the court
and against the authority for his arrest. His grounds
were that he was not amenable to any military jurisdic-
tion, and that his public speech did not constitute an
offence known to the Constitution and laws. To avoid
the appearance of waiving the question of jurisdiction,
his counsel did not appear, though offered the opportu-
nity to do so, and Mr. Vallandigham cross-examined the
witnesses himself, and called those who testified for him.
The question of fact raised by him was that he had not
advised forcible resistance to the govermncnt, but had
urged action at the elections by defeating the party in
power at the polls. That he did not in terms advocate
insurrection was admitted by the judge advocate of the
court, but the commi.ssion were persuaded that the effect
of his speech was intended and well calculated to be
incendiary, and to arouse any kind of outbreak in sym-
pathy with the armed enemies of the country. The trial
ended on the 7th of May, but the judgment was not pro-
mulgated till the i6th, proceedings in habeas corpus hav- ^/T
ing intervened. The finding of the court was that the ^ '
prisoner was guilty, as charged, and the sentence was
close confinement in Fort Warren, Boston harbor, during
the continuance of the war.

On the 9th of May Mr. Pugh made application to the
United States Circuit Court, Judge Leavitt sitting, for a
writ of habeas corpus directed to General Burnside, in
order that the lawfulness of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest
and trial might be tested. The court directed notice of

'i'-;,': '•

462 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the application to be given to the general, and set the
nth for the hearing. The case was elaborately argued by
Mr. Pugh for the prisoner, and by Mr. Aaron F. Perry and
the District Attorney Flamen Ball for General Burnside.
The hearing occupied several days, and the judgment
of the court was given on the morning of the i6th.
Judge Leavitt refused the writ on the ground that, civil
war being flagrant in the land, and Ohio being under the
military command of General Burnside by appointment
of the President, the acts and offences described in Gen-
eral Order No. 38 were cognizable by the military author-
ities under the powers of war.

General Burnside had awaited the action of the court,
and now promulgated the sentence under the judgment of
the military commission. Three days later (May 19th)
the President commuted the sentence by directing that
Mr. Vallandigham be sent "under secure guard, to the
headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by him
beyond our military lines, and that in case of his return
within our line, he be arrested and kept in close custody
for the term specified in his sentence." This was done
accordingly. The Confederate officials adopted a careful
policy of treating him courteously without acknowledging
that he was one of themselves, and facilities were given
him for running the blockade and reaching Canada.
There he established himself on the border and put him-
self in communication v/ith his followers in Ohio, by
'^. whom he was soon nominated for the Governorship of the
State.

The case, of course, excited great public interest, and
was, no doubt, the occasion of considerable embarrass-
ment to the administration. Mr. Lincoln dealt with it
with all that shrewd practical judgment for which he
was so remarkable, and in the final result it worked to
the political advantage of the National cause. Sending
Vallandigham beyond the lines took away from him the

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 463

personal sympathy which might have been aroused had
he been confined in one of the casemates of Fort Warren,
and put upon him an indelible badge of connection with
the enemies of the country. The cautious action of the
Confederates in regard to him did not tend to remove
this : for it was very apparent that they really regarded
him as a friend, and helped him on his way to Canada
in the expectation that he would prove a thorn in Mr.
Lincoln's side. The President's proposal to the leading
politicians who applied to him to rescind the sentence,
trat as a condition of this they should make certain
declarations of the duty to support the government in a
vigorous prosecution of the war, was a most telling bit
of policy on his part, and took the sting entirely out of
the accusations of tyranny and oppression.

It must be admitted, however, that the case was one in
which the administration ought to have left Bumside
wholly untrammelled in carrying out the proclamation of
September 25, 1862, or should have formulated a rule
for its military officers, so that they would have acted
only in accordance with the wishes of the government, and
in cases where the full responsibility would be assumed
at Washington. When Burnside arrested Mr. Vallandig-
ham, the Secretary of War telegraphed from Washington
his approval, saying, " In your determination to support
the authority of the government and suppress treason in
your department, you may count on the firm support of
the President." ^ Yet when a little later Bumside sup-
pressed the " Chicago Times " for similar utterances, the
President, on the request of Senator Trumbull, backed
by prominent citizens of Chicago, directed Burnside to
revoke his action.'* This the latter did by General Order
No. 9!, issued on the 4th of June. He read to me on
June 7th a letter from Mr. Stanton, which practically
revoked the whole of his Order No. 38 by directing him

1 O. R., vol, xxiii. pt. ii. p. 316. * Id., pp. 385, 386.

■•"^

464 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

not to arrest civilians or suppress newspapers without
conferring first with the War Department. This would
have been very well if it had been done at the begin-
ning; but to have it come after political pressure from
the outside, and in so marked contradiction to the ap-
proval first expressed, shows that there was no well-con-
sidered policy. It put Burnside himself in an intolerable
position, and, of course, made him decline further respon-
sibility for such affairs in his department.*

The whole question as to the right and the policy of
military arrests and orders in such a time bristles with
difficulties. Had I been consulted before Burnside took
action, I should have advised him to collect carefully
the facts and report them to Washington, asking for
specific instructions. The subject called for directions
which would be applicable in all the military depart-
ments which included States out of the theatre of active
warlike operations; an', <?uch general directions should
be given by the government. But Burnside was apt to
act impulsively, and his impulse was to follow the bent
of his ardent patriotism. He was stirred to burning
wrath by what seemed to him an intent to give aid and
comfort to the rebellion, and meant to punish such con-
duct without stopping to ask what complications might
come of it.

I had found it desirable to form a judgment of my own
with reference to th*^ f'xtent or limitation of military
authority in the actual circumstances, and I quote the
form in which I then cast it, so that I may not seem to
be giving opinions formed ufter my own military duties
were ended. I concluded, ''Firsc: That martial law
operates either by reason of its proclamation by com-
petent authority, or ex necessitate ret m the immediate

* I do not find in the Official Records the letter of Mr. Stanton above
referred to ; but I speak of it from a written memorandum I made at the
time.

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 465

theatre of military operations. Second; That when the
struggle is in the nature of a revolution, and so long as
the attempted revolution is in active progress, no definite
limits can be given to the 'theatre of operations,' but
the administration must be regarded as possessing a
limited discretionary power in the use of martial law."
As to the practical application of this power, "the pre-
sumptions are always in favor of the established civil law
of the land, whenever and wherever it has a reasonable
chance of unobstructed operation. In a State or portion
of the country not the theatre of actual fighting, and
where the civil courts are actually organized and working,
there must be some strong reason for sending criminals
or State prisoners before a military tribunal; such as
that the government had reason to believe that a con-
spiracy was so powerful as to make an actual present
danger of its overthrowing the loyal governments in
some of the States before the civil courts could act in
the ordinary process of business. In such a case, the
arrest and admission to bail of the conspirators might
be only the signal for their adherents to seize the reins
of civil power, overthrow the courts, and consummate a
revolution. The quick and summary action of military
power would then be the only thing which could avert
the danger. The justification of the use of a military
tribunal depends on the existence of ' probable cause *
for believing the public danger to be great."

I see no reason to change the form of stating the prin-
ciple I then adopted. The limitations given it seem
sufficient to secure proper caution in applying it, and
will show that I thought then, as I do now, that the
administration ought to have laid down rules by which
the commandants of military departments could be
guided, and which would have saved us from the weak-
ness of acting with seeming vigor on one day, only to
retreat from our position the next.
Vol. I, — 30

'^.

466 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

In Vallandigham's case the common argument was
used by his friends that he was not exceeding a lawful
liberty of speech in political opposition to the adminis-
tration. When, however, a civil war is in progress, it is
simply a question of fact whether words used are intended
to give aid and comfort to the enemy and are evidence
of conspiracy with the public enemy. If so, it is too
clear for argument that the overt acts of the enemy are
brought home to all who combine and confederate with
them, and all are involved in the same responsibility.
This question of fact and intent was officially settled by
the findings of the military court. But there was another
connection of the speech with overt acts, which the pub-
lic mind took firm hold of. Among the most incen liary
of Vallandigham's appeals had been those which urged
the people to resist the provost-marshals in the several
districts. It is nonsense to say that resisting the draft
or the arrest of deserters only meant voting for an oppo-
sition party at the elections. There had been armed
and organized resistance to arrest of deserters in Noble
County just before his speech, and soon after it there was
a still more formidable armed organization with warlike
action against the enrolling officers in Holmes County,
in the same region in which the speech was made.
This last took the form of an armed camp, and the in-
surgents did not disperse till a military force was sent
against them and attacked them in fortified lines, where
they used both cannon and musketry. It did not seem
plausible to the common sense of the people that we
could properly charge with volleying musketry upon the
barricades of the less intelligent dupes, whilst the leader
who had incited and counselled the resistance was to be
held to be acting within the limits of proper liberty of j
speech. Law and common sense are entirely in harmony
in regarding the conspiracy as a unit, the speech at
Mount Vernon and the armed collision on the Holmes

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 467

County hill being parts of one series of acts in which
the instigator was responsible for the natural conse-
quences of the forces he set in motion.

To complete the judicial history of the Vallandigham
case, it may be said that he applied to the Supreme Court
of the United States a few months afterward for a writ
to revise and examine the proceedings of the military
commission and to determine their legality. The court
dismissed his application on the ground that the writ
applied for was not a legal means of bringing the pro-
ceedings of the military court under review. The charges
and specifications and the sentence were all set forth in
the application, so that the court was made officially
aware of the full character of the case. This was natu-
rally accepted at the time as practically sustaining the
action of the President and General Burnside. When,
however, the war was over, there was taken up to the
Supreme Court the case of Milligan from Indiana, who
had been condemned to death for treasonable conduct in
aid of the rebellion, done as a member of the Knights of
the Golden Circle, an organization charged with overt
acts in attempting to liberate by force the Confederate
prisoners of war in the military prisons, and otherwise
to assist the rebellion. The current public sentiment in
regard to executive power had unquestionably changed
with the return to peace, and Lincoln having been assas-
sinated and Johnson being in the presidential chair, the
tide was running strongly in favor of congressional rather
than executive initiative in public affairs. It cannot be
denied that the court responded more or less fully to the
popular drift, then as in other important historical junc-
tures. In the opinion as delivered by Judge Davis, it
went all lengths in holding that the military commission
could not act upon charges against a person not in the
military service, and who was a citizen of the State where
tried, when in such State the civil courts were not actu*

468 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

ally suspended by the operations of war. Chief Justice
Chase and three of the justices thought this was going
too far, and whilst concurring in discharging Milligan,
held that Congress could authorize military commissions
to try civilians in time of actual war, and that such mili-
tary tribunals might have concurrent jurisdiction with
the civil courts.*

We must not forget that whilst the judicial action
determines the rights of the parties in a suit, the execu-
tive has always asserted his position as an independent
co-ordinate branch of the government, authorized by the
Constitution to determine for himself, as executive, his
duties, and to interpret his powers, subject only to the
Constitution as he understands it. Jefferson, Jackson,
and Lincoln in turn found themselves in exigencies where
they held it to be their duty to decide for themselves on
their high political responsibility in matters of constitu-
tional power and duty. Lincoln suspended the privilege
of habeas corpus by his own proclamation, and adhered to
his view, although Judge Taney in the Circuit Court
for Maryland denied his power to do so. When Con-
gress passed a regulating act on the subject which seemed
to him sufficient, he signed the statute because he was
quite willing to limit his action by the provisions em-
bodied in it, and not because he thought the act neces-
sary to confer the power.

An incident in the history of the treasonable organiza-
tions believed to exist in Indiana emphasizes the change
of mental attitude of Judge Davis between 1863 and 1866.
During the progress of the Vallandigham case, General
Burnside conceived a distrust of the wisdom of the
course pursued by Brigadier-General Carrlngton, who
commanded at Indianapolis, and sent Brigadier-General
Hascall there to command that district. Carrington had

^ Ex parte Vallandigham, Wallace's Reports, i. 243. £x parte Milligaiit
Id., iv. 2, etc.

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 469

been the right hand of Governor Morton in ferreting out
the secrets of the Golden Circle, and applying Order No.
38 to them, but Burnside's lack of confidence in the cool-
headed caution and judgment of his subordinate led him
to make the change. Hascall was a brave and reliable
Indiana officer, who had seen much active field service,
and with whom I was associated in the Twenty-third
Corps during the Atlanta campaign. He was ardently
loyal, but an unexcitable, matter-of-fact sort of person.
He did not suit Governor Morton, who applied to the
Secretary of War to have him removed from command,
declaring that immediate action was important. Judge
Davis, who was in Indianapolis, was induced to co-operate
with the governor in the matter, and telegraphed to Mr.
Stanton that Hascall 's removal was demanded by the
honor and interests of the government.* Hascall was
sent to the field, and after a short interval Carrington
was restored to duty at Indianapolis. In the continued
investigation and prosecution of the Golden Circle, and
finally in the trial of Milligan, General Carringfton was,
under Governor Morton, the most active instrument; and
it was, of course, to keep him at work on that line that
the changes in command were secured. Yet it was the
fruit of this very work of Carrington that was so strongly
and sweepingly declared to be illegal by the Supreme
Court, Judge Davis himself delivering the opinion and
going beyond the chief -justice and others in denying all
power and authority to military courts in such cases. ^'

Had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would no doubt have avoided
any question before the Supreme Court in regard to his
authority, by pardoning Milligan as he granted amnesty
to so many who had been active in the rebellion. But
Mr. Johnson was so much hampered by his quarrel with
Congress over reconstruction that he was disposed to
avoid interference with criminal cases where his action

^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p- 369. See also /</., p. 194.

470

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

could subject him to the charge of sympathy with the
accused. He carefully abstained from meddling with
Jefferson Davis as he did with Millig^n, and left the
responsibility with the courts.

The final development of the investigation of the Soci-
ety of the Golden Circle took ph.ce after I had again
obtained a field command, and I was glad to have no
occasion to form a personal judgment about it. The
value of evidence collected by means of detectives de-
pends so greatly on the character of the men employed
and the instructions under which they act, that one may
well suspend judgment unless he has more than ordinarily
full knowledge on these points. The findings of the
military commission must stand as a prima facie his-
torical determination of the facts it reported, and the
burden of proof is fairly upon those who assert that the
conclusions were not sustained by trustworthy evidence.

I have mentioned the open resistance to the draft and
to the arrest of deserters in Noble and in Holmes coun-
ties. The first of these was scarcely more than a petty
riotous demonstration, which melted away before the offi-
cers as soon as they were able to show that they were
backed by real power. The second looked for a time
more formidable, and assumed a formal military organiza-
tion. Governor Tod issued a proclamation warning the
offenders of the grave consequences of their acts, and
exhorting them for their own sake and the sake of their
families to disperse and obey the laws. I directed Gen-
eral Mason at Columbus to be sure, if military force had
to be used, that enough was concentrated to make stub-
born resistance hopeless. The insurgents maintained a
bold face till the troops were close upon them ; but when
they saw a strong line of infantry charging up toward the
stone fences on the hillside where they had made their
camp, and heard the whistling of bullets from the skir-
mishers, their courage gave way and they fled, every I

VALLANDIGHAM CASE 47 1

man for himself. Only two or three were seriously
wounded, and comparatively few arrests were made.*
Submission to law was all that was demanded, and when
this was fully established, the prisoners were soon re-
leased without further punishment. The fear of further
prosecutions operated to preserve the peace, and the men
who had been allowed to go at large were a guaranty, in
effect, for the good behavior of the community.

Before dropping the subject, I may properly add that
the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham very naturally raised the
question how far we were willing to go in bringing dis-
loyal men before the military courts. Prominent citi-
zens, and especially men in official position, often found
themselves urged to ask for the arrest of the more out-
spoken followers of Vallandigham in every country
neighborhood. In answer to inquiries which had come
through the Hon. Martin Welker,^ member of Congress
for the Wayne County district, I wrote him a letter
which shows the efforts we made to be prudent and to
avoid unnecessary collisions. Judge Welker had served
as Judge Advocate on my staff in the three months' ser-
vice in the spring of 1861, and my intimacy with him
made me speak as to our policy without reserve.

"We are hopeful," I wrote, "now that the United
States Circuit Court has refused to release Mr. Vallan-
digham on habeas corpus^ that his followers will take
warning and that their course will be so modified that
there may be no occasion to make many more arrests.

"I am persuaded that our policy should be to repress
disloyalty and sedition at home rather by punishment of
prominent examples than by a general arrest of all who
may make themselves obnoxious to General Order No.
38, as the latter course will involve a more frequent

* O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 39S-397.

" Afterward for many years Judge of the U. S. District Court for
northern Ohio.

473

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

>.»

application of military authority than we choose to resort
to, unless circumstances should make it imperatively
necessary. ... I am full of hope that the seditious
designs of bad men will fail by reason of the returning
sense of those who have been their dupes, and that the
able and patriotic opinion of Judge Leavitt in the habeas
corpus case will cause great numbers to take positive
ground in favor of the government, who have hitherto
been more or less under the influence of our northern
traitors. If such shall be the result we can a£ford to
overlook bygones, and I am inclined to await the devel-
opment of public sentiment before following up Vallan-
digham's arrest by many others."

This letter was written before the Secretary of War
made any limitation of Bumside's authority in enforcing
his famous order, and shows that in the District of Ohio,
at least, there was no desire to set up a military des-
potism, or to go further in applying military methods to
conduct in aid of the rebellion than we might be forced
to go.

Burnside's action in suppressing disloyal newspapers
was not peculiar to himself. General Wright, his prede-
cessor, had done the same, and other military comman-
dants, both before and after and in other parts of the
country, had felt obliged to take the same course. These
facts only make more clear the desirability of a well-con-
sidered system of action determined by the government at
Washington, and applicable to all such cases.

.m.\.

