(•'^•v* ^^ "^^y?- ■'Iia-' t'j:^ Ji."-'"" 1-' ■T.r* A :-*■,. :i MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR OTHER BOOKS BT GENERAL JACOB D. COX The Battle of Franklin. With maps. 8vo . $z.oo Atlanta. With maps. [Campaigns of the Civil fFar] . I zmo . . $i .00 The March to the Sea. Franklin and Nashville. With maps. [Campaigns of the Civil fVar], i2mo . . ;gi.oo Gen. Jacob D. Cox has given proof of his ability as a military historian. His work is a valuable contri- bution to our military history and the narrative is told in a style that combines the knowledge of the warrior with the skill of the literary artist. — The Dial. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers 153-157 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY ■'•^ "■^i -^^Ifes., ■■-•)!«%■■''■■'''■ *^ A-^'.- 2 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR disused scenes and properties of a political drama that never pretended to be more than acting, we tried to give our thoughts to business; but there was no heart in it, and the morning hour lagged, for we could not work in earnest and we were unwilling to adjourn. Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an ex- cited way, and catching the chairman's eye, exclaimed, " Mr. President, the telegraph announces that the seces- sionists are bombarding Fort Sumter!" There was a solemn and painful hush, but it was broken in a moment by a woman's shrill voice from the spectators' seats, cry- ing, " Glory to God ! " It startled every one, almost as if the enemy were in the midst. But it was the voice of a radical friend of the slave, who after a lifetime of public agitation believed that only through blood could freedom be won. Abby Kelly Foster had been attending the ses- sion of the Assembly, urging the passage of some meas- ures enlarging the legal rights of married women, and, sitting beyond the railing when the news came in, shouted a fierce cry of joy that oppression had submitted its cause to the decision of the sword. With most of us, the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in our own land overshadowed everything, and seemed too great a price to pay for any good ; a scourge to be borne only in preference to yielding the very groundwork of our re- publicanism, — the right to enforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through the election of President and Congress. The next day we learned that Major Anderson had sur- rendered, and the telegraphic news from all the Northern States showed plain evidence of a popular outburst of loy- alty to the Union, following a brief moment of dismay. Judge Thomas M. Key of Cincinnati, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was the recognized leader of the Democratic party in the Senate,^ and at an early hour 1 Afterward aide-de-camp and acting judge-advocate on McClellan's staff. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR moved an adjournment to the following Tuesday, in order, as he said, that the senators might have the opportunity to go home and consult their constituents in the perilous crisis of public affairs. No objection was made to the adjournment, and the representatives took a similar re- cess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense, — the Republicans to know what initiative the Administration at Washington would take, and the Democrats to deter- mine what course they should follow if the President should call for troops to put down the insurrection. Before we met again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and call for seventy-five thousand militia for three months' service were out, and the great mass of the people of the North, forgetting all party distinctions, answered with an enthusiastic patriotism that swept politicians off their feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning, Judge Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the rail- ing in the Senate chamber, broke out impetuously, " Mr. Cox, the people have gone stark mad ! " "I knew they would if a blow v/as struck against the flag," said I, re- minding him of some previous conversations we had had on that subject. He, with most of the politicians of the day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current of public opinion, and partly by the reaction of their own hearts against the false theories which had encouraged the secessionists, determined to support the war measures of the government, and to make no factious opposition to such state legislation as might be necessary to sustain the federal administration. The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others, and marks one of the most striking features of the time. On the 8th of January the usual Democratic convention and celebration of the Battle of New Orleans had taken place, and a series of resolutions had been passed, which were drafted, as was understood, by Judge Thurman. In these, professing to speak in the name of " two hundred 4 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR thousand Democrats of Ohio," the convention had very significantly intimated that this vast organization of men would be found in the way of any attempt to put down secession until the demands of the South in respect to slavery were complied with. A few days afterward I was returning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull County, and meeting upon the railway train with David Tod, then an active Democratic politician, but afterward one of our loyal "war governors," the conversation turned on the action of the convention which had just adjourned. Mr. Tod and I were personal friends and neighbors, and I freely expressed my surprise that the convention should have committed itself to what must be interpreted as a threat of insurrection in the North if the administration should, in opposing secession by force, follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whose honor they had assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted the substance of the resolution, saying that we Republi- cans would find the two hundred thousand Ohio Demo- crats in front of us, if we attempted to cross the Ohio River. My answer was, " We will give up the contest if we cannot carry your two hundred thousand over the heads of you leaders." The result proved how hollow the party professions had been; or perhaps I should say how superficial was the hold of such party doctrines upon the mass of men in a great political organization. In the excitement of politi- cal campaigns they had cheered the extravagant language of party platforms with very little reflection, and the leaders had imagined that the people were really and earnestly indoctrinated into the political creed of Cal- houn; but at the first shot from Beauregard's guns in Charleston harbor their latent patriotism sprang into vig- orous life, and they crowded to the recruiting stations to enlist for the defence of the national flag and the national Union. It was a popular torrent which no leaders could THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR S, resist; but many of these should be credited with the same patriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivi- ous of party consistency. Stephen A. Douglas passed through Columbus on his way to Washington a few days after the surrender of Sumter, and in response to the calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke to them from his bedroom window in the American House. There had been no thought for any of the common sur- roundings of a public meeting. There were no torches, no music. A dark crowd of men filled full the dim-lit street, and called for Douglas with an earnestness of tone wholly different from the enthusiasm of common political gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and without any light near him, spoke solemnly to the people upon the terrible crisis which had come upon the nation. Men of all parties were there: his own followers to get some light as to their duty; the Breckinridge Democrats ■ready, most of them, repentantly to follow a Northern leader, now that their recent candidate was in the rebel- lion;^ the Republicans eagerly anxious to know whether so potent an influence was to be unreservedly on the side of the country. I remember well the serious solicitude with which I listened to his opening sentences as I leaned against the railing of the State House park, trying in vain to get more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at the unlighted window. His deep sonorous voice rolled down through the darkness from above us, — an earnest, measured voice, the more solemn, the more impressive, because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us literally as "a voice in the night," — the night of our country's unspeakable trial. There was no uncertainty in his tone: the Union must be preserved and the insur- rection must be crushed, — he pledged his hearty support to Mr. Lincoln's administration in doing this. Other ^ Breckinridge did not formally join the Confederacy till September, but his accord with the secessionists was well known. 6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR questions must stand aside till the national authority should be everywhere recognized. I do not think we greatly cheered him, — it was rather a deep Amen that went up from the crowd. We went home breathing freer in the assurance we now felt that, for a time at least, no organized opposition to the federal government and its policy of coercion would be formidable in the North. We did not look for unanimity. Bitter and narrow men there were whose sympathies were with their country's enemies. Others equally narrow were still in the chains of the secession logic they had learned from the Calhoun- ists; but the broader-minded men found themselves happy in being free from disloyal theories, and threw them- selves sincerely and earnestly into the popular move- ment. There was no more doubt where Douglas or Tod or Key would be found, or any of the great class they represented. Yet the situation hung upon us like a nightmare. Garfield and I were lodging together at the time, our wives being kept at home by family cares, and when we reached our sitting-room, after an evening session of the Senate, we often found ourselves involuntarily groaning, " Civil war in our land ! " The shame, the outrage, the folly, seemed too great to believe, and we half hoped to wake from it as from a dream. Among the painful re- membrances of those days is the ever-present weight at the heart which never left me till I found relief in the active duties of camp life at the close of the month. I went about my duties (and I am sure most of those I associated with did the same) with the half-choking sense of a grief I dared not think of: like one who is dragging himself to the ordinary labors of life from some terrible and recent bereavement. We talked of our personal duty, and though both Gar- field and myself had young families, we were agreed that our activity in the organization and support of the THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR Republican party made the duty of supporting the govern- ment by military service come peculiarly home to us. He was, for the moment, somewhat trammelled by his half-clerical position, but he very soon cut the knot. My own path seemed unmistakably clear. He, more careful for his friend than for himself, urged upon me his doubts whether my physical strength was equal to the strain that would be put upon it. " I, said he, " am big and strong, and if my relations to the church and the college can be broken, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting; but you are slender and will break down." It was true that I looked slender for a man six feet high (though it would hardly be suspected now that it was so), yet I had assured confidence in the elasticity of my constitution; and the result justified me, whilst it also showed how liable to mistake one is in such things. Garfield found that he had a tendency to weakness of the alimentary system which broke him down on every campaign in which he served and led to his retiring from the army much earlier than he had intended. My own health, on the other hand, was strengthened by out-door life and exposure, and I served to the end with growing physical vigor. When Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the existing laws made it necessary that these should be fully organized and officered by the several States. Then, the treasury was in no condition to bear the burden of war expenditures, and till Congress could assemble, the Presi- dent was forced to rely on the States to furnish the means necessary for the equipment and transportation of their own troops. This threw upon the governors and legisla- tures of Ihe loyal States responsibilities of a kind wholly unprecedented. A long period of profound peace had made every military organization seem almost farcical. A few independent military companies formed the merest shadow of an army; the state militia proper was only a nominal thing. It happened, however, that I held a com- 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR mission as Brigadier in this state militia, and my inti- macy with Governor Dennison led him to call upon me for such assistance as I could render in the first enrol- ment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arranging to be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might be needed upon important legislation, I gave my time chiefly to such military matters as the governor ap- pointed. Although, as I have said, my military com- mission had been a nominal thing, and in fact I had never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theo- retic preparation for such work. For some years the possibility of a war of secession had been one of the things which would force itself upon the thoughts of re- flecting people, and I had been led to give some careful study to such books of tactics and of strategy as were within easy reach. I had especially been led to read military history with critical care, and had carried away many valuable ideas from this most useful means of mili- tary education. I had therefore some notion of the work before us, and could approach its problems with less loss of time, at least, than if I had been wholly ignorant.^ My commission as Brigadier-General in the Ohio quota in national service was dated on the 23d of April, though it had been understood for several days that my tender of service in the field would be accepted. Just about the same time Captain George B. McClellan was requested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for consul- tation, and by the governor's request I met him at the railway station and took him to the State House. I think Mr. Larz Anderson (brother of Major Robert Anderson) and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with him. The intimation had been given me that he would prob- ably be made major-general and commandant of our Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan him closely. * I have treated this subject somewhat more fully in a paper in the "Atlan- tic Monthly " for March, 1892, " Why the Men of '6i fought for the Union." THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR He was rather under the medium height, but muscularly formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head, active and graceful in motion. His whole appearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out he showed no lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain travelling suit, with a narrow- rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed what he was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At the time his name was a good deal associated with that of Beauregard ; they were spoken of as young men of similar standing in the Engi- neer Corps of the Army, and great things were expected of them both because of their scientific knowledge of their profession, though McClellan had been in civil life for some years. His report on the Crimean War was one of the few important memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army. I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. The destitution of the State of everything like military material and equipment was very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small army out of nothing was not blinked. The governor spoke of the embarrassment be felt at every step from the lack of practical military experience in his staff, and of his desire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the details of military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood the difficulties there would be before him, and said that no man coald wholly master them at once, although he had confidence that if a few weeks' time for preparation were given, he would be able to put the Ohio division into reasonable form for taking the field. The command was then formally tendered and accepted. All of us who were present felt that the selec- tion was one full of promise and hope, and that the lO REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time. The next morning McClellan requested me to accom- pany him to the State Arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. We found a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to militia companies and had been returned rusted and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other accoutre- ments were with them. There were two or three smooth- bore brass fieldpieces, six-pounders, which had been honeycombed by firing salutes, and of which the vents had been worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a heap in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed har- ness, which had probably been once used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had for many years been no money appropriated to buy military material or even to protect the little the State had. The federal government had occasionally distrib- uted some arms which were in the hands of the independ ent uniformed militia, and the arsenal was simply an empty storehouse. It did not take long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the build- ing, McClellan turned, and looking back into its empti- ness, remarked, half humorously and half sadly, " A fine stock of munitions on vhich to begin a great war ! " We went back to the State House, where a room in the Secretary of State's department was assigned us, and we sat down to work. The first task was to make out de- tailed schedules and estimates of what would be needed to equip ten thousand men for the field. This was a unit which could be used by the governor and legislature in estimating the appropriations needed then or subsequently. Intervals in this labor were used in discussing the general situation and plans of campaign. Before the close of the week McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own views, and forwarded it to Lieutenant-General Scott. He THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR II read it to me, and my recollection of it is that he sug- gested two principal lines of movement in the West, — one, to move eastward by the Kanawha valley with a heavy column to co-operate with an army in front of Washing- ton ; the other, to march directly southward and to open the valley of the Mississippi. Scott's answer was appre- ciative and flattering, without distinctly approving his plan ; and I have never doubted that the paper prepared the way for his appointment in the regular army which followed at so early a day.^ During this week McClellan was invited to take the command of the troops to be raised in Pennsylvania, his native State. Some things beside his natural attachment to Pennsylvania made the proposal an attractive one to him. It was already evident that the army which might be organized near Washington would be peculiarly in the public eye, and would give to its leading officers greater opportunities of prompt recognition and promotion than would be likely to occur in the West. The close associa- tion with the government would also be a source of power if he were successful, and the way to a chief command would be more open there than elsewhere. McClellan told me frankly that if the offer had come before he had assumed the Ohio command, he would have accepted it; but he promptly decided that he was honorably bound to serve under the commission he had already received and which, like my own, was dated April 23. My own first assignment to a military command was during the same week, on the completion of our esti- mates, when I was for a few days put in charge of Camp ^ I am not aware that McClellan's plan of campaign has been published. Scott's answer to it is given in General Townsend's " Anecdotes of the Civil War," p. 260. It was, with other communications from Governor Dennison, carried to Washington by Hon. A. F. Perry of Cincinnati, an intimate friend of the governor, who volunteered as special messenger, the mail service being unsafe. See a paper by Mr. Perry in " Sketches of War History " (Ohio Loyal Legion), vol. iii. p. 345. 12 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Jackson, the depot of recruits which Governor Dennison had established in the northern suburb of Columbus and had named in honor of the first squelcher of secessionism. McClellan soon determined, however, that a separate camp of instruction should be formed for the troops mus- tered into the United States service, and should be so placed as to be free from the temptations and inconven- iences of too close neighborhood to a large city, whilst it should also be reasonably well placed for speedy defence of the southern frontier of the State. Other camps could be under state control and used only for the organization of regiments which could afterward be sent to the camp of instruction or elsewhere. Railway lines and connec- tions indicated some point in the Little Miami valley as the proper place for such a camp; and Mr. Woodward, the chief engineer of the Little Miami Railroad, being taken into consultation, suggested a spot on the line of that railway about thirteen miles from Cincinnati, where a considerable bend of the Little Miami River encloses wide and level fields, backed on the west by gently rising hills. I was invited to accompany the general in mak- ing the inspection of the site, and I think we were ac- companied by Captain Rosecrans, an officer who had resigned from the regular army to seek a career as civil engineer, and had lately been in charge of some coal mines in the Kanawha valley. Mr. Woodward was also of the party, and furnished a special train to enable us to stop at as many eligible points as it might be thought desirable to examine. There was no doubt that the point suggested was best adapted for our work, and although the owners of the land made rather hard terms, McClellan was authorized to close a contract for the use of the mili- tary camp, which, in honor of the governor, he named Camp Dennison. But in trying to give a connected idea of the first mili- tary organization of the State, I have outrun some inci- THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 3 dents of those days which are worth recollection. From the hour the call for troops was published, enlistments began, and recruits were parading the streets continually. At the Capitol the restless impulse to be doing some- thing military seized even upon the members of the leg- islature, and a large number of them assembled every evening upon the east terrace of the State House to be drilled in marching and facing, by one or two of their own number who had some knowledge of company tactics. Most of the uniformed independent companies in the cities of the State immediately tendered their services, and began to recruit their numbers to the hundred men required for acceptance. There was no time to procure uniform, nor was it desirable; for these independent companies had chosen their own, and would have to change it for that of the United States as soon as this could be furnished. For some days companies could be seen marching and drilling, of which part would be uni- formed in some gaudy style, such as is apt to prevail in holiday parades in time of peace, whilst another part would be dressed in the ordinary working garb of citizens of all degrees. The uniformed files would also be armed and accoutred ; the others would be without arms or equip- ments, and as awkward a squad as could well be imag- ined. The material, however, was magnificent, and soon began to take shape. The fancy uniforms were left at home, and some approximation to a simple and useful costume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy furnished a useful idea, and the "Garibaldi uniform" of a red flannel shirt with broad falling collar, with blue trousers held by a leathern waist-belt, and a soft felt hat for the head, was extensively copied, and served an excel- lent purpose. It could be made by the wives and sisters at home, and was all the more acceptable for that. The spring was opening, and a heavy coat would not be much needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good 14 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR blanket in an improvised knapsack, the new company was not badly provided. The warm scarlet color, reflected from their enthusiastic faces as they stood in line, made a picture that never failed to impress the mustering offi- cers with the splendid character of the men. The officering of these new troops was a difficult and delicate task, and so far as company officers were con- cerned, there seemed no better way at the beginning than to let the enlisted men elect iheir own, as was in fact done. In most cases where entirely new companies were raised, it had been by the enthusiastic efforts of some energetic volunteers who were naturally made the com- missioned officers. But not always. There were numer- ous examples of self-denying patriotism which stayed in the ranks after expending much labor and money in re- cruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to some one supposed to have military knowledge or experi- ence. The war in Mexico in 1847 was the latest conflict with a civilized people, and to have served in it was a sure passport to confidence. It had often been a service more in name than in fact ; but the young volunteers felt so deeply their own ignorance that they were ready to yield to any pretence of superior knowledge, and gener- ously to trust them3elves to any one who would offer to lead them. Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were thus put into responsible places at the beginning, but the sifting work went on fast after the troops were once in the field. The election of field officers, however, ought not to have been allowed. Companies were necessarily regimented together, of which each could have but little personal knowledge of the officers of the others ; intrigue and demagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mis- takes were made in selection. After a time the evil worked its own cure, but the ill effects of it were long visible. The immediate need of troops to protect Washington THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 5 caused most of the uniformed companies to be united into the first two regiments, which were quickly de- spatched to the East. It was a curious study to watch the indications of character as the officers commanding companies reported to the governor, and wore told that the pressing demand from Washington made it necessary to organize a regiment or two and forward them at once, without waiting to arm or equip the recruits. Some promptly recognized the necessity and took the undesir- able features as part of the duty they had assumed. Others were querulous, wishing some one else to stand first in the breach, leaving them time for drill, equip- ment, and preparation. One figure impressed itself very strongly on my memory. A sturdy form, a head with more than ordinary marks of intelligence, but a bearing with more of swagger than of self-poised courage, yet evi- dently a man of some importance in his own community, stood before the seat of the governor, the bright lights of the chandelier over the table lighting strongly both their figures. The officer was wrapped in a heavy blanket or carriage lap-robe, spotted like a leopard skin, which gave him a brigandish air. He was disposed to protest. " If my men were hellions," said he, with strong emphasis on the word (a new one to me), "I wouldn't mind; but to send off the best young fellows of the county in such a way looks like murder." The governor, sitting with pale, delicate features, but resolute air, answered that the way to Washington was not supposed to be danger- ous, and the men could be armed and equipped, he was assured, as soon as they reached there. It would be done at Harrisburg, if possible, and certainly if any hostility should be shown in Maryland. The President wanted the regiments at once, and Ohio's volunteers were quite as ready to go as any. He had no choice, therefore, but to order them off. The order was obeyed ; but the obedi- ence was with bad grace, and I felt misgivings as to the l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR officer's fitness to command, — misgivings which about a year afterward were vividly recalled with the scene I have described. No sooner were these regiments off than companies began to stream in from all parts of the State. On their first arrival they were quartered wherever shelter could be had, as there were no tents or sheds to make a camp for them. Going to my evening work at the State House, as I crossed the rotunda, I saw a company marching in by the south door, and another disposing itself for the night upon the marble pavement near the east entrance; as I passed on to the north hall, I saw another, that had come a little earlier, holding a prayer-meeting, the stone arches echoing with the excited supplications of some one who was borne out of himself by the terrible pres- sure of events around him, whilst, mingling with his pathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country, came the shrill notes of the fife, and the thundering din of the inevitable bass drum from the company marching in on the other side. In the Senate chamber a company was quartered, and the senators were there supplying them with paper and pens, with which the boys were writing their farew oils to mothers and sweethearts whom they hardly dared ' -""i they should see again. A similar scene was going on in the Representatives' hall, another in the Supreme Court room. In the executive oflfice sat the governor, the unwonted noises, when the door was opened, breaking in on the quiet business-like air of the room, — he meanwhile dictating despatches, indicating answers to others, receiving committees of citizens, giv- ing directions to officers of companies and regiments, accommodating himself to the wilful democracy of our institutions which insists upon seeing the man in chief command and will not take its answer from a subordi- nate, until in the small hours of the night the noises were hushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undis- THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 1 7 turbcd work upon the matters of chief importance, he could leave the glare of his gas-lighted office, and seek a few hours' rest, only to renew the same wearing labors on the morrow. On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not more intense character. A minority of unthinking par- tisans could not understand the strength and sweep of tlie great popular movement, and would sometimes venture to speak out their sympathy with the rebellion or their sneers at some party friend who had enlisted. In the boiling temper of the time the quick answer was a blow; and it was one of the common incidents of the day for those who came into the State House to tell of a knock- down that had occurred here or there, when this popular punishment had been administered to some indiscreet "rebel sympathizer." Various duties brought young army officers of the regu- lar service to the state c?pital, and others sought a brief leave of absence to come and offer their services to the governor of their native State. General Scott, too much bound up in his experience of the Mexican War, and not foreseeing the totally different proportions which this must assume, planted himself firmly on the theory that the regular army must be the principal reliance for severe work, and that the volunteers could only be auxiliaries around this solid nucleus which would show them the way to perform their duty and take the brunt of every encounter. The young regulars who asked leave to accept commissions in state regiments were therefore refused, and were ordered to their own subaltern positions and posts. There can be no doubt that the true policy would have been to encourage the whole of this younger class to enter at once the volunteer service. They would have been the field officers of the new regiments, and would have impressed discipline and system upon the organiza- tion from the beginning. The Confederacy really profited VOL. I. — 2 1 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR by having no regular army. They gave to the officers who left our service, it is true, commissions in their so- called "provisional army," to encourage them in the as- surance that they would have permanent military posi- tions if the war should end in the independence of the South; but this was only a nominal organization, and their real army was made up (as ours turned out practi- cally to be) from the regiments of state volunteers. Less than a year afterward we changed our policy, but it was then too late to induce many of the regular officers to take regimental positions in the volunteer troops. T hesitate to declare that this did not turn out for the best ; for although the organization of our army would have been more rapidly perfected, there are other considera- tions which have much weight. The army would not have been the popular thing it was, its close identifica- tion with the people's movement would have been weak- ened, and it perhaps would not so readily have melted again into the mass of the nation at the close of the war. Among the first of the young regular officers who came to Columbus was Alexander McCook. He was ordered there as inspection and mustering officer, and one of my earliest duties was to accompany him to Camp Jackson to inspect the cooked rations which the contractors were furnishing the new troops. I warmed to his earnest, breezy way, and his business-like activity in performing his duty. As a makeshift, before camp equipage and cooking utensils could be issued to the troops, the con- tractors placed long trestle tables under an improvised shed, and the soldiers came to these and ate, as at a country picnic. It was not a bad arrangement to bridge over the interval between home life and regular soldiers' fare, and the outcry about it at the time was senseless, as all of us know who saw real service afterward. McCook bustled along from table to table, sticking a long skewer into a boiled ham, smelling of it to see if the interior of THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR I9 the meat was tainted ; breaking open a loaf of bread and smelling of it to see if it was sour; examining the coffee before it was put into the kettles, and after it was made; passing his judgment on each, in prompt, peremptory manner as we went on. The food was, in the main, ex- cellent, though, as a way of supporting an army, it was quite too costly to last long. While mustering in the recruits, McCook was elected colonel of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteers, which had, I believe, already gone to Washington. He was eager to accept, and telegraphed to Washington for per- mission. Adjutant-General Thomas replied that it was not the policy of the War Department to permit it. McCook cut the knot in gallant style. He immediately tendered his resignation in the regular army, taking care to say that he did so, not to avoid his country's service or to aid her enemies, but because he believed he could serve her much more effectively by drilling and leading a regiment of Union volunteers. He notified the gov- ernor of his acceptance of the colonelcy, and his cottp-de- main\v3.s a success; for the department did not like to accept a resignation under such circumstances, and he had the exceptional luck to keep his regular commission and gain prestige as well, by his bold energy in the matter. Orlando Poe came about the sai j time, for all this was occurring in the last ten days of April. He was a lieu- tenant of topographical engineers, and was stationed with General (then Captain) Meade at Detroit, doing duty upon the coast survey of the lakes. He was in person the model for a young athlete, tall, dark, and strong, with frank, open countenance, looking fit to repeat his ancestor Adam Foe's adventurous conflicts with the In- dians as told in the frontier traditions of Ohio. He too was eager for service; but the same rule was applied to him, and the argument that the engineers would be especially necessary to the army organization kept him I. .'>''.^,:l .'*. 20 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR for a time from insisting upon taking volunteer service, as McCook had done. He was indefatigable in his labors, assisting the governor in organizing the regi- ments, smoothing the difficulties constantly arising from lack of familiarity with the details of the administrative service of the army, and giving wise advice to the volun- teer officers who made his acquaintance. I asked him, one day, in my pursuit of practical ideas from all who I thought could help me, what he would advise as the most useful means of becoming familiar with my duties. Study the Army Regulations, said he, as if it were your Bible! There was a world of wisdom in this: much more than I appreciated at the time, though it set me earnestly to work in a right direction. An officer in a responsible command, who had already a fair knowledge of tactics, might trust his common sense for guidance in an action on the field; but the administrative duties of the army as a machine must be thoroughly learned, if he would hope to make the management of its complicated organization an easy thing to him. Major Sidney Burbank came to take McCook'o place as mustering officer: a grave, earnest man, of more age and more varied experience than the men I have named. Captain John Pope also visited the governor for consulta- tion, and possibly others came also, though I saw them only in passing, and did not then get far in making their acquaintance. CHAPTER II CAMP DENNISON Laying out the camp — Rosecrans as engineer — A comfortless night — Waking to new duties — Floors or no floors for the huts — Hardee's Tactics — The water-supply — Colonel Tom. Worthington — Joshua S'll — Brigades organized — Bates's brigade — Schleich's — My own — Mc- Clellan's purpose — Division organization — Garfield disappointed — Camp routine — Instruction and drill — Camp cookery — Measles — Hospital bam — Sisters of Charity — Ferment over re-enlistment — Musters by Gordon Granger — " Food for powder " — Brigade staff — De Villiers — " A Captain of Calvary " — The " Bloody Tinth " — Almost a row — Summoned to the field. ON the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to proceed next morning to Camp Dennison, with the Eleventh and half of the Third Ohio regiments. The day was a fair one, and when about noon our railway train reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellent place for our work. The drawback was that very little of the land was in meadow or pasture, part being in wheat and part in Indian corn, which was just coming up. Captain Rosecrans met us, as McClellan' s engineer (later the well-known general), coming from Cincinnati with a train-load of lumber. He had with him his compass and chain, and by the help of a small detail of men soon laid off the ground for the two regimental camps, and the general lines of the whole encampment for a dozen regi- ments. It was McClellan's purpose to put in two bri- gades on the west side of the railway, and one on the east. My own brigade camp was assigned to the west side, and nearest to Cincinnati. The men of the two regiments shouldered their pine boards and carried them up to the line of the company streets, which were close ^ij[. 22 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR to the hills skirting the valley, and which opened into the parade and drill ground along the railway. A general plan was given to the company officers by which the huts should be made uniform in size and shape. The huts of each company faced each other, three or four on each side, making the street between, in which the company assembled before marching to its place on the regimental color line. At the head of each street were the quarters of the company officers, and those of the "field and staff" still further in rear. The Regulations were followed in this plan as closely as the style of bar- racks and nature of the ground would permit. Vigorous work housed all the men before night, and it was well that it did so, for the weather changed in the evening, a cold rain came on, and the next morning was a chill and dreary one. My own headquarters were in a little brick schoolhouse of one story, which stood (and I think still stands) on the east side of the track close to the railway. My improvised camp equipage consisted of a common trestle cot and a pair of blankets, and I made my bed in the open space in front of the teacher's desk or pulpit. My only staff officer was an aide-de-camp, Captain Bas- com (afterward of the regular army), who had graduated at an Eastern military school, and proved himself a faith- ful and efficient assistant. He slept on the floor in one of the little aisles between the pupils' seats. One lesson learned that night remained permanently fixed in my memory, and I had no need of a repetition of it. I found that, having no mattress on my cot, the cold was much more annoying below than above me, and that if one can't keep the under side warm, it doesn't matter how many blankets he may have atop. I procured later an army cot with low legs, the whole of which could be taken apart and packed in a very small parcel, and with this I carried a small quilted mattress of cotton batting. It would have been warmer to have made my bed on the ground with a CAMP DENNISON 2% heap of straw or leaves under me ; but as my tent had to be used for office work whenever a tent could be pitched, I preferred the neater and more orderly interior which this arrangement permitted. This, however, is antici- pating. The comfortless night passed without much re- freshing sleep, the strange situation doing perhaps as much as the limbs aching from cold to keep me awake. The storm beat through broken window-panes, and the gale howled about us, but day at last began to break, and with its dawning light came our first reveille in camp. I shall never forget the peculiar plaintive sound of the fifes as they shrilled out on the damp air. The melody was destined to become very familiar, but to this day I can't help wondering how it happened that so melancholy a strain was chosen for the waking tune of the soldiers' camp. The bugle reveille is quite different; it is even cheery and inspiriting ; but the regulation music for the diums and fifes is better fitted to waken longings for home and all the sadder emotions than to stir the host from sleep to the active duties of the day. I lay for a while listening to it, finding its notes suggesting many things and becoming a thread to string my reveries upon, as I thought of the past which was separated from me by a great gulf, the present with its serious duties, and the future likely to come to a sudden end in the shock of battle. We roused ourselves; a dash of cold water put an end to dreaming; we ate a breakfast from a box of cooked provisions we had brought with us, and resumed the duty of organizing and instructing the camp. The depression which had weighed upon me since the news of the opening guns at Sumter passed away, never to return. The consciousness of having important work to do, and the absorption in the work itself, proved the best of all mental tonics. The Rubicon was crossed, and from this time out, vigorous bodily action, our wild out- door life, and the strenuous use of all the faculties, men- 24 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR tal and physical, in meeting the daily exigencies, made up an existence which, in spite of all its hardships and all its discouragements, still seems a most exhilarating one as I look back on it across a long vista of years. The first of May proved, instead, a true April day, of the most fickle and changeable type. Gusts of rain and wind alternated with flashes of bright sunshine. The second battalion of the Third Regiment arrived, and the work of completing the cantonments went on. The huts which were half finished yesterday were now put in good order, and in building the new ones the men profited by the experience of their comrades. We were however suddenly thrown into one of those small tempests which it is so easy to get up in a new camp, and which for the moment always seems to have an importance out of all proportion to its real consequence. Captain Rosecrans, as engineer, was superintending the work of building, and finding that the companies were putting floors and bunks in their huts, he peremptorily ordered that these should be taken out, insisting that the huts were only in- tended to take the place of tents and give such shelter as tents could give. The company and regimental officers loudly protested, and the men were swelling with indig- nation and wrath. Soon both parties were before me; Rosecrans hot and impetuous, holding a high tone, and making use of General McClellan's name in demanding, as an officer of his staff, that the floors should be torn out, and the officers of the regiments held responsible for obedience to the order that no more should be made. He fairly bubbled with anger at the presumption of those who questioned his authority. As soon as a little quiet could be got, I asked Rosecrans if he had specific orders from the general that the huts should have no floors. No, he had not, but his staff position as engineer gave him sufficient control of the subject. I said I would ex- amine the matter and submit it to General McClellan, CAMP DENNISON 25 and meanwhile the floors already built might remain, though no new ones should be made till the question was decided. I reported to the general that, in my judgment, the huts should have floors and bunks, because the ground was wet when they were built, — they could not be struck like tents to dry and air the earth, and they were meant to be permanent quarters for the rendezvous of troops for an indefinite time. The decision of McClellan was in accordance with the report. Rosecrans acquiesced, and indeed seemed rather to like me the better on finding that I was not carried away by the assumption of indefi- nite power by a staff officer. This little flurry over, the quarters were soon got in as comfortable shape as rough lumber could make them, and the work of drill and instruction was systematized. The men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to begin too soon with the manual of the musket, and they were kept industriously employed in marching in single line, by file, in changing direction, in forming columns of fours from double line, etc., before their guns were put in their hands. Each regiment was treated as a separate camp, with its own chain of sentinels, and the officers of the guard were constantly busy teaching guard and picket duty theoretically to the reliefs off duty, and inspecting the sentinels on post. Schools were established in each regiment for field and staff and for the company officers, and Hardee's Tactics was in the hands of everybody who could procure a copy. It was one of our great inconven- iences that the supply of the authorized Tactics was soon exhausted, and it was difficult to get the means of in- struction in the company schools. An abridgment was made and published in a very few days by Thomas Wor- thington, a graduate of West Point in one of the earliest classes, — of 1827, I think, — a son of one of the first gov- ernors of Ohio. This eccentric offit had served in the regular army and in the Mexican War, and was full of ideas, :..,.j.«j_-'-'" 26 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR but was of so irascible and impetuous a temper that he was always in collision with the powers that be, and spoiled his own usefulness. He was employed to furnish water to the camp by contract, and whilst he ruined himself in his efforts to do it well, he was in perpetual conflict with the troops, who capsized his carts, emptied his barrels, and made life a burden to him. The quarrel was based on his taking the water from the river just opposite the camp, though there was a slaughter-house some distance above. Worthington argued that the distance was such that the running water purified itself ; but the men wouldn't listen to his science, vigorously enforced as it was by idiomatic expletives, and there was no safety for his water-carts till he yielded. He then made a reservoir on one of the hills, filled it by a steam-pump, and carried the water by pipes to the regimental camps at an expense beyond his means, and which, as it was claimed that the scheme was unauthorized, was never half paid for. His subsequent career as colonel of a regiment was no more happy, and talents that seemed fit for highest responsi- bilities were wasted in chafing against circumstances which made him and fate seem to be perpetually playing at cross purposes.^ A very different character was Joshua W. Sill, who was sent to us as ordnance officer. He too had been a regular army ofificer, but of the younger class. Rather small and delicate in person, gentle and refined in man- ner, he had about him little that answered to the popu- lar notion of a soldier. He had resigned from the army some years before, and was a professor in an important educational institution in Brooklyn, N. Y., when at the first act of hostility he offered his services to the gov- 1 He was later colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio, and became involved in a famous controversy with Halleck and Sherman over his conduct in the Shiloh campaign and the question of fieldworks there. He left the service toward the close of 1862. CAMP DENNISON 27 crnor of Ohio, his native State. After our day's work, we walked together along the railway, discussing the politi- cal and military situation, and especially the means of making most quickly an army out of the splendid but untutored material that was collecting about us. Under his modest and scholarly exterior I quickly discerned a fine temper in the metal, that made his after career no enigma to me, and his heroic death at the head of his division in the thickest of the strife at Stone's River no surprise. The two regiments which began the encampment were quickly followed by others, and the arriving regiments sometimes had their first taste of camp life under cir- cumstances well calculated to dampen their ardor. The Fourth Ohio, under Colonel Lorin Andrews, President of Kenyon College, came just before a thunderstorm one evening, and the bivouac that night was as rough a one as his men were likely to experience for many a day. They made shelter by placing boards from the fence tops to the ground, but the fields were level and soon became a mire, so that they were a queer-looking lot when they crawled out next morning. The sun was then shining bright, however, and they had better cover for their heads by the next night. The Seventh Ohio, which was re- cruited in Cleveland and on the Western Reserve, sent a party in advance to build some of their huts, and though they too came in a rain-storm, they were less uncom- fortable than some of the others. Three brigades were organized from the regiments of the Ohio contingent, exclusive of the two which had been hurried to Wash- ington. The brigadiers, beside myself, were Generals Joshua H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Biites, who was the senior, was a graduate of West Point, who had served some years in the regular army, but had re- signed and adopted the profession of the law. He lived at Cincinnati, and organized his brigade in that city. 38 EEAflN/SCENCES OF THE CIVIL IV A R They marched to Camp Dennison on the 20th of May, when, by virtue of his seniority. General Bates assumed command of the camp in McClellan's absence. His bri- gade consisted of the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regi- ments, and encamped on the e st side of the railroad in the bend of the river. General Schleich was a Demo- cratic senator, who had been in the state militia, and was also one of the drill-masters of the legislative squad which had drilled upon the Capitol terrace. His brigade included the Third, Twelfth, and Thirteenth regiments, and, with mine, occupied the fields on the west side of the railroad close to the slopes of the hills. My own brigade was made up of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh regiments, and our position was the southernmost in the general camp. McClellan had intended to make his own headquarters in the camp; but the convenience of attend- ing to official business in Cincinnati kept him in the city. His purpose was to make the brigade organizations per- manent, and to take them as a division to the field when they were a little prepared for the work. Like many other good plans, it failed to be carried out. I was the only one of the brigadiers who remained in the service after the first enlistment for ninety days, and it was my fate to take the field with new regiments, only one of which had been in my brigade in camp. Schleich did not show adaptation to field work, and though taken into West Virginia with McClellan in June, he was relieved of active service in a few weeks. He afterward sought and obtained the colonelcy of the Sixty-first Ohio; but his service with it did not prove a success, and he re- signed in September, 1862, under charges.* General Bates had some reason to expect an assignment to staff duty with McClellan, and therefore declined a colonelcy in the line at the end of the three months' service. He was disappointed in this expectation after waiting some * O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 308-310. CAMP DENNISON 29 time for it, and returned to civil life with the regrets of his comrades. There were some disappointments, also, !n the choice of regimental officers who were elected in the regiments first organized, but were afterward ap- pointed by the governor. The companies were organized and assigned to regiments before they came to camp, but the regimental elections were held after the companies were assembled. Garfield was a candidate for the colo- nelcy of the Seventh Regiment, but as he was still en- gaged in important public duties and was not connected with any company, he was at a disadvantage in the sort of competition which was then rife. He was defeated, — a greater disappointment to me than to him, for I had hoped that our close friendship would be made still closer by comradeship in the field. In a few weeks he was made colonel of the Forty-second Ohio, in the sec- ond levy. Up to the time that General Bates relieved me of the command of the camp, and indeed for two or three days longer, the little schoolhouse was my quarters as well as telegraph and express office. We had cleared out most of the desks and benches, but were still crowded together, day and night, in a way which was anything but comfortable or desirable. Sheds for quartermaster's and subsistence stores were of first necessity, and the building of a hut for myself and staff had to be postponed till these were up. On the arrival of General Bates with two or three staff officers, the necessity for more room could not be longer ignored, and my own hut was built on the slope of the hillside behind my brigade, close under the wooded ridge, and here for the next six weeks was my home. The morning brought its hour of busi- ness correspondence relating to the command ; then came the drill, when the parade ground was full of marching companies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with sword exercise and pistol practice. The day closed with 30 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the inspection of the regiments in turn at d/ess parade, and the evening was allotted to schools of theoretic tac- tics, outpost duty, and the like. Besides their copies of the regulation tactics, officers supplied themselves with such manuals as Mahan's books on Field Fortifications and on Outpost Duty. I adopted at the beginning a rule to have some military work in course of reading, and kept it up even in the field, sendmg home one volume and getting another by mail. In this way I gradually went through all the leading books I could find both in Eng- lish and in French, including the whole of Jomini's works, his histories as well as his "Napoleon" and his " Grandes C '--ations Militaires." I know of no intellec- tual stimulus so valuable to the soldier as the reading of military history narrated by an acknowledged master in the art of war. To see what others have done in im- portant junctures, and to have both their merits and their mistakes analyzed by a competent critic, rouses one's mind to grapple with the problem before it, and begets a generous determination to try to rival in one's own sphere of action the brilliant deeds of soldiers who have made a name in other times. Then the example of the vigorous way in which history will at last deal with those who fail when the pinch comes, tends to keep a man up to his work and to make him avoid the rock on which so many have split, the disposition to take refuge in doing nothing when he finds it difficult to decide what should be done. The first fortnight in camp was the hardest for the troops. The ploughed fields became deep with mud, which nothing could remove but the good weather which should allow them to pack hard under the continued tramp of thousands of men. The organization of the camp kitchens had to be learned by the hardest also, and the men in each company who had some aptitude for cooking had to be found by a slow process of natural CAMP DENNISON 31 selection, during which many an unpalatable meal had to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of information came to us in the proof that more than half the men had never had the contagious diseases of infancy. The measles broke out, and we had to organize a camp hospital at once. A large barn near by was taken for this purpose, and the surgeons had their hands full of cases which, however trivial they might seem at home, were here ag- gravated into dangerous illness by the unwonted sur- roundings and the impossibility of securing the needed protection from exposure. As soon as the increase of sickness in the camp was known in Cincinnati, the good women of that city took promptly in hand the task of providing nurses for the sick, and proper diet and deli- cacies for hospital uses. The Sisters of Charity, under the lead of Sister Anthony, a noble woman, came out in force, and their black and white robes harmonized pictur- esquely with the military surroundings, as they flitted about under the rough timber framing of the old bam, carrying comfort and hope from one rude couch to an- other. As to supplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew how to make out a requisition for rations or for clothing, and easy as it is to rail at "red tape," the necessity of keeping a check upon embezzlement and wastefulness justified the staff bureaus at Washington in insisting upon regular vouchers to support the quartermaster's and commissary's accounts. But here, too, men were grad- ually found who had special talent for the work. The infallible newspapers had no lack of material for criticism. There were plenty of real blunders to invite it, but the severest blame was quite as likely to be vis- ited upon men and things which did not deserve it. The governor was violently attacked for things which he had no responsibility for, or others in which he had done all that forethought and intelligence could do. When every- body had to learn a new business, it would have been 32 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR miraculous if grave errors had not frequently occurred. Looking back at it, the wonder is that the blunders and mishaps had not been tenfold more numerous than they were. By the middle of May the confusion had given place to reasonable system, but we were now obliged to meet the embarrassments of reorganization for three years, under the President's second call for troops. We had more than ten thousand men who had begun to know something of their duties, and it was worth a serious effort to transfer them into the permanent service; but no one who did not go through the ordeal can imagine how trying it was In every company some discontented spirits wanted to go home, shrinking from the perils to which they had committed themselves in a moment of enthusiasm. For a few to go back, however, would be a disgrace; and every dissatisfied man, to avoid the odium of going alone, became a mischief-maker, seeking to pre- vent the whole company from re-enlisting. The recruit- ing of a majority was naturally made the condition of allowing the company organization to be preserved, and a similar rule applied to the regiment. The growing dis- cipline was relaxed or lost in the solicitations, the elec- tioneering, the speech-making, and the other common arts of persuasion. After a majority had re-enlisted and an organization was secure, it would have been better to have discharged the remaining three months' men and to have sent them home at once; but authority for this could not be got, for the civil officers could not see, and did not j know what a nuisance these men were. Dissatisfied with themselves for not going with their comrades, they be- came sulky, disobedient, complaining, trying to make the others as unhappy as themselves by arguing that faith was not kept with them, and doing all the mischief it was possible to do. In spite of all these discouragements, however, the daily drills and instruction went on with some approach CAMP DENNISON 33 to regularity, an. our raw volunteers began to look more like soldiers. Captain Gordon Granger of the regular army came to muster the re-enlisted regiments into the three years' service, and as he stood at the right of the Fourth Ohio, looking down the line of a thousand stal- wart men, all in their Garibaldi shirts (for we had not yet received our uniforms), he turned to me and ex- claimed : " My God ! that such men should be food for powder!" It certainly was a display of manliness and intelligence such as had hardly ever been seen in the ranks of an army. There were in camp at that time three if not four companies, in different regiments, that were wholly made up of undergraduates of colleges who had enlisted together, their ofiiicers being their tutors and professors; and where there was not so striking evi- dence as this of the enlistment of the best of our youth, every company could still show that it was largely re- cruited from the best -nurtured and most promising young men of the community. Granger had been in the Southwest when the secession movement began, had seen the formation of military com- panies everywhere, and the incessant drilling which had been going on all winter, whilst we, in a strange condi- tion of political paralysis, had been doing nothing. His information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost no opportunity of impressing upon us the fact that the South was nearly six months ahead of us in organization and preparation. He did not conceal his belief that we were likely to find the war a much longer and more serious piece of business than was commonly expected, and that unless we pushed hard our drilling and instruction we should find ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier en- counters. What he said had a good effect in making officers and men take more willingly to the laborious routine of the parade ground and the regimental school; for such opinions as his soon ran through the camp, and VOL. I. — 3 34 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR they were commented upon by the enlisted men quite as earnestly as among the officers. Still, hope kept the upper hand, and if the question had been put to vote, I believe that three-fourths of us still cherished the belief that a single campaign would end the war. In the organization of my own brigade I had the assist- ance of Captain McElroy, a young man who had nearly completed the course at West Point, and who was subse- quently made major of the Twentieth Ohio. He was sent to the camp by the governor as a drill officer, and I as- signed him to staff duty. For commissary, I detailed Lieutenant Gibbs, who accompanied one of the regiments from Cincinnati, and who had seen a good deal of service as clerk in one of the staff departmf ats of the regular army. I had also for a time the services of one of the picturesque adventurers who turn up in such crises. In the Seventh Ohio was a company recruited in Cleveland, of which the nucleus was an organization of Zouaves, existing for some time before the war. It was made up of young men who had been stimulated by the popularity of Ellsworth's Zouaves in Chicago to form a similar body. They had had as their drill master a Frenchman named De Villiers. His profession was that of a teacher of fencing; but he had been an officer in Ellsworth's company, and was familiar with fancy manoeuvres for street parade, and with a special skirmish drill and bayonet exercise. Small, swarthy, with angular features, and a brusque, military manner, in a showy uniform and jaunty k^pi of scarlet cloth, covered with gold lace, he created quite a sensa- tion among us. His assumption of knowledge and expe- rience was accepted as true. He claimed to have been a surgeon in the French army in Algiers, though we after- ward learned to doubt if his rank had been higher than that of a barber-surgeon of a cavalry troop. From the testimonials he brought with him, I thought I was doing a good thing in making him my brigade-major, as the CAMP DENNISON 35 officer was then called whom we afterward knew as in- ispector-general. He certainly was a most indefatigable fellow, and went at his work with an enthusiasm that made him very useful for a time. It was worth some- thing to see a man who worked with a kind of dash, — with a prompt, staccato movement that infused spirit and energy into all around him. He would drill all day, and then spend half the night trying to catch sentinels and officers of the guard at fault in their duty. My first im- pression was that I had got hold of a most valuable man, and others were so much of the same mind that in the reorganization of regiments he was successively elected major of the Eighth, and then colonel of the Eleventh. We shall see more of him as we go on; but it turned out that his sharp discipline was not steady or just; his knowledge was only skin-deep, and he had neither the education nor the character for so responsible a situation as he was placed in. He nearly plagued the life out of the officers of his regiment before thay got rid of him, and was a most brilliant example of the way we were im- posed upon by military charlatans at the beginning. He was, however, good proof also of the speed with which real service weeds out the undesirable material which seemed so splendid in the days of common inexperience and at a distance from danger. We had visits from cleri- cal adventurers, too, for the " pay and emoluments of a captain of cavalry" which the law gave to a chaplain induced some to seek the office who were not the best representatives of their profession. One young man who had spent a morning soliciting the appointment in one of the regiments, came to me in a shamefaced sort of way before leaving camp and said, " General, before I decide this matter, I wish you would tell me just what are the pay and emoluments of a Captain of Calvary ! " Though most of our men were native Ohioans, General Bates's brigade had in it two regiments made up of quite 36 REAflXlSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR contrasted nationalities. The Ninth Ohio was recruited from the Germans of Cincinnati, and was commanded by Colonel "Bob" McCook. In camp, the drilling of the regiment fell almost completely into the hands of the ad- jutant, Lieutenant Willich (afterward a general of divi- sion), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own lack of military knowledge, used to say that he was only "clerk for a thousand Dutchmen," so completely did the care of equipping and providing for his regiment engross his time and labor. The Tenth was an Irish regiment, and its men used to be proud of calling themselves the " Bloody Tinth. " The brilliant Lytle was its commander, and his control over them, even in the beginning of their service and near the city of their home, showed that they had fallen into competent hands. It happened, of course, that the guard-house pretty frequently contained repre- sentatives of the Tenth who, on the short furloughs that were allowed them, took a parting glass too much with their friends in the city, and came to camp boisterously drunk. But the men of the regiment got it into their heads that the Thirteenth, which lay just opposite them across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure in filling the guard-house with the Irishmen. Some threats had been made that they would go over and " clean out " the Thirteenth, and one fine evening these came to a head. I suddenly got orders from General Bates to form my bri- gade, and march them at once between the Tenth and Thirteenth to prevent a collision which seemed immi- nent. My brigade was selected because it was the one to which neither of the angry regiments belonged, the others being ordered into their quarters. My little Frenchman, De Villiers, covered himself with glory. His horse flew, under the spur, to the regimental head- quarters, the long roll was beaten as if the drummers realized the full importance of the first opportunity to sound that warlike signal, and the brigade-major's some- CAMP DENNISON 17 what theatrical energy was so contagious that many of the companies were assembled and ready to file out of the company streets before the order reached them. We marched by the moonlight into the space between the belligerent regiments; but Lytle had already got his own men under control, and the less mercurial Thirteenth were not disposed to be aggressive, so that we were soon dis- missed with a compliment for our promptness. I ordered the colonels to march the regiments back to the camps separately, and with my staff rode through that of the Thirteenth, to see how matters were there. All was quiet, the men being in their quarters; so, turning, I passed along near the railway, in rear of the quartermas- ter's sheds. In the shadow of the buildings I had nearly ridden over some one on foot, when he addressed me, and I recognized an officer of high rank in that brigade. He was in great agitation, and exclaimed, "Oh, General, what a horrible thing that brothers should be killing each other!" I assured him the danger of that was all over, and rode on, wondering a little at his presence in that place under the circumstances. The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like months in the retrospect, so full were they crowded with new experiences. The change came in an unexpected way. The initiative taken by the Confederates in West Virginia had to be met by prompt action, and McClellan was forced to drop his own plans to meet the emergency. The organization and equipment of the regiments for the three years' service were still incomplete, and the bri- gades were broken up, to take across the Ohio the regi- ments best prepared to go. One by one my regiments were ordered away, till finally, when on the 3d of July I received orders to proceed to the Kanawha valley, I had but one of the four regiments to which I had been trying to give something of unity and brigade feeling, and that regiment (the Eleventh Ohio) was still incomplete- 38 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR General Bates fared even worse ; for he saw all his regi- ments ordered away, whilst he was left to organize new ones from freshly recruited companies that were sent to the camp. This was discouraging to a brigade com- mander, for even with veteran troops mutual acquaint- ance between the officer and his command is a necessary condition of confidence and a most important element of strength. My own assignment to the Great Kanawha district was one I had every reason to be content with, except that for several months I felt the disadvantage I suffered from assuming command of troops which I had never seen till we met in the field. The period of organization, brief as it was, had been valuable to the regiments, and it had been of the utmost importance to secure the re-enlistment of those which had received some instruction. It had been, in the condition of the statute law, from necessity and not from choice that the Administration had called out the state militia for ninety days. The new term of enrolment was for "three years or the war," and the forces were now desig- nated as United States Volunteers. It would have been well if the period of apprenticeship could have been prolonged ; but events would not wait. All recognized the necessity, and thankful as we should have been for a longer preparation and more thorough instruction, we were eager to be ordered away. McClellan had been made a major-general in the regu- lar army, and a department had been placed under his command which included the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to which was added a little later West Virginia north of the Great Kanawha.