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Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplementaires: This Item is filmed at the reduction ratio ch«»r> troops of the garri««()n oqimlly over all the town, may be BUrpriscd and takoii by tscahide, and in our desperate situation might have been attempted by risking all for all. A surprise in a dark night must naturally spread universal terror, disorder and panic amongst those who are taken unawares, and must soon be communicated through all the quarters of the town. The soldiers are so much the more terrified that they know not where they are most in danger ; not like during a siege, where the place for the assault is marked by the breach. Their heads turn, and, deprived of judgment, coolness and reflection, they think rather of escaping the slaughter that ensues when a town is being captured in this manner, than of defending the ramparts. But Quebec being accessible only on that side of it which faces the heights of Abraham, and having nothing to fear elsewhere, the moment an alarm i« sounded, all the force ot the garrison must naturally be there. Thus the English having seven thousand men in the town — almost as many as our army proposed for the escalade to invest all that part of the town open to attack— it is likely that we should have lost the half of our army in the attempt, and at last, after a horrible sla ;^' ter of men, have been obliged to return ignominiously irom whence we came. Besides, supposing that we had even taken the Lower Town by escalade, we would not have been further advanced. The English in half an hour afterwards, by burning it, by throv/ing down from the Upper Town upon the roofs of the houses fire pots, shells and other combustible matter, conld have soon chased us out of it, or buried us under its ruins. This project, after having furnished for a long time matter for the daily conversations of Montrealers, was at last considered by M. de Levis, and classed as it deserved, amongst the vagaries of bedlam ; he substituting a scheme in its place which was reasonable, well combined, doing honor to his ability and talent. M. de Levis, in giving an account to the Court of the loss of all our artillery and stores at Quebec, gave likewise all possible assurances that he would re-take the town in the »l I i 6 spring and save the colony, provided they would send to him from Europe a ship loaded with field-pieces and ammunition, U» set sail from Europe in the month of February, in order to be in the St. Lawrrence river before the arrival of the English, and near Quebec in the month of April. He collected our army as soon as the season permitted ; got together about twelve pieces of old cannon, which had been laid aside for many years, and with a small quantity of gun- powder and very few bullets, he set out from Montreal with his army towards the beginning of April, the snow being as yet upon the ground ; and he conducted his march so well that the army arrived at Cap Rouge, three leagues from Quebec, without the enemy having any information of their having left Montreal. He did not flatter himself to be able to take Quebec with such a despicable train of artillery, and his design was only to invest the town ; to open the trenches before it ; to advance his approaches, and be in a position, the moment the ships he had asked from the Court should arrive, to land the cannon, placing them instantly upon the batteries ready to receive them, and without loss of time to batter the town immediately. Fortune favored him to the height of his wishes, and if the ships had arrived with the artillery he expected from France, that town could scarce have held out for four and twenty hours, by which means he would have had the glory of preserving to his conntry the colony of Canada, then reduced to its last gasp. The English got the news of our army's being at Cap Rouge by a most singular accident, which greatly manifests the predominant power of Fortune in military operations, and shows that the greatest general cannot guarantee success or put himself out of the reach of those events which human understanding* cannot foresee, whereby the best-combined and well-formed schemes are frustrated in their execution. In all appearance we would have taken Quebec by surprise had it not been for one of Fortune's caprices, that have often as much share in the events of war as the genius and talents of the greatest generals. id to him munition, ruary, in tral of the ril. He ited ; got had been ^ of gun- real with being as 1 so well les from of their >e able to r, and his trenches position, rt should upon the I time to ind if the 1 France, d twenty glory of 1 reduced : at Cap nanifests ions, and iccess or 1 human lined and n. In all ie had it as much ts of the The Athenians were rot in the wrong to paint Timotheus asleep, whilst Fortune, in another part of the picture, was spreading nets over towns to take them for him. An artillery boat having been overturned and sunk by the sheets of ice, which the current of the St. Lawrence brought down with great force, an artilleryman saved himself on a piece of ice that floated down the river with him upon it, without a possibility of his getting to land, when he was opposite to the city. The English, so soon as they perceived that poor distressed man— moved with humanity and compassion— sent out boats, who with difficulty saved him (the river being covered with fields of ice), and brought him to town with scarce any sign of life. Having restored him with cordials, the moment he began to breathe and recover his senses, they asked him from whence