.. .-■ stf^* ■

CHAPTER XXIII

BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS — THE SUMMER'S DELAYS

Condition of Kentucky and Tennessee — Halleck's instructions to Burn-
side — Blockliouses at bridges — Relief of East Tennessee — Condi-
tions of the problem — Vast wagon-train required — Scheme of a railroad
— Surveys begun — Burnside's efforts to arrange co-operation with
Rosecrans — Bragg sending troops to Johnston — Halleck urges Rose-
crans to activity — Continued inactivity — Burnside ordered to send
troops to Grant — Rosecrans's correspondence with Halleck — Lincoln's
dispatch — Rosecrans collects his subordinates' opinions — Councils of
war — The situation considered — Sheridan and Thomas — Computation
of effectives — Garfield's summing up — Review of the situation when
Rosecrans succeeded Buell — After Stone's River — Relative torces —
Disastrous detached expeditions — Appeal to ambition — The major-
generalship in regular army — Views of the President justified — Bum-
side's forces — Confederate forces in East Tennessee — Reasons for the
double organization of the Union armies.

BURNSIDE was not a man to be satisfied with quasi-
military duty and the administration of a depart-
ment outside of the field of active warfare. He had been
reappointed to the formal command of the Ninth Corps
before he came West, and the corps was sent after him
as soon as transportation could be provided for it. He
reached Cincinnati in person just as a raid into Kentucky
by some 2000 Confederate cavalry under Brigadier-Gen-
eral John Pegram was in progress. Pegram marched
from East Tennessee about the middle of March, reach-
ing Danville, Ky., on the 23d. He spread reports that
he was the advance-guard of a large force of all arms
intending a serious invasion of the State. These exag-
gerations had their effect, and the disturbance in the
Department of the Ohio was out of proportion to the

''h

474 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Strength of the hostile column.* The troops belonging
to the post at Danville retreated to the hither side of the
Kentucky River at Hickman's Bridge, where they took
up a defensive position. They saved the railway bridge
from destruction, and Brigadier-General Quincy A.
Gillmore, who commanded the District of Central Ken-
tucky with headquarters at Lexington, was able to con-
centrate there a sufficient force to resume the offensive
against Pegram.

Burnside ordered reinforcements to Gillmore from the
other parts of Kentucky, and Pegram, whose report indi-
cates that a foray for beef, cattle, and horses was the
principal object of his expedition, commenced his retreat.
Gillmore followed him up vigorously, recapturing a con-
siderable part of the cattle he had collected, and over-
taking his principal column at Somerset, routed him and
drove him beyond the Cumberland River.

The month of March had begun with pleasant spring
weather, and on the 15th General Wright had written to
Halleck that an invasion of Kentucky was probable, espe-
cially as Rosecrans showed no signs of resuming the
aggressive against Bragg's army in middle Tennessee.^
In Halleck' s letter of instructions to Burnside as the
latter was leaving Washington to relieve Wright, the
general plan of an advance on East Tennessee in con-
nection with that of Rosecrans toward Chattanooga was
outlined, but the General-in-Chief acknowledged that the
supply of an army in East Tennessee by means of the
wagon roads was probably impracticable.' He pointed
out the necessity of reducing the number and size of gar-
risons in the rear, and making everything bend to the
great object of organizing the army for active initiative
against the enemy. He recommended building block-

1 Letter of Governor Robinson, O. R., toL zxiii. pt. ii. p. 97 ; Id., pp.
121, 126.

« /</., p. 143. » Id., p. 163.

BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS 475

houses to protect the principal bridges on the railroads,
where very small garrisons could give comparative secur-
ity to our lines of communication. This plan was ulti-
mately carried out on a large scale, and was the neces-
sary condition of Sherman's Atlanta ca»npaign of 1864.
Taken as a whole, Halleck's instructions to Burnside
presented no definite objective, and were a perfunctory
sort of introduction to his new command, which raises
a doubt whether the organization of a little army in the
Department of the Ohio met his approval.

The fact was that Burnside was acting on an under-
standing with President Lincoln himself, whose ardent
wish to send a column for the relief of the loyal people
of East Tennessee never slumbered, and who was already
beginning to despair of its accomplishment by Rose-
crans's army. The uneasiness at Washington over Rose-
crans's inaction was becoming acute, and Mr. Lincoln
was evidently turning to Burnside' s department in hope
of an energetic movement there. In this hope Burnside
was sent West, and the Ninth Corps was detached from the
Army of the Potomac and sent after him. The project
of following up his advance by the construction of a rail-
road from Danville, then the terminus of the railway line
reaching southward from Cincinnati, was discussed, and
the President recommended it to Congress, but no appro-
priation of money was made. The scheme was hardly
within the limits of practicable plans, for the building of a
railway through such difficult country as the Cumberland
mountain region implied laborious engineering surveys
which could only be made when the country was reduced
to secure possession, and the expenditure of time as well
as of money would be likely to exceed the measure of
reasonable plans for a military campaign. The true thing
to do was to push Rosecrans's army to Chattanooga and
beyond. With the valley of the Tennessee in our posses-
sion, and Chattanooga held as a new base of supply for a

476

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

column in East Tennessee as well as another in Georgia,
the occupation of Knoxville and the Clinch and Holston
valleys to the Virginia line was easy. Without it, all East
Tennessee campaigns were visionary. It was easy enough
to get there ; the trouble was to stay. Buell's original les-
son in logistics, in which he gave the War Department a
computation of the wagons and mules necessary to supply
ten thousand men at Knoxville, was a solid piece of mili-
tary arithmetic from which there was no escape.^

When Burnside reached Cincinnati and applied himself
practically to the task of organizing his little army for a
march over the mountains, his first requisitions for wagons
and mules were a little startling to the Quartermaster-
General and a little surprising to himself. He began at
once an engineering reconnoissance of the country south of
Lexington and Danville, as far as it was within our control,
and employed an able civil engineer, Mr. Gunn, to locate
the preliminary line for a railway.'-^ These surveys were
the starting-points from which the actual construction of
the road between Cincinnati and Chattanooga was made
after the close of the war.

Burnside also urged that the troops in Kentucky, exclu-
sive of the Ninth Corps, be organized into a new corps
with General Hartsuff as its commander.^ Halleck de-
murred to this, but the President directed it to be done,
and the order was issued by the War Department on 27th
April.* Burnside also applied himself earnestly to pro-
curing from Rosecrans a plan of active co-operation for
an advance. As soon as Hartsufif assumed command of
the new Twenty-third Corps, Burnside sent him, on May 3d,
to visit Rosecrans in person, giving him authority to ar-
range an aggressive campaign.^ Hartsuff 's old relations
to Rosecrans made him a very fit person for the negotia-
tion. Rosecrans hesitated to decide, and called a council

* Ante, p. 199. O. R., vol. vii. p. 931. * Id., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 610.

• Id., p. 259. * Id., pp. 269, 283, 400. * /</., p. 312.

BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS 477

of his principal officers. He suggested that the Ninth
Corps be sent down the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
to Glasgow, near the Tennessee line, but did not indicate
any immediate purpose of advancing.* Burnside meant to
take the field with both corps of his command, which he
had organized under the name of the Army of the Ohio;
but to reassure Rosecrans, he wrote that if in co-operation
the two armies should come together, he would waive his
elder rank and serve under Rosecrans whilst he should re-
main in middle Tennessee.* It was now the 15th of May,
and he sent a confidential staff officer again to Rosecrans
to try to settle a common plan of operations. On the i8th
Halleck had heard of Bragg's army being weakened to
give General Joseph E. Johnston a force with which to re-
lieve Pemberton at Vicksburg, and he became urgent for
both Rosecrans and Burnside to advance.' He thought it
probable that raids would be attempted by the enen^v to
distract attention from his real object, and pointed out
concentration and advance as the best way to protect the
rear as well as to reach the enfeebled adversary. Burnside
hastened in good faith his preparations for movement.
He was collecting a pack mule train to supply the lack of
wagons, and put his detachments in motion to concentrate.
He begged for the third division of his corps (Getty's),
which had been detained in the Army of the Potomac and
could not yet be spared, but did not wait for it.* By the
1st of June he was ready to leave in person for the front,
and on the 3d was at Lexington, definitely committed
to the movement into East Tennessee. There he was met
by an order from Halleck to send 8000 men at once to re-
inforce General Grant at Vicksburg,^ The promise was
made that they should be returned as soon as the imme-
diate exigency was over, but the order was imperative.
Burnside never hesitated in obedience. The two divisions

> O. R., vol. xxHL pt. ii. pp. 313. 315. * Id^ p- 33'-

» Id., p. 337. « Id., p. 338. • Id^ p. 384.

478 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of the Ninth Corps made about the number required, and
they were immediately turned back and ordered to the
Ohio River to be shipped on steamboats. Sorely dis-
appointed, Burnside asked that he might go with his men,
but was told that his departmental duties were too impor-
tant to spare him from them.^ Major-General Parke was
therefore sent in command of the corps. Burnside re-
turned to Cincinnati, grieving at the interruption of his
plans, yet hoping it would not be for long. His duties at
the rear were not agreeable, especially as this was just the
time when he was directed to recall his order suppressing
disloyal newspapers, and to refrain from arrests of civilians
without explicit authority from Washington.

We may safely assume that the President and his War
Secretary were as little pleased at having to order the
Ninth Corps away as Burnside was to have them go. In
fact the order was not made till they entirely despaired of
making Rosecrans advance with the vigor necessary to
checkmate the Confederates. On the receipt of Halleck's
dispatch of the i8th May, Rosecrans entered into a tele-
graphic discussion of the probable accuracy of Halleck's
information, saying that whatever troops were sent by the
enemy to Mississippi were no doubt sent from Charleston
and Savannah and not from Bragg.'' He insisted that
it was not good policy to advance at present. On the
2 1st he said, "If I had 6000 cavalry in addition to
the mounting of the 2000 now waiting horses, I would
attack Bragg within three days. '' He also interposed the
unfavorable judgment of his corps commanders in regard
to an advance. Military history shows that this is pretty
uniformly an excuse for a delay already fully resolved on
by a commanding general. Halleck had no more cavalry
to send, and could only say so. Burnside notified Rose-
crans on the 22d that his columns had begun the move-
ments of concentration and that they would be complete

1 O. R, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 384, 386. » Id., p. 337. » Id., p. 351.

BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS 479

in three or four days.^ On the 28th Mr. Lincoln himself
telegraphed Rosecrans, " I would not push you to any
rashness, but I am very anxious that you do your utmost,
short of rashness, to keep Bragg from getting off to help
Johnston against Grant."* Rosecrans curtly answered,
"Dispatch received. I will attend to it." In his dis-
patches to Mr. Stanton of similar date there is no intima-
tion of any purpose whatever to move.^ In telegraphing
to Burnside, Rosecrans said that he was only waiting for
the development of the former's concentration, and that
he wished to advance by the 4th of June.* Burnside had
already informed him that he would be ready by June 2d,
and repeated it. On the date last named Rosecrans tele-
graphed Burnside that his movement had already begun,
and that he wanted the Army of the Ohio to come up as
near and as quickly as possible.^ Still he gave no intima-
tion to the authorities at Washington of an advance, for
none had in fact been made by his army, nor even of any
near purpose to make one. On June 3d, Halleck telegraphed
him: "Accounts received here indicate that Johnston is
being heavily reinforced from Bragg's army. If you can-
not hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you." He
followed this by his dispatch to Burnside ordering re-
inforcements to be sent to Grant, and the remainder of the
troops in the Department of the Ohio to be concentrated
defensively in Kentucky.* The only move that Rose-
crans made was to send on the 8th to his general officers
commanding corps and divisions, a confidential circular
asking their opinion in writing in answer to the following
questions, in substance, —

I. Has the enemy been so materially weakened that
this army could advance on him at this time with strong
reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful
battle?

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 3^. * Id., p. 369. • Ibid.

* Id, pp. 372, 376. 6 Id., p. 381. • /</., pp. 383, 384.

■■■•yh,

480 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

2. Is an advance of our army likely to prevent addi-
tional reinforcements being sent against General Grant by
Bragg?

3. Is an immediate or early advance of our army
advisable ? ^

With substantial unanimity they answered that it was
not advisable to move, though they seem generally to have
been aware that Breckinridge with about 10,000 men of all
arms had gone from Bragg to Johnston. When Rosecrans
reported the result of this council to Halleck, the latter
reminded him of the maxim that " councils of war never
fight," and that the responsibility for his campaign rests
upon a commanding general and cannot be shared by a
council of war.

The careful study of the correspondence elicited by
Rosecrans's circular would make a most valuable commen-
tary upon the theme, " Why Councils of War never fight."
The three questions were addressed to sixteen general
officers commanding corps and divisions.'' In reading the
responses the impression grows strong that there was what
may be called a popular feeling among these officers that
their duty was to back up their commanding general in a
judgment of his on the subjects submitted, which could
hardly be other than well known. On the question as to
the probable reduction of Bragg's army by detachments
sent to Johnston, whilst they nearly all have some knowl-
edge of the diminution of the Confederate army to about
the extent mentioned above, most of them answer that
they do not think it a material weakening, that being the
tenor of the inquiry put to them. Some of them, however,
say very naturally that as the secret service is managed

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 395.

* Their answers are found in O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. as follows : Davis,
p. 395, Johnson, do., McCook, 396, Turchin, 397, Brannan, 402, Crittenden,
403, Granger, 403, Wood, 405, Negley, 407, Palmer, do., Reynolds, 409,
Rousseau, 410, Sheridan, 411, Stanley, 412* Thomas, 414, Van Cleve, 415,
Mitchell, 417, and Garfield's summing up, 420.

BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS 48 1

from headquarters and all the information received is for-
warded there, General Rosecrans should be much better
able to answer this question than his subordinates. As to
the second part of that question, nearly all seem to assume
that the battle would be in the nature of a direct attack on
the fortifications at Shelbyville and are not sanguine of a
successful result. The few who speak of turning manoeu-
vres feel that the further retreat of Bragg would only
lengthen their own line of communications and do no
good. Strangely, too, they argue, many of them, that an
advance would not prevent further depletion of Bragg to
strengthen Johnston. They consequently and almost unani-
mously advise aga-nst an immediate or early advance.

It is instructive to compare these opinions with the act-
ual facts. The inaction of the summer had led directly
to the detachment of two divisions of infantry and artillery
and one of cavalry to reinforce Johnston, just as the in-
activity of Meade later in the season encouraged the
Richmond government to send Longstreet to Bragg from
Virginia. If Rosecrans had moved early in the season, not
only must Bragg have kept his army intact, but the battle
of Chickamauga, if fought at all, must have been decided
without Longstreet, and therefore most probably with
brilliant success for our arms. It was delay in advancing,
both in Tennessee and in Virginia, that thus directly led
to disaster. If a brilliant victory at Chickamauga had
been coincident with the fall of Vicksburg and Lee's de-
feat at Gettysburg, it does not seem rash to believe that
the collapse of the Confederacy would have been hastened
by a year.

Two of the generals who answered these questions at-
tained afterward to such distinction that their replies are
an interesting means of learning their mental character and
gauging their development. Sheridan answered briefly
that he believed Bragg had no more than 25,000 or 30,000
infantry and artillery, with a " large " cavalry force. In
VOL. I. — 31

482 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

this he was very close to the mark. Bragg's report for the
latter part of May, before sending reinforcements to John-
ston, showed his forces present for duty to be 37,000 in-
fantry, a little less than 3000 artillery, and 15,000 cavalry,
in round numbers. Deduct 10,000 from these, and Sher-
idan is found to be sufficiently accurate.' He did not
think Bragg would fight, but would retreat, and thought
that in such a case he would not be hindered from send-
ing more help to Johnston. Again, as forage in the
country was scarce, he voted against an early advance.

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 846.

The reference to Hragg's returns of strength to the Adjutant-General's
office makes this an appropriate place to note the method of making these
returns and its bearing on the much debated question of the " Effective
Total " commonly given by Confederate writers as the force of their armies
compared with ours. The blanks for these reports were sent out from
the Adjutant-and-Inspector-General's office at Richmond, with the order
that the numerical returns be made " on the forms furnished and according
to the directions expressed on them "(General Orders No. 64, Sept. 8, 1862).
The column " KfTcctive Total " in these returns included only enlisted men
carrying arms and actually in the line of battle. It excluded all officers, the
non-commissioned staff, extra-duty men, the sick in hospital, and those in
arrest. To secure uniformity in the method of reporting in his army and
to correct some irregularity, General Bragg issued a circular, as follows
(O. R., vol. XALiii. pt. ii. p. 619) : —

[Circular.] " HicADQt7ARTBiis, Army op Tinnbssu,

TuLLAHOMA, January ag, 1863.

Hereafter, under the column of ' Effective Total ' in the reports from
this army, extra-duty men and men in arrest will not be included. The
' Eflfective Total ' must include only the fighting field force — those who are
carried into the field of battle with fire-arms in their hands.

I3y command of General Bragg.

George Wm. Brent,
Assistant Adjutant-General."

Before the publication of the Official Records, I had occasion to call
attention to the subject : see " The Nation," May 21, 1874, p. 334; also "At-
lanta" (Scribners' Series), pp. 27, 28; and again in " The Nation," February
2, 1893, p. 86, A fair comparison between the Confederate and the National
armies, therefore, demands a computation of numbers by the same method ;
and as we did not use forms containing the " Effective Total " as reported by
the Confederates, the columns of officers and men " present for duty "
which are computed alike in the returns on both sides are the most
satisfactory and fair basis of comparison.

THE SUMMER'S DELAYS 483

Thomas did not believe Bragg had been materially
weakened, for if any troops had been sent away, he
thought they had returned or their places had been sup-
plied. He concluded that Bragg was ready to fight with
an army at least as large as that of Rosecrans ; that to
hold our army where it was would sufficiently prevent fur-
ther reduction of Bragg's ; that an advance would give the
latter the advantage and was not advisable. His prefer-
ence for defensive warfare was very evident. He said it
was true that Bragg might be reinforced and take the in-
itiative, but that he " should be most happy to meet him
here with his reinforcements." In conclusion he indicated
the necessity of 6ocx) more cavalry to be added to the
army.^

When the answers were all received, Garfield summed
them up in a paper, which must be admitted to be a
remafkable production for a young volunteer officer de-
liberately controverting the opinions of such an array of
seniors. He gave, as the best information at headquarters,
the force of Bragg, before sending help to Johnston, as
38,000 infantry, 2600 artillery, and 17,500 cavalry. This
made the infantry about 1000 too many, the artillery
nearly exactly right, and the cavalry 2500 too many,
— on the whole a very close estimate. From these he
deducted 10,000, which was right. He stated Rosecrans's
force at 82,700 "bayonets and sabres" with about 3000
more on the way, but deducted 15,000 for necessary posts
and garrisons. The balancing showed 65,000 to throw
against Bragg's 41,500. He further showed that delay
would give time for the enemy's detachments to return,
whilst we could hope for no further increase during the
rest of the season. He then analyzed the military and
civil reasons for activity, declared that he believed we
could be victorious, and that the administration and the
country had the right to expect the army to try.