^ Rosecrans was also ap- pointed a brigadier-general in the regulars, and there was much debate at the time whether the Administration had intended this. Many insisted that he was nominated * McCIellan's Report and Campaigns (New York, 1864), p. 8. McClellan's Own Story, p. 44. O. R., vol. ii. p. 633. CAMP DENNISON 39 for the volunteer service, and that the regular appoint- ment was a clerical mistake in the bureaus at Washing- ton. There was no solid foundation for this gossip. A considerable increase of the regular army was authorized by law, and corresponding appointments were made, from major-general downward. It was at this time that Sher- man was made colonel of one of the new regiments of regulars. It would perhaps have been wiser to treat the regular commissions as prizes to be won only by con- spicuous and successful service in the field, as was done later; but this policy was not then adopted, and the newly created offices were filled in all grades. They were, of course, given to men from whom great services could reasonably be expected; but when none had been tested in the great operations of war, every appointment was at the risk that the officer might not show the special talent for command which makes a general. It was something of a lottery, at best; but the system would have been im- proved if a method of retiring inefficient officers had been adopted at once. The ostensible reason for the different organization of volunteers and regulars was that the former, as a temporary force to meet an exigency, might be wholly disbanded when the war should end, without affecting the permanent army, which was measured in size by the needs of the country in its normal condition. i"t-Mfrilhii^i' 'iiii'"' •" -1i ^'li CHAPTER III MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA Political attitude of West Virginia — Rebels take the initiative — McClellan ordered to act — Ohio militia cross the river — The I'hilippi affair — Signilicant dates — The vote on secession— Virginia in the Confederacy — Lee in command — Topography — The mountain passes — Garnett's army — Rich mountain position — McClellan in the field — His forces — Advances against Garnett — Rosecrans's proposal — His fight on the mountain — McClellan's inaction — Garnett's retreat — Affair at Car- rick's Ford — Garnett killed — Hill's efforts to intercept — Pegram in the wildernoss — He surrenders — Indirect results important — McClel- lan's military and personal traits. THE reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia were twofold, political and military. The people were strongly attached to the Union, and had gen- erally voted against the Ordinance of Secession which by the action of the Richmond Convention had been submitted to a popular vote on May 23d. Comparatively few slaves were owned by them, and their interests bound them more to Ohio and Pennsylvania than to eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Mr. Lincoln's administration, strongly backed and chiefly represented by Governor Dennison of Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize a loyal Virginia government, repudiating that of Governor Letcher and the state convention as self-destroyed by the act of secession. Governor Dennison, in close correspond- ence with the leading loyalists, had been urging Mc- Clellan to cross the Ohio to protect and encourage the loyal men, when on the 26th of May news came that the Secessionists had taken the initiative, and that some bridges had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road a little west of Grafton, the crossing of the Mononga- 42 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR hcla River where the two western branches of the road unite as they come from Wheeling and Parkersburg. The great line of communication between Washington and the West had thus been cut, and action on our part was necessary.* Governor Dennison had anticipated the need c' more troops than the thirteen regiments which had been organ- ized as Ohio's quota under the President's first call, and had enrolled nine other regiments, numbering them con- secutively with the others. These last he had put in camps near the Ohio River, where at a moment's notice they could occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the Great Kanawha.'' Two Union regiments were also organizing in West Virginia itself, of which the first was commanded by Colonel B. F. Kelley of Wheeling. The left bank of the Ohio was in McClcllan's department, and on the 24th General Scott, having heard that two Virginia companies had occupied Grafton, telegraphed the fact to McClellan, directing him to act promptly in counteracting the effect of this mo/ement.^ On the 27th Colonel Kcliey was sent by rail from Wheel- ing to drive off the enemy, who withdrew at his approach, and the bridges were quickly rebuilt.* Several of the Ohio regiments were ordered across the river at the same time, and an Indiana brigade under General Thomas A. Morris of that State was hurried forward from Indianapolis. As the Ohio troops at Camp Dennison which had been mustered into national service were in process of reorganizing for the three years' term, McClellan preferred not to move them till this was completed. He also adhered to his plan of making his own principal movement in the Great Ka- nawha valley, and desired to use there the Ohio division at our camp.* Thj Ohio regiments first sent into West Vir- ginia were not mustered in, and were known as State troops. 1 O. R., vol. ii. p. 44. ^ Id., pp. 46, 47. • Id., p. 648. « Id., pp. 45, 49, 655. » Id., pp. so, 656, 674. MCCLELLAN IN PVEST VIRGINIA 43 General Morris reached Graiton on the ist of June, and was intrusted with the command of all the troops in West Vir^'inia. He found that Colonel Kelley had already planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired southward to Philippi, about fifteen miles in a straight line, but some twenty-five by the crooked country roads.^ Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column, under Colonel E. Dumont of the Seventh Indiana, to co-operate with Kcllcy. Both columns were directed to make a night march, starting from points on the railroad about twelve miles apart and converging on Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak on June 3d. Each column consisted of about fifteen hundred men, and Dumont had also two smooth six-pounder cannon. The Confederate force was commanded by Colonel G. A. Porterfield, and was something less than a thousand strong, one-i'ourth cavalry.* The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had not learned picket duty. The concerted move- ment against them was more successful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's first notice of danger was the opening of the artillery upon his sleeping troops. It had been expected that the two columns would enclose the enemy's camp and capture the whole ; but, though in dis- orderly rout, Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness and courage, in getting them off with but few casualties and the loss of a few arms. The camp equipage and sup- plies were, of course, captured. Colonel KclIey was wounded in the breast by a pistol-shot which was at first supposed to be fatal, though it did not turn out so, and this was the only casualty reported on the National side.^ 1 O. R., vol. ii. p. 66. " Id., pp. 70, 72. ' Colonel Kelley was a man already of middle age, and a leading citizen of northwestern Virginia. His whole military career was in that region, where his services were very valuable throughout the war. He was promoted to brigadier-general among the first, and was brevet-major-general when mustered out in 1S65. 44 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR No prisoners were taken, nor did any dead or wounded fall into our hands. Porterfield retreated to Beverly, some thirty miles further to the southeast, and the Na- tional forces occupied Philippi. The telegraphic reports had put the Confederate force at 2CXX), and their loss at 15 killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners, and the newspapers gave it the air of a consid- erable victory. The campaign thus opened with apparent ^clat for McClellan (who was personally at Cincinnati), and the " Philippi races," as they were locally called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia and corre- spondingly depressed the Secessionists.* Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that large forces of the enemy were gathered at Beverly, McClellan determined to proceed in person to that region with his best prepared troops, postponing his Kanawha campaign till northwestern Virginia should be cleared of the enemy. Military affairs in West Virginia had been complicated by the political situation, and it is necessary to recollect the dates of the swift following steps in Virginia's progress into the Confederacy. Sumter surrendered on Saturday, the 13th of April, and on Monday the 15th President Lin- coln issued his first call for troops. On Wednesday the 17th the V^irginia convention passed the Ordinance of Secession in secret session. On Friday the 19th it was known in Washington, and on Saturday Lee and Johnston resigned their commissions in the United States Army, sorrowfully " going with their State." ^ On the following Tuesday (23d) the chairman of the Virginia Convention presented to Lee his commission as Major-General and Commander of the Virginia Forces. On the same day Governor Dennison handed to McClellan his commission * O. R., vol. ii. pp. 64-74. 8 Johnston's Narrative, p. 10. Townsend's Anecdotes of the Civil War, p. 31. Ix>ng's Memoirs of Lee, pp. 94, 96. McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 45 to command the Ohio forces in the service of the Union. Although the Confederate Congress at Montgomery ad- mitted Virginia to the Confederacy early in May, this was not formally accepted in Virginia till after the popular vote on secession (May 23d) and the canvassing of the returns of that election. Governor Letcher issued on June 8th his proclamation announcmg the result, and transfer- ring the command of the Virginia troops to the Confeder- ate Government.* During the whole of May, therefore, Virginia's position was unsettled. Her governor, by the authority of the convention, regarded her as independent of the United States, but by an inchoate act of secession which would not become final till ratified by the popular vote. The Virginia troops were arrayed near the Potomac to resist the advance of national forces ; but Confederate troops had been welcomed in eastern Virginia as early as the lOth of May, and President Davis had authorized Lee, as Commander of the Virginia forces, to assume control of them.2 It was well known that the prevailing sentiment in West Virginia was loyal to the Union, and each party avoided conflict there for fear of prejudicing its cause in the elec- tion. Hence it was that as soon as the vote was cast, the aggressive was taken by the Virginia government in the burning of the bridges near Grafton. The fire of war was thus lighted. The crossing of the Ohio was with a full understanding with Colonel Kelley, who recognized Mc- Clellan at once as his military commander.^ The affair at Philippi was, in form, the last appearance of Virginia in the rdle of an independent nation, for in a very few days Lee announced by a published order that the absorption of the Virginia troops into the Confederate Army was complete.* » o. R., vol. ii. p. 91 1. « Id., p. 827. • I treated the relations of Lee and Virginia to the Confederacy in a paper in "The Nation," Dec. 23, 1897, entitled " Lee, Johnston, and Davis." *0. R., vol. ii. p. 912. 46 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR It will be well to understand the topography of the Virginia mountains and their western slope, if we would reach the reasons which determined the lines of advance chosen by the Confederates and the counter moves of McClellan. The Alleghany range passing out of Pennsyl- vania and running southwest through the whole length of Virginia, consists of several parallel lines of mountains enclosing narrow valleys. The Potomac River breaks through at the common boundary of Virginia and Mary- land, and along its valley runs the National Road as well as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad also follows this natural highway, which is thus indicated as the most important line of communica- tion between Washington and the Ohio valley, though a high mountain summit must be passed, even by this route, before the tributaries of the Ohio can be reached. Half-way across the State to the southward, is a high water- shed connecting the mountain ridges and separating the streams tributary to the Potomac on the north from those falling into the James and New rivers on the south. The Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike follows the line of this high " divide " looking down from among the clouds into the long and nearly straight defiles on either hand, which separate the Alleghany Mountains proper from the Blue Ridge on the east and from Cheat Mountain and other ranges on the west. Still further to the southwest the James River and the New River interlace their headwaters among the mountains, and break out on east and west, making the third natural pass through which the James River and Kanawha turnpike and canal find their way. These three routes across the mountains were the only ones on which military o^^^rations were at all feasible, The northern one was usually in the hands of the National forces, and the other t^vo were those by which the Confed- erates attempted the invasion of West Virginia. Beverly, a hundred miles from Staunton, was near the gate through McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 47 which the Staunton road passes on its way northwestward to Parkersburg and Wheeling, whilst Gauley Bridge was the key-point of the Kanawha route on the westerly slope of the mountains. General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines. General Henry A. Wise (formerly Governor of Virginia) took the Kanawha route, and General Robert S. Garnett (lately Lee's own adjutant-general) marched to Beverly.^ Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly, Garnett, who had also been an officer in the United States Army, was ordered to assume command there and to stimulate the recruiting and organization of regiments from the secession element of the population. Some Virginia regi- ments raised on the eastern slope of the mountains were sent with him, and to these was soon added the First Georgia. On the ist of July he reported his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a complete failure, only 23 having joined. The West Vir- ginians, he says, " are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment." ^ Other reinforcements were promised Garnett, but none reached him except the Forty-fourth Virginia Regiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of his engagement with McClellan's troops, but did not take part in the fighting.^ Tygart's valley, in which Beverly lies, is between Cheat Mountain on the east, and Rich Mountain on the west. The river, of the same name as the valley, flows north- ward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking through the ridge, and by junction with the Buckhannon River forms the Monongahela, which passes by Philippi and afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The Staun- ton and Parkersburg turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg route passing over a saddle in Rich Moun- tain, and the Wheeling route following the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the gap is 1 O. R., vol. ii. pp. 908, 915. » /en the Union general appeared in his front. '^ McClellan entered West Virginia in person on the 21st of June, and on the 23d issued from Grafton a proclama- tion to the inhabitants.^ He had gradually collected his forces along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and these, at the time of the affair at Rich Mountain, consisted of six- teen Ohio regiments, nine from Indiana, and two from West Virginia; in all, twenty-seven regiments with four batteries of artillery of six guns each, two troops of cav- alry, and an independent company of riflemen. Of his batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a company of regulars (Company I, Fourth U. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later.* The regiments varied somewhat in strength, but all were recently organized, and must have averaged at * 0. R., vol. ii. p. 268. 2 Id., pp. 241, 248. ' /c/., pp. 194, 196. * As part of the troops were State troops not mustered into the United States service, no report of them is found in the War Department ; but the following are the numbers of the regiments found named as present in the correspondence and reports, — viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth, 13th, 14th, isth, i6th, 17th, iSth, 19th, 20th, and 22d Ohio ; 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth, nth, 13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and ist and 2d Virginia; also Howe's United States Battery, Barnett's Ohio Battery, Loomis's Michigan Battery, and Daum's Virginia Battery; the cavalry were Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's Illinois Cavalry. VOL. 1.— 4 50 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000. Of these, about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some two hundred miles, under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia ; a strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris of Indiana, was at Philippi, and the rest were in three brigades form- ing the immediate command of McClellan, the brigadiers being General W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A , General Newton Schleich of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L, McCook of Ohio. On the date of his proclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, to move his principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon Beverly ; * but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d that he reached Buckhannon, which is twenty-four miles west of Beverly, on the Parkersburg branch of the turn- pike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had made him estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were at Laurel Mountain in front of General Morris.* On the 7th of July he moved McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork bridge, about half-way to Beverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to march with his brigade from Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of Garnett's principal camp, which was promptly done.* Three days later, McClellan concen- trated the three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about two miles from Colonel Pegram's poi- O. R., vol. ii. p. 195. « Id., p. aos. • Id., p. 200. « Id., pp. 203, 204. McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 51 would be difficult to assail in tront, but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed to hold firmly his position before Garnett, watching for the effect of the attack at Rich Mountain. In the evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a young man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles in rear of Pegram, and who thought he could guide a column of infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of the turnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seize the road at the Hart farm. After some discussion McClel- lan adopted the suggestion, and it was arranged that Rosecrans should march at daybreak of the nth with about 2CXX) men, including a troop of horse, and that upon the sound of his engagement in the rear of Pe- gram McClellan would attack in force in front. By a blunder in one of the regimental camps, the reveille and assembly were sounded at midnight, and Pegram was put on the qui vive. He, however, believed that the attempt to turn his position would be by a path or country road passing round his right, between him and Garnett (of which the latter had warned him), and his attention was diverted from Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought impracticable.^ The alert which had occurred at midnight made Rosecrans think it best to make a longer circuit than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe marching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning movement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegram had detached about 350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered them to guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a single cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, and they threw together a breastwork of * O. R., vol. ii. pp. 215, 256, 260. Conduct of the War, vol. vi. (Rose* crans), pp. a, 3. 52 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR logs. The turnpike at Hart's runs in a depression of the summit, and as Rosecrans, early in the afternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by both mus- ketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were for the first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through two or three hours, when a charge by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by a few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which had secured a good position, broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements from Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon ; but they did not come into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that was coming up, capsized it down the mountain-side where the descending road was scarped diagonally along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was in possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made in rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan ; and the enemy, rallying on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on the crest a little further on, that Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms till next morning. When day broke on the I2th, the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rose- crans, feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's posi- tion, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon being spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still nothing was seen of McClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyond Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position. Rosecrans's loss had been I2 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates left 20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp, includ- ing the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was made.^ The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClel- lan's camp, and he formed his troops for attack, but the * O. R., vol. ii pp. 215, 260, 265. C. W., vol. vi. (Rosecrans) pp. 3-5. McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 53 long continuance of the cannonade and some signs of exultation in Pcgram's camp seem to have made him think Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in accordance with the plan has never been explained.* Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach McClellan during the iith, but the sound of the battle was sufficient notice that he had gained the summit and was engaged ; and he was, in fact, left to win his own battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward evening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring height, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram's position untenable ; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond Roaring Creek at nightfall, and all further action postponed to the next day. About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around Rosecrans's right flank during the night and had gained Beverly. These, with the newly arrived Confed- erate regiment, fled southward on the Staunton road. Garnett had learned in the evening, by messenger from Beverly, that Rich Mountain summit was carried, and evacuated his camp in front of Morris about midnight. He first marched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that place when he received information (false at the time) that the National forces already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road over Cheat Mountain into Cheat River valley, following the stream northward toward St. George and West Union, in the forlorn hope of turning the mountains at the north end of the ridges, and regaining his communications by a very long detour. He might have continued southward * C. W., vol. vi. p. 6. McClellan seems to have expected Rosecrans to reach the rear of Pegram's advanced work before his own attack should be made ; but the reconnoissance of Lieutenant Poe, his engineer, shows that this work could be turned by a much shorter route than the long and difficult one by which Rosecrans went to the mountain ridge. See Poe's Report, O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 14. 54 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR through Beverly almost at leisure, for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th. Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit as soon as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville, where he halted to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and get further orders. These reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he resumed the pursuit. His advance-guard of three regi- ments, accompanied by Captain H. W. Benham of the Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column about noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett himself handled his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounter was had. A mile or two further, at another ford and when the skir- mishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a barricade. One of his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and with about forty wagons fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuit was here discontinued, but McClellan had sent a dispatch to General Hill at Graf- ton, to collect the garrisons along the railroad and block the way of the Confederates where they must pass around the northern spurs of the mountains.* His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and the dispatch written in the evening of the I2th was not forwarded to Hill till near noon of the 13th. This officer immediately ordered the collection of the greater part of his detachments at Oakland, and called upon the railway officials for special trains to hurry them to the rendezvous. About 1000 men under Colonel James Irvine of the Sixteenth Ohio were at West Union, where the St. George road reaches the Northwestern Turnpike, and Hill's information was that a detachment of these held Red House, a crossing several miles in advance, by which the retreating enemy might go. Irvine was directed to ^ Reports of Morris and Benham, O. R., vol. ii. pp. 220, 223. McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 55 hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reinforced. Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oakland with about 500 men and three cannon, reached his destination at nightfall, and hurried his detachment forward by a night march to Irvine, ten or twelve miles over rough roads. It turned out that Irvine did not occupy Red House, and the prevalent belief that the enemy was about 8000 in number, with the uncertainty of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the little force concentrated till reinforcements should come. The first of these reached Irvine about six o'clock on the morning of the 14th, raising his command to 1500; but a few moments after their arrival he learned that the enemy had passed Red House soon after daylight. He gave chase, but did not overtake them. Meanwhile General Hill had spent the night in trying to hasten forward the railway trains, but none were able to reach Oakland till morning, and Garnctt's forces had now more than twenty miles the start, and were on fairly good roads, moving southward on the eastern side of the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that Hill had the one opportunity of a lifetime to capture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided with wagons or extra rations. When however the Union commander learned that the enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit stopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt to concentrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the rail- road to carry them to Oakland before the enemy had passed the turning-point, twenty miles to the southward.* During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. He had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of retreat taken by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the moun- * Report of Hill, O. R., vol. ii. p. 224. 56 REAf/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR tain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rear por- tion of it, he wandered all day of the I2th, seeking to make his way to Ga nett. He halted at evening at the Tygart Valley River, six miles north of Hcverly, and learned from some country people of Garnctt's retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains east of the valley, but beyond lay a hundred miles of wilderness and half a dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found for his men. He called a council of war, and, by advice of his officers, sent to McClellan, at Beverly, an offer of surrender. This was received on the 13th, and Pegram brought in 30 officers and 525 men.* McClellan then moved southward himself, following the Staunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little force had escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments of Confederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reinforce Garnett. These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridge of the Alleghanies, and upon them the retreating forces rallied. Brigadier- General H. R. Jackson was assigned to command in Gar- nett's place, and both Governor Letcher and General Lee made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient to resume aggressive operations.* On McClel- lan's part nothing further was attempted till on the 22d he was summoned to Washington to assume command of the army which had retreated to the capital after the panic of the first Bull Run battle. The affair at Rich Mounta-n and the subsequent move- ments were among the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed description, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the war, by being the occasion of McClellan's promotion to the command of the Potomac army. The narrative which has been given contains the " unvarnished tale," as nearly as official records of both sides can give it, and it is 1 Report of Pegram, O. R., vol. ii. pp. 265, 266. " Id., pp. 247, 254. MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA 57 a curious task to compare it with the picture of the cam- pai(;n and its results which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dispatches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he announced that they had " annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, in- trenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure." The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his success was followed by the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by Providence as the ideal chieftain who could repair the misfortune and lead our armies to certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about him was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclamations, and correspondence are a psychological study, more puzzling to those who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated pre- tence did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed to be composing for stage effect something to be spoken in character by a quite different person from the sensible and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The career of the great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admiration of young American soldiers, and it was perhaps not strange that when real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bear- ing. It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be pleased with McClcUan's rendering of the rdle; they dubbed him the young Napoleon, and the photogra- phers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose. For two or three weeks his dispatches and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic energy. He appeared to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. When he came out of it, he was as genial as ever. The assumed dash and energy of his first campaign made the disap- 58 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR pointment and the reaction more painful when the exces- sive caution of his conduct in command of the Army of the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. There was the same over- estimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his subordinate was engaged. If Garnett had been as strong as McClcllan believed him, he had abundant time and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance, while the National commander delayed attacking Pegram; and had Morris been beaten, Garnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent, and there would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnett was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with being. Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate retreat. CHAPTER IV THE KANAWHA VALLEY Orders for the Kanawha expedition — The troops and their quality — I^ck of artillery and cuvalry — Assembling at Gallipolis — District of the Kanawha — Numbers of the opposing forces — Method of advance • - Use of steamboats — Advance guards on river banks — Camp at Thir- teen-mile Creek — Night alarm — The river chutes — Sunken obstruc- tions — Pocotaligo — Affair at Harboursville — Affair at Scary Creek — Wise's position at Tyler Mountain — His precipitate retreat — Occu- pation of Charleston — Kosecrans succeeds McClellan — Advance toward Gauley Hridge — Insubordination — The Newspaper Con .spond- ent — Occupation of Gauley Bridge. WHEN McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors he heard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of General Wise with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha valley, made him conclude to order a brigade to that region for the purpose of holding the lower part of the valley defensively till he might try to cut off Wise's army after Garnett should be disposed of. This duty was assigned to me. On the 22d of June I had received my appointment as Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, superseding my state commission. I had seen the regiments of my brigade going one by one, as fast as they were reorganized for the three years' service, and T had hoped to be ordered to follow them to McClellan's own column. The only one left in camp was the Eleventh Ohio, of which only five companies were present, though two more companies were soon added. McClellan's letter directed me to assume command of the P"rst and Second Kentucky regiments with the Twelfth Ohio, and to call upon the governor for a troop 60 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR of cavalry and a six-gun battery: to expedite the equip- ment of the whole and move them to Gallipolis via Hampden and Portland, stations on the Marietta Railroad, from which a march of twenty-five miles by country roads would take us to our destination. At Gallipolis was the Twenty-first Ohio, which I should add to my command and proceed at once with two regiments to Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Kanawha, five miles above. When all were assembled, one regiment was to be left at Point Pleasant, two were to be advanced up the valley to Ten-mile Creek, and the other placed at an intermediate position. " Until further orders," the letter continued, " remain on the defensive and endeavor to induce the rebels to remain at Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by a movement from Beverly." Captain W. J. Kountz, an experienced steamboat captain, was in charge of water-transportation, and would furnish light-draught steamboats for my use.^ * What purports to be McCIellan's letter to me is found in the Records (O. R., vol. ii. pt. i. p. 197), but it seems to be only an abstract of it, made to accompany his dispatch to Washington (A/., p. 198), and by a clerical error given the form of the complete letter. It does not contain the quotation given above, which was reiterated before the letter was closed, in these words : '♦ Remember that my present plan is to cut them off by a rapid march from Beverly after driving those in front of me across the mountains, and do all you can to favor that by avoiding offensive movements." After the printing of the earlier volumes of the Records, covering the years 1861-1S62, I learned that the books and jiapers of the Department of the Ohio had not been sent to Washington at the close of the war, but were still in Cincinnati. I brought this fact to the attention of the Ad- jutant-General, and at the request of that officer obtained and forwarded them to the Archives office. With them were my letter books and the original files of my correspondence with McClellan and Rosecrans in 1861 and 1862. Colonel Roliert N. Scott, who was then in charge of the pub- lication, informed me that the whole would be prepared for printing and would appear in the supplemental volumes, after the compl'.tion of the rest of the First Series. Owing to changes in the Board of Puolication in the course of twenty years, there were errors in the arrangement f the matter for the printer, and a considerable part of the correspondence Itetween the generals named and myself was accidentally omitted from the sjpplemental volume (O. R., vol. li. pt. i.) in which it should have appeared. The oriR' inals are no doubt in the files of the Archives office, and for the benefit THE KANAWHA VALLEY 6l Governor Dennison seconded our wishes with his usual earnestness, and ordered the battery of artillery and com- pany of cavalry to meet me at Gallipolis ; but the guns for the battery were not to be had, and a section of two bronze guns (six-pounder smooth-bores rifled) was the only artillery, whilst the cavalry was less than half a troop of raw recruits, useful only as messengers. I succeeded in getting the Eleventh Ohio sent with me, the lacking companies to be recruited and sent later. The Twelfth Ohio was an excellent regiment which had been some- what delayed in its reorganization and had not gone with the rest of its brigade to McClcllan. The Twenty-first was one of the regiments enlisted ^or the State in excess of the first quota, and was now brought into the national service under the President's second call. The two Ken- tucky regiments had been organized in Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crews and " longshore- men " thrown out of employment by the stoppage of commeice on the river. There were in them some com- panies of other material, but these gave the distinctive character to the regiments. The colonels and part of the field officers were Kentuckians, but the organizations were Ohio regiments in nearly everything but the name. The men were mostly of a rough and reckless class, and gave a good deal of trouble by insubordination ; but tliey did not lack courage, and after they had been under discipline for a while, became good fighting regiments. The diffi- culty of getting transportation from the railway company delayed our departure. It was not till the 6th of July that a regiment could be sent, and another followed in two or three days. The two Kentucky regiments were not yet armed and equipped, but after a day or two were ready and were ordered up the river by steamboats. I myself left Camp Dennison on the evening of Sunday of investigators I give in Appendix A a list of the numbers missing from the printed volume, aa shown by comparison with my retained copies. 62 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the 7th with the Eleventh Ohio (seven companies) and reached Gallipolis in the evening of the 9th. The three Ohio regiments were united on the lOth and carried by steamers to Point Pleasant, and we entered the theatre of war.^ My movement had been made upon a telegram from General McClellan, and I found at Gallipolis his letter of instructions of the 2d, and another of the 6th which en- larged the scope of my command. A territorial district was assigned to me, including the southwestern part of Virginia below Parkersburg on the Ohio, and north of the Great Kanawha, reaching back into the country as I should occupy it.* The directions to restrict myself to a defensive occupation of the Lower Kanawha valley were changed to instructions to march on Charleston and Gau- ley Bridge, and, with a view to his resumption of the plan to make this his main line of advance, to " obtain all possible information in regard to the roads leading toward Wytheville and the adjacent region." I was also ordered to place a regiment at Ripley, on the road from Parkers- burg to Charleston, and advised " to beat up Barboursville, Guyandotte, etc., so that the entire course of the Ohio may be secured to us." Communication with Ripley was by Letart's Falls on the Ohio, some thirty miles above Gallipolis, or by Ravenswood, twenty miles further. Guyandotte was a longer distance below Gallipolis, and Barboursville was inland some miles up the Guyandotte River. As to General Wise, McClellan wrote : " Drive Wise out and catch him if you can. If you do catch him, send him to Columbus penitentiary." A regiment at Parkersburg and another at Roane Court House on the northern border of my district were ordered to report to 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 416: my report to McClellan. ' The territorial boundary of McCIellan's Department had been placed at the Great Kanawha and the Ohio rivers, probably with some political idea of avoiding the appearance of aggression upon regions of doubtful loyalty. When warlike operations began, such ideas, of course, were abandoned. THE KANAWHA VALLEY <53 me, but I was not authorized to move them from the stations assigned them, and they were soon united to McClellan's own column. At Gallipolis I heard that a steamboat on the Ohio had been boarded by a rebel party near Guyandotte, and the news giving point to McClellan's suggestion to " beat up " that region, I dispatched a small steamboat down the river to meet the Kentucky regiments with orders for the lead- ing one to land at Guyandotte and suppress any insurgents in that neighborhood.^ It was hazardous to divide my little army into three columns on a base of a hundred miles, but it was thought wise to show some Union troops at various points on the border, and I purposed to unite my detachments by early convergent movements forward to the Kanawha valley as soon as I should reach Red House, thirty-t\vo miles up the river, with my principal column. Before I reached Charleston I added to my artillery one iron and one brass cannon, smooth six-pounders, borrowed from the civil authorities at Gallipolis ; but they were with- out caissons or any proper equipment, and were manned by volunteers from the infantry.'^ My total force, when assembled, would be a little over 3000 men, the regiments having the same average strength as those with McClellan. The opposing force under General Wise was 4000 by the time the campaign was fully opened, though somewhat less at the beginning.* The Great Kanawha River was navigable for small steam- boats about seventy miles, to a point ten or twelve miles above Charleston, the only important town of the region, which was at the confluence of the Kanawha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were plenty, owing to the interruption of trade, > ">. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 417. » Ibid. * Wise reported his force on the 17th of July as 3500 "efifective " men and ten cannon, and says he received " perhaps 300 " in reinforcements on the iSth. When he abandoned the valley ten days later, he reported his force 4000 in round numbers. O. R., vol. ii. pp. 290, 293( loii. 64 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR and wagons were wholly lacking ; so that my column was accompanied and partly carried by a fleet of stern-wheel steamers. On Thursday the iith of July the movement from Point Pleasant began. An advance-guard was sent out on each side of the river, marching upon the roads which were near its banks. The few horsemen were divided and sent with them to carry messages, and the boats followed, steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of two regiments were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to the men, who were as yet unused to their work, and many of whom were footsore from their first long march of twenty-five miles to Gallipolis from Hampden station, where they had been obliged to leave the railway. The arrange- ment was also a good one in a military point of view, for if an enemy were met on either bank of the stream, the boats could land in a moment and the troops disembark without delay. Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was the very romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of the pilot-house of the leading boat, so that I might see over the banks of the stream and across the bottom lands to the high hills which bounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely one. Summer clouds lazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed in their colors and swarmed with the men like bees. The bands played na- tional tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmates would wave their handkerchiefs to us, and were answered by cheers from the troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently winding river making beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us at every turn. On either side the advance-guard could be seen in the dis- tance, the main body in the road, with skirmishers explor- ing the way in front, and flankers on the sides. Now and then a horseman would bring some message to the bank from the front, and a small boat would be sent to receive THE KANAWHA VALLEY 65 it, giving us the rumors with which the country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement and of the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in an enemy's country key everybody to just such a pitch as apparently to double the vividness of every sensation. The landscape seemed more beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilaration of out-door life more joyous than any we had ever known. The halt for the night had been assigned at a little village on the right (northern) bank of the stream, which was nestled beneath a ridge which ran down from the hills toward the river, making an excellent position for defence against any force which might come against it from the upper valley. The sun was getting low behind us in the west, as we approached it, and the advance-guard had already halted. Captain Cotter's two bronze guns gleamed bright on the top of the ridge beyond the pretty little town, and before the sun went down, the new white tents had been carried up to the slope and pitched there. The steamers were moored to the shore, and the low slanting rays of the sunset fell upon as charming a picture as was ever painted. An outpost with pickets was set on the southern side of the river, both grand and camp guards were put out also on the side we occupied, and the men soon had their supper and went to rest. Late in the evening a panic-stricken countryman came in with the news that General Wise was moving down upon us with 4CXX) men. The man was evidently in earnest, and was a loyal one. He believed every word he said, but he had in fact seen only a few of the enemy's horsemen who were scouting toward us, and believed their statement that an army was at their back. It was our initiation into an ex- perience of rumors that was to continue as long as the war. We were to get them daily and almost hourly; sometimes with a little foundation of fact, sometimes with none; rarely purposely deceptive, but always grossly VOL. I. — 5 i 66 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR exaggerated, making chimeras with which a commanding officer had to wage a more incessant warfare than with the substantial enemy in his front. I reasoned that Wise's troops were, like my own, too raw to venture a night attack with, and contented myself with sending a strong reconnoitring party out beyond my pickets, putting in command of it Major Hines of the Twelfth Ohio, an officer who subsequently became noted for his enterprise and activity in charge of scouting parties. The camp rested quietly, and toward morning Hines returned, reporting that a troop of the enemy's horse had come within a couple of miles of our position in search of information about us and our movement. They had indulged in loud bragging as to what Wise and his army would do with us, but this and nothing more was the basis of our honest friend's fright. The morning dawned bright and peaceful, the steamers were sent back for a regiment which was still at Point Pleasant, and the day was used in concentrating the little army and preparing for another advance. On July 13th we moved again, making about ten miles, and finding the navigation becoming difficult by reason of the low water. At several shoals in the stream rough wing-dams had been built from the sides to concentrate the water in the channel, and at Knob Shoals, in one of these " chutes " as they were called, a coal barge had sometime before been sunk. In trying to pass it our leading boat grounded, and, the current being swift, it was for a time doubtful if we should get her off. We finally succeeded, however, and the procession of boats slowly steamed up the rapids. We had hardly got beyond them when we heard a distant cannon-shot from our advance- guard which had opened a long distance between them and us during our delay. We steamed rapidly ahead. Soon we saw a man pulling off from the south bank in a skiff. Nearing the steamer, he stood up and excitedly shouted that a general engagement had begun. We THE KANAWHA VALLEY 67 laughingly told him it could n't be very general till we got in, and we moved on, keeping a sharp outlook for our parties on either bank. When we came up to them, we learned that a party of horsemen had appeared on the southern side of the river and had opened a skirmishing fire, but had scampered ofif as if the Old Nick were after them when a shell from the rifled gun was sent over their heads. The shell, like a good many that were made in those days, did not explode, and the simple people of the vicinity who had heard its long-continued scream told our men some days after that they thought it was " going yet." From this time some show of resistance was made by the enemy, and the skirmishing somewhat retarded the movement. Still, about ten miles was made each day till the evening of the i6th, when we encamped at the mouth of the Pocotaligo, a large creek which enters the Kanawha from the north.* The evening before, we had had one of those incidents, not unusual with new troops, which prove that nothing but habit can make men crol and confident in their duties. We had, as usual, moored our boats to the northern bank and made our camp there, placing an outpost on the left bank opposite us support- ing a chain of sentinels, to prevent a surprise from that direction. A report of some force of the enemy in their front made me order another detachment to their support after nightfall. The detachment had been told oflf and ferried across in small boats. They were dimly seen marching in the starlight up the river after landing, when suddenly a shot was heard, and then an irregular volley was both seen and heard as the muskets flashed out in the darkness. A supporting force was quickly sent over, and, no further disturbance occurring, a search was made for an enemy, but none was found. A gun had accidentally gone off in the squad, and the rest of the men, surprised and 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 418. 68 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR bewildered, had fired, they neither knew why nor at what. Two men were killed, and several others were hurt This and the chaffing the men got from their comrades was a lesson to the whole command. The soldiers were brave enough, and were thoroughly ashamed of themselves, but they were raw ; that was all that could be said of it.* We were here overtaken by the Second Kentucky, which had stopped at Guyandottc on its way up the river, and had marched across the country to join us after our prog- ress had sufficiently covered that lower region. From Guyandotte a portion of the regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ncfif, had gone to Barboursville and had attacked and dispersed an encampment of Confeder- ates which was organizing there. It was a very creditable little action, in which officers and men conducted them- selves well, and which made them for the time the envy of the rest of the command. The situation at ' Poca," as it was called in the neighbor- hood, was one which made the further advance of the army require some consideration. Information which came to us from loyal men showed that some force of the enemy was in position above the mouth of Scary Creek on the south side of the Kanawha, and about three miles from us. We had for two days had constant light skirmishing with the advance-guard of Wise's forces on the north bank of the river, and supposed that the princi- pal part of his command was on our side, and not far in front of us. It turned out in fact that this was so, and that Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Moun- tain, a bold spur which reaches the river on the northern side (on which is also the turnpike road), about twelve miles above my position, while he occupied the south side with a detachment. The Pocotaligo, which entered the river from the north at our camp, covered us against an attack on that side; but we could not take our steam- 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 421. THE KANAWHA VALLEY 69 boats further unless both banks of the river were cleared. We had scarcely any wagons, for those which had been promised us could not yet be forwarded, and we must either continue to keep the steamboats with us, or organize wagon transportation and cut loose from the boats.* My urgent dispatches were hurrying the wagons toward us, but meanwhile I hoped the opposition on the south bank of the river would prove trifling, for artillery in position at any point on the narrow river would at once stop naviga- tion of our light and unarmed transports. On the morning of the 17th a reconnoitring party sent forward on the south side of the river under command of Lieutenant- Colonel White of the Twelfth Ohio, reported the enemy about five hundred strong intrenched on the further side of Scary Creek, which was not fordablc at its mouth, but could be crossed a little way up the stream. Colonel Lowe of the Twelfth requested the privilege of driving off this party with his regiment accompanied by our two cannon. He was ordered to do so, whilst the enemy's skirmishers should be pushed back from the front of the main column, and it should be held ready to advance rapidly up the north bank of the river as soon as the hostile force at Scary Creek should be dislodged. The Twelfth and two companies of the Twenty-first Ohio were ferried over and moved out soon after noon. The first reports from them were encouraging and full of confidence, the enemy were retreating and they had dis- mounted one of his guns; but just before evening they returned, bringing the account of their repulse in the effort to cross at the mouth of the creek, and their failure to find the ford a little higher up. Their ammunition had run short, some casualties had occurred, and they had become discouraged and given it up. Their loss was 10 men killed and 35 wounded. If they had held on and asked for assistance, it would have been well enough; but, ^ O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 420; dispatch of 17th alia ^0 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR as was common with new troops, they passed from confi- dence to discouragement as soon as they were checked, and ihey retreated. The affair was accompanied by another humiliating in- cident which gave me no little chagrin. During the progress of the engagement Colonel Woodruff and Lieu- tenant-Colonel Neff of the Second Kentucky, with Colonel De Viliiers of the Eleventh Ohio, rode out in front, on the north bank of the river, till they came opposite the enemy's position, the hostile party on our side of the stream having fallen back beyond this point. They were told by a negro that the rebels were in retreat, and they got the black man to ferry them over in a skiff, that they might be the first to congratulate their friends. To their amazement they were welcomed as prisoners by the Confederates, who greatly enjoyed their discomfiture. The negro had told the truth in saying that the enemy had been in retreat ; for the fact was that both sides retreated, but the Confederates, being first informed of this, resumed their position and claimed a victory. The officers who were captured had gone out without permission, and, led on by the hare- brained De Viliiers, had done what they knew was foolish and unmilitary, resulting for them in a severe experience in Libby Prison at Richmond, and for us in the m* en- tary appearance of lack of discipline and order v*hich could not fairly be charged upon the command. I re- ported the facts without disguise or apology, trusting to the future to remove the bad impression the affair must naturally make upon McClellan. The report of the strength of the position attacked and our knowledge of the increasing difficulty of the ground before us, led me to conclude that the wisest course would be to await the arrival of the wagons, now daily expected, and then, with supplies for several days in hand, move independent of the steamers, which became only an em- barrassment when it was advisable to leave the river road THE KANAWHA VALLEY 7I for the purpose of turning a fortified position like that we had found before us. We therefore rested quietly in our strong camp for several days, holding both banks of the river and preparing to move the main column by a country road leading away from the stream on the north side, and returning to it at Tyler Mountain, where Wise's camp was reported to be. I ordered up the First Kentucky from Ravenswood and Ripley, but its colonel found obstacles in his way, and did not join us till we reached Charleston the following week. On the 23d of July I had succeeded in getting wagons and teams enough to supply the most necessary uses, and renewed the advance. We marched rapidly on the 24th by the circuitous route I have mentioned, leaving a regiment to protect the steamboats. The country was very broken and the roads very rough, but the enemy had no knowledge of our movement, and toward evening we again approached the river immediately in rear of their camp at Tyler Mountain. When we drove in their pickets, the force was panic-stric^^en and ran off, leaving their camp in confusion, and their supper which they were cooking but did not stop to eat. A little below the point v;here we reached the river, and on the other side, was the steamboat " Maffet " with a party of soldiers gathering the wheat which had been cut in the neighboring fields and was in the sheaf. I was for a moment doubtful whether it might not be one of our own boats which had ventured up the river under protection of the regiment left behind, and directed our skirmishers who were deployed along the edge of the water to hail the other side. "Who are you?" was shouted from both banks simultaneously. " United States troops." our men answered. " Hurrah for Jeff Davis ! " shouted the others, and a rattling fire opened on both sides. A shell was sent from our cannon into the steamer, and the party upon her were immediately seen jumping ashore, having first set fire to her to prevent her 72 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR falling into our hands. The enemy then moved away on that side, under cover of the trees which lined the river bank. Night was now falling, and, sending forward an advance-guard to follow up the force whose camp we had surprised, we bivouacked on the mountain side. In the morning, as we were moving out at an early hour, we were met by the mayor and two or three prominent citizens of Charleston who came to surrender the town to us. Wise having hurriedly retreated during the night. He had done a very unnecessary piece of mischief before leaving, in partly cutting off the cables of a fine suspen- sion bridge which spans the Elk River at Charleston. As this stream enters the Kanawha from the north and below the city, it may have seemed to him that it would delay our progress ; but as a large number of empty coal barges were lying at the town, it took our company of mechanics, under Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio, but a little while to improvise a good floating bridge, and part of the com- mand passed through the town and camped beyond it.^ One day was now given to the establishment of a depot of supplies at Charleston and to the organization of regular communication by water with Gallipolis, and by wagons with such positions as we might occupy further up the river. Deputations of the townspeople were informed that it was not our policy to meddle with private persons who remained quietly at home, nor would we make any inquisition as to the personal opinions of those who attended strictly to their own business; but they were warned that any communication with the enemy would be remorselessly punished. We were now able to get more accurate information about Wise's forces than we could obtain before, and this accorded pretty well with the strength which he reported officially.^ His infantry was therefore more than equal to the column under my command in the valley, whilst in 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 425. a Ante, p. 63 note. THE KANAWHA VALLEY 73 artillery and in cavalry he was greatly superior. Our continued advance in the face of such opposition is suffi- cient evidence that the Confederate force was not well handled, for as the valley contracted and the hills crowded in closer to the river, nearly every mile offered positions in which small numbers could hold at bay an army. Our success in reaching Charleston was therefore good ground for being content with our progress, though I had to blame myself for errors in the management of my part of the campaign at Pocataligo. I ought not to have assumed as confidently as I did that the enemy was only five hun- dred strong at Scary Creek and that a detachment could dispose of that obstacle whilst the rest of the column pre- pared to advance on our principal line. Wise's force at that point was in fact double the number supposed.^ It is true it was very inconvenient to ferry any considerable body of troops back and forth across the river; but I should nevertheless have taken the bulk of my command to the left bank, and by occupying the enemy's attention at the mouth of Scary Creek, covered the movement of a sufficient force upon his flank by means of the fords farther up that stream. This would have resulted in the complete routing of the detachment, and it is nearly cer- tain that I could have pushed on to Charleston at once, and could have waited there for the organization of my wagon train with the prestige of victory, instead of doing so at ' Poca' with the appearance of a check. McClellan recognized the fact that he was asking me to face the enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that Wise was disposed to make a stand he directed me not to risk attacking him in front, but rather to await the result of his own movement toward the Upper Kanawha.'-* Rosecrans did the same when he assumed command ; but I knew the hope had been that I would reach Gauley Bridge, and I was vexed that my move- 1 O. R., vol. ii. p. !oii. 9 Dispatches of July i6 and 20. 74 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ment should have the appearance of failing when I was conscious that we had not fairly measured our strength with my opponent. As soon, therefore, as the needful preparations could be made, I decided upon the turning movement which I have already described, and our reso- lute advance seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from which he did not recover till he got far beyond Gauley Bridge. At Charleston I learned of the Bull Run disaster, and that McClellan had been ordered to Washington, leaving Rosecrans in command of our department. The latter sent me orders which implied that to reach Charleston was the most he could expect of me, and directing me to remain on the defensive if I should succeed in getting so far, whilst he should take up anew McClellan's plan of reaching the rear of Wise's army.^ His dispatches, fortunately, did not reach me till I was close to Gauley Bridge and was sure of my ability to take possession of that defile, some forty miles above Charleston. An additional reason for my prompt advance was that the Twenty-first Ohio was not yet re-enlisted for the war, was only a " three months " regiment whose time was about to expire, and Governor Dennison had telegraphed me to send it back to Ohio. I left this regiment as a post- garrison at Charleston till it could be relieved by another, or till my success in reaching Gauley Bridge should enable me to send back a detachment for that post, and, on the 26th July, pushed forward with the rest of my column, which, now that the First Kentucky had joined me, con- sisted of four regiments. Our first night's encampment was about eleven miles above Charleston in a lovely nook between spurs of the hills. Here I was t.'eated to a little surprise on the part of three of my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of my military experience. The camp had got nicel)^ arranged for the night and ^ Dispatches of July 26 and 29. THE KANAWHA VALLEY 75 supper was over, when these gentlemen waited upon me at my tent. The one who had shown the least capacity as commander of a regiment was spokesman, and in- formed me that after consultation they had concluded that it was foolhardy to follow the Confederates into the gorge we were travelling, and that unless I could show them satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion they would not lead their commands further into it. I dryly asked if he was quite sure he understood the nature of his com- munication. There was something probably in the tone of my question which was not altogether expected, and his companions began to look a little uneasy. He then protested that none of them meant any disrespect, but that as their military experience was about as extensive as my own, they thought I ought to make no movements but on consultation with them and by their consent. The others seemed to be better pleased with this way of putting it, and signified assent. My answer was that their conduct very plainly showed their own lack both of military expe- rience and elementary military knowledge, and that this ignorance was the only thing which could palliate their action. Whether they meant it or not, their action was mutinous. The responsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and whilst I should be inclined to confer very freely with my principal subordinates and explain my purposes, I should call no councils of war, and submit nothing to vote till I felt incompetent to decide for myself. If they apologized for their conduct and showed earnestness in military obedience to orders, what they had now said would be overlooked, but on any recurrence of cause for complaint I should enforce my power by the arrest of the offender at once. I dismissed them with this, and immediately sent out the formal orders through my adjutant-general to march early next morning. Before they slept one of the three had come to me with earnest apology for his part in the matter, and 76 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR a short time made them all as subordinate as I could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the brigade which had been under my command at Camp Dennison, and was a not unnatural result of the sudden assembling of inexperienced men under a brigade commander of whom they knew nothing except that at the beginning of the war he was a civilian like themselves. These very men afterward became devoted followers, and some of them life-long friends. It was part of their military edu- cation as well as mine. If I had been noisy and bluster- ing in my intercourse with them at the beginning, and had done what seemed to be regarded as the "regula- tion " amount of cursing and swearing, they would prob- ably have given me credit for military aptitude at least; but a systematic adherence to a quiet and undemonstra- tive manner evidently told against me, at first, in their opinion. Through my army life I met more or less of the same conduct when assigned to a new command ; but when men learned that discipline would be inevitably enforced, and that it was as necessary to obey a quiet order as one emphasized by expletives, and especially when they had been a little under fire, there was no more trouble. Indeed, I was impressed with the fact that after this acquaintance was once made, my chief embarrass- ment in discipline was that an intimation of dissatisfaction on my part would cause deeper chagrin and more evident pain than I intended or wished. The same march enabled me to make the acquaintance of another army "institution," — the newspaper corre- spondent. We were joined at Charleston by two men representing influential Eastern journals, who wished to know on what terms they could accompany the column. The answer was that the quartermaster would furnish them with a tent and transportation, and that their letters should be submitted to one of the staff, to protect us from the publication of facts which might aid the enemy. This THE KANAWHA VALLEY 77 seemed unsatisfactory, and they intim-ited that they expected to be taken into my mess and to be announced as volunteer aides with military rank. They were told that military position or rank could only be given by au- thority much higher than mine, and that they could be more honestly independent if free from personal obligation and from temptation to repay favors with flattery. My only purpose was to put the matter upon the foundation of public right and of mutual self-respect. The day before we reached Gauley Bridge they opened the subject again to Captain McElroy, my adjutant-general, but were in- formed that I had decided it upon a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was, " Very well ; General Cox thinks he can get along without us, and we will show him. We will write him down." They left the camp the same evening, and wrote letters to their papers describing the army as demoralized, drunken, and without discipline, in a state of insubordina- tion, and the commander as totally incompetent. As to the troops, more baseless slander was never uttered. Their march had been orderly. No wilful injury had been done to private property, and no case of personal violence to any non-combatant, man or woman, had been even charged. Yet the printing of such communications in widely read journals was likely to be as damaging as if it all were true. My «omination as Brigadier-General of U. S. Volunteers was then before the Senate for con- firmation, and " the pen " would probably have proved " mightier than the sword " but for McClellan's knowledge of the nature of the task we had accomplished, as he was then in the flood -tide of power at Washington, and ex- pressed his satisfaction at the performance of our part of the campaign which he had planned. By good for- tune also, the injurious letters were printed at the same time with the telegraphic news of our occupation of Gauley Bridge and the retreat of the enemy out of the 78 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR valley. * I was, however, deeply convinced that my position was the right one, and never changed my rule of conduct in the matter. The relations of newspaper correspondents to general officers of the army became one of the crying scandals and notorious causes of intrigue and demoraliza- tion. It was a subject almost impossible to settle satisfac- torily ; but whoever gained or lost by cultivating this means of reputation, it is a satisfaction to have adhered through- out the war to the rule I first adopted and announced. Wise made no resolute effort to oppose my march after I left Charleston, and contented himself with delaying us by his rear-guard, which obstructed the road by felling trees into it and by skirmishing with my head of column. We however advanced at the rate of twelve or fifteen miles a day, reaching Gauley Bridge on the morning of the 29th of July. Here we captured some fifteen hundred stands of arms and a considerable store of munitions which the Confederate general had not been able to carry away or destroy. It is safe to say that in the wild defile which we had threaded for the last twenty miles there were as many positions as there were miles in which he could easily have delayed my advance a day or two, forc- ing me to turn his flank by the most difficult mountain climbing, and where indeed, with forces so nearly equal, my progress should have been permanently barred. At Gauley Bridge he burned the structure which gave name to the place, and which had been a series of substantial wooden trusses resting upon heavy stone piers. My or- * As one of these correspondents became a writer of history, it is made proper to say that he was Mr. Willian, Swinton, of whom General Grant has occasion to speak in his " Personal Memoirs " (vol. ii. p. 144), and whose facility in changing his point of view in historical writing was shown in his " McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed," which was pub- lished in 1864 by the Union Congressional Committee (first appearing in the "New York Times " of February, March, and April of that year), when compared with his " History of the Army of the Potomac" which appeared two yea.rs later. Burnside accused him of repeated instances of malicious libel of his command in June, 1864. O. R., vol. xxxvi. pt. iii. p. 751. THE KANAWHA VALLEY 79 ders definitively limited me to the point we had now reached in my advance, and I therefore sent forward only a detach- ment to follow the enemy and keep up his precipitate retreat. Wise did not stop till he reached Greenbrier and the White Sulphur Springs, and there was abundant evi- dence that he regarded his movement as a final abandon- ment of this part of West Virginia.