^j^ ^nK ^^-s %^^ ^ 5^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) />v <'/ 1.0 1.1 lU mm "? 140 m 7.2 :J «" Sdmoes Corporatiaii 13 wnsT MAM >7ar ) VVnSTIR,N.Y. 14SM (716)S72-4S03 ^ ..v^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHIVI/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Cainadian Institut* for Historical Microraproductions / Inatitut Canadian da microraproductions historiquaa innBH TMhnloal and BIbllographie Not««/NotM tachniquM at Mbllographlquaa T Tha InatltutM haa attamptad to obtain tha baat original copy availabia for filming. Faaturaa of thia copy which may ba bibliographieaNy unlqua, which may altar any of tha imagaa !n tha raproduction. or which may aignHicantly changa tha uauai mathod of filming, ara chackad bolow. □ Colourad covara/ Couvartura da couiaur I I Covara damagad/ D n n Couvartura andommag4a Covara raatorad and/or laminatad/ Couvartura raataurta at/ou palHculAa □ Covar titia miaaing/ La titra da couvartura manqua □ Colourad mapa/ Cartaa giographiquaa an couiaur □ Colourad Inic (i.a. othar than blua or biacit)/ Encra da couiaur (I.a. autra qua biaua ou noira) □ Colourad piataa and/or iliuatrationa/ Planchaa at/ou iliuatrationa an couiaur D Bound with othar matarial/ RaiiA avac d'autraa documanta Tight binding may cauaa ahadowa or diatortion along intarior margin/ La r« liura tarrAa paut cauaar da i'ombra ou da la diatortion la long da la marga intiriaura Blank iaavaa addad during raatoration may appaar within tha taxt. 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D D D D D D D D Colourad pagaa/ Pagaa da couiaur Pagaa damagai/ Pagaa andommagiaa Pagaa raatorad and/or laminatad/ Pagaa raataur^aa at/ou pailicuiiaa Pagaa diacolourad, atainad or foxad/ Pagaa dAcoioriaa, tachatAaa ou piquAas Pagaa datachad/ Pagaa dAtachAaa Showthrough/ Tranaparanca Quality of print variaa/ Qualit* in^gala da I'impraaaion Includaa aupplamantary matarial/ Comprand du material aupplAmantaira Only adition availabia/ Saula Mition diaponibia Pagaa wholly or partially obacurad by arrata alipa, tiaauaa, ate, hava baan rafilmad no anaura tha baat poaaibia imaga/ Laa pagaa totalamant ou partiallamant obacurciaa par un fauillat d'arrata. una palura. ate. ont 4tA filmiaa A nouvaau da fa9on A obtanir la ntaillaura imdiga poaaibia. 1 P o f C b tl a f a o 1 a i b ri r4 n Thia itam ia filmad at tha raduction ratio chackad balow/ Ca document aat f llmA au taux da rAduction indiquA ci-daaaoua. 10X 14X ItX 22X 26X 30X V 3 12X MX aox 24X 28X 32X TiM eopy fHmiNl htn hm bMn raproduead thanks to th* gcfMrosHy of: Library of tha Public Arohlvas of Canada L'axamplaira fllm4 f ut raprodult grioa A la 04n«roalti da: La bIbllothAqua da* Arohlvaa publlquas du Canada Tha f'nagaa appoaring hara ara tha baat quality poaaibia conaldoring tha condition and laglblNty of tha original copy and in kaaping with tha filming contract spacificatlona. Laa imagaa auh/antaa ont 4t4 raprodultaa avac la plua grand soln. compta tanu da la condition at da la nattat* da raxampiaira film*, at un conformity avac iat conditions du contrat da fHmaga. Original coplaa in printad papar covars ara filmad baginning with tha front oovar and anding on tha iaat paga with a printad or llluatratad impraa* aton. or tha back cover wlian appropriate. All othar original coplaa ara filmad baginning on tha first paga with a printad or llluatratad impraa* sion, and anding on tha Iaat paga with a printad or illustratad Impraaaton. Tha Iaat racordad frama on aach microflcha ahaN contain tha aymbd — ^ (moaning "CON- TINUED"), or tha symbol ▼ (moaning "END"), whichavar appllaa. Lm axamplalraa origlrtauK dont la couvartura mn papiar ast ImprimAa aont fiim4a an commanfant par la pramlar plat at 1% tarmiiiant soit par la darnMra paga qui comporta una amprainta d'impraasion ou d'lllustration. soit par la sacond plat, aalon lo cas. Tous laa autras axamplairas originaux sont fllmto an commandant par la pramlAra paga qui comporta una amprainta d'impraaaion ou d'llluatratlon at an tarminant par la darnlAra paga qui comporta una talla amprainta. Un daa symbdas suh^ants apparattra sur la darnlAra imaga da chaqua microfiche, salon la caa: la symbola -^> signifia "A 8UIVRE". la symbols y signifia "FIN". Maps, platas. charts, ate, may ba filmad at diffarant reduction ratioa. Thoaa too large to be entirely included In one expoeure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames es required. The following diagrama Illustrate the method: Les certes, plenches, tableaux, etc., peuvent 4tre fllmde A dee taux da rMuction diffirants. Loraque la document eat trop grand pour itre reproduit en un seul ciichA, 11 est film* A partir da Tangle supArieur gauche, do gauche A droite. et do haut en bes, en prenant la nombre d'images nAcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illuatrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 LETTERS fROM A. MEMBER OP PARLIAMENT, TO nil FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY. -■':'■%. LETTER I. LONDON: '^ .^ \VV' PRINTED FOB J. BIDOWAY, NO. 170| PICGADILLT. 1809. W. Flint, Printer, Old Bailey. ^ • LETTERS, LETTER r. « Dear Sir, ' "I LOSE no time lit complying with your requeft to explain to you more particularly the grounds of the opinion which I have formed on the late event* in Spain and Portugal, and by which my condu6l intheenfuing feffion will be regulated. ** I have already exprefTed to you in con- verfation the unfavourable impreffions which I have received from thofe tranfac- tions. Our whole fyftem of policy, all the plans for giving effeft to that fyftem, and all the meafures for the execution of thofe plans, appear to me to have been utterly deftitute of that prudent forethought, which I ii fi 2 - is the firll requifite for fuccefs in the con* du6l of great and arduous affairs. " The importance of the crifis, in which we have been placed, no man can contefl. Nor will there be any difference of opinion as to that refulc, which was moil to be defired by this country. When Bonaparte, circumventing by the groflcft treachery the feeble princes of Spain, and drawing into his own net the chief of her nobility, fud* denly afl'umed the right to difpofe of the monarchy of a faithful and obfequious ally, our difguft at the bafenefs of the tranfac- tion, was equalled only by our indignation at its enormity. The tefiftance of the Spanifh Patriots was well calculated to excite the warmeft intereft in every heart in which the principles of juftlce have any fway. Had we heard of fuch an event in fome remote territory, known only to us by report, and feparatedby the intervention of half the globe, yet the beft wifties of every n virtuous mind would have attended the gallant bands of Patriots, armed againft fuch oppreflion. The cafe of Spain touched us much more nearly. *' The fuccefs of our enemy