^ See also ante, p. 478.

484 /i£Af/JV/SC£NC£S OF THE CIVIL WAR

The result was a curious but encouraging result of
bold and cogent reasoning. Although Kosecrans reported
to General Halleck on the i ith of June the opinion of his
corps and division commanders against an early advance,
the logic and the facts pressed upon him by his chief of
staff evidently took strong hold of his active intellect, so
that when Halleck on the i6th asked for a categorical
answer whether he would make an immediate movement
forward, he replied, " If it means to-night or to-morrow,
no. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five
days, yes." * No doubt the rather plain intimation that a
categorical " no " would be followed by action at Washing-
ton helped the decision ; but it would have helped it to a
decided negative if Garfield's paper, reinforced by the
personal advice and oral discussions which we now know
were of daily occurrence between them, had not had a
convincing weight with him, both as to the feasibility of
the campaign of turning manoeuvres which he devised and
adopted, and as to its probable success. The result is
reckoned one of his chief claims to military renown.

But to judge properly the relations of the government
to both the commanding generals in Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, it is necessary to go back to the days immediately
after the battle of Stone's River, and to inquire what were
the tasks assigned these commanders and the means
furnished to perform them. The disappointment of the
administration at Washington with Rosecrans's conduct of
his campaign dated, indeed, much earlier than the time
indicated. He had succeeded Buell at the end of October
•when Bragg was in full retreat to the Tennessee River.
The continuance of a vigorous pursuit and the prompt
reoccupation of the country held by us in the early
summer was regarded as of the utmost importance for
political, quite as much as for military reasons. It was
not a time to halt and reorganize an army. The question
^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 8-ia

THE SUMMER'S DELAYS 485

of foreign intervention was apparently trembling in the
balance, and to let European powers rest under the belief
that we had lost most of what had been gained in the
advance from Donelson to Shiloh and Corinth, was to
invite complications of the most formidable character.
The Washington authorities had therefore a perfect right
to decide that to press Bragg vigorously and without inter-
mission was the imperative duty of the commander of the
Army of the Cumberland. He would be rightly held to
have disappointed the expectations of his government if
he failed to do so. Rosecrans had been chosen to succeed
Buell because of the belief that his character was one of
restless vehemence better adapted to this work than the
slower but more solid qualities of Thomas, who was already
second in command in that army.^ Halleck was obliged
very soon to remind Rosecrans of this, and to claim the
right of urging him onward because he himself had given
the advice which had been decisive when the question of
the choice was under consideration.

Yet as soon as the army was again concentrated about
Nashville, Rosecrans's correspondence took the form of
urgent demands for the means of reorganization. He
insisted that his cavalry force must be greatly increased,
that he must have repeating arms for his horsemen, that
he must organize a selected corps of mounted infantry
and obtain horses for them — in short, that he must take
months to put his army in a condition equal to his desires
before resuming the work of the campaign. His energy
seemed to be wholly directed to driving the administration

1 Since the text was written the Life of O. P. Morton has appeared, and
in it his part in the change froni Buell to Rosecrans is given. He urged the
change upon Lincoln on the ground that aggressive vigor was imperatively
demanded. " Another three months lilte the last six, and we are lost," said
he. " Reject the wicked incapables whom you have patiently tried and found
utterly wanting." On October 24th he telegraphed, "The removal of Gen- A

eral Buell and the appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon." ^

Life, vol. i. pp. 197, 198.

486

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

to supply his wants, whilst Bragg was allowed not only to
stop his rather disorganized flight, but to retrace his steps
toward middle Tennessee.

On the 4th of December Haileck telegraphed that the
President was so disappointed and dissatisfied that another
week of inaction would result in another change of com-
iiianders.^ Rosecrans replied detailing his necessities, but
taking a high tone and declaring himself insensible to
threats of removal. The next day Haileck patiently but
decidedly gave the reasons which made the demand for
activity a reasonable one, adding the reminder that no one
had doubted that Buell would eventually have succeeded,
and that Rosecrans's appointment had been made because
they believed he would move more rapidly.^ Meanwhile
every effort was made to furnish him with the arms, equip-
ments, and horses he desired.

The battle of Stone's River had many points of resem-
blance to that of Antietam, and like that engagement was
indecisive in itself, the subsequent retreat of the Con-
federates making it a victorj/ for the national arms. The
condition of the Army of the Cumberland after the battle
was a. sufficient reason for some delay, and a short time
for recuperation and reinforcement was cordially accepted
by everybody as a necessity of the situation. Congratula-
tions and thanks were abundantly showered on the army,
and promotions were given in more than common number.
It was not concealed, however, that the government was
most anxious to follow up the success and to make the
delays as short as possible. An aggressive campaign was
demanded, and the demand was a reasonable one because
the means furnished were sufficient for the purpose.

At the close of the month of January, Rosecrans's
forces present for duty in his department numbered 65,cxx),'
the Confederates under Bragg were 40,400.* The end

1 O. R., vol. XX. pt. ii. p. 1 18.
* Id., vol. zxiii. pt. ii. p. 29.

a Id., p ■>■
* Id., p. C .L.

THE SUMMElVa DELAYS 487

of February showed the National forces to be 80,000,* the
enemy 43,600.'' After this Bragg's army gradually in-
creased till midsummer, when it reached a maximum of
about 57,000, and Rosecrans's grew to 84,000. The Con-
federates had a larger proportion of cavalry than we, but
this was at the expense of being much weaker in infantry,
the decisive arm in serious engagements. In fact this
disproportion was another reason for active work, since
experience showed that the enemy kept his cavalry at
home when he was vigorously pushed, and sent them on
raids to interrupt our communications when we gave him
a respite. Our superiority in numbers was enough, there-
fore, to make it entirely reasonable and in accord with
every sound rule of conducting war, that the government
should insist upon an active and aggressive campaign
from the earliest day in the spring when the weather
promised to be favorable. Such weather came at the
beginning of March, and the Confederates took advantage
of it, as we have seen, by sending Pegram into Kentucky.
Their cavalry under Wheeler attacked also Fort Donelson,
but were repulsed. A reconnoissance by a brigade under
Colonel Coburn from Franklin toward Spring Hill re-
sulted in the capture of the brigade by the Confederates
under Van Dorn.* In the same month Forrest made a
daring raid close to Nashville and captured Colonel Blood-
good and some 800 men at Brentwood.* Rosecrans
organized a raid by a brigade of infantry mounted on
mules, commanded by Colonel Streight, with the object
of cutting the railroad south of Chattanooga. It was
delayed in starting till near the end of April, and was
overtaken and captured near Rome in Georgia.^ These
exasperating incidents were occurring whilst the Army of
the Cumberland lay still about Murfreesboro, and its com-
mander harassed the departments at Washington with the

' O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 93. "^ Id., p. 654.

^ Id., p. 115. * Id., pp. 171, 732. ' Id., pp. J32, 321.

488 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Story of his wants, and intimated that nothing but care-
lessness as to the public good stood between him and
their full supply. He v/as assured that he was getting
his full share of everything which could be procured, —
rifles, revolvers, carbines, horses, and equipments, — but
the day of readiness seemed as far off as ever.

On the 1st of March the President, feeling that the
time had come when his armies should be in motion, and
plainly discouraged at the poor success he had had in
getting Rosecrans ready for an advance, authorized Gen-
eral Halleck to say to him that there was a vacant major-
generalcy in the regular army which would be given to
the general in the field who should first win an important
and decisive victory.^ The appeal to ambition was treated
as if it had been an insult It was called an " auctioneer-
ing of honor," and a base way to come by a promotion/
Halleck retorted conclusively that Rosecrans himself had
warmly advocated giving promotion in the lower gp-ades
only for distinguished services in the field, and said : " When
last summer, at your request, I urged the government to
promote you for success in the field, and, again at your
request, urged that your commission be dated back to
your services in West Virginia, I thought I was doing
right in advocating your claim to honors for services
rendered." ^ In view of this unique correspondence it is
certainly curious to find Rosecrans a few days later enu-
merating his personal grievances to Mr. Lincoln, and put-
ting among them this, that after the battle of Stone's
River he had asked " as a personal favor " that his com-
mission as major-general of volunteers should be dated back
to December, 1861, and that it was not granted.* It was
considerably antedated, so as to make him outrank Gen-
eral Thomas, much to the disgust of the latter when he
learned it ; but the date was not made as early as Rose-

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 95. • Id., p. iii.

« Id., p. 138. « Id., p. 146.

THE SUMMER'S DELAYS 489

crans desired, which would have made him outrank Grant,
Buell, and Burnside as well as Thomas.

Persuasion and exhortation having failed, Grant must
cither be left to take the chances that part of Bragg's
army would be concentrated under Johnston in Mississippi,
or he must be strengthened by sending to him that part of
our forces in Kentucky and Tennessee which could most
easily be spared. There can be no doubt that it was well
judged to send the Ninth Corps to him, as it would be less
mischievous to suspend Burnside's movement into East
Tennessee than to diminish the Army of the Cumberland
under existing circumstances. It is, however, indisputably
clear that the latter army should have been in active
campaign at the opening of the season, whether we con-
sider the advantage of the country or the reputation of its
commander.

If we inquire what means the administration gave
Burnside to perform his part of the joint task assigned
him, we shall find that it was not niggardly in doing so.
Hia forces were at their maximum at the end of May,
when they reached but little short of 38,000 present for
duty in his whole department.^ This included, however,
all the great States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan
as well as the eastern half of Kentucky, and there were
several camps of prisoners and posts north of the Ohio
which demanded considerable garrisons. Eight thousand
men were used for this purpose, and nobody thought
this an excess. Thirty thousand were thus left him for
such posts in Kentucky as would be necessary to cover
his communications and for his active column. He ex-
pected to make his active army about 25,000, and the
advance movements had begun when, as has been stated,
he was ordered to suspend, and to send the Ninth Corps
to Grant.
The enemy in East Tennessee were under the command

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 380.

490

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of General Dabney Maury at first, but when he was sent
to Mobile, General S. B. Buckner was made the com-
mandant. His returns of forces for May 31st show that
he had 16,267 present for duty, with which to oppose
the advance of Burnside. The information of the latter
was that his opponent had 20,000, and he reckoned on
having to deal with that number. The passes of the
Cumberland Mountains were so few and so difficult that
it was by no means probable that his campaign would be
an easy one; yet the difficulties in the first occupation
were not so serious as those which might arise if Bragg
were able to maintain an interior position between the two
National armies. In that case, iinless he were kept thor-
oughly employed by Rosecrans, he might concentrate to
crush Burnside before his decisive conflict with the Army
of the Cumberland. This was the inherent vice of a
plan which contemplated two independent armies attempt-
ing to co-operate ; and if Rosecrans had been willing to
open his campaign on the ist of March, it is almost
certain that the troops in Kentucky would have been
ordered to him. The President did not determine to
send Burnside to the West and to give him a little army
of his own till he despaired of the liberation of East
Tennessee in that season by any activity of Rosecrans.
This cannot be overlooked in any candid criticism of the
summer's work.

CHAPTER XXrV

THE MORGAN RAID

Departure of the staff for the field — An amusinglj quick return — Changes
in my own duties — Expeditions to occupy the enemy — Sanders' raid
into East Tennessee — His route — His success and return — The Con-
federate Morgan's raid — His instructions — His reputation as a soldier

— Compared with Forrest — Morgan's start delayed — His appearance
at Green River, Ky. — Foiled by Colonel Moore — Captures Lebanon.

— Reaches the Ohio at Brandenburg — General Hobson in pursuit —
Morgan crosses into Indiana — Was this his original purpose? — His
route out of Indiana into Ohio — He approaches Cincinnati — Hot chase
by Hobson — Gunboats co-operating on the river — E£forts to block his
way — He avoids garrisoned posts and cities — Our troops moved in
transports by water — Condition of Morgan's jaded column — Approach-
ing the Ohio at Buffington's — Gunboats near the ford — Hobson attacks

— Part captured, the rest fly northward — Another capture — A long
chase — Surrender of Morgan with the remnant — Summary of results

— A burlesque capitulation.

THE departure of General Burnside and his staff for
active service in the field was quite an event in
Cincinnati society. The young men were a set of fine
fellows, well educated and great social favorites. There
was a public concert the evening before they left for
Lexington, and they were to go by a special train after the
entertainment should be over. They came to the concert
hall, therefore, not only booted and spurred, but there was
perhaps a bit of youthful but very natural ostentation of
being ready for the field. Their hair was Topped as
close as barber's shears could cut it, they wore the reg-
ulation uniform of the cavalry, with trim round-about
jackets, and were the " cynosure of all eyes." Their part-
ing words were said to their lady friends in the intervab
of the music, and the pretty dramatic effect of it all

492 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

suggested to an onlooker the famous parting scene in
" Belgium's capital " which " Childe Harold " has made so
familiar.

It was quite an anti-climax, however, when the gay young
officers came back, before a week was over, crestfallen,
the detaching of the Ninth Corps having suspended opera-
tions in Kentucky. They were a little quizzed about their
very brief campaign, but so good-humoredly that they
bore it pretty well, and were able to seem amused at it, as
well as the fair quizzers.

In preparation for a lengthened absence, Burnside had
turned over to me some extra duties. He ordered the
District of Michigan to be added to my command, and
gave general directions that the current business of the
department headquarters should pass through my hands.
As General Parke, his chief of staff, had gone to Vicksburg
in command of the Ninth Corps, Burnside made informal
use of me to supply in some measure his place. Our
relations therefore became closer than ever. He hoped
his troops would soon come back to him, as was promised,
and in resuming business at the Cincinnati headquarters,
he tried to keep it all in such shape that he could drop it
at a moment's notice.

To keep the enemy occupied he organized two ex-
peditions, one under Brigadier-General Julius White into
West Virginia, and the other under Colonel W. P. Sanders
into East Tennessee, The latter was one of the boldest and
longest raids made during the war, and besides keeping the
enemy on the alert, destroying considerable military stores
and a number of important railway bridges, it was a pre-
liminary reconnoissance of East Tennessee and the ap-
proaches to it through the mountains, which was of great
value a little later. The force consisted of 15CX) mounted
men, being detachments from different regiments of cavalry
and mounted infantry, among which were some of the
loyal men of East Tennessee under Colonel R. K. Byrd.

THE MORGAN RAID 493

Sanders was a young officer of the regular army who was
now colonel of the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry. He rapidly
made a first-class reputation as a bold leader of mounted
troops, but was unfortunately killed in the defence of
Knoxville in November of this same year. His expedi-
tion started from Mount Vernon, Kentucky, on the 14th
of June, marched rapidly southward sixty miles to
Williamsburg, where the Cumberland River was fordable.
Thence he moved southwest about the same distance by
the Marsh Creek route to the vicinity of Huntsville in
Tennessee. Continuing this route southward some fifty
miles more, he struck the Big Emory River, and follow-
ing this through Emory Gap, he reached the vicinity of
Kingston on the Clinch River in East Tennessee, having
marched in all rather more than two hundred miles.
Avoiding Kingston, which was occupied by a superior
force of Confederates, he marched rapidly on Knoxville,
destroying all the more important railway bridges. De-
monstrating boldly in front of Knoxville, and finding that
it was strongly held and its streets barricaded for defence,
he passed around the town and advanced upon Straw-
berry Plains, where a great bridge and trestle crosses the
Holston River, 2100 feet in length, a place to become
very familiar to us in later campaigning. Crossing the
Holston at Flat Creek, where other bridges were burned,
he moved up the left (east) bank of the river to attack
the guard at the big bridge, the Confederate forces being
on that side. He drove them off, capturing 150 of the
party and five cannon. He not only destroyed the bridge,
but captured and burnt large quantities of military stores
and camp equipage. On he went along the railway to
Mossy Creek, where another bridge 300 feet long was
burned. He now turned homeward toward the north-
west, having greatly injured a hundred miles of the
East Tennessee Railroad. Turning like a fox under
the guidance of his East Tennessee scouts, he crossed the

494

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Clinch Mountains and the valley of the Clinch, and made
his way back by way of Smith's Gap through the Cum-
berland Mountains to his starting-place in Kentucky.
He had captured over 450 prisoners, whom he paroled,
had taken ten cannon and icxx) stands of small arms
which he destroyed, besides the large amounts of military
stores which have been mentioned. He marched about
five hundred miles in the whole circuit, and though fre-
quently skirmishing briskly with considerable bodies of
the enemy, hl^ losses were only 2 killed, 4 wounded,
and 13 missing. Of course a good many horses were
used up, but as a preliminary to the campaign which
was to follow and in which Sanders was to have a prom-
inent place, it was a raid which was much more profitable
than most of them. He was gone ten days.^

The expedition under Brigadier-General Julius White
was sent to beat up the Confederate posts in the Big Sandy
valley and to aid incidentally the raid under Sanders
into East Tennessee. Burnside sent another southward
in the direction of Monticello, Kentucky. The object of
these was to keep the enemy amused near home and pre-
vent the raids his cavalry had been making on the railway
line by which Rosecrans kept up his communication with
Louisville. They seem rather to have excited the emula-
tion of the Confederate cavalryman Brigadier-General
John H. Morgan, who, a few days before Rosecrans's
advance on Tullahoma, obtained permission to make a
raid, starting from the neighborhood of McMinnville,
Tenn., crossing the Cumberland near Burkesville, and
thence moving on Louisville, which he thought he might
capture with its depots of military stores, as it was sup-
posed to be almost stripped of troops. His division con-
sisted of about 3000 horsemen, and he took the whole of
it with him, though Wheeler, his chief, seems to have
limited him to 2000. His instructions were to make a

1 Sanders' Report, O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. L pp. 385, 386.

THE MORGAN RAID 495

rapid movement on the line of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad in Kentucky and to get back to his place in
Bragg's army as quickly as possible.^

Morgan's reputation as a soldier was a peculiar one.
He had made a number of raids which showed a good
deal of boldness in the general plan and a good deal of
activity in the execution, but it cannot be said that he
showed any liking for hard fighting. Like boys skating
near thin ice, he seemed to be trying to see how close he
could come to danger without getting in. A really bold
front showed by a small body of brave men was usually
enough to turn him aside. It is instructive to compare his
career with Forrest's. They began with similar grade, but
with all the social and personal prestige in Morgan's favor.
Forrest had been a local slave-trader, a calling which
implied social ostracism in the South, and which put a
great obstacle in the way of advancement. Both were
fond of adventurous raids, but Forrest was a really daring
soldier and fought his way to recognition in the face of
stubborn prejudice. Morgan achieved notoriety by the
showy temerity of his distant movements, but nobody was
afraid of him in the field at close quarters.