he came, and who he was ? he answered, innocently, that he was a French cannonier from M. de Levis' army al Cap Rouge. At first they imagined he raved, and that his sufferings upon the river had turaed his head ; but, after examining him more particularly and his answers being always the same, they were soon convinced of the truth of his assertions, and were not a little confounded to have the French army 2 three leagues from Quebec, without possessing the smallest information of the fact. All their care proved ineffec- tual for the preservation of life ; he expired the moment he had revealed this important secret. What a remarkable and visible instance of fortune fighting for the English— equal at least to the cloud of rain that saved General Wolf's army the year preceding at his attack of 31st of July, at Montmorenci. Had it not been for this most unaccountable accident, to all appearance M. de Levis would have captured all the English advanced posts, which were said to amount to fifteen hundred men, who retired to the town immediately after settiiig fin- to the magazine ci powder in the church of St. Foy,' which ammunition they had not the time to carry with them. Nor would it have been surprising if M. de Levis at the gates of Quebec with his army, without being discovered, had taken it by surprise. It ia certain iliat luck lias more or less share in all the events of li(e, and this is more particularly visible in the operations of war. Hazards may be constantly in the favor of a general blindly protected by that goddess, against an adversary with fur superior talents. Everybody must acknowledge Prince Eugene's superiority of genius, when compared with the Duke of Marlborough ; but Marl- borough war always as fortunate in having continually unforeseen accidents in his favor, as Prince Eugene was unlucky to have them against him to thwart and cross the execution of the best-combined projects, which extorted admiration, and seemed to have only need of Fortune's stand- ing neuter to be successful. The fate of an army, — can it depend upon the personal good fortune of the General who commands it ? Cardinal Mazarin seemed to be of this opinion, since he never failed to ask those who recommended persons to him to head expeditions, "is he lucky?" — est'il heureux '^ Can it be surmised that fortune acts with her favorite sons at the head of armies, as she does at gambling tables ? However it may be, a great General will always watch vigilantly the chapter of accidents — seize rapidly that which is favorable to him, and, by his prudence, foresight and circumspection, will ward off and correct what is contrary to his interests. The smallest things are not unworthy of his attention 5 they often produce the greatest events, and the neglecting what at first view might appear trivial, has often overturned the best-calculated schemes. The most trifling of our actions becomes often a first cause which produces an endless chain of effects — linked to each other — of the greatest importance. Tbe boat sunk by the ice, at Cap Rouge, was a first cause. The cannonier, by this accident, was upon a sheet of ice in the middle of the St. Lawrence, opposite to Quebec ; this inspired with pity the English \o save his life. This humane action of the English in saving the unhappy cannonier, saved Quebec from being taken by surprise, which probably would have been the case without bis information, that M. de Levia^ army was at Cap Rouge. )re or \c$» irticularly ionstanlly goddess, 1 very body f genius, but Marl- mtinually gene was cross the extorted e'3 stand- r, — can it leral who ! of this nmended icky?"— acts with she does General ts — seize )rudence, ect what are not greatest t appear les. The 18 which )ther — of , at Cap iccident, iwrence, iglish to n saving aken by without > Rouge. If taken by M. de Levis, ii would have deterred the English frorf. any further attempt upon Canada, and peace would have s^oon ensued. But by tlie cannonier's declaration, it was not taKen, and consequently the war was prolonged. Quebec in possession of the English rendered the conquest of Canada in.>vitable and sure. The possession of that vast country of Canada, after so much blood, and such immense expenses it had cost the English in these dlfTerent expeditions, excited too much the cupidity of the English to consent to a peace upon reasonable conditions, and induced them to evtend their conquest to other French colonies. The possession of so many French and Spanish colonies by the English brought about the shameful peace that France and Spam were obliged to receive at the hands of the English, upon the hardest terms, as laws of the conqueror. The boat upset and sunk at Cap Rouge was the primary cause and the first link of the chain which had the greatest influence over all the- affairs of Europe. If M. de Levis had saved the cannonier at Cap Rouge, what a multitude of events would have been nipped in the bud ! Perhaps even Great Britain would have been forced to receive the peace from !