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Thoaa too larga to ba antiraly inciudad in ona aapoaura ara fllmad baginning in tha uppar laft hand comar. laft to right and top to bottom, aa many framaa aa raquirad. Tha following diagrama illuatrata ttia mathod: Laa cartaa. planchaa, taMaaux. ate, pauvam Atra film^a i daa taux da rMuction diff«ranta. Loraqua la documam aat trop grand pour Atra raproduit an un aaul cllcM. il aat film* i partir da I'angia aupMaur gaucha, da gaucha i droita. at da haut m* baa. an pranam la nombro dfmagaa n^caaaaira. Laa diagrammaa tuivanta iiluatrant la m^thodo. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Fur pr'tPiitK circulation onlii.) SPECIAL LECTURE. Monday, May 28, 1877. General Sir WILLIAM J. CODRINGTON, G.C.B., &c., &c., &c., Vice-President, in the Chair. A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OP WAR. By Colonel H. C. Fletcher, C.M.G., Commanding 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. It has been somewhat difficult to find a heading for this paper that will explain the views that are intended to be set forth, and there- fore I may as well say that the scheme which I propose to bring under your notice this afternoon, is one for subsidising an expeditionary force of regular troops (supposing such a force should ever be neces- sary) by representative bodies of our volunteers, drawn not only from the mother country, but from her great colonies. I do not venture to propound this plan otherwise than to provoke the critipism, and to draw forth the opinions of the experienced soldiers who would be called upon to command and to organise our forces in the event of war, as well as of those, who brought into contact with the class that compose the strength of our volunteers, will be able to speak au- thoritatively of its desirability and even of its possibility. The diffi- . culties that may attend it are doubtless great, the objections to it are probably numerous, but if there be a germ of practicability about such a scheme the sooner this germ ripens into fruit by the assistance of friendly criticism, the better it will be, and if there be no reality about it, the quicker it is consigned to the limbo where ill-digested and useless plans lie, the better it will also be. Before attempting to set forth any details, I must, in order to de- fend the position I intend to take up, endeavour to lay down a few general principles. Owing to facility of communication, denseness of population, and the power that mechanical skill has afibrded of arming, supplying, and transporting vast numbers of men, and of pro- viding unlimited quantities of material, the armies now placed in the field are far larger than any that have ever been organised in former b 2 A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND periods of European history; whilst in place of fighting their battles with troops removed for long periods of service from civil life, con- tinental nations vie .with each other in sweeping into the ne+^^ of conscription the larger portion of their male population. Happily our insular position enables us to avoid (at all events for the present) this method of converting nations into armed camps, thereby sapping their energies and rendering war almost preferable to armed peace. We are content with a comparatively small army raised from what I must call — in fault of a better word — our poorer classes, and to supple- ment this army by a militia also formed from similar materials, and by our volunteers, who furnish an outl3t for the military instincts of the middle strata of our society ; whilst we leave our great colonies to manage their own affairs, without endeavouring to unite them in any imperial scheme of mutual defence — gradually, and by a method pecu- liarly our own — of improving, without revolutionising — we ar ebringing together a portion of these heterogeneous bodies into something like a cohesive force; but war may not wait for the perfecting of our plans, and we may be called upon to take the field before our organisation Jias advanced beyond its elementary processes. For merely defensive warfare, plans have doubtless been prepared, and the recent mobilisation scheme shows that +he utility of what are called, our auxiliary forces has been partially recognised. But when has England waited to be attacked ? Has she not interests to guard be- yond the four seas : outposts to garrison, on the defence of which the vitality of our Empire depends, and even a policy to support that may lead to our selecting for the seat of war a foreign country rather than our own fields. For such a war expeditionary forces proportionate to the strength of a mighty nation will be necessary, and every energy will be taxed to supply means for rendering them sufficiently powerful to meet the hordes that conscription has enabled our continental neighbours to place under arms. Our regular troops will be aug- mented, our militia mobilized and increased in numbers, and all the inducements that pay and bounty can afEord will be tried, to swell the ranks and supply the needs of our Army and of our Navy. But how can we compete with the product of the wide net of conscription, through whose meshes so few fish can escape, unless we utilize our middle classes, and avail ourselves of at least a small portion of the vast organisation that has placed so many of them under arms ! Why also should we not welcome among our first line, the sons of those enterprising men who have extended the influence and power of pjngland tlu-ough so many distant lands, and have inherited with the warlike instincts of their race, the loyalty that would impel them to great sacrifices, in the event of danger to the country that they still look on as home ? Since the last great wars of the French revolution, the total popu- lation of England has not only increased enormously in numbers, but the