^ A few weeks later General Lee came in person with reinforcements over the mountains and began a new campaign ; but until the 20th of August we were undisturbed except by a petty guerilla warfare. McClellan telegraphed from Washington his congratula- tions,^ and Rosecrans expressed his satisfaction also in terms which assured me that we had done more than had been expected of us.^ The good effect upon the com- mand was also very apparent ; for our success not only justified the policy of a determined advance, but the offi- cers who had been timid as to results were now glad to get their share of the credit, and to make amends for their insubordination by a hearty change in bearing and con- duct. My term of service as a brigadier of the Ohio forces in the three months' enrolment had now ended, and until the Senate should confirm my appointment as a United States officer there was some doubt as to my right to continue in command. My embarrassment in this re- gard was very pleasantly removed by a dispatch from General Rosecrans in which he conveyed the request of Lieutenant-General Scott and of himself that I should re- main in charge of the Kanawha column. It was only a week, however, before notice of the confirmation was re- ceived, and dropping all thoughts of returning home, I prepared my mind for continuous active duty till the war should end. ^ Floyd's Dispatches, O. R., vol. li. pt. ii. pp. 208, 213. 2 Dispatch of August i. » Dispatch of Jdly 31. CHAPTER V GAULEY BRIDGE The gate of the Kanawha valley — The wilderness beyond — West Virginia defences — A romantic post — Chaplain Brown — An adventurous mis- sion — Chaplain Dubois — " The River Path " — Gauley Mount — Colonel Tompkins's home — Bowie-knives — Truculent resolutions — The Engineers — Whittlesey, Benham, Wagner — Fortifications — Dis- tant reconnoissanccs — Comparison of forces — Dangers to steamboat communications — Allotment of duties — The Summersville post — Seventh Ohio at Cross Lanes — Scares and rumors — Robert E. I.ee at Valley Mountain — Floyd and Wise advance — Rosecrans's orders — The Cross Lanes affair — Major Casement's creditable retreat — Colonel Tyler's reports — Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton — Quarrels of Wise and Floyd — Ambushing rebel cavalry — Affair at Boone Court House — New attack at Gauley Bridge — An incipient mutiny — Sad result — A notable court-martial — Rosecrans marching toward us — Communications renewed — Advance toward Lewisburg — Camp Lookout — A private sorrow. THE position at Gauley Bridge was an important one from a military point of view. It was where the James River and Kanawha turnpike, after following the highlands along the course of New River as it comes from the east, drops into a defile with cliffs on one side and a swift and unfordable torrent upon the other, and then crosses the Gauley River, which is a stream of very similar character. The two rivers, meeting at a right angle, there unite to form the Great Kanawha, which plunges over a ledge of rocks a mile below and winds its way among the hills, some thirty miles, before it be- comes a navigable stream even for the lightest class of steamboats. From Gauley Bridge a road runs up the Gauley River to Cross Lanes and Carnifex Ferry, some- thing over twenty miles, and continuing northward reaches Summersville, Sutton, and Weston, making almost the GAULEY BRIDGE 8 1 only line of communication between the posts then occu- pied by our troops in northwestern Virginia and the head of the Kanawha valley. Southwestward the country was extremely wild and broken, with few and small settle- ments and no roads worthy the name. The crossing of the Gauley was therefore the gate through which all important movements from eastern into southwestern Virginia must necessarily come, and it formed an impor- tant link in any chain of posts designed to cover the Ohio valley from invasion. It was also the most ad- vanced single post which could protect the Kanawha valley. Further to the southeast, on Flat-top Mountain, was another very strong position, where the principal road on the left bank of New River crosses a high cind bruad ridge; but a post could not be safely maintained there without still holding Gauley Bridge in considerable force, or establishing another post on the right bank of New River twenty miles further up. All these streams flow in rocky beds seamed and fissured to so great a degree that they had no practicable fords. You might go forty miles up New River and at least twenty up the Gauley before you could find a place where either could be passed by infantry or wagons. The little ferries which had been made in a few eddies of the rivers were destroyed in the first campaign, and the post at the Gauley became nearly impregnable in front, and could only be turned by long and difficult detours. An interval of about a hundred miles separated this mountain fastness from the similar passes which guarded eastern Virginia along the line of the Blue Ridge. This debatable ground was sparsely settled and very poor in agricultural resources, so that it could furnish r.othing for subsistence of man or beast. The necessity of trans- porting forage as well as subsistence and ammunition through this mountainous belt forbade any extended or continuous operations there; for actual computation VOL. I. — 6 82 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR showed that the wagon trains could carry no more than the food for the mule teams on the double trip, going and returning, from Gauley Bridge to the narrows cf New River where the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad crossed upon an important bridge which was several times made the objective point of an expedition. This alone proved the impracticability of the plan McClellan first conceived, GAULEY BRIDGE & VrClNlTY. ._ THUI.-ll.CO of making the Kanawha valley the line of an important movement into eastern Virginia. It pointed very plainly, also, to the true theory of operations in that country. Gauley Bridge should have been held with a good brigade which could have had outposts several miles forward in three directions, and, assisted by a small body of horse to scour the country fifty miles or more to the front, the garrison could have protected all the country which we ever occupied permanently. A similar post at Huttons- ville with detachments at the Cheat Mountain pass and GAULEY BRIDGE 83 Elkwater pass north of Huntersville would have covered the only other practicable routes through the mountains south of the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. These would have been small intreuched camps, defen- sive in character, but keeping detachments constantly active in patrolling the front, going as far as could be done without wagons. All that ever was accomplished in that region of any value would thus have been attained at the smallest expense, and the resources that were for three years wasted in those mountains might have been applied to the legitimate lines of great operations from the valley of the Potomac southward. Nothing could be more romantically beautiful than the situation of the post at Gauley Bridge. The hamlet had, before our arrival there, consisted of a cluster of two or three dwellings, a country store, a little tavern, and a church, irregularly scattered along the base of the moun- tain and facing the road which turns from the Gauley valley into that of the Kanawha. The lower slope of the hillside behind the houses was cultivated, and a hedge- row separated the lower fields from the upper pasturage. Above this gentler slope the wooded steeps rose more precipitately, the sandstone rock jutting out into crags and walls, the sharp ridge above having scarcely soil enough to nourish the chestnut-trees, here, like Mrs. Browning's woods of Vallombrosa, literally " clinging by their spurs to the precipices." In the angle between the Gauley and New rivers rose Gauley Mount, the base a perpendicular wall of rocks of varying height, with high wooded slopes above. There was barely room for the road between the wall of rocks and the water on the New River side, but after going some distance up the valley, the highway gradually ascended the hillside, reaching some rolling uplands at a distance of a couple of miles. Here was Gauley Mount, the country-house of Colonel C. Q. Tompkins, formerly of the Army of 84 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the United States, but now the commandant of a Con- federate regiment raised in the Kanawha valley. Across New River the heavy masses of Cotton Mountain rose rough and almost inaccessible from the very water's edge. The western side of Cotton Mountain was less steep, and buttresses formed a bench about its base, so that in look- ing across the Kanawha a mile below the junction of the rivers, one saw some rounded foothills which had been cleared on the top and tilled, and a gap in the mountain- ous wall made room on that side for a small creek which descended to the Kanawha, and whose bed served for a rude country road leading to Fayette C. H. At the base of Cotton Mountain the Kanawha equals the united width of the two tributaries, and flows foaming over broken rocks with treacherous channels between, till it dashes over the horseshoe ledge below, known far and wide as the Kanawha Falls. On either bank near the falls a small mill had been built, that on the right bank a saw-mill and the one on the left for grinding grain. Our encampment necessarily included the saw-mill below the falls, where the First Kentucky Regiment was placed to guard the road coming from Fayette C. H. Two regiments were encamped at the bridge upon the hillside above the hedgerow, having an advanced post of half a regiment on the Lewisburg road beyond the Tompkins farm, and scouting the country to Sewell Mountain. Smaller outposts were stationed some distance up the valley of the Gauley. My headquarters tents were pitched in the door-yard of a dwelling-house facing the Gauley River, and I occupied an unfurnished room in the house for office purposes. A week was spent, without molestation, exploring the country in all direc- tions and studying its topography. A ferry guided by a cable stretching along the piers of the burnt bridge com- municated with the outposts up the New River, and a smaller ferrv below the Kanawha Falls connected with the GAULEY BRIDGE 85 Fayette road. Systematic discipline and instruction in outpost duty were enforced, and the regiments rapidly became expert mountaineers and scouts. The popula- tion was nearly all loyal below Gauley Bridge, but above they were mostly Secessionists, a small minority of the wealthier slaveholders being the nucleus of all aggressive secession movements. These, by their wealth and social leadership, overawed or controlled a great many who did not at heart sympathize with them, and between parties thus formed a guerilla warfare became chronic. In our scouting expeditions we found little farms in secluded nooks among the mountains, where grown men assured us that they had never before seen the American flag, and whole families had never been further from home than a church and country store a few miles away. From these mountain people several regiments of Union troops were recruited in West Virginia, two of them being organized in rear of my own lines, and becoming part of the garrison of the district in the following season. I had been joined before reaching Gauley Bridge by Chaplain Brown of the Seventh Ohio, who had obtained permission to make an adventurous journey across the country from Sutton to bring me information as to the position and character of the outposts that were stretch- ing from the railway southward toward our line of operations. Disguised as a mountaineer in homespun clothing, his fine features shaded by a slouched felt hat, he reported himself to me in anything but a clerical garb. Full of enterprise as a partisan leader of scouts could be, he was yet a man of high attainments in his profession, of noble character and real learning. When he reached me, I had as my guest another chaplairi who had accepted a commission at my suggestion, the Rev. Mr. Dubois, son- in-law of Bishop Mcllvaine of Ohio, who had been leader of the good people at Chillicothe in providing a supper for the Eleventh Ohio as we were on our way from Camp 86 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Dennison to Gallipolis. He had burned to have some part in the country's struggle, and became a model chap- lain till his labors and exposure broke his health and forced him to resign. The presence of two such men gave some hours of refined social life in th. intervals of rough work. One evening walk along the Kanawha has ever since remained in my memory associated with Whit- tier's poem " The River Path," as a wilder and more bril- liant type of the scene he pictured. We had walked out beyond the camp, leiving its noise and its warlike associa- tions behind us, for a turn of the road around a jutting cliff shut it all out as completely as if we had been trans- ported to another land, except that the distant figure of a sentinel on post reminded us of the limit of safe sauntering for pleasure. My Presbyterian and Episcopalian friends forgot their differences of dogma, and as the sun dropped behind the mountain tops, making an early twilight in the valley, we talked of home, of patriotism, of the relation of our struggle to the world's progress, and other high themes, when " Sudden our pathway turned from night, The hills swung open to the light; Through their green gates the sunshine showed, A long, slant splendor downward flowed. Down glade and glen and bank it rolled ; It bridged the shaded stream with gold ; And borne on piers of mist, allied The shadowy with the sunlit side I " The surroundings, the things of which we talked, our own sentiments, all combined to make the scene stir deep emo- tions for which the poet's succeeding lines seem the only fit expression, and to link the poem indissolubly with the scene as if it had its birth there. When Wise had retreated from the valley, Colonel Tompkins had been unable to remove his family, and had left a letter commending them to our courteous treatment. Mrs. Tompkins was a lady of refinement, and her position GAULEY BRIDGE 87 within our outposts was far from being a comfortable one. She, however, put a cheerful face upon her situation, showed ^reat tact in avoiding controversy with the soldiers and in conciliating the good-will of the officers, and re- mained with her children and servants in her picturesque home on the mountain. So long as there was no fighting in the near vicinity, it was comparatively easy to save her from annoyance; but when a little later in the autumn Floyd occupied Cotton Mountain, and General Rosecrans was with us with larger forces, such a household became an object of suspicion and ill-will, which made it necessary to send her through the lines to her husband. The men fancied they saw signals conveyed from the house to the enemy, and believed that secret messages were sent, giving information of our numbers and movements. All this was highly improbable, for the lady knew that her safety de- pended upon her good faith and prudence ; but such camp rjfpjr becomes a power, and Rosecrans found himself compelled to end it by sending her away. He could no longer be answerable for her complete protection. This, however, was not till November, and in August it was only a pleasant variation, in going the rounds, to call at the pretty house on Gauley Mount, inquire after the welfare of the family, and have a moment's polite chat with the mistress of the mansion. For ten days after we occupied Gauley Bridge, all our information showed that General Wise was not likely to attempt the reconquest of the Kanawha valley voluntarily. His rapid retrograde march ended at White Sulphur Springs and he went into camp there. His destruction of bridges and abandonment of stores and munitions of war showed that he intended to take final leave of our region.^ The contrast between promise and performance in his case had been ludicrous. When we entered the valley, we heard of ^ My report to Rosecrans, O. R., vol, li. pt. i. p. 40. Wise to Lee, /«/., vol. ii. p. I0I2 ; vol, v. p. 769. 88 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR his proclamations and orders, which breathed the spirit of desperate hand-to-hand conflict. His soldiers had been told to despise long-range fire-arms, and to trust to bowie- knives, which our invading hordes would never dare to face. We found some of these knives among the arms we cap- tured at the Gauley, — ferocious-looking weapons, made of broad files ground to a double edge, fitted with rough handles, and still bearing the cross-marking of the file on the flat sides. Such arms pointed many a sarcasm among our soldiers, who had found it hard in the latter part of our advance to get within even the ioiigest musket-range of the enemy's column. It was not strange that ignorant men should think they might find use for weapons less serviceable than the ancient Roman short-sword ; but that, in the existing condition of military science, officers could be found to share and to encourage the delusion was amusing enough ! With the muskets we captured, we armed a regiment of loyal Virginians, and turned over the rest to Governor Peirpoint for similar nse.^ On the 5th of August Lieutenc; it Wagner of the En- gineers arrived at Gauley Bridge with instructions from General Rosecrans to superintend the construction of such fortifications as might be proper for a post of three regi- ments. I had already with me Colonel Whittlesey, * In some documents which fell into our hands we found a series of reso- lutions passed at a meeting in the spring at which one of the companies now with Wise was organized. It shows the melodramatic truculence which vas echoed in the exhortations of the general and of other men who should have had more judgment. The resolutions were these : — "Resolved: i. That this company was formed for the defence of this Commonwealth against her enemies of the North, and for no other purpose. Resolved: 2. That the so-called President of the United States by his war policy has deliberately insulted the people of this Commonwealth, and if blood he wants, blood he can have. Resolved: 3. That we are ready to respond to the call of the Governor of this Commonwealth for resisting Abraham Lincoln and the New York stock-jobbers, and all who sympathize with them. Resolved: 4. That we have not forgotten Harper's Ferry and John Brown." GAULEY BRIDGE 89 Governor Dennison's chief engineer, an old West Point graduate, who had for some years been devoting himself to scientific pursuits, especially to geology. In a few days these were joined by Captain Benham, who was authorized to determine definitely the plans of our de- fences. I was thus stronger in engineering skill than in any other department of staff assistants, though in truth there was little fortifying to be done beyond what the contour of the ground indicated to the most ordinary comprehension.^ Benham stayed but two or three days, modified Wag- ner's plans enough to feel that he had made them his own, and then went back to Rosecrans's headquarters, where he was met with an appointment as brigadier-general, and was relieved of staff duty. He was a stout red-faced man, with a blustering air, dictatorial and assuming, an army engineer of twenty-five years* standing. He was no doubt well skilled in the routine of his profession, but broke down when bur- dened with the responsibility of conducting the movement of troops in the field. Wagner was a recent graduate of the Military Academy, a genial, modest, intelligent young man of great promise. He fell at the siege of Yorktown in the next year. Whittlesey was a veteran whose varied experience in and out of the army had all been turned to good account. He was already growing old, but was inde- fatigable, pushing about in a rather prim, precise way, advising wisely, criticising dryly but in a kindly spirit, and helping bring every department into better form. I soon lost both him and McElroy, my adjutant-general, for their three months* service was up, and they were made, the one colonel, and the other major of the Twentieth Ohio Regi- 1 The cause of this visit of the Engineers is found in a dispatch sent by McClellan to Rosecrans, warning him that Lee and Johnston were both actu- ally in march to crush our forces in West Virginia, and directing that Hut- tonsville and Gauley Bridge be strongly fortified. O. R., vol. v. p. 555 ; Id.^ vol. li. pt. i. pp. 445, 446. 90 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ment, of which my friend General Force was the lieutenant- colonel. We fortified the post by an epaulement or two for can- non, high up on the hillside cov^t^ring the ferry and the road up New River. An infantry trench, with parapet of barrels filled with earth, was run along the margin of Gauley River till it reached a creek coming down from the hills on the left. There a redoubt for a gun or two was made, commanding a stretch of road above, and the infantry trench followed the line of the creek up to a gorge in the hill. On the side of Gauley Mount facing our post, we slashed the timber from the edge of the precipice nearly to the top of the mountain, making an entanglement through which it was impossible that any body of troops should move. Down the Kanawha, below the falls, we strength- ened the saw-mill with logs, till it became a block-house loopholed for musketry, commanding the road to Charles- ton, the ferry, and the opening of the road to Fayette C. H. A single cannon was here put in position also. All this took time, for so small a force as ours could not make very heavy details of working parties, especially as our outpost and reconnoitring duty was also very labo- rious. This duty was done by infantry, for cavalry I had none, except the squad of mounted messengers, who kept carefully out of harm's way, more to save their horses than themselves, for they had been enlisted under an old law which paid them for the risk of their own horses, which risk ' they naturally tried to make as small as possible. My recon- noitring parties reached Big Sewell Mountain, thirty-five miles up New River, Summersville, twenty miles up the Gau- ley, and made excursions into the counties on the left bank of the Kanawha, thirty or forty miles away. These were not exceptional marches, but were kept up with an industry that gave the enemy an exaggerated idea of our strength 2& well as of our activity. About the lOth of August we began to get rumors GAULEY BRIDGE 91 from the country that General Robert E. Lee had arrived at Lewisburg to assume direction of the Confederate move- ments into West Virginia. We heard also that Floyd with a strong brigade had joined that of Wise, whose " legion " had been reinforced, and that this division, reported to be 10,000 or 12,000 strong, would immediately operate against me at Gauley Bridge. We learned also of a general stir among the Secessionists in Fayette, Mercer, and Ra- leigh counties, and of the militia being ordered out under General Chapman to support the Confederate movement by operating upon my line of communications, whilst Floyd and Wise should attack in front. The reported aggregate of the enemy's troops was, as usual, exaggerated, but we now know that it amounted to about 8000 men, a force so greatly superior to any- thing I could assemble to oppose it, that the situation became at once a very grave one for me.^ To resist this advance, I could keep but two regiments at Gauley Bridge, an advance-guard of eight companies vigorously skirmish- ing toward Sewell Mountain, a regiment distributed on the Kanawha to cover steamboat communications, and some companies of West Virginia recruits organizing at the mouth of the Kanawha. By extreme activity these were able to baffle the enemy, and impose upon him the belief that our numbers were more than double our actual force. Small hostile parties began to creep in toward the navi- gable part of the Kanawha, and to fire upon the steam- boats, which were our sole dependence for supplying our depots at Charleston and at the head of navigation. Gen- eral Rosecrans informed me of his purpose to march a ' On the 14th of August Wise reported to General Lee that he had 2000 men ready to move, and could have 2500 ready in five days ; that 550 of his cavalry were with Floyd, besides a detachment of go artillerists. This makes his total force 3100. At that time he gives Floyd's force at 1200 with two strong regiments coming up, besides 2000 militia under General Chapman. The aggregate force operating on the Kanawha line he gives as 7800. (O. R. vol V. p. 787.) 92 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR sufficiently strong column to meet that under Lee as soon as the purpose of the latter should be developed, and en- couraged me to hold fast to my position. I resolved, therefore, to stand a siege if need be, and pushed my means of transportation to the utmost, to accumulate a store of supplies at Gauley Bridge. I succeeded in getting up rations sufficient to last a fortnight, but found it much harder to get ammunition, especially for my ill-assorted little battery of cannon. The Twenty-sixth Ohio came into the Kanawha valley on the 8th through a mistake in their orders, and their arrival supplied for a few days the loss of the Twenty-first, which had gone home to be mustered out and reorganized. Some companies of the newly forming Fourth Virginia were those who protected the village ot Point Pleasant at the mouth of the river, and part of the Twelfth and Twenty-sixth Ohio were in detachments from Charleston toward Gauley Bridge, furnishing guards for the steamboats and assisting in the landing and forwarding of supplies. The Eleventh Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, which still had only eight companies, had the task of covering and reconnoi- tring our immediate front, and was the advance-guard already mentioned. Part of the Twelfth under Major Hines did similar work on the road to Summersville, where Rosecrans had an advanced post, consisting of the Seventh Ohio (Colonel E. B. Tyler), the Thirteenth (Colonel Wtn. Sooy Smith), and the Twenty-third (Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Matthews). On the 13th of August the Seventh Ohio, by orders from Rosecrans, marched to Cross Lanes, the intersection of the read from Summersville to Gauley Bridge, with one from Carnifex Ferry, which is on the Gauley near the mouth of Meadow River. A road called the Sunday Road is in the Meadow River valley, and joins the Lewisburg turnpike about fifteen miles in front of Gau- ley Bridge.^ To give warning against any movement of ^ See Official Atlas, Plate IX. 3, and map, p. 106, post GAULEY BRIDGE -93 the enemy to turn my position by this route or to inter- vene between me and Rosecrans's posts at Summersvillc and beyond, was Tyler's task. He was ordered to picket all crossings of the river near his position, and to join my command if he were driven away. I was authorized to call him to me in an emergency. On the 15th Tyler was joined at Cross Lanes by the Thirteenth and Twenty-third Ohio, in consequence of rumors that the enemy was advancing upon Summersvillc in force from Lewisburg. I would have been glad of such an addition to my forces, but knowing that Rosecrans had stationed them as his own outpost covering the Sutton and Weston road, I ordered Tyler to maintain his own posi- tion, and urged the others to return at once to Summers- villc.^ The road by which they had expected the enemy was the Wilderness road, which crossed the Gauley at Hughes' Ferry, six miles above Carnifex. If attacked from that direction, they should retire northward toward Rosecrans, if possible. Rosecrans gave orders to the same effect as soon as he heard of the movement, saying that his intention had been to station Smith and Matthews at Sutton, where their retreat toward him in case of necessity would be assured,'^ His orders for Tyler were that he should scout far toward the enemy, " striking him wherever he can," and " hold his position at the ferries as long as he can safely do it, and then fall back, as directed," toward Gauley Bridge.^ The incident throws important light upon the situation a week later, when Tyler was attacked by Floyd. Floyd and Wise were now really in motion, though General Lee remained at Valley Mountain near Hunters- ville, whence he directed their movements. On the 17th they had passed Sewell Mountain, but made slow prog- ress in the face of the opposition of the Eleventh Ohio, 1 O. R., vol. 15. pt. i. pp. 449, 453, 454. 3 Dispatch of August 16. * Dispatch of August 17. 94 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR which kept up a constant skirmish with thcm.^ On the 19th Floyd's advance-guard passed the mouth of the Sunday Road on the turnpike, and on the 20th made so determined a push at my advance-guard that I believed it a serious effort of the whole Confederate column. I strengthened my own advance-guard by part of the Twelfth Ohio, which was at hand, and placed them at Pig Creek, a mile beyond the Tompkins place, where the turnpike crossed a gorge making a strongly defensible position. The advance-guard was able to withstand the enemy alone, and drove back those who assaulted them with considerable loss. It has since appeared that this movement of the enemy was by Wise's command making a direct attack upon my position, whilst Floyd was moving by the diagonal road to Dogwood Gap on the Sunday Road where it crosses the old State Road. There he encamped for the night, and next day continued his march to the mouth of Meadow River near Carnifex r^erry.' It was an affair of advance-guards in which Wise was satisfied as soon as he found serious resistance, and he retired during the night. On the first evidence of the enemy's presence in force, I called Tyler from Cross Lanes to Twenty-mile Creek, about six miles from Gauley Bridge, where it was important to guard a road passing to my rear, and to meet any attempt to turn my flank if the attack should be determinedly made by the whole force of the enemy.* As soon as the attack was repulsed, Tyler was ordered to return to Cross Lanes and resume his watch of the roads and river crossings there.* He was delayed by the issue of shoes and clothing to his men, and when he approached his former position on the 24th, he found that Floyd was reported to have crossed the Gauley at Carnifex Ferry. Without waiting to recon* 1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 792, 799 ; /'-_V.*_'.i*r'. . TO SEW ELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II5 rid of so intractable a subordinate, gravely advised him that both honor and duty would be safe in obeying promptly the order. ^ Whilst waiting at Camp Lookout for authority to move forward, an incident occurred which gave us a little ex- citement and amusement, and which shows, better than much explanation could do, the difficult and intricate character of the country in which we were operating. A wagon-master from our camp had gone out hunting for forage, which was very scarce. He soon came back in excitement, reporting that he had come upon an encamp- ment of a regiment of the enemy between our camp and New River and somewhat in our rear. His report was very circumstantial, but was so improbable that I was confident there was some mistake about it. He was, however, so earnest in his assertions that he could not be mistaken, that McCook, in whose brigade he was, sent out an officer with some men, guided by the wagon-mas- ter, to verify the report. The story was confirmed, and the matter was brought to me for action. Puzzled but not convinced, and thinking that as McCook's command was new to the country, it would be better to send some one who was used to scouting in the mountain?, I ordered a lieutenant named Bontecou, of the Second Kentucky Regiment, to take a small party and examine che case anew. Bontecou had done a good deal of successful work in this line, and was regarded as a good woodsman and an enterprising scout. He too came back at nightfall, say- ing that there could be no mistake about it. He had crept close to the sentinels of the camp, had counted the tents, and being challenged by the guard, had made a run for it through the thicket, losing his hat. The position of the enemy was, by all the reports, about three miles from us, diagonally in rear of our right flank. It now seemed that it must be true that some detachment had » o. R., vol. V. p. 879. Il6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR been delayed in joining the retreating column, and had found itself thus partly cut off by our advance. I there- fore ordered McCook to start at earliest peep of day, upon the Chestnutburg road (on which the wagon-master had been foraging), and passing beyond the hostile detach- ment, attack from the other side, it being agreed by all the scouting parties that this would drive the enemy toward our camp. My own brigade would be disposed of to intercept the enemy and prevent escape. McCook moved out as ordered, and following his guides came by many devious turns to a fork in the road, following which, they told him, a few minutes would bring him upon the enemy. He halted the column, and with a small skirmishing party went carefully forward. The guides pointed to a thicket from which the Confederates could be seen. His instinct for topography had made him suspect the truth, as he had noted the courses in advancing, and crawling through the thicket, he looked out from the other side upon what he at once recognized as the rear of his own camp, and the tents of the very regiment from which he had sent an officer to test the wagon-master's report. All the scouts had been so de- ceived by the tangle of wooded hills and circling roads that they fully believed they were still miles from our position; and, bewildered in the labyrinth, they were sure the tents they saw were the enemy's and not ours. The march had been through rain and mist, through dripping thickets and on muddy roads, and the first im- pulse was wrath at the erring scouts; but the ludicrous side soon prevailed, and officers and men joined in hearty laughter over their wild-goose chase. They dubbed the expedition the "Battle of Bontecou," and it was long be- fore the lieutenant heard the last of the chaffing at his talents as a scout. ^ Major Hines's reports of the strength of the position on 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 484, 485. TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II7 Sewell Mountain which the enemy had occupied, and my own reconnoissance of the intervening country, satisfied me that if we meant to advance on this line, we ought not to give the enemy time to reconsider and to reoccupy the mountain top from which he had retreated. On rep- resenting this to General Rosecrans, he authorized me to advance twelve miles to the Confederate camp on Big Sewell, directing me, however, to remain upon the de- fensive when there, and to avoid bringing on any engage- ment till he could bring up the rest of the column. ^ His means of crossing at Carnifex Ferry were so poor that what he had thought would be done in two or three days from the time McCook joined me, took a full fortnight to accomplish. I marched with my own and McCook' s brigades on the 23d September, but when I reached the Confederate camp where Hines with the advance-guard awaited me, it was evident at a glance that we must go further. ^ The posi- tion was a very strong one for resisting an approach from our direction, but was commanded by higher ground be- yond. The true crest of the mountain was two miles fur- ther on, and there alone could we successfully bar the way against a superior force coming from the east. I therefore marched rapidly forward and occupied the crest in force. It was impossible to hide the whole of our camp from view and properly hold the position, but we made use of such cover as we could find, and prepared to defend the pass against all comers, since it was vain to attempt to mystify the enemy as to our advance in force. On the 24th we had a lively skirmish with Wise's legion in front, and forced it to retire to a ridge out of range of our artillery. We dismounted one of his howitzers in the engagement, but contented ourselves with making him yield the ground which would interfere with our easy holding of our own position and the spurs of the moun- 1 O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 484, 486. a Id., p. 487. Il8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR tain directly connected with it. Wise had learned that Rosecrans was not with my column, and on the supposi- tion that the advance was made by my brigade only, Lee concluded to order Floyd to Wise's camp, being now sat isfied that no movement of our troops had been made by way of the Wilderness road. It was at this time that Wise was relieved of command and ordered to Richmond, and Lee found it advisable to unite his forces and take command in person. The relations of these three distinguished Virginians had not begun with this campaign, but dated back to the capture of John Brown at Harper's Ferry. Wise was then the governor of his State, and received from Lee the pris- oner whose execution at Charlestown was to become an historical event. Floyd, who himself had once been gov- ernor of Virginia, was then Buchanan's Secretary of War, and ordered Lee with the detachment of marines to Harper's Ferry, where they stormed the engine-house which Brown had made his fort. Dealing with such men as his subordinates, and with such a history behind them, it can easily be understood that Lee would feel no ordi- nary delicacy in asserting his authority, and no common embarrassment at their quarrels. Rosecrans was at first disturbed at my going further than had been expected;^ but he was soon satisfied that nothing better could have been done. It is true that I was thirty-five miles from the supports in the rear, whether at Camifex Ferry or Gauley Bridge; but the position was almost impregnable in front, and by watch- fulness I should know of any attempt to turn it in time to make safe ray retreat to Camp Lookout. On the 26th Scammon's brigade came within easy supporting dis- tance, and General Rosecrans came in person to my camp. He had not been able to bring up his headquar- ters train, and was my guest for two or three days, shar- 1 Rosecrans's Dispatches, O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 486, 487. J TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK II9 ing my tent with me. Cold autumnal rains cf^t in on the very day the general came to the front, and continued almost without intermission. In the hope of still hav- ing some favorable weather for campaigning, the other brigades were brought forward, and the whole force was concentrated at the mountain except the necessary garri- sons for the posts in the rear. Brigadier-General Robert C. Schenck reported for duty in the evening of a fearfully stormy day whilst Rosecrans was still my tent-mate. He had heard rumors of fighting at the front, and had hur- ried forward with a couple of staff officers, but without baggage. My staff officers were sharing their shelter with the gentlemen who had accompanied Rosecrans, but the new-comers were made heartily welcome to what we had. In my own tent General Rosecrans occupied my camp cot ; I had improvised a rough bunk for myself on the other side of the tent, but as General Schenck got in too late for the construction of any better resting-place, he was obliged to content himself with a bed made of three or four camp-stools set in a row. Anything was better than lying on the damp ground in such a storm ; but Schenck long remembered the aching weariness of that night, as he balanced upon the narrow and unstable supports which threatened to tumble him upon the ground at the least effort to change the position of stiffened body and limbs. One could not desire better companionship than we had during our waking hours, for both my guests had had varied and interesting experience and knew how to make it the means of delightful social intercourse and discussion. The chilly temperature of the tent was pleasantly modified by a furnace which was the successful invention of the private soldiers. A square trench was dug from the middle of the tent leading out behind it; this was capped with flat stones three or four inches thick, which were abundant on the mountain. At the end of it, on the outside, a chimney of stones plastered I20 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IV A R with mud was built up, and the whole topped out by an empty cracker-barrel by way of chimney-pot. The fire built in the furnace had good draught, and the thick stones held the heat well, making, on the whole, the best means of warming a tent which I ever tried. The objection to the little sheet-iron stoves furnished with the Sibley tent is that they are cold in a minute if the fire dies out. The rains, when once they began, continued with such violence that the streams were soon up, the common fords became impassable, and the roads became so muddy and slippery that it was with the utmost difficulty our little array was supplied. The four brigades were so reduced by sickness and by detachments that Rosecrans reported the whole as making only 5200 effective men. Every wagon was put to work hauling supplies and ammu- nition, even the headquarters baggage vagons and the regimental wagons of the troops, as well those stationed in the rear as those in front. We were sixty miles from the head of steamboat navigation, the wagon trains were too small for a condition of things where the teams could hardly haul half loads, and by the ist of October wo had demonstrated the fact that it was impossible to sustain our army any further from its base unless we could rely upon settled weather and good roads. Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Lor- ing, his subordinate, on the Staunton l*.ne, to test the strength of the posts under Reynolds a* Cheat Mountain and Elkwater, and lively combats had resulted on the 1 2th and 14th of September. ^ Reynolds held firm, and as Rosecrans was not diverted from his plans and was pushing forward on the Lewisburg line, Lee ordered Loring to report to him with most of his command. Reynolds, in return, made a forced reconnoissance upon the Confederate position at Greenbrier River on October 2d, but found it too strong to be carried. The reinforce- J O. R., vol. V. pp. 185-193. TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 121 ment by Loring gave Lee a very positive advantage in numbers, but the storms and foundering roads paralyzed both armies, which lay opposite each other upon the crests of Big Sewell separated by a deep gorge. On the 5th of October the condition of the Kanawha valley had be- come such that Rosecrans felt compelled to withdraw his forces to the vicinity of Gauley Bridge. The freshet had been an extraordinary one. At Charleston the Kanawha River usually flows in a bed forty or fifty feet below the plateau on which the town is built ; but the waters now rose above these high banks and flooded the town itself, being four or five feet deep in the first story of dwelling- houses built in what was considered a neighborhood safe from floods. The inundation almost stopped communica- tion, though our quartermasters tried to remedy part of the mischief by forcing light steamers up as near to the Kanawha Falls as possible. But it was very difficult to protect the supplies landed upon a muddy bank where were no warehouses, and no protection but canvas covers stretched over the piles of barrels and boxes of bread and sacks of grain. There was enormous waste and loss, but we managed to keep our men in rations, and were better off than the Confederates, in regard to whom Floyd after- ward reported to his government that the eleven days of cold storms at Sewell Mountain had " cost more men, sick and dead, than the battle of Manassas Plains. " It has been asserted by Confederate writers that Lee was executing a movement to turn Rosecrans's left flank when the latter marched back from Sewell Mountain. If so, it certainly had not gone far enough to attract our attention, and from my own knowledge of the situation, I do not believe it had passed beyond the form of discus- sion of a possible movement when the weather should be- come settled. Such plans were discussed on both sides, but the physical condition of the country was an impera- tive veto upon aggressive action. 132 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR During the 5th of October our sick and spare baggage were sent back to Camp Lookout. Tents were struck at ten o'clock in the evening, and the trains sent on their way under escort at eleven. The column moved as soon as the trains were out of the way, except my own brigade, to which was assigned the duty of rear-guard. We re- mained upon the crest of the hill till half-past one, the men being formed in line of battle and directed to lie down till the time for them to march. Our sentinels had been posted with extra precaution, so that they might be withdrawn an hour or two after the brigade should move. Extra reserves were assigned to them, and Major Hines put in command of the whole detachment, with orders to keep in communication with me at the extreme rear of the marching column. It was interesting to observe the effect of this night movement upon the men. Their im- agination was excited by the novelty of the situation, and they furnished abundant evidence that the unknown is always, in such cases, the wonderful. The night had cleared off and the stars were out. The Confederate position was eastward from us, and as a bright star rose above the ridge on which the enemy was, we could hear soldiers saying in a low tone to each other, "There goes a fire balloon — it must be a signal — they must have dis- covered what we are doing ! " The exaggerated parallax at the horizon made the rising star seem to move rapidly for the first few minutes, and men, ignorant of this, naturally mistook its character. In a similar way an occasional shot on the picket line would be the cause of a subdued excitement. I doubt if soldiers ever make a night move- ment in an enemy's presence without being under a nervous strain which exaggerates the importance of every- thing they see and hear, and this gives uncertainty and increases the difficulty of such duty. It is no small part of the duty of officers, in such cases, to allay this ten- dency to excitement, to explain the situation, and by a TO SEW ELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 1 23 wise mixture of information and discipline to keep the men intelligently cool and in full command of their faculties. General Rosecrans had gone with the head of the col- umn, and had left with me Major Slemmer, his inspector- general, to bring him word when the rear of the column -hould be in march. Slemmer was the officer who, as a lieutenant, had distinguished himself by holding Fort Pickens in Pensacola harbor at the outbreak of the rebel- lion. He was a man of marked character, and in view of his experience it may easily be understood that we had no lack of interesting matter for conversation as we paced in rear of the reclining men during the midnight hours. His failing health prevented his taking the prominent part in the war that his abilities warranted, but I have retained, from that evening's work together, a pleasing impression of his character and a respect for his military knowledge and talents. In impressing on me the fact that my position was the one of special honor in this movement, he expressed the wish that Rosecrans had himself remained there ; but the result showed that hardly less than the commanding general's own authority and energy could have got the column forward in the mud and darkness. The troops had marched but a mile or two when they overtook part of the wagon train toiling slowly over the steep and slippery hills. Here and there a team would be " stalled " in the mud, and it looked as if day- light would overtake us before even a tolerably defensive positiun would be reached. Rosecrans now gave his per- sonal supervision to the moving of the wagons and artil- lery, — wagon -master's work, it may be said, but it was work which had to be done if the little army was not to be found in the morning strung out and exposed to the blows of the enemy if he should prove enterprising. We who were at the rear did not know of the difficulty the column was having, and when my messenger reported 124 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the rear of the preceding brigade a mile or more from the camp, I gave the order to march, and my men filed into the road. Slemmer went forward to inform the general that we were in movement, and I remained with Major Hines till all was quiet, when he was directed to call in his pickets and sentinels and follow. I had gone hardly a mile when wc were brought to a halt by the head of the brigade overtaking those who had preceded us. Word was brought back that the artillery was finding great difficulty in getting over the first considerable hill west of the mountain. We ourselves were upon the downward road from the mountain crest, but our way led along the side of a spur of the mountain which towered above us on our left. We were in a dense wood that shut out the stars, and in darkness that could almost be felt. I rode back a little to meet Hines and to keep s '^ distance between the column and his little rear-guard. We sent a chain of sentinels over the hill commanding the road, and waited, listening for any evidence that the enemy had discovered our movement and followed. An hour passed in this way, and the column moved on a short distance. Again there was a halt, and again a deployment of our sentries. When at last day broke, we were only three or four miles from our camp of the evening before; but we had reached a position which was easily defensible, and where I could halt the brigade and wait for the others to get entirely out of our way. The men boiled their coffee, cooked their breakfast, and rested. Early in the forenoon a small body of the enemy's cavalry followed us, but were contented with very slight skirmishing, and we marched leisurely to Camp Lookout before evening. Such night marches from the presence of an enemy are among the most wearing and trying in the soldier's experience, yet, in spite of the temptation to invest them with extraordi- nary peril, they are rarely interfered with. It is the un- certainty, the darkness, and the effect of these upon men TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 125 and officers that make the duty a delicate one. The risk is more from panic than from the foe, and the loss is more likely to be in baggage and in wagons than in men. I have several times been in command of rear-guards on such occasions, and I believe that I would generally pre- fer an open withdrawal by day. It is not hard to hold even a bold enemy at bay by a determined brigade or division, and a whole army may be saved from the ex- haustion and exposure whicl. rapidly i^ill the hospitals, and may cost more than several combats between rear and advance guards. My brigade remained two or three days at Camp Look- out, where we were put upon the alert on the 7th by a reported advance of the enemy, but it amounted to noth- ing more than a lively skirmish of some cavalry with our outposts. Lee was glad to move back to Meadow Bluff to be nearer his supplies, and Rosecrans encamped his troops between Hawk's Nest and the Tompkins farm, all of them being now within a few miles of Gauley Bridge.* Part of my brigade garrisoned the post at the bridge, but by Rosecrans' s direction my own headquarters tents were pitched near his own upon the Tompkins farm. Both parties now remained in observation till near the end of October. Floyd, more enterprising in plans than resolute or skilful in carrying them out, had obtained Lee's consent to make an attempt to render our position untenable by operations on the opposite side of New River. Lee had intended to co-operate by moving against us with the rest of his force, but on the 20th of October the reports from the Staunton region were so threaten- ing that he determined to send Loring back there,^ and this, of course, settled it that Lewisburg would be cov- ered in front only by Wise's Legion, commanded by Colonel Davis. Although Floyd complained of this change of plan, he did not abandon his purpose, but » O. R., vol. V. p. 253. Sec also Official Atlas, PI. IX. ^ Id., p. 908. 126 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ordering the militia on that side of the river to reas- semble, he marched to Fayette C. H,^ Rosecrans had distributed his brigades in echelon along the turnpike, — Schenck's, the most advanced, being ten miles from Gauley Bridge; McCook's eight miles, where the road from Fayette C. H. by way of Miller's Ferry comes in across New River; Benham's six miles, whilst of my own one regiment at the Tompkins farm guarded headquarters, and the rest were at Gauley Bridge and lower posts where they could protect the navigation of the Kanawha.'^ McCook by Rosecrans's direction marched to Fayette C. H. about the 2Cth of October, and on his return reported that only guerilla parties were abroad in that vicinity. Rosecrans seems to have expected that at least a foothold would be kept on the other side o' New River at Miller's Ferry, but McCook left nothing there, and when he tried to place a detachment on that side about the 25th, the shore and cliffs were found to be held by a force of sharpshooters. This marked the advance of Floyd, who established his camp in front of P^ayette C. H. at the forking of the roads to Miller's Ferry and to Gauley Bridge.^ For a few days he made no serious demonstration, and Rosecrans hastened forward the work of clothing and paying his men, recruiting his teams and bringing back to the ranks the soldiers whom exposure had sent to the hospital. He had heard in a trustworthy way of Lee's intention to move against us by the turn- pike whilst Floyd advanced on the other side of the river, but he had not yet learned of the withdrawal of Lee with Loring's troops. He therefore remained quiet and ex- pectant, awaiting the definite development of events. As this had been my first service in the field as part of a larger command, I was keenly alive to the opportunity of comparing the progress we had made in discipline and instruction with that of other brigades, so that I might » o. R., vol. V. p. 286. « Id., p. 253. 8 /«/., p. 285. TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK 12/ cure defects in my own methods and improve the sol- dierly character as well as the administratis of my own command. I was gratified to see in my t. ops evidence of a pride in their own organization and a wholesome emulation, which made them take kindly to the drill and discipline which were necessary to improvement. I was particularly interested in observing Rosecrans's methods with the men. His standard of soldierly excellence was high, and he was earnest in insisting that his brigadiers and his staff officers should co-operate vigorously in try- ing to attain it. His impulsiveness, however, led him sometimes into personal efforts at discipline where the results were at least doubtful. He would sometimes go out through the camps in the evening, and if he saw a tent lighted after "taps," or heard men singing or talk- ing, he would strike loudly on the canvas with the flat of his sword and command silence or the extinguishment of the light. The men, in good-humored mischief, would try different ways of "getting even " with him. One that gave much amusement to the camp was this : the men in a tent thus attacked pretended to believe that their regi- mental wagon-master was playing a practical joke on them, and shouted back to him all sorts of rough camp chaff. When the exasperated general appeared at the door of the tent, they were, of course, overwhelmed with the most innocent astonishment, and explained that that wagon-master was in the habit of annoying them, and that they really had not heard the "taps." I have been with the general in approaching a picket, when he would hotly lecture a sentinel who showed ignorance of some of his duties or inattention to them. I thought I could see in all such cases that it would have been wiser to avoid any unnecessary collision with the privates, but to take the responsible officer aside and make him privately understand that he must answer for such lack of instruc- tion or of discipline among his men. An impulsive man 128 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR is too apt to meddle with details, and so to weaken the sense of responsibility in the intermediate officers, who hate to be ignored or belittled before the soldiers. But if Rosecrans's method was not an ideal one, it was at least vigorous, and every week showed that the little army was improving in discipline and in knowledge of duty. CHAPTER VII COTTON MOUNTAIN Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge — Effect on Rosecrans — Topography of Gauley Mount — De Villiers runs the gantlet — Movements of our forces — Explaining orders — A hard climb o" the mountain — In the post at Gauley Bridge — Moving magazine and telegraph — A balky mule-team — Ammunition train under fire — Captain Fitch a model quartermaster — Plans to entrap Floyd — Moving supply trains at night — Method of working the ferry — of making flatboats — The Cotton Mountain affair — Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham — Vain plans to reach East Tennessee. ON the 1st of November the early morning was fair but misty, and a fog lay in the gorge of New River nearly a thousand feet below the little plateau at the Tompkins farm, on which the headquarters tents were pitched. General Rosecrans s tents were not more than a hundred yards above mine, between the turnpike and the steep descent to the river, though both our little camps were secluded by thickets of young trees and laurel bushes. Breakfast was over, the fog was lifting out of the valley, and I was attending to the usual morning routine of clerical work, when the report and echo of a cannon-shot, down the gorge in the direction of Gauley Bridge, was heard. It was unusual, enough so to set me thinking what it could mean, but the natural explanation suggested itself that it was one of our own guns, perhaps fired at a target. In a few moments an orderly came in some haste, saying the general desired to see me at his tent. As I walked over to his quarters, another shot was heard. As I approached, I saw him standing in front of his tent door, evidently much excited, and when I came VOL. I. — 9 130 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR up to him, he said in the rapid, half-stammering way peciliar to him at such times: "The enemy has got a battery on Cotton Mountain opposite our post, and is shelling it ! What d' ye think of that ? " The post at the bridge and his headquarters were connected by telegraph, and the operator below had reported the fact of the open- ing of the cannonade from the mountain side above him, and added that his office was so directly under fire that he must move out of it. Indeed he was gone and com- munication broken before orders could be sent to him or to the post. The fact of the cannonade did not disturb me so much as the way in which it affected Rosecrans. He had been expecting to be attacked by Lee in front, and knew that McCook was exchanging shots across the river with some force of the enemy at Miller's Ferry; but that the attack should come two miles or more in our rear, from a point where artillery had a plunging fire directly into our depot of supplies and commanded our only road for a half-mile where it ran on a narrow bench along New River under Gauley Mountain cliffs, had been so startling as to throw him decidedly off his balance. The error in not occupying Cotton Mountain himself was now not only made plain, but the consequences were not pleasant to contemplate. I saw that the best service I could render him for the moment was to help him back into a frame of mind in which cool reasoning on the situation would be possible. I have already stated the contrast between my own sense of care when in sole com- mand and the comparative freedom from it when a senior officer came upon the field; and I now realized how much easier it was for a subordinate to take things coolly. I therefore purposely entered into a discussion of the proba- bilities of the situation, and drew it out at length enough to assist the general in recovering full control of himself and of his own faculties. We could not, from where we stood, see the post at Gauley Bridge nor even the place COTTON MOUNTAIN 131 on Cotton Mountain where the enemy's battery was placed, and we walked a little v;ay apart from our staff officers to a position from which we could see the occa- sional puffs of white smoke from the hostile guns. From our camp the road descended sharply along the shoulders of steep hills covered with wood for a mile and a half, till it reached the bottom of the New River gorge, and then it followed the open bench I have mentioned till it reached the crossing of the Gauley. On the opposite side of New River there was no road, the mass of Cotton Mountain crowding close upon the stream with its pic- turesque face of steep inclines and perpendicular walls of rock. The bridge of boats which Rosecrans had planned at Gauley Bridge had not been built, because it had been found impossible to collect or to construct boats enough to make it. We were therefore still dependent on the ferry. Whilst the general and I were talking, Colonel De Villiers galloped up, having crossed at the ferry and run the gantlet of skirmishers whom he reported as lin- ing the other side of New River opposite the unsheltered part of our road. He had recently reported for duty, hav- ing, as he asserted, escaped in a wonderful way from cap- tivity in Libby Prison at Richmond.^ His regiment was at the bridge and he was the senior officer there; but, in his characteristic light-headed way, instead of taking steps to protect his post and re-establish the tele- graph communications, he had dashed off to report in person at headquarters. As he was willing to take the risks of the race back again, he was allowed to go, after being fully instructed to set up a new telegraph office in a ravine out of range of fire, to put the ferry-boat out of danger as soon as he should be over, and prepare the ord- nance stores to be moved into the valley of Scrabble ^ The Confederates claimed that he had been allowed to act as hospital attendant on parole, and that he violated his obligation in escaping. WTe had no means of verifying the facts in the case. 132 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Creek at night. I begged the general to be allowed to go back with De Villiers, as the thing I most feared was some panic at the post which might result in the destruc- tion of our stores in depot there. He, however, insisted on my staying at headquarters for a time at least. Information of the attack was sent to the brigades up the river, and Schenck, who was farthest up, was directed to push out scouting parties and learn if there was any advance of the enemy from Sewell Mountain. Benham, who was nearest, was ordered to send down part of his brigade to meet the efforts of the enemy to stop our com- munication with Gauley Bridge. The battery of moun- tain howitzers under Captain Mack of the regular army was also ordered to report at headquarters, with the in- tention of placing it high up on Gauley cliffs, where it could drop shells among the enemy's skirmishers on the opposite bank of the river. An hour or two passed and the detachment from Benham 's brigade approached. It was the Thirteenth Ohio, led by one of its field offi- cers, who halted the column and rode up to General Rosecrans for orders. The general's manner was still an excited one, and in the rapidity with which his direc- tions were given the officer did not seem to get a clear idea of what was required of him. He made some effort to get the orders explained, but his failure to comprehend seemed to irritate Rosecrans, and he therefore bowed and rode back to his men with a blank look which did not promise well for intelligent action. Noticing this, 1 quietly walked aside among the bushes, and when out of sight hurried a little in advance and waited at the road- side for the column. I beckoned the officer to me, and said to him, " Colonel, I thought you looked as if you did not fully understand the general's wishes." He replied that he did not, but was unwilling to question him as it seemed to irritate him. I said that was a wrong prin- ciple to act on, as a commanding officer has the greatest COTTON MOUNTAIN 133 possible interest in being clearly understood. I then explained at large what I knew to be Rosecrans's pur- poses. The officer thanked me cordially and rode away. I have ventured to give this incident with such fulness, because subsequent events in Rosecrans's career strength- ened the impression I formed at the time, that the excit- ability of his temperament was such that an unexpected occurrence might upset his judgment so that it would be uncertain how he would act, — whether it would rouse him to a heroism of which he was quite capable, or make him for the time unfit for real leadership by suspending his self-command.