• ranee instead of granting it on her own conditions. There is scarcely any human aciion that is not the beginning of a chain of results. The French army toolc possession of the village of St. Fove the moment the English went out of it, retiring to Quebec, and passed there the night between the 27th and 28th of April INext morning, M. de Levis being informed that the English army was come out of the town, and that they were drawn up m battle upon the .ame ground that the French army had occu- pied the year before at the battle of the 13th September, he drev/ out his men and advanced in order of battle to meet the English army. T'lough fully persuaded that the English ° '"' ^"^^"^ "°^ '^^^ a oauie out oi his town, where he had a great deal to lose in being beat, and could gain little by a victory, he was fully persuaded that he would return at the approacn of the French army. B ii 1 1 «, 10. General Murray, who does the greatest honor to his country by his great knowledge of the art of war, good sense and ability, had come out of the town in order to cover that place with a retrenchment, which was very evident from the prodigious quantity of working tools that were taken by the French ; and the vast rapidity with which the French army advanced in all appearance, deprived him of the possibility of gettin^j back into Quebec without leaving a part of them to be cut to pieces by the Canadians. The English army had ihe advantage of position. They were drawn up in battle upon rising ground, their front armed with twenty-two brass field-pieces— the Palace battery which De Ramsay refused to send to M. de Montcalm. The engage- ment began by the attack of a house (Duraont's) between the right wing of the English army and the French left wing, which was alternately attacked and defended by the Scotch Highlanders and by the French G-rcnadiers, each ol them taking it and losing it by turns. Worthy antagonists !— the Grenadiers, with their bayonets in their hands, forced the High- landers fo go out of it by the windows ; and iha Highlanders getting into it again by the door, immediately, obliged, the Grenadiers to evacuate it by the same road, with their daggers.. Both of them lost and retook the house* several timeSj. and the contest would have continued whilst there remaihed'i a Highlander and a Grenadiei, if both generals had not made> them retire, leaving the house neuter ground. The Grena- diers were reduced to fourteen men— a company at most. No doubt the Highlanders lost in proportion. The left of the French army, which was in hollow ground, about forty paces from the English, was crushed to pieces by tlie fire of their artillery loaded with grape-shot. M.de Levis, perceiving their bad position, sent M. de La Pause, Adjutant of the Guienne Regiment, with orders for the army to retire some steps behind them, in order to occupy an eminence parallel to the rising' ground occupied by the English ; but whether this officer did not comprehend M. de Levis' intentions, or whether he • Dumont'g mill. is country ense ^nd hat place from the in by the ich army nihility of them to 1. They nt armed ry which ! engage- veen the ft wing, i Scotch ol them its!— the ^e High- hlanders ged. the daggers.. I timeSj. imainedi ot made Grena- ost. No t of the ty paces of their ng their Tuienne i behind 5 rising icer did Iher he 11 delivered ill the orders to the different regiments, by his stupidity the battle was very near being lost irremediably. He ran along the line, ordering each regiment to the right about, and to retire, without any further explanation of M. de Levis' orders. Some of the left of the French army being so near as twenty paces to the enemy, the best-disciplined troops in that case can scarce be expected to be able to retire without the greatest disorder and confusion, or without exposing themselves evidently to be defeated and slaughtered. Upon this mc lent, the English, believing tliem in flight, quilted their advantage of the rising ground in order to pursue them complete their disorder, and break them entirely.' M.Dalquier' who commanded the Beam Regiment, with the troops of the' colony upon the left of the French army, a bold, intrepid old officer, turned about to his soldiers wiien La Pause gave him M. de Levis' order to retire, and told them, "It is not time now, my boys, to retire when at twenty paces from the enemy ; with your bayonets upon your mu.kefs, let us throw ourselves headlong amongst them-that is better." hi an instant they lell upon the English impetuously-with thrusts of bayonets hand to hand, got possession, like lightning, of their guns ; and a ball which went through Dalquier's body, which was already quite covered with scars of old wounds, did not hinder him from continuing giving hi. orders. Poularies. who was upon the right flank c,f the army, with his regiment ol Royal Roussillon, and some of the Canadian militia, seeing Dalquier stand firm, and all the troops of the centre having retired in disorder, leaving a space between the two wings, he caused his regunent vyith the Canadians to wheel to the left, in order to fall upon the left Hank ol the English army, the French army extendmg further to their right beyond the English left win^^ The enemy no sooner perceived Poularies' movement, than hey im,ned.ately fled with precipitation and confusion and l^ fl P^»'^-^'"^ken that not an English soldier coud be relied by t eir officers, several of whom were taken prone rs and Jnr V"T "'° ''' "'^"' ^^^'-''^^ imm'edimely and all the French army pursued so hotly the English that if the cry had not been raised to halt, it is very doutt' toy 12 11 would not have got inJo Quebec pell-mell wiih the fugitives, being near the town-gates when this cry began. Thus Quebec would have been retaken in a most singular manner,* unforeseen and unpremeditated. I know nothing worse than ill-disciplined troops ; certainly a brave militia, with its NoTE.