in that quar- ter, has augmented beyond calculation all our former difficulties and dangers : His failure, could fuch an event have happened* would have opened to us the mofl flattering and brilliant prorpe6ls. The interdifl againft our commerce, would, by opening the Spanifh ports, have been rendered of no effe6l. Thofe points of our empire where we arc moft vulnerable, would have been as much prote£led, by the indepen- dance of Spain, as they are now endan« gered by her fubjeflion. And the folidity of that flupendous mafs of power,united againft us on the continent of Europe, would havf been more weakened by the confequences, and the example of a fuccefsful refiftance in Spain, than by almoft any other event. ;: that our imaginations could fugged. It wifhcs therefore could prevail, the indepen« dance of Spain was an obje6l mod devout* edly to be wifhcd. For fuch an obje6l, all men will readily agree, that we were bound both in wifdom and in honour, to make all fuch efforts and facriBces as were really likely in any fober judgment to contribute to its fuccefs. By this tefl alone of the rea- fonablenefs of their plan, and the pra6li- cability of their execution, our exertions' fhould be tried. To this ftandard our fyf- tem of policy muft ultimately be referred. If our treafure has been expended, our armies rifked, our domeftic fafety expofed to the utmoft hazard, in attempts wifely planned and confiftently executed, where fuccefs was probable, and failure of no dan- gerous importance, we may lament the refult, but we cannot condemn the councils which have produced it. My own pefrfua* fion is, on the^contrary, that the refoi^rce^ ofa burthcncd though not cxhauftcd coun- try have been profufcly lavifhcd, in the profecution ofa policy from which uc could anticipate nothing but difaflcr : that botli the cxiftence of our armies, and the repu- tation of our military chara6ler, have been wantonly committed, to a contcll in which it was evident that not even all the va- lour of our troops afforded any profpe6l of fuccefs : and that, as well by th'^ ralhnefs of our original determinations, as by the want of all plan, concert, and preconfidercd fyflem, and the deficiency of the means which fuch enterprifes mod required, wc have ultimately expofed our own domeftic fafety to the fame dangers which w^e have in vain endeavoured to avert from others. * Thefe fentiments reft indeed on fuch knowledge only of thofe tranfa6lions as the public has been hitherto permittedto obtain, and I fully agree with you, that in order to grrive at a cprreft judgment of the meafures 6 of government on this fubjcft, there are difficulties which parliament alone can re- move. •* The firft endeavours therefore of all thofe members of either houfc, who con- fider the privilege of partaking in the deli- berations of the great council of the nation, as a trufl for the upright exercife of which they are refponfible, mud be to obtain fuch information on thcfe points, as may be fuRU cient for their own guidance and fatislaAory to the country. '* Minifters a6ling on a policy adverfe to the conftitutioDi and injurious to the feelings of the country, have withheld from us al- moft all communication from the moment that fuccefs appeared to abandon the caufe of Spain. No difpatch from their nume- rous accredited miniilers and agents in that country, has been given to the public on any one of the many interefting events which have orcurred fince that period. They have not even deigned to fatisFy ilie extreme anxiety of the public, by any of thofc fhort ftatemcnti of fads, by which it has been the eftabllflicd prafticeto givc,in the Ciazette, the fubflanccof important intelli- gence, whenever it has not been thought fafc to publifli the difpatchcs. *• The form and nature of the court ap* pointed to inquire inio the convention of Cintra, and the manner in which the cafe was there brought forward, have alfo abun* dantly proved, that it was the intention of minifters to keep back every information that might conne6l their own condu61 witli the proceedings of the generals, or in any way implicate the king's government, in the tranfa6lions carried on under tlioir in- ftruftions. ' ' " Had their objeft really been, according to the gracious intentions cxprefTcd in his Majefty's royal warrant, to have inllitutcd iearneflly, and with good faith, a fair and full 8 I I inquiry into *• all the causes auO ** CIRCUMSTANCES that Icd to the con- " vention, whether arifing from the pre- ** vious operations of the Britifh army, or *' otherwife," how different would have been their conduft. They would have afked his Majefly's permiffion, to have laid before the court IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, many important documents affe6ling their own chara61er. They would have produced every paper in their poffefTion that might in any way (hew on what grounds the defti- nation of that force was originally fixed. They would have explained, whether when Sir Arthur Wellefley or Sir Harry fiurrard failed from this kingdom, or when the laft inftruftions were fent out to Sir Hew Dal- rymple, there did or did not exift any re^l danger to the caufe of the Spaniards, from the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. They would have (hewn what circumftances conne61ed with the affairs of Spain, rendered theearly evacuation of Lifbon, by the ene- my, a matter either of abfolute necefTity, or of real and urgent expediency. They yrould have told the court on what informa- tion it was believed that the march of our troops into Caflile, by ' the way of Portugal, was not only fafe and pra6licable, but alfo the moft expeditious mode of acconiplifhing thofe obje6ls which were deemed of imme- diate and paramount importance. They would not have left it doubtful whether all thefe fa6ls and opinions were duly commu- nicated to our generals, to thofe efpecially to whom any difcretion was entrufted, in fixing the dire6lion of our immediate or fu- ture operations. "When m theyear 1 757, a court of inquiry was holden upon Sir JohnMordaunt,tocon- fider the caufe of the failure of the expc;dition againft Rochefort, Mr. Pitt and his colleagues thought it their duty to provide that the inquiry might be really complete, in all 10 'ii ITS PARTS. They laid therefore before that court every public and private docu- ment that could bear upon the cafe; even the fecret intelligence was proddced, which they obtained refpefting the real (Irength and means of defence of the enemy, in and about the place itfelf ; and, what wfts of no lefs importance, the fecret reports of the a6lual amount and diflribution of the whole force of France. It was thus feen at onc6 what troops the enemy was able in any given , time to bring to bear upon the Britifh ope- rations, from parts more or lefs