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MICROCOfV RESOLUTION TiST CHART 
 
 (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No 2| 
 
 1^ IS 
 
 MO mil 2.0 
 
 .8 
 
 ^ ^:^PPLIEDJyMGE 
 
 ■e"^: tost Morn Street 
 
 Rochester. Ne* York i4609 USA 
 
 ■;^'6) -.82 - O.lOO - Phoic 
 
 (7^6) 288 - 5989 - Fqi. 
 
'I li r 1' I 
 
 THH 
 
 GALVESTON PLAN OF CITY 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 BY 
 WILLIAM BENNETT MUNFIO 
 
 BeprlBted from the Proceedings of tho national Municipal League 
 
 1907 
 
The Galveston plan of oity government 
 
 By 
 Vllliam Bennett Munro 
 
 
 Reprint from the Proceedings of the 
 National Municipal League. 
 1907 
 
QUEliN'S UNIVERSITY, 
 
 Kingston, C»n «!)* 
 
 19' 
 
Oeneiis of the 
 PreMnt Fnmt- 
 work of City 
 Oovenunent 
 
 The Galve.ton Plan of City Government. 
 
 WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO. Ph U 
 A..i.u„. p„,...„ „, o„.„„„, ,, „,^^^^^ u„iv.;,i.y. 
 
 Toe recent growth in popularity of the •'commission" system 
 
 of cty government is no doubt the offspring of a more of L" 
 
 -, ... ^'•^^Pread dissatisfaction with the compl-xity 
 
 of contemporary American municipal a.lminis- 
 
 ra„on. Paradoxical as it may seem, however. 
 
 "s cunous system which students of compara- 
 
 small co,„cil ,ta foS/r',7' ""'"""« "' " ""'y^ '"" " 
 ..f veto Jwer r„,l n" , , "° '^^^ "«"'i" '"""'o-s. 
 .- been"::";;: V 't illt^^^^'^'T'l '" *'' 
 
 be attributed ^ ' ^''"""'-""-^''on '""st. without doubt. 
 
 analogy .lonimaM decisively the course of 
 organic development in all the areas of Lj 
 
 cXTerL\j:;,j-"™^t:;:Si •;:-„:• r'''^i,r^"' '^' 
 
 l.a.l come to he an independent e.ecuLe'Xr: wi^h "a ^^ 
 
 ChangM 
 Wrought in the 
 American Syi- 
 tern after the 
 Revolution 
 
 administration. 
 
 22390 
 
Defects of the 
 Present System 
 
 of veto oviT local Ii'Ki»latioii, witii ijic rijjlit of appointniciu Mih- 
 
 . _ -,^ kit to confiniuitioi). ati<! with a variity of otl-.or 
 
 Influence of the i • • . . i • , . , 
 
 Federal Analogy •■" "'""-"■ativc priro-.-nucs uludi tiic iap-c of a 
 
 ti-iiitiry lia- jjroaily aii},'mciiu-.|. TIr- iminicipal 
 cnmicil lias likewise beconu' bicameral, apparetitly for no gtx)! 
 reason >avc that tlie clcmaii'ls of analogy IikI seemed so to dic- 
 tate, ill short, it seems to have hceii asMinied that a framework 
 of government devise I to rccoiuile the jarring interests of a 
 dozen indepen lent slates would hear reproduction in miniature, 
 and wouM prove efficient in applicatifin to comparatively small 
 urban units of a tliorouglilx homogeneous character. For three 
 <|uarters of a century the cities of the United States have ex- 
 pended much iKjJiiu.d energy in attempting to patch an adminis- 
 trative garment winch was not devised with an eve to their 
 direct requirements. It may he doubted whether they have suc- 
 ceeded in doing more than to make the misfit 
 more pronounce«l. They have hfcn weighted 
 down wilii an administrative organization which 
 has sacrificed the highly essential qualities of efficiency and 
 promptness in action to a blind adherence to the principle of 
 "division of powers." heedless of the fact that the proper gov- 
 ernance of a municipality makes no urgent demands whatever 
 for any strict recognition of this principle. Steering wide of 
 centralization of powers they have, however, floundered into the 
 slough of a hopelessly divide.I jurisdiction with its unfortunate 
 accompanimenl of ditfused responsibility. 
 