The official order to Morgan to start on his expedition
was dated on the i8th of June, but he did not get off till
the close of the month. It would seem that he remained
in observation on the flank of Rosecrans's army as the
left wing moved upon Manchester, and began his north-
ward march after Bragg had retreated to Decherd on the
way to Chattanooga. At any rate, he was first heard of
on the north side of the Cumberland on the 2d of July,
near Burkesville and marching on Columbia. Burnside
immediately ordered all his cavalry and mounted infantry
to concentrate to meet him, but his route had been chosen
with full knowledge of the positions of our detachments
and he was able to get the start of them. Brigadier-General

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 817.

496 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

H. M. Judah.who commanded the division of the Twenty-
third Corps which covered that part of our front, seems to
have wholly misconceived the situation, and refused to
listen to the better information which his subordinates
gave him.* After a slight skirmish at Columbia, Morgan
made for the Green River bridge at Tebb's Bend, an im-
portant crossing of the Louisville Railroad. The bend
was occupied by Colonel O. H, Moore of the Twenty-fifth
Michigan Infantry, who, under previous instructions from
Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson, intrenched a line across
the neck of the bend, some distance in front of the stock-
ade at the bridge. Morgan advanced upon the 4th of
July, and after a shot or two from his artillery, sent in a
flag demanding the surrender of Moore's little force, which
amounted to only 200 men. Moore did not propose to
celebrate the national anniversary in that way, and an-
swered accordingly. The enemy kept up a lively skirmish-
ing fight for some hours, when he withdrew.* Moore had
beaten him off with a loss of 6 killed and 23 wounded of
the brave Michigan men. He reported Morgan's loss at
50 killed and 200 wounded. The Confederate authorities
admit that they had 36 killed, but put their wounded at
only 46, an incredibly small proportion to the killed.

The raiders continued their route to Lebanon, where was
the Twentieth Kentucky Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles S. Hanson, numbering less than 400 men, without
artillery. A brigade ordered to reinforce the post delayed
its advance, and Hanson was left to his own resources.
After several hours of a lively skirmishing fight without
much loss, he surrendered to save the village from destruc-
tion by fire, which Morgan threatened. The loss in the

1 Sketches of War History, vol. iv. (Papers of the Ohio Commandery of
the Loyal Legion). A paper by Capt. H. C. Weaver, Sixteenth Kentucky
Infantry, who was on the staff of Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson during
the pursuit of Morgan.

* O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 645.

THE MORGAN RAID 497

post was 4 killed and 15 wounded.' Hanson reported 29
rebel dead left on the field and 30 wounded, also abandoned.
No doubt others of the wounded were taken care of and
concealed by their sympathizers in the vicinity. Some
military stores had been burned with the railway station-
house before Hanson surrendered. He and his men were
paroled in the irregular way adopted by Morgan on the
raid.

Bardstown was the next point reached by the enemy,
but Morgan s appetite for Louisville seems now to have
diminished, and he turned to the westward, reaching the
Ohio River on the 8th, at Brandenburg, some thirty miles
below the city. The detachments of mounted troops
which were in pursuit had been united under the com-
mand of General Hobson, the senior officer present, and
consisted of two brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Gen-
eral J. M. Shackelford and Colonel F. Wolford. They
approached Brandenburg on the evening of the 8th and
captured the steamboat " McCombs " with a remnant of Mor-
gan's men and stores the next morning when they entered
the town. They saw on the opposite bank the smoking
wreck of the steamboat " Alice Dean " which Morgan had
set on fire after landing his men on the Indiana shore.
The steamboat " McCombs " was sent to Louisville for
other transports. A delay of twenty-four hours thus
occurred, and when Hobson's command was assembled in
Indiana, Morgan had the start by nearly two days.»

It is claimed by Morgan's intimate friend and chronicler
that he intended to cross the Ohio from the day he left
camp in Tennessee, although it would be contrary to his
orders ; ^ and that he had made investigations in advance
in regard to fords on the upper Ohio and particularly at
Buffington Island, where he ultimately tried to cross into

^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 649.

* Hobson's Report, O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 659.

• Id., p. 8i8. History of Morgan's Cavalry, by B. W. Duke, p. 41a
VOL. I. — 32

498

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

West Virginia. If true, this would forfeit every clai'»^ on
his part to the character of a valuable and intelligent
subordinate; for operations on a large scale would be
absolutely impossible if the commander of a division of
cavalry may go ofif as he pleases, in disobedience to the
orders which assign him a specific task. Except for this
statement, it would be natural to conclude that when he
approached Louisville he began to doubt whether the city
were so defenceless as he had assumed, and knowing that
twenty-four hours' delay would bring Hobson's forces
upon his back, he then looked about for some line of
action that would save his prestige and be more brilliant
than a race back again to Tennessee. It is quite probable
that the feasibility of crossing the Ohio and making a
rapid ride through the country on its northern bank had
been discussed by him, and conscious as he was that he
had thus far accomplished nothing, he might be glad of an
excuse for trying it. This interpretation of his acts would
be more honorable to him as an officer than the deliberate
and premeditated disobedience attributed to him. But
whether the decision was made earlier or later, the capture
of the steamboats at Brandenburg was at once made use of
to ferry over his command, though it was not accomplished
without some exciting incidents. A party of the Con-
federates under Captain Hines had crossed into Indiana
a few days before without orders from Morgan, being as
independent of him, apparently, as he was of General
Bragg. Hines's party had roused the militia of the State,
and he had made a rapid retreat to the Ohio, reaching it
just as Morgan entered Brandenburg. It may be that
the lucky daredeviltry of Hines's little raid fired his com-
mander's heart to try a greater one ; at any rate, Morgan
forgave his trespass against his authority as he prayed to
be forgiven by Bragg, and turned his attention to driving
off the Indiana militia who had followed Hines to the bank
of the river and now opened fire with a single cannon.

THE MORGAN RAID 499

Morgan's artillery silenced the gun and caused the
force to retreat out of range, when he put over two of his
regiments, dismounted, to cover the ferrying of the rest.
At this point one of the " tin-clad " gunboats of the river
fleet made its appearance and took part in the combat.
The section of Parrot guns in Morgan's battery proved an
overmatch for it, however, and it retired to seek reinforce-
ments. The interval was used to hasten the transport of
the Confederate men and horses, and before further op-
position could be made, the division was in the saddle and
marching northward into Indiana.

At the first news of Morgan's advance into Kentucky,
Burnside had directed General Hartsuff, who commanded
in that State, to concentrate his forces so as to capture
Morgan if he should attempt to return through the
central part of it.* Judah's and Boyle's divisions were
put in motion toward Louisville, and the remainder of the
mounted troops not already with Hobson were also
hurried forward. These last constituted a provisional
brigade under Colonel Sanders. It may help to under-
stand the organization of the National troops to note the
fact that all which operated against Morgan were parts
of the Twenty-third Corps, which was composed of four
divisions under Generals Sturgis, Boyle, Judah, and White.
The brigades were of both infantry and mounted troops,
united for the special purposes of the contemplated cam-
paign into East Tennessee. For the pursuit of Morgan
the mounted troops were sent off first, and as these united
they formed a provisional division under Hobson, the
senior brigadier present. Quite a number of the regi-
ments were mounted infantry, who after a few months
were dismounted and resumed their regular place in the
infantry line. For the time being, however, Hobson had
a mounted force that was made up of fractions of bri-
gades from all the divisions of the corps ; and Shackelford,

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 13, 679, etc.

500 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Wolford, Kautz, and Sanders were the commanders of the
provisional brigades during the pursuit. Its strength did
not quite reach 3000 men.*

Morgan's first course was due north, and he marched
with some deliberation. On the loth he reached Salem,
about forty miles from the river, on the railway between
Louisville and Chicago.^ A small body of militia had
assembled here, and made a creditable stand, but were
outflanked and forced to retreat after inflicting on him
a score of casualties. The evidences Morgan here saw
of the ability of the Northern States to overwhelm him
by the militia, satisfied him that further progress inland
was not desirable, and turning at right angles to the road
he had followed, he made for Madison on the Ohio.
There was evidently some understanding with a detach-
ment he had left in Kentucky, for on the nth General
Manson, of Judah's division, who was on his way with a
brigade from Louisville to Madison by steamboats under
naval convoy, fell in with a party of Morgan's men seeking
to cross the river at Twelve-mile Island, a little below
Madison. Twenty men and forty five horses were cap-
tured.' If any of this party had succeeded in crossing
before (as was reported) they would o^ course inform
their chief of the reinforcements going kl, T^adison, and of
the gunboats in the river. Morgan made no attack on
Madison, but took another turn northward in his zigzag
course, and marched on Vernon, a railway-crossing some
twenty miles from Madison, where the line to Indianapolis
intersects that from Cincinnati to Vincennes. Here a
militia force had been assembled under Brigadier-General
Love, and the town was well situated for defence. Morgan,
declining to attack, now turned eastward again, his course
being such that he might be aiming for the river at
Lawrenceburg or at Cincinnati.

» O. R., Tol. ndii. pt. i. p. 658. « Id., pp. 717, 719.

» Id., p» ii. pp. 729. 745.

THE MORGAN RAID $01

The deviousness of his route had been such as to
indicate a want of distinct purpose, and had enabled
Hobson greatly to reduce the distance between them.
Manson's brigade on the steamboats was now about 2500
strong, and moved on the 12th from Madison to Lawrence-
burg, keeping pace as nearly as possible with Morgan's
eastward progress. Sanders's brigade reached the river
twenty miles above Louisville, and General Boyle sent
transports to put him also in motion on the river. At the
request of Burnside, Governor Tod, of Ohio, called out the
militia of the southern counties, as Governor Morton had
done vfk Indiana. Burnside himself, at Cincinnati, kept
in constant telegraphic communication with all points,
assembling the militia where they were most likely to be
useful and trying to put his regular forces in front of the
enemy. It would have been easy to let the slippery
Confederate horsemen back into Kentucky. The force
in the river, both naval and niilitary, unquestionably pre-
vented this at Madison, and probably at Lawrenceburg.
On the 13th Morgan was at Harrison on the Ohio State
line, and it now became my turn as district commander to
take part in the effort to catch him. I had no direct
control of the troops of the Twenty-third Corps, and the
only garrisons in Ohio were at the prison camps at Colum-
bus and Sandusky. These of course could not be re-
moved, and our other detachments were hardly worth
naming. Burnside declared martial law in the counties
threatened with invasion, so that the citizens and militia
might for military purposes come directly under our
control. The relations between the general and myself
were so intimate that no strict demarcation of authority
was necessary. He authorized me to give commands in
his name when haste demanded it, and we relieved each
other in night watching at the telegraph.

A small post had been maintained at Dayton, since the
Vallandigham disturbance, and Major Keith, its com-

502 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

mandant, was ordered to take his men by rail to Hamilton.
He went at once and reported himself holding that town
with 600 men, including the local militia, but only 400
were armed/ Lieutenant-Colonel Neff commanded at
Camp Dennison, thirteen miles from Cincinnati, and had
700 armed men there, with 1200 more of unarmed recruits.*
At both these posts systematic scouting was organized so
as to keep track of the enemy, and their active show of
force was such that Morgan did not venture to attack
either, but threaded his way around them. At Cincinnati
there was no garrison. A couple of hundred men formed
the post at Newport on the Kentucky side of the river,
but the main reliance was on the local militia. These
were organized as soon as the governor's call was issued
on the evening of the 12th. Batteries were put in position
covering the approaches to the city from the north and
west, and the beautiful suburban hills of Clifton and
Avondale afforded excellent defekisive positions.

The militia that were called out were of course in-
fantry, and being both without drill and unaccustomed
to marching, could only be used in position, to defend a
town or block the way. In such work they showed cour-
age and soldierly spirit, so that Morgan avoided collision
with all considerable bodies of them. But they could not
be moved. All we could do was to try to assemble them
at such points in advance as the raiders were likely to
reach, and we especially limited their task to the defensive
one, and to blockading roads and streams. Particular
stress was put on the orders to take up the planking of
bridges and to fell timber into the roads. Little was done
in this way at first, but after two or three days of constant
reiteration, the local forces did their work better, and
delays to the flying enemy were occasioned which con-
tributed essentially to the final capture.

No definite news of Morgan's crossing the Ohio line was

^ O. R., Yol. zxiiL pt L pp. 742, 743. ' Id., p. 749.

THE MORGAN RAID 503

received till about sunset of the 13th when he was march-
ing eastward from Harrison. Satisfied that Lawrenceburg
and lower points on the Ohio were now safe, Burnside
ordered the transports and gunboats at once to Cincinnati.
Manson and Sanders arrived during the night, and the
latter with his brigade of mounted men was, at dawn of
the 14th, placed on the north of the city in the village of
Avondale. Manson with the transports was held in readi-
ness to move further up the river.

Feeling the net drawing about him, Morg' gave his
men but two or three hours' rest near Harris, a, and then
took the road toward Cincinnati. He reached Glendale,
thirteen miles northwest of the city, late in the night, and
then turned to the east, apparently for Camp Dennison,
equally distant in a northeast direction. His men were
jaded to the last degree of endurance, and some were
dropping from the saddle for lack of sleep. Still he kept
on. Colonel Neflf, in accordance with his orders, had
blockaded the principal roads to the west, and stood at
bay in front of his camp. Morgan threw a few shells at
Ncff's force, and a slight skirmish began, but again he
broke away, forced to make a detour of ten miles to the
north. We had been able to warn Neff of their approach
by a message sent after midnight, and he had met them
boldly, protecting the camp and the railroad bridge north
of it.* The raiders reached Williamsburg in Clermont
County, twenty-eight miles from Cincinnati, in the after-
noon of the 14th, and there the tired men and beasts took
the first satisfactory rest they had had for three days.
Morgan had very naturally assumed that there would be a
considerable regular force at Cincinnati, and congratulated
himself that by a forced night march he had passed round
the city and avoided being cut ofif. He had, in truth,
escaped by the skin of his teeth. Could Burnside have
felt sure that Lawrenceburg was safe a few hours earlier,

1 O. R., vol. zziii. pt. i. pp. 748, 750.

504

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Manson and Sanders might have been in Cincinnati early
enough on the 13th to have barred the way from Harrison.
He had in fact ordered Manson up at two o'clock in the
afternoon, but the latter was making a reconnoissance north
of the town, and was detained till late in the night. As
soon as it was learned on the 14th that Morgan had passed
east of the Little Miami River, Sanders was ordered to
join Hobson and aid in the pursuit.^ Hobson's horses
were almost worn out, foi following close upon Morgan's
track, as he was doing, he found only broken down animals
left behind by the rebels, whilst these gathered up the
fresh animals as they advanced. Still he kept doggedly
on, seldom more than ten or fifteen miles behind, but
unable to close that gap till his opponent should be de-
layed or brought to bay.

After entering Clermont County, the questions as to
roads, etc, indicated that Morgan was making for Mays-
ville, hoping to cross the river there.^ Manson's brigade
and the gunboats were accordingly sent up the river to
that vicinity. The militia of the Scioto valley were
ordered to destroy the bridges, in the hope that that river
would delay him, but they were tardy or indifferent, and
it was a day or two later before the means of obstruction
were efficiently used. Judah's forces reached Cincinnati
on the 14th, a brigade was there supplied with horses, and
they were sent by steamers to Portsmouth. Judah was
ordered to spare no effort to march northward far enough
to head off the enemy's column. On the i6th General
Scammon, commanding in West Virginia, wan asked to
concentrate some of his troops at Gallipolis or Pomeroy
on the upper Ohio, and promptly did so.* The militia
were concentrated at several points along the railway to

* In the reports of Hobson and Sanders there seems to be a mistake of a
day in the dates, from the 12th to the i6th. Thii may be corrected by the
copies of current dispatches given in O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 730-750.

■i Id., p 749. • Id., p. 756.

THE MORGAN RAID 505

Marietta. Hobson was in the rear, pushing along at the
rate of forty miles a day.

