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Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, il est filmd d partir de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche i droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. rrata o 3elure, 1 d H 32X 12 3 f 2 3 ■ •« 5 • 6 /. / T] /ly: /' V COLOxXLST ON THE C0L0A7AL aUESTlOK m JEHU M A T H K W S, TOJIOXTO, CANADA. LONDON: h O \ G AI A N S, U K E K X, A \ I) ( : (j. TORONTO: AUAM. STKVKN.sox, ANO CO. 1»72. C.3 KxTKnF.n A(cniiniNG ro tiik Act civ the Pauuamint OK Canaiia, is tiik YKAii IS'J, iiv Jkhu Matiikw.s, in THE OKKICK of tiik Mi.VISTKH Of A<ilUCUl,IUIlK. iiTmni MHiMnnni PEEFACE. Tiifi ruitrouT of the accompanyino- treatise may be explained in a few words. ' Colonijil Kmancipa- tion ' is now warmly advocated by a pretty strono- party in Kngland, and the policy adoi)ted by the Glad.stone Administration wonld seem to indicate that the minds of some of our leadini,^ statesmen are becoming imbued with ' emancipationist ' [)rin- ciples. These principles appear to me to be highly incorrect; but I am forced to admit that the presen*^, relationship of Fatherland and Colonies cannot possibly form the basis of a permanent connection, ami that, in the absence of ii modiH- cation of the terms of union, a disruption of the Empire is not likely to be long delayed. I have consequently sought to set forth the reasons which lead me to believe that ' emancii)ation ' would be at once most disastrous to England and very VI IMiKI-'ACK. iniscliiovous to tlio Colonies ; jind have endeavoured to prove tliat in the application of tlic Federal system of <^()vernincnt to the Knipire is to be found the means, not only of averting di.sruption, with all its evils, but als(j of pormanc^ntly stren^T^theninu; the intef!:rity of the Empire, and lari^cly augment- ing the benefits of imperial imity. The contro\'ersial character of the earlier part of the work is to me a matter of regret. l»ut I felt that r should not be doing justice to the subject were I to lay before my readers only one side of the case, and that in no manner was it possi1)le to bring both sides before them so effec- tually as by allowing the op[)onents of my own views to speak for themselves. ( )ur controversy is merely in reference to the means whereby the interests of our fellow-countrymen may best be advanced. T do not for a moment suppose that I have exhausted the immense subject under review. The labours of our wisest statesmen and most careful thinkers would be requisite for the accom- plishment of that task. My highest hope is that what I have written may perhaps induce some such men to turn their attention to it. Since the ritKIWCK. Vll MS. was coiupleted, I luivu had the i)I('asiire of seeiiio- that in the second series of ' Sliort Studies on Great Sul)jects ' one of the latter lias ah-eady done so. I must warn Englisli n^-iders against takin.<r me for an exponent of Colonial, or even of Canadian, public opinion. The policy which I recommend has not been sufficiently discussed to admit of the formation of any public opinion on the subject. I speak to my countrymen both at liome and in the Colonies, but for nobody except myself. J. M. Toronto : March 9, 1872. r^Hi CONTENTS. INTIJODrCTION. • State of the Colonial Question -Mo.lorn T.^lonisation-Advanfftpos mnght from it-Clmnp:,.. in tl.oory .u..! ,,ra,.tio., - Froo Tra.l..-('oI..nial sclf- povrnment- Their off.K-ts on the Kmpiro-Km.noipation not a.lvi- . . . . . I CHAPTKR I. THE COMMEUCIAl. ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION'. ^Ir. Smith on Colonial Tra.le-Mi.stafomcnt of its amount-Tneorroot estimate of its value-Proportion of l-npHsh rocmIs eonsnnicl l.y oacli colonist ami each foreigner- A f.,reiy:ner takes only one-twenfiVtl. „f that taken l»y a colonist -Maintenance of the diffen-nee dependent on a ^ontmuanee of the eonni«otion-Re]ativn pmwth .,f the colonial and foro.ffn tmdc- Colonial tmde growing twice as fast as that with foreigners ... • • • * ' . . . }j CIIAPTKR 11. niPLOMATIC, MILITAKY, AND KIXAN'CIAl. ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION. Canada and the United Stntos-Canada not a standing .„,.„, A.W_she may act as a paoificator-In war she would be a valuable ally-Without her England would bo exposed to attack-Saving to be 'effected bv emancipation-Its amount overstated -Review of Mr. Smith's argument's m lavour of Inipen.il disruption . .' X CONTKNTS. CIIAPTKK III. COUNTEUVAII.INCl CONSIUKKATIOXS, Niiviil suiircTiiiicv'flif lif»' of Knpland — Knmnoi|mtii)n rould not justifv a rcducliuu ol' licr flt'ctH— It would (liminisli her iiiival rcsoiiivfH — Naval (Icfiiit iiivolvi'M l'n^li»li ruin IiKiciHiKUiKV of cinancipatt'd Colonios would lie vcr^' iiisiciiri' — l^n^ilainl iiii)ilit hcc rivals in j)os.xf.ssion of tlumi — rrcc tradf in Kn^^laml impractioalilo witlioiit coniini'roial Mipn'macy— I'os.siliilify of its loss n-nders niianciiiation iiii|ioliti(' — It nii^rlit fiulaiiffcr Enfflish invtstnn Ills in tin- Colonics — AhandiuinH-nt of licr llolonifs would brin^ l-A^ahnnl a ])rcnfi(/c of iufutny — New udvaiitaj,'cs which 8h(> nuiv derive from tlicni .11 CIIAPTKR IV. Tin; i;i;mki)Y. WcakupfcS of Imperial political connection— Withdrawal of colonial pirri- Kons — Australian statcsincp on the situation — Policy of the Ciladstonc Adniinistralioii t lit! worst possildc— Growth of the Colonics reiiders an early diajijri' incvitahlc- -Lonl 3Iacaulay on n similar case — An Imperial Federation the sohnion — I)erniitioii of such Federation- ^Ir. Smith and Mr. 3Iill on tho scheme — Our issue with them . . . . (iU CHAPTER V. I'llYSUAL DIITICILTIES. Want of geographical unity in the Kmpin; — Obstacles to Federation theneo arising usually exaggerated — The Imperial (iovernment I'ulllls the duties of a Federal Ivvecutive —The Legislature could be assembled almost us easily as tho American Congress — I'rovision for cases of I'luergency — Financial \inity — A Federal budget practicable — Probable expenditure- - Ways and nnans of raising it e(inilably — Thesrc ob^-tacles surmounted, Federation is accomplished ........ 71 CHAPTER VI. CONSTITUTIONAL UIFFICULTIES. Formation of n Federal Legislature — Countries which should be re])resenfed in it— A Legislature at once national and Federal — Hov»- to frann; it out rONTKNTS. xi of tlu- Imporial I'arliamfnt AflvanliigO'* niiil ilisathai.lapis (»f tliin cotir.Mf A jiiircly I'iMlnal I,c;:i.slatiir(' -IJaMs nf njutsi nlaliuii in it - I'avnicnf of iiifmlirrH -The scntntl cIhuhImt Ntnl of ri'i'r)ii»tnu'tiiiic tlu' lIoHsp of Lords -Mo lo of so doiii^; -(lain tlcrival'lc from it — I'llay in ai'iipaliiij; to the jicoplf — Advantage of atrording time for tlioiiglit . 'J I (•IIAl'Ti:i{ VII. PHAt'l'lCAI. Kll I KUI.TIKS. (lovommcnts must l)r adapted to tlic circninstaiici.s of pnuntrios-V'oidJ ri'dcrulisiu suit (lie Hrilisli Kinpirt- Mr. I'l-t'iiiiaii on I'ldcraliHiii — His vifWM applied to tlio .nitiiatioii of the Kiiipiiv .Mr. ^Mili uii I'udtTiil riovornnient.s — Apjilication of his prinoiplcN — I'urtlnr tlitfii nil it's coii- Bidcn-d— Tlic inlialiitaiifs of tlic Einjiire not out' piiMii- iJifK-nMU'cs in file framework of Hoeiety — Proportion of eoluiiial repres"'iitation- Possible ulllcts of the new sy.stem of govirnnuiit . . . .117 CIIAPTKR VIII. FKDEIUTION V. COLON lAI, INI>KPENnKNTE. New stage of in(|uirv — Is Federation politie as well as possible? — (Question must bo reganled from Knglish and Colonial standpoints — Colonial objpction.s considered — Local self-govi rnnient safe — Unjust taxation impossible — Liena-iC of taxation less tlian under indepeudenee — Inde- jiendeiu'e woiild bring some Colonies to ruin — It would i.xpose others to serious internal perils — And all to external aggression — \tlav'k on Canada almost a eertainty Suceessfid resistanee imiio'isilde — Aiinexat'on would be an unmixe<i evil to Canada — Dii'ect gains afforded liy Federation — Constitutional freedom — .Sovereign riglits — Splendiil career for geniu.* - Historic glories — Kapid development of resources . . . . 142 CHAPTER IX. ri;i)i:i;ATio.N r. i;noi.i.<ii i.^i'i.mio.n. KiiL'lisIi interests and I'ederation — All the disadvantages of eiManeijiation are arguments I've Pederation— lt,s direct benefits — It wouM augment the revenue — It would induce jtresent and future reduction of taxation — It would provi<le means of furnishing iniproved legislation — It would secure outlets fur surplus population — It would reuder omipration a IHifBMIi xu CONTEXTS. source of strength— It would provide a nooded inercase of naval and military power— It would bo almost unobjectionable to England— It would bring her immense increase of safety, strength, wealth, and *^'g»'fy ' .... 187 CHAPTER X. CONCLUSION. Course of action which should be pursued— Generosity of feeling essential to success— .Suljject should be kept clear of partyism— All should unite in striving to discover the truth -Mode of inquiry and of legislation suggesti'd— To avoid some change impossible— Earl Grey on Imperial unity— Early action necessary to its JUiiinten'inco— Friendship between England and her Colonies— Political connection its safeguard . 21 1 Errata. I'agc 1. line ^,for Times read Dailij Nni's. ,. <■•"). ,, from bottom,. /(>r her rm*^ its. ., 10;"), „ G, for as usual, was read was practically. „ ]C;"). ., 10, after pretaiion, add, while offering access to all flie fisheries on payment o{ a small license-fee. •;«iT;i'-»-i*j)r THE COLONIAL QUESTION. -»o«- 11 the Many years since it was predicted by far-soeiiifr men that the terms of the connection between England and her Colonies, and the comparative expediency of main- taininnr the tie or severing* it, would form one of the leading political questions in the next generatii)n. The time has arrived, and the prediction has been fulfilled. Ever since the publication of Mr. Goldwin Sni'th's letters 1 in the Times, the subject has taken a firm hold on Eng- lish thoufjlit, and been discussed with a lartre amount of earnestness. As yet, however, the only conclusion which seems to have been reached in England is that matters are in an unsatisfactory condition. Emancipationists not only assert that all the advantages which have been sup- posed to be derived from ' an Empire on which the sun never sets ' are, in fact, ' a mockery, a delusion, and a snare,' but also declare that the Colonics constitute a positive burden to England. Their oj)poncnts, whilst stoutly denying the correctness of these doctrines, find themselves, apparently, rather at a loss to indicate the nature of the benefits which are derived by England from her Colonial Empire. Both agree that it is a source of expense ; that so long as England undertakes the defence ■.»•!>!> ..••.!« ':o.te?af.i>lUH«HS(.:j«aSTti'.a,-i»' t A COLONIST ON Till-: COLONIAL QUESTION. of the Colonies the expense must Increase ; and that Enfflish ratepayers should not be taxed for the benefit of colonists. But having gone thus far together, they seem unable to concur in anything further, save that if the Colonies wish for independence they are perfectly Avelcome to it, for never will England draw the sword to retain unwilling subjects beneath her sway. It is true that of late years signs of better things have api)eared. IMen of eminence have begun to hint that a reorganization of the Em])ire might be both practicable and beneficial ; and a jNIinistry acting on what is practically an emancipationist policy has been checked in its course. But all parties, nevertheless, seem to believe that the present relations l)etween England and her Colonies cannot long constitute a basis of union. It is impossible that in a free country any political question of im[)ortance can long remain in this condition ; least of all in an age and country so fond of innovation as our own have now become ; and this more ])articularly Avhen a reduction of taxatioii is promised as the fruit of an adoption of the emancipationist policy. An early sett.hment is inevitable ; and that settlement, be it what it may, cannot fail to influence the whole future of the British race in both hemispheres. Under these circiunstances, Ave have been led to think that a connected review of the whole controversy by a colonist might help to clear up misunderstandings on both side^s and thus assist to hinder the decision of the question taking the form of* a leap in the dark.' Before entering on the meritc of the case, it may be well to cast a glance backwards, with a view to discover the causes of the crisis in Avhich the Em})ire is now in- Aolved. How does it happen that parties have come to contend that the possession of an immense Colonial Em- ])ire is not only not advantageous,but j)Ositively pernicious, to England ? The solution of this question is to be found ■■.-mti^'-z.-^ MODERN COLONISATION. o 1 that lefit of f seem if the elcome retain that of Men of I of the ; and a ationist parties, slations tistitute country nain in so fond lis more lised as policy, lenient, Avhole Under that a colonist sideL>, Inestion Hiav be liscover low in- iome to a Em- licioiis, found % in certain social ehanires which have occurred in Encfhuul, and certnin political changes which have been established in the relations between the Mother-country and the Colonics. ^Modern colonisation may be considered to have bcirun with the discovery of America. The objects sought to be gained by it seemed to have been : — First, the a('(|ui- sition of increased revenues, cither bv the workinij: oi" mines, or the enlargement of the national territory and resources; scccmdly, an outlet for criminals and a surplus po})ulation ; thirdly, a supply of those fruits of the earth not to be produced at home ; fourthly, a market for honK> manufactures ; fifthlv, an increase of martial strmuth, through an increased population, and the possession of important strategical positions. In order fully to attain these ends, colonies were gene- rally treated as subject and inferior states. The mother- country ruled them absolutely ; and, in some cases, went so far as to prescribe when, where, and how they sluuild trade. English Colonies were ruled much more mildly than those of other European states ; but even Englal^d j)ievented her Colonies frimi trading with foreign nations, and })rohil)ited colonial manufactures, in order to <t'cure to hei'self a m(mo])oly of their trade. But in course of time England began to think that some of these things were unattainable by means of colonies; and that their possession was not essential, (»r Avas i)erha[)s prejudicial, to the attainment of others. It came to be consiilered inexpcMent for the state to work mines. An attempt to tax the Colonies failed miserably, and drew after it a formal abandonment of the policy. The Colonies refused to receive the ofl-scourings of the iMother-country. It was found that the mere fact of countries being British Colonies did not always suHice to attract emigration to them. And instead of the Colonies iiTo h; ;,?5"atJ»;?t t»H»<"»Wi;;> .ntvr.r.i.'jr A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. proving a source of martial strength, it appeared that they drew aAvay from England a large number of troops Avho might otherwise have been employed in her own defence. Thus, commercial advantages, in the shape of a monopoly of colonial trade, were thought to be the only benefits derivable from the Colonies, and ere long this tie, too, was snapped. Possessed of a monopoly of colonial trade, inhabited by an energetic race, holding by her ships the dominion of the seas, receiving from men of genius discoveries of inestimable value, England attained such success in com- merce that she feared no rival, and felt herself strong enough to allow her Colonies freedo)a of trade and to comi)ete with the world for their custom. She came to rcfjuire more raw material for manufacturing purj)oses than they were producing. She also saw that she could ])urchase it cheaper from foreign nations than from her Colonies whilst possessed of differential duties ; and thought that, by purchasing from foreigners, she would gain their custom for her manufactures, while retaining that of the C<jlonies. Hence the adoption of free trade, by wliich the commercial ties between the different parts of the Empire were reduced to the level of those with foreigners, as they were allowed equal commercial privi- leges with those accorded to Britons in all parts of the Empire. This step alone was a most serious blow to Imperial unity, but it induced yet another. Under the old system of colonial administration the Imperial Parlia- ment not only possessed and wielded all the prerogatives of a Federal Legislature, but also could interfere in the local affairs of each colony. Whilst commercial advantages were derived from the connection, the Colonies sub- mitted to this polity, though not without sundry com- plaints. But on the inauguration of free trade they lost any motive for submitting to it, and as England thought I «\i:fi'^-XV.^-i;i* COLONIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. '(1 that troops er own lape of be the re long habited Dniinion cries of in com- ■ strong and to came to )iirposes :ie could her •om and ould e w etaining iG trade, nt parts Qse with al privi- s of the blow to ider the Parlia- itives of he local antages les sub- ry com- hey lost thought that she had lost anv motive for insistinjx on its retention, she established a system of colonial self-government, in order to reconcile the Colonies to the loss sustained by them through the repeal of the differential duties. Hence has sprung the danger of a disruption of the Empire, as these commercial and political changes destroyed old motives for amity, and furnished new means of quarrelling. For althoujrh the concession of colonial self-government has unquestionably increased the loyalty of the Colonies, the peculiar system adopted contained some defects which have practically destroyed the unity of the Empire. It endowed different })arts of it with prerogatives more lofty than had ever before — unless, jierhaps, in the case of the Dutch liepublic — been wielded by any save the su})reme ])ower. It failed to establish any arbiter in case of difhculty arising from the exercise of these prerogatives ; and it omitted altogether to define the duties which the several countries thus endowed, and owning one and the same sovereign, owed to each other. Under the circum- stances each Avas left free to consider its own interests exclusively, and did not fail to do so. Hence it followed that in the Colonies the newly-acquired right of self- government was stretched to its utmost limits, producing some results not at all expected by its English advocates; who, thercui)on, began to declare that there was no benefit derived from trade with the Colonies which would not be derived from trade with the same countries as in- dependent states ; that their possession tended to involve the mother-country in war on their account, and that their garrisons not only cost her a large sum annually, but also weakened her military resources. As these parties had before arrived at the conclusion that the only benefit derivable from colonies was their trade, the inevitable corollary of their commercial theory was that tlie Colonies were useless to England ; and, as they held that all re mmtm^miimmmmmmmmmm 6 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX, (luctions of military cxjienditnre wore so much clear gain to the nation, the conclusion to which their second theory led was that the Colonial Empire was j)ernicious to her host interests. These sentiments are so well expressed in the following extract from INIr. Goldwin Smith's writings, that we quote it in illustration of them : — * In ancient times empire Avas emj)ire. The Roman extorted from his dependencies both military force and revenue. JS])ain extorted revenue. AVe are too moral to extort either force or revenue from our depen- dencies, even if we had the power. AMiile we monopo- lised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and st'ltish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all. But the system has been established ; many prejudices and some interests are bound up with it, and reasons must be found, or i' 'onted, for maintaining it. The reasons found, or invented, are, as might have been expected, various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount of colonial trade; now it is the ])reference of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration. When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, prestige. I give an agent an immense sum of money to invest for me. He tells me he has bought me an estate. I ask to see the estate ; he tells me that the money is laid out not in an estate, but in houses. I ask to see the houses ; he tells me that it is not laid out in houses, but in railway shares. I ask for my scrip ; he tells me that it is not laid out in railway shares, but invested in the funds. I ask for the transfer receipt ; and he tells me that it is not invested in the funds, but in something nuich better and nobler — in prestu/e, I look in the l^^rench dictionary for prestif/e, and find that it is an illusiim, a juggling trick, an imposture.' (Such are the opinions of a large and powerful party in •'«-rr.i.'.:r.-# COLONIAL EMAN'C 1 1' AT I ( )N . England ; and such the course hy wliich, in our opinion, they liavc been led to their conclusions. \Vc admit that oircunistanecs have been very nuich altered during the last twenty-five years ; but we do not think that these alterations render a disruption of the Empire incvital)le, or that they should lead either England or the Colonies to desire it. To the Colonies ' emancipation. ' would bring evils which they should strive, by every means in their power, to avert ; to England it would bring but few of the promised benefits, and those few would have to be paid for so dearly that it is pretty certain the bargain would be an exceedingly bad one. Bui, l)esides this, there are, \\c believe, means by which all dl!Hculties may be permanently settled, leaving England in j)osses- sion of all the benefits ori";inallv souy;ht for from colonies, and the Colonies in possession of all the advantages derivable from British connection and self-ir<>vernment. For the i)resent, however, we have nothing to say as to the manner in which we believe that these ends may be attained. Our first duty is to examine the correctness of the emancipationist theories. If the Colonies are really useless to England, and their abandonment windd be beneficial, it is absurd to sup[)ose that she will retain tli<:' burden, even if it were not asserted that a termination of the connection would be advantageous to the Colonies also. As nobody has advocated colonial emancipation so boldly and fully as Mr. Goldwin Smith, we shall take him as the champion of the emancipationist party, con- sidering that we do them full justice when we quote his arguments in support of any of their theories. As the corner-stone of their position rests on the assumption that the ' emanci})ation ' of the Colonics would not induce any commercial loss to England, we shall, in the first place, examine the correctness of that theory. msmmmm mmm 8 A COLONIST ON inK COLONIAL QUESTION, CHAPTER I. THE COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION. "tViiEN Mr. Smith asserts that there is no advantaije in the shape of convict stations, revenue, or military force derived by England from the Colonies, we are content to admit that he is right, though we are of opinion that all these advantages might he derived from them. But ^\'hen he goes on to say that the colonial trade is no more valuable than that with foreign countries, and that there is no benefit gained from the trade with the Colonies which would not be gained from the trade with the same countries if independent states, we dispute both propo- sitions, and join issue on their correctness. Mr. Smith, replying to the Times, states his case as follows : — ' But figures, as it happens, prove that the Times, in estimating the value of our export trade to the Colonies so highly as it does in comparison with our export trade to foreign countries, is the victim of a great though not uncommon error. Our exports in 1861 Avere: — To foreign countries . . . . • To the East Indies. Cej'lon, Sing:apt>re, and Hong Kong, which arc not British Colonies, liut only dependencies ... To the British Colonies in : North America Australia .... The West Indies 82,854,000 19,606,000 3,696,000 10,701,000 2,463.000 16,860,000 Thus the export trade to the British Colonies was less by three millions than that to India and China, while it THE COLONIAL TRADE. 9 was only about one-fifth of that to foreign countries.' — The Kmjnre, p. 25. The above statement is incorrect in point of fact ; the conchisiDns drawn from it are incorrect in princii)le. Mr. Smitli omits several most important coKmies from l)is list, and this Avithout transferring them to his list of ' dc])en- dencies,' so that, in his calculation, the exports to them do not appear either amongst tiiose to foreign countries, colonies, or dependencies, but are quietly ignored I This is rather a serious error, as its effect is to make the colonial trade of 1861 appear almost one-sixth less than its real amount. We will, hoA\ ever, remedy the omis- sion. There are such places as Cape Colony, Xatal, ^lauritius, Honduras, the West African Settlements, and detached countries like St. Helena, Bermuda, and the Falkland Islands, the exports to which amount, in the aggregate, to a very considerable sum. Taking these places into consideration, we would submit the following statement as affording the correct view of England's exports to the Colonies in 1861. The returns of population are taken from the Statistical and otlier Tables relating to the Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kinqdom^ 1861, p. iii. : — British America West Indies Australia .... Cape Colony and Natal Mauritius .... Gold Coast Sierra Leone Gambia .... Honduras .... Other possessions Total . Imiiorts from Kngliind Population 1 Rate i>er lleiul £ 3.696,000 2.463,(100 10.701,t'00 1,986,000 551.0(»0 144.000 180,000 56,000 201,(»00 76,000 3,305,000 1,081,000 1,333,000 419,000 322,000 151,000 41,000 6,000 25,000 20,000 £ «. <i. 1 2 4 2 5 6 8 6 4 14 9 1 14 2 19 4 7 9 9 6 8 8 9 3 16 20,054,000 6,703,000 2 19 10 Ksmsv^ I^RHMWRn 10 A COLONIST OX TIIH fOLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. It will be seen that we here concede Mr. Smith's «lls- tinction between colonies and (lei»endencies, and that we have inclnded in our list none which do not strictly come under the fonner title. We have adhered to the trade returns of 18()1, as we wished to meet jSIr. Smith on his own iiround. Hut we wish here to notice the fact that the returns of that year do not convey a correct idea of the quantity of Edi^'HsIi goods usually consumed in IJritish North America. The four years endin<^ with isfil wore the least pros[)crous period known in Canada for twenty years previously. The averat^e exports to the Jiritish American provinces in the five years ending with l8o«') were, Mr. Smith tells us, 4,l81J,()0()/., and the exj)orts to them in the years 1862-3-4 were 3,993,000/., 4, 811) ,()()()/. and 5,G 11,000. Ilence it aj)pcars that these Colonics usually consume English goods to the extent of 1/. IOn. per head of their poi)ulation. From these facts it follows that not only has Mr. Smith misstated the value of the colonial trade in 1801, by omitting exports to the amount of 3,194,000/., but also that the exports of that year are likely to lead to an under-estimate of its value. These })oints, however, are not the circumstances to which we invite the special attention of our readers. All that for which we have contended may be admitted, and still the gross amount of the colonial trade api)ear small in comparison with that to foreign countries. Emancipa- tionists argue that this fact proves it to be less valiuiblc : their reasoning is about as correct as that of a buyer who estimates the value of goods irrespective of their (juality. The colonial trade is less valuable than that with all the rest of the world only as the trade Avitli Belgium or Denmark must be less valuable than that with all Europe, or as a })art must be less valuable than the whole. Colo- nists numbered by the million cannot consume as much English goods, in gross, as can foreigners numbered by Tin: FOUi:iGX TRADE. 11 tlie hundred-million, since to effeot this it would be rc- (juisite that each colonist should consume one hundrcil times as much Kn":lish y;oods as a forciiiiicr. This colo- nists do not, and cannot, do. lint as the total value ot" English exports in iSfil wis 12.j.(H )(),()()()/., of which 2(),().')4, ()()()/. went to the Cohmics, with a |)oj)nlation ol 6,7()(),()()0, against 10r>,0()(),()()()/. to all the r<>st of the world, the )>oj)ulation of which, to he within the mark, we will estimate at 7<)0,()()(),()<)(), it a])])ears that foreign countries and (lei)endencies imported from England at the rate of 'h. per head of their po|)ulation, and the Colonics at within a fraction of 'M. ^Vhich of these is the more voludhlc trade — that in which each consumer takes goods to the amount of three shillings or oi' three pounds? AVhat say emancipationists on the question — Ought we, in computing the value of a trade, to consider only its sum total? As well migiit we estimate the chea))- ness of ii'oods hv comi)aring prices whilst iunorini; qualities. Did the Colonies import from England only at the same rate as does the rest of the world, the ex])orts to them in 18G1 would have amounted to only 1,0()0,0(H)/., instead of 2(),()00,()()()/. This fact, we think, is decisive as to which is the more valuable trade. It may, perha[)s, be alleged that, notwithstanding the facts adduced, our statement is calculated to mislead, as by far the largest j)art of foreign consumers consist of half-civilized peo})le who do not take anything like even three shillings per head, whilst civilized nations take much more ; and that if the exports to the Colonies be compared M'ith those to nations which have arrived at a like stage of civilization, the difference between the colonial and the foreign rate of im})ortation will appear nujch less, if not disap})ear altogether. It will certainly aj)i)ear less than in the total ; but will still show a large balance in favour of the Colonies. This will be seen from a survey of the 12 A COLOXrST ox THE COLONIAL Ql'ESTIOX. following statonuMit slunving the exports from Kiij^lnml in 1H61 to the different countries of Europe, excepting Russia and Turkey, whieh we omit as heing uncivilized, and to include which would make the result much m(»re in our favour : — Swcili-n mid Norway Dotiniurk Prussia . HiiiiDVcr ll.iiisc Towns IlDlliind . 1?( l<,'iiiin . Friiiu'o . rortiitril S)iiiiii Sanliiiiii Aiistria . Tuscany Papal States Two Sic'ilii'3 Greoci- . Wallaoliia and Moldavia Total £ 1,0'.HJ.(H)0 y 13,000 2,4i)-1.0()0 l.(»20,()00 9,'218.000 6,439.000 l,lfJ(!,oilO H.HDO.OOO 1,087.000 2,930,000 2.198,000 9(;h,0()0 l,0H2,O00 447,000 2,071.000 28fi.000 102,000 44,159.000 We shall not trouble our readers with a recapitulation of the rate per head taken in each of these countries. For our present purpose it is enough to remark that as their collective pojuilation in 1801 was about 160,000,000, and they imported from England in that year to the extent of 44,159,000/., the rate of export to them was about 5s. C)(l. per head. In view of the facts revealed by these statistics a quo- tation from the Empire on the value of different sorts of trade may not be Inappropriate. Mr. Smith says : — ' The best of all trades is the home trade with the butcher and baker, which cheap governments foster and governments of in perial aspirations bring to decay. The next best trade is that with neighbouring countries, A COMPARISON. 18 hocausc in that trade tlic expense of earria«;e is not p^rcat, and the state oi' supply and diinand arc eertainly known. The worst is that with distant count rics like; Australia, hocausc the carriage is exi)ensive, and the speculation hazardous.' ' The facta of the case scarcely warrant these conclu- feions. The trade which Mr. Sniitli pronouiiccs the worst was, in the year under review, fifteen times as great, proportionately, as that with Holland, the neighliouring state Avhich imported most largely from England, and thirty- two times as great as the average taken by all the 'neighbouring states.' It is also probable that a large ])art of the goods imported into Holland was for export to its own colonics; and, conscciuently, that the entire importation should not be credited to it. J5ut even allowing this doubt to g<t against us, the result is not only enormously in favour of the [)roportionatc value of ' the worst trade,' but even its sum total, 1 0,701, 000/., largely exceeded the exports to any one European state. That it is unwise to state theories without examining facts is a proposition to which we believe that Mr. Smith would assent; but the most charitable view which can be taken of the conduct of himself and his school is that they have forgotten to i)ut it in ])raeticc. Here the facts are again in favour of the colonial trade, for the total exports to ' neighbimring states ' inhabited by 100,000,000 of civil- ized "peojile were little more than double the amount of those to the Colonies with a population of 7,000,000, and the 5s. Gd. per head taken in the neighbouring states is only one-twelfth of the 3/. i)er head taken in the Colonies. Were the Colonies ' emancipated ' and importing from England at the same rate as those countries, the exports to which, according to Mr. Smith's theory, constitute the most valuable exterior trade, they would have taken > The Emiire, p. 93. T 14 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. from England in 1861 goods to the value of only 1,750,000/. Still Mr. Smith has one last ho})e. His stronghold is the United States. There it is that we have the bright results of the ' emancipation ' policy ; there is the happy sample of the spectacle which the Colonics would ])resent if only freed from the influence of their Fatherland : why not let them enter on the same glorious course which the States have pursued ? Such seem to have been Mr. Smith's feelings when he i)ublisliedthe Empire ! and such are still the feelings of the more advanced liberal emanci- ])ationists in England to-day. The course which has led to the ascendancv of an aristocracv of demagogues, and their rule to national disruption and civil war, the full (consequences of which are yet undeveloped, are not calculated to induce less veliement progressionists to emulate them. We shall have something to say on this point hereafter. At })resent we have only to examine the relative value of the colonial trade and of tliat with the United States. In 1861 the exports from England to the States amounted to 9,Oo8,000/., and their population in the ])rcceding year was 31,445,000, which gives bs. 9(/. ])er head as the amount of goods imported from England, or about one~twelfth of the amount consumed by each colonist. It may be rei)lied, liowever, that the year 1861 was an exceptional period, owing to the troubles which then fc'l on the States, and that the returns of other years would show a nuich more favourable result. This is true, but the issue will still be f)und to be in favour of the colonial trade. It is ditHcult to ])resent a clear view of this subject, but Ave will strive to do so. The population of the United States in 1850 was 23,191,000, and iii 1860 31,445,000, showing an increase TRADE WITH THE lXITED STATES. 15 of 8,254,000 within the decade, or at tlie rate of 825,400 per annum. We are, of course, aware that the increase was not equal in each year, and as tlie nearest approxi- mation to the actual poi)uUition in the five years prior to the civil war, we take the figures of a statement ])ublished in the New York Tribune, showing the popu- lation of the United States in each year from 17D0 to 1H67. According to the Tribune's estimate and tlie ]iritish trade returns, tlie population of the States and tlieir imports from England in each of the five years ending with 1861 were as follows:— Year Population Imports 18.57 18,-)8 1 8,J9 18(j() 18G1 28,097,89-) 29.084. GGO 3i),49.'S.S20 31,443.321 32,392,909 & 18,98.5,939 14,491.448 22, .5.53.40(5 21.007.06,5 9,0,58,320 152,017,6] 1 80,756,183 From this it appears that, taking one year witli another, the average imports of British goods l)y the inhabitants of the United States during the above period Avere at the rate of about ll.s-. 4f/. per head, being about one-sixth of the amount taken by colonists in the"" aggre- gate, o.ie-half that taken by much- abused British Anierica at the period of its greatest de])ression, and one-third or tlie proportion usually consumed by it; nay, le.ss than that taken bij some European countries ! AV^e fear that wc cannot compliment Mr. Smith on his talents as a sta- tistician, seeing that, altliough a cursory glance at tiie figures would seem to confirm his views, a close exami- nation proves them to be utterly erroneous. Mr. Smith, and emancipationists generally, in comparing the value of 7 -J'B. :;»«»lr>^»»t^5««t>^**«W':^w^»rf^»»«^t■,^!!.^«^?^',i) ;, .^s^ 1 I* 11 16 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. foreiirn and colonial trade, omit to notice the most important point in any comparison — the relative resources of the competitors. When these are thrust aside the strongest, of course, will be awarded the palm. But when it can be proved that a given amount of power in one party has accomplished more than a like amount in the other, that party has fairly proved its superiority to its competitor, even though overcome in the contest, inasmuch as it follows that, if resources were equalized, it Avould conquer. This, it seems to us, is exactly the position of the colonists. Each of them consumes 2,000 per cent, more of British goods than is consumed by each foreigner generally, 1,200 per cent, more than is consumed by each inhabitant of civilized Europe and 550 per cent, more than is consumed by each American. This brings us to Mr. Smith's great blow on the sub- ject of colonial trade. He remarks, very justly we admit, that— • Arguments drawn from the amount of the colonial trade prove nothing, unless it can be shown that the prosi)erity of the trade in some way depends on the continuance of the political connection. The immense increase of our trade with the United States since the severance of their political connection with the mother-country proves that the reverse is the truth ; the defenders of the system of dependency seem always unwilling to face this fact.' ' We are not at all unwilling to face the fact, or to accept the challenge. The facts which we have already noted go a long way towards proving, if indeed they do not conclusively prove, that the prosperity of the trade does depend on the continuance of the political connection. Here are certain countries which consume British goods to the amount of 3/. per head per annum, against lis. Ad. per head consumed ill the States. Is it unfair to suppose that if they were ' The Empire, p. 41. 1 COLOXrAL PROTI'X'TIOXIST TKXDKXCIKS. 17 Lccept Id go a jsively )n the lertain mt of lumed were to follow in the same path as that in which the States have walked, their imports from England would decline to the same })roportion ? in which case they would have im[)orted in ISGl only to the amount of ;i,,j()0,()0O/., instead of 2(),00(),()00/. We will show that there is ahundant reason to expect the occurrence of such a decline ; and we will prove that the history of En^jjlish trade with the States authorises a conclusion directly con- trary to that which emancipationists draw from it. If the Colonies were separated from En<:;land, thev would he forced to imdertake the hurden of their own defence ; and we sui)p()se that, in face of the history of the Avorld since 184S, even a (Quaker would not assert that armaments could he dispense*! with. The cost of these armaments would larp;cly increase tiie sum which thev Avould re(|uire to raise bv taxation. In what manner would the increased revenue be sup})lied ? j\[r. Smith and his friends will say that it should be raised by direct taxation. But even the fiercest free-trader amongst them will now ])robablv hesitate to sav that what men sJiotild do thev irill do. Mr. Smith, Avritino; several vears since, com[)lains of the disposition on the part of the Colonies to ado])t a i)rotectionist ])()licy. Subse(|uent events show tliat the same disposition still exists. Thou[>-h such a policy has not yet been adoj»tcd in its entirety in any of the Colonies, every weakeninu" of the ties which unite them to the Mother-ccunitry is evidently sti-ennthenino- the ixtsition of the i»rotectionlsts and iiivinii- them a stron<>-er hold on po])ular feelinjx. It can scarcely be supjjosed that this tendency could be successfnliv resisted in case of se])aration from Enu'land and need of increased revenue occnrrinn;, as they would, simultaneously. It is almost certain that these events Avoulil at once i;'ive the victory to the protectionists ; for they would quickly be reinforced by many who would now sui)port them did they not con- c fi - JIIUI. "UW-^IW^^WI wmi mmi 18 A rOL(K\IST ox TIIR COLONIAL QUESTION. Ml hider protection to be unfair to England ; and by those ■Nvlio liold Avitli Dr. Arnold that 'the sutnmuin honutn of" political economy and of human life are not identical ; and, therefore, many questions in "vvhich free trade is involved and the advantages of large capital, &c., although perfectly sim])le in an economic point of view, become, uhen considered politically, very complex ; and the economical good is very often, from a neglect of other points, made in practice a direct social evil.' Jioth these parties would, after separation, join the j)rotectionists on j)rinciple ; and the mass of the people, if confronted, as they would be, with the alternative of new direct, or in- creased indirect, taxes, would certainly choose the latter. It is an indisputable fact that all countries Avhich possess any connnerce have always preferred indirect to direct taxation, and customs to excise duties. Nowhere is this tendency stronger than in the young nations of the earth, as is demonstrated by the connucrcial i)olicy of the United States. But even if inclined to adopt direct taxation, it w^ould be im})ossible for the Colonics to do so to the re- el ulsite extent. In the most thickly-settled districts in Canada, collectors would have to walk about two miles to call at five pro[)erties, as five ' lots,' each of which usually constitutes a farm, cover that frontage ; and in the newlv- scttled districts they might have to walk five miles to find one or two. In xVustrallan })astoral districts the case would be still worse. These facts, we think, prove de- cisively that any attempt to raise by direct taxation such an amount of revenue as would bo required in case of se})aration must necessarily fail ; and that that event Avould conq)el the Colonies to increase their customs duties, even if not inclined to do so. It has been said, however, that protectionist tariffs have already been adopted, aud that England has conse- quently nothing to fear on this head. iMr. Adderley, in bis letter to Mr. Disraeli, published in 18G2, remarked GROWTH OF TRADH WITH THE STATES. la by those ')()/iu)n of dcntical ; trade is tal, &c., of view, )lex ; anil t of other ,()th these ionists on rontcd, as 2ct, or in- the latter, ch possess to direct 3re is this ' the earth, he United ax at ion, it to tlie re- listricts in 'O miles to ch usually lie newly- cs to find the case )rove de- ition such n case of Kit event r customs arifFs have as conse- derley, in remarked that Entiland was ulreadv confnmtcd by ]M()rrill tariffs. This plea is easily answered. The tariff of Canada, tlicie referred to, was raised solely from necessity, and as soon as that necessity had been overcome it was reduced. The general rate on manufactured goods in the Canadian tariff is now about fifteen per cent. This is certainly not a protectionist tarift', as is proved by the very large increase of imj)ortations which has occurred of late. As to other colonies, Australia more particularly, there is yet time to stop the advance towards protection by deal- ing Avith the Avhole of the colonial question in a states- manlike manner ; l)ut, most assuredly, should England adopt the emancipationist })olicy, she will thereby render inevitable the establishment of protectionist tariffs in all the Colonies. ]\Ir. Smith, however, does not care for this contingencv. He tells us that ' the enormous increase in our trade with the United States since the severance of the connection proves that the pros])erity of the trade is not dependent on the continuance of the political connection.' We reply that he has si)oken rather rashly. The total amount of British ex[)orts to the States has, of course, increased since their separation Irom England : it would l)e strange, in<lccd, if (in 1861)81,000,000 or (in 1870) ;58,0O0,O00 ])cople did not consume more goods than did .3,000,000 in 1774. But notwithstanding this increase, it is perfectly easy to pi »ve that the trade with the States is nnich less valuable than was the trade with the same countries Avhilst colonios, and immoasuraldy inferior to what it would have been to-day had the connection been maintained. According to the article ' Imports and Exports,' in ^IcCulloch's Commercial Dlctioiuirtf, the average of the exports to the North American Colonies from 1749 to 1755 was 1,238,000/. per annum; and of those to the United States from 1784 to 1792 2,800,000/. Mr. Ban- c 2 20 A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. croft, in his J/iston/ of the United Stntea, vol. ili. p. 90, estimates the population of the thirteen Colonies in 1750 at 1,200,000; and from 1784 to 1792 the averajre jjopu- lation must have been somewhere about ;5,;jOO,()0(), for it was 3,900,000 at the first othcial census, taken in 1790. Thus it appears that in the middlo of the last century the Colonics imported from Eni^lar.d at the rate of a])ont 1/. ])er head |»er annum; and from 1784 to 1792, inune- diatcly after their inde[)endence, at the rate of Ids. In 1861 the rate had fallen to lis. -id. per head; and this despite the enormous increase in the quantity of manu- factured ffoods consumed bv all ranks and conditions of men everywhere since 1750 and 1784. Besides, in 1750, En<rland was the sole and onlv manufacturer for the States, and in 1784 ])rol)ably remahied in a similar position. The exports at these periods, therefore, re[)re- scnt the entire amount of manufactured goods consumed in the States, l^ut in 1801 the States manufactured to such a large extent for themselves that it is probable thev did not draw from Enii'land more than one-fourth or one-fifth of their total consumption of such goods. Had England supplied as large a proportion of the goods con- sumed in the States during the five years ending with 1801 as in either of the former periods, her annual exports to them would probal)ly have been nearer 100,000,000/. than 17,000,000/. But leaving this plea out of sight, ffood and true though we believe it to be, it is evident that between 1784 and 1801 the population of the States had increased about 900 ])er cent. ; that if the English trade Avith them had increased in the same proportion, the average exports to them would have been 25,000,000/.; and that, if they had been imi)orting from England between 1857 and 1861 at the same rate as from 1749 to 1755, they would in 1800 have imported within a few thousands of 32,000,000/., instead of at th rate of 17,000,000/. These figures, we think, prove that Mr. Smith is alto- (illOWTIl OF TRADE WITH TlIK COLONIES. 21 ii. p. 90, In 17.30 e ])()i)U- 0, for it In 1790. itury the [)f Jl])OUt 2, hnme- lO.s-. In and this if manii- Itions of sides, in turer for I similar e, repre- onsumed pturcd to probable ourtli or s. Had )ds con- ing with exports 00,000/. ^f sight, evident e States English ion, the 0,000/. ; 3etween ) 1755, ousantls )0,000/. is alto- crether wronir in assumlnij that * the enormous increase in our trade with tlie United States ])roves tiiat tlie pros- perity of tlie trade is not dependent on the political connection ; ' but, (m the contrary, j»rove that it is so dej)endent, and, when conjoined witli tlie statistics of the foreign and coh)nial trade at ju-esent, ai)i)roach as nearly to a demonstration as is j)ossible, save in mathematics. Colonics now take a larger j)roi)ortion of liritlsh goods than Is taken by foreign States ; a foreign State now takes a smaller proi)ortlon of IJritlsh goods than it took Avhen It constituted a group of British Colonies, and, in common Avith all the civilized world, consumed nnich less manufactured goods than at j)resent. If this be not sutKcIent proof, very little reliance can be placed in inductive reasonino;. Mr. Smith next attempts to institute an invidious comparIs(jn between the rate of Increase in the colonial, as comi)arcd with that of the Ibrelgn, trade, in the fol- lowing language: — ' The export trade to foreign countries has been in- creasing nuicli more ra[)idly and steadily than that to the liritlsh Colonics, although the markets in Australia have been multljdylng so fast. The Ibrelgn trade has increased over 4().()()0.()()()/. since 1S47 ; the colonial trade only 10,OOOX)()0/.' ' Assuming the amounts to be correctly stated, the con- clusion Is incorrectly reached. As Mr. Smith states the foreign trade In 1861 to have amounted to 82,()0(),()0()/., an increase of 40,000,()0{)/. Avould show that It had just (louhU'd \ as he estimates the colonial trade at lOjHGOjOOO/., an increase of 10,000,000/. would show that it had almost trebled ; or, taking it at what we have i)roved to be the correct amount, the increase from 1S47 would show It to have much more than trebled. Which Is, 100 or 200 per cent., the more rapid rate of increase ? In 1847 the ' The Em])irc, p. 26, T '>9 A COLONIST OX Till-: COLONIAL QUESTION. colonial was about onc-sevciith of the foreign trade. In 1861 it was one-fourth ! We cannot help sayinpf tliat arguments such as those used al)ove by Mr. Smith arc not such as we should have expected from that gentleman. His conelusicms are usually based on a single jmint of the case, an ignore- ment of all other ])oints, and even of the causes which have i)roduced the fact on Avliich he relies. Is it not evi- dent that such a course of reasoninn; must, almost ahvavs, lead to error ? And is it not self-evident that the trade with countries whose population is recruited by immigra- tion as well as by natural increase nmst augment much more rajjidly than that with countries recruited by natu- ral increase only? On the increase of colonial trade we copy from the Westminster Review for July 1870, j). 23, the following extract from an essay read by ]Mr. Hyde ClarjvC before '^'c Society of Arts : — * We liave seen that the combined trade of these reo-ions [the British Possessions] has in the space of sixteen years increased fourfold, that is, from 05,000,000/. in 1850 to 280,000,000/. in 1866. We have seen that at the be- ginning of that period the aggregate of colonial imports wa- 33,000,000/., and of exports 31,000,000/., and that at the end of it these figures had become 137,000,000/. and 143,000,000/. respectively. But, what to my coun- trvmen will be a still more interestin<»; result, is the fact that the consumption by the Colonies of British manu- factures has kept ])ace with the rest of their trade, the imports from the United Kingdom having been in 1850 18,000,000/., and in 1866 61,000,000/. The exports from the Colonies to the mother-country have increased in a yet greater ratio. In 1850 they cori-cspond with the imjiorts, being 18,000,000/. ; in 1866 they were 74,000,000/. In sixteen years, therefore, the trade of the United Kingdom with her Colonies advanced from 37,000,000/. to 135,000,000/. If we exclude India from. TlIK COLONIAL TRADK IX I'^ro. u ,tle. In IS tlio.se lid Imve oils are ignore- !S wliicli not cvi- ahvavs, lie trade Tiinifjra- it much )y natu- radc we ), ]). 23, :. Hyde regions Ml years 850 to tlie be- ini ports nd tliat )0,000/. y couii- tlie fact niaim- ide, the n 1850 ex})orts creased d with y were rade of d from ia from. tlie estimate, we find that wliat may he strictlv recrardcd as the colonial trade of Great Britain — the simple result of AiiLrlo-Saxcm cohniisation during the last twentv ^l years — the finiits of the effln'ts and enterprise of Aiiglo- % Saxon colonists in Australia, Cvinada, South Africa, and the Indian islands, has advanced from 34,000,000/. in 1850 to 157,000,000/. in 1800.' I These facts constitute pretty strong evidence that \ colonial trade is not such a 'slow coach 'as ]Mr. Smith I would fain represent it to be. A\'e close the commercial 'l side of the question with the followino; tables showinn; the '}• value of Euglish goods exported to the Colonics and I certain foreign countries in 18(59 and 1870, and their \ ])oi)ulation according to the latest returns. The tables of .. exports are coi)ied i'rom the Board of Trade returns, as J ])ublishc<l in the London £'cv;y<ow/.v/, ]\Iarch 4, 1871 : and those of i)opulation — save for British America, which we state accordinc; to the census of 1871 for the Dominion, and the latest estimates for provinces not comin-ised in it — from the Year Book for 1871. An examination (if them Avill show that the relative i)roportioii of goods con- sumed has chann-ed verv little since 1861 : — 18IJ9 1S70 Poijulnti'jfi 1 £ £ British America . o,lo9,000 6,800,000 3,903,000 West Indies l,S;34,OOt) 2,4G'2,000l 1.097,000 1 Guiani\ GokOOO 8.") 1.000/ Humlunis . llifJ.ODO HJO.OitO 2.'). 000 1 Austnilasia . 13, 4 11, ()()() 9,902,000 l.GSo.oOO Cape Culdiiy and Natal I,o72,()li0 1 1,807.000 709.000 3Luu'itiiis . 381,0(10 483,000 322,000 Western Africa . 6l';'.oiio 0.")S.(IOO •IS. 000 Other possessions 88,000 ] 79,000 say 2."), 000 Total 23.848.000 ' 23,202.000 7,802,000 ; The exports to Western Europe and the United States — the countries with which we compared the colonial trade of 1861 — were in the same years us follows: — • I 24 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUL.STION. H i i imt 1«7(> riipiihitlon A « j Swt'ilon ainl Nnrwiiy . l.rwi 1,000 2,(t 14,000 /•),8!t7.000 j Dciiiiiiirk l,.')74,000 2,02:5.000 1.7H:i,ooo < icriiiiuiv ;^. 2:50.000 lll.liOl.OOO 2.o:is,()00 1 17,t;52.oooj 38.0 14. 000 ll(.llaiia . i(»,7oo,(ioo 11.222.000 ;5,7:5i"),ooo IJclL'iiim 4.oo;5,ooo 4.470.000 4,8;50,(tOO !'"nme(' ll.ClS.OOO 11.(1 IT), 000 38,007,000 I'ortii^fiil i.();5»,ooo 1.027.000 ;i.087.ooo Spain .... 2,204,000 2..")i:5,ooo 10.301.000 1 Italy .... G,Hi2,000 r),2()f;.ooo 24.273,000 Austria I, :m 1.000 1.714.000 3.j.l^l 3.000 (ircici' !»74.000 842,000 1,3:52.000 Wallai'liiaanil Moldavia 007.000 659,000 :i,80i.ooo Total . G(5,3.")4.000 04,.J71.0I)(» I78,r)3r).o()0 United .States 24,024,000 28,:5;3 1.000 38,.")5;"),O00 From the above tables it can be seen tliat in tlie years 18(59 and 1870 eacli colonist consnnied Eiii^Iish ffoods to the amount of U/. Ids. llr/., against 7.v. 3r/. taken by each inhabitant of Western Euro|)e, and I'As. Hd. l)y each American. AVe have previously shown that Americans ■\vlien colonists, and Avhen they, in common with all the world, consumed much less inanni'actured goods than they do at present, iin])ortcd from England at the rate of 1/. per head. Do not these facts decisively ])rove that the colo- nial trade is much more valuable than that with foreigners, and that maintenance of the connection is requisite to keep it so ? As we remember to have seen a statement to the eifect that tables similar to the above had lately been published in England, it may be as well to state that we have never seen them ; that the above argument was set forth by the Avriter six years since in a Toronto newspaper, and that the original idea of the relative superiority of colonial trade was derived from a passage in the second volume of Alison's Europe, 1815-52, vol. ii. p. 6. li 25 CIIAPTHK IT. DIl'LO-MATIC, .MIMTAllV, AM) FINANCIAL ASl'KCTS OF EMANC'JJ*AT1<)N. x uro-mcT the di )f the !