 .\ logical result of all this has been a reaction against t,.e \ery 
 cunibrousness of municipal machinery — a reaction which has 
 manifested itself in some cities by the abolition 
 of bicameral councils and the substitution of 
 single elective bodies. In other cases the domi- 
 nant iiitlnciici' in civic aihninistration has been 
 tr-.nsferred lo the mayor, the local legislative 
 authority bcnig dnis shorn of nearly all its jurisdiction. Even 
 more frequently the delicate adjustment of powers has been ruth- 
 lessly disturbed by the direct intervention of state authorities 
 an! the assumption of purely municipal functions by state 
 boards. This movement toward definiteness in the location of 
 
 The Reaction 
 Against the 
 Multiplication 
 of Municipal 
 Organs 
 
- i" cities liKe 1:..^:. r\ :'n''T/'''"'"""' "^«""'"- 
 
 : -•'••>-''-'-''-"""-:n..X.^^s:;;i"r 
 
 'c'.v exiHTnncMt succcssfnllv cnn.luctC bv 7(Z , ■' "' 
 
 ."an.ls upon tl,o civic trea L p e me I ^l^T'T""' '"" "" 
 
 '>ron,ht ..atters to suci, a "c r a LIT '", "^^ 
 
 <""n.l itself calle 1 u.x.n hv h ""' ^'''g'-^'ature 
 
 cane I upon hj .!,e busniess men of Galveston to 
 
 The Galveston ^l' n' '"'''"'"' ^"' ''^■•' '"« "!'!> the finan- 
 Experiment ^''^ Pr-^len. The ol.l n :ipal frame-vork 
 
 \\as aholisliei! root rii-I bra nn i i.„ 
 
 cLarter. grante.l in .c;o.. ,„e a.lminis^rat: in of ii.e c t "'" 
 
 tntsfe.i to five commissioners thre, f ^ ^ ''^ *'"" 
 
 Poinlci l.v the governor 1 ? "^. '7 ''''' ^° ''*^ ^P" 
 
 -o for .„ a:eir;,,'n:'x r^i^itii'Tr' "=' '^!^'''"'' 
 
 elective nn.l ti,„ fi. • ■ ,*^'^ makmg all the commiss oners 
 > ivvo jears, of five commissioners, one of 
 
whom is given the title of mayor -president. All are elected at 
 large. The mayor-president is presiding officer of the commis- 
 sion hut otherwise has no special powers. By a majority vote 
 of the five commissioners all municipal ordinances are passed, 
 and all appropriations are voted, the mayor-president having no 
 right to veto either ahsolute or qualified. The commissioners 
 likewise, hy majority vole, apportion among themselves the head- 
 ships of the four main departments of civic administration, 
 namely, finance and revenue, waterworks and sewerage, police 
 and fire protection, and streets and public prop, -y; the mayor- 
 president having no special department but exercising a general 
 coordinating intiucncc over all. A single commissioner is, there- 
 fore, immediately responsible for the administration of each de- 
 partm-nt. The commission as a whole draws up and passes the 
 annual budget, awards all contracts, and makes all important 
 appointments. Minor appointments are made by the individual 
 commissioners each in his own special department. There is 
 throughout a complete centralization of all powers, legislative 
 and administrative, and a very definite location of all • 'spon- 
 
 sibility. 
 
 No one who has made any impartial attempt to follow the 
 work of the Galveston commission during the last six years will 
 venture to gainsay its very striking success. 
 The financial condition of die city has been most 
 decideiUy improved; all the municipal services 
 have been brought to a much higher point of efficiency ; a better 
 grade of citizens has been found willing to seek and to accept 
 civic office; and the general tone of municipal administration 
 has been very noticeably raised. The commissioners present, in 
 their reports, such a convincing array of facts that it would be 
 idle to question the success of the new regime. This success has 
 been attributable in general to three or four canons of policy, 
 from whic.i the commissioners have not swerved during the last 
 five years, and which may be summed up as ( i ) the use of ap- 
 proved business methods in civic financing; (2) the entire elim- 
 ination of all leakages in expenditures; (3) the making of all 
 appointments on the basis of individual efficiency; and (4) the 
 strict accountability of each commissioner for the on-goings of 
 
 The Besults in 
 Galveston 
 
his own department. All the improvements of the last half 
 -lecade in the Texan city can be attributed, substantially, to the 
 tact that the new system of government has rendered strict ad- 
 Merence to these fun.lamental rules of sound municipal admin- 
 istration possible and even imperative. 
 
