IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 ^^ tii 1.1 5.' 4.0 1.6 .^^ ^ ^ ^m f V HiolDgraphic Sciences Corporation %^^ ::nfrj) iff .»rif; ?.ncf ;tj?.>£ brrr. /•.")}^'..f.? ^^.*[fo.> | b:)vf;)0':»*i '•(JoKiMV/:'? vf,'/^ bfti, iAt' '»^ii>i ft bi-r' :i(-';fi oijjil Entbred, according to Act of the Parliament of Canada, m tlye year Q-.ie thousand ^^^Vigjr^W^di«(in^dN^^Att^^. W'^xh^Kilfy^iiti/^V Ste^rd'6f^f^'^>' i " !'>';>'"<-(? woii I- r.W fni.-i ot prviyc/rn/; \vy.^ '»v£:fl v/./.t: l»;.f»:t /uw a .'!^ '.itv •"♦no ,''.sV«\\ till* lo r; •p'j^ifAtxiqi^ iff ^ *.")7^.'; v"!j,;iy fjv-T -.<.t;»q>'Tno'-' rtfiir: f;*;!! -.ivv v>ti' vV vf ;il.,'; Ir.n* 1 "li; INTRODUCTION. IN 1882 I wrote a series of IcJtters reviewing Inger- soU's tactics and assertions anent Christianity and religion in general, as exhibited in two articles ^jub- lished by him in the North American Review. These letters were subsequently collected and published in book form under the title, Notes on IngtrsolL The little book had a large sale and was favorably received by the religious as well as by the secular press. Be- lieving that Ingersoll — who is cunning of fence — Ay,qHl4,taKe AWWtag^.af.ovy .Qbsq»rityK and, treat the bookiwithihaughtyisileQceiiii said in the conclusion-- of the Notes : " Let some of his disciples or admi)i6rs reha- bilitate his smirched character. We hold ourselves responsible to him and to all the glib little whifiets of his shallow school." My anticipation was justified by the fact. Inger- soll, so talkative generally, maintained a studied silence, though urged by the press and by interview- ers in a way that must have been annoying to him. Two years afler the appearance of the Notes, one of his disciples, urged by "multiple requests and challenges," published a ^^Reply to Rev. L. A. Lam" berfs Notes on Ingersoll." From these " multiple requests " it is natural to infer that some response was considered necessary and that Mr. B. W. Lacy was the man competent to give it. Notwithstanding the title of his book, it is in fact nothin|^ more than an essay towards a defense IV. INTRODUCTION. of Ingersoll. In this " Reply " the author plays the part of the bat in the fabled war of the birds and beasts. He£l|j^t^Jb|^kAfid^^^^^ iMweiin ,the .two con- tending pam^, accejp'ting as a wnOle' ttit pf ihciples of neither. According to his own account of himself, he is in an intellectual fog, in a state of suspension be- tween two judgments, patiently awaiting more light. In the medn time, while in this nebulous condition, he is willing to give to all.;Whom it piay concern, the ben- efit of his advice, correction drtcl information. What- ever we ittfl^ think of his consistency, we cannot but ^diftlV^WS'oMi^ng diiqposition. '•. a/fi / -I , r.^X ^ In Wh'arl'hdvetbsay bf thU"l^eply'Vi M^^^^^ low the same method — that of quotation and comment ^vHilch %ji[g IbliowM in "th^ A^/sri*t This method 3t^^^ dtilUTiAcfctAioti,- and at^the same time gives ^each ^fty'thift li(dV{iihtag:e ofspe^king* for himself, and In hie; oWhivOtdS.' ' ' Ihitead/ h6wevefi ■ of twno'i rl';»!iv> ':.-:":':[■ \> 'u- i- ! 'i;?a .>.!;:•? -:??^j:;I^ *^fj* ?" •^^>{V''«■ //!»(!<;( -'i '-'d i :■;« ■ >''•«•.•*> It*; i :f Y'lf- 't >!J| ,1 '•-.■^!lr: 'uij, nn;:lr'j-i'H.-> !>' ; ; -r >.n '■■'>: n V'- i/'/^nj h?!«^ ''i^aiiury*..) 'i^ii *:ii' ,!">.>r:«.i»7yv ;<(.;>ns ij,. ..< ''.J«-"' JO lijf jf- <•• r; •■•;-■'« li'ijj-j'tilojg] nr, .'•' <>a r^rf Ml ij<.»!j:b!co;> >.u«>iiid*j..i ' '.'.'t fit Mi/n'-w ,^>r.5n rttMrn f'dj r-I- noi: -ji-tiV/ .Uj<' Jiiafi«> "J-iii 'i<. >lr'/tj -»f>/!l> Z.-{; -//o) . > liotnbert: That depencisf on /.whelher ;th« di$piu tint be siiicere or not. .Insincerity ; is mk \Klf^y> v^^ but dishonest, and i when [it Aoats ojjLth&8ur^oeMij^ ciisputant'SKwrkings, .aa vi$ibiy( ais oilrfV)at$(cyi) wateri>> attentioni^ouldbf callodto it icfr<]t do tl^fs i« a^Alul^f na honest iliiiin sho^d; shirk |hri^gh.^. f4}^iji^liQ^ of the polemkalartUEWti^.f.. Insincerity' iir,<;^^ teacher is an offense which honest men cannot tol- erate ; he who is guilty of it is unworthy of the slights est consideration, and should, like any other fraud, be exposed, that the credulous and unwary may not be deceived. An honest, sincere man even when in error is at par in the estimation of his fellowmen, but an insincere man is always at a heavy discount, even when he happens to tell the truth. It is one of IngerscU's favorite theories that the ministers of all religions are insincere; and '• hypocrite " is the epithet he usually applies to them, When he thus makes himself the judge of the hearts, QQns<^iences and thoughts of his fellowmen he iof . ♦ « 'tAOTKs c» tmirmts. hh imiruittit^ k-mssAife^ Ms^fAmk t^ ttsit 'fttfn^ him that cl<^k^oi^" hohor iMi^htf t*^ tfttdftf whidb4l6 >attein|)te to hidib'it; ^'^ 'ii;^;:M Ibtoui 'jtii psui i»i>fa on bnii ,t)).'I to «Ldi A/df^^. Yoii^'inaJ^' butrage'-ertrlfilSih 'seA^meAt, you may laug^h at ^nd^'lsmiesqiik^ Moses^aitd^Xtliirlfit, but youihiu^ b^ gcttitei^l^at)^ ^dlit«»' and''nrcr^|^^hdk you sp^ak of 'M-f^. Ing^i'sott;'' '^^^ j<' i'^">*^ ^^'-^^ ^'^ ' Zthe'PaAii6^ilot?see'^hat'!iAr»the^^ Ci'^sibn ckitiediidtt betw^eiv' Jtfdgtf-Btatk' artiJ'^ M'^. Ingersoll, the Christian religion, and neithei' '^M*. Black noiJ/IngersDllj Was Qit;triaL? ^ravoiu.l • -r Lambert:: Np,.the;FafthJ9tdoes>hot>seeitL' iBoth Black arid IngcrsdU were on :tnal,ibecattse bothiwere responsible, and. anfietiable t6t!cbriticism for; thei^ucoa'^ great meh; ihtei charactfef ^ common sensfe bf ^^H 'hdffest plub'lfd? ' ' ' Ti^u'^, ^^ solid argumettt is not lii'lt^elf sif^i^hgtheneB'ti'Veidkened by the gbbdor Bad ch^iictfek-'Bf Wti^^y hb &lfe# jt, but when he has recourse to calumny,^ "i/'fHlrckti6Vi, mis- representati<>n, tb'f4»t(bdnd^iktse£bel&^gmnst God and man, people will beEfevehb doe^nso'forwaifit of argu- ment, and they areright. rt/r:: V} 1 i>» i^iii/ ,'^>." v^ > Lacj^. hidt tiot^artap^ea! tp outpagdd'-Cthnstian sentimeht'* ttfo^^freb,* fair and full Investigaftilsn^f ' ' LamberP. 'Thd^e isiibthirtginstich^a^iitive'stiga- tton that ttoChrfsitism'i*eedjfear.' ^ It >y n^sfte IngersoU's arguments; but bis; methoids-^wbicH ^sgerfi^ta'be in- spired by uhbridledH^amibnn^^>^th^ cMage Chris- >'sM^Kt:p nK\ And h^ viho intric^c«§? tlfenii JA/nolt mspb04;jfey fW0rtil»y The following ebctract/ taleeii<^ the >^ba!te be- tweenr • liimself and. i In^ersoll^ • wffi sh^w^ who i»i41fe enemy of fre*, fair and full hivfalftttsl libel Ijstaf ever ;^a9r.w^tten against God or man wtor sent taljiteii; I !was f ;.ljrJVientirfely:iMrillJngt to treat ijtas ihad the^ther; " that jfe^j give it the answer: I thdugbt itj deserved, . :.. .'landietioth gqtogetheri .Biltiit camevvw^hen I ? . . ^;W£k4 disabled from .aft iajjuiy-frbrti wlwchiJxoqld -m. *'not.iiope tS>getweU.for.t»nnief 'wsdk%:andiiso:d •^'r?:yn^^sA: tiicr -editor: (of. v^hfcA:j^9rtifiL' Af^firtcan .*n «. ^6 '-. XACtlCS ro riQy> stirtsrise I :w«^ 'informed, "Ikatyno contr^tHtkenf ^ohnctiom or briticism cf " mine er anybddyitUe weuid ht aUm0€d\ ia actom- *' ftany this nnv ^fiuionyt}/ filik, Jt \IQI8 to be "printed immediatelj^aiid would occi^fso innch f* space that ngne could be. spared for the a^fter^iide. " I proposed that if its bulk could not be rteduced ,jTe^ controlled by feim to suit himself, I do not think L was bound -to ii v.- ^ « "go further." ;uij «i.(;. '; ■^ l ' }'• If" pin:' t Such are the words ' of the leader ef ; the Araer- hijQan-Bar. ... >. ^-.^^.i ^.-.u/. -r.. ..; .o /;■::./•.•' ?•> Now, Mr. Lacy, on 'wiiat principle 4o-y<^u reconcile this conduct oflngersoil with' a ^desire' for V free, fair and full investigaitidn?- Hd^^i^econGile ^t "With sincerity, or with thdt "courage df tht ^ soul " of which he speaks so frequently and utictuouslyF To speak plain English, it was as -contemi^tible as it \^as i' cowardly, and reminds one of the gattartt Golonel's invasion of the South, which ' accbrding •t6 Mr. Rid- , path^ consisted in marching down 'there and then marching home ^gain where there Was less careless shooting. In his first, wh'icH proved to be his last skirmish, the doughty Colone^Hoffered to acknowledge the Confederacy if they would only stop shooting at him. He must have bieen terribly; scared to give up the cause so suddenly. His heart was perhaps brave : enough, bjat it was^ a question of kneds. 'That little .^.tAcncB OP tNnoeis. c9 istn of \ to be intBch rteduced letiuiti- ly coiild* number. dutdifor ,ould not 1 by l»in^ tie Anwx- ^siref for jGonGlle it ; soul" of iisly? To GoloneV's Mr. Rid» bless you, no, but a load- ed musket; with the glittering eye of a Confederate at the : qther end of it, is another Uiing. Had the manly men qf the North beert equally " brave," the xlaiik of the ghain would still mmgle with the iftkj^ans of the slave. It; required men Hk)3 Grants who feared God and not the miJsket, to put down the rebellion and free tlie slave. And now after these worthy ends havfe been attained, the talkative infidel is once more to the front . wd i^O'« How could Mr. Ingersoll defend hif posi- tions at allif handicapped> by ^sentiment he deems ;Spurious,?. -. :.. .i-i^^v— ,-.;!.. ■■'■ . ■ ■ ■ • ^iv Lambert. Let him defend his positions by i reii- son and logic, not by what Judge Black calls "foulest •and falsest libel, and effusions of filth" and Christian w^",-.. 10 "TACTICS 0¥ INFIDELS. ^sentiment iUill ' not be bffbs^d.i : R^alsoiit j < ai^tzt i logic Inajri ^ overthrow an opinion 6t i.cHange a\ (eoriviption ifita a doubt, but they cannfstidifend 'Sootimei^j 'iMt'lis ribalchry ^anbfy argumcntar,"' and .iiiteUe'ct;.' by; intellect^: bilit .whpni'the blown bf/ackcus< or the -end mdn.of ai minstrel (troii^ thakes ithese'awtal questions the butt o£ his ibottun- Ghfistian sentiment reyoltls.i.i " Whatiicai^ihe maghifi^ehtclown make' fun for^us if handicanpkfl >by a. sentiment • hti dtems spurious?" ; If he Ci:nn)Oity'-.he had'bbtter throw aside^dw cap and beU& ^ !>):.;«! ',il ?B;iii- The, sentiment of arr mdividiiab-aiiommuiii^v 'dr a* ipeople springs necessarily from honest conviction^. I say necessarily f because it cannot spring from tdieh lionest convictions; for a dishonest conviction is not a conviction at all. tAIl admit -th^t:honestx:oitvictioiis should be respected. Infidelsi harp on this idea as (if they originated it, whereas it is a fundamental princi- ple^ ' of Christian . philosophy. , ; True, the conviction jnay be an ef ror, ind error should not be honored, but in honoring an honest conviction, we hortori:the honesty of him who. holds it, hot tlie. error he liolds. As loi^ as he who honestly errs should ibe respected, thfe 'Sfentinjents in him which arifee ftom his error should' be respected;. We have :no. rights to .qutrage his sentiments merely because we belitvc him to bein error. Hence tngersoll's utter disregard of the senti^ ttients and feelings of Christians, eveniupposin^, them toht in the wrong; is entirely indefensibld.^L make jjo special plea here for Christian sentiineiil The ^rinciple;.that honest- cottvictaons and the sentiments tACXriCS ; 01^ ' INFtttfitS. Ill iviption j.J;It'liS D The temp€?r ljK>r:;the ihpnithc iiitroiilje i,ibortun- ^; cant the mpfefl by :hiiot/-^^he (urtityv dr riwictionfe. ^ is not a Qiivictioiis idea as vtf ±al.princi- conviction honorecl, horiot* the he liblda. respected, his. error to QJitrage hn to be in f ^e senti- losin^them Ijinake lent. Tlfe seittimBpts gro^iA^ i6Uii! T]f > tHem.blwMzrd' be^tie^iect^'isjft univer- sal < prindple-^ppHoable itO(/Bil>^.o GhriitiaaJ'sentiment should h^ honored raAd' respected; > ikbt nd^rdiy * ibecadae itils O^im^if , bbtt b^catiH^) itris'ASii^lssdtittknmtaHs^ frqm- hc^est,citnmcttoni i ii WjhctJuJr/itiis- trutt-X)ii. ftlseiis ai^uestiorDwIth wktehitiie hbne^anfidecisntTdii^putant has iiothtiigKwhatiever tpii do;j f^lAk ihould ide;^i nrHih |]HncipIe6, idoicti^ind^;i&ctsf/iaild>deal' t\vith£theni ration^ a|iy ahd> lc^cally,iand leave.sefEvdin£nt&>tQ staikd lor fsUl wlth/the'lbasesjod MrhidiKthey/ire^iand'jfrohi which theyrtoriginat^^ If Jhgersdhjwdre^tajjgcyita'Constarir tihopli^nand- : spba^ ^agaihst. JVIt>bammed : add Moham*' 'Jiiedamisin' with' the samd' iverbal: ikendousnes&i^and disregard of trilr|H that be speaks againsti Jour ^Divin^ ^ord 'Jesus ' ChcistV he iwidMnkl 4!:oiauiiit> « i tirknC' i against Turkish jsociety'thatiwduldriueceive aQdii(^eserve tb^ •^aastinadb.;-::^'--:' ;'>M.ijr> ii .>;^"j:;.->'.i , '\v^\*',.-./>v ■.^•.- ; i. I- ::Z>;-,♦:! .;(u' ■(-;■? '" ■'. - ) Lambertl > He >iiiay . dibpute^ to ^his > hteart's" conten|: the < authority of tliwi Gaiholio chiiroh ,without-^hocking 2lthotic I sentiment, ' becau^ • thkt dof^rine, like : all doctrines, h>^ mattbf cxf belid(:^ith| conviction, not of sentin^ent. I smi' inotiaothoiiized* tbv spteak fi>r the Presbyterian, but I belifevei that he, like' theiGathoHci dlstitiguishesbetwren thrftgs that blelong to the d6* snain of intellect 'arid those that b^lo^ng to the domain ■of isentittientr ■';►;.,:>■-•■ ;b t-jj,; -: ii. ,- :.-^:>T ■, '..•!; - : . .- i ^vtesK ] i Mr. IngersotV fciulid thp • legitimate field of witlandidrolleryi preoccupied by Ajrteinos Ward, Mark Twaih and: odiers with whom: he could not ii^ompetef ; He ioughttnew /fields: aitti,-^ithi . a: reckless ill'' V I I? 'j*Af j'iC^ OF . NFIpELS. ai^dacity, selects.., that \YJiich the . civilized world j\a^ .always %|d^^c^9d:r-Religi.oh^., ., .'. .^h' . . -j,^.., Z^rk ;We ask, Wh^t $.eligion? whose Jtel^- gjou?; I^eligion ui the Abstract or some particiil^ form of faith?, , LaniberU Eyerybody'^s religion. By the word r^j(igionj.wlxehus!£;(^. without adjective or.^ qualiftCf^tio^ is meaiit that primitive and umversal intuition or idi^ which is common to all men, and is one and the sanie ihalL however various ^€\x forms or systems of reli- giori'fjiay be. This primitive idea is that of a'poSver superior to that of man ; of a Supreme Being who governs all things. From this primitive idea, springs the idea of relation:^ between this Supreme Being and m^n,: and : from these are derived Obligations, duties ^hd the. impulse . to worship and to manifest that worship by ejiternsil acts. AH the various /^^i«^ or systems of religion, true or. ialse, that are known tp th«^;world have their origin in, this primitive intuition oi* idea, called religion ; wr;:bout it they would be aiik^ impossible.- This primitive Idea is a fundamental fe^ct of our nature, it is the common property of all meii) Christian, Jew or Qentjle. The errors of false systeins of religion .^re not in the primitive idea but in th^ false development of It. ,, . . ,...;• In all you have said on this point you have eon* foynded ^is primitive idea with the various forms or ir^5/^;^ it has assumed in its true and ^Ise develop- nient; in a word, you have confounded religion with jy/j^*'»w of religion. You may say that this primitive idea of a Su' pren^e Being is not universal or common to all men, because atheists ancl agnostics like IngersoU deny His existence. But their very denials prove that rficy TkCtlt^ OP INFlDttA. H he wor4 iific9.tio^, the same !S of reli- ' a poSver eing who a, springs Jeing a?* ;a of a Su- to all men, )ll deny His likve the id& of Hiih, t6r how tart they detiy thte existence of that of which ^hey have no idea? T6 afBrtn or deny a thiiicj wc must have art idea of that thing. Will you admit that Ingefsoll denies that of which he has no idea? He talks of God, doe^ he talk of that of which he has no idea? The id^a of a Siipi'cme Beirtg is universal — tommon to all in6n, without any exception whatever. , . Lacy. If religioa Pfr se is a sacred thjng, why should the Christian propagandist lay rude hands pn the heathen's idol ? , . . . , ■ ^ , . Lambert. Religion per se or in ie, is a universal and piimitive intuition, is sacred and good, because planted in the human mind by the Supreme Being. It is the same in the heathen as in the Christian, and true and sacred in both. Hence the Christian has no reason to lay rude hands on it. He respecJts it and tries to enlighten and direct it, and lead it to its- true and only worthy object— the S^»preme Being--— the living ^od. The Christian does not object to that intuition in the heathen which impels him to worship sbmething; he merely objects to the misdirection of that noble impulse by which it is lead to and expended on an object utterly unworthy of it. He directs the heathen's attention from the stone and stick, before which he is prostrate, to his Creator and eternal and omnipotent Father. Can you who believe in a God object to this ? Would you leave him in ignorance to worship a stone, or a snake, or a crocodile, when you could enlighten him ? Lacy. Or defame the religions of Zoroaster, Gautama and Confucius — religions ei^i^pbled by many soiihd doctrines and moral precepts. ' •- -. - i^4 t-ACtIEC&i OWdNfilOEaSl ^\i^ j^ d06tHn^ > iM t^cXDrdi pipqcdfits^tcx i^ £heso ^ thd €hfistiaii>doed^9ot qi^etit poi^ tto'cintrary ihsir^oticesl h3ive sdme trutH t^n^Aontei t-Birtlihese systcm^have. maby^felfie db^trines and ^jrefcept^ff^o these th^Clids^'. fiafi 'object^ v^!asi' of 'Iruih %nd • mo^aitj;;^ ihdtlkt*''^ /J'Hrc^rn^rf^f; rjK-t^htiD oiU x<^ ^--'^n ;^: i:-'::ob - V 'IJMjt, -i 1 WRat 'right : falive: we^ Ibgkal or otherwtse^l fi!i^^am'2bgu^ent»'i(^ithta{di$9Bnteii;n4!e ^assupte our dwnt feligi0h-a« ^^uSji^Ji^hrl;: ) "to >"r,fi':,r;jv;j nilT .;.irr:.{,rqrn;;?^/i ^oi^; Liwiberti iThe-safn€fiigihtrthatev<9ryrmatiiias to- a:g6liihe thiat his hot^st (^dnanmtttoiis' are truie; the {iamei I'Igbi the di^sdnter has to as^nie; that hi^^^^^^f^/l^ ami tm*vfthe same' thiat you- and Ijigerso(H;i;ave' to assume^ thMtf your dogm^i^j Would .y6u haw an^lione^t {nan as^anire' asrhe'trae(imti|i>tl|e dissenter or opj)6nefit proves f it io^rbei^se* ^:>Dot not yomi; own words assume as true that we have no right to assu^ oxjk religion as ti\ie againsta di^^^mtefrB '\Have'Chris- ti^ns ho\ Hghts as agisdnlsti dissenters, objectors: jafidt irilideis ? ' ' Ydu >seenk tof intfer tiiey liatve liot. i / ' . ) But the Christian religion does not rest on tcsettr as^iifflptiort. It fsi^ fe:ct'r tkciidgbts Qf. Augustus Cassax^ Thb; is .tbe:|)o^itioa 9/ tb«^CHri^tiaiii)£^.(;Q long asihef i^'not' driveiv firon> it by logic^- i^aso^ mi% eviidence-^-^iorti by f blaisphcim^ and biifiR>QiiQryrhhe^ h^ 2L ri^t to assume/Ghrirtianity . tor bk' tfue>; aml),eveiy! otor Byritem «lf i^igion ta be felser. Of course, : Inn gersoll idehies iihese olaims . of Ghri3j|;ianityv ;b(ut j)i$r denial is met by the Christian affirmation. Ingeri^li; has undertake^. tQ,dll^/r<^^ the *futh q{ Christiaility — tovdo this requires something Jmort. than denials no^fil assumptions. The evidences of Christianity arc, sprpa^ al) ovcl-.thepage^ oft Christian literature and need not bciiE^eated here.* M Christianity is in possession oft th^ minds, thoiughts.friorals and mannfers.of thie civiU^ed world* ., To sujJpose that this institution^., so intejFrt woven in' ej^ery fibre of civilized societyi so r dpn[iingnf^f in its thought and movement, could be ov^rthrpwOv by the fall^ies/ Sophistries and downright; falseh/oot^f of a^ handful of shallow, ndisy objectors, is vain^j <. Th^ reasons that gave'it a'begiilning,-a development and ac growth I. up to the. present time, when it is the m09»t|[ powerful factor of human society, cannot be ove<:cQni«> by 3 joke or a play- upon wotds; /the reasons of jt^? origin, growth and idevelo^ment are the reasons of )fei> perpetuity. '^'v^ • .■? "vr,'! •,.■ f-iTi ■■■v^:_ -j .. ■ ; .".-'..Iv Lacy. ; What right have we - ^^ f ^. * ■ to d§n mand a deferfenqe for our faith that is equally due tf^i every creed which iS hoftestly professed by inteUigent^ men? mo iK-yi Va «:■•-•:■ rioi)::!'-. t ..';..■;;; ■ ;:/' ':,H Lam6ert' } It: is 9s natural in a man to demand; deference fdr whatt-he believes to be true as it is fi^r^ his body to demand food for nourishment You dt^ it ; Ittgersoll does it ; we all do it, he who holdst^r false, creed as well as I he whp hold? the ^ue one^^t i6 TACtlCS OF INFtDfiLS. We would not be human if we did not. But the fact still remains that a creed that is false deserves no respect, no deference or consideration. To say that true and false creeds have a right to equal deference, is to destroy all distinction between the true and the false, to put truth and errof oti equal terms. Sane intellects can never do this. You confound the per- ^ sonal rights of the individual who holds an error with' ■ the right of error itself, and forget that error as error has no rights whatever as against truth. We owe no respect to a creed merely because some one honestly holds it. The honesty of the holding is no criterion of the truth. The respect we owe is to the honesty of him who thinks error — not to the error he thinks. Lacy. Negation is often entitled t as much re- spect as affirmation. Lambert. Who is to determine when a negation has this oftenness which gives it the value of an affirmation ? Had you said that negation is entitled to as much respect as an affirmation, you would have said something that meant something. But I would immediately dissent, for negation as negation is not entitled to the same respect in logic as affirmation, for without affirmation all logic, all reasoning is impos- sible. Affirmation is an absolute necessity to begin to think, for no thought is possible that does not begin with an affirmation expressed or implied. A negation is the denial of an affirmation ; it cannot be formulated in words without an affirmation. - Take for illustration this negation : " A horse is not a man." Here you must affirm " A horse is " before you can say " not a man." In the same way you must affirm that God is before you can say He is not. This necessity runs through the whole domain of human cognition, and 1 1 TAflff^^^^iOF tl^FiORLSi ITly le fact res no y that srence, nd the Sane le per- or with IS error owe no lonestly :riterion honesty ; thinks. nuch re- negation ae of an s entitled uld have I would on is not firmation, is impos- [) begin to lOt begin negation brmulated Uustration Here you ay " not a lat God is ssity runs lition, and is the ftin4a|lientalf^rtnGi|)l6;Qf&ayirfeasp^!nig. A^iderr from logic,: the c^spept ^ue am:..?ifi6r0iat;4Qn or.a.migja-:-. tion depends jentir^lyi/jQntth^^^MJSiity; ^d .quantity ot. i evidence! in itsrl^ehalf. v; i ,. -, ^r{ a i.. . ' 7 L^y.' Axy fc|ga^dr;fe<^' thepliQgieal^ questjqns the., chances inr|ts>(neg{^(;ipn's) ^^yf>r. aire,;a$ a .thousand )tp 1 one ; foe WQ • aj^' assur ed th^ti j ther^ can b^ but on^ ; true feligipn^^Tj; AA^.^a ':>vrn iivj>iv(i,mf 'iv.} ^'» =Mt^ •( \f.'V-Z'? . ..Lam^erti- Ift, Tiegard to; theofogi/cal, iquestipns, as - 1 in all oth/er. question?} the» ^ph^nftesjn> favor: of affirma- h tion aftd; negation depend qn/theiff reasons and. eyi-., dences in ^vor of one or the lOtJien, If men { determined the jtrije from, false religions by tW toss of ^ a penny, the doctrine^ of chance might have place, \>\xt , as each man; mM?t inith^ last resort depend onx his own reason and judgment, the " head or tail" method,? of seeking ,tifuth..is pi^t pf[ place. The claims of a thousand .fal^^ rejigions^/do^ not in ^jthe, least invalidate^ : the claim of thp triie..pnew; The value pf a true (ppjn, . is not affectedi , by any.AM.Jnber of.counterfeit?.; He ; who measure? the: valHeino( thj^, negations by the dqctrine pf . every side assurelum that ]he^^ is .being led oi^.tp cer- [tain, ruin..-,iV n4 ^■^^^r• n ;. . n. :-'.:.-^:r . ; - ■■• '^^^'- Lambert. -. The intelligent tirayeller should inves- tigate the, claims of these conflicting guides, and not issume that he knows more about the wilderness than . [all of them together. ., ,. . Lacy. " Have faith," says the guide. "Whose jfaith?" asks, the pilgrii^. , ".My .faith," ''My faith;\ i8 TACTICS OF IXFIDEL5. I "My faith!" answer a thousand voices, with ever increasing emphasis. What can he do ? Lambert. He can ask these guides the reasons or grounds of their faith, and examine them with care. To accept any faith without doing this would be unreasonable. As a rule, men who have faith are willing to give reasons therefor. It is a principle of theology that every man should obey his own con- science, and, therefore, that he cannot accept any system of religion that does not meet with the ap- proval of his own judgment. The inference you leave to be inferred, that Christians abandon their rt ison and judgment when accepting a faith, is a pitiful sophism, but it is in keeping with infidel tactics. The Christian's judgment forbids him to accept any guide in whose integrity and ability to lead him he has no confidence, and if he have confidence in that ability and integrity, why should he not follow his chosen guide? Does he not, in doing so, follow his best judgment? It is a mistake to suppose that infi- dels have a monopoly of reason and judgment. Notes. All this time while he (Ingersoll) has been combining the professions of the philosopher, the buffoon and the ghoul, he has talked sweetly of delicacy, refinement, sentiment, feeling, honor bright, etc. AH this time he has delighted in tearing, and wounding, and lacerating the he^uts and faith and feelings of those by whose tolerance he is permitted to outrage the common sense and sentiment of Chris- tendom. Lacy. We ask, is a faith which is worth being preserved, liable to be torn, and wounded, and lacer- ated by some one who doubts, and by doubting dsamns himself ? .-.. . - ^ TACTICS OF kiNFlDEl^S. »9 ith ever reasons rith care, ould be faith are nciple of ►wn con- cept any i the ap- ence you don their faith, is a iel tactics, accept any id him he ice in that follow his 1 follow his » that infi- lent. rersoU) l^as Philosopher, sweetly of mor bright, tearing, and d faith and is permitted nt of Chris- Lanibert. I must repeat that it Is not Ingersoll's doubts or arguments that offend Christian faith and feeling, but his buffoonery. Faith is of two kinds. It may be that body of doctrines which a system of religion proposes to its members, or it may be that mental habit or state of mind produced by belief in those doctrines. The former is called objective, the latter subjective. Now a system of religion is false only by reason of the falseness of its doctrines. These doctrines, then, are the only legitimate object of attack, because a religious system, if false, can be overthrown only by proving its doctrines to be false. Had IngersoU confined himself to disproving the doctrines of Christianity, we could not reasonably object, because his arguments could be met by argu- ments. But he vulgarly attacks the mental habits, associations, sentiments and feelings of Christians by coarse buffoonery. There is no defence for such conduct; it is an offense against both reason and etiquette, as well as against the common decencies and amenities of civilized, social life. You may try to cover it up by a cloud of words, but in vain ; the offense still remains in all its naked monstrosity. Lacy. I 'worship the God of my choice, or none at all, if I like ; not by tolerance but by rights a right inherent, inalienable. Lambert Then you have the same right to worship a false god that you have to worship the true one ! It is a matter of choice ^ not of reason or con- viction ! This is to deny all distinction between the true God and false gods. It is difficult to reconcile your statement with the belief in a Supreme Being 1^ which you appear to hold. You certainly have no rights but those vour Creator gave you, and He did 20 TACTICS OK INFIDEi-S. not give you the right to disobey Him, although He gave you the power. When you admit the existence of a Supreme Being, you destroy the right to worship any other being. As between the true God and false gods man has no right of choice. Ignorance alone can excuse him. Lacy. If, as alleged, Mr. Ingersoll has advanced nothing new, and his arguments are borrowed from Paine, Bolingbroke and others, why has such a bevy of writers, priests and preachers essayed replies to his writings and lectures ? ""'l Lambett. On the principle, that when an objec- tion is repeated, the answer should be repeated. If Ingersoll is as unassailable as you woiild make it ap- pear, why do you essay a defence of him ? Notes. Wanting in originality, he (Ingersoll) draws liJserally from the writings of Paine, Voltaire, Bolingbroke and others for his points and arguments. He does not succeed in advai^cing anything new against Christianity. Lacy. Are there no new ' issues raised in the present which were unknown in the past? Lambert. Yes, new objections have been raised, but they are not original "with ^ Ingersoll ; he simply borrowed them without credit, and forgot to borrow the answers. . ' ■ " Lacy. Why employ epithets vile ? Lambert. A pretty question for a disciple of Ingersoll to ask. Lacy. Foul words give no weight to statement. Lambert. Tell that to your master ; it may im- prove both his logic and his manners. ? Uvi'- :. / ii'^'':,\':f\- CHAPTER II. IngersolL The Universe, according to my idea, is, always was, and forever will be * * * It is the one eternal being — the only thing that ever did, does or can exist. Notes. When you say " according to my idea " • you leave the inference that this theory of an eternal universe never occurred to the mind of man until your brain acquired its full development Of course, you did not intend to mislead or deceive; you simply meant that your " idea" of the universe is, like most of our modem plays, adapted from the French or elsewhere. * * * The old originals from whom you copy thought it incumbent on them to give a reason or at least a show of reason for " thei^ idea." In this enlightened age you do not deem it necessary. It is sufficient for you to formulate your " idea." To attempt to prove it would be beneath you. Have ' you got so far as to believe that your "idea" has the force of. an argument, or that the science of philosophy must be re-adjusted because you happen to have an "idea?" Lacy. The words, " according to my idea " are said to imply primitive conception ; because I say " I have an idea," I leave the inference that no one ever conceived the same idea before I Lambert. There is a difference between a?t idea and my idea. To say you have an 'idea might cause surprise, but to say it is yours is to claim originality for it. If IngersoU were to claim some of Edison's >•■• . ,,..,. M.. *".•'<■* '>'> TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Ideas as his, he would be liable to prosecution for infringement of the patent laws. The pantheistic theory of the universe is too old to be claimed by Ingcrsoll as his idea. In claiming it he carries out his usual method of appropriating the thoughts and speculations of others without giving credit, for which he deserves the title of the Philosopher of the Pur- loined. Of course one may get at his meaning, but this verbal hypercritic of Moses should try to say what he means. Lacy. Let us try the good priest's logic on himself Lambert. It is a question not of logic but of the correct use of words ; proceed. Lacy. According to his idea the Catholic church is infallible, the priest can forgive sins, and so of every doctrine of his church, therefore his brain first con- ceived the dogmas. Lambert. The good priest would say : " accord- ing to his judgment or conviction,'' not " according to his idea." In this he would be careful not to imitate you or your client. His judgment, whatever it is worth is his own. The dogmas of his church are not his idea, though his judgment accepts them as true. Lacy. True, our Rev. Father may claim that his faith is more than an " idea," but this only shows the superior modesty of Mr. Ingersoll. Lambert. He may and does claim that his and every other man's faith is more that an idea, just as Ingersoll's theory of the universe is more than an idea, and this is why his use of the word is incorrect. Faith is an assent to truth on the authority of an- other. This assent is an affirmative judgment, and TACTICS OF INi'JDELi). :^.3 whether true or false, is more, has a higher logical value, than an idea, which is a mere apprehension or conception that neither affirms nor denies^ Ideas arc the elements or timbers of a jud^jmcnt, as the bricks are the component parts of a house. As the house is greater than one of its bricks, so is a judgment, an assent or a faith greater than any one of the ideas composing it. A judgment is, then, more than an idea, on the principle that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Your mistake arises from ignorance of the difference between a judgment and an idea. It is another mistake to advance this ignorance as an evidence of modesty. Lacy. This only shows modesty of Mr. In- gersoU. Lambert, This is the first time the good Father has seen ignorance of the first principles of logic cited as an evidence of modesty. Modesty seems to be a favorite virtue with you. It absorbs the greater part of your preface; it permeates it like the odor of a lily — ^pleasant enough in small quantities, but offensive when too much concentrated. Having established yourself in this desirable article, you are better able to discover it in your client, on the homoeopathic principle probably, that like has an affinity for like. Ingersoll's modesty is an " idea " for which you can certainly claim "primitive conception " without fear of an adverse claimant at the patent office. It is difficult to determine which, the master or his disciple, should bear the bell for modesty. For a pure article without any sugar in it the master seems to have the advantage because he is modest enough not to parade his modes- ty as one of his strong points, while the disciple keeps his on tap — such as it is. n ^4 TACTICS OF IMFJDELS. Lacy. The remark of Mr. IngersoII was merely prefatory, and given to indicate his p>osition to his adversary. Lambert. That is no justification for the misuse of terms. There is no reason why a prefatory remark should not be as correct as any other remark. There is no time when a man should be more careful and cor- rect than when indicating his position to his adversary; Lacy. And (Ingersoll's remark) is followed by the modest confession : " of course upon a question like this (the origin of the world) nothing can be ab- solutely known." Lambert. Modesty again ! Instead of modesty we have in this so-called confession ah example of the highest order of egotism. It assumes that what In- gersoII does not know cannot be known. He makes his intellect the highest measure of human capacity. He does not know how the world began of whetlfer it began, therefore on this question nothing can be ab- solutely known! That is the meaning of bis con- fession. Ag?»inst this modest confession we have the; faith of the world in all times that " in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,-* God whQ; created the world can certainly tell that fact to man in some way, therefore on a question like this something can be absolutely and most certainly known. Inger- soll's confession is clearly a denial of the possibility of revelation ; and if it be an evidence of modesty it v/ould be well to have Mr. Lacy's definition of egotism Lacy. Let us come down to " hard-pan " and, examine the Father's metaphysics. Lambert. Yes. It is time to come to somethincr harder and more tangible than Ingersollian modesty, which may, be designated as very " soft-pan..'* TACTICS OF INFrDELS. 25 I will now give in full the argument in the Notes which you undertake to refute. According to Inger- soll's "idea," matter is eternal. Against this I argue thus : Notes. That which is eternal is infinite. It must be infinite, because if eternal, it can have nothing to limit it. But that which is infinite must be infinite in every way. If limited in any way it would not be in- finite. Now matter is limited It is composed of parts, and composition is limitation. Change sup- poses succession, and there can be no succession with- out a beginning, and therefore limitation. Thus far we are borne out by reason, experience and common sense. Then — Matter is limited and therefore finite, and if finite in anything finite in everything; and '\{ finite in everything, therefore finite ifi time, and there- fore not eternal. The idea of an eternal, self-existent being is incompatible in every point of view with our idea of matter. The former is essentially simple, un- changeable, impassible, and one. The latter is com- posite, changeable, passible and multiple. To assert that matter is eternal is to assert that ail these antago- nistic attributes are identical — a privilege granted to lunatics only. Lacy. Waving the question of the power of "experience" .to bear us out in our ideas of the eternal, the infinite, and illimitable, is it true that that which is infinite must be infinite in "every way?" Every way is indefinite, but let us suppose it means in every attribute. Lambert, We will not waive the question as to the power of experience. In the above argument I said, " Thus far we are borne out by reason, exper- ience and common sense." The first part of the argu- 26 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. !i| . ; (■! !!1 1 ment deals with the nature of the eternal and infinite —a question of pure reason. The second part treats of matter as composed of parts and subject to change — a question of experience. The third part compares the attributes of the infinite with the attributes of mat- ter and finds them incompatible — a question of com- mon sense. It served your purpose to pretend that I made experience the criterion of the infinite and eternal, and then pass it with a waiver. You have not studied Ingersoll's methods in vain. But no matter. Let us return to your question : Lac^, Is it true that that which is infinite must be infinite in " every way ?" Lambert Yes/ it is true as we shall see in ex- amining your arguments to the contrary. Lacy, The human soul, scripture being judge, starts on an eternal pilgrimage. Jt never dies. Its life is eternal \\i&. Lambert. The soul starts. A start is a begin- ning. That which begins is not eternal because it has at least one limit— a beginning, while that which is eternal has neither beginning nor end. The human sbul, once begun, will never cease to be. It will for- ever continue to be a being that Had a beginning. And because it had a beginning it is finite in time, therefore^ not eternal. You must not forget that you are dealing with the Father's metaphysics. In the metaphysical sense a future eternal or infinite duration, is a contradiction in terms, for the moment you limit it to the future you deny its eternity or infinity. A limit to duration in either direction makes that dura- tion finite. Lacy. Yet as to *infinity of duration future, the lives of angels and men are co-extensive with that of the deity. So the scripture teaches. TACriCS OF JNFIDELS. 27 Lambert. The lives of men aild dngels will never cease, but they will always be finite lives because they had a beginning. The life of the infinite being is in- finite, because it has neither beginning nor end. The eternity of God is an actual, real and there- fore present and simultaneous eternity, without past or future. The future life of man is not actual and real, but potential, and will ever remain potential. The difference between actual and potential is as great as that between being and not being. Man's life can- not be conceived but as existing in the temporal rela- tion of a past and a future, while the eternity of God excludes all temporal relations, has neither a past nor a future. It • is the eternal simultaneous now while man's life is a ceaseless merging of the future into the present, and the present into the past, and this succes- sion is a neccessary condition of finite existence. Be- tween these two conceptions of eternity, that of God and that of the soul, there is no similarity, no com- parison. These two eternities then are not alike, and the Scripture does not, as you say, teach that they are alike. When you say " infinity of duration future," y®u contradict yourself; for infinity is the negation of all limits, while the term " future" affirms a limit. A future duration is not a real duration, has no real existence. It is always just goin^ to be, but never isv It is merely a conception of the possibility of the continuance of a finite being. The future is so thoroughly a nothing, that the soul cannot live in it. To live at all the soul must live in the noiu. The future must cease to be the future and become actual- ized in the noiv before it can be lived. As this future cannot have actual existence, infinity or eternity can- not be predicated of it, for the first attribute of the in- 28 TACTICS OP INFIDELS. finite is real, actual existence. The infinite must be a real, not a potential bein^. You speak of future as of an actual fact, whereas it is from its nature, always becoming but never becomes ; it is always to be about td be. Lacy. Space, which has been aptly defined as that which has tts centre everywhere and its circum^- ference howhere, is infinite expansion but nothing more;- -^-•,. ■■-.-:•:. ■ ,, ,. ■•-.,;.; •■;.;,]" Lambert. This may be good poetry, but it is not metaphysics. It is simply no definition at all, for it involves a contradiction and therefore defines nothing, conveys no idea vvhatever to the mind. A thing may or may not have a centre, but no thing can have a centre everywhere ; a thing may or may not have a circumference, but if it have it must be somewhere. Although you call the definition " apt," you appear hot to be satisfied with it, for you give another, mrtj* '^' ' Lacy, Space is infinite expansion but nothing 'more. ^ , :• Mit i^- . ..rinunt '>i\- Lambert, Expansion of what ? Expansion with- out something expanded is a mere fiction of the mind halving no real existence outside the mind. Expan- sion is a mode of matter and without matter it is a non-entity. As matter is finite its expansion is finite. Herbert Spencer defines space as " the abstract of all co-existencies " and by " the abstract " he tells us he means "that which is left behind when tho realities are absent." Now take away all reality and what have you left? No reality, nothing. Then according to Spencer's definition spclce is no reality. But reality, real being, is the first essential condition of the infinite, therefore, space, having no reality, no real existence aside from matter, cannot be infinite. Spencer also says wc cannot attribute to space "absence of limita- spj W( as I on TACTICS OF INflDEIrS. 29/ tion " and therefore again we cannot attribute infinity to it. ;•■' ■ ■ 'r)i^i.':r..r' r :^ Christian philosophers tell us that space, in as far as it is real, is the distances between extended or spaced things, and can exist only when extended things exist, just as form can have no real existence without things formed. Space in this sense is limited to extended things and therefore cannot be infinite. These same philosophers teach that space abstracted from things — ^r space absolute, is the possibility of ex- tended things — that which makes extended things pos- sible, and that aside from extended things it is noth- ing. To conclude then, it is evident, that whether we accept the agnostic or Christian definition, space is not infinite. ; Lacy. So of time it is infinite duration only. '■• Lambert. Duration of what? Duration without something that endures has no real existence. The duration of finite beings is called time ; the duration of the Infinite Being is called eternity. But without " being," finite or infinite, in which to endure, both time and eternity are mere mental abstractions, and abstractions wanting reality of being cannot be in- finite. Time is, because finite, mutable things are — ^it is the measure of mutability. Eternity is, because an eternal, immutable Being is. Space is the simultane- ous relation of extended things ; time is the successive relation of mutable things. Lacy. A line infinite in length extending through space, may be imagined or symbolized as steadily as we may symbolize space or eternal duration regarded as the sum total of infinite diurnal succession. Lambert. It is difficult to know where to begin on this exquisite specimen of metaphysics. A line that is imagined is only an imaginary line — a mental fiction, /:; \ 50 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. unreal, and wanting reality it wants the first condition of the infinite, which is real, actual being or existence. To imagine, or rather to conceive an infinite line is to conceive a line to whose lineal value nothing can be added, for as long as an addition to it can be conceived it is not yet infinite. Is such a line con- ceivable as a reality? No. Let us see why. Im- agine your infinite line extending through space in opposite directions — say north and south. Now this so-called infinite line is not infinite so long as we can conceive it increased by additional length. Let us now imagine another so-called infinite line of equal length with the first, and running parallel to it. If we add the second to the first do we not increase its lineal value ? Most certainly. Then the first line was not infinite because it admitted of addition. Nor are the two together infinite because we may imagine another parallel line and another addition and a consequent increase of lineal value. We may continue this pro- cess for ever and never exhaust the possibilities — never come to a lineal value that excludes possible addition. From this you will see that you cannot conceive, much less imagine, an infinite line so " readily " as you thought. Take another illustration. With infinites there can be no degrees of comparison — no greater or less infinite. This premised, take your infinite straight line and beside it imagine an infinite waiving line. Is it not evident that the infinite waving line has greater lineal value than the straight infinite line ? Here you see your theory of an infinite line involves the absurd- ity of two infinite lines one of which is longer than the other. This is enough to prove that you de- ceived yourself when you imagined that you could "readily" imagine an infinite line. But even granting •m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 31 that you could imagine it, it would not help you out, for at best it would be only an imaginary line, which, because only imaginary, cannot be infinite. Thus, on examination, your specimens of infinites arc found to want the essential condition of infinity. They are not infinites either as j-ealities or as fictions of thought. Therefore your effort to prove that a thing may be infinite in one way and not in another fails, and my proposition, that what is infinite must be infinite in every way remains untouched. There is but one infinite — the Supreme Being, and He is real and infinite in all his attributes ;. and besides Him there is no infinite. Everything that is not God or an at- tribute of God, is finite. We come now to your "eternal duration regarded as the sura total of infinite diurnal succession." This involves a contradiction. A sum total sup- poses a definite number of successions. A definite nurhber must be an actual and fixed number as i , 2, 3, 4, 5. You may increase this series by the addition of one or more at each step, but as long as you con- tinue to add you cannot have a sum total, and if you stop adding to sum up your total you have immedi- ately a definite number of units ; that number is the limit of the series. Then you have a limited series, beginning with unity and ending at the last number added. You may continue adding for ever and yet there will always be a last number to Ayliich you can still add another. Let your sum total be as great as you please to imagine it, it is still only the last number of a series of which the first is unity. Every series of numbers or successions must begin with unity — or one, and that which begins is not infinite. You may say that a series may be continued in- finitely. Yos, but the possibility of an infinite contin- 32 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ■■4 uance destroys the idea of an infinite sum total, for as we have seen, a sum total must be a fixed and limited number. An infinite number or series of successions as a reality, is impossible because you can imagine or conceive no pumber that may not be increased by the addition of one, and that which is susceptible of in- crease is not infinite. The idea of infinity which we associate with numbers is not in the numbers but in the possibility of increase. The fact that this possi- bility can never be exhausted is again proof that an infinite real number is impossible — the same is of course true of successions. Metaphysicians divide number into rea/ and potential. A real number, to exist or be counted, must be finite. It must be i^ 2, 3, 4, 5, or some such total expressing unity repeated a finite number of times. Potential number is nothing but the exhaustless possibility of increasing real num- bers. You may say here that if possibility of numerical increase be infinite we have at last found an infinite that has but one attribute. To this I reply that pos- sibility is not a real thing but only a condition of real being — the absence of contradictory attributes in a being. The possibility of a potential infinite number is nothing more than the possibility of adding one to one or to any number. It is the possibility of always adding one to any number however large that makes an infinite real number impossible. Let us now apply these self-evident principles to your " infinite diurnal successions." Whether you accept the Mosaic account or the theory of the evolu- tionists you must admit that diurnal evolutions or suc- cessions had a beginning, for Moses and the evolu- tionists agree on this question. According to the TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 53 , for as limited sessions gine or I by the e of in- hich we •s but in Ls possi- f that an ne is of IS divide mber, to be li 2, repeated is nothing real num- numerical an infinite r that pos- ion of real ;utes in a ;e number [ng one to of always :hat makes latter, matter was first in a nebular condition and in time evolved into its present order of existence and movement. According^ to this theory there must have been a time when diurnal successions began. Now that which begins is not infinite, for it has at least one limit — a beginning, while the infinite is that which has no limits. Hence according to either theory of the origin of the present universe your notion of " infinite diurnal succession " is erroneous. But again, aside from the question of when or how diurnal succession began, nothing is more evident than that the diurnal revolution taking place to-day is the last real one. It follows then that up to the present the real number of successions is finite, be- cause fixed and limited to a certain number since the first one, and that which is finite at any time is always finite. The future successions cannot be counted be- cause they have no existence, they are not. Your idea of them is simply your idea of the present or past revolutions mentally, projected into the future. When the succession of to-morrow is completed the whole number of successions will be increased by one. Let these to-morrows continue coming forever, at the end of each one we find a definite and limited number of successions — always finite because always capable of increase. Your error as to the infinities arises from confounding possible being with real being, and your [imaginative creations with the creations of God. It lis the first duty of a student of philosophy to learn to Idistinguish between the possible and the real, and between the infinite and the indefinite. »'5 '' V ! *' ' biCK.I --*y-^ -b<-' !-5--r^ -:^t )--■ ':■'';. i»-:ri ,> CHAPTER III. •'I « •■V iV- ^-t'Hi^OC'O'JO As to space, we have seen that it is not a real being, but only a relation between material beings; that abstracted from material beings it is nothing; that it bears somewhat the same relation to extended or expanaed things that form does to matter or weight to ponderable things. Annihilate extended or expanded things and form and space and weight will "fade away like the shadows which flit before us and are seen no more." By the way, speaking of shadows suggests the question, How can God an- nihilate a shadow? By removing the substance that casts it. In the same way space would cease to be if God were by His omnipotent hand to annihilate ex- tended things on which it depends for its existence. He removes the condition when He removes the con- ditioned. > TACTICS >©I«iI IN ElDKWi n ■ EVert man with his* feeble haiicls^;cait, creajd and annihilate forms and shadaws.i Pr^eaS: ja. globujsff shaped piece of; putty in your ban4 < What ha^ become of its fomier shape ? Has ^ it not ce^qd to be ? Has not a new form been created ? What finite power can, do with form^ infinite, power can d0> with things. L .U.