Morgan had soon learned that the river was so patrolled
that no chance to make a ferry could be trusted, and he
made his final effort to reach the ford at Bufiington Island,
between Marietta and Pomeroy. He reached Pomeroy on
the 1 8th, but Scammon was occupying it, and the troops
of the Kanawha division soon satisfied Morgan that he
was not dealing with militia. He avoided the roads held
by our troops, and as they were infantry, could move
around them, though a running skirmish was kept up for
some miles. Hobson was close in rear, and Judah's men
were approaching BuflP.ngton. Morgan reached the river
near the ford about eight o'clock in the evening. The
night was pitchy dark, and his information was that a small
earthwork built to command the ford was occupied by a
permanent garrison. He concluded to wait for daylight.
The work had in fact been abandoned on the preceding
day, but at daybreak in the morning he was attacked.
Hobson's men pushed in from west and north, and Judah
from the south. The gunboats came close up to the
island, within range of the ford, and commanded it. Hob-
son attacked vigorously and captured the artillery. The
wing of the Confederate forces, about ^QO in number, sur-
rendered to General Shackelford, and about 200 to the
other brigades under Hobson The rest of the enemy,
favored by a fog which filled the valley, evaded their pur-
suers and fled northward. Hobson ordered all his bri-
gades to obey the commands of Shackelford, who was in
the lead, and himself sought Judah, whose approach had
been unknown to him till firing was heard on the other
side of the enemy. Judah had also advanced at daybreak,
but in making a reconnoissance he himself with a small
escort had stumbled upon the enemy in the fog. Both
parties were completely surprised, and before Judah could
bring up supports, three of his staff were captured. Major

506 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Daniel McCook, paymaster, who had volunteered as an
aide, was mortally wounded, ten privates were wounded,
and twenty or thirty with a piece of artillery captured.
Morgan hastily turned in the opposite direction, when he
ran into Hobson's columns ; Judah's prisoners and the
gun were recaptured, and the enemy driven in confusion,
with the losses above stated.^

As Hobson was regularly a brigade commander in
Judah's division, the latter now asserted command of the
whole force, against Hobson's protest, who was provision-
ally in a separate command by Burnside's order. Fortu-
nately, Shackelford had already led Hobson's men in rapid
pursuit of the enemy, and as soon as Burnside was in-
formed of the dispute, he ordered Judah not to interfere
with the troops which had operated separately. By the
time this order came Shackelford was too far away for
Hobson to rejoin him, and continued in independent com-
mand till Morgan's final surrender. He overtook the fly-
ing Confederates on the 20th, about sixty miles further
north, and they were forced to halt and defend them-
selves. Shackelford succeeded in getting a regiment in
the enemy's rear, and after a lively skirmish between 1200
and 13CX5 surrendered.' Morgan himself again evaded
with about 600 followers. Shackelford took 500 volunteers
on his best horses and pressed the pursuit. The chase
lasted four days of almost continuous riding, when the
enemy was again overtaken in Jefferson County, some fif-
teen miles northwest of Steubenville. General Burnside
had collected at Cincinnati the dismounted men of Hob-
son's command, had given them fresh horses, and had
sent them by rail to join Shackelford. They were under
command of Major W. B. Way of the Ninth Michigan
Cavalry and Major G. W. Rue of the Ninth Kentucky
Cavalry. They brought five or six hundred fresh men to
Shackelford's aid, and their assistance was decisive.

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 775-777. ' Id., pp. 778, 781.

THE MORGAN RAID 507

Morgan's course to the river at Smith's Ferry on the border
of Columbiana County was intercepted, and near Saline-
ville he was forced to surrender with a little less than 4CX5
men who still followed him. About 250 had surrendered
in smaller bodies within a day or two before, and stragglers
had been picked up at many points along the line of pur-
suit. Burnside reported officially that about 3000 pris-
oners were brought to Cincinnati.* General Duke states
that some 300 of Morgan's command succeeded in cross-
ing the Ohio about twenty miles above Buffington, and
escaped through West Virginia. He also gives us some
idea of the straggling caused by the terrible fatigues of the
march by telling us that the column was reduced by
nearly 500 effectives when it passed around Cincinnati.^
It is probable that these figures are somewhat loosely
stated, as the number of prisoners is very nearly the whole
which the Confederate authorities give as Morgan's total
strength.* Either a considerable reinforcement must have
succeeded in getting to him across the river, or a very
small body must have escaped through West Virginia.
Burnside directed the officers to be sent to the military
prison camp for officers on Johnson's Island in Sandusky
Bay, and the private soldiers to go to Camp Chase at
Columbus and Camp Morton at Indianapolis. Soon after-
ward, however, orders came from Washington that the
officers should be confined in the Ohio penitentiary, in re-
taliation for unusual severities practised on our officers
who were prisoners in the South. Morgan's romantic es-
cape from the prison occurred just after I was relieved

* O. R,, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 14.

2 Hist, of Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 442, 443.

' A note attached to Wheeler's return of the cavalry of his corps for
July 31st says that Morgan's division was absent " on detached service," ef-
fectives 2743. Add to this the officers, etc., and the total " present for duty "
would be a little over 3000. O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 941. For Bragg's
circular explaining the term " effectives " as applying only to private soldiei-s
actually in the line of battle, see Id., p. 619, and ante, p. 482.

5o8

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

from the command of the district in the fall, for the pur-
pose of joining the active army in East Tennessee.

A glance at the raid as a whole, shows that whilst it
naturally attracted much attention and caused great excite-
ment at the North, it was of very little military importance.
It greatly scattered for a time and fatigued the men and
horses of the Twenty-third Corps who took part in the
chase. It cost Indiana and Ohio something in the plunder
of country stores and farm-houses, and in the pay and
expenses of large bodies of militia that were temporarily
called into service. But this was all. North of the Ohio
no military posts were captured, no public depots of
supply were destroyed, not even an important railway
bridge was burned. There was no fighting worthy of the
name; the list of casualties on the National side showing
only 19 killed, 47 wounded, and 8 missing in the whole
campaign, from the 2d of July to the final surrender.^
For this the whole Confederate division of cavalry was
sacrificed. Its leader was never again trusted by his
government, and his prestige was gone forever. His men
made simply a race for life from the day they turned
away from the militia at Vernon, Indiana. Morgan care-
fully avoided every fortified post and even the smaller
towns. The places he visited after he crossed the Ohio
line do not include the larger towns and villages that
seemed to lie directly in his path. He avoided the rail-
roads also, and these were used every day to convey the
militia and other troops parallel to his route, to hedge him
in and finally to stop him. His absence was mischievous
to Bragg, who was retreating upon Chattanooga and to
whom the division would have been a most welcome
reinforcement. He did not delay Burnside, for the latter
was awaiting the return of the Ninth Corps from Vicks-
burg, and this did not begin to arrive till long after the
raid was over. None of the National army's communica-
1 O. R., vol. xxlii. pt i. p. 637.

THE MORGAN RAID 509

tions were interrupted, and not a soldier under Rosecrans
lost a ration by reason of the pretentious expedition. It
ended in a scene that was ridiculous in the extreme.
Morgan had pressed into his service as guides, on the last
day of his flight, two men who were not even oflicers of
the local militia, but who were acting as volunteer home-
guards to protect their neighborhood. When he finally
despaired of escape, he begged his captive guides to
change their rdle into commanders of an imaginary army
and to accept his surrender upon merciful and favorable
terms to the vanquished ! He afterward claimed the right
tu immediate liberation on parole, under the conditions of
this burlesque capitulation. Shackelford and his rough
riders would accept no surrender but an unconditional one
as prisoners of war, and were sustained in this by their
superiors. The distance by the river between the crossing at
Brandenburg and the ferry above Steubenville near which
Morgan finally surrendered, was some six hundred miles.
This added to the march from Tennessee through Ken-
tucky would make the whole ride nearly a thousand miles
long. Its importance, however, except as a subject for an
entertaining story, was in an inverse ratio to its length.
Its chief interest to the student of military history is in its
bearing on the question of the rational use of cavalry in
an army, and the wasteful folly of expeditions which have
no definite and tangible military object.*

1 For official reports and correspondence concerning the raid, see Burn-
side's report (O. R., vol. xxiii. pt i. pp. 13, 14) and the miscellaneous docu-
ments (/(/., pp. 632-818).

'•y

CHAPTER XXV

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE

News of Grant's victory at Vicksburg — A thrilling scene at the opera —
Burnside's Ninth Corps to return — Stanton urges Rosecrans to advance
— The Tullahoma manoeuvres — Testy correspondence — Its real mean-
ing — Urgency with Burnside — Ignorance concerning his situation —
His disappointment as to Ninth Corps — Rapid concentration of other
troops — Burnside's march into East Tennessee — Occupation of Knox-
ville - - Invests Cumberland Gap — The garrison surrenders — Good
news from Rosecrans — Distances between armies — Divergent lines —
No railway communication — Burnside concentrates toward the Vir-
ginia line — Joy of the people — Their intense loyalty — Their faith in
the future.

DURING the Morgan Raid and whilst we in Ohio
were absorbed in the excitement of it, events were
moving elsewhere. Lee had advanced from Virginia
through Maryland into Pennsylvania and had been de-
feated at Gettysburg by the National army under Meade.
Grant had brought the siege of Vicksburg to a glorious
conclusion and had received the surrender of Pemberton
with his army of 30,000 Confederates. These victories,
coming together as they did and on the 4th of July, made
the national anniversary seem more than ever a day of
rejoicing and of hope to the whole people. We did not
get the news of Grant's victory quite so soon as that of
Meade's, but it came to us at Cincinnati in a way to excite
peculiar enthusiasm.

An excellent operatic company was giving a series of
performances in the city, and all Cincinnati was at Pike's
Opera House listening to / Puritani on the evening of
the 7th of July. General Burnside and his wife had one of
the proscenium boxes, and my wife and I were their guests.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE $11

The second act had just closed with the famous trumpet
song, in which Susini, the great basco of the day, had
created di furore. A messenger entered the box where the
general was surrounded by a brilliant company, and gave
him a dispatch which announced the surrender of Vicks-
burg and Pemberton's army. Burnside, overjoyed, an-
nounced the great news to us who were near him, and
then stepped to the front of the box to make the whole
audience sharers in the pleasure. As soon as he was seen
with the paper in his hand, the house was hushed, and his
voice rang through it as he proclaimed the great victory
and declared it a long stride toward the restoration of the
Union. The people went almost wild with excitement,
the men shouted hurrahs, the ladies waved their handker-
chiefs and clapped their hands, all rising to their feet
The cheering was long as well as loud, and before it sub-
sided the excitement reached behind the stage. The
curtain rose again, and Susini came forward with a national
flag in each hand, waving them enthusiastically whilst his
magnificent voice resounded in a repetition of the song
he had just sung, and which seemed as appropriate as if
it were inspired for the occasion, —

" Suoni la tromba, e intrepido
lo pugner6 da forte,
Bello h affrontar la morte,
Gridando liberty ! "

The rejoicing and the cheers were repeated to the echo,
and when at last they subsided, the rest of the opera was
only half listened to, suppressed excitement filling every
heart and the thought of the great results to flow from the
victories absorbing every mind.

Burnside reckoned with entire certainty on the imme-
diate return of the Ninth Corps, and planned to resume
his expedition into East Tennessee as soon as his old
troops should reach him again. Tlie Morgan raid was
just beginning, and no one anticipated its final scope. In

512

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the dispatch from the Secretary of War which announced
Grant's great victory, Burnside was also told that the corps
would immediately return to him. In answering it on the
8th July, he said, " I thought I was very happy at the
success of General Grant and General Meade, but I am
still happier to hear of the speedy return of the Ninth
Corps." He informed Rosecrans of it on the same day,
adding, " I hope soon to be at work again." '

The Washington authorities very naturally and very
properly wished that the tide of success should be kept
moving, and Secretary Stanton had exhorted Rosecrans to
further activity by saying, on the 7th, " You and your noble
army now have the chance to give the finishing blow to the
rebellion.* Will you neglect the chance?" Rosecrans
replied : " You do not appear to observe the fact that this
noble army has driven the rebels from middle Tennessee,
of which my dispatches advised you. I beg in behalf of
this army that the War Department may not overlook so
great an event because it is not written in letters of blood."
He, however, did not intimate any purpose of advancing.
No doubt the manoeuvring of Bragg out of his fortified
positions at Shelbyville and Tullahoma had been well
done ; but its chief value was that it forced Bragg to
meet the Army of the Cumberland in the open field if the
advantage should be promptly followed up. If he were
allowed to fortify another position, nothing would be
gained but the ground the army stood on. Had Rose-
crans given any intimation of an early date at which he
could rebuild the Elk River bridge and resume active
operations, it would probably have relieved the strain so
noticeable in the corr. ipondence between him and the
War Department. He did nothing of the kind, and the
necessity of removing him from the command was a matter
of every-day discussion at Washington, as is evident from
the confidential letters Halleck sent to him. The corre-

1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 522, 524.

« Id., p. 518.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 513

spondence between the General-in-Chief and his subordinate
is a curious one. A number of the most urgent dispatches
representing the dissatisfaction of the President and the
Secretary were accompanied by private and confidential
letters in which Halleck explains the situation and strongly
asserts his friendship for Rosecrans and the error of the
latter in assuming that personal hostility to himself was at
bottom of the reprimands sent him on account of his
delays. It was with good intentions that Halleck wrote
thus, but the w:,dom of it is very questionable. It gave
Rosecrans ground to assume that the official dispatches
were only the formal expression of the ideas of the Presi-
dent and Secretary whilst the General-in-Chief did not join
in the condemnation of his dilatory mode of conducting
the campaign. To say to Rosecrans, as Halleck did on
July 24th, " Whether well founded or without any founda-
tion, the dissatisfaction really exists, and I deem it my
duty as a friend to represent it to you truly and fairly," *
is to neglect his duty as commander of the whole army to
express his own judgment and to give orders which would
have the weight of his military position and presumed
knowledge in military matters. When, therefore, a few days
later he gave peremptory orders to begin an active advance,
these orders were interpreted in the light of the preced-
ing correspondence, and lost their force and vigor. They
were met by querulous and insubordinate inquiries whether
they were intended to take away all discretion as to details
from the commander of an army in the field.* It has
been argued that Rosecrans's weakness of character con-
sisted in a disposition to quarrel with those in power
over him, and that a spirit of contradiction thwarted the
good military conduct which his natural energy might
have produced. I cannot help reading his controversial
correspondence in the light of my personal observation of
the man, and my conviction is that his quarrelsome mode

^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 552, 555, 601. * Aug. 4, Id., p. 592.

VOL. I. — 33

5 14 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

of dealing with the War Department was the result of a
real weakness of will and purpose which did not take
naturally to an aggressive campaig that involved great
responsibilities and risks. Being really indecisive in fixing
his plan of campaign and acting upon it, his infirmity of
will was covered by a belligerence in his correspondence.
A really enterprising commander in the field would have
begun an active campaign in the spring before any dis-
satisfaction was exhibited at Washington ; and if he had a
decided purpose to advance at any reasonably early period,
there was nothing in the urgency shown by his superiors
to make him abandon his purpose. He might have made
testy comments, but he would have acted.

Halleck's correspondence with Burnside in July is hard
to understand, unless we assume that it was so perfunctory
that he did not remember at one time what he said or did
earlier. In a dispatch to the General-in-Chief dated the
nth, Rosecrans had said, "It is important to know if it
will be practicable for Burnside to come in on our left
flank and hold the line of the Cumberland ; if not, a line
in advance of it and east of us." ^ It was already under-
stood between Rosecrans and Burnside that the latter
would do this and more as soon as he sliould have the
Ninth Corps with him ; and the dispatch must be regarded
as a variation on the form of excuses for inaction, by
suggesting that he was delayed by the lack of an under-
standing as to co-operation by the Army of the Ohio. On
receipt of Rosecrans's dispatch, Halleck answered it on
the 13th, saying, " General Burnside has been frequently
urged to move forward and cover your left by entering
East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He
seems tied fast to Cincinnati." On the same day he
telegraphed Burnside, " I must again urge upon you the
importance of moving forward into East Tennessee, to
cover Rosecrans's left."* It is possible that Burnside's

^ O. IL, ToL xziii. pt ii. p. 529. * Id., p. 531.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 515

telegraphic correspondence with the Secretary of War was
not known to Halleck, but it is hard to believe that the
latter was ignorant of the proportions the Morgan raid had
taken after the enemy had crossed the Ohio River. The
13th of July was the day that Morgan marched from
Indiana into Ohio and came within thirteen miles of
Cincinnati. Burnside was organizing all the militia of
southern Ohio, and was concentrating two divisions of the
Twenty-third Corps to catch the raiders. One of these
was on a fleet of steamboats which reached Cininnati
that day, and the other, under Hobson, was in close pur-
suit of the enemy. Where should Burnside have been, if
not at Cincinnati? If the raid had been left to the " militia
and home guards," as Halleck afterward said all petty raids
should be, this, which was not a petty raid, would pretty
certainly have had results which would have produced
more discomfort at Washington than the idea that Burn-
side was " tied fast to Cincinnati." Burnside was exactly
where he ought to be, and doing admirable work which
resulted in the capture of the division of 3CXX) rebel cavalry
with its officers from the general in command downward.
That the General-in-Chief was entirely ignorant of what
was going on, when every intelligent citizen of the country
was excited over it and every newspaper was full of it,
reflects far more severely upon him than upon Burnside.

But this was by no means the whole. He forgot that
when he stopped Burnside's movement on 3d June to
send the Ninth Corps to Grant, it was with the distinct
understanding that it prevented its resumption till the
corps should return. He had himself said that this should
be as early as possible, and meanwhile directed Burnside
to concentrate his remaining forces as much as he could.*
Burnside had been told on the Sth of July, without inquiry
from him, that the corps was coming back to him, and
had immediately begun his preparation to resume an
1 O. R., vol. xxHi. pt. ii. p. 384.

5l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

active campaign as soon as it should reach him. Not
hearing of its being on the way, on the i8th he asked
Halleck if orders for its return had been given. To this
dispatch no answer was given, and it was probably pigeon-
holed and forgotten. Burnside continued his campaign
against Morgan, and on the 24th, when the last combina-
tions near Steubenville were closing the career of the raider,
Halleck again telegraphs that there must be no further
delay in the movement into East Tennessee,^ and orders
an immediate report of the position and number of Burn-
side's troops organized for that purpose! He was still
ignorant, apparently, that there had been any occasion to
withdraw the troops in Keptucky from the positions near
the Cumberland River.