^ Soon after noon I obtained permission to go to Gauley Bridge and assume command there ; but as the road along New River was now impracticable by reason of the in- creased fire of the enemy upon it, I took the route over the top of Gauley Mountain, intending to reach the Gauley River as near the post as practicable. I took with me only my aide. Captain Christie, and an orderly. We rode a little beyond the top of the mountain, and sending the orderly back with the horses, proceeded on foot down the northern slope. We soon came to the slashing which I had made in August to prevent the enemy's easy ap- proach to the river near the post. The mist of the morn- ing had changed to a drizzling rain. We had on our heavy horsemen's overcoats with large capes, cavalry boots and spurs, swords and pistols. This made it toil- some work for us. The trees had been felled so that they crossed each other in utmost confusion on the steep de- clivity. Many of them were very large, and we slid over the great wet trunks, climbed through and under branches, let ourselves down walls of natural rock, tripped and ham- pered by our accoutrements, till we came to the end of ^ See Crittenden's testimony in Buell Court of Inquiry, O. R., vol. xvi. pt. i. p. 578 Cist's account of Chickamauga, Army o£ the Cumberland, p. 226, and chap, xxvii., post. 134 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the entanglement at what we supposed was the edge of the river. To our dismay we found that we had not kept up stream far enough, and that at this point was a sheer precipice some thirty feet high. We could find no crev- ices to help us climb down it. We tried to work along the edge till we should reach a lower place, but this ut- terly failed. We were obliged to retrace our steps to the open wood above the slashing. But if the downward climbing had been hard, this attempt to pull ourselves up again, — "... superasque evadere ad auras," — was labor indeed. We stopped several times from sheer exhaustion, so blown that it seemed almost impossible to get breath again. Our clothes were heavy from the rain on the outside and wet with perspiration on the inside. At last, however, we accomplished it, and resting for a while at the foot of a great tree till we gained a little strength, we followed the upper line of the slashing till we passed beyond it, and then turned toward the river, choosing to reach its banks high up above the camp rather than attempt again to climb through the fallen timber. Once at the water's edge we followed the stream down till we were opposite the guard post above the camp, when we hailed for a skiff and were ferried over. It was now almost dark, but the arrangements were soon made to have wagons ready at the building on the Kanawha front used as a magazine, and to move all our ammunition during the night to the place I had indicated in the ravine of Scrabble Creek, which runs into the Gauley. The telegraph station was moved there and connection of wires made. We also prepared to run the ferry industriously during the night and to put over the necessary trainloads of supplies for the troops above. A place was selected high up on the hill behind us, where I hoped to get up a couple of Parrott guns which might silence the cannon of the enemy on Cotton Mountain. I COTTON MOUNTAIN 1 35 was naturally gratified at the expressions of relief and satisfaction of the officers of the post to have me in person among them. They had already found that the plunging fire from the heights across the river was not a formidable thing, and that little mischief would happen if the men were kept from assembling in bodies or large groups within range of the enemy's cannon. The fatigues of the day made sleep welcome as soon as the most pressing duties had been done, and I went early to rest, giving orders to the guard at my quarters to call me at peep of day. The weather cleared during the night, and when I went out in the morning to see what progress had been made in transferring the ammunition to a safe place, I was surprised to find the train of wagons stopped in the road along the Gauley in front of the camp. General Rosecrans's ordnance officer was of the regular army, but unfortunately was intemperate. He had neglected his duty during the night, leaving his ser- geant to get on without guidance or direction. The result was that the ordnance stores had not been loaded upon the waiting wagons till nearly daylight, and soon after turning out of the Kanawha road into that of the Gauley, the mules of a team near the head of the train balked, and the whole had been brought to a standstill. There was a little rise in the road on the hither side of Scrabble Creek, where the track, cr.tting through the crest of a hillock, was only wide enougrh for a single team, and this rise was of course the place v/here the balky ani- mals stopped. The line of the road was enfiladed by the enemy's cannon, the morning fog in the valley was be- ginning to lift under the influence of the rising sun, and as soon as the situation was discovered we might reckon upon receiving the fire of the Cotton Mountain battery. The wagon-drivers realized the danger of handling an ammunition train under such circumstances and began to be nervous, whilst the onlookers not connected with the 136 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR duty made haste to get out of harm's way. My pres- ence strengthened the authority of the quartermaster in charge, Captain E. P. Fitch, helped in steadying the men, and enabled him to enforce promptly his orders. He stopped the noisy efforts to make the refractory mules move, and sent in has*^e for a fresh team. As soon as it came, this was put in place of the balky ani- mals, and at the word of command the train started quickly forward. The fog had thinned enough, however, to give the enemy an inkl'ng of what was going on, and the rattling of the wagons on the road completed the exposure. Without warning, a ball struck in the road near us and bounded over the rear of the train, the report of the cannon following instantly. The drivers involun- tarily crouched over their mules and cracked their whips. Another shot followed, but it was also short, and the last wagon turned the shoulder of the hill into the gorge of the creek as the ball bounded along up the Gauley valley. It was perhaps fortunate for us that solid shot instead of shrapnel were used, but it is not improbable that the need of haste in firing made the battery officer feel that he had no time to cut and adjust fuses to the estimated distance to our train ; or it is possible that shells were used but did not explode. It was my first acquaintance with Captain Fitch, who had accompanied Rosecrans's col- umn, and his cool efficiency was so marked that I applied for him as quartermaster upon r y staff. He remained with me till I finally left West Virginia in 1863, and I never saw his superior in handling trains in the field. He was a West Virginian, volunteering from civil life, whose outfit was a good business education and an indom- itable rough energy that nothing could tire. During the evening of the ist of November Genen.l Benham's brigade came to the post at Gauley Bridge to strengthen the garrison, and was encamped on the Ka- nawha side near the falls, where the widening of the valley COTTON MOUNTAIN 1 37 put them out of range of the enemy's fire. The ferry below the falls was called Montgomery's and was at the mouth of Big Falls Creek, up which ran the road to Fay- ette C. H. A detachment of the enemy had pushed back our outposts on this road, and had fired upon our lower camp wi.a cannon, but the position was not a favorable one for them and they did not try to stay long. After a day or two we were able to keep pickets on that side with a flatboat and hawser to bring them back, cov- ered by artillery on our side of the Kanawha. During November 2d Rosecrans matured a plan of op- erations against Floyd, who was now definitely found to be in command of the hostile force on Cotton Mountain. It was also learned through scouting parties and the country people that Lee had left the region, with most of the force that had been at Sewell Mountain. It seemed possible therefore to entrap Floyd, and this was what Rosecrans determined to attempt. Benham was ordered to take his brigade down the Kanawha and cross to the other side at the mouth of Loup Creek, five miles below. Schenck was ordered to prepare wagon bodies as tempo- rary boats, to make such flatboats as he could, and get ready to cross the New River at Townsend's Ferry, about fifteen miles above Gauley Bridge. McCook was ordered to watch Miller's Ferry near his camp, and be prepared to make a dash on the short road to Fayette C. H. I was ordered to hold the post at Gauley Bridge, forward supplies by night, keep down the enemy's fire as far as possible, and watch for an opportunity to co-operate with Benham by way of Montgomery's Ferry. ^ Benham 's bri- gade was temporarily increased by 1500 picked men from the posts between Kanawha Falls and Charles- ton. He was expected to march up Loup Creek and cut off Floyd's retreat by way of Raleigh C. H., whilst Schenck should co-operate from Townsend's Ferry. On » O. R., vol. ▼. p. 254. 138 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the 5th the preparations had been made, and Benham was ordered to cross the Kanawha. He did so on the night of the 6th, but except sending scouting parties up Loup Creek, he did nothing, as a sudden rise in New River made Rosecrans suspend the concerted movement, and matters remained as they were, awaiting the fall of the river, till the loth. For a week after the ist, Floyd's battery on Cotton Mountain fired on very slight provocation, and caution was necessary in riding or moving about the camp. The houses of the hamlet were not purposely injured, for Floyd would naturally be unwilling to destroy the prop- erty of West Virginians, and it was a safe presumption that we had removed the government property from build- ings within range of fire, as we had in fact done. Our method of forwarding supplies was to assemble the wagon trains near my lower camp during the day, and push them forward to Gauley Mount and Tompkins farm during the night. The ferry-boat at Gauley liridge was kept out of harm's way in the Gauley, behind the projection of Gauley Mount, but the hawser on which it ran was not removed. At nightfall the boat would be manned, dropped down to its place, made fast to the hawser by a snatch-block, and commence its regular trips, passing over the wagons. The ferries, both at the bridge and at Montgomery's, were rnder the management of Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio and his company of mechanics.^ We had found at points along the Kanawha the gunwales of flatboats, gotten out by lumbermen in the woods and brought to the river bank ready to be put into boats for the coal- trade, which had already much importance in the valley. Ihese gunwales were single sticks of timber, sixty or eighty feet long, two or three feet wide, and say six inches thick. Each formed the side of a boat, which was built by tying two gunwales together with cross timbers, ^ Captain P. P. Lane of Cincinnati, iater colonel of the regiment COTTON MOUNTAIN 139 the whole being then planked. Such boats were three or four times as large as those used for th^ country fer- ries upon the Gaulcy and New rivers, and enabled us to make these larger ferries very commodious. Of course the enemy knew that we used them at night, and would fire an occasional random shot at them, but did us no harm. The enemy's guns on the mountain were so masked by the forest that we did not waste ammunition in firing at them, except as they opened, when our guns so quickly returned their fire that they never ventured upon continu- ous action, and after the first week we had only occasional shots from them. We had planted our sharpshooters also in protected spots along the narrower part of New River near the post, and made the enemy abandon the other margin of the stream, except with scattered senti- nels. In a short time matters thus assumed a shape in which our work went on regularly, and the only advan- tage Floyd had attained was to make us move our supply trains at night. His presence on the mountain overlook- ing our post was an irritation under which we chafed, and from Rosecrans down, everybody was disgusted with the enforced delay of Benham at Loup Creek. Floyd kept his principal camp behind Cotton Mountain, in the posi- tion I have already indicated, in an inaction which seemed to invite enterprise on our part. His courage had oozed out when he had carried his little army into an exposed position, and here as at Carnifex Ferry he seemed to be waiting for his adversary to take the initiative. To prepare for my own part in the contemplated move- ment, I had ordered Captain Lane to build a couple of flatboats of a smaller size than our large ferry-boats, and to rig these with sweeps or large oars, so that they could be used to throw detachments acro.os the New River to the base of Cotton Mountain, at a point selected a little 140 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR way up the river, where the stream was not so swift and broken as in most places. Many of our men had become expert in managing such boats, and a careful computa- tion showed that we could put over 500 men an hour with these small scows. From the 5th to the loth Rosecrans had been waiting for the waters to subside, and pressing Benham to exam- ine the roads up Loup Creek so thoroughly tha*- he could plant himself in Floyd's rear as soon as orders should be given. Schenck would make the simultaneous movement when Benham was known to be in march, and McCook's and my own brigade would at least make demonstrations from our several positions.* From my picket post at Montgomery's Ferry I had sent scouts up the Fayette road, and by the 9th had discovered such symptoms of weakness in the enemy that I thought the time had come to make an effort to dislodge the battery and get com- mand of the crest of Cotton Mountain overlooking my camp. On the loth I made a combined movement from both my upper and lower camps. Colonel De Villiers was ordered to take all of the Eleventh Ohio fit for duty (being only 200 men), and crossing by the small boats, make a vigorous reconnoissance over the New River face of Cotton Mountain, reaching the crest if possible. Lieu- tenant-Colonel Enyart of the First Kentucky was directed to cross below the falls with a similar force, and push a reconnoissance out on the Fayette road, whilst he also should try to co-operate with De Villiers in clearing the enemy from the heights opposite Gauley Bridge. The place at which De Villiers crossed was out of sight and range from the enemy's battery. His first boat -load of forty men reached the opposite shore safely, and dividing into two parties, one pushed up the New River to a ravine making a somewhat easy ascent toward the crest, whilst the others skirmished up the almost perpendicular face 1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 255, 261-265. COTTON MOUNTAIN 141 of the rocks where they landed. The remainder of the men of the Eleventh were put over as fast as possible, and joined their colonel in the ravine mentioned, up which they marched to a little clearing high up the hill, known as Blake's farm, where the advanced party had found the enemy. The battery was withdrawn as soon as De Villiers' approach at the Blake farm was known, supports being sent to the outpost there to check our advance. The men of the Eleventh, led by Major Cole- man, attacked sharply, drove back the enemy, and suc- ceeded in extending thei • right to the crest above the recent position of the battery. They were of course stretched out into a mere skirmish line, and I directed them to hold the crest without advancing further till Enyart should be heard from. He also found the enemy indisposed to be stubborn, and skirmished up the oppo- site side of the mountain till he joined hands with De Villiers on the top. The enemy seemed to be increasing before them, and our men held their position as directed, having relieved us from the hostile occupation of ground commanding our camps. Enyart's reconnoitring party sent toward Fayette advanced a mile on that road and remained in observation, finding no enemy. I reported our success to Rosecrans, and doubtful whether he wished to press the enemy in front till Benham and Schenck should be in his rear, I asked for further instructions. General Rosecrans authorized me to take over the rest of my available force and press the enemy next day, as he was very confident that Benham would by that time be in position to attack him in rear. Accordingly I passed the Second Kentucky regiment over the river during the night and joined them in person on the crest at daybreak. The remainder of the First Kentucky, under Major Lieper, was ordered to cross at Montgomery's Ferry later in the day, and advance upon the Fayette road as far as possible. My climb to the crest of Cotton 142 REMINISCEACES OF THE CIVIL WAR Mountain was a repetition of the exhausting sort of work I had tried on Gauley Mount on the ist. I took the short route straight up the face of the hill, clambering over rocks, pulling myself up by clinging t'^ the laurel bushes, and often literally lifting myself from one great rocky step to another. This work was harder upon officers who were usually mounted than upon the men in the line, as we were not used to it, and the labor of the whole day was thus increased, for of course we could take no horses. Resuming the advance along the mountain crest, the enemy made no serious resistance, but fell back skir- mishing briskly, till we came to more open ground where the mountain breaks down toward some open farms where detachments of Floyd's forces had been encamped. Their baggage train was seen in the distance, moving off upon the Fayette turnpike. As we were now in the close neighborhood of the whole force of the enemy, and those in our presence were quite as numerous as we, I halted the command on the wooded heights commanding the open ground below, till we should hear some sound from Ben- ham's column. Toward evening Major Lieper came up on our right to the place where the Fayette road passes over a long spur of the mountain which is known in the neighborhood as Cotton Hill.^ Here he was halted, and nothing being heard from co-operating columns, the troops bivouacked for the night, Rosecrans had informed Benham of my advance and ordered him to push forward; but he spent the day in discussing the topography which he was supposed to have learned before, and did not move.^ Schenck had not been put across New River at Townsend s Ferry, because Rosecrans thought it hazardous to do this whilst Floyd 1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 272-275, and map, p. 82, ante. The greater mass in the angle of the rivers was not aniformly called Cotton Mountain then, and in my report I spoke of passing along those crests toward Cotton Hill, mean- ing this elevation on the Fayette road. » Id., pp. 266-268. COTTON MOUNTAIN I43 was near that point in force, and he intended that when Floyd should be forced to attack Benham (whose com- mand was now equal to two brigades), it would withdraw the enemy so far that Schenck would have room to oper- ate after crossing. But as Benham had not advanced, toward evening of the nth Rosecrans sent him orders to march immediately up the Kanawha to my position and follow Major Lieper on the road that officer had opened to the top of Cotton Hill, and as much further toward Fayette C. H. as possible, taking Lieper's detachment with him; meanwhile I was ordered to keep the re- mainder of my troops on the mountain in the position already occupied. Benham was expected to reach Lie- per's position by ten o'clock that evening, but he did not reach there in fact till three o'clock in the following after- noon (i2th).^ After some skirmishing with an outpost of the enemy at Laurel Creek behind which Major Lieper had been posted, nothing more was done till the evening of the 13th. Floyd's report shows that he retired be- yond Fayette C. H. on the 12th, having conceived the mistaken idea that Benham's column was a new rein- forcement of 5000 men from Ohio.^ Abandoning the hope of using Schenck's brigade in a movement from Townsend's Ferry, Rosecrans now ordered him to march to Gauley Bridge on the 13th, and joining Benham by a night march, assume command of the moving column. Schenck did so, but Floyd was now retreating upon Ra- leigh C. H. and a slight affair with his rear-guard was the only result. Fayette C. H. was occupied and the campaign ended. It would appear from official docu- ments that Floyd did not learn of Benham's presence at the mouth of Loup Creek till the 12th, when he began his retreat, and that at any time during the preceding week a single rapid march would have placed Benham's brigade without resistance upon the line of the enemy's 1 O. R., vol. V. pp. 256, 273. « A/., p. 287. 144 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR communications. Rosecrans was indignant at the balk- ing of his elaborate plans, and ordered Benham before a court-martial for misconduct;^ but I believe that McClellan caused the proceedings to be quashed to avoid scandal, and Benham was transferred to another depart- ment. It is very improbable that Schenck's contem- plated movement across New River at Townsend's Ferry could have been made successfully; for his boats were few and small, and the ferrying would have been slow and tedious. Floyd would pretty surely learn of it soon after it began, and would hasten his retreat in- stead of waiting to be surrounded. It would have been better to join Schenck to Benham by a forced march as soon as the latter was at the mouth of Loup Creek, and then to push the whole to the Fayette and Raleigh road, Rosecrans leading the column in person. As Floyd seems to have been ignorant of what was going on in Loup Creek valley, decisive results might have fol- lowed from anticipating him on his line of retreat. Cap- turing such a force, or, as the phrase then went, " bagging it," is easier talked of than done; but it is quite probable that it might have been so scattered and demoralized as to be of little further value as an army, and considerable parts of it might have been taken prisoners. Rosecrans had ^ gun the campaign in August with the announced p ipose of marching to Wytheville and Abingdon in the Holston valley, and thence into East Tennessee. McClellan had cherished the idea of making the Kanawha line the base of operations into the same region; still later Fremont, and after him Halleck did the same. Looking only at the map, it seemed an easy thing to do; but the almost wilderness character of the intervening country with its poor and sparsely scattered people, the weary miles of steep mountain-roads becom- ing impassable in rainy weather, and the total absence of 1 o. R., vol. V. p. 669. COTTON MOUNTAIN U5 forage for animals, were elements of the problem which they all ignored or greatly underestimated. It was easy, sitting at one's office table, to sweep the hand over a few inches of chart showing next to nothing of the topog- raphy, and to say, '* We will march from here to here ; " but when the march was undertaken, the natural obstacles began to assert themselves, and one general after another had to find apologies for failing to accomplish what ought never to have been undertaken. After a year or two, the military advisers of the War Department began to realize how closely the movements of great bodies of soldiers were tied to rivers and railways; but they seemed to learn it only as the merest civilian could learn it, by the expe- rience of repeated failures of plans based on long lines of communication over forest-clad mountains, dependent upon wagons to carry everything for man and beast. Instead of reaching Wytheville or Abingdon, Rosecrans found that he could not supply his little army » jn at Big Sewell Mountain ; and except for a few days, he occupied no part of the country in advance of my positions in August, then held by a single brigade in the presence of the same enemy. It was not Floyd's army, but the phys- ical obstacles presented by the country that chained him to Gauley Bridge. I shall have occasion hereafter to note how the same ignoring of nature's laws came near starving Burnside's command in East Tennessee, where the attempt to supply it by wagon trains from Lexington in Kentucky or from Nashville failed so utterly as to disappear from the calculation of our problem of exist- ence through the winter of 1863-64. VOL. i. — 10 CHAPTER VIII WINTER-QUARTERS An impracticable country — Movements suspended — Experienced troops ocdered away — My orders from Washington — Rosecrans objects — A disappmntment — Winter organization of the Department — Sifting our material — Courts-martial — Regimental schools — Drill and picket duty — A military exerution — Effect upon the army — Political sentiments of the people — Rules of conduct toward them — Case of Mr. Parks — Mr. Summers — Mr. Patrick — Mr. Lewis Ruffner — Mr. Doddridge — Mr. B. F. Smith — A house divided against itself — Major Smith's jour- nal — The contrabands — A fugitive-slave case — Embarrassments as to military jurisdiction. FLOYD'S retreat was continued to the vicinity of Newberne and Dublin Depot, where the Virginia and East Tennessee Railway crosses the upper waters of New River. He reported the country absolutely destitute of everything and the roads so broken up that he could not supply his troops at any distance from the railroad.' Rosecrans was of a similar opinion, and on the 19th of November signified to General McClellan ^ his purpose to hold Gauley Bridge, Cheat Mountain, and Romney as the frontier of his department, and to devote the winter to the instruction and discipline of his troops, and the sift- ing out of incompetent officers. About the 1st of De- cember he fixed his headquarters at Wheeling,' assigning the District of the Kanawha to my command, with head- quarters at Charleston.* This gave me substantially the » O. R, Tol. V. pp. 287, 288. a /«/., p. 657. * Fd^ pp. 669, ^5. On January 21 I called attention to the anomaly of boomUng the department by the Kanawha River on the south, and cor- rectioa was at once made by General McClellaii. /«-h- ing but a union of the two columns would have me, the situation. At the beginning of May, the additional transporta- tion necessary for my advance beyond Flat-top had not arrived, but we did not wait for it.® The regiments were * Ante, pp. no, III. « Id., p. 71. ._., , * Id., pt. iii. pp. 108, 112, 114, 127, 2 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 89, 108. < Id., pp. 168, 177, pt. i. pp. 8, 9. 14, 127. 208 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ordered to leave tents behind, and to bivouac without shelter except such as they could make with "brush," for the expected shelter tents also were lacking. The whole distance from the head of navigation to the railroad at Newberne was one hundred nd forty miles. Flat-top Mountain and Lewisburg were, respectively, about half- way on the two routes assigned to us. Some two thou- sand of the enemy's militia were holding the mountain passes in front of us, and a concentration of the regular Confederate troops was going on behind them. These last consisted of two brigades under General Henry Heth, as well as J. S. Williams's and Marshall's brigades, under General Humphrey Marshall, with the Eighth Virginia Cavalry. General Marshall appears to have been senior when the commands were united. Lookmg south from Flat-top Mountain we see the basin of the Blue-stone River, which flows northeastward into New River. This basin, with that of the Greenbrier on the other side of New River, forms the broadest stretch of cultivated land found between the mountain ranges, though the whole country is rough and broken even here. The crest of Flat-top Mountain curves southward around the head waters of the Blue-stone, and joins the more regular ranges in Tazewell County. The straight ridge of East- River Mountain forms a barrier on the southern side of the basin, more than thirty miles away from the summit of Flat-top where Scammon's camp was placed on the road from Raleigh C. H. to Princeton, the county-seat of Mercer. The Narrows of New River were where that stream breaks through the mountain barrier 1 have described, and the road from Princeton to Giles C H. passes through the defile. Only one other outlet from the basin goes southward, and that is where the road from Princeton to Wytheville passes through Rocky Gap, a gorge of the wildest character, some thirty miles south- westward from the Narrows. These passes were held by THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 209 Confederate forces, whilst their cavalry, under Colonel W. H. Jenifer, occupied Princeton and presented a skir- mishing resistance to our advance-guard. On the 1st of May a small party of the Twenty -third Ohio met the enemy's horse at Camp Creek, a branch of the Blue-stone, six miles from the crest of Flat-top, and had a lively engagement, repulsing greatly superior numbers. On hearing of this, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes marched with part of the Twenty-third Ohio and part of the West Virginia cavalry, and followed up the enemy with such vigor that Jenifer was driven through Princeton too rapidly to permit him to remove the stores collected there. ^ To avoid their falling into our hands, Jenifer set fire to the town. Hayes succeeded in sav- ing six or eight houses, but the rest were destroyed. Jenifer retreated on the Wytheville road, expecting us to follow by that route; but Hayes, learning that the Narrows were not strongly held, and being now rein- forced by the rest of his regiment (the Twenty-third), marched on the 6th to the Narrows which he held,^ whilst he sent Major Comly with a detachment into Pearisburg, the county-seat of Giles. The affair at Camp Creek had cost Jenifer some twenty in killed and wounded, and an equal number were captured in the advance on Giles C. H. Our casualties were i killed and 20 wounded. Our line, however, was getting too extended, and the utmost exertions were needed to sup- ply the troops in their present positions. Princeton, being at the forking 01 the roads to Pearisburg and Wytheville, was too important a point to be left un- guarded, and I at once sent forward Colonel Scammon with the Thirtieth Ohio to hold it.* On the 9th of May ' O R., vol. xii. pt. i. pp. 449, 450. * Id., pt. iij. p. 140. ' James M. Comly, later Brevet Brigadier-General, and since the war at one time United States minister to the Sandwich Islands. * Id., p 148. VOL. 1.— 14 210 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the Twelfth Ohio was put in march from Raleigh to join him, and Moor's brigade was approaching the last-named place where my headquarters were, that being the ter- minus, for the time, of the telegraph line which kept me in communication with Fremont.* The same day the department commander informed me of the attack by Jackson on Milroy on the 7th, and ordered me to suspend movements in advance until my forces should be concen- trated.^ The weather was rainy, and the roads suffered badly from cutting up by the wagons, but I had hoped to push forward a strong advanced guard to the great rail- way br'dge near Newberne, and destroy it before the enemy had time to concentrate there. This made it neces- sary to take some risk, for it was not possible to move the whole command till some supplies could be accumu- lated at Raleigh and at Flat-top Mountain. As fast as the supplies would permit. Moor went for- ward, taking no tents beyond Raleigh, and all of the troops on this line now faced the continuing rains with- out shelter. Guerilla parties were set actively at work by the Confederates in the region of the Guyandotte and at other points in our rear. Colonel Lightburn was directed to keep his forces actively moving to suppress these outbreaks, and the forward movement was pressed. On the loth of May Heth's two brigades of the enemy attacked our advance-guard at Pearisburg, and these, after destroying the enemy's stores, which they had cap- tured there, retired skirmishing, till they joined Scam- mon, who had advanced from Princeton to their support. ^ Scammon's brigade was now together, a mile below the Narrows of New River, with the East River in front of him, making a strong, defensible position. The tele- graph reached Flat-top Mountain on the 13th,* even this being delayed because wagons to carry the wire could 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p 157. ^ Id., p. 158. » Id., p. 176. * Id., p. 184. THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 211 not be spared from the task of supplying the troops with food. I moved my headquarters to Princeton on this day, and pressed forward Moor's brigade in the hope of being able to push again beyond the barrier at the Nar- rows of New River, where Heth's brigades had now taken position.^ Neither Scammon nor Moor was able to take with him ammunition enough for more than a slight engagement, nor was any accumulation of food possible. We were living "from hand to mouth," no additional transportation had reached us, and every wagon and pack-mule was doing its best. As fast as Moor's regiments reached Princeton they were hurried forward to French's Mill, five miles in rear of Scammon, on the road running up East River, and intersecting the Wytheville road so as to form a triangle with the two going from Princeton. During the 14th and 15th Moor's regiments arrived, and were pushed on to their position, except one half regiment (detachments of the Thirty-fourth and Thirty-seventh Ohio), under Major F. E. Franklin, and one troop of cavalry, which were kept at Princeton as a guard against any effort on the enemy's part to inter- rupt our communications. Moor was ordered to send a detachment up the East River to the crossing of the Wytheville road, so as to give early warning of any attempt of the enemy to come in upon our flank from that direction.^ My purpose was to attack Heth with Scammon 's and Moor's brigades, drive him away from the Narrows of New River, and prevent him, if pos- sible, from uniting with Marshall's command, which was understood to be somewhere between Jeffersonville (Tazewell C. H.) and Wytheville. If we succeeded in beating Heth, we could then turn upon Marshall. ^ On the afternoon of the 15th Moor threw a detach- ment of two companies over East River Mountain 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 188. « Id., pt. ii. p. 505. • Id., pt. iii. pp. 197-199. 212 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ■■■ ■ ■ ■■■ ^^M— II 1^—11 I II ■ ■■ ■ I ■ ^ I ■ .1. I..-. . - — - -■ lllll -■ ■■ -I I . I.I. Ill H as a rcconnoissance to learn whether the roads in that direction were practicable for a movement to turn the left of Heth. It attacked and handsomely routed a post of the enemy on Wolf Creek.* The few wagons and pack-mules were hurrying forward some rations and ammunition; but the 17th would be the earliest possible moment at which I could lead a general advance. The telegraph wire would reach Princeton by the evening of that day, and I waited there for the purpose of exchang- ing messages with Fremont before pushing toward New- berne, the expected rendezvous with the other troops of the department. But all our efforts could not give us the needed time to anticipate the enemy. They had rail- way communication behind a mountain wall which had few and difficult passes. Marshall and Williams were already marching from Tazewell C. H. to .strike our line of communications at Princeton, and were far on the way.^ About noon of the i6th Colonel Moor reported that his detachment on the Wytheville road was attacked by a force of the enemy estimated at 1500.^ This seems to have been the command of Colonel Wharton, marching to join Marshall, who was coming from the west by a road down the head-waters of Iiast River. Of this, how- ever, we were ignorant. I ordered Moor to take the remainder of his command (leaving half a regiment only at P'rench's) to drive off the force at the cross-roads, and if he were overpowered to retreat directly upon Princeton by the western side of the triangle of roads, of which each side was twelve or fifteen miles long. Colonel Scammon reported no change in Heth's positions or force in front of him. Patrols were sent out on all the roads west and south of Princeton, our little force of horsemen being limited to Smith's troop of Ohio cavalry which was 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 505. '^ Id., pt. iii. p. 199. 8 / O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 506. 214 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR he had been able to send to Wytheville road crossing. These, we learned later in the night, had succeeded in re-occupying the cross-roads. They were ordered to hold fast till morning, and if the enemy still appeared to be mainly at Princeton, to march in that direction and attack them from the rear. Scammon was ordered to send half a regiment to occupy Moor's position at French's during the night, and to march his whole command at daybreak toward Princeton. There was but one and a half regiments now with Moor, and these were roused and ordered to accompany me at once on our return to Princeton. It was a dark and muddy march, and as we approached the town we deployed skirmishers in front, though they were obliged to move slowly in the darkness. Day was just breaking as we came out of the forest upon the clearing, line ot battle was formed, and the troops went forward cheering. The enemy made no stubborn resistance, but retired gradually to a strong position on rough wooded hills about a mile from the village, where they covered both the Wytheville and the Wyoming road. They had artillery on both tianks, and could only be reached over open and exposed ground. We recovered our headquarters tents, standing as we had left them. We had captured a few prisoners and learned that Marshall and Williams were both before us. Whilst pushing them back, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Blessingh with the ten companies of Moor's brigade approached on the Wytheville road and attacked; but the enemy was aware of their approach and repulsed them, having placed a detachment in a very strong position to meet them. Von Blessingh withdrew his men, and later joined the command by a considerable detour. With less than two regiments in hand, and with the certainty of the enemy's great superiority, there was nothing for it but to take the best position we could and await Scammon 's arrival. We made as strong a show of force THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT 215 as possible, and by skirmishing advances tempted the enemy to come down to attack ; but he also was expect- ing reinforcements, and a little artillery firing was the only response we provoked.^ As some evidence of the physical exhaustion from the continuous exertions of the preceding day and night, I may mention the fact that during the artillery firing I threw myself for a little rest on the ground, close beside the guns; and though these were firing at frequent intervals, I fell asleep and had a short but refreshing nap almost within arm's length of the wheels of a gun-carriage. Toward evening Scammon arrived with his brigade, reporting that Heth's force had followed his retiring movement as far as French's, ?nd confirming the infor- mation that four brigades of the enemy were before us. Shortly after dark the officer of the day, on the right, re- ported the noise of artillery marching around that flank. Our last day's rations had been issued, and our animals were without forage. Small parties of the enemy had gone far to our rear and cut the telegraph, so that we had had no news from the Kanawha valley for two days. The interruption was likely to create disturbance there and derange all our plans for supply. It was plain that we should have to be content with having foiled the enemy's plan to inflict a severe blow upon us, and that we might congratulate ourselves that with two brigades against four we had regained our line without .serious loss. I therefore ordered that the troops be allowed to rest till three o'clock in the morning of the i8th, and that the column then retire behind the Blue-stone River. The movement was made without interruption, and a camp on Flat-top Mountain was selected, from which the roads on every side were well guarded, and which was almost impregnable in itself.* Our casualties of all kinds in the affairs about Princeton had been only 113, * O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 506, 507. ' Id., pt. iii. p. 209. 2l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR as the enemy had not delivered any serious attack, and the contest on our side had been one of manoeuvre in which our only chance of important results was in attack- ing cither Heth or Marshall when they were so far sepa- rated that they could not unite against us on the field of battle. After the 15th this chance did not exist, and wisdom dictated that we should retire to a safe point from which we could watch for contingencies which might give us a better opportunity. Our experience proved what I have before stated, that the facility for railway concentration of the enemy in our front made this line a useless one for aggressive movements, as they could always concentrate a superior force after they re- ceived the news of our being in motion. It also showed the error of dividing my forces on two lines, for had Crook's brigade been with me, or my two brigades with him, we should have felt strong enough to cope with the force which was actually in our front, and would at least have made it necessary for the enemy to detach still more troops from other movements to meet us. Our cam- paign, though a little one, very well illustrates the char- acter of the subordinate movements so often attempted during the war, and shows that the same principles of strategy are found operating as in great movements. The scale is a reduced one, but cause and effect are linked by the same necessity as on a broader theatre of warfare. CHAPTER XI POPE IN COMMAND — TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON A key position — Crook's engagement at Lewisburg — Watching and scout- ing — Mountain work — Pope in command — Consolidation of Dgpart- ments — Suggestions of our transfer to the East — Pope's Order No. 1 1 and Address to the Army — Orders to march across the mountains — Discussion of them — Changed to route by water and rail — Ninety-mile march — Logistics — Arriving in Washington — Two regiments reach Pope — Two sent to Manassas — Jackson captures Manassas — Railway broken — McClellan at Alexandria — Engagement at Hull Run Bridge — Ordered to Upton's Hill — Covering Washington— Listening to the Bull Run battle — 111 news travels fast. OUR retreat to Flat-top Mountain had been made without loss of material, except one baggage- wagon, which broke down irreparably, and was burned by my order. At the crossing of Blue-stone River we were beyond the junction of roads by which our flank could be turned, and we halted there as the end of the first march. As the men forded the stream, the sun broke through the clouds, which had been pretty stead- ily raining upon us, the brass band with the leading brigade struck up the popular tune, "Are n't you glad to get out of the wilderness?" and the soldiers, quick to see the humorous application of any such incident, greeted it with cheers and laughter. All felt that we were again masters of the situation. Next day we moved leisurely to the mountain summit, a broad undulating table-land with some cultivated farms, where our camp was perfectly hidden from sight, whilst we commanded a most extensive view of the country in front. Outposts at the crossing of the Blue-stone and at Pack's Ferry on New River, with active scouting-parties and patrols 2l8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR scouring the country far and wide, kept me fully informed of everything occurring near us. We had time to organ- ize the new wagon-trains which were beginning to reach us, and, while waiting till Fremont could plan new co-operative movements, to prepare for our part in such work. The camp on Flat-top Mountain deserved the name of a "key point" to the country in front as well, perhaps, as that much abused phrase ever is deserved. ^ The nam j of the mountain indicates its character. The northern slope is gentle, so that the approach from Raleigh C. H. is not difficult, whilst the southern declivity falls off rapidly to the Blue-stone valley. The broad ridge at the summit is broke.i into rounded hills which covered the camp from view, whilst they still per "ted manoeuvre to meet any hostile approach. The mountam abutted on the gorge of the New River on the northeast, and stretched also southwestward into the impracticable wilderness about the headwaters of the Guyandotte and the Tug Fork of Sandy. The position was practically unassail- able in front by any force less than double our own, and whilst we occupied it the enemy never ventured in force beyond the passes of East River Mountain. We built a flying-bridge ferry at Pack's, on Nevv River, near the mouth of the Blue-stone, where a passable road up the valley of the Greenbrier connected us with Colonel Crook's position at Lewisburg. The post at Pack's Ferry was lield by a detachment from Scammon's brigade in command of Major Comly of the Twenty-third Ohio. On the 6th of August a detachment of the enemy con- sisting of three regiments and a section of artillery under Colonel Wharton made an effort to break up the 1 Clausewitz says of the phrases " covering poaition," " key of the coun- try," etc., that they are for the most part mere words without sense when t! ey indicate only the material advantage which is given by the elevation of the land. " On War," part ii. chap. xvii. POPE IN COMMAND 219 ferry by an attack from the east side, but they accom- plished nothing. Major Comly was quickly supported by reinforcements from Scammon's brigade, and drove off his assailants.^ I have not yet spoken of the movements of Colonel Crook's brigade on the Lewisburg route, because circum- stances so delayed his advance that it had no immediate relation to our movements upon Pearisburg and Prince- tun. As the march o" my own column was beginning. General Fremont, upon information of guerilla raids north of Summersville, directed that Crook be sent into Webster County to co-operate with troops sent south- ward from Weston to destroy the lawless parties. This involved a march of more than seventy miles each way, and unforeseen delays of various kinds. Two of the guerillas captured were tried and convicted of murder, and Colonel Crook was obliged to remain in that region to protect the administration of justice till the execution of the murderers and the dispersion of the guerilla bands.' The organization and movement of his brigade upon Lewisburg was by this means put back so far that his column could not get within supporting di.stance of mine. He reached Lewisburg on the day of our affair at Princeton. He had been energetic in all his movements, but the diversion of parts of his command to so distant an enterprise as that into Webster County had been fatal to co-operation. The Confederate General Heth had been able to neglect the Lewisburg route and to carry his brigade to the assistance of Marshall in his opposi- tion to my advance. As it turned out, I should have done better to have waited at Flat-top* Mountain till I knew that Crook was at Lewisburg, and then to have made a fresh combination of movements. Our experi- ence only added another to the numerous proofs the * O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 127 ; pt. iii. pp. 541, 54*. « / Id^ vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 629. THANSFER TO WASHINGTON 22/ Raleigh C. H. On the 15th we completed the rest of the sixty miles to Gauley Bridge. From that point j was able to telegraph General Meigs, the Quartermaster- General at Washington, that I should reach Parkersburg, the Ohio River terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, on the evening of the 20th, and should need railway transportation for 5000 men, two batteries of six guns each, 1 100 horses, 270 wagons, with camp equipage and regimental trains complete, according to the army regulations then in force. ^ At Gauley Bridge I met Colonel Lightburn, to whom I turned over the command of the district, and spent the time, whilst the troops were on the march, in complet- ing the arrangements both for our transportation and for the best disposition of the troops which were to remain. The movement of the division was the first in which there had been a carefully prepared effort to move a con- siderable body of troops with wagons and animals over a long distance within a definitely fixed time, and it was made the basis of the calculations for the movement of General Hooker and his two corps from Washington to Tennessee in the next year. It thus obtained some importance in the logistics of the war. The president of the railway put the matter unreservedly into the hands of W. P. Smith, the master of transportation ; Mr. P.. H. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, represented the army in the management of the transfer, and by thus concentrating responsibility and power, the business was simplified, and what was then regarded as a noteworthy success was secured. The command could have moved more rapidly, perhaps, without its wagons and animals, but a constant supply of these was needed for the eastern army, and it was wise to take them, for they were organ- ized into trains with drivers used to their teams and feeling a personal interest in them. It turned out that * O. R., vol. xii. pt iii. pp. 577, 619, 629; vol. li. p. 754. 228 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR our having them was a most fortunate thing, for not only were the troops of the Army of the Potomac greatly crippled for lack of transportation on their return from the peninsula, but we were able to give rations to the Ninth Army Corps after the battle of Antietam, when the transportation of the other divisions proved entirely insufficient to keep up the supply of food. From the head of navigation on the Kanawha to Parkers- burg on the Ohio was about one hundred and fifty miles; but the rivers were so low that the steamboats proceeded slowly, delayed by various obstacles and impediments. At Letart's Falls, on the Ohio, the water was a broken rapid, up which the boats had to be warped one at a time, by means of a heavy warp-line made fast to the bank and carried to the steam-capstan on the steamer. At the foot of Blennerhassett's Island there was only two feet of water in the channel, and the boats dragged themselves over the bottom by " sparring," a process some- what like an invalid's pushing his wheel-chair along by a pair of crutches. But everybody worked with a will, and on the 21st the advanced regiments were transferred to the railway cars at Parkersburg, according to pro- gramme, and pulled out for Washington.* These were the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Crook, and the Thirtieth Ohio, Colonel Ewing. They passed through Washing- ton to Alexandria, and thence, without stopping, to Warrenton, Virginia, where they reported at General Pope's headquarters. 2 The Eleventh Ohio (Lieutenant- Colonel Coleman) and Twelfth (Colonel White), with Colonel Scammon commanding brigade, left Parkersburg on the 22d, reaching Washington on the 24th. One of them passed on to Alexandria, but the other (Eleventh Ohio) was stopped in Washington by reason of a break in Long Bridge across the Potomac, and marched to 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 619, 629. 3 Id., pp. 636, 637, 668, 676. TKANSFER TO WASHINGTON 229 Alexandria the next day.* The last of the regiments (Twenty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Moor, and Twenty-third, Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes), with the artillery and cavalry followed, and on the 26th all the men had reached Wash- ington, though the wagons and animals were a day or two later in arriving.* In Washington I reported to the Secretary of War, and was received with a cordiality that went far to remove from my mind the impression I had got from others, that Mr. Stanton was abrupt and unpleasant to approach. Both on this occasion and later, he was as affable as could be expected of a man driven with incessant and importunate duties of state. In the intervals of my con- stant visits to the railway offices (for getting my troops and my wagons together was the absorbing duty) I found time for a hurried visit to Secretary Chase, and found also my friend Governor Dennison in the city, mediat- ing between the President and General McClellan with the gcjd-will and diplomatic wisdom which peculiarly marked his character. I had expected to go forward with three regiments to join General Pope on the even- ing of the 26th; but Colonel Haupt, the military superin- tendent of railways at Alexandria, was unable to furnish the transportation by reason of the detention of trains at the front.^ Lee's flank movement against Pope's army had begun, and as the latter retreated all the railway cars which could be procured were needed to move his stores back toward Washington. On the afternoon of the 26th, however, arrangements had been made for moving the regiments at Alexandria early next morning.* The wagons and animals were near at hand, and I ordered Colonel Moor with the Twenty-eighth Ohio to march with them to Manassas as soon as they should be un- loaded from the railway trains. But during the night * O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 650, 677. '■' Id., p. 698. ' / O. R., vol. zii. pt. ii p. 644. ' Member of Congress (1890), and recently Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio. TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON 233 stricken brigade were fruitless, and Scammon resisted the advance of Hill's division through nearly a whole day with the two regiments alciie. A Lieutenant Wright of the Fourth New Jersey, with ten men, re- ported to Colonel Scammon and begged assignment in the line. Their names are honorably enrolled in Scam- mon's report,* and these, with Captain Durham, did heroic service, but were all of the brigade that took any further part in the fight. Dunham succeeded in rallying a portion of the brigade later in the day, but too late to enter the engagement. Taking advantage of the bridges near the stream, Scammon kept his men covered from the artillery fire as well as possible, driving back with his volleys every effort to pass by the bridge or to ford the .stream in his front. Hill moved brigades considerably to right and left, and attempted to surround White and the Twelfth Ohio. But Coleman, with the Eleventh, had come up in support, and Scammon ordered him to charge on the enemy's right, which was passing White's left flank. Coleman did so in splendid style, driving his foe before him, and crossing the bridge to the west side. The odds, however, were far too great where a brigade could attack each regiment of ours and others pass be- yond them, so that Scammon, having fully developed the enemy's force, had to limit himself to delaying their advance, retiring his little command in echelon from one ridge to another, as his wings were threatened. This he did with perfect coolness and order, maintaining the unequal struggle without assistance till about half-past three in the afternoon. The enemy's efforts now re- laxed, and Scammon withdrew at leisure to a position some three miles from the bridge. Hill still showed a disposition to surround the detachment by manoeuvres, and Scamm'^n retired toward Annandale in the night. 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 407. 234 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR He himself underestimated the enemy's force in infan- try, which Jackson's report puts at "several brigjades."* His loss in the two Ohio regiments was io6 in killed, wounded, and missing.^ Those of the New Jersey bri- gade are not reported. The combat was a most instruc- tive military lesson, teaching what audacity and skill may do with a very small force in delaying and mystify- ing a much larger one, which was imposed upon by its firm front and its able handling. Some of Scammon's wounded being too badly hurt to be removed, he detailed a surgeon to remain with them and care for them till they should be exchanged or other- wise brought within our lines. This surgeon was taken to Jackson's headquarters, where he was questioned as to the troops which had held the Confederates at bay. Gen- eral J. E. B. Stuart was with Jackson, and on the sur- geon's stating that the fighting during most of the day had been by the two Ohio regiments alone, Stuart's racy expressions of admiration were doubly complimentary as coming from such an adversary, and, when repeated, were more prized by the officers and men than any praise from their own people. ^ Toward evening on Thursday, a thunderstorm and gale of wind came up, adding greatly to the wretched discom- fort of the troops for the moment, but making the air clearer and laying the dust for a day or two. I found partial shelter with my staff, on the veranda of a small house which was occupied by ladies of the families of some general officers of the Potomac Army, who had seized the passing opportunity to see their husbands in the interval of the campaign. We thought ourselves * O. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. p. 644. ' Id., p. 262. ' The history of this engagement was currently published with curious inaccuracies. Even Mr. Ropes in his " Campaign under Pope " does not seem to have seen the official reports on our side, and supposed that Taylor's brigade was all that was engaged. See O. R., vol. xii. pt. it pp. 405-411; also pt. iii. pp. 698, 699; also C. W., vol. i. pp. 379-382. TRAASFER TO WASHINGTON 235 fortunate in getting even the shelter of the veranda roof for the night. On Friday morning (29th), Captain Fitch, my quartermaster, was able to report his train and bag- gage safe at Alexandria, and we were ready for any ser- vice. Orders came from General McClellan during the forenoon to move the four regiments now with me into Soiltof BlIc* 12 3 Forts Ramsey and Buffalo, on Upton's and Munson's hills, covering Washington on the direct road to Cen- treville by Aqueduct Bridge, Ball's Cross-Roads, and Fairfax C. H.^ General McClellan had established his headquarters on Seminary Ridge beyond the northern outskirts of Alexandria, and after putting my command * O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 712, 726. For this he had Halleck's authority, i& Tiew of the danger of cavalry raids into the city. IJ., p. 722. 236 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR in motion I rode there to get fuller instructions from him as to the duty assigned me. His tents were pitched in a high airy situation looking toward the Potomac on the east; indeed he had found Sem a little too airy in the thunder-squall of the previous evening which had demolished part of the canvas village. It must have been about noon when I dismounted at his tent. The distant pounding of artillery had been in our ears as we rode. It was Pope's battle with Jackson along the turnpike between Bull Run and Gainesville and on the heights above Groveton, thirty miles away. General Franklin had ridden over from Annandale and was with McClellan receiving his parting directions under the imperative orders which Halleck had sent to push that corps out to Pope. McClellan 's words I was not likely to forget. "Go," he said, "and whatever may happen, don't allow it to be said that the Army of the Potomac failed to do its utmost for the country." McClellan then explained to me the importance of the position to which I was ordered. The heights were the outer line of defence of Washington on the west, which had been held at one time, a year before, by the Con- federates, who had an earthwork there, notorious for a while under the camp name of "Fort Skedaddle." From them the unfinished dome of the Capitol was to be seen, and the rebel flag had flaunted there, easily distin- guishable by the telescopes which were daily pointed at it from the city. McClellan had little expectation that Pope would escape defeat, and impressed upon me the necessity of being prepared to cover a perhaps disorderly retreat within the lines. Some heavy artillery troops (Fourth New York Heavy Artillery) were in garrison at one of the forts, and these with the forces at Falls Church were ordered to report to me.* Assuring me that he would soon visit me in my new quarters, McClellan ^ O. R., vol* ziL pt. iii. p. 726. TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON 237 dismissed me, and I galloped forward to overtake my troops. I found the position of the forts a most commanding one, overlooking the country in every direction. West- ward the ground sloped away from us toward Fairfax Court House and Centreville. Northward, in a pretty valley, lay the village of Falls Church, and beyond it a wooded ridge over which a turnpike road ran to Vienna and on to Leesburg. Behind us was the rolling country skirting the Potomac, and from Ball's Cross-Roads, a mile or two in rear, a northward road led to the chain- bridge above Georgetown, whilst the principal w^^ went directly to the city by the Aqueduct Bridge. Three knolls grouped so as to command these different direc- tions had been crowned with forts of strong profile. The largest of these. Fort Ramsey, on Upton's Hill was arrSed with twenty-pounder Parrott rifles, and the heavy- artillery troops occupied this work. I had a pair of guns of the same kind and calibre in my mixed battery, and these with my other field artillery were put in the other forts. Lines of infantry trench connected the works and extended right and left, and my four regiments occupied these. ^ A regiment of cavalry (Eighth Illinois, joined later by the Eighth Pennsylvania) was ordered to report to me, and this, with Schambeck's squadron which had come with me, made a cavalry camp in front of Falls Church and picketed and patrolled the front.^ We pitched our headquarters tents on Upton's Hill, just in rear of Fort Ramsey, and had a sense of luxury in "setting our house in order" after the uncomfortable experience of our long journey from West Virginia. The hurry of startling events in the past few days made our late campaign in the mountains seem as far away in time * O. R., vol. li. pt. i. pp. 777, 779; vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 176. ^ See my order assigning garrisons to the forts. O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 771. 238 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR as it was in space. We were now in the very centre of excitement, and had become a very small part of a great army. The isolation and the separate responsibility of the past few months seemed like another existence in- definitely far away. I lost no time in making a rapid ride about my position, studying its approaches in the gathering twilight and trying to fix in mind the leading features of the topography with their relation to the pos- sible retreat of our army and advance of the enemy. And all the while the rapid though muffled thumping of the distant cannon was in our ears, coming from the field in front of Groveton, where Lee, having now united his whole army against Pope, was sending part of Long- street's divisions against McDowell's corps along the Warrenton turnpike. On Saturday the 30th ambulances began coming through our lines with wounded men, and some on foot with an arm in a sling or bandages upon the head were wearily finding their way into the city. All such were systematically questioned, their information was collated and corrected, and reports were made to General Halleck and General McClellan.^ The general impression of all undoubtedly was that the engagement of Friday had been victorious for our army, and that the enemy was probably retreatir at dark. During the day the cannonade con- tinued with occasional lulls. It seemed more distant and fainter, requiring attentive listening to hear it. This was no doubt due to some change in the condition of the atmosphere; but we naturally interpreted it accord- ing to our wishes, and believed that the success of Friday was followed by the pursuit of the enemy. About four o'clock in the afternoon the distant firing became much more rapid; at times the separate shots could not be counted. I telegraphed to McClellan the fact which in- 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt, ii, p. 405; pt. iii. pp. 748, 789; vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 170: vol. Ii. pt. i. p. 777. TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON 239 dicated a crisis in the battle.* It was the fierce artillery duel which preceded the decisive advance of Longstreet against Pope's left wing. This was the decisive turning- point in the engagement, and Pope was forced to retreat upon Centreville. Early in the evening all doubt was removed about the result of the battle. Ill news travels fast, and the retreat toward us shortened the distance to be travelled. But as .Sumner's and Franklin's corps had gone forward and would report to Pope at Centreville, we were assured that Pope was " out of his scrape " (to use the words of McClellan's too famous dispatch to the President 2), and that the worst that could now happen would be the con- tinuance of the retreat within our lines. The combat at Chantilly on the evening of September ist was the last of Pope's long series of bloody engagements, and though the enemy was repulsed, the loss of Generals Kearny and Stevens made it seem to us like another disaster. ^ O. R., vol. xii. pt iii. p. 748. ' Id., vol. xL pt. i. p. 98. CHAPTER XII RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES — REORGANIZATION — HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES McClellan's visits to my position — Riding the lines — Discussing the past campaign — The withdrawal from the James — Prophecy — McClellan and the soldiers — He is in command of the defences — Intricacy of offi- cial relations — Reorganization begun — Pope's army marches through our works — Meeting of McClellan and Pope — Pope's characteristics — Undue depreciation of him — The situation when Halleck was made General-in-Chief — Pope's part in it — Reasons for dislike on the part of the Potomac Army — McClellan's secret service — Deceptive informa- tion of the enemy's force — Information from prisoners and citizens — Effects of McClellan's illusion as to Lee's strength — Halleck's pievious career — Did he intend to take command in the field ? — His abdication of the field command — The necessity for a union of forces in Virginia — McClellan's inaction was Lee's opportunity — Slow transfer of the Army of the Potomac — Haileck burdened with subordinate's work — Burnside twice declines the command — It is given to McClellan — Pope relieved — Other changes in organization — Consolidation — New campaign begun. ON Sunday, the 31st, McClellan rode over to Upton's Hill and spent most of the day with me. He brought me a copy of the McDowell map of the country about Washington, the compilation of which had been that officer's first work at the beginning of hostilities. It covered the region to and beyond the Bull Run battle- field, and although not wholly accurate, it was approxi- mately so, and was the only authority relied upon for topographical details of the region. McClellan's primary purpose was to instruct me as to the responsibilities that might fall upon me if the army should be driven in. A day or two later I received formal orders to prepare to destroy buildings in front within my lines of artillery RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES 24I fire, and to be ready to cover the retreat of our army should any part be driven back near my position.* All this, however, had been discussed with McClcllan him- self. We rode together over all the principal points in the neighborhood, and he pointed out their relation to each other and to positions on the map which we did not visit. The discussion of the topography led to reminis- cences of the preceding year, — of the manner in which the enemy had originally occupied these hills, and of their withdrawal from them, — of the subsequent con- struction of the forts and connecting lines, who occupied them all, and the system of mutual support, of telegraphic communication, and of plans for defence in case of attack. McClellan had received me at Alexandria on the 27th with all his old cordiality, and had put me at once upon our accustomed footing of personal friendship. On my part, there was naturally a little watchfulness not to overstep the proper line of subordination or to be in- quisitive about things he did not choose to confide to me; but, this being assumed, I found myself in a circle where he seemed to unbosom himself with freedom. I saw no interruption in this while I remained in the Poto- mac Army. He was, at this time, a little depressed in manner, feeling keenly his loss of power and command, but maintaining a quiet dignity that became him better than any show of carelessness would have done. He used no bitter or harsh language in criticising others. Pope and McDowell he plainly disliked, and rated them low as to capacity for command; but he spoke of them without discourtesy or vilification. I think it necessary to say this because of the curious sidelight thrown on his character by the private letters to his wife which have since been published in his "Own Story," and of which I shall have more to say. Their inconsistency with his expressions and manner in conversation, or at least their 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 802, 805. 242 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL IVAR great exaggeration of what he conveyed in familiar talk, has struck me very forcibly and unpleasantly. He discussed his campaign of the peninsula with ap- parent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing to do in that emergency was to reinforce his army there and make it strong enough to go on with its work and capture Richmond. He said that if the government had lost confidence in his ability to conduct the campaign to a successful end, still it was unwise to think of anything else except to strengthen that army and give it to some one they could trust. He added explicitly, " If Pope was the man they had faith in^ then Pope should have been sent to Harrison's Landing to take command, and how- ever bitter it would have been, I should have had no just reason to complain." He predicted that they would yet be put to the cost of much life and treasure to get back to the position left by him. On Monday, September ist, he visited me again, and we renewed our riding and our conversation. The road from his headquarters encampment near Alexandria to Upton's Hill was a pleasant one for his "constitutional " ride, and my position was nearest the army in front where news from it would most likely be first found. The Army of the Potomac had all passed to the front from Alexan- dria, and according to the letter of the orders issued, he was wholly without command; though Halleck person- ally directed him to exercise supervision over all detach- ments about the works and lines. He came almost alone on these visits, an aide and an orderly or two being his only escort. Colonel Colburn of his staff was usually his companion. He wore a blue flannel hunting-shirt quite different from the common army blouse. It was made with a broad yoke at the neck, and belt at the waist, the body in plaits. He was without sash or side arms, or any insignia of rank except inconspicuous shoul- RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES a43 der-straps. On this day he was going into Washington, and I rode down with him to the bridge. Bodies of troops of the new levies were encamped at different points near the river. In these there seemed to be always some veterans or officers who knew the general, and the men quickly gathered in groups and cheered him. He had a taking way of returning such salutations. He went be- yond the formal military salute, and gave his cap a little twirl, which with his bow and smile seemed to carry a little of personal good fellowship even to the humblest private soldier. If the cheer was repeated, he would turn in his saddle and repeat the salute. It was very plain that these little attentions to the troops took well, and had no doubt some influence in establishing a sort of comradeship between him and them. They were part of an attractive and winning deportment which adapted itself to all sorts and ranks of men. On Tuesday he came a little later in the day, and I noticed at once a change in his appearance. He wore his yellow sash with sword and belt buckled over it, and his face was animated as he greeted me with "Well, Gen- eral, I am in command again ! " I congratulated him with hearty earnestness, for I was personally rejoiced at it. I was really attached to him, believed him to be, on the whole, the most accomplished officer I knew, and was warmly disposed to give him loyal friendship and ser- vice. He told me of his cordial interview with Presi- dent Lincoln, and that the latter had said he believed him to be the only man who could bring organized shape out of the chaos in which everything seemed then to be. The form of his new assignment to duty was that he was to "have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defence of the capital."* The order was made by the personal direction of the President, and McClellan knew that Secretary Stanton » O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 807. 244 /lEAf/JV/SCEACES OF THE CIVIL WAR did not approve of it. General Hallcck seemed glad to be rid of a great responsibility, and accepted the Presi- dent's action with entire cordiality. Still, he was no doubt accurate in writing to Pope later that the action was that of the President alone without any advice from him.^ McClellan was evidently and entirely happy in his personal relation to things. He had not been re- lieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, though the troops had passed temporarily to Pope's army. As commandant of all within the defences, his own army reported to him directly when they came within our lines. Pope's army of northern Virginia would, of course, report through its commander, and Burnside's in a similar way. The first thing to be done was to get the army in good condition, to strengthen its corps by the new regiments which were swarming toward the capital, and to prepare it for a new campaign. McClellan seemed quite willing to postpone the question who would command when it took the field. Of the present he was sure. It was in his own hands, and the work of reorgani- zation was that in which his prestige was almost sure to increase. This attitude was plainly shown in all he said and in all he hinted at without fully saying it. Halleck had already directed Pope to bring the army within the fortifications, though the latter had vainly tried to induce him to ride out toward Centreville, to see the troops and have a consultation there before de- termining what to do.