>'\V lOii 7 .lU, ;^*i; '>. /' Lacy! It is inconceivable how He (God) epuld create a being equal to Himself or t make a; df^meter ecjtlal to its circle. ' • ; ^ Lnmdert. These things are metaphysically im-^ possible because they suppose a union of essenti^tl attributes that are incompatible and mutually destruc- tive of each other. They suppose the co-ejcistence of being and not-^bein^ in the same subject at the same time. A proposition that affirms and denies the same attribute of tnc^ same subject at the same time is a proposition that has nothing as its result. Thus when I say; A is and is not B^ I affirm nothing, of ^ A or B, and the result of my contradictory proposition is nothing or zeroi In the same way, to do an act whose doing in- volves its not doing, or is contrary, is to do an act that results in nothing— that is,, to do no thing. A contradictory proposition (:/0;:-' y To know then whether a proposition or a thing involves contradiction, we must know its essential attributes. If we know these attributes we can posi- tively deny contradiction. If we do not know these attributes we can neither affirm nor deny. Lacy. How he (GHrk) knows that the creation of matter out of nothing — which is the old way of putting itr-^does not involve contradiction and absurd- ity we are not told. i,i Lambert. As everything is possible that does not involve contradictory attributes, Dr. Clark was right in assuming the possibility of an act until the presence of contradictory attributes are demonstrated. He who asserts the possibility of an act is not required by any principle of logic or common sense to prove the absence of contradictory attributes — to do this would be to prove a negative. He on the other hand who asserts the impossibility of an act is l;)ound to prove the presence of contradiction by demonstrating the presence of mutually destructive attributes. If you deny the possibility of the creative act it is for you to show wherein that impossibility lies. Lacy. To our mind the act is inconceivable. Lambert. Your inability to conceive the nature |of an act is no proof that it is impossible. You must [not confound your inability to conceive an act with your ability to conceive its impossibility. This is an error skepticaare prone to commit. You cannot con* ceive how two lines can forever approach each other 44 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. and yet can never meet. This is however a fact of conic sections. There is no v/ord more misused by the skeptic than the word " inconceivable." He thinks it to be an estoppel to all further argument, and forgets that in saying a thing is inconceivable to his mind he lim- its the capacity of his mind but not the possibility of the thing. To conceive a thing in logic is to have an idea of it. That of which we have no conception or idea is to us as that which is not. We cannot think or speak of that of which we have no conception. Hence it follows that you must have some conception of the creative act or you could not even assert that it is inconceivable. Therefore in asserting it to be in- conceivable y*ou prove that you have a conception of it. You must then admit that you conceive the crea- tive act or that you talk of that of which you have no conception or idea. Hence your proposition is self- contradictory. You probably meant to say the crea- tive act is unimaginable. This I grant, but it proves nothing. We cannot picture to our mind the creative act but we can conceive it, otherwise we could nor dispute about it, for we cannot dispute about that of which we have no conception. We have a conception of what the phrase ** creative act " means, therefore it is not inconceivable. It is the how of the creative act that we cannot conceive. But our inability to con- ceive the how does not prove the act to be impossible. Lacy. Be that as it may there are limits to divine power. Lambert, We have seen the nature of thpse limits and also the nature of your metaphysics. I *.. CHAPTER IV. Lambert. Before leaving the mestaphysical ques- tions I must revert to one point, lest you may think I declined to meet it on mere technical ground. I refer to the possibility of the creative act, or creation. You say : Lacy. How he (Clark) knows that the creation of matter out of nothing does not involve contradic- tion and absurdity we are not told. Lambert. Of course Dr. Clark was not logically boutid to prove a negative, as every logician and most lawyers know. But as skeptics are in the habit of assuming that creation involves contradiction and is therefore impossible, I propose to show that there is not only no contradiction, but that contradiction is impossible. Thus : If to create beings where before there were no beings involves a contradiction that contradiction must be found in being, or in non-being, or in the relation of being to non-being. If it cannot be found in any of these three it does not exist. But contra- diction cannot be found in any of these. Therefore i there is no contradiction. Now : First — Contradiction is the essential antagonism [of two or more attributes. It cannot therefore exist An being, because being has but one essential attribute 'namely, existence, or to coin a word, " isitiveness." It requires at least two attributes to make antagonism or contradiction, just as it takes two to make a quarrel. As being has but one attribute, antagonism or contra- 46 TACTICS OF INFlDELS. dfctlon 13 impossible in it: Besides, ydu Admit the actual existence of things, and the /act o( their exis- tence proves that they are possible, and being possible, their existence cannot involve contradiction , Second — Contradiction cannot exist in non-beihg^^. Non-being is nothing, and nothing is defined as that which has no attributes. Now that \^hich has no attributes can have no antagonism or contradiction of attributes..'' '•'• '■ •- ■'^;^i> -■ ■• ;' ■' V- *^of^-^'^ Third— There can be no contradiction in the relation of being to non-being as long as they are not predicated of the same subject at the sanie time and in the same sense, for non-being having no attribuses cannot be in contradiction with anything having , at- tributes because it is only by and throu^ their attributes that the things can be conceived as contradictory or antagonistic. There is then no contradiction *in the relation of being and non-being when being and non-being are not involved in the same subject at the same time. But does the creative act involve being and non-being at the same time? No, being is only after the act, while non-being or nothing is de/ore it. This before or after leave no room for simultaneous contradiction. Therefore there is not only no contradiction in the creative act, but contradiction is a metaphysical impossibility. Lac}^. The Pentateuch portrays God as of huilian form, after whose image man is made, Lambert. In representing the Infinite Being to our minds we must from necessity of our infinite nature think of Him in modes of being known to us, although in doing so we are ever aware that these iViodes are not in the Infinite'Being as they arc in us. We must [tic TACTIC^ OF, INFIDELS. 47 as of huhiiin think in human terms of thought, they are all we have and without them We cannot think at all. We cannot imagine (observe I do not say conceive) anything except by means of terms or symbols acquired through the senses. Therefore we cannot imagine God or image Him to ourselves unless we use forms and symbols known to us. Thus when we refer to the in- finite knowledge of God, we represent it to our imagi- nation by an eye and speak of the all-seeing eye of God, and no one but a very stupid person could think we attributed material eyes to Him. When we refer to His power and Fatherly protection we represent it by a hand and speak of the hand of God. This form of symbolic speech is common to all men and pervades all languages. We say the sun rises and sets although we know it does not We speak of the scythe and forelocks and han4 of time, of the cap of liberty, of the scales of justice, of the finger of scorn, of the head of a chapter, the foot of a page or of a mountain, the; tongue of detraction, the ear of attention, the sword of revenge, the ribs of a ship, the nod of approbation, a limb of the law, the cry of pain, the tears of grief .All these and a thousand other forms of symbolic speech are familiar and intelligible, and mislead no one. What a sHly ass is he who imagines that we *Vportray" all these things as of human form? . Yet when Moses, yielding to a legitimate and j universal custom, speaks of. the hand of God how muick the narrow-eyed skeptic snaps him up as por- ||raying God in human form, and accuses him of [anthropomorphism. This big word, which the skep- Itic is as fond of as a girl is of chewing gum, means to [represent God in human form. Moses no more taught (that God was of human form than we teach that time » f^ TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 48 is of human form when we speak of the hand or fore- locks of time, or that scorn is of human form when we speak of its finger. Moses when describing the nature of God rose above all forms and called Him Je-ho-va, / am who am. This is the most perfect description of the Supreme Being that has ever been voiced to human ear or traisraitted to the mind of man. This Mosaic Tetragramaton implies all perfection, infinity, independence, immutability, eternity, absolute Being, the causQ of all that is or will be. Let the infidel find a more transcendent name for the Supreme Being before he criticises and misrepresents the great He- brew legislator. Let him devise a more comprehen- sive term and we will adopt it. IngersoU says : " He (Moses) did not know that the sun wooed with amorous kisses the waves of the sea, and that they clad in glorified mist, rising to meet their lover, were by disappointment changed to tears and fell as rain." Here, according to Mr. IngersoU, the sun wooes. That is exceedingly anthropomorphic. He (the sun, not IngersoU) kisses the waves* — the rude, anthropos. The waves, nothing loth clad in glorified mist rise to meet him ; and he, the bashful Adonis, shrinks from the amorous advances of the wanton waves. Disap- pointment — who, by the way, had no right to inter- fere in this delicate affair — changed the waves, by magic perhaps, into tears. Who could believe that the great hierophant of agnosticism is so deeply sunk in the most heathenish anthropomorphism, if his own words did not reveal it ? The scientific progress of the age seems to have made no perceptible impression on hirn. The science of astronomy and the spectro- scope tell us that the sun is a globular mass of matter TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 49 and gas. Ingersoll "portrays" it as a luscious lipped osculator. Chemistry tells us that water is the result of two gases, or a sort of residuary legatee of two exploded gases. IngersoU believes it to be a woman who flirts with the sun in open day and weeps because he limits himself to a mere labial salutation. And yet he talks of science and anthropomorphism! You will say that I am unfair, and that your's and IngersoU's phrases are figurative. I am aware of it, but I am only treating you as you tfeat Moses. Why do you claim a verbal license that you refuse to grant him? Interpret the language of Moses accord- ing to the rules of common sense, as you wish your own to be interpreted, and your anthropomorphic ob- jections will fade away as the distempered dreams of a dyspeptic sleeper fade on awakening. Notes. If this universe of matter alone exists, the mind, intellect or soul must be matter or a form of matter. • Lacy. Certainly, but this is but to affirm that all that is, is all that is. Lambert. You mistake. It affirms that all that [is, is matter or a form of matter, and it is to this con- clusion that I object, for Christian philosophy in con- jsonance with the common sense of mankind holds that [there are beings that are neither matter nor forms of imatter. These are God, spirit, soul. If all that is, is latter, as IngersoU asserts, then God, spirit, soul, in- tellect or mind are matter or a form of matter. If his premises are granted this conclusion must follow, ''our effort to avoid this conclusion is vain. And if II be matter there is no real liberty, for liberty can- lot be predicated of matter. It is thus that material- lism destroys the very liberty it pretends to defend* 50 TACTICS OV INFIDELS. Lacf. Those who hold that matter always ex- isted, may yet hold that within its folds were enwrap- ped all the phenomena of past, present and future time, mcluding animal and vegetable life, gravitating forces. Lambert. They not only may but must so claim. It is a necessity arising from their doctrine, that be- dsides matter and its forms there is nothing. But is the claim a valid one ? We have seen in the Notes that the eternity of increated inattoi , the theory on which this glaim is based, involves contK dictions and absurdities. You carefully avoided meeting this argu- ment of the Notes, But even if it were granted that animal and vegetable life were enwrapped in matter, the question still arises who enwrapped them in it ? To en- wrap is an act that cannot be without an actor. Who is this actor ? Again, supposing this difficulty solved, there remains still a greater one, namely, the origin ol mind, intellect, volition, thought, liberty. Your ac- count'of the origin of animal and vegetable life is not sufficient to account for these. Animal and vegetable life does not necessarily include thought, nor does thought necessarily suppose a material subject. This is why materialism fails to account for the origin of mind from the evolutions of matter. Lacy. No one, so far as I know, regards thought as a material substance, although bom of materiality, or expressed from its inter-relations. Lambert. Then you have read materialistic and pantheistic literature to very little purpose. You should not require to be told that if there is nothing but matter and its forms, (which is the doctrine of In- gersoll,) thought must be matter or a form of matter, or nothing. yol dol mc nol TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 51 ways cx- e enwrap- ture time, ng forces. t so claim. J, that bc- g. But is the Notes theory on ictions and TtViisargu- ranted that matter, the it? Toen- ctor. Who :ulty solved, :he origin ol r. Your ac- ple life is not nd vegetable it, nor does ibject. This the origm of ards thought materiality, terialistic and irpose. You :re is nothing octrine of In- inn of matter, Ingersoll tells us that thought is digested food.. Just think of the stomach making a Tenny son ian poem out of a red herring or chicken salad ! lujrcrsoll. Man is a machine into which we put what wo call food and produce what we call thought. Think of that wonderful chemistry by which bread was changed into the divine tragedy of Hamlet ! ( The Gods^ page 47.) Lambert. Yet, so far as Mr. Lacy knows, no one regards thought as material substance ! But if this man-machine theory is true, why are we not all tra- gedians ? What food do you eat that makes you think so differently from me ? What is that myster- ious agent that changes my food into faith and yours into skepticism ? Or is skepticism the result of a dis- eased liver or an excess of bile? If thought is the result of the digestive organs why not throw logic to the dogs, eschew metaphysics and appeal to physic ? Why not quit reasoning and take to emetics and cho- lagogues? Why spend time reasoning when a fly blister on the epigastrium will do as well. Let recipe take the place of reason, and argument give place to vermifuge. Wliy does Ingersoll try to convince his hearers when he admits that their thoughts and con- victions depend upon the quality of their food and the condition of the alimentary canal ? You say, " thought is bom of materiality." Even if I should grant this, which I do not, the question would still remain, Is thought a material substance or is it not ? If it be not matter then according to Ingersoll it is nothing. But you admit that thought exists, then if you believe the doctrine taught by Ingersoll you must believe it is matter. And yet you tell us that so far as you know no one regards thought as a material substance ! .? ».'j 53 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lacy, So far as I know, no one * * * re- gards thought as a material substance. Lambert. I spoke of mind, intellect, not of thought. To account for thought, even in the ridicu- lous manner you have done, does not accour.t for mind or intellect — the thinking principle. Thoi^bt necessarily supposes a thinking principle or think u\ The question raised by me is this, What is this princi- ple, material or sp' ritual ? And whence is it ? Lacy. The Father, from words unsaid by his opponent, depicts fearful consequences ; such as that the free agency of man is destroyed. Lambert. The destruction of free agency is a necessary consequence of the principle that nothing exists but matter, for matter is governed by unvarying organic or mechanical laws, and these laws destroy free agency in all that is subject to it. But aside from the general principle of mate'-ialism, IngersoU has said ex- plicitly enough to destroy free agency or liberty in man. I quote his words : IngersoU. In the phenomena of mind we find the same endless chain of efficient causes ; the same mecnanical necessity. Every thought must have had an efficient cause. Every motive, every desire, every fear, hope and dream must have been necessarily pro- duced. * * * The facts and forces? governing thought are as absolute as those governing the mo- tions of the planets. A poem is produced by the forces of nature and is as necessarily and naturally pro- duced as mountains and seas. * * * Every men- tal operation is the necessary result of certain facts and conditions. (The Gods, page 55.) Lambert. Now, Mr. Lacy, where is there in this system, as laid down by IngersoU, room for free agency TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 53 <*'. , not of le ridicu- cour.t for r thmk'.r. [lis princi- t? dd by his ch as that rency is a at nothing unvarying destroy free ie from the las said ex- r liberty in nd we find 5 ; the same 5t have had lesire, every <;ssarily pro- governing iing the mo- [iced by the Lturally pro- Every men- tin facts and there in this Ir free agency of man ? It would have been well if you had studied more attentively the teachings of your master before volunteering to defend him. If he is right you were not free in writing your book. It grew out of your brain as naturally as ears grow on a donkey's head. Lacy. Will it be affirmed that the mind, in its conceptions and the moral results which follow from them, is entirely capricious ? Lambert. No sir. But while we are dealing with the question of free agency, free will, volition, we should leave caprice to physicians who make a specialty of mental disorders, and to breeders of goats. Capra is Latin ior goat, hence caprice. Don't forget that we are treating of the human mind. iMcy. Will it be afifirmed that it is not governed by laws germane to its nature ? Lambert. The mind is governed by laws ger- mane to its nature. One of these laws is that it is free in willing, and this freedom of willing is what we call the faculty of volition and from this springs liberty. The mind as an intellective and rational ager* is bound by the laws of its own nature to judge accord- ing to the facts and data as known to it. Its perfec- tion consists in knowing things as they are and in j udging them to be as they are. The mind then zzxi- not Judge that to be true which it knows to be false, although it can will the true to be false or vice versa. The mind as a voluntary agent is controlled by no facts, no data, no law, for the law and essence of its being is to be free. It defies all law and all neces- sity, all limits and all control. It is the masterpiece of creation, the most wonderful of all created wonders. It is this faculty of free will, more sublime than the material universe, that makes man a responsible, moral 54 TACTICS OP INFIDELS. agent, and it is by and through it that he will be saved or damned. Lacy. Is not man, when free to act, controlled by the strongest motive ? (sic.) Lambert. If he is free how can he be controlled^ and if controlled, how free ? But even granting that the will yields to what the judgment deems the strongest motive, it does so because it wills to do so, and is therefore free even when it yields to the strong- •est motive. As long as you hold with your master that mind is controlled by an irrisistiblc and unbreakable chain of facts and circumstances, your supposition that man is free is absurd. Lacy. If the individual nature of man impose no limits upon choice, how can we predict that if Wash- ington had lived another year, conditions having been favorable to such a result, he might not have betrayed his country ? Lambert. We can predict nothing about it. We nonor Washington for what he did and was, not for what he may or may not have been cr done. We can neither credit or condemn him for what his action might have been in a case that might have occurred a year after his death. If Ingersoll's phil6sophy be true, Washington's life, from his cradle to his grave, was controlled by an irrisistable chain of circumstances over which he had no control, and of which he was the absolute slave. He deserved no credit for his patriotism, and would deserve no blame if he had turned traitor. He was a mere cog in the wheel of fate, and our veneration of him is no honor to his memory, because it is merely another cog in the same wheel. If Washington could not, like Arnold, have TACTICS OF iNFlDELS. 55 be saved :ontrolled controlled, itiiig that leems the to do 30, :he strong- • that mind cable chain n that man I impose no at if Wash- laving been ve betrayed out it. We was, not for le. We can t his action Lve occurred iil6sophy be to his grave, ircumstances hich he was •edit for his e if he had the wheel of honor to his / in the same Arnold, have betrayed his country, he deserves no credit for not having done so— no more credit or honor than we owe to a locomotive engine for not running off the track. We deserve no reward for not committing sins that we cannot commit. Washington's merit consists in the fect»that while/r^^ to be a traitor or patriot he chose to be the latter. We honor him because in the face of danger and death he elected to serve his country while free to choose an opposite course. He was a great man because he was someth'*ng more than a thresh- ing machine that threshes out wheat or tares indififer- ently, without having any will of its own. You seem to be oblivMous of the fact that when free will is con- trolled it ceases to be choice and becomes necessity. Washington was a believer in free will and divine providence. Lacy. The action of the mind is subtle, and the data ^rom which we would judge of its attributes and ssence are wont to evade our grasp. Lambert. We j u dge of the attributes and essence of the mind by its manifestations, just as we judge of everything else that comes under our cognizance. The mind is a conscious being, it apprehends, judges and wills. These are facts that no man can deny and save his reputation for sanity. To plead that the mind evades our grasp is to plead the white feather, and this is disgraceful in a disciple whose master tells us that thought is the result of hash and gastric juice, bola of which are analysible and therefore cannot evade our grasp, 'J 'A f*-* CHAPTER V. Lacy. In chap. II of the Notes we are met by this surprising declaration : " The idea of law in^en- eral is and must be prior to the idea of particular laws." Lambert The mind in apprehending being must at the same time apprehend that it must have modes or laws, and the intuitive perception of the necessary rela- tion that exists between being and mode is the percep- tion of law in general. It is by the light of this primitive perception of law in general that we are enabled to determine and affirm particular law in a given case. Let me illustrate. Observation of matter shows us that one of its modes is a tendency in its particles or ultimate molecules to approach each other and unite. This tendency is called attraction or gravitation. It is found to be, when left to itself unvarying. It is called the law of gravitation or attraction. Now comes the question, How could we call this tendehcy a law if we had not, before we discovered it, an idea of law ? How can we say a thing is a law if the idea of law is not prior in our mind to the idea of that thing ? How can we say that snow is white if we have not, before we see the snow, an idea of whiteness in general ? To say snow is white is simply to particularize the gen- eral idea of whiteness and limit it to a particular object. To jay that gravitation is a law is simply to particu- larize the general idea of law and limit it to the object under consideration, namely, gravitation. We call it an idea of law in general because it is applicable to or predicable of all tendencies of nature discovered or to 1* Clf idt Tl TACTICS OF" INFIDELS. 57 re met by iw'in'^en- ular laws." jeing must e modes or essary rela- the percep- lis primitive enabled to given case, r shows us particles or ;r and unite, vitation. It rying. It is ^ow comes dehcy a law idea of law? iea of law is ling? How e not, before reneral ? To rize the gen- icular object, ly to particu- to the object I. We call it plicable to or overed or to m be discovered. To say that we p»^oceed from the idea of a particular law to the idea of law in general is to in- vert the mc \tal process. We cannot deduce from a thing or get out of a thing more than there is in it. A particular cannot contain a universal any more than a pint measure can contain the ocean. Now as the idea of a particular law does not contain the idea of law in general it follows as a necessary consequence that you cannot deduce the universal or general from the par- ticular, and therefore you cannot ascend from a par- ticular to a universal without having, consciously or unconsciously, the universal already in your mind. As a matter of fact you have made use of the idea of law in general at the very time that you deny its exis- tence. When you say gravitation is a law you make use of the idea of law in general, for without that idea in the mind, as a criterion, you could not intelligently affirm law of gravitation or anything whatever. Law in general is to particular law what being in general is to particular existences, and as the idea of being in general does and must, in the order of cognitions, precede the idea of particular existences or things, so, in like manner, the idea of law in gen- eral must precede the idea of particular laws. It is only through the general or what metaphysicians call the universals that we can know particular things ; it is only through the idea of being that we can have an idea of a thing. These are some of the considerations which made me say that the idea of law in general ; must be prior to the idea of particular laws. The misapprehension that pervades your criti- cism of my proposition arises from confounding the idea of a general law with the idea of law in general. There is a wide gulf between these two ideas. A gen- WW I i 1 i; i 58 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. eral law, be it ever so general, is always definite, whereas law in general is indefinite and universal, be- cause predicable of every particular law, just as the universal whiteness, is predicable of every white thing that exists or may exist. Lacy. Our wonder at this postulate is heightened when we read in subsequent chapters of the Notes that justice, larceny, industry, prosperity, etc., are mere ab- stractions, and that abstractions are nonentities and " have none but abstract consequences, which are no consequence at all." Yet law is no less an abstrac- tion than justice. Lambert Law considered apart from being is an abstraction — having no objective existence, just, as larceny, industry, etc., considered apart from being are abstractions — nothings. All these are modes of being, and without being they are nothing, for mode cannot exist without existing in being. Lacy. Then we must conclude that we gain a knowledge of particular laws by means of a nonentity " which exists intuitively in the mind ! " . Lambert. This conclusion is the result of your narrow-eyed philosophy. Law considered apart from being, or on the hypothesis that being is not, is a non- entity. But being is, and therefore modes or laws of being are, and are real entities, just as theft is a fact because there are real thieves, murder a fact because real murderers exist, dishonesty a fact because there are dishonest people. Our knowledge of particular laws then is derived from the idea of a real entity, for the idea of mode or law of being is necessarily implied in the idea of being, because being cannot be without mode. Therefore law is an entity because being is. The conclusion TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 59 definite, rersal, be- ast as the hite thing leightened ^otes that e mere ab- ntities and lich are no an abstrac- t being is an ice/just, as from being re modes of ig, ^o^ mode it we gain a f a nonentity isult of your pd apart from [not, is a non- les or laws ot theft is a fact . fact because tecause there icn is derived ;a of mode or idea of being, ie Therefore you draw from my premises is certainly, as you say, an insane one, but it is your own. Lacy. Suppose we see for the first time that molten lead when precipitated from a shot-tower, rain drops falling from the clouds, and the dew drops pen- dant on blades of grass, all assume a globular form. We inquire, why is this ? Lambert, Why do you ask. Why is this ? Why and how does the interrogaticn occur to you at all ? If you have not the intuitive idea that there must be some reason for it, what is it that moves your mind to seek a reason for it? When you go back into your own mind far enough to discover why you ask Why water assumes a globular form you will find v/hat I have been insisting on, namely, the idea of law in gen- eral. You will discover that you have in your mind an intuition that being must have modes and ways of being and acting. This intuition or idea of law in general being admitted, the origin of your interroga- tion and the principle that moved your mind to ask it, becomes explicable, for the question. Why does water assume a globular form in falling, is equivalent to the question, What is the particular law in this case ? And this seeking after a particular law neces- sarily implies and presupposes the idea of law in gen- leral, for we cannot think of seeking a law if we have ino idea of law. Lacy. Hence arises our conception of what we iterm the laws of attraction of various kinds. Lambert. This is all very well, but it does not [solve the difficulty, for the question still remains, How iCan you term the modes of attraction laws before you (have an idea of law ? And if you have an idea of law '\x onclusion M^^'^ y^^ \^^VQ a knowledge of attraction how can 6q TACTICS OF INFIDELS. iS you make your idea of law the result of your knowl- edge of attraction ? Lacy. When we further see that all nature is controlled by principles of action, modified only by changes of relation and condition, we arise to a con- ception of law in its abstract sense. Lambert. The onlj'^ inference we can draw from seeing that all nature is governed by principles of ac- tion, is thai iiU nature is governed by a general, but at the same time a real, actual law. Now a real, ac- tual law is very different Tom " law in the abstract sense." From our knowledge of the phenomena of nature we deduce and can deduce only real laws, whereas our conception of law in general aiises and can only arise from our intuitive conception of the necessary relation that exists between being and mode. As to what you call abstract laws, they have, in this connection, no place whatever. An abstract law is no law at all. It is a mere logical fiction having no existence except m the mind. Lacy. Thus we ascend from efifect to cause, from the special (particular ?) to the universal. Lambert. Before we can start from an effect to as- cend to its cause we must kno^ that it is an effect \ but we cannot know this unless we have already in our mind the idea of cause. We cannot' say it is an effect unless we know it had a cause. Cause and effect are correla- tive terms and the idea of the one necessarily JViV olves the simultaneous idea of the other. Separate them and they are both meaningless. Cause has to effect a logical priority in the mind, but in the order of real being neither can have existence without the other ; they are and must be simultaneous both in reality and ontological conception. What then, you will say, did m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 6i not God exist before the creation ? Yes. Well then is not the cause of the universe prior to it ? No. God existed before the creation as God, but not as catise. He could not be the cause of things till he caused them. Once having the idea of cause and effect we can ascend from a particular effect to its cause. But how do we acquire this first idea ? Is it not evi- dent that the ascent from effect to cause presupposes the idea of cause ? This idea of cause cannot come from experience or sensation, because they both pre- suppose it. Lacy. We do not usually formulate abstractions. Lambert. Then you do not usually deal with mathematics, geometry or algebra, as these sciences deal with abstractions. An abstraction in logic is an attribute or mode of a being or thing considered by the mind apart feom the thing in which it exists. Hence we 'can reason on and formulate abstractions just as we formulalr real things although they have but a purely mental existence. Lacy, Nor do we avail ourselves of one (abstrjic- tion) already formulated or intuitively existing in the mind, and then, by traveling downward, discover the differentiations of its action. • Lambert. You speak very positively of this, and yet I think I have shown that the opposite is true, namely, that we do ancf can apprehend particular beings only through the idea of being in general. Without the idea of action in the abstract you cannot assert that any particular ihing is an action. You cannot say that A, B or C, acts unless you have a prior idea of action considered without reference to him. You have in your mind an idea of that mode of being called action or activity. This general or abstract idea you I! r 62 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. : 'J III :i 10: -I particularize when you assert it as an attribute of A. D or C. It is evident then that the mind must travel from the abstract or universal downward to the par- ticular, because without these universals the mind can- not travel at all, cannot apprehend things or form judgments. It is a principle of logic that a conclusion cannot be greater than the premise from which it is drawn, that is to say, we cannot infer from a postulate more than there is in it. From this self-evident prin- ciple it follows thai: you cannot infer a universal from a particular, for thf. particular does not contain the universal. Hence the ascending from a particular to a universal, without having already in the mind the universal, is a process purely imaginary on your part. When Bacon by induction or experiment nought gen- eral laws, he had from that fact an idea of law, for we cannot seek that of which we ha\ e no idea. Your notions about deduction and induction are peculiar and evidently formed in haste for the occa- sion, and without reference to the elementary princi- ples of logic. Inducticn is a process by which we induce or bring in facts. When the? farts are brought in the work of induction is completed. Deduction takes these facts as a basis of inference and draws or deduces the conclusion. Hence both processes ^re necessary in scientific investigjation. They are like the two handles of a wheelbarrow which cannot be propelled without having both well in hand — or like the two parts of a pair of scissors, each useless with- out the other. " In every scientific process or argu- ment, induction and deduction both have place and are never separated from each other. Every such process begins with a principle or axiom. Under such principles facts are induced and arranged ; this is TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 63 induction. From this principle and the facts under it, a conclusion is deduced; this is deduction. Take the following example of what always does and must take place in induction and deduction in their only proper forms Things equal to the same thing ar« equal to each other. Here is a general principle or axiom. A is equal to C and B is equal to C. Here we have our facts induced and arranged under the general principle, and this is induction proper. Therefore A and B are equal to each other. Here we have a scientific inference or deduction. Any induction in which facts are not ranged under a principle is a meaningless and lawless proceeding. Any deduction in which an inference is not deduced from a principle and facts ranged under it, is either a lawless leap, or a senseless begging of the question in logic and science." These two methods, induction and deduction, when separated have no validity. Hence your logical structure based on induction alone is a "castle in Spain." r CHAPTER VI. Lacy. But Mr. IngcrsoU says, "Water always runs down hill," and the Father protests because water sometimes evaporates and pjoes up into the clouds. Fire demoralizes it; even vegetables seduce it by capillary attraction. Lambert. It would have been more candid to have stated my argument and then replied to it, instead of garbling it. There is no fact in nature more evident to human experience than that water does not always run down hill. The forniula "water always runs down hill " is as unphilosophicai as it is untrue. There is only one case in which water runs down hill — that is when it is left to the sole control of gravitation or when gravitation overcomes centrifugal and all the other natural forces that act in opposition to it. Now as a matter of fact water is never left to sole action of gravitation, for all the other forces are as constant as that of gravitation, and water is never free from their influences. Centrifugal force drives the water from the poles up toward the equator. The moon pulls it up towards it. The Mississippi river from its source at Itasca to its mouth at the Delta, runs up hill, driven by a stronger force than that of gravitation. As long as this mighty river empties its waters into the Gulf of Mexico, it will remain a resist- less current of argument against the inane platitudes of IngersoU and his disciples. One instance is as good as a thousand to disprove a general proposition. What IngersoU should have said is this : Water, like TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 6S candid to ied to it, in nature ;hat water ila " water al as it is water runs ; control of I centrifugal opposition jver left to forces are er is never 3rce drives ator. The ssippi river the Delta, lan that of empties its lin a resist- e platitudes tance is as proposition. Water, like matter in all its forms, yields to the stronger force, or water when left to gravitation alone, runs down hill. Lacy. We might add that, perchance, a servant maid carries a bucket of water up a hill ; therefore, water does not always run down hill. Surely this baby is too small to whip. Lambert. I am of the same opinion. But the bantling is your own. This is not the first time I have had occasion to notice that the drift of your thoughts tend toward the kitchen. Were I not in- formed that you are a lawyer I would judge from the way servant maids and cooks float through your im- agination and illustrations, that your profession was that of a head waiter to whose memory old associa- tions cling like burs to a beggar's rags. When deal- ing with philosophical questions you should steer clear of housemaids and cooks and guard well your mind from the distractions of culinary odors. Notes, The forces that govern matter are in- variable. iMcy. If so what becomes of miracles. The Father no doubt intended to be understood as having affirmed that the forces of matter are invariable unless when interfered with by some superior force. He wrote with sufficient 'precision; for no one can, while announcing general principles, stop to note every particular exception, and no rational man expects it. Lambert. Here I must dissent. Every correct writer is expected to say precisely what he means. A stuttering intellect is as objectionable as a stutter- ing tongue. When I said the forces that govern matter are invariable I meant precisely what I said. One of the invariable laws of force is that it always yields to superior force. Hence force in yielding to :» I 66 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. II < Si i superior force does not vary, but obeys its own high- est law. It is only when it does not yield to superior force that it varies from the essential mode of its being. It is invariable when it yields; it would be variable if it yielded not. Hence when the forces of nature yield to superior force — say that of the Creator, they do not vary, but obey the highest law of their being. The forces of nature are invariable, because change in them implies contradiction, or their utter annihilation. Take for example, the law of force called gravitation and suppose its direction to be changed. What has happened? Why it has simply ceased to be and the law of repulsion has taken its place. Hence a change in the laws of nature sup- poses them to be and not to be at the same time ; it supposes grs.vitation to be gravitation and not gravi- tation at the same time. The essential nature of a thing cannot be changed without destroyiug the thing. The essential nature of the force of gravitation is to gravitate, if it ceases to do this it ceases to be. The same of the force called attraction ; if it ceases tc attract it ceases to be, and so of all the other forces and activities of nature. Hence when T said the forces that govern nature are invariable I meant precisely that — no more and no less. Lacy, If that be so what becomes of miracles? Lambert. It is precisely because the laws or forces of nature are invariable that miracles can be known. If these forces were variable we could not distinguish a miracle from a variation. If dead men remained dead or came to life indifferently we could not say that the resurrection of Lazarus was a miracle. If fire burned or froze us indifferently we could not say that the preservation of the children in the fiery ^-^^_LJ1^ \ i JL TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 67 furnace was a miracle. And so of every miracle re- corded in the Old and New Testament. It is by comparing them to the known forces of nature and discovering that those forces could not produce them that we know they are miracles, that a higher power than those of nature effected them. But, you will ask, does not this higher power, in producing a miracle, abrogate or interfere with or change the forces of nature? Here we have in a nut- shell the objection of infidels to miracles. I reply that God in working miracles does not change, abro- gate or intc -fere with the forces of nature. He simply intervenes by His power between the action of those forces and their results, or does directly what those forces could not of themselves do. He intervenes between the forces and their result. I will make this clear by an illustration. I hold in my hand a pound weight. By thus holding it I do not interfere with the force of gravitation, for the force still acts and presses on my hand to the extent of a pound. I do however intervene between ,that force and its result for I prevent the weight from falling which would be the result if I did not intervene. Do I abrogate or change the law of gravitation ? Cer- tainly not, for whether I hold or let fall the weight the law continually and uniformly asserts itself. Do I vary the result ? Yes, for I prevent it from falling. Now whether I lift the pound weight or the Almighty lifts the Rocky Mountains from their bases and holds them suspended in space, the law of gravitation is not varied or abrogated ; but the still more general law of forces is affirmed, namely, the law that force yields to superior force. The first would not be a miracle be- cause the force I wield is in nature. The second 11 t • 68 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. would be a miracle because the force manifestec* is evidently above nature. But in neither case have we any evidence that the law is changed or abrogated. Lacy. Issue is taken on the definition of law. Perhaps one has not yet been framed which is not liable to justly adverse criticism. Lambert. This subject cannot be dismissed with a " perhaps." We cannot discuss any subject intelli- gently until we have, a common understanding as to what the nature of the subject is. This common un- derstanding cannot be had but by a definition. In discussing a subject then a definition is the first thing in order. If a definition cannot be given there can be no common ground on which to agree or disagree. That which cannot be defined in such a way that the disputants may know that they are disputing about the same thing cannot be discussed or talked about intelligently or intelligibly. The freethinking fratern- ity are shy of definitions. They prefer loose notions to exact definitions because they leave a wider margin for sophistry. In disputing with them we must insist "on clear and exact definitions. It is the only way to keep them from cavilling and beating about the bush — ^the only way to keep them within sight of the ques- tion at issue. To talk about a thing while at the same time you confess that you cannot tell what that thing is, is to admit that you do not know what you are talking about. In such a case silence is the best evi- dence of sense. Lacy. I might define natural law, in its general sense, as a governing principle or force. Lambert. You certainly mif ht, but in doing so you differ from Blackstone, Mill and other standard writers who agree as to the definition of law. That 1( Ic c| e: ai TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 69 nifestec* is e have we ogated. on of law. lich is not lissed with iject intelli- nding as to 5mmon un- inition. In e first thing :here can be or disagree, vay that the uting about talked about king fratern- Dose notions vider margin e must insist only way to :)ut the bush t of the ques- e at the same tat tliat thing vhat you are the best evi- in its general It in doing so ther standard of law. That the natural law is not force is evident from the fact that force itself is subject to law. That it is not a principle is equally evident for principles have refer- ence to intelligent action. Intelligences act from principles,, and they alone comprehend principles. Material nature acts in obedience to forces, and forces act in obedience to laws, and the supreme law is the supreme intelligence. The law of a clock is the de- sign of its maker realized in machinery; the law of nature is the design of its Creator realized in natter. Lacy. Yet I do not believe the common sense of the world will remain suspended while Blackstone, Ingersoll, the good priest, and my humble self (mod- esty ^gain !) contend about a word which all rational men understand, but which no one may be able to de- fine with entire exactness. Lambert. If rational men understand what law is they can tell what it is, that is, give a definition of it. If they cannot do this it is very evident they do not understand what it means. And if they cannot define it with entire exactness how can they talk of it with exactness or intelligence i Lacy. But, pray, consider the definition of the laws of nature as recorded in the Notes. Notes. The laws of nature, then, as commonly understood, are the the uniform action of natural forces expressed in words. Lacy. So we are to infer ♦:hat if men were speech- less, and could not express natural forces in words^ the laws would be non est, and the universe plunged in chaos. Lambert. We are to infer that if men could not express facts, forces and truths in words, facts, forces and truths would have to remain unexpressed. When i-\ m li \ 70 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. d ■ ''■' .i' ■^ 'i we formulate in words what a certain force will do under given circumstances, we formulate its law or mode of action. This formula is called the law. Thus when we speak of the law of gravitation we refer to • Newton's formula which expresses the unvarying mode of that force's action. I said in the fic^tcs that law in the sense of a verbal formula is merely subjec- tive, that is to say, it exists only in the mind appre- hending it, and not in nature. The verbal formula is simply an afifirmadon of what those forces do. This affirmation is an act of the mind and exists and can exist only in the mind, and therefore until conceived by the mind, has no existence, I made this distinc- tion in the Notes, but it served your purpose to ignore it. I said "When physicists speak of the laws of nature, t/icy refer to the forces of which the laws are but the verbal expression. Ihey suppose philoso- phers have sufficient intelligence to understand this fact." Lacy. The good priest has only confouiiJed law with our conception of it, as "expressed in words." Lavibert. In saying this you could not have been ignorant of the fact that the good priest devoted a paragraph of half a page to distinguish law as exi.st- ing in nature and law as existing in the mind or form- ulated in words. He anticipated ju.st such quibblers as you, but he did not think that a disciple of the " honor bright " school would suppress a distinction and then pretend that it was not made. Lacy. A pot-pie might be defined as a com- posite of dough, meat, butter, pepper and salt, as expressed in words. TACTICS OK INFIDBLS. 71 Lambert. You seem to be more of an adept in gastronomy and the culinary art than in philosophy and metaphysics. On page 85 of your " Reply" you give a receipt for making apple-pie. There is a story to the effect that once upon a time a cat was changed by magic into a beautiful lady. All went well until one day when she was surrounded by many admirers, and putting on fine airs a rat ran round the room. The sight aroused old and almost forgotten instincts, and forgetful of her company and the part she was playing, she sprang after it. The catastrophy caused much amusement, and many and felicitous were the remarks made about it. Do not forget that you are now playing the philosopher. Ingcr:iolL To put God back of the universe compels us to admit that there was a time when noth- ing existed but God. Notes. It compels us to admit nothing of the kind. The eternal God can place an eternal act. His creative act could therefore be co-eternal with his being. The end of the act — that is, creation — could be co-existent with the eternal act, and therefore eter- nal. To deny that is to affirm that there could be a moment when the eternal and omnipotent God could not act, which is contrary to Christian teaching. Lacy. But what you call "Christian teaching" is the very thing in controversy. What right have you to assume the point in dispute as true? Lambert. Christian teaching is not the point in discussion here. The point is whether putting God back of the universe compels us to admit that there was a time when nothing existed but God.^ Whether this point be determined in the affirmative or negative does not aftect Christian teaching in the least. Chris- >i TACtiCS )F I>fI?IDELS. tianity teaches that God created tlie universe, and there stops. It does not aflfirm or deny that he cre2*"ed it from eternity or that he was alone before he created it. These are questions for the philosopher or the metaphysician— not for the theologian. Why tifien, you will ask, did I adduce Christian teaching at all ? I adduced it to show that it is con- formable to right reason. To say that God is omni- potent and yet that there could be a moment when he could not act is to aflfirm and deny his omnipotence at the same time. But God is omnipotent, this you admit ; therefore there never was a moment when he could not act, and therefore he could act or create from eternity — therefore the possibility of an eternal creation.