Burnside answered temperately, reciting the facts and
reminding him of the actual state of orders and corre-
spondence, adding only, "I should be glad to be more
'definitely instructed, if you think the work can be better
•done." Morgan's surrender was on the 26th, and Burn-
side immediately applied himself with earnest zeal to get
his forces back into Kentucky. Judah's division at But-
.fington was three hundred miles from Cincinnati and five
hundred from the place it had left to begin the chase.
.Shackelford's mounted force was two hundred miles fur-
ther up the Ohio. This last was, as has been recited,
made up of detachments from all the divisions of the
Twenty-third Corps, and its four weeks of constant hard
riding had used up men and horses. These all had to be
got back to the southern part of central Kentucky and re-
vfitted, returned to their proper divisions, and prepared for
;a new campaign. The General-in-Chief does not seem to
Ihave had the slightest knowledge of these circumstances
vor conditions.

On the 28th another Confederate raid developed itself
in southern Kentucky, under General Scott. It seemed

1 O. R., vol. xxiiL pt. ii. p. 553.

THE UBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 517

to be intended as a diversion to aid Morgan to escape
from Ohio, but failed to accomplish anything. Scott ad-
vanced rapidly from the south with his brigade, crossing
the Cumberland at Williamsburg and moving through
London upon Richmond.' Colonel Sanders endeavored,
to stop the enemy at Richmond with about 500 men
hastily collected, but was driven back. He was ordered!
to Lexington and put in command of all the mounted men
which could be got together there, 2400 in all, and ad-
vanced against Scott, who now retreated by Lancaster^.
Stanford, and Somerset. At Lancaster the enemy was^
routed in a charge and 200 of them captured. Following
them up with vigor, their train was destroyed and about
500 more prisoners were taken. At the Cumberland River
Sanders halted, having been without rations for four days.
The remnant of Scott's force had succeeded in crossing
the river after abandoning the train. Scott claimed to
have taken and paroled about 200 prisoners in the first
part of his raid, but such irregular paroles of captured
men who could not be carried off were unauthorized and
void. The actual casualties in Sanders's command were
trifling.*

The effect of this last raid was still further to wear out
Burnside's mounted troops, but he pressed forward to the
front all his infantry and organized a column for advance.
In less than a week, on August 4, he was able to announce
to the War Department that he had 11,000 men concen-
trated at Lebanon, Stanford, and Glasgow, with outposts
on the Cumberland River, and that he could possibly in-
crease this to 12,000 by reducing some posts in guard of
the railway.' Upon this, Halleck gave to Rosecrans per-
emptory orders for the immediate advance of the Army
of the Cumberland, directing him also to report daily the

1 O. R., vol. zziii. pt ii. p. 568.

* Id^ pt. i. pp. 828-843 ; pt ii. pp. 568, 589.

• Id^ p. 591.

5l8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

movement of each corps till he should cross the Tennessee.
On the next day Burnside was ordered in like manner to
advance with a column of I2,<XX) men upon Knoxville, on
reaching which place he was to endeavor to connect with
the forces under Rosecrans.* The dispatch closed with
what was called a repetition of a former order from the
Secretary of War for Burnside to leave Cincinnati and take
command of his moving column in person. Burnside had
never dreamed of doing anything else, as everybody near
him knew, though he had in fact been quite ill during the
latter part of July. The mention c. a former order was
another sheer blunder on General Halleck's part, and
Burnside indignantly protested against the imputation con-
tained in it.^ The truth seems to be that Halleck was in
such a condition of irritation over his correspondence with
Rosecrans, that nothing pertaining to the Department of
the Ohio was accurately placed in his mind or accurately
stated when he had occasion to refer to it. In cutting the
knot by peremptory orders to both armies to move, he
was right, and was justified in insisting that the little
column of 12,000 under Burnside should start although it
could only be got together in greatest haste and with the
lack of equipment occasioned by the " wear and tear " of
the operations against Morgan, If, in insisting on this, he
had recognized the facts and given Burnside and his troops
credit for the capture of the rebel raiders and the concen-
tration, in a week, of forces scattered over a distance of
nearly a thousand miles, no one would have had a right to
criticise him. The exigency fairly justified it. But to
treat Burnside as if he had been only enjoying himself in
Cincinnati, and his troops all quietly in camp along the
Cumberland River through the whole summer, — to ig-
nore the absence of the Ninth Corps and his own suspen-
sion of a movement already begun when he took it away,
— to assume in almost every particular a basis of fact ab-
' O. R., vol. xxlll. pt. ii. pp. S9*-S93' " ■'<'•» PP- S93. 594-

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 519

solutely contrary to the reality and to telegraph censures
for what had been done, under his own orders or strictly
in harmony with them, — all this was doing a right thing
in as absurdly wrong a way as was possible. A gleam of
humor and the light of common sense is thrown over one
incident, when Mr. Lincoln, seeing that Burnside had full
right from the dispatches to suppose the Ninth Corps was
to come at once to him from Vicksburg and that no one
had given him any ex})lanation, himself telegraphed that
the information had been based on a statement from Gen-
eral Grant, who had not informed them why the troops
had not been sent. " General Grant," the President
quaintly added, " is a copious worker and fighter, but a
vc^y meagre writer or telegrapher. No doubt he changed
his purpose for some sufficient reason, but has forgotten
to notify us of it." * The reference to copious work as con-
trasted with the copia verhorum gains added point from a
dispatch of Halleck to Rosecrans, quite early in the season,
in which the latter is told that the cost of his telegraph
dispatches is " as much or perhaps more than that of all
the other generals in the field." ' The form of the reference
to Grant enables us also to read between the lines the prog-
ress he was making in reputation and in the President's
confidence. He kept " pegging a*ray," and was putting
brains as well as energy into his work. The records show
also that Burnside took the hint, whether intended or not,
and in this campaign did not err on the side of copiousness
in dispatches to Washington.

To avoid the delay which would be caused by the dis-
tribution of his mounted force to the divisions they had
originally been attached to, Burnside organized these into
a division under Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, and an in-
dependent brigade under Colonel F. Wolford. He also
reorganized the infantry divisions of the Twenty-third
Corps. The first division, under Brigadier-General J. T.
> O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 561. * M-, P *5S

520 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Boyle, was to remain in Kentucky and protect the lines of
communication. The second was put under command of
Brigadier-General M. D. Manson, and the third under Brig-
adier-General M. S. Hascall. Each marching division was
organized into two brigades with a battery of artillery
attached to each brigade. Three batteries of artillery
were in reserve,*

On the nth of August General Burnside went to Hick-
man's Bridge, and the forward movement was begun.'
At this date the Confederate forces in East Tennessee
under General Buckner numbered 14,733 " present for
duty," with an " aggregate present" of 20CX) or 3000 more.
Conscious that the column of 12,000 which Halleck had
directed him to start with was less than the hostile forces
in the Holston valley, Burnside reduced to the utmost
the garrisons and posts left behind him. Fortunately the
advanced division of the Ninth Corps returning from
Vicksburg reached Cincinnati on the I2th, and althous^h
the troops were wholly unfit for active service by reason
of malarial diseases contracted on the " Yazoo," they could
. relieve some of the Kentucky garrisons, and Burnside was
thus enabled to increase his moving column to about
15,000 men. The earlier stages of the advance were slow,
as the columns were brought into position to take up
their separate lines of march and organize their supply
trains for the road. On the 20th Manson's division was
at Columbia, Hascall's was at Stanford, Carter's cavalry
division was at Crab Orchard, and independent brigades
of cavalry under Colonels Wolford and Graham were at
Somerset and Glasgow.^ On that day orders were issued

1 O. R., vol :x. pt. ii. pp. 553-555.

3 /(/., pt. ii.. p. 16. Hickman's Bridge, as has already been mentioned,
was at the terminus of the Central Kentucky Railroad. There, on the bank
of the Kentucky River, Burnside m.ide a fortified depot from which his
wagon trains should start as a base for the supply system of his army in
East Tennessee. It was called Camp Nelson in honor of the dead Kentucky
general.

• Id., pt. ii. p. 548.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE $21

522 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

for the continuous march. General Julius White relieved
Manson in command of the second division, and the two
infantry divisions were to move on Montgomery, Tenn.,
Hascall's by way of Somerset, Chitwoods, and Huntsville,
and White's by way of Creelsboro, Albany, and Jamestown.
Carter's cavalry, which covered the extreme left flank,
marched through Mt. Vernon and London to Williams-
burg, where it forded the Cumberland, thence over the
Jellico Mountains to Chitwoods where it became the
advance of Hascall's column to Montgomery.* At this
point the columns were united and all moved together
through Emory Gap upon Kingston. Burnside accom-
panied the cavalry in person, and sent two detachments,
one to go by way of Big Creek Gap to make a demonstra-
tion on Knoxville, and the other through Winter's Gap for
the same purpose of misleading the enemy as to his line
of principal movement.

Nothing could be more systematic and vigorous than
the march of Burnside's columns.' They made from
fifteen to twenty or twenty-five miles a day with the reg-
ularity of clock-work, though the route in many parts of
it was most difficult. There were mountains to climb and
narrow gorges to thread. Streams were to be forded,
roads were to be repaired and in places to be made anew.
On the 1st of September Burnside occupied Kingston,
having passed through Emory Gap into East Tennessee
and communicated with Crittenden's corps of Rosecrans's
army.^ Here he learned that upon the development of
the joint plan of campaign of the National commanders,
Bragg had withdrawn Buckner's forces south of the Ten-
nessee at Loudon, there making them the right flank of his
army about Chattanooga. There was, however, one ex-
ception in Buckner's order to withdraw. Brigadier-General
John W. Frazer was left at Cumberland Gap with 2500 men,

1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 548. " Id., p. 569.

• Itinerary, O. R., vol. xxx. pt. ii. pp. 576-578.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 523

and though Buckner had on August 30th ordered him to
destroy his material and retreat into Virginia, joining the
command of Major-General Samuel Jones, this order was
withdrawn on Frazer's representation of his ability to hold
the place and that he had rations for forty days.^ Inere
being therefore no troops in East Tennessee to oppose its
occupation, Burnside's advance-guard entered Knoxville
on the 3d of September. Part of the Twenty-third Corps
had been sent toward Loudon on the 2d, and upon their
approach the enemy burned the great railroad bridge at
that place. A light-draught steamboat was building at
Kingston, and this was captured and preserved.^ It played
a useful part subsequently in the transportation of supplies
when the wagon-trains were broken down and the troops
were reduced nearly to starvation. No sooner was Burn-
side in Knoxville than he put portions of his army in
motion for Cumberland Gap, sixty miles northward. He
had already put Colonel John F. DeCourcey (Sixteenth
Ohio Infantry) in command of new troops arriving in Ken-
tucky, and ordered him to advance against the fortifica-
tions of the gap on the north side. General Shackelford
was sent with his cavalry from Knoxville, but when Burnside
learned that DeCourcey and he were not strong enough
to take the place, he left Knoxville in person with Colonel
Samuel Gilbert's brigade of infantry and made the sixty-
mile march in fifty-two hours. Frazer had refused to sur-
render on the summons of the subordinates; but when
Burnside arrived and made the demand in person, he
despaired of holding out and on the 9th of September
surrendered the garrison. A considerable number got
away by scattering after the flag was hauled down, but
2,205 "^en laid down their arms, and twelve pieces of cannon
were also among the spoils.' DeCourcey's troops were
left to garrison the fortifications, and the rest were sent to

» O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 608. " « Id., pt. lii. p. 333.

• Id., pt. ii. pp. 548, 599, 604, 611.

524 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

occupy the upper valley of the Holston toward the Vir-
ginia line.

On the lOth, and while still at Cumberland Gap, Burn-
side received a dispatch from General Crittenden with
the news that he was in possession of Chattanooga, that
Bragg had retreated toward Rome, Ga., and that Rose-
crans hoped with his centre and right to intercept the
enemy at Rome, which was sixty miles south of Chat-
tanooga.^ Everything was therefore most promising on
the south, and Burnside had only to provide for driving
back the Confederates under Jones, at the Virginia line,
a hundred and thirty miles northeast of Knoxville. It
becomes important here to estimate these distances rightly.
Knoxville is a hundred and eleven miles distant from
Chattanooga by the railroad, and more by the country
roads. From Bristol on the northeast to Chattanooga on
the southwest is two hundred and forty-two miles, which
measures the length of that part of the Holston and Ten-
nessee valley known as East Tennessee. If Rosecrans
were at Rome, as General Crittenden's dispatch indicated,
he was more than a hundred and seventy miles distant from
Knoxville, and nearly three hundred miles from the region
about Greeneville and the Watauga River, whose crossing
would be the natural frontier of the upper valley, if Burn-
side should not be able to extend his occupation quite to
the Virginia line. It will be seen therefore that the prog-
ress of the campaign had necessarily made Rosecrans's
and Burnside's lines of operation widely divergent, and
they were far beyond supporting distance of each other,
since there wis no railway communication between them,
and could not be for a long time. Burnside captured some
locomotives and cars at Knoxville ; but bridges had been
destroyed to such an extent that these were of little use
to him, for the road could be operated but a short distance
in either direction and the amount of rolling stock was,

1 O. R., vol. xzz. pt. iii. p. 533.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 525

at most, very little. Complete success for Rosecrans,
with the reopening and repair of the whole line from
Nashville through Chattanooga, including the rebuilding
of the great bridge at Loudon, were the essential condi-
tions of further co-operation between the two armies, and
of the permanent existence of Burnside's in East Tennessee.
Efforts had been made to extend the lines of telegraph
as Burnside advanced,^ but it took some time to do this,
and even when the wires were up there occurred a diffi-
culty in making the electric circuit, so that through all
the critical part of the Chickamauga campaign, Burnside
had to communicate by means of so long a line of couriers
that three days was the actual time of transmittal of dis-
patches between himself and Washington.* The news
from Rosecrans on the loth was so reassuring that Bum-
side's plain duty was to apply himself to clearing the
upper valley of the enemy, and then to further the great
object of his expedition by giving the loyal inhabitants
the means of self-government, and encouraging them to
organize and arm themselves with the weapons which his
wagon trains were already bringing from Kentucky. He
had also to provide for his supplies, and must use the
good weather of the early autumn to the utmost, for the
long roads over the mountains would be practically im-
passable in winter. The route from Kentucky by way of
Cumberland Gap was the shortest, and, on the whole,
the easiest, and a great system of transportation by trains
under escort was put in operation. The camp at Cum-
berland Gap could give this protection through the moun-
tain district, and made a convenient stopping-place in the
weary way when teams broke down or had to be replaced.
Other roads were also used whilst they seemed to be safe,
and the energies and resources of the quartermaster's
department were strained to the utmost to bring forward

1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 574 ; pt. iii. p. 717.
" Id.., pt. iii. p. 718.

$26 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

arms, ammunition for cannon and .nuskets, food and
medical supplies, and all the munuions of war. The
roads were covered with herds of beeves and swine, and
feeding stations for these were established and the forage
had to be drawn to them, for nothing could be got, along
the greater part of the route. Burnside hoped that the
railway by Chattanooga would be put in repair and be
open before winter should shut in, but he very prudently
acted on the principle of making the most of his present
means. It was well he did so, for otherwise his little army
would have been starved before the winter was half over.
From Cumberland Gap the courier line was sixty miles
shorter than from Knoxville, and the first dispatches
of Burnside announcing his capture of Frazer's troops
reached Washington more quickly than later ones. At
noon of the nth Mr. Lincoln answered it with hearty
congratulations and thanks. This was quickly followed
by a congratulatory message from Halleck accompanied
by formal orders.^ These last only recapitulated the
points in Burnside's further operations and administration
which were the simplest deductions from the situation.
Burnside was to hold the country eastward to the gaps of
the North Carolina mountains (the Great Smokies) and
the valley of the Holston up to the Virginia line. Hal-
leck used the phrase "the line of the Holston," which
would be absurd, and was probably only a slip of the pen.
The exact strength of General Jones, the Confederate
commander in southwestern Virginia, was not known, but,
to preserve his preponderance, Burnside could not pru-
dently send less than a division of infantry and a couple
of brigades of cavalry to the vicinity of Rogersville or
Greeneville and the railroad crossing of the Watauga.
This would be just- about half his available force. The
other division was at first divided, one of the two brigades
being centrally placed at Knoxville, and the other at

* O. R , vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 555.

THE Li BE RATION OF EAST TENNESSEE >?/

Sevicrville, thirty miles up the French Broad Ki"'.»%
where it covered the principal pass over the Gnc'a'j*: »•;
Asheville, N. C. The rest of his cavalry was at Lojd.)n
and Kingston, where it covered the north side of the Ten-
nessee River and communicated with Rosccrans's oi.'«
posts above Chattanooga.

Halleck further informed Burnside that the Secretary
of War directed him to raise all the volunteers he could
in East Tennessee and to select officers for them. If he
had not already enough arms and equipments he could
order them by telegraph. As to Rosecrans, the Gen-
eral-in-Chief stated that he would occupy Dalton or some
other point south of Chattanooga, closing the enemy's line
from Atlanta, and when this was done, the question would
be settled whether the whole would move eastward into
Virginia or southward into Georgia and Alabama. ^ Burn-
side's present work being thus cut out for him, he set
himself about it with the cordial earnestness which marked
his character. He had suggested the propriety of his
retiring as soon as the surrender of Frazer had made his
occupation of East Tennessee an assured success, but he
had not formally asked to be relieved.* His reasons for
doing so dated back to the Fredericksburg campaign, in
part; for he had believed that his alternative then pre-
sented to the government, that he should be allowed to
dismiss insubordinate generals or should himself resign,
ought to have been accepted. His case had some resem-
blance to Pope's when the administration approved his
conduct and his courage but retired him and restored
McClellan to command, in deference to the supposed
sentiment of the Army of the Potomac. Halleck's per-
sistent ignoring of the officially recorded causes of the
delay in this campaign, and his assumption that the Mor-
gan raid was not an incident of any importance in Burn-
side's responsibilities, had not tended to diminish the
latter's sense of discomfort in dealing with army head-

» O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 555. * /</.. p. 523-

528 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

quarters. A debilitating illness gave some added force to
his other reasons, which, however, we who knew him well
understood to be the decisive ones with him.* Mr. Lin-
coin's sincere friendship and confidence he never doubted,
but his nature could not fully appreciate the President's
policy of bending to existing circumstances when current
opinion was contrary to his own, so that he might save
his strength for more critical action at another time.
Bumside had now the iclat of success in a campaign
which was very near the heart of the President and full
of interest for the Northern people. This, he felt, was a
time when he could retire with honor. Mr. Lincoln post-
poned action in the kindest and most complimentary
words,' and when he finally assigned another to command
the department, did not allow Burnside to resign, but laid
out other work for him where his patriotism and his cour-
age could be of use to the country.