^ We were therefore expecting the head of column to approach my lines, and I arranged that we should be notified when they came near. McClellan had already determined to put the corps and divisions of the Army of the Potomac in the works, at positions sub- stantially the same as they had occupied a year before, — Porter near Chain Bridge, Sumner next, Franklin near Alexandria, etc. I was directed to continue in the posi- » O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. p. 820. « Id., p. 796. RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES »45 tion I already occupied, to be supported by part of McDowell's corps. About fDur o'clock McClellan rode forward, and I accompanied him. We halted at the brow of the hill looking down the Fairfax road. The head of the column was in sight, and rising dust showed its position far be- yond. Pope and McDowell, with the staff, rode at the head. Their uniform and that of all the party was cov- ered with dust, their beards were powdered with it; they looked worn and serious, but alert and self-possessed. When we met, after brief salutations, McClellan an- nounced that he had been ordered to assume command within the fortifications, and named to General Pope the positions the several corps would occupy. This done, both parties bowed, and the cavalcade moved on. King's division of McDowell's corps was the leading one. Gen- eral Hatch, the senior brigadier, being in command by reason of King's illness. Hatch was present, near Pope, when McClellan assumed command, and instantly turn- ing rode a few paces to the head of his column and shouted, "Boys, McClellan is in command again; three cheers!" The cheers were given with wild delight, and were taken up and passed toward the rear of the column. Warm friend of McClellan as I was, I felt my flesh cringe at the unnecessary affront to the unfortunate com- mander of that army. But no word was spoken. Pope lifted his hat in a parting salute to McClellan and rode quietly on with his escort.^ McClellan remained for a time, warmly greeted by the passing troops. He then left me, and rode off toward Vienna, northward. According to my recollection, Colo- ' General Hatch had been in command of the cavalry of Banks's corps up to the battle of Cedar Mountain, when he was relieved by Pope's order by reason of dissatisfaction with his handling of that arm of the service. His assignment to a brigade of infantry in King's division was such a reduc- tion of his prominence as an officer that it would not be strange if it chafed him. 246 REAf/N/SCK.yCES OF THE CIVIL W/iR iicl Colhurii was the only member of his staff with him; they had a small cavalry escort. My untlerstancUnj^ also was that they proposed to return by Chain liridj^e, avoid- ing the crowding of the road on which they had cume out, and on which McDowell's corps was now moving. In his "Own Story" McClcllan speaks of going in that direction to see the situation of Sumner's troops, sup- posed to be attacked, and intimates a neglect on I'ojMi's part of a duty in that direction. I am confident he is mistaken as to this, and that I have given the whole in- terview between him and Pope. The telegraphic connec- tion with my hcad(|uartcrs was such that he could learn the situation in front of any part of the line much more promptly there than by riding in person. Lee did not pursue, in fact, beyond l^'airfax C. 11. and Centreville, and nothing more than small bodies of cavalry were in our vicinity. I had kept scouting-partics of our own cavalry active in our front, and had also collects J news from other sources. On the ist of Sei)tcmber I had been able to send to army headquarters authentic information of the expectation of the Confederate army to move into Mary- land, and every day thereafter addetl to the evidence of that puqwsc, until they actually crossed the Potomac on the 5th. » Hatch's division was put into the lines on my left with orders to report to me in case of attack. I'atrick's bri- gade of that division was next day placed near l''alls Church in support of my cavalry, reporting directly to me. My two regiments which had been with jk* re- joined the division, and made it complete again. The night of the 2d was one in which I was on the alert all night, as it was probable the enemy would disturb us then if ever; but it passed quietly. A .skirmish in our front on the Vienna ro-id on the 4th was the oiily enliv- * O. R., vol. xii, pt. ii. pp. 404, 405 ( vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 170; vol. li. pt. L p. 777- REOKGANIXA J ION 247 cuing event till we bc^un the campaign o. South Moun- tain and Antietam on the 6th. Tope's proposed reorganization of his army,* which would have put me with most of Sigel's corps under Hooker, was prevented by a larger change which relieved him of command and consolidated his army with that of the I'otoniac on September 5lh.'** I had a very slight acquaintance with i'ope at the beginning of the war, but 110 opportunity of increasing it till he assumed command ill Virginia and 1 reported to iiim as a subordinate. The events just sketched had once more interfered with my expected association with him, and I did not meet him again till long afterward. Then I came to know him well. His wife and the wife of my intimate friend (icneral Force were sister.s, and in I-'orce's house we often met. He was then broken in health and softened by personal afllictions." llis reputation in 1861 was that of an able and energetic man, vehement and positive in character, apt to be choleric and even violent toward those who displeased him. I remember well that I shrunk a little from coming under his immediate orders through fear of some chafing, though I learned in the army that choleric commanders, if they have ability, are often warmly appreciative of those who serve them with soldierly spirit and faithfulness. No one who had any right to judge questioned Pope's ability or his zeal in the National cause. liis military career in the West had been a brilliant one. The necessity for uniting the col- umns in northern Virginia into one army was palpable; hut it was a delicate question to decide who should com- ' (). R., vol. xll. pt. ili. p. 810. • ///., p. «i V * Mrs. I'ope and Mrs. Force were dai^ihli-rji of tin- lion. V. H. Ilorton, of l*omvroy, Ohio, a public man of solid inllucnce and character, and prom* inunt in the development of the coal and salt industries of the Ohio valley. I leave the text us I wrote it some years l>efore (icneral Pope's death. Since he died, the friendship of our families has culminated in a mai riagu Ix-twecn our children. 248 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR mand them. It seems to have been assumed by Mr. Lin- coln that the commander must be a new man, — neither Fremont, McDowell, nor Banks. The reasons were prob- ably much the same as those which later brought Grant and Sheridan from the West. Pope's introduction to the Eastern army, which I have already mentioned, was an unfortunate one; but neither he nor any one else could have imagined the heat of par- tisan spirit or the lengths it would run. No personal vilification was too absurd to be credited, and no charac- terization was too ridiculous to be received as true to the life. It was assumed that he had pledged himself to take Richmond with an army of 40,000 men when McClellan had failed to do so with 100,000. His defeat by Lee was taken to prove him contemptible as a commander, by the very men who lauded McClellan for having escaped destruction from the same army. There was neither intelligence nor consistency in the vituperation with which he was covered ; but there was abundant proof that the wounded amour propre of the officers and men of the Potomac Army made them practically a unit in in- tense dislike and distrust of him. It may be that this condition of things destroyed his possibility of useful- ness at the East; but it would be asking too much of human nature (certainly too much of Pope's impetuous nature) to ask him to take meekly the office of scapegoat for the disastrous result of the whole campaign. His demand on Hallcck that he should publish the approval he had personally given to the several steps of the move- ments and combats from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly was just, but it was imprudent.* Halleck was irritated, and made more ready to sacrifice his subordinate. Mr. Lincoln was saddened and embarrassed; but being per- suaded that Pope's usefulness was spoiled, he swallowed his own pride and sense of justice, and turned again 1 O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 812, 821. REORGANIZATION 249 to McClellan as the resource in the emergency of the moment. Pope seems to mc entirely right in claiming that Jack- son's laid to Manassas was a thing which should have resulted in the destruction of that column. He seems to have kept his head, and to have prepared his combina- tions skilfully for making Jackson pay the penalty of his audacity. There were a few hours of apparent hesitation on August 28th, but champions of McClellan should be the last to urge that against him. His plans were deranged on that day by the accident of McDowell's absence from his own command. This happened through an excess of zeal on McDowell's part to find his commander and give him the benefit of his knowledge of the topography of the country; yet it proved a serious misfortune, and shows how perilous it is for any officer to be away from his troops, no matter for what reason. Many still think Porter's inaction on the 29th prevented the advantage over Jackson from becoming a victory.* But after all, when the army was united within our lines, the injuries it had inflicted on the enemy so nearly balanced those it had received that if Grant or Sherman had been in Halleck's place, Lee would never have crossed the Poto- mac into Maryland. McClellan, Pope, and Burnside would have commanded the centre and wings of the united and reinforced army, and under a competent head it would have marched back to the Rappahannock with scarcely a halt. That Halleck was in command was, in no small meas- ure, Pope's own work. He reminded Halleck of this in his letter of September 30th, written when he was chafing under the first effects of his removal.'* "If you desire," said he, "to know the personal obligation to which I refer, * I have treated this subject at large in "The Second Battle of Bull Run as connected with the Fitz-John Porter Case." • ^ O. R., vol. xii. pt. iii. pp. 816, etc. 250 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR I commend you to the President, the Secretary of War, or any other member of the administration. Any of these can satisfy your inquiries." This means that he had, before the President and the cabinet, advocated putting Halleck in supreme command over himself and McClellan to give unity to a campaign that would else be hopelessly broken down. McClellan was then at Harrison's Landing, be- lieving Lee's army to be 200,000 strong, and refusing to listen to any suggestion except that enormous reinforce- ments should be sent to him there. He had taught the Army of the Potomac to believe implicitly that the Con- federate army was more than twice as numerous as it was in fact. With this conviction it was natural that they should admire the generalship which had saved them from annihilation. They accepted with equal faith the lessons which came to them from headquarters teaching that the "radicals" at Washington were trying for politi- cal ends to destroy their general and them. In regard to the facts there were varying degrees of intelligence among officers and men; but there was a common opinion that they and he were willingly sacrificed, and that Pope, the radical, was to succeed him. This made them hate Pope, for the time, with holy hatred. If the army could at that time have compared authentic tables of strength of Lee's army and their own, the whole theory would have col- lapsed at once, and McClellan's reputation and popular- ity with it. They did not have the authentic tables, and fought for a year under the awful cloud created by a blundering spy-system. The fiction as to Lee's forces is the most remarkable in the history of modern wars. Whether McClelian was the victim or the accomplice of the inventions of his "secret service," we cannot tell. It is almost incredible that he should be deceived, except willingly. I confess to a contempt for all organizations of spies and detec- tives, which is the result of my military experience. REORGA NIZA TION 2 5 1 The only spies who long escape are those who work for both sides. They sell to each what it wants, and suit their wares to the demand. Pinkerton's man in the rebel commissariat at Yorktown who reported 119,000 rations issued daily, laughed well in his sleeve as he pocketed the secret service money.* A great deal of valuable information may be got from a hostile population, for few men or women know how to hold their tongues, though they try never so honestly. A friendly population overdoes its information, as a rule. I had an excellent example of this in the Kanawha valley. After I had first advanced to Gauley Bridge, the Seces- sionists behind me were busy sending to the enemy all they could learn of my force. We intercepted, among others, a letter from an intelligent woman who had tried hard to keep her attention upon the organization of my command as it passed her house. In counting my can- non, she had evidently taken the teams as the easiest units to count, and had set down every caisson as a gun, with the battery-forge thrown in for an extra one. In a similar way, every accidental break in the marching col- umn was counted as the head of a new regiment. She thus, in perfect good faith, doubled my force, and taught me that such information to the enemy did them more harm than good. As to the enemy's organization and numbers, the only information I ever found trustworthy is that got by con- tact with him. No day should pass without having some prisoners got by "feeling the lines." These, to secure treatment as regular prisoners of war, must always tell the company and regiment to which they belong. Rightly questioned, they rarely stop there, and it is not difficult to get the brigade, division, etc. The reaction from the dangers with which the imagination had in- vested capture, to the commonly good-humored hospi- ^ For Pinkerton's reports, see O. R., vol. xL pt. i. pp. 264-273. 252 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR tality of the captors, makes men garrulous of whom one would not expect it. General Pope's chief quartermas- ter, of the rank of colonel, was captured by Stuart's cav- alry in this very campaign ; and since the war I have read with amazement General Lee's letters to President Davis, to the Secretary of War at Richmond, and to General Loring in West Virginia, dated August 23d, in which he says:* "General Stuart reports that General Pope's chief quartermaster, who was captured last night, positively asserts that Cox's troops are being withdrawn by the way of Wheeling." Of course Lee suggests the importance of "pushing things" in the Kanawha valley. Stuart thus knew my movement on the day I left Parkersburg. Even when the captured person tells nothing he is bound to conceal, enough is necessarily known to enable a diligent provost-marshal to construct a reasonably complete roster of the enemy in a short time. In the Atlanta campaign I always carried a memorandum book in which I noted and corrected all the information of this sort which came to me, and by comparing this with others and with the lists at General Sherman's headquar- ters, there was no difficulty in keeping well up in the enemy's organization. It may therefore be said that every commanding officer ought to know the divisions and brigades of his enemy. The strength of a brigade is fairly estimated from the average of our own, for in people of similar race and education, the models of organization are essentially the same, and subject to the same causes of diminution during a campaign. Such considerations as these leave no escape from the conclu- sion that McClellan's estimates of Lee's army were abso- lutely destructive of all chances of success, and made it impossible for the President or for General Halleck to deal with the military problem before them. That he had continued this erroneous counting for more than a 1 0. R., vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 940-941. REORGANIZA TION 253 year, and through an active campaign in the field, de- stroyed every hope of correcting it. The reports of the peninsular campaign reveal, at times, the difficulty there was in keeping up the illusion. The known divisions in the Confederate army would not account for the numbers attributed to them, and so these divisions occasionally figure in our reports as "grand divisions."^ That the false estimate was unnecessary is proven by the fact that General Meigs, in Washington, on July 28th, made up an estimate from the regiments, brigades, etc., mentioned in the newspapers that got through the lines, which was reasonably accurate. But McClellan held Meigs for an enemy.* When I joined McClellan at Washington, I had no personal knowledge of either army except as I had learned it from the newspapers. My predilections in favor of McClellan made me assume that his facts were well based, as they ought to have been. I therefore accepted the general judgment of himself and his inti- mate friends as to his late campaign and Pope's, and believed that his restoration to command was an act of justice to him and of advantage to the country. I did not stay long enough with that army to apply any test of my own to the question of relative numbers, and have had to correct my opinions of the men and the cam- paigns by knowledge gained long afterward. I how- ever used whatever influence I had to combat the ideas 1 In his dispatch to Halleck on the morning after South Mountain (Sep- tember 15), D. H. HiU's division is called a corps. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 294. ^ General Meigs found ninety regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery designated by name in the " Confed- erate" newspaper reports of the seven days' battlrs. Comparing this with other information from similar sources, he concluded that Lee had about one hundred and fifty regiments. These, at 700 men each, would make 105,000, or at 400 (which he found a full average) the gross of the infantry would be 60,000. General Webb, with official documents before him, puts 't at 70,000 to 80,000. Does one need better evidence how much worse than useless; was McClellan's secret service ? See O. R., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 340. a54 KEM/NISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAH in McClellan's mind that the administration meant to do him any wrong, or had any end but the restoration of National unity in view. Whether Hallecic was appointed on Pope's urgent rec- ommendation or no, his campaign in the West was the ground of his promotion. The advance from the Ohio to Fort Donelson, to Nashville, to Shiloh, and to Corinth had been under his command, and he deservedly had credit for movements which had brought Kentucky and Tennessee within the Union lines. He had gone in per- son to the front after the battle of Shiloh, and though much just criticism had been made of his slow digging the way to Corinth by a species of siege operations, he had at any rate got there. Mr. Lincoln was willing to compromise upon a slow advance upon Richmond, pro- vided it were sure and steady. Halleck's age and stand- ing in the army were such that McClellan himself could find no fault with his appointment, if any one were to be put over him. Everything points to the expectation, at the time of his appointment, that Halleck would assume the per- sonal command in the field. He visited McClellan at Harrison's Landing on July 25th, however, and promised him that if the armies should be promptly reunited, he (McClellan) should command the whole, with Burnside and Pope as his subordinates.^ That he did not inform Pope of this abdication of his generalship in the field is plain from Pope's correspondence during the campaign. It is made indisputably clear by Pope's letter to him of the 25th of August.^ He probably did not tell the Presi- dent or Mr. Stanton of it. He seems to have waited for the union of the parts of the army, and when that came his prestige was forever gone, and he had become, what he remained to the close of the war, a bureau officer 1 McC. Own Story, p. 474; O. R., vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 360. 8 /(/,, vol. xii. pt. ii. pp. 65, 66. HALLECK AND HIS SUBORDINATES 255 in Washington. He had ordered the transfer of the Potomac Army from the James to Acquia Creek, intend- ing to unite it with Burnside's at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, and thus begin a fresh advance from the line of the Rappahannock.* He believed, and apparently with reason, that ten days was sufficient to complete this transfer with the means at McClellan's disposal, but at the end of ten days the movement had not yet begun.* He was right in thinking that the whole army should be united. McClellan thought the same. The question was where and how. McClellan said, " Send Pope's men to me." Halleck replied that it would not do to thus uncover Washington. McClellan had said that vigorous advance upon the enemy by his army and a victory would best protect the capital.* Again he was right, but he seemed incapable of a vigorous advance. Had he made it when he knew (on July 30) that Jackson had gone northward with thirty thousand men to resist Pope's advance, his army would not have been withdrawn.* He was then nearly twice as strong as Lee, but he did not venture even upon a forced reconnoissance. The situa- tion of the previous year was repeated. He was allowing himself to be besieged by a fraction of his own force. Grant would have put himself into the relation to McClellan which he sustained to Meade in 1864 and would have infused his own energy into the army. Halleck did not do this. It would seem that he had become conscious of his own lack of nerve in the actual presence of an enemy, and looked back upon his work at St. Louis in administering his department, whilst Grant and Buell took the field, with more satisfaction than upon his own advance from Shiloh to Corinth. He seemed * O. R., vol. xil. pt. \\. p. 5 ; vol. xl. pt. i, pp. 80-84 ; Id., pt. iii. p. 337. ' The order was given August 3; the movement began August 14. Id., pt. i. pp. 80, 89. * /(/., vol. xii. pt ii. pp. 9, la * /taft' duty, especially with Burnside, whose confidence in him was complete, and who would leave to him almost untrammelled control of the administrative work of the command. On September 7th I was ordered to take the advance of the Ninth Corps in the march to Leesboro, following Hooker's corps. It was my first march with troops of this army, and I was shocked at the straggling I wit- nessed. The "roadside brigade," as we called it, was often as numerous, by careful estimate, as our own column moving in the middle of the road. I could say of the men of the Kanawha division, as Richard Taylor said of his Louisiana brigade with Stonewall Jackson, that they had not yet learned to straggle.^ I tried to prevent their learning it. We had a roll-call immediately upon halt- ing after the march, and another half an hour later, with prompt reports of the result. I also assigned a field officer and medical officer to duty at the rear of the column, with ambulances for those who became ill and with punishments for the rest. The result was that, in spite of the example of others, the division had no strag- glers, the first roll-call rarely showing more than twenty or thirty not answering to their names, and the second often proving every man to be present. ^ In both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia the evil had become a most serious one. After the battle of Antietam, for the express purpose of remedying it, McClellan appointed General Patrick ProA'ost-Marshal with a strong provost-guard, giving him very extended powers, and permitting nobody, of whatever rank, to interfere with him. Patrick was a man of vigor, of * See Taylor's " Destruction and Reconstruction," p. 50, for a curious interview with Jackson. * See letters of General R. B. Hayes and General George Crook, Appendix B. 1 266 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR conscience, and of system, and though he was greatly desirous of keeping a field command, proved so useful, indeed so necessary a part of the organization, that he was retained in it against his wishes, to the end of the war, each commander of the Army of the Potomac in turn finding that he was indispensable. ^ The Confederate army suffered from straggling quite as much, perhaps, as ours, but in a somewhat different way. At the close of the Antietam campaign General Lee made bitter complaints in regard to it, and asked the Confederate government for legislation which would authorize him to apply the severest punishments. As the Confederate stragglers were generally in the midst of friends, where they could sleep under shelter and get food of better quality than the army ration, this grew to be the regular mode of life with many even of those who would join their comrades in an engagement. They were not reported in the return of ** effectives " made by their officers, but that they often made part of the killed, wounded, and captured I have little doubt. In this way a rational explanation may be found of the larger dis- crepancies between the Confederate reports of casualties and ours of their dead buried and prisoners taken. The weather during this brief campaign was as lovely as possible, and the contrast between the rich farming country in which we now were, and the forest -covered mountains of West Virginia to which we had been ac- customed, was very striking. An evening march, under a brilliant moon, over a park-like landscape with alterna- tions of groves and meadows which could not have been more beautifully composed by a master artist, remains in my memory as a page out of a lovely romance. On the day that we marched to Leesboro, Lee's army was concentrated near Frederick, behind the Monocacy * I have discussed this subject also in a review of Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, "The Nation," Nov. 24, 1898, p. 396. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 267 River, having begun the crossing of the Potomac on the 4th. There was a singular dearth of trustworthy infor- mation on the subject at our army headquarters. We moved forward by very short marches of six or eight miles, feeling our way so cautiously that Lee's reports speak of it as an unexpectedly slow approach. The Comte de Paris excuses it on the ground of the dis- organized condition of McClellan's army after the recent battle. It must be remembered, however, that Sumner's corps and Franklin's had not been at the second Bull Run, and were veterans of the Potomac Army. The Twelfth Corps had been Banks's, and it too had not been engaged at the second Bull Run, its work having been to cover the trains of Pope's army on the retrograde movement from Warrenton Junction. Although new regiments had been added to these corps, it is hardly proper to say that the army as a whole was not one which could be rapidly manoeuvred. I see no good reason why it might not have advanced at once to the left bank of the Monocacy, covering thus both Washington and Baltimore, and hastening by some days Lee's movement across the Blue Ridge. We should at least have known where the enemy was by being in contact with him, instead of being the sport of all sorts of vague rumors and wild reports.^ The Kanawha division took the advance of the right wing when we left Leesboro on the 8th, and marched to Brookville. On the 9th it reached Goshen, where it lay on the loth, and on the nth reached Ridgeville on the railroad. The rest of the Ninth Corps was an easy march behind us. Hooker had been ordered further to the right on the strength of rumo's that Lee was making a circuit towards Baltimore, ard his corps reached Cooks- ^ McClellan was not wholly responsible for this tardiness, for Halleck was very timid about uncovering Washington, and his dispatches tended to increase McClellan's natural indecision. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 280. 268 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ville and the railroad some ten miles east of my position. The extreme left of the army was at Poolesvillc, near the Potomac, making a spread of thirty miles across the whole front. The cavalry did not succeed in getting far in advance of the infantry, and very little valuable infor- mation was obtained. At Ridgeville, however, we got reliable evidence that Lee had evacuated Frederick the day before, and that only cavalry was east of the Catoctin Mountains, Hooker got similar information at about the same time. It was now determined to move more rapidly, and early in the morning of the I2th I was ordered to march to New Market and thence to Frederick. At New Market I was overtaken by General Reno, with several officers of rank from the other divisions of the corps, and they dismounted at a little tavern by the road- side to see the Kanawha division go by. Up to this time they had seen nothing of us whatever. The men had been so long in the West Virginia mountains at hard service, involving long and rapid marches, that they had much the same strength of legs and ease in marching which was afterward so much talked of when seen in Sherman's army at the review in Washington at the close of the war. I stood a little behind Reno and the rest, and had the pleasure of hearing their involun- tary exclamations of admiration at the marching of the men. The easy swinging step, the graceful poise of the musket on the shoulder, as if it were a toy and not a burden, and the compactness of the column were all noticed and praised with a heartiness which was very grateful to my ears. I no longer felt any doubt that the division stood well in the opinion of my associates. I enjoyed this the more because, the evening before, a little incident had occurred which had threatened to result in some ill-feeling. It had been thought that we were likely to be attacked at Ridgeville, and on reaching the village I disposed the division so as to cover the SOUTH MOUNTAIN 269 place and to be ready for an engagement. I ordered the brigades to bivouac in line of battle, covering the front with outposts and with cavalry vedettes from the Sixth New York Cavalry (Colonel Dcvin), which had been attached to the division during the advance. The men were without tents, and to make beds had helped them- selves to some straw from stacks in the vicinity. Toward evening General Reno rode up, and happening fir.t to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, command- ing the Twenty third Ohio, he rather sharply inquired why the troops were not bivouacking "closed in mass," and also blamed the taking of the straw. Colonel Hayes referred him to me as the proper person to account for the disposition of the troops, and quietly said he thought the quartermaster's department could settle for the straw if the owner was loyal. A few minutes later the general came to my own position, but was now quite over his irritation. I, of course, knew nothing of his interview with Hayes, and when he said that it was the policy in Maryland to make the troops bivouac in compact mass, so as to do as little damage to property as possible, I cordially assented, but urged that such a rule would not apply to the advance-guard when supposed to be in pres- ence of the enemy ; we needed to have the men already in line if an alarm should be given in the night. To this he agreed, and a pleasant conversation followed. Nothing was said to me about the straw taken for bed- ding, and when I heard of the little passage-at-arms with Colonel Hayes, I saw that it was a momentary dis- turbance which had no real significance. Camp gossip, however, is as bad as village gossip, and in a fine volume of the "History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regi- ment," I find it stated that the Kanawha division coming fresh from the West was disposed to plunder and pillage, giving an exaggerated version of the foregoing story as evidence of it. This makes it a duty to tell what was 2/0 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the small foundation for the charge, and to say that I believe no regiments in the army were less obnoxious to any just accusation of such a sort. The gossip would never have survived the war at all but for the fact that Colonel Hayes became President of the United States, and the supposed incident of his army life thus acquired a new interest.^ 1 This incident gives me the opportunity to say that after reading a good many regimental histories, I am struck with the fact that with the really invaluable material they contain when giving the actual experiences of the regiments themselves, they also embody a great deal of mere gossip. As a rule, their value is confined to what strictly belongs to the regiment; and the criticisms, whether of other organizations or of commanders, are likely to be the expression of the local and temporary prejudices and misconcep- tions which are notoriously current in time of war. They need to be read with due allowance for this. The volume referred to is a favorable example of its class, but its references to the Kana.vha division (which was in the Ninth Corps only a month) illustrate the tendency I have mentioned. It should be borne in mind that the Kanawha men had the position of advance- guard, and I believe did not camp in the neighborhood of the other divisions in a single instance from the time we left Leesboro till the battle of South Mountain. What is said of them, therefore, is not from observation. The incident between Reno and Hayes occurred in the camp of the latter, and could not possibly be known to the author of the regimental history but by hearsay. Yet he affirms as a fact that the Kanawha division " plundered the country unmercifully," for which Reno " took Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes severely though justly to task." He also asserts that the division set a " very bad example " in straggling. As to this, the truth is as I have circumstantially stated it above. He has still further indulged in a "slant" at the " Ohio- ans " in a story of dead Confederates being put in a well at South Mountain, — a story as apocryphal as the others. Wise's house and well were within the camp of the division to which the Twenty-first Massachusetts belonged, and the burial party there would have been from that division. Lastly, the writer says that General Cox, the temporary corps commander, " robs us [the Twenty-first Massachusetts] of our dearly bought fame " by naming the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania as the regiments which stormed the bridge at Antietam. He acquits Burnside and McClellan of the alleged injustice, saying they " follow the corps report in this respect." Yet mention is not made of the fact that my report literally copies that of the division commander, who himself selected the regiments for the charge 1 The " Ohioan " had soon gone west again with his division, and was probably fair game. There is something akin to provincialism in regimental tiprit de corps, and such instances as the above, which are all found within a few pages of the book referred to, show that, like Leech's famous Staffordshire SOUTH MOUNTAIN 27 1 From New Market we sent the regiment of cavalry off to the right to cover our flank, and to investigate reports that heavy bodies of the enemy's cavalry were north of us. The infantry pushed rapidly toward Frederick. The opposition was very slight till we reached the Monocacy River, which is perhaps half a mile from the town. Here General Wade Hampton, with his brigade as rear- guard of Lee's army, attempted to resist the crossing. The highway crosses the river by a substantial stone bridge, and the ground upon our bank was considerably higher than that on the other side. We engaged the artillery of the enemy with a battery of our own, which had the advantage of position, whilst the infantry forced the crossing both by the bridge and by a ford a quarter of a mile to the right. As soon as Moor's brigade was over, it was deployed on the right and left of the turn- pike, which was bordered on either side by a high and strong post-and-rail fence. Scammon's was soon over, and similarly deployed as a second line, with the Eleventh Ohio in column in the road. Moor had with him a troop of horse and a single cannon, and went for- ward with the first line, allowing it to keep abreast of him on right and left. I also rode on the turnpike between the two lines, and only a few rods behind Moor, having with me my staff and a few orderlies. Reno was upon the other bank of the river, overlooking the move- ment, which made a fine military display as the lines advanced at quick-step toward the city. Hampton's horsemen had passed out of our sight, for the straight causeway turned sharply to the left just as it entered the town, and we could not see beyond the turn. We were perhaps a quarter of a mile from the city, when a young staff officer from corps headquarters rode up beside me rough in the Punch cartoon, to be a " stranger " is a sufficient reason to " 'eave 'arf a brick at un." See letters of President Hayes and General Crook on the subject, Appendix B. 2/2 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR and exclaimed in a boisterous way, "Why don't they go in faster? There's nothing there! " I said to the young man, " Did General Reno send you with any order to me?" "No," he replied. "Then," said I, "when I want your advice I will aslc it." He moved off abashed, and I did not notice what had become of him, but, in fact, he rode up to Colonel Moor, and repeated a similar speech. Moor was stung by the impertinence which he assumed to be a criticism upon him from corps head- quarters, and, to my amazement, I saw him suddenly dash ahead at a gallop with his escort and the gun. He soon came to the turn of the road where it loses itself among the houses ; there was a quick, sharp rattling of carbines, and Hampton's cavalry was atop of the little party. There was one discharge of the cannon, and some of the brigade staff and escort came back in dis- order. I ordered up at " double quick " the Eleventh Ohio, which, as I have said, was in column in the road, and these, with bayonets fixed, dashed into the town. The enemy had not waited for them, but retreated out of the place by the Hagerstown road. Moor had been ridden down, unhorsed, and captured. The artillery-men had unlimbered the gun, pointed it, and the gunner stood with the lanyard in his hand, when he was struck by a charging horse; the gun was fired by the concussion, but at the same moment it was capsized into the ditch by the impact of the cavalry column. The enemy had no time to right the gun or carry it off, nor to stop for prisoners. They forced Moor on another horse, and turned tail as the charging lines of infantry came up on right and left as well as the column in the road, for there had not been a moment's pause in the advance. It had all happened, and the gun with a few dead and wounded of both sides were in our hands, in less time than it has taken to describe it. Those who may have a fancy for learning how Munchausen would tell this story, may find it in the SOUTH MOUNTAIN 2/3 narrative of Major Heros von Borke of J. E. B. Stuart's staff.^ Moor's capture, however, had consequences, as we shall see. The command of his brigade passed to Colonel George Crook of the Thirty-sixth Ohio. Frederick was a loyal city, and as Hampton's cavalry went out at one end of the street and our infantry came in at the other, and whilst the carbine smoke and the smell of powder still lingered, the closed window-shut- ters of the houses flew open, the sashes went up, the windows were filled with ladies waving their handker- chiefs and national flags, whilst the men came to the column with fruits and refreshments for the marching soldiers as they went by in the hot sunshine of the Sep- tember afternoon. 2 Pleasonton's cavalry came in soon 1 Von Borke's account is so good an example of the way in which romance may be built up out of a little fact that I give it in full. The burning of the stone bridge half a mile in rear of the little affair was a peculiarly brilliant idea ; but he has evidently confused our advance with that on the Urbana road. He says ; " Toward evening the enemy arrived in the immediate neighborhood of Monocacy bridge, and observing only a small force at this point, advanced very carelessly. A six-pounder gun had been placed in position by them at a very short distance from the bridge, which fired from time to time a shot at our horsemen, while the foremost regiment marched along at their ease, as if they believed this small body of cavalry would soon wheel in flight. This favorable moment for an attack was seized in splendid style by Major Butler, who commanded the two squadrons of the Second South Carolina Cavalry, stationed at this point as our rear-guard. Like lightning he darted across the bridge, taking the piece of artillery, which had scarcely an opportunity of tiring a shot, and falling upon the regiment of infantry, which was dispersed in a few seconds, many of them being shot down, and many others, among whom was the colonel in command, captured. The colors of the regiment also fell into Major Butler's hands. The piece of artillery, in the hurry of the moment, could not be brought over to our side of the river, as the enemy instantly sent forward a large body of cavalry at a gallop, and our dashing men had only time to spike it and trot with their prisoners across the bridge, which, having been already fully prepared for burning, was in a blaze when the infuriated Yankees arrived at the water's edge. The conflagration of the bridge of course checked their onward movement, and we quietly continued the retreat." Von Borke, vol. i. p. 203. Stuart's report is very nearly accurate : 0. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 816. '^ Although at the head of the column, the "truth of history " compels VOL. I. — 18 274 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR after by the Urbana road, and during the evening a large part of the army drew near the place. Next morning (13th) the cavalry went forward to reconnoitre the passes of Catoctin Mountain, Rodman's division of our corps being ordered to support them and to proceed toward Middletown in the Catoctin valley. Through some mis- understanding Rodman took the road to Jefferson, lead- ing to the left, where Franklin's corps was moving, and did not get upon the Hagerstown road. About noon I was ordered to march upon the latter road to Middletown. McClellan himself met me as my column moved out of town, and told me of the misunderstanding in Rodman's orders, adding that if I found him on the march I should take his division also along with me.^ I did not meet him, but the other two divisions of the corps crossed Catoctin Mountain that night, whilst Rodman returned to Frederick. The Kanawha division made an easy march, and as the cavalry was now ahead of us, met no opposition in crossing Catoctin Mountain or in tf e valley beyond. On the way we passed a house belonging to a branch of the Washington family, and a few officers of the division accompanied me, at the invitation of the occupant, to look at some relics of the Father of his Country which were preserved there. We stood for some minutes with uncovered heads before a case containing a uniform he had worn, and other articles of personal use hallowed by their association with him, and went on our way with our zeal strengthened by closer contact with me to say that I saw nothing of Barbara Frietchie, and heard nothing of her till I read Whittier's poem in later years. When, however, I visited Frederick with General Grant in 1869, we were both presented with walking- sticks made from timbers of Barbara's house which had been torn down, and, of course, I cannot dispute the story of which I have the stick as evidence; for Grant thought the stick shut me up from any denial and established the legend. 1 As is usual in such cases, the direction was later put in writing by his chief of staff. O. R., vol. li. pt. i. p. 827. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 275 souvenirs of the great patriot. Willcox's division fol- lowed us, and encamped a mile and a half east of Middle- town. Sturgis's halted not far from the western foot of the mountain, with corps headquarters near by. My own camp for the night was pitched in front (west) of the vil- lage of Middletown along Catoctin Creek. Pleasonton's cavalry was a little in advance of us, at the forks of the road where the old Sharpsburg road turns off to the left from the turnpike. The rest of the army was camped about Frederick, except Franklin's corps (Sixth), which was near Jefferson, ten miles further south but also east of Catoctin Mountain. The Catoctin or Middletown valley is beautifully in- cluded between Catoctin Mountain and South Mountain, two ranges of the Blue Ridge, running northeast and southwest. It is six or eight miles wide, watered by Catoctin Creek, which winds southward among rich farms and enters the Potomac near Point of Rocks. The Na- tional road leaving Frederick passes through Middletown and crosses South Mountain, as it goes northwestward, at a depression called Turner's Gap. The old Sharps- burg road crosses the summit at another gap, known as Fox's, about a mile south of Turner's. Still another, the old Hagerstown road, finds a passage over the ridge at about an equal distance north. The National road, be- ing of easier grades and better engineering, was now the principal route, the others having degenerated to rough country roads. The mountain crests are from ten to thirteen hundred feet above the Catoctin valley, and the "gaps" are from two to three hundred feet lower than the summits near them.^ These summits are like scat- tered and irregular hills upon the high rounded surface of the mountain top. They are wooded, but along the southeasterly slopes, quite near the top of the mountain, are small farms, with meadows and cultivated fields. * These elevations axe from the official map of the U. S. Engineers. 276 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR The military situation had been cleared up by the knowledge of Lee's movements which McClellan got from a copy of Lee's order of the day for the loth. Ihis had been found at Frederick on the 13th, and it tallied so well with what was otherwise known that no doubt was left as to its authenticity. It showed that Jackson's corps with Walker's division were besieging Harper's Ferry on the Virginia side of the Potomac, whilst McLaws's division supported by Anderson's was co-operating on Maryland Heights.^ Longstreet, with the remainder of his corps, was at Boonsboro or near Hagerstown. D. H. Hill's division was the rear-guard, and the cavalry under Stuart covered the whole, a de- tached squadron being with Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws each. The order did not name the three sepa- rate divisions in Jackson's command proper (exclusive of Walker), nor those remaining with Longstreet except D. H. Hill's; but it is hardly conceivable that these were not known to McCleilan after his own and Pope's contact with them during the campaigns of the spring and summer. At any rate, the order showed that Lee's army was in tv;'<, parts, separated by the Potomac and thirty or forty mik"? of road. As "oon as Jackson should reduce Harper's Ferry they would reunite. Friday the 1 2th was the day fixed for the concentration of Jackson's force for his attack, and it was Saturday when the order fell into McClellan's hands. Three days had already been lost in the slow advance since Lee had crossed Catoctin Mountain, and Jackson s artillery was now heard pounding at the camp and earthv/orks of Harper's Ferry. McLaws had already driven our forces from Maryland Heights, and had opened upon the ferry with his guns in commanding position on the north of the Potomac.'^ McClellan telegraphed to the President that he would catch the rebels " in their own trap if my men 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 281, 603. * /^.^ p, 607. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 2.T7 are equal to the emergency."^ There was certainly no time to lose. The information was in his hands before noon, for he refers to it in a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln at twelve. If his men had been ordered to be at the top of South Mountain before dark, they could have been there; but less than one full corps passed Catoctin Mountain that day or night, and when the leisurely movement of the 14th began, he himself, instead of being with the advance, was in Frederick till after 2 P.M., at which hour he sent a dispatch to Washington, and then rode to the front ten or twelve miles away. The failure to be " equal to the emergency " was not in his men. Twenty-four hours, as it turned out, was the whole difference between saving and losing Harper's Ferry with its ten or twelve thousand men and its unes- timated munitions and stores. It may be that the com- manders of the garrison were in fault, and that a more stubborn resistance should have been made. It may be that Halleck ought to have ordered the place to be evac- uated earlier, as McClellan suggested. Nevertheless, at noon of the 13th McClellan had it in his power to save the place and interpose his army between the two wings of the Confederates with decisive effect on the campaign. He saw that it was an "emergency," but did not call upon his men for any extraordinary exertion. Harper's Ferry surrendered, and Lee united the wings of his army beyond the Antietam before the final and general engagement was forced upon him. At my camp in front of Middletown, I received no orders looking to a general advance on the 14th ; but only to support, by a detachment, Pleasonton's cavalry in a reconnoissance toward Turner's Gap. Pleasonton himself came to my tent in the evening, and asked that one brigade might report to him in the morning for the purpose. Six o'clock was the hour at which he wished 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 281. 278 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR them to march. He said further that he and Colonel Crook were old army acquaintances and that he would like Crook to have the detail. I wished to please him, and not h inking that it would make any difference to my brigade commanders, intimated that I would do so. But Colonel Scammon, learning what was intended, protested that under our custom his brigade was '^ntitled to the advance next day, as the brigades had taken it in turn. I explained that it was only as a courtesy to Pleasonton and at his request that the change was proposed. This did not better the matter in Scammon's opinion. He had been himself a regular officer, and the point of pro- fessional honor touched him. I recognized the justice of his demand, and said he should have the duty if he in- sisted upon it. Pleasonton was still in the camp visiting with Colonel Crook, and I explained to him the reasons why I could not yield to his wish, but must assign Scam- mon's brigade to the duty in conformity with the usual course. There was in fact no reason except the personal one for choosing one brigade more than the other, for they were equally good. Crook took the decision in good part, though it was natural that he should wish for an opportunity of distinguished service, as he had not been the regular commandant of the brigade. Pleason- ton was a little chafed, and even intimated that he claimed some right to name the officer and command to be detailed. This, of course, I could not admit, and issued the formal orders at once. The little controversy had put Scammon and his whole brigade upon their mettle, and was a case in which a generous emulation did no harm. What happened in the morning only in- creased their spirit and prepared them the better to per- form what I have always regarded as a very brilliant exploit. The morning of Sunday the 14th of September was a bright one. I had my breakfast very early and was in SOUTH MOUNTAIN 279 the saddle before it was time for Scammon to move. He was prompt, and I rode on with him to see in what way his support was likely to be used. Two of the Ninth Corps batteries (Gibson's and Benjamin's) had accompanied the cavalry, and one of these was a heavy one of twenty -pounder Parrotts. They were placed upon 280 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR a knoll a little in front of the cavalry camp, about half a mile beyond the forks of the old Sharpsburg road with the turnpike. They were exchanging shots with a battery of the enemy well up in the gap. Just as Scammon and I crossed Catoctin Creek I was surprised to see Colonel Moor standing at the roadside. With astonishment I rode to him and asked how he came there. He said that he had been taken beyond the mountain after his capture, but had been paroled the evening before, and was now finding his way back to us on foot. " But where are you going.'" said he. I answered that Scammon was going to support Pleasonton in a rcconnoissance into the gap. Moor made an involuntary start, saying, " My God ! be careful!" then checking himself, added, "But I am pa- roled ! " and turned away. I galloped to Scammon and told him that I should follow him in close support with Crook's brigade, and as I went back along the column I spoke to each regimental commander, warning them to be prepared for anything, big or little, — it might be a skirmish, it might be a battle. Hurrying to camp, I ordered Crook to turn out his brigade and march at once. I then wrote a dispatch to General Reno, saying I sus- pected we should find the enemy in force on the moun- tain top, and should go forward with both brigades instead of sending one. Starting a courier with this, I rode forward again and found Pleasonton. Scammon had given him an inkling of our suspicions, and in the per- sonal interview they had reached a mutual good under- standing. I found that he was convinced that it would be unwise to make an attack in front, and had deter- mined that his horsemen should merely demonstrate upon the main road and support the batteries, whilst Scammon should march by the old Sharpsburg road and try to reach the flank of the force on the summit. I told him that in view of my fear that the force of the enemy might be too great for Scammon, I had determined to bring SOUTH MOUNTAIN 281 forward Crook's brigade in support. If it became neces- sary to fight with the whole division, I should do so, and in that case I should assume the responsibility myself as his senior officer. To this he cordially assented. One section of McMullin's six-gun battery was all that went forward with Scammon (and even these not till the infantry reached the summit), four guns being left be- hind, as the road was rough and steep. There were in Simmonds's battery two twenty-pounder Parrott guns, and I ordered these also to remain on the turnpike and to go into action with Benjamin's battery of the same calibre. It was about half-past seven when Crook's head of column filed off from the turnpike upon the old Sharpsburg road, and Scammon had perhaps half an hour's start. We had fully two miles to go before we should reach the place where our attack was actually made, and as it was a pretty sharp ascent the men marched slowly with fre- quent rests. On our way up we were overtaken by my courier who had returned from General Reno with ap- proval of my action and the assurance that the rest of the Ninth Corps would come forward to my support. When Scammon had got within half a mile of Fox's Gap (the summit of the old Sharpsburg road),^ the enemy opened upon him with case-shot from the edge of the timber above the open fields, and he had judiciously turned off upon a country road leading still further to the left, and nearly parallel to the ridge above. His move- ment had been made under cover of the forest, and he had reached the extreme southern limit of the open fields south of the gap on this face of the mountain. Here I overtook him, his brigade being formed in line under cover of the timber, facing open pasture fields having a ^ The Sharpsburg road is also called the Braddock road, as it was the way by which Braddock and Washington had marched to Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg) in the old French war. For the same reason the gap is called Braddock's Gap. I have adopted that which seems to be in most common local use. > 282 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR stone wall along the upper side, with the forest again beyond this. On his left was the Twenty-third Ohio under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes, who had been directed to keep in the woods beyond the open, and to strike if possible the flank of the enemy. His centre was the Twelfth Ohio under Colonel Carr B. White, whose duty was to attack the stone wall in front, charg- ing over the broad open fields. On the right was the Thirtieth Ohio, Colonel Hugh Ewing, who was ordered to advance against a battery on the crest which kept up a rapid and annoying fire It was now about nine o'clock, and Crook's column had come into close support. Bay- onets were fixed, and at the word the line rushed forward with loud hurrahs. Hayes, being in the woods, was not seen till he had passed over the crest and turned upon the enemy's flank and rear. Here was a sharp combat, but our men established themselves upon the summit and drove the enemy before them. White and Ewing charged over the open under a destructive fire of musketry and shrapnel. As Ewing approached the enemy's battery (Bondurant's), it gave him a parting salvo, and limbered rapidly toward the right along a road in the edge of the woods which follows the summit to the turnpike near the Mountain House at Turner's Gap. White's men never flinched, and the North Carolinians of Garland's brigade (for it was they who held the ridge at this point) poured in their fire till the advancing line of bayonets was in their faces when they broke away from the wall. Our men fell fast, but they kept up their pace, and the enemy's centre was broken by a heroic charge. Gar- land strove hard to rally his men, but his brigade was hopelessly broken in two. He rallied his right wing on the second ridge a little in rear of that part of his line, but Hayes's regiment was here pushing forward from our left. Colonel Ruffin of the Thirteenth North Carolina held on to the ridge road beyond our right, near Fox's SOUTH MOUNTAm 283 Gap. The fighting was now wholly in the woods, and though the enemy's centre was routed there was stubborn resistance on both flanks. His cavalry dismounted (said to be under Colonel Rosser ') was found to extend beyond Hayes's line, and supported the Stuart artillery, which poured canister into our advancing troops. I now ordered Crook to send the Eleventh Ohio (under Lieu- tenant-Colonel Coleman) beyond Hayes's left to extend our line in that direction, and to direct the Thirty- sixth Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Clark) to fill a gap be- tween the Twelfth and Thirtieth caused by diverging lines of advance. The only remaining regiment (the Twenty-eighth, Lieutenant-Colonel Becker) was held in reserve on the right. The Thirty-sixth aided by the Twelfth repulsed a stout effort of the enemy to re-estab- lish their centre. The whole line again sprung forward. A high knoll on our left was carried. The dismounted cavalry was forced to retreat with their battery across the ravine in which the Sharpsburg road descends on the west of the mountain, and took a new position on a sepa- rate hill in rear of the heights at the Mountain House. There was considerable open ground at this new position, from which their battery had full play at a range of about twelve hundred yards upon the ridge held by us. But the Eleventh and Twenty-third stuck stoutly to the hill which Hayes had first carried, and their line was nearly parallel to the Sharpsburg road, facing north. Garland had rushed to the right of his brigade to rally them when they had broken before the onset of the Twenty-third Ohio upon the flank, and in the desperate contest there he had been killed and the disaster to his command made irreparable. On our side Colonel Hayes had also been disabled by a severe wound as he gallantly led the Ohio regiment. I now directed the centre and right to push forward 1 Stuart's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 817. 284 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR toward Fox's Gap. Lieutenant Croome with a section of McMullin's battery had come up, and he put his guns in action in the most gallant manner in the open ground near Wise's house. The Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth changed front to the right and attacked the remnant of Garland's brigade, now commanded by Colonel McRae, and drove it and two regiments from G. B. Anderson's brigade back upon the wooded hill beyond Wise's farm at Fox's Gap. The whole of Anderson's brigade retreated further along the crest toward the Mountain House. Meanwhile the Twelfth Ohio, also changing front, had thridded its way in the same direction through laurel thickets on the reverse slope of the mountain, and attacking suddenly the force at Wise's as the other two regiments charged it in front, completed the rout and brought off two hun- dred prisoners. Bondurant's battery was again driven hurriedly off to the north. But the hollow at the gap about Wise's was no place to stay. It was open ground and was swept by the batteries of the cavalry on the open hill to the northwest, and by those of Hill's division about the Mountain House and upon the highlands north of the National road; for those hills run forward like a bastion and give a perfect flanking fire along our part of the mountain. The gallant Croome with a number of his gunners had been killed, and his guns were brought back into the shelter of the woods, on the hither side of Wise's fields. The infantry of the right wing was brought to the same position, and our lines were re- formed along the curving crests from that point which looks down into the gap and the Sharpsburg road, toward the left. The extreme right with Croome's two guns was held by the Thirtieth, with the Twenty-eighth in second line. Next came the Twelfth, with the Thirty- sixth in second line, the front curving toward the west with the form of the mountain summit. The left of the Twelfth dipped a little into a hollow, beyond which the SOUTH MOUNTAIN 285 Twenty-third and Eleventh occupied the next hill facing toward the Sharpsburg road. Our front was hollow, for the two wings were nearly at right angles to each other; but the flanks were strongly placed, the right, which was most exposed, having open ground in front which it could sweep with its fire and having the reserve regiments closely supporting it. Part of Simmonds's battery which had also come up had done good service in the last com- bats, and was now disposed so as to check the fire of the enemy. It was t^me to rest. Three hours of up-hill marching and climbing had been followed by as long a period of bloody battle, and it was almost noon. The troops began to feel the exhaustion of such labor and struggle. We had several hundred prisoners in our hands, and the field was thickly strewn with dead, in gray and in blue, while our field hospital a little down the mountain side was encumbered with hundreds of wounded. We learned from our prisoners that the summit was held by D. H. Hill's division of five brigades with Stuart's cavalry, and that Longstreet's corps was in close support. I was momentarily expecting to hear from the supporting divi- sions of the Ninth Corps, and thought it the part of wis- dom to hold fast to our strong position astride of the mountain top commanding the Sharpsburg road till our force should be increased. The two Kanawha brigades had certainly won a glorious victory, and had made so assured a success of the day's work that it would be folly to imperil it.^ General Hill has since argued that only part of his division could oppose us;* but his brigades were all on the mountain summit within easy support of each other, and they had the day before them. It was five hours from the time ot our first charge to the arrival of our first 1 For official reports, see O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 458-474. " Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 559, etc. 'X 286 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR supports, and it was not till three o'clock in the afternoon that Hooker's corps reached the eastern base of the moun- tain and began its deployment north of the National road. Our effort was to attack the weak end of his line, and we succeeded in putting a stronger force there than that which opposed us. It is for our opponent to explain how we were permitted to do it. The two brigades of the Kanawha division numbered less than 3000 men. Hill's division was 5000 strong,^ ever, by the Confederate method of counting their effectives, which should be in- creased nearly one-fifth to compare properly with our reports. In addition to these Stuart had the principal part of the Confederate cavalry on this line, and they were not idle spectators. Parts of Lee's and Hampton's brigades were certainly there, and probably the whole of Lee's.^ With less than half the numerical strength which was opposed to it, therefore, the Kanawha division had carried the summit, advancing to the charge for the most part over open ground in the storm of musketry and artil- lery fire, and held the crests they had gained through the livelong day, in spite of all efforts to retake them. In our mountain camps of West Virginia I had felt dis- contented that our native Ohio regiments did not take as kindly to the labors of drill and camp police as some of German birth, and I had warned them that they would feel the need of accuracy and mechanical precision when the day of battle came. They had done reasonably well, but suffered in comparison with some of the others on dress parade and in the form and neatness of the camp. When, however, on the slopes of South Mountain I saw the lines go forward steadier and more even under fire than they ever had done at drill, their intelligence mak- ing them perfectly comprehend the advantage of unity in their effort and in the shock when they met the foe — when their bodies seemed to dilate, their step to have '^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 1025. ' Id., p. 819. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 287 better cadence and a tread as of giants as they went cheering up the hill, — I took back all my criticisms and felt a pride and glory in them as soldiers rnd comrades that words cannot express. It was about noon that the lull in the battle occurred, and it lasted a couple of hours, while reinforcements were approaching the mountain top from both sides. The enemy's artillery kept up a pretty steady fire, an- swered occasionally by our few cannon; but the infantry rested on their arms, the front covered by a watchful line of skirmishers, every man at his tree. The Confed- erate guns had so perfectly the range of the sloping fields about and behind us, that their canister shot made long furrows in the sod with a noise like the cutting of a melon rind, and the shells which skimmed the crest and burst in the tree-tops at the lower side of the fields made a sound like the crashing and falling of some brittle sub- stance, instead of the tough fibre of oak and pine. We had time to notice these things as we paced the lines waiting for the renewal of the battle. Willcox's division reported to me about two o'clock, and would have been up earlier, but for a mistake in the delivery of a message to him. He had sent from Mid- dletown to ask me where I desired him to come, and find- ing that the messenger had no clear idea of the roads by which he had travelled, I directed him to say that Gen- eral Pleasonton would point out the road I had followed, if inquired of. Willcox understood the messenger that I wished him to inquire of Pleasonton where he had better put his division in, and on doing so, the latter suggested that he move against the crests on the north of the National road. He was preparing to do this when Burn- side and Reno came up and corrected the movement, recalling him from the north and sending him by the old Sharpsburg road to my position. As his head of column came up, Longstreet's corps was already forming with its 288 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR right outflanking my left. I sent two regiments^ to ex- tend my left, and requested Willcox to form the rest of the division on my right facing the summit. He was doing this when he received an order from General Reno to take position overlooking the National road facing northward. 2 I can hardly think the order could have been intended to effect this, as the turnpike is deep be- tween the hills there, and the enemy quite distant on the other side of the gorge. But Willcox, obeying the order as he received it, formed along the Sharpsburg road, his left next to my right, but his line drawn back nearly at right angles to it. He placed Cook's battery in the angle, and this opened a rapid fire on one of the enemy's which was on the bastion-like hill north of the gorge already mentioned. Longstreet's men were now pretty •well up, and pushed a battery forward to the edge of the timber beyond Wise's farm, and opened upon Willcox's line, enfilading it badly. There was a momentary break there, but Willcox was able to check the confusion, and to reform his lines facing westward as I had originally directed; Welch's brigade was on my right, closely sup- porting Cook's battery and Christ's beyond it. The general line of Willcox's division was at the eastern edge of the wood looking into the open ground at Fox's Gap, on the north side of the Sharpsburg road. A warm skir- mishing fight was continued along the whole of our line, our purpose being to hold fast my extreme left which was well advanced upon and over the mountain crest, and to swing the right up to the continuation of the same line of hills near the Mountain House. At nearly four o'clock the head of Sturgis's column approached.^ McClellan had arrived on the field, and he 1 In my official report I said one regiment, but General Willcox reported that he sent two, and he is doubtless right. For his official report, sec O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 428. 3 Ibid. * Sturgis's Report, Id., pt. i. p. 443. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 289 with Burnside and Reno was at Pleasonton's position at the knoll in the valley, and from that point, a central one in the midst of the curving hills, they issued their orders. They could see the firing of the enemy's battery from the woods beyond the open ground in front of Will- cox, and sent orders to him to take or silence those guns at all hazards. He was preparing co advance, when the Confederates anticipated him (for their formation had now been completed) and came charging out of the woods across the open fields. It was part 01 their general ad- vance and their most determined effort to drive us from the summit we had gained in the morning. The brigades of Hood, Whiting, Drayton, and D. R. Jones in addition to Hill's division (eight brigades in all) joined in the attack on our side of the National road, batteries being put in every available position.