remote front the fcene of a6lion ; the government on that occafion wifelv confidered that un** lefs the cafe before the court were complete in all its parts, no jufl opinion could be formed of its real merits, and no judgment given that muft not be in its nature il- lufory, and in its impreflion wholly unfa- - tisfaftory. «* The whole merits of the expedition to 11 Portugal, Its original deftinatioiii its interme- diate operations, and its ultimate conclu- fion, reft on its connexion with the affairs of 3pain. Was the original deftlnation of that army right ? It can be fo only becaufe this was the beft mode of aflTifting the Spa- nifh Pariots. Were the bold and adventurous enterprizes of its firft general, preferable to furer but more tardy meafures ? They were fo only becaufe they held out more rapid aid to the caufe of Spain. Can the convention iifelf be defended on any other ground, than that it fooner fet free an army to march to that fcene of a6lion in which centered all our hopes and all our dangers ? For thofe, therefore, who were to judge of any part of thefe proceedings, ful^ informa* tion was indifpenfably neceffary, not only of the (late of Portugal, but alfo of that of Spain. .V .^ V - V " Ha4 minifters on this occafion been go- verned by the fame principles as Lord Chat- ]fl n:' f ( ham, they would have laid before the court the fubdance at leaft of all they knew of the public mind in both thofe countries ; and of the means and refources of their feveral provinces. They would have pointed out the plans that had been fuggefled to them for tranfporting a Britifh arny by land from Lifbon into Spain, the difficulties that attended fuch a march, and the meafures that had been provided,adopted or prepared^ for enabling the army to move forward with rapidity, from the inftant that Lifbon had capitulated. But above all, for upon this point every military calculation mud evidently be grounded, they would have (hewn what, according to the information to which they mud have given credit, wa? the real amount and difpofition of the mili- tary force of France, not only in Spain and Portugal, but in all other parts from whence kwaspoflible before the campaign were Over, that reinforcements could be fent into 13 lliofe countries. And they would have explained at what period, and to what amount at each rcfpetlivc period, any fuch reinforcements might be brought to bear upon the operations of the Britifli army, in different quarters of the peninfula. ** That fome fuch information was in the poffeflion of government is fcarcely to be doubted, nor will it lightly be believed that without it a Britifli army has been commit- ted to its fate, in the face of the whole military rcfources of France, and its de- pendant governments. ** Such information doubtlefs had not ' only been obtained, but had been made the fubjedl of frequent confultations among the miniflers, and the ground- work alfo of ftate-pap?rs, in which its bearings upon the ' general queflion of the affairs of Spainj, and upon the military operations of this country, were carefully examined and di- gefted by the proper departments for the i I 14 deliberate confidcration of the King and of the Cabinet. To fuppofc otherwife would be to attribute to government, negligence and raflincfs fo extraordinary as ought not certainly to be imputed without proof to any men charged with the public interefts. Without fome fuch information, the Cabi- net could not have adopted their meafures : without the fame information the Court of Inquiry could neither <;xamine, nor decide upon them ; and if any doubts fliould arife in your mind as to the competency of fuch a court, for fo extenfive an inquiry, that doubt will only afFeft the propriety of bring- ing the matter at all to iflue before an ina- dequate tribunal : and the conclufion can only be that the queftion remains entire for the confideration of Parliament ; fince there at lead no defe6l can be alledged of compe# tency or of power, - . ' - - " It muft be remembered,however, amidft all the artificial difhculties with which the 15 queflion has been dcfignedly obfcured, that great ligKt has neverthclefs been already thrown upon it. '• ' " The official papers of the enemy ,however coloured and exaggerated in other refpefts, have communicated to us many important fa6ls, refpefting the amount and difpofition of their own force ; the very nature and tonftitution of the provincial juntas have alfo required from them very full and fre- quent publications of various kinds, and have given to their whole proceedings, a publicity that could never have been ex- pefted from a more formed and regular government. ' • •'' " All this information is not only within our reach, but it is familiar to the public mind. The affairs of Spain have, from their extraordinary importance, fo entirely interefted all the affeflions, hopes, fears, and defires of the people of England, a« to have abforbedalmofl exclufively their whole at^ I ' 16 tcntion. There is therefore no fa£l that has yet tranfpircd refpefting them, that has not been made throughout the whole coun- try, and almofl equally fo in every clafs of life, a fubjc6l of public curiofiiyai of pub- ' lie difcufTion* ; ** With thefe helps I proceed to flate the various points that in my judgment moil require the attention of parliament, and of the country. In doing this, it will be unne- reflary for me to fpeak of the events that have happened, otherwife than as they Ihall appear to be the neceflary confe- quences of the plans and meafures by which , they were preceded. It is to thofe plans and meafures, that I wi(h folely to advert, without reference to the condu6l or abili- ties of the perfons appointed to carry them into execution. I propofe to argue, and I fear I cannot well fail to prove, even from our prefent information, that upon fuch a, fyftem and with fuch plans it was not fofn 17 '^ fible that Spain could have derived any be* ilefit from the exertions of Great Britain, ahd that all our lofTes and difgrace have arifen entirely from our having taken falfe views of the whole rubje£l, and departed from the only principles by which under the fame circumftances the condu6l of a wife and confiderate government would ne- Ccflarily have been direfted. . *' The fubje6l naturally divides itfelf in point of time into three di(lin6l periods, ^ach marked by circumftances and events peculiarly its own, and each admitting of di(lin6l and feparate examination without prejudice to a full and connefted view of the whole. The first of thefe periods^ that which preceded our a6lual operations, terminates with the prorogation of Parlia- ment on the 4th of July, on which day the King's intentions with refpeft to Spain were made known by his Majefty's fpeech, and nearly about which time Sir Arthur WeL ' \ ^1 Vf \H i Icflcy failed from Cork. The second pc riod, that which includes the expedition to Portugal, ends on the 31ft of Auguft, thjB day on which the convention of Cintra was ratified, from which time the forces of Great Britain were dire6led to new objefls. The THijtD period which dill continues and comprehends our operations in Spain, is unfortunately diflinguiflied by the fucceifes 9nd triumphs of the French, the fubjugation of the capital and many of the fined pro- vinces of Spain, and the beginning of our own national difgraces and difafters. " To anyjuft view that can be taken of ihc two lafl of thefe periods the confidera- tion of the firfl, which will be the principal fubjcQ of this Lctter,is abfolutely neceffary, and it includes thofe primary and rood im- portant refolutions of our own government^ Avhich had unavoidably a decifive influence on all that was to follow. .