middle class which now forms the bulk of our volunteer forces has augmented in an even higher ratio. The threat of invasion in 1859 called forth its warlike instincts, and gradually but steadily the organ- isation it adopted has risen in efficiency, and the force has shewn itself COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OF WAR. i more and more alive to the reality of the work that may possibly await it. There are doubtless great differences in the efficiency of regiments, but the majority of those officers who have had opportu- nities of commanding brigades composed of volunteers will I feel sure bear evidence of their discipline, and aptitude to learn, and of the willingness with which they will make sacrifices for the sake of in- struction in their military duties. The liking for display and for what may be called the showy externals of a military career, have in great measure given place to a sense of the reality of their work, and the more this reality is brought home to the members of the force, the greater will be their zeal, and the higher their standard of efficiency. It is well understood in all countries, that to keep a picked body of troops, such as those that do duty as guards to the sovereign, up to the proper mark, the feeling that in times of danger, they will be the first to be sent on service, is of the most vital importance, and on a some- what similar principle the dangers of active service ought to be faced by the peculiarly constituted force represented by the English volun- teers. War is a great leveller, distinction of class, advantages of social position, the possession of wealth, and of the capacity for enjoying it, all vanish before the exigencies of service, and the very fact that the volunteer regiments include among their rank and file men of a higher social grade than the regulars and the militia, points to the desirability of giving them opportunities of facing danger, and of showing that they are worthy of the advantages that Providence has bestowed upon them. That this feeling exists among the members of the force is evidenced by the increased impetus that even a vague prospect of service gives to their recruiting, and by the additional and self-imposed work which many of the Officers and men undertake when war on the continent shows even a slight chance of military employ- ment. What the French describe as the baptism of fire, applied even to a small portion of the force, would do more to increase the popu- larity and raise the standard of the volunteers, than years of drill and preparation. It would augment their prestige, would create tradi- tions of danger faced and of glory won, and would stamp on them a reality which subsequent years of peace would fail to efface. I think that it is hardly necessary to pursue further this portion of the sub- ject, the fact is so indubitable that few will be disposed to question it, and if I may be allowed, I will assume that solely with the object of elevating the morale of the volunteers, the advantage of employing a portion of the f orcq on the first opportunity that war affords (putting aside for the present all difficulties in carrying out the plan) is indis- putable, and may be taken for granted. There are, however, other aspects of the question, which naturally occur to all who think it over. In the first place would a force com- posed of volunteers be able at the outbreak, or soon tifter the out- break of hostilities, to take its place with regular troops ? To this query I can well understand that many officers who have experience of soldiers, will feel some difficulty in giving a favourable reply. They know how long it takes to make an effect" ve soldier, and how gradually discipline becomes inculcated into his mind by the daily, b 2 A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH 'aND strict), routine of drill and duty. From much experience, they are aware of the constant attention and caref nl supervision which the raw recruit requires to convert him from the yokel to the smart soldier, and they view with suspicion the royal road to learninr^ which they thiiik the volunteer is aiming at. These objections are well worthy of consideration and afford much scope for thought ; but on the other hand the end in view must not be forgotten in testing the means employed, and the lessons of history ought to be carefully criticised and then duly appreciated. The aim of all military training is to roduce a body of men who will face hardship, danger and deatli i — w ithout question and without flinching. The ordinary weaknesses of ' tfto flesh have to be subdued by other impulses, and as the body is "[lengthened by exercise, so must the moral qualities of the soldier be fortified by the stimulants comprised in the comprehensive term of ^^djfifipline, whilst hm own self-reliance must be augmented by the be lief that he is supported by men actuated by similar motives. But men are differently constituted, and although in peace time, and having regard to the ordinary type of recruit, we grind all in the same mill, yet it does not follow that there may not be a shorter way of attaining a similar result. Among the numbers that compose the volunteer force, there must be many men who are imbued with a large share of what may be termed military instincts, but who are debarred by their position in life from taking service either as private soldiers, or as officers of the regular army. These men voluntarily attend many more than the prescribed number of drills, they also view their work in a more practical light than others who go through it in a perfunctory manner, consequently they are far in advance of their comrades, and are frequently on a par with men, who have engaged exclusively, at all events for a few years, in a military career. To these men the prospect of active employment would serve as a power- ful incentive for