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The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent itre film6s A des taux de reduction diff^rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour &tre reprodult en un seul clichA, 11 est film* i partir da I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche d drolte, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nAcessaire. Las diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. ita lure. ] 1 2 3 t 2 3 4 5 6 EMANCIPATE YOURCOLONIES! ADDRESSED TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF FRANCE, A" 1793, SHEWING THE USELESSNESS AND MISCHIEVOUSNESS OF DISTANT DEPENDENCIES TO AN EUROPEAN STATE. By JEREMY BENTHAM. NOW FIRST PUBLISHED FOR SALE. LONDON: PBINTED BT C. AND W. REYMELL, BROAD STREET, FOR ROBERT REWARD, WELLINGTON STREET. 1830. [price two shillings.] t- 1^^ - -H UVJlL' I i I /f JEREMY BENTHAM TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION or FRANCE* YOUR predecefTors made me a French citizen : hear me fpeak Hke one : War thickens round you : I will (hew you a vaftrcfource: — Emancitate your Colonies. You ftart: Hear and you will be reconciled. I (ay again, emanci- pate your Colonies. Juftice, confillency, policy, economy, honour, gencrolity, all demand it of you : all this you (hall fee. Conquer, you are (till but running the race of vulgar ambition : Emancipate : you ftrike out a new path to glory. Con- quer, it is by your armies : Emancipate, the B coni^ueft jy^-'> '*. ! ) ■ ? conqueft is your own, and made over your- felvcs. To give freedom at the expence of others, is but conquefl: in difguife : to rife fuperior to conquerors, the facrifice muft be your own. — Reafons you will not find want- ing, if you will hear them : fome more pref- ling than you might wifli. What is lead pleafant among them, may pay you beft for hearing it. Were it ever fo unpleafant, better hear it while it is yet time, than when it is too late, and from one friend, than from a hoft of enemies. If you are kings, you will hear nothing but flattery ; if you are republicans, you will bear rugged truths. I begin with jufl'ice : it ftands foremoft in your thoughts, — And are you yet to learn, that on this ground the queftion is already judged? That you at leaft have judged it, and given judgment againft yourfelves ?■— You abhor tyranny : You abhor it in the lump not lefs than in detail : You abhor the fub- jeftion of one nation to another : You call it flavery. You gave fentence in Aie cafe of Britain againft her colonies : Have you fo foon forgot that fentence ? Have you fo foon forgot the fchool in which you ferved your apprenticelhip to freedom } You L. .( 3 ) You choofe your own government, why are not other people to choofe theirs ? Do you ferioufly mean to govern the world, and do you call that liberty ? What is be- come of the rights of men ? Are you the only men who have rights ? Alas ! my fel- low citizens, have you two meafures ? Oh ! but they are but a part of the empire, and apart inuft be governed by the whole. — Part of the empire, lay you ? Yes, in point of fa^ft, they certainly are, or at leaft were. Yes : fo was New-York a part of the Britifh empire, while the Britifh army garrifoned it : fo were Longwy and V>rdun parts of the Pruflian or the Auftrian em- pire t'other day : that you have, or at leaft had poffejjion of them is out of difpute : the queftion is, whether you now ought to have it ? Yes, you have, or had it : but whence came it to you ? Whence, but from the hand of defpotifm. Think how you have dealt by them. One common Baftile in- clofed them and you. You knock down the jailor, you let youfelves out, you keep them in, and put youffelves into his place. B2 You I i I ( 4 ) You dcftroy the criminal, and you reap the profit, I mean always what Iccms to you proht, of the crime. O/;, l^uf t/ji'v Will find deputies : and thofe deputies will govern us, as much as we go- vern them. Illufion ! — What is that but doubling the mirchicf infteadof leflening it? To give yourfelvcs a pretence for govern- ing a million or two of ftrangers, you ad- mit half a dozen. To govern a million or two of people you don*t care about, you ad- mit half a dozen people who don't care about you. To govern a fct of people whofe bufinefs ^oa know nothing about, you encumber yourfelves with half a dozen ftarers who know nothing abvnit your*s. Is this fraternity ? Is this liberty and equa- lity ? Open domination would be alefs griev- ance. Were I an American, I had rather not be rcprefciited at all, than reprefcnted thus. If tyranny mufl- come, let it come without a miilk. 0/», hut information — 'l rue, it muft be had ; but to give informa- tion, mufl a man pofl'efs a vote ? Frenchmen, how would you like a Par- liament of ours to govern you, you fending fix members to it ? London is not a third part 1 ,v ( 5 ) part fo far from Paris, as London from the Orkneys, or Paris from Perpigiian. You ftart — think then, what rr.ay be the feelings of thecolonifts. Are they Frenchmen? they will feel like Frr ^hmcn ? Are they not Frenchmen? then vv^fre is ^our right to govern them P Is equality what you want ? I will tell you how to make it. As often as France fends commiflaries with fleets and armies to govern the colonies, let the colonies fend commifTaries with equal fleets and armies to govern France. What are a thoufand fuch pleas to the purpofe? Let us leave imagination, and coafult feelings. Is it for their advantage to be governed by you rather than by themfeives? Is it for your advantage to go- vern them, rather than leave them to them- feives ? Is it then for their advantage to be go- verned by a people who never know, nor ever can know either their inclinations or their wants ? What is it vou ever can know about them? The vvifhes they entertain? The wants they labour under ? No fuch B 3 thin^^ ; I i! ( 6 ) thing : but the vvifhcj they entertained, the wants they laboured under two months ago, wilhcsthat may have changed, and for the beft realons : wants that may have been re- lieved, or become unrehevable. — Do they apply to you for jullice? Truth is nnattain- able for want of evidence : You get not a tenth part perhaps of the witnelFes you ought to have, and thofe perhaps onlyonone fide. — Do they alk fuccours of you ? You put yourfelves to immenle expence : You fit out an armament, and when it arrives, it finds nothing to be done ; the party to whom yon fend it are either