«: )leas h I lie (lisruplion or the r^mj)ire on ])leas hasec on di|»h)niatic', niilitarv, and financial consicUn'ations, emancipationists tai<c liii^hcr ground than tliat which thev occupy when survcyiuf:; the commercial aspects of the question. There tliey only say that the Colonies are useless to En<i;land, and tiiat no Iosk would accrue from se[)aration. ]kit, in urginu^ the latter pleas, they contend that the Colonies are positively prDiicluiis to the mother-country, iiiasnuu'h as they tend to involve her in war for theii' defence, draw aAvay her troops for their garrisons, and her revenue for paying them ; and that, as emancij)ation Avoidd deliver her from the dangers of war to which tiiey now expose her, and would, j)ractically, strengthen her army by enabling her to concentrate it in England, besides relieving her from the charge of paving the colonial garrisons, she would be a positive gainer in a di])lomati(', military, and financial ])oint of view I>y its adoption. All these pleas are urged in the strongest manner against British America, as it is — or has been — the most vulner- able of the Colonies on each of these points. ]Mr. Smith thus states the case : — ' If there had been a war with the United States, the " Trent " would have been the occasion, but Canada would have been the cause. It Is because we have a ■■i 20 A COLO.NLST ON TllK COLONIAL Ql'lvSTION. (loiKMidoticy on that rontinont oiislly sis8:iil.*il)lo, and wliicli bccaiiso it is a (IcpiMxlciicy it is not tlmii|i;ht immoral to assail, that the idoa of a quarrel with lCii<i:laii(l rises in the minds of the Amerieans whenever their tempei* or tiie desire of relief iVoni internal difliculties leads them to think of foreijijn Avar.' ' And, ao;ain, even more distinctly, he alKrms that Canada is the sole cause wiiieh can inchiee a war Avith tLc States : — * For Canada, and i'or Canada alone, we stand alwavs on the hrink of a war with the great Anujlo-Saxon Kepuhli'', our hest mart, and, if we were not eomjtelled to stand in the path of her udvaneinj^ greatness, our closest and sure>t allv."^ On the (»thcr hand, Canada's only danger of aggression is said to arise from her connection with England: — ' There is hut one way to make Canada im})regnal)le, and that is to fence her I'ound with the malestv of an inde])endent nation. To invade and conquer an indc- j)endent nation without ])rovocatIon is an act from -which, in the present state of opinion, even the Americans would shrink/ And in a note he adds — * even the Americans as they were while their (rovernment Avas filled Avith the aggressive insolence of the Southern slave-owner. I know not Avhat reascni avc have for helleving that a Government rej)resentlng the iiidustiious and thrifty citi- zens of the North is llkelv to he military and aimresslve." ■' Perhaps after having seen the history of the 'Alahama' controversy, Mr. Smith may he less confident of the ])aclfic temj)eranient of his Xorthern friends than he Avas when Avriting the ahove. It is ])retty certain that a good many other people have altered opinions much the same as those expressed hy him. But hoAvever this may he, the sentiments conveved in the above extracts must be ' The Empire, p. 1. = Ibkl p. 131. » iUfi p_ 2. CANADA N'oT A * f'ASr.S BKLM.' 27 111 ct ; for tliov reprosrnt liviii;; issues, hold even more good strongly to-day lliaii when tluy wcic writtc Tl 10 whole course of reasoning is a »iiass of inconsistencies which go far to destroy it- entire f()rcc. ]SIr. Smith tells us that the States neither are, nor are likely to heconie, aggressiye, and fills seyeral jtages with arguments intended to estahlish these propositions. If this view be correct, England need not fear that Canada Avill oyer form n cf is us /WZ/hetween herself and the States, and the first plea which einan<'ipationists urge in favour of its ahandonment is inoperative. There is no danger, or rather no /mssihillff/, of aggression from a non-aggressive ])eoi)le and government. Mr. Smith, however, in defiance of his own argument to prove that the States are not aggressive, maintains that ' th(! j)ossession of Canada, and that alone, keeps Kuirhmd constantly on the hriidv of war with the si'cat Anglo-Sax(m Ke})uhlic,' and not oidv this, hut also that Canada's sole danger of attack arises from the connection with lOngland. One of these ])ropositlons may he correct, hut both of th'^m cannot be so. If the States be aggres- sive, and entertain hostile feelings towards both England and Canada, it is plain that a severance of the connection would not alter this feeling. If they had hostile feelings or det-iixHs a}j;ainst one of them only, then it is true that the other would esca})e being drawn into war when the victim was attacked by having ])reviously dissolved the partnership ; but that tir(f countries can e\ or escape an assault directed against one only, by severing their ])oli- tical connection, is clearly impossible. Therefore, before we can be sure that this new, honourable, and truly British mode of averting aEcgression — by running away from aggressors ! — would be effectual in the case of either England or Canada, avc nuist be sure that one only of these countries is in danger of aggression from the States, »■ 28 A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAI. QUKSTIOX, 'I k r I II '' ■i ^k and must know which of them it is. This we cannot tell ; and, therefore, must remain ignorant as to which of them might gain safety by the above device ; but we may be sure that, in case of the States becoming aggressive, emanci- j)ation could not bring safety to both England and Canada. If the assault were directed against one only, that one Avould still remain open to attack ; if against both, it would be their interest to form an alliance to resist it. These inconsistencies j>ervatle the reasonings of the whole of the emancij/ itionist school on this subject. They hold up Canada as a standing casus helli between England and the States ; but as it would be too cruel a blow to their feelings to admit that their model lie))ublic could be aggressive, and as they know that the British ])CO[)le would never abandon their oifsj)ring to the tender mercies of an aggro.-sor, they stoutly deny that the States are aggressive, and assert that Canada's only danger of attack is to be found in her connect' . w'tb England; for(j('ttiii<i tluit, if this Jtc true, it invdli'^uUs their former tJieorj/ that it is Canada which hriuf/s </a/ff/er to England; whilst there can be no doubt that, if Canada really does bring danger to Enoland, the dani2;er to herself must continue to exist after the severance of the connection. Thus, in establishing either one of these theories, they overturn the other. But is the doctrine witli which we are now more inmic- diatcly concerned, that ' for Canada, and Canada alone, England stands always on the brink of a Avar with the great Anglo-Saxon Bepublic,' correct? AVe say that it is grossly incorrect. The * Trent ' affair is a case in point. Mr. Smith says that had hostilities arisen out of that event Canada would have been ' the cause,' though the * Trent ' affair avouUI have been ' the occasion.' We are unable to extract any other meaning from this nice dis- tinction than that the ' Trent ' affair would have been seized CAXADA MAV I'ROVK A PACIFICATOR. 29 nmc- oiic, tlie at it •oiiit. that the ii])on as affording; a pretext for an attempt to annex Canada, wiiich, we snp})()se, is very far from Mr. Siuitli's idea. But wliatever meanino; lie mav liave intended to convev, the glaring fallacy of the ])ro})().siti<Mi that Canada would have been ' the cause ' of war in that case is sufficiently proved by the fact that, had Canada been sei)arated from Enu'land at the time of the connnission of the outrage, reparation must have been demanded all the same, and war ensued had it been refused. The same reniarks aj)i)ly to the enlistment f[uesti()n (during the Uussiaii war) and the subsequent long controversy on the '.Vla- bama' claims. What had Canada to do with any one of these difficulties? The emanci[)ationist theory on this subject is c(|uivalent to saying that geograi)hicid contiguity is essential to the creation of a casus helli, which is a manifest absurdity. It is, therefore, ridiculous to say that Canada is the sole cause which can induce war between England and the States, though it may be one of the causes which can induce that event, as both the people of the United States and their rulers set a much higher value on Canada than is done by British emanci[)ationists. To this possibility there are, however, countervailing considerations. Does Canada act only as a casus hclli? jNIay she not also act as a pacificator? In the ' Trent' affair we are j)retty sure that she did so act. For in Canada Hno-land was furnished Avith a base of operations for her army, ready access to the States' northern frontier, and the means of streno-theninu; her forces by the addition of from 50,(300 to 80,000 hardy recruits. May not these things, and the consequent fact that a Avar Avith England and British America is certain to be more dangerous to the States than a Avar Avith Enirland single-handed, de- nuded of Canada, and thus able to assail the States only as a naval poAver, have been the causes, as they certainly w^ mmm^mmm!imi''m wmmmm 30 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. ^ |:i I! were amongst the causes, which led the States to yield, and so averted war ? And as we have shown before that war, on account of Canada, can arise only in case of the States being an aggressive Power, the question arises whether considerations such as these are not much more likely to avert aggression than is any flattering of their van'ty by withdrawing from their neighbourhood in fear of encountering their prowess; nay, whether such are not the only arguments which can prevent aggression on tlie part of a PoAver inclined to attemi)t it. It thus appears that the only event in which the emancipationist theories on this subject can prove correct is in that of the States desiring to annex Canada, and of Knrjland consentiMcj to stand aside and allow them to do There can ])e no danu'cr of a<)i:£jrcssion from a non- on SO. aggressive Power, and if the States were aggressive, and their hostile foelin<i's directed aii'ainst Eno-jand alone, she would not esca|)c tiie assault by cutting Canada adrift. The increased chances of war with t!ie States which Canadii brings to England are consequently reduced to very small proportions; and still further reduced when on the other side of the account we place the motives for keeping the peace Avhicli are furnished to them by the union of the two countries, rendering a war Avith both nuich more dano-erous than with Eiifi;land alone — a motive which orows with the i»:ro\vth of Canada. As to the other Colonies, we do not think that they have, during the present century, created a single ditficulty with any foreign Power. The })osItion which we have taken, in reference to the connection with Canada rendering Enji-land more formid- able in a war with the States, Avould certainly be disputed by any logical emancipationist, for the party contends that the military strength of England is weakened by the IXVASIOX OF ENGLAND POSSIBLE. 81 dispersion of lier army in colonial garrisons. Mr. Smith's argument in support of this view is as follows : — ' As regards the position of England in Europe, I con- tend that she would become not more, but less, insular, Avhen disencumbered of her distant dependencies. AVhy cannot she now speak the one word of spirited foreign })()licy that is worth s})eaking — the Avord that -would set Italy free? Because her armies and fleets are scattered, and she is in fear of her dependencies all over the globe." ' There is no doubt that this view of the case is, in some measure, correct. If the colonial garrisons Avere Avith- drawn to England, and still kept in pay there, England Avould, under present circumstances, have a larger army disposable for operations in Europe Avithout her Colonies than Avith them. But for a Avar with the States such a policy Avould certainly Aveaken her. For it should be re- membered that Avith Canada for an ally England could find employment for at least 200,000 American tro(){)s in their own country, or on its borders, and that Avithout Canada these troops Avould be disposable for action else- Avhere. Has it never occurred to Englishmen that their scene of action might be in the British Islands? We are tolerably sure that it has not ; and, also, that the sugges- tion of such a possibility may, at first, rather tend to excite the risible muscles of the reader than his appre- hensions of such an event. But reflection Avill soon alter this. Sixty years ago England transported her forces across the Atlantic and attacked the States at many points on their OAvn soil. Since that time steam navifjation has innnensely lessened the difficulty of expeditions across the sea, as has been repeatedly ])roved by experience. Under these circumstances, there are but two means by Avhich such an invasion could be prevented from reaching the British Islands. One is that England should possess ^ The Empire, p. 35. r I A COLONIST OX TFIE COLONIAL QUESTION. va 3i such a su])oriority at sea as would enable her to blockade the States' seaports, and so hinder the sailinn; of the arma- ment, and the other Is that she would be able to destroy it at sea. The former continj^ency, however, is very unlikely to prove a fact, and the latter is dej)endent on tlic chance of meeting the hostile fleet. Hence, there are no other difficulties in the way of an invasion of the British Islands by the States than such as are peculiar to any niilitary enterprise undertaken across the sea; and if anybody should suppose that it Avould not be attem})te(l, or the requisite force not forthcoming, he would labour under a sad delusion. The population of the States now exceeds that of the United Kingdom by about twenty- five per cent. They have raised armies quadruple those of England, and the rnatericl of an inunense force is still avaihible at almost any moment. Their navy is pretty formidable ; and a war with ICngland would cause an enormous fleet to spring into being with mushroom ra- pidity, by letters of marque bringing ])rivate enterprise to the work of its autrmcntation. How can En<ilishmcn sup[)0se that so terribly energetic a peoj)le as the xVmeri- cans would employ their immense resources in watching for some expeditions of 10,000 or lo,000 men, which England might send over to make casual landhigs on their coasts, instead of emi)loying them to strike at the heart of their foe. If there were any doubt on the matter at any time, there certainly can be none while Fenianism exists in both Ireland and America; and this under so strong a form that not only are raids from the latter country into British territories planned, but also executed, in time of peace. What, then, would be done in time of war? And what would be a more eft'ectual check on any scheme of invasicm than the fact that, before attacking other ])eople, the States would require to guard their own laud against the assaults of from 100,000 to I ^ CANADA A GUARDIAX AGAIXST IXVASIOX. 33 200,000 men in Canada? Enp;lancl complains of havino; to undertake the defence of Canada, whilst the fact is that, in a war with the States, Canada would constitute a breakwater to defend England against the storm, for unless she were defending herself in America, she wouM probably have to do it at home. It is really strange to hear British statesmen talking of Canada beincr likelv to prove a weakness to England in a war with the States ; or, averring that it is impossible to defend Canada in Canada, and that the only way to defend her is to withdraw the British troops and strike elsewliere. If Canada be indefensible by the union of English and (>anadian forces, how can she be defensible by those of Canada alone? and if England could not confront the States in a friendly country with those united forces, how could she confront them in a hostile country with her own alone? For a war with the States, emanci|)ation would unquestionably weaken England, though we will grant that, by enabling her to withdraw the colonial garrisons, it would strengthen the force dis})osable i\n' o})erations in Europe, if the troo})S were still kejjt under pay.' lil uie ' Early in 1870. and subsequent to the writinii uf the above, some in!- niirable letters from a gentleman subscribing himself 'A Colonist' wt-re |nil)li^hfil in the Tiincs. In the second of thcsr htters the writer takt s prci'isrly the same ground that we have done. He says: — ' In my last letter I contended that the colony whicli is most exposed I'f all '.vas defensible in case of war, and that uii the grounds of military expi'- diency it wi.idd be more to the advantage of Entrland to defend than to rniire from Canadii. Let me now look at the alternative of the case: that ('anada is given up and that the whole C'onfetleration in any future strngirlo is neutral. This, it is to be kept in mind, involves the consequence tiiat on no part of the Atlantic coast north of l>irmuda, nor on the American sido of tiie Pacific Ocean, would England possess a siuirle harbour where she could coal, or retit a vessel, or obtain supplies. To repair damages a ship must return to England, and if the United .States were left free to operato with all their power against Bernuula. how long could that island be held y T 34 A COJ.OXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION, The niuincial argument is the hist plea in favour of* a disruption of the Empire Avliich we liave to consider. England has been accustomed to garrison the Colonies, and the expense of so doing would, it is contended, be saved by declaring the Colonies independent, and ceasing to garris( n them. The following is Mr. Smith's estimate of the ex})ense : — ' The military expenditure on the whole of the depen- n i .ft i I t h 1 [ '[ ■ ft b It'iiiir wiihiii (■;l^ ;• necfss to the United States, it must, at all evciit.«. Iidw- ever guv ■ f>i " reduction or actual capture, be closely blockaded, and, fur all cm I. ir; es. would be useless. If I'ernuida fell, how lonj^ would the 'V -I 1. II, '(.-.' remain British ? And might not the contairion of (lissohition i"vt(ii<l to Australia and the other Colonies of the empire? If Canada wer ijaii''o ined >n ^hc jrround that she Wiis difficult to defend, would the PaciHc or ..as^raj/- n ( 'onies not claim the right to be neutral ? In the lancuaire uf Lord Grrev, "the policy of abandoning a pnrt of our Colonial empire could scai'cely be adopted without giving so great a shock to tht^ feeling of confidence and security in the remainder as greatly to increase the ditficulty of maintaining it." England would thus br deprived of active allies, numbering nearly seven millions of people, all over the globe, and her enemy would gain inmiensely in the means of inflictina- injury on her coninieree in every sea. And what of the fact that Newfoundland is within six days' steaming of Ireland? If all the ships of England are to lie with- drawn from the Anu'rican possessions, that island at once Ijecoraes a safe lia.>e of operations against Ireland, whence men and munitions of war could and Would be despatched as opportunity or the chances of success war- ranleil. ' To >um up. therefore, in such a war, if the policy of abandonment is to be followed. England loses whatever advantage is to be found in the alli- ance and active support derived from Camuia alouo of half a million of flLihtinsJ: men. of whom 7(b"0() are as hardy seamen as tlie world can pro- ttuce : of till' employment of a. very large sliare of the enemy's resources and men in dilHcult and exhaustinc expeditions; in having no harbours to repair and coal her ships and to tit out expeditions within easy access of the enemy's country, and of so being able to harass a coasting trade which extends tY'im Elaine to Cape Horn, and from Cape Horn to the Columbia Iiiver. She reliiujuishes, besides, all lu)pe of executing ^hat some regard as a stratetretic oper.ition possessing elements of probable success — a descent on California by a force drawn from India and collected at Vancouver's Island : and, above all, she risks alienating the active support of every other possession, and turnincr them, if no worse befalls, into the condition of neutrals ; and she furnishes a safe footing to a liostilo force on an island less than six days' sail from Ireland.' "1 MILITARY KXPRXDITURE ON TIIR COLONIES. .');") ir of a nsider. )lonies, led, be [^easinu: stimate depen- tits. liow- ulcil. mid, iiosv luiifi rairion of pire ? If defend, iieutriil ? irt I if our a shock to :o iiK'rertJjo 1 of active sliilie. and ry 'in her i> within le with- ■8 a satV ■;iv cuuld jcess war- nt'iit is to the alli- illion of .•an pro- ui'cos and 'bours to iicccss of le which Columbia ;it' regard -a descent ncoi'.ver's of every condition an island dencics for tlic vear ciidlni; March I808, was .S.oOO,!)!)'*/. Tlie cx})eiuliture on the Nortli Ainerieau Colonies was 473,000/. ; on tlie West Indies, ;}84,()0O/. ; on the Australian Coh)nics, 340,000/. At tlie Cape we had an army of 10,759 regular troojjs, and tlie military expendi- ture alone was 830,687/.' ' As these statistics are now somewhat old, it may be well to turn to some of a more recent date- \\'e find it stated in the Year Bixfki'oY 1871, j)]). 278-9, that aceonl- inacto a parliamentary return issued in the session of ls70, the cost of the colonial ))()Ssessions of the Kmpire falliiio- to the charge of the British Exchequer was 4,100,000/. in the financial year 18f)()-7, and 3,969,426/. in 1S67-8. Full deiails are o-lvcii of the cost in each colony or station, but with these we shall not trouble our readers. Following the classification which avo have ado[)ted when examining the amount of the colonial trade, we deduct the items for Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, Ceylon, Labuaii, and the Straits Settlements, amounting collec- tively to 1,012,914/. in 1866-7, and 1,106,306/. in l,s67-8, leaving the cost of colonial garrisons in the former vear 3.090,090/., and in the latter 2.863,120/. It is certain that since then still further reductions haye been made ; but we shall not take tlie expenditure under the Glad- stone Administration as a fair test of the cost of the Colonies, as we i)elieve the measures adopted by it to be inconsistent either with the security of the Colonies or the integrity of the Empire. AVe are, therefore, content to admit that the defence of the Colonies must ctnistitute a charge of from 2,500,000/. to 3,000,000/. on the Im- perial Exchequer. There is no doubt that if England were to abandon the Colonies, withdraAV their garrisons to the United Kingdom and there disband them, she would save the cost ' 7'^e Empire, p. 7o. D 2 00 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. i kl of their maintenance. But as many i)eople are led to believe, by the confusion of emancipationist arnuments on this subject, that by the adoption of that })olicy England would gain both a saving of expense and an increase of her available force, wc think it right to indicate the fallacy of that idea. Were the Empire dis- solved and the troops re([uired to garrison the Colonies concentrated in England, they would certainly be more easily moved to any point in Europe, and more available for her own defence than if scattered over the Colonies, but they Avould still have to be kept embodied and i)aid. To save the expense, it would be necessarv to disband them : and were this done, England's available force would not be one whit greater, but decidedly less, than with these troops in the Colonies. Either the advantage of a decrease of expenditure, or a concentration of troops, nn'ght be gained, but not both of them. Against this, however, is to be placed the loss of certain benefits derived from the Colonies of which people seem to be strangely forgetful, and which we shall stiive to indicate further on. Mr. Smith's case against the Colonies is sunnnarised in the extract which we quoted as a fair sam})le of the emanci})ationist s])irit, and which we reproduce here for the pur})ose of analysing it : — ' In ancient times empire was empire. The Roman extorted from his dependencies both military force and revenue. Sj)ain extorted revenue. We are too moral to extort either force or revenue from our dependencies, even if we had the poAver. While we monopolised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all. But the system has been established ; many prejudices and some interests are bound up with it, and reasons must be found or invented for maintaining it. The reasons found or in- AX ANALYSIS. 37 vcntctl fii'G, as might be expectetl, various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount of tlie colonial trade ; now it is tiic ])reterence of our people for the Colonies as l)laces of emigration. AVhen facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, yrvatUje. I give an agent an immense sum of money to invest for me. lie tells me he has bought me an estate. I ask to see the estate: he tells me that the money is laid out not in an estate but in houses. 1 ask to see the houses : he tells me that it is not laid out in houses but in railway shares. I ask for my scrii) : he tells me that it is not laid out in railway shares but invested in the funds. I ask for the transfer- receii)t, and he tells me that it is not invested in the funds but in something much better and nobler, in prestiijc. I look in the French dictionary for prestUje, and find that it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.' ' A vigorous and well-written outburst, we must say, ])ut a very poor argument is the above. * AVe are too moral to exact either force or revenue from our depen- dencies,' though the burden of Mr. Smith's argument is the injiistu-c Avhich the Colonies inflict on England bv drawing on her force and revenue for their defence, in- stead of furnishing the requisite armaments from their own resources. His ideas of morality and justice would, tlierefore, seem to be that thev conflict Avith one another — in this case, at least. Besides, his memory must be rather bad if he fancies that England is so ' moral ' as to believe herself bound to present her dependencies w'ith forces and refuse to take anything from them. Canada has furnished troops when attacked ; offered to furnish them during the Kussian Avar, and raised a reiiiiuent of the line Avhilst the Indian rebellion Avas in })rogress. India furnishes double pay for British troops Avithin her limits, and her native troops have been employed on » The Emjnre, pp. 93, 94. r ;■ i i i A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUKSTIOX. exterior expeditions more than once. Tlicse facts dispose of tiie ' too moral ' theory, ^vhIch is in direct opposition to all the rest of Mr. Smith's ideas ; but one who writes so hotly can scarcely be expected to perceive the contradic- tion. •• While we monoj)olised their trade in a general reiii'n of monopoly, they brouoht us a real advantage, thouiih of a narrow and selfish kind.' This is the most astounding sentence in the book. We are much sur- ]»rised that jNIr. Smith has not been denounced by his ])olitical friends for the ])ro])osition. It is almost enough to make Adam Smith, Peel, and Cobden stir uneasily in their graves: an advantage gained by a Protectionist j»olicy and lost by that of free trade I Seriously, it would seem as if ]Mr. Smith did not know^ his own mind. Anybody reading his letters would take him for a free trader jxtr iwccl/oice ; and the ideas of free traders on this subject were in direct contradiction to the theory broached by him. They held that, under that monopo- li>ing process which jNIr. Smith declares to have been ' a real advantage,' Canada cost Kno-land some millions annually, through differential duties on her timber and wheat ; the AVest Indies some more throuii'h those on su^ar ; and Australia vet others throujTh those on wool : C(msequently, that the Colonies were, under this 'general reign of monopoly,' a })0sitive loss to England in a com- mercial point of view, but would become an advantage under a free trade policy, as England would thus im- ])ort from them less the differential duties, and export to them as fully as before by being able to undersell any competitor. This seems to have been the case, as articles of colonial produce did decline in value in the English markets, and English exports to the Colonies have nearly (juadrupled in amount. If the colonial connection Avere an advantage to England under the reign of monopoly, it assuredly remains so under free trade, whatever may be A SUM^^ARV. '30 the case with the Colonies. * Tlie reasons invented an- various and disconlant enou<rh. Now it is the amount ol' the colonial trade.' A very good argument, we should sav, seeino- that the amount of that trade is twentv times greater, j)ro})ortionately, than is the i'oreign trade. ' Now it is the sceuritv of the colonial trade.' No small heneKt at any time, but stronger than ever Avhen the reign of universal j)eace promised by Progressionists still seems to lie in the dim future. ' Now it is the preference of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration.* If the people do not prefer them they could easily be led to do so by a slight departure from the ' let alone ' policy. ' When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, ])rest/(/e. ... I look in the French dic- tionary for prcstlffc, and find it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.' But facts, as we have seen, do not overturn these arguments ; and, as we shall see, there are some others to offer. Having thus followed Mr. Smith's arguments in favour of enianci}>ation — for the points on which we have quoted from him are really the only reasons which he (ttlers in favour of that policy — we think we may sum uj* the result of our inquiries by saying that the value of the strictly colonial trade was, in 1861, 2(),()0(),0()0/. per annum, or about one-fourth of the foreign trade ; that between 1847 and 1861 the trade with the Colonies, according to Mr. Smith's own showing, increased twice as fast as that with foreii^n countries — thouo:h this rate of increase does not seem to have been maintained since that date ; that the comparative value of the colonial, as compared with the foreign, trade was as 20 to 1 in 1861, and about 15 to 1 in 1869 and 1870 ; that there is strong reason to believe that the maintenance of the political connection is essential to the continuance of this difference, and that the Colonies, if ' emancipated,' would import . I T 40 A rOLOMST ON THE tOlOXIAL QUKSTIOX. oiilv at the fanio rate as foreiijn countries, in wlnrli case Kniiland Wduld iinincdiately lose from 15,(M)0,(H)()/. to 2(),()()0,()()()/. j)C'r ammm ; that tlie possession of bases of military operations in the CoKmies may sometimes serve 1() maintain peace, and almost tihvays to secure victory ii» Avar, by makinijj Enghmd a more formidable foe than hhe would be without them ; but that if England were to adopt the emancipationist policy she could, by with- drawing lier troops and disbanding them, save the cost of the colonial garrisons; or, by still keeping them under arms, strengthen \wr army in Euroj)e. Hence it ap])ear8 that the sole and only argument established in favour of emanci])!itu)n is that one or other of these advantages could be fjained from it. In forming a iudjjment on the (luestion, however, against this single advantaiie must be placed those disadvantages which we have endeavoured to show that it would induce. Even on these i)oints alone, judgment, we think, ought to go against emanci- j)ation ; but as our readers may not agree with us, we fihall s1k)w them some further evils which a disruption of the Empire would bring on England. , 4 ! It >Vl 41 CHAPTER III. COUXTEIIVAILING COXSI DERATIONS. It has been well observed by De Tocqiievillc that ' Reason shows and experience proves that no connnercial j)rosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in ease of need, to naval force.' Of no country w;i , or is, this j)ro})Osition so true as of the United Kingdom. Naval su[)remacy is the life of England. Let her fleets bo conquered and she is ruined ; because, in that event, not only would the trade on Avhich millions of her peo})lo depend for subsistence be destroyed, but even the food which they consume would be hindered from reaching her shores. The maintenance of that supremacy shoidd, therefore, be the supreme object of British statesmen and the British people. All other objects should be made subordinate to it, and anything tending to diminish England's naval resources should be looked on with intense suspicion, if the mere fact of its having such a tendency should not alone suffice to lead to its rejection. Colonial emancipation Avonld have such a tendency. The emancipation of the Colonies would not lessen the amount of naval force which England would require to maintain. So lono; as her commerce extends to every quarter of the globe, so long will she require to maintain fleets in every quarter to protect it. But fleets, to be efficient, must be kept in repair ; and to keep them in repair it is necessary to possess harbours in which they I u l;1: Ij ^ ]. M A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. may be refitted, and ])rocure supplies at pleasure. At j)resciit British fleets enjoy this advantage most com- pletely. There is not an ocean in the world Avithout a British port on its shores. In these ports are, or may he, tiie means of keei)ing the fleets efficient, and of securing thein shelter if pursued by the foe. But let colonial emancipation be adoi)ted and how different would be the situation ! Fleets thousands of miles from England with- out a spot where they could refit, or keep u|) that supi)ly of coal which has now become as much a naval requisite as guns and powder. How would a British fleet stand after a battle if it had no means of refitting nearer than in England? Is it not evident that defeat, under such cir- cuinstances, woidd he ruinous, and victory useless, if the enemy had a port to whicli they could retu'e, seeing that in such a case they would be prepared to re-enter the lists sooner than their ojjponents could be ready to meet them? If it be said that certain ' stations ' could be re- tained for iiiivnl [)urposes, the answer is that to fortify and oarrison them would cost as much as the colonial garrisons have done, whilst the objects in view would not be attained nearly so completely as under the present ref/i>nr. The creation of a marine power is the work of a con- siderable time, since to form a sailor recjuircs mjiny years' apprenticeship and to commence early in lil'e. Thus the naval strength of any nation is proportionate to the amount of its shipping and sailors. Were the Colonies separated from England, their shipping au'l seamen would ii'o with them, and the force available to man the British navy would, thereby, be very seriously reduced. According to the St<itcst)i<uis Year Book for 1869, ]>. xx. the total number of vessels, steam and sailing, belonging to Great Britain and Ireland at the end of 186G was 28,971, with a tonnage of 5,779,000 tons. In the same publica- I COLOXFAL SHIPPING. 43 re. At ?t coin- thout a nay ^'e, ecurinir colonial I he the id witli- supi)ly equisite it stand than in ich cir- ;s, if the no; that iter the to meet [ be re- fortify colonial uld \V)t )i'esent a con- man V Thn's to the Colonies woidd Briti>h ,]>. XX. gintif to 28,971, lublica- tion, p. 308, it is stated that * at the close of 1806 the Colonies and possessions of the United Kino-doni had 12,146 vessels of 1,458,000 tons re«(istered at their ports, an increase on the previous year of above 1,700 vessels, and above 160,000 tons.' According to these statistics the colonial marine was, in 1860, equal to about one- fourth that of Enurland, to -vvhich extent her naval re- sources would be at once reduced by emanci})ation.' To how mui'h the loss would amount in the future it is difficult to say. Detailed calculations in reference to the future are never very reliable. In the present instance the various returns of the tonnao-e of the colonial marine at different ])eriods, which have fallen under our notice, contain so many discrepancies that we shall refrain from (luotin": anv statistics in reference to its rate of increase. lint throunhout all there shines forth the broad truth that colonial is increasing so much more rapidly than English shipi)ing that, should the same rate of growth l)e maintained on both sides, it Avili have gone a good way towards equalling that of England by the end of the cen- tury. At present, however, we may be sure that eman- cipation would reduce the marine resources of England by one-fourth. Nor is it by any means certain that the immediate diminution of English sailors or shii)ping would stop here. It is, on the contrary, highly probable that, in the event of emancii»ation, the colonial marine would be enlarged, and that of England diminished, by the transfer to the former of a j)ortion of the English vessels engaged in the trade with the Colonies ; and from the very large proportitni of English shipping em- ' It is true that in tlnse returns the shipping of India, wliirh country (i'H's nnt onie under emancipationist tlieories, is ineluded. The t(junai.i:e of tliat eountrv and the Asiatic Colonics in 18(J0 amounted to 21.S,<)(M) tuns. Ihit. allowinc: for suhseiiuent inereaso. \\v tliink there ean Ite uu doubt that, jijw the loss would be us above stated. ft m I 44 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. ■ 1 i 1 ' j ) j jjloyed In the colonial trade, such a loss might prove very serious. The proportion of British shipping thus employed at present we have not the means of ascer- taining. But in 1861, the tonnage of British shipping entered in the United Kingdom from foreign ports was 5,400,000 tons, and cleared to them 5,200,000, whilst to the Colonies there were cleared 2,500,000 tons, and en- tered from them 2,300,000 tons. Thus it appears that in 1861 the colonial trade employed one-half as much British shipping as did the foreign trade, although the total amount of the former >vo,s only one-fourth tliat of the latter. Is it unlikely that the emancipated Colonies might desire to have some of the shi})})ing transferred to themselves, or that they might enact navigation laws to secure it ? And is it not almost certain that if they Avere to enact such laws they would secure such a transfer ? AVhat Eno;lishman can req-ard a measure Avhich would ensure an immediate, and render probable a future, weakening of the maritime strength of his country with complacency, when he remembers that England now imports from one-third to one-half of the breadstuifs con- sumed by her people ? The fact that she requires to do so is alone sufficient to prove that maritime supremacy is to her a matter of life and death, for if the importation of this food could be prevented her people must starve ; there is no other alternative. It is impossible to blink tlie fact that war without command of the seas brina;s starvation to England, as she is dependent on foreign countries for a large part of her supply of food, and the loss of maritime supremacy would render her unable to get it. No need have England's enemies to invade her shores, or land a single battalion on her coasts, to conquer her. If they can only blockade her ports their work is done, and Eng- land lies prostrate at their feet. She must yield to their demands or see her people without the means of support- i MARITIME WAR AXD ENGLISH COMMERCE. 45 it prove ns thus f ascer- shipping )rts was vhilst to and en- iars that as much lUffh the 1 tliat of Colonies fcrred to \ laws to bey Avere transfer ? ;h would I future, try with Old now ufts con- es to do emacy is tation of ve ; there the fact vation to les for a maritime Xo need »r land a If they and Eng- \ to their support- ing life. An uneasy consciousness of the possihility f)f this catastrophe, and of the fact that a maritime war would, in any case, so much disarrange the complicated machinery by which British commerce is keptinmotiim as to leave millions of En<ilishmen starvinfj, is the real cause of that nervous fear of war which seems to rule botli Biitish peo])le and statesmen with absolute sway, and which has reduced her influence in the councils of Euroj)e to that of a second-rate Power — if, indeed, it now stands so high. To have the ocean covered Avith hostile cruisers c(»uld not fail seriously to deranije her commerce. This event is always a heavy disaster to any nation ; but to England, at the present time, it might be a death-blow, shice the whole framework of her society has become interwoven with foreign commerce. In other countries commerce is, generally, the exchange of the surj^lus })ro- duce of their own soil, I'aw or manufactured, for that of other nations. It thus ])artakes princi[)ally of the cha- racter of a purchase of luxuries, leaving the nation possessed within itself of all the necessaries of life. But with Enolii^h commerce this is not the case. Enfjland exports little of her own produce in a raw state, but a great deal of manufactured goods. And she exchanges her ex})orts not only for products peculiar to other countries, but also for the food with which many of her j)eo])]e are fed, and for the raw material which, after manufacturing, she exports. An intcrrui)tion of her commerce would, consequently, leave her not only with- out the luxuries which she imports, but, by hindering the ini})ortation of raw material for manufacturing ])urposes, one portion of the connnunity without the means of earning a living ; and, by sto])i)ing the imjwrtation of breadstuff's, another portion without food at any price. These calamities would, in themselves, be pretty severe ; but when to them we add the influence which the distress of 111 40 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. . I.' tf , the suffering poo])le would exercise on others tlcpendent on tlieir expenditure for support ; the influence wliich the distress of all might exercise on public credit, and the manner in which almost the entire realised wealth of I'^ngland is dependent on public credit, the i)rospect becomes perfectly a])])alling. England may strive to l)lind herself to the fact that it is a dread of these calamities, and a conse([uent national bankru})tcy, which leads her to desire peace so ardently, and to view any ])ros})cct of war Avith a degree of nervous apprehension that is well understood bv foreigners : but that such is the case is none the less true. But the more dangerous to Euijlaiid is war, the o-reater n^ed is there that she should be prepared for it. To be j)re])ared it is necessary to be jtossessed of warlike resources. Emancipation would instantly lessen by one-fourth, and ultimately by a great deal more, her resources for maintaining that maritime su})rcmacy the loss of which would ])robably involve her in absolute ruin, since without it she could, in time of war, neither carrv on her trade witli foreign nations, im})ort lor her people the necessaries of life, nor keep hostile battalions away from her shores, and a failure to clfect these things woidd exi)Ose her to the risk of a deranL''ement of the framework of societv in Enjrland. This consideration alone should, wo think, suffice to prove the im[)olicy of a disruption of the Empire. But besides the fact that emancipation would weaken Eng- land's resources for wao-inij a maritime war, there is a very strong ])robability that it might tend to involve her in war with her resources thus weakened. The Colonics are now held up as being a fruitful source of dij)lomatic difficulties. They may be so, but what security is there that new difficulties of a like character miiiht not follow on cmancipaticm ? The emancipationist seems to consider the Colonies as each affording a ready casus belli to any IXSP:CURITY of COLOXLaL ixdepexdente. 47 icndent ich the ,iul the laltli of ro.s[)ect rive to f thes^e , which 3w any hcusion sucli is meroiis liat she jcessary 11 would a o;reat laritime Ive her time of nations, )r keep ure to of a, ncl. fice to But Enir - I. •e is a Ive her olonies h)niatie there follow onsider to any 11 s Power which may desire it, and as forming so many points of weakness in war. We have endeavoured to prove that, even in the case of the Colony most o})on to these charo-es, there is somethinsi; to be said on the other side of the fjuestion ; whilst we do not think that a single difficulty has arisen concerning any other of the Colonies during t1»e present century. But granting us to be wrong and emanci[)ationists right, would emanci- ])ation mend the matter? Supposing it to be accom- jilished, and the Colonies independent states, what security has England that they would remain so, and Ljive her no further trouble ? Mr. Smith contends that the colonial empire is useless to England, but he does not say that under no circumstances can a colonial empire prove advantageous to its possessor. On the contrary, he tells us that ' in ancient times empire was empire. Rome exacted force and revenue from her colonies ; Spain exacted revenue.' All ([uite true, but not the whi)le truth, for even more than these has tiie rulini)' ])0wer generally exacted from its colonies. Their governments furnished i)laces for its statesmen, their mines and revenues filled its coffers, their inhabitants frequently fought its battles, and their connnerce Avas always arranged in subordination to its interests. Has it never occurred to men of the emancipationist stamp that it' Eno'liind were to abandon her Colonies thev miiiht fall under such a rule as this? We sus])ect that it has not, and that at first they Avould hoot the idea, savinjji: that such thin<z;s mio'ht have been dreaded in other times but not in ours, that men are too enlightened to act in such a manner now-a-duys, and that ' the age of con([uests is past.' But, unfortunately, the stubborn logic of facts l)roves that these theories are incorrect. The man who first declared the age of conquests to have de}>arted, himself renewed them, and has not wanted followers, as 4 lis 'it I ■"BBBBsaaiBs: S33 48 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. If ! : > i 1 he has found to his cosit. His attempt on Mexico was very much such a case as we have supposed, and its failure can be ascribed only to the fact that the States, after bav- in;;' conquered the Southern Confederacy, stood, flushed with victory, and with a mighty army and navy, ready to enforce the * Monroe doctrine.' How would Enjrland like to see her ancient Colonies falling under the sway of jiolitlcal or commercial rivals, and being ruled for their selfish purposes ? Is it not evident that such an event would not only crip[)le English commerce most seriously, l)ut also increase the naval power of her rivals to such an extent as might enable them to destroy it, and with it almost the existence of England ? And what security is tliere that if the Colonies were emancipated this result would not ensue? Can we sup[)ose that French ambition has been destroyed by the campaign of 1870, or that anxiety to escape from her present degradation will not tend to increase it? Has not Spain given forth signs that her peo})lc are recovering their ancient energies ? Are not the nations arising in Italy and Germany likely to prove formidable naval powers ; and is not the latter, in consequence of the great emigration from its shores, likely to covet a colonial emi)ire ? Are not our Yankee neighbours strong, energetic, and ambitious, and ready to hold a ])eople in bondage if they believe it to be con- ducive to their own interests ? And is it impossible that even Australasian Colonies might turn to them for pro- tection ? Is it }»ossible that any one of the Colonies could, single-handed, resist successfully an attack from such Powers? and are not Australian gold-fields, West Indian soil and commerce, and Canadian territory, bono and muscle likely to prove temi)ting objects of pursuit to those who would use them for their own benefit ? How would England like to see them turned against herself, and what security has she that they would not THE ' SPIRIT OF THE AGE. 49 be so turned? If it be said that England would not permit the conquest of any of the emancipated Colonies, the answer is that * prevention is better than cure," and that she is likely to find their defence easier whilst they form a part of her empire than it would be when they were independent states. If it be rei)licd that the * spirit of the age ' affords jH'otection against any attempt at conquest, Ave would inquire, in the style of Frederick the Great, 'How many battalions can he bring into the field ? ' and what state will treat a violation of the spirit of this doubtful cha- racter as a casus hdll ? Tried by this test we fear that the protection derivable from the * spirit of the age ' vanishes into thin air. But it may be said that, although tho ' spirit of the age ' cannot array battalions, it can prevent their being arrayed, and that this is the security which it offers. A very good security it would be if one could only be sure that it Avere in existence and Avould so con- tinue. But what is the ' spirit of the age ' on this point ? AVe very much fear that it is the spirit of war and conquest, especially against Aveak PoAvers. Ever since 1848, Avhen Euroj)e had recovered from the lethargy caused by the Xp.poleonic Avars, avc have had Avars in plenty, and QxoAy one of them has been induced by the most unblushing aggression. Witness Kussia against Turkey, France agahist Austria, the series of intrigues by Avhich Cavour annexed Naples and the Legations to Sardinia, Germany against Denmark, Prussia and Italy against Austria, France against Prussia, and the terrible re])risal. If this be not enough, Ave point to America, Avhere one-half of ISIexico has been annexed by tlic States, and the re- mainder of it Avas conquered by France : and to the Avar Avagcd against the Southern Confederacv in defiance of the principle declared l)y the States to be a self-evident truth — that the sole right of government is derived from I 11 jl 'I f' 50 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. the consent of the governetl. jNIoreover, in all these cases, neutrals have manifested a decided disinclination to interfere unless their own interests were directly involved, as England well remembers in the case of Denmark, thou2:h she could go to Avar with China for a boat worth 80/. We, therefore, hold that the ' spirit of the age ' is more likelv to induce atiffression on the emancipated Colonies than to afford any guarantee against it. Is England pre])ared to face the risk ? Is she determined, in the event of an attack on any of her offspring, to refrain from extending her arm in their defence? If not, let her hold on to the Colonies, as she can assuredly aid them much more easily and effectually when united to them than when separated from them. The question of the dej)endence of the prosperity of the colonial trade on the continuance of the political connection has been already considered. If we have succeeded in establishina; the correctness of our view of the case, it of course forms a most important argument against emancipation. But behind this there lies another question, which is, how far it is safe for England to rely on being able to retain that commercial su])remacy in virtue of which she is able to permit the unrestricted im- })ortation of foreign manufactured goods ; and whether, if she should need to return to her old colonial policy, it would not be well for her to have Colonies to which it could be applied. That such a contingency is possible is beyond doubt. For, without entering on the question of the l)alance of trade, it is undeniable that to import goods without being able to pay for them by exports is im- jiossible, and a nation can find a sale for Its exports only so long as it can furnish them as cheaply as others in the same market. England now exports manufactured goods chea])er than other nations ; but is she sure of being able to continue to do so ? and if her ability to do so FREE TRADE XOT AUYAYS PRACTICABLE. 51 I these 1 illation lirectly case of a for a spirit of on the arante(! sk ? Is ' of her n their , as she actually leni. erity of [)olitical e have view of o'liment another to rely lacy in ted im- ther, if licy, it hich it slble is tion of t jxoods is iin- ts only lers in ictnred f beino; do so should fail, could she continue to ])ractisc a free triidc l)olicv? We think not. In vounu; countries like tiie Colonies, having boundless unoccupied lands on which their peo])le can readily find homes, and Avhcre there is plenty of work for all, free trade is always j)racticaljle, because, having witliin themselves all the necessaries of life, they can, at a })inch, dispense with imported luxuries ; but in thickly peopled countries like Enghmd, free trade, or unrestricted importation, is j)ossIble under peculinr cir- cumstances only. England now imports breadstutls and raw material for manufacturing purposes, and piys tin- tliem by exporting manufactured goods. This i,>, done on the princi})le that to ' buy in the chea})est market and sell in the dearest ' is the true way to wealth for nations no less than for individuals. But supposiiuj that for cii/n markets .yltonld become the clicapest fur manvfctcturcd (joods as iccli as for hreadsti/Jfs, horv ico/dd the case then stand? Sup- ])osing that Belgium could supply hardware, France cotton goods, and Germany woollen goods che:ij)cr than they could be manufactured in England, would it suit her then to abandon the manufacture of these o-oods and follow the policy of 'buying in the cheapest market and s/llinn- in the dearest' hi/ import/nc/ mannfactul^d r/nods as ire// c/.s- hreadstt/ffs? Whatever reply some enthusiastic free- trader may make, it is certain that this could nut be done. The acjricultural communitv miirht, indeed, nrefi r to buy cheap foreign, rather than dear English, good?-. and be willing to export their produce in payment, but tliey certainly could not be allowed to do so. All the grain which they raise, and a great deal more, is con- sumed in J'^.ngland, consequently if any of it were tc- Ijc exported in the absence of foreign receipts, a lai'uc oart of the consumers would be involved in starvation, and the manufacturing population thrown out of employment, £ 2 ir- ■i1 til ii If II ■^ « '■' 52 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. •! •'; n from the loss of both foreio;n and home markets. There- fore, in the event of foreign markets becoming cheaper tlian those of England for manufactured goods, England would be forced to abandon free trade and close her ports against foreign manufactures, or else see her j)eople not only without the means of purchasing food but also without food to purchase. But even a less imj)rove- ment in the arts of manufacturing on the part of foreigners than that requisite to enable them to undersell Enolish manufactures at home would suffice to destroy free trade in England. Let them improve only so much as to be able to dispense with English imports, and free trade is ruined. For although they might be willing to export to England the goods which she now imports from them, and she willing to receive their exports, she would be unable to do so, because to buy anything Ave must be able to pay for it ; and if foreigners could buy clieaper at home th )se goods which they now import from England, they would not buy from her ; and England, having lost the means of paying for the goods which she now imports from foreigners, would be unable to obtain thorn. In either of these cases the only manner in which England could procure a suj)ply of those goods Avhich are essential to her existence — breadstuffs and raw material for manu- iacturing pur})oses — would be by entering into treaties with other countries, granting them an advantatje in her markets on condition of receiving a like advantage in their own. This she might do with the Colonies and with them only, since it is only young countries that can import their manufactured goods and yet find emi)loy- ment for all their people, and because their extent and the variety of their produce would enable them to supply the diversified goods which she Avould require. This possibility of England being obliged to abandon free trade and return to her old commercial policy constitutes, EXGLAND's commercial supremacy IX DANGER. 