The advent of the army into East Tennessee was, to
its loyal people, a resurrection from the grave. Their
joy had an exultation which seemed almost beyond the
power of expression. Old men fell down fainting and
unconscious under the stress of their emotions as they saw
the flag at the head of the column and tried to cheer it !
Women wept with happiness as their husbands stepped
out of the ranks of the loyal Tennessee regiments when
these came marching by the home.* These men h^ 1 gath-
ered in little recruiting camps on the mountain-sides and
had found their way to Kentucky, travelling by night and
guided by the pole-star, as the dark-skinned fugitives
from bondage had used to make their way to freedom.
Their families had been marked as traitors to the Confed-

1 O. R., vol. zxx. pt iii. p. 523 ; vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 757.

3 Id., Tol. zxz. pt. iii. p. 554. " Yours received. A thousand thanks for
the late successes you have g:ven us. We cannot allow you to resign until
things shall be a little more settled in East Tennessee. If then, purely on
your own account you wish to resign, we will not further refuse you."

' Temple's East Tennessee and the Civil War, pp. 476, 478. Humer'
The I^yal Mountaineers, pp. 211, ai8.

THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE $29

eracy, and had suffered sharpest privations and cruel
wrong on account of the absence of the husband and
father, the brother, or the son. Now it was all over, and
a jubilee began in those picturesque valleys in the
mountains, which none can understand who had not seen
the former despair and the present revulsion of happi-
ness. The mountain coves and nooks far up toward the
Virginia line had been among the most intense in loyal y
to the nation. Andrew Johnson's home was at Greene-
ville, and he was now the loyal provisional governor of
Tennessee, soon to be nominated Vice-President of the
United States. General Carter, who had asked to be
transferred from the navy to organize the refugee loyal-
ists into regiments, was a native of the same region. It
was at the Watauga that the neighboring opponents of
secession had given the first example of daring self-
sacrifice in burning the railway bridge. For this they
were hanged, and their memory was revered by the loyal
men about them, as was Nathan Hale's by our revolu-
tionary fathers. East Tennessee was full of such loyalty,
but here were good reasons why Burnside should push his
advance at least to the Watauga, and if possible to the
Virginia line. His sympathies were all alive for this
people. The region, he telegraphed the President, is as
loyal as any State of the North. ^ It threw off all dis-
guise, it blossomed with National flags, it took no coun-
sel of prudence, it refused to think of a return of Confed-
erate soldiers and Confederate rule as a possibility. It
exulted in every form of defiance to the Richmond govern-
ment and what had been called treason to the Confederate
States. The people had a religious faith that God would
not abandon them or suffer them to be again abandoned.
If such an incredible wrong were to happen, they must
either leave their country in mass, or they must be ready
to die. They could see no other alternative.

1 O. R., vol. Tax. pt. iii. p. 523.
VOL. I. — 34

CHAPTER XXVI

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE

Organizing and anning the loyalists — Bumside concentrates near Grecne-
ville — His general plan — Kumors of Confederate reinforcements —
Lack of accurate information — The Ninth Corps in Kentucky — Its
depletion by malarial disease — Death of General Welsh from this cause
— Preparing for further work — situation on i6th September — Dis-
patch from Halleck — Its apparent purpose — Necessity to dispose of
the enemy near Virginia border — Bumside personally at the front —
His great 'activity — Ignorance of Rosecrans's peril — Impossibility
of joining him by the 20th — Ruinous e£fects of abandoning East
Tennessee — Efforts to aid Rosecrans without such abandonment —
Enemy duped into burning Watauga bridge themselves — Ninth Corps
arriving — Willcox's division garrisons Cumberland Gap — Reinforce-
ments sent Rosecrans from all quarters — Chattanooga made safe from
attack — The supply question — Meigs's description of the roads — Bum-
side halted near Loudon — Halleck's misconception of the geography —
The people imploring the President not to remove the troops — How
Longstreet got away from Virginia — Burnside's alternate plans — Minor
operations in upper Holston valley — Wolford's afiair on the lower
Holston.

FOR a week after the capture of Cumberland Gap
Bumside devoted himself to the pleasing task of
organizing the native loyalists into a National Guard for
home defence, issuing arms to them upon condition that
they should, as a local militia, respond to his.jcall and
reinforce for temporary work his regular forces whenever
the need should arise. The detailed reports from the
upper valley reported the enemy under Jones at first to be
40CX), and later to be 6000 strong. These estimates
came through cool-headed and prudent officers, and were
based upon information brought in by loyal men who nad
proven singularly accurate in their knowledge throughout
the campaign. Point was added to these reports by the

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 53 1

experience of one of his regiments. A detachment of
3CX) men of the One Hundredth Ohio had been sent to
support a cavalry reconnoissance near Limestone Station
on the railroad, whilst Burnside was investing Cumber-
land Gap, and these had been surrounded and forced to
surrender by the enemy. This showed the presence of a
considerable body of Confederates in the upper valley,
and that they were bold and aggressive. It was the part
of prudence to act upon this information, and Burnside
ordered all his infantry except one brigade to march
toward Greeneville. Two brigades of cavalry were already
there, and his purpose was to concentrate about 6000
infantry, try to obtain a decisive engagement with the
Confederates, and to punish them so severely that the
upper valley would be safe, for a tinje at least, from inva-
sion by them, so that he might be free to withdraw most
of his troops to co-operate with Rosecrans in a Georgia
campaign, if that alternative in Halleck's plans should
be adopted. He felt the importance of this the more, as
the news received from Virginia mentioned the movement
of railway rolling-stock to the East to bring, as rumor
had it, Ewell's corps from Lee to reinforce Jones. ^ The
sending of the railway trains was a fact, but the object,
as it turned out, was to transport Longstreet's corps to
reinforce Bragg.' Of this, however, Burnside had no in-
timation, and must act upon the information which came
to him.

The Ninth Corps began to arrive at Cincinnati from
Vicksburg on the 12th of August, half of it coming then,
and the second division arriving on the 20th. It was re-
duced to 6(XX) by casualties and by sickness, and was in
a pitis^ble condition. Being made up of troops which had
served in the East, the men were not acclimated to the
Mississippi valley, and in the bayous and marshes about
Vicksburg had suffered greatly. Malarial fevers ate out

1 O. R, voL XXX. pt iiL pp. 661, 717. ' /</., p. 731.

■■>.

532 HEM/mSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

their vitality, and even those who reported for duty
dragged themselves about, the mere shadows of what
they had been. General Parke reported their arrival and
was then obliged to go upon sick-leave himself. General
Welsh, who had distinguished himself at Antietam» re-
ported that his division must recuperate for a few weeks
before it could take the field. He made a heroic effort
to remain on duty, but died suddenly on the 14th, and his
loss was deeply felt by the corps.* Potter's division was
as badly off as Welsh's, and both were for a short time
scattered at healthful camps in the Kentucky hills. Each
camp was, at first, a hospital ; but the change of climate
and diet rapidly restored the tone of the hardy soldiery.

General Willcox, who commanded the Indiana district,
belonged to the corps, and asked to be returned to duty
with it. He was allowed to do so on the nth of Sep-
tember, and the War Department sent with him a new
division of Indiana troops which had been recruited and
organized during the summer. Burnside had ordered
recruits and new regiments to rendezvous in Kentucky,
and prepared to bring them as well as the Ninth Corps
forward as soon as the latter should be fit to march.
Every camp and station at the rear was full of busy prepa-
ration during the last of August and the beginning of
September, and at the front the general himself was now
"*vicentrating his little forces to strike a blow near the
. .<ginia line which would make him free to move
afterward in any direction the General-in-Chief should
determine.

On the i6th of September Hascall's division was
echeloned along the road from Morristown back toward
Knoxville; White's division passed Knoxville, moving
up the valley to join Hascall. HartsufF, who commanded
the Twenty-third Corps, had been disabled for field work
by trouble from his old wounds and was at Knoxville.

^ O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 45.

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 533

Burnside was also there, intending to go rapidly forward
and overtake his infantry as soon as they should approach
Greeneville. In the night the courier brought him a dis-
patch from Halleck,^ dated the 13th, directing a rapid
movement of all his forces in Kentucky toward East
Tennessee, where the whole Army of the Ohio was to be
concentrated as soon as possible.' He also directed Bum-
side to move his infantry toward Chattanooga, giving as
a reason that Bragg might raanceuvre to turn Rosecrans's
right, and in that case Rosecrans would want to hand
Chattanooga over to Burnside so that he himself could
move the whole Army of the Cumberland to meet Bragg.
There was nothing in this dispatch which intimated
that Rosecrans was in any danger, nor was Burnside in-
formed that Bragg had been reinforced by Longstreet's
corps. On the other hand, his information looked to
Ewell's joining Jones against himself. The object Hal-
leck had in view seemed to be to get the Ninth Corps
and other troops now in Kentucky into East Tennessee as
rapidly as possible, and then to move the whole Army of
the Ohio down toward Rosecrans. It certainly could not
be that he wished Cumberland Gap abandoned, and the
trains and detachments coming through it from Kentucky
left to the tender mercies of Jones and his Confederates,
who could capture them at their leisure and without a
blow. It was equally incredible that the government
could wish to stop the organization of the loyalists just
as weapons were being distributed to them, and to aban-
don them to the enemy when their recent open demon-
strations in favor of the Union would make their condi-
tion infinitely worse than if our troops had never come to
them. The rational interpretation, and the one Burnside
^s^ave it, was that the alternative which had been stated in
the earlier dispatch of the i ith had been settled in favor
of a general movement southward instead of eastward,
1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. Hi. p. 617. • //^ pt iL p. 55a

534 REAf/A'ISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

and that this made it all the more imperative that he
should disembarrass himself of General Jones and estab-
lish a line on the upper Holston which a small force could
hold, whilst he with the rest of the two corps should
move southward as soon as the Ninth Corps could make
the march from Kentucky. This was exactly what Gen-
eral Schofield did in the next spring when he was ordered
to join Sherman with the Army of the Ohio; and I do
not hesitate to say that it was the only thing which an
intelligent military man on the ground and knowing the
topography would think of doing. To make a panicky
abandonment of the country and of the trains and detach-
ments en route to it, would have been hardly less dis-
graceful than a surrender of the whole. To Burnside's
honor and credit it should be recorded that he did not
dream of doing it. He strained every nerve to hasten the
movement of his troops so as to get through with his
little campaign against Jones by the time the Ninth Corps
could come from Kentucky, and if he could accomplish it
within that limit, he would have the right to challenge
the judgment of every competent critic, whether he had
not done that which became a good soldier and a good
general.

On the 17th of September the concentration of Burn-
side's infantry toward Greeneville had so far progressed
that he was preparing to go personally to the front and
lead them against the enemy. It is noticeable in the
whole campaign that he took this personal leadership and
activity on himself. In Hartsuff's condition of health it
would have beqn within the ordinary methods of action
that the next in rank should assume command of the
Twenty-third Corps, and that the department commander
should remain at his headquarters at Knoxville. But
Hartsuff was able to attend to office business, and so
Burnside practically exchanged places with him, leaving
his subordinate with discretion to direct affairs in the

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 535

department at large, whilst he himsel£ did the field work
with his troops. He had done it at Cumberland Gap
when he received the surrender of Frazer ; he was doing
it now, and he was to do it again, still later, when he met
Longstreet's advance at the crossing of the Holston
River.

In preparation for an absence of some days, he wrote,
on the date last mentioned, a long dispatch to General
Halleck, in the nature of a report of the state of affairs
at that date. ^ He explained the failure of the telegraph
and the efforts that were making to get it in working
order. He gave the situation of the troops and stated his
purpose to attack the enemy. He noticed the report of
Ewell's coming against him and promised stout resist-
ance, finding satisfaction in the thought that it would give
Meade the opportunity to strike a decisive blow against
Lee's reduced army. He reported the condition of his
trains and cattle droves on the road from Kentucky, and
the contact of his cavalry in the south part of the valley
with Rosecrans's outposts. The bridge over the Hiwassee
at Calhoun, he said, could be finished in ten days, and the
steamboat at Kingston would soon be completed and ready
for use. All this promised better means of supply at an
early day, though at present " twenty-odd cars " were all
the means of moving men or supplies on the portion of
the railroad within his control.

Later in the same day he received Halleck's dispatch
of the 14th, which said it was believed the enemy would
concentrate to give Rosecrans battle, and directed him to
reinforce the latter with all possible speed.^ Still, no

* O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 717.

* Burnside's dispatches of the 17th in answer to Halleck's seem to show
that both those of 13th and 14th were received by him after he had written
the long one in the morning. The internal evidence supports this idea, and
his second dispatch on the 17th acknowledges the receipt of Halleck's two
together. O. R., vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 718. In his official report, however,
Bumside says the dispatch of 13th was received " on the night of the i6ch "

536

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

information was given of the movement of Longstreet to
join Bragg, and indeed it was only on the 15th that Hal-
leci( gave the news to Rosecrans as reliable.^ Burnside
must therefore regard the enemy concentrating in Geor-
gia as only the same which Rosecrans had been peremp-
torily ordered to attack and which he had been supposed
to be strong enough to cope with. No time was stated
at which the battle in Georgia would probably occur. To
hasten the work in hand, to put affairs at the Virginia
line in condition to be left as soon as might be, and then
to speed his forces toward Chattanooga to join in the Geor-
gia campaign, was plainly Burnside' s duty. If it would
be too rash for Rosecrans to give battle without reinforce-
ments, that officer was competent to manoeuvre his army
in retreat and take a defensible position till his reinforce-
ments could come. That course would be certainly much
wiser than to abandon East Tennessee to the enemy, with
all the consequences of such an act, quite as bad as the
loss of a battle. As matters turned out, even such in-
stantaneous and ruinous abandonment would not have
helped Rosecrans. It was now the afternoon of the 17th
of September. The battle of Chickamauga was to begin
in the early morning of the 19th and to end disastrously
on the 20th. One full day for the marching of troops
was all that intervened, or two at most, if they were only
to reach the field upon the second day of the battle. And
where were Burnside's men? One division at Greeneville
and above, more than two hundred miles from Chatta-
nooga, and the other near New Market and Morristown,
a hundred and fifty miles. Burnside's "twenty-odd cars "
were confined to a section of the railroad less than eighty

(O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 550), and I have followed this statement, although
his report was not written till November, 1865, when lapse of time might
easily give rise to an error in so trifling a detail. The matter is of no real
consequence in the view I have taken of the situation.
1 O R., XXX. pt. ii. p. 643.

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 537

miles long, and could hardly carry the necessary baggage
and ammunition even for that fraction of the way. The
troops must march, and could not by any physical possi-
bility make a quarter of the distance before Rosecrans's
fate at Chickamauga should be decided. The authorities
at Washington must bear the responsibility for complete
ignorance of these conditions, or, what would be equally
bad, a forgetfulness of them in a moment of panic.

But Burnside did not know and could not guess that ^
battle was to be fought so soon. All he could do was to
prepare to carry out the wishes of the War Department
as speedily as could be, without the total ruin of East
Tennessee and all he had accomplished. Such ruin
might come by the fate of war if he were driven out by
superior force, but he would have been rightly condemned
if it had come by his precipitate abandonment of the
country. He did more to carry out Halleck's wish than
was quite prudent. He stopped the troops which had not
yet reached Greeneville and ordered a countermarch. He
hastened up the country to make the attack upon the
Confederates with the force he already had in their pres-
ence, and then to bring the infantry back at once, hoping
the cavalry could hold in check a defeated enemy.

The necessity of delivering a blow at General Jones
was afterwards criticised by Halleck, but it was in accord-
ance with the sound rules of conducting war. To have
called back his troops without a fight would have been to
give the enemy double courage by his retreat, and his
brigades would have been chased by the exulting foe.
They would either have been forced to halt and fight their
pursuers under every disadvantage of loss of prestige and
of the initiative, or have made a precipitate flight which
would have gone far to ruin the whole command as well
as the Tennessee people they had just liberated. It is
true that this involved an advance from Greeneville upon
Jonesboro, but the cavalry were already in contact with

538 REAf/NrSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the enemy near there, and this was the only successful
mode of accomplishing his purpose.*

Making use of the portion of the railroad which could
be operated, Burnside reached Grecneville on the i8th
and rode rapidly to Jonesboro. On the 19th a brigade
of cavalry under Colonel Foster attacked the enemy at
Bristol, defeated them, tore up the railroad, and destroyed
the bridges two miles above the town.* Foster then
returned to Blountsville, and marched on the next day
to Hall's Ford on the Watauga, where, after a skirmishing
fight lasting several hours, he again dislodged the enemy,
capturing about fifty prisoners and a piece of artillery
with slight loss to himself. These were flanking move-
ments designed to distract the attention of the enemy
whilst Burnside concentrated most of his force in front of
their principal position at Carter's Station, where the
most important of the railway bridges in that region
crosses the Watauga. To impress his opponent with the
belief that he meant to make an extended campaign,
Burnside, on the 22d, notified Jones to remove the non-
combatants from the villages of the upper valley. Fos-
ter's brigade of cavalry was again sent to demonstrate on
the rear, whilst Burnside threatened in front with the
infantry. The enemy now evacuated the position and
retreated, first burning the bridge. This was what Burn-
side desired, and the means of resuming railway commu-
nication to support an advance toward Knoxville being
taken from the Confederates for a considerable time, he

1 Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, in their " Life of Lincoln," give tlie draft of
a letter to Burnside which Mr. Lincoln wrote but did not send, in which he
expressed his surprise that Burnside should be moving toward Virginia
when they at Washington were so anxious to have him in Georgia. Mr.
Lincoln's judgments of military affairs were excellent when he was fully
possessed of the facts ; and I have elaborated somewhat my statement of
the circumstances in East Tennessee, and of the distances, etc., to show how
little they were known or understood in Washington. Nicolay and Hay's
Lincoln, vol. viii. p. i66.