conquerors or conquered. — Do they want fubfiflencc ? Before your fupply reaches them, they are ftarved. No negligence could put them in a fituation fo helplefs, as that in which, fo long as they continue dependant on you, the nature of things has fixed them, in fpiteofall your iblicitude. Pi I I Solicitude did I lay ? How can they ex-» pe6t any fuch thing ? What care you, or what can you care about them 5 What do you know about them ? What pidure can you fo much as form to youlclves of the country ? What conception can y«u frame to yourfelves of manners and modes of life I ( 7 ) fo different from your own ? When will you ever ice them ? When will they ever fee you ? If they fuffer, will their cries ever wound your ears ? Will their wrctchcdnefs ever meet your eyes ? What time have you to think about them ? Preflcd by fo many important objeds that are at your door, how uninterefting will be the tale that comes from St. Domingo or Martinique ? What is it you want to govern them for ? What ? but to monopolize and cramp their trade. What is it they can want you to govern them for ? — Defence ? — their only ger is from you. Do they like to be governed by you ? a(k them and you will know. Yet why alk them, as if you did not know ? They may be better pleafcd to be governed by you than by any body elfe ; but is it poflible they fhould not be ft ill better pleafed to be go- verned by themfelves ? — A minority among them might choofe rather to be governed by you than by their antagonifts, the majo- rity : but is it for you to protect minori- ties ? — A majority, which did not feel itfelf fo ftrong as it could wifli, might wifli to borrow a little ftrength of you : — but for the B 4 loan ( 8 ) loA!i of a moment, would you cxa6l a perpe- tual annuitv of lervitudc ? Jlit it d , ' i 0/j, but they are nrijlocrais — Are they lb ? — then I am lure you have no right to govern thern : then 1 am fure it is not their interell to be governed by you ; then I am fure it is not vour intereft to orovern them, J o Are thty ariftocrats ? they hate you. Are they arillocrats ? you hate them. For what would you wilh to govern a people who hate you ? Will they hate you the lefs for go- verni[ig them ? Are a people the happier for beiii;^ governed by thole they hate ? If fo, fend for the Duke of Brunfwick, and feat him on your throne. For what can you wilh to govern a people whom you hate ? Is it for the pleafure of making them miler ible ? Is iiot this copying the Frede- ricks and the Francis's ? Is not this being arillocrats, and ariftocrats with a vengeance ? But why deal in fuppofitions and put cafes ? Two colonies, Martinico and Gua- dalupe, hav e already pronounced the fepara- tion. Has that fatisfied you ? I am afraid rather ii iias irritated you. They have Ihaken olf the yoke ; and you have decreed an armament to fallen it on again — You are playing ( 9 ) playing over ?gaiii our old game. Demo- crats ill Europe, you arc ariftocrats in Ame rica. What is this to end in ? If you will not be good citizens and good Frenchmen, be good neighbours and good allies : — wlieii you have conquered Martinico and Guada- lupe, conquer the United States, and give them back to Britain. Oh, hut the Capets will get hold of them f So much the better. Why not let the Ca- pets go to America ? Europe would thea be rid of them. Arethev bad ncio-hbours? re- joice that they are at a difrancc. Why fliould not the Capets even reign, iince there are thofe that choofe to be governed by them, why fliould not even the Capets reign, while it is in another hemilphere r — Such ariftocrats as you do not kill, you yourtelveSf talk of tranfporting. What do you mean to make of them when tranfported ? — Slaves \ If you muft have flaves, keep them rather at home, where they will be more out- numbered by freemen, and kept in better order. If you mean they Ihould be tranf- ported without being enflavcd, why not let them tranfport themfelves ? Does your delicacy forbid your cummu- vvith the degraded delpots ? You need nicating C 10 ) ii t need not communicate with them : your communication is with the people. You take the people as you find them : you give them to themlelvcs : and if afterwards they choofc to give themfelves to any body elfe, it is their doing, you neither ne^'d, nor ought to have any concern in it. 0/>, hr^f the good citizens I what will be\ come of the good citizens ? — What will be- come of them ? — their fate depends upon yourfclves. Give up your dominion, you may fave them : fight for it, you deftroy them. Secure, if you can do it without force, a fair emiflion of the wifhes of all the citizens, if what you call the good citi- zens are the majority, they will govern : if a minority, they neither will nor ought to govern, but you may give them fafety if you pleafe. This you may do for them at any rate : whe:her thofe in whofe hands you find them fubmit to collect the fenfe of the majority or refufe it. Conclude not, that if you ceafe to maintain tyranny, you have no power to infure juflice. Think not, that thofe who refift oppreflion, mufl be deaf to kindncl's. Set the example of juftice, you who if you preferred deftruc- ticn might ufe force, fet the example of juftice, jiiftice, the moft perverfe will be afhamed not to follow it. How different are the fame words from a tyrant and from a bene- faftor ! Abhorrence and fufpicion poifon them in the one cafe : love and confidence fwceten them in the other. Would you fee your juftice fliine with unrivalled luftre ? Call in commifTaries from fome other nation, and add them to your own. Do this, do it of your own accord, it will be certain you can mean nothing but juftice. The cool and unbiafTed fentiments of thefe ftrangcrs will be a guide to the judgment, and a check upon the affedions, of your own delegates. They will be pledges and evidence, to you and to the world, of the probity of their colleagues. Think not that I mean to propofe to you to crouch to the infolence of armed media- tion, or to adopt the abominations of the guaranteeing fyftem: think not that lam for acting over again the tragedies of Poland, Holland, or Geneva. The bufmefs to be fettled is — not conftitution but adminiftra- tion : not perpetual law but temporary ar- rangement : The mediators come only be- caule you bid them, and they come unarm- cd. Thus ( 12 ) Thus you may fave the good citizens : for you may fave every body. Keep to the plan of domination, you fave