53 >'land, we believe, a valid and practical argument in favour of the retention of the Colonies. It may, perhaps, be replied that the argument would be valid and practical if there were any prospect of such a contingency arising ; but as there is none, it is worth- less. We shall not enter into a controversy on the greater or less probability of the contingency, but we may remark that, as British commerce has not extended itself since 1866 at the rate at which it was formerly growing, and as the manufacturing interest has, in some casesj begun to call for protection against foreign com- petition, there seem to be reasonable grounds for fear- ing that English commercial supremacy may already be in danger. Besides this, there is no doubt that the natural course of events for a nation which has begun manufacturing is to go on copying from its rivals until it overtakes them, and manufacturers all over the civilised world have been copying those of England for at least a quarter of a century, so the contingency is not impossible, it may be, not improbable. Along with this it should be remembered that in almost every civilised age some one nation has enjoyed a commercial supremacy, and that it has always })roved to be a fleeting possession. It is well, therefore, for England to kee[) the possibility of its fleeting from her in view, and to retain in her hands the means of securing a trade which would always leave her a great commercial Power ; more especially as we know not yet whether the signs of the times do not indicate that it has begun to slip from her, and are still ignorant of the changes which the gold discoveries, by the influence Avhich they are exerting on prices, may work in the com- merce of the world. It should be remembered that the arguments In refer- ence to the dependence of the prosperity of the colonial trade ou the continuance of the political connection are ill 54 I ill A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. !l ■ / I ','1 I! ■; '^^ h altogothor unaffected by the correctness, or incorrectness, of our views on this luttcr i)oint. Tiic two should never l)ecome mixed in nnvbodv's thoun-lits. It nuiv he good ])f)licy for England to retain her Colonies as a precaution against the loss of her connnercial su})remacy, so that in ease she might cease to be able to compete with the Avorld for their cust(mi, or to meet the foreigner in his own market, she would have at hand the means of revertin<j; to her old system of colonial monopoly with differential duties on colonial products ; and it may be good jjolicy for England to retain her Colonies, though sure of re- maining tlie first connnercial Power in the world, because her trade with them as colonies might be more prosi)erous than it would be if they were to become independent states. Both points we believe to form important argu- ments against the emancipationist policy; but neither is, in any way, dependent on the other. There is now a large and almost annually-increasing amount of British capital invested in colonial securities, the safety of Avhich might be seriously affected by eman- cipation. The latest estimate, that of ]Mr. Dudley Baxter, states the debts of British Americaat 20,920,000/., and those of Australasia at 35,744,000/. If to these we add the debts of the AVest Indies, South Africa, and ^Mauritius, we shall have a total of about 60,000,000/., nearly all of which is held by parties resident in tlie United Kingdom. 'Nov does the amount invested • I here. Colonial railways have been, and are being, in nearly every instance by the monev of British - i-e- holders, aided by grants from the local Governments ; and there are, also, very many miscellaneous joint-stock enterprises peculiar to the Colonies, in Avhich large sums are locked up. We shall certainly not exaggerate by estimating the amount of these latter securities at 40,000,000/., maldng a total of 100,000,000/. due by the EXGLISII INVKSTMKNTS IN THE CO|/).\IK,S. 55 Colonies to British investors. "We do not, for a moment, moan even so mucli as to hint that the emancipated Coh)nies mlglit think of a<loj)tin^' a ])olicy of ro])U(liation ; hut we do mean to say that the safety of these invest- ments would he much lessened by the establishment of colonial independence. The value of any, and every, stock security is dependent on the maintenance of order within and safety Avithout on the part of the country froui which it is held. It is by no means certain tluit these conditions would l)e fulfilled by tiie new nations. War abroad, and civil strife at home, are certainly amongst the possible se(|uences of emancipation. Nations involved in either ol' these pursuits do not pay much regard to the claims of foreign creditors, for the simide reason that they cannot. We may feel jn-etty sure that in the event of any of the Colonies becoming thus involved, English securities would quickly become worth little more than the }>aper on which they were written. But even a less amount of disorder than the above would suttice to en- danger their safety. The Erie scandal has not yet been lorgotten in England. It is the fruit of a social ami govermnental organisation similar to that whicli, under the most favourable circumstances, would be induced bv emancii)ation. AV'ould England like to see similar re- sults follow? If not, let her retain her hold on the ( 'olonies. Whilst she does so, there is not much danger of invasion from abroad, and there is none of disorder within, ller influence supj)lies precisely the conservative force which is needed to prevent young commiuiities rushing headlong into a career of democratic innovation which cannot fail to result disastrously ; and if any in- justi< should be done to the investors, they have always ojien an ap})cal to the House of Lords, which tribunal they can safely rely on to rectify it. To adopt emau«- cipatit a is to expose every penny now, or hereafter to be. 4 f ; 1 I'.' in irw A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 1 !' !;, invested in the securities of the emancipated countries to tlie chance of the rule of an unbridled democracy pro- ducing a reign of external peace,, and internal order, jus- tice, and purity. To retain them is to provide guarantees against the threatened danger and the means of redress in case of its occurrence. And whether we consider the large amounts already involved, or the splendid field for the employment of British capital and enterprise likely to be afforded by the Colonies in the future, there can be no question whatever as to the expediency of securing the former, and keeping the latter open, by maintaining the Integrity of the Empire. Granting the preatu/e of glory which England derives from her colonial empire to be a 'juggle," &c., the pre.stif/e of infamy which the abandonment of it Avould entail on her would be a stern reality. Britain cannot tell other nations that she is afraid of them, and suppose that they will continue to respect her Avill. To abandon outlying provinces because it is feared that their possession may induce complications with their neighbours is, in effect, to proclaim this statement most distinctly ; and the natural deduction from.it is that England Avill yield any- thing if only pressed hard enough. Does it suit her that such an impression should go abroad ? Can she doubt that (f it does the pressure will be apjilied? Does she not present any point f^v aggression ; and does the history of oiu" time seem to say that the passion for national aggrandisement, or even for warlike renown, is either extinct or likelv to become so? If not, can it be anv- tliino; short of absolute madness to tell the world that she prefers abandoning half a contincrt to facing the chances of meeting a nation in search of one or both of these things ? However conducive peace may be to her }irosperity, it will never do to act meanly in the pursuit of its maintenance? War never was averted by running PRESTIGE IS NOT ' A JUGGLE.' m m , away from it. England may practise non-intervention to the extreme point to which it can be pushed ; she may abandon Coh)nies to p^et clear of bellicose neighbours ; she may forsake her allies and leave them to be swallowed up by their foes ; her statesmen may ' hoi)e that Ave shall never be involved in a war with America or any other nation ; ' but all this unmeasured craving after peace will not save her from having to appeal to the sword some time, and oftentimes, until we have a new dispensation, seeing that war is one of the consequences of the Fall, and will endure as long as any other of them. Therefore, instead of adopting the whimpering notes of cosmopolitans and emanci})ationists, let her rather brace her nerves to their old vigour, if they have ever really relaxed, and stand ready to meet difficulties and dangers witli the same spirit which brought her through the most tre- mendous contests of modern times victorious in arms and unscathed in honour. The spirit which led to the de- claration that ' unless mercy were shown to the people of God, the English guns should be heard in the Castle of St. Angelo,' and which enabled her unflinchingly to con- front the might of Xapoleon the Great Avith all Europe at his feet, Avill sit on her much more o-racefullv than that Avhich moans for ' peace at any price, and cheap at that ; ' and Avill, assuredly, do quite as much toAvards keeping the Avorld quiet as an advertisement to the effect that England ])refers abandoning an empire to risking a Avar. Let her infuse into the Colonies the spirit of those Avhose deeds are recorded in her history, and she need not to fear either for them or for herself. Let her yield to the cravens Avho tell her to forget her historic "-lories, and she invites the Avorld to insult her, and may feel tolerably sure tliat it Avill acce})t the invitation. Fresthje is not a juggle. It is an influence Avhich enables its possessor to effect l)y a Avord Avhat requires force Avithout it; and Avhich often 58 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX, I 4 ii I i! : I j il -: trebles the effective power of a given amount of force, as has been well exemplified on the plains of Hindostan. * It is the imagination which jjoverns the world,' said one on -whom was showered ' the pomp and i)rodigality of Heaven ' more abundantly than on any other man of our era. This imagination is — or at least has been — swaved by England; and, if she will rise to the grand destiny o])ening before her, may continue to be her property. Let her forsake her colonial dnpire from a principle of fear, and she will cease to swpy it for ever, and come to mourn her loss in tears of Ijlood I To those of our readers who may be of o})inIon that "we fail 3d to dis})rove the advantages promised from emancipa- tion we offer these considerations of its disadvantages in the shape of a weakening of England's naval supremacy thi'ough the loss of sailors, shipping, and harbours ; the di[)lomatic difficulties which might ensue from the creation of a number of weak Powers offering a ready })rey to aggressive nations or ambitious potentates ; the lament- able position which England without her Colonies would occui>y if compelled to abandon free trade ; the danger to Avhich her investments might be exposed in young, weak, and democratic communities confronted with the world ; and, more important than all, the ill-fame which would be gained by retreating in the face of a foe. We :idniit that some saving of expenditure would be effected l)y emancipation, but think that we have proved the ])ecuniary loss in commerce likely to be much greater than that of the saving in taxation ; and if to this we add the above naval, military, economic, and moral considera- tions, it seems to us that, even on the present terms of union, England would find an enormous balance aoainst oniancipation. We do not, however, believe that the Empire can be maintained on that basis. The circum- (jtances of Fatherland and Colonies alike render it im- A NEW COLONIAL POLICY INEVITABLE. 59 possible. They must draAv nearer to one another or separate. Our reasons for holding this opinion Ave shall exi)lain further on, and when so doing shall present the question of emancipation in altogether a new light, England — thanks to that glorious modern discovery in jjolitical science, the 'let alone' policy — has allowed matters to ' drift ' into a position which makes it im- possible for her to derive from her Colonies one-tenth of the advantages which she miglit have derived, or may still derive, from them. We have admitted that some advantage would be gained by jmrsuing an emancii)a- tionist policy consistently. But we scruple not to say that all the motives for emancii)ation may be destroyed, all the present advantages of the connection main- tained, and m.any new ones added to them, by the adoption of a new and nobler colonial policy than any yet pursued by our rulers ; that England may gain soldiers for her army, sailors for her navy, money for her revenue, and commerce for her merchants, from the Colonies; and may find in their boundless extent happy homes for those of her people who live at home in misery, and whose existence is probably sapj)ing the foundations of society, and, possibly, prepanng for it an awful down- fall. Moreover, v»e say that these gains in revenue, armaments, and commerce would grow witli the ijjrowth of the Colonies ; and that, in consequence, the British Em])ire would, ere twenty years, be the mightiest State on the face of the earth, without whose permission not a irun should be fired in anger in the world. And all this, Ave add, can be done, not by degrading the Colonies, but bv exaltinn; them. If Ave are rif.dit in tlnnkinLC that these ends can be achieved, Avho then Avill advise emanci- pation ? GO A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. if ir i. ,. I u t 1 ill i II CHAPTER IV. THE SITUATION AND THE REMEDY. When examining the emancipationist theories, we came to the conclusion that it woukl be better for EngLand to retain her Colonies, even under that which we must noAv call the httc colonial policy, than to ' emancipate ' them ; but added, that we did not attempt to shut our eyes to the fact that matters could not long remain in their present condition, and that to conserve the Empire some change had become inevitable. Our reasons for entertaining this opinion, and the changes which we think requisite to place Fatherland and Colonies on fair terms towards each other, as well as to render their connection permanently beneficial to both parties, we shall now endeavour to explain. Foremost amongst our reasons for believing some change in the relations of England and her Colonies to be inevit- able is the fact that the coLM3Ction between the several countries constituting the British Empire is much less intimate than that by Avhich federal democracies are united, and bids fair to be still further weakened. The members of the Gladstone Administration seem fully to share in the views of those who look on the weakening of the colonial tie as a cause for congratulation. They have reduced colonial garrisons to an extent altogether WITHDRAWAL OF COLOXfAL GARRISOXS. 6t unexampled ; left not a British soldier in Ontario or Quebec ; settled that even * the Gibraltar of North America ' shall be left unfrarrisoned, and that the entire English force in the Dominion shall consist of l,oOO men at Halifax. They have, also, i)ursued the same policy elsewhere, aud this so recklessly tliat New Zealand was within a hair's breadth of beino; abandoned to Maori savages. Should this course of action ^e definitely adopted as the basis of England's colonial policy, a dis- ruption of the Emj)ire can scarcely fail to ensue. Thi ? has already been very clearly perceived in some of the Colonies. The lioval Commission, consislinn- of Austra- lian statesmen, appointed in 1870 to consider the ex- pediency of forming these Colonies into a Confederation, says in its report : — ' The British Colonies from which British troops have been withdrawn present the unpre- cedented phenomenon of responsibility without either any corresponding authority or any corresponding pro- tection. They are as liable to all the hazards of war as the United Kingdom, but they can influence the com- mencement or contimiance of war no more than they can control the movements of the solar system, and they have no certain assurance of that aid against an enemy at war with the United Kingdom upon Avhich integral portions oi' the Empire can confidently reckon. This is a relation so wanting In mutuality that it cannot .e safely regarded a^ })ermanent, and it becomes necessary to consider how it may Ijecome so modified as to alford greater security for permanence.' The connnlssloners evidently see the goal toAvards which English })olicy is tending ; but, with desperate loyalty to British nationality and institutions, strive to blind themselves to the fact that separation must follow unless a chan<2:e be made. That such is the case, however, none who calmly survey the situation can doubt. The above simple statement clearly proves that, in the ' 1 pi 02 A COLOXIST OX TIIF. COLONIAL QUESTION. ' 1 ■ I i f' 1 1 ■ I instance cited, none of the bonds of national unity exist. Under such circumstances it is absurd to suppose that the name can long survive, or that the Colonies will continue to wish it to survive ; and this because, as is above in- dicated, it brings them all the responsibilities and none of the benefits of union. The garrisonincr of the Colonics Avas almost the last existing feature in England's colonial jiolicy which gave her any influence in their councils oi* over their [jcople. Should the troops be permanently withdrawn, and the cost of providing armaments thrown exclusively on the colonists, they will quickly insist on raiding and using their own forces as they may prefer. ' Nothing for nothing ! 'will be the i)opular cry at the polls. If England will not keep one military system for the whole Empire on ibot, it is very im})rol)ai3le that the Colonies Avill care to leave tlie ccmtrol of their foreis;!! relations in her hands, or to run the risk of being in- volved in wars undertaken, it may be, solely from con- siderations affecting the interests of the United Kinn-dom. Still less likely is it that tl'.oy Avill allow her interests any consideration in the adjustment of their commercial polic\'. And should thev act in this manner, it is to be feared not only that the emancipationist programme would quicklv {)ecome po}>ular in England, but that the mutual recrimi- nations which Avould ensue might lead to the separation bf^ing effected on rather unfriendly terms. Indeed, to .suppose that the jHilicy which avc arc criticising can have been ado})tcd with any other design than that of serving as an initiatory stop towards emanci[)ation seems absurd. If the Colonics are to be defended, and are exp,ected to aid in })rovi(ling the requisite armaments, it is evident that means should be taken to have the colouial forces oro'anised on a nermanent footino-, and a svstem leadinix to united action between the Colonial and Imperial Go- vernments arranged. To leave the Colonies ungarrisoned is, unquestionably, to facilitate attacks on them ; hence PRESENT POLICY ALTOGETHER UXSATISFACTORY to follow this ' let alone ' policy, whilst intending to brino; the strength of the Empire to their aid, in case of war. is simply to run all the risk of the danger deprecated bv emancipationists, and at the same time to take the fcAvest possible precautions against its occurrence. We will not insult any men Avho have been Her Majesty's ministers by even insinuating that they could ever have supposed that such a policy could be other than tem])orary ; and, therefore, assume that when they initiated it, they in- tended it as a first step in emancipation. They have since declared that they do not desire a disruption of the Iv^ipire ; but to prevent it they must alter their coni^v?^ Whatever else may last, the present colonial policy will not : it must be retraced or a further advance made. It reduces the benefits of union to the mininiuni and raises its evils to the maximnm. Emancipation would bring some benefits to both sides ; but, like all half-measures, the Gladstone policy brings none to either. The United King:dom may still be involved in war on a colonial question ; and as the Colonies are left in a state calcu- lated to encourage the aggressor, and increasinsxly free to quarrel on their own account, the risk is not lessened, if it be not increased; Avhilst they are still liable to be plunged into war for an object of English policy, not only without any voice in the matter, but, also, Avithout the ])rotection of British red-coats. Thus one party loses all the benefits of empire Avithout escaping any of its re- sponsibilities ; and the other loses all the benefits Avhicli may be derived from an alliance Avith a mighty Po^',{'r Avithout gaining those of nationality. This Avill not do. The experience of all nations unites to prove that perfect identity of policy in military and diplomatic services is essential to national unity. The tendency of English l)olicy of late years has been to change unity into division. The result, should this course be persisted in, cannot be a matter of douljt. Nations separated by the ocean can u m i;l ;? i M 1 * m A COLONIST. OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. remain in -willing union only so long as they gain some advantage from their unity. This none can gain under a ])olicy which labours to make every detail of national life a matter for the sole consideration of each country separr'ely, and discourages any attempt to consider their interests in common. Even ' the bond of affection ' be- comes but a slight tie when people are pursuing different ends in different countries ; especially as this exclusive jtursuit of local ends not only tends to weaken existing tics, but also to create new objects of affection, to which those of other days, when they come in contact, will be sacrificed. Disrujjtion cannot fail to ensue from the j)resent colonial ])olicy ; and this for the simple reason that it retains on both sides all ihe evils of union whilst conferring none, or scarcely any of the benefits of eman- cipation or nationality. But irrespective of any question of colonial policy, the circumstances of the Colonies are such as must shortly render some change in their relations with the Fatherland a matter of necessity to both. Theii' inhabited bounds are extending so i-apidly that in a few years some of them will be transformed into mighty nations. For England to furnish, shigle-handed, the men and money necessary for the defence of such territories would pro- bably be an impossibility, even were she inclined to do so. To guard a frontier stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific ; to watch over a fifth i)art of the world in Australasia ; to garrison a large corner of the African continent, and very many of the West Indian islands, besides numerous outlying stations and India, would be a heavy task. To fulfil it would probably tax her martial resources pretty severely, even did she receive tribute from the subject countries ; and to attempt it in the absence of a direct reimbursement of expenses would be a policy of at least doubtful expediency. But even EFFECTS OF COLOXIAL GROWTH. 0)5 were slie willing to remain in her former petition, it is by no means probable that she would be able to do so. As the Colonies advance towards maturity, they will feel the same desire to wield the i)rerogatives of nationality that youth does to exercise those of manhood. This desire will be intensified by the fact that they have already ac(iuired })erfcct local independence ; and that with their growth diploraatic affairs will become of increasing im- portance to their interests. The foreign relations (»f small conmiunities, such as were most of the Colonies in the first half of this century, are unimportant. They have not suflScicnt comnnnii(!ation with foreiiiMiers to render their interests much involved in diplomacy, ex- cept Avhen their independence is directly threatened, in which case they can only yield, or seek shelter under the wings of a protecting PoAver. AVith their growth, all this is altered. They are able to make some defence of their independence, and are inclined to do so — at least, we are })retty sure that such would be the inclination of British hearts. Their interests become extended, and liable to be affected by the action of their neighbours. The conduct of their forelirn relations thus becomes increasingly difficult, and as its importance Increases in their eyes, they are less likely to consent to that aban- donment of all concern in its adjustment which Is the primary condition of the colonial relationship. That the British dependencies will not long remain Coloides may be confidently predicted, from the fact that the C(Hirse of civilisation will shortly render the maintenance of that relationship with the Fatherland impossible, hy swelling the burden beyond her power to bear, and necessitating an amount of submission bevond that which thev will l)e inclined to render. Emancipationists have, it must be admitted, the merit of perceiving this fiict, and of offering a solution of the problem by means of the destruction t)f r I :i| { C6 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. «! f iu its subject. Such a solution is never very satisfactory, and where the subject is the source of benefits, it is de- cidedly the reverse. The connection has already yielded much jfood to both Fatherland and Colonies, but nothing like so much as it may be made to yield, if each will only consent to accej)t the new relation to the other which their altered circumstances require. Their posi- tion calls for an application of the principles enunciated by Lord ^lacaulay, in his remarks on the Irish woollen manuftictures controversy. He tells us distinctly that ' there cannot really be more than one supreme power in a society. If, therefore, a time comes at which the mother-country finds it expedient altof>;ether to abdicate her paramount authority over a colony, one of two courses ought to be taken. There ought to be complete incorporation, if such incor])oration be possible. If not, there ought to be comj)lete separation. Very few pro- positions in ymlitics can be so perfectly demonstrated as this, that parliamentary government cannot be carried on by two really equal and independent parliaments in one empire.' ^ The remedy which we desire to see adopted is complete incor))oration — though not, perhaps, in the sense understood by Lord Macaulay. If the Empire is to remain united, the Colonies must consent to assume the burdens and responsibilities of maturity, and the Father- land to share with them its sovereign rights and privi- leges. There can no longer be anv inenualitv between them. Equal privileges and equal burdens must be the basis of their future connection. England's only diffi- culty with the Colonies lies in the fact that they act as a charge on her revenue and armaments ; the Colonies' <nily difficulty with England is the fact that she monopo- lises all the prerogatives incidental to nationality, and ' History of England, c\\a,T^. xxm. m AX IMPERIAL FEDERATIOX. 1)1 the diffi- thiis loaves thoin in an inforior ])()sition, cxposofl to (lanjiers wliich tliey may have liad no share in croiitiiiir, and unable to brina; imperial resources to the defence of their own peculiar interests. The ap])iication of tiie FEOEitAL SYSTKM to tlic framework of tiie Imj)erial Government would at once eliminate froui the relation- ship all the evils deprecated, and embrace within it ail the benefits sought, on either side. The establislnnent of a FKDEIIATION OF THE EMPIRE on the basis o\' rijiiiilifif of taxntion for Federal expcntUture would immediately, or within a very short time, bring to tlie Knglish coflers contributions sufficient to ])ay every charge to whicii the Colonics now subject them ; and would, consequently, enable the Imperial Government to organise a connected military system for the whole Empire, which would un- questionably leave every member of it a source of strength to the rest — both ofAvhich advantages, it must be remem- bered, would increase at a rate of compound interest. It would place the Colonies in possession of all the prerogatives of nationality, and thus enable tiiem to bring tlie whole strength of the Empire to the dei'ence of their interests against foreign Powers. It would open to colonial talent a career of unexami)led splendour ; and, bvliftino; the Colonies to an equalitv with Enn;land, leave the mass of the colonial ])0])ulation nothing whatever to gain by a severance of the connecticm witii the ^Nlother- eountry. Tiiese benefits comprise all that the imperialist seeks to gain from the maintenance of the Empire, or the the emancipationist from its disruption. Hence Federa- tion would confer on both Fatherland and Colonies all the advantages of separation and connection simulta- neouslv. Here it is necessary to explain what it is we have in view when we advocate the establishment of a Federation of the Empire. The basis of any Federation is a perma- f2 (.. ii i i:; I 1 ! i OS A COLOXrST ON' TITR COLOXIAL QUESTION'. K'i n<?nt (tfTeiiKive and defensive Jilliuncc between several countries, in wlncli all their military resources arc thrown into a common stock for the ])uri)()se of preservinj^ j)eace at home and of increasing their martial power abroad. This union necessitates the creation of some rulinu,' power, usually styled the Federal Government, which shall enforce its terms over all the members of the Federation. As the several countries are to be one l)efore foreigners, the Federal Government must have control of diplomacy. As their alliance is offensive and defensive, it must possess the power of raising, equipping, kee})ing on foot, and controlling military and naval forces. As these require to be paid, it must possess a revenue, to raise which it must enjoy, directly or in- directly, the right of taxation. As taxation can scarcely tail to interfere with commerce, and as a Federation is one nation externally, the Federal Government nuist be allowed to regulate trade. And so closely connected with trade are the monetary system and the post-office, that it has generally been found requisite to })lacc these also under the control of the Federal Government. The exact limit of its prerogative is, however, a matter of detail. Any authority enjoying the power of making- peace and war, with its accessories, for several countries which possess Governments empowered to regulate their internal affairs, is, in effect, a Federal Government. If these principles arc correct, it follows that the ruling powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries comprising the British Empire a Federation. Questions of peace and war are decided by the Imperial Govern- ment. The conduct of diplomacy is in its hands, the only exception ever made being, we believe, the per- mission accorded to Canada to decide for itself on the reciprocity treaty. The army and navy are raised. I I now TO VOllM TIIH FHDKRATIOX. 09 ruled, ami paid solely l»y the same power. The dis- cliarge of these functions comprises most of the duties of a Federal CJovernment; and in them the Colonies have IK) share. lUit they have, on the other hand, local (lovernments which conduct ♦he administration of their internal affairs, just as in a Federation is done hy the State Govcriunents. Here we have almost the whole framework of a Federal Government already in existence. All that is needed to convert the Empire into a Fede- ration is to place its several members on terms of equality. To effect this, there are necessary only the following measures :- — I. That the Colonies should be left in possession of the system of local self-government at ])resent enjoyed by them. And that means should be taken to secure the same privilege to the United Kingdom. II. That the revenue required to meet the expenditure of the Federal Government should be raised on a uniform rate of taxation, though not necessarily on a uniform system, over the whole of the Empire, and that the inhal)itants of every part of it should be eciually liable to militarv and naval service. in. That a Federal Legislature, consisting of tAvo chambers, should be formed, the Lower House to consist of representatives returned on one uniform system by the British Islands and' the Colonies, and that provision should be made for colonial representation in the Upi)er House also. IV. That the Federal Legislature should succeed to all the prerogatives now enjoyed by the Imperial Par- liament, excei)ting only those granted to the body, or bodies, ai)pointed to legislate for the local government of the British Islands ; and should also enjoy the right of taxation all over the Federation. It will be granted, we presume, that were these if Srt 'I f'M TTT mm i A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. ■f U'; t M I « h measures accomplished, a Federal union between Eii£jla?Kl and her Colonies, on terms of equality, would he esta- l)li.shed. Whether they arc capable of accom})lishment has next to be considered. At this point emancipationists meet us with the most uncompromising resistance. Some refuse even to discuss a scheme which they regard as an ahburdity. Against it Mr. John Stuart Mill and Mr. Goldwin Smith have argued with a force ])eculiarly their own. AVe reproduce their arguments here in order that we may give our opponents a fair hearing, and lay both sides of the case before our readers. I\Ir. Smitli's language is as follows : — ' Tiie scheme of giving the Cohmies rej)resentatives in our Parliament may l)e said to have been generally abandoned. Independently of the obstacles arising from distance, from the difi'orence of the franchise in the several c(.mntries, and from the hopeless difficulty of settling the pro})ortion between the numl)ers of the En(>;lish and the colonial members, there is a decisive objection arising from the fact that the Colonies have now Parliaments of their own. Such a piece of political snachinevy as a set of Parliaments, one of vv'hich would be at once national and federal, while all the rest were national onlv, would scarcelv fin:', an advocate even among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs. ' The other scheme is a vast federation. It is almost enough to say that if there is a federation there iiiust be a federa' Government, and that this federal Government must be made, in the matters belonging to its jurisdiction, supreme over all the national Govermnents, including the British Crown. We need not discuss in detail the ])ossibility or expediency of sununoning from the ends of the earth peoj)le who could not be convoked in less than six months to decide whether Eng-land slK»uld jjo to war upou iMue question solely affecting herself, and not ad- MR. SMITH OX FEDERATIOX. 71 the mittinjx, perhnps, of an hour's delay. The German Con- federation has been cited as an example of the iederal union proposed. In the German Confederation, the Diet, in tlie matters Ijelonging to it, is supreme over all national Governments, and the Germans on the Danube are not three months' sail from the Germans on tlie lihine. Do not these schemes of " Universal Em[)ire," and a Universal State of which -vve and our anLijiodes are to be citizens, spring from an exaggerated estimate of the moral grandeur to be derived from enormous political combinations. A political unity is not a moral unity, nor will moral grandeur be gained by stretching it until it bursts. If people want a grand moral unity, they must seek it in the moral and intellectual syiheres. Keligion knows no imjje'^iment of distance. The do- minions of science are divided by no sea. To restore, ^r to pave the way to restore, the unity of long-divided Christendom may seem the most chimerical of all aspira- tions ; yet, perhaps, it may be less chimei'ical than tlui proj'.:ct of founding a world-wide State.'' The reckless- ness of Mr. Smith's stvle is well disnlave"! throuiriiout the above quotation; but never, probably, Avas it better manifested than in his assertion that such a federal Government as proposed ' must be made, in matters l)e- longing to its jurisdiction, supreme over all the national Governments, indndbuj tJir Brilisli Cniwn.' As the British Crown is sr,])reme head of the iMnpircit is difficult to see how its rights would lapse on the formation of a I'oderal Legislatnre rejn-esenting different parts of its dominions, or how its relationship to all wouh'. he. affected by a change in the relationshij) of the several parts to each other. Wq notice this ])oint here, l)ecause we shall not liave an ojtportu.iity of doing so elsewhere. Mr. Mill is rather more temperate in tone tliaii — but ' The Empire, pp. 86. 86, m yJl i' i.»;^,j,i.!. iAi..aw i»iw A COLOXTST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. V i '■: Ills views are su1)stantitilly i>lcntical vith those of — Mr. Smith, lie criticises the scheme of a federal union of the Enijiire as foHows : — ' With this view it has been proposed by some that tlie Colonies should return representatives to the British Parliament ; and by others that the powers of our own as well as of their Parliaments should be confined to internal j)olicy, and that there should be another repre- s.iutative body for foreign and Imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner and with the same com- pleteness as Great Britain itself. • On this system there would be a perfectly equal federation between the Mother-country and her Colonies, then no longer de})endencies. The leelings of equity, iind conee])tion of public morality, from Avhich these sug- gestions emanate, are worthy of all praise ; but the sug- U'estions themselves are so inconsistent with rational ])rinciples of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker. Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one (Toverimient, or even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are not i)art of the same public ; they dc iiot discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what jiasses in the n\inds of one another. They neither know L-acli other's objects nor have confidence in each other's }»rinei}»les of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how lie should like his destinies to de})end on an assembly of which one-third was British- American, and another third Soutii- African and Australian. Yet to this it must come if there wei-. anything like fair or equal re[)reseuta- u< MR. MILL >\ FEDERATIOX. i o ional have able not one If not, Unscl they but 'hat tion ; and would not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an Ini})eriul character, eould not know or feel any sulhelent concern for the interests, oi)inions, or wishes of Englisli, Irish, and S<\H\h'' Even for strictly federative purposes, tlie con- d'iti'ons do not exist which we have seen to be essential to a federation. England is sufficient for her own i)rt)teetion withont the Colonies ; and would be in a much stronger as well as more dignified position if se})arated from them than when reduced to be a single meml)orofan American, All -tn, and Australian confederation. Over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after sepa- ration, England derives little advantage, except in prestuje, from her dependencies ; and the little she does derive is :nite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force, which, in case of war or any real a})prehension of it, requires to be double or trv°ble what wouhl be needed for the defence of thir, country alone.' ' Tiie arguments of these gentlemen are, in fact, based on the theories that any attempt to form a Federation of the Em})ire would be useless, as the Federal Government could not discharge its functions if created ; that it AV(juld l>e ho[)eless, as the difficulties in detail are insuj)eral)le ; and that it would be inexpedient, as the practical influence of the Empire would be pernicious. In other woi'ds they tell us that the scheme is at once absurd, impracticable, and impolitic. We are content to join issue with them on each of these propositions. In so doing we shall not confine ourselves merely to the arguments used in the above quotations, but shall carefully consider every difficulty that seems to us to be in the way. Wo, a»k of our readers a })atient and iuipariial hearing. -S ^\ ' li- preventative Govern/i'- nt, p. 132. r ■jajL.. iBMKLUlxi i ■ 74 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. CHAPTER V. niYSICAL DIFFICULTIES. \'n ■! ( The first arnfument usually uro;ecl against any scheme lor the establishment of an Imperial Federation is, that the want of geo<Trai)hical unity in the Empire, and the distances by which the several countries which it is pro- pc^sed t( unite are divided from one another, increase the difficulty of communication to such an extent that it would be impossible for any central authority to discharge the duties of even a Federal Govermnent for all of them. The argument is one which must be met. Unless it can be jn'oved that the legislative and executive duties usually assigned to a Federal Government may be fulfilled for the whole of the Empire by authorities located in London, there is clearly no use whatever in considering either the means 1)y which the necessary framework of government might be created or any detail of the scheme effected. JJef'ore adopting any piece of machinery it is necessary to be sure that it will prove competent to accomplish the Avork for which it is designed. The argument against Federation on the ground of ])hysical difficulties is asserted by emanr i[)ationists in the most uncom])romising terms. Mr. jNIill tells us that ' countries se])arated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one Government, or even members of one Fcdei-ation.' Our reply is that experience contradicts this statement. In the cases of » THE I^MPIRE ALREADY A FEDERATIOX. < O the Roman, Kussian, and Spanish Empires, countries thus divided have remained under one Government lor centuries; and, in the latter case, bad as was tlie old Government, the substitutes do not seem to be any im- provement on it. Still more decisively is this theory confuted by the fact that the very countries now in ques- tion have been, and are, under one Government ; and by the fact which we have already noticed, and wliich is admitted by Mr. Mill himself, that ' the ruling powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries com})risiiig the British Empire a Federation.'' The Imperial Govern- ment has the exclusive control of diplomacy, and of ques- tions of peace and war, in its hands. It garrisons every part of the Empire, and, until lately, su})})lied all the aimaments needed for its defence. It appoints the head of the local Government in every Colony, and through him can, Avhen it pleases, exercise a very considerable intluence on even local legislation. Experience i)roves, beyond the power of dispute, that the Imperial Government can exercise these prerogatives ethciently, successfully, and to the satisfaction of the Colonists, all over the Empire. But these include all the admlnistratwe duties of a Federal Government, with the single exception of that of raising a revenue. To obtain the grant of this revenue, however, it would l)e requisite that the Executive Government should be able to assemble, whenever needed, the Legislature empowered to grant it, which would consist of representatives from both the British Islands and the Colonies ; and that, the grant once made, the Government should be able to levy it. Could the Federal Government assemble the Federal Legislature, and levy the federal revenues as needed, there 1, H ' Rvpresentativi: Government (people's edition), p. 132. 'i\ 7G A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION . M r 1 11 can be no doub^ of Its ability to discliarffe all Its other duties, for they either liave been discharged by the Im- perial Government in times past or are being discharged by it to-day. Let this truth be carefully borne In mind, and many of the mountainous difficulties of imagination Avill quickly subside into molehills of fact. It Is maintained, however, that to assemble such a Legislature Avould be an impossibility, in consequence of the vast distances by -svliich the several parts of the Empire are separated from one another. Mr. Smith says: — ' AVe need not discuss in detail the possibility or expediency of summoning from the ends of the earth ])eo[)le who could not be convoked In less than six months to decide whether Enijland should go to war unon some (piestlon solely affecting herself, and not admitting, per- haj)s, of an hour's delay.' AVere the facts correctly re- })rcsented by Mr. Smith, we should agree with him. But here he finds It convenient to fbro-et, or Ignore, circum- stances which clash with his theories. He seems to think that the world is to-day In the same state as it was in former o-encratlons. Does not this — horror of horrors ! — seem tu indicate that he Is Imbued with something of the si)lrlt of an Impracticable Tory ? The difficulty of assembling the Leo-ishitiu'c is always much exaggerated. Fifty years ago, there might have been soniu force in the jilca that its accom])lishment was iinjiosslble ; but such a position cannot be maintained to-day. Distance, for pur- j)oses of communication, has been annihilated by the electric telegraph, and, for loc(miotion, reduced about threc-fourtlis by steam. At the beginning of the present century it required almost a week to send a summons for the convocation of Parliament from the ^eat of govern- ment to the remoter parts of the United Kingdom, and another Aveek for the representatives o^' these ])arts to rea London. Now, the sunnnons could be sent to the i coxvocATiox OF TUP: legislatur::. i i furthest limits of the Empire Instantaneously ; conse- quently, the only delay -would be that of travelling from the Colonies to the legislative halls. AVJiat leniith of time would this journey consume? At present the run between Ireland and Quebec is made week alter week in nine or ten days, and mails and passeng'ers from London are delivered in Toronto witliin eleven, and vice versa ; and, on the completion of the Intercolonial llailroad, it will be possil)le to save another day by fixing the Canadian port of departure at IltUifax. Thus it seems that Canada is practically as near London to-day as was Caithness or Donegal at the beiiinninj^ of the centurv. In the case of Australia, mails are now delivered in liondon within seven weeks. There is no doubt that New Zealand can be reached by Panama in the same time, and it seems ])robable that, by using first-class vessels, some few davs more mav be saved. As theso latter points are the most distant from England of all parts of the Em})ire, the time consumed in travelling from them to the seat of government would determine the ]>eriod Avithin which the Federal Legislature could be con- voked ; and, judging tVom the facts before us, we should say that the time necessary f )r its convocation would be nearer six weeks than the six months alloti'cd bv Mr. Smith to be the shortest time in which that process could be effected. Is this too long to admit of the countries so divided being united in one federation? Should anybody reply in the affirmative we would remind him that, prior to the completion of the Pacific Ilailway, Oregon was practically almost as far from AVashington as Australia or NcAv Zealand is from London to-da\ ; and that even the conii)letivjn of that great work has not reduced the time necessary for passing between the two points to nuich less than that in which a voyage from Canada to England can now be accomplished. It takes seven days I *'.] H mmmm 78 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. { io travel by rail from New York or WashiMfjtoii to San Francisco, and tlu'ce and a half more to reach Portland, Orefi;on, by steamer. The Pacific Railway has been opened for only a few months. Prior to its o])eiiinor California had been for nearly twenty years a member of the Union, althongh durinn; these twenty years the most expeditions ronte to that State was by steamer to Aspin- ^vall, thence across the Istlnnus to Panama, and thence aiijain by steamer to San Francisco. The accomplish- ment of tliis journey required twenty-four days, and tiiree more were needed to reach Oreijon. Here Ave see that countries two-thirds as far, in ]»oint of time, from ^Vashiniiton as Australia need be from London, hav^e il)een for nearly a ({uarter of a century loj'al members of a democratic Federation ; and that even to-day they are no nearer to tlie seat of government than Canada is to Downino; Street. Is not this fact a sufficient ansAvcr to those who assert that the distances which divide the liritish Empire render the maintenance of its integrity or the asseml)lage of a Pan-Kritannic Parliament an impos- sibility ? Twenty-eight days' travel has been proved to be consistent with the integrity of the democratic American Union, and the assemblage of its Congress. Why, then, should forty or even forty-five days' travel be inconsistent Avith like results in the case of a Federation in Avhich the conservative tics, both moral and constitutional, aa-ouUI be nuich strono'cr than they are or can be in the States? JOxperience has proved, in the case of the British Islands, tliat distance, measured in hours of travel, as o-reat as that which now divides England and Canada, does not constitute any obstacle to the efficient Avorking of a Icf/is- httioe union. Why, then, should it be declared to form an insui)erable olistacle in the Avav of Avorkino; the lio'hter machinery of a federal union? And Avhen, in the United States, countries practically as distant from the seat of VOTE BY PROXY. 7Q « government as some of the remoter Colonies are from England have been actually united in a federal union, why may not other countries similarly divided also he united within similar bonds? That some countries sepa- rated by such distances can exist in the saine Federation is beino; proved every day. Why, then, may not others? The distance to be travelled would not lundcr the ])unc- tual meetinor of the Leu'islature if the members should have fair notice of the time of meetinn;. This thev could have, on ordinary occasions, were the plan pursued at Washington — that of meeting at the same date every year — adoi)ted. AVere this done they would know the time at Avhich they would be wanted, and could be j)unc- tually at their posts. Multiplication of lines of ocean telegraphs and fast steamers, with the adoj)tion of short routes, are all that is needed to bring the remotest ])arts of the Em])ire as near each other as were Washington and San Francisco during the last twenty years. It may, perhaps, be granted that this reasoning is correct in reference to ' ordinary occasions,' but alleged that it will not hold good when a])plied to extraordinary circumstances. It is urged, as we have seen, that nations are liable to certain political crises, such as those created by diplomatic difficulties, in which even such a diminished delay as would be necessary under present circumstances could not be borne. We will admit this view of the case to be correct, but we think that the fvbjection is not fatal, and that the difficulty can be overcome. Let colonial members be allowed to vote by proxy, and let them be ])ermitted at the end of each session to elect certain members who should remain in England during the recess holding their proxies, and Parliament could 1)0 assembled as quickly as it is to-day, and the Colonies as truly rei)resented in it as if every one of their rei)resentatives were present. Xay, it is probable that they would be •11 : t L-ijtTir i!am mnmi 80 A COLONIST OX TIIR COLOXIAL QUESTFO.V, : I i I I'' i 1 ' still more cfTiclcntly rcprosentcd, ns the ])r()xies would certjiinly l)e entrusted to the Iciidinn; men of every ))iirty. Avlio would thus have irreater influenec than if they had to lead tlu ir more stupid followers into the ])ath which would be clear to their brighter intellects. There eould not be any difKeultv about finding; a sufHcienev of colonial representatives willinij; to nndertakc this duty, especially if it were accompanied, as it ought to be, by a small extra indemnity. In the f\ict that by availing; ourselves of the resources of modern science we can bring the most distant Colonies almost as near Tiondon as Avere the Pacific States to Washington prior to the construction of the Pacific Railway, is to be found- pretty ])ositive j)roof that the time required to reach the scat of government from the Colonies would not be greater than is consistent with the punctual meeting of a Legislature on ordinary occa- sions ; and in our pro])OPal for colonial ])r()xy-voting is, we think, to be found the means of rendering ])ossible, on extraordinary occasions, as quick an assemblage of a Legislature, in which all parts of the Empire would be represented, as of the Imperial Parliament to-day. But supposing that Ave are right in thus assuming that the Federal Legislature, or its ecjuivalent, could be as- sembled whenever needed, it has to be jiroved that its legislation could be promptly executed. We have before seen that all the functions of a Federal Government, save that of raising a revenue, are already dischai'iied by the Imperial Executive. That the proposed Federal Govern- ment could fulfil this duty also, we will now jn-oceed to show. The difficulties in the Avay were pretty well stated by the Times, Avhen, in an article published some time in January 1870, it argued as follows : — ' There can be no real political unity Avithout financial unity, and there can be no financial unity Avithout geo- graphical unity. Australia and the Cape, the East Indies )!: A FEDERAL BUDGET. 81 and tlic Canadian Dominion, are too "widely sundered from each other and from us, too various in tlicir jiroducts and resources, to be embraced in one budget, and to be charged in common witli a single system of military and naval armaments. Tiie man nnist be a visionary indeed who hopes one day to hear Mr. Lowe deal with the esti- mates and the revenues of the United Kingdom and its forty colonics in a Pan-Britannic Parliament, ^'ct be- tween this and the local inde])endcnce which now pre- vails we see no middle way.' In case of the establishment of a Federation of the Empire, such as we propose, there would certainly -Ifc no middle way. If ' taxation without representation ' would be tyranny to the Colonies, representation without taxation would be tyranny to the British Islands. In case of rederati(m being adopted, justice requires that all the countries represented in the Federal Legislature should contribute in equal proportion to the federal expenditure. This Avould necessitate a federal budget ; and the Times says that the man who expects to see such a ])hcnomenon is a visionary indeed. We are sufficiently visionary to believe that it may be seen, if our statesmen and people Avill but rouse themselves to the most glorious enterprise ever presented to the ambition of nations or rulers. The first point in proving the possibility of framing a budget for the Empire united in one Federation is to discover the amount vdiich it would be requisite to raise. Here we shall find aid in a survey of the expenditure of the United Kingdom. The following statement fi-om the Year Booh for 1869, p. 246, exhibits the official account of the ex})enditure in the financial year ending on March 31, 1868, in which year its amount was considerably above the annual ave- V rage of the decade : — G t# iH^ ^^^y^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 !i:*- .5. 112 I.I M 11 2.5 Ik IIIII22 1^ iio 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 < 6" - ^ V] <^ /2 '^: 7 m J^f \> y ^ Photographic Sciences Corporation S: iP .•V 4 ^\ V % ^ % ^^ 4> •\^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14S80 (716) 873-4503 <f, ^^ 6^ ' ■M 82 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. £ .t. d. Chauoes on Debt • • • 20,571,750 1 9 Chaiioes on Consolidated Fund : & 1. d. Civil list 405.721 5 Annuitios and pensions 286,839 1 10 Salaries and allowances 143,419 8 Diplomatic salaries and pen- sions 174,053 1 4 Courts of justice 072,559 13 8 Miscellaneous . 211,305 13 7 — 1,893,898 3 ff Supply Services: Army .... 15,418,581 17 1 Navy .... 11,168,949 9 Al)yssinian expedition . 2,000,000 » Miscellaneous civil services 8,491,341 11 7 Salaries and superannuations of customs and inland revenue 2,481,152 2 Ditto of post office 2.402,051 9 2 Packet service . 808,517 13 8 42,770,593 12 5 Tofail ordinary expenditure 71,236,241 Tr ~7 Expenses of fortifications provided for by money raised per Act 28 «^ 29 Vic. c. 61 . • « 530,000 Total . 71,766,241 T7~ ~7 The Government of the United Kingdom is national, which form of administration embraces the duties — and, consequently, the expenditure — which, in a Federation, appertain to both the Local and Federal authorities. To ascertain the probable expenditure of the Federation, it is therefore necessary to distinguish the charges which, under the proposed regime, each of these Governments would have to meet. This can be done by classifying them accordingly as they are expended in meeting the expenses of duties which it would rest with Federal or Local authorities to discharge. There are three of these items which would, unques- tionably, fall on the Local Government. As the several colonial debts would remain charges on the countries F( Bi ' AMOUNT OF FEDERAL EXl'EXDlTUUi:. 83 ,1. wliicli had contracted them, so the English national debt should remain a charge on the British Islands exclusively, and he met by their Local Government. As the duties of the local, or state authorities in every Federation are confined almost exclusively to the conduct of the civil government of the countries under their sway, the items for the courts of justice and miscellaneous civil services would also devolve on it. These items collectively amount to 35,735,651/. 