 It is not necessary to speak in any detail of specific a<Ivances 
 made in municipal administration by Galveston under the sys- 
 The Galveston IZ °tt ^°"'"^'"^"* by commission. It is enough 
 Example in ',^* *''^'^ '^^''^ '■^^^'••y "oted by neighboring 
 
 Other Texan ^^^^" ^"'^^' ^"^1 ^^at the latter soon bestirred 
 
 Cities themselves to the task of inaug- ting a similar 
 
 framework of administration. Since loo^ char- 
 ters fundamentally similar to that of Galveston have been sought 
 and obtained by five other cities of Texas: Houston, Fort Worth 
 Austin Dallas, and El Paso. The experience, moreover, was 
 not lost upon many cities in the North, and during the last two 
 ur three years measures have been introduced into the legisla- 
 tures of at least a dozen states all aiming to permit cities to 
 simplify their framework of administration more or less gener- 
 ally in accord with the Texan plan. At its last session the Legis- 
 lature of Iowa put such a measure upon the statute books, 
 rendering optional to all cities of over 25,000 population the 
 adoption of the commission system. This privilege has already 
 found acceptance in the capital city of Des Moines; in this case 
 provision being ma.le for the employment of certain advanced 
 :ne hods of securing the strict and consistent responsibility of the 
 authorities to their constituents. 
 
 Despite a general impression that the commission system of 
 The System '°"' administration is a novelty in American 
 
 Not a New One government, the principle involved is by no 
 in America "^cans new in the United States. It is in almost 
 
 no important respect different from the New 
 luigland system of town government by a board of selectmen 
 who with their chairman, assume and concentrate in themselves' 
 all administrative and legislative functions from one annual elec- 
 tion until the next. There are many New England " towns " 
 with populations quite large enough to entitle them to rank as 
 cities, which have, for more than a century, maintained what is 
 
8 
 
 The Herits and 
 Defects of the 
 Commission 
 Plan 
 
 to all intents and purposes a system of government by commis- 
 sion. Tiieir selectmen, who are chosen by the people at large, 
 represent in their jurisdiction a complete fusion of local power 
 and responsibility. In every state of the L'nion, moreover (with 
 the exception of Louisiana and Rhode Island), county adminis- 
 tration has been vesteil almost wholly in the hands of an elective 
 commission. Tlie use of the term " commission " has misled 
 many into overlooking a system with which they have been 
 long familiar under a different designation. American cities 
 have had occasion, no doubt, to become familiar with " commis- 
 sions," but with commissions of a very different sort. 
 
 No aspect of the general problem of municipal reform has 
 received more attention in the press and on the platform during 
 the last year than the merits and defects of the 
 commission plan. In the main, however, these 
 discussions have <lwelt largely upon the advan- 
 tages of the system, many of which are almost 
 too obvious to require emphasis. The defects, 
 on the other hand, do not appear on the surface so plainly, 
 though a closer examination will di.sclose thai die system of gov- 
 ernment by commission, if generally applied to American cities 
 under present conditions, would in all probability encounter im- 
 portant objections which no real friend of permanent municipal 
 reform ought to treat lightly. Some of these relative merits and 
 defects may be briefly noticed, so far as it may be accounted 
 safe to generalize in the light of American municipa' experience. 
 The cardinal advantage of the system is that it affords definite 
 iiope of putting an end to the intolerable decentralization of re- 
 sponsibility which now characterizes American 
 civic administration. By concentrating powers 
 and focusing public attention upon a narrow 
 area il will render more effective the scrutin\ 
 which the voters may apply to the conduct of 
 men in public office. If the system does not guarantee efficient 
 administration, it at least promises to disclose where the blame 
 for inefficiency should be made to fall It will undoubtedly facil- 
 itate the election of a higher type of men, for American mu- 
 nicipal experience has plainly demonstrated that small bodies 
 
 The Important 
 Advantage of 
 Centralizing 
 Besponsibility 
 
Willi large powers attract a better class of citizens than large 
 bodies wit!, restricte.l jurisdiction. The reduclion in numbers 
 of the school boards of St. Louis, Boston, and other large cities 
 have .-served to show the truth of this aphorism in conclusive 
 fashion. Even thoiigii party organizations may continue to dic- 
 tate tlie nomination of commissioners, as thev now do that of 
 councilmcn, these organizations will no longer he placed under 
 pressure to give representation to every sectional, racial, and re- 
 hgu ns interest at the cost of placing inferior men in candirlacy 
 I hat government by commission will eliminate partisan candida- 
 tures IS something scarcely to be hoped for ; but there is goorl rea- 
 son to believe that it would remove from party organizations much 
 of the sinister pressure with which tliese have now to contend. 
 