* Lacy. But you say, " The eternal God can place an eternal act." Reader, what is the placing of an eternal act? It is a conundrum which we give up and pass to you. Lambert. An eternal act is an act that is co- eternal with the eternal actor. To place or posit an act is an expression familiar to writers on and readers of metaphysics, and it is strange that it is a conun- drum to you. But the alphabet is a conundrum to some people. Lacy. "To put God back of the universe" is certainly to aflfirm that in time or order of being he antedates the universe. Lambert. Here you assume the point in debate. If creation is r^-etemal with the Creator the latter * This point is treated at length by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Opusculum Contra Murmuranies, in which he takes the view above given. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 73 does not antedate the former. That creation could be co-eternal must be admitted if we admit that God is eternal and omnipotent, and this we must admit if we admit his existence. Hence it does not follow that putting God back of the universe proves that he antedates it. Lacy. If this be not so, what becomes of the dogma that God created matter "out of nothing?" Lambert. If he can create from eternity he can create "out of nothing" from eternity. The dogma is in no danger. Lacy. Can you conceive of such a creative act, without a time or point in infinite duration when it was performed? Try it. Lambert. I cannot conceive wiev it was per- formed, for the simple reason that if it be an eternal act it could not, because eternal, ever have had a "when." Any act of which when can be asserted is not an eternal act. When is an adverb of time, not of eternity. As well might you ask. If' God be eternal when did he begin ? Do you not see that when you assert eternity of a being you deny all " whenitiveness " to it? Again, even if I cannot conceive it nothing follows, for conceivability is not the criterion of possi- I bility as Herbert Spencer truly tells us, and as he is an agnostic his opinion ought to have some weight with you. CHAPTER VII. Lacy. We " e told in the Notes that before creati 'n whj. time wds not. This as poet*y may pass, but as fact It 5S iri',. vaceivable. Lambert, jf it I conceivable, even as poetry, it is conceivable. Hence your argument from incon- ceivability falls to the ground, for that which is con- ceivable even as poetry is possible, and that which is possible is conceivable as fact. I must here again repeat, that inconceivability is not the criterion of possibility and that therefore our inability to conceive a thing is no evidence that the thing is impossible. If sceptics could once get this truth injected into their skulls, they v/ould perhaps use their unmetaphysical catchword less. In the present case your error comes from confounding time with eternity. The ideas re- presenting these two things are essentially different. Time is the measure of duration of created things, or the measure of successive changes of changeable things. Our idea of it is derived from the move- ments or changes of material, extended things. With- out these movements and changes we could acquire no idea whatever of time. Time is divided into a past, present and future. These divisions are essential to the idea of it. Take them away and the idea of time is taken away, and is replaced by that of eternity, for eternity is one unpassed and unpassable moment, indivisible, having neither past nor future. It is the incommunicable, real, actual, now. Time is because changeable things are ; eternity is because an eternal, til mel Chc TACTICS OK INFIDELS. « poetry, it >m incon- h is con- : which is lere again -iterion of 3 conceive impossible. 1 into their etaphysical rror comes e ideas re- y different, things, or changeable the move- gs. With- uld acquire i into a past, essential to dea of time iternity, for moment, It is the is because an eternal. e mchang(!ib!o Being is. Without changeable things mJ an unchaiigeable, eternal Being, neither time nor jternity \.ould have any existence, for they are both ip} litenances of things and Being and depend on them for their 'existence. Liicy. As a ^act it is inconceivable. Lavihcri. This is a pet phrase of the infidel. It i.-; to him what the fire cracker is, to the patriotic 'irchin on the Fourth of July; and, like the cracker, if valueless when exploded. We can affirm or .'vi-y nothing of that which is inconceivable. That wiiir.' v.e cannot conceive is to us as that which *s not, for if we cannot conceive it we can have j i. ea of it, and if no idea, therefore no knowledge o: iL We can pass no judgment whatever on that ^ which we have no idea. We cannot c\ en affirm or deny that it is inconceivable, for on the hypothesis that it is inconceivable, we can know nothing about it, and we cannot affiim inconceivability of that of which we are ignorant. To talk about a thing and at the same time assert that the thing is inconceivable is to admit that you talk of that of which you have no concep- tion, no idea, no knowledge. The mind cannot think of that which is inconceivable, for conceptions or ideas are the materials on which the activity of the mind operates; they are the raw materials, and without them the mental or logical process is impossible. Your blunder arises from confounding the faculty of •conccknng with the faculty of imagining. Lacy. But if it be true (that before creation was, time was not) how do we know that it is true ? Lambert. We know it in this w^ay. Time is the measure of movement and change in moving and changing things; it is an appurtenance of changeable 76 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. things, and it is evident that an appurtenance of a thing cannot exist without the existence of that to which it appertains. Therefore, without created things, time could not be. It does not require much profound thinking to see this. Lacy. We are also informed that reason teaches that the universe could have been created from all eternity. Whose reason? Lambert. The reason of every man who has the capacity to deduce a conclusion from incontestable data. The data in the present case is that God is eternal and omnipotent, which is the same as to say that he is eternally omnipotent. This being the case he could act from eternity, and the result of an eternal, creative act is an eternal creation. Lacy. What grounds have you for saying that reason teaches such an incomprehensible proposition. Lambert. These. An eternal omnipotent being can act at any moment of his being ; indeed if he could not he would not be omnipotent. How can you say the proposition is incomprehensible at the very time that you are disputing it? For how can you dispute it if you do not comprehend it? Are you so lost to all sense of logic as to dispute or question that which y ju do not comprehend? To comprehend is to under- stand, to mentally take in. Now if you have not understood or mentally taken in my proposition, on what principle of common sense do you dispute it? Lacy. To create means to make, to bring into being. How then can any thing be made or brought into being "from all eternity?" Lambert To create is to reduce a possible uni- verse to a reality, to give real existence to that which was before only possible. Now it is a fact that the TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 77 universe exists, therefore it is intrinsically possible, for if not it could never be. And if it be intrinsically pos- sible once it must be intrinsically possible always. The universe was also always intrinsically possibh because there is an eternal, omnipotent Being who can reduce it from a possible state to a real state. Then the universe was both intrinsically and extrin- sically possible from all eternity. The conclusion is unavoidable that an eternal creation was possible, and this is what was claimed in the Notes. But this was not claimed as Christian teaching, for Christianity does not teach that the universe is an eternal creation, but as the result of reasoning from admitted data. The question is metaphysical and ontological, not theological. But you will insist and say: Lacy. How * * * Can anything be brought into being from "all eternity." Lambert. I do not know how it could be done, but my ignorance of the how has no bearing on the question. I do not know how Mrs. Winslow's sooth- ing syrup is made, but it is made " all the same." I do not know how grass when eaten by an ox changes into fiesh and hair, and when eaten by a goose changes into feathers, yet it does. It is sufficient for the pres- ent discussion that an eternal creation was possible, — that is the issue, and I believe I have shown its possi- bility. The how or viodus operandi it would be use- less to discuss for it is impossible for man to know it. Although we may not know the how, we know that everything that is possible has a how. Turn the matter as we may it always resolves itself into a question of pure possibility, and of that we have said enough, and perhaps too much for the patience of the reader, who, however, I hope will be kind enough to rdmembsir 78 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. that I have been under the necessity of showing the fallacy and shallowness of Mr. Lacy's metaphysics. I could not let the patent, yet (juite prevalent philo- sophical trash pass without challenge. Most modern antichristian errors are based on downright ignorance, superficial notions and false ideas of metaphysics and ontology. It would be amusing if it were not sad to hear these pert egotists clatter about possibilities, infinities, inconceivables, unknowablcs, etc. Lacy. To say that God could create anything the existence of which is co-eternal with his own be- ing is to affirm the possibility of God having created himself Lambert. This conclusion is the result of very superficial reflection. To affirm that God could create himself involves the absurdity that he exists and does not exist at the same time. It supposes him first to exist, for unless he exists he cannot act or create ; ac- cording to the axiom, that which is not cannot act. In the second place it supposes him not to exist in order to be created, for that which already exists can- not be again created. The absurdity of a proposition involving the existence and the non-existence of God at the same time is apparent at a glance. But this absurdity is not involved in the affirmation that God can act at any moment of his being, and therefore act or create from eternity. To show this I will use the illustration of Aquinas: An eternal foot eternally pressed in eternal dust makes an eternal footstep. Here we have cause and effect co-eternal. In the same way an eternal creator eternally creating creates a co-eternal creation. Lacy. It is said that God is self-existent, but never has theology been plunged in the delirium of '^^1 -'''''^^l I \ ^ TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 79 ^ult of very :ould create its and does him first to - create ; ac- : cannot act. )t to exist in y exists can- i proposition -nee of God e. But this on that God therefore act will use the oot eternally i-nal footstep, rnal. In the mating creates -existent, but delirium of nonsense so as to affirm that God was his own creator. Lambert. It is refreshing to see theology getting credit, even a httle credit, for common sense. The credit, however, is improperly given, for the question you speak of is not a theological, but a metaphysical one. It n*quires as good judgment to give credit as to give censure. Lacy. But if it be true that the universe was always created, it must have existed "from the begin- ning." Lambert. Certainly; that goes without saying. Observe, I do not say the world was always created, but that it might have been. Lacy. That is, there never was a time when it was not. Precisely what Mr. IngersoU asserts. Lambert. The difference between IngersoU and me is this : He holds that the universe is eternal ; I hold, not that it is eternal, but that it might be. He holds that it was not created, I that it was created. He holds that besides this universe there is nothing, I that beyond and above it there is its creator, God. You see there is not a single point on which we agree. Lacy. How pleasant it is to see extremes meet. Lambert. Yes, particularly when they meet. Lacy. To behold the good Father and Mr. In- gersoU, as in this case, clasp each other in logical embrace. Lambert. It is particularly funny, seeing that we do not agree < n a single point. To say that we do, speaks badly for your logical acumen. It seems to me if an embrace is in order it ought to be a triangu- lar one and include you who discovered the reason for it. What a touching tableau it would be, the doughty Colonel, the good Father and the modest ! 8o TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lacy engaged in a three cornered embrace, soiling each other's collars with lachrymal chloride of sodium ! It is overcoming. Lacy. We are told that " God is pure act," the source and origin of all activity and life. How there can be "pure act" or any other act without an actor, is another riddle to which we succumb. Lambert. Riddles and conundrums seem to buzz about your brain like blue-bottle flies about a dead horse. You should try to learn and comprehend that which you do njt know and understand, and not imbecilely yield to gross ignorance and display it as an evidence of profundity. A joke or a laugh can never hide ignorance or change it into wisdom. An act is the reduction of a potentiality or possi- bility to a reality. Pure act is an act of being which excludes all potentiality. A Being wh:'rh is necessarily real, which excludes from its essence everything that implies imperfection or defect of reality, is pure act Potentiality of any kind always and necessarily implies defect or lack of reality ; because it has always some- thing not yet actuated or realized in act. Being, therefore, which is necessarily real, with supreme and infinite reality, excludes all potentiality. Now God is necessarily and essentially real. He excludes from his essence everything that implies imperfection or defect of reality. He is therefore Pure Act. To say th: t God is pure act is the same as saying that he is a Being to whorp. no perfection of being is wanting. Being is an act; man's being is an act; it is not his act, it is himself. He is not the actor of his act of being — but the act itself This first act of being then is, so far as man is concerned, an act without an actor. But as his being is contingent and dependent, we TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 8i em to buzz )ut a dead ■ehend that d, and not splay it as laugh can dom. ty or possi- ,eing which s necessarily rything that is pure act arily implies ways some- act. Being, mpreme and Now God is ccludes from ,erfection or ct. To say \a that he is a ^is wanting. it is not his lof his act of ,f being then .lOut an actor. ependent, we must seek further for the cause of it, and we must go back till we find a Being who is not dependent for his existence on another, a necessary Being, a Being who is so supremely perfect that he exhausts all possibility of further perfection. When we come to this un- caused cause of all causes and things we have found Pure Act. Lacy. When the Father says that, " Kant held that we have absolute certainty of nothing ; which is equivalent to a denial of both God and the universe (the italics are ours,) we dissent. Uncertainty is never affirmation nor negation. Lambert. Certainty or certitude is a necessary condition of knowledge; without it knowledge is im- possible. To know a thing and to be certain of it express one and the same idea. To be uncertain of a thing is to not know that thing in just so far as you are uncertain of it. Then that of which we are un- certain, we know not, and that which we know not is to us as that which is not. Hence Kant's denial of certainty is equivalent to a denial of both God and the universe — ^because it implies that to us they are not and cannot be an object of knowledge. Uncer- tainty, being ignorance pure and simple is, of course, neither affirmative nor negative. 'n ']' \k 1 1 ■ CHAPTER vm. . ^aes We Unow ^^God adsolutely, but we ^n::? lt?ot^ dl'/hre^istence. but can we ^"°\S.'j:.^Vrs:wecan lao- Utence.butcanlknowha^y-e-^^^^^^ , /.aO-. Bishop Alexan°'= i^'yjj tvie senses ; said: "^"'-'f.^^C'n^d to the mind; .M«^«- heUef from evidence presenita ^^ knowledge Sle result of our -a-nmf^ J/ssthe're be a sixth comes to us through the seM ^ ^ sense, how «" T >"t° be hoped in the interest of Lam/>ert. It is to be ^°P f^Hed to express Campbell s memory that you ha .^^ ^^ his meaning. From the dnft ol Y^ ^^ H^^^^ ,, ^^ the pears that Campbell was a loi g ^ ys words as Origin of ideas and "^""^'the theory of Locke | quoted by you fa'l to exPI-e^^ knowledge, come | Tho taught that 'deas, and hence^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^ H from sensation and if^'^^^ „Hgin of knowledge of eivine the senses as the oniy s j ^^^^ tc admU that without reflection kno.leg^^.^^^ ^^ tmpossible. I infe//^^" ^bluCords. 1 believe he TACxICS OF INFIDELS. «3 ,, but we at can we - y your ex- at proceed. the senses ; ^d; opinions knowledge re be a sixth e interest of \ to express otation it ap- cke as to the ^is words as ,ry of Locke, pledge, come ^ocke instead )f knowledge, ^ge would be faUed to re- ^ 1 believe he | ^ualifiedly the^^ Uses alone^ as ,; Low that Mr, ched. tasted or smelled him. Now if there be no other means of ac- quiring knowledge than through the five senses, how can I know that he exists, since none of my senses testifies to his existence ? He has never come within reach of any of them. So far then as my senses are concerned he is to me that which is not. Ah, but did you not read his " Reply to Lambert's Notes on Liger- soll ? " I have read a book with that title, but which of my five senses tells me that the book ever had an author ? My senses tell me that a certain book exists, but none of them tell me that it ever had an author or that an author was necessary. I have the knowl- edge that a book must have an author. As this knowl- edge could not come through the senses, which testify only to the book's existence, it must have come to me through some other source, and therefore knowledge does not come to us through the senses alone, whether they be five, six or twenty. What then is the mental process by which T came to that intellectual state in which I can affirm Mr. Lacy's existence? My reason, enlightened by the idea of being in general tells me that a book coul J not come into being without a cause or author. My senses tell me that a book is in being. My reason then says, therefore its author also exists, and this affirmation of reason to itself constitutes what we call knowledge. It follows that my knowledge that the ** Reply " had an author comes from reason and not through the senses. It is the result of a judgment of reason. True, the senses supply the reason with sensations or the raw materials of thought, but just here their office ceases. And here comes the real difficulty. How can the reason, because conscience of a sensa- 84 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. tion, affirm anyting more than Ihe existence of that sensation. How can it pass from the consciousness of a sensation, to the idea of a real being external to itself? If the reason have nothing in it but the sen- sations supplied by the senses, how can it form an in- tellectual judgment and affirm the existence of some thing that is not itself nor a sensation ? For ir stance, I have a sensation of hardness, smoothness, weight and dimensions ; how can my mind from these data affirm the existence of something that is neither smoothness, hardness, v/eight or dimensions — namely substance? The mind un receiving a sensation in- variably makes this affirmation. It cannot make it from data given by the senses, for the senses deal only with the qualities of things, as hardness, smoothness, etc., and not with things themselves. Tre mind then must have data of its own which, joined with the data supplied by the senses, enable it to affirm the existence of beings external to itself; which enable it to sa/ : " I have a sensation, therefore something exists, something besides myself is in being." But how did the mind acquire in the first place the idea of being ? It could not get it from sensation alone, for these are but modes of itself. And if we ask, How can the mind, from its own modes or modifications, infer the existence of things external to itself, we are brought back to the original difficulty. The mind cannot acquire the idea of being from the senses, for they only supply it with sensations of qualities, but do not supply the. logical nexvs^ between qualities and real, subsistent beings. How then does the mind originally acquire the idea of being ? There appears to be but one answer to ihk? question, 'tamely, it never acquired it, it is innate and co-exis*tiit with the mind. This idea of being is TACTICS OF INFlDfiLS. 85 m :e of that :iousriess eternal to t the sen- ,rm an in- i of some r h stance, iss, weight these data is neither ^s — namely msation in- lot make it iS deal only smoothness, 2 mind then rith the data ;he existence ttosa/:"! s, somethmg id the mind ^ ? It could ^e but modes lind, from its existence ot , back to the mire the idf^a supply it with )ly the. logical listent beings, quire the idea 3ne answer to it, it is innate lea of being is the light of reason ; it is that which makes the mind an intelligent being, and enables it to interpret sensa- tions and from them to affirm the existence of things ; which enables it to say : " There is a knock at my door, t/uTif on' there is someone without." This nexus between sensations and realities is the Pons assinomm of the philosophers and it has occupied their atten- tion in all times. As you appear not to see clearly and appreciate at its true value the difficulty which your quotation from Campbell raises, let us view it in another light. It is admitted by all logicians and philosophers, and indeed by all men who think at all, that it requires at least two ideas to form a judgment. When the mind affirms that something exists, it forms a judgment. In doing this it must have two ideas, the idea of a sensation and the idea of being. The first comes through the senses ; but whence comes the second ? It must com:^ from within ; it must exist originallv in the mind, for the theory of sensationalism cannot ac- count for it, but always supposes it. Now then as the senses alone cannot account for the first judgment of the mind they cannot accc at for knowledge, for all knowledge is the result of ju ;- ments. I grant that in our present state of exist* ce the mind cannot acquire knowledge without L« mg stimulated into activity by those external stimuli \ ich are supplied by the senses. But this does n(5t ove that knowledge comes through the senses. It r jves that the senses are a necessary condition of know ledge, but not that they are the origin, or only condition of it. Let us now come back to the point trom which we digressed. What is the process of the mind in 86 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. acquiring knowledge of a thing ? The senses supply the mind with certain data called sensations. The mind having intuitively or innately the idea of being, and comparing it to the idea of particular sensations, forms a judgment to the effect that the sensation is caused by a being and that therefore a particular be- ing exists. The particular being in the present case is a book called a " Reply etc." The mind still en- lightened by the idea of being, also affirms that the book cannot come into being without a cause or author and that therefor the book has an author. It then says : " Therefore the author exists — therefore Mr. Lacy exists. And this is the way I come to know that Mr. Lacy is. This knowledge it will be observed comes not from the senses, but from a conjunction of the senses with reason or intellect. This being premised, we can now consider the question : " How can we know that God is ? " We have seen how we know that you exist, namely, be- cause you did something — wrote a book. Well there is another book called the Book of Nature. It is an admirable work, an exhaustless source of instruction, pleasure and amusement. Unlike some books it bears reperusal ; unlike others it never requires a second edition. It has a way of reproducing its leaves as Time's skeleton finger stains and mars them, and pre- sents fresh pages to its readers as they hurry past from tht cradle to the grave. Humanity, as it rises and sinks wave after wave, gazes on them in admira- tion as it passes away. But the book remains ever ancient and ever new while intelligences flit past it and are gone. It may appear a want of literary etiquette on my part to make a comparison, and yet I must say that this Book of Nature gives evidence of more TACTICS OF INFlDJEtS. 8; creative ability than you have displayed in your " Reply to Lambert's Notes on Ingersoll." Now if your book proves your existence, why should not this magnificent Book of Nature prove the existence of its author ? If my reasoning be sound in one case why is it not sound in the other ? The process is the same in both. I know you lUre by your work ; I know God is by, his work. If you deny the validity of this reasoning you destroy in me the possi- bility of knowing that you exist ; if you admit it, you admit that there is a way of knowing that God exists. I leave you to seek a fence over which to escape from this dilemma. Ingersoll. What we know of the infinite is almost infinitely limited ; but little as we know, all have an equal right to give their honest thought. Notes. Has any man the right, coy: inon sense being the judge, to tal': about that of which his knowl- edge is almost infinitely limited ? Lacy. Yes ; but in return we inquire, is not the knowledge of every one, yea, the combined knowledge of all men of all time, " almost infinitely limited," in regard to that infinity that is above, below and around us? Lambert. No, sir. The expression "almost in- finitely limited " is unadulterated nonsense. The idea of anything being "almost" infinite in any way is too absurd to be discussed. In infinity there are no degrees, and between the finite and the infinite* there can be no comparison whatever. Human knowledge is limited — the fact should be a lesson to infidel gas- bags — but it is not infinitely limited. The reason is that that which is limited can be infinite in no way. A thing must be infinite or finite, and there is no place for an " almost." 1 ! 1 S8 TACTICS OF INFIDEI5. Lacy. Infinity! We name thee but we know thee not. Lambert. Well, if you know it not, why did you spend so much of your second chapter in discussing it. You appeared to know all about it then. Of all kinds of cant that offends human ears the most thor- oughly nauseating is infidel cant. One moment, in its pride, it soars above the throne of the Omnipotent and gibbers at his providence; the next, in its offen- sively demonstrative modesty, it writhes in its own slime. Lacy. Newton with his peerless intellect, after a life-time of devotion to science, in view of what he knew as compared with the great unknown, likened himself to a child standing on the margin of the sea and toying with pebbles upon the beach. This bespoke the modesty of true science. (Italics ours.) Lambert. Just observe here how Newton, a man who believed in and worshipped God in awe and de- voiion, and bowed reverently before him in all his discoveries, is drafted into the service of infidelity, while it treats with contempt that God whom he adored and honored and praised by his discoveries. This outrage on the memory of a great and good Christian man v/ere inconceivable if we did not under- stand the chicanery that characterizes those "honor bright" gentlemen whenever they put in an appear ance. Notice again that they are not content with takirf^ the Christian Newton's wonderful discoveries as infidel trophies. They have the unparalled " cheek " to use even his Christian humility as a weapon against that Christianity which he professed and whose teach- ings were the solace of his last hour. Lacy. This bespoke the modesty of true science. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I 89 true science. Lambert. No, sir. It bespoke the modesty of a true Christian gentleman who beHeved that God knows more than he did, and who therefore venerated God's revelation as the only solution of the mystery of being and the destiny of man. He had a peerless intellect, and true science led him nearer to God. Notes. All may have an equal right to give their honest thoughts but none has the right to give his honest thoughts on all subjects and under all circum- stances. Laey. Certainly not; and no one has claimed such a right. Lambert. You mistake. Ingersoll claims the right if language means anything. When he says, " all have the right to give their honest thought " he lays down a broad, universal proposition and makes no limits or exceptions to it. It was to the universal and sweeping lature of his proposition that I objected when I sai-d " none has the right to give his honest thoughd what Ingersoll really did say, and would not have hastily and rashly denied that he said it. It is a ^eat advantage to understand the author you defend. When Ingersoll laid down his general proposi- tion he formulated a principle that ju.stifies the filthiest utterances that ever contaminated the moral atmos- phere, or the mind of a rake. He justified the preach- ing of adultery, licentiousness, murder robbery, nihil- ism, dynamitism, etc., for at one time or another in the history of man all these have been advocated in one t 90 TACTICS OF iS'KIDELS. form Of another by fanatics, lunatics, fools or black- guards. You will say IngersoU did not mean this. You pay him a poor compliment ; he believes that he can say what he means. There is no wiiy of knowing what he means but by what, he says. And therefore I dealt with what iic r.aid and with that only. His proposition is clear and explicit, and it asserts the veiy right which you say no one has claimed. Lacy. Why does the Father lead his thousands of readers, who have never read IngersoU, to believe that he has uttered words and sentiments which he never said or thought. Lambert. I quoted word for word in the Notes IngersoU's proposition; it justifies the preaching of every crime known to the Decalogue. How you can say he never said it, after I had quoted his very words, is, as you would say, a conundrum which I must give up. To say as you do that he never thought it, is strange in face of the fact that he said it. CHAPTER IX. Notes, This plea of honesty in thinking is a justification of every error and crime, for we must, in the very nature of the case, take the thinker's word tor the honesty of his thought. Lacy. Not always. Lambert. Yes, always. Lacy. His acts may belie his words. iMinbcvt. Certainly. But that proves only that he is inconsistent. When he tells you he gives you his honest thought he places himself under Ingersoll's dictum that he has a right to give that thought at any and all times and places, be it true or fa'se, moral or immoral. The unlimited right once granted, the thinker becomes the sole judge of the honesty of his thought. The dynamiter, the nihilist, the assassin, the thug, the lecher and the rake have at last been sup- plied with a principle which, if admitted, would save [them from the halter and the prison. Of course you [will say Ingersoll did not mean all this. Well, if he lid not he should not have said it. He must be held to the full force of his universal proposition, that " all Save a right to give their honest thought," until he lisclaims it. You are not authorized to make a dis- :laimer for him. • » Lacy. But what is the Father warring with, and ^hat is his doctrine on the subject of " free thought." Lambert. He is warring with Ingersoll's propo- sition, which, being universal, justifies, under the plea )f " honest thought," the preaching of and inciting IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) 1.0^ !f KS l£i ■tt Bii 12.2 |Jj25 IIJ^ |LA 1.1 V r Ti /. w .<^>> ^«> ^^ '/ Photognaphic Sdences Corporation 23 WIST MAIN STRUT WIUTH,N.Y. 14SI0 (716) •72-4903 9^ TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ! ■!'♦ ' Mi to every crime known to man — and the practicing of them as well, for a man can give what he may call his " honest thought " in acts as well as in words ; and if the principle be true the plea is a justification, for, from the nature of the case no one can go behind the returns. If the rascal plead " honesty of thought " he stops all trial, all investigation, for there is no trib- unal to determine the honesty of his thought. It is well for society that our courts make short work of this Ingersollian plea in the face of guilty acts. The Chinese High Binder and the Indian Thug on trial for murder may plead " honesty of thought," but the court tries them on the facts in evidence, and if found guilty remits them to the sheriff who sends them, to- gether with their plea of " honesty of thought," to a higher court. Guiteau made the plea of honest thought on his trial, but little attention was paid to it except as evidence of his insanity. Lacy. What is his (the Father's) doctrine on the subject of " free thought ? " Lambert. The Father's doctrine on the subject is very simple. It is, that there is no such thing. The phrase " free thought " is mere loud cant — ^a mis- nomer in philosophy and therefore has no place in the writings of the great masters of the science. There is however, a class to whom the phrase is the " harp of a thousand strings." This class consists of what may be called the bummers of philosophy. They fol- low at d distance the army of silent, laborious philos- ophers and scientists, pick up here and there a fact or supposed fact, misinterpret it and then proceed with the music. They are to philosophy and sciance what a Chinese band is to a Chinese drama-*-the noise. They are the gong-men of science. Euphonious TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 93 phrases are in their line. They use them for their sound's sake and without much, if any, reference to sense. To these gentry the high sounding phrase " free-thaw-et " is irresistible. But to the intelligent student of psycology the expression is simply absurd, unless he considers it indicative of mental aberration, in which case it belongs not to philosopy but must be passed to the expert in nervous and cerebral disorders. The psycologist knows that the intellect is not free ; that it is chained to the data that is given it ; that it must necessarily^ if it acts at all, draw the con- clusion from the data as they are or as it conceives them to be. It may have an incorrect conception of the data, in which case its conclusions will not accord with the facts, but they will and must accord with the intellect's conception of the facts, if the intellect be normal. Take a case. If 2x2=4 what will 2x4 equal ? In replying to this question the intellect has no freedom whatever. If it be sane and sound it must say 2x4=8. And its inability to say otherwise is pre- cisely what gives it its value as an authority in the search after truth. The dignity and value of the intel- lect then consists in its utter lack of freedom. If the intellect, by which I mean each individual thinker's intellect were free to say 2x4=25, is it not evident that it would lose its value as a criterion of truth ? It follows then that the highest attribute of the intellect is its irredeemable slavery to data ? Now thought is an act of the thinking principle or intellect, and as this thinking principle is not free, it follows that thought is not free, because the act of an actor that acts from ne- cessity is not a free act. Therefore thought is not free, and therefore again there is no such thing as " free thought. Now my dear sir you have the " Father's " I ^ 5 i -^ i: Sir 1- ■ !■■■ ■y i| i ! 94 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. doctrine on the subject of " f -ee thought." How do you Hke it ? But you will ask, " if all this be true what becomes of the human liberty or freedom which Christian the- ology holds that man has ? " Bridle your anxiety, my dear Lacy. Human liberty is perfectly safe, because no philosopher except you and some other disciples of Ingersoll ever dreamed of making the human in- tellect the seat and source of human liberty. And if you understood your master, as you should under- stand him in defending him, you would know that even he destroyed it, root and branch, when he made mind and thought the outcome of digestion conditioned by the action of the kidneys, liver and alimentary canal. The philosophers of all ages. Christian and pagan, who admit that there is any such thing as liberty, unite in lodging it, not in the intellect, but in the will. They make human liberty consist in the capacity of the soul to wUl or not to will or to will the contrary, just as it wUls. In this capacity of the soul consists human liberty, and not in the mere absence of prisons and chains. Notes. The right to give an honest thought im- plies the right to realize that thought in action and habit. Lacy. Here two distinct things are confounded, moral right and legal right. Which is meant ? Lambert. Both. When Ingersoll said " all have an equal right to give their honest thought," he cer- tainly meant that a man should not be punished for giving his honest thought — hence the legal right ; a man has the moral right to say and do what he be- lieves to be right— under ^ circumstances ^nd all TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 95 occasions ; this is a necessary conclusion from Inger- soU's dictum. Hence both rights are meant. Lacy. The moral right to do what one conceives to be a duty can only be denied by affirming that a man is morally right in refusing to do what he be- lieves to be right. Lambert. This is queer theology. I have the right to give five hundred dollars to the poor of Water- loo ; I have also the moral right to decline doing so. A conviction that a thing is right does not induce an obligation of doing it. It simply leaves one free to do it or not. I believe it to be morally right for me to study the Choctaw language, but I am morally right in declining to do so. The moral right to do a thing does not oblige us to do it. It is the conviction of duty or obligation that binds us to do a thing, not the mere moral right to do it, as you seem to imagine. Lacy. Guilt may be incurred by insufficient ex- amination in regard to the moral quality of thoughts and acts. (Italics ours.) Lambert. A thought is an intellectual judgment, and you should not need to be told that judgments as pure mental acts have no moral qualities. Morality is an attribute of a free agent and we have seen that the intellect is not a free agent, therefore moral quali- ties caT^ not be affirmed of its acts or thoughts. Moral- ity is of the wUly not of the intellect. You have evi- dently incurred guilt by insufficient examination in regard to the moral quality of thoughts, and you should not forget your own remark that " no man has the moral right to neglect opportunities of enlightenment." I ask you as a disciple of Ingersoll how you can at- tribute morality to thought when he tells you that I t I IP)";- ; ; % 1 I. in 96 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. thought is the result of digested food ? What moral- ity is there in a beefstake ? And if it be not in it how can the gastric juice evolve it ? Lacy. The solution of the apparent difficulty is this : The moral nature of an act is not determined by the mere act itself, but, measurably, by antecedent circumstances and conditions, proximate and remote. Lambert, If the difficulty is only apparent it needs no solution. You Ijave not told us what de- termines the moral nature of an act. To say circum- stances and conditions measurably determine it is not to tell us what determines it. Hence your solution solves nothing. The moral nature of an act depends on the nature of the actor or agent. Everj' human act is a moral act, because it is the act of a moral or free agent. If a man deliberately kill another his act is a moral act — ^a very bad moral act of course, but yet a moral act, because he is a moral agent. If a locomotive kills a man it is not a moral act, because the engine is not a moral or free agent. Hence in the former case we call it murder, while in the latter it is simply killing. The difference between murder and killing is determined by the intention. If a hunter intending to kill a deer kill a man whom he mistook for a deer, he is not guilty of murder because he had not the intention. It will be obsen/ed then that the moral nature of an act depends on the nature of the actor, and the goodness or wickedness of the moral act depends on the intention of the free moral agent. It is a mistake to suppose that a good act is a moral one and a bad one is not. Every act of man, good or bad, done with an intention is a moral act. We at- tribute morals, good and bad, to man alone, because he alone of all the inhabitants of the earth is capable ot forming an intention and acting from a motive. TACTICS OK INFIDELS. 97 Notes. I take it, then, that in claiming the right to give your honest thought you claim the right to promulgate that thought and put it in practice in the affairs of life. Lacy. In a general way, yes. Lambert. This will not do. You claim the right or you do not. To say you claim it " in a general way "is too indefinite. It leaves too many loop-holes. You, like Ingersoll, are fond of using loose, indefinite terms. They are the abomination of logic, and serve to confuse rather than to clear up a question. Lacy. But what is the negation of this right ? you have no right to promulgate your Itonest thouglit or put it in practice in the affairs of life. Lambert. Had you consulted your logic before writing the above you would have learned that a uni- versal proposition can be negatived in two ways. — by a contradictory or by a contrary proposition. For ex- ample : " All men are wise " is a universal proposition the contrary of which is, " No man is wise," and the contradictory of which is, " Some men are not wise," Now Ingersoll's proposition is a universal one •' that all have a right to give their honest thought." It denies all limits to this right. It is in this univi^ts- ality that its fallacy consists, for there are as you ad- mit 'times, circumstances and subjects that limit this right. Hence in denying his proposition I do not say that no man has a right to give his honest thought, but simply that Ingersoll's proposition as a universal is false. It is irksome to have to explain these simple, elementary principles of logic to one who as- sumes to know all about them. Lacy. The truth is we hav^* no standard of right and wrong to which we can appeal without liabilitj" to errori 98 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lambert. That is not the point. The liability to err is human. The question is, Is there a standard, and what is it ? You and IngersoU admit the exist- ence of a standard since you both try to tell what it is. You, with your usual indefiniteness, say it is in the mind and heart of man ; IngersoU tells us it is to be found in the consequences of acts. The disciple contradicts his master. A standard of right, or a measure by which to dis- tinguish what is right from what is wrong is necessary for man, — without it all difference between right and wrong is destroyed. Men may and do err in the ap- plication of this standard, but this fact does not lessen its value, for the error is not in the standard but in its application. Lacy. You say, yes, " the will of God," but how do we determine that will ? Lambert. When a man is called on to act he is obliged as a moral agent to consider, there and then, whether the act he is about to do is good or bad. He must determine it by the light of his knowledge of the will of God. If he does this honestly and to the best of his ability his act, so far as he is concerned, is good. He must always follow his conscience and act on his own honest interpretation of the standard. His knowledge and conception of it may change but the standard is unchangeable ; because founded in the will and nature of God. It is man's duty to act ac- cording to the will of God as far as he knows it or honestly believe^ he knows it at the time. His knowl- edge of the will of God is the measure of his merit or demerit. Lacy. Protestants say the Bible alone (is the standard). TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 99 ? t Lambert. Protestants, like Catholics, hold that the will of God is the standard, and they value the Bible only because they believe it to be a revelation of that will. They do not confound the will with the in- strument by which it is made known. In the same way the Catholic values the teachings of his own church. It seems that in representing Christian be- lief you are utterly incapable of stating it correctly. Lacy, The standard of right and wrong, what- ever rule may be professed, is in the mind and heart of man and has varied from age to age, as he advanced from the barbarism of the past to the comparative en- lightenment of the present. Lambert. The standard is certainly in the mind of man, for all peoples in all times have recognized a supreme will as the standard. Catholics, Protestants and Jews call it the will of God ; Pagans call it the will of the gods — ^but all recognize a supreme, super- natural will as the standard of right and wrong. You say truly then that it is in the mind of man. But it is not always in his heart for men often do what they know to be wrong. This standard has never varied, though men's knowledge of it may have in- creased or diminished, or their application of it may have differed. Lacy. ' Has this standard stayed the hand of per- secution ? Lambert. It is the province of the standard to indicate what is right and what is wrong, — it goes no further. It enlightens the intellect but does not sway the will. Crimes and persecutions will continue as long as man has free will and is wickedly inclined, whatever be his knowledge of the standard — or will of God. Since Cain slew Abel men have a disposi- L -f !| u 11 lOO TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ( liiH tion to cut each other's throats, for one reason or an- other; in one age it is religion, in another patriotism, liberty, union, etc. We sent to their graves a million or so lately. It was in the name of liberty ; if it had been in that of religion what a howl there would be ! As long as man is free and viciously inclined he will find a reason to slay his brother, in spite of all stand- ards. But this sanguinary penchant should not be considered a result of Christianity. Christianity has modified but it cannot eliminate this wolfishness from human nature. If knowledge from the standard were claimed to be an irresistible preventive of crime, your question would have some force. But men know the right and do the wrong. I may here return your question and ask, Has your standard or that of Inger- soll stayed the hand of persecution or put a stop to crime. i; CHAPTER X. t ! Ijicy. Our knowledge of the rules of morality has come to us by slow degrees, and is not perfect yet. Lambert. If so we cannot say that murder, theft or adultery is wrong. We must wait for developments ! Some new discovery may yet prove that vice is virtue and virtue vice, that honesty is a superstition, decency a prejudice and duty an illusion. I do not concede what you so trippingly take for granted that " our knowledge of the rules of morality come to us, (i. e. to the human race) by slow degrees." The rule or standard of morality was made known to the first man, and as men fell into idolatry, it by degrees fadecl out, or nearly so ; it was renewed and reinforced by the Almighty through Moses, and subsequently through Christ. The standard of right and wrong or of mor- ality, is the will of a moral being; this will can be made known only by that intellectual commerce called revelation, in one or another of its forms. It is ab- surd then to suppose that science, by which the infidel means the physical sciences, can give us any better knowledge of the will of God in its relation to moral agents. When you know the ten commandments and understand them in all their ramifications, you have a perfect knowledge of the moral law — a knowledge that cannot be improved by a knowledge of the phys- ical sciences. Lacy. By the old rule it was right to cremate (burn) witches and heretics. I I 1 102 TACTICS OP INFIDELS. U Lambert. If by the " old rule " you mean the standard of right and wrong, it is the same now that it has always been. But you confound the local stat- ute laws of former times with the universal standard of morality. We cannot .say that those statute laws were right or wrong, wise or otherwise, because wc do not know all the circumstances which they were made to meet. But be that as it may, those laws were not, and were not intended to be, the standard of right and wrong. They were special enactments made to meet special cases which the people of those times be- lieved, for reasons better knovvn to them than to us, to be necessary. We cannot account for the existence of prohibitory laws except by supposing the existence of that which is prohibited by them. There must there- fore have been some sort of a social nuisance called witchcraft, or laws would not have been made to sup- press it. If under these anti-witchcraft laws innocent people were put to death owing to imperfect modes of procedure, the same may be said of our own laws, for it must be admitted that under our laws against mur- der many an innocent man has been hanged. This, however, is no argument against the laws forbidding and punishing murder, or against the principal of trial by jury. Your argument against the punishment of witches is based on the assumption that there were no witches and therefore that all who were punished as such were innocent victims of a popular delusion. But this is a begging of the question. The belief in witchcraft, necromancy, goety and what is called modern spirit- ualism but which is as old as the human race, is based on the belief that non-material beings exist in the uni- verse, that the souls of men continue to exist after the TACTICS OP INFIDEIJS. 103 body is dissolved, and that these spirits and souls can communicate with those that still animate human bodies. This is a common or universal belief of the human race in all times, all places, of all nations and all tribes, civilized, semi-civilized or barbarous. It is found in the literature, customs and habits of all peo- ples. It is therefore exceedingly ridiculous to imagine that you can dismiss it with the same ease that you tip the ashes from your cigar. If there be not a basis of truth in this belief, how do you account for its uni- versality ? !s it not more rational to suppose it has a basis in truth than to suppose the human race to be constantly and persistently deceived ? Keep in mind also that this constant and universal drift in belief is in perfect consonance with divine revelation. It is found in both the Old and New Testament, as it is found in the books of every people that have a literature, and in the traditions of those who have not. It is not true to say as you do that witches are regarded under the present " regime ** as phantoms. True, the name " witch " is discarded but the thing remains, for there are more people " under the present regime^' or at the present time who believe in and practice communica- tion with spirits than there were in Judea or in the middle ages or in later times in France, England, Scotland and New England. In those times they were called witches, soothsayers, sibyls, pythons and pythonesses ; in our time they are called mediums, clairvoyants, spirit-rappers, etc. The names h ve changed but the thing remains. There is, no doLbt, much trickery and humbug in so-called modern spirit- ualism, but there never was a trick or a humbug or a lie that did not have in it a basis of truth — that was not a false presentation of a truth or a counterfeit of a 104 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. :l,.'