^^f^When the King's fpeech was delivered^ %■ 19 minifters plainly thoughf. that tlicy had fuHicicnt information for forming new plans adapted to the new and extraorditiary cir- cumftances which had arifen. Two leading principles upon which we were to a6l had at that time been finally fettled and adopted by them. Firft, the in(lru£lions of Sir Arthur Wellefley of the 1 2th and 30th of June, fhew that it had then already beende« termined to employ Britifh armies on the Continent in the caufe of Spain, inflead of confining our affidance to fupplics of mo- ney, arms and ftores, or to fuch divcrfions as a maritime armament might create. And fccondly, it was diftinflly announced frorh the Throne on the 4th of July, that in the fupj^brt the King was prepared td give to the Spanifh caufe, (in which fupport the employment of his armies was then necef- fatily included,) his Majefty would be " guided in the choice and in the direftion " of his exertions by the wifhes of thofe no L ri' 1' ' «• in whofc behalf they were to be em» «« ployed." «* To judge rightly of the wiFdom of thefe determinations either as feparate or ai conrbincd together, we mud confidcr what was neccfTary to be known before fuch de* cifions, the lad fo novel in its nature, and both of them fo important in their confc- qucnces, could ever have been taken. They were fuch as all men mud necefla- rily have pronounced hazardous in their exo- ccution, and, in the podible event of their failure, full of danger to the date; aU thofe I mean who know any thing of the extent of the various demands for our army, of the real numbers of which it is compofedt und of the difficulty of merely keeping it up to its edablidiment, without reference to the urgent and imperious calls which we might, and dill may have, (I fear too foon) for its further augmentation. First, with refpeft to Spain itfelf, it was not enough to have learnt that the people of Spain Si had manifencd a difpofition to fiiake olT the yoke of France in all the provinces not immediately occupied by the enemy ; nor that they fhould in moie than one in (la nee have manifefled that difpofition by a6ls oi (extraordinary valour againd confidcrabic detachments of the French armies, a£ls of which no one fpeaks or thinks without heartfelt admiration and applaufe; it was further necelTary to afcertain what were their real means of executing this honourable purpofe. If wc were to be committed to the conteft we (hould at lead have known what were the fupplies in men, in arms, in provifions and in (lores, upon the liberal ufe and proper application of which this country might fafely rely. But there were alfo other matters of flill more grave and weighty confideration. If the fuccefs of our arms, if the very exiftence of our troops was to be made dependent on the . co*Qperation of a new government and power yo l>c forined in Spain, cpuld >ve forbear I >I 22 15 J I ' ' ' ' i to inquire into the nature and (lability of fuch inftitutions ? upon what principles and tvith what views the rifing had taken place ? whether it had the fame obje6l and direc- tion, in each different province ? or whether fch'gious bigotry, unfa\ curable in its very nature to co-operation with Britifh troopr, might not have occafioned in one pro- vince what had been efFefted in another by the puror fpirit of patriotifm, or by a ftrong attachment to a legitimate fovereign ? whe- ther there were any jarring interefts fepa- lating the rerpeftive provinces, creating diftrufl among the grandees, and jealoufies between the military commanders, and ob- itru6ling all hope of union among the dif- ferent orders of the ftate, bey ore AN OVERWHELMING MOSTILt ^ORCE WOULD BE INTRODUCED AGAIN WITH l>OWER TO CRUSH THEM ALL UNDER ONE COSfKlON DESPOTISM? Should irnbt have been afked where was the power, the talents, and the energy to enforce the many at} i I cxtenfive meafurcs, both civil and niilita'-y^ that fuch a proje6l would indifpenfably re* quire ? Nor was It indifferent to us whether the rifing of a people fo long degraded was likely to follow the iiiipulfe of its heft leaders, the perfons of weight and con(ider« ation in thecountry, or to tcike a democratic form and to reft on revolutionary principles ? ^' In the latter cafe was it prudent to cost^* mit our armies to a co-operation with un* tried chara6lcrs and to a fupport of mea« fures the moft adverfe to the feeUngs and * jnterefts of Englifhmen. If, on the contra* ry,full confidence appeared to be placed by that people on thofe who from their rank and influence would naturally become the leading members of any central government adapted to the antient mixed and free con^ ftitutionofthe Spanifli monarchy, the con* iluft, the talents, the charafter and the prin- ciples of thcfo perions could not well be ^unknown to our government. From f^ch jconfiderations juft conclufions might ha^vt .i < ■Mil I ii| 224 f.ti I been drawn how far there was a pofTibility of regenerating vithin the fpace of two or three tnunths a country which had fo much dnd fo long declined, and of calling forth from amongft a people bowed down by Civil and religious tyranny, a fpirit, mind, and power, capable of defending itfelf againll a French army commanding itloft of the military refources in Europe. ' " Nor was fuch inquiry neceffary only as with refpe6l to any future general govern- ftient which might have been formed in Spain. At the time of which I am fpeak* ing none fuch exifted, the efforts of the patriots were dire£led folely by the provin- cial juntas, and with the members of thefe felf-conftituted councils alone our govern- ment communicated. Their chara6lers, views, and interefts were therefore points of the uunoft poffible importance. 