 Again, it is well known that municipal corruption nowadays 
 arises as frequently from the power of municipal authorities to 
 Thelegseningof '''"'^''* ^''^ meritorious plans of public-service 
 Civic Corruption '^'^•'Porations as from their power to forward 
 reprehensible projects. If the present system 
 of checks and balances puts a restriction upon the ill-considered 
 granting away of privileges, it none the less puts a premium 
 upon the withholding of rights which should, in the public in- 
 terest, be granted without hesitation. It is extremely doubtful 
 whether the chances of obtaining a municipal franchise at the 
 present time in any large city are properly proportioned to the 
 merits of an application therefor. A small commission would, 
 in.Ieed. simplify the task of .lealing with civic franchises on a 
 business basis, and, if there be any fear that the unchecked power 
 of granting municipal franchises is a jurisdiction too momentous 
 to be veste<l in the hands of a small body, provision mav be 
 made, as in the Des Moines charter, for having the acts of the 
 commission in this sphere subject to ratification by the voters. 
 
 Still again, as we are frequently reminded, the work of ad- 
 Approximates ";""»stering the affairs of a city is in every essen- 
 the Government *'^' respect akin to that of conducting the affairs 
 of the City to of a private business corporation. Now the 
 SL*Cornn™«„„ ''''"'"* ^'^^'"''^^^teristic of sound corporate man- 
 new Corporation ,gen,ent is the centralization of powers in the 
 hands of a small board of directors. What, we are asked, would 
 
lO 
 
 be tliought of a business corpuration whicli intrusted the man- 
 agement of its interests to a bicameral hoa-d, made up of classes 
 of mcml)ers selected in different ways, representing different in- 
 terests, possessing separate jurisdictions, and designed to embody 
 a system of checks and balances? Why should the affairs of a 
 municipality demand an administrative machinery so much more 
 complex than that of the largest private corporation? There is 
 danger, however, of pressing this point too far, for it must be re- 
 membered that the analogy between the work of the municipal 
 and that of the private coriwration is by no means perfect. The 
 city, for example, enjoys many legal privileges and immunitier. 
 which an ordinary business corporation does not possess. It is 
 not legally responsible for the torts of its police officers, of the 
 employes of its fire department, or for tho.e of several other 
 classes of its agents ; whereas the private corporation is directly 
 liable to be heavily mulcted for the negligence or inefficiency of 
 those whom it takes into its service. Furthermore, in determin- 
 ing matters of policy the authorities of a municipality must give 
 weight to many considerations of social well-being which the 
 management of ^ private corporation may afford to neglect. It 
 must be admitted, too, that administration by a board of direc- 
 t(jrs is not necessarily synonymous with integrity and efficiency. 
 One need not go far afield to find instances in 'which directors 
 have been deficient in their knowledge of affairs immediately in 
 their care, or in which they have personally profited at the ex- 
 pense of those interests which they were chosen to guard. 
 Xevertheless, it may be said with truth that there is plenty of 
 room for the infusion of "business principles" into civic ad- 
 ministration, and the analogy, if not pushed too far. lia> much 
 force. 
 
 The system of government by commission will serve to render 
 _,, - . . municipal administration more prompt and more 
 
 p,nd Effective in ""^ "'^'"'^ '"'''>' ^^ '■''S''om, but there is also, al- 
 Action "'"^t inevi!ai)Iy. friction, delay, and intriguery. 
 
 A system of division of powers is almost certain 
 to counterbalance what it gains in security against hasty and 
 arbitrary action what it loses in inability to cope with problems 
 
II 
 
 winch demand prompt, united and uncompromising attention 
 In local admmistration promptness an J efficiency are impel ative- 
 and It may be properly urged tiat, in order to secure these 
 essential qualities, a municipality is justified in weakening its 
 organs of deliberation and in assuming a reasonable amount of 
 risk that concentrate.! power will be abuse. 
 
 There are, no doubt, mar^y incidental advantages which cities 
 may reasonably hope to secur, from the introduction of the com- 
 mission system, and to these Lhe experience of Galveston l--->rs 
 abundant testimony. Most of these, however, are relativ to 
 the existing conditions in particular cities, and mav not, there- 
 fore, be dealt with in general terms. 
 