renewed exertions. Their education, the feeling of responsibility which their status in society gives, and the additional stake they possess in the country, would all act as stimulants to enter- prise, and would more than counterbalance the absence of a portion of the professional training which an ordinary recruit receives. _Surely a^ brigade of men such as these, chosen from among the best volunteer regiments, of high physical qualities, and brought together, say for a Jortnight's training under some energetic regular officer, would be welcomed by any general of division, and would be infinitely pre- jrred to the foreign mercenary levies who augmented the numbers ^f_the English Army at the close of the Crimean war ; good as those troops doubtless were. And here I would observe that it appears to "me unworthy of a great nation to fight its battles with troops that have nothing in common with it except the pay they receive, whilst it leaves untapped the mine of wealth that its middle classes present. Without doubt we have pursued this course in former wars, but it must be remembered that the principal recruiting grounds for mercenary troops is now more than occupied by a great military nation, that has too much employment for its own sons, to permit of their giving military service to other countries. Besides this, in the i COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OF WAR. Peninsular war, we fought the battle of oppressed Europe, and so drew into our Army those, who, hating French rule, were consequently un- able to remain in their own homes, and therefore took service in our army. It is a comparatively modern idea that battles are to be fought by men trained exclusively for war, and that the mass of the nation is to look on whilst its life and honour are defended by a portion only of its representatives. In the ancient republics of Greece and Italy it was the duty, and even the exclusive privilege of the citizens to bear arms, and not until the decline of Roman liberties did paid legionaries take the place of the levies of the free inhabitants of the f^reut city. Con- scription, properly enforced, compels all classes to bear their share of military duty, and those armies have been most formidable that have included in their ranks representatives from every portion of the nation. The troops of the French Republic which the Great Napoleon led into Italy, the German army that conquered at Sadowa and at Sedan, were types of the nations they fought for, being composed of every element of which they were formed. Excellent as the English regular army is, it yet lacks the elasticity which gives scope for all the warlike energy of the people ; and when a serious war tries the nation, a loss of strength will ensue unless every class pays its share of the blood as well as of the money contributions. I have now endeavoured to establish two theses : first, that a repre- sentative body of volunteers in a military expedition beyond the seas, would be of great service to the force itself ; and secondly, that they would add to the strength of the army of which they would form a part, whilst, indirectly, both as benefiting the volunteer force, and as bringing prominently to the front the middle classes of the community, they would materially increase the fighting power of the nation. It now remains for me to endeavour to indicate how such a force might be raised, and here I must ask for the indulgence and forbearance of those who are so much better acquainted with the subject than I am, presuming on the fact that sometimes the ignorant, from a want of knowledge of difficulties, may strike out a line which those who are brought face to face with them, cannot ventui'e to pursue. In a dis- cussion on the recent mobilization scheme, and the place allotted to the voluntoers in the defence of the country, I heard a distinguished Colonel of one of the best metropolitan corps make the remark that he quite approved of the force being at first placed in fortresses or en- ti'enched positions, as he felt sure that if they were subsequently found fit for the field, the Generals in command would be too glad to have them. Mr. Hoste, in the able paper which he read at this Institution, pointed out the desirability of dividing the force into a first line and a reserve ; and this idea has been advocated by Lord Elcho, and I be- lieve already partially carried out in so far that the force of some of the regiments is sti-engthened by a register of men who have passed through the ranks, and who are willing to serve again in the event of war. I would propose to enlarge on this scheme, and endeavour in peace time to provide for an organization that might be utilised in providing a force ready for immediate war. in every regiment of 6 A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND Volunteers a roll of men might bo prepared who would be williuif in case of hostilities to serve abroad, say for a limited time ; these men should pledge themselves to attain to a higher pitch of efficiency than their comrades, by attending a larger number of drills ; they should be passed as medically fit for service, and should be certified as being effective soldiers by the Inspecting Officers at the yearly inspections of the regiments. As there are about 105,(JU0 enrolled and etHcieut infantry volunteers, two per cent, would give a force of upwards of 3,500, or very nearly a brigade ; whilst if a really popular Avar should break out, and (with the present extension of the franchise) no war not popular could be undertaken, this number would be rapidly increased. It may be objected that under the most favourable aspect the force raised would be small ; but as I have already endeavoured to point out, mere num- bers do not measure its real value. The yeast that leavens the dough is insignificant in quantity, but its effects are unmistakeably