1 hey were the perfons by whofe wifhes the King was to be guided in the employment of Britilh troops, and in the profe^ution of Britifh '.'sm^' S5 operations. Nor has this extravagant principle only been announced. It has been a6led upon ; for it now appears that when our troops a6lually failed, their fird ope- rations were left to the difcre;«on of a gene- ral officer, whom, whatever be his talents and merited reputation, the minifters con- fidered worthy only of the fourth or fifth place in the command. To him was en- trufted the power by his determination to bind his fuperior officers to a particular plan of operations ; to commit thofe officers, together with the whole army, to the defence and protefiion of any particular province ; iand to embark the country in whatever courfe, or fcene of a6lion, his own zeal and judgment might fugged. For his guidance no other information was fupplied, no other council provided by the minifters, but that only of a reference to the " wifhes^ of the men, whoever they might be, by whom the affairs of that particular province might hap^ I 11' 26 1 ', t f '! ^ pen at thai: particular moment to be admi« niflered. No one can indeed have failed to remark how much (Irefs has in the late in<« quiries been laid on the fa6l, that the fug- gellions on which one of our befl officers a6led in the difpofal of his force, were re<* ceivedby him from fome provincial junta of the diflri£l where he chanced to ]and« But of whom that junta was compofed, anu how competent it was to determine fucb aqueftion for the Britifh Empire* we havo not, as far as I know,ever yet been informed* The plans of operations to be undertaken by cur armies, the quarters to which their efirort9 are to be dire6led, the means of afcertaining find counterafiing the difficulties to which they are to be expofed, and of apportion* ing their numbers and refources to the pro^ bable e^cigencies of the fervice they under^ take, have hitherto beenconfidered as among the mod difficult and important queilion^ vrhich can occqpy the delibers^tions of any «7 ftatefmen. The decifion involves the live* of thoufands of our brave troops ; the repu- tation of our military charadler ; and even- tually the fafety of all that is deareft to us« Can it it be faid that thefe are points to be (hifted by a iritifh Cabinet from their own refponfibility,and committed to the diredion of fome local or municipal aflembly, fome bench perhaps of provincial lawyers, of whofe chara£lers and names we were igno- rant, and who may have been vaifed by the hazards of a revolution, then firit tode« liberate on fubjefls on which they had never beftowed a thought till called upon to decide them in behalf of the Britifh Cabinet ? •' Again, it was not fufficient that minifters (hould have known that what remained of the regular army in Spain had joined the ilandard of the patriots, it was their duty further to have inquired not merely into their numbers but into their formation, difcipline, and military chara6ler; of what ?>■ '■ / 28 troops compored,andin what miterial points deficient, for a6live operations in the field ; what was the reputation of their generals ; and above alli whether there was any one among them to whom the chief command would readily be ceded, and by whom it might advantageoufly be exercifed ; what perfonal objeflions might cxift to fuch an appointment, however obvioufly indifpenfa* ble to the final fuccefs and triumph of the caufe of Spain ? vvu « UiKt " It cannot be doubted that all thefe points (hould, as far as was pra3icable, have been invefligated by any prudent govcm- ment, even in the cafe of a common military alliance : but in thofe inftances much is fup« plied when we a£l with ancient and regular governments, by previous knowledge of their nature, difpofition,and refources. Here iie whole field of inquiry was new. The II v^efligation might appear extenfive, the judgment to be exercifed might be difficult; • but on its iflue was to depend notliing left than the fafcty and chara6ler of our own army, about to be committed in a foreign country, remote from all firitifh fupport* and with no other protection againll an aU moft infinite fuperiority in number than that which might be found in the energy of the Spanifli patriots, in the wifdom of their go« vernment, and the fitnefs of their armies for cxtenfive operations in the field. With re- fpeft to another great head of this con fide- ration, that which relates to our own troops, whatever might be the opinion entertained, and no one can entertain a higher than my* felf of their fpirit and difcipline, their ardent and brilliant courage, their intrepidity in at- tack, and above all their unfhaken (leadintjk whether under fire,or when engaged hand to hand with an enemy, it was dill to be remem^ bered, that thefe qualities alone, though they make excellent foldiers, do not con ft i- tute AN ARMY. Before that name can fi 30 I Si)* properly be given to any number of troops a£ling together they mud be furnifhed with all the requifitcs for performing with certainty, withfafcty, and above all with expe- dition,whatever is expeflcd ofANARMY in T H £ F I E LD. To commtt them without thefe requifites at a diflance from their refources, and beyond the proteflion of fleets and fortrefles, in the face of an a6live, enterprif- ing and experienced enemy, amply provided with every thing neceflary for carrying on the war on the largeft fcale, and poflefling an almoft unlimited command of numbers, was to expofe them, notwithftanding the moft brilliant exertions of (kill or valour, to ulti* mate and inevitable failure. How far they have been fo fupplied we may collefl from a comparifon of the times refpcftively employed in the marches and movements of fuch comparatively fmall bo« dies of our own troops on the one hand,and of the mighty force of the enemy on the other. f^ SI To examine the particulars of the deficiency, and to confider the manifed neglefls on the part of our government, to which it is in great meafure to be afcribed, is a part of my fubje6l falling naturally under a fubfequent head of inquiry. All that I mean now to advance is this obvious truth, that before the refolution had been finally taken to fend troops in aid of the caufe of Spain, it was incumbent on minifters to have corre6lIy afcertained, and fully fupplied, all that would be necelFary for fo new a«d arduous :r:.