. r . :! truth, and a counterfeit always supposes something genuine — else it would not be a counterfeft. Robert Dale Owen, in a work published twelve or fourteen years ago, stated that there were in the United States ten million spiritualists. Add to these the Sweeden- borgians and all Christians who believe in the possi- bility of spirits in the other world communicating with those in this and you will find that the vast majority of mankind believe to-day as the race has always be- lieved. I do not wish to be understood as approving the practices of spiritists, because they are condemned by the Old and New Testament, and by the church, but the belief on which those practices are based, that is, the belief in the possible and actual communication of intelligences in the other world with thoso in this is universal, and cannot be denied by those who be- lieve in revelation. The Old Testament recognizes the fact of such communications while it condemns the practice of it. " Neither let there be among you * * * any one that consulteth pythonical spirits, nor fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. For the Lord abhorreth all these things." (Deuteronomy i8 — lo to 12). Here in condeming the practice Moses admits the fact. Many other texts might be quoted to the same purport, but the above is sufficient. In the New Testament we have the fol- lowing : " It came to pass as we went to prayer, a cer- tain girl with a pythonical spirit (she would now be called a medium) met us, who brought her master much gain by divining, (a striking likeness between the ancient and modern medium.) The same, follow- ing Paul and us, cried out, saying : these men are the servants of the most high God, who show you the way to salvation. And this she did many days. But Paul, being grieved, turned and said to the spirit : I H: TACTICS OF lNFlt)ELS. 105 command thee in the name of Jesus Christ, to go out of her. And he went out at that same hour. But the masters, seeing that the hope of their gain w is gone, having apprehended Paul and Silas, they brought them into the market place to the rulers." (Acts 16 — 16 to 19.) Here again the fact of spirit communication is admitted and the practice condemned. It is evident then that a belief in the communica- tion of intelligences in one order of existence with in- telligences in another order of existence is a fact of our nature, a fact verified by revelation. The prac- tices of spiritism, necromancy, witchcraft, etc., have their foundation in this belief. Whether spiritists, witches, etc., really exist or have existed is not a mat- ter of doctrine but of fact, and as a matter of fact it must be considered and treated as any other fact that comes under our cognizance. Each particular case must be credited or discredited according to the evi- dence, for the belief in the possibility of persons hav- ing dealings with spirits does not imply that any par- ticular person has such dealings. We cannot argue the existence of a fact from its mere possibility. The question then is : Did ever witches or persons having dealings with spirits exist? In answering this ques- tion we must proceed just as we ' ould if the question were. Did ever murderers exist ? that is, we must con- sider the evidence. That persons have been executed for witchcraft on insufficient and even ridiculous evi- dence is clear from the records of trials for witchcraft in New England. Bui men have also been hanged for murder on insufficient evidence. It is easier and more rational to believe that persons were guilty of prac- tices that are known as witchcraft, than to believe that nations would make laws against practices that never had any existence. And if these practices existed, as ■■I, ", Iti ifi!;;' , 1 i , 106 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. they must have since they were the object of legisla- tion, and if society believed them to be injurious to its welfare it had the right to forbid them and punish the perpetrators. Even granting for the moment that witchcraft was a delusion, yet society had the right to legislate against the real evils produced by the delu- lusion, and the right to legislate against an effect im- plies the right to legislate against the cause of it. Lacy, By the old rule it was right to cremate * * * heretics. Lambert. The intelligent student of, human na- ture knows that " heresy " is always punished in one way or another. The political heretics of the south were punished by the killing of thousands of their people. Society wil) always punish those whom it be- lieves, rightly or wrongly, to be inimical to its well being. Poets and philosophers may gush and gas, but they cannot change human nature. Nations, like individuals, have the instinct of self-preservation and will always punish what they conceive to be an attack on their stability. And it ni?.kes no difference whether the attack be in the form of a religious or political in- novation. In Protestant countries Catholics were con- siderjed heretics and enemies of the state and were treated accordingly. In Catholic countries the same thing took place with the difference that the glove was on the other hand. They were both right in princi- ple, but both failed in its proper application, for the principle that society has a right to destroy that which threatens its existence is unquestionable. But if Ingersoll's doctrine be true, that all the events in the universe are but links in the unalterable chain of fate, on what theory do you or he condemn the witch hangings and persecutions of the past ? If TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 107 those events are but inevitable links in the chain the perscutors were as guiltless as their victims. Ingersoll. It will not do to say the universe is designed and therefore there must be a designer. Lacy. Listen to the profound comment of the Father. Notes. Why not if all have a right to give their honest thoughts ? iMcy. In such stuff the cotton of Catholicity with which it closes the eyes and stops the ears of its votaries ? Lambert. It is the stuft* with which to stop In- gersoll's mouth by jamming his own nonsense down his throat. Lacy. Does not the Father know that the words " it will not do to say " imply only that it is not logi- cal to say ? Lambert. The Father knows that it is logical to infer a designer from the evidences of design and he de- nies that Ingersoll meant to imply the contrary. Even you admit this when you say that ** tiiere is great force in this argument," for you certainly would not admit force in an argument that is not logical. The argu- ment from design is stated thus in logical form : • That which shows evidences 0/ design had a designer. The World shows evidence of design. Therefore the world had a designer. To say, as you translated Ingersoll as saying, that this argument is not logical is to confess ignorance of the first principles of syllogistic reasoning. If there be any weak point in the argument it must be sought for elsewhere than in its logic. We must say to Inger- soll's credit, that he did not dispute the logic of the above argument ; he disputed the truth of the minor I 'I V ■. ^ s-ii ":<\ 108 TACTICS OF INTIDELS. premise, namely, that " the world shows evidences of design," and the truth of this is to be looked for in ex- perience and in the facts of nature, not in logic. When we see tracks of a human foot in the snow we say a human being has passed over it. When we see an in- tricate piece of machinery, a watch for instance, so con- structed as to accomplish a design, we conclude that a designer threw his intention into the inert matter and made it go. When I read your " Reply " and find the thousands of letters of which it is composed so arranged that they convey a meaning ; the pages regularly num- bered ; the half of a word at the foot of one page finished on the top of the next, I must conclude that there is an intelligent design in all this. In a word the " Reply " shows evidences of design, for I cannot believe that all these intelligent combinations were the result of chance ; that the paper was made by chance, that the types were made and fell into their positions by chance, that the paper was folded, cut, and bound by chance. I must believe that behind all these there was a directing intelligence. Now when we turn to the Book of Nature we find like evidences of intelligence, intention, design, in its beauty, order and harmony, in the adaptation of means to the end, just as we find design in a watch, a locomotive or in a book. We may not understand fully the design but we see enough to know that there ts a design. It will then " do " to say : There are in the world evidences of design, and that therefore it had a designer. Although the argument from design is forcible, it is by no means the only one adduced by Christian philosophers to prove the exis- tence of God, and IngersoU acts the part of a special pleader when he leaves the impression that it is the only one. '. tl CHAPTER XI. H Lacy. Some have believed in an eternal succes- sion of being and unless disproved by science it is dif- ficult to logically controvert the possibility of such succession. Lambert. The eternal succession of which you speak is a logical absurdity and an ontological para- dox. Succession exist only in things that succeed in moments of time. An eternal number of successions is an infinite number, but an infinite number of suc- cessions cannot exist, for the sum total of these suc- cessions must be a particular, definite number, and the moment you fix a number you will immediately discover that it is finite. A number may be potentially infinite. But it cannot be in reality so because it in- volves a contradiction. , I have called your attention to this before. LMcy. We can as readily apprehend the idea of a chain composed of successive links coextensive with space as we can the infinite extension of space itself Lambert. Yes, as readily, that is to say, not at all. We have seen in a former article that according to the agnostic ph'losopher, Herbert Spencer, " space ii. that which is left behind when all realities are absent." That is to say, that absolute space, space considered without reference to things, is nothing, and nothing has no extension, finite or infinite. In this Spencer agrees with Christian philosophers. Now Mr. Lacy, we cannot " readily " apprehend the idea of nothing. We cannot imagine an infinite chain as ex- isting, for a chain to exist must have a certain number l^'TTW no TACTICS OF INFIDELS. of links. This number may be greater or less, but it must be a fixed number. It may have ten links or ten billion links, but the moment you fix a number you iiave a limit and your chain is finite. An infinite chain is one whose length can admit of no addition, for if an addition be made to it, it was evidently not in- finite before that addition is made. Now try if you can to imagine a chain whose length would not be in- creased by the addition of another chain of equal length. Your error consists in mistaking the infinite possibility of increasing the chain and attributing that possibility to the chain itself, whereas the infinity is ot the possibility, and not of the chain. You deceive yourself when you imagine that you can imagine an infinite chain or infinite space. But even suppose you could, it would prove nothing to your purpose, be- cause it would be always only an imaginary chain and as such would want the first essential condition of a true infinite, namely, real being, for nothing can be in- '| finite that has not real existence, or is not an attribute of real being. Lacy. Again, the belief in a plurality of gods meets us as a doctrine held by some of the greatest minds of antiquity, and which in former times was believed in by the great majority of ignorant and educated. Lambert. But what has this to do with Inger- soU's objection to the argument from the design? You have unconsciously rambled away from the ques- tion you started on. But no matter. If we go back to the highest antiquity of which we have any records we find that all peoples originally believed in one God and that they gradually fell into polytheism or the be- lief in many gods. But although they came to belfeve >i. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. MI in -many gods they always believed there was above them all one Supreme Being, so that a belief in one Supreme Being is common to all men in all times, Christian, Jew, Mahomedan and pagan. Lacy, Even the Jews believed the gods of the heathens were real deities, though far inferior to Jehovah. Lambert. In making this statement you have followed with passive sequacity.some author as unre- liable as IngersoU himself The Old Testament is the best authority on the belief of »the Jews. The follow- ing texts will show that you were deceived and misled by the authority on which you relied. " That thou mightest know that the Lord he is God, and there is no other beside him y (Deuteronomy 4-35.)" See ye that I alone am, and thetr is no other God besides me'' (Ibid 32-39.) " Therefore thou art magnified, O Lord God, because there is none like to thee ; neither is there ^ any God besides thee. (2 Kings 7-22.) " For there is no other God but thou." (Wisdom 12-13.) " There is no other God beside thee O Lord." (Eccli. 36-5.) *' Before me there was no God formed, and after me there .shall be none." (Isa 43-11.) "lam the first and I am the last ; and besides me there is no God." (Ibid 44-6.) " Remember the former age, for I am God and there is no God beside." (Ibid 46-9.) The Roman historian, Tacitus, a contemporary of Josephus. in his account of the Jews, says : " The Jews have no notion of any more than one Divine Being, and that known only to the mind." Lacy. Christian theology also affirms that there are three Gods, co-equal and infinite in every divine attribute, although declaring that the three are in some inexplicable sense, one. fl^B r; ^ i,F :ii ,1 1 '■*' Hi- I ;i iii||;; 112 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lambert. This is the kind of stuff infidel writers feed their credulous dupes on. It is difficult to un- derstand how one brought up in a Christian commun- ity, and pretending to know anything about even the simplest elements of Christianity, could honestly make the above statement. If he can make such an ignor- ant blunder about the belief of those among whom he lives, what reliance can we place on his statements about the ancient Jews or about the principles that governed the thoughts of men in former times ? A Sunday school boy of ten years who, after studying the first three chapters of his catechism, should make such a statement as Mr. Lacy makes, would richly de- serve to be spanked for inattention or pitied for his si ipidity. And yet this modest defender of Ingersoll pi intends to know and criticise Christian theology ! " Christian theology affirms that there are three Gods ! " The man who makes such a statement sacri- fices all claim to consideration as a scholar, or to hav- ing the most ordinary knowledge of the subject he elects to talk about. Yet this is the kind of people who are most flippant and noisy about theology, the Bible, and Moses. They are always as ready, as a self-cocking pistol, to give their " honest " and ignor- ant contents. Here is the author of a book, who un- dertakes to treat of philosophy, revelation and Chris- tian theology, and who attributes to Christians a doc- trine they not only do not hold, but which they have in all times condenmed ! And this ignorant upstart states it as if it were a matter about which there is no doubt whatever. Can any language be too severe for such an offense ? If he be ignorant of the Christian doc- trine on this subject he is too ignorant to discuss Christian theology in a cross road grocery ; and if he TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 113 be not ignorant of the Christian doctrine of the unity of God, and yet made in cold type the above statement, what are we to think of him ? Does not his statement justify me in dismissing him as too ignorant or too dishonest to deal with in discussing the great ques- tion at issue ? I think it does, and yet I continue to make his book the text of what I have to say because my purpose is beyond an u'^'erior to the personality of this most worthy disciple of Ingersoll. " Christian theology affirms that there are three Gods ! " That is what he says, and were it not printed in clear type and in black ink I could not be- lieve that it could have been written by any sane man in the nineteenth century. It is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity that there is but one God. On this point cUl Christians agree But it appears, according to Mr. Lacy, that Chris- tian theology declares the three gods to be " in some inexplicable sense, one." Christian theology makes no such affirmation, because it is contrary to reason that three Gods can be in the,same sense three Gods and one God. Here again this disciple misrepresents Christianity. Christian theology affims that there are not three Gods, but one God, one divine nature, and that in this one divine nature there are three persons. The unity is asserted of the divine nature, the tri-unity of the divine persons, and it does not require more than average brains to understand that nature and person- ality are not one and the same thing. But, says Mr. Lacy, it is " inexplicable." It is I inexplicable how one can be one and three at the same ||time and in the same sense, but that is precisely what Christi^in theology does not affirm. When it affirms ■I f. i '.I i 1 i 114 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. unity and trinity of God it does not affim them in the same sense. It asserts that the divine nature is one ; the divine persons, three. But you may urge that even this is inexplicable. It is easily explained. Thus, Is not human nature one? Human nature is the union of animality and rationality. Anything that is not this is not human. Now does this unity or oneness of human nature make many human persons impossible ? To say so is to deny the facts of life. The oneness which we affirm of humanity refers to the nature of humanity, and the multiplicity we assert of it refers to persons. Humanity then is evidently one and multiple at the same time, though not in the same sense. Just so, God is one and three. This explanation will enable you to understand those divine words, *• Let us make man to our own image and likeness," and teach you what every Christian is supposed to know, that in making man or humanity after his own image and likeness God made him both one and multiple, and that the likeness was not to cons, st in individual form. While on this point •let us go a little farther. We cannot conceive humanity to exist at all except as one and three, just as God is one and three. All the mil- lions of human beings that have existed or shall exist on this earth must be traced down to i\\G family. The family is the father, the mother and the child. With- out these three human society is inconceivable in the | order of nature. The family has in it all the potential- ities of human nature and without it human nature! would cease to be. The family then is the type ofl humanity. Let us look at this mysterious thing called! so unreflectingly "the family." It is composed ofl man the father, man the mother, and man the child [ m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. •115 It is essentially one and essentially three. Man the father, comes direct from God, man the mother comes from man the father, (from Adam's side) and man the child comes from the love between man th j father and man the mother. Such is human nature. " Let us make man to our own image " said the eternal Father. Let us now go back to God the Father the first per- son of the Trinity. From him proceeds God the Son, and the love between the Father and the Son, is the Holy Ghost. Here is unity of nature and trinity of persons, just as we find in humanity (the family) unity of nature and trn^ity of persons. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost — man the father, man the mother and man the child. Here is the image and likeness of God in humanity and here is to be found the meaning of those divine words, " Let us make to our image and likeness." Observe that the three persons are so co- related that one cannot be con- ceived without the others. To be a father there must be a son, to be a son there must be a father, and so bf mother and son ; thus each supposes the others and is necessary to a conception of them. This explana- tion affords a key to what Ingersoll calls the " rib story." Why did the Creator take a rib from Adam's side to make Eve ? Because in making man or hu- manity to his own image and likeness, he must make the second human person proceed from the first, as the second divine person proceeds from the first, and the third human person from the first and the second as the third divine person proceeds from the first and the r second. When Moses wrote that God took a rib from .Adam's side and made the woman, he stated one of |the most profound and significant facts of all time, a fact which images forth that eternal relation which Ii6 TACTICS OF 1NF11>ELS. ; ' si; m exists between the three divine persons who said " Let us make man — humanity — in our own image and likeness." Lacy. But in the statement of this doctrine (the unity of God) and its consequences Catholics and Protestants do not agree. Lambert. Here again is a pitiful display of ig- norance. In disputing with modern infidels about half one's time must be given to correcting their miscon- ceptions and misstatements. Protestants, except Uni- terians, and Catholics agree as to the unity and trinity of God, as a reference to their theological literature will show. Lacy. One holding that Mary was the Mother of God, the other repudiating this dogma. Lambert. However Catholics and Protestants may differ as to the office and place of Mary in the divine economy, their differences do not relate to the unity and trinity of God, which is the question on which you say they differ. But the difference between Catholics and Protestants on the relation of Mary to God is not as you represent. Even this you could not get straight.. In the first place Catholics do not believe Mary to be the mother of God in the sense that God had no existence until he was bom of her. , The Catholic doctrine is that Mary is the mother of the humane nature of Christ the second person of the eternal trinity ; that this second person is from eternity — eternal; that he assumed human nature of Mary some 1,900 years ago. If I mistake not this is the doctrine also of Protestant theol- ogy. Catholics believe Mary to be a creature of God, I as all of us are, but that she was selected by Him to be that mysterious link which unites the divine nature! TACTICS OF INFIDELS. n; to human nature in the Christ and that on account of this, her extraordinary and unique relation to God, she is deserving of our special love and venera- tion — not that she is divine, but that God has exalted and honored her above all other creatures. The facts on which this reverence is based is admitted by Prot- estants and Catholics alike. Lacy. If the Catholic be correct, the Protertant •is withholding from one to whom honor is due as unto the next to God in honor and glory ; while, if the Protestant is right, Maryolatryls idolatry. Lambert. The Catholic is right in honoring Mary and the Protestant is also right in condemning Maryol- atry. Maryolatry is the worship of Mary as a goddess as the heathen worshipped their goddesses. There is a vast difference between worsnipping her in this way and honoring her because God honored her. There was a sect in ancient times that worshipped Mary as a goddess, but it was promptly condemned land anathematized by the Christian church. Your cunningly worded insinuation that Catholics are guilty of idolatry because they venerate one whom JGod so highly favored is in perfect keeping with the [tortuous spirit of the whole paragraph in which it is [found. Catholics and Protestants may differ in the [degree of their veneration of Mary, as Catholics them- [selves differ, some yielding her more, others less ; but [all agree as to the facts, so clearly set forth in the [scriptures, on which that veneration is based. s ! iJ I II M CHAPTER Xn. Ingersoll. Was there no design in having an infinite designer ? Notes. None whatever, since there cannot be anything back of an infinite and eternal designer. There can be nothing more infinite, nothing prior to the eternal. It is as if you should ask : Is there anything more circular than a circle, anything squarer than a square ? Lacy. Certainly ; but the " eternal " part of it is the very question in debate. This is assumed by one dash of the pen, the point in dispute. Lambert. The "eternal" part of it is not the point ; nor is anything assumed. The question here between Ingersoll and me was not as to the existence of an infinite and eternal designei but whether, on the hypothesis that such a designer exists, there could be back of and independent of him a design ? Or, grant- ing the existence of an infinite designer, can there be back of him another infinite designer who designed him, and another back of him again, etc ? In a word, can there be an infinite series of designs and designers. This is IngersoU's question, to which I replied in the negative, because there can be nothing anterior to or back of the infinite and eternal; and this is true whether there really exists an infinite designer or not. In not distinguishing between a question of possibility and a question of fact you failed to discover the real point in dispute. To say that there is anything more infinite than the infinite or more eternal than the eternal is to fall into an evident contradiction, just as TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 119 he does who says there is something squarer than a square or more circular than a circle. To say that A is more infinite or eternal than B, is to deny the infinity and eternity of B. IngersoU's question must then be answered in the negative, and this without any refer- ence as to whether an infinite designer actually exists or not. IngersolL It is somewhat difficult to discern the design or the benevolence in so making the world that billions of animals live on the agonies of others. Notes. Until you prove that God so made the world that billions of animals live on the agonies of others, you are not called upon to discern design or benevolence in this agonizing state of things. It does not follow because agony exists that God designed it to be so. It is for you to prove that God designed this suffering before you should attribute It to him. You should be just — even to God. Lacy, (i.) Can it be possible that Father Lam- bert fails to see the issue raised by Mr. IngersoU's re- mark ? or that he is ignorant of the scientific facts to which he alludes? or, no, he would not intentionally mislead those whom it is his duty to point heavenward. (2.) Therefore I say — for I think I understand the Father — that he attributes all the suffering in the ani- mal kingdom to the primal sin of Adam. If not, if God did not design it, to what does he impute that suffering ? Lambert. For the sake of convenience of refer- ence I have numbered the points in the above, (i.) The Father notices with some surprise that the disciple has failed to understand his master. IngersoU is try- ing to prove the invalidity of the argument from de- sign which is urged by theologians in proof of the \% fc; ''8 K\ ;i„ C .i l.i ... r :' • 1 120 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ¥■ 'I'-t' existence of God. In his effort to do this he says, " it is diflficult to discern the design, etc." His purpose is to show that there is no design ; that all events are but links in the endless chain of fate. Hence he had no inference to the scientific facts referred to by you, for these facts as adduced by you prove design, the very thing IngersoU denies. It is amusing to see you, while defending IngersoU, arguing tooth and nail against his thesis, — and doing it in apparent uncon- sciousness of the fact. IngersoU denies that there is in the universe any evidence whatever of design, and forthwith Mr. Lacy, like the too willing witness, un- dertakes to prove that there are evidences of design ! " If God did not design it (the suffering of animals) to what does he (Father Lambert) impute that suffering ? " asks Mr. Lacy. He goes on to prove from scientific discoveries that there is design in the universe. In this he agrees with the theologians against IngersoU. He spends half a page talking of the teeth, stomach, and structural parts of animals to prove that the suffer- ings of animals were designed, forgetting in his scien- tific exuberance, that IngersoU denies that there is any design whatever ! Suppose I grant for argument's sake that because some animals are flesh eaters, animal sufferings were designed, what follows ? It follows of course thatthere was a design and therefore a designer. The very thing theologians insist on and which Inger- soU denies. It is a good thing for a polemic to know on which side of a question he is, and to have enough sense to keep on it. But you will say : If God designed animal suffer- ing he cannot be good or benevolent. My dear sir, the goodness or badness of the de- signer is not in question just now. The question at ■^'^^. TACTICS OF INFIDfiLS. 121 present is as to the existence of a designer, the nature of his designs will be considered in its proper place. His existence once settled, the goodness or badness of his designs will be in order. You have admitted design in the universe even though you conceive it to be a cruel one and therefore you have admitted a de- signer. This admission on your part is of vast im- portance, and far-reaching in its effects so far as you are concerned. It makes you stand out in opposition to your master, and simplifies the question between you and me. It admits the full force of the theologi- cal argument from design to prove the existence of a Supreme designer. (2.) When you think you understand the Father you mistake. You don't understand him, when you imagine he attributes all animal suffering to Adam's sin. It would be more prudent in you to confine your rhetoric to what the Father said, and not spend your time in discussing what you imagine he might, could, would or should have meant. 1 (3.) If God did not design the sufferings of ani- mals who did ? This question supposes that all things that happen were originally designed — ^an assumption which cannot be admitted. It is a begging of the question. Before you attribute animal suffering to God you must prove that it was originally designed by God as an essential phase of life. This is what I required Ingersoll to do, and my purpose should have [been evident to you. Had he undertaken, unwarily as you did, to prove evidences of design in the forma- htion of the teeth and stomachs of animals he would have cut the throat of his own thesis, which is that [there are no evidences of design. I i; it 122 TACTICS 01^ INPlDfil^. v< Lacy. If design can be seen in nature, teeth, stomach, etc., of animals indicate that they were origi- nally intended to feed upon each other. Lambert. Design can be seen in nature or it can- not. If it can then Ingersoll's theory is wrong, and a designer exists. If design cannot be seen in nature your reasoning is all in vain. To agree with Inger- soU you must deny the existence of design, and to convict God of being the designer of animal suffering you must admit design. Strange as it may seem, you try to advocate both these two conflicting theories. Lacy. • If then, death and suffering did exist be- fore human transgressions (as science teaches us it did) why claim that contrary to all analogy, t/ie effect goes before its cause f Lambert. As it is not claimed that all suffering in the universe is caused by human transgression it is not necessary to place the effect before the caiise. The reason for these sufferings will be seen further on. Lacy. Waiving the hardships to prattlir g infancy, in that the child must suffer for sin committed six thousand years before it was born, does it seem just that dumb brutes should endure uncompensated suf- fering because " In Adam's fall We sinned all." Lambert. Why does the infant of to-day suf- fer because Adam sinned six thousand years ago? The answer is this. A possible being to exist in this world must exist as an individual. To exist as an in- dividual it must exist as some kind or species of indi- vidual. It must exist as man, animal, vegetable or mineral. In whatever class of beings it assumes in- dividuality or personality, it must assume the condi- ^ 11 TACTICS OP INFIDELS. 1^3 tions of that class. As merely possible being it has no choice of the nature it is to assume. Its place in existence is assigned it by him who has the power to give it existence. If it individualizes as a plant it is subject to the laws and conditions of that class of be- ings ; if as a brute it is under the laws and conditions of that class ; if as man it is subject to the laws and conditions of manhood or humanity, whatever those conditions may be or however they may have come about. Now Adam was not only a man, but he was the man, the only man and aside from him there was no humanity on earth. He was humanity, and Eve was human because she was from Adam. Now whatever condition Adam was in when he begot his like, in that condition his like must exist, because they are his like. A progenitor can not give more than he is. If human- ity when called Adam put itself in a certain condition or state, humanity when called John Doe or Richard' Roe will be found in that state. The child then is guilty of humanity's sin because it is human, and as human it is subject to the disadvantages of humanity — of that class of beings to which it belongs — it also has the advantages of its class. It is no more difficult to imagine how the prattling infant takes its guilt from Adam than it is to understand how it takes its exist- ence and form from him through numberless inter- mediate individuals and thousands of years. The child born of an exile is an exile. As to animals, even granting that their sufferings were designed, we can see benevolence in it. If they did not die the world would soon be uninhabitable. The same would be the case if they died and were left I to decay. The economy of death makes the greater ; number of lives possible. It is more beneficent that In pi 124 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. billions of animals may live for a time and die than that a comparative few should live^nd not die; better that the world should be the temporary abode of many succeeding generations of beings than be the perma- nent abode of one generation ; better that one genera- tion become the sepulchre of the preceding one than that the latter should in its decay and corruption make the conditions of life impossible on earth ; better to be if but for an hour than not to be ; better that a thousand animals should live one year than that one should live a thousand years. The law of the happi- ness of the greatest number on earth makes death necessary. Animals destroy each other, yet that very destruc- tion has its effect in diminishing the sufferings of want, disease and senile decay. " The essence of all suffer- ing is mental. It is not the sensation, pure and simple, jut such sensation accompanied by intellectual con- sciousness and reflection, which is so fearfully distres- sing. This distrust the brute creation is spared ; they suffer but never reflect on their sufferings, and there- fore cannot be truly said to 'know' them." Before pain can be used as an argument against divine benevolence it must be shown that the sum total of pain in the life of an individual or in the universe is greater than the sum total of pleasure and the absence of pain. This cannot be done. That all animals, including man, love life with all its pains is evident from the fact that they preserve life as long as they can. Lacy, (i.) No heaven could we covet where we must lose the identity of self — (2) forget the past with its memories of moral battles fought and won — (3) of friendships so dear and loves so holy that heaven would not be heaven if it denied their continuance. M TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 125 Lambert, (i. We are conscious that we are, and that we are ourselves and not some one else. That this conscious identity will continue in the unending future is a Christian doctrine. If it be not true heaven would not be heaven nor hell hell, for what is happi- ness or misery to him who is not conscious that it is he that is happy or miserable ? (2.) The past with its memories of moral battles fought and won is a source of happiness to man here and hereafter, but the past with its iniquities done, its crimes and injustices committed, what of 2/ .^ Why do you leavt this side of the picture out of your poet- ical effusion ? Will not the memory of this past make a hell even of heaven ? Will not the, memory of evil deeds be as heated plow-shares to the evil-doer? Memory to the good will be a part of their heaven and to the wicked the memory of their evil deeds and op- opportunities willfully lost will be a part, and no small part, of their hell. (3.) Friendships pure, loves holy, emotions noble, aspirations sublime ! What are they but qualities im- planted in our nature by the Creator. But what of the ignoble friendshipi> and unholy loves ? Are these to receive the same reward ? They may both con- tinue but certainly not in the same place. Even in this world the true man will bar his door against the immoral wretch who seeks a place among his children at his fireside. Yet, according to you, God is a Mo- loch if he does not admit this unrepentant aud rotten wretch into the company of the pure, true and noble ! Are the evil-doers not to be punished because their punishment may afflict loving relatives! Should friendship, love, affection prevent the State from pun- ishing criminals ? Should a murderer go unhung be- cause his death afflicts a loving mother or wife? !■! •' \. I 126 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Should a spurious sentiment here stand in the way of social order or justice ? Certainly not. Neither will it in heaven. God wills the conversion of the sinner and gives him the means of salvation, but if he per- severes in his course he brings destruction on him- self. He has no one but himself to blame. He is the arbiter of his own destiny. Lacy. Those of us who revere a Supreme Spirit bow not to a Moloch, etc. Lambert. You certainly are not one of those who revere the Supreme Spirit, for you tell us that you are a disciple of IngersoU who denies the existence of such Spirit. Lacy. Suffering in the moral world is the child of violated law. Lambert. This is an important admission. It chimes perfectly with what I said in Notes as to the origin of human ills in this world. You seem to have the ability to talk not only on either side, but on both sides at the same time. '*y. w CHAPTER XIII. Lacy. To do justice to Mr. Ingersoll, as well as to show how fragmentary are the Father's citations from him, I will quote, somewhat at length, I will do justice even to an infidel. Lambert. After making the quotation Mr. Lacy observes : iMcy. In the brief excerpt which the Father quotes from the above, " The justice of God is not vis- ible to me in this world," Mr. Ingersoll only states an orthodox sentiment, etc. Lambert. The charge made here is that I was unfair to Ingersoll because I gave only a brief excerpt from a long passage of his argument. The reader will be somewhat surprised at this charge when he learns that, with the exception of the first sentence, which does not belong to the argument, and two parenthetic sentences equally irrelevant, I quoted every word of Ingersoll's reply as quoted by Mr. Lacy : that instead of selecting out one short excerpt, I replied to the ivhole argument sentence by sentence ^ and that I devoted the whole of chapter fourth of Notes and the greater part of chapter fifth to it ! This is a fact, and from it the reader can judge for himself of the value of Mr. Lacy's statement. Ingersoll. The justice of God is not visible to me in this world. Lambert. Granted that it is not visible to you, are you so forgetful of the requirements of logic as to advance your inability to see it as a proof that God is not just in his management of this world ? That 13 ii F Mil !iV::v 128 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. the inference you intend to be drawn, but your state- ment does not rise to the dignity of an argument. It reminds one of the defense of the thief who was ac- cused of stealing a coat. Two witnesses swore they saw him steal it. In rebuttal he offered to bring fifty witnesses who did not see him steal it. It is needless to say he was convicted. Poor Artemus Ward used to say " I do not see it in those lamps." tie meant it for wit, and never dreamt that his idea would be pur- loined and adapted to philosophical investigation by the hierophant of modern philosophical knownothing- i^m. Lacy, (i.) Mr. IngersoU only states an ortho- dox sentiment proclaimed from the pulpit thousands of times a week. (2.) It accords with scripture ; (3) it is the oft and sad refrain of the songs of modern Zion, and of afflicted and pious hearts everywhere. (4.) All say, " we know not wiiy it is that sin defiles us, that siv-kness tortures us, and that death, cold and ghastly death, is the conqueror of all." Lambert, (i.) My objection was to Mr. Inger- soU's implied inference that God's justice is not in the woHJ, because it is not visible to him, the omniscient Tiigersoll. This inference was the point and pith of his remark, and my purpose was to direct attention to it and show its fallacy. The sentiment of IngersoU as to the justice of God is not, as you assert, proclaimed from the pulpit. The wickedness and miseries of mari are portrayed and deplored, but the pulpit does not assert the invisibility of divine justice in the world. On the contrary it asserts the divine justice in all his- tory, and sees evidences of it even in human suffering: Yo J confound its threnodies over the miseries of man with Ingersoll's denials of the justice of God. IM^;; TACTICS OF INFIDKLS. I2g " It accords with the scriptures." This is equally as false as what you say about the pulpit. Here is what the Scriptures say about the justice of God. He is just and right. — Deutoronomy 32-4, He is faithful and just. — i John 1-9. I am the Lord who search and prove the reins, who give to every one according to the fruit of his devices. — Jeremiah 17-10. For he will render to every man according to his works ; and according to the ways of every one He will reward them. For in very deed, God will not condemn without cause ; neither will the Almighty pervert judgment. — ^Job 34-11. He shall judge the world with justice, and the l^eople with truth. — Psalm 95-1 3. Behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every one according to his works. — Apocalypse 22-12. I might quote page after page if necessary. But the above is enough to show that you are as much in error about what the Scriptures say as you are about what the pulpit says. (3.) " It is the oft and sad refrain of the songs of modern Zion, and of afflicted and pious hearts every- where." • Here again you Confound the lamentations over the miseries of man with IngersoU's declaration that God's justice is not visible. You forget that modern Zion sees in human sufferings evidences of that divine justice which the infidel says are invisible. Suffering and justice are not incompatible. On the contrary they frequently go hand in hand as every judge and juryman in the country will tell you, although it is not always visible to the criminal. Afflicted and pious hearts recognize and experience 130 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I- suffering, but this recognition is in no sense equivalent to Ingersoll's declaration that the justice of God is in- visible; and this simple fact explodes your theory that all agree with the infidel's sentiment. The afflicted and pious hearts say " Thy will be done," knowing that the divine will is always just, although they may not understand its workings in a given case. (4.) All say, " we do not know why sin defiles us," No, they do not. All Christians say sin is a state or condition arising from disobedience. Its why and how is therefore perfectly apparent. All say, " we know not why sickness tortures us." How does this accord with your own declaration that " suffering in the moral world i.- the child of vio- lated law ? " Here you give a sound reajjon why sick- ness tortures us, a reason which you evidently had forgotten when you perpetrated the above gush. All say, " we know not how death, cold, ghastly death, is the conqueror of all." No they don't, for all know that death is the result of the natural law of physical decomposition — the law of growth and decay; the law by which matter is con- stantly changing its forms. Notes. If there is an infinite, self-existent being, he must from his very nature, be infinite in everything ; and if infinite in everything, infinite in his justice. To assert that he is not infinitely just is to deny his exist- ence, but your statement supposes his existence, and therefore his infinite justice. Lacy. All this is mere assertion without proof. It is worse ; it is an unintelligible medley. Lambert. On the hypothesis that an infinite, self- existent Being exists, it follows as a necessary consQ- TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I3> qucnce that he is infinite in every perfection, for to lack any perfection is fatal to the concept of an infinite being. You may deny the existence of a triangle, but if you admit it, you must admit also the existence of its angles. To admit one and deny the other is to fall into absurdity. In the same way, once admit the existence of an infinite Being and you must also admit the existence of all the attributes necessary to the reality of that being. But you admit the existence of the infinite being, therefore "you must admit all his in- finite perfections. To deny infinite attributes is to deny infinity. Therefore you must assert the infinite at- tributes or perfections, if you assert infinite being. Justice is a perfection, therefore it must be asserted of the infinite being. Thus you see that the infinite jus- tice of God follows necessarily from the admission of his existence. All this may seem " an unintelligible medley " to you, but I think there are readers who have intelligence enough to understand it. Let us however go a little further for your benefit. The infinite being must be infinitely good. To deny goodness of him is to deny a perfection, and to deny him a perfection is to deny his infinity, for that which is not perfect cannot be infinite, as the limit to its per- fection would limit and therefore destroy its infinity.' But it is granted in the hypothesis that he is infinite — hence he is infinitely good. This Being, because infinitely good, must love good and hate evil, reward the one and punish the other. In this, and in its ap- plication to acts, consists justice. Justice is founded on goodness — it is goodness most wisely administered. Now what does goodness exact in regard to the guilty ? It requires that they be punished neither more nor less than is necessary to repair offended order. This I'i .!'■ ; 132 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. IP is also what justice requires when wisely used. Good- ness per se loves every individual, and in this respect it is inclined to do good rather than evil to the guilty, but inasmuch as it is intelligent goodness it differs from blind goodness where individual good conflicts with the common good. Then goodness wisely used should, on account of the love it has for the common good, punish the individual offender as far as is neces- sary* to satisfy offended order or the common good ; and on account of the love it has for the offender, it should punish no more than is necessary to ma^^e the proper reparation. In other words, the punishment inflicted by intelligent goodness should be the least that is compatible with the common good. In this consists the essence of justice. The supreme authority in a community which punishes with neither too great severity nor too great lenity, is, for that reason said to be just. This goodness wills good, not evil, to the individual, even to the guilty, and therefore prefers to benefit rather than punish. It wills that the whole com- munity be tranquil, orderly and free from disturbance. It must therefore will the punishment necessaiy to bring about this result. That power then \sjust which, on account of its love for the common good, does not punish too lightly to secure the common good or more severely than necessary to effect it. Now it is this perfect adjustment of the means to the end in the moral order that constitutes the infinite justice of God — infinite goodness and infinite wisdom unitedly exercised. All this is implied in your admis- sion that an infinite Being exists. Lacy. Suppose we never before heard of God and were told for the first time that he is a self^xistent, infinite being, would not our first inquiry be : " Infinite in what ? " ti '■ : _C^^ m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 133 Lambert. This would be a natural inquiry for one who had no idea of the meaning of the words " infinite being," and the proper way to answer him would be to instruct him in the meaning of those words and what they necessarily imply. Suppose we had never before heard of a triangle and were told for the first time that it is a three angled figure. What would you think of the intelligeaice of the man who would ask, " Three angled is what ? " Would he^ not need instruction in the meaning of the terms ? Just so the other. The idea of infinite being carries with it necessarily every perfection ; if any perfection is wanting or limited, the idea of infinite being is im- mediately lost, just as the idea of a triangle is lost when the number of its angles is changed. Lacy. If answered that he is infinite in every holy attribute, would we not further ask : " How do you know this ? " Lambert. If ^'^ou asked this question, you should be answered hy being told the meaning of the terms " infinite being." Infinity in every holy attribute is as essential to the idea of infinite being as three angles are to the idea of a triangle. We know the infinite being has these attributes because without them he would not be infinite being. You admit he exists and therefore you must admit he has the attributes that necessarily follow. Lacy. The Scriptures deal not in this patristic knowledge. Lambert. When the Scriptures call God I Am Who Am they say everything implied by the phrase " infinite being " — that God is essentially all-perfect infinite, independent, immutable, eternal, omnipotent, etc., for the word Je-ho-vah implies all these. 134 TAdtlCS OP INFIDELS. fiiii Lacy, (i.) But to dispose of the assertion that ir/inity of being combined with self-existence implies " infinite justice," we remark, that (2) infinity can scarcely be predicated of justice. (3.) It is doubtful whetlver any attribute can be properly described as infinite which does not admit of degrees of comparison Lambert, (i.) The naivete of this is refreshing. To dispose of my assertion you remark, etc. Whether my- deduction of infinite justice from the idea of infinite being be a mere assertion or not I leave the reader to judge. (2.) " Infinity can scarcely be predicated of jus- tice." Scarcely ? It either can or cannot. There is no middle ground. Your remark neither affirms nor denies the point in question, and therefore disposes of nothing. (3.) " It is doubtful whether any attribute can be properly described as infinite which does not ad- mit of degrees of comparison." Here again you do not affirm or deny anything. You merely doubt it. And this is the way you dispose of my assertion is it ? The infinite, because it is infinite, admits of no degrees of comparison. To compare is to put two things or ideas together and discover their difference of degree in that (juality in which the comparison is made. Their difference is found in the difference of their lim- itations, therefore things that have no limitations can- not be compared. Lacy. We cannot say with philosophical pro- priety — just, more just, most just. Lambert. Here at least you say something, but it is not true, because it is contrary to a well known principle of logic which is, that the predicate or at- TACtlCS Ot* INFIDELS. >3S tribute of an aflfirmative proposition is limited in its extent to the extent of the subject of which it is pred- icated. In other words an adjective applied to a noun is limited in its extension to that noun. When I say A is just, justice is asserted of A only and is limited to him ; and as he is finite the justice predicated of him id finite, according to the axiom of logic that the predicate can have no greater extension than its sub- ject. The justice then of A, B, or C, is finite and there- fore admits of degrees of comparison. Hence we can with philosophical propriety and logical accuracy say, A is just. B is more just, C is most just. In attribut- ing justice to God there is no need of using the word " infinite," for as according to the axiom, that the ex- tension of the attribute is equal to the extension of the subject, the justice asserted of God must be infinite since he the subject of the attribute "just," is infinite. Jus- tice to be anything more than a sound or a word, must exist in beings. In finite beings it is limited because they are limited : in the infinite being it has no limits, it is infinite because he is infinite. You may affirm or deny justice of God, but when you affirm it at all you affirm it without limit. Lacy. When we say jufc, we have expressed a quality in its fiHlness. Lambert. In its fullness to the extent of the sub- ject of which it is predicated, yes. In its fullness in its absolute sense, no. Here you again flatly contradict the principle of logic which I have referred to above, that the extension of the predicate is limited to the extension of the subject. Lacy. Conventionally speaking, and for conven- ience, we employ the words " more just" and " most just," as when we say, A is a more just judge than B, ■i t3^ tACtldS OF INi^mfiLS. 