great, and the first expeditionary force sent abroad would in all probability form the nucleus of considerable reinforcements as the nation warmed to its work, and as the strain of war closed many of the outlets for labour, which peaceful civilization opens for the middle classes of society. For it must not be forgotten that a serious conflict would necessitate great sacrifices and many economies, and thai those who minister to the refinements of life would find less demand for their labour. There are, also, in all vigorous communities many young men whom the prospect of military service arouses from idleness and pleasure, and who would willingly engage in a force where they would find friends and companions of their own condition, although they might be unwilling to embrace a purely military career by enlisting into the regular army ; for although it may be said, that if these young fellows are so fond of soldiering, they had better take service in the ordinary way, the fact remains that they will not do so. Even among the most military nations, where conscription is the law of the land, some escape is afforded to the sons of the gentry by means of a cadet service ; and I think few will be prepared to say that, except under the pressure of the most imminent danger, the sons of our gentry, of our tradesmen, and of our farmers, will enlist in any large numbers into the regular Army or the Militia. We must deal with facts as we find them, and 1 am inclined to believe that this is a fact that few will be prepared to contest. Supposing it were possible in psace time to form any approximate idea of the numbers of a force raised from the volunteers, companies might be organized on paper from regiments that have an affinity to to each other, and the proper officers nominated to command them. Cei'tain regiments, either from social similitude or from local influ- ences, establish ties which it might be well to recognise, and so whilst providing for uniformity in the total force raised, some consideration might be given to the inclinations of the volunteers in the divisions of the brigade into battalions and companies. To guard against the in- terference that the organization of such a force might cause to the recruiting for the Army and the militia, and to the possibility of ambitious men raising companies and regiments to obtain commis- COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OF WAR. X sions, I would forbid any but efficient volunteers being enrolled in it ; so that at the outset of hostilities the brigade for service would bo selected solely from those who had made themselves efficient members of their corps during time of peace A notable instance of a largo portion of an army being raised from a class similar to that which forms our volunteers, may be found in the troops of the Southern States of America that commenced the war with the victory of Bull Run. There, might be seen companies raised by wealthy men, who recognizing in themselves a want of military experience took service in the ranks, Avhilst the private soldiers came into camp attended by their slaves, who, exempt from military dis- cipline, enjoyed more freedom than their masters. As the war de- veloped into larger proportions, tliose who survived the first battles returned with the experience gained on service and raised fresh com- panies and regiments, which they were able to command as officers and non-commissioned officers. And thus the country benefited not only by the example set by the upper classes, and by their actual fighting powers, but by the training aiTorded to men who in other respects were well qualified to serve as officers. In a minor degree (as the war at its commencement was less national) the Northern States furnished regiments composed of men who could compare with those who fill the ranks of the best of our volunteer regiments. I have frequently seen a regiment from New York (recruited from what may be considered a wealthy class) engaged in some of the hardest work of a siege, and it certainly was not among su(;h troops that breeches of discipline occurred. In neither of the instances quoted had however the volunteer regiments the advantage of serving side by side with regulars, a defect in organization inseparable from the constitution of the American armies, but one which led to terrible disaster : for I would insist with great stress on the necessity of this description of force being limited to a small proportion only of the Army, After months of drill and of discipline the proportion might doubtless lie increased, but nothing can compensate for any want of the elements of stab ility, w hich disc ipline, training, and, I may add, professional instincts, can al o ne insur ed " ' "^^ tov the regimental Officers of such a force I would provide in the same way as for the men, only greater care should be taken in their selection. jjo t__ouly should they be w ell instructed in drill, but they should be rnen k^nown in their regiments as possessing po wer of command and qualities that would bear the test of actual jscrvico. If n o I they have had the advantnge of training in tlie regular army^ so much the bettor; but there are qualities which no training can giye,n5iiF which seem to bo born with men, and which are instinctively felt by those who arc brought in contact with them. The field of selection would probably be large, as the imuiber of Officers required would be but few, and in the event of active employment no hesitation sliould be felt in summarily getting i*id of any who might be incompetent, T be_ less highly trained a force is, th e better should be its QHicers. There are many men who can command "creditably a regimeiit m perfect order, and possessing all its proper links of resiionsibility : but there are but ,8 A VOLUNTKEK FOK( K, BUITISU AND few who can load and improsH a character on a force such as our Indian irregular regiments. 