7.v. Od. sterling. It is probable tiiat other items might be found properly chargeable to the Local Government ; but as we do not wish to under- state the possible exi)enditure of the Federal Government, we are content to take only those concerning which there can be no doubt. Then deducting the above sum of 35,735,651/. 7s. Od. from 71,766,241/. 17.s-, Id., we have 36,030,590/. 10s. 7d. as the amount of the Lnperial ex- penditure for the year 1867-8, which would, under Federation, have fallen to the lot of the Federal Govern- ment to discharge. But as there are 2,000,000/. of * extraordinary expenditure ' included in the above sum, and what we seek to discover is the probable amount of the ordinary expenditure, this amount may also be de- ducted, making it aj)pear that about 34,000,000/. would have sutiiced to meet the ordinary expenditure of a Federal Government of the British Empire in 1867-8. It may be thought that the union of the Colonies with the British Islands under one and the same authority could not fail to cause an increase in the above expenditure. If it did so the increase would be very insignificant. The quantity of armaments necessary for the defence of the Emi)ire against foreign foes could not be affected by a change in the political relations of its several [)arts towards each other. Under the above ex{)t'nditure all portions of the Empire were garrisoned by land and guarded by sea ; for which reason we have taken the iOTBVI 84 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. U. I year 1867-8 instead of either of the subsequent years, in which these garrisons were withdrawn and the expen- diture reduced, as our standard. In some cases the Colonies themselves spend money on armaments, which, under Federation, would fall as a burden on the Federal Government. It must be observed, however, that this transfer would reduce the colonial local expenditure by the same amount that it would increase that of the Federal Government. There would, indeed, be a new item of expenditure in the cost of collecting the Federal revenue in the Colonies ; but as the above items for collection of customs and excise duties cover the cost of gathering-in a revenue much larger than that which the Federal Government would ordmarily require to raise, we think that the suras above allowed for collection of the revenue could T>ot fail to prove sufficient. There would, probably, be some increase in the charges for packet service ; and, also, in those of legislation. But to meet all these we presume it will be admitted that the sum of 2,000,000/. would be adequate. We are content, in order that we may be on the safe side, to increase the above estimate by this sum, and think it must be admitted that we are safe in assuming that the ordinary expenditure of the Federal Government would not exceed 36,000,000/. annually, which sum is a little over one-half of that expended by the Federal Government of the United States. Next there looms up the question of ' Ways and Means.' It is alleged that to form a system of finance for the whole Empire is utterly impossible. The ground of this assertion is, we suppose, to be found in the fact of its being composed of so many countries, and embracing such dissimilar industries. It comprises lands in a frigid zone and in the tropics ; countries peopled thickly and scantily ; communities devoted to agricultural, and to WAYS AND MEANS. 85 manufacturing, pursuits, and moved by the contending interests of producers and consumers. To form a system of taxation which would deal justly with all these interests is indeed likely to prove rather a difficult task, but we do not think that the difficulty would be insuperable. In forming an equitable system of taxation for the Federation, the first step requisite would be to fix a definite proportion of the Federal expenditure for which each of its members would be liable. This is not neces- sary in confederations in which the revenue can be raised on one uniform system throughout ; but as it would clearly be impossible to establish such a scheme of tax- ation for the British Empire, an actual proportion to be paid by each member would need to be definitely fixed, in order to guard against inequality of taxation ensuing from dissimilarity in finance. In fixing it, the prior establishment of some uniform basis of taxation would be indispensable. We assume that none will refuse to admit property to be the most equitable basis of taxation. Hence it follows that the proportion to be paid by each country should be identical with that borne by the pro- perty held by its inhabitants, or within its bounds, to that held in the whole of the Federation. We think, how- ever, that it would be v/ell, for some time at least, to leave personal property out of sight in adjusting the pro- portions, and to assess each country for the same pro- portion of Federal expenditure as that borne by the real property held in it, to that held in the whole of the Fede- ration, as thus only would colonial contributions suffice to cover colonial expenses. As these proportions would be in a state of perpetual variation, it would be essential to have the wealth of the Empire carefully ascertained at each census, and the proportion of each country period- ically adjusted according to the return. Were this mm immmmmmmm 86 A COLOXIST OX TIIK COLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. done, an nbiiiKlant security would 1)g jn'ovidcd ajjainst any nicmhcr of the Federation being subjected to any more than its fair share of taxation. In this manner we would propose to fix that proportion of the expenditure of the Federation Avhich should be borne by each of its members. Before considering the manner in which the colonial contributions miiiht be levied, it may be well to cast a glance at their probable amount. To work out the problem in detail it would be re(iuisite to have statistics showing the wealth of the United Kingdom, and of every Colony which it would be proposed to comprehend in the Federation, and thence to assess each member's share of the expenditure. This we cannot do, as we do not possess the statistics ; but we think that we have sufficient information to arrive at some api)roach to a solution. The i)rovince of Ontario, late Upper Canada, is cer- tainly by far the most wealthy portion of British America, and ])robably as Avealthy as any other of the Colonies, though it is ])ossible that some parts of Australia may be slightly ahead of it. According to the assessment rolls of 18G9, the gross value of real property in Ontario in that year was 240,358,000 dollars, or in round numbers about 50,000,000/. sterling. It is true that this assessment is always far below the actual value of the property assessed. After careful inquiry we have come to the conclusion that an addition of about 75 per cent, is needed to show its true value ; but in order to be on the safe side we Avill add 100 j)er cent., and assume the gross value of the real l>roperty of Ontario to be 100,000,000/. sterling. We have next to see what proportion this sum bears to the gross value of the real property of the United Kingdom. The annual value of the real property of the British Islands has been shown in a parliamentary return issued ill the session of 1864, and quoted in the Statesman's U . ^■Vi PROPOUTIOX OF COLONIAL TAXATION'. Vcnr Book for 18G9, to have been as follows in the yeai« inilicated : — Enfrlaiul Soot land Ircliiml Total 1857 € l()3,4'J«,2r)3 12.r»8'2.74!) ll,!*ir>,286 127,991,288 IMS 120,0(i!),9r)3 1.0,1 28. j.'JS 13,4(li),.'»16 148,599,017 We have here an increase of over 10 per cent, in five years. AVe presume, tlicrefore, that it will not ])e <leemetl unfai if we assume that a like increase lias heon effected in the ensuing six years. This would give an increase of 23,775,847/. lOv. 4d., which added to the above sum would make the annual v.alue of the real })ro- perty in the United Kingdom in the year ISO 9 about 172,374,894/.> Its gross value at .33^ years' purchase would amount to 5,745,829,800/., or a little over fifty- seven times the wealth of Ontario, which would conse- quently have to furnish to the Federal revenue a con- tribution amounting to one fiff) -seventh ])art (if that furnished by the United Kingdom. How much money this would be we cannot say, in the absence of statistics showing the relative valuation of the United Kin<>;tlom and all the Colonies. But, taking it on a less favourable basis, and assuming that Ontario would have to furnish one fifty-seventh part of the whole of the Federal ex- l)enditure, estimated at 36,000,000/. per animm, we find that the amount of its annual assessment would be 631,403/. 10.S-. 2d. sterling. Its population at the census of 1871 was returned at 1,620,000, so that this sum would amount to about 7s. 9(1. per head. As Ontario is ' That this estimate is not excessive lias been proved by the returns hiid before the House of Commons by Mr. (josolien, whieli. aconrdinfj; to a cart^- ful digest in the Economist of April 8, 1871. show the value of rc^l pro- perty in England and Wales to have been 143,872,001)/. in 1868. 88 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. I probably as rich in real property as any other of the Colonies — it is certainly much richer than any other British American Colony — we think that we shall not err in favour of them if we assume that its rate of 7s. 9d. per head would form the average rate of Colonial con- tribution to the Federal revenue at present. The * Ways and Means ' by which this sum could be raised have next to be indicated. Happily the task is not very difficult to accomplish. Whilst treating of the nature of the Federal form of government we said : * As taxation can scarcely fail to interfere with comme /ce, and as a Federation is one nation externally, the Federal Government must be allowed to regulate trade ; or, in other words, it must have control of the customs duties.' It is clear that in the event of union, the colonial con- tribution to the federal expenditure could readily be raised from these duties. Let it be allowed to form a first charge on them, and the problem of * Ways and Means' is at once solved. The customs amount to a much smaller proportion of the revenue of Canada than of any other of the Colonies ; but even there they would furnish nearly double as much money as would be re- quired. The customs revenue of the Dominion in the last three years amounted to 8,578,380 dollars in 1868, to 8,272,879 dollars in 1869, and to 9,334,212 dollars in 1870, being equal on an average to about 8,728,490 dollars. Its total population, according to the census of 1871, is 3,484,924, on which number the customs would amount to 2*50 dollars, or about lO*. 5d. per head. Hence it appears that, in the least favourable instance which can be chosen, the customs alone would yield almost fifty per cent, over the amount needed at 7s. 9d. per head. But as it is unquestionably true that Ontario is much more wealthy than any one of the other British American pro- vinces, it is nearly certain that the rate of assessment COLONIAL CUSTOMS REVENUE. 89 fur all of them would be at least one shilling below this figure, in which case about one-half of the customs re- venue would suffice to meet the demands of the Federal Exchequer. As to the other Colonies, we appeal to the following statement compiled from Statistical Tables re- lating to the Colonial and other possessions of the United Kingdom (Part XI.), showing the customs revenue of the Colonies for the year 1865, and their population at the latest dates received prior to the above return : — CuBtoms Rcvcnno Fupulation Canada £ 1,169,574 2,^81,862 New Brunswick 114,626 252,047 Nova Scotia . 209,678 330,857 Princo ildward « 17,000 84.386 Newfoundland 91,045 122,638 British Columbia 73,110 13,671 Vancouver 6,871 6.000 "West Indies , 661,094 1,231,967 New South Wales 636,102 411,388 Victoria 1,192,257 626,639 South Australia 240,184 166,605 "West „ 38,771 20,260 Tasmania 119,461 96,201 New Zealand . 730,037 201,712 Queensland 195,541 87,775 Mauritius 163,912 322,517 Natal . 42,166 168,580 Cape . 275,559 267,096 St. Helena 14,626 6,860 Total . 5,980,514 7,288,061 Estimated : import and excise duties arc stated at ^Afi'iV. have included Honduras and Bermuda. Under West ludies we Here we see that the population of the above Colonies six years ago was 7,288,061 and their customs revenue 5,980,514/. or about 16.s. 4rf. per head. It may very fairly be assumed that in 1870 the population had ad- vanced to 8,000,000, and the customs to 7,000,000/., which T T !)() A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUKSTION. I ! would loavo a rovciiiic of IT.v. Cxi. ])er head, or more ilmn <loublc tlie amount lor which thoy would be assessed for Federal revenue, assuniinj^ that tlie rate for Ontario wouKl fo?*ni a fair average for the whole of the Colonies. To quiet colonial fears in referen<'e to such an increase of tiixation as this sum represents, we would remark that we shall, hereafter, show that hy savings in the local ex- ])enditure, consequent on Federation, the actual increase could be reduced, in all cases, very considerably, and in some nearly one-half It may be remarked, however, that, even granting all our views on this subject to be correct, there remains a practical obstacle in the way of their realisation in the fact that to ])lace the customs duties under the control of the Federal Legislature would be to leave the regulation of the entire commercial policy of every member of the Federation at its disposal ; and that, although the Colonics might be willing to i)ay the amounts for which they Avould severally be assessed, it is very unlikely that they would be content to have their trade regulated by an assembly in which the representation of the British Islands would so Largely outnumber their own. We think that this view of the case would be likely to prove correct ; but we are also of o])inion that a reconciliation of the contending claims could be effected. It is self-evident that to establish a uniform tariff for the whole Federation Avould be an im])ossibility, as the stai)le exports of one portion of it are the staple imports of another. The fact of each wanting the goods which otluu'd can supply, is one of the leading arguments in favour of maintaining the integrity of the Empire, since by- it each is secured a su})ply of those goods which it requires to buy and a safe market for those which it has to sell. In order that these advantages may continue to exist, it is essential that no other than * revenue tariffs ' should X. ' A MAXIMUM RATE OF CUSTOMS. 1)1 1)0 levied in any part oftlie Federation. Hut if provisiiui were made to liinder the infrinn;(Mnent of tlii.s rule, it w(»uld not he essential — ^since the tariffs eould not be uniform — that the enartment of them should be in the hands of the Federal Lejjfislature exclusively; and were the Local Legislatures allowed to enact their own tariffs, no dispute as to financial ])oIicy could arise, as each w(mld be able, within certain definite limits, to choose its own policy. We Avould therefore propose that in the Act of Union a clause should be inserted, fixing a tnaxi- muifi rate of duty, never to be exceeded by any member of the Federation, on goods the ])roduct of any other part of it ; and would provide a safeguard against it being exceeded by another clause enacting that the levy of a higher rate of duty by any custom-house official should constitute a misdemeanour, and subject him to instant dismissal, Avith, or without, other pains and penalties, as might seem exi)edient. And in order to jircvent (iapricious variations in financial })olicy, we would require the Local Legislatures at each re-assessment of the Federati(m to fix their tariffs for the ensuino; ten vears, subject to the condition that if at any time in the interval it were desired to effect an alteration, this might be done by petitiim to the Federal Legislature and the i)assage of a bill by it in accordance with the prayer of the petition — but thus only.* To sum uj) : Ave propose that the Federal liCgislature ' As it would 1)0 desirable to have fret! trade established between colon'al ".'roups, such as British America, the Wist Indies, Australia, and SouOi Africa, it would be necessary to have all the Local Legislatures or authorities of the diiferent provinces in each of these proups meet in congress to fix the tariff at each period of re-adjustment, and to have the balance of customs distributed on the Zollverein system — though we think that property would form a fairer basis of distribution than population. The fact that excise duties would uni)ucstionably be needed to complete the contributions of the British Islands, and. in time of war, might be needed in the Colonies, 92 A COLONIST O:: THE COLONIAL QUESTION. Bhould enjoy unlimited right of taxation ; but that, in order to prevent it overtaxing any member of the Fede- ration, each should be liable only for a definite proportion of the Federal expenditure, and that this proportion should be re-adju8ted after the decennially recurring census ; that the Federal rev enue should be collected by officers of the Federal Government ; that the revenue should, in the first instance, be raised from the customs duties of the several members of the Federation ; that ■wherever these should prove more than sufficient to meet the amount assessed, the balance should be paid to the Local Government, and that wherever this should prove insufficient, the deficit should be made up by such ether taxes as the Federal Legislature should see fit to impose ; and in order to prevent the commercial interests of one province being sacrificed to those of another, each should, under certain limits, be allowed to arrange its own tariffs We confess that we are visionary enough * to believe that, under these conditions, a Chancellor of the Exchequer would be able to deal with the [Federal] estimates and revenues of the United Kingdom and its forty Colonies in a Pan-Britannic Parliament.' Not only do we think that he could * deal with them,' but also that he could deal with them satisfactorily. No member of the Fede- ration could be over-taxed without the fact becoming at renders it a fair subject for consideration whether it might not be well to place the coUiction of the entire indirect taxation of the Empire, whether imposed by Locivl or Federal authorities, in the hands of Federal officials, and to make the Federal revenue a first charge on all of it, indifferently; also it might be considered whether, in case of Federation being adopted, it might not be possible to allow the Local Legislatures to fix the waj's and means of both Local and Federal revenue, leaving the Federal Legislature em- powered to provide ways and means only in case the Local Legislature should fail to do so. These, however, are all matters of detail, which, along with many more, would require the careful thought of the first statesmen of the Empire. It is our part to prove that the difficulties may be overcome, but not to say which is the best means of meeting them. PROVISION AGAIXST UNFAIR TAXATION. 93 at once apparent. No difficulty about ways and means could arise, as the one source of revenue which we have indicated would suffice to pay the colonial proportion, even were the amount which it seems likely to reach doubled, and in the British Islands the same resources would be open under Federation as at present. No obstacle would have to be overcome in recimcilinjr con- flicting sectional interests, as each would be left free to settle its own commercial policy within definite limits agreed to by all. And the distance which separates the several countries would not be any impediment to their financial union, as the Finance Minister in London could, by means of the electric wire, converse at pleasure with his subordinates all over the Empire ; and would thus, in fact, be nearer to New Zealand than his predecessors were to places only a day's journey from head-quarters. Such are our reasons for believing that the want of geographical unity, and the long distances by which the several parts of the British Empire are divided, are not inconsistent either with the assemblage of a Federal Legislature as quickly as would be needed, or with the levy of a common revenue for the discharge of Federal expenditure. We have before endeavoured to show that every function of a Federal Government, save these two, is, or has been, fulfilled for the whole Empire by the Government of the United Kingdom — which view we have seen is endorsed by one of the ablest opponents of Federation. Hence it follows that if these, also, can be discharged, the capacity of a Federal Government of the Empire to accomplish all the duties incidental to its office is demonstrated. 1^: but mm mi 04 A ('OLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION, CHAPTER VI. CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES. In the preceding cliapter we have endeavoured to show that if the macliinery of a Federal Government for the Empire were created, it would be competent to fulfil all the duties which are usually assigned to such Govern- ments. Until the arguments by Avhich we arrived at this conclusion have been refuted, any further op})osition to Federation, as being an imi)racticable project, must bo based on constitutional and administrative difficulties, similar in kind to those which are to be encouutered in the formation and administration of any representative Government, though we are willing to admit that in this case they would be likely to prove greater in degree. Assimiing it to have been proved that the conditions of existence are to be found, the possibility of creating and maintaining the proposed Federation have yet to be demonstrated. We therefore proceed to consider the nature of the governmental machinery which would be required to call the Federation into being, and the manner in which the difficulties in the way of its formation may be overcome. The lirst point, of course, would be the establishment of a Federal Legislature — a Parliament in which the British Islands and the Colonies should be alike repre- sented on terms of equality. Here it is necessary, before going any further, to define :t ' i COUNTRIES COXSTITUTIXG COLOMKS. 95 the term * Col( the ine tlie sense in -wliich we ii Empire includes many outlyinfj provinces which do not properly come under that appellation. Foremost amongf these is India, and next are fortresses — such as Gibraltar and Malta — and commercial stations — such as HonijKonj;. By the term Colonies avc mean countries in which all, or a very considerable ])ortion, of the population, consists of a British or European stock ; or, to descend to j)articulars, British America, Australasia, South Africa, and the West Indies, with })erhaps Mauritius, and hereafter such other lands within the Empire as may be colonised by emi'i;ration from Great Britain. To these and to the British Islands representation in the Federal Lep^islature would have to be confined : all other parts of the Empire would require to remain in their present position of dependencies, from their incompetency to fulfil the con- ditions on Avhich the Federation would be based. Tbe constitution of the Federal Legislature would be a matter of the very highest imjxjrtance. On It ihe success or failure of the new Em})ire would, to a very great extent, depend. For its establishment there are two courses oi)en: the Colonies might be allowed repre- sentation in the Imi)erial Parliament as at present consti- tuted ; or an absolutely new Federal Legislature might be created, whilst the Imperial Parliament should become the local legislature of the British Islands, either remain- ing in its present shape or being divided into three legislatures, accordingly as it might be determined to have one or three Local Governments for England, lie- land, and Scotland. On the former of these schemes ]\Ir. Smith has exerted himself to })our a large volume of contempt. ' Such a piece of political n\'>chinery,' says he, ' as a set of Parlia- ments, one of which would be at once national and federal, while all the rest would be national only, would scarcely '■mOmmmtH m A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. i; find an advocate, even among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs.' We shall, however, examine the merits of this scheme, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's con- temptuous dismissal of it. The Imperial Parliament already fulfils almost all the duties which in every Federation devolve on the Federal Legislature ; and is legally competent to legislate for any, and every, part of the Empire. The les& violent the nature of political changes by which a desired result is obtained, the better it is for all parties. I.; may therefore be well to inquire if a Federal Legislature could be created by allowing colonial representatives seats in the Imperial Parliament. We must premise, however, that this is not to be taken as indicative of a personal preference for that course. The difficulty in the way of this plan lies in the fact that whilst the Imperial Parliament discharges the duties of a federal legislature, it unites with them, as every national legislature must do, those which, in a Federation, are discharged by the local legislatures. It would evi- dently be unfair to the United Kingdom to allow repre- sentatives elected in Canada or Australia to vote on matters affecting the people of the British Islands ex- clusively, whilst their representatives would be destitute of any corresponding influence over the internal govern- ment of the Colonies. We believe, however, that this difficulty might be overcome, and a Federation established with a ' set of Parliaments, one of which would be national and federal, whilst all the rest would be national only.' The manner in which we believe this to be capable of accomplishment is by a classification of the prerogatives of the Imperial Parlinment as a federal and national legislature, and having its duties in each capacity dis- charged in different sessions. This classification having been effected, the body now MODIFICATIOX OF THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. 97 known as the Imperial Parliament might meet to legislate on the subjects defined as belonging to the internal government of the British Islands. This legislation having been finished, the colonial representatives might be admitted to their seats, and a second session opened for legislation on matters defined as bcioniring to the Federal Government of the Emj)ire. At present the representatives of the United Kingdom discharge the duties of both a federal and local legislature every session. If these duties were distinguished and discharged at different times in the manner })roposcd, there would be nothing to hinder the Colonies enjoying representation in a Federal Legislature, and the United Kingdom retaining the exclusive control of its own local affairs, without the formation of any legislative power at ]>rcsent unknown to the constitution ; though in the Executive (iovernment a slight change would be needed. One sovereign and one ministrv now disdiaro-e the duties of both a Federal and Local Executive Goveriunent. But with the Imperial Parliament acting in two separate characters, they could not continue to do so. Ministers, indeed, would not find any increased dilliculty in the discharge of the same duties Avhich they have to fulfil to- day. But ministerial responsibility is now-a-days the corner-stone of the British constitution, and as the Federal Legislature might declare its want of confidence in a ministry sustained by the Local, and vice versa, it M'ouid be requisite to have two ministries — one fo- the Federal, and the other for the Local Government. Each, of course, would be resi)onsible only to that legislature of which it acted as the Executive, and to the Crown actino- as head of both Local and Federal Executives. AVe should not think it requisite to impose any check on the members of either ministry sitting in both legislatures. lu Canada there are Dominion ministers who sit in the u w 08 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. I ■i- , ( Local Parliament, and Local Ministers who sit in the House of Conunons, and the results have been to increase the legislative cai)acity of both, and to augment identity of feclino- between them. By these means we think that the Im])erial Parliament miirht be made to fulfil the functions of both a Federal and a Local Legislature witht)ut conferring on the United Kingdom any unjust control over the local rights of the Colonies, or on the Colonies any influence whntever over the internal aflfairs of tlie British Islands. There is a iXood deal to be said in favour of this course. England has h.4)})ily been always dis{)osed to look with disfavour on any violent changes, and felt a desire to adapt old institutions to the fulfilment of new duties. The above policy would be in consonance with this feeling. Th*) old P'lrliament of England would remain intact, no new assembly would displace it from the lofty height which it has so long occupied, nor would it be thrust down into any interior position, as would necessarily follow were it confined to the single duty of legislating for the affairs of the British Islands. It would thus leave England somewhat more in possession of her original supremacy in the Empire than would be the case were a legislature entirely new to be created ; and, colonist though we be, we can truly say that Ave would not grudge it to her ourselves, nor do we think that our fellow-colonists Avould disagree with our feeling in the matter. But, besides thus soothing English pride, colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament would secure the great advantage of rendering any collision between the Federal authorities and the Local Government of the most important member of the confederation almost impossible. Such collisions are the peculiar danger of federal institutions. But when the same men would act in both capacities in the United Kingdom, it is pretty certain tliat the two Governments mmmm'mmmmm DIFFICULTIES OF SL'CII .MODIFICATION'. 0') ffairs land Dmacy ature be, her iVOiild esides ion in intage oritics ember isions when nitod mentis ■could not fail to act in harmony. The fact of their so doini; would tend both to check throughout the Empire the rise of jealous feeling on either side, and to provide a corrective for any small portion of it that might be developed. Enghmd would thus be })hiced in the j)osition of the conservative power of the Empire. It is a post for which she is eminently qualified; and it is one which it is desirable to have filled by some member in any federation. But, in case England had formally to descend from her present position, and take her place with the Colonies in a new legislature, it is by no means clear that she would be by any means the most loyal member of the Union, whilst the chances of collision between her Government and that of the Emi)ire might be increased. These would be very considerable advantages, but they would be accompanied by some very heavy disad- vantages. It is possible that, were the Imperial Parlia- ment increased by the addition of the colonial repre- sentatives, it would become a body too unwieldy for effective action. Were the Colonies represented in the same pro])ortion as the liritish Islands now arc, they would, probably, start with from 80 to 100 members ; and there can be little .loubt that an assembly consisting of 750 members is likely to be too numerous for efhcient action. Then the labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch members would be seriously augmented, as they would have two budgets to pass, and two ministries to watch, instead of one of each, as at present. There seems to be no doubt that their duties are already too heavy to be efhciently discharged ; and that were this plan of ac- comi)Iishing Federation adoi>ted, it woidd be absolutely indisi)ensable to establish some means of relieving them, from the ' i)rivate bills' which now consume a large part of their labours. Neither is the formation ol'a new Ijody to fulfil the duties of a Federal Legislature without arguments H 2 i!^ 100 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUKSTIOX. to recommend it on its own merits. The machinery of government would then be more simple than in case the members of the Imperial Parliament Avere to act in two distinct ca})acities. It would afford the Local Governments of the British Islands less oj)portunity of encroaching on the prerogatives of the Federal authority than they would enjoy when the same men who would be resi)onsible for any encroachment would form a majority of the body whose prerogatives would be infringed. It would render tlie labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch representatives lighter than they would be under the other scheme. It would afford an ojjening for obscure talent to find its way into j)olitical life. It wovdd place the Colonies more on terms of equality with the Fatherland. It would facilitate the formation of a lejfislature accordiufij to the latest discoveries in political science, and with a single eye to the especial duties Avhich it Avould be called on to perform, ■which would be, as Ave shall show hereafter, a matter of considenible importance, especially in reference to ^.le Upper House ; and, besides this, it would render possible the establishment of separate Local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland, which we are strongly inclined to think would be likely to prove a decided ad- vantage to each of them, and, perhaps, to the whole Federatim. Our principal reason for holding this oi)inion is that Ave very much doubt the possibility of maintaining, under present circumstances, the union Avith Ireland by any other means than the indefinite suspension of liberty in that country. None Avho have any knowledge of Ireland Avill deny that the cry for * repeal ' is one that finds an echo in every Celtic heart. Nor can it be denied that the Liberal policy towards Ireland has been one long series of failures. Catholic emancipation •, the reduction of the Protestant episcopate ; the abolition of tithes ; the IRELAND NOT YET PACIFIED. 101 ' 1 Maynooth errant ; free trade ; tlie Orann;e Processions Act ; the disestablishment of the Protestant Ciiurch ; the Land Bill, and the handing over the patronage of Ireland so completely to the Romanists that, at one time, ten of the twelve judges were Catholics, — all these, and many more measures of a similar spirit have successively been h(;ld up as unfailing remedies for ' the Irish difficulty.' If at any time they could have produced a good effect it would have been at present. For along with them came social changes which destroyed many of the most crying evils prevalent in Ireland. Emigration cleared away a large part, if not all, of the surplus population, and increased the rate of wages probably 400 to 500 per cent. The Encumbered Estates Court swept out of existence a race of bankrupt landlords and bloodsucking middlemen, and induced some influx of English capital. It was all in vain. Increased prosperity, social equality, and political supremacy did not render the Celtic Komanists of the present day less ready to become Fenians than were their fathers and jxrandfathers to become United Irishmen. Still from all went up the cry — 'Tis little I cure for emuncipution, 'Tis littlo I cure for such laws as that; "What I ask is to seo old Erin a nation, And niyhelf with a siiamrock in my hat. With the experience of the effect of forty years' con- cessions before her, England destroyed in 1869 the insti- tution which had ever formed a rallying-})oint for her supporters, and affection for which had prevented them from allying themselves with their Catholic countrymen in their cry for repeal. Will they do so any longer ? It is rather too soon to s[)eak with confidence, but the signs and tokens seem to indicate that they will not. ^> either rich Protestants nor Irish landlords have now any cause to fear the advent of a repeal of the Union. Should a p 1 r ^-^^ri^mnmimmm^ m III t '•1 102 A COLONIST OX Tlir-: COF.O.MAI. (iUKSTIOX. Catholics and Protectants unite in the a<^itatioii to <;ain it >vliat could Knjjjland do? One tliiiifr she certainly could not do, and that is resist it successfully whilst niaintainini:^ j)olitical liberty in Ireland. Neither do Ave believe that .she either could, or would, rule Ireland pennanently by the sword. Yet the history of the two conntries from 1782 to the Union has proved pretty conclusively that the existence of tAvo sovereign legislatures in one empire is an impossibility. If this be so, a repeal of the Unicm is clearly impracticable under present circmnstanccs. But it is erpially clear that, in the event of a Federatiou of the Emi)ire, it would be jn-acticable to make Ireland one of the members of the Union, and to grant her a local legis- lature for the discharij-e of the same duties as would belong to similar legislatures in other parts of the Empire. There could be no legal or constitutional difficulty in this course, for the question which it Vvould involve w^ould be that of the number of states or provinces into which the Empire should be divided; and, so far as the exercise of the h'</(/I powers of the Irish Legislatiue Avas concerned there wcmld be no more danger of a collision with the Federal Government arising therefrom than must exist in any, and every, federation. The fact that Ireland is, in reality, inhabited by two races who hate or have hated each other about as intensely as it is possible for people to do without flying at each other's throats renders us somewhat doul)tful whether they could safely be entrusted with even the limited powers of local self- government. But Avhen we remember that this, or a full and comi)lete sei)aratIon from English connection, has been the desire at the root of all the Irish agitations of the last century ; and when Ave see that almost all really active causes of discord betAveen the two local races have no\v been removed, avc have no hesitation in saying that we think the risk should be run. It is, we believe, the M ENGLISH, IRISH, AND SCOTCH LKfllSLATUUKS. 108 hi IS n only lucfisure tliat can ever render Ireland a really loyal member of the Kinj)lre.' But, besides these facts In rcj^urd to Ireland, there are reasons in favour of local legislatures in the case of both England and Scotland. The fcclinu; of Ireland is dii'ectly antagonistic to that of England, and, although fricn(lshi|) is maintained with Scotland, the feelinus of the two countries are by no means identical, and it seems pro- bable that, in reference to local matters, each would be better able to judge ibr itself than could any united legis- lature. Xor is this all ; the ])roccss of centralization of the national energies at the capital which has produced such alarming results in the case of France is at work also in the United Kingdom. 01' course, we do not for a moment suppose that It Is on anything like the same scale ; or, so long as the framework of sociiety remains as it is, can be. But we think that the intellectual strcin/th of the country Is becoming centralized to an alarminii; de<iree. The press at the present day is not so much the fourth as the firat estate of the realm. The influence of that j)ortion of it located in London Is probably, or almost certainly, greater than that of the residue all over the liritlsh Islands. The fact Is not one to be regarded with com- placency, as It tends to render this mighty thougiit-ruling machine more liable to be swayed bycliciues, parties, and philosophical theories than would be the case were it scattered more widely over the land. W^e are aware that there are many counteracting influences at work ; but still think that It would not be amiss to have other ' The above was written before the morotnent in favour of ' Irish Fede- ralism ' had got into shape, and before we had seen Mr. Butt's pamphlet on the subject. We need scarcely say that tiie subsccjueiit spread of tlio movement — verifying, as it does, some of the above speculations — and the arguments adduced by Mr. Butt, have strengthened our couvictions in favour of the above policy. Ksm 111 11' i I ' liii ': 104 A COLOMST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. centres of political activity, such as would be furnished by the creation of local governments, brought into existence. Thus it seems that there are many considerations in favour of each of these courses. Our own feelino: is in favour of the latter; both because we should anticipate nmch good from the formation of local legislatures in each of the three kingdoms, and because we fear that under the former the lal)ours of English, Irish, and Scotch representatives would be too severe for any men to dis- charge etKciently. But, Avhilst discussing the principles on which the Federal Legislature might be formed, we must not ibrget that the possibility of forming such a legisla- ture at all is vehemently denied. Mr. Smith has indi- cated ' the ditference of franchise, and the hopeless difficulty of settling the proportion between the English and Colonial members,' as amongst the obstacles. As to the former of these it has been solved by the Reform Bill of 1866. The franchise in Eno-land is now as low as it is in most of the Colonies, so that that difficulty has disappeared since the gentleman wrote. Independently of this, however, it may be remarked that, were a new legislature created, it could fix a new and uniform rate of qualification at its j)leasure. As to the difficulty of settling the proportion of English and Colonial representatives, it does not seem to us to be very formidable. The rapid growth of the Colonies would, of course, render necessary the adoption of a basis under which periodical readjustments could be made at diiferent intervals, as is done in the United States. Such a basis could be found in either population or taxation. Our own belief is that neither of them would alone serve for an equitable basis, but that such a basis might be found in a combination of the two. If popula- tion were to be ignored in the distribution of taxation, it ■would clearly be unjust to make it supreme in the adjust- ' I A BASIS OF T^EPRKSKXTATIOX. 105 ment of representation. To do so would he to arrange burdens acoordin<; to tlie system of rthitivc equality, and privileges according to that of absolute equality. It is true that modern democracy always insists on such a distribution of privileges and burdens ; but it is clear that the equality which im])oses on one man the payment of a sum of money perhajts one hundred times as great as that which it imposes on another, is fundamentally difl'ci'cnt from the equality which makes the power of each man to influence his neighbours, or the State, precisely the same. The injustice of such a system when ap|)lied to communities will be recognised by many who refuse to admit it to be inequitable towards individuals ; conse- quently we should never think of proposing that each country should be represented in the Federal Legislature proportionately to its i)opulation,and taxed proportionately to its proj)erty. Neither do we think that the basis of representation and taxation should be absolutely identical. Some natural instinct always seems to hinder the ])arties on either side carrying their principles to their logical results. Men who announce as the first article of their political creed the sovereignty of the people and the in- fallibility of the majority, yet seek in an Ui)i)er House a check on the free exercise of the popular will ; and men who declaim loudly ccmcerning the rights of property are never found to maintain that political influence should increase in the same ratio as do contributions to the revenue. We would act in the same way. We think that one half of the members of the Federal l-icgislature should be distributed according to the 2)opulation, and the other half according to the taxation of the several countries therein represented; and that a readjustment should take place at the completion of the decennially- recurring census. At all events, in some such basis means could be found of overcoming the ' hopeless diffi- 1 'is ■ i : 100 A COF.DMST OX THK COLONIAL QrKSTION". ciilty of scttlinn- tlie j>r<))M)rti()U between tlie I'lif^llsli aiid tlic Colonial meinlxiis ; ' but, for reasons hei( at'tcr to be explained, we do not tliink tiiut the first bu^is tshould be rejiank'd as unjilteral)le. It may be urj^ed, however, that, even were the rehitivo representation of tlie British Islands and tlie Colonies satisfaetorily adjusted, it would be impossible for (Colonists to find amonixst themselves a sufficient niunber of men duly (|ualified to act as their representatives. The Colonies, it may be argued, are destitute of anything like a landed aristocracy, or a body of men ])osscssing realised wealth ; and, in the absence of such classes, none could be found who could afford to surrender so much of their time as would be consumed in travelllnii; to and from the seat of government and in there discliarging the duties of legislators. It is perfectly true that the Colonies could not suj)ply men who could afford to undertake the dis- charn-e of these duties without rcnnmeration for their services, or an indcnmity for expenses. But let such an indemnity be granted to the members of the le<;isluture, and the difficulty would at once vanish. We are aware that a strong feeling against paying legislators exists in England. But it may fairly be doubted Avhcther the feeling is well founded. It is thought, Ave believe, that to grant any remuneration to the representatives would be to o[)en the legislature to demagogues. It might, possibly, lead to that result in England, where Parliament is practically closed to any save men of wealth ; but it Avould simultaneously provide safeguards against their ])ower to do mischief in the opening Avhich it would afford to men of tale^it ;iiid education, avIio now in the periodical ])ress furnish many of the thoughts of statesmen, to offer their views on the floor of the House, and bring their ])Owers to the elucidation of political problems in the arena where the course of action in reference to them I V ^ ■ IXDK.MMTV TO MK.MnK'.lS. TO" must at last \)V decided. Nouo n\n douitt lliat sueli men would he uuich iui»re useful in tlu; leLfisliture than iu their |)rcsent sjihere ; or that the ehi.^s disposed to -ei d denui;i;o<^ues to i'arliauient would listen to them inueli more contidin^Iy, and respeetl'ully, than thoy woidd to mcmhers oC the class which they look upon as their oppressors. The want of such politicians — men who prior to the passage of the first Uel'orni liill, used to he returned by the nomination boroughs — has been felt ever since 1832; and, unless the House of Conunons is permanently to deteriorate, some means of introducing them into it must be found. The i)ayment of members would probably furnish one nutans of attaining this di'sidcnitinif. So long as the intellectual calibre of the House is kept at a high mark, the demagogue, even if he should find his way into it, would, when there, be powerless to effect any mischiel'; whilst his power wM)uld increase pi'eeisely in the sanu; dejxree as the intellect of the House declIiuMl. It Is vcrv doubtful whethei' the landed and moneyed aristocracy of England can alone furnish as hum' an amount of talent as is requisite to maintain the intellect of the House at a ju'oper jMtch ; and, therefore, eyen were there no question of colonial rei)resentation in the way, it might be well to adopt the indemnification of mendicrs iu order to re- open the House to indigent talent and learning. lUit should this view not be thought correct, an indemnity, say 500/. or 600/., might be granted to colonial uumu- bers exclusiyely, in c(msideration of the fact that, in the dischartje of their duties as members of Parliament, thev would be forced to make much greater sacrifices than would the English members. AVe will not suppose that anybody can be so foolish as to imagine that the re({uisitc amount of talent would not be forthcomino; in the Colonies. All who know the Colonial Legislatures must be aware that it exists iu plenty. It follows that an adoption of the in- ^t^K!^smmi ih 108 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. >! Pi \\4 (Icmnity system would at once render it avail !il)le for the Federal Le<^islatiir3. There remains to be solved the problem of providing the means of fiirnisliing a colonial representation in the Ui»per House. 1'liis, it will probably be said, is insoluble, i'rom the absence oi' anything like an hereditary aris- tocracy in nearly all the Colonies. The ditficulty, nevertheless, is cliiefly imaginary. An hereditary aris- tocracy is not essential to the formation of a second chamber; nor does its existence [jreclude the construction of it on p. non-hei-cditary basis. Neither equity, nor policy, requires that the lJj)por House of the Federal Legis- lature should be of an hereditary character. The right to one privilege does not convey a right to another still greater. When the union with Scotland was effected, the fact that Scotch peers formed the Upper House of the Scotch Leji'islaturc was not held suthcient to entitle all of them to seats in the House of Lords. They Avere instead allowed to elect a certain niunber of the body to represent them in that House. In like manner, on the union Avith Ireland, the Irish })eers Avere not admitted bodily to the Uj)[)er House, but were allowed a re[)resentati()n in it. We should j»ro[)o;<e to follow the precedent set on each of these occasions, only acting more mildly towards the ])eerage than Avas done in either ijistance. The peers of Ireland and Sc(jtland Avere utterly dispossessed of the right previously enjoyed by them of forming the U})per House of the Legislature in their respective countries. This right might, and should, l)e left intact in the present instance; and the U}»[)er House of the Local Legislatures in England, Ireland, and Scotland be made to consist of the hereditary })eerage of (!ach country. The members of these Ixulies are unquestionably the fittest jiersons Avho can be found to fill that position ; and, if custom can create ii right, they are undoubtedly in possession of it to this TIIK HOUSE OF LORDS. 100 extent. lUit as the ri«2:ht to a seat in the Local Lef!;isla- tures of Scothxnd and Ireland was not considered a sufficient title to anythinfj; more than representation in tin more important Legislature oi' the United Kinj:;- dom, neither do we think that the right to a seat in the Uj)per House of the L^nited Kino-dom forms a title to anything more than rej)resentation in the body which would constitute the still more important Ijcgislature of the United Empire. We would, therefore, in addition to leaving the j)cers in possession of their hereditary rights in the Local Legislatures, allow them to elect, from their own ranks, a certain proportion of the second chamher of the Federal Legislature. This slight concession on the part of the English ]»eers is all that is requisite to ])ave the way for the formation of the Upj)er House of the Federal Legislature on a non-hereditary basis. That once done, all colonial difficulties are at an end, nor are there wanting important considerations in favour of the change on its own merits. It is not any hostility to an hereditary chamher or a landed aristocracy which leads us to this conclusioi";. We ap[)rove of the bestowal of hereditary honours on the irround tliat, as the fruit of the lives and labours of j^reat men extends to an indefinite future, so should the rewards of them. As to a landed aristocracy, we believe that, when patriotically inclined, it forms ])robably the most valuable element for the c<mstruction of a representative Cxovernment, as is proved on almost every ])age of the history of England. But none, in view of that history, can contend that the existence <if an hereditary chamber is essential to its utilisation ; or that the power of the L^I)per House is necessarily increased by seats in it being hereditary instead of for life only. We fear, on the contrary, that the exclusively aristocratic character of the House of Lords is tending to reduce its influence to m ir 110 A COLONIST OX Till-: COLONIAL QUKSTION. )!i a point inconsistent with a due fulfilment of the objects for wliich such a body exists ; and it is chit fiy for this reason that we should desire to see the second chamber of the Federal Legislature formed on a somewhat different basis. There cannot be any doubt tliat for the last forty years the House of Lords has been })assing bills which were distasteful to a large majority of the members ; and that, since 1866, it has ajireed to measures which were conscien- tiously disapproved of by almost all of them. Now, whether the Lords were right or wrong in these opinions, it is equally clear that a body which is afraid, on account of the circumstances under which it exists, to act accord- inijly as it believes to be for the good of the common- wealth, is not likely to conduce much to the national benefit. If it is wrong in disap})roving of the measures which it unwillingly adopts, it acts as a bar to the triumph of Truth, and furnishes permanent sources of ill-will in the community. If it is right in believing them to be pernicious, it fails in the discharge of the very first duty for which it exists, and allows error to gain sway in the liope that, by so doing, it may esca])e unpleasant consequences to itself. This state of affairs must always be mischievous. No prerogative should ever be entrusted to men, unless it is intended that they should use it whenever they believe it to be for the permanent interest of the trustees to do so. The great object for which a second chamber exists is to furnish an answer to the question, What is truth ? It should, therefore, be constructed in such a maimer that its members will neither prejudge the case, nor, having once reached an intellectual conviction, hesitate to maintain it. We fear that the House of Lords does not at present fulfil these requisites. It must be admitted, we think, that many of its members inherit their political theories; and that IlErOXSTRlTTIOX OF TIIK I'PPER HOUSE. Ill ever Ihoiikl lueiit t for iswer e, be will (1 an fear these ,ny of that many more, who have ])erf;onally tlioiiirht them out, sacri- fice convictions in a manner which, did they sit in the Commons, they would consider to be highly unbecoming. AVe are well aware that it is a generous and ])atnotic desire to avoid anything like a dead-lock which induces the/n to act in this manner. But, even in the United Kingdom, a time must come when this course of action will reach an end, and something be demanded that the Lords will refuse to grant; and in the proposed Federa- tion it would not work at all. In such an Em})ire the Ui)])er House would be a much more important element of the Legislature than it is in the United Kingdom at ])resent ; and it Avould be essential to form its constitution in such a manner as to make it emphatically a ' chamber of statesmen.' It seems to us that the course most likely to lead to the formation of a chamber embodying this and the various other qualifications needed in the Upper House of the Federal Legislature, would be to open different means of access to it. W^e would suggest that one j)ro- ])ortit)n — we will not say how much — of the Mouse should be elective ; that a second proportion should consist of men who had filled certain offices in the State, as is pro- ])osed by Mr. Mill in his hypothetical scheme for a second chamber in England ; • that a third proportion should ' ' Were the place vacant in England tor sucli a senate (and I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might W eoniposfd of sonic sucli elements as the following. All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter, and whicli I regard a.s Hn indispensable ingredient in any well-constituled popular Go\ernnient : ■ill who were or laid been chief justices, or heads of any of tlie superior courts of law or equity: all who hud for five years filled the office of puisne judge: all who had for two years tilled any cabinet oifice ; but these should also bo eligible to the House of Commons, and, if elected niembcrs of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be ludd in suspense. The conditiuu of time is needed to prevent persons lieiiiiz named cal)inet ministers merely to give them a seat in the senate; and the period of two ■MP -^r-^-^^ I) t M I fi 112 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. consist of members to be appointed by the Crown uncon- ditionally ; and that a few hereditary seats mi_g;ht, j)erhaps, be sprinkled in with advantage, to keep alive the principle. The elective members we would have chosen, in the Colonies, by both branches of the Colonial Legislatures, and in the British Islands, by the Upper Houses only, in order to leave untouched the hereditary rights of the peerage. It would of course be requisite to allot a certain number of these representatives to each province, and this number, for reasons hereafter to be explained, we do not think should vary : and it might also be need- ful to exact, in the case of the colonial members, certain qualifications of residence and property, and to grant them, as well as their brethren in the Lower House, an indemnity. Seats, of course, should beheld for life; but whether a seat should carry with it a title is a question on years is suggested, that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a scnatorship : all who had filled the office of coni- mandei'-in-ehief ; and all who. having commanded an army or a flett, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes : all who had held during ten years first-class diplomatic appointments : all who had been Governors-General of India or British America, aud all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships. The permanent Civil Service blunild also be represented ; all should be senators who had filled during tun years the important offices of Under-Secretary to the Treasury, perma- nent Under-Secretary of State, or any others equally high and responsible. If along with the persons thus qualified by practical experience in the ad- ministration of public atfairs any representation of the speculative classes were to bo included — a thing in itself desirable — it would be worth con- sideration whether cei-taiu professorships in certain iiational institutions, after a tenure of a few years, might confer a seat in the senate. Mere scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable ; they imply a power of selection, whereas the other appointments speak for them- selves ; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected witli ]>olitics they are no evidence of the special qualities required, whilst if political they would enable successive ministries to deluge the House with }>arty toolis.' — Rrprcf^nifativ Croi'mnninf, chap. xiii. [We see nothing wanting here save some special representation of the interests of Christian morality.] ADVANTAGE OF SUCH IlECONSTRUCTIOX. 