^ The fight raged fiercely along the whole front, but the bloodiest struggle was around Wise's house, where Drayton's brigade assaulted my right and Willcox's left, coming across the open ground. Here the Sharpsburg road curves around the hill held by us so that for a little way it was parallel to our position. As the enemy came down the hill forming the other side of the gap, across the road and up again to our line, they were met by so withering a fire that they were checked quickly, and even drifted more to the right where their descent was continuous. Here Willcox's line volleyed into them a destructive fire, followed by a charge that swept them in confusion back along the road, where the men of the Kanawha division took up the attack and completed their rout. Willcox succeeded in getting a foothold on the further side of the open ground and driv- ing off the artillery which was there. Along our centre and left where the forest was thick, the enemy was equally repulsed, but the cover of the timber enabled them to keep a footing near by, whilst they continually tried to ' Longstreet's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 839. VOL. I. — 19 290 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR extend so as to outflank us, moving their troops along a road which goes diagonally down that side of the moun- tain from Turner's Gap to Rohrersville. The batteries on the north of the National road had been annoying to Willcox's men as they advanced, but Sturgis sent forward Durell's battery from his division as soon as he came up, and this gave special attention to these hostile guns, diverting their fire from the infantry. Hooker's men, of the First Corps, were also by this time pushing up the mountain on that side of the turnpike, and we were not again troubled by artillery on our right flank. It was nearly five o'clock when the enemy had disap- peared in the woods beyond Fox's Gap and Willcox could reform his shattered lines. As the easiest mode of getting Sturgis's fresh men into position, Willcox made room on his left for Ferrero's brigade supported by Nagle's, doubling also his lines at the extreme right. Rodman's division, the last of the corps, now began to reach the summit, and as the report came from the ex- treme left that the enemy was stretching beyond our flank, I sent Fairchild's brigade to assist our men there, whilst Rodman took Harland's to the support of Willcox. A staff officer now brought word that McClellan directed the whole line to advance. At the left this could only mean to clear our front decisively of the enemy there, for the slopes went steadily down to the Rohrersville road. At the centre and right, whilst we held Fox's Gap, the high and rocky summit at the Mountain House was still in the enemy's possession. The order came to me as senior officer upon the line, and the signal was given. On the left Longstreet's men were pushed down the mountain side beyond the Rohrersville and Sharps- burg roads, and the contest there was ended. The two hills between the latter road and the turnpike were still held by the enemy, and the further one could not be reached till the Mountain House should be in our hands. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 291 Sturgis and Willcox, supported by Rodman, again pushed forward, but whilst they made progress they were baffled by a stubborn and concentrated resistance. Reno had followed Rodman's division up the mountain, and came to me a little before sunset, anxious to know why the right could not get forward quite to the summit. I explained that the ground there was very rough and rocky, a fortress in itself and evidently very strongly held. He passed on to Sturgis, and it seemed to me he was hardly gone before he was brought back upon a stretcher, dead. He had gone to the skirmish line to examine for himself the situation, and had been shot down by the enemy posted among the rocks and trees. There was more or less firing on that part of the field till late in the evening, but when morning dawned the Con- federates had abandoned the last foothold above Turner's Gap and retreated by way of Boonsboro to Sharpsburg. The casualties in the Ninth Corps had been 889, of which 356 were in the Kanawha division. Some 6ck) of the enemy were captured by my division and sent to the rear under guard. On the north of the National road the First Corps under Hooker had been opposed by one of Hill's brigades and four of Longstreet's, and had gradually worked its way along the old Hagerstown road, crowning the heights in that direction after dark in the evening. Gibbon's bri- gade had also advanced in the National road, crowding up quite close to Turner's Gap and engaging the enemy in a lively combat. It is not my purpose to give a de- tailed history of events which did not come under my own eye. It is due to General Burnside, however, to note Hooker's conduct toward his immediate superior and his characteristic efforts to grasp all the glory of the battle at the expense of truth and of honorable dealing with his commander and his comrades. Hooker's offi- cial report for the battle of South Mountain was dated at 292 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Washington, November 17th, when Burnsidcwas in com- mand of the Army of the Potomac, and when the in- trigues of the former to obtain the command for himself were notorious and near their final success. In it he studiously avoided any recognition of orders or directions received from Burnside, and ignores his staff, whilst he assumes that his orders came directly from McClellan and compliments the staff officers of the latter, as if they had been the only means of communication. This was not only insolent but a military offence, had Burnside chosen to prosecute it. He also asserts that the troops on our part of the line had been defeated and were at the turnpike at the base of the mountain in retreat when he went forward. At the close of his report, after declaring that "the forcing of the passage of South Mountain will be classed among the most brilliant and satisfactory achievements of this army," he adds, "its principal glory will be awarded to the First Corps."* Nothing is more justly odious in military conduct than embodying slanders against other commands in an official report. It puts into the official records misrepresenta- tions which cannot be met because they are unknown, and it is a mere accident if those who know the truth are able to neutralize their effect. In most cases it will be too late to counteract the mischief when those most in- terested learn of the slanders. All this is well illus- trated in the present case. Hooker's report got on file months after the battle, and it was not till the January following that Burnside gave it his attention. I believe that none of the division commanders of the Ninth Corps learned of it till long afterward. I certainly did not till 1887, a quarter of a century after the battle, when the volume of the official records containing it was published. Burnside had asked to be relieved of the command oi the Army of the Potomac after the battle of Fredericksburg 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 214-215. SOUTH MOUNTAIN 293 unless Hooker among others was punished for insubordi* nation. As in the preceding August, the popular senti- ment of that army as an organization was again, in Mr. Lincoln's estimation, too potent a factor to be opposed, and the result was the superseding of Burnside by Hooker himself, though the President declared in the letter accompanying the appointment that the latter' s conduct had been blameworthy. It was under these circum- stances that Burnside learned of the false statements in Hooker's report of South Mountain, and put upon file his stinging response to it. His explicit statement of the facts will settle that question among all who know the reputation of the men, and though unprincipled am- bition was for a time successful, that time was so short and things were "set even" so soon that the ultimate result is one that lovers of justice may find comfort in.* ' The text of Hurnside's supplemental report is as follows : — "When I sent in my report of the part taken by my command in the battle of South Mountain, (General Hooker, who commanded one of the corps of my command (the right wing), had not sent in his report, but it has since been sent to me. I at first determined to pass over its inaccuracies as harmless, or rather as harming only their author ; but upon reflection I have felt it my duty to notice two gross misstatements made with reference to the commands of Generals Reno and Cox, the former officer having been killed on that day, and the latter now removed with his command to the West. "General Hooker says that as he came up to the front, Cox's corps was retiring from the contest. This is untrue. General Cox did not command a corps, but a division ; and that division was in action, fighting most gal- lantly, long before General Hooker came up, and remained in the action all day, never leaving the field for one moment. He also says that he discovered that the attack by General Reno's corps was without sequence. This is also untrue, and when said of an officer who so nobly fought and died on that same field, it partakes of something worse than untruthfulness. Every offi- cer present who knew anything of the battle knows that Reno performed a most important part in the battle, his corps driving the enemy from the heights on one side of the main pike, whilst that of General Hooker drove them from the heights on the other side. "General Hooker should remember that I had to order him four separate times to move his command into action, and that I had to myself order his le-ding division (Meade's) to start before he would go." O. R., vol. xix. Pt- i. p. 422. 294 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR The men of the First Corps and its officers did their duty nobly on that as on many another field, and the only spot on the honor of the day is made by the personal unscru- pulousness and vainglory of its commander. Franklin's corps had attacked and carried the ridge about five miles further south, at Crampton's Gap, where the pass had been so stubbornly defended by Mahone's and Cobb's brigades with artillery and a detachment of Hampton's cavalry as to cause considerable loss to our troops. The principal fighting was at a stone wall near the eastern base of the mountain, and when the enemy was routed from this position, he made no successful rally and the summit was gained without much more fighting. The attack at the stone wall not far from Burkettsville was made at about three o'clock in the afternoon. The Sixth Corps rested upon the summit at night. CHAPTER XIV antietam: preliminary movements Lee's plan of invasion — Changed by McClellan's advance — The position at Sharpsburg — Our routes of march — At the Antietam — McClellan reconnoitring — Lee striving to concentrate — Our delays — Tuesday's quiet — Hooker's evening march — The Ninth Corps command — Chang- ing our positions — McClellan's plan of battle — Hooker's evening skir- mish — Mansfield goes to support Hooker — Confederate positions — Jackson arrives — McLaws and Walker reach the field — Their places. BEFORE morning on the 15th of September it be- came evident that Lee had used the night in with- drawing his army. An advance of the pickets at daybreak confirmed this, and Pleasonton's cavalry was pushed for- ward to Boonsboro, where they had a brisk skirmish with the enemy's rear-guard. At Boonsboro a turnpike to Sharpsburg leaves the National road, and the retreat of the Confederate cavalry, as well as other indications, pointed out the Sharpsburg road as the line of Lee's retreat. He had abandoned his plan of moving further northward, and had chosen a line bringing him into surer communication with Jackson. His movements before the battle of South Mountain revealed a purpose of invasion identical with that which he tried to carry out in 1863 in the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet, with two divi- sions and a brigade (D. R. Jones, Hood, and Evans), had advanced to Hagerstown, and it seems that a large part of the Confederate trains reached there also. D. H. Hill's division held Boonsboro and the passes of South Moun- tain at Turner's and Fox's Gaps. McLaws invested our fortifications on Maryland Heights, .supported by 296 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR R. H. Anderson's division. Jackson, with four divi- sions (A. P. Hill, Ewcll, and Starke of his own corps, with Walker temporarily reporting to him), was besieg- ing Harper's Ferry. On Saturday, the 13th, Lee determined to draw back Longstreet from his advanced position, in view of the fact that Jackson had not yet reduced Harper's Ferry and that McClellan was marching to its relief. Long- street's divisions therefore approached Boonsboro so as to support D. H. Hill, and thus it happened that they took part in the battle of South Mountain. Hill again occupied the summit where we found him on the 14th. From all this it is very plain that if McClellan had has- tened his advance on the 13th, the passes of South Moun- tain at Turner's and Fox's gaps would not have been occupied in force by the enemy, and the condition of things would have been what he believed it was on the morning of the 14th, when a single brigade had been thought enough to support Pleasonton's reconnoissance. Twenty-four hours had changed all that. The turnpike from Boonsboro to Sharpsburg continues southward a couple of miles, crossing the Potomac to Shepherdstown, which lies on the Virginia side of the river. A bridge which formerly carried the road over the stream had been burned; but not far below the ruined piers was a ford, which was a pretty good one in the present stage of water. Shepherdstown was the natu- ral place of junction for Lee and Jackson; but for Lee to have marched there at once would have exposed Jack- son to attack from the northern side of the Potomac. The precious stores and supplies captured at Harper's Ferry must be got to a place of safety, and this was likely to delay Jackson a day or two. Lee therefore ordered McLaws to obstruct Franklin's movement as much as he could, whilst he himself concentrated the rest of Longstreet' s corps at Sharpsburg, behind the ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 297 Antietam. If McClellan's force should prove over- whelming, the past experience of the Confederate general encouraged him to believe that our advance would not be so enterprising that he could not make a safe retreat into Virginia. He resolved therefore to halt at Sharpsburg, which oflfered an excellent field for a defensive battle, leaving himself free to resume his aggressive campaign or to retreat into Virginia according to the result. McClellan had ordered Richardson's division of the Second Corps to support the cavalry in the advance, and Hooker's corps followed Richardson.* It would seem most natural that the whole of Sumner's wing should take the advance on the 15th, though the breaking up of organizations was so much a habit with McClellan that perhaps it should not be surprising that one of Sumner's divisions was thus separated from the rest, and that Burnside's right wing was also divided.* The Ninth Corps was ordered to follow the old Sharpsburg road through Fox's Gap, our line of march being thus parallel to the others till we should reach the road from Boons- boro to Sharpsburg. But we were not put in motion early in the day. We were ordered first to bury the dead, and to send the wounded and prisoners to Middletown It was nearly noon when we got orders to march, and when the head of column filed into the road, the way was blocked by Porter's corps, which was moving to the front by the same road. As soon as the way was clear, we followed, leaving a small detachment to complete the other tasks which had been assigned us. In the wooded slope of the mountain west of the gap, a good many of the Con- federate dead still lay where they had fallen in the fierce ' Hooker's Report, O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 216. ' We must not forget the fact, however, ihat the order dividing the army into wings was suspended on that morning, and that this gives to the inci- dent the air of an intentional reduction of the wing commanders to the con- trol of a single corps. O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 297. 298 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR combats for the possession of the crest near Wise's house. Our road led through a little hamlet called Springvale, and thence to another, Porterstown, near the left bank of the Antictam, where it runs into the Boons- boro and Sharpsburg turnpike. Sumner's two corps had taken temporary position on cither side of the turnpike, behind the line of hills which there borders the stream. Porter's corps was massed in rear of Sumner, and Hooker's had been moved off to the right, around Kecdysville. I was with the Kanawha division, assum- ing that my temporary command of the corps ended with the battle on the mountain. As we came up in rear of the troops already assembled, we received orders to turn off the road to the left, and halted our battalions closed in mass. It was now about three o'clock in the after- noon. McClcllan, as it seemed, had just reached the field, and was surrounded by a group of his principal officers, most of whom I had never seen before. I rode up with General Burnside, dismounted, and was very cordially greeted by General McClellan. He and Burn- side were evidently on terms of most intimate friendship and familiarity. He introduced me to the officers I had not known before, referring pleasantly to my service with him in Ohio and West Virginia, putting me upon an easy footing with them in u very agreeable and genial way. We walked up the slope ot the ridge before us, and looking westward from its crest, the whole field of the coming battle was before us. Immediately in front the Antietam wound through the hollow, the hills rising gently on both sides. In the background, on our left, was the village of Sharpsburg, with fields enclosed by stone fences in front of it. At its right was a bit of wood (since known as the West Wood), with the little Dunker Church standing out white and sharp against it. Farther to the right and left, the scene was closed in by ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 299 300 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR wooded ridges with open farm lands between, the whole making as pleasing and prosperous a landscape as can easily be imagined. We made a large group as we stood upon the hill, and it was not long before we attracted the enemy's atten- tion. A puff of white smoke from a knoll on the right of the Sharpsburg road was followed by the screaming of a shell over our heads. McClellan directed that all but one or two should retire behind the ridge, while he con- tinued the reconnoissance, walking slowly to the right. I think Fitz-John Porter was the only general officer who was retained as a companion in this walk. I noted with satisfaction the cool and business-like air with which McClellan made his examination under fire. The Con- federate artillery was answered by a battery of ours, and a lively cannonade en.sued on both sides, though with- out any noticeable effect. The enemy's position was revealed, and he was evidently in force on both sides of the turnpike in front of Sharpsburg, covered by the undulations of the rolling ground which hid his infantry from our sight. The examination of the enemy's position and the dis- cussion of it continued till near the close of the day. Orders were then given for the Ninth Corps to move to the left, keeping off the road, which was occupied by other troops. We moved through fields and farm lands, an hour's march in the dusk of evening, going into bivouac about a mile south of the Sharpsburg bridge, and in rear of the hills bordering the Antietam, The village of Sharpsburg is in the midst of a plateau which is almost enclosed by the Potomac River and the Antietam. The Potomac bounds it on the south and west, and the Antietam on the east. The plateau in general outline may be considered a parallelogram, four miles in length from north to south, and two and a half miles in width inside the bends of the river. The ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 301 northern side of this terrain appears the narrowest, for here the river curves sharply away to the west, nearly doubling the width of the field above and below the bend. From the village the ground descends in all directions, though a continuous ridge runs northward, on which is the Hagerstown turnpike. The Boonsboro turn- pike enters the village from the northeast, crossing the Antietam on a stone bridge, and continuing through Sharpsburg to the southwest, reaches Shepherdstown by the ford of the Potomac already mentioned. The Hagers- town turnpike enters the town from the north, passing the Dunker Church a mile out, and goes nearly due south, crossing the Antietam at its mouth, and continu- ing down the Potomac toward Harper's Ferry. The Antietam is a deep creek, with few fords at an ordinary stage of water, and the principal roads cross it upon stone bridges. Of these there were three within the field of battle ; the upper one in front of Keedysville, the middle one upon the Boonsboro turnpike, and the lower one on the Sharpsburg and Rohrersville road, since known as Burnside's bridge. McCIellan's staff was better supplied with oflficers of engineers than the staff of most of our separate armies, and Captain Duane, his chief engineer, systematized the work of gathering topo- graphical information. This was communicated to the general officers in connection with the orders which were given them. In this way we were instructed that the only fords of the Antietam passable at t -at time were one between the two upper bridges named, and another about half a mile below Burnside's bridge, in a deep bend of the stream. We found, however, during the engagement of the 17th, another practicable crossing for infantry a short distance above the bridge. This was not a ford in common use, but in the low stage of water at the time it was made available for a small force. It was about noon of the 15th of September that Lee 302 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR placed the forces which he had in hand across the turn- pike in front of Sharpsburg. D. H. Hill's division was on the north of the road, and on the south of it Long- street's own old 'ivision (now under General D. R. Jones), Hood's division, and Evans's independent bri- gade. Stuart's cavalry and the reserve artillery were also present. The rest of the army was with Jackson at Harper's Ferry, or co-operating with him in the neigh- borhood of Maryland Heights. Out of forty-four bri- gades, Lee could put but fourteen or fifteen in line that day to oppose McClellan. He was very strong in artil- lery, however, and his cannon looked grimly over the hill-crests behind which his infantry were lying. Cutts's and Jones's battalions of the reserve artillery were ordered to report to Hill for the protection of the left of the Confederate line, and gave him in all the sixty or seventy guns which he speaks of in his report, and which have puzzled several writers who have described the battle. Whenever our troops showed themselves as they marched into position, they were saluted from shotted cannon, and the numerous batteries that were developed on the long line of hills before us no doubt did much to impress McClellan with the belief that he had the great bulk of Lee's army before him. The value of time was one of the things McClellan never understood. He should have been among the first in the saddle at every step in the campaign after he was in possession of Lee's order of the 9th, and should have infused energy into every unit in his army. Instead of making his reconnoissance at three in the afternoon of Monday, it might have been made at ten in the morning, and the battle could have been fought before night, if, indeed, Lee had not promptly retreated when support from Jackson would thus have become impossible. Or if McClellan had pushed boldly for the bridge at the mouth of the Antietam, nothing but a precipitate retreat ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 303 by Lee could have prevented the interposition of the whole National army between the separated wings of the Confederates. The opportunity was still supremely favorable for McClellan, but prompt decision was not easy for him. Nothing but reconnoitring was done on Monday afternoon or on Tuesday, whilst Lee was strain- ing every nerve to concentrate his forces and to correct what would have proven a fatal blunder in scattering them, had his opponent acted with vigor. The strongest defence the eulogists of the Confederate general have made for him is that he perfectly understood McClellan's caution and calculated with confidence upon it; that he would have been at liberty to perfect his combinations still more at leisure, but for the accident by which the copy of his plan had fallen into our hands at Frederick City. During the i6th we confidently expected a battle, and I kept with my division. In the afternoon I saw General Burnside, and learned from him that McClellan had determined to let Hooker make a movement on our extreme right to turn Lee's position. Burnside's man- ner in speaking of this implied that he thought it was done at Hooker's solicitation, and through his desire, openly evinced, to be independent in command. I urged Burnside to assume the immediate command of the corps and allow me to lead my own division. He objected that as he had been announced as commander of the right wing of the army, composed of the two corps, he was unwilling to waive his precedence or to assume that Hooker was detached for anything more than a tempo- rary purpose. I pointed out that Reno's staff had been granted leave of absence to take the body of their chief to Washington, and that my division stafif was too small for corps duty; but he met this by saying that he would use his staff for this purpose, and help me in every way he could till the crisis of the campaign should be over. 304 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Sympathizing with his very natural feeling, I ceased objecting, and accepted with as good grace as I could the unsatisfactory position of nominal commander of the corps to which I was a comparative stranger, and which, under the circumstances, naturally looked to him as its accustomed and real commander. Burnside's intentions in respect to myself were thoroughly friendly, as he afterward proved, and I had no ground for complaint on this score; but the position of second in command is always an awkward and anomalous one, and such I felt it. The i6th passed without serious fighting, though we had desultory cannonading and picket firing. It was hard to restrain our men from showing themselves on the crest of the long ridge in front of us, and whenever they did so they drew the fire from some of the enemy's bat- teries, to which ours would respond. McClellan recon- noitred the line of the Antietam near us, and the country immediately on our left, down the valley. As the result of this we were ordered to change our positions at night- fall, staff officers being sent to guide each division to its new camp. The selected positions were marked by McClellan's engineers, who then took members of Burn- side's staff to identify the locations, and these in turn conducted our divisions. There was far more routine of this sort in that army than I ever saw elsewhere. Corps and division commanders should have the responsibility of protecting their own flanks and in choosing ordinary camps. To depend upon the general staff for this is to take away the vigor and spontaneity of the subordinate and make him perform his duty in a mechanical way. He should be told what is known of the enemy and his movements so as to be put upon his guard, and should then have freedom of judgment as to details. The changes made were as follows : Rodman's division went half a mile further to the left, where a country road led ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 305 to the Antietam ford, half a mile below the Burnside bridge. Sturgis's division was placed on the sides of the road leading to the stone bridge just mentioned^ Willcox's was put in reserve in rear of Sturgis. My own was divided, Scammon's brigade going with Rod- man, and Crook's going with Sturgis. Crook was ordered to take the advance in crossing the bridge in case we should be ordered to attack. This selection was made by Burnside himself as a compliment to the division for the vigor of its assault at South Mountain. While we were moving we heard Hooker's guns far off on the right and front, and the cannonade continued an hour or more after it became dark. What, then, was the plan of battle of which the first step was this movement of Hooker's.? McClellan's dis- positions on the 15th were made whilst Franklin's corps was still absent, and, under the orders he received, was likely to be so for a day at least* Sumner's two corps had been treated as the centre of the army in hand. Burn- side's had been divided by putting Hooker on the extreme right and the Ninth Corps on the extreme left, and Porter's corps was in reserve. This looked as if a gen- eral attack in front with this organization of the army were intended. But the more McClellan examined the enemy's position the less inclined he was to attack the centre. He could cross the bridge there and on the right, and deploy ; but the gentle slopes rising toward Sharps- burg were swept by formidable batteries and offered no cover to advancing troops. The enemy's infantry was behind stone fences and in sunken roads, whilst ours must advance over the open. Lee's right rested upon the wooded bluffs above the Burnside bridge, where it could only be approached by a small head of column charging along the narrow roadway under a concentrated fire of cannon and small arms. No point of attack on * O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 29. VOL. I. — 20 306 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the whole field was so unpromising as this. Then, as Jackson was still at Harper's Ferry, there was the con- tingency of a.i attack in rear if anything less than the mass of our army were pushed beyond Lee's right. On our right, in front of Hooker, it was easy to turn the Confederate line. The road from Keedysville through Smoketown to the Hagerstown turnpike crossed the Antietam in a hollow, out of the line of fire, and a march around Lee's left flank could be made almost wholly under cover. The topography of the field therefore sug- gested a flank attack from our right, if the National com- mander rejected the better strategy of interposing his army between Lee and Jackson as too daring a move- ment. This flank attack McClellan determined to make, and some time after noon of the i6th issued his orders accordingly. In his preliminary report of the battle, made before he was relieved from command, McClellan says : — "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left, — at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more, by assailing the enemy's right, — and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their centre with any reserve I might then have in hand." * His report covering his whole career in the war, dated August 4, 1863 (and published February, 1864, after warm controversies had arisen, and he had become a political character), modifies the above statement in some important particulars. It says : — " My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield supported by Sumner's and if necessary by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Bumside against the enemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and 1 O R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 3a ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 307 rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable." * The opinion I got from Burnside at the time, as to the part the Ninth Corps was to take, was fairly consistent with the design first quoted, namely, that when the attack by Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin should be progressing favorably, we were "to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more." It is also probable that Hooker's movement was at first in- tended to be made by his corps alone, the attack to be taken up by Sumner's two corps as soon as Hooker began, and to be shared in by Franklin if he reached the field in time, thus making a simultaneous oblique attack from our right by the whole army except Porter's corps, which was in reserve and the Ninth Corps, which was to create the " diversion " on our left and prevent the enemy from stripping his right to reinforce his left. It is hardly disputable that this would have been a better plan than the one actually carried out. Certainly the assump- tion that the Ninth Corps could cross the Antietam alone at the only place on the field where the Confederates had their line immediately upon the stream which must be crossed under fire by two narrow heads of column, and could then turn to the right along the high ground occu- pied by the hostile army before that army had been broken or seriously shaken elsewhere, is one which would hardly be made till time had dimmed the remembrance of the actual position of Lee's divisions upon the field. It is also noticeable that the plan as given in the final report leaves no " centre " with which to " advance " when either of the flank movements should be successful, Porter's corps in reserve being the only one not included 'n the movement as described. > O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 55. 308 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Further evidence that the plan did not originally in- clude the wide separation of two corps to the right to make the extended turning movement is found in Hooker's incomplete report, and in the wide interval in time be- tween the marching of his corps and that of Mansfield. Hooker was ordered to cross the Antietam at about t'vo o'clock in the afternoon of the i6th by the bridge in front of Keedysville and the ford below it. He says that after his troops were over and in march, he rode back to McClellan, who told him that he might call for reinforce- ments, and that when they came they should be under his command. Somewhat later McClellan rode forward with his staff to observe the progress making, and Hooker again urged the necessity of reinforcements.* Yet Sumner did not receive orders to send Mansfield's corps to his support till evening, and it marched only half an hour before midnight,' reaching its bivouac, about a mile and a half in rear of that of Hooker, at 2 A.M. of the 1 7th. 3 After crossing the Antietam, Hooker had shaped his course to the westward, aiming to reach the ridge on which the Hagerstown turnpike runs, and which is the dominant feature in the landscape. This ridge is about two miles distant from the Antietam, and for the first mile of the way no resistance was met. However, his progress had been observed by the enemy, and Hood's two brigades were taken from the centre and passed tc the left of D. H. Hill. Here they occupied an open wood (since known as the East Wood) northeast of the Dunker Church. Hooker was now trying to approach the Confederate positions, Meade's division of the Penn sylvania Reserves being in the advance. A sharp skir- mishing combat ensued, and artillery was brought into action on both sides. I have mentioned our hearing the * O. R., vol. xiz. pt. i. p. 217. s / O. R., vol. ziz. pt. i. p. 224. 314 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR ported by his cavalry and by Early's brigade of infantry which Jackson detached for that purpose.^ Doublecay's division (except Hofmann), was in two lines, Gibbon's and Phelps's in front, supported by Pat- rick's. Of Meade's division Seymour's brigade, which had sustained the combat of the evening before, had con- tinued to cover the frcnt with skirmishers during the night, and remained on the northeast side of the East Wood. The other brigades (Anderson and Magilton) were placed in reserve behind Doubleday.^ The Tenth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves was sent from Ander- son's to a strong position west of the turnpike near the extremity of the strip of wood northwest of the Miller house. It was among ledges of rock looking into the ravine beyond which were Stuart and Early. The ravine was the continuation northward to the Potomac of a little watercourse which headed near the Dunker Church and along one side of which the West Wood lay, the outcrop of rock making broken ledges along its whole length. Indeed, all the pieces of wood in the neighborhood seemed to be full of such rocks, and for that reason had been allowed to remain in forest. The regiment was ordered to cover its front with skirmishers and to hold its position at all hazards. Ricketts's division had biv- ouacked in a wood east of Doubleday's. Its three brigades (Duryea's, Hartsuff's, and Christian's) were deployed on the left of Doubleday, and were to march toward the Dunker Church through the East Wood, pass- ing the line of Seymour's brigade, which was then to become its support. The Confederates opened a rapid artillery fire from the open ground in front of the Dunker Church as well as from Stuart's position, and Hooker answered the chal- lenge by an immediate order for his line to advance. Doubleday directed Gibbon, who was on the right, to 1 O. R. vol. zix. pt. i. p. 819. ' Id., p. 269. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 315 guide upon the turnpike. i^atrick remained for a time in the wood north of the liller house, till he should be needed at the front. ^ Doubleday and his brigade com- manders seem to have supposed that Meade's men occu- pied part at least of the West Wood, and that they would cover Gibbon's flank as he advanced. This belief was based on the stationing of the Tenth Pennsylvania Re- serves; but that regiment was fifteen or twenty rods north of the northern end of the West Wood, and Gibbon's right flank, as he advanced, was soon exposed to attack from Ewell's division (Lawton in command), which held the wood, hidden from view and perfectly protected by the slope of the ground and the forest, as they looked over the rim into the undulating open fields in front. Part of Battery B, Fourth United Statet; Artillery (Gib- bon's own battery), was run forward to Miller's barn and stack-yard on the right of the road, and fired over the heads of the advancing regiments. ^ Other batteries were similarly placed, more to the left, and our cannon roared from all the hill crests encircling the field. The line moved swiftly forward through Miller's orchard and kitchen garden, breaking through a stout picket fence on the near side, down into the moist ground of the hollow, and up through the corn which was higher than their heads and shut out everything from view.^ At the southern side of the field they came to a low fence, be- yond which was the open field already mentioned, and the enemy's line at the further side of it. But the cornfield only covered part of the line, and Gibbon's right had outmarched the left, which had been exposed to a terrible fire. The direction taken had been a little oblique, so that the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin (the flanking regiment) had crossed the turnpike and was suddenly assailed by a sharp fire from the West Wood on its flank. ' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 224. s Id., pp. 229, 248. ^ Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 88. 3l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR They swung back into the read, lying down along the high, stout post-andrail fence, keeping up their fire by shooting between the rails.* Leaving this little band to protect their right, the main line, which had come up on the left, leaped the fence at the south edge of the cornfield, and charged up hill across the open at the enemy in front. But the con- centrated fire of artillery and musketry was more than they could bear. Men fell by scores and hundreds, and the thinned lines gave way and ran for the shelter of the corn. They were rallied in the hollow on the north side of the field. The enemy had rapidly extended his left under cover of the West Wood, and now made a dash at the right flank and at Gibbon's exposed guns. His men on the right faced by that flank and followed him bravely, though with little order, in a dash at the Confederates who were swarming out of the wood.^ The gunners double-charged the cannon with canister, and under a terrible fire of artillery and rifles Lawton's division broke and sought shelter. ^ Patrick's brigade had now come up in support of Gib- bon, and was sent across the turnpike into the West Wood to cover that flank, two regiments of Gibbon's going with him.* His men pushed forward, the enemy retir- ing, until they were in advance of the principal line in the cornfield upon which the Confederates of Jackson's division were now marching to attack. Patrick faced his brigade to the left, parallel to the edge of the wood and to the turnpike, and poured his fire into the flank of the enemy, following it by a charge through the field and up to the fence along the road. Again the Confederates were driven back, but their left came forward in the wood again, attacking Patrick's right, forcing him to resume his original direction of front and to retire to the 1 Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 89. • Id., p. 91. • O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 248. * Id., p. 243. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 317 cover of a rocky ledge in the open at right angles to the turnpike not far from the northern end of the timber. Phelps's brigade had gone forward with Gibbon's, push- ing tiearly to the Confederate lines, and being driven back with great loss when they charged over open ground against the enemy. Ricketts's division advanced from the wood in which it had spent the night, passed through Seymour's skir- mishers and entered the East Wood, swinging his left for- ward as he went. This grove was open, but the rocks made perfect cover for Jackson's men, and every stone and tree blazed with deadly fire. Hartsuff endeavored to reconnoitre the ground, but was wounded and disabled immediately. Ricketts pushed on, suffering fearfully from an enemy which in open order could fall back from rock to rock and from tree to tree with little comparative loss. He succeeded at last in reaching the west edge of this wood, forming along the road and fences that were just within its margin. Here he kept up a rapid fire till his ammunition was exhausted. ^ When Doubleday's men had been finally repulsed, our line on the right curved from the ledge where Patrick took refuge, forward in front of Miller's orchard and gar- den, part of Gibbon's men lying down along the turnpike fence facing to the west. Meade's two brigades in re- serve were sent forward, but when they reached Gibbon and Phelps, Ricketts was calling for assistance in the East Wood and Magilton's brigade was sent to him, leav- ing a gap on the left of Anderson. Another gallant effort was now made, Seymour's depleted brigade striv- ing to cover the opening, but the enemy dashed at it as Anderson came up the slope, and the left being taken in flank, the whole broke again to the rear.^ Ricketts's right was also imperilled, and he withdrew his exhausted lines to reorganize and to fill their empty cartridge-boxes. ^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 258. * Id., pp. 269, 270. 31 8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR There was a lull in the battle, and the combatants on both sides were making desperate efforts to reform their broken regiments. Mansfield had called the Twelfth Corps to arms at the first sound of Hooker's battle and marched to his aid.* It consisted of two divisions, Williams's and Greene's, the first of two and the other of three brigades. There were a number of new and undrilled regiments in the command, and in hastening to the front in columns of battalions in mass, proper intervals for deployment had not been preserved, and time was necessarily lost before the troops could be put in line. Indeed, some of them were not regularly deployed at all. They had left their bivouac at sunrise which, as it was about the equinox, was not far from six o'clock. They had marched across the country without reference to roads, always a very slow mode of advancing, and doubly so with undrilled men. The untrained regiments must, in the nature of things, have been very much like a mob when their so- called columns-in-mass approached the field of battle. It is impossible to reconcile the statements of the re- ports as to the time they became engaged. General Williams says they were engaged before seven o'clock.* General Meade says they relieved his men not earlier than ten or eleven.^ It seems to be guesswork in both cases, and we are forced to judge from circumstantial evidence. Ricketts thinks he had been fighting four hours when he retired for lack of ammunition, and the Twelfth Corps men had not yet reached him.* Patrick, on the extreme right, says that his men had made their coffee in the lull after his retreat to the sheltering ledge of rocks, and had completed their breakfast before the first of Mansfield's men joined him there. ^ The circum- 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 475. a Id., p. 476. 8 Id., p. 270. * Id., p. 259. 6 Id., p. 244. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT 319 stantial details given by several officers make the interval between the attack by the Twelfth Corps and the arrival of Sumner a very short one. It may be regarded as prob« able, therefore, that Hooker's battle covered the larger part of the time between six o'clock and the arrival of Sumner at about ten. On reaching the field, Mansfield had a brief consulta- tion with Hooker, resulting in his ordering Williams to form his division nearly as Doubleday's had been, and to advance with his right upon the turnpike. He himself led forward the left of Crawford's brigade, which was the first to arrive, and pushed toward the East Wood. The regiments were still in columns of companies, and though Williams had ordered them deployed, the corps com- mander himself, as Crawford says, countermanded this order and led them under fire in column.* He evidently believed Ricketts's men to be still holding the East Wood, and tried to keep his own from opening fire upon the troops that were seen there. At this moment he was mortally wounded, before the deployment was made. General Alpheus S. Williams, on whom the command devolved, was a cool and experienced officer. He has- tened the deployment of Crawford's and Gordon's bri- gades of his own division, sending one of the new and large regiments to assist the Pennsylvania regiment in holding the important position covering the right beyond the turnpike. As Greene's division came up, he ordered him to form beyond Gordon's left, and when deployed to move on the Dunker Church through the East Wood, guiding his left by the cloud of smoke from the Mumma house, which had been set on fire by D. H. Hill's men.* At Doubleday's request, he detached Goodrich's brigade from Greene, and sent it to Patrick on the right with orders to advance into the West Wood from its northern extremity. Patrick says the regiments came separately ^ O. R., Tol. xix. pt. i. p. 484. * Id., pp. 475, 1033. 320 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR and at considerable intervals,^ and it is not unlikely that the older regiments were sent in to relieve Hooker's men as fast as they were ready, and the more disorganized ones were obliged to delay till they could be got into some sort of shape. Williams made his first disposition of his troops according to Hooker's suggestion, but the latter received a serious wound in the foot, as it would seem, before the attack by the Twelfth Corps had begun. Hooker turned over the command to Meade, and a formal order confirming this was issued from McClellan's head- quarters later in the day.' So many of the regiments were carried under fire while still in column that not only was the formation of the line an irregular one, but the deployment when made was more diagonal to the turnpike than Hooker's had been, and the whole line faced more to the westward. But they advanced with a courage equal to the heroism al- ready shown on that field. The Confederates who now held the open space at the Dunker Chruch were Hood's two brigades, and the rest of Jackson's corps extended into the West Wood. Stuart had found his artillery posi- tion on the hill too far from Jackson's line, and the fight- ing was so near the church that he could not fire upon our men without hurting his own.^ He therefore moved further to the south and west, and Early carried his brigade (except the Thirteenth Virginia) back toward Ewell's division, which now came under his command by the disabling of General Lawton in the fight.* Williams's first line was a good deal shortened, and the divisions, guiding as well as they could upon Greene, crowded so far to the south that even Crawford's brigade, which was on the right of all, went partly through the East Wood advancing on a line nearly at right angles to the turnpike. The enemy had followed Ricketts's retir- * O. R., Tol. xix. pt. i. p. 2J^ * Id., pt. H. p. 31 5. > / ately in front of Greene, and Early was further to the right, opposing Goodrich and Patrick; Early, however, made haste under cover of the woods to pass around Sedg- wick's right and to get in front of him to oppose his progress.* This led to a lively skirmishing fight in which Early was making as great a demonstration as pos- sible, but with no chance of solid success. Sedgwick pushed him back, and his left was coming obliquely into the open at the bottom of the hollow beyond the wood, when, at the very moment, McLaws's and Walker's Con- federate divisions came upon the field. The former had only just arrived by rapid marching from Shepherdstown * O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 305. » Id., p. 305. a /onsibility for his acts. It was not till his report was published in the Official Records (1887)8 that I saw it or learned its contents, although I enjoyed his personal friendship down to 'lis death. He was content to have stated the fact as he knew it, and did not feel the need of debating it. The circum.«»tances ' O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 30, 61, 376. • Id,, p. 424. • Id., p. 416. VOL. I. — 22 338 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR have satisfied me that his accuracy in giving the hour was greater than my own.* It will not be wondered at, therefore, if to my mind the story of the eight o'clock order is an instance of the way in which an erroneous recollection is based upon the desire to make the facts accord with a thcor3^ The actual time must have been as much later than nine o'clock as the period during which, with absorbed attention, we had been watching the battle on the right, — a period, it is safe to say, much longer than it seemed to us. The judgment of the hour which I gave in my report was merely my impression from passing events, for I hastened at once to my own duties without thinking to look at my watch; whilst the cumulative evidence seems to prove, conclusively, that the time stated by Burnside, and by McClellan himself in his original report, is correct. The order, then, to Burnside to attack was not sent at eight o'clock, but reached him at ten; it was not sent to follow up an advantage gained by Hooker and Sumner, but to create, if possible, a strong diversion in favor of the imperilled right wing when the general outlook was far from reassuring. McClellan truly said, in his original report, that the task of carrying the bridge in front of Burnside was a difficult one.' The hill on which I have placed the sta- tion of General Burnside was the uolder and more promi- nent crest of the line of hills which skirted the Antietam on the east, and was broken by depressions here and there, through which the country roads ran down to the stream. Such a hollow was just at the south of Bum- side's position at the haystack on the Rohrback farm. In rear of him and a little lower down were the farm * Upon reflection, I think it probable that the order from McClellan was read to me, and that I thus got the hour of its date connected in my mind with the beginning of our attack. • O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 31. ANTIETAhf: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 339 buildings, and from these a road ran ii'>wn the winding hollow to the Antietam, but reached the stream several hundred yards below the bridge. Following the road, therefore, it was necessary to turn up stream upon the narrow space between the hills and the water, without any cover from the fire of the enemy on the opposite side. The bluffs on that side were wooded to the water's edge, and were so steep that the road from the bridge could not go up at right angles to the bank, but forked both ways and sought the upper land by a more gradual ascent to right and left. The fork to the right ran around a shoulder of the hill into a ravine which there reaches the Antietam, and thence ascends by an easy grade toward Sharpsburg. The left branch of the road rises by a simi- lar but less marked depression. These roads were faced by stone fences, and the depth of the valley and its course made it impossible to reach the enemy's position at the bridge by artillery fire from the hill -tops on our side. Not so from the enemy's posi- tion, for the curve of the valley was such that it was perfectly enfiladed near the bridge by the Confederate batteries at the position now occupied by the National Cemetery. The bridge itself was a stone structure of three arches with stone parapets on the sides. These curved outward at the end of the bridge to allow for the turn of the roadway. On the enemy's side, the stone fences came down close to the bridge. The Confederate defence of the passage was intrusted to D. R. Jones's division of six brigades,* which was the one Longstreet himself had disciplined and led till he was assigned to a larger command. Toombs's brigade was placed in advance, occupying the defences of the bridge itself and the wooded slopes above, while the other brigades supported him, covered by the ridges which looked down upon the valley. The division bat- * O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 804. 340 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR teries were supplemented by others from the enemy's reserve, and the valley, the bridge, and the ford below were under the direct and powerful fire of shot and snell from the Confederate cannon. Toombs's force, thus strongly supported, was as large as could be dis- posed of at the head of the bridge, and abundantly large for resistance to any that could be brought against it. Our advance upon the bridge could only be made by a narrow column, showing a front of eight men at most; but the front which Toombs deployed behind his defences was three or four hundred yards both above and below the bridge. He himself says in his report : * " From the nature of the ground on the other side, the enemy were compelled to approach mainly by the road which led up the river near three hundred paces parallel with my line of battle and distant therefr tn from fifty to a hundred and fifty feet, thus exposing his flank to a destructive fire the most of that distance." Under such circum- stances the Confederate position was nearly impregnable against a direct attack over the bridge; for the column approaching it was not only exposed at almost pistol- range to the perfectly covered infantry of the enemy and to two batteries which were assigned to the special duty of supporting Toombs, having the exact range of the little valley with their shrapnel ; but, if it should succeed in reaching the bridge, its charge ross it must be made under a fire ploughing through its length, the head of the column melting away as it advanced, so that, as every soldier knows, It could show no front strong enough to make an impression upon the enemy's breast- works, even if it should reach the other side. As a desperai >; sort of diversion in favor of the right wing, it might be justifiable; but I believe that no officer or man who knew the actual situation at that bridge thinks that a serious attack upon '..-. was any part of McClellan's > O. R., vol. xiz. pt. i. p. 890. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 34I original plan. Yet, in his detailed report of 1863, in- stead of speaking of it as the difficult task the original report had called it, he treats it as little different from a parade or march across which might have been done in half an hour. Burnside's view of the matter was that the front attack at the bridge was so difficult that the passage by the ford below must be an important factor in the task; for if Rodman's division should succeed in getting across there, at the bend of the Antietam, he would come up in rear of Toombs, and either the whole of D. R. Jones's divi- sion would have to advance to meet Rodman, or Toombs must abandon the bridge. In this I certainly concurred, and Rodman was ordered to push rapidly for the ford. It is important to remember, however, that Walker's Confederate division had been posted during the earlier morning to hold that part of the Antietam line, support- ing Toombs as well,* and it was probably from him that Rodman suffered the first casualties that occurred in his ranks. But, as we have seen. Walker had been called away by Lee only an hour before, and had made the hasty march by the rear of Sharpsburg to fall upon Sedg- wick. If therefore Rodman had been sent to cross at eight o'clock, it is safe to say that his column, fording the stream in the face of Walker's deployed division, would never have reached the further bank, — a con- tingency that McClellan did not consider when arguing, long afterward, the favorable results that might have followed an earlier attack. As Rodman died upon the field, no full report for his division was made, and we only know that he met with some resistance from both infantr)' and artillery; that the winding of the stream made his march longer than he anticipated, and that, in fact, he only apprc^ched the rear of Toombs's position from that direction about the time when our last and > O. R^ voL six. pt. i. p. 914. 342 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR successful charge upon the bridge was made, between noon and one o'clock. The attacks at the Burnside bridge were made under my own eye. Sturgis's division occupied the centre of our line, with Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division on his right front, and Willcox's division in reserve, as I have already stated. Crook's position was somewhat above the bridge, but it was thought that by advancing part of Sturgis's men to the brow of the hill, they could cover the advance of Crook, and that the latter could make a straight dash down the hill to our end of the bridge. The orders were accordingly given, and Crook advanced, covered by the Eleventh Connecticut (of Rod- man's) under Colonel Kingsbury, deployed as skir- mishers.^ In passing over the spurs of the hills. Crook came out on the bank of the stream above the bridge and found himself under a heavy fire at short range. He faced the enemy and returned the fire, getting such cover for his men as he could and trying to drive off or silence his opponents. The engagement was one in which the Antietam prevented the combatants from coming to close quarters, but it was none the less vigorously continued with musketry fire. Crook reported that his hands were full and that he could not appioach closer to the bridge. Later in the contest, his men, lining the stream, made •experiments in trying to get over, and found a fordable place a little way above, by which he got over five com- panies of the Twenty-eighth Ohio at about the same time as the final and successful charge. But on the failure of Crook's first effort, Sturgis ordered forward an attacking column from Nagle's brigade, supported and covered by Ferrero's brigade, which took position in a field of »;orn on one of the lower slopes of the hill opposite the head of the bridge. The whole front was carefully covered with skirmishers, and our batteries on the heights over- 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 419, 424. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 343 head were ordered to keep down the fire of the enemy's artillery. Nagle's effort was gallantly made, but it failed, and his men were forced to seek cover behind the spur of the hill from which they hid advanced.* We were constantly hoping to hear something from Rod- man's advance by the ford, and would gladly have waited for some more certain knowledge of his progress, but at this time McClellan's sense of the necessity of relieving the right was such that he was sending reiterated orders to push the assault. Not only were these forwarded to me, but to give added weight to my instructions, Burn- side sent direct to Sturgis urgent messages to carry the bridge at all hazards. I directed Sturgis to take two regiments from Ferrero's brigade, which had not been engaged, and make a column by moving them together by the flank, the one left in front and the other right in front, side by side, so that when they passed the bridge they could turn to left and right, forming line as they advanced on the run. He chose the Fifty-first New York, Colonel Robert B. Potter, and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel John F. Hartranft (both names afte. ward greatly distinguished), and both officers and men were made to feel the necessity of si'ccess.2 At the same time Crook succeeded in bring- ing a light howitzer of Simmonds's mixed battery down from the hill-tops, and placed it where it had a point- blank fire on the further end of the bridge. The howitzer was one we had captured in West Virginia, and had been added to the battery, which was partly made up of heavy rifled Parrott guns. When everything was ready, a heavy skirmishing fire was opened all along the bank, the howitzer threw in double charges of canister, and in scarcely more time than it takes to tell it, the bridge was passed and Toombs's brigade fled through the woods and over the top of the hill. The charging regiments were * O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 444. » Ibid. 344 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR advanced in line to the crest above the bridge as soon as they were deployed, and the rest of Sturgis's division, with Crook's brigade, were immediately brought over to strengthen the line. These were soon joined by Rod- man's division, with Scammon's brigade, which had crossed at the ford, and whose presence on that side of the stream had no doubt made the final struggle of Toombs's men less obstinate than it would otherwise have been, the fear of being taken in rear having always a strong moral effect upon even the best of troops. It was now about one o'clock, and nearly three hours had been spent in a bitter and bloody contest across the narrow stream. The successive efforts to carry the bridge had been as closely following each other as possible. Each had been a fierce combat, in which the men with wonderful courage had not easily accepted defeat, and even, when not able to cross the bridge, had made use of the walls at the end, the fences, and every tree and stone as cover, while they strove to reach with their fire their well-protected and nearly concealed opponents. The lulls in the fighting had been short, and only to prepare new efforts. The severity of the work was attested by our losses, which, before the crossing was won, exceeded 500 men, and included some of our best officers, such as Colonel Kingsbury of the Eleventh Connecticut, Lieu- tenant-Colonel Bell of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, and Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman of the Eleventh Ohio, two of them commanding regiments.- The proportion of casualties to the number engaged was much greater than common; for the nature of the combat required that comparatively few troops should be exposed at once, the others remaining under cover. Our next task was to prepare to hold the heights we had gained against the return assault of the enemy which we expected, and to reply to the destructive fire from 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 427. ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 345 the enemy's abundant artillery. Light batteries were brought over and distributed in the line. The men were made to lie down behind the crest to save them from the concentrated cannonade which the enemy opened upon us as soon as Toombs's regiments succeeded in reaching their main line. But McClellan's anticipation of an overwhelming attack upon his right was so strong that he determined still to press our advance, and sent orders accordingly. The ammunition of Sturgis's and Crook's men had been nearly exhausted, and it was imperative that they should be freshly supplied before entering into another engagement. Sturgis also reported his men so exhausted by their efforts as to be unfit for an immediate advance. On this I sent to Burnside the request that Willcox's division be sent over, with an ammunition train, and that Sturgis's division be replaced by the fresh troops, remaining, however, on the west side of the stream as support to the others. This was done as rapidly as was practicable, where everything had to pass down the steep hill-road and through so narrow a defile as the bridge.^ Still, it was three o'clock before these changes and preparations could be made. Burnside had personally striven to hasten them, and had come over to the west bank to consult and to hurry matters, and took his share of personal peril, for he came at a time when the ammunition wagons were delivering cartridges, and the road at the end of the bridge where they were was in the range of the enemy's constant and accurate fire. It is proper to mention this because it has been said that he did not cross the stream. The criticisms made by McClellan as to the time occupied in these changes and movements will not seem forcible if one will compare them with any similar movements on the field ; such as ^ As a mode of ready reckoning, it is usual to assume that a division requires an hour to march past a given point by the flank. With the cross- ing of an ammunition train, the interval of time is more than accounted for. 346 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Mansfield's to support Hooker, or Sumner's or Frank- lin's to reach the scene of action. About this, however, there is fair room for difference of opinion: what I per- sonally know is that it would have been folly to advance again before Willcox had relieved Sturgis, and that as soon as the fresh troops reported and could be put in line, the order to advance was given. McClellan is in accord with all other witnesses in declaring that when the move- ment began, the conduct of the troops was gallant beyond criticism. Willcox's division formed the right, Christ's brigade being north, and Welsh's brigade south of the road lead- ing from the bridge to Sharpsburg. Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division supported Willcox. Rodman's division formed on the left, Harland's brigade having the position on the flank, and Fairchild's uniting with Will- cox at the centre. Scammon's brigade was the reserve for Rodman at the extreme left.^ Sturgis's division re- mained and held the crest of the hill above the bridge. About half of the batteries of the divisions accompanied the movement, the rest being in position on the hill-tops east of the Antietam. The advance necessarily followed the high ground toward Sharpsburg, and as the enemy made strongest resistance toward our right, the move- ment curved in that direction, the six brigades of Jones's Confederate division being deployed diagonally across our front, holding the stone fences and crests of the cross-ridges and aided by abundant artillery, in which arm the enemy was particularly strong. The battle was a fierce one from the moment Willcox's men showed themselves on the open ground. Christ's brigade, taking advantage of all the cover the trees and inequalities of surface gave them, pushed on along the depression in which the road ran, a section of artillery keeping pace with them in the road. The direction of ^ O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 425, 43a ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 347 movement brought all the brigades of the first line in Echelon, but Welsh soon fought his way up beside Christ, and they together drove the enemy successively from the fields and farm-yards till they reached the edge of the village. Upon the elevation on the right of the road was an orchard in which the shattered and diminished force of Jones made a final stand, but Willcox concentrated his artillery fire upon it, and his infantry was able to push forward and occupy it. They now partly occupied the town of Sharpsburg, and held the high ground command- ing it on the southeast, where the National Cemetery now is.^ The struggle had been long and bloody. It was half-past four in the afternoon, and ammunition had again run low, for the wagons had not been able to accompany the movement. Willcox paused for his men to take breath again and to fetch up some cartridges; but meanwhile affairs were taking a serious turn on the left. As Rodman's division went forward, he found the enemy before him seemingly detached from Willcox's opponents, and occupying ridges on his left front, so that he was not able to keep his own connection with Willcox in the swinging movement to the right. Still, he made good progress in the face of stubborn resistance, though finding the enemy constantly developing more to his left, and the interval between him and Willcox wid- ening. The view of the field to the south was now ob- structed by fields of tall Indian corn, and under this cover Confederate troops approached the fliank in line of battle. Scammon's oflficers in the reserve saw them as soon as Rodman's brigades Echeloned, as these were toward the front and right. This hostile force proved to be A. P. Hill's division of six brigades, the last of Jackson's force to leave Harper's Ferry, and which had reached Sharps- burg since noon. Those first seen by Scammon's men * O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 431. 348 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR were dressed in the National blue uniforms which they had captured at Harper's Ferry, and it was assumed that they were part of our own forces till they began to fireJ Scammon quickly changed front to the left, drove back the enemy before him, and occupied a line of stone fences, which he held until he was afterward withdrawn from it.' Harland's brigade was partly moving in the corn-fields. One of his regiments was new, having been organized only three weeks, and the brigade had some- what lost its order and connection when the sudden attack came. Rodman directed Colonel Harland to lead the right of the brigade, while he himself attempted to bring the left into position. In performing this duty he fell, mortally wounded. Harland's horse was shot under him, and the brigade broke in confusion after a brief effort of its right wing to hold on. Fairchild also now received the fire on his left, and was forced to fall back and change front.' Being at the centre vhen this break occurred on the left, I saw that it would be impossible to continue the movement to the right, and sent instant orders to Will- cox and Crook to retire the left of their line, and to Sturgis to come forward into the gap made in Rodman's. The troops on the right swung back in p>erfect order; Scammon's brigade hung on at its stone wall at the extreme left with unflinching tenacity till Sturgis had formed on the curving hill in rear of. them, and Rod- man's had found refuge behind. Willcox's left then united with Sturgis, and Scammon was withdrawn to a new position on the left flank of the whole line. That these manoeuvres on the field were really performed in good order is demonstrated by the fact that although the break in Rodman's line was a bad one, the enemy was not. able to capture many prisoners, the whole number of missing, out of the 2349 casualties which the Ninth 1 O. R., vol. xiz. pt i. p. 468. > / men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it." It also required him to report immediately which line he adopted. Halleck, as General-in-chief, ought to have given his own decision as to the line of operations, but his characteristic inde- cision was shown in failing to do so. He did not even express an opinion as to the relative merits of the two lines, and limited himself to his concurrence in the order to move in one way or the other. McClellan replied on the 7th,^ saying that he had determined to adopt the Shenandoah line, though he wished to "state distinctly" that he should only use that line till the enemy should retire beyond Winchester, as he did not expect to be able to supply his army more than twenty or twenty-five miles beyond a railway or canal depot. If the enemy retreated, he would adopt some new and decisive line of operations. He objected to the interior line because it did not cover Maryland and Pennsylvania from a return of Lee's army, and because (as he said) the army could not be supplied by it. He indicated three days as the time within which he could move. At the end of that time he complained of still lacking clothing. On the 12th he found it "absolutely necessary " that the cavalry should have more horses. The discussion over these things ran on till the 21st. Mr. Lincoln made a strong effort to save McClellan from the effects of his mental deficiencies. He ex- hausted advice and exhortation. He even ventured upon mild raillery on the idleness of the army. On the 13th he had written a remarkable letter to McClellan, in 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. II. McCLELLAN AND POLITICS 373 which he reminded him of what had occurred between them at the Antietam and argued in favor of the interior line A movement.