-.The preceding winter had been employed in skirmishing around Quebec— (J. M. L.) • " On the night of the eighteenth of March, two hundred light infantry were detached from the garrison of Quebec, with three days' provisions, and a company of grenadiers marched the next dav to Lorette church, bemg the place of rendezvous. The whole proceeded to Calvaire, accompanied by a French deserter in a British uniform. In this route they surprised an advanced post of the French and made the party prisoners, consisting of a corporal and nine privates ; having secured these, they pushed forward with the greatest speed, fearing that a straggling peasant, whom they met, should mar their further views by alarming the country. The light infantry having reached the wished-for object, which was a strong pamp or entrenchment of logs and timber, with a house detached at a small distance from it, they carried the dwelling-house with their accustomed bravery, killed four and took the rest, being twenty ,n number, some of whom were wounded. The main body of the French by this time had manned their works, which were breast high, and environed with an abattis of wood, to the distance of about three hundred yards, whence they fired a few random shots and shouted as usual. Captain McDonald, wha commanded this detachment, seeing the French advantageously situated and perceiving their officers very active in encouraging their men, expected a warm dispute, and therefore made a disposition to attack them in form As soon, however, as the light infantry advanced to the charge, the French threw down their arms and took to flight, when near eighty of them were made prisoners. In the attack the English had only si.x wounded : but the French .ost five killed and thirteen wounded. Captain McDonald destroyed the post, three corn-mills, granaries, and other houses contiguous thereto. The French p. , oners were brought to Quebec, except the wounded, who were left m charge of the peasants, with directions to conduct them to Jacques Cartier. Near one hundred soldiers of the English detachment were frost-bitten, and were brought back to the garrison on sleighs. Captain Herbin, the commanding oilicer, escaped ; but his watch, hat, and feather, fille de joie,' with a cask of wine and case of liqueurs, were taken. M 'i J*"' aIk'""""' <"^^^^^bec(General Murray) sent the Town Major to the Mother Abbess^ ol the Convent of Hotel Dieu, to acquaint her with the reasons that induced him to destroy their mills and tenements at Calvaire • namely, on account of her having transmitted intelligence to the French of 13 fclmple, ancient way of fighting, even not drilled, is preferable to a force having a crude notion of discipline-a science entirely neglected in Canada amongst French regular troop, ; .o that the French regiments there might be looked upon a, d flering very httle from the Canadian militia. The method of managmg militia and well-disciplined regular troops arv pears to be quite as different as they differ in nature. A cool pblegmatic, undaunted bravery is the fruit of an excellent disctplme, rendermg the soldiers capable, when repulsed, to return several t.mea to the assault, and rally of their own accord. But the strength and merit of the militia resemble" a hot, ardent, raging fire, that must be suffered to blaze until It dies out of itself: it i.a flash, an explosion, that often works prodigies, and which, when stiffed, there is no possibility of preventing the immediate disorder that must ensue, nor any means of bnng.ng it back a second time to face the one.ny. The French had about two thousand lulled and wounded in Hns bat le of the 27th (? 28th) of April, of which number the e was an hundred and ten officers of the regular troops, besides a great many officers of the Canadian militia: so^Ley mth' say with Pyrrhus, the day of his victory over the Romans- Agaiu such another victory, and I would be undone !» the last detaclnnent's being ovder^dZhr^7^^^^ii^~^ hav.ng actually carried on a correspondence with the French army „' the whole course of the winter, whereby they were informed of aM rvements proceedM.gs, an every c ther occurrence that ]>appened within th wai ! the Governor also signified to her, that if either«he or her sisters ho d presume to correspond m future with the French, either directly or Tdt recUy, or m any respect act contrary to good faith and the dutv they owei U> the King of Great Britain, they should, without further cemnony ^ ba„,shed from Quebec, and their convent be converted into a barrack f^ the troops As Madame de St. Claude, who was sister to M. de Ramsay and Superior of the General Hospital, had always been in.micaUoTh: _Enghsh ,n propagatmg falsehoods, and in encouraging the Canadians t 2 1 ^??7'/^"'™^' '^'^^ the Brigade-Major to signity to this lady, tha't Bhe should des,st from such conduct ; and that as she appeared to ^e a great, nterest.n the affairs of this world, and seemed t.rej'of her sLlion he wo ■ d .nhst her as a grenadier, which from her stature (full six feet) 2 I ij i 1 t f 14 "M. dn Levis opened the trenches the same night before Quebec, and they were carried on with such activity that his batteries were soon ready to receive the guns necessary to make a breach. But the most considerable of his bad pieces Was a twelve ■pounder, which lie mounted upon batteries, firing at times AVith the greatest economy, as he had but a small store of gunpowder. Tliere needed only the arrival of a ship from France with artillery and ammunition to crown M. de Levis with glory. The English in Quebec confessed that the first flag that would appear in the St. Lawrence would decide the question, if Canada should remain in possession of the English or return to the French. No ships arrived from-France with artillery. The fate of Canada was at last settled by the appearance of three English ijien-of-war, on the 7tli of May. They ascended