113 if com- vt, hiid 10 had no had id held Service during perma- iisible. ho ad- classps |th con- Itulions, Mere le; they r them- inneeted hilst if se with nothing hristiiin which we need not here enter, as it is not of a very j)r!U'tical cliaracter where titles are a recognised j)art of the institutions of the Empire. We believe that such a body as we have sketclied could not fail to prove as great a blessing to the British Empire as is the Senate to the United States. The members personally qualified would brii>g to it the highest statesmanlike exi)erience of the day ; through the Crown-nominated members obscure or unpopular talent and ballast could be introduced ; by nominees of the Local Legislatures, some of the ' sj)irit of the age ' would find its Avay into a place where it is often wanted ; and we need only point to the history of the United States Senate to prove that these bodies gene- rally choose to be represented by the best talent avail- nl)le. The peerage would be fairly influential in it, and l)y means of a few hereditary seats, the historic names of the Empire could be kept in that place of honour which is their right. In such an assembly all sides of every question would be sure to find advocates of the very highest ability, in which case it could not fail to discharge its duties fearlessly and efficiently, and by the sheer force of genius to command respect for its decisions. But should this scheme not be approved of, there is a simpler means of settlement available. Peerages for life are, in the opinion of many eminent lawyers, already constitu- tional. At all events, a bill could be passed legalising them, and the Crown could then call to the House of Lords a suflScient number, or a definite proportion, of colonial life peers. Th other mode of settlement, how- ever, we believe to be much uku'c likely to prove beneficial to all parties. Such is the manner in which we think it possible to overcome the constitutional difliiculties in the way of the I'ormation of a Federal Legislature for the Empire. As to the possibility of creating such a body, and the necessity 1 i) ■ ■j ' i; •3i M\ : 114 A COLONIST OX TIIH COLONIAL QUKSTION. for so (loin*; if it is desired to maintain tlic intojrritv of the Emjure, we have no doubt whatever. But when con- sidering the details of such a measure, we feel painfully the difficulties of a task which would tax severely the intellects of the foremost statesmen of our age and country. In the language of Dr. Arnold on Church Keform, we would say : ' As to the manner of carrying these principles into effect, I am far from jiroposing any- thing with equal confidence. Nor am I anxious about any particular measure which I may have ventured to recommend, if anything can be suggested ])y others which may effect the same great object more comjjletely.' For this reason it is that we have not hesitated in any case, where two courses seemed available, to indicate both, leavinjj their relative merits for further discussion. AVe know that, in having attempted so much as we have done, W'C have acted in opposition to the views of an able advocate of an Imj)erial Federation ' Avho condemns attempts ' to limn out in detail the form of a British Federal system,' and alleges that ' at present it is for the federalist simply to show his doctrine to be reasonable, his suggestions to be pr hud facie practical, his system to be desirable, and to demonstrate that it deserves to be made the subject of united conference and negotiation.' We fully endorse the views enunciated in the latter quo- tation, but do not see how it is possible to prove the scheme to be either reasonable, practicable, or desirable, otherwise than by refuting the arguments put forth against it as unreasonable, impracticable, and unde- sirable, to e.Obct which an explanation of the manner in V. ! ' ' '.stacles may be conquered is essential. * n. e i •'^ more objection, of a constitutional charac- ter, V uich )j~ V possibly be urged against Federation. It ■• The author of ' Ginx's Baby,' in the Contcmporari/ lit view for April. L'cll itish for able, m to o be tion.' quo- the rable, forth Linde- aimer larac- It pril. DELAY IN APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE. 115 arises from the need of making ajjpeals to the people by means of a dissolution of Parliament, and a general election when the Executive and the House of Commons are at variance. It may be aroiied that, even supposing the whole framework of a Federal Government erected, it would be impossible to carry out such appeals within a reasonable si)ace of time, in which case tliere would remain no means of carrying on the Quoen's government by bringing the executive and legisl'itive autliorities into unison. It is quite certain that such appeals are a necessity of the constitution as at present administered; and also that to comj)lete the process in the proposed Federation would require about six months. The delay, however, seems to us more likely to be beneficial than pernicious. The questions on which these direct appeals are made are almost always those of internal policy. It is, consequently, jtrobable that such appeals would be less numerous under a federal than under a national government. But we will not insist on this point. The only evil which would ensue from the lengthened time consumed in making the ai)peal would be that a defeated ministry could remain in ofKce some three or four months longer than at present. This evil, Ave think, would be very light; and nuich more than compensated by the increased probability of obtaining an equitable and in- telligent response, which would be induced by the electors haviuir had tune to weii>;h the merits of the case. It has been well observed by Sir Henry Bulwer that ' Ileason predouunates at the end of every crisis, but has her voice drowned at the commencement;' and by Sir A. Alison that ' Public opinion is almost always wrong in the outset, but almost always right in the end ; and the reason is that in the former case it is formed by the unthinking many, and in the latter by the thinking few.' These observations arc true in reference to all times ; I 2 i . i It ' f ;■?! m t t ! 111) A COLO.Vr^T ox TIIR COLO.VIAL QUKSTION. but are cinj)liati('iilly so in rco'iird to our own era ; be- cause never before could thought be utiU.sed so rapidly as it can now through the press. But raj)idly as it can be utilised, it is still impossible for it to gain sway during the few weeks now consumed in making an appeal to the |)eo])le; and the consequence is that erroneous decisicms arc frequently returned and rash measures adopted, the full meaninn; of which is not realised. This danii;er would be nmch lessened by the increased time afforded for a discussion of the mei'its of the points at issue ; and when we remember the enormous importance of arriving at the truth in such cases, it seems to us that the minor evil of delay is one which might be very cheerfully borne, in consideration of the safeguard afforded by it against the greater evil of the ascendancy of falsehood. There is also another important constitutional question which would be raised by the establishment of an Imperial Federation. It is >,hether, un'^T this system of govern- ment, it would be requisite to establish a Supreme Court, similar to that of the United States, to act as arbiter between the several authorities of the Empire, or whether Parliament coidd remain as at present practically omni- })otent in the sphere of government. The subject Avonld deserve more careful consideration, probably, than any other involved in the scheme ; but as it does not touch the possibiliti/ of the establishment of such a polity as we advocate, we shall not here enter on the consideration of it. Having thus endeavoured to prove that it is practicable to overcome the alleged difficulties in the way of the for- mation and working of the machinery of a Federal Government of the Emjnre, we have next to examine the probability of such machinery proving stable if erected. 117 CHAPTER VII. r U A C r I C A L D 1 F F I C U L i' I K S. MoiiE impoitunt, and more deserving of careful attention, than any of tlie ohs^taclcs in the way of Federation whicli we have yet considered is that l)raiich of the subject M'hich now rises before us. We liavc no doul)t whatever that, in the event of a Federal (iovernnient of the Enij)ire being establisiied, it would j»rove fully equal to the dis- charge of its duties, despite the absence of geogra})hical luiity in the countries under its sway. E(jually are we convinced that the constitutional ditliculties in the way of the foi'niation of such a Government could be overcome ; and if our readers are not of the same o[)inion, we can attribute the fact only to our own bad advocacy of a good cause. But we are well aware that every word which we have written might be perfectly unimpeachable, and yet the scheme which we advocate completely impracticable. It is clear that there is nothing in the physical conforma- tion of the United States, or of England, to -render im- l)0ssible the rule of an absolute monarch in the former instance, or that of a democratic; republic in the latter ; and it is also evident that a poj)ular i)arty })ossessed of a majority in the legislature of either country might efiect a revolution initiating the new system in it. But how long would the new form of government continue in existence, under present circumstances, in either case ? Would it contain in itself the elements of stability ? This is the vital FF J18 A COLOXIST OX TTTE COLOXIAL QIHSTIOX. ^' I* I' point in any, and every, schoinc afFocting tlio political interests of nationf^. It is evident that despotism would not ' AV(uk ' in the States, nor democracy in Eno:land, as the conditions under whidi either may prove beneficial are wanting, (lovernmental constitutions must everywhere be adapted to the wants of the j)eople to be governed. No nation will tolerate a form of government which it dislikes, if there be any reasonable chance of over- throwing it ; and no form of re})rescntative govern- ment, at all events, can long exist unless the great majority of the people are satisfied that it conduces to their benefit. There was no doubt of the ability of the Federal (iovernment of the United States to fulfil all its functions; the manner in which it exercised its prero- gatives was the cause which led to secession, and a fierce civil war, which have probably sown the seeds of dissolu- tion in the American Union. The discontent at its course of action was induced by the existence of hostile feelings and interests in different parts of the Union, rendering it possible to secure the loyalty of one section only at the cost of the disloyalty of another. Wherever such hostility of interest or of feeling exists, there it is useless to attempt to form a Federation. Free nations will remain united politically only so long as they are united in heart. Are, then, the feelings and interests of the several parts of the British Empire which we have ])roposed to unite in one great Federation, sufficiently in unison to render it probable that, if such a scheme of government as we have sketched were established, they would accept its results harmoniously ? Would the enforcement of the terms of union on all be likely to induce discontent with union on the part of any ? Unless favourable ansAvers can be returned to these questions, physical and constitutional difficulties may be annihi- Mil. fi{i:i:ma\ ox fkukijalism. ir.) latcd, and still any attempt to form a Federation of the Empire utterly useless. In considerinj^ these questions, it may be well, in the first instMuee, to turn from details to principles; to examine the eonditions requisite for the sueeess of the Federal form of <;overnment ; then to in(juire Avhether they are to he found in the countries to which it is j)ro- ])osed to apply it; and finally to consider the prohahilitv of bcinj^ able to overcome the difficulties peculiar to th« ])resent case. The 'circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable' have been set forth so clearlv bv Mr. Freeman in his Ilistort/ of Federal Govcrnmnitx, that we think we shall be most likely to arrive at a cor- rect conclusion on the abstract question by endeavourini^ to a})ply his })rincij)lcs to the case before us. Mr. Freeman writes of Federalism as fcrllows : — ' It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place whenever it ai)]>cars in the form of closer union. Europeans, accui^tomed to a system of large consolidated States, are a})t to look ujjon Federalism as a system of disunion, and therefore of weakness. To a Greek of the third century B.C., to an American in 1787 it presented itself as a system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was not closer union butAvider separation. A kingdom of Peloponnesos or of America was an absurdity too ijreat to be thousj-ht of. A single consolidated republic was almost equally out of the question. The real question was, Shall these cities, these states, remain utterly isolated, perha})s hostile to one another, at most united by an inefficient and precarious alliance ? — oi* shall they, while retaining full internal independence, bi; I'used into one nation as regards all dealings with other Powers ? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically a system of union and of that strength :r v^\ ;:j I. i 120 A COLONIST ON TIIF. COLONIAL Ql'KSTION. if. i ! I !i in lilii wliiclj follows upon union. TIk; Fedorjil connection is in its place wlierever the several nienibers to l)e united nra fitted for that specie*.^ of union and for no other. It re- quires a sufficient dei^iree ofconununity in orin;in or feelin<jj or interest, to allow the several nienihers to work together up to a certain point. It requires that there shoidd not be that ])erfect de<j!;rec of connnunity, or rather identity, which aUows the several menihers to be fused to<rether for all purposes. Where there is no conuinmity at all, Federalism is inappropriate ; tlie cities, or states, had better remain wholly indc'pendent. Where comnumity rises into identity, Federalism is c(jually inapj)ro|n'iate ; the cities or states had better sink into mere (lounties <»f n kinjjjdom in' (consolidated rej)ublic, and take their chance of the advantages or disadvantages ol' lar^e states. But in the intermediate set of circumstances, the circum- stances of Peloponiu'sos 8tru<;<^ling against Macedonia, of Switzerland strugglinnj against Austria, of the Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American colonies struggling against Fngland, Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union as the members need, and not more than they need Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Federalism is out of ])lace. It is out of place if it attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united, or to unite what is wholly incai)able of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes, capable of being either des])ised us a compromise or of being extolled as the golden mean.' ' The circumstances of England and her Colonies seem to answer almost exactly to those in which ]Mr. Freeman de- clares Federalism to be in its place. It would there unite ' History of Federal Governments, pp. 108-110. ITS SIITAIUIJTY TO TIIK KMIMRI'. r.M • ill closer union' tli;m at prosctit cduutrios t«» nliicli flic altcniativo is, not ;i .still more intimate union, l)Ul * wider separation.' As in the cases of I'eloponnesos ami .America, a consolidated rei)ul)lic is ' an absurdity toe ^reat to l)e thou<;lit of, ' and the real choice lies betwci'ii ' utter isolation ' and * unity as rcixards all dealinus with other Powers,' accom|)anied hy ' full internal independence.' We have tidier prool' than existed in the case of I'clo- ponnesos or vVmerica that ' the several nu'inhers to he united are fitted lor that speci(!s of union and for no other,' in the facts that they have for a lonj^ time constituted a harmonious modified Federation, and that a system of •^overnnumt under which certain mend>ers were dcjirived of' full internal itidependeiice ' has been tried ai»d failed. Their history proves indisputably that there is ' a sutK- cient de<^ree of community in origin or feeling or interest [or rather in origin, feeling, and interest] to allow the several members to work together up to a certain ])oint;' and it is etiually indisputable that they cannot be ' fused together for all purposes.' The mend)ers ai"e not, indeed, struggling for national independence against foreign foes, as in the cases mentioned; but the Colonies are, one and all, incapable of maintaining their indejx'ndoncc single- handed ; and the growth of mighty empires on every sidt; of Enghuui renders it essential to her safety to be able to keep ])ace with their growth, which can be done only by utilising the resources of hei' n;rowini>- em])ires bevond the sea. For these j)urposes a Federal union would give 'as much of union as the mend)ers need, and not more than they need.' It is affirmed that, ' wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable. Federalism is out of i)h)cc.' In the present instance it is certain that closer union is not desirable ; and, if our arguments be correct, neither is entire se[)aration ; conse([uently we may conclude that Federalism would not be ' out of place. \''. I 122 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION, f • ■I And if it be a correct statement that * ITS MISSION is TO UNITK TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHAT IS' CAPABLE OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF UNION AND NO MORE,' Can there be tlie shadow of a doubt that it is exactly the remedy needed to-day by the British Empire, inasmuch as its history i)roves incontestably that its members are capable of a certain amount of union and no more ? Almost every one of Mr. Freeman's theories as to the * circum- stances under whicli a Federal union is desirable ' finds its counterpart in the present relations of England and her Colonies. Hence, if that gentleman be correct, the Empire is admirably suited to const'tute a Federation such as we propose should be formed. Another great thinker, however, has enunciated his views on this subject. Mr. Mill, in his work on Repre- sentative Government, has devoted a chapter to the Federal form of it ; and in it he carefully inquires into the qualifications calculated to fit different countries for be- coming members of a Federation. We will not say that we endorse all he says ; but as we do not wish to si? . 'k from meeting 'the whole truth' wherever it may bo found, we shall endeavour to apply his principles to the case before us. The first requisite for a Federation is,, according to Mr. Mill, the existence of a large amount of mutual sympathy amongst its members : — ' To render a Federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufii- cient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The Federation binds them always to fight on the same side ; and if they have such feelings towards one another, or such diversity towards their neighbours, that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the Federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, nor to be well observed Avhilst it subsists. The sympathies available for the f^irpose are those of race, language, and m MR. MILL OX FEDERALISM. 123 religion, and, above all, of political Institutions, as conducinjjf most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When a few free states, separately insufficient for their own defence, are hemmed in on all sides hy military or feudal monarch s, who hate and despise freedom even in a neighbour, those states have no chance of preserving liberty and its blessings but by a Federal union. The common interest arising from this cause, has, in Swit- zerland, for several centuries, been found adequate to maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only of diversity of religion, when religion was the grand source of political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spito of great weakness in the constitution of the Federation itself. In America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point, with the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single, but most important, article of slavery, this one difference has gone so far in alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the Union that the main- tenance or disruption of a tie of so much value to them both depends upon the issue of an obstinate civil war.' We are content to endorse the whole of the above extract, and to undertake to prove that such ' an amount of mutual sympathy ' as is therein described exists between the several members of the Em])ire which it is proposed to unite. In i)roof of the existence of such sympathy we j)oint to tho existence of the Empire under present con- ditions of union. For the senior member of a firm to inform the junior partners that they can leave Avhenever they please, is a course not very likely to strengthen their affection or respect for him : sympathetic feelings will, in such a case, continue to exist rather in spite of his conduct than in consequence of it. Yet what other conduct than the above has the ruling })arty in England been ])ursuing towards the Colonies for the last twenty-five years ? i"ij m It ;!l (, ll Hi 124 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. Ever since the adoption of free trade an ostentatious repetition of the statement that they could have their independence whenever they wished, has been dinned in their ears ; Canada, in fact, has been all but told to ' get out.' But what is the reply of one and all? At the present day how stands the case ? Canada has been, and is, wooed by Yankee annexationists; insulted by English emancipationists ; told that, in tiic event of war, her lands and cities must be the battle-ground of England and America ; enjoys a foretaste of sucii a lot in being ex- posed to Fenian raids; sees British troops withdrawn even whilst these ruffians sit in council on projects of attack ; hears that she must bear the cost of ercctin<x fortresses and of raising a provincial force to garrison them, and provide for her own defence in a war which nuiy arise in consequence of quarrels in which she has not any direct concern ; and this whilst her influence avails not the Aveight of a straw in favour of either war or peace. Yet does she flinch ? New Zealand is exposed to the inroads of raging savages ; and troops, alone able to defend her people, have been or- dered to be withdrawn whilst they Avere being massacred. Cape Colony is told that it will soon be left in a like position to New Zealand, and that against a race Avhose ])rowess has been significantly displayed in times past. The West Indies stand almost ruined by English legis- lation during the last forty years. And all find those matters on which their very life de[)ends settled for them, without appeal, by English ministers, intent above all things on conciliating a majority of the House of Commons, and are left in the position of inferiority necessarily incident to Colonies ; yet what signs of disloyalty are to be seen ? The reality, or the prospect, of troubles from Maories, Kaffirs, Negroes, Fenians, Yankees, subor- dination and possible ruin, are calmly faced ; and from one and all is heard the steady asseveration of love: ' " For !. I m* MR. MILL S FIRST CONDITION FULFILLED. 125 better for worse ; for richer for poorer ; in sickness or in health, till death do us part " will we stand to old Kngland I ' Or, in the language lately used by a New Brunswick minister : ' Though she slay us, yet will we trust her.' Surely Avhen, under a system of government which in- duces so many of these disturbing causes, such a burning spirit of loyalty to the Fatherland can exist, it would not l)e lessened under another system w^hereby many of them would be removed ? If any of our readers should doubt that this would be the case, we advise him to pay a short visit to ' this Canada of ours,' and see for himself the almost romantic love and admiration for everything British that therein exists, and which we doubt not is, from similar causes, developed in other Colonies. It can never be otherwise in any of them until such a quarrel as was waged with the United States has trans[)ired. To the colonist his Fatherland is classic ground. The man who has exchanged it for a new land looks back with a sort of happy melancholy on the scenes of his childhood, and feels for them much of the holy reverence with which we recall rominiscences of a beloved parent in the grave. The native colonist has his ears fed from infancy Avith accounts of the glories of the old land beyond the sea, and of the greatness of the sovereign who rules over it and over him. He passes to the village school and drinks in the Ifistort/ of Eiif/lnnd with greedy appetite ; finds his bosom swell with that exquisite joy which every ardent youth experiences on learning the glories of his Fatherland ; but in the present instance, that land being at a distance, has cast over it, to his eyes, a 'dim religions light ' which makes those glories appear more exquisitely beautiful, and thus renders them still more heart-entrancing, than in ordinary cases. He grows to manhood, and learns that all the liberties which he enjoys he inherits from Britain ; that the conservation of T ilU.i^.J..!..J.J._JU! R_ll.l»» ]2G A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. his national freedom mainly depends on the alliance with her ; that much of the garments in which he is clothed, of the tools with which he works, and, more important than all, of the books which he reads, have been derived from the same source ; besides Avhich, he sees that the development of the Land he inhabits must be effected mainly by the importation of British labour and capital. Thus, veneration for the past, pride in the present, and hope for the future, all combine to turn his heart towards the Fatherland with feelings akin to those with which a lloman of old looked on the City of the Seven Hills, and to make him boast his British citizenship with as much jjr.ide as ever any man felt on being able to say : ' Civis Romanus sum!'' One point, at all events, is certain; and that is, that should an adequate amount of sympathy be wanting, the deficiency will not be found in the Colonies. On the other hand late events, and the reception which an emancipationist policy has met with in the United Kingdom, seem to indicate that something of the same sacred flame which glowed in the breast of the immortal Chatham when in his dying moments he prayed that if Britain must fall she might at least fall with honour, still warms the hearts of the great-grandsons of those who heard him. When that spirit has become extinct the sym[)athy requisite to keep the Empire united will be wanting — but not until then. Mr. Mill goes on to say : — ' A second condition of the stability of a Federal Government is that the separate states should not be so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own liberty of action ; and consequently, when- ever tlie policy of the Confederation in things reserved i I ; nv^^ MR. mill's second coxditiox fulfilled. 127 to its cognizance is different from that wliicli any one of its members would separately pursue, the internal and sectional breach will, through absence of sutficient anxiety to preserve the union, be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it.' AVe will grant these theories, also, to be correct. In the case of the Colonies it is clear that ti»e condition is fulfilled. There is not one of them that could ' rely for j)rotection against foreign encroachment on its own in- dividual strength.' A consciousness of this fact is one of the causes which to-day render them so intensely desirous as they are to maintain the connection, and the motive would exist as strongly after Federation as at present. It may be said that the contrary is the case as regards England — that she could not only maintain her in- dependence alone, but much more easily when alone than whilst united to the Colonies ; and that a consciousness of this * fact ' is what renders some of her peo})le anxious to end the connection. This, also, may be correct. But if we have succeeded in proving that England would be a direct loser by emancipation — of which proposition it is certain that she would have to be convinced before agree- ing to adopt the Union proposed — such a feeling could not continue under the new regime^ even did the military relations remain on their former footing ; and much less could this feeling last were the martial resources of the orowins: Colonies utilized and brouj^lit to increase the common fund, as we propose should be done. \\e. shall show, hereafter, that by this means the martial strength of England would be enormously increased, which fact would render her probably as anxious as other members to maintain the connection on account of the increased strength which would be derived therefrom. Hence we conclude that Mr. Mill's second condition wnuld be ful- filled in the present instance. t I ! S 128 A COLONIST ON THE COLON FAL QUESTION ; I U i n l':i a f The next, and concluding, condition which Mr. Mill declares to be essential to a Federation is stated as follows : — * A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states. They cannot, indeed, be exactly equal in resources: in all Federations there will be a gradation of power among the members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilised than others. There is a wide difference in population and wealth between New York and Khode Island ; between Berne and Z ,' y, ris. The essential is that there should not be an/ c^ ir. • • so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If the.-^^ ^^e such a one, and only one, it will insist on being ; it r of the joint deliberations ; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree ; and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.' ^ It must be admitted that this condition is not fulfilled in the case of England and her Colonies. The British Islands would be much more powerful than all the Colonies, and could for many years outvote them in the Federal Parliament. Their division into three states by the formation of separate local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland, as we have proposed, would bring the situation more into accordance with Mr. Mill's theorv than if they formed only one state ; though even England alone would probably return at first one-half the members of the Lower House. But let it not be inferred that Federation is impossible, in consequence of the non- existence of this one of Mr. Mill's conditions for a Fede- ral Union. The danger which he indicates is that of one ' Representative Government (People's edition), pp. 124, 126. MR. MILLS THIRD REQUISITE EX^VMIXED. 129 as? state capable of vying with many, insisting on being master of the joint deliberations. Before this can be done, the people and re])re.sentatives of that one state must be united against all the rcf^t. But the interests and feelings of the inhabitants of P^ngland are so very various and conflicting that the formation of such a union seems to be almost beyond the reach of possibility, and is certainly beyond probability. Moreover, England is precisely the country which, from the character of its people, and of its legislators, would be least likely of all the members of the Federation to seek for an unfair advantage at the expense of the Empire. The single point on which it is possible that these moral influences might be overcome, is that of the acquisition of commercial ascendancy ; and that is exactly the point on which it is most improbable that the representatives of her rural, manufacturing, and mercantile interests could unite. Besides this, such a union would be almost useless ; if, according to the scheme which we have sketched, the arrangement of the details of the commercial policy of the several members of the Federation were left to be settled by the local legislatures, and its grand principles fixed once for all on the initiation of the Union. On other matters there would be scarcely any temptation for England to unite against the rest of the Empire ; and on this one it is scarcely possible that such a union could be either effected or effective. But in considering the ])ositi()n which England vvould occupy in the proposed Federation, that occupied by the Colonies hi the Emj)ire of to-day should not be forgotten. Thoy now possess no injiuence whatever in reference to the sub- jects which would fall under the action of the Federal Government. Under a Federation of the Emi)ire they would enjoy a considerable amount of influence imme- diately, and more with the la])se of years. If they are loyal to England at present, Avhen she monoi)olises all the f l^il' ;^,iwmxr\.m.j%jmw\... 'li 1 H' I 11 lv)0 A COLOMST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTION. prerogatives of the Federal Government, would they he less loyal if she, ceasing to do so, should admit them to a share in the loftiest sphere of government, to all the honours of her time-honoured Parliament and of the ]\linisterial henches, to the glories of the army and navy, and to the viceroyalties of mighty kingdoms? If the influence of England over the destinies of the Em{)ire to- day is not too great to be consistent with its voluntary and loyal union, could it be too great if diminished, as it necessarily would be, under Federation? The results of an application of Mr. Mill's principles to the case before us may not be so encouraging as those whi(!h followed from tho similar operation with those of Mr. Freeman ; but we are, nevertheless, of opinion that nearly all the conditions which he declares to be requisite to render a Federation advisable are to be found in it ; and that counteracting influences may be relied on as substitutes for the little that may be wanting. We are aware that Mr. Mill takes a different view of the case : but his arguments to prove that these conditions are wanting are based on emancipationist theories, and of course fall with them ; other difficulties which he sujiffcsts we shall consider further on. Meanwhile we think it may fairly be assumed that tlie circumstances of the British Empire approach very closely to those under Avhich these gentlemen affirm an application of Federalism to be prac- ticable and desirable. The circumstances which would tend to hinder the administration of the government of the Empire according to the 2)roposed system have next to be considered. 1. When inquiring into the possibility of a Federal Government fulfilling its duties to the Empire, we quoted ]\Ir. Mill's opinions on the feasibility of a Federation of its parts, but omitted to analyze any other portion of them than that which related to the point immediately under FURTIIKR DIFFICULTIES CONSIDKRHD. 131 ey be n to a ill the of the nav V , If the lire to- iintary 1, as it nciplesj s those lose of m that iquisite in it ; on as ^Ve are e case ; t)ns are and of Lijisests it may British h thes(; e prac- would nent of ve next ederal quoted tion of )f them under review. The statements tlien left unnoticed must now be examined. Mr. Mill says of England and her Colonies : ' If they had sufficiently the same interests, ihey have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are no j)art of the same ])ublic; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only an imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct.' We are willing to admit that a difficulty might be found to exist here. But we think that it could within a very short time be overcome. The fact is that the disciple of ' progress ' here shuts his eyes to the effects of progress. This is nothing more than is done by his brethren whenever progress seems likely to sap the foundations of any darling theory, so he must not be judged very severely ; but the effect of his action is to lead to a false conclusion. Were communication now as tardy as it was at the beginning of this century, there could be no doubt of Mr. Mill's theories proving correct. It is different, however, when the proceedings of the Imi)erial Parliament are read in Canada, and will shortly be read in Australia, much sooner than at the former period they were read in Ireland, or even in Scot- land, xilready such news is greedily sought after, giving proof of an earnest interest in the affairs of the Father- land ; but how much more earnestly would it be sought after if there were sitting in London a legislature in which the Colonies were represented, and in the pro- ceedings of which they were directly interested? That they have not already ' a sufficient habit of taking counsel together ' is due, in a great measure, to the laborious efforts which have been made to disintegrate them. That they ' never can ' have such a habit, we, who have seen columns of Canadian newspapers filled with Englisli. k2 ¥<'■ / i 132 A COLONIST ON thl: colonial qukstion. or European, intelligence of the previous day, must be permitted to doubt, nay, even to believe that they tv/w acquire such a habit. The disposition for taking such counsel would be enlarged by the need of it which would be induced by union ; and the means of suj)plying in- stantaneous communication are practically illimitable. The fuller and calmer counsel needed would be supplied by newspapers and periodicals, which could travel across the Atlantic in about ten days, and to or from the Antipodes in about six weeks. The higher class of periodical literature read in Canada already consists almost entirely of English magazines and reviews. Their circulation would certainly be extended in all the Colonies with the increased interest in much of their contents which Avould result from Federation. Finallv, the meet- ing of the representatives of these dift'erent countries in the legislative halls, and their proceedings therein, would constitute an interchange of thought between them, and that the thoughts of their noblest men. We confess that we should not be very sorry to see such men left pretty free to act on their own judgment, and would rejoice if the condition of the Empire should tend to make our statesmen leaders of public opinion instead of its followers, and we admit that we believe they would become such. But, in the presence of such facilities of communication as we have seen would exist, it is just as unlikely that any representative could be led to sacrifice the interests of his constituents through ignorance, or that the feeling of any province regarding the various measures in progress could be mistaken, as is the case to-day with the members and constituencies of the United Kingdom. It is difficult to see what further * taking of counsel ' than that neces- sary to attain such a result would be needed ; the inter- change of this much would be secured by the co-existence of the want and the means of supplying it. EXCiF.lSH AND COLONIAL SOCIKTV. O'} rogress 2. It injiy be said that the framework of socievy in the United Kingdom and in the Coh>nies is essentially differ- ent, being in the former case aristocratic and in the latter democi-atic ; that this fact is likely to render the whole tendency of political thonght diverse in each of these sections of the Empire, and that such diversity would be a standing menace to unity. We are content to admit that it might prove to be a difficulty in the way. Differ- ence of institutions in any form is not calculated to induce that unity of national sentiment which in its fullest development constitutes patriotism. Denuncia- tions of * bloated aristocracies ' might be likely to form a staple ingredient in the harangues of colonial dema- gogues, and assertions to the effect that the interests of the Empire were being sacrificed to those of a selfish oligarchy would, doubtless, not be wanting. But what more would such language be than that which ie now, and long has been, heard almost daily in England itself without inducing any disturbance of the public peace or of the structure of society ? There have always been another side of the case to be presented and a party to present it, and the same would be the case in the Colonies. The distance between the extreme Aving of each party in England is quite as wide as that which exists between English Tories and Colonial Radicals. The latter are, it is probable, much more firmly attached to monarchical institutions than are their Advanced Liberal brethren in Enjjland. ' Distance lends enchantment to the view ' of democracv in the one case, and of a sovereign in the other. And in the case of Colonial Tories, a near contact with democracy has, by forcing them to enter into con- troversy with it face to face, implanted a reason for the faith that is in them, often more clear and consistent than that of English Conservatives. Nor must it be supposed that colonial society is of a cast exclusively democratic. iir' I!. ill 'iin T f ! ■ f 1 ■ > I |.i I - 4 1;U A COLOMST OX THK COLOMAh QUKSTIO.V. In every couiitiy, poelcty, if allowed ])cacelMlly to devc loj) itself, inihst beeoiue iiicrensiTin;ly aristoeratie with the lapse of years, For the 8imj)le reason that as ' power hej^ets power,' those who have inherited or acennmlated property are constantly being placed in a more advnntai^eons posi- tion for increasing it. The progress of civilization is the progress of inequalities. The wealth or knowledge of the ' labouring classes ' may have been increased very much of late years, but that of the rich or learned has been augmented in a much greater proportion. These natural itifluences are making themselves felt in the Colonies, and will be felt still more in the future. Neither can it be said that that mad worship of ' equality ' which is the leading characteristic of democracies, ])re vails in them. So long as honours are open to all, a colonist feels no jealousy at others than himself gaining them, and always seems pleased at the attainment of them by colonial statesmen from the Im))erial Government. But the main point behind all these facts is that the framework of society in every part of the Empire would be a matter of local concern exclusivelv. AVere the members of the Upper House of the Federal Legislature not hereditary legislators, it would be impossible for any man in the Emi)ire to acquire power otherwise than on the same terms in every part of it. This being the case, and the laws of real property within the control of the local Government in each country, the facts that a different tenure of land, or greater or less equality of condition, prevailed in one part of the Federation than in another could never lead to controversv in the Federal Lcirisla- ture ; and so long as it failed to induce that, it would be as powerless to create ill-feeling between the several parts of the Empire as it is to-day. The Federation Avould form a league of nations united in sympathy by ties of lan- guage, race, religion, and historic glory ; and in interest SCANTY CULOXIAL UKPKKSK.NTATK ).V. 1 '"»'i I)y commercial aiul polit'u^iil consitlenitions wliich woiilil rcudir tln'ii iiiiidM coiiviucivo to tl>c urowtli of (lu'ii- wc'iilth and iliu (M)nservatioii of tlieii* III)ortIos. Ihidcr tliese ciroumst'inccs, tlicy could suicly allow each m('inl)c'i' to ^^ his own house in such order as he mi<;lit jnefor, wi A quarrelliuf^ in reference to details, when they would be united in a common love of those «>;raii(l j)riM- ci})les of liberty and order enunciated in the (ireat Charter. 3. The small proportion of colonial representation in the Federal Legislature at its inception, and its sul)se([uent probable or j)()ssible increase, are alternately used as arguments against Federation. The former dilhculty has come before us in tlie third of Mr. Mill's conditions ; con- cerning the latter he seems des j)erately frightened. ' Let any Englishman,' he says, * ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which onc- thi' was British-American, and another third South- A 1 and Australian?' It n)ay fairly be replied that these different fears, in a great measure, destroy one •another. The Fatherland, profiting by the growth of its offspring, is not likely, in the face of their iiu^reasing power, either to wish or to strive to act unjustly towards them. The offspring, tenderly guarded in youth, and generously treated in maturity, are equally unlikely to feel any jealousy of the guardian to whom they have been indebted for civil liberty, local inde])endence, and imperial nationality, and on whose protection they may still be dependent for the conservation of these l)less- ings. Thus, interest, affection, and prudence would unite to prevent either side from pushing its j)()wers t(» excess. Still less formidable does either danger ai)poar when viewed in detail. It is true that at first the Colonies could not be entitled to over twenty per cent, of the representation. Still such a proportion is by no means insignificant. It is double that which Scotland m' i'K i( ' 4i fl t i mm» lo6 A COLONIST OX THE COLOXIAL QUK>TION. i:i ,1 I has possessed in the Imperial Parliament, and which has been found amply sufficient to ensure due attention to all the interests of that country. On questions in which the constitutional riglits of any Colony were involved, there can be little doubt that the colonial representatives would vote together as one man ; for the rights of all the Colonies being identical, to suffer any one of them to be oppressed would serve to establish a precedent against the remainder. As colonial interests are diversified, there might be less unity in the defence of them than of that of colonial rights. But even in this case it is pretty certain that a good deal of fellow-feeling would ])revail, and lead colonists to act together, unless where their interests Avould directly clash. In the former case it is probable, if not positive, that a compact body of one-fifth or even one-sixth of the House would always find suffi- cient support to secure respect for the privileges guaran- teed by the act of union. And in the event of a conflict of interests arising, a similar result would probably ensue from like causes, unless when the policy arraigned should appear favourable to colonial interests generally as well as to those of England, in which case it would not be desirable that the special interest assailed should prevail against them. With each member of the Federation regu- lating its own tariff, as we have proposed, the material interests with which the Federal Legislature would have to deal would be so few that there seems little danger of any conflict arising in reference to them ; and on ques- tions of peace and Avar there is no chance at all of England proving too bellicose for the Colonies, whilst they — with boundless lands uninhabited — are not likely to be affected with any lust of conquest. In no instance could the wishes of any province be neglected, or its interests sacrificed, without its being able to explain and defend its position to a statesmanlike audience. At CHANCE OF ENGLAND BEING OUTNU.NfBERED. 1 ')' re vail present, one portion of the Empire can ami does legislate against the interests and wishes of the vest of it, without there being any remedy and scarcely any hearing for the parties aggrieved. Under this system the heart of the British people remains so sound that in the Colonies scarcely .any, and in the British Islands comparatively few, desire dismemberment. Is it not, then, improbable that, under a system of government in which each country would be forced to consider the interests of otheis as well as its own, disturbing causes more powerful than those which have as yet proved insufficient to induce a disruption of the Empire would be introduced ? A small colonial representation would suffice, because colonial rio-hts and intsrests would be otherwise guarded against assault from the legislative majority, whilst that small proportion would steadily increase. In regard to Mr. Mill's bugbear of the ultimate effect of this increase in * an assembly of which one-third was British- American, and another third South-African and Australian,' we Avould remark that the time Avhen the representation of either of these countries would be equal to that of the • British Islands lies so far off" in the dim future that we may fairly be excused from regarding it as a practical point of debate in our day. It is pretty certain, how- ever, that by the time such an event could occur, England would have little reason to fear any hostile combination, as the idiosyncrasies of different parts of the territories indicated would then be so well developed that Xova Scotia would have quite as little in common with British Columbia, or New Zealand with Queensland, as either with England. Furthermore, it is e(iually certain that, should the union last until such changes might occur, its existence could have been maintained only by the disap- pearance of all such local jealousies as are here hinted at. It may, thei efore, fairly be presumed that if our desceud- I'lf m 138 A (.'OLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUIvSTION. ■I ! ])•( ants could agree to live together for so long a period, they could also agree to some measure whereby the difH- culty, should it arise, might be overcome. Nay, we are inclined to think that provision for meeting it might be made even in the act of union ; and, as Mr. Mill's fears are likely to be echoed in England, we shall endeavour to explain the manner in Avhlch \ve think this could be done. It was this difficulty which we had in view when we said that we did not consider the first basis of repre- sentati(m should be regarded as unalterable. The proposed Federation would constitute emi)hatically a league of nations, one in race, language, history, and feelings, and probably in interests, but divided Tiom each other by such vast distances that any attempt to intro- duce uniform it If of institutions amongst them would be sheer madness : to keep them always friends and allies is the i»:reat end which should be souuht after in Federation. Under these circumstances the exact distribution of poli- tical power would be of nuich less consequence than in a territory geographically united. AYe are, therefore, of opinion that it would not be essential to the Colonies to insist on- a permanently progressive increase in the pro- portion of their representatives, after their collective re- presentation had become equal to that of the British Islands. We Avould propose to have it provided that, after that j)oint had been reached, the proportion of re- presentation should remain unaltered until the proportion of colonial taxation had become identical Avith that of their representation ; and that thereafter re])resentation and taxation should be apportioned on the same basis, according to which the only title to an increase of repre- sentation would con^st in liability to the payment of an increased proportion of taxation ; and, als' , that a hint should then be taken from the United States, where re- presentation in the two chambers is adjusted on different MIIANS TO .SECURH EXfiLAND. 139 ])rlticiples, and arrangements made to leave the i)rop()rtIon of representation in the Upper House inialtered, save when a new i>rovince should be formed. By means of such measures it is probable that security could be liad against the a|)prehen(led extinction of English influence, without interfering with the o-uarantees for colonial rights. For, in the event of the basis of re))rescntation being made to correspond with that of taxation, England would ])robably be able to hold her own with the Colonics after the time at which it would be established, since the greater part of them would then have ceased to be virgin soil. Or, at all events, the rate of Colonial in- crease would be so slow that the danger foreseen by Mr. Mill might be regarded as postponed sini' (lie, even with- out the security against it afforded by the constituticm of the Upper House. On the other hand, the Colonies would have u'ained, before the chanoe in the basis of representation had been effected, an amount of influence fully sufficient to enforce attention to tlieir rights and interests, and might, possibly, continue to add to it ; whilst the com[)osition of the Upper House, and the fact thjit many of its crown-ap})ointcd mendjcrs would consist of men who had held colonial governorships, would impart to it enough of the judicial character to ren<lcr any iii- cfjuitable action on its part very imj)robal)le. Even diff(;rent principles of action may be needed at different stages of a nation's history; and, l)y thus providing for them in the future, we thiidv that the occurrence of the a})prehended difficulties could be prevented. 4. It has been seen that the existence of a certain amount of sympathy amongst the [)oj)ulations to be united is essential to rendering advisable the formation of any federation, and we have endeavoured to prove the ex- istence of such sympathy in the ))resent case. But it may be replied that the sympathy now existing is a :!