* He showed that Lee at Winchester supplied his army twice as far from his railway depot as McCIellan thought possible for the Army of the Potomac. Wk". urged the recognized advantage of operating by a line which attacked the enemy's communications. He pointed out that if Lee should try to cross the Potomac, our army could be in his rear and should destroy him. He showed that McCIellan at Harper's Ferry was nearer to Richmond than Lee: "His route is the arc of a circle of which yours is the chord." He analyzed the map and showed that the interior line was the easier for supplying the army : " The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington." He even gave the figures in miles from gap to gap in the mountains, which would enable McCIellan to strike the enemy in flank or rear; and this was of course to be done if Lee made a stand. " It is all easy," his letter concluded, " if our troops march as well as the enemy ; and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it." Yet he expressly disclaimed making his letter an order. ^ As a mere matter of military comprehension and judg- ment of the strategic situation, the letter puts Mr. Lincoln head and shoulders above both his military sub- ordinates. Halleck saw its force, but would not order it to be carried out. McCIellan shrank from the decisive vigor of the plan, though he finally accepted it as the means of getting the larger reinforcements. On the 2ist • O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 13. * Since writing this, I have had occasion to treat this subject more fully, as bearing upon Mr, Lincoln's military judgment and intelligence, in a review of Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, "The Nation," Nov. 24, Dec. i, 1898, ^ 374 RElUlNlSCEf/CES OF THE CIVIL WAK of October the discussion of cavalry horses was pretty well exhausted, and McClellan telegraphed Hallcck * that in other respects he was nearly ready to move, and inquires whether the President desired him to march on the enemy at once or to wait the arrival of the new horses. Halleck answered that the order of the 6th October remained unchanged. "If you have not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move and on what lines you propose to march." This dispatch was plainly a notice to McClellan that he would be held responsible for the failure to obey the order of the 6th unless he could exon- erate himself by showing that he could not obey it. In his final report, however, he says that he treated it as authority to decide for himself whether or not it was possible to move with safety to the army;* "and this responsibility," he says, "I exercised with the more con- fidence in view of the strong assurance of his trust in me, as commander of that army, with which the President had seen fit to honor me during his last visit." Argu- ment is superfluous, in view of the correspondence, to show that orders and exhortations were alike wasted. The movement began in the last days of October, the Sixth Corps, which was in the rear, crossing the Potomac on the 2d of November. McClellan had accepted Mr. Lincoln's plan, but lack of vigor in its execution broke down the President's patience, and on the 5th of Novem- ber, upon Lee's recrossing the Blue Ridge without a battle, he ordered the general to turn over the command to Burnside, as he had declared he would do if Lee's was allowed to regain the interior line. The order was pre- sented and obeyed on the 7th, and McClellan left the 1 O. R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 81. » /Ud. McCLELLAN AND POLITICS. 375 army. The fallen general brooded morbidly over it all for twenty years, and then wrote his "Own Story," a most curious piece of self-exposure, in which he uncon- sciously showed that the illusions which had misguided him in his campaigns were still realities to him, and that he had made no use of the authentic facts which Con- federate as well as National records had brought within his reach. He had forgotten much, but he had learned nothing. >A CHAPTER XVIII PERSONAL RELATIONS OF McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER Intimacy of McClellan and Burnside — Private letters in the official files — Bumside's mediation — His self-forgetful devotion — The movement to join Pope — Burnside forwards Porter's dispatches — His double refusal of the command — McClellan suspends the organization of wings — His relations to Porter — Lincoln's letter on the subject — Fault-finding with Burnside — Whose work? — Bumside's appearance and bearing in the field. McCLELLAN and Burnside had been classmates at West Point, and had been associated in railway employment after they had left the army, in the years immediately before the war. The intimacy which began at the Academy had not only continued, but they had kept up the demonstrative boyish friendship which made their intercourse like that of brothers. They were " Mac" and " Burn" to each other when I knew them, and al- though Fitz-John Porter, Hancock, Parker, Reno, and Pleasonton had all been members of the same class, the two seemed to be bosom friends in a way totally different from their intimacy with the others. Probably there was no one outside of his own family to whom McClellan spoke his secret thoughts in his letters, as he did to Burnside. The characteristic lack of system in business which was very noticeable in Burnside, made him negli- gent, apparently, in discriminating between official letters and private ones, and so it happens that there. are a num- ber in the official records which were never meant to reach the public. They show, however, as nothing else could. McCLELLAN, BURNSWE, AND PORTER 377 the relations which the two men sustained to each other, ant! reveal strong traits in the characters of both. After Burnside had secured his first success in the Roanoke expedition, he had written to McClollan, then in the midst of his campaign of the peninsula, and this was McClellan's reply on the 21st of May, 1862:* — " My Dear Burn, — Your dispatch and kind letter received. I have instructed Seth [Williams] to reply to the official letter, and now acknowledge the kind private note. It always does me good, in the midst of my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched old scrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend with, but have met them with a good heart, liki: >our good old self, and have thus far sUiiggled through successfrlly. ... I feel very proud of York- town : it and Manassas will be my brightest chaplets in history, for I know that I accomplished everything in both places by pure mili- tary skill. I am very proud, and very grateful to God that he allowed me to purchase such great success at so trifling a loss of life. . . . The crisis cannot long be deferred. I pray for Gcd's blessing on our arms, and rely far niore on his goodness than I do on my own poor intellect. I sometimes think, now, that I can almost realize that Mahomet was sincere. When I see the hand of God guarding one so weak as myself, I can almost think myself a chosen instrument to carry out his schemes. Would that a better man had been selected. . . Good-bye and God bless you, Bum. With the sincere hope that we may soon shake hands, I am, as ever. Your sincere friend, McClellan." When McClellan reached the James River after the seven days' battles, the first suggestion as to reinforcing him was that Burnside should bring to his aid the bulk of his little army in North Carolina. This was determined upon, and the Ninth Corps was carried by sea to Fortress Monroe. As soon as the movement was started, Burnside hastened in advance to Washington, and on returning to the fortress wrote McClellan as follows:* — * O. R., vol ix. p 392. 2 O. S., p. 472- 378 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR "Old Point, July 15, 1862. My dear Mac, — I have just arrived from Washington, and have not time to get ready to go up this morning, but will to-mor- row. I 've much to say to you and am very anxious to see you. . . . The President has ordered me to remain here for the present, and when I asked him how long, he said five or six days. I don't know what it means ; but I do know, my dear Mac, that you have lots of enemies. But you must keep cool ; don't allow them to provoke you into a quarrel. You must come out all right ; I *11 tell you all to-morrow. Your old friend, Burn." He went up the river to Harrison's Landing and stayed a couple of days, consulting with McClellan as to the situation. He returned to Old Point Comfort on the 1 8th, and immediately telegraphed to the War Depart- ment for leave to go to Washington and present the results of his conference with McClellan.^ This was granted, and he again presented himself before the Pres- ident and Secretary Stanton as the friend of McClellan. He urged the increase of McClellan's army to an extent which would make the general resume the aggressive with confidence. Halleck visited McClellan at once after assuming command as general-in-chief, but satisfied him- self that the government could not furnish the thirty thousand additional troops which McClellan then de- manded. ^ This led to the decision to bring the Army of the Potomac back by water, and to unite it with Pope's army on the Rappahannock. On this visit to Washington the President and Secre- tary of War had offered to Burnside himself the command of the Army of the Potomac. He had refused it, earnestly asserting his faith that McClellan was much fitter for the command than he, and trving hard to restore confidence and a mutual good understanding between his friend and the government. He was discouraged at the result, and O. R., vol. xi, pt. ill p. 326. " Id., p. 337. McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER 379 after he returned to his command wrote a letter, every line of which shows his sadness and his disinterested friendship, for he does not mention, much less take credit to himself for, the refusal to supersede his friend.^ " Fort Monroe, Aug. 2, 1862. My dear Mac, — I 'm laid up with a lame leg, and besides am much worried at the decision they have chosen to make in regard to your army. From the moment I reached Washington I feared it would be so, and I am of the opinion that your engineers ' had much to do with bringing about the determination. When the conclusion was arrived at. I was the only one who advocated your forward movement. I speak now as if a positive decision had been arrived at, which I do not know, and you of course do ; my present orders indicate it. But you know what they are and all about it, so I will accept it as something that is ordered for the best. Let us continue to give our undivided support to the cause and all will be well. It looks dark sometimes, but a just God will order everything for the best. We can't expect to have it all as we wish. I 'm off for my destination, and will write you a long letter from there. The troops are nearly all embarked. Good- bye. God bless you ! Your old friend, A. E. Burnside." Burnside was sent with the Ninth Corps to Falmouth on the Rappahannock. Porter's corps joined him there, and both the corps were sent forward to Warrenton to join Pope. When Pope's communication with Wash- ington was cut, it was only through Burnside that the government could hear of him for several days, and in response to the calls for news he telegraphed copies of Porter's dispatches to him. Like McClellan's private letters, these dispatches told more of the writer's mind and heart than would willingly have been made public. * O. S., p. 472. ^ This hints at General Barnard's unfavorable criticisms of McClellan's management, which led to a request by the latter to have another officer ^signed as chief engineer. See Halleck to McClellan, Aug. 7, 1862. O. R, vol. xi. pt. iii. p. 359. 38o REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Burnside's careless outspoken frankness as to his own opinions was such that he probably did not reflect what reticences others might wish to have made. Perhaps he also thought that Porter's sarcasms on Pope, coming from one who had gained much reputation in the peninsula, would be powerful in helping to reinstate McClellan. At any rate, the dispatches were the only news from the battle-field he could send the President in answer to his anxious inquiries, and he sent them. They were the cause of Mr. Lincoln's request to McClellan, on Septem- ber I St, that he would write Porter and other friends begging them to give Pope loyal support. They were also the most damaging evidence against Porter in his subsequent court-martial. Before the Maryland campaign began, Mr. Lincoln again urged upon Burnside the command of the army, and he again declined, warmly advocating McClellan's retention as before. * His advocacy was successful, as I have already stated,* The arrangement that Burnside and Sumner were to command wings of the army of at least two corps each, was made before we left Wash- ington, and Burnside's subordinates. Hooker and Reno, were, by direction of the President, assigned to corps commands through orders from army headquarters.^ McClellan did not publish to the Army of the Potomac this assignment of Burnside and Sumner till the 14th of September, though it had been acted upon from the be- ginning of the campaign.* On the evening of the same day Porter's corps joined the army at South Mountain, and before the advance was resumed on the following morning, the order was again suspended and Burnside reduced to the command of a single corps.* I have already suggested Hooker's relation to this, and only » c. W., vol. i. p. 650. » O. R., vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. i88, 197. 6 Id., p. 297. 2 Ante., p. 257. « / letter to Halleck, Sept. 4, 1864. " To-morrow is the day for the draft, and I feel more interested in it than in any event that ever transpired. I do think it has been wrong to keep our old troops so constantly ander fire. Some of these old regiments that we had at Shiloh and Corinth have been with me ever since, and some of them have lost seventy per cent in battle It looks hard to put these brigades, now numbering less than 800 men, into battle. They feel discouraged, whereas, if we could have a steady influx of recruits, the living would soon forget the dead. The wounded and sick are lost to us, for once at a hospital, they become worthless. It has been a Tery bad economy to kill off our best men and pay full wages and bounties to the drift and substitutes." O. R., vol. xxzviii. pt. v. p. 793. I CHAPTER XXI FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA — BURNSIDE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO Desire for field service — Changes in the Army of the Potomac — Judgment of McClellan at that time — Our defective linowledge — Changes in West Virginia — Errors in new organization — Embarrassments resulting — Visit to General Schenck — New orders from Washington — Sent to Ohio to administer the draft — Burnside at head of the department — District of Ohio — Headquarters at Cincinnati — Cordial relations of Governor Tod with the military authorities — System of enrolment and draft — Administration by Colonel Fry — Decay of the veteran regiments — Bounty-jumping — Effects on political parties — Soldiers voting — Burnside's military plane — East Tennessee — Rosecrans aiming at Chattanooga — Burnside's business habits — His frankness — Stories about him — His personal characteristics — Cincinnati as a border city — Rebel sympathizers — Order No. 38 — Challenged by Vallandigham — The order not a new departure — Lincoln's proclamation — General Wright's circular. MY purpose to get into active field service had not slept, and soon after the establishment of a winter organization in the district, I had applied to be ordered to other duty. My fixed conviction that no use- ful military movements could be made across the moun- tain region implied that the garrisons of West Virginia should be reduced to a minimum and confined to the duty of defending the frontier of the new State. The rest of the troops might properly be added to the active columns in the field. McClellan had been relieved of command whilst I was conducting active operations in the Kanawha valley, and Burnside suffered his repulse at Fredericks- burg within a few days after I was directed to make my headquarters at Marietta and perfect the organization of FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA 443 the district. I was therefore at a loss to choose where I would serve, even if I had been given cartt blancht to determine my own woric. Enough was known of the reasons for the President's dissatisfaction with McClcllan to make me admit that the change of command was an apparent necessity, yet much was unknown, and the full strength of the President's case was not revealed till the war was over. My personal friendship for McClellan remained warm, and I felt sure that Hooker as a com- mander would be a long step downward. In private I did not hesitate to express the wish that McClellan should still be intrusted with the command of the Poto- mac army, that it should be btrongly reinforced, and that by constant pressure upon its commander his indecision of character might be overcome. Those who were near to McClellan believed that he was learning greater self> confidence, for the Antietam campaign seemed a decided improvement on that of the Chickahominy. The event, in great measure, justified this opinion, for it was not till Grant took command a year later that any leadership superior to McClellan' s was developed. Yet it must be confessed that we did not know half the discouragements that were weighing upon the President and his Secretary of War, and which made the inertia of the Eastern army demand a desperate remedy. My personal affairs drifted in this way: the contest over the lists of promotions, of which I knew next to nothing, prevented any action on the request for a change of duty, and the close of the session of Congress brought the official notice that the promotion had expired by legal limitation.* The first effect was naturally depressing, and it took a little time and some philosophy to over- come it ; but the war was not ended yet, and reflection made the path of duty appear to be in the line of con- tinued active service. March 24th ; received the 30th. 444 KEAf/NrSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR To form a new department for General Schenck, West Virginia was detached from the Department of the Ohio and annexed to Maryland.* This was a mistake from a military point of view, for not only must the posts near the mountains be supplied and reinforced from the Ohio as their base, toward which would also be the line of retreat if retreat were necessary, but the frequent ad- vances of the Confederate forces, through the Shenandoah valley to the Potomac, always separated the West from any connection with Baltimore, and made it impossible for an officer stationed there (as General Schenck was) to direct affairs in the western district at the very time of greatest necessity. Another important fact was overlooked. The river counties of Ohio formed part of the district, and the depots on the river were supplied from Cincinnati. Not only was Gallipolis thus put in another department from the posts directly dependent on that depot as a base of supplies and the principal station for hospitals, but the new boundary line left me, personally, and my head- quarters in the Department of the Ohio. I at once called the attention of the War Department to these results, sending my communication in the first instance through General Wright. He was in the same boat with myself, for his rank had also been reduced on the 4th of March, but he thought the intention must have been to transfer me with the district to the Eastern Department. On this I wrote to Washington direct, asking for definite orders. I also wrote to General Schenck, telling him of General Wright's supposition that I was transferred with the district, and inquiring if he had any definite decision of the question.' About the 3d of April I was directed to report in per- son to General Schenck at Baltimore,' and reached that city on the 4th. My relations with General Schenck had > O. R., vol. XXV. pt. ii. p. 145. * Jd^ pp. 159, i6a * Id., p. \^\ FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA 445 been, personally, cordial, and our friendship continued till his death, many years after the war. Whatever plans he may have had were set aside by orders from Washing- ton, which met me at his headquarters, ordering me to report at Columbus, Ohio, to assist the governor in organizing the troops to be called out under the new enrolment and conscription law. This was accompanied by the assurance that this duty would be but temporary, and that my desire to be assigned to active field duty would then be favorably considered. It is not improb- able that my report on army organization, which has been mentioned, had something to do with this assign- ment; but I did not ask permission to visit Washington, though within a couple of hours' ride of the capital, and hastened back to my assigned post. Besides my wish to cut my connection with West Virginia on general mili- tary theories of its insignificance as a theatre of war, my stay there would have been intolerable, since General Milroy, in whose judgment I had less confidence than in that of any of my other subordinates, was, by the curious outcome of the winter's promotions, the one of all others who had been put over my head. I could not then fore- see the cost the country would pay for this in the next summer's campaign in the Shenandoah, but every instinct urged me to sever a connection which could bode no good. The reasonableness of my objection to serving as a subordinate where I had been in command was recognized, and the arrangement actually made was as acceptable as anything except a division in an active army. It greatly added to my contentment to learn that Gen- eral Bumside had been ordered to the Department of the Ohio, and would be my immediate superior. I hastened back to Marietta, closed up the business pending there, and went to Columbus on the 9th of April. The arrange- ment between Governor Tod and General Burnside proved 446 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR to be the formation of the Military District of Ohio, including the whole State. I was placed in command of this district, reporting directly to the general, who him- self conferred with the governor. My own relations to my superiors were thus made strictly military, which was a much pleasanter thing for me than direct connec- tion with the civil authorities would be; for this in- volved a danger of cross-purposes and conflicting orders. Brigadier-General John S. Mason, an excellent officer, was ordered to report to me as my immediate subordinate in command of the camps and the post at Columbus, and before the end of the month Burnside directed me to fix my own headquarters at Cincinnati, where I could be in constant communication with himself. All this was done with the most cordial understanding between Bum- side and the governor. Indeed, nothing could be more perfect than the genial and reasonable tone of Governor Tod's intercourse with the military officers stationed in Ohio. My duties under the Enrolment Act turned out to be very slight. The Act (passed March 3, 1863) made, in general, each congressional district an enrolment dis- trict under charge of a provost-marshal with the rank of captain. A deputy provost-marshal supervised the en- rolment and draft for the State, and the whole was under the control of the provost-marshal -general at Washington, Colonel James B. Fry. The law provided for classification of all citizens capable of military duty between the ages of twenty and forty-five, so as to call out first the unmarried men and those not having fami- lies dependent on them. The exemptions on account of physical defects were submitted to joard of three, of which the local provost-marshal waL chairman, and one was a medical man. Substitutes might be accepted in the place of drafted men, or a payment of three hundred dollars would be taken in place of personal service, that FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA 447 sum being thought sufficient to secure a voluntary re- cruit by the government. The principal effect of this provision was to establish a current market price for substitutes. The general provisions of the law for the drafting were wise and well matured, and the rules for the subordinate details were well digested and admirably administered by Colonel Fry and his bureau. It was a delicate and difficult task, but it was carried out with such patience, honesty, and thoroughness that nothing better could be done than copy it, if a future necessity for like work should arise. There was no good ground for complaint, and in those cases where, as in New York, hostile polit- ical leaders raised the cry of unfairness and provoked collision between the mob and the National authorities, the victims were proved to be the dupes of ignorance and malice. The administration of the law was thoroughly vindicated, and if there were to be a draft at all, it could not be more fairly and justly enforced. There was room for difference of opinion as to some of the provisions of the law regarding exemption and sub- stitution, but the most serious question was raised by the section which applied to old regiments and which had nothing to do with the enrolment and draft. This sec- tion directed that when regiments had become reduced in numbers by any cause, the officers of the regiment should be proportionately diminished. As new regiments were still received and credited upon the State's liability under the draft, it of course resulted that the old regi- ments continued to decay. A public sentiment had been created which looked upon the draft as a disgrace, and the most extraordinary efforts were made to escape it. Extra bounties for volunteering were paid by counties and towns, and the combination of influences was so powerful that it was successful in most localities, and very few ioen were actually put in the ranks by the draft. 448 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR The offer of extra bounties to induce volunteering brought into existence "bounty-jumping," a new crime analogous to that of " repeating " at elections. A man would enlist and receive the bounty, frequently several hundred dollars, but varying somewhat in different places and periods. He would take an early opportunity to desert, as he had intended to do from the first. Chang- ing his name, he would go to some new locality and enlist again, repeating the fraud as often as he could escape detection. The urgency to get recruits and for- ward them at once to the field, and the wide country which was open to recruiting, made the risk of punish- ment very small. Occasionally one was caught, and he would of course be liable to punishment as a deserter. The final report of the provost-marshal-general mentions the case of a criminal in the Albany penitentiary, New York, who confessed that he had " jumped the bounty " thirty-two times. ^ Another evil incidental to the excessive stimulus of volunteering was a political one, which threatened seri- ous results. It deranged the natural political balance of the country by sending the most patriotic young men to the field, and thus giving an undue power to the dis- affected and to the opponents of the administration. This led to the State laws for allowing the soldiers to vote wherever they might be, their votes being certified and sent home. In its very nature this was a makeshift and a very dubious expedient to cure the mischief. It would not have been necessary if we had had at an early day a system of recruiting that would have drawn more evenly from different classes into the common service of the country. The military officers of the department and district had nothing to do with the enrolment and drafting, unless resistance to the provost-marshals should make 1 Provost-Marshal-General's Report, p. 153. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 4A9 military support for these officers necessary. We had hoped to have large camps of recruits to be organized and instructed, but the numbers actually drafted in Ohio, in 1863, were insignificant, for reasons already stated. Three or four very small post garrisons were the only forces at my command, and these were reduced to the minimum necessary to guard the prison camps and the depots of recruiting and supply. General Burnside had not come West with a purpose to content himself with the retiracy of a department out of the theatre of actual war. His department included eastern Kentucky, and afforded a base for operations in the direction of East Tennessee. Mr. Lincoln had never lost his eagerness and zeal to give assistance to the loyal mountaineers, and had arranged with Burnside a plan of co-operation with Rosecrans by which the former should move from Lexington, Ky., upon Knoxville, whilst the latter marched from Muifreesboro, Tenn., upon Chat- tanooga. This was better than the impracticable plan of 1 861, which aimed at the occupation of East Ten- nessee before Chattanooga had been taken, and the task was at last accomplished by the method now used. It was by no means the best or most economical method, which would have been to have but one strong army till Chattanooga were firmly in our hands, and then direct a subordinate column upon the upper Holston valley. It was utterly impossible to keep up a line of supply for an army in East Tennessee by the wagon roads over the mountains. The railroad through Chattanooga was in- dispensable for this purpose. But Mr. Lincoln had not fully appreciated this, and was discontented that both Buel) and Rosecrans had in turn paid little attention, as it seemed, to his desire to make the liberation of East Tennessee the primary and immediate aim of their cam- paigns. He had therefore determined to show his own faith in Burnside, and his approval of the man, by giving VOL. I. — 29 450 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR him a small but active army in the field, and to carry out his cherished purpose by having it march directly over the Cumberland Mountains, whilst Rosecrans was allowed to carry out the plan on which the commanders of the Cumberland army seemed, in the President's opinion, too stubbornly bent. Burnside's old corps, the Ninth, was taken from the Army of the Potomac and sent to Kentucky, and a new corps, to be called the Twenty-third, was soon author- ized, to contain the Tennessee regiments which had been in General Morgan's command, and two divisions made up of new regiments organized in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois under the last call for volunteers. To these were added several Kentucky regiments of different ages in service. General Parke, so long Burnside's chief of staff, was to command the Ninth Corps, and Major-General George L. Hartsuff was assigned to the Twenty-third. In a former chapter I have spoken of Hartsuff' s abilities as a staff officer in West Virginia.^ His qualities as a general officer had not been tri-^d. He was wounded at the beginning of the engagement at Antietam, where he commanded a brigade in Hooker's corps. ^ That was his first service under his appointment as brigadier, and he had necessarily been out of the field since that time. My own expectation was that he would make an excellent reputation as a corps commander, but it was not his fortune to see much continuous field service. His health was seriously affected by his wounds, and after a short trial of active campaigning he was obliged to seek more quiet employment. The establishment of my headquarters at Cincinnati threw me once more into close personal relations with Burnside, and enabled me to learn his character more intimately. His adjutant-general's office was on East Fourth Street, and most of the routine work was done 1 Chap, vi., ante. * Chap. XV., ante. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 45 1 there. The general had his own quarters on Ninth Street, where he had also an office for himself and his aides-de-camp. My own office and the official head- quarters of the district were or Broadway below Fourth, in the house now occupied by the Natural History Soci- ety. There was thus near half a mile between us, though I was but a little way from the adjutant-general of the department, through whose office my regular business with the general went. Burnside, however, loved to dis- cuss department affairs informally, and with the perfect freedom of unrestrained social intercourse. When he gave his confidence he gave it without reserve, and en- couraged the fullest and freest criticism of his own plans and purposes. His decisions would then be put in offi- cial form by the proper officers of the staff, and would be transmitted, though I was nearly always personally aware of what was to be ordered before the formal papers reached me. He had very little pride of opinion, and was perfectly candid in weighing whatever was contrary to his predilections; yet he was not systematic in his business methods, and was quite apt to decide first and discuss afterward. He never found fault with a subordi- nate for assuming responsibility or acting \. ithout orders, provided he was assured of his earnest good purpose in doing so. In such cases he would assume the responsi- bility for what was done as cheerfully as if he had given the order. In like manner he was careless of forms himself, in doing whatever seemed necessary or proper, and might pass by intermediate officers to reach immediately the persons who were to act or the things to be done. There was no intentional slight to any one in this : it was only a characteristic carelessness of routine. Martinets would be exasperated by it, and would be pretty sure to quarrel with him. No doubt it was a bad business method, and had its mischiefs and inconveniences. A story used to go the rounds a little 452 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR later that soldiers belonging to the little army in East Tennessee were sometimes arrested at their homes and sent back as deserters, when they would produce a fur- lough written by Burnside on a leaf of his pocket memo- randum-book, which, as they said, had been given by him after hearing a pitiful story which moved his sym- pathies. Such inventions were a kind of popular recog- nition of his well-known neglect of forms, as well as of his kind heart. There waw an older story about him, to the effect that, when a lieutenant in the army, he had been made post-quartermaster at some little frontier garrison, and that his accounts and returns got into such confusion that after several pretty sharp reminders the quarter- master-general notified him, as a final terror, that he would send a special officer and subject him and his papers to a severe scrutiny. As the story ran, Burnside, in transparent honesty, wrote a cordial letter of thanks in reply, saying it was just what he desired, as he had been trying hard to make his accounts up, but had to confess he could do nothing with them, but was sure such an expert would straighten them. In my own ser- vice under him I often found occasion to supply the formal links in the official chain, so that business would move on according to "regulations;" but any trouble that was made in this way was much more than com- pensated by the generous trust with which he allowed his name and authority to be used when prompt action would serve the greater ends in view. My habit was to go to his private quarters on Ninth Street, when the regular business of the day was over, and there get the military news and confer with him on pending or prospective business affecting my own dis- trict. His attractive personality made him the centre of a good deal of society, and business would drop into the background till late in the evening, when his guests voluntarily departed. Then, perhaps after midnight, he DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 453 would take up the arrears of work and dictate letters, orders, and dispatches, turning night into day. It not unfrequently happened that after making my usual official call in the afternoon, I had gone to my quarters and to bed at my usual hour, when I would be roused by an orderly from the general begging that I would come up and consult with him on some matter of neglected busi- ness. He was always brij;^,ht and clear in those late hours, and when he buckled to work, rapidly disposed of it. He did not indulge much in retrospect, and rarely re- ferred to his misfortunes in the Army of the Potomac. On one or two occasions he discussed his Fredericksburg campaign with me. The delay in sending pontoons from Washington to Falmouth, which gave Lee time to con- centrate at Fredericksburg, he reasonably argued, was the fault of the military authorities at Washington ; but I could easily see that if his supervision of business had been more rigidly systematic, he would have made sure that he was not to be disappointed in his means of cross- ing the Rappahannock promptly. As to the battle itself he steadily insisted that the advance of Meade's division proved that if all the left wing had acted with equal vigor and promptness, Marye's heights would have been turned and carried. It is due to him to repeat that in such discussions his judgment of men and their motives ^ was always kind and charitable. I never heard him say anything bitter, even of those whom I knew he distrusted. * At the time I am speaking of, Cincinnati was in a curious political and social condition. The advance through Kentucky of Bragg and Kirby Smith in the pre- ceding year had made it a centre for " rebel sympathizers." The fact that a Confederate army had approached the hills that bordered the river had revived the hopes and the confidence of many who, while wishing success to the Southern cause, had done sc in a vague and distant way. 454 HEM/N/SCEA'CES OF THE CIVIL WAR Now it seemed nearer to them, and the stimulus to per. sonal activity was greater. There was always, in the city, a considerable and influential body of business men who were of Southern families; and besides this, the trade connections with the South, and the personal alliances by marriage, made a ground of sympathy which had noticeable effects. There were two camps in the community, pretty distinctly defined, as there were in Kentucky. The loyal were ardently and intensely so. The disloyal were bitter and not always restrained by common prudence. A good many Southern women, refugees from the theatre of active war, were very open in their defiance of the government, and in their efforts to aid the Southern armies by being the bearers of intel- ligence. The " contraband mail " was notoriously a large and active one. Burnside had been impressed with this condition of things from the day he assumed command. His prede- cessor had struggled with it without satisfactory results. It was, doubtless, impossible to do more than diminish and restrain the evil, which was the most annoying of the smaller troubles attending the anomalous half- military and half-civil government of the department. Within three weeks from his arrival in Cincinnati, Burn- side was so convinced of the widespread and multiform activity of the disloyal element that he tried to subdue it by the publication of his famous General Order No. 38. The reading of the order gives a fair idea of the hostile influences he found at work, for of every class named by him there were numerous examples.^ It was no doubt 1 The text of the order is as follows : . U -: " General Orders. I Headquarters Department of th'? Ohio. No. 38. ) • Cincinnati, Ohio, April 13, 1863. The con.\manding general publishes, for the information of all concerned, that hereafter all persons found within our lines who commit acts for the benefit of the ciiej:.-.iv.-3 of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, wil' suffer death. This order includes the following classes of persons : Carriers of secret mails ; writers of letters sent by secret mails '• DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 455 true that the Confederate authorities had constant corre- spondence with people in the Northern States, and that systematic means were used to pass information and con- traband merchandise through the lines. Quinine among drugs, and percussion caps among ordnance stores were the things they most coveted, and dealers in these car- ried on their trade under pretence of being spies for each side in turn. But besides these who were merely mer- cenary, there were men and women who were honestly fanatical in their devotion to the Confederate cause. The women were especially troublesome, for they often seemed to court martyrdom. They practised on our forbearance to the last degree ; for they knew our extreme unwilling- ness to deal harshly with any of their sex. Personally, I rated the value of spies and informers very low, and my experience had made me much more prone to contempt than to fear of them. But examples had to be made occasionally; a few men were punished, a few women who belonged in the South were sent through the lines, and we reduced to its lowest practical terms an evil and nuisance which we could not wholly cure. The best remedy for these plots and disturbances at the rear always was to keep the enemy busy by a vigorous aggres- sive at the front. We kept, however, a species of provost court pretty actively at work, and one or two secret recruiting officers within the lines ; persons who have entered into an agreement to pass our lines for the purpose of joining the enemy ; persons found concealed within our lines, belonging to the service of the enemy; and, in fact, all persons found improperly within our lines who could give private infcmation to the enemy; and all persons within our lines who harbor, protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies of our country. The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offences will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends. It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department. All officers and soldiers are strictly charged with the execution of this order. By command of Major-General Burnside, Lewis Richmond, Assistant Adjutant GeneraL" 45^ REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR officers were assigned to judge-advocate's duty, who ran these courts under a careful supervision to make sure that they should not fall into indiscretions. So long as the hand of military power was laid only on private persons who were engaged in overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the rebellion in the ways specified in Order No. 38, there was little criticism. But the time came when General Burnsidc seemed to be chal- lenged by a public character of no little prominence to enforce his order against him. The Vallandigham case became the sensation of the day, and acquired a singular historical importance. The noise which was made about it seemed to create a current opinion that Burnside's action was a new departure, and that his Order No. 38 was issued wholly on his own responsibility. This was not so. In the preceding year, and about the time of his Emancipation Proclamation, the President had also pro- claimed against treasonable practices in very emphatic terms. He had declared that " all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, afford- ing aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commission." ^ Burnside's order was in strict accordance with this authority, and he had no ultimate responsibility for the policy thus proclaimed. He was simply reiterating and carrying out in his department the declared purpose of the administration. Even in the matter of newspaper publications, his predecessor. General Wright, had felt obliged, upon Bragg and Kirby Smith's invasion of Ken- 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi. p. 98. See also Order No. 42 of General Burbridge, commanding District of Kentucky. O. R., vol. xxxix. pt. ii. p. 27. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO 457 tucky, to put a stop to treasonable editorials and to the publication of military information likely to benefit the enemy. He issued a circular on September 13, 1862, notifying the publishers of the Cincinnati papers that the repetition of such offence would be immediately fol- lowed by the suppression of the paper and the arrest and confinement of the proprietors and writers.^ It is neces- sary to keep these facts in mind if we would judge fairly of Burnside's responsibility when it was his fortune to apply the rule to a case attracting great public attention. 1 O. R., vol. xTi. pt. ii. p. 514. See a characteristic letter by Sherman on this subject, Id., vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 765: " Now I am again in authority over you, and you must heed my advice. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, precious relics of former history, must not be construed too largely. You must print nothing that prejudices government or excites envy, hatred, and malice in a community. Persons in office or out of office must not be flattered or abused. Don't publish an account of any skirmish, battle, or movement of an army, unless the name of the writer is given in full and printed. I wish you success; but my first duty is to maintain ' order and harmony.' " (To editors of " Memphis Bulletin.") r-^ vA CHAPTER XXII THE VALLANDIGHAM CASE — THE HOLMES COUNTY WAR Clement L. Vallandigham — His opposition to the war. — His theory of reconstruction — His Mount Vernon speech — His arrest — Sent before the military commission — General Potter its president — Counsel for the prisoner — The line of defence — The judgment — Habeas Corpus proceedings — Circuit Court of the United States — Judge Leavitt denies the release — Commutation by the President — Sent beyond the lines — Conduct of Confederate authorities — Vallandigham in Canada — Candi- date for Governor — Political results — Martial law — Principles under- lying it — Practical application — The intent to aid the public enemy — The intent to defeat the draft — Armed resistance to arrest of de- serters, Noble County — To the enrolment in Holmes County — A real insurrection — Connection of these with Vallandigham's speeches — The Supreme Court refuses to interfere — Action in the Milligan case after the war — Judge Davis's personal views — Knights of the Golden Circle — The Holmes County outbreak — Its suppression — Letter to Judge Wclker. CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM had been repre- sentative in Congress of the Montgomery County district of Ohio, and lived at Dayton. He was a man of ^> .^ intense and saturnine character, belligerent and denuncia- tory in his political speeches, and extreme in his views. He was the leader in Ohio of the ultra element of oppo- sition to the administration of Mr. Lincoln, and a bitter opponent of the war. He would have prevented the secession of the Southern States by yielding all they de- manded, for he agreed with them in thinking that their demands for the recognition of the constitutional invio- lability of the slave system were just. After the war began he still advocated peace at any price, and vehe- ^% VALLANDIGHAM CASE 459 mently opposed every effort to subdue the rebellion. To his mind the war was absolutely unconstitutional on the part of the national government, and he denounced it as tyranny and usurpation. His theory seemed to be that if the South were "let alone," a reconstruction of the Union could be satisfactorily effected by squelching the anti-slavery agitation, and that the Western States, at any rate, would find their true interest in uniting with the South, even if the other Northern States should refuse to do so. Beyond all question he answered to the old description of a " Northern man with Southern prin- ciples," and his violence of temper made it all a matter of personal hatred with him in his opposition to the leaders of the party in power at the North. His denunciations were the most extreme, and his expressions of contempt and ill-will were wholly unbridled. He claimed, of course, that he kept within the limits of a "constitutional opposition," because he did not, in terms, advise his hearers to combine in armed opposition to the government. About the first of May he addressed a public meeting at Mount Vernon in central Ohio, where, in addition to his diatribes against the Lincoln administration, he de- nounced Order No. 38, and Burnside as its author. His words were noted down in short-hand by a captain of volunteers who was there on leave of absence from the army, and the report was corroborated by other reputable witnesses. He charged the administration with design- ing to erect a despotism, with refusing to restore the Union when it might be done, with carrying on the war for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites. He declared that the provost-marshals for the congressional districts were intended to restrict the liberties of the people; that courts-martial had already usurped power to try citizens contrary to law; that he himself would never submit to the orders of a military dictator, and such were Burnside and his subordinates; 46o REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR that if those in authority were allowed to accomplish their purposes, the people would be deprived of their liberties and a monarchy established. Such and like ex- pressions, varied by "trampling under his feet" Order No. 38, etc., made the staple of his incendiary speech. When the report was made to Burnside and he had satisfied himself of its substantial truth, he promptly accepted the challenge to test the legality of his order, and directed the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. It was characteristic of him that he did not consult with his subordinates or with lawyers. He did not even act through my district organization, but sent his own aide- de-c?imp with a guard to make the arrest at Dayton. My recollection is that I did not know of the purpose till it was accomplished. His reason for direct action, no doubt, was that if there were many links in the chain of routine, there were multiplied chances of failure. He did not want to be baffled in the arrest, or to give the opportu- nity for raising a mob, which there would be if his pur- poses were to become known in advance. The arrest was made in the early morning of the 5th of May, before dawn, and the prisoner was brought to Cincinnati. He was at first taken under guard to the Burnet House, where he breakfasted, and was then put in the military prison connected with the houses used as barracks for the troops in the city. A military commis- sion had been ordered on the 21st of April from Depart- ment Headquarters for the trial of the classes of offenders named in Order No. 38, and of this commission Brigadier- General R. B. Potter of the Ninth Corps was President. General Potter was a distinguished officer throughout the war. He was a brother of Clarkson N. Potter, the promi- nent lawyer and Democratic member of Congress later, and both were sons of the Episcopal Bishop Potter of Pennsylvania. The character of the whole court was very high for intelligence and standing. Before this VALLANDIGHAM CASE 46 1 court Mr. Vallandigham was arraigned on the charge of publicly expressing sympathy with those in arms against the government, and uttering disloyal sentiments and opinions with intent to weaken the power of the govern- ment in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. Vallandigham consulted with the Hon. George E. Pugh and others as his counsel, and then adopted the course of protesting against the jurisdiction of the court and against the authority for his arrest. His grounds were that he was not amenable to any military jurisdic- tion, and that his public speech did not constitute an offence known to the Constitution and laws. To avoid the appearance of waiving the question of jurisdiction, his counsel did not appear, though offered the opportu- nity to do so, and Mr. Vallandigham cross-examined the witnesses himself, and called those who testified for him. The question of fact raised by him was that he had not advised forcible resistance to the govermncnt, but had urged action at the elections by defeating the party in power at the polls. That he did not in terms advocate insurrection was admitted by the judge advocate of the court, but the commi.ssion were persuaded that the effect of his speech was intended and well calculated to be incendiary, and to arouse any kind of outbreak in sym- pathy with the armed enemies of the country. The trial ended on the 7th of May, but the judgment was not pro- mulgated till the i6th, proceedings in habeas corpus hav- ^/T ing intervened. The finding of the court was that the ^ ' prisoner was guilty, as charged, and the sentence was close confinement in Fort Warren, Boston harbor, during the continuance of the war. On the 9th of May Mr. Pugh made application to the United States Circuit Court, Judge Leavitt sitting, for a writ of habeas corpus directed to General Burnside, in order that the lawfulness of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest and trial might be tested. The court directed notice of 'i'-;,': '• 462 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the application to be given to the general, and set the nth for the hearing. The case was elaborately argued by Mr. Pugh for the prisoner, and by Mr. Aaron F. Perry and the District Attorney Flamen Ball for General Burnside. The hearing occupied several days, and the judgment of the court was given on the morning of the i6th. Judge Leavitt refused the writ on the ground that, civil war being flagrant in the land, and Ohio being under the military command of General Burnside by appointment of the President, the acts and offences described in Gen- eral Order No. 38 were cognizable by the military author- ities under the powers of war. General Burnside had awaited the action of the court, and now promulgated the sentence under the judgment of the military commission. Three days later (May 19th) the President commuted the sentence by directing that Mr. Vallandigham be sent "under secure guard, to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by him beyond our military lines, and that in case of his return within our line, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the term specified in his sentence." This was done accordingly. The Confederate officials adopted a careful policy of treating him courteously without acknowledging that he was one of themselves, and facilities were given him for running the blockade and reaching Canada. There he established himself on the border and put him- self in communication v/ith his followers in Ohio, by '^. whom he was soon nominated for the Governorship of the State. The case, of course, excited great public interest, and was, no doubt, the occasion of considerable embarrass- ment to the administration. Mr. Lincoln dealt with it with all that shrewd practical judgment for which he was so remarkable, and in the final result it worked to the political advantage of the National cause. Sending Vallandigham beyond the lines took away from him the VALLANDIGHAM CASE 463 personal sympathy which might have been aroused had he been confined in one of the casemates of Fort Warren, and put upon him an indelible badge of connection with the enemies of the country. The cautious action of the Confederates in regard to him did not tend to remove this : for it was very apparent that they really regarded him as a friend, and helped him on his way to Canada in the expectation that he would prove a thorn in Mr. Lincoln's side. The President's proposal to the leading politicians who applied to him to rescind the sentence, trat as a condition of this they should make certain declarations of the duty to support the government in a vigorous prosecution of the war, was a most telling bit of policy on his part, and took the sting entirely out of the accusations of tyranny and oppression. It must be admitted, however, that the case was one in which the administration ought to have left Bumside wholly untrammelled in carrying out the proclamation of September 25, 1862, or should have formulated a rule for its military officers, so that they would have acted only in accordance with the wishes of the government, and in cases where the full responsibility would be assumed at Washington. When Burnside arrested Mr. Vallandig- ham, the Secretary of War telegraphed from Washington his approval, saying, " In your determination to support the authority of the government and suppress treason in your department, you may count on the firm support of the President." ^ Yet when a little later Bumside sup- pressed the " Chicago Times " for similar utterances, the President, on the request of Senator Trumbull, backed by prominent citizens of Chicago, directed Burnside to revoke his action.'* This the latter did by General Order No. 9!, issued on the 4th of June. He read to me on June 7th a letter from Mr. Stanton, which practically revoked the whole of his Order No. 38 by directing him 1 O. R., vol, xxiii. pt. ii. p. 316. * Id., pp. 385, 386. ■•"^ 464 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR not to arrest civilians or suppress newspapers without conferring first with the War Department. This would have been very well if it had been done at the begin- ning; but to have it come after political pressure from the outside, and in so marked contradiction to the ap- proval first expressed, shows that there was no well-con- sidered policy. It put Burnside himself in an intolerable position, and, of course, made him decline further respon- sibility for such affairs in his department.* The whole question as to the right and the policy of military arrests and orders in such a time bristles with difficulties. Had I been consulted before Burnside took action, I should have advised him to collect carefully the facts and report them to Washington, asking for specific instructions. The subject called for directions which would be applicable in all the military depart- ments which included States out of the theatre of active warlike operations; an', .» application of military authority than we choose to resort to, unless circumstances should make it imperatively necessary. ... I am full of hope that the seditious designs of bad men will fail by reason of the returning sense of those who have been their dupes, and that the able and patriotic opinion of Judge Leavitt in the habeas corpus case will cause great numbers to take positive ground in favor of the government, who have hitherto been more or less under the influence of our northern traitors. If such shall be the result we can a£ford to overlook bygones, and I am inclined to await the devel- opment of public sentiment before following up Vallan- digham's arrest by many others." This letter was written before the Secretary of War made any limitation of Bumside's authority in enforcing his famous order, and shows that in the District of Ohio, at least, there was no desire to set up a military des- potism, or to go further in applying military methods to conduct in aid of the rebellion than we might be forced to go. Burnside's action in suppressing disloyal newspapers was not peculiar to himself. General Wright, his prede- cessor, had done the same, and other military comman- dants, both before and after and in other parts of the country, had felt obliged to take the same course. These facts only make more clear the desirability of a well-con- sidered system of action determined by the government at Washington, and applicable to all such cases. .m.\. .. .-■ stf^* ■ CHAPTER XXIII BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS — THE SUMMER'S DELAYS Condition of Kentucky and Tennessee — Halleck's instructions to Burn- side — Blockliouses at bridges — Relief of East Tennessee — Condi- tions of the problem — Vast wagon-train required — Scheme of a railroad — Surveys begun — Burnside's efforts to arrange co-operation with Rosecrans — Bragg sending troops to Johnston — Halleck urges Rose- crans to activity — Continued inactivity — Burnside ordered to send troops to Grant — Rosecrans's correspondence with Halleck — Lincoln's dispatch — Rosecrans collects his subordinates' opinions — Councils of war — The situation considered — Sheridan and Thomas — Computation of effectives — Garfield's summing up — Review of the situation when Rosecrans succeeded Buell — After Stone's River — Relative torces — Disastrous detached expeditions — Appeal to ambition — The major- generalship in regular army — Views of the President justified — Bum- side's forces — Confederate forces in East Tennessee — Reasons for the double organization of the Union armies. BURNSIDE was not a man to be satisfied with quasi- military duty and the administration of a depart- ment outside of the field of active warfare. He had been reappointed to the formal command of the Ninth Corps before he came West, and the corps was sent after him as soon as transportation could be provided for it. He reached Cincinnati in person just as a raid into Kentucky by some 2000 Confederate cavalry under Brigadier-Gen- eral John Pegram was in progress. Pegram marched from East Tennessee about the middle of March, reach- ing Danville, Ky., on the 23d. He spread reports that he was the advance-guard of a large force of all arms intending a serious invasion of the State. These exag- gerations had their effect, and the disturbance in the Department of the Ohio was out of proportion to the ''h 474 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Strength of the hostile column.* The troops belonging to the post at Danville retreated to the hither side of the Kentucky River at Hickman's Bridge, where they took up a defensive position. They saved the railway bridge from destruction, and Brigadier-General Quincy A. Gillmore, who commanded the District of Central Ken- tucky with headquarters at Lexington, was able to con- centrate there a sufficient force to resume the offensive against Pegram. Burnside ordered reinforcements to Gillmore from the other parts of Kentucky, and Pegram, whose report indi- cates that a foray for beef, cattle, and horses was the principal object of his expedition, commenced his retreat. Gillmore followed him up vigorously, recapturing a con- siderable part of the cattle he had collected, and over- taking his principal column at Somerset, routed him and drove him beyond the Cumberland River. The month of March had begun with pleasant spring weather, and on the 15th General Wright had written to Halleck that an invasion of Kentucky was probable, espe- cially as Rosecrans showed no signs of resuming the aggressive against Bragg's army in middle Tennessee.^ In Halleck' s letter of instructions to Burnside as the latter was leaving Washington to relieve Wright, the general plan of an advance on East Tennessee in con- nection with that of Rosecrans toward Chattanooga was outlined, but the General-in-Chief acknowledged that the supply of an army in East Tennessee by means of the wagon roads was probably impracticable.' He pointed out the necessity of reducing the number and size of gar- risons in the rear, and making everything bend to the great object of organizing the army for active initiative against the enemy. He recommended building block- 1 Letter of Governor Robinson, O. R., toL zxiii. pt. ii. p. 97 ; Id., pp. 121, 126. « / O. R., vol. xxHL pt. ii. pp. 313. 315. * Id^ p- 33'- » Id., p. 337. « Id., p. 338. • Id^ p. 384. 478 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR of the Ninth Corps made about the number required, and they were immediately turned back and ordered to the Ohio River to be shipped on steamboats. Sorely dis- appointed, Burnside asked that he might go with his men, but was told that his departmental duties were too impor- tant to spare him from them.^ Major-General Parke was therefore sent in command of the corps. Burnside re- turned to Cincinnati, grieving at the interruption of his plans, yet hoping it would not be for long. His duties at the rear were not agreeable, especially as this was just the time when he was directed to recall his order suppressing disloyal newspapers, and to refrain from arrests of civilians without explicit authority from Washington. We may safely assume that the President and his War Secretary were as little pleased at having to order the Ninth Corps away as Burnside was to have them go. In fact the order was not made till they entirely despaired of making Rosecrans advance with the vigor necessary to checkmate the Confederates. On the receipt of Halleck's dispatch of the i8th May, Rosecrans entered into a tele- graphic discussion of the probable accuracy of Halleck's information, saying that whatever troops were sent by the enemy to Mississippi were no doubt sent from Charleston and Savannah and not from Bragg.'' He insisted that it was not good policy to advance at present. On the 2 1st he said, "If I had 6000 cavalry in addition to the mounting of the 2000 now waiting horses, I would attack Bragg within three days. '' He also interposed the unfavorable judgment of his corps commanders in regard to an advance. Military history shows that this is pretty uniformly an excuse for a delay already fully resolved on by a commanding general. Halleck had no more cavalry to send, and could only say so. Burnside notified Rose- crans on the 22d that his columns had begun the move- ments of concentration and that they would be complete 1 O. R, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 384, 386. » Id., p. 337. » Id., p. 351. BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS 479 in three or four days.^ On the 28th Mr. Lincoln himself telegraphed Rosecrans, " I would not push you to any rashness, but I am very anxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Bragg from getting off to help Johnston against Grant."* Rosecrans curtly answered, "Dispatch received. I will attend to it." In his dis- patches to Mr. Stanton of similar date there is no intima- tion of any purpose whatever to move.^ In telegraphing to Burnside, Rosecrans said that he was only waiting for the development of the former's concentration, and that he wished to advance by the 4th of June.* Burnside had already informed him that he would be ready by June 2d, and repeated it. On the date last named Rosecrans tele- graphed Burnside that his movement had already begun, and that he wanted the Army of the Ohio to come up as near and as quickly as possible.^ Still he gave no intima- tion to the authorities at Washington of an advance, for none had in fact been made by his army, nor even of any near purpose to make one. On June 3d, Halleck telegraphed him: "Accounts received here indicate that Johnston is being heavily reinforced from Bragg's army. If you can- not hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you." He followed this by his dispatch to Burnside ordering re- inforcements to be sent to Grant, and the remainder of the troops in the Department of the Ohio to be concentrated defensively in Kentucky.* The only move that Rose- crans made was to send on the 8th to his general officers commanding corps and divisions, a confidential circular asking their opinion in writing in answer to the following questions, in substance, — I. Has the enemy been so materially weakened that this army could advance on him at this time with strong reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle? 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 3^. * Id., p. 369. • Ibid. * Id, pp. 372, 376. 6 Id., p. 381. • /■ * Id., p. C .L. THE SUMMElVa DELAYS 487 of February showed the National forces to be 80,000,* the enemy 43,600.'' After this Bragg's army gradually in- creased till midsummer, when it reached a maximum of about 57,000, and Rosecrans's grew to 84,000. The Con- federates had a larger proportion of cavalry than we, but this was at the expense of being much weaker in infantry, the decisive arm in serious engagements. In fact this disproportion was another reason for active work, since experience showed that the enemy kept his cavalry at home when he was vigorously pushed, and sent them on raids to interrupt our communications when we gave him a respite. Our superiority in numbers was enough, there- fore, to make it entirely reasonable and in accord with every sound rule of conducting war, that the government should insist upon an active and aggressive campaign from the earliest day in the spring when the weather promised to be favorable. Such weather came at the beginning of March, and the Confederates took advantage of it, as we have seen, by sending Pegram into Kentucky. Their cavalry under Wheeler attacked also Fort Donelson, but were repulsed. A reconnoissance by a brigade under Colonel Coburn from Franklin toward Spring Hill re- sulted in the capture of the brigade by the Confederates under Van Dorn.* In the same month Forrest made a daring raid close to Nashville and captured Colonel Blood- good and some 800 men at Brentwood.* Rosecrans organized a raid by a brigade of infantry mounted on mules, commanded by Colonel Streight, with the object of cutting the railroad south of Chattanooga. It was delayed in starting till near the end of April, and was overtaken and captured near Rome in Georgia.^ These exasperating incidents were occurring whilst the Army of the Cumberland lay still about Murfreesboro, and its com- mander harassed the departments at Washington with the ' O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 93. "^ Id., p. 654. ^ Id., p. 115. * Id., pp. 171, 732. ' Id., pp. J32, 321. 488 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Story of his wants, and intimated that nothing but care- lessness as to the public good stood between him and their full supply. He v/as assured that he was getting his full share of everything which could be procured, — rifles, revolvers, carbines, horses, and equipments, — but the day of readiness seemed as far off as ever. On the 1st of March the President, feeling that the time had come when his armies should be in motion, and plainly discouraged at the poor success he had had in getting Rosecrans ready for an advance, authorized Gen- eral Halleck to say to him that there was a vacant major- generalcy in the regular army which would be given to the general in the field who should first win an important and decisive victory.^ The appeal to ambition was treated as if it had been an insult It was called an " auctioneer- ing of honor," and a base way to come by a promotion/ Halleck retorted conclusively that Rosecrans himself had warmly advocated giving promotion in the lower gp-ades only for distinguished services in the field, and said : " When last summer, at your request, I urged the government to promote you for success in the field, and, again at your request, urged that your commission be dated back to your services in West Virginia, I thought I was doing right in advocating your claim to honors for services rendered." ^ In view of this unique correspondence it is certainly curious to find Rosecrans a few days later enu- merating his personal grievances to Mr. Lincoln, and put- ting among them this, that after the battle of Stone's River he had asked " as a personal favor " that his com- mission as major-general of volunteers should be dated back to December, 1861, and that it was not granted.