immediately the St. Lawrence without stopping at Quebec. They attacked the small French frigates-at the Ance du Foulon, about a mile above the town-which had passed the winter in Canada; took some of them, burned others, and, in short, destroyed in an instant all the French marine. This unlooked-for arrival instead ol the vessel which M. de Levis expected from' t ranee, so astonished and terrified the French army, that they immediately raised the siege-and that without any necessity lor It. rhey again left as a present lor the English their tents and their baggage, as they had done previously on retiring from Beauport, after the battle of the 13th September. Such was their consternation that, as if struck by a thunderbolt, they lied with the utmost precipitation, as if the English were pur- smng them after the loss ol a battle. De Vauquelin alone distinguished himself by a truly heroic bravery. He com- manded one of the small French frigates of about sixteen guns, and fought like a lion against an English man-of-war lorty yuns, until he had no powder nor shot. He then sent a 1 his crew ashore to M. de Levis, judging that they might be 01 use to h.ra, and remained on board with the wounded, his colors always flying. 15 ight before ity that his ecessary to s a twelve g at times ill store of ship from [. de Levis It the first decide the be English he fate of ;e English mediately y attacked 1, about a 1 Canada; siroyed in or arrival, 2ted from , that they necessity heir tents I retiring Jr. Such bolt, they ivere pur- lin alone He com- t sixteen in-of-vvar then sent might be ided, his The English, after firing some time at his vessel, anc! roceivmg no answer, approached in their boats and asked him why he did not fire, or lower his Hag ? De Vannuelin answered them fiercely that, had he had any more powder he would not have been silent so long ; that if they had a mind to take him, they might cut down his flag themselves, as hitherto his custom was not to strike his colors, but to make? others— his country's enemies— do so. The English then went on board of his ship, and took him prisoner, with his wounded men, and in consideration of his determination— they having- cut down his flag— treated him with the regard which bravery can claim at the hands of a generous enemy. De Vauquelin had already made himself known to the English by his undaunted courage at the siege of Louisburg. His intrepidity so delighted the English Admiral, that he begged him to tell him freely how he could serve him. He answered the Admiral, " that what he wished for of all things was to have his liberty and permission to return to France." The Admiral had so great a consideration for him, that he c-ised a vessel to be imme- dmtely fitted out to carry him to Europe, orderingthe English captamtoobey De Vauquelin and land him in any French port he might ask for, leaving him ai the same time to choose what trench passengers woulJ accompany him. This noble and generous behaviour of the English did honor to their nation by rendering justice to, and discerning the merit of, an enemy' far beyond what De Vauquelin met with from Berryer, the Secretary of the Navy, on his arrival in France. The unhappy situation of the colony was now past remedy and: may be compared to a man in the agonies of death, tJ wKom the physician continues to administer cordials, not from hopes ofi his recovery, but to allay and soften the violence of his sufferings. All that could now be expected was to obtain an honorable capitulation, favorable to its inhabitants, the colony being at its last gasp. M. de Levis left two thousand men at Jacques Cartier, with orders to retire slowly according as the English advanced from Quebec, and to avoid an engagement with them, without ) vl j id Joking sight of ,|.em. This retarded their march, and put ofT he evil hour as long as possible. He went with the rest of MS army to Montreal. As there was no provision in that town to be able to keep his army assembled, he was obliged to disperse t em sending them back to their winter quarters, where each inhabitant was obliged to board a soldier at a Very low rdte, which was paid by the muniiionary general. &UX No.x, with eleven hundred men, of which number were the Regiment of Guienne and Berry. This island is situated in the River Chambly (Richelieu), about eight leagues in a Mraight line from Montreal, and two miles distant from Lake i^namplain. M. Bourlamarque, an officer of great knowledge in all the branches of his profession, decided upon that position for his retreat the year before, when he evacuated Ticonderoga, haying been forced to abandon to the English that lake. He fortified this island as well as was possible in a sandy ground, in order to serve as a frontier on that side of Canada, and hinder the English from coming down by the River Richelieu into the River St. Lawrence, by which means in a very short ^me they might have been in possession of Montreal and Ihree Rivers,-a much easier way than by Lake Ontario, which IS much longer and full of chicares (?) by the rapids in the St. Lawrence, and prolong their operations ;-a very great advantage in a country where there are violent frosts during seven months of the year. This island is about twelve hun- dred fathoms long, and from a hundred to two hundred broad. The entrenchments traced and conducted by M. Bourlamarque are regular, and a proof of his superior knowledge in fortifica- ions He barred the two branches of the river which formed ln'o,tr«. 7h ''"f 'u °'' °' "'^"'"^ °^ ^'S ^'^^«' linked to one toother at their ends by strong rings and circles of iron. This prevented the English boats from r.alr» rKorv,^™;-. .