«, I 140 A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. consequence of the looseness of the connection which binds together the several members of the Empire, and that Avere an attempt made to unite them more closely by means of a common legislature, the increased interference Avith each other's affairs consequent thereon, would tend to destroy it. Tiiis objection is one that may be brought against any projected union, but it will always prove null and void when the advantages to be gained are in excess of the sacrifices demanded. Seldom, if ever, have the sacrifices required been so small as in the present instance. Federal unitv would not interfere with local independence, and more than local independence no colony does, or ever can, enjoy. The United Kingdom possesses to-day — with a single exception — all the pre- rogatives which it would be necessary to confer upon the Federal Government. The change would consist in the fact that whereas the federal prerogatives are now wielded by only a part of the Empire, they would under a federation be wielded by all. But even then the Federal Legislature would have no more influence over the Colonies — save in the imposition of the regulated share of taxation — than the Imperial Parliament has always exercised. The local Governments Avould be almost as strong as ever they were ; whilst the Colonies would, in addition to former rights, enjoy the privilege of a voice in im])erial affairs. One new cause of dispute in the shape of taxatitm would, indeed, be introduced ; but along witli it would come a corrective, in the shape of represen- tation. To this it may be replied that the disturbing force would be more i)owerful tlian the corrective. We admit that the influence of money has never been better de- scribed than in the happy term ' almighty dollar,' and tliat in the Colonies the love of money is pretty strong and widely diffused. But we assume that, should a Federa- tion of the Empire be formed, it would be done only after ^ THE QUESTION ONE OB^ COMPAR I.SOX. 141 the assent of the Colonies had been obtained, and we think that, if they were to enter into it Avith their eyes open to the increase of taxation, they would l)e prepared to abide by tlieir bargain. That they would voluntarily accept it we are led to believe from the fact that Federa- tion would involve a smaller increase of taxation than would separation, and that when forced — as both Eng- land and they soon must be — to choo'^c between these alternatives, they would choose the least onerous, even if there were not many other considerations to recommend it. In this, as in every other case in this world, that which we have to accept is not absolute good but com- ])arative superiority : some objection will appear to every- thing. The best course is that which jn-omises the greatest amount of advantage at the cost of the smallest amount of sacrifice. If it can be shown that, in the case before us. Federation is the course which answers to this description, it is evident that it should be adoj)ted. We are not afraid to attempt to prove that it would bring to both Fatherland and Colonies all the benefits of connection and separation simultaneously, and this at the cost of smaller sacrifices to either side than would inevitably be induced by separation. Should these benefits follow, as we assert they would, the fact of their so doing would constitute the most powerful element pos.^ible in the stability of the system which had induced them. A flood o^' loyal admiration would be created by which any such diflliculties as those arising from want of taking counsel, slight diversities of landed tenure, differences of repre- sentation, or a slight increase of taxation to sonic of the members, would be crushed out of existence. If Federa- tion should prove to be beneficial, it could not fiil to be stable. We are thus led to the last stage of our subject, viz., whether, supposing Fedoi-ation to bo practicahle, it promises sufificient advantages to render its adoption expedient ? 'ih: 142 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL (QUESTION. \\i CHAPTER VIII. :,( h!! I" mi FEDERATION V. COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE. The last stage of our inquiry has now been reached. V^c have examined the projtosed emancipationist policy, and jriven our reasons for pronouncing it to be essentially pernicious. Admitting, at the same time, that the re- lations between the mother-country and her Colonics cannot long remain on their j)resent footing, we have propounded a scheme in which we believe that a })ractical solution of the colonial question may be found. It re- mains to prove that this solution would be a good one : a practicable solution of a difficulty is one thing, a politic solution is another. Granting that a Federation of the Empire could be established, would it be for the ad- vantage of the parties concerned to adopt it in preference to sc])aratioh ? This, we think, is the fair statement of the question. It is not Federation in the abstract which we have to consider, but Fodei-aticm as comjjared with a disruption of the Empire. )Ve neet not here re})eat our reasons for believing one or other of these measures tt) be inevitable ; we think that very few will dispute the point. In fact, as Lord Bury has well pointed out in the con- cluding chapter of his Exodus of the Western Notions, the separation is already, de facto, concluded. We are lui[)py, however, to be able to add that, as it has not been concluded by law, there is yet time to retrace unfortunate J TIII<] COLOxMKS NOT A(iGKli:\ KU. 14:l steps, and re-establish the union on a new and lasting basis. To arrive at a fair conclusion on the relative merits o(" Federation and separation, it is necessary to survey tlie (juestion from an English and a Colonial 8tand[)()int, as advantages to one of these parties might be obtained at the cost of disadvantajjes to the other. We shall first consider the colonial side of the case, and in so doing shall confine our observations to a comparison of the increased responsibilities which either independence or Federation would necessarily involve, and eschew, as far as ])os- sible, any expression of opinion on details, as a know- ledge of the local affiiirs of each Colony would be requisite to the formation of a correct judgment on them. The spectacle of Colonies being informed that they can become independent at pleasure, and yet refusing the boon, is almost unicjue in the history of the world. It is undoubtedly due to the fact that the governmental, social, and connnercial peculiarities of England, foi the last fifty years, have been such as have led her to confer on the Colonies an amount of freedom from control on the jiart of the su}n'eme Government almost unexam})led ; and, as is now appearing, inconsistent with permanent unioii. A desire to escape from oppression and tyranny on the pai-t of the parent state, is the motive which has usually led colonies to desire nationality. I>ut, in the })resent instance, this motive has no existence. No colonist even attempts to charge the Fatherland with any act of op- pression. For any local evils the Colonies have only themselves to blame, seeing that their local indei)endence is much greater than that of the States of the American Union, and for the same reason the remedy for any evils which may exist is in their own hands. The only charge which is ever made against the connection Avith England IH A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUKSTION. '\i il ■: 11 1'! is that by it they may be involved in wars in which they have no interest ; but, as it certainly preserves them from other Mars in which they would have a very great interest — as we shall prove liereafter — we have no hesi- tation in saying that the Colonies have no reason to desire independence as a means of escape from ex- ])erienced evils, — indeed, we feel confident that ninety- nine per cent, of our fellow-colonists are of the same opinion. It is possible, however, that some of them may reply that they wouhi cease to be of this opinion if tlic terms of unicm were modified according to the basis which we have sketched for a Federation of the Empire, as that measure would interfere with their local indej)endence, and impose on them burdens from which they are now free. We must again remind such parties that unmixed good is to be found nowhere upon earth, and that the loftiest political height which we ever can reach is that state in which the good most preponderates over the ovil. Separation would certainly secure local indepen- dence from the danger of infringement to which it might be exposed under Federation ; but for this security a very heavy price would have to be paid, in the shape of a sacrifice of all the benefits of connection ; and before consenting to its payment, it is at least necessary to be sure that the a})prehended danger to local independence is a reality. There seems to us to be no reasonable ground for siicli apprehension. The union of the Empire would be federal in all its characteristics. Under it certain ])re- rogatives would be granted to each member of the Federa- tion, and would be much more firmly secured than are those enjoyed by the Colonies at the present day, as they would haverepr( sentatives in the Federal Legislature ready to repel any attempt to infringe them, whilst to-day the LOCAL INDEPEXDENCE SECURED. 145 o Licll be )re- 'ra- are ley uly :he Imperial Parliament is legally supreme, and the Colonies are absolutely unrepresented in it. Federation would provide the legal security against aggression which is now wanting. As to the prerogatives to be possessed by the Colonial Governments, the only points in which any cur- tailment of those now enjoyed would be needed are the control of local armaments, but lately forced upon them, and the imposition of a maximum rate of customs, with iir -'^hibition to alter their tariffs save at each decennial adjustment of the assessment of the Empire. It is plain that the former of these curtailments could not, in any way, interfere with local independence, and that thc^ latter would still leave each of the great divisions of the Empire free to arrange its own commercial policy — an amount of independence far in excess of that enjoyed by the States of the American Union. Yet the guarantees against federal oppression would not end here. An un- just distribution of the burdens of taxation, either upon sections or classes, is the form most frequently assumed by the legal injustice in which oppression is usu- ally veiled under representative government. The evil is almost always irremediable when tlie control of the legislature has been acquired by any class or section. But, in the present instance, a most effective security against any such legislative tyranny would form part of the basis of Federation. Neither in the amount of taxa- tion, nor in the manner of raising it, could the Federal Legislature favour any one member, section, or class of the Federation at the expense of another, even should it desire to do so. The liability of each member would be distinctly defined ; hence none could have imposed on it a sum above its fair share. The choice of the ways and means of raising: it would be in the hands of the local Govern- ments ; hence no form of local industry in one section could be sacrificed to benefit a different interest in L ■m hi i': < W:\ 140 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. M anotlicr. Property lieing thus guarded aicainst injustiee, no other form of federal o))[)resHion need be feared by any Colony, slriee the British Islands, if not all parts of the Empire, would be equally interested in opjtosiug it. In coiisi(lerin<r this questicm, an iidiabitant of the Colonics nuist remember that he would, imder Federation, oeeu|)y a })osition altogether different from that whieh he holds as a colonist. lie and his fellow-eountryinerj in the IJritish Islands would stand on exa(;tly the same footitig — perfect equality would be established between them. And instead of the whole force of the United Kingdom beinii" brouiiht to the aid of the Federal Government, as was formerly the case, its inhabitants would have a common interest with those of the Colonies in forcing the Federal Government to keep within its constitutional limits. This tendency on their part, would, moreover, increase Avith the growth of colonial representation, with which would also increase the power of the Colonies to repel any infringement of their rights. It is agreed that the ' composite state system,' or that in which the federal authority acts directly on the inhabitants of the Federation, and not on the local Governments, is the only form of federal government which possesses the elements of stability. It is that which is established in Canada and in the States. Yet it is very improbable that, if Canada were to become independent, the prerogatives of the local Governments would be increased at the expense of those appertaining to the Government of the Dominion ; and it is certain that no Canadian, West Indian, or Australasian would oj)pose annexation on the ground that the American constitution, legally administered, fails to grant a sufficient share of local independence to the States. Yet local independence under the Canadian form of Federation is less than that existinc; hi the States, and that existing in the States is less than that IXCRHASE OF TAXATION'. 147 which would exist under the proposed terms of union. It' local Indepcndinice would be safe in the former cases, surely it would be safe in the latter, when special pro- vision would be made against almost the only form of federal oppression which the Colonies would have any reason to fear from English selfishness or sectionalism. The fact is that, so long as these terms were observed, the auiount of local inde[(endence would be much in excess of that ever enjoyed umlerany composite state goverument. It is im[)ossil)Ie to provide (Constitutional securities against daniiers arising; from violations of the law; but the circum- stances of the Jiritish Empire are such that any attemjjt tt) destroy I'lcal independence in it would be an absurdity too great to be entertained. The fact of its being physically impossible for any one legislature to attend to all the concerns of the Em})ire would alone form a strong guarantee against any illegal attempt being made to render the Federal Government, or the British Islands, absolute ; though we think that few colonists would refuse to take the ])lightod faith of the ' old country ' for this and a great deal more alst). As to legal securities, we have seen that they would be much greater than could otherwise be attained. The colonists, however, may reply that, even admitting local indei)endence to be safe under Federation, a further objection to it is to be found in the increased taxation which it would induce. The objection is of a really practical character ; but the mere fact that such an increase would follow on Federation does not carry with it a condemnation of the scheme. Independence would likewise induce increased expenditure and taxation, ji> the Colonies would then be forced to supply the arma- ments needed to maintain order ajxainst internal, and freedom against foreign, foes. Increased taxation being thus inevitable, they nmst, to judge fairly, compare the L 2 ,l|i il iM ii, I i :. i h I'., i n 148 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QIKSTION. increase which Federation and separation would each induce. We have no doubt of being able to satisfy any impartial inquirer that, in such a comparison, the balance would be in favour of Federation. We have already seen that in the case of Ontario the probable increase would be only 7s. i)d. i)cr head, and this althouj^h we omitted to take the wealth of any other part of the Empire than those of it and of the United Kingdom into account in estimathig the assessment, and stated that the wealth of that province is indisputably much greater, proportionately, than that of any other ])art of British America. Allowing for these circum- stances, there can be little chance of the rate for any other of the Colonies proving to be in excess of that for Ontario. We believe that, on the contrary, many of them would not have to pay nearly so much, but are content to let this pass, and, assuming 7s. 9d. per head as the average amount of federal taxation to which colonists would be liable, to compare it with the probable increase which would be induced by separation. Independence would bring to each Colony fresh charges, in the shape of expen- diture necessary to maintain an army and navy, and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. No nation has, in time of peace, ever reduced these charges to such a low point as have the United States. We may therefore fairly conclude that the Colonies coukl not escape at least as high a proportion of taxation for these purposes as the States have to bear. According to the report of the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury for the year 1870, the expenditure of the War Department in the year ending June 30, 1870, was 57,655,675 dollars ; that of the Xavy Department 21,780,229 dollars; and that of the Diplomatic Service 1,490,776 dollars. We have here a total of 80,926,681 dollars, which sum divided by 38,555,000, the population w TAXATION UXDKR I.N'DIII'K.VDKXCK. 140 of the States in the aamc year, f^ivcs t>To dollars ami ten cents, or 8.v. 9^^. sterling per head — an exi)enditiire about l.s\ j)er head greater than that whieh Federation would bring to Ontario. It is true that since the above year a reduction of expenditure has been effected by cut- ting down the army ; but even after this the decrease is very slight. The ' appropriations,' or sums voted, for the financial year ending June 30, 1872, were 38,727,172 dollars for the army; 21,122,657 dollars for tlie Navy Department, and 1,529,134 for the Diplomatic Service, befng a total of 61,378,963 dollars, or 6.?. 7j^d. per head. And the estimates for 1873 were 52,224,033 dollars for war, 20,586,498 for the navy, and 1,208,634 for dii)lo- macy, making a total of 74,019,165 dollars, or 8*'. sterling per head. Hence it appears that, even if the emancipated Colonies could reduce their military, naval, and diplomatic expen- diture to the same rate per head as that of the United States, they would have to pay, according to the returns of 1870, about Is. per head more than the increase which Avould be induced by Federation ; according to the appropriations for 1872, Is. l^d. less, and according to the estimates for 1873 about 3d. more. But it is per- fectly certain that even if the lowest rate of expenditure should suffice for the States, it Avould not prove sufficient to keep on foot anything approaching to a force adequate to guard effectually the liberties of the new nationalities. Sup[ j; troops to cost as much in the Colonies as they o in the States, which it is certain that they would. It is clear thu* the Colonies could, at the States' rate of expen- diture per head, raise only a force beaiing the same pro- ]iortion to the population which the American army bears to that of the Union. The population of the States in 1870 was 38,555,( Oil ; their army at the same time num- bered 37,383 men, or one for every 1031 of the population. tf •*1 III: "(1 ti T i Kri ■ I .( ■ 1 h i .!■■ '1 . ;l 1 , i V 1 1 , ' j ill I !' 1 M iih 1 50 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. Taking it, for the sake of round iiuni1)ers, at one in 1,000, we find tliat the States' rate of expenditure would enable Canada, with a poj)ulation slightly under 4,000,000, to raise at most an army of 4,000 men ; Australasia, with a ])()pulation under 2,000,000, one of uot more than 2,000 men ; the AVest Indies, with about 1 ,100,000, a regiment of 1,100 men; and South Africa, with 427,000 inhabitants, less than half a regiment. AYe do not think that even Canadian or Australasian Josei)li Humes would dare to j)ropjse smaller standing armies than these, or fleets less than a tenth and twentieth })art that of the States, if they had any intention whatever of eschewing a ])olicy of non-resistance, or making any effort at all in defence of their national and political freedom. But to maintain even forces such as these would require an expenditure one-seventh greater than that Avliich we have seen to be the heaviest rate of contribution likely to be induced by Federation. This single fact is of course sufficient to prove that. In the matter of taxaticm, the balance is in favour of Fede- ration and against ind'^j)endence. But this is not all. \Vhen examinirig the probable increase of taxation which would be induced by Federation, we said that we would thereafter show how the ap})arent increase of 7.v. dd. per head, would be largely reduced through the transfer of certain charges, now borne by the Colonial Governments, to the Federal excliequer. The Federal Government would have exclusive control of armaments ; consequently colonial local revenues would be relieved from all charoes for militia, volunteers, oi* naval forces. It would derive a revenue from the Colonies, and would have to defray the cost of its collection ; and if the management of the Post Office should form one of its duties, it would ha\c to meet all the charges of the packet service. In the liuancial year ending June 30, 1870, Canada expended SAVINGS !>' J.OUAL EXPEND ITLRi:. 151 1,245,972 (lolliirs on militia and defence, 343,.3()8 dollars on ocean and river steam service, and .30,3,109 dollars in the collection of customs. These items amount collect- ively to 2,094,.')y9 dollars ; but, as about lialf the customs revenue would have sufficed to meet the chari^cs of the Federal revenue, we deduct 2o2,.3.34 dollars, l)ein;j!; half the cost of their collection. This leaves a total of 1,841, SIM dollars, or 3H0,o44/. sterling, of annual expen- diture from vhicli Canada would be relieved by Fedei-a- tion. This sum, distributed over a |)oi)ulation of 3,484,924, l)ein<'* that of the Dominion acc(/rdiny: to the census of 1871 , would be ecjual to a reduction of about 2.v. 7(i. per head, and would bring down the increased taxation conseciuent on Fedei'ation from 7.s". \)d. })er head to about o.s. '2d. As wj are not in possession of details of the expenditure of other Colonies on these services, we cannot say to what sum the saving would elsewhere amount. It is pretty certain, however, that the reduction conseciuent on the transfer of these items from the Colonial to the Federal Government, would tend to reduce the increase of taxa- tion very consiilerably everywhere ; nor can it be said thiit the transfer of these items would increase the Federal expenditure proi)ortionately, so that the saving anouM not be real. \V'e have, in calculating the probable amount of Federal exi)enditure, allowed 2,000,000/. to meet such increase as might result from the transfer of these items. The saving to the Colonies would consist in the fact that whilst they are now liable for the whole of those charges, they would, under Federation, be liable only for their jToportion of then). Savings on these items WM)uld be indubitable, and could scarcely fail to reduce the increase of taxation to about one-half that which would ibllow on indcjiendence with an expenditure at the same rate as that of the States. But it is by no means impossible that a still iurther reduc- • !.; ! ! ill il! , ,1 1 ii\ M ■ h ■h ]■■ ] *. 152 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. tion might be made. Should the Colonies consent to bear equal taxation with England for Federal expenditure, the Fatherland, we presume, would be inclined to help to render their burden as light as possible. This we think that she might do by simply lending them her name. Colonial debts generally bear 6 per cent, interest ; none less than 5, save when guaranteed. England can borrow at 3 per cent., or, to be within the mark, we Avill say 3^. Of course the Federal Government would be able to do the same. Were it to borrow money sufficient to dis- charge the colonial debts, pay them, and lend the money to the Colonies at the reduced rate of interest, the saving would, in some cases, not only suffice to pay the whole contribution to the Federal revenue, but also leave a handsome balance behind. Mr. Baxter, we have seen, estimates the debts of the Australasian Colonies at 35,744,000/. Much the greater part of it bears interest at 6 per cent. A saving of 2^ per cent, on this rate would aggregate 893,600/. sterling per annum, being about 9.9. per head, or far above the entire sum for which they would be liable to the Federal revenue. In the case of Canada there is a debt of 31,824,000 dollars, bearing interest at 5 per cent., payable in London ; another of 34,289,000 dollars, at 6 per cent., also payable in London, and 7,479,300 dollars, at 6 per cent., payable in Canada. On the first of these debts a saving of 1^ per cent, would amount to 477,360 dollars ; on the second, a saving of 2^ per cent, to 857,225 dollars ; and on the third, a saving at the same rate, to 186,982 dollars, being a total saving of 1,521,567 dollars, or 314,373/. sterling, or about Is. dd. per head on the population of the Dominion, according to the census of 187 1 , which, deducted from 5s. 'Id. per head — the rate to which we have seen that the increase would be reduced by the transfer of expenditure on militia, &c. — would reduce the increased taxation on Canada to about 3a\ 5d. per head. In the 4' TAXATION LIGHTEST UXDER FEDERATIOX. 153 rl H the 3tecl een i of sed the West Indies, owing to the small amount of the debts and the fact that many of them are already guaranteed, the saving would be small. But in South Africa, where, in 1868, the debt of Natal was 263,000/. at 6 per cent. ; that of the Cape 846,2oOZ. at the same rate, and 255,400/. at 5 per cent., the saving would amount to 6,575/. for Natal, and 24,987/. for the Cape, or almost J. v. 6d. per head on their population of 425,476, as it was stated in the same year. Thus it appears that, if this measure could be adopted, the savings in local expenditure conse(j[uent on Federation would reduce the increase of taxation very largely in South Africa, to a very insignificant sum in British America, and cause,, not an increase, but a decline of taxation in Australasia ; and that, leaving the payment of debts out of sight, the sure and certain reduction in local expenditure from the transfer of certain charges to the Federal Government, would render the balance of cheapness enormously in favour of Federation against independence, since we have seen that in the case of British America, the former would at the worst induce an increased taxation of only 5s. 2d. per head, and the latter one of Ss. 9d. So far as taxation is concerned, there can be no doubt that there is an overwhelmino" case in favour of Federation.' But the relative amount of taxation is only one point in the coni))arison : the returns to be received in cxcliange for taxation are quite as important couiridenitions as the sums which may have to be paid. Suj)j)0sing tlie Colonies to be indej)endent, and taxing themselves 8*-. \)d. })er head for armaments, Sec, would tiiis ex})enditure secure order against internal, and freedom against external, foes as effectually as would the lesser ex[)enditurc under Federa- tion? We have no hesitation in saying that in the case of some of the Colonies a reign of terror might fairly be ' See Appendix. l')4 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 1 1 ' 'ii tr H cx})ected to lollow on separation; that in otliers^ it is c^ortaln that order and i)eace could not be secured ; that, even in the countries l)est ada|)ted for indepenchniee, their attain- ment wouhl be at least doubtful ; and tliat in none couhl there be gained, l)y any expenditure whatever, as good security for peace and ])r()spcrity as is now afforded by the aUiance Avith the Fatlierhmd. The CoKjnies in whic-li we shouhl expect a reign of terror to follow on scj)aration are the West Indies. Whatever may be the case in other Colonies, it is clear that these, at all events, are not fitted for indei)ondence. Their poj)ulation consists of a minority of wealth and intelligence and of a majority of })overty and savage ignorance. Even the minority is not of a homogeneous character, and would not be likely to be able tt) agree on the form of government to be established, to say nothing of working it. Ilecent events have proved that the hostility of the black population to the whites is un- abated by over thirty years of freedom, and that it is impracticable to work a representative government for local purposes. What, then, would ensue when, in addition to the task of local c;overnment, these Colonies had also thrown ujwn them tlie resj)onsibilities of nation- ality ? Might we not fairly expect to see the history of St. Domingo repeated, unless the States, or some other power, should step into the position from which England had shrunk ? In South Africa the danger of internal dissension would not be so great as in the West Indies ; but even there materials for strife are not wanting. AVe i;ave a ])opula- tion consisting of British, Dutch, German, and native races, differing in antecedents, manners, and language. Some of the natives are warlike, and have already given serious trouble to the colonists. Is it improbable that they might seize the opportunity aftbrdcd by the colonists DANGER OF IXTERXAL DISSEXSIOXS. ir>5 given 3 that oiii;?t.s being left alone to assjiil them; or that a Avell-organiscd attack might bring much mischief and misery on the colonists ? Or, supposing this (hmger surmounted, is it likely that the different elements of the population could combine harmoniously to work a national government such as would be re({uired ? or is it at all unlikely that some one of the j)olitical, or national, })arties which would be engendered might look for aid to the parent stock in Europe and receive it? In the case of Australasia the difficulties in the way >r the establishment and workino; of an efficient Govermncnt are much less than in the previous instances ; indeed, it may be said that there is a fair })rospect of its being able to discharn;e its duties to the extent of maintainino- order within. The population is almost entirely British in race, and intellifjent in character. There are no neighbours either to foment internal disputes, or to stand waiting for a chance to destroy the new-born state. On the whole we are of oi)inion that Australasia constitutes the grou}) of Colonies best fitted for independence. Y-it it would be Avell for the inhabitants to remember that party spirit amongst them has run to a very high point, and that self-government has been by no means an unmixed suc- cess in each of the provinces, before making up tluir minds that they c<)uld all unite under one Government, and work together harmoniouslv in a wider field of action than the smaller one, which seems to tax their cnerL;;ies pretty severely at present. Passina: over the l*acific we reach British America, now united under one government from Halifax to Vancouver. The machinery of a national government is here already in existence, and England has retired as far from interference as is possible without utterly sever- ing the connection. Nevertheless, we should not ex})ect to see independence succeeded by a harmonious political - r li F^ 156 '11 1 1 i 1 1 j •■ '. A COLONIST OX TV7. COLONIAL QUESTION. There would be several incongruous elements m IK' system. at work. The population consists of two races, professing two religions, each of which differences has formed the ba.sis of fierce ])arty disputes. Not long since, parties in Canada were for several years almost identical with sectional divisions ; and it was simply the deadlock thus induced that led to a coalition which alone rendered possible the union of the provinces. Nor has that event destroyed sectionalism. The maritime provinces are still hostile to the union, and the same differences of race and religion which induced previous quarrels between Ontario and Quebec, are still in existence, and likely to produce similar results in future. Then the provinces on the Atlantic, in the north-west, and on the Pacific, are sepa- rated by immense tracts of wilderness. And all are close on the frontier of a subtle and ambitious neighbour, ready to seize any chance of extending its territory, and having in each of its citizens, when in contact with a foreigner, a political missionary, to proclaim its unex- ampled and unapproachable glories, and to promise a share in them to all who will enter into the ' glorious Union.' It is surely improbable, when sectionalism has been so strong under the colonial riujime that ex- tremists on one side have talked of ' looking to France,' and, on the other, of ' looking to Washington,' that it would disappear in the ftice of the new and more exciting controversies which would be induced by inde})endence, or that a discontented province could resist the entice- ments of the syren deceiver. Yet, if either of these improbabilities should fail to occur, Canadian independ- ence would soon cease to exist. It may be inquired, however, what reason there can be to expect difficulties in the internal government of the emancipated Colonies when they are already in some cases in the full enjoyment of local self-government. ^1 DANGER OF FOREIGX AGGRESSION. 157 ■( We reply that the influence of the Imperial Governor is in no case a dead letter, but frequently ])roves of the utmost importance in restraining the violence of local partyism ; that the moral weight of English opinion, public and governmental, the fact that British troops are — or were formerly — at hand to enforce order, and the knowledge that the Imperial Parliament possesses the power to legislate for the Colonies, and in cases of extremity will not fail to do so, tends to keep all the elements of strife quiet. On the other hand, were all these influences withdrawn, every man would seek to do ' that which was right in his own eyes ; ' and when, even in presence of these influences, we have seen a sectional deadlock in Canada, two or three ministries in a session in Australia, and the deliberate abandonment of self- government in Jamaica, we might expect to see much more disastrous events in their absence. The task of maintaining order within would, however, be only one part of the work devolving on the new nationalities. They would also have to maintain their national independence and political freedom against foreigners. It will, we doubt not, be re})licd by many parties in both the United Kingdom and the Colonies, that the task would be an easy one, as the only cause which could lead to these countries being involved in war is to be found in their connection with England. But this conclusion is most glaringly shortsighted. Its fallacy has been well exposed by Mr. Adderlcy, whose argu- ments are the more worthy of the attention of colonists from the fact that he is by no means a meniber of the emancipationist school. In his letter to ]Mr. Disraeli on ' The Present Relations of England and her Colonies ' [1862], he asks very pertinently, 'Does England now draw her Colonies, or her Colonies draw her, most into war? If England were a foreign power to them, in place ■ I' ■^HJSHBBBW^^ipiiPI 158 A COLO.VIST ON TlfH COLOXIAL (H'f'^lSTIOX. m 1 1 l! % 'I of beinn; tlioir slilcld affainstthe interference of all forci<>n powers, they avouIcI soon learn how they might be more involved in war. They have, on the other hand, them- selves the chief influence in Imperial implications in war. It is their being s})read over all the world wiiich brings lis in contact at so many })oints with the sensibilities, jealousies, and cin)idities of other nations, and makes Avar so wide a concern to us. Though the Irish temj)erament enters into but one-third of our national com])osition, we cannot help our skirts of em])ire being spread about the earth on which anyone may tread his challenge. AVhat brought us to the verge of hostilities on the ]\Iaine boundary, or, more lately, on the Musquito shore, or at St. fluan's, or about the Newfoundland fisheries ; or why are wo now (1802) sending troops to Canada?' We think everybody must admit that ?{r. Adderley's position is very strong; and that Eng.' li connection tends to avert war from the Colonies at least as much as r,o induce it. And in regard more particularly to Canada, the same idea Avas Avell put by Lord Palmer- ston, Avhen, in his usual style of strong common sense, he said : — ' Sup[)ose these provinces separated from this country — suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or any other form of government. Are there not motives that might lead a strong neighbour to pick a quarrel with that smaller state, with a view to its annexation ? (Hear, hear.) Is there nothing like teri'itorial ambition ])er- vading the })olicy of great military states ? The example of the world should teach us that, as far as the danger of invasion and annexation is concerned, that dantrer would Ije increased to Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and Avhen she is deprived of the protection that the military power and resources of this country may alford.' (Cheers.) m* GAIN FROM IMrKRIAL LMTV. V)i) i'lev'> Tliese arguinents arc unanswerable. It is Inipdssihlc to consider them fairly and refuse to aeknowledi^e that Lord Palinerston and jNIr. Adderley liave said quite enough to silence all colonial grunihlers who refuse to see anythini]^ else than the single fact that they may be involved in war by a quarrel peculiar to En<r|and, and who seem to think that, once separated from her, a millen- nium of peace would dawn on them. Tt may be true that conne(;tion with an Enij)ire having ramifications all over the world does tend to l)rin<>; the Colonies into contact Avith ])owers to which they might, perhaps, otherwise be strangers, and thus escay)e any chance of collision with them. But, independent of the difficulty of attaining such isolation, and the disadvantages which could not fail to result therefrom, it must be remembered that foreiiiuers arc much more likelv to defer to a miulitv l^m})irc than to a Aveak nationality: that, even granting the connection with England to bring to the Colonies a slightly increased risk of war, the aid of her fleets and armies brings them, surely aiul sinudtaneously, a irreat increase of the prospect of victory in the strife; that the danger of defeat is the oidy effectual preventive of aggression on the ])art of an ambitious power, and that separation would certainlv increase the risk of airiiression, as all the motives to induce it would remain undiminished, whilst the chances of success against a small nationality beiuir enormously in excess of those against a mi<;htv em], 're, the deterrent causes wotdd be lessened. The certain increase in diph^natic influence and martial re- sources may thus be taken as balancing the very doubtful increase in the risk of war. For althoujih the uain from victory in war may not always comjx'usate for the loss of ])eace, defeat, puch as that to which the Colonies would be exposed, would almost surely })lace them under the rule of a foreign state, and that means conquest and ruin. |: J'' """"w^^nMwmvaBip^m h I \h. : ii III! I .ii , ( 1(')0 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. which they should run any risk of war and spill their last drop of blood to avert. There is, however, another point in connection with this part of our subject which must not be forgotten. Were the Colonies independent nations, it is pretty certain that the form of government adopted in nearly all cases would be democratic ; since it is almost that already, and the tide has not yet turned sufficiently against it to enable them to get rid of its essential cha- racteristic — a suffrage at once equal, and in effect almost universal. The chief increase of prerogatives which would accrue to the new Goverimients would be the right of making peace and war, and of controlling their own diplomacy. But this task is precisely that which a democracy is least capable of accomplishing. * As for myself,' says De Tocqueville, ' I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be most decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different princi})les. Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses : and they I'equire, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those qualities in which it is deficient. . . . A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an im- portant undertaking, to i)ersevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will not wait their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more es])ecially belong to an individual or an aristocracy ; and they are i)recisely the means by which an individual people attains a predominant j)osi- tion.' The name of De Tocqueville may alone almost suffice to command assent to any of his unfavourable theories regardiiiu' the workings of democracy, for the event has nearly always justified them ; and, at all events. 1' fr M MAUTIAT. WKAKNKSS OF TriK COLOXIMS. KU their with (tteii. retty early that iently I cha- ihn()«t which ; right r own lich a As for tion in in the nments timents politics locracy perfect t. • • • an inl- and to istacles. tid will |ese are lividual pans by \i\t posi- almost lonrable Ifor the events, the Colonies sjionld he careful before assniniii<; thes(» powers, wliich they would be least fitted to wield, when :i fUilurc io wield them arijiht inijiht endanj^er both their national and political freedom. These several consideratit)ns should, we think, convince any candid inquirer that the Cohmies would be in at least as much danirer of beinii- involved in war if inde- jjcndent as if united to Entrland, and this with much less power to resist aggression : which brings us back to the question of their ability to maintain their newly-acquired independence. In the case of the West Indies and in that of South Africa, it must, we think, be admitted that such ability does not exist. The islands could be defended only by a ])ower having the control of the sea, which they certaiidy could not have ; and South Africa would be utterly unable to jdace in line a I'orce sufficient to resist success- i'ully half a division of a Euro[)ean army. It is more difficult to sj)eak confidently of the prosj)ects of Australasia than of those of the above countries. The population is homogeneous, and the country is isolated and out of the way of enemies, exce])ting the French settlement in New Caledonia, an exce})tion, however, worthy of attention. It is a case in which a considerable amount of local knowledge is needed to authorise the utterance of any very decided opinion. Still the broad facts remain clear to all, that the population would be less than 2,000,000 ; that a part of it would be se})a- rated by the ocean from the centre of power and the seat of government, and the difficulty of defence thereby increased ; that, the greater part of the coast-line being nncolonised, it presents a tem[>ting opportunity for any nmbltious power to establish itself, vvithout direct aggres- sion, on the territories of the new nationality ; that, this (lence would be in a constant state of lepenc M I I ' I? f i' ii 102 A COLONIST OX TMH COLOXfAL QIKSTIOX. itoril ; that to resist anv nillitarv Twition thus ostjil)lisho(l would, with Austr.'ihisian rcsourccH, he an impossihility ; and tliat tlic circnmstaiiees of the country are such as wouhl ])e likely to lead an anibilious potentate, or greedy ])eoi)le, to turn towards it as a most valuable ]»rize. It may he, however, that Australasians would think more confidently than an outsider of their ability to maintain their iiuh'jtendenee ; but wc cannot lielj) advisirifjf them to ' take counsel whether they be able with ten tliousand to meet him who cometh aj^ainst them witli twenty.' There remains the case of British America. That country has tlie advantap^c of ])ossessin|nj a ])oj)ulation more than double that of Australasia ; but it is of a less houiofjeneous character, and alonjrside the frontier lies a mi'ditv country wliose inhabitants everv day declare, until by the sheer force of repetition they have come to believe, that it is their * manifest destiny ' to unite the whole of the North American ccmtinent under their sw.ay. Before Canada can })ecome independent, she must be able to present to the United States a front sufficiently strouf^ to convince tliem tliat any attempt at conquest could result only in defeat. It is possible that some English readers may deny the correctness of the preceding proposition, and affirm that were Canada separated from England, the States would cease to have any feeling against it, and that the interests and feelings of the two nations would become so identifird that those interests and feelings would suffice to render war between them next to an impossibility. To this re- hash of the Peace Society's twaddle we would reply by Dointino; to the Americans themselves — united by ramifi- cations of commerce extending into every hole and corner of the land- -united by the still stronirer ties arising from that community of feeling produced by a common na- tionality, and the recollection of perils, difficulties, and ny the ■in that would itorcsts entifiod render Ills re- ply by ramifi- corner l\cr tVom r CAXADA AND THR STAIRS. ir,:] a('hlcv(>ments shared in eoniinon, and whose ener^r'ies had l)een directed almost entirely to paeific, pur^uits. If (!ver a peo|)le were interested in rcinaininf:^ at peace, and i'avourahly situated for so doinj^, it was this. Vet we have seen tluMU hurstinu; these ties, and rushinui: nuilually to arms, with an amount of hatred and ferocity almost unexampl(!d. Is it })ossil)le that Canada and the States ever can feel as many, or as stronnr, inducements to main- tain peace with one another as those \vhi(di failed to pre- serve it in the Union? They form two separate nations. They inherit traditions of each other rather hostile than pacific. The States, as we see by their press, coiilinu(> to view it as Canada's destiny to he absorbed by them. They now contain thousands of men ex])erienced in arms. In face of all these facts, favourable to i)eace in one case, and unfavourable in the other, can we hojie that, if sepa- rated from England, j)acific interests would suftice to secure the new nation from beiuf; assailed bv its neiiih- hour? Some obstinate oi)timists may, ])erhaj)s, reply in the affirmative, on the fjjround that the States would <^ain nothing by the annexation of Canada. The fact that the States are of a different opini(m is a sufficient refutation of this theory, for men's actions are governed not by their actual, but by their supposed, interests. That the States believe the annexation of Canada likely to conduce to their benefit, and that they ardently desire it, has been ])roved decisively during the last six years. The i-eci[)ro- city treaty, extolled as a glorious triumph of modern (Mi- lightenment, has been repealed ; and this avowedly in the hoj)e that the commercial distress thereby induced might lead Canada to seek a remedy in annexation. A crowd oi' British traitors have been allowed to form an innnense oroanization throughout the length and breadth of the Uni(»n, and actually to make two hostile incursions into M 2 ss .i. riiSiSWa mt ■■HI f 101 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. Canada, witliout a single atteni])t being made by the Government to hinder tliem, or anything more than one voice in a thousand being raised in condemnation of tlieir nefarious iiiffianism. In rej)elling these raids many Canadians lost their lives; many more were disabled; heavy expenses were incurred, and commerce suffered severely. Yet, v/hen England actually ventured to sug- gest, at the conference of 1S71, that some reparation was due for these wrongs, an unmistakably clear refusal was given and accei)ted. lic})aration was demanded for damages inflicted on American commerce by a ship which escaped from an English hai'bour, but was refused for those inflicted by a })ermanent organization, existing in the full light of day, and proclaiiniiKj its purpose to be the Avaiiinti' of Avar against a country with which the United States were at })eacc. And this in face of the fact that when, in 1864, a band of about fifty Southerners made a rush from Canada on the States, not only was it demanded that the men should be given up, but when, through a legal technicality, they escaped this fate, a hoAvl of raije was heard all over the North ; and not (mlv had Canada to make reparation in hard cash for the in- juries <l(me, but to line the frontier with her volunteers to render iriipossible a repetition of the offence. Canaila asked England to seek nmcii less reparation and secuvitj'^ than in a siiuilar case she had been instructec^ to yield, and had yielded, to the States ; but even this was dis- tinctly refused, and Canada lives to-day not knowing when a third Fenian raid may bring death and destruc- tion on her borders, those who are to be such loving neighbours in the future i ot so much as lifting a finger to avert it, and the vast majority of the American pecfple bidding Fenianisni go on and j)ro!-j»er. If these facts be not cnouu'h to foreshadow i)rettv <lis- tinctly the feelings with which the States are likely to \ ■n AMERICAN' r.T.-WILL TO CAXAPA. 105 j roi,^ar(l Canada as an indopcTidont nation, wo can go a little f'urtlicr. In faro of a troaty wliicli distinctly declared that tlioy should not fish within throe miles of anv hav, creek, or headland, thev asserted their rio-ht to fish in anv hay provided it Avere more than six miles wide, The point, as usual, was yielded to them, and, as usual, they took something mnve and fisiied within three miles of the shore. C'anada thereupon set to work to enforce the observance of the treaty ,(trct>rdi)if/ to tltc Aincricdii 'nifrr- ])r('tnt}o)i. Forthwith it ap[)eared that the rights and dignities of the States were being shamefully violated, and a demand was made not only of free entrance to the great marine treasures of the niaritime provinces, but for the ' free navigation of the 8l. Lawrence,' and this in face of the facts that American vessels were allowed to use the canals on the same terms as Cana<lian, and that Canadian vessels were not only excluded from American rivers and canals, but were not allowed to carry a cargo from one American lakeport to anotlier. These pro- ccediiiii's certainlv auo-ur a most friendiv disijosltlon on the part of the States, and a disposition to let Canada go on her own way peaceablv ! It is, moreover, altogether absurd to allege that the States would have no motive to lead them to desire the annexation of Bj-ifish America al'tor it iiad been separated from Eni>:land. There are ot'ier advantaixes to be ii'alned by its annexation besides exiiclllng England from the North American c<nitinent, and these are of no iusigidfi- cant character. To annex British America would re- move the only possible chance of any power finding a base of operations against the States' nortliern frontier, seeing that it would then stretch to the Arctic ()ce:".n. This would be no small matter, for though they v»'ould not fear Canada as a foe, they might fear her as the ally of another power, VV ith Canada in the Union they would H i:| 1 u.'.i„m.Vij;^.."Ri.!wii^.L-f-.-i lOCj A COLOMST OX TIIK C'OLOXIAL QLJ'>.ST(0\. II constitute the mightiest power in tlie workl, and one against Avliich it would be ahnost inij)ossihle for a foe to find a basis of ()})erations. Besi(h^s tliis the expendituri^ of the Federal Government, inelnding the sums spent in the redenii)tion {>f the debt, is about ten dollars j)er head uf the population, and without them would be about eight. Let British America be annexed, and its popula- tion taxed at the same rate, and the taxation would vield thirty-two milli(ms of dollars in the one case, or forty millions in the other. It is certain, however, that the cost of its government to the States would not be over ten millions at tlic utmost ; leaving a balance of from twenty-two to thirty millions of dollars, which would be so nuich clear gain to the Federal excheciuer. These fact.s constitute i)retty strong motives to lead the States to desire Canadian annexation ; and if any other were wantino' it would be found in their belief in the ' mani- fest destiny.' This belief has become so deeply im- bedded in the heart of almost every American, that a con- viction of the im})ossibility of realising it is the only thing which will hinder the nation from pursuing it. The late Avar was less against secession than to preserve the Union for the * manifest destiny' to Aviiich ii was believed to be temlino;. That the ])assion still burns as briiihtlv as ever is demonstrated by the piu'chase of that lum[) of ice and snow known as Alaska, or Kussian ^Vmcrica, and by the efforts made by a large party in 1871 to carry the San Domingo scheme. Let Canada put lierself in a positioji whicii would enable the Americans to carry out tiiis leading idea of their })olitical life, and she will not have long to wait for its accomplishment, even if there were no other motive to induce them to desire her annexation. It is j»ossible. however, that sonu; may be found who will say that Canada could repel an invasion from the States and maintain iicr independence single-handed. ^f^ CANADIAN L\I)i:iM:X])lL\CE IMIUSSIBLE. 1G7 For such we liave a short answer. The Soutlicriiers were about twice as numerous as Canadians would be. They were animated by a unity of sentiment which tlie Latter will never tec! whilst Canada is inhaljitcd by two races, and by a j)atriotism -which it would re({uire years of nationality to engender in them for Canada separated from the old flag. They were led by men of genius, whoni it is not |>ivbable that Canada could rival. They inhabited a country far more defensible than Canada, and \"et .m y were conquered. How could Canadians SU' > , li against the whv»le Union, when the Southerners, under so much more favourable circumstances, failed against haU'ol it ' Their fate is proof sufficient that, so long as the States remain united, a British American nationality is impossll)le, seeing its existence would de- pend on the''* ^'>rbearance. That forbearance there seems no reason t • expect would be exercised; and, even if tliere Nvere, we do not tliink that Canadian- would choose to hold their independence on sufl^^'erance. It is highly probable that, whilst perusitig the above, some of oiu* readers may have mentally inquired, Why, then, should not Canada solve all difficulties in her case by becoming annexed to the States? The answer is to be found in the fact that the States are labouring under such serious financial, political, and sectional difficulties that for Canada to adojjt annexation would be simj)ly equivalent to a merchant embarking his all in a crazy craft. The fiii.'incial history of the Union since the conclusion of the war has proved decisively that the cy[)enses of the Federal Govenunent cannot be reduced below .'i(){),()()(),()(M) dollars, and that if the present policy of striving to dis- charge the debt as soon as possible should be adhered to, the aniuuil exi>enditure must reach close on 4(>0,(H)(),()()() ik)llai"s. The po})ulation of Canada and the States is dl I , r mamm n :; ■■^i MjS a colonist ox the colonial question. iilinut 42,000,000. Annexation would, consequently, sMl)jcct Canadiuns to taxation at the i-atc of about seven dollars per head per annum under the former rate of taxa- tion, or about nine and a-half dollars under the latter. It is possiblt' that the increase of taxation might not amount to these sums. But, o;rantini»; that annexation Avould induce a saving in the local expenditure of the provinces ; that no counterbalancinij increase Avould be induced by the addition of Canada to the Union ; that (^anadians would consume less dutiable o-oods than Americans, and consequently would have less taxation to endure, the fact remains that an increase of <>nly one- Jfii/foi' the lowest of tlie above rates of taxation would l)e almost quadraph: that which we have seen might be expected to result from Federation. The political system established in the States is ])ro- ducing most deplorable; misgovernment, and promises to induce still worse results. Lord Macaulav said, in his letter to Mr. Randall, on that gentleman sending him a co[)y of his Life of Jeffrrson : ' I have long been con- vinced that a system of unmixed democracy must, in the end, destroy either liberty, or civilization, or both.' It seems pi'obable that in the States it will lead to one of these goals, and by a much quicker route than that which ]\Iacaulay had in view. Unmixed democracy has theie led to the country falling under the rule of an aristocracy of demagogues, consisting of the members of the several partisan conventions existing in every state, county, and township in the Unicm. Their sway is so absolute that without an endorsation from them no man need ever think of even offering himself to the electors as a candi- date for any ]>ublic position whatsoever ; and they exact such disgraceful conditimis in return for a ' nomination ' that no honourable man will com]>ly with them. Their riile has culminated in a ])artisan strife so furious, uud a ■■■I AXAiuiiv i:xri:cTED ix tiii: statks. Id) system of (iorruptioii so widesju-ead, tluit we find some oi' tiie foremost men in America seriously alarmed at the ])rospects of their country. Mr. (ireeley admits that— ' By means of " log-rolling," American statute-books are filled with acts which subserve no eml but to illl the pockets of the few at the expense of the interests, or the rights, of the many.'' Mr. Fisher confesses that — ' A degree of corruption prevails disgraceful to the country and the age. Bribery is almost acknowledged as a j)art of legislation, whilst dishonest jobs and contracts so abound that thev are regarded as thino's of course.'^ And Mr. Seaman alleges that — ' Unless some remed\- can be devised to correct the corruj)t j)racticcs and evils which have grown up under our system of party organisa- tions, nominating conventions and caucuses, and electing j)ublic officers, t/icre is great danger of siieh iridespreaa corruption and dit^triist of all public officers and of legis- lation and the administration of Uue, that toe shall sink into anarchy and a chronic state of recolution and civil war — as Mexico has done.