nobody. The firfl viftims are the very perfons you are fo folicitous to fave : fo at leaft it is in two great iflands: for there they are already overpowered. Then comes your armament, with double deflrnflion at its heels : if it is repulfed,you are difappointcd and difgraced ; if it conquers, then come beheadings and confifcations. Such are the two plans. Which then do. you choofe ? Univerfal fafe- ty, or reciprocal deftrudtion ? Abhorrence, 01 admiration ? The curfes of" your friends, or the benedictions of your enemies ? Butfuppofe the Colonics unanimous, and \inanimous in your favour, ought you evea then to keep them ? By no means : they are a million or two : you are five or fix-and- twenty millions. Think not that becaule I mentioned them firft, it is for their fake in the firiT: place that I wifli to fee theni free. No : it is the mifchief you do your- felves by maintaining this unnatural domi- nation ; it is the miTchief to the fix-aad- twenty'*YnilHons, that occupies a much 'higher place nrmy thoughts. What ( '3 ) What if colonies, as they are called, arc worth nothing to you ? What if they are worth lels than nothing ? — If you prefer in- juflice, (pardon me the fuppofition) are you fo fond of it, as to commit it to your own lofs ? i ■:^¥: What then fliould they be worth to you, but by yieldiii^ a furplus of revenue, beyond what is neccflary for their own mainten- ance and defence ? Do you, can you, get any fuch furplus from them ? If you do, you plunder them, and violate your own principles. But you neither do, nor ever have done, nor intend to do, nor ever can, do any fuch thing. The expence of the peace eftablifhment, you may know : and I much queftion whe- ther any revenue you can draw from them, can fo much as equal that expence. But the expence of defence in time of war, you do not know, nor ever can know. It is no lefs than the expence of a navy, capable of overawing that of Britain. 0/}t hut the produce of our toiuti'ies is worth fo many millions a year : it has been^ and when quiet is reftored will be cgain : all thisf if ^ ) oh, hut we give ourf elves a monopoly of their produce, and Jo zve get it cheaper thati we JhoulJ otherwife, and Jo ive make them pay ui J'or governing them. Not you, indeed: not a penny : the attempt is iniquitous, and the profit an illufion. 'i The attempt, I fay, is iniquitous : it is an ariftocratical abomination : it is a clufter of ariftocratical abominations : it is iniquitous towards them ; but much more as among yourfelves. Abomination the I ft. Liberty, property, and equality violated on the part of a large clafs of citizens (the colonifts j by prevent- ing them from carrying their goods to the markets which it is fuppofed would be moft advantageous to them, and thence keeping from them fo much as it is fuppofed they would otherwife acquire. Abomination 2d. Onepartofa nation, (the people of FVance) taxed to raife money to maintain by force the reftraints fo impofed upon another partof the nation, the colonifts. Abomination 3d. The poor, who after allare un:ible to buy fugar, the poor in C 2 France, I Mi : it » ?ii I' ■]t{ •r ■ ( 20 ) France, taxed in order to pay the rich for eating it. Necefl^irics abridged for the fup- pojt of luxury. The burthen fills upon the rich and poor in common : the benefit k fliared cxclufivcly by the rich. The injufticc is not fuch in appearance only : as it would be, if what is thus taken or meant to be taken from the colonifti* went to make revenue : it would then be only a mode of taxation. In France (it might then be faid) people are taxed one way, in the colonies another : the only queftion would then be about the eligibility of the mode. But revenue is here out of the cafe : nothing goes to the nation in com- mon, every thing goes to individuals : if it is a tax, it is a tax the produce of which is fquaudered away before colle£lion ; it is a tax the produce of which, inftead of being gathered into the treafury, is given away to lugar-eaters. But even as to fugar-caters the profit, I fay, is an illufion. For does the monopoly you give yourfelves againft the growers of fugar fo much as keep the price of fu gar lower than it would be other wife ?---not a fixpence. Lower than the price at which th* comnoodity ( 2X ) ■flP commodity is kept by the average rate of profit on trade in general, no monopoly cam reduce tlie price ot this commodity nny more than of any other, for any length of time : you may keep your fubjects from felling their fugars elfewhere, but you cannot force them to raifc it for you at a lofs, Jx)wer than this natural price, no monopoly can ever keep it : down to this price, natu- ral competition cannot fail to reduce it, fooner or later, without monopoly. Cuf- tomers remaining as they were, without encreafe of the number of traders there can be no reduction of price. Monopoly, that is, exclufion of cuftomers, has certainly no tendency to produce encreafe of the number of traders : it may pinch the profits of thofe whom it firft falls upon, but that is not the way to invite oth'^rs. Monopoly accord- ingly, ag far as it does any thing, produces mifchief without remedy. High prices on the other hand, the mifchief againil: which monopoly is employed as a remedy, high prices, produced by competition among ciif- tomers, cannot in any degree produce incon- venience, without laying a proportionate foundation for the cure. From high profits in trade comes influx of traders, from influx pf tf'aders competition among traders, from C 3 cpmpetitioTi ( ^2 ) competition among traders rcduclion of prices, till the rate of profit in the trade in queflion is brought down to the fame level as in others. m !| Were it pofii'olc for monopoly to keep priLC^: lov\ er than they would Lj otherwile, would it be pofiible for any body to tell how much lower, and how many fixpences a year were faved to fugar-eaters by lb many millions impofed upon the people ? No, never : for lince, where the monopoly fub- {\i\i, againll: the p^'oducers, there is nothing but the monopoly to prevent acceflion of, and competition among the producers, com- petion runs along with the monopoly, and to prove that any part of the efFe£t is pro- duced by the monopoly and not by the com- petition, is impoHible. 