- „.,_ .,. . wland m the night, to reach Montreal. But for the staccados the island must have been taken by them before they could proceed any further. ^ 17 "^ and put off Ihe rest of 1 that town obliged to sr quarters, )ldier at a general, and at Isle Tiber were is situated gues in a from Lake in all the ion for his onderoga, ake. He y ground, lada, and Richelieu ^ery short treal and! Ontario, rapids in 'ery great ts during slve hun- sd broad, amarque fortifica- h formed ed to one )n. This pass the taccados ey could Some Iroquois, of the Five Nations, informed M. de Vaudreuil at Montreal, that General Amherst was marching to invade Canada with a very considerable army by the rapids and Lake Ontario, whilst General Murray had orders to come up the river with his army from Quebec, and join Gen. Amherst at Montreal. But they had no knowledge of a third body of troops, about four thousand men, that came by Lake Cham- plam, m the month of July, five weeks before the arrival of the other two armies at Montreal, and besieged Isle anx Noix with a very considerable train of artillery, cannon, mortars, «c., in profusion. ^ They erected five batteries of guns on the south side of the nver, with a bomb battery, which rendered our trenches use- less, as they had a sight of us everywhere, back, face and sideways, and so near us that at the south staccado they killed several of our soldiers by their musket shots. The sandy ground protected us from the eflfect of their shells, which they threw upon us in great numbers, with a continual fire from their gun batteries. After sJxteen days' siege with a. most violent cannonade, without a moment's interruption, M. Nogaire, an officer in the Regiment of Royal Roussillon, came to us from Montreal, having crossed directly through the woods, with some Indiana for his guides, with two letters from De Bougainville, one of which was from him to Vaudreuil, and the other from M. de Levis. It was a very critical conjuncture, having only two days provision for the garrison, which had subsisted until the arrival of the English troops by means of fishing-nets, that nver abounding with the most delicious fish, with seven or eight oxen, which had been kept as a reserve and killed by the enemy scannon. M. deVaudreuil's letter contained a permis. sion to M. de Bougainville to capitulate or retire from the island d U was possible. M. de Levis' letter was a positive order .u ucfend tnat post to the last extremity. De Bougainville notwithstanding his genius, good sense and learninrwith personal courage, and who lacked only taste for the sfudy of the art of war to distinguish himself, was nevertheless put to c 18 i ! I' I' ' a nonplus how to act from the contradictory orders he received'. In this dilemma he shewed me the letters, asking at the same time my advice ; and my answer was :— "That in two days famine must oblige us to surrenderto the enemy at discretion. That the reinforcements of a thousand men at Montreal might be of the greatest importance, and help to make a good countenance when the English army had advanced in the neighborhood of it. That it was M. de Vaudreuil who com- manded-in-chief in Canada, and not M. de Levis ; and that there was yet a possibility of retiring with the garrison towards the north side of the island, where the swampy ground upon the border of the river had hindered the English from establishing a post." De Bougainville immediately decided for a retreat, which was executed and combined with equal justness ; and the success answered exactly to the prudence wisdom and good conduct that De Bougainville exhibited in preparing for it. It was then about ten in the morning when Nogaire arrived with the Indians, who— not accustomed ta such a terrible fire as was at that moment poured forth by the- English batteries, very different from their way of fighting behind trees— were not at all at ease, and furiously impatient to get out of the island. The hour of retreat was settled for ten that night. The north shore of Isle aux Noix, on the opposite side of the river, was marshy to the distance of three hundred paces from the river, covered with small trees where there was a rising ground, and there was no English post nearer to it than at the Prairie de Boileau, distant half a mile down the river^ so that the locality where the river was fordable was a little below the north staccados. De Bougainville adopted every pru- dent measure imaginable to achieve success. He ordered all the boats to be mended and put in condition to be used at a moment's warning. He also ordained that the boats, bark cg,noes, and putiis hewn out of a large tree, be removed a certain distgince from the river side, lest some soldier should desert and apprise the English of his design, such as had happened from the posts near Quebec. He commanded that 10 »n the garrison should be in order of battle at ten at night, all observing a profound silence, without the least clashing of arms or other noise, and be in readiness to march. He ordered M. le Borgne, an officer in the colonial troops, to remain on the island with a detachment of forty men, to keep up a smart fire from our battery, which consisted of seven or eight pieces of cannon, during the time we were employed in passing the river, in order to hinder the English from hearing us in our operations, and to continue firing whilst ammunition lasted, and to conceal our retreat as long as it was possible to do so. We began to cross the river in two lighters, with some small boats, about ten at night. They plied continually to and