->n '•^•♦> ] sir a fervice, / . It was indeed no light or trifling deci« fion they were about to take. They were to refolve on fending to the Continent forty thoufand men, the flower of the firitifli army, not as in former periods to limit their operations to the coafl, not to co-operate with fome great military power, aflifling our efforts and fupplying our deficiencies ; but to a£i aloqe, to penetrate into the 52 1^ ■d 1^ ' ficart of a great kingdorrii and to be itfelf the foundation on which, and on the frag, ments of a regular army long difufed to fervice, an undifciplined population was to build up its military fyftem. • The combinations neceffary for the movements and fupply of fo numerous a force are extremely complicated and difficult. They are the refult of profound fcience, multiplied refearch, and long experience. . To this (ludy the greateft attention is given in all the European armies,and in none more than that of our enemy, nor has any other circumftance more contributed to the af- cendancy which he has acquired over the other military powers of the continent. The nature of our force fcattercd over fo many diftant pofTcflions, the comparative fmallnefs of our armies, and the maritime operations in which they are principally employed, render thefe fubje^ls far tefs familiar than in 33 any other fcrvicc in Europe, both to our of- ficers and to thofc who more immediately ferve in fuch departments. *' By (ludy alone this knowledge never can be gained. It is eflentially pra6iical, it mocks all theory, and exclufively depends on obfervation and experience. ThoFeonly can acquire it, who with an attention fixed on thefe obje£ls, have carefully obferved fuch armies as in the prefent (late of conti* nenul warfiire, are drawn together, exer- cifed, manceuvredi and fubfifted : nor is it perhaps fufficient to have feen, without be- ing alfo a6lively engaged in the execution of fuch arrangements, both in their purely mi- litary branches, and in thofe which partake alfo of civil employment. >• i'» « ' /•• " Far from wifhing to deny, I have a plea- fure in boafting of the true military fpirit and talent which now pervades our army, and of its great and acknowledged progrefs in military fcience. That progrefs is ho- i ysf. 34 nourable both to the commander in chieF, and to the individuals who in defpite of fo many difadvantagcs have fo far fucccedcd in acquiring the means of diilin6lion to them- felvesand of fccurity to the deareft interefts of their country. "* " Whether our armies ever can be fitted for a£ling on the continent alone or fupported only by an irregular and newly levied force» is a qucftion on which it might appear pre* fumptuous to pronounce with a confidence, t|iat fo novel an experiment untried for cen- turies, was not in the prefcnt flate of Eu- rope lightly to be hazarded, mufl be ob- vious to the mod fuperficial obfcrvcr. Nor is it lefs notorious to thofe acquainted with our military fydem, that if it ever (hould be really neccfTary for us to embrace this dangerous policy, much flill remaint to be previoufly fupplied, and many rc- fources to be created of which a thought has hardly yet been entertained. Even for . .-■_*.(. M .-.-:-i^v 1 f that (lomrflic ft rvi(<^ on which the fafcty of nil may \\nw too prohahly depend, a more hahitual and more f^onoral familinrify with thccollcdion and fxcrcifc of niiincrous l»o. dies, will probably be thoii^dit indifpenfible, by all who can rcaCon on fuch fubjc^ls. Nor will it be Icfs nrcefTary, even with that view, that wc (hould apply ourftlvcs to the formation of fome, and to the improvement of other fubordinate departments of an army, in one fcnfe only fubordinate, fince, without them, no great military movements can be made with rapidity or precificn. But to have attained thcfo obje61s even for fer- vice at home, and much more to have qua- lified our army, if fuch was the dreadful neceflity of the cafe, for the unheard-of difficulties to which it was to be expofed in Spain, minifters (hould have done the re- verfe of all that they have been mod defi- rous to cfFeft. Inftead of concealing, they muft have fairly and candidly expofed the F 2 3C ('', t wants and ciefe£ls of our eflablifhment : in- Aead of encouraging and exciting the de- lufive hopes and inflamed imaginations of the people ; inflead ot underrating the for* midable and daily increafmg power of the enemy, they (hould have truly dated all the hazards we were about to encounter , and urged from tnence the ueceflity of leaving nothing undone, which fo perilous an en- terpiize might require. Such was the cou. fe they (hould have followed even for the purpofe of fitting our army to embark in this unprofitable and hopelefs expedition, iiow much better would it have been if from thefc confiderations, they had drawn the trnie conclufion ? What decifive argu- mentSj would not the . circunoflances of France and Europe have afforded againil our vain defire of military conqueft^ and our rage for continental expeditions ? What gratitude, what praifes would not our mi« nifters have deferved> if iiiftead of goading 37 us on to impra6licable enterpii/es with vU fionary nopes daily renewed in their pre- di6lions, but in our own experience daily contradided, they had urged us to confider rather what might one day be our wants at home? ■' If infteadoF announcing to us the certain defeat of the Fronch armies, and the already accomplifhed overthrow of their chief, they had themfelves reflefted what might be the fate of our own troops rafhly committed under every difadvantage on the continent of Europe, and oppofed to a vt« gilp" t and Ikilful enemy pofleflTing there, ia addition to alH^ii other means, an irre&Ri- ble fupcriority of numbers ? - ' "Lastly, in what refpe6ls the force of the 'memy. I can in truth add little to what I have already faid. The amonnt, com poll- tioii and diftribution of the whole difpofablc army of France, and particularly the num- ber ot troops that (under the different cir- cumftanccs in which Europe might be placed,) it would be in her power at any period to bring to bear upon the propofed operations of the Britifh army, are points on which no one can deny that the fulled information fhould have been obtained ; as little will it be queflioncd that to have com- mitted that' army to its fate on the conti- nent without fuch information would in any cafe have been an a6l of the moft extraordi- nary n^^rligence and rafhnefs. What know- ledge the cabinet had on thefe fubjefts we cannot yet have leakPt. We all know the confidence with which it was afferted throughout the public (but not I truft at the fuggeftion of minifters) that 100,000 men was the utmoft force which Buona- parte could apply to this fervice. Such was the expedation and belief of the Britifh public ; how raifed and how maintained I will not now inquire : we all have feen how grievoufly it has been difappointed. Did } 39 minifters partake of this delufion? How elfe can we account for the dcfti nation of 40,000 Britifh troops to this fervice? A force which, although it was too large to b^ rapidly manoeuvred and plentifully fubfifted without much more ample means than were fupplied for both thofe purpofes, was yet too fmall to offer the rcmoteft hope of effec- tual refiliance againfl the overwhelming '^mies of Buonaparte. - ,;v :>,.