0/7, but we have not done with them yet? JVe give ourfeives another monopoly — we give eurjclves the monopoly of their cujiom, and fo we make them, buy things dearer of us than they would otherwfe, bcfides buyifig things of us which other wife they would buv of other people, andfo we make them pay us for govern' ing them. Mere illuiion — hi the articles which you can make better and cheapen' - ' than c 23 than foreioners can, which voii can furnlfh them with upon better terms than foreigners can, not a penny do you get in confequence of the monopoly, more than you would without it. You prevent their buying their goods of any body but your own peo- ple : true: but what does this lignify ? you do not force them to buy of any one or more of your own people to the cxclufion of the reft. Your own people then have liill the faculty of underfelling one another without ftint, and they have the fame in- ducement to exercil^' that faculty under the monopoly as they wopM have without it. It is ftill the competition that lets the price. In this cafe as in the other, the monopoly is a chip in porridge. It is ftill the pr(^}H)rtion of the profit of thefe branches of trade to the average rate of profit in trade that regu- lates this competition : it is frill the quan- tity of the capital which there is to be em- ployed in trade that regulates the average rate of profit in trade. In the inftance of fuch articles as you can not make better or cheaper than foreigners can, in the inftance of articles which yon can not furnilh them with on better terms than foreigners can, it is ftill the faine ilkw C 4 fion. I l-rH : : .»- ( ^4 ) \ 1 ' i Mi M i' lion, though peihitps not quite fo ^ranf- parent. "Not a penny (li;es the nation get (1 mean the total number of individuals concerned in produ(5\ive induftry of all kinds) not a penny docs the nation get by this pre- ference of bad articles to good ones, more than it would otherwife. In France, any more than any where elfe, people do not get more by the goods they produce than if there were no fuch monopoly : for if the rate of profit in the articles thus favoured were higher one moment, competition would pull it down the next. All that relults from the monopolyyou thus give yourlblvesof the cuf- tom of your colonies is, that goods of all forts are fomewhat worfe for the money all over the world than they would be otherwife. People in France are engaged to produce, for the confumption of the French Colonies, goods HI which they fucceed not fo well as England for example, inftead of producing for their own confumption, or that of fome other nation^ goods in which they fucceed better than England. People in England on the other hand, being fo far kept from pro- ducing tne goods they could have fucceeded beft in, are in fo far turned aiide to the pro- du^lion of goods in which they do not fuc- ceed fo well : and thus it is all the world over. ' ■*»«*■ ( 15 ) over. The happinefs of mankind is not much impaired perhaps by the difference between wearing goods of one patt«='rn, and goods of another : but, though much is not loft perhaps to any body by the arrange- ment, what is certain is, that nothing is gained by it to any body, and particularly to France. Will you believe experience ? Turn to the United States. Before the feparation, Britain had the monopoly of their trade : upon the feparation of courfe (he loft it. How much lefs is their trade with Britain Tiuw than then ? On the contrary, it is much greater. All this while, is not the monopoly againft the colonifts, clogged with a ro««- ter-monopoly f To make amends to the co- lonifts for their being excluded from other markets, are not the people in France for- bidden to take colony-produce from other colonies, though they could get it ever fa much cheaper ? If fo, would not the bene- fit to France, if there were any, from the fuppofed gainful monopoly be -outweighed by the burthen of that which is acknow- ledged to be burthenfomc ? Yes — the bene- fit ! 1 N i. i ( ^6 ) fit is Imaginary, and it is clogge'd with a burthen which is real. Monopoly therefore and counter- mono- poly taken together, fugar mull: come the dearer to iugar-eaters, inftead of cheaper : to a certain degree for a conftancy ; and much more occafionally, wiien the dearnefs occa- fioned by a failure of crops in the French Colonies, is by the counter-monopoly againft France, prevented from being relieved by imports from other colonies, where crops have been more fiuourable. If monopoly favoured chcapnefs^ which it does not, it would favour it to the neglect of another objedl, Jieadinefs of price, which is of more importance. It is not a man's not having fugar to eat that diflrefles him : Crcefus, Apicius, Heliogabalus had no fugar to eat : what diftreifes a man, is his not be- ing able to get what he has been ufed to, oi' not io much of it as he has been ufed to. The monopoly againft the French Colonies, were it to contribute ever fo much to the chcapnefs of the price, could contribute no- thing to the fteadinefsof it : on the contrary, in confequence of the counter- monopoly it ii clogged with, its tendency is to perpetuate tlic !. ) ( ^-1 ) the oppofitc Inconvenience, variation. Any monopoly whicli France gives herfelf again ll her colonies, will not prevent any of thofe accidents in confequence of which fugar is produced in lefs abundance in thofe colonies than at others : and when it is fcarce there, the monopoly againft France will prevent France from getting from other places where it is to be had cheaper. How much dearer is fugar in countries which have no colonies than in thofe which have ? Let thofe enquire who think it worth the while. They will then fee the utmoft which in any fuppofition it would be poffible for the body of fu gar-eaters in France to lofe. Not that this lofs could amount to any thing like the above differ- ence : for, in ns fir as thofe countries get their fugar from monopolized Colonies, which muft be through the medium of fome monopolizing country, they get it loaded with the occafional dearth produced thus by the efFecls of the counter-monopoly above mentioned-, and loaded more or lefs with conftant import taxes, befides the ex- pence of circuitous freight and multiplied mcrchaiit's profit. I ' t 1 1 I\Ta ( 28 ) ■M May not monopoly then /j;vr rfown prices r moft certainly. Will it not then /vry? i/jem down? By no means. If I h^tve goods I can make no life cf^, and there is but one man in the world that I can fell them to, fooner than not fell them, though they coft me d hundred pounds to make, I will fell them for fixpence. Thus monopoly will beat down prices. — But