fro until midnight, when all had crossed the river without the enemy perceiving or even suspecting our operation, although so near to us were their posts on their left that we heard ' distmctly their voices. All was executed without the least noise, disorder, or confusion-a rare occurrence on such an occasion. Le Borgne acted well, and at the same time economized his ammunition so well that he had wherewith to fire upon the English at intervals until one in the morning Imagining us then to be near Montreal, he hoisted the white flag to capitulate, and the English, not having the smallest notion of our retreat, granted him immediately very honorable terms. We had eighty men killed or wounded durinc. the siege-a very inconsiderable loss for a cannonade of sixteen days' duration, from five batteries, besides a bomb battery without an instant's intermission. Had it been a stony instead of a sandy ground, we must have lost above one-half of the garrison, and could not have resisted so long. So soon as every one had passed the river, we set out for Montreal, crossing through the woods, which, in a straight line, IS only eight leagues from Isle aux Noix, always half running one after the other, after having marched in this manner, from midnigh.t until twelve at noon,over fens, swamps, mosses, p ^ sinking often up to the waist in marshy ground, without r.,..3ingor halting one minute. InsteaS of being 20 wero thunderstruck II I* near Montreal, as we imagined, finding ourselves, by the fault of l„. ^ . . distance of half a league from Isle aux Noix : our guide, not knowing the road through the woods, had caused us to turn round continually for twelve hours without advancing ! We were so near an English post at the Prairie de Boileau, that a grenadier of the Regiment de Berry, seeing his com- mander, Cormier, sink down with latigue, and not in a condition to go any further, carried oft" a horse from them which was upon the borders of the wood, and mounted his commander on it ; otherwis he would have been left aside and taken prisoner by the English, or scalped by the Indians. Having lost all hopes of going to Montreal through the woods, we took the road to Fort St. Jean, on the River Chambly, four leagues lower than Isle aux Noix, and five leagues by land to Montreal. My strength was so entirely spent, that it was with great difficulty I could draw one leg after the other. Nevertheless the fear of falling into the hands of the Indians, the idea of the horrible cruelties which they practice on their prisoners, which shock human nature, pre- vented me from sinking down with pain, and gave me strength to push on. Arrived at a settlement at four in the afternoon, about a league and a half from St. John's Fort, where De Bougainville caused his detachment to halt and repose themselves for the first time since midnight, that they left Isle aux Noix. I perceived there a boat going off" tc St. Jean, and I had only strength enough remaining to throve myself into it. We lost in this march about eighty men : those who could not hold out were left behind, victims to the Indians. Arriving at St. John's Fort, the first person I saw there was Poularies, on the river side, who told me they had news of our retreat, and that he was sent with his regiment to sustain us in case we had been pursued by the ilnglish. We were now shut up in the island of Montreal on all sides. The English were masters of the River Chambly by 21 ths possession of Isle aux Nolx. General Amherst approach«rf with his army from Lake Ontario ; and General Murray waji in march, coming up from Quebec, with six thousand men that had passed through the winter there, and with some men-of-war, one of which of about forty guns, on its arrival in sight of the town of Momreal, greatly astonished, and excited the admiration of, the inhabitants, who, from the ignorance and negligence of those person-, charged with the sounding of the St. Lawrence, had never s ten vessels anive there of above sixty or seventy tons. General Murray conducted himself as an officer of great understanding, knowledge and capacity, and left nothing to do lor General Amherst ; he employed five weeks in coming from Quebec to Montreal, which is only sixty leagues, and did U3 during his march more harm by his policy than by bis army. He stopped often in the villages ; spoke kindly to the inhabitants he found at home in their houses— whom Lunger and famine had obliged to fly from our army at Montreal ; gave provisions to those unhappy creatures perishing for want of subsistence. He burned, in some cases, the houses of those who were absent from home and in the French army at Montreal, publishing everywhere an amnesty and good treat- ment to all Canadians who would return io their habitations and live there peaceably. In short— flattering some and frightening others— he succeeded so well, that at last there was no more possibility of keeping them at Montreal. It is true we had now only need of them to make a good coun- tenance. The three English armies amounting to nbove twenty thousand men, it was impossible to make any further resistance. Amherst's army appeared in sight from the town of Mon- treal, towards the gate of Lachine, on the 7th of September about three in the afternoon. General Murray with his army! irom Quebec, appeared two hours after at the'opposite side ^f thr town : thus a dark crisis was at hand for the fate of Canada. Montreal was nowise susceptible of defence. It was surrounded with stone walls, built in the beginning of !J I I ^Hiilony, merely to preserve the inhabitants from the incur- BioHB oi the Indians, few