2 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 592.

BURiWSWE IN EAST TENNESSEE 539

was now able to put all his infantry except two regiments
in march for Knoxville. A brigade of cavalry with this
small infantry support at Hull's Gap was entrusted with
the protection of this region, and by the help of the home
guards of loyal men, was able to hold it during the opera-
tions of the next fortnight. Burnside's purpose had
been, if he had not been interrupted, to have pressed the
Confederates closely with a sufficient force in front to
compel a retreat, whilst he intercepted them with the
remainder of his army, moving by a shorter line from
Blountsville. He made, however, the best of the situa-
tion, and having driven the enemy over the State line and
disengaged his own troops, he was free to concentrate the
greater part of them for operations at the other end of the
valley.

The Ninth Corps was now beginning to arrive, and
was ordered to rendezvous first at Knoxville. Willcox
had assembled his division of new troops, mostly Indian-
ians, and marched with them to Cumberland Gap, where
he relieved the garrison of that post, and was himself
entrusted by Burnside with the command of that portion
of the department, covering the upper valleys of the
Clinch and Holston as well as the lines of communication
with Cincinnati and the Ohio River.

In the days immediately preceding the battle of Chick-
amauga, Halleck had urged reinforcements forward toward
Rosecrans from all parts of the West. Pope in Minne-
sota, Schofield in Missouri, Hurlbut at Memphis, and
Sherman at Vicksburg had all been called upon for help,
and all had put bodies of troops in motion, though the
distances were great and the effect was a little too much
like the proverbial one of locking the stable door after
the horse had been stolen. As there was no telegraphic
communication with Burnside, the General-in-Chief gave
orders through the adjutant-general's office in Cincinnati
directly to the Ninth Corps and to the detachments of

540 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

the Twenty-third Corps remaining or assembling in Ken-
tucky, to march at once into East Tennessee. An advi-
sory supervision of the department offices in Cincinnati
had been left with me, and Captain Anderson, the assist-
ant adjutant-general, issued orders in General Burnside's
name after consultation with me. General Parke cut
short his sick-leave, and, though far from strong, assumed
command of the Ninth Corps and began the march for
Cumberland Gap. The guards for the railways and neces-
sary posts were reduced to the lowest limits of safety, and
every available regiment was hurried to the front.

By the end of September Burnside's forces were pretty
well concentrated between Knoxville and Loudon, the
crossing of the Holston River. It had now been learned
that Bragg' s army had suffered even more than Rosecrans's
in the battle of Chickamauga, and notwithstanding the
rout of the right wing of the Cumberland Army, the stub-
born fighting of the centre and left wing under Thomas
had made the enemy willing to admit that they had not
won a decisive victory. Our army was within its lines at
Chattanooga, and these had been so strengthened that
General Meigs, who had bee jent out in haste as a spe-
cial envoy of the War Depar lent, reported to Mr. Stan-
ton on the 27th of September that the position was very
strong, being practically secure against an assault, and
that the army was hearty, cheerful, and confident.^ Meigs
was himself a distinguished officer of the Engineer Corps
«?^ as well as quartermaster-general, and the weight of his

opinion at once restored confidence in Washington. He
saw at a glance that the only perilous contingency was
the danger of starvation, for the wagon roads over the
mountains on the north side of the Tennessee were most
difficult at best, and soon likely to become impassable.
The army was safe from the enemy till it chose to resume
the offensive, provided it could be fed. He concluded

1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 890.

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 54I

his dispatch by saying, "Of the rugged nature of this
region I had no conception when I left Washington.
I never travelled on such roads before." * It was only too
evident that Halleck shared this ignorance, and had
added to it a neglect to estimate the distances over these
mountains and through these valleys, and the relations
of the points, he directed Bumside to hold, with the imme-
diate theatre of Rosecrans's operations.

On the same date as Meigs's report, Bumside w^is also
sending a full statement of his situation and an expla-
nation of his conduct. 2 The tel^raphic communication
was opened just as he finished his dispatch, and for the
first time he had the means of rapid intercourse with
army headquarters. He patiently explained the miscon-
ceptions and cross purposes of the preceding fortnight,
and showed how impossible and how ruinous would have
been any other action than that which he took. Hal-
leck had said that it would now be necessary to move the
Army of the Ohio along the north side of the Tennessee
till it should be opposite Chattanooga and reinforce Rose-
crans in that way. Bumside pointed out that this would
open the heart of East Tennessee to Bragg's cavalry
or detachments from his army. He oflFered to take the
bolder course of moving down the south side of the rivers,
covering Knoxville and the valley as he advanced.

Mr. Lincoln replied by authorizing Burnside to hold
his present positions, sending Rosecrans, in his own
way, what help he could spare. ^ Halleck's answer was an
amazing proof that he had never comprehended the cam-
paign. He reiterated that Bumside's orders, before leav-
ing Kentucky and continuously since, had been "to con-
nect your right with General Rosecrans's left, so that if
the enemy concentrated on one, the other would be able
to assist." * If this meant anything, it meant that Bura-

1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 890. * Td., p. 904.

« Id., p. 905. * Id^ p. 9061

542 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

side was to keep within a day's march of Rosecrans; for
two days was more than enough to fight out a battle like
Chickamauga. Yet he and everybody else knew that
Burnside's supply route from Kentucky was through
Cumberland Gap, and he had warmly applauded when
Burnside turned that position, and by investing it in front
and rear, had forced Frazer to surrender. He had expli-
citly directed Burnside to occupy and hold the upper Hol-
ston valley nearly or quite to the Virginia line, and one
gets weary of repeating that between these places and
Chattanooga was a breadth of two hundred miles of the
kind of country Meigs had described and more than ten
days of hard marching. His present orders are equally
blind. Burnside is directed to reinforce Rosecrans with
"all your available force," yet "East Tennessee must be
held at all hazards, if possible." To "hold at all haz-
ards " might be understood, but what is the effect of the
phrase " if possible " } It must amount in substance to
authority to do exactly what Burnside was doing, — to
hold East Tennessee with as small means as he thought
practicable, and to reinforce Rosecrans with what he
could spare.

It was, on the whole, fortunate for the country that
Burnside was not in telegraphic communication with
Washington sooner. Had he been actually compelled to
abandon East Tennessee on the 13th or 14th of September,
incalculable mischief would have followed. The Ninth
Corps was en route for Cumberland Gap, and it with all
the trains and droves on the road must either have turned
back or pushed on blindly with no probability of effecting
a junction with the Twenty-third Corps. Even as it was,
the terror in East Tennessee, when it became known that
they were likely to be abandoned, was something fearful.
Public and private men united in passionate protests, and
the common people stood aghast. Two of the most prom-
inent citizens only expressed the universal feeling when,

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 543

in a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, they used such language
as this, —

" In the name of Christianity and humanity, in the name of God
and liberty, for the sake of their wives and children and everything
they hold sacred and dear on earth, the loyal people of Tennessee
appeal to you and implore you not to abandon them again to the
merciless dominion of the rebels, by the withdrawal of the Union
forces from East Tennessee." ^

With the evidence of the ability of the Army of the
Cumberland to hold its position at Chattanooga, there
came a breathing spell and a quick end of the panic. It
was seen that there was time to get all desirable rein-
forcements to Rosecrans from the West, and Hooker was
sent with two corps from the East, open lines of well-
managed railways making this a quicker assistance than
could be given by even a few days' marches over country
roads. The culmination of the peril had been caused by
the inactivity of the Army of the Potomac, which had
permitted the transfer of Longstreet across four States ;
and now Hooker was sent from that army by a still longer
route through the West to the vicinity of Bridgeport,
thirty miles by rail below Chattanooga on the Tennessee
River, but nearer fifty by the circuitous mountain roads
actually used. It became evident also that Burnside's
army could only subsist by making the most of its own
lines of supply through Kentucky. To add its trains to
those which were toiling over the mountains between
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, would risk the starvation
of the whole. Until a better line could be opened, Burn-
side was allowed to concentrate most of his forces in the
vicinity of Loudon, where he guarded the whole valley.
His cavalry connected with Rosecrans on the north side
of the Tennessee, and also held the line of .the Hiwassee
on the left.

^ O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iv. p. 401.

544

REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

On the last day of September Burnside reported the
concentration of his forces and submitted three alternate
plans of assisting Rosecrans:^ First, to abandon East
Tennessee and move all his forces by the north b?nk of
the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. This war. what
Halleck had seemed to propose. Second, to cross the
Holston and march directly against Bragg's right flank
whilst Rosecrans should attack in front. This was essen-
tially what Grant afterward did, putting Sherman in a
position similar to that which Burnside would have taken.
Third, to march with 7000 infantry and 5000 cavalry
entirely around Bragg by the east, and strike his line of
communications at Dalton or thereabouts. This had a
strong resemblance to the strategy of Sherman next
spring, when he forced Johnston out of Dalton by send-
ing McPherson to his rear at Resaca. Burnside added to
it the plan of a march to the sea, proposing that if Bragg
pursued him, he should march down the railroad to
Atlanta, destroying it as thoroughly as possible, and then
make his way to the coast, living on the country.

The last of these plans was that which Burnside pre-
ferred and offered to put into immediate execution.
Neither of them was likely to succeed at that moment,
for Rosecrans was so far demoralized by the effects of his
late battle that he was in no condition to carry out any
aggressive campaign with decisive energy. He declared
in favor of the first ^ (for they were communicated to him
as well as to Halleck), and this only meant that he wanted
his army at Chattanooga reinforced by any and every
means, though he could not supply them, and the fortifi-
cations were already so strong that General Meigs reported
that io,cxx) men could very soon hold them against all
Bragg's army. The plans, however, give us interesting
light on Burnside's character and abilities, and show that
he was both fertile in resources and disposed to adopt the

* O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 954. ^ Id., pt. iv. p. 72.

BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE 545

boldest action. Halleck in reply said that distant expe-
ditions into Georgia were not now contemplated, nor was
it now necessary to join Rosecrans at Chattanooga.* It
was sufficient for Burnside to be in position to go to
Rosecrans's assistance if he should require it. He was,
however, to " hold some point near the upper end of the
valley," which kept alive the constant occasion for mis-
understanding, since it implied the protection and occu-
pation of all East Tennessee, and the general there in
command was the only one who could judge what was
necessary to secure the object. The necessity for activity
soon showed itself. About the 6th of October General
Jones was reported to be showing a disposition to be
aggressive, and Burnside determined to strike a blow at
him again and with more force ihan that which had been
interrupted a fortnight before. Willcox was ordered from
Cumberland Gap to Morristown with his four new Indiana
regiments ; the Ninth Corps (having now only about 5000
men present for duty) was moved up the valley also,
whilst the Twenty-third Corps, with two brigades of cav-
alry, was left in its positions near Loudon. The rest of
the cavalry, under Shackelford, accompanied the move-
ment up the valley of which Burnside took command
in person. Leaving the cavalry post at Bull's Gap and
advancing with his little army, he found the enemy
strongly posted about midway between the Gap and Greene-
ville. Engaging them and trying to hold them by a
skirmishing fight, he sent Foster's cavalry brigade to
close the passage behind them. Foster found the roads
too rough to enable him to reach the desired position in
, time, and the enemy retreating in the night escaped. The
pursuit was pushed beyond the Watauga River, and a
more thorough destruction was made of the railroad to
and beyond the Virginia line. Considerable loss had
been inflicted on the enemy and 1 50 prisoners had been

1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iv. p. 25.

VOL. I. — 35

546 REM/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

captured, but no decisive engagement had been brought
about, Jones being wary and conscious of inferiority of
force. Willcox was left at Greeneville with part of the
cavalry, while Burnside brought back the Ninth Corps to
Knoxville. The activity was good for the troops and was
successful in curbing the enemy's enterprise, besides
encouraging the loyal inhabitants. There was now a lull
in affairs till November, broken only by a mishap to
Colonel Wolford's brigade of cavalry on the south of the
Holston, where he was watching the enemy's advanced
posts in the direction of Athens and Cleveland. Burnside
had sent a flag of truce through the lines on the 19th
of October, and the enemy taking advantage of it, de-
livered an unexpected blow upon Wolford, capturing
300 or 400 of his men and a battery of mountain how-
itzers, together v;ith a wagon train which was several
miles from camp.^ Wolford heard that his train was
attacked and sent two regiments to protect it. These
were surrounded by a superior force, and Wolford then
brought up the rest of his command, only 700 strong, and
made a bold effort to rescue his comrades. This he did,
with the loss of the prisoners mentioned and the how-
itzers, which were taken after they had fired their last
cartridge. The wagons were burned, but the men bravely
cut their way out. Approaching Loudon, they were met
by General Julius White with infantry reinforcements.
The tables were now turned on the Confederates, who
fled over the Hiwassee again, losing in their turn about
ICX) prisoners.^

^ I O. R., vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 273. « Id., pp. 5, 6. ^

APPENDIX A

List of Letters and Dispatches relating to the campaign in the
Great Kanawha valley, 1861, which are not found in the pub-
lication of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
armies (see footnote, chapter iv. p. 60).

Letters and Dispatches of General McClellan to General J. D.
Cox, of dates July 6th, 12th, 13th, 14th, isth, i6th, 20th, August ist.

Letters and Dispatches of General J. D. Cox to General
McClellan, of dates July 4th, 6th, loth, 17th.

Letters and Dispatches of General Rosecrans to General Cox of
dates July 26th, 29th, 31st, four of August 5th, one of August 6th,
8th, two of 13th, three of i6th, one of 17th, 18th, two of 20th,
one each of 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th.

Letters and Dispatches of General Cox to General Rosecrans, of
dates August 6th, 7 th, loth, 19th, 28th, two each of 30th and 31st,
one of September 2d (enclosing Colonel Tyler's report of en-
gagement at Cross Lanes), 3d, 9th, 2 2d, October 5th (order of
withdrawal from Sewell Mountain), two of October 7th, one each
of 8th, 9th, three of loth, one of i6th.

There are also missing numerous ones from and to Colonel
Tyler, Colonel W. Sooy Smith, Colonel J. V. Guthrie, and other
officers.

APPENDIX B

Letters of Generals R. B. Hayes and George Crook as to the dis-
cipline and conduct of the Kanawha Division in the campaign
of September, 1862. The death of President Hayes has re-
moved any objections to the publication of his letter.

'-'^^ Fremont, Ohio, 8th September, 1882.

My DEAR General, — Your note of the 4th instant came dur-
ing a brief absence from home. I appreciate your kindness and

548 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

your friendly suggestions. After sleeping on it, I am not inclined
to depart from my custom in dealing with attacks upon me. . . .
Besides, to give a correct relation of the Reno altercation would
be to disparage an officer who died in battle a few days after the
affair, and who cannot now give his side of the controversy.

One of the brigades of the division was commanded by General
Crook and another by General Scammon, both regular army offi-
cers conspicuous for attention to strictness of discipline. General
Scammon was at the time still colonel of the Twenty-third. The
regiment on that march repeatedly reported, as I was glad to do,
not a single absentee on the first roll-call immediately after the
halt.

The altercation, in its general facts, was as you recall it. But
the occasion of it was this. The regiment halted to bivouac in a
stubble-field. The men got bundles of straw, or possibly of wheat
unthreshed, from a stack in the field to lie upon. General Reno
saw it. I was temporarily absent. The general, as you say, " in
a rough way" accosted the men, and as I returned, I heard
his bnguage and retorted in behalf of my men, not in my own
case at all, for he had said nothing to me. Hence the row be-
tween us. I was told, while I was lying wounded,^ that General
Reno was greatly pleased by our vigorous attack, and that he paid
us a high compliment, expressing gratification that our difficulty
had gone no further than it did.

Now excuse my suggestion. Let officers tell the story whose
names are not called in question in the note referred to — say
General Scammon, General Crook, and yourself. I am grateful
for your attention to this misrepresentation, and hope you will not
differ widely from me as to the correctness of the course I take.

Sincerely,

(Signed) R. B. Hayes.

Headquarters Department of Arizona, Whipple Barracks,
Prescott, a. T., November 27, 1882. "

My dear General, — Referring to your letter of the 3d instant

asking replies to certain queries with reference to the conduct of

the Kanawha Division during the Antietam campaign, I can only

reply generally. The twenty years which have elapsed make my

^ During the battle of South Mountain. — J. D. C.

APPENDIX B 549

memory indistinct, and I can now recall only prominent features
or particular incidents in which I was especially interested. I re-
member distinctly, however, that the Kanawha Division compared
favorably in discipline and general good conduct with the best
troops of the army. In my own brigade there was no straggling,
or, if any, so little that it did not come to my notice. I am quite
sure there was no pillaging in my brigade. My men probably
took fence rails for their bivouac fires, and straw and hay for their
beds, but to the best of my belief there was nothing done that
could be called pillaging.

I heard, at the time, something with reference to a contro-
versy between Generals Reno and Hayes, but if ever I knew what
it was about, I have forgotten it. In this matter it seems as if the
statement of General Hayes should be conclusive.

I am very glad that you have interested yourself in refuting the
numberless charges which the writers of personal histories have
found it convenient to lay against the Kanawha Division, and which
in almost every instance are base slanders. 'Y)a& personnel oi'Ca^
division should in itself be a sufficient refutation. The regiments
were mainly of '6i men from country districts who enlisted from
motives of patriotism, and as a rule were never disgraced by con-
duct which many of the regiments enlisted in the large cities of
the East were notorious for throughout the army.

The Kanawha Division did not belong to the Army of the Po-
tomac, and it was therefore an easy matter to shift responsibility
from its own organization by throwing it on the shoulders of the
troops serving with it. The subsequent reputation of this division
is in itself a sufficient answer, and I challenge history to show an
organization which was more distinguished for all soldierly quali-
ties than the one you had the honor to command during the cam-
paign, until the death of Reno gave you the Ninth Corps.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way you deem best,
and I am only sorry that I can do no more to assist you.
Very Sincerely, Your friend,

George Crook, Brig. Gen'l.
To General J. D. Cox.