fliall 1 go on mak- ing them and felling them at that rate ? Not if I am in my fenfes. Thus monopoly will not keep down prices. — Hence then comes all the error in favour of monopolies — from not attending to the difterence between forc- ing down prices and keeping them down. When an article is dear, it is by no means ^ r^i-Uter of indifference, whether it is made by freedom or by force. Dearth which .., natural a misfortune : dearth which is crf'ated is a grievance. Suffering takes quite a different colour, when the fenfe of opprefiion is mixed with it. Even if the ef- fect of a monopoly is nothing, its ineffici- ency as a remedy does not take aw- ay its nia- lignity as a grievance. What then do you get by the monopo- lizing fyflem take it altogether? You get the 'f'. ( 29 ) the credit of this grievance : you get occa- fional dearth : you get the lofs you are at by the armaments you keep up againft fmug- gling : you get the expeiice of profecution, and the wafre and mifery attendant upon fine and confifcation. Oh, hut the dutki upon the Colony trade produce revenue to us. I dare lay they do, and what then ? Muft you govern a country in order to tax your trade with it ? Is there that country that dees not produce revenue to you ? You tax your trade with Britain, don't you ? and do you govern Britain ? you tax Britifh goods as high as Imu^gUng will permit : could you tax them higner if they came from the Colonics ? Would you if you could ? would you tax your own fub- jeds higher than you would flrangers ? I will flicw you how you may get reve- nue out of them i I will (hew you the way, and the only way in which, if you choofe iniquity, you may make it profitable. Tax none of their produce, tax none of your im- ports from them ; of all fuch taxes every penny is paid by yourfelves. Tax your cx- pc ru to them : tax all your exports to them : tax them as high as fmuggling will admit : of i ( 3= ) of all luch taxes every peony Is paid by them. >\( I will (liew you how much more you could get iu this way from them than from foreigners. You could not, it muft becon- feifcd, get, unlefs by accident, more per cent, on what they look from you, than on what foreigners took from you : for fmuggling, which limits the rate percent, you could thus levy upon foreigners, limits in like manner the rate per cent, you could levy upon your vafTals. Remote countries like the colonies mi Imuggling would enable them, for by the fuppolition they have no other. Upon foreigners the tax is an experiment, and what you rilk by the experiment is, the temporary diftrefs to individuals propor- tioned to the decreafe, whatever it be, of that branch of trade : for as to the abfohite I'um of trade, or tofpeak more diftindly, of national wealth, it fuffers nothing, as you have fcen, beyond the amount of th^relativc and momentary decreafe : fo that the whole produce of this tax is fo much clear gain to the revenue, for which nothing is paid or lo much as rilked, beyond the above-men- tioned momentary and contingent diftrefs to individual traders. Upon your own vaflals there is nothing for experiment to afcertain: you have them in a jail, and you fet what price you pleafe on their exiftence ; only you muft keep the door well locked, and if the jail be a large one, this may be no fuch: eaty matter. In Guadalupe, Martinico, and St. Dit)mingo, what could the expence amount to? theprifoners all refra(5lory, and maklp.H, holes and beatino; down doors and walls :* /i ■ ( ) walls, at every opportunity, with people on the outfide to help them. — Let thofe calculate who may think it worth their while. ill ^ Nil 'III t\\ ^ N m h 1 *-m In all this there are no figures— why ? bccaufe nothing turns upon figures. Fi* gures might fhew what the incomes of youf colonifls amount to ; and what the incomes of your colonifls amount to is nothing to you, for they are their incomes and not your's.-*— Figures might (hew the amount of your /;;/- ports from your colonies ; and it makes no- thing to the queflion, for they do not fell it you without being paid for it, and they would not be the lefs glad to be paid for it for being free. — Figures might fliew the pro- duce of your taxes on thofe imports ; and it makes nothing to the queflion, for you might get it equally whether the producers of thofe articles were dependent or indepen- dent, and it is your own people at home that pay it. Figures might (hew, what you fold in the way oi exports to yor.r coloiiifls in this and that fhape : and it makes nothing to the queflion ; for confumption not fale is the final ufe of produ^^ion, and if you did not fell it in that fhape, you would lell it or confume it in another. Figures misfht fhcw you '# ( r^ ) you the amount of the faxes you levy on thole exports : and nothing turns upon that amount ; for if the price of the ar- ticle will bear the amount of the tax with- out the helpoffuch a monopoly as fubjec- tion only can enfure, you may get it from them when independent as well as from other foreigners, and if it will not, neither will they bear to fee it raifed fo high, nor will you bear to raife it fo high, as to pay the expence of a marine capable of block- ing up all their ports, and defending fo ma- ny vait and diftant countries againft the rival powers, with the inhabitants on their fide. Ob but they are a great part of our power — Say rather, the whole of your weaknefs. In your own natural body you are impregna- ble : in thofe unnatural excrefcences yoxi are vulnerable. Are you attacked at home ? not a man can you ever get from them : ndt * a fixpence. Are they attacked ? they draw upon you for fleets and armies. If you were refolved to keep them, could * you ? it may be worth your confideration. Is it not matter of fome doubt, even now ' D whca '♦■ ,v. Sf '♦•■•J #■ . :| > / ( 34 ) I'l whci) you have been to defend only agaiiift thenjielvcs : can there be a moment's doubt^ when the power of Jiritain is thrown into the fcale ? Five men of war, I think, or fome fuch matter, you have ordered out to defend them againil one another. Aik your mi- nider of the marine, can he fpare 50 more to defend them againft their prote^ors ? Fifteen thouland are bound for Martinico ta fight ariftocrafs : alk your war-minifter whether Culline can fpare 30,000 more his befl men to fight Britons. Do not feed yourfelves with illufions. You can not be every where : you can not do every thing. Your refources, great as they arc, have {\\\\ their limits, The land is yours. But do- you think it polfible for you to keep it fo, and the fea likcwife ? — the land againft eyery body, and at the fame time tlie fea againft Britain? Look back a little. Could Spain, Holland, and America together fave you from the 10th of April ? How will it be now ? America is neutral. Spain and Holland are againft you*^ Send as many ftiips as you can, Eoglaiid alone can fend double the number, jijad if that be not fufficicnt, treble. Oi^ M^ *» h \ I e ( 35 ) 0/% but times are changed. I dare believe it — What fupcrior bravery can do will be done. But how little does that amount to on fuch an element ? Can bravery keep a ihip from fuiking ? With (kill any thing Jike equal, can any poflible difference ii> point of bravery make up for the difference between two and one ? €* Confider a little : a fhip is not a town, that you can bombard it with orators, and decrees for the encouragement of deferticuV, and declarations of the righis of men ; a (hip is not a town, out of which the lukewarm can (lip away, or into whici. a few friends ^ can give you admittance. You are brave *, but neither are Englifli feamen remarkably deficient ni point of bravery. If you have your lights, they have their prejudices: they may find it not fo cafy as you may think to comprehend the do6lrine of forced liberty J they may prefer a made conflitution which gives tranquillity, to an tinmade one under which fecurity is yet to come 1 they may queftion the right of the thoufands who ad- drefs you, to anfwer for the millions who are bid to abhor you : they may prefer the George whom they know, to a Froft whom* they never heard of. Pa *'-:■: Hea I J y i S; i II i» !ii i ( 36 ) Hear a paradox, it is a true one. Give up your Cv)lonies, they are yours : keep them, they are ours. This is what I raoft tremble at : excule me maa — it touches me the moft nearlv. 1 am an Englifli- Oh^ but the people of Bourdeaux — Well — ^ u hat of the people of" Bourdeaux ? Are the paiiioiis of one town to fet at nought thein- tereil ot the whole nation ? Are juftice, pro- iperity, poffibility to be fought witii i^v their fake ? — Think more h incurably of rheir patriotifm. Addrefs them, enlighten them, perfuade them : and if you find a dif- ficulty in bridling that fpeck on your own i DUtlncnt, think v.- nether you will find it c-r. A r to mafter fo many vafl and diftant iflands, with Britain on theirfide. To yield to juftice is what muft happen to the mightieil and proudeft nations. Dif- grace or honour follows, according to the mode. Britain yielded to America : Britain yielded to Ireland.- On which occafion was her dignity beft preferved ? ' " " (( Sitting where you do, call it not courage fU) t^ri, - on in the track of war and violence. There '"^'- ■ ■ \ f \ 37 ) i>; f There is nothing in fuch courage that is not compatible with the bafefl cowardice. The paffions you gratify are yonr own paf- iions : but the blood you fhed is the blood of your fellow-citizens, Who can fay what it cofts you at prefent to guard colonies ? Who can {\y what you might fave by parting with them ? — 1 fliould be afraid to fay it — almofl the whole of your marine ? — What do you keep a marine for but to guard colonies ? — Whom have you to fear but the Englifh ? — and why, but for your colonies ? To defend your trade, fay , yo,u? — Do us juftice, we are not pirates. We fliould not meddle with vour merchant- men, if you had not a fingle frigate: we fhould not invade your copfts, if you had not a fingle fort. We have ambition and injuftice enough, but it does not fliew itfelf , in that fliape. Do we hurt the trade of Denmark, Sweden, Naples, any of the in- ferior powers ? — Ne^'er : except they carry your trade for you, wL'^^n you are at war with us for coionie^.-r— What do 1 fay? If we ourfelves have a marine, it is njt for trade,, it is for colonies : it is becaufe feme of us long to take your colonies, all of us feaf your taking ours. »3 F , 'i';'f ^ ft- I III ( 38 ) Is confiflency worth preferving ? Is your boafted conquert-abjuring decree, that decree which mi"ht indeed be boafted of if it were kept, is that nioft: beneficent of all laws to be any thli^g better than warte paper ? — The 'ettcr, I fear, has been long broken : the fpiiit of it may be yet reftored, and reftored with added In fire. Set fiee your colonies, then every thing is as it (hould be. IVe in- corporated Savoy and j4vignon^ you may fay, becauje it was their wijh to join us : we part with our dijia^t brethren^ becauje like us they choofe to be governed by themfelvcs. — Mutual convenience fandion^d our compliance with the wijhes of our foreign nei^ hbours : mutual ttif- convenience^ the rejult of unnatural conjunc- tion^ mutual inconverience asfoon as it was underftood, made us follow and even an- ticipate the wijhes of our diflant fellow-ci^ tizens. — Reduction of the expences of defence was the inducement to ou*- union with thofe whom we either bordered on or inclofed : the fame advantage ^ but in a much fuperior de- gree^ rewards us J or the rejpe£l we Jhew to the wijhes and interefls of the inhabitants of another hemifphere. — 10 neutral powers we give much caufcfor fatisfa&ion^ none for jea^ loujy. Our acquirements are two fmall pro- viftccs : our [acrifces are^ befides continental fettlemcnts 'V' ( 39 ) feitlements m r^ery quarter vf the globe ^ a multitude of ijlands, the leaji of them cavahle ^holding both our acquifttions. — Were fuch your language, every thing would be ex- plained, every thing fet to rights. — While you take what fuiti you, keeping what does not fuit you, you al'pire openly to univerfal domination : with fraternity in your lips, you declare war againfl mankind. Shake off your fplendid incumbrances, the fins of your youth are atoned for, and your cha- racter for truth, prrbi^ moderation and philanthropy built on /ivcxxiifting ground. In the event of a rupture with Spain, you have defigns, I think, in favour of her colo- nies. With what view? — -To keep them? Say fo boldly, and acknowledge yourfelves worthy fuccefTors of Lewis XIV. To give them independence ? Why not give it then where it is already in your power to give it? Will you put your conftituents to an im- nnenfe expence for the chance u*' living li- berty, and refufe it when you c '^. - vc it for a certainty and for nothing? — i !V are the pictures — liberty without bloodfhca n\\ the one hand, bloodshed with only a chance for liberty on the other. Which is thebeft pr?lcnt ? Which of the two is naoft cvnge* D4 nis) ( 40 ) Is ill (^ :u,^ Hi I II nial to your tafte ? is it the bloody one ?