'i ■'.; ■ ,i::t Lambert. A is a more just judge than B or he is not. If he is more just than B, philosophical pro- priety requires us to say he is more just, for it is al- ways philosophical to say the truth. Lacy. Philosophical diction is not so indulgent to us ; for' when we wish to draw an important con- clusion by the use of words, we should employ them according to strict meaning. Lambert. This is very true, and it is on this ac- count I have required you and Ingersoll to define some of you words. The principle you lay down is a most excellent one, but you have sinned against it in giving expression to it. We do not " draw conclusions by the use of words." We draw conclusions by com- paring ideas, and we express them by the use of words. Lacy. " Infinite " is a word which strikes the popular mind as exceedingly eulogistic and it can scarcely realize that when we call God just we have accorded him as great praise as when we declare him " infinitely " just. Lambert. It is not a question of praise, but of truth. This perching yourself on the Chimberaizo of self-esteem and speaking of the " popular mind " as of | some almost invisible object away off down there in the distajit valley, is characteristic of Ingersoll and his school. The popular mind, which is never radically wrong, may not know why, in asserting justice of an infinite being, it must assert infinite justice — just as you appear not to know it — out following an instinct of reason, it always does it. It knows that in assert- ing justice of God and in asserting it of man it never as- serts it in the same sense. In the first, it calls it divine or infinite justice, in the second human or finite j justice. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 137 Lacy. Neither can any being be more than perfect. Lambert. No being can be more than perfect in the perfection of its order, but there are degrees in the orders of being. If what you say be true there is no difference between a perfect oyster and a perfect man, as each is perfect, and according to you, neither can be more. Your own sense should tell you that although both may be perfect there is a difference of perfection between a perfect man and a perfect goose. A goose may be perfect in its order of being, but its order of being is not as perfect as that of man. Hence the attribute " perfect " is always limited to the subject of which it is predicted. If predicted of man it is finite perfection, if of God it is infinite perfection. This is according to the axiom of logic referred to heretofore in this article. -■■ . V \ -V-' Iff CHAPTER XIV. Lacy. No man is truthful who will tell otte lie. Lambert. And yet he is more truthful than he who tells many lies. But if your saying be true how are we to classify you, who have said that Christians believe in three Gods ? Are you ready to accept in your own case the consequences of your dictum ? Lacy. To say that he (God) is infinitely perfect or infinitely just is as redundant as to describe an ob- ject as infinitely round or infinitely square. Lambert. This is of a piece with what I have al- ready examined. When we say God is infinitely per- fect we express a truth. We formally assert the attri-l bute perfection to the full extension of the subject of | which it is asserted. The subject^— God, is infinite, and therefore the attribute asserted of him is infinite, and it is no redundancy to say it. To say an object! is infinitely round or square is not a redundancy ; it is simply a fallacy or an absurdity. To say it is round | or square is to limit it, and to limit it is to deny infinit}! of it. Therefore to say an object is infinitely round is to say it is infinite and finite at the'^'same timef Philosophical diction is not so indulgent as to permitj this ; neither is common sense. Lacy. How do we know that self-existence neces i sitates the possession of specific qualities, good or| bad? Lambert. It is known by a process of reasoning! which one who writes on metaphysical questions shouyi not be ignorant of. I will take one attribute, tli{ TACTICS Ot? INI^ibfiLS. 13^ eternity of the self-existent being, as an illustration. As I am not writing a treatise on theodicy, I need not go through all the divine attributes. One will be enough to show that these attributes follow neces- sarily, one from another. Granted that God is self- existent, it follows that he is eternal. We know this from the following process of reasoning. That which is and which did not come into be- ing is eternal. It is admitted in the hypothesi that the self existent Being is or exists. It follows then that if he did not come into being he must be eternal. Well he could not have come into being for the fol- 1 lowing reasons : If he came into being he must have [been produced by the agency of another or by his own [agency or by chance. But neither of these can be [said, for if he were produced by another he would not )e j^^-existent— but existent from another. He did [not produce himself, because that would involve the con- tradiction that he existed and acted before he existed. [e was not produced by chance, because then again jhe would not be j^^-existent — but a creature of chance. fow it is granted that the self-existent Being is. And St is evident that he did not come into existence, there- fore he is eternal. In a like manner we prove that he is supreme, [ndependent, perfect, omnipotent, immutable, abso- lutely simple and one. And from these qualities we »rove, by an analogous process of reasoning, that he a spirit endowed with understanding, will, liberty id infinite power, and that he is just, holy and true. If you were in the least familiar with any hand- book on theodicy you would never have asked the juestion I have just answered, for you would have lown that the question itself is an exhibition of ignor- ! ] ;Ji I '.) ml i 140 ^TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ance on a subject which you would fain treat with tripping familiarity. Lacf. Neither power nor wisdom measures the justice of men. Why should they (it?) the ethics of I the deity? Lambert. Both power and wisdom are necessar}' to the justice of men. He who has not the power to I think and will and the wisdom to know^ can be neither just nor unjust. Man's justice must then be measured by his power to will good or evil, do good or evil, and by his wisdom or knowledge of what is right or wrong, just or unjust. Hence the question based on your| statement has no relevancy. Lacy. The truth is, fear constrains the theological | world to adopt certain and dogmatic and complimen- tary forms of expression when speaking of the deit},| Lambert. Here you assume that those who deny! the attributes of God are more fearless than those whol affirm them. What grounds have you for such a law| less assumption ? Lacy. It is supposed that the vanity of God de-l lights itself in adulatory phrases and in the self-abne[ gation of his subjects. Lambert. Supposed by whom? The Christianl theologian knows that the idea of vanity is incompatf ible with the idea of the deity, and that any one whol attributes it to God has no true conception of Him. Hej knows that such ideas of God arise from ignorancel He knows that the highest he can think or say of thcT Supreme Being is infinitely below ine truth ; that thJ human mind and tongue are inadequate to think oij speak of God as he is. Notes. The finite cannot be the measure of tlij infinite; the human mind is finite. Hence the lattq iii' TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 141 cannot be the measue of the former — in other words we have not the capacity, and for a stronger reason, not the jurisdiction to rejudge the justice of God. Lacy. We are told that " the finite cannot be the [measure of the infinite." True, but it may test its nature and quahty though it may not measure lits extent. Lambert. How can the finite test the nature and IquaWty if the infinite, if it be not a measure of that mature and quality ? You should see that when you (admit the finite is not the measure of the infinite yoa aeld the point at issue. Lacy. We know enough of space between ma- terial objects to render it unconceivable to us that space in any part of the universe, can differ from it save in extent. Lambert. You thought you knew enough about |t to enable you to assert that space is infinite, and yet ^e have seen that the greatest of modern agnostic, [erbert Spencer, agrees with Christian philosphers lat it is not infinite ; that considered separate from lings, it is nothing. Hence your knowledge of space fincluded between two material objects" did not etiable rou to form a correct notion of space considered with- out reference to those two objects. This shows the difference between knowing enough and thinking we low enough. iMcy. You say that "God's justice is infinite;" re admit its perfection, but the question is whether le God of your conception is just. Lambert. When you admit the perfection of rod's justice you concede all I claim when I say it is ifinite, for you have told us that infinite is redundant, leaning no more than perfect. Hence our concep- ! I ! .Ill' i 1 fip^ •,- 1 .:^||nHfcJ. i 'f' « 1 li mm T42 TACTICS OF INFinEI^. tion of God's justice agrees thus far and there can therefore be no question between you and me on this point. Lacjf. If we know aught of God, we are com- pelled by the laws of our mental and moral being to judge him. Lambert. When we know that God is infinitely wise and infinit-'ly just the laws of our mental being compel us to say that whatever he does must be most wise and just, however contrary to our notions of jus- tice his actions may seem to be. To judge a being is to pass in review his acts, and measuring them by the measure of our confessedly limited judgment, con- demn or approve them. This is the sense in which In- gersoll claims the right to judge the Supreme Being, and in this sense I denied and still deny that right, be- cause it is contrary to the dictates of reason. To ad- mit a being to be infinitely just and still claim the right to pass judgment as to the justice or injustice of | his acts is irrational, illogical and self-stultifying. To examine the acts of the Supreme Being with a view of | determining whether they are just or not, is to assume that tfiey may be unjust, but you cannot assume this after having admitted that that Being is infinitely just. However unjust an act may seem to us, we arci bound by the laws of our intellect to believe it to be | just, so long as we hold the actor to be infinitely just. This is an imperative dictate of reason. We may I question the justice of any given act until we discover that it is an act of the infinitely just Being, but when we discover this, all right to doubt, question or judge of the act immediately ceases. The sound intellectl refuses to proceed further, because to go further! would be to stultify itself, Let us take an illustration, TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 143 Suppose you admit the existence of an equi-angular triangle. When you know what this admission means you will see that your intellect has yielded the right to judge as to the relative value of its angels. Why? Because in conceding the existence of the equi-angular triangle you concede all that is essential to its existence, and after this concession, if you attempt to discuss the relative value of the angels you prove that you have no true conception of an equi- angular triangle. The conclusion from all this is that, if you grant the infinite justice of God you give away the right to judge, that is, to examine with a view to approve or condemn, his acts. You may ask, do not theologians examine the acts of God with a view to judge and approve them ? I answer, no. It is as great a blasphemy to examine his acts to approve them as it is to examine to con- demn them, because in both cases it is to put the finite intellect above the infinite intellect, to pass judg- ment upon it, and this is a blasphemous usurpation, as [inconsistent with the mental as it is with the moral law. The fact is you have simply failed to say what jyou meant. You meant to say that the acts attributed Ito God in the Old Testament are not just, good, [merciful, etc., and therefore they are not the acts of [God. But here the judgment you pass is not on the lacts of God but on acts attributed to Him. You deny that they are acts of God and this denial giA cs you logical right to pass judgment on them. But this is very different from the right to judge God. Once idmit that the acts attributed to God in the* Old "estament are acts of God, and your right to judge of their justice immediately ceases. Hence instead of claiming the right to judge God, you should if you li i-^ w "I i' 144 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. wish to be consistent, claim that those acts attributed to him are not his. But it will not do to say, they are unjust and therefore they are not His, for the reply will be: If they are his they must be just. This re- duces the whole controversy to this question, Are those acts God's acts ? This is a question of/act, not of the- ology. And being a question of fact, the nature of those acts must be left out of the question until we discover who the real actor was. If God is the actor the acts must be right whatever we n.^v think of them. If God was not the actor the acts are iogitimate sub- jects of discussion. How is this question to be deter- mined? Being a question of fact, it must be de- termined by the known facts of history. I cannot here go into an analysis of the history of the Jews from Abraham down to the time when the sceptre passed from the hands of Israel, and when all-conquer- ing Rome sunk Palestine into a province. The acts of God in Hebrew history will come up in proper time, but the time is not now. As you bring them up 1 will defend them. Lacy. If we say he (God) is righteous we pro- nounce judgment upon him, which, according to the Father's logic we cannot do, because the finite cannot pass judgment upon the infinite. Lambert. When we say God is righteous we simply assert that the attribute " righteous " is neces- sarily involved in the assertion that the infinitely per- fect Being is. This is not prr.nouncing a judgment on Him. It is merely asset", jg a consequence which «/«j/'follow from the hypichesis that He is. This is a very different thing from passing His actions in review and judging Him to be just or unjust according as we judge His actions to be just or unjust We do noti TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 145 say that God is just because His actions are just; we say all his actions are just because He is infinitely just. In this we do not judjije God ; we only make Him, or rather our idea of Him, the ultimate basis of our judg- ments. In doing this we act the true part of rational beings. Lacy. The Father virtually concedes the right of examination but not of judgment. Lambert. I concede the right of investigation as to whether a particular act is an act of God, but when investigation discovers that that particular act is God's act, investigation and sound judgment must stop there, [for what God does must be right, whatever we may think of it. Lacy. It is apparent that if we have the right to think and examine any subject, it must be with a view to the formation of an opinion in regard to it, and opinion \s judgment.. Lximbert. I deny the right to think about and examine the acts of G od with a view to the formation [of a judgment as to whether they are right or wrong. It is both immoral and irrational. It is immoral for [man to assume to judge his creator, and it is irrational [to make the finite the measure of the infinite. In the [second place, an opinion is not 2i judgment. Judgment un logic is a fixed quantity. Opinion is a thing un- [known to logic. Ingersoll. The question cannot be settled by [saymg that it would be a mere waste of time and space to enumerate the proofs that show that the mi verse was created by a pre-existent and self- :onscious being, \ Lacy. The le^irned priest takes issue with this Statement, and claims that Mr. Ingersoll is refuted by m ■ ,1 :j m 'l;' ! V'.li ' '.M i ill 146 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. his, the Father's, averment that the books are full of" refutations of Mr. Ingersoll's arguments, and of proofs positive of the doctrines he controverts. Considering that the good priest is a volunteer, and not, like me, invited to join the intellectual tourney, would not a little modesty on his part become the situation? Should he not, at least, name the books where those invincible proofs may be found? Lambert. The priest still insists that the Chris- tian philosopher is not bound to reprint large volumes on metaphysics, theodicy and cosmology every time some Tom, Dick or Harry expresses a doubt about the creation. Your and Ingersoll's ignorance of I Christian and even gentile arguments on this point I shows how poorly you are by your own confession, equipped to meet them. You undertake to refute! those arguments, and after doing it to your own satis- faction you innocently ask what the arguments are] and where they are to be found. In discussing meta- physics we have a right to suppose that you have a I reasonable amount of information on its literature, and! your pert confession of ignorance does not enable you to laugh your way out. If you really desire to knowf those arguments consult such authors as St. Thomasl of Aquin, Rosmini, Rosset, Rothenflue, Liberatoref Tongiorgi, Sanseverino, Valecshi, or any hand-bool;| on theodicy and ontology. Lacy. In assenting to the fact of doubting thel intelligible is the intelligence doubting, and there \\ required no other "intelligible," which satisfies thel requirement for something intelligible without postuj lating any reality besides the intelligence. Lambert. This very intelligible piece of wor(| spinning is a criticism on Doctor Brownson's psycho TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 147 logical argument for the existence of God. This argument I will give in full in the next chapter. It is not clear in the first part of what Mr. Lacy says whether he asks a question or states a proposition. In assenting to the fact of doubting, the intelligence aflfirms the existence of a doubt. It may be admitted without detriment to Brownson's argument, that there need be no intelligible besides the intelligence itself. When the intellect reflects on itself it become the I object of its own activity, and in cognizing or knowing itself it knows that an intelligence, a being exists. When you grant this, as you do, you grant all that is jnecessary for the validity of Brownson's argument. [In n^aking the intelligence its own intelligible, you (admit the existence of an intelligible — the very thing the doctor was insisting on. CHAPTER XV. ^mm ^">. The following is Dr. Brownson's psychological argument for the existence of God, as published in the Notes: — " I allow you to doubt all things if you wish, till j you come to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe, — to deny as it does to J affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, an impossibility,! for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubtl itself You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, ifl you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is onef thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that youl doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts wouldl be to doubt that you doubt, for without intelligence! there can be no more doubt than belief Intelligencej then, you must assert, for withor.t intelligence yoii| cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intel- ligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirnisj intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubtl then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intel ligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not, cannot act. " This much, then, is certain, that however far yoil may be disposed to carry your deftials, you cannoj carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because tha would be denial of denial itself Then you must conj cede intelligence and then whatever is essential to till TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 149 reality of intelligence. In conceding anything, you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intel- lligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some lobject capable of being known. So, in conceding intel- lligence, you necessarily concede the intelligible. The {intelligible is therefore something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real, there is and can be no possible or ibstract. The abstract, in that it is abstract, is noth- ing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no )bject of knowledge or of intellect. The possible, as )ossible, is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is apprehensible only in that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is pure nullity, las no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is inintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, m the principle that what is not is not intelligible, sequently, to the reality of intelligence, a real itelligible is necessary, and since the reality of intel- pgence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, id asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible iing. You are obliged to assert intelligence, but ^ou cannot assert intelligence without asserting the Itelligible, and you cannot assert the intelligible rithout asserting something that really is, that is without asserting real being. The real being thus iserted is either necessary and eternal being, being itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contin- <;nt and therefore created being. One or the other ^e must say, for being which is neither necessary nor )ntingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, id cannot be asserted or supposed. "Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and 111 i It M 1 '. ISO TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ;;■ i\ I ip "i«ii,is';i(i i eternal, or contingent and created — is eith t being in itself, absolute being, or existence dependent on an- other for its being and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not, is not intelligible, is intelligible as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting neces- sary and eternal being, and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God, or that God is; and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelli- gence God is asserted, and that it is impossible with- out self-contradiction to deny his existence.* " Lacy. Without preamble let us admit that God exists ; yet those who believe in the eternity of matter believe also that all the possibilities of life were infold- ed within it from the "beginning." Lambert. In admitting the existence of God you concede the invalidity of all arguments against that existence, for it is an axiom of common sense that it is nf ver lawful to argue against a fact. Having ad- mitted, as you have, the existence of God to be a fact, you stultify yourself when you endeavor to show that arguments against that fact have any force. The fact being granted all arguments against it must neces- sarily be false. The "belief" of the atheist and the ii TACTICS OF INFIDELS. IJt agnostic is of no more weight than the belief of the Christian — considered merely as a belief. There is however this difference between the two be- liefs. The Christian's belief does not involve a con- tradiction while that of the atheist does. The belief of the atheist as formulated by you supposes an effect jwithout a cause. He believes all the possibilities of [life are infolded in matter. Who infolded these possi- Ibilities in matter? According to the atheist, no one linfolded them. Hero we have an act done without an [actor to do it. This is absurd. You may say these )ossibilities were eternally infolded in matter, but an iternal infolding necessarily supposes an eternal in- folder. Hence it is evident that even if we grant the iternity of matter and that all the possibilities of life ire infolded in it, we must still go beyond all this to ind the reason why it is and why these possibilities ire infolded in it. The human mind refuses peremp- torily to take its ultimate repose on phenomena. It ITorever seeks through phenomena or appearances or ipparitions to get at the real. It refuses to believe that phenomena or appearances, such as matter is, can jxist without something real behind them to sustain lem in being. Lacy, Infinite succession of being is no more lifificult of comprehension than self-existent, eternal )eing. Lambert, You have just admitted the existence )f the self-existent, eternal Being, hence you must :cncede that his existence does not involve contradic- ion or absurdity. Your admission closes the debate m this point. An infinite succession of being clearly involves jontradiction and absurdity, and is therefore impossi- ' 1.1 •Nir i^ ,1: r i , ■ Li 1 '■ i t i'l :■;» ! ' '* ' ' . 'i r;M 152 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ble. A series is composed of units and therefore can be increased or diminished, and that which can be increased or diminished is not infinite. Again those who beUeve in infinite succession of being must admit many infinite series of beings, some of which must be greater than others, for example, an infinite series of trees and an infinite series of leaves ; an infinite series of geese and a still greater infinite series of feathers. A series being composed of a greater or less number of units, must, to exist, have a definite number of units. It must be three, five or a million, or any number you like, but it must be fixed. Without this you can not imagine a series to exist. Now when the number is fixed your series is finite. A series that is once finite may be increased forever but can never become infinite. Lacy. While we conceive of space as illimitable, the idea of a limit being unthinkable, we can, as we have shown, conceive as well of a chain composed of links interminable extending through space. Lambert. We have seen according to Herbert Spencer, that space abstracted from extended things is nothing, and as such has no extension or limits. Hence the illimitible space of which you speak is a mental fiction, having no reality external to the n>ind ; it is the mere possibility of extension. When you deprive space of limits you destroy it. Hence to conceive it we must conceive it as limited. On this point Spencer and Christian philosophers agree. A chain is composed of links each of which is a unit. It cannot exist without having a definite number of these units and it is therefore terminable and limited. Again this chain maybe increased, for you can imagine another the same length and then add them together. You TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 153 can continue this process forever and you will never have an infinite chain. However long it may be it is still composed of units, and an infinite real number of units is a contradiction. But at best your chain is an imaginary one, has no real existence, and wanting this it wants the first condition of a real infinite, namely, real existence. You have introduced this space and chain business several times. It is monotonous to have to show its fallacy again and again. Lacy. The truth is we may apprehend both or either (infinite space and chain.) Lambert. The truth is we can apprehend neither. You mistake infinite possibility of extension for in- finite real space and infinite possibility of increasing your chain with an infinite real chain. What you apprehend is a possibility not a reality, and between a possible or potential infinite and a real infinite there is an infinite gulf Ingersoll. Logic is not satisfied with assertion. Notes. Then it is not satisfied with your asser- tion in reference to it. As an assertion merely, it a major premise, and if dis- If self-evident it need not I be proved. We consider it as such. Lambert. The question here is as to what logic [requires. An assertion merely as such has no weight as an evidence of truth, but in the art of logic an [assertion or proposition whether true or false, negative lor affirmative, has a value, just as a figure has a value [in a mathematical process. The figure may represent false quantity but with that the mathematical pro- :ess has nothing to do. It must take the data as [iven and deduce from them the result. A says B Lacy. Certainly not. carries no weight. It is jputed it must be proved. i t 'l> III ill B 154 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. owes him 5 and 6 and 9 dollars. Arithmetic says, then B owes A 20 dollars. But as a matter of fact A has lied, for B owes him nothing. Does A's lie about the data make the arithmetical computation false? certainly not. Why ? Because it is not the office of arithmetic to test the truth of A's data. Its duty is to take the data and draw ♦^he conclusion. In the same way logic, which is the reasoning process by which from '.y'lve.n data a conclusion is deduced, takes asser- tions or propositions without reference lo their truth or fallacy and draws a co elusion, a true conclusion^ if the process be properly conducted, whether the data be true or false. It is not the office of logic to pass judgment on the veracity of a proposition, but to de- t=^rmine the validity of an argument. It deals with the fallacy of argumentation, not with the fallacy of propositions. For example : All men are black. All horses are men. Therefore all horses are black. Here all the requirements of logic are met, and yet there is not a true assertion in the syllogism. The logical process is perfect and the conclusion, while false as a proposition, is nevertheless a true conclusion from the premises. Again, to show that logic has nothing to do with the sense of the proposition, true or fabe, take the fol- lowing syllogism algebraically expressed : A equals B: C equals A. Theretbie C equa's B. Here lOgi'^ fills its office without any reference to the meaning of A, B or C. Substitute terms for letters and we have : A (all men) are B (mortal). C (John) is A (a man). Therefore C (John) is B (mortal). All this beiongs to the first elements of logic, yet it is necessary to give it to show that assertions merely as such, and whether true or false, carry enough weight with them to meet TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 155 the requirements of logic. Therefore logic is satisfied with assertions. The fact is, both Ingersoll and his disciple invariably use the term "logic" in a false sense. Ingersoll might as well have said that grammar is not satisfied with assertions. Grammar deals with the correct expression of a proposition and has no refer- ence to its truth or fallacy. Many a lie has been told in grammatical English, just as many a true deduction has been drawn from false premises and many false deductions from true premises. It may be asked, if logic does not determine the truth of propositions, what does? I answer, research, investigation, ej^erierce. We know the proposition "all men are black" is falser, not from logic but experi- ence. The art of logic is simply the reasoning pro- cess by which we pass from truths already found to truths less known, and by which we guard against false arguments in such passage. It has nothing to do with the subject-matter of scientific investigation. That is the province of philosophy proper. Notes. Logic as a science deals with principles, not assertions ; and logic as an art deals with asser- tions only. Lacy, The Father might have added that logic, as a science, when applied to the grandest problems which can engage the attention of man, scorns the quibbles and subterfuges of the schoolmen and directs its aim to the exposition of truth only. Lambert. The Father might have added the nonsense you suggest had he been ignorant of the subject he was talking about. Logic as a science, treats o{\h& pnnciples upon which the human mind is based in reasoning, and with these principles only. Hence when you apply it to the solution of problems -.1 n iT i ^ «< 1 1 1 : i fe 1 » 1 156 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. in general you misapply it, and compound it with theodicy, metaphysics and ethics or with philosophy in general. » Your talk about the "quibbles and subterfuges of the schoolmen" is a cheap haberdashery which every modern philosophical peddler has on top of his pack to be thrown in as make-weight. Those familiar with scholastic philosophy, and the discussions about it, know that the faults found with it had reference to its metaphysics, not to its logic. Since Aristole the art of logic has made no progress. He worked out all its possible processes and left it finished. There is only one logic given to man by his Creator as the rule of his reasoning, which is always true and independent of the subject-matter to which it may be applied. Call it inductive, deductive, Aristoleiim, Baconian, scho- lastic, or what not, it is and always has been one and the same. Lacjy. I speak of logic with a soul back of it. Lambert. Then you speak of a kind of logic un- known to logicians and philosophf^rs. Logic has nothing to do with setiments or emotions — that is the province of poetry and gush. The sphere of logic is purely intellectual. As well might you speak of mathematics or geometry with a soul back of it. Lacy. Not that kind (of logic) which amuses itself with the jumping-jacks of technicality. Lambert. Technicalities are necessary in all the sciences. Exact knowledge requires exact terms and definitions, and he who would be a master of philos- ophy must be familiar with them. Those only who are fond of loose, lawless thinking are averse to them. higersoll. A fact is a legal tender. Notes. A counterfeit is a fact ; is it legal tender? TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 157 Lacy. Yes, as a counterfeit it is. It is a legal tender fact in court to convict the one who made or circulated it with criminal intent. Lambert. Then a fact nrfiiy be Lgal tender in one sense and not in another. The legal-tenderness of it depends on the use you make of it. A fact twisted out of its proper relations with other facts and circumstances, or by false preserltation, can be made to lie like a false witness, who by the way is also a fact, and therefore a legal tender. A fact to be of any value must be interpreted, and then its value depends on the interpretation. A killed B. This is the fact. Is A guilty of murder? The killing is admitted. What value has this fact in determining the question whether A is guilty of murder or not? None what- ever. The only value it has, merely as a fact, is to prove that B is dead, which is evident of itself and needs not any other fact to establish it. I give this illustration to show that a mere naked, external fact is not ?egal tender in any useful or practical sense. For graniing the fact of the killing the practical question still remains, was the fact a murder, a justifiable homi- cide or an accident ? If a murder, it was a criminal fact, if justifiable homicide or an accident A is acquit- ted. This shows that the value on legal-tenderness of the fact is not found in the mere external accomplished fact, but in the nature of the fact, which is determined by the intention of A when he accomplished it. It follows from this that a fact merely as such is not legal tender in the sense Ingersoll asserted it. Again, it requires an expert to distinguish a counterfeit, as it requires an expert to determine whether an apparent or alleged fact is a real and gen- uine fact. Until this is determined neither the fact i.'J I ' \rf III ! I t|li III ill 158 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. nor the note is legal tender. Ancient astronomers held it to be a fact that the Sun went round the earth. They were just as dogmatic about it as you and IngersoU are about fallacies which you and he advance as facts. He said water always runs down hill, and you said Christians believe in three Gods. He made deductions from \i\sfact and you made de- ductions from yours. Yet neither of these "facts" is legal tender. As a matter of fact men dispute about the genu- ineness of facts. I hold it to be a fact, that the Bible is inspired ; you hold that it is not a fact. What is Ingersoll's little maxim worth here ? Like most of his maxims it is of no value whatever. I conclude then that a fact is not legal tender in an argument to him who denies it to be a fact or who for valid rea- sons rejects the interpretation of it. IngersoU is very fond of perpetrating taking little maxims which when analyzed have neither sense nor reason in them ; and his disciple, with a delusive conviction that he un- derstands the inner sense of his master, jumps on the stand, like a too willing witness, to testify to their validity. Lacy. In the well understood sense in which Mr. IngersoU used the word, (legal tender) it (a coun- terfeit) is not a fact, but a lie. Lambert. I assume to know as much about the sense of a simple proposition as Mr. Lacy does. He has no patent right to interpret IngersoU. The phrase used by IngersoU was in its very nature mis- leading, and therefore had no "well understood" sense. A few moments ago friend Lacy told us that a counterfeit is legal tender. He now tells it is not a factf but a lie. Now how a thing that is not a fact, TACTICS OF INFIDELS. IS9 but a lie, can be legal tender surpasses our faculties of comprehension. But we are not done with Lacian logic. According to him a counterfeit is nol a fact. Then in the name of common sense what is it? Well, says Lacy, it is a lie. Yes, but even a lie must be a fact as a. Vie and therefore a fact. Lacy. The same sophistical spirit pervades chap- ter VI. . Lambert. And I fear it will have to pervade chapter VII. Lacy. Not content with animadverting the state- ment that "assertions and miracles are spurious coin" the good priest inserts the word "all" before "asser- tions." Lambert. The good priest had a perfect right to insert "all" before "assertions." It is a principle of logic that when the subject of a proposition is left unlimited by quantitative restrictions it is to be taken in its universal sense. Ingersoll's utter disregard of this principle is the cause of many of his blunders. When I say "men are mortal" it is the exact equiva- lent to '*all men are mortal." In both cases the proposition is universal, that is to say, "men," the subject of the proposition, is taken in its full exten- sion, meaning all men. When Ingersoll said, "asser- tions and miracles are spurious coin" he made a universal, unlimited proposition. And the sign of a universal affirmative proposition is all just as some is the sign of a particular proposition. I used the word "all" to call the reader's attention to the fact that Ingersoll's proposition was a universal, unlimited one, because in that fact consists its fallacy. Had he said some a^jertions and some so-called miracles are spuri- ous coin, I would have agreed with him. ;hi i! i > li! 1 !; '■ ;.■:'' i'j i6o TACTICS OF INFIDELS. i 1 ■.ill! Z^rj/. Where the Father's self-appointed task to construe and not to misconstrue, he as the commenta- tor of Ingersoll, would have inserted mere in place of "all." In other words, mere assertion is not proof Lambert. Fhe Father acted on the assumption that Ingersoll knew or ought to know how to say in English what he meant, and he did him the hQ^<^\ of supposing that he meant what he said. It^as the Father's business to deal with what Ingersoll said. He leaves the construing to the disciple who admits by his glossary that his master could not or did not say what he meant. It is now in order for some one to construe the disciple and tell us the difference be- tween an assertion and a mere assertion. Ingersoll. Reason is the result of all experience. Lacy. This is incorrect, Lambert. Of course it is. Ingersoll probably wanted to say : ''Kyi0bUil^e is the result of experi- ence." Z«^.— but it is quite as true as the Father's dictum that "the mind and reason are identical." Invagination is as much an attribute of mind as reason, yet imagination is not synonymous with reason. Lambert. Here you confound the act of reason- ing with that entity called reason which produces the act. That active, cognitive, intelligent entity whicl is conscious of its own existence and which thinks, rea- sons, reflects, imagines, wills, loves, hates, rejoices or is sad, in a word that principle which distinguishes man from the brute, is called soul, mind or reason ; by whichever name called it is the same active entity or being. When it reasons its act is called reasoning, when it thinks its act is called thought, when it TACTICS OF INFIDELS. l6l reflects its act is called reflection, when it imagines its act is called imagination, when it wills its act is called volition, etc. Its ability to do all these things is called its faculties. But these faculties are not dis- tinct from itself They are simply its ability exercised in different directions and on different objects. We say a man walks, runs, leaps, dances, sings, talks, etc.; the ability to do these, we call faculties. And yet we know that all these acts are but different manifesta- tions of one and the same force and proceed from one and the sane principle of activity. It is the same of the mind or reason ; though it manifests itself in many different kinds of acts, yet it is always one and the same actor. Thought is reason thinking, imagination is reason imagining, reflection, reason reflecting, etc. Imagination is no more an attribute of mind or reason than walking is an attribute of man. The attribute or faculty is the ability which man has to walk, and the faculty of imagination is the ability of reason or mind to imagine. In all you say on this subject you con- found reason with reasoning, the actor with the act, cause with effect. Lacy. Does not the soul act in it^ love and affectional longings? Lambert. These acts of love and longing, of reasoning and willing are all acts of one and the same agent, and that agent, in man, is called soul, reason or mind. ' Lacy. Here we gladly leave the field of meta- physics Lambert. This is not surprising considering the display you have made in it. Lacy.—-2Xi6. turn to that book with which a priest of the infallible church is supposed to be conversant. #1 1" 1 62 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I . iS I I iiilii^ Ir i',. ; ; ;.![•. :t;i: ■ i. - ", ■ "■ )'. This brings us to the real subject and substanwe of the controversy as raised by Mr. IngersoU, "Is a/l of the Bible inspired ?" Lambert. Here you mistake the issue, ^nger- soU in the North American Review, undertook to prove that the Bible was not inspired. And I, in the Notes in reply to him undertook to show that he did not succeed in his undertaking. The question raised by me — and remember it is to me you are replying — was whether IngersoU had proved that the Bible was not inspired, or whether his arguments against its inspiration were valid. My purpose was to show that he had proved nothing but his own ignorance, bad faith, and controversial dishonesty. In conclud- ing the Notes I invited some little whiffet of his shal- low school to rehabilitate him. This invitation you accepted. These facts will enable the reader to un- derstand the present state of the question. Your deft attempt to shift our relative positions is worthy of that child-like and bland celestial immortalized by the pen of Bret Harte. The question then between you and me is not whether all of the Bible is inspired, but whether IngersoU is inspired by a spirit of wisdom, honesty and "honor bright," whether his information is of the kind to make him a competent critic of the Bible, and lastly whether he has manifested those qualities which an honest seeker after truth expects to find in one who pjetends to teach it. This is the question between you and me. I will now follow you in your comments on the Bible, and I propose to show that your arguments are no better than IngersoH's, and that whether the Bible is or is not inspired, neither yOju nor he has proved it is not. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 163 Ingersoll. In passing it may be well enough to say that the commandment "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of any- thing that is in the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth," was the absolute death of art ; and that not until after the destruction of Jerusalem was there a Hebrew painter or sculptor. Lacy. Here it is alleged that the abo\e com- mand was a prohibition of two arts — painting and sculpture. Lambert. Here you are wrong. Ingersoll's statement is plain, and admits of no two meanings. He says the first commandment was the absolute death of art, not of two arts, but of art. You, on re- flection, saw that this unqualified proposition could not be maintained, and you forthwith set to work to ''construe" it and limit it to tw0 arts — painting and sculpture, so that it might appear defensible. This will not do. It would have been wiser to have frankly admitted that he was wrong and have done with it. But even limiting Ingersoll's statement to painting and sculpture, you fail to maintain his posi- tion, for you say : Ljicy. I do not think it (the commandment) was so intended (to forbid art,) however the Jews may have interpreted it. Lambert. Here you yield the point that the command was not "the absolute death of art," for if it does not forbid art, as you admit it does not, the de- struction of art cannot be attributed to it. If the Jews misinterpreted the command the result must be attributed to their misinterpretation of it 4nd not to the commandi But as a matter of fact the Jews did 'Ill 1 ] . ( 1 , ■ i . ll - ■ 'ill 'III :i|" .^'1 164 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. not misinterpret it ; they understood it as forbidding the making of images as objects of adoration and worship. This is evident from the fact that after the command was given they made images and likenesses for the adornment of the Temple — that very Temple in which they were to worship that Gou who gave the command. It follows from your own concessions thus far that Ingersoll's statement is not true. If this is the way you reply to me, I am satisfied. Lacj/. It would seem that a fair criticism would construe the words as limiting the making of works of art in so far only as they were intended for devo- tional purposes. Lambert, Here you are right, and it follows that Ingersoll's criticism of the command was not a fair one. Why then stoop to hide this unfairness by running off on irrelevant issues? Why not frankly admit he was wrong and pass on to other points ? Why continue to hem and haw about it after you have admitted all I claimed? Lancy. How Hebrew fastidiousness may have construed the prohibition I am not able to ^ay. Lambert. And yet their construction of it is evi- dent from the texts which I quoteJ in the Notes. But aside from this, the question between Ingersoll and me had reference to the command itself and not to the Hebrew construction or interpretation of it. He said nothing about Hebrew construction. That was a bit of fine sophistry for which you deserve undisputed credit. Lacy. But the Father has done little to disprove the charge that the arts referred to were dead as to the Hebrew race until after the destruction of Jerusalem, by showing that God gave specific instructions for the TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 165 creation of works of art for the adornment of His own Temple. Lambert. One who talks so learnedly of meta- physics and logic ought to be able to keep his eye fixed steadily on the point in debate until it is disposed of. The question between Ingersoll and me was not whether art was dead as to the Hebrew race, but whether if dead its death was cavised by the command- ment. The specific instructions given by God for the making of works of art were quoted to show that the first commandment did not forbid the making of works of art as such ; for the command of God could not for- bid making works of art when that same God who gave the command commanded them to be made. Notes. Who made the golden calf? Lacy. How the calf would stand as a work of art if made to-day no one can tell Lambert. Nor is it at all necessary. Lacy. — but is it probable that as slaves of Egypt, or as dwellers in the wilderness, the Hebrews had time or opportunity to study art ? Lambert. It is most probable they had not. You suggest here two good reasons why the Hebrews should not be artists. But why did not these good and sufficient reasons occur to Ingersoll ? Why did he overlook them and attribute the death of art to the command of God ? Lacy. So far \wq must excuse them (the Hebrews) for a lack of knowledge which they could not obtain. Lambert. This is very considerate and proper, but was it fair in Ingersoll to attribute to the com- mandment a want of knowledge which circumstances made it impossible for the Hebrews to obtain ? Was he ignorant of these circumstances — the E^^ptian Ilil^ m r»! 1 ■■ 166 tACTlcS OF INFIDELS. slavery and the wanderings in the wilderness — or did he deliberately hide them from view that his attack on th? commandment might appear stronger? If the first he is too ignorant to criticise the Bible, if the latter he is too dishonest. Lacj/. If God by miracle endowed special sculp- tors with artistic skill, for his own purpose, such endowment goes not to the credit of the Jews as an art cultivating people. Lambert. Either God worked a miracle in the case or He did not. If He did, then you must admit the existence of miracles, and that the God of the Hebrews worked them. This upsets all Ingersoll's objections to miracles. If God did not work a miracle in the case of the Hebrew sculptors then their art must be accredited to the Jews. You may take either horn of this dilemma. Consult your own comfort. This reminds me of a question you ask a few lines above : Lacy. What matters it then to the argument that exceptions only are given (of works of art) qualified by their own nature, and made conspicuous by divine command ? Lambert. It matters considerable, as you shall see. God revealed to the builders the manner of building and ornamenting the Temple or He did not. If He revealed it, then divine revelation is a fact. This oversets Ingersoll and does away with all objections against the existence of revelation. If He did not reveal the art to the builders, then the builders must receive the credit for building and adorning the Tem- ple ; which goes to prove that art was not dead among the Jews, and that Ingersoll's statement to that effect is false. Here again you may take a horn — either horn — of this dilemma. You are thus driven by your TACT.CS OF INFIDELS. 