1 use this example as the nearest at hand, and as serving to describe the class of men to whom should be granted the privilege of officering a force such as it is proposed to organize. There would, I believe, be little difficulty in finding properly qualitied men for this responsible position. In the volunteers are many ex- Officers of the regular Army, who have seen service in tfio tield and who are young and energetic ; and although, as I have just said, this quali- fication should not be insisted upon, it should still carry considerable weighs., and should constitute a claim for selection provided other re- quirements were fulfilled. Similar arguments would apj)ly in a minor degree to the non-commissioned Officers, but as in all probability several of the young men who would enrol themselves would already hold that grade, although prepared to resign it and to serve as privates, there would be a considerable scope for selection on the assembly of the force prior to embarkation. It may, perhaps, be contended that the regiments would lack cohesion, that men would not know their Officers, and that it would take a considerable time before the units could be welded into a cohesive mass. But it must be i-emembered, that I am speaking of a time when a prospect of war would add an indescribable stimulant to exertion, and when, consequently, as much could be done in one day as in a week or month of ordinary life. I am also taking for granted that the ingredients of such a force, selected from so large a body as the volunteers now are, would be of no common order, and that each and all being actuated by similar motives, the fortnight or so in camp or in barracks previous to embarkation under an energetic staff, would be able to work wonders. The system of drilling regiments of volunteers in brigade, would give the opportunity to men of becom- ing acquainted with each other in peace time. The young fellows, whose luimes were enrolled as willing to serve in war, would soon be known throughout the brigade, they would probably be inspected to- gether whenever it assembled for drill, and thus the men of the com- panies would not be strangers to each other. A few days in a trans- port, and a still fewer before an enemy would cement the union already formed, and would create ties that years of peaceful life would fail to form. A similar objection may also be found to apply to the regular Army, when regiments for embarkation are often swamped by draughts of men totally unacquainted with each other or with their Officers. It can, therefore, be overcome, especially under the favourable conditions of a force composed as that we are dealing with, and I think the diffi- culty may be regarded as more ideal than real. A place would, of course, be indicated for the brigade to assemble at when war appeared imminent, probably near London or Aldershot, where arms, clothing, and equipment would be served out, and where its organisation, previous to embarkation, might be completed. It would be desirable that the uniform should be assimilated in all essentials to that of the Army, and that the men once assembled should, in every respect, be dealt with as regular soldiers. There would be no difficulty in discipline if the reins were in proper hands, as <)' COLONIAL, IN TlIK KVKNT OF WAR. i> m. I have now briefly, and I fear incompletely, brought under your notice the first part of the scheme, which is comprised under the heading of this paper ; but before discussing the second portion of the subject, I would desire to answer an objection that I foresee may be made. There are three great organisations th;it compose our Army, the i-egulars, the militia, and the volunteers, and it may be said that I am unduly exalting the third at the expense of the second. But to this I would reply, that one of the bases of my argument lies in th e assertion that the volunteers represent a class in the community^^^^^ which — unless conscrii)tion be enforced — is not found in either the regulars or the militia, and that it is to utilise this force and to give it additional vitality, that I propose to place a small portion of it in the first line; whilst I would quote (to strengthen my arguments) the great benefit that accrued to the militia from the sending of several regiments to garrison our fortresses in the Mediterranean during the Crimean war. If that war had continued and expanded, doubtless these regiments (excellent in every way, and by the training and practice they had had, tit to take their place in the field) would have been pushed to the front. The same result would, I venture to say, occur in any future great Avar, and the militia regiments need not fear lest they should be ignored, if — and this adinits of no doubt — they 10 A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND attain to the standard of efficiency which their comrades of 1855 and 1856 reached. There is room for all in a serious war, and wealthy England need not be afraid that she will be called upon to equip more soldiers than she can afford to bring into the field. I contend that she has never tapped a most rich mine, and that in place of sub- sidizing other countries and engaging mercenaries, she ought to utilise to the utmost her own children, especially when so many of them will be only too eager to fight for her. To tarn to the second portion of the subject, namely, the employ- ment of a Colonial force to act with our regular Army. A The fi^cilities of communication, and the increased intercourse between portions of the globe separated from each other by what were formerly considered as vust distances, have tended to bring our great colonies into far closer union with the mother country than in past days. Time, has, in fact, been completely annihilated, and the instantaneous transmission of intelligence augments the in- terest that those