^^ It is now six years since the civil war was ended, but it is evident that the ' lleconstruction of the Union ' is still incomplete. The heroes of the south are the traitors of the north, and vice versa. In the Southern legislatures the majority of the members generally consists of frecd- men, ignorant of the three K's, and voting at the dicta- tion of northern ' carpet-baggers.' Such is the state o{' feelinu; of the two sections towards each other that Con- gress in 1871 [)assed an act authorising the President to establish martial law in the Southern States, and that ho iias seen fit partially to exercise the power. For our ' ^ • "",' American Covflict, pp. 209, 210. - Trial of the Conxtitutioii, p. 3 {(J. ' The American System of Goccrnmrnf, p. G6. i ■ I J i ' m = ii I* 170 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. ])urpose we need not attempt to jn'ove that t.liis act was needed ; we only refei- to it as proof positive of tlie eniiiity existing between tlie two sections. l>ut still more significant is the following confession in the re[)ort of the Secretary of War, j)resented to Congress on its mcet- hig in December 1871. He says: ' It has been abso- lutely necessary to retain about one-sixth of the army in those States of the south, east of the Mississip[)i, which were engaged in the war of the rebellion, liidisputable evidence establishes the fact, which is proven too by the ex})erience of numerous sufferers, that an armed rebellion of regular orijanisation and srrength now exists in i)arts of those States, and, so long as it exists, so long will it be necessary to aid the civil authorities with the armed force of the nation in putting down this seccmd rebellion and in bringhig its leaders to speedy i)unishment.' AVe mio'ht o-o on to slio-v that the love of wealth and physical enjoyment has obtained such mastery of the American mind as to sap the foundations of commer- cial morality and lead to the establishment of a system of clieating in trade, and to weaken the influence of the lioliest feelings of our nature, by triumphing even over mateiiial love. But here we forbear. Suilicient evi- dence is })robably to be found in the facts and confessions to which we have referred to })rove that for Canada to adopt annexation Avould be nothing short of madness. The States are, in fact, in the stage of political develop- ment described by Washington in that portion of hit farewell address where, after warning them that '• the alternate; dominion of one faction over another is itself a most horrid despotism,' he goes on to say : ' But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent desi)()tism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of a single individual; and soi»ncr or bi:m:fits or xatioxalitv. 171 later the chief of some previiiliiig faction, more abh' or more fortunate than his com{)etitors, turns tliis despotism to the j)ur])oses of his own elevation on the ruins of j)ublic liberty.' Tlie (lisru))tive tendencies at [)resent in force tend very mucli to increase this dan<:;er, and tin- annexation of Canada would airuravate ratiier tlian iin- })rove the situation. The i)resence of a })ossible foe on the northern frontier serves, more than anything else, to nnilvc the different sections, parties, and intei'ests in the Union ' bear and forbear ' towards one another. Thar danger once removed, they would feel free to give vent to their feelings. And just as the concjuest of Canada in I7G() acted as the chief cause of the destruction of the connection between the Thirteen Coh:>nies and EiiLiland, by destroying the most })owerful motive for its conserva- tion, and leaving contrary influences free to act uncliecked, so woukl its annexation act on the Union a century later. Annexation involves an instant realization of many of the prospective evils of independence. AVe do not affect to despise the benefits of nationality. Under any other circumstances than the present for Colonies to refuse inde})endence would be sheer madness; and even British colonists cannot foru;et that until a country has become a nation, or part of one, and has control of its own dij>lomacy, army, and navy, and is able to make war or peace at })leasure, it has not reached its full development. The possession of these ])owers acts on countries as does the assumption of manhood on individuals. As the youth sent forth on the world to ' sink or swim ' on his owm resources, becomes conscious of powers and responsibilities of wiiich he was unconscious whilst leaning on another's arm, and has his eneruies ai'oused and his judgment sobered thereby, so do comnumities formed into nationalities find their ener«ries stirred and their intdli- gence sharpened by the new field which is opened for tht'ir III i1 U ¥• 172 A COLONIST OX TIIH COLONIAL (^IKSTION. hi! exercise, and the neeessity of aetino; in it. And as tliis dcveldpnu'nt is a dirccl improvement of man's faeiilties — an (Mid of i)oth politics and rcll^^ion — a gi'cater benefit it is imj)ossil)l(' to conceive than that wliicii flows from tlic possession of a national antonomy. If we thought the Hritish Colonics were ri])e for natif»nality, and tliat its benefits conld be obtained (mly by separation from England, we should say that it would be for their interest to seize the offered boon ; but, as we do not believe either of these thinn;s, Ave think that thcv had better hold on to the Fatherland. For, althouiih the exercise of these powers and ])rivileges improves the character of a people which is able to use the powers aright, and to sustain the resiKmsibilities bv'ita own unaided resources, it is (juite different when these ([ualifications are Avanting : in that case nationality is as dangerous to its possessors as is a razor to a vounji- child. Colonists may rest assured that, at ])resent, independence Avould be nnich more likely to prove a curse than a blessing. But Fedei'ation offers the means of seeming all the l)cneflts of nationality vii/ius its evils. Were it effected the Colonist would find his title of CiviK Britannicna as noble and as awe-inspiring as ever was that of Civis Ronuinus. His political inferiority would be ended. He would stand on a level with his countrymen at home. He would be represented in the same legislature Avith them, and his voice Avould form a real poAver in the decision of any, and every, question of Imperial interest. The loftiest honours in arms, politics, laAv, or diplomacy Avould be opened to his ambition, or as Ave hope Avould be the motive-poAver, to his patriotism. From all these he is practicalli/ excluded at present. But let an Imperial Federation be established, and colonists miji'lit fill the office of constitutional monarchs in countries as larfje as many European states ; might be viceroys, for Imperial m m CARKKR OI'IONKD RV FHDKIIATIOX. 1 7:; 11 the rccted us as Chris Ho home, with the crest. macy a be I>se lie periiil I the ge as )erial ])nr|)()«os, over laiuls strctchirifx across half a coiitiiiiMit, or comprising one of the gi'cat divisions of the glohe ; or. sitting on the throne of the Cfrcat Mogul, might rule a |)o[)ulation almost equal to that of all I'^uropc I Xor Avouid the summit he reached even here. All these arc hut suhoi'dimite officers. Above them are a Legislature and an Executive fi'om which thev nuist take their orders. More than ever would it be re(|uisitc in an l']m[)ire such ;js this to have the supreme otKce beyond the rejieh of dispute. But all below the Crown would be open to competition, nor could the Crown exercise any undue fiivoui'itism in the distribution of offices or honours. Coh)- nists would be members of the Imperial Ministrv. leadinji; and n-uiding the affiurs of this tremendous orirani- zation, before the glories of which even those of ohl Home would ])ale ; and should any of them stand first in the Xatio)ial Council, he could not f;iil to stand first in the Executive, filling even the jiroud place of Premier. Can imagination itself j)i(!tui'e a (farcer foi' ])atriotic ardour mon^ gh)rious than that which would exist in the new Empire? Can the Christian moralist ho[)e for a field of and)ition niore pure than that in which all honours could be won only by such deeds as would leave the winner, if not ' first in war, first in peace, and first in the heai'ts of his countrymen,' at least high in some one or more of these lines ? Can the political [>hiloso})her show in what maimer })olitical organisation can be made of so much profit to the governed as in binding together in peace and unity so many different countries, sup})lying the deficiencies of one from the superfluities, or even excrescences, of another, and in securing to all that invaluable heritage of ])olitical fr'3(Ml(nii of which the foundation was laid on the field of Ruimymede? And can the brightest dreams of colonial })rogress conjure up a vision of prosperity and glory to each isolated atom ecjual to that which would 'i I i 1 ^ M If M\ \ f'OLO.VIST OX THR TOLOXIAL Ql'RSTIO.V. IMi m i I oiisnc from tlio uniterl efforts of the British race to deve- lop its niii^iiificent heritage of ahnost a fiftli part of tlie earth, and to maintain its common historic glories strctch- inij from Ilavelock to Alfred? This language may, perhaps, be denounced as c(m- sisting of mere rhapsody. In view of such denunciation let us examine in detail the direct benefits Avhich Fede- ration would confer u})on the Colonies. We have seen that possible colonial objections to it are balanced by still more weighty objections of the same nature to inde- ])endence. It w(mld induce increased taxati(m — though in the case of Australasia even this is doubtful — but independence would induce an increase at least double as great. It is barely possible that it might endanger local self-government ; but independence would leave both naticmal and political freedom in very serious danger. These circumstances alone should suffice to induce a choice of Federaticm in i)reference to independence, for ' of two evils choose the least.' But Federation would not be merely a choice of evils. One of the apprehended evils is, we do not hesitate to say, imaginary ; and for the other very slight real evil, large benefits would be gained, which would rei)ay it many times over. 1. Federation would ensure to the Colonies a con- tinuance of that internal peace and liberty along with that security against foreign aggression and comparatively free commercial access to the rest of the Empire which they now enjoy. Without the former of these blessings there can exist no prosperity of any kind whatever. Neither commerce, arts, literature, politics, nor religion can flourish in a land where law and order are wantino:, or where national rights cannot uncompromisingly be asserted against foreign foes. The alliance Avith the Fatherland secures both oi' those blessing's. Colonists Avill probably admit that the latter of them would not be .1 for IJTlOll ting, be the nists )t be COLOXIAF. GAIX F^0^[ rKDKKATIOy. 1 <) very safe under Indepoiidcnee, and we would exhort tlieni not to feel confident tliat it would be otherwise with the former. Democratic republicanism is not favourable to internal ])eace. It has proved an unmiti<i;!ited failure wherever it has been tried, save in the United States. P^ven there its success has not been by any means en- couragin<r, nor are signs wanting, as we have already shown, that even in that land also it ' must destroy libei'ty, or civilisation, if not both.' These words are n(^t ours. They are those of the great advocate of modern ' progress,' Lord Macaulay. Against disorders within, or subjugation from without, Federation offers a sure and certain guarantee ; and as all the blessings of liberty and civilisation are de])endent on the existence of some such security, it would be nothing short of madness to sacrifice it when once possessed. The gain from commercial intercourse with the rest of the Empire would be com- ])aratively less valuable; but, with the impetus which might be given to such intercourse under the new rer/fmr, it could not fail to conduce very considerably to the material wealth of the Colonies. 2. Federation would place the Colonies in possession of ' sovereign rights,' with all their accompanying advan- tages. We have already stated our belief that without these no community can reach the full development of wdiich it is capable. Their attainment constitutes the national majority. It is with nations as with men. As each year of growth renders a youth better fitted for his entrance on the rights of manhood, and the possession of these rights of increasing importance to his well-being, so does each step forwards in wealth, pc^pulation, intelligence, liberty, or religion, render a connuunity better qualified to exercise sovereign rights, and the ])ossession of these rio"hts more essential to its welfare. The foreign relations of a few hundred immigrants on a desert shore are simply 1 wi IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 11.25 *" IIIIM IIIIM '"° IIIIM ~ •' itt iio mil 2.0 1.8 1.4 III 1.6 vQ <? 'c>l 'W -Pi /2 -^0/ A'' O /, 7 /A Photographic Sdences Corporation i\ •■^ ^ <> ^ .V 6^ ^v re '<?> v^. 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 '^ w 1! 176 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. I ll V ; nil, because they have neither means nor inclination to bring themselves into contact with the rest of the ■world, and they are too insignificant for it to notice them. But see the same land after the lapse of a century ! The Avilderness has become a fruitful field, and the desert rejoices and blossoms as the rose. The few hundreds of poverty-stricken colonists have swelled into hundreds of thousands of wealthy citizens, gathering riches from the sea, the mine, the forest, and the field ; scattering the fruits of their industry over the world, bringing back into their own midst the luxuries of other climes, and present- ing such a prize as has in every age served to excite most strongly the aggressive propensities of kings or nations. The desert island of San Juan was merely a speck on an unknown sea in 1846, but in 1872 it is a strategical point on which depends the safety of a considerable i)ort, likely to expand into the commercial emporium of a mighty trade between China, Japan, the East Indies, and the northern half of the North American continent; and, perhaps, with England also. Fenian raids into Ontario would have been of slight consequence fifty years ago, when there was little to destroy ; but to-day a rich garden invites the plunderer. A centilry since the wealth that lies hid in the ocean depths around Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was merely tapped by visitors, but now it has become the source from which thousands of families draw their daily bread. The boundary of Maine, or the possession of Oregon, may have seemed a liirht matter when the Ashburton treatv was concluded ; but the former concession has since necessitated the building of a railroad through an almost unproductive territory, whilst a profitable commercial route was open, and even then still leaves it dangerously exposed to a possible foe, and American acquisitions on the Pacific now constitute part of the great wheat-growing region of the GROWTH TEMPTS AGGRESSION. 17 ;linatii)n of the ;e them. ! The ; desert undreds undreds les from ring the ack into present- site most nations, peck on rategical Die port, mi of a u Indie.s, ntinent ; ids into 'ty years y a rich nee the id Nova visitors, lousands idary of eemcd a icluded ; ited the oductive us open, ed to a ific now m of tlie Union. Canadian trade was a small matter fifty year.« since ; but now it has swollen to large proportions, and i.s daily swelling to still larger. It is the same elsewhere. What foe would have cared to attack the Australian convict-settlements at the beginning of the century ? What enemy would forget Sydney or Melbi)urne to-day? Hence the increasing necessity of growing countries' obtaining j)ossession of sovereign rights, and gaining a ccmtrol over their relations with foreign powers. To obtain this desideratum by means of independence will not do in the present case, because prerogatives are use- less Avithout j)ower to enforce them. But Federation would secure both power and prerogative. The united might of the British Empire would be such as no power Avould care to resist, or would be likelv to resist success- fully ; and a due api)lication of that might to the main- tenance of colonial interests Avould be assured bv means of colonial representation. Can any Camidinn supj)ose that the loner course of truckliniT; to YankiH' aoii;ressivc- ness which has been pursued by England for over thirty years, would have been adopted had there been colonial members of the Imperial Parliament avIio understood, and felt an interest in, the various (|ueslions, to call ministers to account? Canada is now mourninu: over the Alabama treaty, and, tiiough allowed to r.ject those clauses which iunnediately affect her own interests, dares not do so, knowino- that she cannot maintain her riirhts unless backed by tiie power of the C^nitcd Kingdom, and that this, under })resent circumstances, will not be ac- corded. It is the same to (hiy as Avhen, fifteen years ago, IVFr. Howe, in discussing the Colonial (Question, said: ' Your fisheries, if given away to-morrow, would scaicely ])rovoke a discussion in the House of Connnons ; but ])lace ten North Americans there, and no minister would dare to bring down a treaty by which they were sucri- I 178 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. ficed.' The same lanjijuaj^e is still applicable to any, anu every, colonial interest ct)rning under the control of the Imperial Government. Ministers do not hesitate to sacrifice it if by so doing they can show a saving of a few thousand pounds in the estimates. If, perchance, there is somebody found to hint that the saving is being effected at the cost of feUow-countrymen, and that it may induce a much heavier loss hereafter, the unfortunate ' alarmist ' is probably coughed down, for the simple reason that no I)art of the House has any interest in supporting him. But let it be knoAvn that such a man has one-fifth, or even one-tenth, of the members ready to back his views with their votes, and we should see leaders on both sides paying all deference to his wishes, if not striving to anticipate them. Colonial questions would no longer be looked upon as * bores,' but would command tlie ready and symi)athising attcnticm of the first intellects and the strongest parties of the day ; and the result would be that, instead of seeing New Zealand on the eve of being abandoned to iSIaori savages, Australia lying almost defenceless, and Can.ada compelled to yield control over her waters, and surrender to Yankee greed those fisheries which are the chief source of wealth to a large part of her i)eople, we should see the whole force of the Empire employed to maintain colonial interests. Every year the importance to the Colonies of their foreign relations is likely to increase ; and if they are wise they will seize on the opportunity of gaining both sovereign rights and the power to make them respected, which is oifered in Federation. One of these is useless without the other ; and they Avill never again have such a fair chance of combining them. 3. Federation would open to the Colonies that field for patriotic genius and ambition which must ever be either entirely absent or very ill-sui)i)lied in the colonial rela- [. iny, niu il of the iitate to of a few ce, there ; effected y induce alarmist ' II that no ing him. 3-lifth, or his views )oth sides riving to longer be the ready 8 and the would be of being rr almost ;rol over fisheries e part of le Empire ery year relations will seize ights and offered in le other ; chance of Lt field for be either nial rela- FEDKRATIOX AND COLOMAL (JKXIUS. 17!) tionship. It is true that the growth of the Colonics, and the system of local self-government Avhich has been established in so many of them, have done much to improve tlieir condition in this respect, but their situation is still highly unsatisfactory. The C(»lonist is restricted to the narrow bounds of his own province ; and if the whole truth be told, partisan and democratic jealousy oi'ten render local honours by no means desirable. He is practically excluded from the army, navy, diplomacy, and all the higher honours of the Empire, and must remain so as long as the relationship continues on its present foot- ing. But let Federy.tion be established, and a mighty cliange would instantly ensue. Its first effect would be to oi)en the doors of both Houses of Parliament to coh)- nists, and from that one honour all others would quickly follow. We need not attempt to demonstrate this pro- ]>osition, for we feel sure that nobody will dispute it. But we ask colonists to consider in what i)olitical condi- tion would such a s[)lendid career be oi)ened to them as in the Federal Legislature, or in the service of an Empire on which the sun never sets ? The gain to colonial genius would be inunense ; nor would the benefit be confined to men of talent: it would extend to the whole community. The opening of these new fields for genius would, through the necessity of colonial members being able to vie with men from Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin, tend to induce increased attention to the higher branches of education, and to raise the educational stan- dard generally throughout colonial society. This, again, would impart a higher tone to local ])olitics, Avhich wouhl be assisted by the accjualntance with English political morals and ideas gained by representatives in the Federal Legislature, and scattered over the land by them <m their return. The training which colonial politicians would receive in England would be calculated to fit them for K 2 ;i::; '!■ ': il I 181) A COLONIST oy Tin: colonial qilstion. fillinfjf efficiently the duties of local ministers ; and as jteojile are, at last, beginninj^ to understand that the Avorld before the French Revolution was not entirely astrav in thinkin<; that soniethinu more than the decisions of local and transient numerical majorities Mere necessary to rule a country efficiently, we need not arjjue that colonial communities would reap the benefit of imjuoved local j^overnment from improvement in the (p'.alifications of their rulers, in addition to havinjjj a noble Held for the exercise of jrenius oj)eiied by Federaticm. 4. Federation would <;ive the Colonies a history. It mav \)G thought by some that this would be a very small ad- vantage, but a little reflection would prove it to be a very large one. Historical recollections are probably the most ]K)werrul lever that can be found to lift each generation out of itself, and impart to the national mind some sta- bility of feeling and <lefinite j)olitical convictiim. With- out national convictions of some sort i)olitical unity is im] ossible, and to create these co<n ictions a national history seems to be almost indispensable. In its absence the public mind finds nothing in the })ast on which it can feed, and as the future is necessarily a regif>n of pure iniagination, it is inevitably turned almost exclu.-ivelv to the ])resent for jxditical food. The conse(iuence is that the events of the passing time become elevated beyond their actual importance, and the j)ublic are led to believe that such times as those in which they live never before fiii'ured in their own or in any other land. Conceit and self-confidence are thereby instilled to a very dangerous extent. Laws, manners, j>olicies, institutions and rulers, not liavinff been liallowed by the hand of time, are all regarded as 'open questions' and ex))'>sod nearly un- ])rotected to the rash assaults of the demagogue. The full effect of such a state of affairs is best illustrated bv • the cases of Spanish-America and France. Emancipa- snid as liat the entirely lecisious eeessarv • fue that mproved ifieatious d i'or the , Itinav" Muall ad- )e a very liho most [•neration ome sta- . AVith- unity is national ? absence ch it can of pure isivelv to i' i.s that [] beyond believe er before iceit and aiijxerous lid rulers, .', are all •arlv un- ue. The 1 rated by niancipa- S ! TITH AI)VANTA(ii:s OF A XATin.NAL HISTORY. 1 >1 tion in the former countries, and in the latter the Ke vo- lution of 1789, constituted a complete break with the past. After these events all things became new, but in becoming new they became also unsettled. Nobody had a living faith in anything as being beyond doubt just, true, or lovely. The consequence was that, nothing being respected, all fell to pieces. In both countries revolution seems to have become a chronic disease of the political system. Some of the influences by which these countiies have been ruinrd have begun to show themselves in the United States and in the Colcnies; but the hitter being strongly influenced by British traditions, they have not obtained nuu'h sway there, and the States having some- thing of a historv have not vet fullv yielded to them. But let these countries break with the past, and they will follow France or Spanish- America in the future. Living sctlely in the prcr-ent is but, in other words, living solely to self, and this 'bourse will never Avork satisfactorily. Faith, ho[>(', and charity can as little be dispensed with in politics as in any other walk of life. For infusing these virtues into that sphere ol' action there is pi-obably no earthly means so efficacious as is a glorious history. Xoble deeds cannot i'ail to induce respect for their authoi*s and trust in their judgment : that is faith. The inherit- ance of a splendid and ancient [>ro[»erty rouses a desire in the inheritors to prove themselves at least not inferior to their ancestors, by tranmitting it unimpaire<l to future generations : that is hope. ^Vnd an appreciation of tlu? merits of the herita<i;e cannot fail to induce love of it and gratitude towards those who established it, and that is charity. The effect is, in some measure at least, to impress statesmen and people with the mighty truth tha*: ' \o man liveth unto himself.' Each learns to resjject other Avills than his own, to consult not so nnu'h his personal profit as that of the cominonweulth, and this not 1(S2 A COLONIST OX TIIR COLONIAL QVESTIOX. merely for liis own time but for so long as Iiis country hIuiII stand above tbc sea ! It is tbis spirit alone tbat can ballow party-strife. In its absence tbe contests of parties first dejienerate into a disgustino; scramble for the lawful, and next for tbe unlawful, gains of office : a contest conducted first by votes, tben by bribes, and finally by tbe sword. But under its influence party struggles ap])roacb as nearly as possible to an honest controversy between bonest men as to tbe means Avliereby tbe welfare »»f their common country may best be promoted. To ])reserve, and still further to infuse, this si)irit amongst the inhabitants of the Colonics it is only requisite that they should continue to be closely identified Avith their glorious aiu'cstors in the Fatherland. Then they nu'ght j)roudly exclaim : * We have classical associations and ijreat njimes of our own which we can confidently opj)ose to the most splendid of ancient times. " Senate " has not to our e.ars a sound so venerable as " Parliament." We respect the (ireat Charter more than the laws of Solon. The Caj)itol and the Forum im])ress us with less awe than our own Westminster Hall and Westminster Abbey, the place where the great men of twenty generations have contended, the place where they sleep together ! The list of warriors and statesmen bv whom our constitution was founded or preserved, from De Montfort down to Fox, may Avell stand a comparison with the Fasti of Rome. The dying thanksgiving of Sidney is as noble as the libation which Thrasea poured to liberating Jove, and we think with far less pleasure of Cato tearing out his en- trails than of Russell saying, as he turned away from his wife, that the bitterness of death was ])ast.' ' Federation would preserve this glorious inheritance to the Colonies, and as the possession of it would contribute more than anything else towards keeping public life pure, and es- ' Macaulay. <. FEDKRATIOX AND COLONIAL fiROWTII. 188 con n try one tlmt titcsts of e for the a contest Jially by strujjnrles itroversy B welfare ted. To mgst the hat they ghn'ions proudly at names the most t to our e respect n. The we than >l)ey, the •ns have r ! The stltution down to •f Rome. I as the , and we his en- from his deration yolonies, )re than and es- tublisliinjr libortv on a siu'e foundation, the ijain wouM he second to none derivable from the establishment of a Pan-Hri tannic Kmpirc. 5. Rapid as have been the gfrowth of colonial wealth, and the development of colonial resources in the past, the future proj^ress of both would be enormously increased by Federation. The Colonies want only labour and capital to make them vie with the noblest countries in the world ; and to find investments for labour and capital is the problem of the day in the United Kinjjjdom. The Colonies can take all of both that it has to offer, and a srreat deal more, too, and return rich interest on the investment. For half-a-century past, foreign countries have profited by a rich stream of liritish emigration and ca[)ital, which, had it flowed into the Colonies, would have made them thrice as great as they are at present. The causes which have led to its taking this uiniatural course are to be found in foreign j>rrsfif/r' and colonial obscuritv. A fair .amount of knowledge of the resources of foreign fields of emigration has pi'cvailed in England ; c«mcerninir those of the Cohmies comi)arativelv nothing was known, and until lately gross ignorance on the matter existed. The discovery of Australian gold-fields, and the formation of the Canadian Dominion have done some- thinsr to turn attention to the«e countries, but there is still very much room for imjirovement. Canada is yet popularly believed to be another Norway, instead of a land in which the vine flourishes in the open air, and the isothernuil lines of which pass through France. A remedy for this ignorance is the first step towards turning Enjrlish emiirration to the Col{)nies ; and such a reniedv would be found in Federation. Every colonial member would constitute a living advertisement of the resources of his country ; able to correct errors, suj)j»ly information, or offer useful suggestions to all inclined either to cmi- " WW f I i ' 'I II 1^ 1<S4 A COLONIST ON TUi: COLON I. \ I. (^'KSTIO.V. grate thereto or invest capital tlioreiii. Tiiis steady suj)])ly of infonnation woiiM alone exercise a most iin- portunt influctice on the course of einiu;ration : and, in connection with the new relations of the several j)arts of the Knipire, could scantely fail to increase its amount, and to turn it almost entirelv into tl>e Colonics. Under Federation the emigrant wotdd continue to enjoy almost the same interest in, and he as closely connected with, the hind of his hirth as when livinir in it. Under these circumstances, cmi<jjration would lose the cliaracter of an act of expatriation in which it n(»w appears. The emi- trrant would leave the Fatherland with the sweet thouj^ht that he would remain as dear to it, and it to him, as when dwelling within its hounds ; and instead of feeling ao'onised as does one who deserts his countrv, a i)atriotic ardour would glow in his breast as he felt that he was going forth to extend its greatness and glory by wiiming bloodless conquests over the waste places of the earth. Thus, all the patriotic; motives which now tend to check emigration would, under Federation, cease to exist, or else be turned to its encouragement. But great as would be the aid g-ained from this fact, still «j;reater would be that gained from the prominence into which the Colonies would be thrown by Federation. Barnum set an ele[)hant to plough a field, in order to make people talk about himself and his museum, in full confidence that if they should talk they would visit. The result proved that he was right. It always has been, and always will be, the same. Let the Colonies be ke[>t constantly before tho eyes of the English public, as they necessarily would be, under the new rcf/itne, and Ave should have eager inquirers into every detail of their circumstances, and thousands instead of hundreds rushing into them to find new homes, and findirg them. The increased infiux of capital would be even greater than that of labour, for the inquiry X. s stcudv most iin- iind, in I piirts of ninount, lIi»(K»r )y almost :cm1 with, Icr those or of ii!i riic cmi- tliouj^ht Ikim, as f ft' cling patriotic t he was winning le earth. io check L'xist, or as would ion Id he Colonies elephant '/{ ahout if they that he be, the fore tho ould be, iquirers ousands ' homes, d would inquiry BL'KDKXS AND DKNKKITS OF rDDIllJATIOX. IS.') wouhl be most aetivelv itursnod bv men of iiitclli^^ence amongst tin* middle classes, crushed out at honu' by monster capitalists. A mixture of such men in the tide of immiixration would be an immense moral and intellcc- tual benefit to the Colonies, whilst their capital would probably double the productive power of labour. Nor woidd the benefit cud here. Xot thiec years would elapse before the revelations niade, the interest excited, and the experience gained, would induce; the establish- ment of a svstem of (iovernmcnt emii^ration |in»vidin<»' free transit for those unable to j)ay their way. The result of thes!' cond)ine<l iuHuences would be to throw into the shade all the marvels of colonial increase in the past, and to cause new conununities to spring into life with ahnost magic rapidity. N«)t long sh(»uld we have to Avait to see the Uritain of the South covered with home- steads akin to those in tlic Britain of the North : Australian products rivalling those of Sjiain and France, and per- haps those of the 'Cotton States' also; West Indian plantations, instead of being deserted, again as rich as in former davs, and a chain of settlements extendinjj across the \(nth American continent, coimected by an iron road, over which would be I'caliscd ' the north-west passage by land.' The enormous benefits gained by older settlements fi-om such increase is too well known to colonists to render it ncedl'ul for us to >av a sinn;le word on the subject. If anv colonist should still feel chai'v ot' consenting" to a scheme bv which taxativ)n miy;lit possiblv be increased to the extent of o.v. 2(1. })er head, we would ask him to compare the loss by taxation with the gain through the appreciation of property, which couhl not fail to follow on the increased infiux of labour and capital, and say if it would not thereby be repaid tenfold? We are thus led to conclude that colonial indepen- dence is, at present, an impossibility ; but that all the 1 ISO A rOLOMST O.V TIIK COLOMAT. QIT-STION. 1 ! Ix'tiofits wliich a national antonomv ()ffovH to oountrios <'iipul)le of niiiintninin*!^ it, iiloiij; with a jjood many more &U<), woiild be attained by the Colouios under a Federation (»r tiie I^nipire. How, tlien, ean any colonist hesitate for i\ moment aw to the expediency of adoptinj^ it, in default of bein«( able to prove the course of reasoning; by which we have been led to this conclusion to be incorrect? M 18: CHAPTKR IX. FEDERATION V. ENGLISH ISOLATION. The oxpedienoy of Fedorution has now to he eonsidcM'od from an iMijjIish standpoint: having arrived at the con- clusion that the ineaHure woidd he bcneHcial to tlio C/olonies, it remains to inquire whether tliere is fair ground to believe that its influence on the ITnitcil Ivinir- dom would be of a similar character. The answer, it seems to us, can be reached much more readily than that to the correspondiiiii^ (|uesti<»n in refer- ence to the Colonies. That the Fiitiieriand would be a ijainer, to an enormous extent, by Federation has been almost proved already. We have seen that einan('i|iation could scarcely fail to present Eni^land to the eyes of the world in a manner which would piin for her a /irrsfif/r by no means enviable, and ]n*etty certain to ])rove Iii2:hly mischievous; that it might tend to endanger Fuirlish investments in the Colonies ; that it could not fail to reduce that maritime strength on which her existence depends; that it would, in all probability, create at least as many new dijdosnatic difficulties as its advocates allege that it would solve ; that heavv connnercial losses could not fail to ensue from it; and that it would, in case of England being forced to abandon free trade, dei)rive her of the only resource Avhereby she could save her com- merce from utter ruin. Against all these circumstances adverse to emancipation can be placed only the single * 3 ISS A COLOXIST OX Till-: COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. fact lliat it would render [)ossible a reduction of about 2,')0(),()()()/. in the military expenditure. But as tlio conuiierc'al loss would probably amount to treble or (jUi\drui)lc the amount saved in expenditure, it folbnvs that crcn tlw jx'ciiitiuri/ huhince would be against emanci- paticm, to say nothing of the other evils, present and ])rospective, which it would induce. Hence it appears that it would be better for Entjland to oarriv*on the Colonies at her own expense, as was done prior to 1871. if that course should prove essential to the maintenance of the connection with its accomi)anvi7i<i: advantatres, than dissolve it in consideration of effectinjj a saving of 2,.")()0,()0()/. in her annual ex])enditure. But if the loss of the Colonies would entail on Knijland evils Avhich it would pay to spend the above sum to avert, is it needful to say one woi-d in defence of the exi)ediency of a scheme Avhich would enable her to retain them without the expenditure of one farthing? This, and a good deal more too, would Federation accomplish for England. We shall strive to state categorically the benefits which would thence «iccrue to her. 1. The one sound argument of emancipationists is that the policy Avhich they advocate would relieve England of the ex})cnse heretofore entailed by the possession of her colonial empire. Federation would accom[)Hsh the same result and leave that empire intact. Under it the Colo- nies would become sources of revenue to England. Tiieir cinitributions to the common fund would, at the outset, probaldy range from 2,500,000/. to 3,000,000/. per annum — a sum which, we have seen, would suffice to defray all the charges which they now entail. This advantage, we doubt not, would be duly api)reciated by England. But the sjain to her would not end here. The growth of wealth and population in the Colonies is not correctly understood by Englishmen. All, lnjwcver, know that (iAlN TO KXULAXI) FROM FEDKKATIO.V, ISO of about t as the treble or t follows einanei- sent and appears Mson the to 1871, ntenance ^•aiitaLres. I. saviiiiji: of the loss which it t nceflful icy of a 1 without jood (Ion I t^ug'laud. ts whioh ts is that lijlaud of n of her he same he Colo- Tiieir e outset, r annum efray all tage, we d. But •owth of jorrectly ow that the rate of increase in new countries must be much more rapid than in those thickly-peopled like Enolaud. Hence it appears that not only the amount, but also the prujfor- tlou of revenue to be paid by the Colonies woidd be continually on the increase, and conse([uently that of lMi<;land on the decline. We do not say that each increase in the colonial contributions to the Fcdei'al icvenue would be so much clear uain to I']nii;land, as the sum total of Federal exj)euditure, and ])robably the amount (tf it s])ent in the Colonies, would o-row with the growth of the Em[)ire. But as tlu- wealth of Knoland has, during the present century at least, increased much moi'e raj)idly than has her ex})enditure, it is almost a matter of certainty that the growth of colonial wealth, and consequently of taxation, would outstiij) that ol* expenditure in a sti'l greater degree; in which case the relief to the English tax])ayei" Avould be ])ci'manently augmenting, fi't)m the mere increase of colonial wealth. Should any contentious colonist here exclaim that this rt'lief would be unjust to the Colonies, we reply that it would be nothing different from that which must occur in every state, since it is impossible to secure an identical growth of wealth in every section ; and that, in the present instance, the accomjianyijig increase of influence in the national council would furnish a c()mi)ensati(tu not usually provided, and enable the Colonies to secure due attention to their interests in the expenditure of the revenue, which is all that they would in ecjuity be entitled to clahn. As we wish to kee[) within i\\v. limits tif sober facts, we shall make no estimate of the ])i'obal)Ie growth of colonial contributions. To any who may feel sce])tical w^e say : Look at the Colonies, see what they were and what they are. AVe say nothing of the dazzling iirowth of Australia, for thar has occurred under verv peculiar circumstances. But we poi:it to the fact that 190 A COLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. f! ;f] i « the growth of British America has far outstripped the miich-vaunted progress of the United States. The popu- lation of the entire countries wliich now constitute British America, in tlie year 17o0, has hitely been esti- mated by one of our best statisticians at 81,000, which is certainly a j)retty high estimate. The jwpulatiou of the territories of the present Union in the same year is stated by Mr. Bancroft at 1,260,000. In 1870 it had risen to 38,555,000, showing the rate of increase to have been about 2,959 per cent., Avhilst the population of British America in the same year was about 3,800,000, being an increase of 4,710 per cent. In 1750, the Canadian popu- lation was about one-fifteenth that of the States; in 1870 it was one-tenth ! If it be replied that this comparison is unfair, as the rate of increase is a})parently more raj)id in the early than in the late stages of society, we turn to the fact that between 1830 and 1871 the po[)ulati(m of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec increased from 700,000 to about 2,811,000, or over 300 per cent., whilst the increase in the States during the same time was only i'vom 12,866,000 to 38,555,000, or 199 per cent. The population of these two provinces was about 5^ per cent, that of the States in 1830, and in 1871 it was almost 7^. It is thus clear that the growth of the Colonies is much more rapid than that prevailing in the States, and we have before seen that the establishment of the proposed Federal ret/ime could scarcely fail to increase it very nuiterially. The former fact alone should, we think, suffice to convince the most scepvical that the relief to Knglish finances from emanci[)ation would be nuich less tlian that which would ensue from Federation. 2. Federation would confer an immense benefit on the United Kingdom by supplying it with legislative machi- nery ade(iuate to its wants. That it does not j)ossess this at present was pithily stated by the Saturdny Riricir ^T S. BRITISH PARLIAMENT UVKR WORK ED, 11(1 )|)e(l the lie popu- onstitute een esti- wliich is n of the is stated risen to ive been ^ British beinjj an in po[)u- in 1870 nparison •re rajtid 3 turn to lation ol' ed from ;., Avhilst vas only t. Tiie )er cent, most 7|. is mu(;h and we )ro[)osed it very think. elief to ioh less on the niaelii- ])Ossess Ri'vh'w ' of AiifTust 12, 1871, when it said: 'In every direction it is a{)j)arent that Parliament tries to do too mueli ; dues very badly very much of what it does, and leaves very much undone.' The correctness of this statement is substantiated by the annual ' slaughter of the innocents,' the lai'ge numl)er of emendatory statutes required, and the many important questions awaiting solution and never solved. That these evils do not arise from any laziness on the j)art of either ministei's or legislators is confessed by all. The amount of labour which is discharged by a minister of the Crown, or even by a member of Parliament, during the session, is probably much in excess of that fulfilled by the hardest-worked of ' working men.' Theii- in effi- ciency {irises chiefly from the fact that they have a great deal more work on hand than it is possible for liinnan nature efficiently to acconqdish. There is more attempted every session than it is possible to complete, and a know- ledi-e of tiie large measures and careful thought needed in the settlement of great social and political ])robk'ms — such as this very colonial (question, national defence, or pauperism— leads wearied and badgered statesmen actu- ally to shirk them, and l)y so doing to prc})are for their country a terrible awakening. We do not blame them very much. The national ideal for a couple of genera- tions has been a legislature which would follow rather than lead public o})inion ; and i)ublic oj)inion during that time has been chiefly engrossed by matters in which par- tisan or social jealousies and the cheapness of goods were involved, whilst a cerUiin code of opinion was declared to constitute the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and any attenq)t to violate it was denounced as political blasphemy. Under such circumstances, rulers cannot fairlv be blamed for the ' confusion worse con- founded ' that reigns in the hnperial Legislature. It is !l H 1«!» !• f 11 '2 A COLONIST OX TIIK COI.OXIAL QUKSTIOX. impossible tliiit the relations of len;isljitors aiul constituents Clin, with safety to the commonwealth, ever be reduced to the conditicm in which the sovereign |)eo])le say to their servant, ' Do this, and he doeth it.' Inde[»endently of the difficulty of ascertaining what the voice of the ])eo|)le really says, the interests of the body ])olitic may demand many measures Avhich that voice never asks for at all, and the Legislature should be both able and willing to supply them. It may demand measures which are either totally impracticable or essentially vicious, and the Legislature should be able to refuse them, and to convince the people or, at least, the intelligent i)art of the c(»nununity, that it does well to do so. And it may be possible t() attain the end desired much moie advan- tageously by means of another [)olicy than that advocated, and the Legislature shoidd c(^nn)rehcnd this policy and substitute it for that proj)oscd. It is, of course, true that to the due fulfilment of these duties the presence of a large amount of knowledge and talent within the Legislature is indispensable. But It Is also true that no anumnt whatever of talent could fulfil these duties unless it ha I time to aj>})ly Itself to the work. This English legislators have not at present, and consequently they fail in the discharge of the duties of their office. The growth of wealth and j)0})ulatIon has enormously in- creased the quantity, and rendered more intricate the quality of the legislation required at their hands ; and ' although this nineteenth century has produced many Avonderful things, it has not ])roduced a new mankind ' who can labour seventeen hours a day with Imj)unity, though even that time does not suffice to enable them to fuliil their Avork. The declaration that representative institutions are on their trial has ])assed into a sort of cant phrase. Let them, at least, have a fair trial ; let them not suffer from legislators being required to fulfil m R1:M1:DY L\ local liEGISLATURi:S. 193 tituonts reduced say ti» mlently of the tic may isks ftn" ble and s which )us, and and to part of 1 it may advan- vocated, licy and ■se, true :senee of hln the that no s unless English ;ly they The dy in- ite the ; and many mkind ' j)unity, them to ntative sort of ial; let fto fulfil isl Is tasks beyond tlie ])hysical power of man to accomplish, and failinii" to do so. That some relief nnist l)e afforded to Britisli le_<;ishit()!'s is hecoming increasingly apjjarent every session. Federation otters the means of furnislilniji; it. Increase of business must be accompanied by division of labour, it' tlie labour is to be dischari>;ed efficiently ; and division oi' labour is the essence of the federal form of government. With the; Imix'rial ParlianuMit relieved of the mass o!" local and private business, which now con- stitutes really the heaviest ])art of its labours, and new legislatures created for the discharge of this Inisiness, we should soon see an Innnense im])i"o\ement in both local and Imj)crial legislation. The legislatures Avould have leisure sufficient ior the due examination of all (picstions; and conse(juently a decrease In the nuudier of those neglected would ensue. They would be able to weigh all subjects thoroughly, and thence might fairly l)e ex- pected to legislate more wisely. They would possess increased local independence; and, conse(|uently, would \)(i move likely to frame measures suited to local idiosyn- erasi^"'s than would a legislature for the three kingdoms. And if means were ado[)ted to }»romote rhe iiiiiux of talent into them, there would be men at iiand cai)able of grai)pling with the various problems that would arise and of solvhig them. The alternative, in fact, is between the machinery of good government or that of im})erfect legis- lation for the British Islands. There seems no reason to doubt that local (iovernments would prove effective in practice, in Avhicli case the gain to the strictly Ic-cal Interests of England, Ireland, and Scotland from their establishment would be such as should almost alone suffice to induce them to support the scheme of Imperial Federation. .1. Federation woidd secui'e to England that outlet for her surjdus [ ojjuiation wlilch it is daily becoming more O I!; II 104: A COLONIST O.N THE COl.OMAI. QUKSTIOX. I' ' I '$ important that she should possess; indeed its possession niav be said to liave become ahiiost a matter of neeessitv. The sijins of tlie times seem to indicate that in emi<rration ah)ne can the means of em})loyment and su))sistcnce for her teeming millions be found. According to the Vrar Book for 1871 (pj). 24o, 24S, and 2o4), the number of ])aupers in England on the 1st of .January ]8G() was S,") 1,020, against l,07y,.'^*Jl <>" the corresponding date in 1870; in Scotland, on May 14, 18r)(», 114,209. against I28,3.'i9 on the corresponding date in 1800 ; and in Ireland, on January 1, 1801, 50,08;^, against 73,921 on the corresponding date in 1870. The total number of ])au[)ers in the United Kingdom on the former dates thus a])pears to have been 1,01.3,912, against l,28l,0.')l on the latter. The jiopulation in 1861 was 2 9, .3 .'5 8, 000, and in 1871, 31,833,000. The increase of population thus aj)- pears to have been about 8^ per cent, whilst the increase in the ])auperism was 20 per cent. It is pretty certain that, should this disproportionate rate of increase continue in force it must result in national ruin. It is still more certain that in a country where all the land available for the i)lough has been brouglit under cultivation, and scientific farming carried to a very high pitch, there is little or no prosj)ect of the increasing populatitm finding em])loymcnt in agricultural labour. Hence it follows that the only spheres of action for it are to be found in manufacturing or commercial industry ; and the above returns prove that even the rapid rate at which these have progressed is insufliicient to keep ])ace with the simul- taneous increase in the supply of labour. Hence it is that England has bect)me the scene of a vast social strife, in Avhich cajntal and labour, employers and emi)loyed, are contending for the mastery, and in so doing becoming daily more estranged, less and less accustomed to think that they have any interest in common ; and in which the mm EM Hi RATION TO THK COLON IKS. r.>5 ' workiii'i'-classos,' tln'oiiiili the inacliinerv of trades unions, are hchv^ led to look u|t(»i all above tlieir own rank in life as foes whose destruction would be conducive to the advancement of their class interests. It is impossible to doubt that this strife must expose the framework of j»;overnment and society to very serious dangers. In this, as in all other cases, the evil can be elfectually eradicated onlv by destroyini; its cause. That cause is an over sup)>ly of labour. There are but two means of reducin<i; the supply to an equality with the demand. The one is by im[)osing checks on the increase of i>o})ida- tion, and the other is by providing an outlet for the excess. The former jxylicy, we fear, Avould i)rove a remedy worse than the disease ; the latter would bring blessings to the sufferers, blessings to England, and blessinii's to the Colonies. Enu'land would find consumers of her manufactures, and contributors to her revenue, in those who at home only contrii)ute to swell the roll of misery, the rate of assessment, and the dangers of social convulsion. The Colonies would find their resources developed, and the value of pre-existent pro^jci'ty in- creased, through the labour of the immigrants ; and the latter would find peace and plenty on a virgin soil, and become loyal Britons, ready, if called on, to die for the Empire, instead t)f dangerous foes, anxious to shake its foundations. We believe that nothing short of Federa- tion will suffice to awaken English opinion to the enormous benefits which must accrue to all ])artics from the establishment of an orjxanized svstem of emiiiration : and we feel sure that without it — unless the increase of j)opulation should be otherwise checked — conununistic doctrines will, within twenty years, become nuich more rampant in England than in France. If it be said that the Colonies would furnish this outlet Avhen emancipated as well as when federated, Ave reply that they could do so o 2 190 A COLONIST OX TIIi: COLOMAL (trKSTIO.V. only in tlic event of tlie prevalenee of ])eaee nrd pro- sperity in their midst, wliieli we have shown would be at least a doubtful continj^oncy under independence : and that Encrland, in a matter of sueh vital importance to her interests, should leave nothing:; to chance. 4. Even suj)posing it to be granted that the required outlet for a snrjdus i)o])ulation could be found in the emancipated Colonies, or in foreign states, the fact re- nianis that Federation would convert emigratitm from a negative benefit into a positive gain to I']ngland. When directed towards foreiixn countries, it certainlv serves to diminish Enijlish povertv and discontent, but it also lessens her ])opu]ation and increases that of her rivals ; uhiist, if directed towards the fedi-rated Colonies, it would achieve the former end. and also strengthen her resources instead of weakening them. We have already dwelt on the i)robabilitv of English emiicration beinj;: turned into the Colonies by means of Federation, and on the benefits which would accrue to them from this diversion. But it must not be sui)posed that the gain would belong to the Colonies exclusively. England would })rofit by it almost as much as would they. In a pecuniary point of view she would gain immensely by sending her people to countries in which each emigrant would consume from 1/. lO.v. to over 51. Avorth of her manufictures, instead of to the States, where each inhal)itant takes only 13.v. worth. This gain would be pretty heavy, and it is astonishing that it has not received more attention from statesmen and statisticians. But along Avith tliis jiecuniary gain would be acquired a most im])ortant j)olitical advantage. In the Cohmies the innnigrant finds his l()ve of ' home,' or the 'old country,' rather inci'eased than diminished, whilst abroad it either dies out or is converted into deadly hatred. It is surely of no small importance to EntrUind that the men who leave her shores should K.\ii(;i:.\Tij.\ TO Tiih: states ol'r loss. 11)7 m] ])ro- (l be iit e : atul J to her equired in the faet rc- fVoni a Wlien rves to It also rivals : t would ^sources welt on icd into ])enefits But it to tlie almost f view pie to from tead of wttrlli. lishiuij; tesnien ■V <ji;ain antage. home,' lished, d into mee to sliould serve to iiu-rcase llie numbers of her allies rather than those of hei' jtossible foes. ()l!i('ial returns — quoted in the }\'(/r Uoith for 1871, \). 2'A — state the number of emi^'runts, ineluding foreigners, wh(> left the United Kingdom from IS 15 to the elose of 1869, at fi,7.)