167 own peculiar line of argument to admit miracles and divine revelation, or to admit that art was not dead among the Jews. Mr. Lacy next treats us to an essay on art, in which he shows that there we great artists, poets, his- torians, etc., who were not Jews or Christians ; but as no one ever denied the fact his effort in this direction was an unnecessary expenditure of brain power — an article to be economized with care. We admire the great men of pagan antiquity, but we have some ad- miration left for the masters in Israel and in the New Dispensation. After citing some of the great masters of painting and sculpture who were Christians Mr. Lacy admits that their efforts were i ispired and their aims directed by religion. Ingersoll. He (God) authorized the murder of millions. Notes. He never authorized or ordered the mur- der of anyone from Abel to Garfield. God is the author and giver of life, and those he places on this earth He can remove at His will. No man has a right to live one instant longer than his Creator wills him to remain, be he born or unborn, innocent or guilty. As creatures of God we are absolutely His and can have no right whatever as against Him. Lacy. The proposition embraced in the Father's comment raises two questions : ist, Has God a "right" to do whatever He arbitrarily might will with His creature man, moulded in his image, whom He made a little lower than the angels, and thought worthy of a crown of glory and honoi. Has He the right, for instance, to inflict wanton punishment without any moral aim whatever ? ;n'' 1 68 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lambert. Yes. He has the right to do what- soever He wills with His creature man, iirst, because being infinitely perfect He wills rightly and justly, and secondly, because man is His creature. To suppv)sc God to V ill uni istiy or punish wantonly is to suppose Hni to '*e )!,upwrt ct, bi;t you cannot suppose this since you liave admitted Him to be perfect. God being infinitely pv.ijct.TT< d just His will is infinitely perfect and just; and an liiLiitely perfect and just will has a right to will what it wills to will. This does not need demonstration, it follows from the admitted existence of a perfect Being. Whatever this perfect Being wills or does must be wise, just and good, however contrary to our ideas of goodness and justness it may appear. His perfection of will and knowledge being granted we have no longer the right to judge Him. We are bound to suppose that back of His will and action there are valid reasons, although we, being finite in knowledge, may not see them. When we presume to judge Him we must necessarily put our finite knowledge of princi- ples and facts against His infinite knowledge. The man who presumes to do this sins against his own reason and against that infinite Being who gave him his reason God being infinitely perfect has a right to will what He wills to will, and against this right there can be no right ; against His perfect will there is nothing but moral evil — sin. All moral evil, all sin is nothing but a dissonance, a revolt of finite wills against this infinitely perfect will. Man can have no rights that antagonize the perfect Being for that which antagonizes the perfect Being must, from the fact of antagonism, be wrong-; and man as a rational being has no rigli\ to do wrong or be wrong. Tactics of infidels. 169 When you speak of "ar' ;itrary will" you introduce an idea Uiat is incompatable with the idea of the infi- nit 1/ perfect Being. 'Arbitrary willing" supposes unreasonable captious, impulsive willing, where pas- sion sways and right reason is quiescent. To assert this of the perfect Being is to assert imperfection ot Him. This you cannot do after having admitted that He is perfect. Ingersoll is more logical than vqu. He saw that to admit an infinitely perfect Bei; ^; he must admit the necessary consequences, and to ^et nd of these consequences he denied His existence He has enough of the logical instinct to see the comU "Von between admissions and their consequences — a point I you seem to be utterly oblivious of, for you • .? con- Itinually making admissions and at the same time [arguing against the results that flow from them. Lacjy. Has He (God) the right to inflict wanton I suffering without any moral aim whatever? Lambert. This is an absurd question. It is if [you should ask, Has the perfect Being the right to do [wrong ? Has the perfect Being the right to be ini- [perfect ? A question that supposes imperfection in the [perfect Being involves a contradiction and requires no [answer. God, being perfect, has a right to do as 'He [wills. Lacy. (2) Had He, according to some mysterious [rule of justice, the right to do so (act arbitrarily and )unish wantonly,) would He, as the merciful ruler of the universe, exercise that right ? Lambert. Inasmuch as the perfect Being cannot )e imperfect. He does not act arbitrarily or punish wantonly. It is not a question of mercy, but of divine lature. What God would do in a giv-^n case cannot )e known to man, because man from the fact that he 1 1/0 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. \\ I ! ! ■ii is finite in knowledge cannot know all the "ins and outs" of that given case. If he could know all about the case he might, knowing the perfections of God, know what God would do in that given case. But man, being ignorant of the essential elements of the problem, is as foolish in untertaking to solve it as would be the mathematician who should undertake to solve a problem without knowing its conditions. The radical error of you infidels is that, in your abnormal self-conceit, you imagine you are in full possession of all the conditions. Lacy. God, we are told, is "infinite" in every holy attribute ; and that holiness embraces justice, mercy and truth. It may be assumed illogically, however, that justice in human language does not mean justice in the divine vernacular — that God's code of morals. so to speak, differs from man's code. Lambert God's code of morals, so to speak, is different from man's code. God's code is not some- thing outside of and independent of Himself — it is Himself; whereas man's code is something outside of j and independent of himself — it is the nature and will of his creator. While the the code then is intrinsically | the same, it is as different relative to God and man as the creator is different from the creature. Again, jus- tice is essential to the perfect Being for we cannot I conceive Him without it, whereas it is not essential to man for we can conceive him without it. This is an essential difference. God is essentially yusi) man is | contingently so. Lacy. Yet, if God has spoken to us at all, He I has employed human speech as the medium of coni| munication. ill. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 171 Lambert. Here you have uttered a profound truth. If the infinite intellect wishes to impart some- thing to a finite intellect it must use a finite symbolism. When two intellects come in contact the basis of com- munication must be the capacity of the weaker ; what the stronger knows over and above the capacity of the weaker is to the weaker "unthinkable," to use a fond expression of modern agnosticism. The infinite Being mu^t therefore, when in communication with finite beings, use a medium suited to their capacity. Lacy. If (we are) made to His (God's) "mental and moral likeness," we conceive and practice, under analogous conditions, the same kind of justice and mercy as he, only to a more limited extent. Lambert. Granting your hypothetic premises I deny the conclusion. We neither conceive nor practice the same kind of justice and mercy that God does, because God and man are not and cannot be conceived to be "under analogous conditions." God's acts can have but two possible relations. They relate to Him- self or to his creatures. Man cannot act in relation to himself and his creatures. He cannot act in relation to himself for being a creature his acts must have rela- i tion to his creator. He cannot act in relation to his I creatures for the reason that he is not a creator and i therefore has no creatures. Therefore there is no analogy between God's and man's acts. Again, man cannot act without relation to his creator and his fel- jlow creatures, and God cannot act in such relation for he has no creator, no fellow creatures. Therefore again there is no analogy. Again, God is infinite and man finite and between the finite and infinite there are [no "analogous conditions." Man is said to be just when he deals justly with his fellow creatures, but God •». ill il't :5; 172 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. cannot be just in that way, because he has no fellow- creatures. He has only creatures who depend abso- lutely on him for their beinjr, and this being tlie case he can deal with them as he wills and in doing so is responsible to himself alone. Lacy. Justice and mercy, then, with God and man are qualitatively alike though quantitatively un- equal. Lambert. The quality of God's justice is infioite, the quality of man's justice is finite ; the former essen- tial the latter contingent. Then God's and man's jus- tice are not qualitatively alike. God's justice has reference to his creatures, man's justice has reference to his felloiu-creatures, therefore again the quality is not the same. Be justice qualitative or quantitative there can be no comparison between that of the in- finite Being and that of the finite being, because between the finite and infinite there can be no com- parison. ! i CHAPTER XVI. Lacy. Fear of the superior power of God, and a [gross conception of a liability on his part to use it to our disadvantage, may torture from us an admission [that divine and human justice are not alike in kind. Lambert. All this proves that you have not the I most remote conception of the Christian idea of God. The Christian's idea is that God is the Perfect Being, land this excludes the idea that he could use power to lour disadvantage, unless we deserve punishment. IDivine and human justice are not alike in kind ; this ladmission is tortured from us by common sense, not jby the fear of God. Lacy. But we can apprehend neither justice nor Imercy which is not humanly conceived and realized ; [any other kind is unthinkable. Latnber^ The difficulty is not in conceiving livine justice but in understanding its application. >ur ignorance of all the conditions, circumstances ind divine purposes disables us from judging the acts )f God in any given case. But knowing that he is the perfect B^ing we must conclude a priori that his Jvery aict is just, without reference to how it may ap- ;ar to us whose minds ai^e rendered impotent by jnorance. To know what justice is and to discern le justice of a particular act are different things. Ian is capable of the former but not of the latter in 11 cases, for the latter depends on conditions of which le is ignorant. I''' 1 I ■ ill' 174 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lacy. The Scripture, when speaking of duty, addresses man as man and appeals to his sense of right and wrong. Lambert. The Scripture in addressing man must address him as man. To address him otherwise would not be to address him at all. I lis sense of right and wrong is a divine revelation and therefore a good thing to appeal to. Lacy. Well may it (the Scripture); for we have no other means by which to judge of the morality of human actions, nor of the attributes of God. Lambert. I have italicised the above words as they make an important concession. If, aside from the Scripture, there are no other means to enable us to judge of the morality of human acts and of the at- tributes of God, why do you reject the Scripture, which by your own admission, is i^ e only means of knowing and judging of morality and the divine attri- butes ?. You have told us elsewhere that the Bible is crammed full of errors, immoralities and iniquities, and you now tell us it is the only rule of morals, the only means of acquiring a knowledge of the attributes of God ! It was written, you tell us, by men who lived in dark and superstitious ages, and almost in the same breath you confess that there are no other means than the Scripture of judging of the morality of human acts ! Lacy. Has he (God) the right to violate those attributes vvhirh are in consonance with the moral sense he has implanted in us ? If so, he has the right to do wrong. Lambert. The infinitely wise and perfect Being has the right to act according to his wisdom and nature, and he has the right that imperfect creatures, TACTICS OFJNFIDELS. 175 confessedly finite in knowledge and judgment, should not presume to judge him. Whatever He wills and does must be right. V/e cannot suppose the contra;y without implying that he is imperfect, and to imply this is to deny his existence. To ask. Has the perfect [Being the right to do wrong ? is the same as asking, Can he be perfect and imperfect at the same time, or, [Has a triangle the right to have four angles ? As God is infinitely perfect he cannot violate his [own attributes. This would argue imperfection in Ihim. We cannot entertain a supposition that implies imperfection in God after having admitted him to be )erfect. But, you ask, can God act contrary to that loral sense which he has implanted in man ? That lepends on whether that moral sense has been dwarfed, carped, stunted or contorted out of its original normal :ondition. Polygamy is contrary to our moral sense )ut not contrary to the moral sense of the Mormon )r Turk. So you will observe that our moral sense lepends much on education. God implanted in us the germ of the moral sense just as he implanted in us the germ of intelligence, and both need to be devel- )ped by education. It does not follow that an act is really wrong in itself because it appears wrong to the flly instructed moral sense of the individual. We lust distinguish between the idea of right and wrong md that judgment by which the idea is applied to a riven act. Man has the idea of right and wrong lore or less developed according to circumstances, )ut this idea alone is not sufficient to form a practical judgment of any given act. To form this judgment, that is, to apply the idea as the measure of the good- less or badness of any given act, we must be in full ind absolute pQ^fiedsion of all the circumstances, con- 5I ! H \H n r t ■■■ I : 1i i\ii 176 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ditions and reasons of the act. That is, we must have full knowledge, for the correctness of our judgment depends on the correctness and extent of our knowl- edge. Now man's knowledge is confessedly finite and imperfect, while God's knowledge is infinitely perfect. This being the case man acts irrationally when he as- sumes with his finite and imperfect knowledge to judge of the morality of any act of that Being who is infinitely perfect in knowledge, and justice and truth. Wisdom dictates that when there is a clash between an act of God and man's idea of right, man must im- mediately conclude that he is not in full possession of all the facts, reasons and motives in the case ; he must furbish his moral sense, and not assume to know as much or more than the perfect Being knows. To limit God's right in any given case or hypothesis is to assume that you know more than he knows, both as to the principles of right and the facts of the case — to place finite knowledge and intellect against infinite knowledge and intellect. Therefore, when there is a real or apparent dissonance between an act of God and the judgment of man, man, if he have the use of reason, must infer that his judgment is wrong. This is a logical and necessary conclusion from the admission of a perfect Being. Lacy. ' Can we believe that he (God) has a right to create a sentient being, simply to damn him, and that for his own glory ? Lambert. Considering that he is the perfect Be- ing, infinitely good, just and holy, we cannot under- stand ho\v he could create a being simply to make him suffer. It appears to us it would be against his goodness and holiness and we cannot suppose him to act against his own essential attributes. But if he TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 177 cannot thus create a being, it is because of his own attributes and not because of any right inherent in the created sentient being. We are not called on to be- lieve that God creates any being to damn it. Christian theology teaches that damnation is the result of man's free acts and not of divine predetermination. Lacy. Why do we call God just? because he is powerful ? Lambert. No, but because he is the perfect Be- ing of whom justice is a necessary attribute. Lacy. Why do you adjudge him merciful ? Is it for no better reason than that fear constrains you ? Lambert. For the same reason that we call Him just. See above. It is silly to talk of fear — the veriset trifling. Lacy. If God be God, he is no Nero, no Herod, no Gessler, but a Father lifting up his children to himself. Lambert. This is true, and therefore you and IngersoU slander him when you make him out a tyrant. Lacy. Parent of all, they are most like him who dare to speak the truth. Lambert. This is also true, but the inference that Christians through fear dare not speak the truth is in the true Ingersollian style. Lacy. We are told that we may not pre-judge the justice of God. Lambert. Yes, and you were also told the reason. Lacy. We believe that he is good, but you slander him by imputing to him acts he never did, and words by him never spoken. Lambert. Here you beg the question in debate, namely, whether God said and did what the Scriptures represent him as having said and done. lil' • m 178 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lacj/. We believe that certain pictures ci him contained in the Bible are but the conceptions of men who Hved in the dark and superstitious ages. Lambert. And we beHeve you mistake. Your behef in the matter is not of the sHghtest consequence until you give good and sufficient reason for it. This you have not done. Lacy. Even admitting that God has a right to inflict wanton torture, as a being of perfect justice and infinite mercy, is it likely he would do so ? Lambert. But we do not admit that God can inflict wancG7i torture. Wanton torture is punishment inflicted without reason. But God who, is the perfect Being, cannot act without reason, because to do so would be an imperfection. Therefore your question is absurd. Lacy. If man have no rights whatever as agpinst him (God) he would have a right to thus afflict man if he chose. Lambert. This does not follow. God cannot afflict man unjustly, but this arises from his infinite justice and not from any rights on man's part as against God. A moment's reflecticn ought to show you that man has no rights as against his creator. Man, a creature, possesses and can possess nothing but what he receives from his creator. This is self- evident, for the source of his being is the source of all he has. Therefore whatever rights he has he received from God. Now God is the perfect Being and there- fore cannot give to his creatures any right as against hiiiiSelf Man's security against unjust punishment r.^sts not on any right he has, but on the nature of the pcj \^iiv Being. i .ay. Na ural law holds sway over the universe. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 179 Lambert. True, but" this natural law is nothiiif^ more than the impress of the creator's will on matter. Lacy. If we break that law, even by accident, we suffer the penalty. Lambert. It would be interesting to know how man can break the natural law. We can understand How man can break the moral law, but how he can break the physical law, of which you speak, is a conundrum which wc must give up. CHAPTER XVII. ifpt Lacy. We know how impartial justice is, and how swcL't to our hoHcst contemplation is that mercy which endurcth for ever. Lambert. You infidel gentry are fond of personi- fying abstractions. Justice, unless it is an attribute of some being, is an abstraction, like whiteness without something that is white. Abstracted from moral agents justice is nothing real. To exist it must inhere in some real being as a quality in its subject. Ab- solute, infinite and perfect justice exists only as an essential mode of the absolute, infinite and perfect Be- ing, and without this Being it cannot exist or be con- ceived to exist. To talk of justice as something beyond and independent of the perfect Being, as some- thing to which he is amenable as an inferior to a superior, is to ignore its nature. The perfect Being is the centre, source and origin of all perfection in the moral as well as in the physical universe. As j ustice has no existence aside from the just Being, so that mercy which endureth forever has no existence aside from the merciful Being who endures forever. Both justice and mercy, to be operative, require a being of infinite knowledge to apply them. Man, not having infinite knowledge, cannot apply them or know when they are applied. Take a case to illus- trate. Two men being equally guilty under like cir- cumstances and conditions, and being equally non- repentant of their guilt, will be equally punished by divine justice ; and two men being equally good under TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I8l like circumstances and conditions, will be equally re- v/arded. This is clear, but the case bcin'^ merely hypothetical has no practical value to assisting us in judginj^ of justice and mercy in any particular case, because we cannot know ivhcn two Dicn are equally guilty, or ivhcu- the circumstances and conditions are exactly alike. Now it is evident that to form a practi- cal judgment in the case we must know that they are equally guilty and that the circumstances and con- ditions are alike. But man with his limited knowl- edge cannot know all these things. Hence he cannot know in any given case whether justice or mercy has been applied or not. And hence again, in no given case can man accuse the perfect Being of injustice, for the perfect Being alone knows when th : f uilt is equal and the circumstances and conditions ..like. This is why the finite mir. d cannot be the judge of divine acts — why the mere attempt is a self stultification. To subordinate the infinite intelligence to the finite is to destroy it, and to subject God's judgments and acts to the human judgment is to deny God's existence. I lay stress on these incontrovertible principles because it is by their application that most of the difficulties raised by Mr. Lacy are to be solved. Lacy. We meet a book of which 'tis said, God — a name implying all the beauty of holiness^ — is the author, and we ask, do the facts stated and the lessons taught in that book comport with the character a; - cribed to its reputed author ? Say not we have no right to judge him ; we agree as to his supreme ex- cellence ; it is the Book which is on trial. Lainbcrt. Have you forgotten that Ingersoll claimed the right to judge even God, and you, some pages back in your book, do the same thing. You m 182 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. L« ■ f|;' .' 'U' appear now to give up this position and make " the Book " the object of your censure. Lacjf. It is the Book which is on trial. Lambert. The question according to your own statement of it is whether the Book is or is not in- spired. The question then is not as to the Book or its contents, but as to its inspiration. If it is inspired by God its precepts and commands must be just and right, however they may appear to us. It will not do to say the Book commanded unjust things to be done and therefore it is not inspired. This is to beg the quescion, for if it be inspired those things which you imagine to be unjust are not and cannot be unjust. To say anything in the Bible is unjust is to deny its inspiration. But its inspiration is the very point in debate. You will then observe that the inspiration of the Book is the first point to be determined, for you cannot determine the nature of its precepts and com- mands until its inspiration is settled. If inspired its con xnts are just and right and beyond human criti- cism. But, you will ask, arc we not to determine its inspiration by its contents ? I answer, no. The claim that the Bible is inspired is not based on its contents but on facts, circumstances and evidence outside of and independent of the nature of the contents. Now inasmuch as the claim of inspiration is not based on the contents, that claim must be overthrown without reference to the contents. When the claim is over- thrown the contents can be considered on their merits, but as long as the claim is not disproved the contents must be assumed to be in everyway correct, just and proper. If the Christian theologian adduced the con- tents of the Bible as evidence of its inspiration, they would then be legitimate subjects of discussion, but he jjii ^fi Mi TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 183 the its claim ents e of Slow d on hout is not so ilIoi;ical, for he knows that even if the infidel were to admit that the contents of the Bible were true, just and holy, it would be no proof of inspiration, for a book may be true, just and holy without bein^j in- spired, and it may appear to you unjust and untrue and yet be just, true and inspired. There are many passages in the Bible that claim inspiration, but every logician knows that these claims, inasmuch as they are made by the B\">ok itself, have no validity or force until the inspiration is otherwise established, for if it be not inspired its claims are not inspired and are therefore of no wviji^ht. A book cannot testify in its own behalf. If it v\)uld we would have to admit the inspiration oi th-e Koran and the Book of Mormon, for both claim inspiration. The inspiration of a book must then be proved or disproved by evidence outside of it. The mspiration of the Bible is proved by its histCMV, by miracles and by the fulfillment of its proi>h' accomplished facts, its history states with impartial fidelity the crimes of both Jew 1 84 TACTICS c;l' 1MTDEL3. iiH and gentile. Many of the facts arc discreditable to Jew and gentile and even to our common humanity, and shock our reason and mo'.al sense. Ikit if God inspired men to write history he must have inspired them to write it trutl'fullv. Would you have him in- spire them to write false history to prevent a shock to your delicate sensibility ? Do you pretend that God sanctioned these crimes because he inspired men to record them in justification of his own action and as a warning and lesson to mankind ? If you say the doctrines and moral teachings of the Bible shock reason and normal moral sensibility I take issue with you, and hope that the mere fact of differing from you is no evidence of moral obliquity of vision on my part. If mere assertion were proof you and Ingersoil would certainly have the best of it. Lacy. Would we not rather believe that men — good men, considering the times in which they lived — wrote their conceptions of God, and, by their tra- ditions, defiled the pure current of history ? Lambert. It is not a question of what we would rather believe, but what facts and evidence require us to believe. Those good men you speak of were as competent to record the facts of their times as you or our historians are to write of the facts of our times. And as .o their conceptions of God, modern develop- ment has not enabled us to improve on them. As to their traditions, why should. they be less reliable than our traditions ? Those good men were as intelligent and competent to deal with the facts and traditions of their times as we are to deal with the facts and tra- ditions of our times. It is cheap charity to grant them goodness at the expense of their intelligence ; to say they were fools, but good fools. To say that they iii* TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 1 85 defiled the pure current of history' is to sny that you know more about the history of their times than they did. Of course you do, but it is not modest to sny it. Notes. He who has the absokite ri'dit to take life cannot be guilty of murder in taking it ; for mnvdcr is an unjust killing, and there is no unjust killing in the taking of life by him who has the absolute right to take it. There is no escape from this reasoning except by denying the absolute right, and you cannot deny this but by denying God's existence ; for on the hypothesis that he exists, he is creator, and being creator, the absolute right of dominion over his creatures necessarily follows, * * * ^q deny this right is to deny God's existence. Lacy. If by absolute dominion be meant to gov- ern without regard to the principles of justice, written by God's own finger on the human heart, we fail to see it. Lambert. Inasmuch as absolute dominion does not mean to govern without regard to the principles of justice, your if is of no consequence. No one thinks of asserting that the perfect Being can govern without reference to his own essential attributes, of which justice is one. When I assert the absolute dominion of God, I simply assert that*he is account- able to no one but himself, and that whatever lie does, merely because he does it, is beyond human criticism. God himself is the principle and the only principle of justice, and of being, and of life, and of intelligence, and of Vv'hatever we are, and of whatever anything is, or that is at all. He is the Reason of existences and of all their essential appurtenances. Without a revel- ation of some kind from the perfect Being, man is utterly incapable of making or imagining a rule of J IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. %^ ^ 1.0 £^l^ Ki£ ^S *^ ^ 122 itflSI^^^^^^B ^^W^^^^^^^B ^^^^^^HHB ^ ^ '/ Hiotographic Sciences Corporalion 33 WfIT MAM STMIT «MMTW,N.Y. I«SM ^ ^ v^ 6^ 1 86 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 'Ml ? 1 ri^ht or wrong. Therefore if he seek a rule at all he must seek it in the will and nature of the perfect Being. Lacy. The right of dominion is not the tyrant's right. Lambert. Of course it is not, and no sane man ever thought of saying it is. y Lacy. Suppose I had the power to speak into sentient life the sands of the sea and to endue them with mental, moral and physical being, would I be justified, because the creator of such, in inflicting suf- fering upon them from mere caprice or for my own pleasure ? Lambert. From mere caprice or for your own pleasure^ no. But who claims that God punishes from mere caprice or for his own pleasure ? Certainly not the Christian. By what right do you assume that God penults suffering or inflicts punishment through caprice or for pleasure ? To assert, as I do, that God has absolute dominion is not to assert that he can act through caprice or that pain as such can please him. God, because he is infinitely perfect, always acts for a reason — ^a sufficient and adequate reason, and there- fore never through caprice. That God cannot punish unjustly or through caprice arises from the fact that such action is contrary to his nature and attributes and not because the creature has any rights as against God. You may say that according to Scripture God has punished through caprice and for his own pleas- ure. But this I deny, and my denial is as good as your assertion. If I v/ere to grant all you say on this point it would not meet my argument, which from beginning to end does not imply the right to act from caprice. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 187 You seem to imagine that power and authority simply because they are power and authority must necessarily be capricious, tyrannical and unjust. Against such a postulate I cannot stop to argue. Lacy. " God has a right to take life." Granted. Lambert. This admission covers the whole ground — concedes all I have claimed. He who has a right to take life does not commit murder in taking it. Therefore IngersoU spoke falsely when he said God ordered the mtirder of millions. Your admission condemns IngersoU as a false witness. Lacy. But should he or would he convert the world into a slaughter-house and dispute his chosen people, as human butchers, to slay, not only men, but women, children, and babes unborn ? Lambert. This is too transparent. The question is not what God would or should do, but what he has a right to do. You admit he has a right to tal e life. He being infinitely wise and just is the judge — the only judge of why, how and when he shall take it. Whether by the lightning's flash, disease or the sword is of no consequence to the main issue which you have granted. The right to take life being admitted, you can no longer question the justice of God's com- mands in ordering the death of men, women and children for reasons which because they are his must be just. He is amendable to himself — not to us. The guilt must have been terrible that brought such ter- rible retribution. Lacy. From the days of Abraham the lash of the Almighty was held in terrorcin over their backs, and his will was made clearly manifest to them; and yet, with all, they were in a state of chronic rebellion against their divine ruler. i88 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lambert. The words n italics contain another of those illogical admissions by which Mr. Lacy up- sets his own position. If the will of the Almighty was cleary manifested to the Jews, it ntiist have been by revelation and miracles as recorded in the Old Testament. Except by miraculous manifestations and revelation there is no other way conceivable by which the will of God could have been manifested to the Jews. Now as you admit that the will of God was clearly manifested to the Jews, you must admit the only means by which it could have been so mani- fested ; these means are miracles and revelations, therefore you must admit that miracles and revela- tions are facts. Here you antagonize IngersoU who denies both and calls the former spurious coin. You have told us that the Bible gives us false conceptions of God, written by men who lived in dark and super- stitious ages. You now tell us that the will of God was clearly manifested to the Jews ! When will you learn to be consistent with yourself? That many of the Jews were rebellious against God, and some of their rulers were bad men, is true, just as men in all ages have been rebellious and rulers bad, and this accounts for the punishment inflicted on them. If'' CHAPTER XVIII. Lacy. The killing of the heathen by the idola- trous Jews is justified, although the heathen nations were ignorant of the divine law and its penalties, be- cause they had been revealed to their ancestors hun- dreds of years before. Ingersoll. Whatever the Jewish nation may have been guilty of, it was most certainly not guilty of idolatry. The laws of Moses condemned and put to death those who were guilty of it ; yet in the face of this fact you call them without exception idolaters. As well might ygu call the American people polyga- mists because they made laws prohibiting and punish- ing polygamy. That some Jews from time to time fell into idolatry is true, just as some Americans fall into polygamy, but this does not justify the sweeping statement that the Jews were idolaters or the Ameri- cans polygamists. You state with infallible assurance that the heathen nations were ignorant of the divine law. How do you know this ? That they were not ignor- ant of the divine natural law is evident from the fact that, as you truly say, " it was written by God's own finger on the tablets of the human heart." Now this divine natural law, because written on the tablets of the human heart, must have been known to the heathen. It was for sinning against this law, of which they were not ignorant, that they were pun- ished, and not for disobeyirug the divine positive law as revealed to the Jews, which they did not know. IQO TACTICSOF INFIDELS. 1 ( The cause of their punishment is made clear in the Book of Wisdom. " Those ancient inhabitants of the holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did works hateful to thee by their sorceries and wicked sacrifices, and those merciless murderers of their own children^ and eaters of men's bowels^ and devourers of blood from the midst of thy consecration ; and those parents sacrifici^ig with their own hands helpless soids, it was thy will to destroy by the hands of our parents." (See Notes, page 65.) Do not understand me as defending God's action in removing from the face of the earth those people because they were guilty, for I hold that he had the right to remove them whether they were guilty or in- nocent, just as by means of his natural law he is daily removing us, both innocent and guilty, both infancy and age. Against his will there is no appeal or right ' t J appeal. He owes no man to-morrow. The mistake you infidels make is in measuring God's economy by your experience of the narrow span of human life from the cradle to the grave, as if it were the be-all and end-all, whereas it is only the initiatory — the mere introduction into endless exist- ence. The child whose first breath is its last has received a beginning, and is as fixed forever in the order of realties as he who lingers here in this migra- tory state for five score years to sink at last gray haired and trembling into his grave. To live as man forever we must begin to live as man here, and this beginning, short or long, secures an endless future. Of what consequence then in the long run is a longer or shorter sojourn here in this phase of being ? The child that is born and dies to-day is as old as that 'vhich born to-day dies a hundred years hence. The TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 191 latter has greater experience here, the former greater experience beyond. What is this speck of time to either or to God ? There is in all this infidel lachry- mose blubbering an occult denial of a future existence; a want of that serene calmness which comes from a conviction of endless life, an indefinable, white-lipped, cowardly fear, the horrible imaginings of a fever patient. This want of belief in the future impels them to make the facts of this phase of existence the ultimate rule of divine justice. To please them God must interfere with his divine plan, shut up the etern- ities and begin and complete everything within the space of man's earthly life. It must be confessed to the honor of human nature that people of this kind are comparatively few. Lacy. Mr. IngersoU is severely reprimanded because he avers, ar'^ording to Scripture, captive maidens were su'rrena*. red to lustful captors. He is accused of being reckless in statement. The charge he makes is termed a baseless assertion and an appeal to ignorance. Lambert. And I repeat that his assertion is base- less and an appeal to or the result of ignorance. He said : IngersoU, He (God) gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors. Notes ^ I flatly deny the truth of your statement and appeal to the only record that can give us any information on the subject, namely, the Old Testa- ment. The Hebrew military laws did not abandon captive women to the insolence and brutality of cap- tors. On the contrary they made special provision forbidding the first familiarities of the soldier with his captives. If you study the 2 1 st chapter of Deutcron- m I . I m 192 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. omy, verses 10 to 14, you will learn that the soldier was obliged to make the captive his wife, or to respect her person and honor. Instead of tolerating that licentiousness which the customs and laws of other nations authorized, the laws of the Hebrews kept the soldier in restraint. They show that the Hebrews were far in advance of other nations in all those regu- lations that mitigate the horrors of war. The pagan nations of that time allowed every familiarity with the captives, and afterwards they were sold as slaves or given to the lusts of slaves. This was strictly and specifically forbidden by the Hebrew law. And yet in the face of all this, you have the affrontery to charge the Almighty with permitting the Jews to do that which he forbade, and which they alone of all ancient nations prohibited by strict and specific laws. What will honest men of common sense think of a philosophy that has to be propped and bolstered up by such shameless misrepresentations of history ? Lacj^. Why does the Father say "to" and not through the 14th verse. Without divining his motive it will be apparent that by so doing he would have disproved his own assertion and have justified Mr. IngersoU's statement. Lambert. It is clear from verses ii, 12 and 13, that the captor was required to marry his captive, and that the intercourse between them was to be that of husband and wife. "Thou shalt * * * ^^ her husband and she shall be thy wifcy Does this justify the state- merit that God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors ? If so every woman that marries is given over to the lusts of her husband. But thfe is not the way men speak of women who are married. Verse nth says to the Jewish soldier: "When thou TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 193 not lotive have Mr. scest among the captives a beautiful woman, and hast a desire unto her, that thou wouldst have her to wife." Here there is no talk of giving captive maidens to the lust of captors, but of how the captors should viakc them tJicir ivivcs. The manner of doing so is laid down in verses 1 2 and 1 3 as follows : " Thou shalt bring her home to thy house; and shalt shave her head and pare her nails; and she shall put the raiment of captivity from off her, and she shall remain in thy house, and bewail her father and mother a full month." There are three things to be observed here, ist, the captor was to bring her home and by a simple ceremony adopt her into the family and nation and give her the right of a Hebrew woman. 2d, she was to cast aside the signs of captivity, tliat is, she was no longer to be considered in the relation of a captive. 3rd, she was to be left free one month to mourn the loss of her relations, and on the expiration of the month the captor was to marry her. There is certain- ly nothing here to justify Ingersoll's misrepresentation. " This," says Philo, " is an admirable statute. On the one hand, instead of tolerating that licentiousness which custom and the laws of other nations authorized, it kept the soldier during thirty days, in constraint, and as it showed him his captive, during this interval in an undress, and stripped of all those ornaments which might add to her charms, it gave him time and opportunity to moderate the violence of his passion. On the other hand, this law was a balm to the sorrows of the captive." But you say verse 14th disproves my statement and justifies Ingersoll's. The verse is as follows: " And it shall be, if thou have no delight in her, then .1 J i! i 194 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. thou shalt let her go whither she will ; but thou shalt not sell her at all for money, thou slialt not make mer- chandise of her, because thou hast humbled her." This verse simply means that if, after having married her, he saw fit afterwards to use his liberty of divorce, recognized by the Jewish code, she was then entitled to her freedom ; she was not to be retained as a slave, nor sold by him to be another's. The purpose of this law was to protect her liberty, to prevent her after the divorce from falling into slavery, and to secure to her the rights of a Hebrew woihan. This verse then, instead of disproving my statement, con- firms it, and proves that when IngersoU said, ** God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors," he said what is not true. Instead of consigning the captive maiden to the lawless passions of the soldier, the laws contained in the above verses hold him in restraint, and leave him no way to approach her except through honorable marriage. If after marri- age he takes advantage of the divorce laws, verse 14 still protects her and prevents her captor husband's cupidity from making her a slave or a prostitute. She must be free to go whither she will, free as the daughters of Abraham, for she is an adopted daughter of the nation. Such was the effect of those laws which IngersoU and you quote as evidences of lawless lech- ery sanctioned by Almighty God. A more profound study of the laws of Moses, the man with a mind of unparalleled greatness, who acted with a primeval strength of his own, independent of all history, would enlarge your vision, enable you to judge more justly, and criticise in a more enlightened spirit. Instead of this scholarl)'^ method you prefer that of the serpent which beslimes every beautiful thing it touches. CHAPTER XIX. Lacy. Certainly ; a lady of the present day would, no doubt, feel sufficiently " humbled " by treatment like this. (That is, changed from a captive slave to an hon- orable wife and afterwards divorced, but with all the rights of the women of the conquerors, and with all the ways of ambition open to her that are open to the ambition of the women of the nation — free to marry the peasant or the king, and without that stigma ot immoral repute which attaches to the divorced woman of our day.) Lambert. When the lady of the present day is divorced, her moral character is blasted and her future ruined ; her disgrace ramifies out to her most remotest kindred and taints them as having bad blood. The man who dares to marry her partakes of her loss of social caste, sinks to her moral level, shares her ostracism, bares his brow and breast to the arrows and shafts of his enemies, to the sympathy ot his friends and to the jibes and jokes of the thoughtless and heart- less. Who dares to marry such a woman ? How wretched then is her condition? It is indeed sad. She stands out alone, a solitary in society, an aimless creature whose lamp has been put out, whose hopes have no foundation but in the good God and in the eternity that awaits us all. The joys of earthly life have for her forever vanished. But to judge of the condition of the Jewish di- vorced captive by this sad picture is to make a great mistake. The reason of her divorce is aistinctly laid 4- ! I. 196 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I ' i! down, and implies no evil repute; ^ive her her liberty, let her j^o whither she will, with character unstained, free to marry in honor with him who offers her his heart and devotion, and who in doing so lost not caste or respect. But he has "humbled" her. True, but not in the sense of defilement, as implied in IngersoU's statement, for she was his wife. Her humiliation consisted in being divorced and not in the disgrace arising from outrage on an unmarried woman. She was divorced by the law that prevailed among the Jews. In all this there is not the slightest foundation for IngersoU's filthy insinuation. Lacy. So in the plentitude of thy mercy sell her not, noble man ! devoted husband ! Lambert. You will admit that the law forbidding the Jews to imitate the custom of the neighboring heathens was an admirable law. But this is straying from the point, which is whether IngersoU told the truth when he said that " God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors." That his statement is false is evident from the verse quoted from Deuter- onomy. As further proof you quote from Numbers : "But all the women children who have not known man by lying with him, keep for yourselves y' and add : — Lacy. Female innocence to be offered on the altar of lust ! Noble trophies of victory ! Lambert. A Comanche Indian would probably interpret the verse that way. But what is there in the words to justify the inference that the captives were devoted to the lusts of the captors? The captives were to be adopted into the nation and subsequently to intermarry with the Jews in accordance with the , (.. 11 TACTtCS OF INFIDELS. 19; law of Deuteronomy quoted above. It is only a libidi- nous imagination that cin give the words any other interpretation. The United States government ** keeps for itself" the children of those Indians whom it de- stroys. Are we to infer that those children are to be offered on the altar of lust ? Notes. God abhors lying spirits, false prophets and false philosophers ; yet he permits them to exi.t, because he cannot make them impossible without de- stroying free will, or human liberty. Lacy, The good priest has at last confessed it. There be some things that even God cannot do. To the extent of his inability he is of course " limited." Lambert. I have already spoken of the imaginary limits to the power of the infinite Being. Power is the capacity to do something; infinite power is the capacity to do all things — not the capacity to do all nothings, such as contradictions. The inability to do nothing is no limit of power. Its limit is the inability to do something. Now an act that involves a contra- diction results in nothing. To expend energy in doing an act that has no result is contrary to infinite wisdom. To make a square circle is to make nothing, because the essential attributes of one excludes the essential attributes of the other. The result is a square and a circle, or nothing. To make a free slavey like a square circle, is to do nothing, for if he be free he is not a slave, and if a slave he is not free. To do nothing requires no CxXercise of power and therefore is no limit of power. Now wh . .1 I say God cannot make a man free and at the same time prevent him from lying, it is the same as saying that he cannot do an act that on account of inherent contradiction results in nothing. Christian theology teaches that ■b .... I i ■■■«*!■ ■'■ Iri Hii . '^ liHt ^' ■ f ■Br I ' « -1 I i I* ' • I II! . 198 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. God can do all things. A square circle or a free slave is not a thing ; it is a nothfng. Your blunder arises from confounding something with no thing, or all things ^with no things. Lacj/. We now agree that some things are im- possible with God, even if we disagree as to what is and what is not impossible. Lambert. We do not agree ; on the contrary we differ radically. God can do all things^ and that which he cannot do is no thing — but a contradiction. Lacy. But did the God of the Hebrews, as the Father avers he did, abhor lying spirits ? Lambert. Yes, as will be seen from the following texts : Thou shalt fly lying. — Exodus 23-1. These six things doth the Lord hate * * * a lying tongue * * * and a false witness that speaketh lies. — Prov. 6-16, 19. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord, but they that deal faithfully please him. — Prov. 12-22. . A false witness shall not be unpunished, and he that speaketh lies shall not escape. — Prov. 19*5. The bread of lying is sweet to a man, but after- wards his mouth shall be filled with gravel. — Prov. 12-27. He that gathereth treasures by a lying tongue, is vain and foolish, and shall stumble upon the snares of •death. — Prov. 21-6. The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. — Wis- dom i-ii. Do not devise a lie against thy brother * * * Be not willing to make any manner of lie, for the custom thereof is not good. — Eccli. 7-13. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 199 : slave arises or all re im- hat is iry we which as the owing 5K •!* o eaketh rd, but 2. . and he • t after- — Prov. igue, IS lares of — Wis- ^ * Be custom A lie is a foul blot in a man * * * A thief is better than a man that is always lying ; both of them shall inherit destruction. The mar.ier of lying men is without honor ; and their confusion is with them without ceasing. — Wisdom 20-26 to 28. Cursing, and lying and killing and theft, and adultery have overflowed * * * therefore shall the land mourn. — Osee 3-2, 3. These texts are from the Old Testament. The following are from the New ; You are of your father, the devil, and the desires of your father you will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and he abode not in the truth, because truth is not in him, for he is a liar and the father there- of. — ^John 8-44. Putting away lying, speak ye the truth, every man with his neighbor. — Ephes. 4-25. Lie not at all. — Coloss. 3-9. There shall not enter into it (heaven) anything defiled, or any that worketh abomination, or a lie. — Apocal. 