>' ) . " That this force has been committed to its fate in the prefence of a fuperior enemy is now but too notorious. It feems, there- fore, to follow as a neceffary confequence, that when miniflcrs determined to fend it to Spain, tliey inuft cither have taken their re- folutio' MIKST NEGLIGENTLY withoUt fuf- ficientl^ ir jrtaining the difpofable force of the enemy, or most rashly have con- figned our troops to inevitable difafter, in open defiance of the mofl obvious rules of humeri policy and wifdom, , 1 -,fi; r,vc j : - 40 i I m ••That Buonaparte has at his abfolute dif- pofal at the lead 500,000 European troops, is a faft of which no well informed man en- tertains a doubt; that a fyllcm has been fuccefsfully adopted in his armies by which large bodies of thefe troops can be removed from place to place with a rapidity unknown to former times, has been made but too ma- nifeft in the melancholy ' ^ry of the other flates of the continent as well as in that of Spain. It will I think be as readily ac- knowledged that 250,000 men, commanded as his armies now are, with numerous for- trefles and military depots and magazines in their rear, are abundantly fufRcient, not perhaps to make further conquefts, but cer'> tainly to fecure all their prefent acquifitions * in Germany and in Italy, and to make head by defenfive operations again ft all that re- mains of continental Europe, had any prof- pe6l of fuch warfare really exifted. *' How then could it ever have entered into 41 the mind of any man, that with fuch an ob« jcft in vie\T, and having the means entirely in his power, he would not tranfport at the lead 150,000 men into Spain, in addition to the forces already there, or that if thefe were not fufficient, he would not carry there almoft any given number neceflary for the accomplilhment of his revenge, and the gra« tification of his ambition ? As well might it have been doubted that he would take the command of this mighty force himfelf, af* fifted by his ableft generals, or that he would furnifh it in abundance with every objeft neceffary for the moft powerful and exten- fiv€ military operations, that confummate fkill and deliberate forethought could pofli- blydevile. "" To a force like this what but a prefump- tion quite unexampled in the hiftory of mankind could induce the BritiQi govern- ment to expofe the flower of its army, the laft hope and flay of the country, without \\i ■ I the remoted chance of its ferving any other purpofe than to fwell the triumphs of the enemy? , , Nor in this flate of things (hould it ever have been forgotten, that together with our troopswere necelTarily committed the ho- nour and good faith of the nation ; and that there could be thenceforth no retreat whilft any confiderable part of Spain remained in arms, without our being liable to the impu- tation, however unmerited, of abandoning to the mercy of a conqueror thofe whom we had animated to reO fiance. It was alfo to be remembered that by fending our troops to Spain and Portugal, we involved thofe countries in difficulties from which they could not eafily be extricated. . . : ^ . If for the purpofe of fupporting the ope- rations of our army in the field, their raw levies were alfo to engage in the enterprizes of regular war, the confequences muft be, what from the beginning the Spaniards at i 43 leaft forefaw, inevitable difafler when con- • tending with fuch fuperiority of military ikiil. If, on the contrary, they purfucd that fyftem of defultory warfare fo wifely recom- mended in their fird in(lru6lions, and at that time fo generally applauded in this coun- try, the Britifh force, to which fuch a fyf- tem was quite inapplicable, mufl (land alone, deferted by the allies whom it came to fupport, and fingly expofed to the whole accumulated force of the French armies* Nor even in the cafe of the mod extreme ne- ccflity could thefe ini'aded countries enter without difgrace into negociation with the conqueror, unlefs they flipulated from him not only amnefly for his newly acquired fubje6ls, but fafe and honourable retreat for his moft hated enemies. , . ; They would be placed therefore in the cruel neceflity of either facrificing their allies, or for our fake expofing their coun- try to the rage of a mercilefs invader, j. ' 44 tt has indeed been faid, that miniflers in th^ principles upon which they have a6led, and in the leading meafures they have adopted with rerpe6l to Spain, have followed not led the wifhes of the nation ; a dangerous argu* ment which fhifts upon the multitude that refponfibility which our conflitution at- taches to the few, and which entrufts the direflion of our military enterprizes not to the provident forecafl of our government, but to the uninformed, the honourable en* thufiafm of the people. It may be right, however, to confider what it is to which the nation has in fa6l committed itfelf upon the Spanifh queflion. It may, I thi nk, be correftly flated that the opinions of all were from the beginning unanimous in favour of granting every pru- dent and pra6licable aid to the Spanifh pa- triots, and that there exifted throughout the country much enthufiafm for the caufe, and an undefined, but eager defire of making aH K'l.; 45 ureful racrifices in its favour. There was at the Came time in mod men a Hrong difpofi- lion (though not without great Ihades of difference) to believe almod implicitly the flatements circulated by miniflers of the in- creafing numbers and means of the patriots. Thus the hopes of the country keeping pace with its wiftics, they were led to give a more than ordinary confidence to the king's government as to the propriety of afling vith a Britifh force in Spain,as to the amount and nature of that force, and as to the man- ner in which it might be mofl adrantage- oufly employed. But it would be going far indeed to conclude, that becaufe the people of England wifhed fuccefs to the caufe of Spain, they were therefore indifferent as to the manner in which that caufe (liould be fupported ; or that they had in blind igno- rance previoufly recognized thewifdom of any poflible meafures which government might adopt, much Ids can it beargued^ that uien \ 4C ready on fuch a fubjed to give a confidence perhaps too large to the councils of their own fovcrcign, had therefore confented^ without any knowledge of the individuals, or the principles direfling the Spanifh jun- tas, that this country fhould be guided by THEM IN TH£ CHOICE, AND IN THE DIRECTION OF ITS EXERTIONS. If fuch was indeed the cafe, we are un- doubtedly precluded now from any inquiry into the manner in which our efforts have been applied and direfled. The fun6lions of parliament are fuperfeded, and the difcuf- fions of the Britifh public on thefe inter- efting queftions are worfe than fuperfluous* The condituents of the Spanifh juntas can alone examine how they have exercifed a power exclufively confided to their