(),()t)7. Of these there went 4,270,597 to the United States, 1,350,470 to liritlsh Ameriea, 971,358 to Australasia, and 152.200 elsewhere. Thus it appears that almost tiro- thirds of the emigrants embarking from the United King- dom went to the States. The total number of iunni- irrants who arrived in the Union durinn; the thirteen vears from 1850 to 1808 was 2,505,044, of wlutm 1,215,000 were; natives of the British Islands. Ilenee it aj)pears that the emi<!;rants from the United Kiuiji-dom eonstituted nearly one-half of that vast tide of labour and eapital wdiieh has made the l^nion the miglity and insolent power whieli it is to-day. The Irish Celt has gone there, and hr.s carried with him his hatred of Eny-land. Anu'Io- Irish, Seoteh, and English have gone and forgotten the love of country in the love of democracy. Tiie result has been the creation of a power whieli, in spite of all the twaddle that is nnceasingly uttered about the identity of the two pe()[)les, has never yet shown itself to be a cordial ally of England, but has re[)eatedly acted most un- generously towards her, and demanded and obtained con- cessions such as were never even sought by any other country. How very dilferent would have been the l)resent situation had this vast flood been poured into British America! Instead of a 'narrow strip' of terri- tory in Canada, we should have had wide tracts settled and cultivated. Instead of being engaged to-day in opening a way from Lake Superior to the lied Iliver, we should have had it opened fifteen or twenty years ago. Instead of a wide waste in the North- West, we should have had large settlements on the lied liiver and the Saskat- ; * ; ill 108 A (OL()\I8T OX Tin: COLOMAL (^I'KSTlo.V. chewan. Tiistond of liavini>: no internal connnunication witli JJritisIi Colmul)ia, we sliould pndialtly liavc a rail- way across the continent. Instead of having Irish Celts converted into Fenian raiders, tiireateniiig ns from the States, we shonld have had them ("oiiverted into loval Britons in Canada, ready as any otlier to repel Yankee invaders ; for, with scarcely an exception, IJoman Catholic Irish ai'e as loyal in Canada as are any other class. In a word, instead of having fonr millions in Canada eon- fronting thirty-eight millions of semi-contem}»tiions spec- tators in the States, we should ])i-ol)al)ly have had ten or twelve millions here livin<>- nlonnside twentv-five or twcntv- eiirht millions of resitcctiny; f )rei<i:ners across the line. Putting the connnercial advantages, which would have amounted to a gain of several millions annually, alto- o-ethcr aside, is it ])ossible, we ask, easily to exauiierate the benefit wdiich it would be to England to have such a state of things substituted for that actually in ex- istence ? Is it likely that in such a case we should have seen any Alabama treaty signed, or, indeed, any Alabama difficulty raised ? We believe that neither one nor other of them would have been heard of, and that it would have been the same with many other of our ' diffi- culties' with the States. At all events, it is certain that we should have been much stronger and they nuich weaker than is actually the case, and that this single fact would have compelled them to assiunc a much more modest tone in tlieir dealings with us than they have done for thirty years past. What a strong argument, then, in favour of Federation is to be found in the fact that it could scarcely fail to turn emigration from countries where the emigrant at least ibrgets his Fatherland, into those where he and his children would remain as loyal, and their services be as readily available, as if they had never left its shores ! MILITARY WKAK.VKSS OP KX<il,A.VI). 100 mention ' a rail- ;h Celts I'om the to loyal Yankee Catliolie iss. In ida eon- US sj)ee- (1 ten or twenty- lie line, lid have ly, alto- a liberate live such in ex- ) should eed, any ther one 1 that it iir ' dif!i- 1 that we 1 weaker 't would lest tone or thirty 'avour of it eould here the »se wdiere iiid their ever left .'). Federation would largely Inerease the naval and military resonn-es of KiiMlaiul. The events of the vear 1871 have demonstrated that the warninii' of Solon to Cra'sus is as aj)|»Ii('al)le to our time as to his own. It is as true in the nineteenth century as it was uNcr li.OOO years hei'ore that, ' if anyhody eomi' who has hctter iron than you, he will he master of all this i^old.' Xo country has ii'one so far in ii»;norin!'- this truth as has Kniiland : and this jtreeisely at the time when, from the increase of her tjold, she should have rememhered it most carefulU . The national feeling on the siihject has, indeed, advance<l considerahly heyoml the idiotic phase in which it was gravely ]tro|iosed to swee}) away the army and navy as useless inenmhrances in an nge which had heeome too enlightened to wage war. Some rough exj>erience (iniekly demonstrated the ahsurdity of these theories, and foi-ec*! all, save a few fannties, to admit that armaments were still necessaries of i)olitical life. A new course was, therefore, rcconmiended, and 'non-intervention' projiosed as the hasis of Kniidand's foreign policy. How far it has heen carried, or how far it has heen snccessiul, we need not now impiire. The point which we wish to enforce is that the time has now come when it must, to all appearance, be aban(U)iie(h Conquest and military despotism have enormously increased the military resources of all Con- tinental Europe, an<l the naval force of some parts of it ; whilst any development of those of Englan<l, from either of these causes, has heen impossible, and liritish arma- ments are to-day little, if anything, stronger than in IMM. The consequence has been that the relative imj)ortance of our country has very seriously declined. Jt is an un- deniable fact that Belgium, with about one-sixth tin; population of the United Khigdom, could, in 1871, have brought at least twice as many troojis into the field as could England. But even the 100,()()() soldiers of lielgium I I ^ \. 'JOO A COLONIST ON TIIK COLOVfAf, ()'/!', HloV. WOW uttorlv insijxnificiujt in coinpnrisnu with tlic iiiijaitlii' iiiassrs of Fninco sind (icnimiiy, and still n;i'(.at('r than tlit'so were those of liussia. Kiiu'laiid, \v1umi (•(mtVoiitcd i)V them, I'clt hcrscir to ho ultorlv noworlcss. Still more jiowcrloss to meet tlu'in will she he in the I'litiire, when the Prussian military system lias l)een put in loreo all over the Continent, as it is to he. It is imjtossihle for h(?r to leniain in this position unless she is content to let foreitjn potentates erect vast empires, whoso l)ehests she would he I'oreed to ohey from inahility to resist them. All the si^ns of the times unite in indicating that ' hlood and iron' are likelv to he the characteristics of the next ju;eneration. Europe is now coidVonted hy two mighty powers which, for tw(> centuries, have pursued a career of war and con- quest with I'eally alarming success. Prussia has grown, from an insiguilicant electorate, into a mighty military emi)ire, with a population ol' ahout 4(),()()(),0(H), in which every man is a soldier. Russia has now pushed her way, «)n the west, far into the heart of Europe; on the east has advanced into dangerous proximity to the gates of Pekin ; and on the south has estahlished herself on the Oxus, in a position so close to our ln<lian outposts that the <'hances of a struj^U'le with her on the Indus can no longer he rejected from consideration as an e})isode in a new Russian war. This vast empire is i)eoi)ledl)y nearly eighty milliims of peoi)le, who one and all, ' fnmi the liighest nohle to the lowest serf, hclieve that it is their destiny to conquer the world.' In it the resources of harharism and civilisati(m are in dancrerous union, and in Prussia all those of learnincr are carefully utilised for warlike ])urposes. Is it possible to believe that they will now stop short in their career, especially when the Avorn- out dynasties of Asia almost invite Kussian attack ; and in Europe Austria and Turkey stand forth as tempting victims directly in their way ? Besides this, England r:x(iLAM) AM) rouMKi.v rowiiij." !iOl lid 1)0 nptin mwA ronioiiihcr that Friiiico, MeediiiL!: nt cvory jioro and Iat»licd into fnrv at licr dc^iradation, is likdv to rniln'aci' any alliance which may cnahlc \\vr to rcc(.\( r lur Inrnu r dignity and iidlncnci', and that in the States there exists a power whoso ai'roiiance and ainhition she lell j>retty t^overeiy in 1S71. 11 we eonii)are thi' I'nited Kingdom with those conntrioM wo find that it is iideri<»r, in extent and popnhition, to any one of them ; that it is ('(inailed ])V !»on»o in arts and ci\ iii/ation ; that its I'aeilitii's for dovelo[)nient aro prohal)ly inferior to thosc^ of any slate in Westell! Kni'ope. whilst with those of Ku>sia and tlu' I'nited States it cannot attempt a comparison ; that they are all ambitions ol" territorial a<:|:;randisement ; that, to j»rocure it, America omidoys democratic; enerLjy, and Europe desj)Otic plotting-, hacked hy armaments against ■which 'the streak of silver sea' which sej>arates Kniiland from the Continent is admitted to he her only security. AVe think that nobody, honestly lookin<»; these facts in the face, can allege that the isolated resources of the United Kingdom could enable it to maintain a position oldpiality amongst such rivals. Yet even a Radical peiiodical has lately cojd'essed that ' it is rccpiisite to maintain a tirst-class rank, if only to kee}> foreign nnu'kets open.' ' It is reciuisite for that reason and a gootl many m(»re also. But how is this to be ilone ? \\'hat course should lOngland pursue in order to attain it? Our answei" is that she should adopt Federation ; unite the Colonies more closely vitli herself; utilise their joint military resources for the conmion benefit ; set to work to erect out of the free lands over which now floats the Union Jack a mighty em})ire, one in history, race, language, and symjjathies; and that, that once done, she avouKI exercise as great an inlluence in the world as in the glorious days of Quebec and Waterloo, ' British (Quarter' ij Ik view, April 1871. {■'■ !;;■ H 202 A ( OLOXTST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. and ])G al)lo to confront either despotic or doniocralic anil)ition Avlierever either wouUl require to be cliecked. Tluis it may be done, and thus only. There is no other means open whereby she can increase lier military re- sources, and the increase of these resources in foreign countries renders it essential t(> her safety that she should not be left utterly behind in the race. Federation would probably enable her to hold her own. We think it has been proved that the States would meet a much more formidable foe in Enfrland and Canada than in Enijland alone. If so, an empire embracing iin{)()rtant strategical points in all parts of the world, and containing a })opu- lation of 40,00(),0()(), whose martial re ources were duly developed, would constitute a much more })owerful state than would one consisting of the British Islands alone, peopled by less than 32,000.000 inhabitants, with a large number of them dependent on foreign trade for their daily bread. It may be said that we have previously spoken in depreciatory terms of colonial military resources. It is true that Ave believe those of each Colony would prove incompetent to maintain its independence single- handed. But in this, as in all other cases, it would be found true that ' union is strength. ' AVe do not say that the Ct)lonies would be likely to constitute fertile recruiting- grounds, for there are scarcely any of their inhabitants who could not adopt a calling that would serve their interests better than enlistment. Their forces would con- sist almost entirely of the militia, which would be avail- able to repel attack, and which would probably pour forth crowds of volunteers to fill the ranks of the regular ?irmy operating elsewhere in time of Avar. Without a consistent policy, strict discipline, and a regular army to serve as a nucleus, such a force is useless ; but Avith these adjuncts it can be made most formidable. They Avould he wanting under independence, and would be sui)plied I' THE KMnRE AND FOEEIGX POWHRS. 2Ui] nocral Ic allocked, lo other tiiry re- foreign e should in would k it has ch more Kngland futcglcal a pojni- 3re duly •ful state Is alone, with a for their •eviously ^sources. y would 3 sino-le- v'ould be say that cruiting- abitants ve their )uld con- )e avail - )ly pour regular ithout a army to ith these would supplied y under Federation. The Imperial War-office would he less liable than that of a small democratic republic to be dis- turbed by the unceasing changes in the waves of })opular movement, and would therefore be more likely to enforce discipline, and })ursue a consistent policy, whereby all available resources would be developed, while the needed nucleus would be found in the standing army of the Em- pire. Hence it is that resources which would l)e very insignificant if isolated, would become most formidable if united with those of the mother-country. The latter would reap a most important gain almost innnedlately. It is certain that very large armies of colonial militia could be kept on foot ready to move at a moment's warning to repel local attack ; and in case a reserve force were established throughout the Empire, liable to be drafted into the line in case of war, the Colonies Avould already be entitled to furnish one-fifth of it. The gain in naval resources would be still greater than that in military force. The Canadian mercantile marine is now the fourth in the world. The British American fisheries must always nurture a race of hardy seamen. There seems to be every probability of a large share of the carrying trade of America becoming the [)atrimony of Xova Scotia antl New Brunswick, these countries being evidently marked out by Nature as scenes of shipping industry. Add to these the resources of the other Coh)nics, and say, can there be any means of strengthening British naval a>- cendancy so effective as Federation ? The immediate accession of strength in both dej)artments Avould be very great, but it shrinks into insignifican(;e when compared with the prospective gain. The p<)[)u!ation of the more important Colonies has been doubling itself every twenty years ; the growth of wealth has been still more rapid than that of numbers, and the rate of increase in both could scarcely fail to be considerably augmented by Federa- \i !'i! ■ m K fiM 204 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. tlon. It is in tliis trcnientlous growth of colonial re- sources that Enu'lantrs i>rcat gain would be found. AVhiUt other nations might possibly make conquests by the sword, she would surely make them by the plough and the axe ; and thus keep their relative positi(ms unchanged ; and it is only in so keeping them that security for her national independence, political liberty, or realised wealth, is to be found. It is no small thinjji; thr.t is at stake — it is her life ; and in her life is involved that of her offspring. Let parent and chiklren start to their work; and — if they would retain for themselves and transmit to posterity the mighty roll of gradually-increasing blessings which the present generation has inherited from the labours of forty of its predecessors — form, by the union of their resources, an empire able to stand, if not against the world in arms, at least against the mightiest of those powers which are now beginning to eclipse the ancient glories of the British race. No one member of the ]']m[)ire could stand ahjne against the foes which actually do, or are likely to, threaten its independence, liut let them unite their forces and they will be invincible. 6. We are aware tliat there are many who refuse to consider an extension of the naval and military jtower of England as an advantage ; who exclaim that a ' moral and intellectual sway ' is not only the most gh>rious, but the only glorious national ascendancy. AVe must refuse to agree with them, (jold cannot be relied on to stop the advance of iron, but still less can rhetoric ; and how, in face of the events of the last twenty years, people can suppose thai martial virtues are not as necessary to the maintenance of liberty in the nineteenth as in any pre- ceding century, is more than we can comprehend. Still, if by a ' moral and intellectual sway ' it is meant that a country should fill a position commanding the respect and afiection of other peoi)leSj should constitute a centre to ,:■ i A MORAL SWAV. 205 Avliich their loaders in the field of Thou.fjht should turn for inspiration, and thus have a considerable share in forininnr the institutions, literature, and plHloso})hy of other lands, Ave willincvly admit that it is a very glorious sway indeed, and one well worthy the ambition of Engbind. Has it ever occurred to the special admirers of this sway that emancipation could not fail instantly to annihilate, and Federation firmly to establish it? That such could not fail to be the result of each policy can easily be proved. Like every other sway, it is one which caimot be estab- lished by ap})eals addressed solely to the intellect. Man's ]-eason is that part of his nature wliich often exercises the least influence over his actions. That which we receive in faith from our schoolmaster we dis])ute when conveyed by our schoolmate. Facts which, wlien heard from a mother's lips, seem tales of love and beauty, to doubt which would be perfectly horril)le, too often, alas! are in later years set down by those revelling in the full pride of in- tellect as silly romances. Neither man nor nation Avill ever acknowledge the moral or intellectual sway of those with whom they have no affinity, and towards whom their sentiments are those of dislik(; or contempt: a favourable, or. at least, a fair hearing, is essential to the accjuisition or retention of any such influence. The chances of obtaining suc^h a hearing are in a {)recise ratio to the respect, or affection, felt for the partv seeking it. Therefore England can exercise a ujoral and intellectual i-way over her Colonies only so long as she continues to be to them that object of fervent love and passionate admiration which she is to-day. And this we niav be j^erfectly sure she will quickly cease to be should she thrust away the offsi)ring who lovintxlv clino; to her. telling them that they must shift for themselves; that she is their 'mother-country' no more than is (Jernianv: that they constitute an expense which, she will not bear; fi ■ 20G A COLOXIST ox THE COLONIAL QUESTION, W 11 i 8 1^ i that thev may hr'mcr her into trouble ; and that she desires, above all else, to ' take her ease — eat, drink, and be merry.' Any nation actings in this manner could never command a moral and intellectual sway, for the simple reason that it would present a spectacle at which tlic moral and intolloctual faculties of the race generally, and of the injured parties universally, would revolt. There is, consequently, no surer means of destroying any such sway that England may now exercise than by ad<)})ting emancipation, and, as the directly opposite policy must induce a directly opposite effect, no siu'cr means of strenii'thcning and extcndino; it than bv convertincr the Empire into a Federation. That once dcme she would stand forth to her offspring, united to her by bonds of love and interest, as the Alma il/r/tr-r, to assail whose reputation would be political sacrilege; as the great exemjilar whose course would fix the wav in which all should follow ; and as the supreme court from whose decisicm, in cases of con- troversy, there could be no appeal. Her sway would not extend over all the world ; but it would extend over about a fifth part of its terrestrial surface ; whilst, in case of the occurrence of a disruption of the Empire, it is very im- probable that it would extend beyond her own shores. The materials for a moral and intellectual sway are to her hands in lavish profusion. Emancipation would destroy them ; Federation would erect them into a glorious edifice. Such are the benefits which would, as we think, accrue to England from Federation. It would at once add to her revenue as largely as emancipation would diminish her expenditure, and in future would bring still larger sums to her coffers. Whilst thus accomi)lishing all the good which she could hope to gain from that measure, it would, also, on the one hand enable her to escape its dangerous consequences to her moral influence, her realised in- vestments, her commercial wealth and her maritime DANG Ell TO ENGLAND OF LOSS OF I'OSITION. 207 at she ik, and could for the which lerally, revolt, ng any lan by e policy leans of ing the ! would 5 of love )utation X whose iw ; and fi of con- luld not er about se of the ,'erv im- ft/ shores, e to her destroy edifice. , accrue d to her lish her fcr sums le good t would, mjterous ised in- naritime supremacy ; and, on the other hand, it would Immensely augment her naval and military strength, oj>on a secure outlet for her teeming })oj)ulrttion, increase her Irade and place it on a much more secure basis than at present, improve very materially the internal government of the British Islands, and })lace them in a j)0!«ition of dazzling glory at the head of the mightiest Em})ire on the face of the earth. It is impossible to compare the relative ex- pediency of each course, when on the one side there are evils to be encountered, and on the other benefits to be acquired. iVt this point it is possible that some English reader may object to the above statement on the ground that Federation would reduce England from her lofty position of supremacy in the Emjure to that of ecpiality with the countries which are now her dei)endencies ; and that, besides the loss of ]K)sition thus entailed, she would become liable to have her will controlled by the Colonies and her interests sacrificed to theirs. It is of cou)se true tliat in the })rt>posed Federation Enu'land would be no more than * first among e(juals.' The Colonics could not submit to increased burdens without receivino; some compensation therefor. But we utterly deny that anv danger to England's local interests, or anv diminution of her prcst'nje could result from her new relationship to the Colonies. Under Federation they could exercise no moie influerice over the internal government of tjjo liritish Islands than they do to-day. The colonial will could not even interfere with that of England in any other matters than those coming under the control of the Federal Government, which would be little more than the management of the armaments and di}»lomacy of the Empire. Even in the legislature which would arrani^e the details of these departments, the representatives of the United Kingdom would, for a very long time, immensely 203 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. f;' fc outnumber those of the Colonies, and avc have previously sugo'cstcd means whereby the voice of the Fatherland eould be s^fii'^lcd against that extinction which some seem to dread. But parties who feai- wjiat they Avould call this ' dejijradation ' of Enii-hind must ijo a little further than they generally seem inclined to do. Can this merely apparent ' degradation ' be avoided without running the risk of encounterinn; a real one ? I']no'land to-dav stands forth as the richest country in the world, and this position a great many of her ])eople seem to consider as the suminuni. hoiinm of political life. Granting it to be so, Avill they never ap})ly their own commercial principles to their own case and examine tiis basis on which the wealth of England now rests? The security of any investment is usually the most important element in its value ; but the security of English wealth under the present system never seems to enter into tlie minds of her connnercial j)rinccs or political rulers. The author of The Battle of Dor/iinr/ has well described her ]iosition where he says: ' Our people could not be got to see how artificial our ])ros[>erity was — that it all rested on foreign trade and financial credit ; that the course of trade once turned away from us, even for a time, it might never return ; and that our credit once sluiheu inhjlit nerer he restored. .... They could not be got to see that the wealth heaped uj) on every side ir<is not credted in tJte country^ but in India and China and other })arts of the world ; and that it would be quite possible for the })eople Avho made money by buying and selling the natural treasures of the earth to go and live in other places and take their [)rofits with them.' This language is simply that of sober common sense. England's positi( n is, doubtless, very splendid in a})pearance ; but so long as it rests on foreign trade and financial credit, it may at any moment be shattered : thert! i.s nothing more clearly revealed in the f eviously therland ine seem call this ler than 1 merely linfT the V stands 1 position • as the be so, ciples to e wealth restment ue ; but t system nmercial Battle of lie says: cial our ade and 3 turned return ; restored. 1 wealth count ry^ '1(1 ; and 10 nia<ie js of the 1' [)i"olits )f Sober 5S, vei'v I forciiiu mcnt be 1 in the , I DANTiEll OF A STOJTACiE OF FOOD SUITLIES. 209 history of the world than that such greatness is of the most unstable character. Cxreat as is the danger to-day It would be enormously increased by a disruption of the JMiipire. Urban industry rests upon rural labour, as it IS from the latter that the materials on which its em- ployees work and live are derived. The field for rural labour in England may be considered to have reached its limit. Let the Colonies be cut loose, and she would have no means of finding employment for her increasinrr population within her own bounds, save in manufacturinn- and commercial pursuits. Her urban industry would thus be increased in the absence of any corresponding increase of that other industry on which it depends for working materials and food. Every such increase must add to the delicacy of the social structure. There is no sign abroad to indicate that there will be fewer storms either internal or external, to assail it in the future than' in the past. In that case it must at last succumb to some of them, and with its fall all would be lost. On the .)ther hand, let Federation be adopted, and in the Colonies would be found the means of an almost boundless exten- sion of agricultural industry, which extension would place the urban industry of England on a secure basis by providing a sure supj.ly of the materials and food necessary to its sustenance, an increased number of steady customers for its products, and of fellow-countrymen mterested in its defence. Such a security against the danger of an irremediable degradation would, we should say, be cheaply purchased at the cost of the slight loss of English dignity involved in Federation. As to the loss of prestif/c conse(iuent on this descent, it may also be re- marked that emancipationists who regard it as a juo-o-le cannot object to Federation on the ground that that measure would lessen England's share of so worthless a commodity. And let those who do value prestir^e compare fl ■f! :-i. jJlO A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. tlie amount of it whieli would be possessed by the sea- girt isles in the Atlantic Ocean when standing alone in the world ; confronted by mighty military mon- archies ; having an imj)ortant member of the family at variance with the remainder; jiopulation ])ressing on the means of subsistence ; one-third of their inhabitants dej)cndent on foreigners for their food, and j)robably as many on their custom for the means of buying it — with the glory, strength, and influence which would surround the same islands when standing forth as the head of a mighty confederacy embracing lands in every clime ; shores on every ocean ; fortresses of ancient note ; i)lains of virgin ])urity ; the fisheries, the timber-lands and wheat- fields of Canada ; the sugar-isles of the Mexican Gulf; the pasture-g'"ounds, the gold-fields, and the diamond- lands of Australasia and South Africa ; the tropic wealth of Ceylon ; the unmatched riches of the Indian peninsula ; the unequalled soil of the Emerald Isle ; and the hives of Scotch and English industry — uniting the realised wealth of the mother-country with the untouched and unbounded resources of the Colonies ; the science of ancient civilization with the energy of modern coloni- zation ; the lustre of historic glory with that gained from the rushing growth of young communities — and say which of these conditions is best calculated to place, not only the glory, but also the wealth, the liberty, and the inde- j)endence of the Fatherland on the most stable basis ? The primacy of such an Empire would carry with it an amount of substantial wealth, power, and prestige probably unexampled in the history of the world, and certainly unprecedented if to these elements of worth we add the fact that the institutions of the Empire Avould be based on Truth, Justice, Liberty, and Christianity ! X. the sea- ig alone ry moii- faiiiily at jssinjj on habitants bably as it — Avitli surround eatl of a ' clime ; 3 ; plains id wheat- 11 Gulf; liamond- c wealth ninsula ; he hives realised hed and ience of . coloni- led from ay which not only he inde- e basis ? th it an probably certainly add the jased on 211 CHAPTER X. CONCLUSION. Omx task is done : but ' we linger round a subject which nothing could tempt us to leave but a consciousness of treating it too unworthily ;' and before closing wish to add a few words on tlie course of action to be pursued in case the policy which we advocate should commend itself to our lellow-countrynien. The first and most important requisite of success in any attempt to form an Imj,erial Federation would be the absence of jealousy towards each other on the part of the several countries lo be comprised in it. Should they enter on a discussion of the scheme in a niggard spirit ; each anxious to make the smallest concessions, and to gain the largest advantages possible for itself, and makn.g invidious comparisons between the benefits -ained by one party and by another, it may be confidentlv pre- dicted that the movement would end in smoke, and had better never have been begun. The only question which, in a conference on the subject, each country would have any right to ask is, whether it could obtain equal, or supe- rior, advantages, from the adoption (.f any other ,,olitical career open to it. If any part of the Empire would be a loser by joining the Federation, instead of becomin<.- inde- pendent or associating itself with some other country, it would have fair grounds for refusing to do so ; and if the Lmted Kingdom could, by severing the connection, <rain greater benefits than by establishing a union bused on P 2 f Mi; 212 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLOXIAI- (^IHSTIO.V. pcrfoet equality of privilogos and 1)1ii'(1(mis, it Avould he justified in rejecting the scheme. But neither the mother-country nor a Colony would have any rijjht to reject it merely on the ground that it would subject them to certain <U's<nfrenu'iis from winch they are uow free. That Federation would import local troubles into every ])art of the Em})irc we have no doubt ; but we have equally little dcmbt that it would also import benefits which would heavily overbalance them, and that a dis- ruption of the Empire would induce s;ill greater troubles, without affording any com])ensation whatever. A choice must be made between the different courses open. Hence it is not the (thsoJntr, but the cominirntivf, merits of Federation that should be considered. Should this fact be borne in mind, all will go well ; but all will go ill should ir be forgotten. It may, perhaps, be said that this language is trite. That is true. But it is equally true that, as a perception of the facts, and the existence of the spirit which we have indicated, arc indispensable to success, it is impossible to insist too strongly on atten- tion to them. It is also to be desired that the subject should be kept clear of i)arty feeling, in so far at least that no ])arty should make the advocacy, or rejection, of Federation, a plank in its political platform. ^.Vhatever benefits may be derived from {mlitical partyism, it will scarcely be contended that unmixed love of truth is amongst the number. But the need of discovering the whole truth is in an exact ratio to the impoi'tance of the sid)ject under legislation ; and the difficulty of so doing is proportionate to its intricacy. There have been very few subjects before the British Legislature calculated to affect the destinies of our race so seriously as this Colonial Question, and, possibly, none so very intricate. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that every available means of arriving COLKSl-: OF ACTION. lil.'J oiild hv lier the riy;ht to 3Ct tlicm aw free. () ovcrv we liave benefits it a (lis- tr(nil)le.s, A. choice Hence lerits of tins fart 11 (TO ill that this illy true [;e of the ■;able to n atten- be kept lo party ation, a fits may •eely be ijTst the truth is 3t under rt ion ate subjects cct the ncstlon, fore, of irriving at the unmixed truth should be put in force. This, certainly, will not be done should existing parties bind their members to an unconditional sn[)|)ort of, or oppo- sition to, Federation. IJut it will be done shonld they proclaim it an oj)en ([uestion, and leave members free to speak their minds on its merits without their jicditieal standing being aifected thereby. In the former case they could act oidy as advocates; in the latter they would be free to act as judges, nor do we think that in this (piestion they would I'all short of that standard. In the Colonies all parties are united In favour of the maintetiance of British connection ; and in the Imperial Parliament an emancipationist party can scarcely be said to have been yet organized. Under these circumstances no l)arty is thus far connnitted to any definite policy on the (juestion ; and all are, conseciuently, perfectly free to a(h»[)t what- ever course may seem to be most expedient. The question, moreover, is not one which s|)eclally affects English, Canadian, or Australasian classes or parties, but all England, Canada, and Australasia alike. It follows that, it" these local parties wish to discharge faithl'idly their duties towards their constituents, they will unite to examine it with a single eye to the interests ot their several countries. To this it may be rei)lied that, under British institu- tions, the only means whereby this, or any important measure can be carried is by a ministry ado})ting it as a part of its policy. We are aware that this is the normal state of things. But we strongly suspect that if we nuist wait for a ministry to undertake the settlement of the colonial question iu the face of a hostile 0})p()sition, we shall have to wait until doomsday. The question does not touch any class or party interest, so it will not stir any of those infiuences which force ministries to undertake the settlement of important political questions. It is un- I (I I 214 A C'OhOXIST ox TIIK f'OLO.VlAI. (^I'K'^TIO.V. iismlly nli'^tnioo — n siibjort on wliicli nriruinoiits rnti ho foimd botli for and afrainst any dcHnito policy cajialilc of adoption. It tlnis offers bnt few chanro?* of frjilnln"- ])oliti('al Ianrols,so ministers tlionis<^Ivos ^sill wish to avoid a field of action in Avhicli tlioy arc snrc to find tronble and danijoi- in case of liavinu; to fare a Parliamontarv o|i|)(»si- tion. Thus, neither from ahove iku' from helow does there seem to he .any elianec of tlie movinfi;-sj)rini2:s of legislation Ijeinji; set in motion ; ajid it ia unlikely that emaneij)ation theorists, in fare of recent events, will press for any fnrthei" action than tliat which they have won already. Under such circumstances, the adoption of the let-alone policy as that of ministries may he looked upon as almost a matter of certainty, in the ahsencc of .some extraordinary means to facilitate the accomplish- ment of the work. That means of facilitatiiiLi; it can he found Ave are sure ; and eciually so that all Avho desire to maintain the integrity of the Empire should hasten to afford it, since the result of the ])resent colonial jiolicy eannot fail to be a collision between the niothei'-conntrv and the Colonies, which nnist lead to disrni)tion. Almost all parties, politicians, and jjapers at home profess to deprecate such an event, but thei-e are very few of them who will undertake to s:.y that the connection can long be maintained on its present basis. If, then, that hai'inony of opinion which is ex])ressed be really a fact, let the parties so agreeing unite their forces to effect the settlement desired by all, and transfer the question from the realm of partisanship to that of patriotism. This could be done by the party in o])position coming forward with a recognition of the importance of the subject, and an offer to treat it as an open question on condition of being allowed a share of influence in its settlement. This once agreed on, the way Avould be 0})en for a full discussion of the question on its merits. The only i)olicies possible v. (•!i)»;iltl(' jjnininix to avoid iible and V opposi- low dors )riiii;s of* vcly that its, Avill hoy luivo option of (? looked )soncc of ;()n)plisli- t can be desire to lastoii to \\ ])oIi('y -country Almost ofess to '• few of tion can ion, that y a fact. Hoot the on from . This forward jeot, and of bcincT his onco ission of possible A SOIATIOX NOT IN I'AKTVISM. 21:) arc tliose (.f i-oooiistruotion iind disruption, as that of drift must ultimatoiy load to one or otiior of them; and this, we thiidx. ctiMld not fail to bo nnivt'rsally soon, should British legislators sot thomsoKH's resolutely to the oxa- niination of the matter. It is probable that a lull exa- miuiition of tlu; merits of the ease could best bo eifocted by a ('oinmittee of both Houses, or a Commission ap- pointed by the C'ntwn, and eonsistin*;' of loatliiio- men of all parties, empowered to sunnnon witnesses from all jiarts of the Kmi)ire, and to end)ody the results of thoir in- (juiries in a report to the Imperial Parliament, but which it would probably be advisable to transmit also to the Coh)nial Lev;islatures for consideration. If suoh a bodv of men, after full in([uiry, should arrive at the conclusion that emancij)ation would be the best ccmrsc for all j»arties, it had better occur under a friendly agreement, and while they could separate with mutual respect and atfoction, than as the fruit of some unfortunate (piarrel which would leave ill-feelinn; behind it. On the other hand, if they were in favour of reconstruction, they could indicate the principles on which it shcmld be conducted, and the course of legis- lation necessarv to rj-ivc them effect. This haviuLi' been done, the rei)ort wcmld come before the Imperial Parlia- ment for discussion, the result of which could scarcely fail to be the ado})tion of its more salient features. The next point would be to embody the principles ado[)ted in the form of law. And this, we think, should be done by a Commission, on which it would be essential to have the Colonies Avell represented throutih their leading states- men, appointed to draft and submit to Parliament a bill to provide for the reconstruction of the ICmpIre, based on the principles previously agreed uj)on. This, having been passed by the Imperial Parliament, should then be submitted to the legislatures of the self-governing Colonies with the alternative of acceptance within a n I i I liL I 'I, 21G A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL (iUlvSTIOX. given time or separation. Of tlieir acceptance of the latter, in case they had been made to understand the points at issue, and granted a share in fi-aming the mea- sure, as we have recommended, wc sliould have little fear. This course of action, it is true, would be altogether unusual. But its justification is to he found in the fact that the question to be settled would be equally so. In extraordinary circun;stances, extraordinary forces must be called into play. It is impossible to adopt a)i// poliri/ for the settlement of the colonial question which would not be liable to severe criticism, and for that reason no ministry will choose to run the risk of attempting to settle it single-handed. To discover the best policy and to j)ut it into force, it is essential not only that one-half of the statesmanship of the Empire should be free from the op})Osition of the other half, bu ai: j, that all should unite their forces in the work. This they Avill do only on conditiim that the leading ideas of each party are embodied in the [lolicy to be adopted, and their leading men are allowed a share in the glory of the work. Neither has taken any definite position on the question as yet, ai'd until one, at least, has done so, there will be nothing to hiiuler them from uniting as we have proposed. A measure passed in this manner could scarcely fail to be intrinsically suj)erior to any of a partisan character, and would possess the further merit of being likely to satisfy all, save that insignificant minoi'ity of grumblers who can never be satisfied. Every section and l)arty in the Em}>ire would have a voice in determining the policy to be adoi)ted ; and, in case reconstruction were determined on, in framing the measure which would j)ut it into effect ; and alter that, if any part of the Em[)ire should consider that its peculiar interests had been overlooked, it could suggest amendments ; or, in case it saw a better course ■^,,,,u^m m.m^^ ' ammi» mmvai*>*^*f9m^^i^i^^S^Pii^i}i'i*^-*<'^ s. FURTIIKR ORJI-:CTIO\S COXSIDMIJET). in: e of tlie tand the he incji- v^c little I together the fact ' so. In les must >li/ poUrif ;li would jason no to settle id to put If of the rom the 1 should do only artv are leading Neither as vet, nothinii sed. A il to be tcr, and satisfy rs who in the iolicy to imined ) effect ; consider ^ could course open, reject it altogether, ^^'erc an Inn)erial Federation established in this manner, it would be, in some measure, the work of all, which fact would go far towards makiii-!; it an object of aifection to all. We believe it to be highly probable that many of our readers may pronounce themselves to be strongly op])osed t(> emanci[)ation, and yet refuse to endorse the jtolicy Avhich we have recommended in its stead. Constituti(^)nal dread of change in some minds, and a like jealousy of authority in others, may lead them to shrink from Federa- tion, and seek the means of maintaining the unity of the Empire at the cost of less innovation, or the concession of smaller })rerogatives to the central government, than it would necessitate. We will not assert that success in such a search would be impossible, and tiiat Federation is the sole and only means whereby disruption can be averted. Hut we do not hesitate to say that it cannot be averted in the absence of a coherent connnercial })()licy, equality of privileges and burdens, and a ruling-power absolute for purposes of peace and Avar with their accessories, throughout the Empire. And we do say that countries standing in this relations^hip towards each other Avould substantially constitute a Federation; and that in this case, as in all (»thers, the wisest course Avould be to recognise the fact and follow it unflinehingly to its eon- se(iuenees. Neither iMigland nor the Colonies can enjoy the benefits of unity and isolation sinudtaneously ; and if it be concluded that unity is more bcnelicial than iso- lation, to be daunted by the nun'e magnitude of tho changes requisite to make it fully effective would be un- mixed cowardice, and to shrink from conferring on a free representative government any amount of authority re- (pjisite to ensure its conservatitm, most disgusting factious- ness. Parties alarmed for ltl)erty we would point to tho facts that federalism, by the large amount of local iude- h ^w lip ' 218 A ro[,OXTST ox THE COLOXTAL QUESTIOX. pciidcnce ^vllich it secures, is almost necessarily a stronnr friciul to freedom, and that the prerogatives of the pro- posed Federal Government would he less than those possessed by that of the United States. On parties dreadiiio- chaniTje in itself we would press a reconsidera- tion of the arouments which we have used to show that it is impossible to avoid some change in the rehitionship of the several parts of the Empire to one another, and that, if unity is to be maintained, there must be established some common policy and some supreme authority. Our language on these points, however, may be set down as a piece of self-opinionativeness ; and, in view of such an event, we shall here fortify our position by quoting the words of a man generally admitted to be one of the uiost judicial-minded and liberty-loving statesmen in l']ngland. Earl Grey, in a letter dated September 4, 1869, and ad- dressed to Messrs. Youl, Scwell, and Bhiine, gentlemen who had been strivinn; to form a conference of cohmial representatives, to meet in London, for the ])urpose of considering the Colonial Question, says : ' The breaking up of the great Colonial Empire of England would, in my opinion, l)e a calamity to the Colonies, to this country, and to the world, and I cannot doultt that yon arc rujlit in hplierinri this to be the result which mnst he looked for from the policf/ distinct/// declared hy Her 3IaJesty's Govern- ment. . . The ado|)ti(m of this policy, Avhich 1 consider to be one of selfislmess, quite unworthy of a great nation, and the ])revalence of the opinion which has given rise to it, must be regarded as the direct and natural conse- quence of the claim put forward of late years on behalf of the Colonies, to be free from all control or the exercise of any authority over them by the Imperial Goxernment. There is no one who has always been more o[)posed than myself to meddling and vexatious interference on the part of that Government in the purely local and internal 8»mifa^iirsS!i«ttCMil^i»ail8gfj^»a^^ the pro- m those parties )nsi(lera- low that itionship ler, and ablished y. Our lowii as such an iniT the ho most inrrljind. and ad- iitlcmcn colonial •pose of reakinfT >uld, in ountry, ^'i(/lit in ) I' from jrovern- sider to nation, rise to conse- behalf xercise nment. 3d than m the uterjuil II. LORD r;REy o\ tiff: situatiox. 210 affairs of Colonies of which the inhabitants arc ca]iabl(« .,f l)roperly manaoing those affairs for themselves. I'.ut, in the administration of all Colonial Governments, questions are continually arising ?r///c/^ affW-t the hitm'sts not o„h, of the particular Colonicft, hut of the Empirr as a ivholr ; and it would not l)e difhcult to show that, of late years, tlie inhabitants of many of our Colonies, urged on"^by t'liose M'ho profess to speak for them in this country, have set up a claim (which has been jjractically conceded) to be allowed to deal even witli these questions according to their oavu will, without allowing the Imperial Government to exercise that authority without which a due regard to the general interests of the whole Empire, and ''an ad- herence to its policy, cannot be secured in the measures of the several local Governments. I Jut if the Imperial (jovernment is to exercise no authority over the Colonies, there is no reason why it should incur any responsibility or expense on their behalf, and the feeling against doing so, which has of late years been so strongly manifested in Parliament, has naturally arisen from the exaggerated claims for colonial freedom of action which have been asserted. . . . I am bound to say that, for my own j)art, much as I deplore what I regard as tb.e virtual dissolution' of our Colonial Emi»ire by the adoption of the jjolicv in question, I do not think it ought to be abandoned, cx- <'ept on the condition I have menticmed.' The condition referred to is ' the exercise of a larger measure of authority over the Colonies by the Imperial Government than they have of late been willing to submit to.' Lord Grey's sentiments are almost identical with those which we have expressed, save that we hold an increase of im- perial authority should he accomj)anied by an infusion of the colonial element into it, on which condition alone do we think that the Colonies slumld submit to such an increase. ( )n this point too we should say, from other .V I t I' i: 220 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUKSTION. parts of tlie letter, tliat Lord Grey's views agree with our own. But, at all events, it is clear that he believes the let-alone i)olicy cannot fail to lead to disru})tion. Coining from su<^l; a source, there arc few who will attempt to dispute the correctness «jf the theory. Let us not then strive to shrink from meeting the inevitable. To do so is at once an act of cowardice and of foolishness, and the disposition so to act an infallible token of the dissolution of the spirit essential to the conservation of national or political freedom. Such a }>olicy, and such a spirit, sluiuld be denounced uncompromisingly in press, i)ulpit, and legislature, by all who value those virtues, in the shape of truthfulness, courage, aid energy, which have made our race what it is to-day, and without which no nation has ever been elevated in the scale of humanitv. Britons must surely have degenerated sadly in political ability if they cannot discover some means of l)indiiig together the several branches of their race without en ■ dani2:erino: the liberties whose oriii'in is lost in the twi- light of Anglo-Saxon history ; and they must surely have lost the spirit which carried their banners up the heights of (Quebec, through the gates of Paris, through the i)asses of the Himalayas, and across the Arctic Ocean — which lias covered the seas with their fleets — which has enabled thousands to trium[)h, single-handed, over nature, beast, and savage, and cover desert lands with hai)py homes — and which has made the Fatherland the great emporium of the wealth of the world, if the mere magnitude of the task will make them shrink from attempting it, or if the surpassing glory of the achievement will not beckon them on to its accomplishment ! Whether it wH)uld have been possible to have formetl an Imperial Federation more easily at a former })eriod than at present, is a point which it is now useless to discuss. The scheme would, doubtless, have involved ■^^S^!!^^^^mm^mmmm^iHti^^m^i'j^ s. witli our eves the Coiuino- einpt to lot tlieii do so is and the isolutioii ioiial or a spirit, , i)LiIpit, , in tlu' ch have liieli no inanity, political IjindiiiiT out en • he twi- )]y have heights i passes —which enabled I, beast, onies — poriuni of the • if the beckon formed period jless to ivolved Tin: COLOMHS AVKRSE TO SErARATIOX. 221 much less legislation under the old colonial r,yi'mr than under the present. It might then have been effected simply by the action of the -lm])erial Government, or at least it could have enforced on the Coh)nial Legislatures the ad()i)tlon of any measure which it desired'' to jiass, whilst now it would be necessary to have the reconstruc- ti<m bill freely accepted by them. This fact, it is tru(s would increase the amount of labour to be done ; but the constitutional structure, when comi)leted by the joint efforts of all and adopted by the common voice, would stand on a much more enduring basis than if it had been framed solely by the mother-country, and forced by her on unsym])athising Colonies. The Colonies are now anxious to have the connection maintained, and arc pre- ])ared to give a favourable hearing to any scheme for the accomplishment of this object. It is certainly desirable that action should be taken whilst this feeling remains in force; nor is it likely, under the present relationship, ever to be stronger than at present. The political bonds which unite the different members of the Empire have l)een already rendered so very loose that in many of the Colonies their actual severance would scarcely be felt. This actual dissociation, and the prospect of separation which is so i)ersistently foi-ced on their view by English emancipationists, cannot fail to weaken those moralities the existence of which can alone form a solid foundation for any species of political connection. Hence we con- clude that the earlier the action the greater the chances of success in the glorious wcn-k of forming a world-wide liritish Empire, from every corner of which would ascend the poet's aspiration : — The free fair homos of Eiitrliind ! Long, long, in hut iiml Imll, May hearts of native proof be roared To guard each hallowed wall : '^)9 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION, And green for over be the groves, And bright their flowery sod, Where first tlie child's glad spirit loves Its country and its God ! It may perhaps be said tliat the invocation would arise as readily from the Colonies if ' cmancii)ated ' as if federated. Judging from the history of our relations Avith the United States, we should say that it would not. Indeed, we feel compelled to endorse the weighty words contained in the pages of Tlie Coxttms, and to exclaim with T/orf- Lytton ; ' Depend upon it, t lie New World will he J . ,v <r' hostile to the Old, not in proportion to kin- ship q) I uci , but in proportion to siniiluritij of manners and if/.'tifufions.^ Federation offers the best means avail- able for muintaiii r.g ruch similarity of manners and in- stitutions. 1 APPENDIX. It must bo carefully borne in mind that the calculation of the probable amount of Colonial liability on pp. 8(3, 87 is not in- tended for anything more than an approximative estimate We are, however, so strongly of opinion that it errs rather ao.ainst the Colonies than in their favour, that we deem it advisable tu bring forward some other poinf ^ of the case. Taking the value of the real property of Outnrio, as we have done, at 100,000,000/., it amounts-in round numbers-to about bll. per head of its population of 1,620,842. Sunposiuo- the proportion to be the same throughout all the Colonies, andlbeir populutKui in 18011 at 8,000,000, we should have 4h8,000 000/ as the amount of their realised wealth, and the valuation of the' iiinpire in the above year somewhat as follow.s :— Gross value of real property in the United Kingdom Gross value of real property in the Colonies Total Under this assessment the liability of Ontario would reach only one s.xty-second part of the Federal expenditure of db,OO0,O00/. This would amount to 580,045/. 3>^ •>,! or 7s '->,! per head of its population. Deducting from this the -^s"7,i per head which we have shown would be saved bvthe transfer of certain charges from the local revenue to that of the Empire we have the actual increase reduced to 4.s-. 7^1. ■ and £';,74o.OOO,0()() !88,0()0,0(,)() ded . --^^..^ ......v.^.t tu .r^. ,<,.- aiia tieauc again tlie 1... !»,/. per head, which might be sav(.l by a Fee guarantee of the debt, we have 26-. l0(/ ting ,'de ral per head a* the actual II 5 ■! I 121 AI'IM'LVDIX. incrraso of luxation for wliicli Ontario would become liable by Fed enit ion. But- even tlie above, we arc inclined to tliink, miq;ht prove to bo too bij^li an estimate for IJritisli America, as the wealth of Ontario is considerably in excess of that of the other jiro- vinees. In the CiDiaiJldn Vrar Una!; for IHtl? a very carefully com) died estimate of the wealth of Ontario, Quebec, Now iJrunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Kdwai'd Island, and New- i'oundlaud, j^ives r)4(V*00,000 dollars as the cash value of farms, and ■200,00(),(M)() dollars as that of real pro])erty in cities, towns, and villai^es, makiny' a total of 71<<»,000,()()0 dollars, or about l-")<»,nno^(i(jo/. sterlinjjf. As the valuation of farm pro- ])orty is based on the census returns of IHdl, we may assume the t!)!al to have since renchcd 200,00(),(»00/. This would leave those six provinces lifible for one thirty-first part of the Federal expenditure of 8(;,O0O,(i007., or l,l(;i,290/. <')«. 4'/. ].er annum. Their population beincr about 3,700,000, this sum would amount to t).s'. '4d. per head. Dcductinof from this the 2.S'. 7(L of savin<; in local expenditure!, we have the increase irduced to os. Sd. per head; and deducting from this the saving of l.s\ Od. consequent on a guarantee of the debt, we liave the total increase reduced to l.s". \ld. per head. We repeat that our estimates on this point can be taken only as approximative. The statistics requisite to the for- mation of an exact calculation are, probably, not in existence : at all events we have not got them. But it must, we think, 1)0 evident that our estimate of the increased taxation which Federation would bring to the Colonies is certainly not too low; nay, that the actual increase would, in all probability, ])rove to be less ; and that as the increase which would be necessitated by independence would be above even the highest estimated increase under Federation, financial considerations are overwhelmingly in favour of the latter policy. LONDON: I'HINTF.I) IIV :JPOTT!~ VMJOUH AND CO., NKW-8TI1EHT SQUAllE AND PAKLIAMl'lX;; El'BKKT f. ■i:..r;.-r;;:v^^? j^;a*^-.ttfti»b^;agMB«WEm3E no liable l)y ii'u'lit prove tlie wcalfli other jii'o- "V carefnlly iel)cc, Xew and New- le of farms, i in cities, dollars, or farm pro- lay assnino 'bis would liivt of tlie <>>'. 4'/. ])or , this sum m this the lO increase [1 this the e debt, wo L be taken o the for- existenee : wo think, tion which ily not too robability, would be he highest ^derations