imagining at that time that it would become the theatre of a regular war, and that one day they would see formidable armies of regular, well-di«cipi:ned troops before its walls. We were, however, all pent up in that uiiserabic, bad place— witiiout provisions, a thousand t'unef> v.ume off than an advantageous position in open fields— whose pitiful walla could not resist, two hours' cannonade without being level with the ground, and where we would have been forced to eurrender at discretion, if the English had insisted upon it. The night between the 7th ard 8th September was passed in negotiating for the articles of capilulation. But in the morning all the difficulties were removed, and Gen. Amherst granted conditions infinitely more favourable than coula be expeoi .d in our circumstances. Thus the Canadians, as brave as they are docile, and easy to be governed, became subjects of Great Britain ; and if they can think themselves happy under that Government, by remembering their past vexations, they will do so. M. (Col.) Poularies and M, (Col.) Dalquier, who were generally distinguished in the French army by their high sense of honor, probity, and their bravery, experience and knowledge in the art of war, were both of them, on their arrival in France, brokeu ^•^M )inn.anders o'' a battalion— a grade vhich was abolishf'd m L "rench sf ' i je, in order to make the Major, as in ::il i5riu4>h service, command the regiment in absence of the Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel. Belcomb, Poularies' Adjt. of Royal Roussillon, and Montgnary, Captain in the Regiment of Beam which Dalquier com- manded—two very handsome men, capable to attract the attention of the ladies of any court in Europe— were made Colonels of Foot, without possessing any remarkable military talent or capacity. Fortune manifested most cruelly her almighty power in the military state, where justice, punishments and rewards alone the incur- Lt it would day thoy i«cipl;ned abit, bad )ffthanan iful walls sing level forced to ipon it. as passed tut in the . Amherst coula be and easy I ; and if imenr, by irho were heir high ence and , on their tali on — a I order to Hand the •Colonel, antgnary, ier corn- tract the ^re made military 'er in the rds alone .2sr Mght to be the base of it. Men conduct themsefves fronV the view either of honor or interest ; and there can be no emulation in a service where mediocrity of talents, intriguei. favor, and credit, override merit. Greatness of soul, joined to superiority of talent, ignores the' art of cringing ; it is even impossible that merit can leul to' lortune m a corrupted and venal country : on the contra y it becomes a cause of exclusion. Virtue elevates the soul, and can neither fawn nor buy credit, nr.r flatter vice and inca- pacity. « If such is the military cons .tution of a State," says M. Ganbert, in his Treatise of Tactic , "of which the Sove- reign (the King of Prussia) is one of tl " greatest men of the age, who instructs and commands hi armies, and who^e armies form all the pomp of the court, xs hat ought it to bo irr those States where the Sovereign is not a' all a military man • where he does not see his troops ; where ae seems to disdairt or be Ignorant of all that regards them ; where the Court, who^ always obey the impression of the Soverei< n, is consequently not military ; where almost all the great re- ards are obtained by surprise, by intrigue ; where the greater portion of favors are hereditary ; where merit languishes f- r v ant of a support • where favor can advance without talent ; nx here to make a fortune no more implies acquiring a repatatic n, but merely to- heap up riches ; where men may be, at on. and the same lime, covered with orders and infamy_wi h grades and Ignorance, serve ill the State, and occupy th best places • be smeared with the censure of the public, and enjoy the Sovereign's good graces ? If, whilst all other sciences are becoming perfected, that of war remains in its infancy, it is the fault of the Governments, who do not attach t^ it sufficient importance ; who do not make it an object of pi blic educa- tion; who fail to direct men of genius to that profession; who suiter them to find more glory and advantages m sciences tnning or less useful ; m render the profession of arms an ungrateful employment, . acre talents are outstripped by intrigue, and the prizes distributed by Fortune." General Amherst, according to his statement in his letter . ill 84 to Mr. Pitt, then Secretary of State, lost incoming down the rapids — without meeting there any opposition from the French or Indians — by drowning, eighty-four men. Twenty more of the regiments' boats were dashed to pieces. Seven boats of the artillery, loaded with arms and ammunition, and one of his galleys, were also lost. If 900 Indians had been there, as they should have been, scattered in the wood's upon the borders of the river, with 1,200 Canadians, which they had solicited earnestly from M. de Vaudreuil, to defend those difficult passes of the Rapids, but which this officer obstinately refused, what would have become of General Amherst ? How could he have got out of the ;icrape ? As it happened to Braddock, Amherst and his •rmy must have perished there ; his expedition would have been fruitless, and Canada would have been yet saved to France : but heaven willed it otherwise. How long the English may preserve this conquest depends on their own wise and prudent conduct. THX END. lown the le French J more of boats of d one of ve been, ver, with from M . Rapids, aid have jot out of t and his aid have saved to long the leir own