difcre- tion. In this country a difpofilion to place unufual confidence in the king's govern- ment, muft in every cafe imply the necefla- •*3 ry condition of lUbfcqucnt rcrponfibility. Such confidence is granted only in the jud expc£lation, that before any important mea* fures are carried into execution, miniflcrs (hall have done all that human prudence can requireto enfure fuccefs tothcir undertakings; and if they (hall have failed in this elTcntial duty, (hall they be allowed to plead in their defence the libcraldifpofitionof theircountry? Far from it, their guilt will be aggravated by the extent of the means which wcr^- con- fidcd to them. They will be anrwcrable not only for the failure of their own efforts, but alfo for the dif'apponument of that en- thufiafm and zeal with which Britidi bofoms beat high at the fight of an injured^ nation ; ftruggling for its independence. ^^ It would therefore be a grofs calumny on an enlightened nation to fuppofe that they had approved of fending troops to Spain on any other fuppofition than that go- vernment had fatisfied itfelf upon the I 48 FULLEST CONSIDKRATIOM AND INQUN RY, that the mcafure would be both prac* ticable and advantageous. Until that con* vi6lion (hould be obtained, the country had doubtlcfs a right to expe^l that miniflers would have firmly refifted all ignorant and unfounded clamour, well knowing that on this as on every other occafion, though the refulc of all human a6lions is beyond our reach, wifdom is the bed ground of hope, and prudent counfcls the furefl foundation offuccefsful nieafures. Enihufiafm is indeed a quality much bet- ter fitted for a people ihan for its govern- ment : generous and even romantic feel- ings adorn a brave and free nation ; but zeal without knowledge is the difgrace of legiflators and ilattrmcn. Thefe are the rcfle£lions which naturally arife from the rciult of our late enter- prize, compared with the knowledge we have fucceflively acquired of the circum* 49 ftiftcei under which they were undertakbi* ^ ctrctimflances fttsdioufly concealed at the' time, and even u p to thii hour imperfeftfy difctored. '"" •' »^'' • -i X^ I-'-- '*"' **^ *^ A complete view oF the whole cafe can be obtained and given to the poblick hy' parliament alone, and r(ireI)rnofubjt6l evef did more urgently call for the attfcmion of itti aftmbly entruRed with the dearefl intcr-^ efla of a great and powerful empire. It is indeed fearcely poflible for the boldeft oir iioft infcnfible among us, to contemplate m •aecBSSioN the events that ha^i^KippAeiied in 8pain fince pariiament was laft prorogued vmhout mingled fenfations of imaaement, and alarm, of the moft deep and poignant grief (or What is paft, and the moft awful •pprehenGon for what is flill to come. * All men eagerly inquire to what thefe Aings are io be aferibed, and how it is that the riGng in arms of a people whom they I so). n believed to hive been united, and were i uught to call the universax. Spanish ) NATION* has ferved only to rivet the fetters^ of that unhappy people, and to expofe their iiouncils to the derifion^and their Leaders to the perfecution, of their infulting and mer-. cilefsOppreflbr? Nor is lefs aftoni(hiiien|| fxprefled that all the fleets and armies, all the treafures and rcfourccs of a mighty kingdom prodigal in its offers, and enthufi-. attic in its zeal for the caufe of Spain« flipuld l^ayj^ beciffliewn only in preparation l^nd expence, and (hould never once hav^ ^een broyght into the fee ne of a£lion until the tragedy was already clofed, A refult^ |^y5 the enemyf in one of his infulting buU Jetips, a rcfult perfc6Uy aflonifhing ! " Aq armament of fuch mighty promife, produce tive ofeffe^ls fo very inconfiderable !*' \ ^^ We all feel thr taunt, and grieve to^aic* knowledge, that fucii is the judgment of our iondufl which mud b^ formed by the pe- 61 J fent age and by pofterity. But if wj mean to know the caufei of thcfe things, we rauft endeavoui for a time to ftifle thefe fenfa* tions. We muft, however painful the tafk, trace down the whole melancholy hiPiOry from its beginning, pafs in review each leading event as it arofe, conne6l it with its origin and confequences, and by this de- tailed examination of the whole fubje6l» defeat every attempt to involve it in ob' Iciirity. ,^. .*?• '■ ^''■'' . •*'; ; •■ ::* : ;• ' This mod important work, Parliament alone can elFeftually perform, h is only Parliament that can call for and ccmmand the many documents neceffary for "uch ah mveftigation. .; - iFrora fuch documents the country and pofterity wi:l learn what previous delibera^ tion and inquiry preceded the adoption of the moft important and decifive refolutions* From thefe they will judge whether ralhnefs s» *T-« I 1 IV'? I! as! j^^id ncglig^ce, producing tliqir invariable conre(;[uences, have brought upon us thefe ctilapitieSf or whether this awful diTpmfa* tion With which we are vifite(}ft wai beyond .the reach of all human fbrefight and pru* m dence. .: .. i...' t .en i' AH that can now be done is to reafon upon the fa6ls already known : to point the attention of thofe who are to judge on this pccafion in behalf of their country to thofe heads of information which can alone enabk them to form with jufiice that opinion which they are authoritatively to pro- nounce : and to indicate to thofe who are called upon for their defence, thofe circum- (lances of ftrong f»nd hitherto unremoved impreflion which appear to jullify us in at- tributing to their temerity and their negli- gence, all the pad evils and all the future confequences refulu) )g from their fatal policy. jTu Thefe obfervations have, however, rcJat- *5 ed only to the general deierminadont of 4ifiing by a Brkilh army in Spain, and of rendering the operations of that army fub- fervient, not to the plans of their own go- vernment, but to the wiflies of the Spanifli Juntas. Much more (lill remains to be faid of the manner in v/hichthofe two determina- tions have bteen adled upon by the govern- ment ; what Forces have in fa£t been fen^ to what Quarters and at what Periods^ hdw provided and how eoninanded« and parti- cularly how combined and adapted in their compofition to the peculiar fervices ex- pelled from them. The particulars of thefe proofs of miinia- nagement I will detail to you in a fucceed- inghtter, following as much as poHibk the order of time, and adhering wherever I can to the very words of the official documents. Anxious only for truth, and above all things , folicitpus to warn my country by the awful 1 1 I ! 4* example of talamities already inctirrecf againft a perfeTcrance in thofe paths which can lead only to a repetition of the fame misfortunes* ^ ^^ •' .m-^ivi^l ;:r^r l,i;c .' i*;; FINIS. ' iy-s. f '.;- ,i^ •:." '-^^r/... :*»f"t ..* . ll.'^Qi ••«■■: j'*^*'* • W.FIiaC,Filoter, Old Bailey, I . , ^J*-