 To the casual student the defects of the commission syst-m 
 are, perhaps, not so apparent as the merits. They exist, never- 
 THe Defects of *'^'^'^^^^' ^"^' ^^'^ of sufficient importance to de- 
 the CommiMion "^^"'' '^^''^f^'' an<l judicious consideration; for 
 System t'le cause of municipal reform may receive per- 
 
 manent injury through the open advocacy by its 
 friends of any plan of administration which has not been ade- 
 quately studied in the light of conditions which now exist or are 
 likely to exist in American cities. 
 
 The most common objection urged in the public press and by 
 the rank and file of municipal politicians is that the plan is un- 
 American and undemocratic; that it 'involves a 
 radical <leparture from American traditions of 
 local self-government and proposes a step in the 
 direction of municipal dictatorships. This ob- 
 jection is as easy to raise as it is difficult to 
 support. The present framework of m„„icipal ac-ministration 
 with Its .Iiyision of powers, is not a whit more traditionally 
 American than is the New England town sys.em of govern- 
 ment by a board of selectmen with no division of powers what- 
 ever. That the system of administration bv a small body of men 
 ten.ls to remove control " awav from the people " is an asser- 
 tion which the whole history of local government in the United 
 States absolutely refutes. Indeed, it has been proven time and 
 again t!iat a single elective officer may, in his official actions, 
 more faithfully reflect public opinion than a large body of elect.'d 
 
 The Commission 
 System Claimed 
 to be rn-Ameri- 
 can and un- 
 democratic 
 
The Plan Pro- 
 poses to Narrow 
 the Educative 
 Work of Local 
 Government 
 
 12 
 
 representatives. Mud, of tl.e latent an.I unreasoning prejudice 
 agan,st the new plan springs, no .loubt. fron, the p.^nliar asso! 
 uat.on ot the " eommission " with the i.lea of state interference 
 in municipal matters. 
 
 Tl,e observant De Tocqueville once remarked tliat local jjov- 
 cniment is to national what the elementary school is to the uni- 
 versity; tliat each in its respective sphere per- 
 forms the work of preparation. Political edu- 
 cation, It has been observed, consists in the 
 ^ercise not only of the riglit to choose but of 
 , , ^''*-' '■'f^''^ '-^ ^^ chosen-in can,li<!acv and in ser- 
 
 annnally allorded to a large number of citizens. The plan of 
 government by commission proposes greatly to reduce this „um- 
 
 fnn: f ""'"'■ J;"^^'-^ ^^'"S fille^I by appointment presumal^ly for 
 long terms. This policy, it is objected, would tend to ve.^ the 
 work of CIVIC administration permanently in the hands of a very 
 few men. and might very well assist in the development, as in 
 the German cities, of a professional city I)ureaucracv Tl,; pres- 
 ent mulnplication of elective offices alTords u a unique degree the 
 opportunity for a large number of citizen to be brought into 
 touch wi:h local political atYairs and to obtain such political e.lu- 
 cation as this contact involves. 
 
 Again, objection is made that the system will serve to 
 s.rengthen rather than to weaken the influence of the regular 
 The System will P^^'^^n organizations in civic affairs. The con- 
 Tend to Increase centration of power and patronage in the hands 
 if pI^I"*'"'* °^ ,^ ^""''^ commissioners would, it is claimed, 
 OrSfJat..ns Z'^'Jl '^^^"^ inoperative to the party leaders 
 . /h^t the commission .should be controlled; and 
 
 the party energies, now spread over a wider area, woukl thus be 
 concentrated at a single point. It is quite true tliat whenever 
 e power and the patronage of the mayor ha^fe been e.xten.led 
 the result has not been to diminish the force of partisanship in 
 mayoralty elections; on the contrary, party leaders have been 
 .mpelled to make more energetic campaigns and to perfect their 
 organizations in order that they might control an office which 
 
13 
 
 l.a.l bccun,e ,l,e nu.rc vahuble to tho;n. Furthermore, tlte clcc- 
 .. of fcn,r or i.vc con.n.issioners by tbe voters at large vvo'^ 1 
 1 probab.l.ty. resnlt in selections from the ranks of a sbg 
 