— Go then to thofe colonifts, go with liberty on your lips, and with fetters in your hands, go and hear them make this anfwer. — Frenchmen, we believe you intend liberty for us Jt rangers, when we have feen you give it to yeur own brethren. You who hold us fo cheap ; who look down with luch contemptuous pity on our corruption, on our prejudices, on ourimper- fecl liberty ; — how long will you take our example to govern you, and of all parts of it thofe which are leaft defenfible ? Is it a fecret to you anymore than toourfelves, that they coft us much, that they yield us nothing-^ that our government makes us pay them for fi.i6feringit to govern them— and that all the ufe or purpofe of this compad: is to make places, and wars that breed more places ? ? You who look down with fo much dif- dain on our corruption, on our prejudices, on our imperfedl liberty, how long will you fubmit to copy a fy flem, in which corrup- tion and prejudice are in league to deftroy liberty ? — a compadl between government and its colonies, of which the mother coun- try is the facrifice and the dupe ? You it' [ 41 ) You have feen hitherto only what id cf- fential — Collateral advantages crowd in ia numbers. Saving of the time of public men, limplification of government, prefervation of internal harmony, propagation of liberty and good government over the earth. You are chofenby the people: you mean to be fo ; you are chofen by the moft nu- merous part, who m\ift be the leaft learned, of the people. This quality, with all its ad- vantages and difadvantages, you the chil- dren of the people, muft expert more or lefs to partake of. Inform yourfelves as yju can, labour as you will, reduce your bufi- nefs as much as you will, you need not fear the finding it too light for you. — What a mountain of arguments and calculations muft 'you have to ftruggle under, if you perfevere ill the fyftem of colony-holding with its monopolies and counter- monopolies ! What a cover for tyranny and peculation ! — Give yonr commifTaries infufficient power, they are laughed at : give them fufficient, your fervants become dangerous to their mafters. — All this plague you get rid of, by the fim- ple expedient of letting go thofe whom you have no right to meddle with. Cleared of all this rubbiHi of mifchievous and falfe ici- ence, Vc' ■»'■ ■■» 'U ( 4^ ) :U a iii M I' •la ,.tl " i i encc, your laws will be free to put on their beft ornament : then and not till then you may fee them fimple as they ought to be, iimplc as thofe who fcnt you, fimple as yourfelves. Yes, citizens : your time, all the time you either have or can make, is the property of thole who know you and whom you know : you have none to beflow vjpon thofe diftant Grangers. Great differences of opinion, and thofe attended with no little warmth, between the toleratois and profcribers of negro fla- very : — emancipation throws all thefe heart burnings and difficulties out of doors ; it is a middle term in which all parties may agree. Keep the fugar iflands, it is impoflible for you to do right : — let go the negroes, you have no fugar, and the reafon for keeping thefe colonies is at end ; keep the negroes, you trample up r the declaration of rights, and^acft in tb*^ teeth of principle. — Scruples muft have a term : how fugar is raifedis what you need not trouble yourfelves about, fo long as you do not direct the railing it. Re- form the world by example, you aft genc- roufly and wifely: reform the world by force, you might as well reform, the moon, and the defign is ht only for lunatics. The If, h, r ijS*- ■ ( 43 ) ■ The good you do will not be confined to yourfelves. It will extend to us : I do not mean to our miniftry, who affront you, but to the nation, which you moft wi(h to find your friend. — No, there is no end to the good you may do to the world : there is no end to the power that you may exercife over it. By emancipating your own colonies, you may emancipate ours : by fetting the example, you may open our eyes and force us to follow it. By reducing your owa marine you may reduce our marine : by re- ducing our marine, you may reduce our taxes : by reducing our taxes, you may re- duce our places : by reducing our places, you may reduce our corruptive influence. By emancipating our colonies, you may thus purify our parliament : you may pu- rify our conftitution. — You muft not de- ftroy it : excufe us, we are a flow people, and a little obftinate : we are ufed to it, and it anfwers our purpofe. You fliall not de- ftroy it : but if purifying it in that flow way will fatisfy you, wc can't help your purifying it. A word is enough for your Rail India pofleflions. Affedions apart, which are as yet I M felf-govcrnment. There remains know how things are *■: ( 44 ) yet unknown, whatever apphcsto the Weft Indies, apphcs to the Eall: with double force. Tlie illands prei'ent no difficulty : th(i populati(»n there is French : they are ripe for the continent : you changed there : — the power of Tippoo is no more. — Would the tree of liberty grow there if planted ? Would the declaration of rights tranllatc into Shaitfcrit ? Would 'Bramin, Chetrec, Bice, Sooder, and Halla" chore meet on equal ground ? If not, you may find fome difficulty in giving them to themfelves. You may find yourfelves re- duced by mere neceflity to what we Ihould call here a practical plan. If it is deter- mined they muft have maflers, you will then look out for the leaft bad ones that could take them : and after all that we have heard, I queftion whether you would find any lefs bad than our Englifh company. If thefe merchants would give you any thing for the bargain, it would be fo much clear gain to you : and not impoffible but they might. You know better than to think of obtaining for the quiet pofTeffion of thefe provinces any thing like what would be fpent at the firft word for the chance of taking them by- force : the pleafure of rapine, bloodffied and devaflation. ( 45 ) tlevaftation, is not to be fet at Co low a price : but fomething I'urely they would give you. Though to you the country is a burthen, it does not follow that to them it mio-ht not be a benefit. Though even the whole of. their vaft pofleifions were a burthen to them, the burthen, inftead of being encreafed, might be diminilhed by the addition : the expence of defence might be reduced : Pon- dicherry might be to them what Savoy i^ to you. ' ' ■i But enough of fuppofitions and conjec- tures.