* It was considerably antedated, so as to make him outrank Gen- eral Thomas, much to the disgust of the latter when he learned it ; but the date was not made as early as Rose- 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 95. • Id., p. iii. « Id., p. 138. « Id., p. 146. THE SUMMER'S DELAYS 489 crans desired, which would have made him outrank Grant, Buell, and Burnside as well as Thomas. Persuasion and exhortation having failed, Grant must cither be left to take the chances that part of Bragg's army would be concentrated under Johnston in Mississippi, or he must be strengthened by sending to him that part of our forces in Kentucky and Tennessee which could most easily be spared. There can be no doubt that it was well judged to send the Ninth Corps to him, as it would be less mischievous to suspend Burnside's movement into East Tennessee than to diminish the Army of the Cumberland under existing circumstances. It is, however, indisputably clear that the latter army should have been in active campaign at the opening of the season, whether we con- sider the advantage of the country or the reputation of its commander. If we inquire what means the administration gave Burnside to perform his part of the joint task assigned him, we shall find that it was not niggardly in doing so. Hia forces were at their maximum at the end of May, when they reached but little short of 38,000 present for duty in his whole department.^ This included, however, all the great States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan as well as the eastern half of Kentucky, and there were several camps of prisoners and posts north of the Ohio which demanded considerable garrisons. Eight thousand men were used for this purpose, and nobody thought this an excess. Thirty thousand were thus left him for such posts in Kentucky as would be necessary to cover his communications and for his active column. He ex- pected to make his active army about 25,000, and the advance movements had begun when, as has been stated, he was ordered to suspend, and to send the Ninth Corps to Grant. The enemy in East Tennessee were under the command 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 380. 490 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR of General Dabney Maury at first, but when he was sent to Mobile, General S. B. Buckner was made the com- mandant. His returns of forces for May 31st show that he had 16,267 present for duty, with which to oppose the advance of Burnside. The information of the latter was that his opponent had 20,000, and he reckoned on having to deal with that number. The passes of the Cumberland Mountains were so few and so difficult that it was by no means probable that his campaign would be an easy one; yet the difficulties in the first occupation were not so serious as those which might arise if Bragg were able to maintain an interior position between the two National armies. In that case, iinless he were kept thor- oughly employed by Rosecrans, he might concentrate to crush Burnside before his decisive conflict with the Army of the Cumberland. This was the inherent vice of a plan which contemplated two independent armies attempt- ing to co-operate ; and if Rosecrans had been willing to open his campaign on the ist of March, it is almost certain that the troops in Kentucky would have been ordered to him. The President did not determine to send Burnside to the West and to give him a little army of his own till he despaired of the liberation of East Tennessee in that season by any activity of Rosecrans. This cannot be overlooked in any candid criticism of the summer's work. CHAPTER XXrV THE MORGAN RAID Departure of the staff for the field — An amusinglj quick return — Changes in my own duties — Expeditions to occupy the enemy — Sanders' raid into East Tennessee — His route — His success and return — The Con- federate Morgan's raid — His instructions — His reputation as a soldier — Compared with Forrest — Morgan's start delayed — His appearance at Green River, Ky. — Foiled by Colonel Moore — Captures Lebanon. — Reaches the Ohio at Brandenburg — General Hobson in pursuit — Morgan crosses into Indiana — Was this his original purpose? — His route out of Indiana into Ohio — He approaches Cincinnati — Hot chase by Hobson — Gunboats co-operating on the river — E£forts to block his way — He avoids garrisoned posts and cities — Our troops moved in transports by water — Condition of Morgan's jaded column — Approach- ing the Ohio at Buffington's — Gunboats near the ford — Hobson attacks — Part captured, the rest fly northward — Another capture — A long chase — Surrender of Morgan with the remnant — Summary of results — A burlesque capitulation. THE departure of General Burnside and his staff for active service in the field was quite an event in Cincinnati society. The young men were a set of fine fellows, well educated and great social favorites. There was a public concert the evening before they left for Lexington, and they were to go by a special train after the entertainment should be over. They came to the concert hall, therefore, not only booted and spurred, but there was perhaps a bit of youthful but very natural ostentation of being ready for the field. Their hair was Topped as close as barber's shears could cut it, they wore the reg- ulation uniform of the cavalry, with trim round-about jackets, and were the " cynosure of all eyes." Their part- ing words were said to their lady friends in the intervab of the music, and the pretty dramatic effect of it all 492 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR suggested to an onlooker the famous parting scene in " Belgium's capital " which " Childe Harold " has made so familiar. It was quite an anti-climax, however, when the gay young officers came back, before a week was over, crestfallen, the detaching of the Ninth Corps having suspended opera- tions in Kentucky. They were a little quizzed about their very brief campaign, but so good-humoredly that they bore it pretty well, and were able to seem amused at it, as well as the fair quizzers. In preparation for a lengthened absence, Burnside had turned over to me some extra duties. He ordered the District of Michigan to be added to my command, and gave general directions that the current business of the department headquarters should pass through my hands. As General Parke, his chief of staff, had gone to Vicksburg in command of the Ninth Corps, Burnside made informal use of me to supply in some measure his place. Our relations therefore became closer than ever. He hoped his troops would soon come back to him, as was promised, and in resuming business at the Cincinnati headquarters, he tried to keep it all in such shape that he could drop it at a moment's notice. To keep the enemy occupied he organized two ex- peditions, one under Brigadier-General Julius White into West Virginia, and the other under Colonel W. P. Sanders into East Tennessee, The latter was one of the boldest and longest raids made during the war, and besides keeping the enemy on the alert, destroying considerable military stores and a number of important railway bridges, it was a pre- liminary reconnoissance of East Tennessee and the ap- proaches to it through the mountains, which was of great value a little later. The force consisted of 15CX) mounted men, being detachments from different regiments of cavalry and mounted infantry, among which were some of the loyal men of East Tennessee under Colonel R. K. Byrd. THE MORGAN RAID 493 Sanders was a young officer of the regular army who was now colonel of the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry. He rapidly made a first-class reputation as a bold leader of mounted troops, but was unfortunately killed in the defence of Knoxville in November of this same year. His expedi- tion started from Mount Vernon, Kentucky, on the 14th of June, marched rapidly southward sixty miles to Williamsburg, where the Cumberland River was fordable. Thence he moved southwest about the same distance by the Marsh Creek route to the vicinity of Huntsville in Tennessee. Continuing this route southward some fifty miles more, he struck the Big Emory River, and follow- ing this through Emory Gap, he reached the vicinity of Kingston on the Clinch River in East Tennessee, having marched in all rather more than two hundred miles. Avoiding Kingston, which was occupied by a superior force of Confederates, he marched rapidly on Knoxville, destroying all the more important railway bridges. De- monstrating boldly in front of Knoxville, and finding that it was strongly held and its streets barricaded for defence, he passed around the town and advanced upon Straw- berry Plains, where a great bridge and trestle crosses the Holston River, 2100 feet in length, a place to become very familiar to us in later campaigning. Crossing the Holston at Flat Creek, where other bridges were burned, he moved up the left (east) bank of the river to attack the guard at the big bridge, the Confederate forces being on that side. He drove them off, capturing 150 of the party and five cannon. He not only destroyed the bridge, but captured and burnt large quantities of military stores and camp equipage. On he went along the railway to Mossy Creek, where another bridge 300 feet long was burned. He now turned homeward toward the north- west, having greatly injured a hundred miles of the East Tennessee Railroad. Turning like a fox under the guidance of his East Tennessee scouts, he crossed the 494 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Clinch Mountains and the valley of the Clinch, and made his way back by way of Smith's Gap through the Cum- berland Mountains to his starting-place in Kentucky. He had captured over 450 prisoners, whom he paroled, had taken ten cannon and icxx) stands of small arms which he destroyed, besides the large amounts of military stores which have been mentioned. He marched about five hundred miles in the whole circuit, and though fre- quently skirmishing briskly with considerable bodies of the enemy, hl^ losses were only 2 killed, 4 wounded, and 13 missing. Of course a good many horses were used up, but as a preliminary to the campaign which was to follow and in which Sanders was to have a prom- inent place, it was a raid which was much more profitable than most of them. He was gone ten days.^ The expedition under Brigadier-General Julius White was sent to beat up the Confederate posts in the Big Sandy valley and to aid incidentally the raid under Sanders into East Tennessee. Burnside sent another southward in the direction of Monticello, Kentucky. The object of these was to keep the enemy amused near home and pre- vent the raids his cavalry had been making on the railway line by which Rosecrans kept up his communication with Louisville. They seem rather to have excited the emula- tion of the Confederate cavalryman Brigadier-General John H. Morgan, who, a few days before Rosecrans's advance on Tullahoma, obtained permission to make a raid, starting from the neighborhood of McMinnville, Tenn., crossing the Cumberland near Burkesville, and thence moving on Louisville, which he thought he might capture with its depots of military stores, as it was sup- posed to be almost stripped of troops. His division con- sisted of about 3000 horsemen, and he took the whole of it with him, though Wheeler, his chief, seems to have limited him to 2000. His instructions were to make a 1 Sanders' Report, O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. L pp. 385, 386. THE MORGAN RAID 495 rapid movement on the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in Kentucky and to get back to his place in Bragg's army as quickly as possible.^ Morgan's reputation as a soldier was a peculiar one. He had made a number of raids which showed a good deal of boldness in the general plan and a good deal of activity in the execution, but it cannot be said that he showed any liking for hard fighting. Like boys skating near thin ice, he seemed to be trying to see how close he could come to danger without getting in. A really bold front showed by a small body of brave men was usually enough to turn him aside. It is instructive to compare his career with Forrest's. They began with similar grade, but with all the social and personal prestige in Morgan's favor. Forrest had been a local slave-trader, a calling which implied social ostracism in the South, and which put a great obstacle in the way of advancement. Both were fond of adventurous raids, but Forrest was a really daring soldier and fought his way to recognition in the face of stubborn prejudice. Morgan achieved notoriety by the showy temerity of his distant movements, but nobody was afraid of him in the field at close quarters. The official order to Morgan to start on his expedition was dated on the i8th of June, but he did not get off till the close of the month. It would seem that he remained in observation on the flank of Rosecrans's army as the left wing moved upon Manchester, and began his north- ward march after Bragg had retreated to Decherd on the way to Chattanooga. At any rate, he was first heard of on the north side of the Cumberland on the 2d of July, near Burkesville and marching on Columbia. Burnside immediately ordered all his cavalry and mounted infantry to concentrate to meet him, but his route had been chosen with full knowledge of the positions of our detachments and he was able to get the start of them. Brigadier-General 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 817. "\ 496 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR H. M. Judah.who commanded the division of the Twenty- third Corps which covered that part of our front, seems to have wholly misconceived the situation, and refused to listen to the better information which his subordinates gave him.* After a slight skirmish at Columbia, Morgan made for the Green River bridge at Tebb's Bend, an im- portant crossing of the Louisville Railroad. The bend was occupied by Colonel O. H, Moore of the Twenty-fifth Michigan Infantry, who, under previous instructions from Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson, intrenched a line across the neck of the bend, some distance in front of the stock- ade at the bridge. Morgan advanced upon the 4th of July, and after a shot or two from his artillery, sent in a flag demanding the surrender of Moore's little force, which amounted to only 200 men. Moore did not propose to celebrate the national anniversary in that way, and an- swered accordingly. The enemy kept up a lively skirmish- ing fight for some hours, when he withdrew.* Moore had beaten him off with a loss of 6 killed and 23 wounded of the brave Michigan men. He reported Morgan's loss at 50 killed and 200 wounded. The Confederate authorities admit that they had 36 killed, but put their wounded at only 46, an incredibly small proportion to the killed. The raiders continued their route to Lebanon, where was the Twentieth Kentucky Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Hanson, numbering less than 400 men, without artillery. A brigade ordered to reinforce the post delayed its advance, and Hanson was left to his own resources. After several hours of a lively skirmishing fight without much loss, he surrendered to save the village from destruc- tion by fire, which Morgan threatened. The loss in the 1 Sketches of War History, vol. iv. (Papers of the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion). A paper by Capt. H. C. Weaver, Sixteenth Kentucky Infantry, who was on the staff of Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson during the pursuit of Morgan. * O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 645. THE MORGAN RAID 497 post was 4 killed and 15 wounded.' Hanson reported 29 rebel dead left on the field and 30 wounded, also abandoned. No doubt others of the wounded were taken care of and concealed by their sympathizers in the vicinity. Some military stores had been burned with the railway station- house before Hanson surrendered. He and his men were paroled in the irregular way adopted by Morgan on the raid. Bardstown was the next point reached by the enemy, but Morgan s appetite for Louisville seems now to have diminished, and he turned to the westward, reaching the Ohio River on the 8th, at Brandenburg, some thirty miles below the city. The detachments of mounted troops which were in pursuit had been united under the com- mand of General Hobson, the senior officer present, and consisted of two brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Gen- eral J. M. Shackelford and Colonel F. Wolford. They approached Brandenburg on the evening of the 8th and captured the steamboat " McCombs " with a remnant of Mor- gan's men and stores the next morning when they entered the town. They saw on the opposite bank the smoking wreck of the steamboat " Alice Dean " which Morgan had set on fire after landing his men on the Indiana shore. The steamboat " McCombs " was sent to Louisville for other transports. A delay of twenty-four hours thus occurred, and when Hobson's command was assembled in Indiana, Morgan had the start by nearly two days.» It is claimed by Morgan's intimate friend and chronicler that he intended to cross the Ohio from the day he left camp in Tennessee, although it would be contrary to his orders ; ^ and that he had made investigations in advance in regard to fords on the upper Ohio and particularly at Buffington Island, where he ultimately tried to cross into ^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 649. * Hobson's Report, O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 659. • Id., p. 8i8. History of Morgan's Cavalry, by B. W. Duke, p. 41a VOL. I. — 32 498 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR West Virginia. If true, this would forfeit every clai'»^ on his part to the character of a valuable and intelligent subordinate; for operations on a large scale would be absolutely impossible if the commander of a division of cavalry may go ofif as he pleases, in disobedience to the orders which assign him a specific task. Except for this statement, it would be natural to conclude that when he approached Louisville he began to doubt whether the city were so defenceless as he had assumed, and knowing that twenty-four hours' delay would bring Hobson's forces upon his back, he then looked about for some line of action that would save his prestige and be more brilliant than a race back again to Tennessee. It is quite probable that the feasibility of crossing the Ohio and making a rapid ride through the country on its northern bank had been discussed by him, and conscious as he was that he had thus far accomplished nothing, he might be glad of an excuse for trying it. This interpretation of his acts would be more honorable to him as an officer than the deliberate and premeditated disobedience attributed to him. But whether the decision was made earlier or later, the capture of the steamboats at Brandenburg was at once made use of to ferry over his command, though it was not accomplished without some exciting incidents. A party of the Con- federates under Captain Hines had crossed into Indiana a few days before without orders from Morgan, being as independent of him, apparently, as he was of General Bragg. Hines's party had roused the militia of the State, and he had made a rapid retreat to the Ohio, reaching it just as Morgan entered Brandenburg. It may be that the lucky daredeviltry of Hines's little raid fired his com- mander's heart to try a greater one ; at any rate, Morgan forgave his trespass against his authority as he prayed to be forgiven by Bragg, and turned his attention to driving off the Indiana militia who had followed Hines to the bank of the river and now opened fire with a single cannon. THE MORGAN RAID 499 Morgan's artillery silenced the gun and caused the force to retreat out of range, when he put over two of his regiments, dismounted, to cover the ferrying of the rest. At this point one of the " tin-clad " gunboats of the river fleet made its appearance and took part in the combat. The section of Parrot guns in Morgan's battery proved an overmatch for it, however, and it retired to seek reinforce- ments. The interval was used to hasten the transport of the Confederate men and horses, and before further op- position could be made, the division was in the saddle and marching northward into Indiana. At the first news of Morgan's advance into Kentucky, Burnside had directed General Hartsuff, who commanded in that State, to concentrate his forces so as to capture Morgan if he should attempt to return through the central part of it.* Judah's and Boyle's divisions were put in motion toward Louisville, and the remainder of the mounted troops not already with Hobson were also hurried forward. These last constituted a provisional brigade under Colonel Sanders. It may help to under- stand the organization of the National troops to note the fact that all which operated against Morgan were parts of the Twenty-third Corps, which was composed of four divisions under Generals Sturgis, Boyle, Judah, and White. The brigades were of both infantry and mounted troops, united for the special purposes of the contemplated cam- paign into East Tennessee. For the pursuit of Morgan the mounted troops were sent off first, and as these united they formed a provisional division under Hobson, the senior brigadier present. Quite a number of the regi- ments were mounted infantry, who after a few months were dismounted and resumed their regular place in the infantry line. For the time being, however, Hobson had a mounted force that was made up of fractions of bri- gades from all the divisions of the corps ; and Shackelford, 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 13, 679, etc. 500 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Wolford, Kautz, and Sanders were the commanders of the provisional brigades during the pursuit. Its strength did not quite reach 3000 men.* Morgan's first course was due north, and he marched with some deliberation. On the loth he reached Salem, about forty miles from the river, on the railway between Louisville and Chicago.^ A small body of militia had assembled here, and made a creditable stand, but were outflanked and forced to retreat after inflicting on him a score of casualties. The evidences Morgan here saw of the ability of the Northern States to overwhelm him by the militia, satisfied him that further progress inland was not desirable, and turning at right angles to the road he had followed, he made for Madison on the Ohio. There was evidently some understanding with a detach- ment he had left in Kentucky, for on the nth General Manson, of Judah's division, who was on his way with a brigade from Louisville to Madison by steamboats under naval convoy, fell in with a party of Morgan's men seeking to cross the river at Twelve-mile Island, a little below Madison. Twenty men and forty five horses were cap- tured.' If any of this party had succeeded in crossing before (as was reported) they would o^ course inform their chief of the reinforcements going kl, T^adison, and of the gunboats in the river. Morgan made no attack on Madison, but took another turn northward in his zigzag course, and marched on Vernon, a railway-crossing some twenty miles from Madison, where the line to Indianapolis intersects that from Cincinnati to Vincennes. Here a militia force had been assembled under Brigadier-General Love, and the town was well situated for defence. Morgan, declining to attack, now turned eastward again, his course being such that he might be aiming for the river at Lawrenceburg or at Cincinnati. » O. R., Tol. ndii. pt. i. p. 658. « Id., pp. 717, 719. » Id., p» ii. pp. 729. 745. THE MORGAN RAID $01 The deviousness of his route had been such as to indicate a want of distinct purpose, and had enabled Hobson greatly to reduce the distance between them. Manson's brigade on the steamboats was now about 2500 strong, and moved on the 12th from Madison to Lawrence- burg, keeping pace as nearly as possible with Morgan's eastward progress. Sanders's brigade reached the river twenty miles above Louisville, and General Boyle sent transports to put him also in motion on the river. At the request of Burnside, Governor Tod, of Ohio, called out the militia of the southern counties, as Governor Morton had done vfk Indiana. Burnside himself, at Cincinnati, kept in constant telegraphic communication with all points, assembling the militia where they were most likely to be useful and trying to put his regular forces in front of the enemy. It would have been easy to let the slippery Confederate horsemen back into Kentucky. The force in the river, both naval and niilitary, unquestionably pre- vented this at Madison, and probably at Lawrenceburg. On the 13th Morgan was at Harrison on the Ohio State line, and it now became my turn as district commander to take part in the effort to catch him. I had no direct control of the troops of the Twenty-third Corps, and the only garrisons in Ohio were at the prison camps at Colum- bus and Sandusky. These of course could not be re- moved, and our other detachments were hardly worth naming. Burnside declared martial law in the counties threatened with invasion, so that the citizens and militia might for military purposes come directly under our control. The relations between the general and myself were so intimate that no strict demarcation of authority was necessary. He authorized me to give commands in his name when haste demanded it, and we relieved each other in night watching at the telegraph. A small post had been maintained at Dayton, since the Vallandigham disturbance, and Major Keith, its com- 502 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR mandant, was ordered to take his men by rail to Hamilton. He went at once and reported himself holding that town with 600 men, including the local militia, but only 400 were armed/ Lieutenant-Colonel Neff commanded at Camp Dennison, thirteen miles from Cincinnati, and had 700 armed men there, with 1200 more of unarmed recruits.* At both these posts systematic scouting was organized so as to keep track of the enemy, and their active show of force was such that Morgan did not venture to attack either, but threaded his way around them. At Cincinnati there was no garrison. A couple of hundred men formed the post at Newport on the Kentucky side of the river, but the main reliance was on the local militia. These were organized as soon as the governor's call was issued on the evening of the 12th. Batteries were put in position covering the approaches to the city from the north and west, and the beautiful suburban hills of Clifton and Avondale afforded excellent defekisive positions. The militia that were called out were of course in- fantry, and being both without drill and unaccustomed to marching, could only be used in position, to defend a town or block the way. In such work they showed cour- age and soldierly spirit, so that Morgan avoided collision with all considerable bodies of them. But they could not be moved. All we could do was to try to assemble them at such points in advance as the raiders were likely to reach, and we especially limited their task to the defensive one, and to blockading roads and streams. Particular stress was put on the orders to take up the planking of bridges and to fell timber into the roads. Little was done in this way at first, but after two or three days of constant reiteration, the local forces did their work better, and delays to the flying enemy were occasioned which con- tributed essentially to the final capture. No definite news of Morgan's crossing the Ohio line was ^ O. R., Yol. zxiiL pt L pp. 742, 743. ' Id., p. 749. THE MORGAN RAID 503 received till about sunset of the 13th when he was march- ing eastward from Harrison. Satisfied that Lawrenceburg and lower points on the Ohio were now safe, Burnside ordered the transports and gunboats at once to Cincinnati. Manson and Sanders arrived during the night, and the latter with his brigade of mounted men was, at dawn of the 14th, placed on the north of the city in the village of Avondale. Manson with the transports was held in readi- ness to move further up the river. Feeling the net drawing about him, Morg' gave his men but two or three hours' rest near Harris, a, and then took the road toward Cincinnati. He reached Glendale, thirteen miles northwest of the city, late in the night, and then turned to the east, apparently for Camp Dennison, equally distant in a northeast direction. His men were jaded to the last degree of endurance, and some were dropping from the saddle for lack of sleep. Still he kept on. Colonel Neflf, in accordance with his orders, had blockaded the principal roads to the west, and stood at bay in front of his camp. Morgan threw a few shells at Ncff's force, and a slight skirmish began, but again he broke away, forced to make a detour of ten miles to the north. We had been able to warn Neff of their approach by a message sent after midnight, and he had met them boldly, protecting the camp and the railroad bridge north of it.* The raiders reached Williamsburg in Clermont County, twenty-eight miles from Cincinnati, in the after- noon of the 14th, and there the tired men and beasts took the first satisfactory rest they had had for three days. Morgan had very naturally assumed that there would be a considerable regular force at Cincinnati, and congratulated himself that by a forced night march he had passed round the city and avoided being cut ofif. He had, in truth, escaped by the skin of his teeth. Could Burnside have felt sure that Lawrenceburg was safe a few hours earlier, 1 O. R., vol. zziii. pt. i. pp. 748, 750. 504 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Manson and Sanders might have been in Cincinnati early enough on the 13th to have barred the way from Harrison. He had in fact ordered Manson up at two o'clock in the afternoon, but the latter was making a reconnoissance north of the town, and was detained till late in the night. As soon as it was learned on the 14th that Morgan had passed east of the Little Miami River, Sanders was ordered to join Hobson and aid in the pursuit.^ Hobson's horses were almost worn out, foi following close upon Morgan's track, as he was doing, he found only broken down animals left behind by the rebels, whilst these gathered up the fresh animals as they advanced. Still he kept doggedly on, seldom more than ten or fifteen miles behind, but unable to close that gap till his opponent should be de- layed or brought to bay. After entering Clermont County, the questions as to roads, etc, indicated that Morgan was making for Mays- ville, hoping to cross the river there.^ Manson's brigade and the gunboats were accordingly sent up the river to that vicinity. The militia of the Scioto valley were ordered to destroy the bridges, in the hope that that river would delay him, but they were tardy or indifferent, and it was a day or two later before the means of obstruction were efficiently used. Judah's forces reached Cincinnati on the 14th, a brigade was there supplied with horses, and they were sent by steamers to Portsmouth. Judah was ordered to spare no effort to march northward far enough to head off the enemy's column. On the i6th General Scammon, commanding in West Virginia, wan asked to concentrate some of his troops at Gallipolis or Pomeroy on the upper Ohio, and promptly did so.* The militia were concentrated at several points along the railway to * In the reports of Hobson and Sanders there seems to be a mistake of a day in the dates, from the 12th to the i6th. Thii may be corrected by the copies of current dispatches given in O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 730-750. ■i Id., p 749. • Id., p. 756. THE MORGAN RAID 505 Marietta. Hobson was in the rear, pushing along at the rate of forty miles a day. Morgan had soon learned that the river was so patrolled that no chance to make a ferry could be trusted, and he made his final effort to reach the ford at Bufiington Island, between Marietta and Pomeroy. He reached Pomeroy on the 1 8th, but Scammon was occupying it, and the troops of the Kanawha division soon satisfied Morgan that he was not dealing with militia. He avoided the roads held by our troops, and as they were infantry, could move around them, though a running skirmish was kept up for some miles. Hobson was close in rear, and Judah's men were approaching BuflP.ngton. Morgan reached the river near the ford about eight o'clock in the evening. The night was pitchy dark, and his information was that a small earthwork built to command the ford was occupied by a permanent garrison. He concluded to wait for daylight. The work had in fact been abandoned on the preceding day, but at daybreak in the morning he was attacked. Hobson's men pushed in from west and north, and Judah from the south. The gunboats came close up to the island, within range of the ford, and commanded it. Hob- son attacked vigorously and captured the artillery. The wing of the Confederate forces, about ^QO in number, sur- rendered to General Shackelford, and about 200 to the other brigades under Hobson The rest of the enemy, favored by a fog which filled the valley, evaded their pur- suers and fled northward. Hobson ordered all his bri- gades to obey the commands of Shackelford, who was in the lead, and himself sought Judah, whose approach had been unknown to him till firing was heard on the other side of the enemy. Judah had also advanced at daybreak, but in making a reconnoissance he himself with a small escort had stumbled upon the enemy in the fog. Both parties were completely surprised, and before Judah could bring up supports, three of his staff were captured. Major 506 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Daniel McCook, paymaster, who had volunteered as an aide, was mortally wounded, ten privates were wounded, and twenty or thirty with a piece of artillery captured. Morgan hastily turned in the opposite direction, when he ran into Hobson's columns ; Judah's prisoners and the gun were recaptured, and the enemy driven in confusion, with the losses above stated.^ As Hobson was regularly a brigade commander in Judah's division, the latter now asserted command of the whole force, against Hobson's protest, who was provision- ally in a separate command by Burnside's order. Fortu- nately, Shackelford had already led Hobson's men in rapid pursuit of the enemy, and as soon as Burnside was in- formed of the dispute, he ordered Judah not to interfere with the troops which had operated separately. By the time this order came Shackelford was too far away for Hobson to rejoin him, and continued in independent com- mand till Morgan's final surrender. He overtook the fly- ing Confederates on the 20th, about sixty miles further north, and they were forced to halt and defend them- selves. Shackelford succeeded in getting a regiment in the enemy's rear, and after a lively skirmish between 1200 and 13CX5 surrendered.' Morgan himself again evaded with about 600 followers. Shackelford took 500 volunteers on his best horses and pressed the pursuit. The chase lasted four days of almost continuous riding, when the enemy was again overtaken in Jefferson County, some fif- teen miles northwest of Steubenville. General Burnside had collected at Cincinnati the dismounted men of Hob- son's command, had given them fresh horses, and had sent them by rail to join Shackelford. They were under command of Major W. B. Way of the Ninth Michigan Cavalry and Major G. W. Rue of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry. They brought five or six hundred fresh men to Shackelford's aid, and their assistance was decisive. 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 775-777. ' Id., pp. 778, 781. THE MORGAN RAID 507 Morgan's course to the river at Smith's Ferry on the border of Columbiana County was intercepted, and near Saline- ville he was forced to surrender with a little less than 4CX5 men who still followed him. About 250 had surrendered in smaller bodies within a day or two before, and stragglers had been picked up at many points along the line of pur- suit. Burnside reported officially that about 3000 pris- oners were brought to Cincinnati.* General Duke states that some 300 of Morgan's command succeeded in cross- ing the Ohio about twenty miles above Buffington, and escaped through West Virginia. He also gives us some idea of the straggling caused by the terrible fatigues of the march by telling us that the column was reduced by nearly 500 effectives when it passed around Cincinnati.^ It is probable that these figures are somewhat loosely stated, as the number of prisoners is very nearly the whole which the Confederate authorities give as Morgan's total strength.* Either a considerable reinforcement must have succeeded in getting to him across the river, or a very small body must have escaped through West Virginia. Burnside directed the officers to be sent to the military prison camp for officers on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay, and the private soldiers to go to Camp Chase at Columbus and Camp Morton at Indianapolis. Soon after- ward, however, orders came from Washington that the officers should be confined in the Ohio penitentiary, in re- taliation for unusual severities practised on our officers who were prisoners in the South. Morgan's romantic es- cape from the prison occurred just after I was relieved * O. R,, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 14. 2 Hist, of Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 442, 443. ' A note attached to Wheeler's return of the cavalry of his corps for July 31st says that Morgan's division was absent " on detached service," ef- fectives 2743. Add to this the officers, etc., and the total " present for duty " would be a little over 3000. O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 941. For Bragg's circular explaining the term " effectives " as applying only to private soldiei-s actually in the line of battle, see Id., p. 619, and ante, p. 482. 5o8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR from the command of the district in the fall, for the pur- pose of joining the active army in East Tennessee. A glance at the raid as a whole, shows that whilst it naturally attracted much attention and caused great excite- ment at the North, it was of very little military importance. It greatly scattered for a time and fatigued the men and horses of the Twenty-third Corps who took part in the chase. It cost Indiana and Ohio something in the plunder of country stores and farm-houses, and in the pay and expenses of large bodies of militia that were temporarily called into service. But this was all. North of the Ohio no military posts were captured, no public depots of supply were destroyed, not even an important railway bridge was burned. There was no fighting worthy of the name; the list of casualties on the National side showing only 19 killed, 47 wounded, and 8 missing in the whole campaign, from the 2d of July to the final surrender.^ For this the whole Confederate division of cavalry was sacrificed. Its leader was never again trusted by his government, and his prestige was gone forever. His men made simply a race for life from the day they turned away from the militia at Vernon, Indiana. Morgan care- fully avoided every fortified post and even the smaller towns. The places he visited after he crossed the Ohio line do not include the larger towns and villages that seemed to lie directly in his path. He avoided the rail- roads also, and these were used every day to convey the militia and other troops parallel to his route, to hedge him in and finally to stop him. His absence was mischievous to Bragg, who was retreating upon Chattanooga and to whom the division would have been a most welcome reinforcement. He did not delay Burnside, for the latter was awaiting the return of the Ninth Corps from Vicks- burg, and this did not begin to arrive till long after the raid was over. None of the National army's communica- 1 O. R., vol. xxlii. pt i. p. 637. THE MORGAN RAID 509 tions were interrupted, and not a soldier under Rosecrans lost a ration by reason of the pretentious expedition. It ended in a scene that was ridiculous in the extreme. Morgan had pressed into his service as guides, on the last day of his flight, two men who were not even oflicers of the local militia, but who were acting as volunteer home- guards to protect their neighborhood. When he finally despaired of escape, he begged his captive guides to change their rdle into commanders of an imaginary army and to accept his surrender upon merciful and favorable terms to the vanquished ! He afterward claimed the right tu immediate liberation on parole, under the conditions of this burlesque capitulation. Shackelford and his rough riders would accept no surrender but an unconditional one as prisoners of war, and were sustained in this by their superiors. The distance by the river between the crossing at Brandenburg and the ferry above Steubenville near which Morgan finally surrendered, was some six hundred miles. This added to the march from Tennessee through Ken- tucky would make the whole ride nearly a thousand miles long. Its importance, however, except as a subject for an entertaining story, was in an inverse ratio to its length. Its chief interest to the student of military history is in its bearing on the question of the rational use of cavalry in an army, and the wasteful folly of expeditions which have no definite and tangible military object.* 1 For official reports and correspondence concerning the raid, see Burn- side's report (O. R., vol. xxiii. pt i. pp. 13, 14) and the miscellaneous docu- ments (/(/., pp. 632-818). '•y CHAPTER XXV THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE News of Grant's victory at Vicksburg — A thrilling scene at the opera — Burnside's Ninth Corps to return — Stanton urges Rosecrans to advance — The Tullahoma manoeuvres — Testy correspondence — Its real mean- ing — Urgency with Burnside — Ignorance concerning his situation — His disappointment as to Ninth Corps — Rapid concentration of other troops — Burnside's march into East Tennessee — Occupation of Knox- ville - - Invests Cumberland Gap — The garrison surrenders — Good news from Rosecrans — Distances between armies — Divergent lines — No railway communication — Burnside concentrates toward the Vir- ginia line — Joy of the people — Their intense loyalty — Their faith in the future. DURING the Morgan Raid and whilst we in Ohio were absorbed in the excitement of it, events were moving elsewhere. Lee had advanced from Virginia through Maryland into Pennsylvania and had been de- feated at Gettysburg by the National army under Meade. Grant had brought the siege of Vicksburg to a glorious conclusion and had received the surrender of Pemberton with his army of 30,000 Confederates. These victories, coming together as they did and on the 4th of July, made the national anniversary seem more than ever a day of rejoicing and of hope to the whole people. We did not get the news of Grant's victory quite so soon as that of Meade's, but it came to us at Cincinnati in a way to excite peculiar enthusiasm. An excellent operatic company was giving a series of performances in the city, and all Cincinnati was at Pike's Opera House listening to / Puritani on the evening of the 7th of July. General Burnside and his wife had one of the proscenium boxes, and my wife and I were their guests. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE $11 The second act had just closed with the famous trumpet song, in which Susini, the great basco of the day, had created di furore. A messenger entered the box where the general was surrounded by a brilliant company, and gave him a dispatch which announced the surrender of Vicks- burg and Pemberton's army. Burnside, overjoyed, an- nounced the great news to us who were near him, and then stepped to the front of the box to make the whole audience sharers in the pleasure. As soon as he was seen with the paper in his hand, the house was hushed, and his voice rang through it as he proclaimed the great victory and declared it a long stride toward the restoration of the Union. The people went almost wild with excitement, the men shouted hurrahs, the ladies waved their handker- chiefs and clapped their hands, all rising to their feet The cheering was long as well as loud, and before it sub- sided the excitement reached behind the stage. The curtain rose again, and Susini came forward with a national flag in each hand, waving them enthusiastically whilst his magnificent voice resounded in a repetition of the song he had just sung, and which seemed as appropriate as if it were inspired for the occasion, — " Suoni la tromba, e intrepido lo pugner6 da forte, Bello h affrontar la morte, Gridando liberty ! " The rejoicing and the cheers were repeated to the echo, and when at last they subsided, the rest of the opera was only half listened to, suppressed excitement filling every heart and the thought of the great results to flow from the victories absorbing every mind. Burnside reckoned with entire certainty on the imme- diate return of the Ninth Corps, and planned to resume his expedition into East Tennessee as soon as his old troops should reach him again. Tlie Morgan raid was just beginning, and no one anticipated its final scope. In 512 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR the dispatch from the Secretary of War which announced Grant's great victory, Burnside was also told that the corps would immediately return to him. In answering it on the 8th July, he said, " I thought I was very happy at the success of General Grant and General Meade, but I am still happier to hear of the speedy return of the Ninth Corps." He informed Rosecrans of it on the same day, adding, " I hope soon to be at work again." ' The Washington authorities very naturally and very properly wished that the tide of success should be kept moving, and Secretary Stanton had exhorted Rosecrans to further activity by saying, on the 7th, " You and your noble army now have the chance to give the finishing blow to the rebellion.* Will you neglect the chance?" Rosecrans replied : " You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from middle Tennessee, of which my dispatches advised you. I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood." He, however, did not intimate any purpose of advancing. No doubt the manoeuvring of Bragg out of his fortified positions at Shelbyville and Tullahoma had been well done ; but its chief value was that it forced Bragg to meet the Army of the Cumberland in the open field if the advantage should be promptly followed up. If he were allowed to fortify another position, nothing would be gained but the ground the army stood on. Had Rose- crans given any intimation of an early date at which he could rebuild the Elk River bridge and resume active operations, it would probably have relieved the strain so noticeable in the corr. ipondence between him and the War Department. He did nothing of the kind, and the necessity of removing him from the command was a matter of every-day discussion at Washington, as is evident from the confidential letters Halleck sent to him. The corre- 1 O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 522, 524. « Id., p. 518. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 513 spondence between the General-in-Chief and his subordinate is a curious one. A number of the most urgent dispatches representing the dissatisfaction of the President and the Secretary were accompanied by private and confidential letters in which Halleck explains the situation and strongly asserts his friendship for Rosecrans and the error of the latter in assuming that personal hostility to himself was at bottom of the reprimands sent him on account of his delays. It was with good intentions that Halleck wrote thus, but the w:,dom of it is very questionable. It gave Rosecrans ground to assume that the official dispatches were only the formal expression of the ideas of the Presi- dent and Secretary whilst the General-in-Chief did not join in the condemnation of his dilatory mode of conducting the campaign. To say to Rosecrans, as Halleck did on July 24th, " Whether well founded or without any founda- tion, the dissatisfaction really exists, and I deem it my duty as a friend to represent it to you truly and fairly," * is to neglect his duty as commander of the whole army to express his own judgment and to give orders which would have the weight of his military position and presumed knowledge in military matters. When, therefore, a few days later he gave peremptory orders to begin an active advance, these orders were interpreted in the light of the preced- ing correspondence, and lost their force and vigor. They were met by querulous and insubordinate inquiries whether they were intended to take away all discretion as to details from the commander of an army in the field.* It has been argued that Rosecrans's weakness of character con- sisted in a disposition to quarrel with those in power over him, and that a spirit of contradiction thwarted the good military conduct which his natural energy might have produced. I cannot help reading his controversial correspondence in the light of my personal observation of the man, and my conviction is that his quarrelsome mode ^ O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 552, 555, 601. * Aug. 4, Id., p. 592. VOL. I. — 33 5 14 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR of dealing with the War Department was the result of a real weakness of will and purpose which did not take naturally to an aggressive campaig that involved great responsibilities and risks. Being really indecisive in fixing his plan of campaign and acting upon it, his infirmity of will was covered by a belligerence in his correspondence. A really enterprising commander in the field would have begun an active campaign in the spring before any dis- satisfaction was exhibited at Washington ; and if he had a decided purpose to advance at any reasonably early period, there was nothing in the urgency shown by his superiors to make him abandon his purpose. He might have made testy comments, but he would have acted. Halleck's correspondence with Burnside in July is hard to understand, unless we assume that it was so perfunctory that he did not remember at one time what he said or did earlier. In a dispatch to the General-in-Chief dated the nth, Rosecrans had said, "It is important to know if it will be practicable for Burnside to come in on our left flank and hold the line of the Cumberland ; if not, a line in advance of it and east of us." ^ It was already under- stood between Rosecrans and Burnside that the latter would do this and more as soon as he sliould have the Ninth Corps with him ; and the dispatch must be regarded as a variation on the form of excuses for inaction, by suggesting that he was delayed by the lack of an under- standing as to co-operation by the Army of the Ohio. On receipt of Rosecrans's dispatch, Halleck answered it on the 13th, saying, " General Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left by entering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati." On the same day he telegraphed Burnside, " I must again urge upon you the importance of moving forward into East Tennessee, to cover Rosecrans's left."* It is possible that Burnside's ^ O. IL, ToL xziii. pt ii. p. 529. * Id., p. 531. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 515 » telegraphic correspondence with the Secretary of War was not known to Halleck, but it is hard to believe that the latter was ignorant of the proportions the Morgan raid had taken after the enemy had crossed the Ohio River. The 13th of July was the day that Morgan marched from Indiana into Ohio and came within thirteen miles of Cincinnati. Burnside was organizing all the militia of southern Ohio, and was concentrating two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps to catch the raiders. One of these was on a fleet of steamboats which reached Cininnati that day, and the other, under Hobson, was in close pur- suit of the enemy. Where should Burnside have been, if not at Cincinnati? If the raid had been left to the " militia and home guards," as Halleck afterward said all petty raids should be, this, which was not a petty raid, would pretty certainly have had results which would have produced more discomfort at Washington than the idea that Burn- side was " tied fast to Cincinnati." Burnside was exactly where he ought to be, and doing admirable work which resulted in the capture of the division of 3CXX) rebel cavalry with its officers from the general in command downward. That the General-in-Chief was entirely ignorant of what was going on, when every intelligent citizen of the country was excited over it and every newspaper was full of it, reflects far more severely upon him than upon Burnside. But this was by no means the whole. He forgot that when he stopped Burnside's movement on 3d June to send the Ninth Corps to Grant, it was with the distinct understanding that it prevented its resumption till the corps should return. He had himself said that this should be as early as possible, and meanwhile directed Burnside to concentrate his remaining forces as much as he could.* Burnside had been told on the Sth of July, without inquiry from him, that the corps was coming back to him, and had immediately begun his preparation to resume an 1 O. R., vol. xxHi. pt. ii. p. 384. 5l6 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR active campaign as soon as it should reach him. Not hearing of its being on the way, on the i8th he asked Halleck if orders for its return had been given. To this dispatch no answer was given, and it was probably pigeon- holed and forgotten. Burnside continued his campaign against Morgan, and on the 24th, when the last combina- tions near Steubenville were closing the career of the raider, Halleck again telegraphs that there must be no further delay in the movement into East Tennessee,^ and orders an immediate report of the position and number of Burn- side's troops organized for that purpose! He was still ignorant, apparently, that there had been any occasion to withdraw the troops in Keptucky from the positions near the Cumberland River. Burnside answered temperately, reciting the facts and reminding him of the actual state of orders and corre- spondence, adding only, "I should be glad to be more 'definitely instructed, if you think the work can be better •done." Morgan's surrender was on the 26th, and Burn- side immediately applied himself with earnest zeal to get his forces back into Kentucky. Judah's division at But- .fington was three hundred miles from Cincinnati and five hundred from the place it had left to begin the chase. .Shackelford's mounted force was two hundred miles fur- ther up the Ohio. This last was, as has been recited, made up of detachments from all the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and its four weeks of constant hard riding had used up men and horses. These all had to be got back to the southern part of central Kentucky and re- vfitted, returned to their proper divisions, and prepared for ;a new campaign. The General-in-Chief does not seem to Ihave had the slightest knowledge of these circumstances vor conditions. On the 28th another Confederate raid developed itself in southern Kentucky, under General Scott. It seemed 1 O. R., vol. xxiiL pt. ii. p. 553. THE UBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 517 to be intended as a diversion to aid Morgan to escape from Ohio, but failed to accomplish anything. Scott ad- vanced rapidly from the south with his brigade, crossing the Cumberland at Williamsburg and moving through London upon Richmond.' Colonel Sanders endeavored, to stop the enemy at Richmond with about 500 men hastily collected, but was driven back. He was ordered! to Lexington and put in command of all the mounted men which could be got together there, 2400 in all, and ad- vanced against Scott, who now retreated by Lancaster^. Stanford, and Somerset. At Lancaster the enemy was^ routed in a charge and 200 of them captured. Following them up with vigor, their train was destroyed and about 500 more prisoners were taken. At the Cumberland River Sanders halted, having been without rations for four days. The remnant of Scott's force had succeeded in crossing the river after abandoning the train. Scott claimed to have taken and paroled about 200 prisoners in the first part of his raid, but such irregular paroles of captured men who could not be carried off were unauthorized and void. The actual casualties in Sanders's command were trifling.* The effect of this last raid was still further to wear out Burnside's mounted troops, but he pressed forward to the front all his infantry and organized a column for advance. In less than a week, on August 4, he was able to announce to the War Department that he had 11,000 men concen- trated at Lebanon, Stanford, and Glasgow, with outposts on the Cumberland River, and that he could possibly in- crease this to 12,000 by reducing some posts in guard of the railway.' Upon this, Halleck gave to Rosecrans per- emptory orders for the immediate advance of the Army of the Cumberland, directing him also to report daily the 1 O. R., vol. zziii. pt ii. p. 568. * Id^ pt. i. pp. 828-843 ; pt ii. pp. 568, 589. • Id^ p. 591. 5l8 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR movement of each corps till he should cross the Tennessee. On the next day Burnside was ordered in like manner to advance with a column of I2, O. R., vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 561. * M-, P *5S 520 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR Boyle, was to remain in Kentucky and protect the lines of communication. The second was put under command of Brigadier-General M. D. Manson, and the third under Brig- adier-General M. S. Hascall. Each marching division was organized into two brigades with a battery of artillery attached to each brigade. Three batteries of artillery were in reserve,* On the nth of August General Burnside went to Hick- man's Bridge, and the forward movement was begun.' At this date the Confederate forces in East Tennessee under General Buckner numbered 14,733 " present for duty," with an " aggregate present" of 20CX) or 3000 more. Conscious that the column of 12,000 which Halleck had directed him to start with was less than the hostile forces in the Holston valley, Burnside reduced to the utmost the garrisons and posts left behind him. Fortunately the advanced division of the Ninth Corps returning from Vicksburg reached Cincinnati on the I2th, and althous^h the troops were wholly unfit for active service by reason of malarial diseases contracted on the " Yazoo," they could . relieve some of the Kentucky garrisons, and Burnside was thus enabled to increase his moving column to about 15,000 men. The earlier stages of the advance were slow, as the columns were brought into position to take up their separate lines of march and organize their supply trains for the road. On the 20th Manson's division was at Columbia, Hascall's was at Stanford, Carter's cavalry division was at Crab Orchard, and independent brigades of cavalry under Colonels Wolford and Graham were at Somerset and Glasgow.^ On that day orders were issued 1 O. R., vol :x. pt. ii. pp. 553-555. 3 /(/., pt. ii.. p. 16. Hickman's Bridge, as has already been mentioned, was at the terminus of the Central Kentucky Railroad. There, on the bank of the Kentucky River, Burnside m.ide a fortified depot from which his wagon trains should start as a base for the supply system of his army in East Tennessee. It was called Camp Nelson in honor of the dead Kentucky general. • Id., pt. ii. p. 548. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE $21 522 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR for the continuous march. General Julius White relieved Manson in command of the second division, and the two infantry divisions were to move on Montgomery, Tenn., Hascall's by way of Somerset, Chitwoods, and Huntsville, and White's by way of Creelsboro, Albany, and Jamestown. Carter's cavalry, which covered the extreme left flank, marched through Mt. Vernon and London to Williams- burg, where it forded the Cumberland, thence over the Jellico Mountains to Chitwoods where it became the advance of Hascall's column to Montgomery.* At this point the columns were united and all moved together through Emory Gap upon Kingston. Burnside accom- panied the cavalry in person, and sent two detachments, one to go by way of Big Creek Gap to make a demonstra- tion on Knoxville, and the other through Winter's Gap for the same purpose of misleading the enemy as to his line of principal movement. Nothing could be more systematic and vigorous than the march of Burnside's columns.' They made from fifteen to twenty or twenty-five miles a day with the reg- ularity of clock-work, though the route in many parts of it was most difficult. There were mountains to climb and narrow gorges to thread. Streams were to be forded, roads were to be repaired and in places to be made anew. On the 1st of September Burnside occupied Kingston, having passed through Emory Gap into East Tennessee and communicated with Crittenden's corps of Rosecrans's army.^ Here he learned that upon the development of the joint plan of campaign of the National commanders, Bragg had withdrawn Buckner's forces south of the Ten- nessee at Loudon, there making them the right flank of his army about Chattanooga. There was, however, one ex- ception in Buckner's order to withdraw. Brigadier-General John W. Frazer was left at Cumberland Gap with 2500 men, 1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 548. " Id., p. 569. • Itinerary, O. R., vol. xxx. pt. ii. pp. 576-578. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 523 and though Buckner had on August 30th ordered him to destroy his material and retreat into Virginia, joining the command of Major-General Samuel Jones, this order was withdrawn on Frazer's representation of his ability to hold the place and that he had rations for forty days.^ Inere being therefore no troops in East Tennessee to oppose its occupation, Burnside's advance-guard entered Knoxville on the 3d of September. Part of the Twenty-third Corps had been sent toward Loudon on the 2d, and upon their approach the enemy burned the great railroad bridge at that place. A light-draught steamboat was building at Kingston, and this was captured and preserved.^ It played a useful part subsequently in the transportation of supplies when the wagon-trains were broken down and the troops were reduced nearly to starvation. No sooner was Burn- side in Knoxville than he put portions of his army in motion for Cumberland Gap, sixty miles northward. He had already put Colonel John F. DeCourcey (Sixteenth Ohio Infantry) in command of new troops arriving in Ken- tucky, and ordered him to advance against the fortifica- tions of the gap on the north side. General Shackelford was sent with his cavalry from Knoxville, but when Burnside learned that DeCourcey and he were not strong enough to take the place, he left Knoxville in person with Colonel Samuel Gilbert's brigade of infantry and made the sixty- mile march in fifty-two hours. Frazer had refused to sur- render on the summons of the subordinates; but when Burnside arrived and made the demand in person, he despaired of holding out and on the 9th of September surrendered the garrison. A considerable number got away by scattering after the flag was hauled down, but 2,205 "^en laid down their arms, and twelve pieces of cannon were also among the spoils.' DeCourcey's troops were left to garrison the fortifications, and the rest were sent to » O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 608. " « Id., pt. lii. p. 333. • Id., pt. ii. pp. 548, 599, 604, 611. 524 REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR occupy the upper valley of the Holston toward the Vir- ginia line. On the lOth, and while still at Cumberland Gap, Burn- side received a dispatch from General Crittenden with the news that he was in possession of Chattanooga, that Bragg had retreated toward Rome, Ga., and that Rose- crans hoped with his centre and right to intercept the enemy at Rome, which was sixty miles south of Chat- tanooga.^ Everything was therefore most promising on the south, and Burnside had only to provide for driving back the Confederates under Jones, at the Virginia line, a hundred and thirty miles northeast of Knoxville. It becomes important here to estimate these distances rightly. Knoxville is a hundred and eleven miles distant from Chattanooga by the railroad, and more by the country roads. From Bristol on the northeast to Chattanooga on the southwest is two hundred and forty-two miles, which measures the length of that part of the Holston and Ten- nessee valley known as East Tennessee. If Rosecrans were at Rome, as General Crittenden's dispatch indicated, he was more than a hundred and seventy miles distant from Knoxville, and nearly three hundred miles from the region about Greeneville and the Watauga River, whose crossing would be the natural frontier of the upper valley, if Burn- side should not be able to extend his occupation quite to the Virginia line. It will be seen therefore that the prog- ress of the campaign had necessarily made Rosecrans's and Burnside's lines of operation widely divergent, and they were far beyond supporting distance of each other, since there wis no railway communication between them, and could not be for a long time. Burnside captured some locomotives and cars at Knoxville ; but bridges had been destroyed to such an extent that these were of little use to him, for the road could be operated but a short distance in either direction and the amount of rolling stock was, 1 O. R., vol. xzz. pt. iii. p. 533. THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE 525 at most, very little. Complete success for Rosecrans, with the reopening and repair of the whole line from Nashville through Chattanooga, including the rebuilding of the great bridge at Loudon, were the essential condi- tions of further co-operation between the two armies, and of the permanent existence of Burnside's in East Tennessee. Efforts had been made to extend the lines of telegraph as Burnside advanced,^ but it took some time to do this, and even when the wires were up there occurred a diffi- culty in making the electric circuit, so that through all the critical part of the Chickamauga campaign, Burnside had to communicate by means of so long a line of couriers that three days was the actual time of transmittal of dis- patches between himself and Washington.* The news from Rosecrans on the loth was so reassuring that Bum- side's plain duty was to apply himself to clearing the upper valley of the enemy, and then to further the great object of his expedition by giving the loyal inhabitants the means of self-government, and encouraging them to organize and arm themselves with the weapons which his wagon trains were already bringing from Kentucky. He had also to provide for his supplies, and must use the good weather of the early autumn to the utmost, for the long roads over the mountains would be practically im- passable in winter. The route from Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap was the shortest, and, on the whole, the easiest, and a great system of transportation by trains under escort was put in operation. The camp at Cum- berland Gap could give this protection through the moun- tain district, and made a convenient stopping-place in the weary way when teams broke down or had to be replaced. Other roads were also used whilst they seemed to be safe, and the energies and resources of the quartermaster's department were strained to the utmost to bring forward 1 O. R., vol. XXX. pt. ii. p. 574 ; pt. iii. p. 717. " Id.., pt. iii. p. 718. $26 REAflNISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR arms, ammunition for cannon and .nuskets, food and medical supplies, and all the munuions of war. The roads were covered with herds of beeves and swine, and feeding stations for these were established and the forage had to be drawn to them, for nothing could be got, along the greater part of the route. Burnside hoped that the railway by Chattanooga would be put in repair and be open before winter should shut in, but he very prudently acted on the principle of making the most of his present means. It was well he did so, for otherwise his little army would have been starved before the winter was half over. From Cumberland Gap the courier line was sixty miles shorter than from Knoxville, and the first dispatches of Burnside announcing his capture of Frazer's troops reached Washington more quickly than later ones. At noon of the nth Mr. Lincoln answered it with hearty congratulations and thanks. This was quickly followed by a congratulatory message from Halleck accompanied by formal orders.^ These last only recapitulated the points in Burnside's further operations and administration which were the simplest deductions from the situation. Burnside was to hold the country eastward to the gaps of the North Carolina mountains (the Great Smokies) and the valley of the Holston up to the Virginia line. Hal- leck used the phrase "the line of the Holston," which would be absurd, and was probably only a slip of the pen. The exact strength of General Jones, the Confederate commander in southwestern Virginia, was not known, but, to preserve his preponderance, Burnside could not pru- dently send less than a division of infantry and a couple of brigades of cavalry to the vicinity of Rogersville or Greeneville and the railroad crossing of the Watauga. This would be just- about half his available force. The other division was at first divided, one of the two brigades being centrally placed at Knoxville, and the other at * O. R , vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 555. THE Li BE RATION OF EAST TENNESSEE >?/ Sevicrville, thirty miles up the French Broad Ki"'.»% where it covered the principal pass over the Gnc'a'j*: »•; Asheville, N. C. The rest of his cavalry was at Lojd.)n and Kingston, where it covered the north side of the Ten- nessee River and communicated with Rosccrans's oi.'« posts above Chattanooga. Halleck further informed Burnside that the Secretary of War directed him to raise all the volunteers he could in East Tennessee and to select officers for them. If he had not already enough arms and equipments he could order them by telegraph. As to Rosecrans, the Gen- eral-in-Chief stated that he would occupy Dalton or some other point south of Chattanooga, closing the enemy's line from Atlanta, and when this was done, the question would be settled whether the whole would move eastward into Virginia or southward into Georgia and Alabama. ^ Burn- side's present work being thus cut out for him, he set himself about it with the cordial earnestness which marked his character. He had suggested the propriety of his retiring as soon as the surrender of Frazer had made his occupation of East Tennessee an assured success, but he had not formally asked to be relieved.* His reasons for doing so dated back to the Fredericksburg campaign, in part; for he had believed that his alternative then pre- sented to the government, that he should be allowed to dismiss insubordinate generals or should himself resign, ought to have been accepted. His case had some resem- blance to Pope's when the administration approved his conduct and his courage but retired him and restored McClellan to command, in deference to the supposed sentiment of the Army of the Potomac. Halleck's per- sistent ignoring of the officially recorded causes of the delay in this campaign, and his assumption that the Mor- gan raid was not an incident of any importance in Burn- side's responsibilities, had not tended to diminish the latter's sense of discomfort in dealing with army head- » O. R., vol. XXX. pt. iii. p. 555. * /. 532 HEM/mSCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR their vitality, and even those who reported for duty dragged themselves about, the mere shadows of what they had been. General Parke reported their arrival and was then obliged to go upon sick-leave himself. General Welsh, who had distinguished himself at Antietam» re- ported that his division must recuperate for a few weeks before it could take the field. He made a heroic effort to remain on duty, but died suddenly on the 14th, and his loss was deeply felt by the corps.* Potter's division was as badly off as Welsh's, and both were for a short time scattered at healthful camps in the Kentucky hills. Each camp was, at first, a hospital ; but the change of climate and diet rapidly restored the tone of the hardy soldiery. General Willcox, who commanded the Indiana district, belonged to the corps, and asked to be returned to duty with it. He was allowed to do so on the nth of Sep- tember, and the War Department sent with him a new division of Indiana troops which had been recruited and organized during the summer. Burnside had ordered recruits and new regiments to rendezvous in Kentucky, and prepared to bring them as well as the Ninth Corps forward as soon as the latter should be fit to march. Every camp and station at the rear was full of busy prepa- ration during the last of August and the beginning of September, and at the front the general himself was now "*vicentrating his little forces to strike a blow near the . .