who look on, have for those who are engaged in war ; whilst rapidity of communication affords means of giving practical expression to their feelings of sympathy. The connection between England and Canada has become very close, every event is telegraphed, and if the occurrence of a fog in London affords a paragraph in an Ottawa evening paper of the same day, much more will any circum- stance that touches on the interests of England find an immediate echo throughout the Colony. A war in which England were engaged, would stir to the depths tue feeling of loyalty and the love of home that are such marked characteristics of Canadians, and there would be a universal desire to do more tlian merely look on as spectators of any struggle in which we might be involved. A few days ago a telegram from Canada announced that a field battery at Toronto had volunteered for service in the event of England going to war, and it is probable that many other portions of the Canadian Militia would, under such circumstances, be eager to cast in their lot with the British Army. _Gv/ing partly to a general belief that in consequence of the good feeling existing between England and the United States, and the peaceful aspect of affairs throuu'hout the great Republic, no need ^^xists of military preparation, the Canadian ]\Iilitia has gradually ''~T)ecn reduced in numl)er, and I must say in etticioncy. The last " report shows that they consist of not more than 23,000 a(;tua]ly ex- ercised during the pi'eceding year, and the period of training extenfls only to twelve davs for artillery and eio'ht davs for the otlior branches of the service. VVhcn 1 add that there is no pevnianont and ])ai(l staft of any description below a brigade major, a notion may bo arriveil at, of the general condition of the foi'co if measured by a European standard. "At the same time" (to qiuite General iSelby Smyth's report) " it must be borne in mind that tlie active militia is but the " advanced guard of the Ai'my of Canada in case a general call to " arms should ever occur. The real force of the country would then " bo represented by the reserve militia amounting by law to some " ()00,000 men." Fnmi this larger basis of su}»[)ly, the troops who i i I COLONI\L, IN THE EVENT OF WAR. 11 might enrol themselves for foreign service could be drawn, and it^ must bo remembered, that although no portion of the force might be^ highly trained, the Canadians possess, in a marked degree, qualities calculated to make excellent soldiers. They are hardy, industrious, accustomed to rough work, and handy in dealing with the many exigencies of colonial lite. They are also easily subjected to dis- cipline, and willing to submit to the authority which they recognise as necessary for military efficiency. The various descriptions of labour in ^vhich they are engaged, and their habit of adapting them- selves to different conditions of life, make them peculiarly fitted for many of the requirements of soldiers on service. In the Red River Expedition, under a leader whom they respected and admired, they performed excellent service, and the manner in which they overcame the many difficulties that beset their path through the wilderness, showed that in a very high degree they possessed the qualifications of excellent troops. During the Fenian raid, I have been assured on the authority of the Officer who so ably commanded the Red River Expe- dition, that their cavalry, under Colonel Denison, of Toronto (well kr )\vn as a writer of a treatise on that arm) performed most valuable service in watching a wide extent of country, whilst the manner in which their held batteries wo . and manccuvre, gives a proof that the habits of driving so universal in Canada and the States, can be turned to good account for military purposes. In fact, there is no better material for making soldiers than is to be found in Canada, and I may add— if th'3 marititno population of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the semi-inaritime navicjators of the inland soas bo taken into con- sideration — there woukl bo found ample materials for addling to our seamen. That there is a warlike spirit in the country is shown by tlie popularity of tiie militia and the willingness witii which thoy turn out on the prosp:^ct of anything like servico. But peace tends to rust_ their arms, and the absence of any regular troops to furnish a stan^ dard of excellence, leads to a gradual diminution of etHciency. If, however, England should be engaged in war, and if the sorvi(!es of a few regiments of Canadians were asked for, I feel sure that the call would be warmly answered, and that a body of troops, which, in a short time would reach a high state of efficiency, would be I'eady to embark for scu'vice wherevor they might be required. In accepti ng their services, Canada should be treated as an equal, the force ougnt~ to be taken with its own Officers, and if sufficiently advanced, the New_ Military School at Kingston s hould be utilised, to furnish a portion at least oi the necessary statl". Possibly some regular OHicer, known in Canada, might be appointed to the command, but the Colony should be encouraged to organise, equip, and otHcer its own troops. When once on hoard shi]) they would come under the Mutiny Act, and be paid by England, j)ossil)ly, also, it would be well that a portion of tlieir equipments and arms should be furnisheil to tliem by the mother country, hut the i)olitical as well as the material benefit ac(!ruing from such a force, would, in a great measure, depend on its organization being Colonial, i.e., that it should not consist merely of soldiers re- cruited and paid lor by the mofher c broad views of imperial defence that alone can lead to a proper ap- preciation of all the resources that England possesses for a serious war. 1 HAEEISON AND SONS, PRINTEnS IN OUDTNARY TO HER MAJFSTY, ST. MABTIN's LANK.