 " a l.;'"'"""'"'"'^' "^"'•' '" -""^^ --^ *-'l-t its whole 
 ^ Lr^ UeT '"n""' ?T*'' """'"' '" — 1-nce be wholly 
 "IS, but a uouM be the more usual outcome. (J„ ,he other han.l 
 |. brge .nmcil, the members of which are electe., b/sm H^ 
 tr. ts. w.Il ahnos, certainly contain representatives of the weatr 
 H. Ucal party. .Much of the hopes placed upon the new "^ten 
 ar.se fn.n the proposal that commissioners shall be electe 1 
 arge; but ,t must not be forgotten that the plan of et on a 
 large ,s not wulunu its counterbalancing ,!etects 
 
 It has. perhaps, been characteristic of the American voter that 
 1- .s prone to .ay too much stress upon the form of governme.n 
 A Change in '"^ ''"'^ "P"" '^s personnel. He is not al- 
 
 Ftn of Govern- ^''^^^ ^""^"^ 'o see that the more efficient admin- 
 ment will Avail '^tration of European cities results not at all 
 a'chZiffr* ''''''■ '"P""'"'' ^'■^•"ework of local govern- 
 
 se»k and oblam municipal office Without a 
 
 t7;or 't?:Trt^' ''' ^"'^'"^'^" "*■ ^°— - ^^^^ 
 
 sion for the existmg system wou' i assuredly avail but little 
 
 l"^d 'b' "":;'" " "' ''"■'"'^'^"^ ^"-"->- with wide Jw Is 
 oul be much more capable of injuring the best interes s of a 
 
 or4n ith '"' ' "7"P^ ''' ""'^*--''^"^ ^^^ -' administrat ve 
 cXlx^^v 7 >'"""'' '"*''°^"^^ -iecentralized: for the very 
 compltx.ty and cumbrousness of tl,e prese.it system serves in 
 -me degree to place an obstacle in the way of "anrw cLspre;^ 
 or consis ent nront'dointr ti,„ i • ^ ^vuiespreati 
 
 whether a better clas"f n --^f , 1"^-^^-" i^ therefore, 
 
 'a ueuer class ot men would be attracted to a «mali 
 
 ccmm,ss,on than to a large council. To this the es on n 
 
 pcnence .seems to give an affirm ..ive reply P t i i " 1^ 
 
 of probability rather than a matter of certainty ' "'"" 
 
 Sponsors of the commission plan have sometimes ur^ed that 
 
 ts adopt.on would ensure administration by skilled ex^m s nee 
 
 appom ments n,ade by a small body would probablyTe i'ctlted 
 
 by reasons of „,er,t and experience alone.' It may be not d 
 
14 
 
 however, that tlie vesting of tlie riglit of appointment in the 
 hands of a small body, or even in the hands of a single officer, 
 would not necessarily ensure this result. There was a time in 
 The Syrtem American cities when patronage was committed 
 
 does net AMure to the municipal council, and under this system 
 Adminiitration partisan considerations almost exclusively intUi- 
 by Experts £,,^^.,1 ji,g making of appointments to office. 
 
 Municipal reformers insisted that this nernicious policy could be 
 brought to an end only by irnnsf erring the appointing p<jwer to 
 liie mayor and by placing upon the mayor alone the full and 
 entire res{)onsibility. Ijut during the decade or more since this 
 transfer has been maile it may well be tloubted whether indivitlual 
 merit and capabilities have counted much more in determining 
 appointments than they did in the days when the council pos- 
 sessed the patronage. Now it is proposed to vest the patronage 
 once again with a body of men ; but one may scarcely venture to 
 hope that partisan considerations will lose much of their strength 
 l)ccause of any such further transfer. Definite location of re- 
 sponsibility for civic appointments seems, as experience shows, 
 to afford some assurance against gross inefficiency; it does not, 
 apparently, afford a guarantee that the degree of efficiency will 
 be very high. 
 
 An important feature of both the Galveston and Des Moines 
 plans of city government by commission is that the " appropri 
 ating " and " spending " authorities are fused. 
 In other branches of American government 
 it has been the policy to keep these two juris- 
 dictions distinct and independent ; and this has 
 been true alike of national, state and local ad- 
 ministration. The legislative organs appropriate 
 the funds, the administrative organs supervise their expenditure. 
 In the New England system of town government the board of 
 selectmen does not appropriate moneys for any purpose; this 
 function is reserved to the annual " town meeting." The con- 
 centration of both powers in the hands of a single small commis- 
 sion might, and ])robal)ly would, serve the interests of integrity 
 so long as men of the right caliber constituted the cot-mission ; 
 but there are those who see in this fusion of jur, dictions a 
 
 The Concentra 
 tion of Appro- 
 priating^ and 
 Expending 
 Powers in the 
 Same Hands 
 
»5 
 
 potential clement of danger. It involves, at any rate, a radical 
 departure from a principle which has hitherto characterized not 
 alone American government, but the governmental systems of the 
 leading European states as well. In the successful administra- 
 tion of German cities, for example, this separation of the appro- 
 priating from the speniling departments has always been strongly 
 emphasized. 
 