-— How you part with the poor people who are now your Haves, is after all a fub- ordinate confideration : the eflential thing is to get rid of them : You ought to do fo if nobody would take them without being paid for it. Whatever be their rights, they have no fuch right as that of forcing: o you govern them to your own prejudice. to r? •■ 0/6, btct you are a hireling : Tou are a tool of your king^ atid of his Eajl India company : they have employed you to tell us a fine piry^ and perfuade us to firip ourfelves of our colo* nies, not being able to rob us of them them" fdves. — O yes : I am all that : I have not bread to eat, and no fooner is your decree come \ If • ht.' ^ I ' U^ • ( : ( 46 ) come out, than I get 50,000/. from the company, and a peerage from the king.-—/ am a hireling : — ^but will you then betray the iiitereft of your confHtuents, bccaufe a man has been hired to fliew it you ? — // would be ofufeto England: — but are there no fuch things as common interefts, and arc you never to ferve yourfelves but upon con- dition of not ferving others at the fame time ? Is your love for your brethren (o much weaker than your hatred of your !j'.4SiJeigh hours r — // would be of uje to England, — But are England and king of EnglandtQxms fo perfeftly lynonymous, and do you of all men think fo ? — Ibe king's intereji would be ferved by it : — but by knowing a man's in- tcrcft^ his true and lafting intereft, are you always certain of his wiftier. ? Is confum- mate wifdom among the attributes of his minifters ? Have they no paffions to blind, have they no prejudices to miflead them ? Are you fo unable to comprehend your own intereft, that it is only from the opinion of others that you can learn it, and thofe your enemies ? — ^he king of England is your ene-* my : — but bccaufe heisfo, will you put your- felves under his command ? Shall it be in the power of an enemy to make you do as he pleafes, only by employing fomebody to propofe W-^> I 47 ) propofe the contrary ? — See what a man ex- pofes himfelf to by hfteiiiiig to fuch imper- tinences ! — I am hired: but are not advocates hired, as often as a queftion comes before a court of juftice ? and isjufticeon neither fide, becaufe men are paid on both fides ? — Le- w giflators, fuffer me to give you a warning— this is not the only occafion on which it may have its ufe. Thofe, if any fuch there be,, who call attention off from the argument* that are ofFered to the motives of him who, offers them, (how how humble their couf ception is, either of the goodnefs of their 4 caufe, of the ftrcngth of their own powers, or of the folidity of your judgment, not to fay of all three- If they pradtife upon you by fuggeftiofls (o wide from reaibn, it is be- caufe they either fear or hope to find yovt ^ incapable of being governed by it. A word of recapitulation, and I have done* You will, I lay, give up your colonies — be- caufe you have no right to govern them, be - caufe they had rather not be governed by you, becaufe it is againft their intereft to ' be governed by you, becaufe you get no- thing by governing them, becaufe you can*t keep them, becaufe the expence of trying to keep them would be ruinous, becaufe your conijitution A >t yij. ■m ( 48 ) ,>• If I i ih' '. conftitution would fuffcr by your keeping them, becaure your principles forbid your keeping them, and becaulc you would do good to all the world by parting with them. In all this is there a fyllable not true ? — But though three fourths of it were falfe, theconclufion would be ftill the fame. — Rife then fuperior to prejudice and paflion : the objedl is worth the labour. Suffer not even your virtues to prejudice you againft each Other : keep honour within its bounds ; nor fpurn the decrees of juftice becaufe con- firmed by prudence. To conclude — If hatred is your ruling paffion, and the gratification of it your firft objed, you w ill ftill grafp your colonies. If the happinels of mankind is your objedt, and the declaration of rights your guide, you willfet them free. — The fooner the better : it cofts you but a word : and by that word you cover yourfelves with the pureft glory. •i^^'i. ; . 1 1 ^1 ^m- FINIS. POSTSCRIPT, 21JiNr, I.S-2f>. All lUTTument, thnt had not as yet presented itself to the view of the Author when penning the aecompanying Tract, is furnished hy the consideration of tlie quantity of the matter of goody oi)erating to the effect of corruption, in the shape of patronage. , * As a citizen of Great Bniain and Ireland, he is thereby confirmed in tlie same opinions, and accordingly in the ime wishes. But, as a citizen of the Britis npire, including the sixty millions already under its Government in British India, and the forty millions likely to be under its Government in the vicinity of British India, not to speak of the one hundred and fifty millions, as some say, or three hundred millions, as the Russians say, of the contiguous Empire of China, — his opinions and consequent wishes are the reverse. So likewise, regard being had to the Colonizj^tion of Australia ; especially, if the account given of the intended settlement on the Swan River in the Quarterly Review for April, 1829, and from it in the ^ A- I ( .2 ), Morning Chronicle of 26 April, 1829, be correct. In regard to Australia, it is in his eyes preponderantly probable that, long before this century is at an* end, tlie settlements in that vast and distant country will, all of them, have emancipated themselves, changing the Govern- ment from a dependency on the English Monarchy, into a Representative Democracy. Dilemma, applying to a dista,nt dependency, thip. Admit no Appeal, (Judicial Appeal,) you liiereby, unless your fTOvernment is purely mi- lil ry, establish independence: admit Appeal, you therrh" subject the vasi mhuy of those who can not .rd the expense of the Appeal, to slavery under the relatively few who can. /in most of the copies which, from time to time were distributed in the way of gift. In- serted in MS. at the bottom of the first page, in the fbrm of a note to the title, was the me- morandum following : — "A" 1793, written just before the departure of M. Talleyrand, on the occasion of the rupture between France and England'. Copy given to Talleyrand's Secretary, Gallois, who talked of translating it." / ' w