 It is sometimes urged that the general adoption of the system 
 of government by commission would encourage state interven- 
 The Incentive *'°" '" municipal affairs. In every large city 
 to State Inter- there come up, yea.- by year, many important 
 ferenoe questions which demand broad legislative action. 
 
 Now, whether their policy has .been v ise or unwise in this direc- 
 tion, it is an undoubted fact that state authorities have been 
 extremely loath to entrust broad legislative functions to small 
 boards whose juris''xtion is mainly administrative. The associa- 
 tion of well-considered legislative a'-tion with large bodies is 
 deeply imbedded in the American mind and will not be easily 
 eradicated. If large municipal councils are eliminated from the 
 framework of city government there would seem to be a danger 
 that state legislatures would be tempted to assume for them- 
 selves some of the broader legislative functions which the coun- 
 cils have been accustomed to exercise. At any rate, we know 
 from experience that where the legislative powers of municipal 
 councils have been curtailed their former powers have usually 
 been assumed by Mie state legislature and have not been trans- 
 ferred to some other organ of loial government. That there 
 has been, on the whole, too much state interference in municipal 
 affairs most stmlents of government are disposed to admit ; this 
 intervention has been on occasions salutary, but more often detri- 
 mental to the best interests of the cities concerned. It may prop- 
 erly be urged, therefore, that any step which promises to afford 
 an incentive to greater inroads upon the principle of civic auton- 
 omy should not be taken hastily or without due consideration of 
 its less immediate but none the less important consequences. 
 
 In weighing the respective merits and defects of the Galveston 
 plan as these would probably work out were the system given 
 general application, the burden of proof ought in fairness to be 
 placed upon those who advocate the extension. A change in 
 
i6 
 
 Conclnaion 
 
 any department of American gmcmnient wliich involves a trans- 
 formation so complete of the whole framework of organization 
 
 „ . . „ . should not he readilv adopted until it can be 
 atlative Mtnti . , , , 
 
 and Defects of ^ ^" promise, with a reasonable degree of cer- 
 the Plan tainty, a very tlecisive improvement in civic ad- 
 
 ministration. It must not be forgotten that the 
 experiment of government by commission has as yet been ade- 
 quately tried in Galveston alon-, and that here the circumstances 
 were distinctly unusual. A receivership may be the Ijest means 
 of getting a bankrupt business corporation upon its financial feet, 
 but does not follow that all sound and solvent concerns should 
 forthwith permanently adopt this method of administering their 
 atYairs. 
 
 (3n the other hand, as the present system of civic administra- 
 tion is loo complicated, and too cursed with the curse of divided 
 responsibility to prove reasonably efficient, any 
 step in the direction of simplification .should be 
 welcomed by those who have the best interests of American cities 
 at heart. Those who are prone to look askance at anything which 
 involves concentration of power may be reminded that such is 
 never dangerous when accompanied by an equal concentration of 
 responsibility. Not a few Ai.ierican cities at the present time are, 
 as every one knows, controlled by small coteries of men — party 
 managers — who dominate the official organs. These men are 
 dangerous because they concentrate power without responsibility. 
 The system of govcrnr I by commission, if it would not elim- 
 inate the " bosses," promises at any rate to compel them to 
 work in the open. 
 
 E.xper intents with the Galveston plan in a number of cities 
 ilififcring in size and situated in tlifferent parts of the country, 
 will serve to mark out more clearly the merits and defects of 
 the system in action. Such experiments may be welcomed as 
 paving the way for what may secure substantial improvement in 
 civic administration ; but no one who appreciates the difficulties 
 of the problem will readily hope to find in this or n any other 
 formal change a panacea for all municipal ills. The plan can be 
 said to have established a f^riira facie case ; and it well deserves 
 a sympathetic trial on a sufficiently broad scale to enable it to 
 be fairly judged. 
 
■Mi