22-15. Here we have enough to prove that the God of the Hebrews and Christians abhors and punishes liars of all kinds, whether they assume the cant of the hypocrite in religion ^r the cant of the hypocrite in philosophy, whether a sorcerer in the jungles of Africa or a lecturer in dress coat and neck-tie, whether for evil purposes or for 50 cents admission fee, whether ignorant or learned, gross or polite, funny or stupid — all are detesred by the God of truth, and if unrepent- ant will be damned for their lying — whether they believe in damnation or not. i: 1]} i iH '. '■ 1 '> ! !. /'( ! OfH * ! I ^ i, CHAPTER XX. Mr. Lacy introduces his lOth chapter by stigma- tizing the science of theology. He makes no distinc- tion between true and false theology. It does not seem to have occurred to him that there is a true and a false theology, as there is a true and a false science, a true and false astronomy, a true and false philosophy, a true and false view to everything that can become an object of human thought. He sums up all human notions of religion under the word "theology" and concludes that because many of these notions are erroneous the whole science of theology is erroneous. The fallacy of this position is evident from the mere statement of it, for if the errors made by investigators in theology destroy the value of theological science, the errors of investigators in all other fields of inquiry would equally destroy tlie validity of all the other sciences. This is too absurd to deserve a moment's consideration. And yet in this absurd way does the average infidel talk. He seems to have no sense of precision in his logic — in thinking or in talking — as long as he can talk, talk, talk, witnout interruption, he is happy. Lacy. It is difficult for theology to cleanse itselt from the moths, the mould and mildew of the past. Lambert. I go further than you and say that it is not only difficult but impossible for the science of theology to disassociate itself from the errors of the past or of the future. The true and the false will move along together, as a body and its shadow, But TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 201 the errors of men in theological speculation . can no more be attributed to the science of theology than the mis- takes of an urchin in the Rule of Three can be attributed to the science of geometry or mathematics. Must a science be rejected because those who deal with it make mistakes ? Must we throw aside the science of astronomy because of the mistakes of Galileo, Ptolemy and Brahe, or because of the new theories that are being broached of late ? Moths, moulds and mildews are concomitants of real, substantial things. Moulds and mildews must have something to mould and mil- dew, or they would not exist; just so, theological errors cannot exist without theological truth in which they can inhere and which they mould and mildew, as moss grows on granite. Lacy. It (theology) started out in a blaze of the miraculous ; it assumed, a :, a God-given privilege, the right to torture and to slay. Lambert. This is one of those many infidel phrases which requires the Christian to exercise his patience to meet with equanimity. It is false from be- ginning to end, false all through from top to bottom, as full of unmitigated falsehood as a thoroughly wet sponge is of water. Every fibre of it is impregnated to its fullest capacity with the spirit of fallacy. One could imagine that the lying spirit spoken of by the prophet Micheas was once again abroad. How a civilized man of this nineteenth century could be guilty of the false and absurd statement which Mr. Lacy has made himself responsible for, is unaccount- able except on the theory that his intellectual vision has been seriously paralyzed by the sophisms of an eloquent, money-making showman. Let us now examine Mr. Lacy's statement. it 202 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ? s il- ' " It (theology) started out in a blaze of the mirac- ulous." If you had the sligjitest pinch of common sense in this matter you would know that the miraculous supposes the Deity and the Deity supposes theology, for theology means the science of the Deity, and therefore, that theology in the ontological order pre- cedcs the miraculous and hence cannot start from it. We cannot conceive a miracle without a miracle worker, therefore the miracle worker is the Jirst element in the idea of the miraculous. This miracle worker, traced to the last analysis, is the Deity. Therefore the idea of the Deity must precede the idea of the mirac- ulous, since the miraculous aS a fact is inconceivable with- out the miracle worker, and the miracle worker incon- ceivable without the Deity. The idea of the Deity then precedes the idea of the miraculous, and is the subject matter of the science of theology. Now in as much as the idea of the Deity precedes any action of the Deity, theology precedes any action of the Deity and therefore precedes the miraculous, for the mirac- ulous can be nothing but an action of the Deity. Theology is then necessarily prior to the miraculous and therefore could not start from it. Lacy. It (theology) assumed, as a God-given principle, to torture and to slay. Lambert. In as much as theology is the science which treats of God and His divine attributes — and of these alone, it is not easy to see how it claims the right to persecute, torture and slay. You simply con- found theology with religion, a confusion which a writer pretending to exactness should not fall into. But does religion claim the right to persecute, torture and slay ? The true religion under the Mosaic or Christian %\ TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 203 dispensation, never claimed such a right, although it recognized the supreme jurisdiction of God over life and death and all things, and that God being perfect cannot punish unjustly, and therefore that punishments inflicted by His command could not be persecution, since persecution is the infliction of unjust punish- ment. The right to inflict just punishment is and has always been claimed by human society in all its phases, and justly too, because without this right society and social order would be impossible. We never think of accusing civil society of persecution or torture because it imprisons and executes law-breakers. Yet this was the only right claimed by Moses as the law-giver of the Jewish nation, the only right exercised by him as the executive of that nation. When in obedience to the command of God he made war on the guilty na- tions of Palestine he only obeyed the will of Him whose right to take life you have admitted. Lacy, Let us, for the sake of argument, admit that idolatry and blasphemy were treason and merited death. In this view how stood Aaron the high priest, who made the golden calf? Lambert. He stood guilty of treason, but was pardoned. God, who can by right inflict death on the guilty, can also pardon. At one moment you condemn your Maker for punishing, at another for pardoning. You are hard to please. IngersolL He (God) sent forth lying spirits to deceive His own prophets. Notes. I will give one hundred dollars to the poor of this town if you or your disciples make good your statement. I am familiar with the texts in Kings and Ezekiel which ' you probably imagine will bear you out, but if you carefully compare those texts with hh h Ir 204 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. your statement you will find that your zeal has run away, with your discretion, and that your hatred of your Maker is more intense than your love for the truth. Lambert. At this point Mr. Lacy steps in to the assistance of Ingersoll and quotes with jubilant triumph the very texts I referred to in Kings. They are as follows: "And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead ? And one said on this manner and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit a!nd stood be- fore the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, wherewith ? And he said, I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And He said, thou shalt persuade him and prevail also ; go forth and do so. Now therefore, behold the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil against thee." Lacy. Would it not appear from this that the " lying spirit " was on good terms with the Deity when he volunteered his service to lie for Him, which tender was accepted and approved. Lambert. It might so appear to a reader who is ignorant of the Eastern parabolic modes of speech, but it would not so appear to the student familiar with these modes and who reads for the purpose of acquir- ing information rather than to indulge in narrow-eyed, inimical criticism. The first point to settle is, did God, as Ingersoll says, send abroad lying spirits to deceive his own prophets? This must be determined before we go further. Loose talk will not do. Now if I were to grant every inference you claim to draw from your no TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 205 LS run red of or the to the iumph ire as rsuade rilead ? )n that od be- And said, I I of all ie k^m ;refore, mouth en evil lat the Deity which who is speech, ar with acquir- v-eyed, gersoll lis own we go vere to 1 your quotation from Kings, which I do not, it still remains that IngersoH's statement is false, for there is no evidence in chapter 22d that God's own prophets were deceived. On the contrary the whole chapter leaves it beyond doubt that God's own prophets were not deceived, but spoke the truth and persisted in it and suffered imprisonment for doing so. Even from the quotation you give it is evident that the prophets who were deceived by the lying spirit were not God's prophets, but the false prophets of King Ahab. But does it appear from the text thfet God sent forth lying spirits to deceive any one ? Let us see. Ahab King of Israel consulted his false prophets to know the result of a war he was about to wage against the King of Syria. Josaphat King of Juda liked not the word of these prophets who foretold that Ahab would be victorious, and said : " Is there not here some prophet of the Lord, that we may inquire of him ?" And Ahab replied : " There is one man here by whom we may inquire of the Lord, Micheas the son of Jemala, but I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good to me but evil." He however sent for Micheas and consulted him. Micheas said : " I saw all Israel scattered upon the hills like sheep that had no shepherd." These are the words of the true prophet, and they were verified by the result of the war undertaken by the king at the instigation of his false prophets, for his army was scattered like sheep upon the hills, and the king himself was killed. The texts quoted by you contain a dramatic parable or picture which the true prophet Micheas made use of to convince the king that he was being deceived and led to his destruction by his false prophets. The king disregarded the warning of God by the mouth of his 2o6 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ",!. prophet Micheas, and was in consequence defeated and put to death. The language of Micheas is parabolic — a familiar form of speech used by all Eastern people and to be found in both the Old and New Testaments — the drift of which is to impress vividly on the mind of King Ahab that his false prophets were inspired by a lying spirit. God permitted the lying spirit to go forth but warned the king by the lips of Micheas to heed it not. The fact that God by Micheas warned the king against the prophets who were inspired by the lying spirit is a sufficient answer to your charge that he made use of it, or was on what you call " familiar terms" with it. Had you read carefully the whole of chapter 22d you would have seen that the whole drift of it is inconsistent with the literal inter- pretation you gave to the parabolic language of the prophet. Lacy. When will humanity exchange the swad- dling-clothes of its infancy for garments becoming its mature manhood? Lambert. When will the infidel understand that he is not the accepted judge of the nature of mature manhood ? When will he understand that man began his career on this planet in mature manhood and not in infancy ? When will he learn that the egotism of assuming that manhood is more mature at present than it was four thousand years ago is puerile non- sense or a miserable begging of the question ? When will he learn that snarling at everything sacred, as a rabid cur snaps and snarls at straws, is no evidence of sense or manhood ? In a word, when will he get into his skull that if his brains had never developed there would still be brains enough in the world to get along with? What has infidelity or scepticism ever done ■|:V'' TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 207 for the world of mankind? Did it ever build a col- lege for the advancement of learning, a hospital for the sick or an asylum for unfortunate little ones ? We look over the surface of the earth in vain, and through all time in vain, for any such evidences of its bcnificent tracks. Its past leaves no monument to be honored ; its present is destructive of morality, social order and liberty; its discipkj are proud, self-conceited and egotistic ; it pilfers the results of the labors of honest workers in the field of knowledge and the fruits of Christian enlightenment, and unblushingly parades these stolen properties as its own ; it talks of love for rpankind with lips white with hate ; of mercy now, but when it had the power, as in the French revolu- tion, it proved that it had it not ; it talks of honor, when its principles leave no reason for its existence ; of woman while it strips her of all real dignity and leaves her no more than a female animal ; it talks of virtue, while in its code the word has no meaning. Spectre-like it moves down the ages with Christianity, gibing and gibbering as monkeys in the equatorial regions bar and interrupt the advances of the civilized explorer. It enjoys the fruits of Christian civilization as the barnacle or parasite enjoys the vigorous health of a stronger organism, or as a tubercle lives on the human lungs. It is an intellectual disease. Lacy. It is said that he (Aaron) permitted the people to worship naked, to their shame, and this excuse, filmy and attenuated as it is, is the best his brother Moses has given for him. Lambert. " It is said." By whom is it said that Aaron permitted the people to worship naked ? The account of the golden calf and the worship of it, is found in the 32d chapter of Exodus, and there is not ^ ! 1 208 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. fi one word from the beginning to the end of it to justify your statement that Aaron "permitted the people to worship naked." The only verse that could by the most remote possibility justify you if the 25th, which is as follows : " And when Moses saw that the people were naked, (for Aaron had made them naked unto their shame among their enemies)." There is not the slightest suggestion here of a permission to " worship naked." The expression " to make one naked among one's enemies " means in all languages, to leave one defenseless among one's enemies, and none but a very crooked intellect would imagine that it meant " shirt- less " among one's enemies. When Cardinal Wolsey says to Cromwell : " Had I but served my God witli half the zeal I served my King, He^ would not in mine age have left me naked to mine enemies." There is no danger that the true critic will think the dying Cardinal meant that the King had deprived him of his clothing and left him in a state of nudity. It is only when Moses uses the word that the infidel wiseacre scents a whiff of the obscene. Aaron, by yielding to. the de- mands of the people, as men in power often yield, joined with them in their disobedience to God, and in doing so lost His divine protection, and thus the peo- ple and he were left, without that protection, defense- less — naked to their enemies. When " Moses saw that the people were naked " he saw that by their dis- obedience they had stripped themselves of that divine promise and protection which was their only defense. He saw that " Aaron had made them naked * * * among their enemies." This is a simple and natural ex- planation of the 25 th verse which you have so " honestly " misrepresented. II ' ill TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 209 peo- tense- saw ir dis- livine [fense. 9|C ♦ The Jewish targum of Jerusalem giVes still an- other explanation of this verse. The Jews were accustomed to wear bands upon their foreheads and wrists on which was inscribed the sacred tetragram- m?Xon Je-ho-va. When they turned from the true God to the worship of the golden calf they threw aside their insignia of loyalty to the God who brought them out of the land of Egypt. The Jew who was stripped of these phylacteries was said to be naked or uncovered, just as a man is said to be uncovered when his hat is off. The word "naked" has many meanings besides that of physical nudity. According to Web- ster it means defenseless, unprotected, unarmed, etc. It is strange that of all these meanings of the word the only one that occurs to you is that suggested by hungry-eyed libidinosity. When you say that this nakedness is the best ex- cuse Moses has given for his brother you suggest an idea that is nowhere to be found in the text. The great lawgiver offered no excuse whatever for Aaron. He turned to God and said : " This people have sinned a great sin ; yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin — ; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written." Which is to be the most admired, the spirit of Moses as exhibited in this prayer, or the spirit of his critic ? / - CHAPTER XXI. Lacy. What of Solomon the wise man, and of the long line of kings who introduced idol worship even in the temple of the Lord ? Lambert. Solomon and others who fell into idol- atry were punished for the crime. Your " long line of kings who introduced idol worship even in the temple " is a fiction for which you can claim ori- ginality ; it is the kind of line used by imaginative people when drawing the long bow. Lacy. Did God punish his (Solomon's) treason with death ? Oh I no ! Lambert. Had you read the whole chapter, i ith Kings I, you would probably have been satiated with the sufferings inflicted on the sinning monarch and not have grown indignant because God did not imme- diately take his life. It would appear that your Maker is always wrong, whether He punishes or par- dons ; if He does not kill the sinner He is partial, and if He kills him He is cruel. For the Supreme Being there is no escape from Lacy. It is a mystery how the All-wise 'Being could create an intelligence that can corner Him so easily, how He could create a being so much wiser than Himself Lacy. But in regard to treason as a justification for the slaying of millions, because God was king, and to deny His authority was treason ; unfortunately for such logic, after the Book of the Law was found in the house of the Lord (2 Kings XXII, 8) the Jewish people were professedly governed by it and enforced TACTICS OF IS'FIDELS. 311 the laws therein prescribed, among which were com- mands that witches, idolaters and Sabbath-breakers should be put to death. Lambert. This Book of the Law was the Penta- teuch, the Book of the Laws of God whether admin- istered by Moses, Josue, the judges or kings. The fact that this divine law was administered by kings does not change the nature of the case so long as the law was given by God for the government of the Jew- ish nation. To disobey that law was to disobey the divine lawgiver. To break that law was a crime against God as well as against the State which recog- nized him as its law giver. To make out your case you very judiciously suppressed a part of my argu- ment in the Notes, which was as follows : " Grant society or government, and it is of no consequence whether X, Y or Z is its king ; the principle of its action must be the same in reference to those things which touch its authority." Lacy. We may ask whether God is not at all times the ruler of all men. Lambert. He is, but not in the sense that He was for a time the ruler of the Jewish nation. Lacy. If His justice and mercy sanctioned in olden times the slaughter of those who defied His authority, so also should they now. Lambert. God has the right to remove the human race from the face of the earth when He wills to do so. He is the judge, the only judge, of the when and the how. God authorizes the taking of life, or slaughtering as you delight to call it, now as of old. That authority He gives to every government, and every government worthy of the name exercises it on those who defy its authority or trample on its laws. I i' t iir i' '■ : If u iJii 4:1 "1 ,. m 212 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. The United States Government exercised that right in the late rebellion against its authority, and piled up in doing so a hecatomb of corpses. Canada lately did the same thing in the Northwest. Without this right all government would be impossible, and the world be given up to Herr Most and his fellow- anarchists. Lacy. Idolatry, treason ! No honest thought can be treason to Him who knows the hearts and mo- tives of men. Lambert. That is true. Hence we conclude that when God ordered the punishment of the guilty Canaanites He did not find in them sufficient " honest thought" to shield them from punishment. He knows the hearts and motives of men and when He punishes them we must assume that their thought was not honest. Your mistake is in assuming "honest thought" in every wretch that is punished for his crimes. Lacy. The same punishn. tit was meted out to idolaters * * * under kingly rule as under theocratic rule * * * the treason argument, therefore, as it proves too much proves nothing. Lambert. The same punishment was meted out under kingly rule as under theocratic rule. Yes, but the law in both cases was the same divine law. Idol- atry did not cease to be a crime against God and the State because Saul was made king. As long as the law of God was the fundamental law of the nation the crime of disobedience to it was the same and the pun- ishment the same, and the treason argument the same. Th^ law against idolatry was promulgated by God Himself, and when punished under the kings it was punished as treason against the Supreme ruler and lawgiver. It is a grave mistake to suppose that TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 213 out but Idol- the the n the pun- Isame. God was and that because the Jews had kings they were no longer bound by the laws which God had given them. Lacy. Humanity of to-day,- even in capital cases, for the highest grade of crime, requires that the offend- er should be put out of the way (why not say slaughter- ed ?) with as little suffering as possible. Lambert. Here you admit in society the right to take life, to slaughter men, and to determine what are capital cases. How can you deny to Jewish society what you concede to modern society ? God and the Jewish government under the kings declared idolatry to be of the highest grade of crime and punished it accordingly. When the Jews execute law breakers you call it slaughter or murder; when the humanity of to-day does it you call it " putting them out of the way." This is a beautiful distinction. If the plea of honest thought is so potent why not give the modern law breaker the benefit of it? Why reserve your maudlin sympathy for the law breakers of ancient Judea? Lacy. We never torture the living or mutilate the dead. Lambert. Is not imprisonment a torture ? Why have insane asylums become a part of our prisons if not for the care of those whose minds have been de- stroyed by the tortures of imprisonment ? Go to our medical colleges and then tell us "we do not mutilate the dead." You may say there are reasons that justify it. That I grant, but the fact disproves your state- ment. Is it not strange that the ancient modes of inflicting death are still existing everywhere in the world where Christianity does not prevail ? Lacy. With regard to liberty of conscience the Father seems somewhat confused. In one place his ,-H 214 TACTICS OF JNKIDELS. ! ^ til ■• !■ ,1 v/ords imply that " speculative conscience " is admis- sible and not subject to the penalties of mundane law divine. In other words, a man is privileged to think what he pleases if he does not speak of or formulate his ideas in overt acts. Lambert. It would have been more candid to have quoted what the Father said than to have given your readers a false interpretation of it. So far as the human 'operation of law or government is concerned man is free to design and plan what he pleases, mur- der, theft, or any other crime ; for so long as his thoughts and designs are purely speculative, that is, not reduced to acts, the government cannot know them, and therefore cannot take cognizance of or pun- ish them. The inability of the government to know his mind gives him immunity from punishment, but it does not give him a right to " think what he pleases." This is not to say that his guilty thought is " admissi- ble," but simply that government cannot punish an offence it does not know. Some modern governments allow a limited liberty of speech — our own for instance — but no government ever has or ever will tolerate that liberty in an unlimited sense. During the war men were imprisoned for exercising that liberty and the anarchist Most was arrested the other day in New York for doing the same. Again, while government tolerates a large liberty of speech, it punishes when certain doctrines are put into practice. Thus the communist may teach that all property is common, but when he or his followers reduce that doctrine to act he is jailed as a thief The Mormon may teach polygamy as a speculative doctrine, but when he re- duces it to practice he is punished. ■ ■ ,. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 215 But before God, man is responsible for his de- signs and thoughts and is culpable and punishable if they be evil, because God knows the nature of those thoughts and designs. This distinction between acts in their relation to God and in their relation to human government is very evident, and yet you do not or pretend not to see it. Lacy. But who shall decide what is error, what meditations are evil, and what plans criminal ? Lambert. Have not you and IngersoU been de- ciding to your own satisfaction, what is error ? As long as our errors, meditations and plans are purely speculative, that is, not reduced to overt acts, God alone is the judge, for he alone can know the thoughts of men. If they are reduced to acts such as murder, theft, perjury, the government is the judge and the executioner. But in both cases God is the ultimate judge. Lacy. The safest way is not to think at all, for the rod is over us and may fall, but to hire some ecclesiastic to think for us. Lambert. Or buy Mr. Lacy's book or pay fifty cents to IngersoU. IngersoU. Think of the author of all mercy im- bruing his hands in the blood of helpless men, women and children simply because He did not furnish them with intelligence enough to understand His law. Notes. Think of a man who is always talking " honor bright," manhood and truth, making such a false and groundless statement to intelligent readers. I italicise the words in the above quotation which con- tain a blasphemous fallacy. On what evidence or authority do you assert that men, etc., were punished simply because they had not intelligence enough to 2l6 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. If i, ,r ■ '■■ i Wf^ '■ 1 8 1 if ; :■ I- * ! i: p ! '■ '!"• i ' -■^ 1 jk. understand the law ? What evidence have you that they did not understand the law ? Did those who were punished ever make this plea in extenuation of their crime? It is a principle of revealed ethics that those who have not intelligence enough to understand the law are not judged by the law. To cover up this calumny on God, Mr. Lacy chips in thus : — Lacy. It would seem that the wanderers in a desert wild would not have worshipped Aaron's calf if they had not honestly expected deliverance by it. Lambert. These wanderers knew that idolatry was forbidden; they sinned against that knowledge and were punished. But is there any evidence that they were punished simply because they had not enough intelligence to understand the law ? But your defence of these idolaters is a singular one ; they would not have worshipped the golden calf if they had not hon- estly expected deliverance by it! In ot ^er words, they would not have done what they knew to be wrong if they had not honestly expected to obtain some benefit. If this defence be valid, it is equally good as a plea for the thief, for he would not steal un- less he " honestly " expected some advantage from it. Indeed it is difficult to imagine how any one can break the law and subject himself to punishment without ex- pecting to gain some desired end, but the honesty of his expectations is no justification for his unlawful act. Your plea for the wanderers in the desert involves a new principle of morals, a principle that if adopted would render law and order impossible. Lacy. But what of the decree : That which dieth of itself ye may give to the stranger or sell to the alien TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 217 in a that he may eat it, but thou O Israel must forego the luxury ! Lambert. This illustrates the oblique eye with which the infidel looks on everything Jewish or Chris- tian. That the Jews were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that had died of themselves is a proof that they and their neighbors were accustomed to eat such food, for a prohibitory law is never promulgated unless to prevent some practice. No legislator thinks of pro- hibiting things that are never done. When Moses gave this wise prohibition to his people he did not for- bid them to give or sell such forbidden food to those aliens and strangers who desired it. According to this law of Moses, if a Jew caught a mess of salmon and let them die on the string he could not eat them because they died of themselves. Would there be anything wrong in his selling them to you who are accustomed to eat them in that way ? You do not eat dog ; would there be anything improper in your sell- ing or giving a dog to an Indian who considers it a luxury ? The Jew according to the law cannot eat oysters, clams or shell-fish of any kind ; is that a rea- son why he should not sell to you who love the suc- culent bivalve more than you do the law of Moses ? The whole force of your insinuation consists in the supposition that the Jew was permitted to cheat his customer, to sell him under false pretenses a kind of food he did not want ; whereas he was permitted to give or sell what the customer wanted, but what he was not himself permitted to eat. Lacy. Do not say to those who advocate liberty of conscience that they plead for the right to do wrong; though they hold that there are thoughts and acts for which man is not accountable to man. 2l8 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 3t;- Lambert. Those who claim, as you do, the right to think as they " please " certainly do claim the right to think wrong, evil, if they please so to think, and the right to think wrong implies the right to reduce that thought to act. As no one of sense will admit this latter right so no one can admit the former, for in re- jecting the result we must reject the principle from which the result is logically drawn. The liberty of conscience^does not mean that we can thmk or do as we please. There is a standard of right and wrong entirely independent of human judgment or volition, to which both should comply. In matters of detail men may differ in regard to this standard, but no one is free in conscience to disregard it as he conceives it to be. Conscience itself requires him to obey it, and deprives its possessor of the right of doing as he pleases. We must not confound conscience with will or volition. They are very different things, and are frequently in antagonism. Men often will to do things their conscience forbids and will not to do things their conscience commands them to do. It is a mistake to say or infer that men do not claim the right to do wrong. You will certainly ad- mit that to assassinate is wrong and yet there are those in this nineteenth century and in this country who claim that right. How can you as an apostle of " honest thought " meet these assassins ? Grant them the plea of " conscience " and " honest thought," and grant, as you must from the nature of the case, that they are the judges of their honest conscience and honest thought, and what valid argument can you bring to oppose them ? None whatever. If your and Ingersoll's theory of freedom of thought is correct, the anarchists are strictly logical. It is unwise, if not ■ if! . TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 219 wicked, to advocate a principle that deprives you of all valid arguments against these enemies of society. Lacy. There are thoughts and acts for which man is not accountable. Lambert. Yes, such as the actions of sleep- walkers and lunatics. Lacy, Neither refer us to those erratic spirits who confound liberty with license. Lambert. We must refer to those spirits, for they have the same right to appeal to liberty, conscience, and honest thought that you and IngersoU have. Why assert liberty for yourself and deny it to those erratic spirits ? Or why call them erratic because they carry your theory of " honest thought " a little farther than you do ? If liberty is all that IngersoU says it is why should the liberty of those erratic spirits be limited by what you call the educated common sense of the world ? And if this educated common sense of the world is the critedon and limit of liberty who is to determine what is the dictum of this comn^on sense ? Are not these erratic spirits as free as you to determine what it is ? The educated common sense of Utah and Turkey says polygamy is right ; the educated com- mon sense of Christendom says it is wrong. Now when the educated common sense of the world clashes and contradicts who is to determine ? You should be slow to condemn the " erratic spirits " for they com- pose the rank and file of all the anti-Christians in Christendom. Besides, they might retort that you, not they, are the erratic spirits, and the Christian will believe that you are both right. CHAPTER XXII. i^ 1 Lacy. ' The boundary line which divides them (liberty and license) we may not be able to define with absolute exactness, but when license appears as the counterfeit of liberty, the educated common sense of the world protests. Lambert. If the educated common sense of the world cannot draw the I'ne where liberty stops and license begins how can it determine when license ap- pears as " the counterfeit of liberty ?" You first admit that it cannot draw the line and then assume that it can draw the line. How can the counterfeit be dis- tinguished from the genuine if there be no criterion or rule or line ? Where is the court to determine in any given case what the common sense of the world teaches ? . Who is its interpreter ? By the educated common sense of the world you evidently mean that little mutual admiration society composed of rocket- headed infidels who follow the shallow Ingersoll. Every one who does not come up to your line of thought is a fool, a knave or a victim of superstition ; every one who accepts that line of thought and carries it beyond you is " erratic." You do not see or care to see that your principle furnishes the " erratic " with all the ammunition they have. ♦ Lacy. Human liberty is a science. Lambert. We can understand how liberty may be a fact, how it can be the object of science, as the world is the object of the science of geology, the stars the object of the science of astronomy, the relation of 1;i TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 221 numbers the object of the science of mathematics, but how liberty, the world, the stars or numbers can be considered as sciences we must leave Mr. Lacy to explain. Science is knowledge, and things and their causes are the objects of the sciences. To say liberty is a science is simply to confound knowledge with the thing known. Liberty is a fact or a condition, but it is not a science. Lacy. As a man advances in the scale of enlight- enment, so do his ideas of personal liberty become more clear. Lambert. That depends on the kind of enlight- enment. The Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans were enlightened people ; so are the Chinese of the present day, yet none of these seem to have clear ideas of liberty. As a matter of fact it is only where Chris- tian enlightenment and civilization prevail that the true idea of liberty is known. Glance over the surface of the earth and point to any spot thereon outside the pale of Christendom where even the slightest pretense of liberty is found. The enlightenment then of which you boast is Christian, and it is the only enlighten- ment that has ever revealed the true nature of liberty. It is thus that the infidel plucks and enjoys the fruit of the tree he despises ; he is like a certain animal that greedily munches the acorns without raising its downcast eyes to th« tree on which they grew. What I have said of liberty is equally true of the sciences ; it is only on that bright spot of the earth where Christianity sheds its divine light that we find scientific progress in modern times. Lacy. But " the right to think error " being de- nied him (man) the wheels of human progress must stop. '»'»'» tl ! i! ' at i it TACTICS OF INFIUKLS. Lauibcrt. It would seem that progress, if it be of the right kind, depends on thinking rightly, not erro- neously. Error, because it is error, is a drag on the wheels of progress. Progress is a movement in the direction of truth and perfection, a movement from a less perfect to a more perfect state. Error is a devi- ation from that movement, a wandering from the straight line which is always the shortest way to the end to be attained. Arriving at truth and perfection by thinking error is like going from Buffalo to New ' York by way of New Orleans. How wandering from the object to be attained assists us in coming to it, will require the genius of more than an Ingersoll or a Lacy to explain. To err is human ; it is a fact, a mis- fortune, a weakness of human nature — not a right. To make error a means to truth is to make darkness the source of light. Thr right to err is the right of the blind man to tumble into the ditch. Lacy. Who that ever thought has not thought error ? Lambert. Few indeed ; and this accounts for the slow movement of progress. It does not follow be- cause ail limp and hobble that limping and hobbling accelerate our speed. All the time spent in thinking error is so much time lost to progress and truth, just as time is lost by him who goes from Buffalo to New York by way of New Orleans, instead of going by the direct route. But suppose all great thinkers have at • times thought error, does that sanctify error ? Would • they not have been still greater if they had not had the weakness to think error ? Lacy. Who does not know that from the begin- ning of his career man has been compelled to grope his way through darkness ? TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 223 Lambert. It is not at all conceded that man be- gan his way in darkness, but passing that, it may be asked : Is thinking error the shortest way to escape from that darkness ? Is it not evident that the more correctly man thinks the sooner he will advance to the light ? To think error is a misfortune arising from in- tellectual weakness, and the philosophy that would raise this misfortune to the dignity of a "right" might be introduced into our lunatic asylums, but it is not the philosophy that comm.ends itself to right thinking men. Men can look with indulgence on him who errs, but when he glories in his imbecility as in a right, their indulgent spirit changes into one of contempt. Men do err and will continue to err, just as lame men will continue to limp, and for the same reason — weak- ness, in the first case, of intellect, in the second of muscle. But we have yet to hear of any one claiming a defective limb as a right or an ornament — except in dime museums. Lacy. Yet, says the Father, God gives us not the liberty to think error. Lambert. Certainly not. He simply gives us im- munity from punishment for unintentionally thinking error, and this on the same principle that He does not punish the man who honestly limps. He knows the weakness of the human intellect, and that to err is one of those weaknesses; that to err is not a liberty to be given but a weakness to be considered with indulgence. This immunity from punishment for thinking error has place only when man thinks error believing it to be the truth, and the immunity is not for the error thought but for the honest belief of him who thinks it. It is the man's integrity that God respects and for which 224 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I!'» i ii » 'I , f mi- ll? W'* He condones the error. In all this there is no liberty granted to think error as such. Lacj^. In the following words Mr. Ingersoll raises the point that an infinitely merciful God must pity the misfortunes of His children, and forgive an ignorance which is " invincible." Lambert. Before quoting Ingersoll I must stop you to observe that what you state as the point was not the point raised by him. Had Ingersoll said that God would forgive *' an ignorance which is invincible^' he would have formulated a well known principle of Christian theology, and there would have been no cause of difference between him and me — no point to raise. Your sly introduction of a distinction as to ignorance and your attempt to imply that Ingersoll made it, must be considered as an illustration of what an infidel means by " honest thought." Now, to the quotation : — Ingersoll. I insist that if there is a good and wise God, He beholds with pity the misfortunes of His children. Notes, I insist on the same , *^ut we must distin- guish between misfortune and crime, misfortune and wickedness. Ingersoll. I insist that such a God would know the mists, the clouds, the darkness, enveloping the human mind. Notes. He does know ; and takes into account these disadvantages in dealing with His creatures. But are you not a little inconsistent? Some pages back you exalt the human mind and clairri for it the right to judge the justice of God, and nd>^ you deplore the mists and clouds that enshroud it. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 225 t the pldre Lacy. In regard to the distinction between the misfortune and the sinfulness of i«j[norance — and there is such a distinction — will the Father point it out clearly and definitely, so that we may know its ear- marks for all time. Lambert. The ignorance displayed in formulating the above request is of that kind which theologians call crass. What you wanted to ask was this : What is the distinction or difference between ignorance that is sinful and ignorance that is not sinful, or in other words, when is ignorance imputed to us as a sin, and when not ? The very asking of this question is an exhibition of the ear-marks of crass ignorance, for had you consulted some theological primer, as you should have done, you would not have had to ask the question at all. You would have found the distinction between vincible and invincible, guilty and not guilty ignorance clearly and definitely laid down for all time. Your ignorance is still further illustrated by your re- mark that if the Father explains the difference between ignorance that is sinful and that which is not, " he will confer a great benefit on humanity." From this it ap- pears that you not only did not know the difference, but that you did not even know that the difference had ever been pointed out. The benefit has been conferred on humanity ages before you or the Father was born, and has been for centuries a permanent part of Christian theological and philosophical literature. As I did not undertake to teach you theology, I must refer you to such theologians as St. Thomas of Aquin, Billuart, Gury, Scavini, and Kenrick. Study their treatises on Human Acts and you will learn those distinctions A'hich confer a benefit on humanity. I do not believe that because you need some information on the inter- 226 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. iM; ■'", ■ ■ ' '1$ km ■ 'i ■' ^■''. ■' llffi iU:. : 1 ?!:; esting subject of ignorance I am obliged to republish their writings for your especial benefit. Lac}^. What of Catholic persecutions in the past? Lambert. I simply hand your question back to you. What of them ? Are you so silly as to imagine that I am so silly as to write an essay on the religious turmoils of three or four centuries ago and treat of thei*- causes and circumstances, on the mere spur of an interrogation point ? The interrogative trick is a shrewd one and non-committal, br.t like the game of three card monte, it is too old to catch any but those whose ignorance is invincible. When you commit yourself to definite statements in regard to those "Catholic persecutions'' it will be time for me to reply to you. If your honest desire is for information, I recommend you to the writings of M. Le Maistre, Balmes, and Milner. It would give me great pleasure to republish all they have said on the subject for your benefit, but unfortunately I am not able, owing to pecuniary circumstances over which I have not and never had control. I am aware of course that when you and IngersoU ask a question, or raise a moss- covered objection to revealed religion you expect all the literature on the subject to be reproduced, but in view of the expense the expectation is unreasonable. Lacy, Were they (Catholic persecutions) right or wrong ? Lambert. The word persecution, like the word orthodoxy, depends for its meaning on him who uses it. When the Mormon is prosecuted for polygamy he calls it persecution. The On«ida sexual communists were prosecuted by public sentiment until they had to disband and their leader had to flee to Canada, where h^ di^d in exile, Ask one of those deluded miscQ- TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 227 genators and he will tell you they were the victims of persecution. The people of Chicago will prosecute the dynamite anarchists, and the anarchists the world over and in all time will call it persecution, and if the mur- derers are hanged they will be martyrs in the anarchist calendar. If you read history carefully and intelli- gently you will find that he who is vanquished is the " persecuted " and he who conquers is the " perse- cutor." The great majority of criminals who meet their end at the end of a rope believe that they are the victims of persecution. The next best thing to being a victor is to be a victim. These are the two opposite poles of every contest. The idea of being a victim compensates for the chagrin of defeat, and victory justifies itself by criminating the vanquished. In mod- ern times the most unjustifiable revolutions are justi- fied by the shibboleth of " liberty ;" in former times they were justified by that of " religion ;" but man remains always the same. He loves to quarrel and fight, and he is ingenious enough to always find a pretext. At one time it is " liberty," at another " religion," at another something else. It is only the shibboleth that changes. There is but the difference of a vowel between persecution and prosecution. The fellow that is whipped uses the former, and he who whips uses the latter. Catholics were in the majority three hundred years ago and as a consequence gener- ally whipped their opponents; and this fact is the origin of the so-called Catholic persecutions. The Catholics of those times fought and died and killed for the public opinion prevalent at the time, just as men do now. The Protestants did the same. Men killed and died then for religious ideas ; they kill and die now for political ideas. As the killing and dying 228 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. m «■■ f still goes on what have we gained by changing the rea*?on of it from a religious to a political idea ? More lives were lost in the political and social contests of the last hundred years than were lost in the last ten hundred years from strifes among Christians arising from differences of doctrine. With these considerations in mind we can now come back to your question. Were they (Catholic persecutions) right or wrong ? And I answer ; it de- pends entirely on whether they were persecutions or prosecutions. To determine this requires a careful consideration of the causes and circumstances in each particular case. This would lead you and me away from our business. Lac}^. Of course the exigencies of theology re- quire that broken fragments should be soldered together — that excuses be made for wrongs unspeakable ; for it will not do to surrender the doctrine of infallibility. Lambert. The exigencies of theology require that your quibbles should be prompdy met and ex- posed. The "wrongs unspeakable," of whicn you yef manage som'^how or other to speak, are wrongs inci- dent to human nature and will continue to exist in spite of all systems of theology. In as much as the infallibility of the church is in no way concerned with the unspeakable wrongs of which you speak, I fail to see how a question of surrender is involved. Lacy. Faith in the theological world is exalted above works. Lambert. St. James, one of the writers of the New Testament, and who for that reason ought to be consid- ered good authority as to the meaning of faith in the theological world, says: "Faith without works is dead" (James 2-26). It would appear from th'c that ■\i%: -r I j I) ' I |x alted le New lonsid- I in the Irks is that TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 229 the lore s of ten ising now hoUc t de- ls or . ireful each away ry re- rether e; for ibility. quire d ex- u yet* inci- :ist in ,s the with •ail to the theological world does not exalt faith above works. St. Matthew says : " That the son of man shall come in the glory of his father and his angels ; and then shall he render to every man according to his works y Does this look like putting faith above works ? St. James says : " Do you see that by works a man is justified and not by faith only?" (2-24.) " God is not unjust that He should forget your work'' (Hebrews 6-9.) And yet you say the theological world puts faith above works ! What is faith itself but a good work? Lacy. How tolerant the church to those — if they subscribe to her dogmatic teaching — who do ill. Lambert. The church teaches that he who knows the truth and does not regulate his conduct by it is in a worse state than the heathen who knows it not. Your statement is therefore slanderous as are your other statements in regard to the church. Your use of the phrase " venal " sin instead of venial, sin shows how well you are instructed in the catechism. ... , i-i CHAPTER XXIIL .1 I ' Lacy. The Father talks much of blasphemy. As used by him the word is misleading, and is dust in the eyes of common sense, as well as- an incentive to moral cowardice. Lambert. According to Webster — whose defini- tion agrees with that of the theologians — to blaspheme " is to speak of the Supreme Being with impious irrev- erence ; to revile or speak reproachfully of God, Christ or the Holy Spirit. Blasphemy is an indignity offered to God by words or writing ; reproachful, contempt- uous, or irreverent words uttered impiously against God." It was in this sense that I i-sed the words " blasphemous jests " in reference to certain utterances of IngersoU, and no one familiar with hisiectures will question the justness of the phrase. Is it evidence of cowardice to fear to insult your Maker ? Is it evidence of bravery to do it ? Is it not rather a sign of rash- ness, foolhardiness, and diabolism? IngersoU is a blasphemer, is he braver than Grant who was not ? Lacy. Do I blaspheme, because in my estimate I exalt God above the Father's conception of Him ? Lambert. It is not a question of what you may do, but what IngersoU has done. You do not blas- pheme by exalting God above the Father's conception of Him, but in asserting that you can do so, you give an illustration of extreme modesty. According to the Father's conception, God's attributes are infinite, ac- cording to yours they are finite, hence the Father's conception of God is as far above yours as the infinite is above the finite. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 231 Lacy. In justification of wars of conquest and extermination, Father Lairibert says : ** Mr. Black de- fended what you call the atrocities of the Jews record- ed in the Old Testament on the principles admitted by all peoples and nations, pagan philosophers and Chris- tian apostles, that the right to exist implies the right to repel the opposing force that threatens destruction. If enemies come to conquer, a nation has the right to conquer them ; if they give no quarter, they have a right to none; if the death of the whole population be their purpose, it has a right to defeat it by putting them all to the sword if it is necessary." Lambert. The principle of lex talionis as formu- lated in the above extract from the Notes was not ad- vanced, as you incorrectly say, to justify wars of con- quest and extermination, but to justify the Jews in inflicting the same punishment on their enemies in time of war as their enemies inflicted on them. The conquest of Palestine and the extermination of its inhabitants is justified on a very different principle. Fo^ycrimes set forth at length in the i8th chapter of Leviticus, God hisi doomed the inhabitants of Canaan to destruction, ' and he commanded the Israelites to exterminate them. This comman^f is an all-sufficient justification. You have admitted that the Supreme Being is master of life and death. As He is the Supreme Being His commands need no justification ; it is entirely above our criticism — even if He had not given a reason for it. He is amenable to Himself alone for what He does. That He gave the command is evidence that there was a sufficient reason for it. iMcy, Let us apply the Father's logic to the exact point at issue, and see where it will lead the Jewish race. " If enemies come to conquer, a nation 1 1 2^2 tACtlCS Of INFIDELS. has a right to conquer them." The Jews came prd- fessedly to conquer ; therefore the heathen nation had a right to conquer them. Lambert. They certainly had if they could, just as a condemned criminal has the right to escape exe- cution if he can. They were condemned to death, not for defending themselves, but for crimes commit- ted anterior to the invasion. You cannot find in the scriptures that their self-defense was a crime. Lacy, ** If they give no quarter they have a right to none." The Jews gave no quarter, therefore they had a right to none. Lambert. The Jews obeyed the command of God and took their chances — they neither expected nor asked quarter. Lacy. " If the death of the whole population be ' their purpose, it is right to defeat it by putting them all to the sword if necessary." The death of the whole population of the heathen nations was the avowed purpose of the Jews ; hence the right of those nations to defeat that purpose by putting all of the Jews to the sword. Lambert. The right to defend themselves to the best of their ability was not denied them. •They did put as many Jews to the sword as they could and were never accused of crime for doing so. Notes. God is the Creator, the Supreme Ruler of the universe and of all men. As such man owes Him allegiance and obedience. , Lacy. Not so; man owes liim allegiance, not because he is powerful, but because he is just; obedi- ence because of the righteousness of his law. Lambert. Pray who said man owes God allegiance because he is powerful ? Why spend your time in de- TACTICS OK INFIDtLS. 23^ liying what no one asserts ? But I deny that allegiance is due to God merely because He is just, or His laws righteous. The mere fact of an authority or a ruler or a law being just does not induce an objection of obedience. To induce the obligation of obedience the authority, ruler or law must have the right of domin- ion or jurisdiction over us. There are many just and righteous laws that we are not obliged to obey, be- cause they are made by law makers who have no juris- diction over us. There are many just and righteous laws in Germany, France and England ; if mere justness and righteousness alone induced obligation, we would be bound to obey them. Justness and righteousness alone then are not sufficient to impose allegiance and obedience. There is another element necessary, namely, dominion or jurisdiction over us. Now as God is Creator and Supreme Ruler He has supreme dominion and jurisdiction over us. It is this Supreme Creatorship and Rulership that induces the obligation of obedience when once His will is known, and His will is always just and right. Lacy. What is the obedience which power alone commands ? Lambert. A very poor article indeed, and that is the reason why Christian theologians do not make mere power the source of obedience. Lacy. Such low conceptions of the Deity and of the grounds of human obligation make " Bob " Inger- soU's possible. Lambert. Such ignorance of Christian theology on the subject of obedience makes his dupes possible. Lacy. Here a protest must be entered against the methods of warfare commended by the Father and termed " civilized." 234 TACTICS OF II'FIDELS. 1 1 i Ingcrsoll. If they kill the babes in our cradles must we brain theirs ? Notes. Here they are again — yes, by all means brain them, tear them limb from limb, salt them, ship them to the Cannibal Islands, make them read your article on the Christian religion or your lecture on " skulls " — do anything with them to keep them from muddling your brains when you are reasoning with men on subjects that require all your attention. Lacy. Reader, do not mistake; the foregoing was not written by a Fiji chief, but by a disciple of the Prince of Peace ! Lambert. If the Father's suggestion is too atrocious, we might omit the reading of the article on the Christian Religion and the lecture on " Skulls." Or, Iiow would it do to make sandwiches of them and send them to the Sandwich Islands ? Lacy. What has Mr. IngersoU's personal charr acter, good or bad, or the Father's cleverness, to do with the subject in dispute ? Lambert. It is important to the controversy to know that IngersoU's mere statement cannot be relied on, that he misrepresents his opponent, Judge Black ; that he misquotes and interpolates the scriptures and that he falsifies almost every Christian doctrine that he treats of. In some of these points the disciple is worthy of his master, for instance where you misrep- resent the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In de- fending IngersoU you seem to have caught his method, as men catch contagious diseases. Ii you did not know the doctrine of the Trinity you should not have snarled at it or attempted to criticise it ; if you knew it, you knowingly misrepresented it. I leave you and the reader to draw the inference. Thus you see that I s TACTICS OF INFIDELS, 235 the personal character of a disputant has much to do with the question in dispute. It would be a wise economy to exhaust less of your energy in defense of Ingersoll's character as it would leave you more to devote to the defense of your own. Your misrepre- sentation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is found on page 39 of your " Reply." " Christian theol- ogy affirms that there are three Gods." These are your words. Read them over again, sir, and perhaps on reflection you may feel ashamed of your ignorance, or of being caught in such a freak of " honest thought." Do you pretend to say that a Christian in replying to such antagonists as IngersoU and you must not go aside from the question to meet your false statements and brand them with the proper label ? The main business of the Christian controversialist in meeting infidels is not so much to reason as to correct misstate- ments, and when this is done in plain English they whine about politeness, abuse, and so on. They have no regard for the feelings of others, while they expect others to treat them with lavender kids. When they utter glaring untruths in reference to Christian doc- trines, we cannot accuse them of falsehood or lying, no, that would wound their delicate sensibilities. We must play "make believe" and refer delicately to their untruthful utterances as " honest errors," the results of "honest though c" and "honor bright" — ^pshaw. It is a fact worthy of note that most infidel arguments against Christianity are based on misrepresentation of its doctrines. Lacy. The chapter under review (the nth of Notes) is in the main devoted to the subject of war and slavery. Mr. IngersoU had said that a war of conquest was simply murder. 236 TACTICS OF IKFlDELS. Lambert. And I denied the truth of the proposi- tion. Lacy. It would seem that no one should have mistaken his meaning — certainly no one who kept in mind the kind of wars he was condemning, that is, the aggressive wars of the Jews. Lambert. There is no mistaking his words. They are plain enouj^^i : "A war of conquest is simply murder." This is a universal proposition, and as such it cannot be limited, to suit your purpose, to the agres- sive wars of the Jews. Ingersoll wished to condemn the invasion of Canaan by the Jews. To do this he laid down a general proposition and included those wars under it. His reasoning formulated syllogisti- cally would stand thus : A war of conquest is simply murder. The wars of the Jews were wars of con- quest. Therefore the wars of the Jews were simply murders. If the major or first proposition in the above syl- logism were true the conclusion would necessarily be true. Hence unless you wish to stultify Ingersoll you must confess that he meant precisely what his words express. But it is not true that wars of conquest are simply murders. No moralist or writer on the laws of nations concedes it ; even you, Mr. Lacy, do not hold it as true, for you try to prove that Ingersoll did not mean it — that is, did not mean what he actually said. Had Ingersoll said the Jewish wars of invasion were murders he would have raised a question oifacty but when he said "A war of conquest is simply mur- der," he raised a question as to the truth of a general proposition. As the general proposition is not true, the inference he draws from it is to be rejected. You may be pardoned for the conceit of believing you ..4i lli.. m TACTICS OK INFIDEI.'^^ 237 understand your master better than others, but your belief must not be permitted to override the rules of interpretation. In the present case you have evidently failed to understand your master, although, as you say, " no one should have mistaken his meaning." Notes. According to Mr. Ingersoll, "a war of conquest is simply murder. But the war with the South was a war of conquest. Therefore (according to his logic) the war against the South was simply murder. Now Mr. Ingersoll participated in that war, therefore Mr. Ingersoll was a party to the crime of murder. Lacy. The fallacy of this syllogistic statement lies in the use of the little word " conquest " as ap- plied to the fact of which Mr. Ingersoll was writing. Lambert. Your mistake arises from forgetfulness of the little fact that the word "conquest" has its meaning entirely independent of the facts to which Ingersoll applies it, and it is not in his power to change the meaning of the word to suit his or your fancy. The proposition in which he used it is a gen- eral one, and therefore it had no direct reference to the Jewish wars, although he intended subsequently to apply it to them. A general proposition must stand or fall by its ©wn intrinsic truth and not on a particular application of it. Ingersoll wanted to con- demn the Jew, and any kind of a hammer, even a false proposition, was good enough to hit a son of Abraham on the head with. Lacy. The words " wars of conquest " in their proper historical application, mean aggressive wars, wherein one nation seeks to subdue and to establish dominion over another. 23« TACTICS OK INFIDELS. i ! ■1 \\ .1 Lambert. That the phrase has been used in that sense is true, but to infer from this that that is the only proper sense is a grave mistake. According to Web- ster, " conquest" is the act of conquering or acquiring by force; the act of overcoming or subduing oppo- sition by force, whether physical or moral ; subjuga- tion, victory. The act of gaining or regaining by suc- cess, as the conquest of liberty or peare." According to these Websterian definitions, con- quest means to overcome force by force Wilhout refer- ence to the ultimate intention ot the victor or the use to be made of the victory. A "war of conquest" then is a war in which each of the contestants seeks to over- come the other, and this, observe, without any refer- ence to the establishment of dominion of one over the other. From this it follows that even " defensive wars for the establishment of independent governments," as well as " wars to maintain the integrity of governments already established," are wars of conquest. Our war with Mexico was as truly a war of conquest as was that of Cortez, although we did not make the same use of our victory. Lacy. The historian, or conversationalist even, who should aflfirm that the United States had ever conquered Great Britain would be laughed at. Lambert. A laugh, as an argument, proves noth- ing — except perhaps the lightheadedness, ignorance and conceit of the giggler. It is a historical fact thac the United States conquered England and compelled her to submit to conditions, not only in the war of the revolution but also in the war of 1812, and the his- torian who fails to state this fails to state the truth. CHAPTER XXIV. Lacy. There never was a war waged against the " South " any more than a war against the city of New York when her riotous elements were quelled by United States soldiery, Lambert. To what miserable straits you are driven in defense of your master! If sending the largest organized .-rmy that ever existed under one commander into the South, if fighting the most terrific series of battles during four years that are recorded in history, is not waging war, pray what is it ? You may mislead the ignorant by yo.ir sophistries about the ancient wars of the Jews, but not about the late war ; it is too recent. True, the war ivas waged against the South to put down a rebellion against the govern- ment's authority, but does that make it any the less a war? England waged war against her colonies to maintain her authority. To say she did not wage a war against the colonies, simply because she carried it on to maintain the unity of. the Empire, is to ignore the meaning of words and the records of history. The United States waged a war for the union against the South which endeavored to destroy it ; and they conquered, gained what they waged war for, and thus achieved as true a Conquest as is recorded in history, although they did not dispossess the inhabitants of their lands. To compare a street riot to the war of the rebel- lion shows a lack of discrimination in perfect keeping with the loose, indefinite theories of the noisy Inger- §oU and his " modest " disciple, / 240 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. if! jfi , Ingersoll. Slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer, and hypocrite. Notes. How does it include all other crimes if it be the joint product of them ? A product is an effect. Lacy. An apple pie includes apples, dough, nut- megs, etc., yet is not the pie the joint product of these ingredients ? Ask your cook. Lambert. W hile he may not be able to dispute your superior knowiedge of pastry, the cook will per- sist in believing that it is he who makes the pie, and that it is the joint product of his labor and ingenuity. He will not admit that apples, dough, nutmegs, etc., can produce a pie, for if they could the cook's occu- pation would be orone. Your "Reply" includes paper, ink, words and ideas. Is ihe "Reply" the product of these ingredients or the product of your mind ? Your knowledge of the ingredients of an apple pie is evi- dently superior to your knowledge of the relations between cause and effect, producer and product. It is to be hoped that in your next reply you ,vill indulge your readers with an essay on tarts. It may go a good Avay in disproving the inspiration of the Scrip- tures. Ingersoll's strong point is blasphemy ; yours appears to be modesty and piety. Lngersoll. The superior man is eyes for the blind. Notes. His superiority does not consist in seeing for the blind, but in his ability to see. iMcy. Then we ask is there no such thing as moral superiority? Lambert. I ani not aware that any one has ever denied it, \ iM TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 241 m\\ 3. It thief, sif it effect. I, nut- ' these ispute 11 per- e, and -nuity. s, etc., occu- paper, duct of Your is evi" elations :. It is ndulge y go a Scrip- yours for the I seeing hing as as ever Lacjy. Or if there be, is it dwarfed into insignifi- cance by the overshadowing greatness of physical power ? Lambert. I do not think it is ; on the contrary I believe it to be much more important to have than physical power. But for the life of me I cannot see what this has to do with the question. Superiority of whatever kind must consist in a fact, not in the results that flow from a fact. The latter are not superiority; they are but evidences of it. Ingersoll. With me, liberty is not merely a means — it is an end. Notes. This is too vague. We are all in favor of liberty, as we understand it, but we do not agree as to what it is or ought to be. It is a foolish loss of time to caw over the word until we have a common idea or understanding of the thing. Do you mean by the word the liberty Guiteau exercised, or that of the Nihilists, or that of the Moripons, or that of the thief, the robber or the murderer? All these appeal to liberty as vociferously as you do. Do you not see that this word " liberty " must be defined and limited — in other words, that it must become a known quan- tity before it can become a legitimate object of debate. If there is anything thoroughly detested and abhored by logicians it is a word, or the use of a word, that has no fixed, clear and clean cut meaning to it. You use this word with what Shakespeare would call " damnable iteration," and in all your multifarious uses of it you have never, so far as I have seen, given a definition of it. Lacy. Of course from this extract it would be inferred that the Father was in doubt as to what kind of liberty Mr. Ingersoll referred to. 1-! 242 TACTICS OF INFIDELS, [•i;^; nd "1 kii I i'<' Lambert. The Father was in doubt and is in doubt still, despite your luminous explanation. Lacy. What will the reader think, when informed that the Rev. Lambert passed over three little words immediately preceding his last quotation, which words make the meaning plain beyond all cavil, and perfectly germane to the subject ? These words are, " I abhor slavery." And he (Ingersoll) continues : " With me liberty is not merely a means — it is an end.^' Here it is manifest that the liberty spoken of is of the kind contradistinguished from slavery, from property -right in men, women and children. Lambert. With all due respect for your intimate knowledge of IngersoU's meaning, I must decline to accept your theory of interpretation. The word " liberty " has a meaning of its own which does not depend on its location or collocation in IngersoU's sentences. When he speaks of "liberty" without any qualification whatever, as he did in the sentence I quot- ed, it must be assumed that he uses the word as other men use it. If he used the word in the sease you give to it he simply misused it; for men at all familiar with the use of words never use the vord " liberty " in contradistinction with domestic slp;/ery. " Free- dom " is the word Ingersoll should have used if he meant what you imagine he meant. The freedom of the slaves is the result of Lincoln's proclamation ; their liberty in this country is the result of the consti- tution of the United States. This is the reason why in all official documents concerning the former slaves they are called " Freedmen." Liberty is the genus, freedom is a species of it. But liberty, freedom, and free will are all jumbled together in the infidel vocab- ulary ; sometimes they mean one sometimes another 'Mi TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 243 thing, and they expect the benighted Christian to catch their meaning as it flies. That Ingersoll's meaning is not clear is evident from the fact that Mr. Lacy has devoted half a page to explain it. According to Mr. Lacy's exposition of In- gersoll's idea of liberty, it means exemption from property-right in men. Will anyone in the 19th century admit that liberty means that? Was that what Patrick Henry meant when he said, " Give me liberty or give me death ?" Was that what the colo- nists fought for when they made war with England ? Or was it mere freedom from domestic slavery that Ingersoll meant when he said : " With me liberty is not merely a means — it is an end ?" If so he misused the word liberty as he misuses many other words, and in this misuse consists, to a great extent, his sophistry. If Mr. Lacy spent half the energy and ingenuity in explaining the meaning of Moses that he spends in explaining Ingersoll he would take high rank as a hermenentist. Lacy, Because his (Lambert's) opponent praises liberty, without specifically defining its metes and bounds, he is gruffly reproved. Lambert. And justly reproved. How can he talk sensibly about a thing unless it is defined by metes and bounds? "Liberty," "free thought," "hon- est error," "honor bright," etc., are infidel catch-words that require to be clearly defined and their meaning understood before they can pass current. In all dis- cussions conducted intelligently, words or terms should be clearly defined in order that both parties may know that they are talking about the same thing. If a man is unable to give the proper definition of a word he 244 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. m it U should at least tell us what he means by it ; if he can- not do this he should not use the word at all. Notes. " O liberty ! what crimes are committed in thy name," said Madame Roland as she was carted to the guillotine. Lacy. Madame Roland uttered an eloquent truth. But could not every victim of the accursed inquisition have said with equal truth, " O religion ! what crimes are committed in thy name !" Lambert. Yes ; but as the crimes committed in the name of liberty are not to be attributed to liberty, so neither are the crimes committed in the name of religion to be attributed to religion. Neither is to be rejected because of these crimes. Bad men in all ages have abused both liberty and religion and will continue to do so, but this is no valid reason why either should be condemned. Bad men will persist in stealing the livery of Jieaven to serve the devil in. Liberty, like religion, is a divine gift, and blood has been shed in defense of and in the name of both. To subject either to indiscriminate and sweeping condemnation is as unphilosophical as it is contrary to common sense and justice. If we were to banish from the earth every- thing that human ingenuity and malice can abuse, life on it would not be worth living. Lacy. The Father, unreasonably, we think, de- mands, a definition for almost every important word his friend, Mr. Ingersoll, employs. Lambert. When the meaning of a word is ob- scure ard when it is used now in one sense and now in another, a definition is the only way to arrive at a common understanding. The incorrect use of a word may, and often does, vitiate a whole argument; it fre- quently amounts to a begging of the question, and jf?» t4 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 245 ,'1 gives room for sophistry. Ingersoll has a fatal facility in the use of words of many meanings, and in making them do duty now in one capacity, now in another. It is for this reason that the Father demands defini- tions. It is the only way to nail Ingersoll down to definite ideas. The demand for a definition, like a motion to adjourn, is always in order. True, it ham- pers eloquence and flights of imagination,, but it is conducive to truth. Lacy. The word "liberty" disconnected from any particular subject or train of thought is a mere abstraction. Lambert. Here you confound the name of a thing with the thing itself. When we speak of liberty in reference to intelligent beings we mean the thing, not the sign or sound by which it is indicated. But liberty, according to your own definition, is not an abstraction. You say : Lacy. Liberty is the right to do what one may please without intrenching on the rights of others. Lambert. It seems that this is something more than an abstraction. But the definition is not correct, because (i) it does not define the genus, but only a species or certain kind of liberty, and (2) it includes too much, for there are many things we can do with- out intrenching on our neighbors which we have not the liberty or right to do. We have not the right to injure ourselves though we in no way intrench on our neigh- bor's rights in doing so. Lacy. Yet the query arises, what does intrench on those rights (of other's) ? Lambert. That has nothing to do with the ques- tion ; it is a matter of details. 1' I ?46 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. \M : kit w H ■pi ■■ Lac}^. The ancient church held that heresy was a greater crime than murder. Lambert. This is on a par with your statement about the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The ancient church held that murder is a crime deserving of eternal hell, and no greater punishment can be inflicted for heresy. The same moral code that forbids the one forbids the other, and the punishment in both cases is the same. There is the same difference be- tween heresy and the teaching of it that there is be- tween murder and the teaching of it. He who com- mits murder is guilty of a criminal fact, while he who teaches it is guilty of a criminal doctrine ; of the two the latter is the greater enemy of society. It is the same with heresy, political or religious. When it threatens government or social order it is always pun- ished. And the leaders and teachers of jt are always considered the most guilty. Be this right or wrong, it is human nature. Lacy. Do you, Father, justify what the church did and what is now regarded as ecclesiastical murder? Lambert. I justify what the church really did, but not what she is ignorantly accused of having done. Nor do I justify the murders committed in the name of religion or the church, or in the name of liberty. Lacy. Would you, now, had you the power, re- strain me, or any one, by penal enactment, ecclesias- tical or otherwise, from publicly avowing "Protestant" sentiments, or from proclaiming what you call infidel doctrines? Lambert. I would judge of the sentiments them- selves without reference to what you might call them. If you were as logical in your infidelity as the com- munists and anarchists are, and if you proclaimed TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 247 ;y was ement The erving an be brbids n both ce be- is be- ► com- e who le two is the ^hen it 's pun- always wrong, church urder? ly did, y done. name erty. ^er, re- clesias- estant" infidel s them- 1 them. 2 com- claimed such doctrines as Herr Most, Spies & Co. preach in the name of Hberty, I would, had I the power, put you behind the bars of a jail or lunatic asylum. The name you might give to your sentiments would have nothing to do with it. Lacj^. Do you believe in the broad-guage relig- ious liberty we Americans enjoy ? Lambert. I believe that every man has the right and the obligation to follow and obey the dictates of his own conscience, although I do not believe that the mere plea of conscience should protect offences against social order or against the common principles of morality. The prosecutions of the Mormons shows that we Americans recognize a limit to the practice of certain so-called liberties. Lacy. Were the United States under Catholic domination would what we call " religious toleration " be enjoyed to the same extent by people of all shades of religious and non-religious faith as at present? Lambert. I see no reason to think otherwise. The danger to the liberties of this country is infidelity and its twin daughters, anarchy and communism. Lacy. Some twenty years ago or more I read an editorial in the Pittsburg Catholic^ in which the writer claimed that Catholic nations alone had the right to forbid the exercise of other than the prescribed kinds of worship, for the reason that non-Catholics only be- lieve that they are right, while Catholics hold their faith with the certainty of knowledge. Lambert. I must decline to hold the Pittsburg Catholic responsible for the nonsense your memory of twenty years or more attributes to it. I call for the exact words of that journal, not your travesty of them. CHAPTER XXV. Lacy. A year or so ago it was broadly published that a son of General Sherman, in a lecture before a Catholic institution of learning, spoke in advocacy of the inquisition. I :ievt r saw or heard a denial of the charge although I watched the papers to see if any was made. Lambert. It would he -e been wiser on your part to have read the lecture of General Sherman's son than to take second-hand reports of its nature; from the papers. lentil you produce something more tangible than vague newspaper reports vaguely re- mtmbered you must not expect what you say to be seriously considered. I know not the opinion of Gen- eral Sherman's son, not having seen the lecture referred to, but I know that he is not the Catholic church. At the same time he is as free to give his individual opin- ion as you are ; and the weight of his opinion, as of yours, depends on the weight of the arguments adduced. If the son inherits the genius of his father I doubt not his ability to justify his opinions whatever they may be — against Mr. Lacy. Lacy. But true or false, what say you on the subject ? Your ideas may help us to a practical d«.fi- nition of liberty satisfactory to both ol u". Lambert. One of my ideas on the subject is that the /n«r2)>/r whereon the Spanish Inquisition w4s estab- lished has been recognized by all governments pa,; t and present as just The principle is this : *' Great political. evils ^ and especially violent attacks levelled at the body of %'m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 249 the dcfi- that istab- It and litical- uiy of a state, can not he prevented or repelled hut hy means equally violent.'' " This," says Lc Maistre, " is a political axiom, which no sensible man ever denied." Our own government acted on it during the late war. It sus- pended the writ oi habeas corpus, so that the Secretary of State, by ringing a little bell, could arrest and imprison or exile any citizen, and against this action there was for the time no appeal. This was unconstitutional, but was justified on the principle formulated in the above axiom and on another less general proposition, stated by General Grant in his Memoirs, that those who were endeavoring to destroy the constitution had no right to appeal to its protection. These are the principles on which the inquisition was established. Nov/ what were the facts ? They are thus succinctly stated by M. Le Maistre in his " Spanish Inquisition :" " About the fifteenth century, Judaism deeply shot its roots into the soil of Spain, and threatened to kill the national plant. The riches and influence of the Jews, and their intermarriage with the most distinguished families of the government, rendered them truly formidable. They were a nation contained within a nation. Mahometism prodigiously increased the danger ; that tree had been pulled down in Spain but its roots were unimpaired. The great question then was whether the nation could continue its' Spanish character and independence, or whether Ji>daism and Islamism would divide the spoil of these rich provinces, if superstition, despotism, and barbarity were to drive their triumphal car over the rights and lives of mankind. The Jews were nearly masters of Spain, ahd between the hot-blooded Castilians and the degenerate sons of Israel no good feeling existed. 250 ACTICS OF INFIDELS. Their hatred as mutual and was often carried to ex- cess. The Cortes (i. e. the Spanish parhament) cried aloud for the adoption of severe measures against the latter. An insurrection broke out in the year 1 39 1, and a dreadful slaughter ensued. The danger daily increased, and Ferdinand, surnamed the Catholic, sup- posed that in order to save the country from utter ruin, it was indispensably necessary to establish the Inquisition, as best calculated to cure the political cancer which was rapidly corroding the heart of the nation." These are the facts that caused the establishment of the Inquisition. Now I ask, had not the Spanish government, in view of impending destruction, the right to use every means in its power to repel the for- eign invasion that threatened its existence? To say it had not is to deny a nation the ^ight of self defense. You may say the Inquisition was more severe than was necessary for self defense. But this, even admitting it, was an incident arising from the excited passions of the times, and not an essential part of the Inquisition. Our own courts have fif ntenced innocent people to death, but this incidental error is no argu- ment against the existence of our system of judicature. Aside from this consideration, I believe that the Span- iards of that time were better judges of what was nec- essary to defend their country and repel invasion than we are who live five hundred years after. We imagine ourselves to be familiar with the punishments, but we are strangely ignorant of the offences for which they were inflicted. > Such are my ideas on the principles and facts which gave rise to the Spanish Inquisition. ' If you seek further information on the subject I advise you TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 251 .0 ex- cricd 1st the daily c,sup- 1 utter sh the lolitical of the shment Spanish on, the the for- To say defense, i severe is, even excited t of the nnocent |io argu- icature. e Span- as nec- ion than imagine but we ch they ind facts If you [vise you to read " Letters on the Spanish Inquisition/* by M. Le Comte Joseph Le Maistre. They will enable you to appreciate the lecture of the son of General Sher- man, when you have time to read it. The time has happily passed — a result of modern, progress — when a mere loose indefinite reference to the Inquisition has the force of an argument ; a fact you seem to have for- gotten. Lacy. We now approach a marvelous piece of assertion. We are told that as to the physical and in- tellectual laws man has no liberty whatever. Lambert. I have yet to hear of the philosopher who claims liberty as to the physical laws of the universe — so far as man is concerned. The genius who is to proclaim that man has liberty as to the physical laws of nature has yet to appear, and when he does appear, as he may, for it is not impossible, he will suffer under the disadvantage of being considered a " crank." Lacy. Is it true, then, that the intellect of man Wk)ich above all things else determines his choice and shccpes his conduct, has no more freedom of action than a grain of sand, or the wave that dashes on the shore and returns again to the bosom of the deep ? Lambert. In the first place it is not the intellect of man, but his will that shapes his conduct, and his will, not his intellect is the seat of liberty. To speak with philosophical precision, it is knowledge and will that determine the actions of men, for the will cannot act without something to act on, it cannot desire a thing without knowing that thing. To the will, the unknown and the non-existing, are one and the same. The intellect as the seat of knowledge is a necessary condition of liberty, but knowledge without free will 252 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Hi," lilK |ii i I- it, sU - mii, cannot produce liberty. The scat of liberty is in the will, but the will cannot act without an object on which to act. This object is supplied by the intellect which intelligences or apprehends things, and these things presented by the intellect to the will afford the latter its field of operation, its field of liberty — and beyond this there is neither knowledge nor liberty. The intel- lect or intellective faculty is to the will or volativc fac- ulty what the telescope is to the astronomer ; it pre- sents the object to the will as the telescope presents the distant star to the eye of the astronomer. Having done this its work is done. The will like the astron- omer then deals with the object presented ; and the intellect like the telescope, having presented the object to the will, becomes inoperative, and the will dominates thereafter, and in this dominancy c( the will consists liberty. As the astronomer directs the telescope to •this, that or the other object, so the will directs the in- tellective faculty to this, that or the other object as it wills. When I will to reply to Mr. Lacy, my will forthwith takes up its intellective microscope and through it examines his sayings. My intellect in the case is the servant of my will, nay, the slave, for it finds no pleasure in the operation ; it does its work as best it can at the imperative command of the will. The intellect is the instrument by which the will ac- quires its materials, and the will never loses control over it. When the intellect begins to bring home some unpalatable truths the will says : Stop, you must go no farther, and it stops. This is why ignorance is sometimes a sin, because it is the result of the will. The intellect cannot sin. It is the will alone that sins or can sin. But is it not strange that a disciple of Ingersoll TACTICS O:- INl'lUELS. 253 shoulri plcarl for liberty of intellect ? Ingersoll teaclics that the action of the intellect depends on the food we cat and on the condition of our dij^^estive orj^ans; and this food and this condition of our dij^estive orj^ans depend on prior conditions of something else and these prior conditions depend on conditions still prior, and these on others in an endless chain. He holds that every thought and thing that is, is the necessary re- sult of something that was. What are we to think of the dis' iple who, while following such a leader talks of liberty of intellect? If our thoughts are the result of what we eat, as Ingersoll says they are, how can the intellect be free? or how can Mr. Lacy talk about free intellect ? or does the disciple really un- derstand his master? Lacy. May not man abuse his intellect as well as his moral nature ? Lambert. Certainly. But how unless by his will? How can a man abuse anything unless he can will to do so ? And if the will is free to abuse the* intellect, is that not sufficient to prove that it is the will and not the intellect that is free ? Lacy. Perhaps I do not understand the Father. Lambert, I believe you do not. And yet you go off at half-cock to answer him. Lacy. The subject of polygamy, as practiced under the Old Testament dispensation, is next in order. Lambert. Very well, proceed. Ingersoll. "^Ve are informed by Mr. Black that polygamy is neither commanded nor prohibited in the Old Testament — that it is only discouraged. It seems to me that a little legislation on the subject might have tended to its discouragement. But where is the legislation ? 254 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. lliM raising of the white m- Notes. In your first article on the Christian relig- ion you said that the Bible upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue. Your opponent met your assertion with a denial that the Bible so held or taught. Here a direct issno was made — a question of veracity raised. And how did you meet it ? Did you stand by your statement and proceed to prove it ? Not at all. You reply by saying that the Bible did not legis- late against it. This is an admission that your state- ment could not be sustained — a flag. Lacy. Here we are told is a question of veracity. Lambert. Yes, that is about it. Lacy. Veracity, of course, means adherence to truth. If a man lacks veracity he is untruthful ; is, in short, what the Father, by necessary implication, often calls Mr. Ingersoll — a liar. Would this critic like to be tested by the same rule ? Lambert. Certainly. iMcy. The Father says that Mr. Ingersoll assert- ed that the Bible upheld polygamy as the higher form of virtue. He said no such thing. Lambert. Ingersoll said : " The believer in the inspiration of the Bible * * * is compelled to insist that there was a time when polygamy was the highest form of virtue * * ♦ Once they (slavery, polygamy, etc.) were right — once commanded by God." I leave it to the reader, after reading the above quotation, to say whether or not I misrepresented Ingersoll's posi- tion when I represented him as holding that the Bible upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue. The attempt to show that he did not so hold is the merest quibbling. Lacy. The charge that the Bible taught or upheld t r I TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 255 relig- is the your aught, sracity stand tSfot at t legis- • state- j white eracity. snce to ; is, in •n, often Uke to I assert- ler form r in the to insist r highest lygamy, I leave ation, to I's posi- he Bible je. The e merest or upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue would imply that the Bible contained commands or precepts ex- ceedingly favorable to it. Lambert, Precisely. And Ingersoll said: "slavery, polygamy, etc., * * * were once commanded by God." Therefore according to your own showing my charge against him was true. Here, in your very effort to disprove my charge, you verify it. Ingersoll. In the moral code (of the Old Testa- ment) not one word is said on the subject of polygamy. Notes. Then why did you say the Bible taught polyga..iy as the highest form of virtue ? Lucy. We have shown that the Father imputed to Mr. Ingersoll words that were not written by him. Here we have the same false charge the second time repeated. Lambert. The Father correctly stated Ingersoll's position. You seem to forget that Ingersoll said that slavery and polygamy " were once commanded by God." This one statement upsets all your fine spun explanations. Notes. If you look in Genesis, chap. II, verse 24, you will find the following words : " Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife (not wives) and they shall be two in one flesh." This is the law in the case. Lacy. Mark what Father Lambert is trying to disprove. His opponent had said : ** In the moral code of the Old Testament not one word is said on the subject of polygamy." Has this been disproved ? Lambert. The verse from Genesis laying down the doctrine of monogamy, and therefore disapproving polygamy, is a part of the code of the Old Testament, and therefore disproves Ingersoll's statement. If fur- 256 TACTICS OF IxNFIDELS. ther disproof is necessary I need only quote IngersoU's own words, that slavery and polygamy " were once commanded hy God." Now if commande'^ by God there must have been at least one word about polyg- amy in the moral code of the Old Testament. Surely your master's own testimony should be sufficient for you ; of course he contradicts himself, but that is noth- ing new. Lacy. Who wrote that one verse ? Lambert. It is nothing to our present purpose who wrote it. It is enough that it is a part of the moral code of the Old Testament of which IngersoU spoke. Lacy. To whom was the command given ? No one knows. Lambert. This has nothing to do with the point at present in issue; which is whether IngersoU stated the truth when he said : " In the moral code (of the Old Testament) there is not one word on the subject of polygamy." Lacy. But even if the clause referred to were prohibitory, the uninterruptd and unrebuked practice for thousands of years among God's own people, and even while He was their direct ruler, would certainly seem to be a practical repeal of the command. Lambert. I insist on your keeping to the point. The question is. Is there one word on the subject ot polygamy in the moral code of the Old Testament ? IngersoU says there is not. Do you still hold that he is right? :^ll jrsoU's t once Y God polyg- Surely ent for s noth- Durpose t of the ngersoll n? No he point II stated £ (of the subject to were practice )ple, and certainly I. the point, lubject ot jstament ? ,d that he CHAPTER XXVI. " Lac}^. The doctrine that if we had no revelation we would have neither moral sense nor moral law, not only antagonizes experience and sound phiiosophy but the scripture as well. Lambert. The principle advanced by me was that if all revelation be rejected there can be found no. valid argument against polygamy. This appears all the more evident frgm a consideration of your arguments against polygamy. You assert that it is wrong because it in- jures society and those who practice it But this is a begging of Lhe question, for those who believe in and practice polygamy deny point blank your assertion. An argument based on an assertion has no validity or force against those who deny the truth of the asser- tion. The majority of mankind outside of Christen- dom have believed in and practiced polygamy or its equivalent in some form. Hence if you appeal to rea- son alone and reject revelation you have this majority against you — a majority that does not believe that polygamy is injurious to society or to those who prac- tice it. As a matter of fact your assertion is based on Christian sentiment and this sentiment is based on divine revelation. Now a word as to your statement above, first, no one, at least no Christian philosopher that without revelation there would be no moral sense. The moral s^nse is a faculty of the soul by which it apprehends moral questions or the principles of moral- ity when presented to it, just as our physical senses agam And holds 258 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. if/' II are faculties by whicn we appreliend physical, material things when presented to them. The existence of the moral sense then does not depend on revelation. Be- ing a faculty of the soul its existence is concomitant with the soul. But a faculty without an object on which to act is quiescent, dead, or useless. Tf there were no sounds the faculty of hearing would be of no use; if there were no visible things the faculty of sight would be of no avail; if there were nothing tangible we would not be conscious that we possessed the faculty of feeling. So with every faculty of mind and body ; each must be brought into relation with its proper object. Now the proper object of the fac- ulty of moral sense is moral principles. These prin- ciples must be presented to it before it can act on them or act at all. These moral principles are based on the zen// of the supreme, infinite and perfect Being, and they cannot pass from the mind of the supreme Being to the mind of the finite being without a revelation of some kind. Hence the moral sense without revelation would not have its proper object to act on ; it would wither and die as the eyes of the fishes in the dark recesses of the Mammoth Cave lose the ability to per- form their functions for want of light. Take away the moral principles that are known only by revela- tion and the moral sense would be a faculty without an object — a dead faculty. Moral principles are then necessary to its life ; and these principles are supplied by revelation. Hence revelation is necessary to the life and activity of the moral sense, although not to its mere inoperative existence. Second, the doctrine that without revelation there would be no moral law is verified by common sense and sound philosophy as well as by the Scripture. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 259 terial )fthe Be- litant ;ct on there of no Ity of Dthing sessed : mind n with le fac- e prin- nthem ion the ig, and 2 Being ation of delation would le dark to per- :e away T revela- without ire then supplied y to the \ot to its ion there an sense kripture. The moral law as contradistinguished from physical law is, according to Webster who agrees with the theologians, " the will of God, as the Supreme moral ruler, concerning the character and conduct of all re- sponsible beings." Now as the moral law is the will of God it is very evident that that will cannot be known to man unless it is revealed — hence the necess- ity of a revelation to a knowledge of the moral law. Hence, again if we have no revelation we can have no knowledge of the moral law. The moral law may and does exist in the mind of God, but it is no laW for us until it is promulgated, and its promulgation is a revelation. The doctrine that there is no moral law without revelation accords equally with Scripture. To show this I need go no further than the text quoted by you from St. Paul. "These (the Gentiles) having not the law, are a law unto themselves ; which show the work of the law, wr^iten in their hearts^ their conscience also bearing witness." (Romans II, 14, 15). If the law was written in their hearts it was certainly revealed to them by Him who wrote it in their hearts. This wri- ting of the law in their hearts was a revelation. This is why I have said that without revelation of some kind t:he moral law cannot be known to man. Had you bsen familiar with the well known distinction be- tween the divine natural law which was revealed to all men and the d'vine positive law which was revealed on Mount Sinai yo a would have understood St. Paul better. Lacy. Tha Father quotes Rousseau, the French skeptic, to show the egotism of philosophers and the vanity of philosophy. Lambert. The Father quoted him to show the egotism of the French infidel philosophers of his day. 26o TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 'fi I When he "sized them up" he drew an excellent pic- ture of the latter day infidels. Lacy. The Father claims that before deciding what women's rights are, they must be determined rightly and independently of sentiments and feelings. Lambert. You do not put it straight. The Father claims that until it is determined what these *' rights " are,, the question as to what the Bible says about them cannot be intelligently discussed. Here is one of those cases in which a definition is imperatively necessar}^. Until we have a clear, common under- standing of what is meant by woman's rights it is idling time away to discuss the question. Lacy. A rather difficult task to undertake, for who can discuss a moral question, or one involving human rights, without sentiment or feelings ? Lambert. It was not a question of discussion, but of a definition, or determining the meaning of the phrase "woman's rights." In defining terms there is no place for sentiment or feeling. Besides, he who can- not conduct a logical argument without sentiment or feeling is unfit to discuss any question. Sentiment and feeling are good things in poetry and in a certain kind of oratory, but they are as out of place in logic as they are in the solution of a mathematical or geo- metrical problem. Mr. Lacy after charging me with garbling and misquoting Ingersoll's article, makes a long quotation for the purpose, he tells us, of doing justice to him. He is of course free to quote the whole of Ingersoll's article if it suits his purpose, while I am equally free to use my judgment and select such of his statements as I deem it proper to reply to, being careful to give verbatim the statements quoted. A writer is responsi- \m TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 261 t pic- :iding mined clings. The these 2 says lere is atively under- ;s it is ke, for /olving ion, but ; phrase is no 10 can- lent or ntiment certain n logic or geo- ng and dotation to him. gersoU's lly free itements to give responsi- ble for ever>' statement he makes and each statement should stand or fall by its own intrinsic truth or fallacy. If the statements on which his argument is based are false, the whole argument falls. When M» Lacy asserts that I garbled or misquoted Ingersoll's statements I must refer him to that precept of the decalogue which forbids bearing false witness. Mr. Lacy understands the trick of insinuation. He would rather refer than quote when he writes " of the treatment to which women were subject under Jewish rule and law ; for instance as delineated in the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of Deuteron- omy." I have already treated of the twenty-first chapter in a preceding article and need not repeat. It is sufficient here to state that the parts he objects to in that chapter consist of certain regulations made by Moses to protect female captives from the first famil- iarities of the soldier. The twenty-second chapter which his mock modesty forbids him to quote speaks of certain crimes and their punishments. For in- stance, it forbids a woman to be clothed with a man's apparel and a man to be clothed in a woman's apparel. How cruel in Moses to subject women to such limita- tions. It also lays down the punishment of a man who slanders his wife, and that to be afflicted on im- moral women. It states the punishment for adultery, to be inflicted on both parties alike. It protects the innocent woman by inflicting death on her ravisher, and obliges the man to marry the woman whose confidence he has betrayed. Such is chapter twenty-second of Deuteronomy to which Mr. Lacy lofers so delicately and blushingly. The only right taken away from women in this chapter is the righf- to wear trousers or commit adultery. Does Mr. Lacy insist on these " rights ?" " % 262 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. B Notes. Moses forbade these abominations (the licentious modes of worship practiced by women at the altars of Venui> and Cybele) and for this you accuse him of takings away the " rights " of women. Lacj^. What v/il] the reader say when he finds that this is i, .Jaii nv vrnished misstatement? i^amdcn'. Uninckily for you IngersoU is some- what speci.c i • ^bi? matter. He, in speaking of the rights of women amo^ , pagans as contradistinguished from those of Jewish women, says : " In Persia women were priests." Now it is a fact that these pagan priestesses sacrificed their virtue at the lewd altars of their false gods. This was not a mere lapse on their part. It was a part of their abominable ceremonies. When IngersoU refers to these priestesses as examples of better treatment than that accorded to Jewish wom- en, he referred also to their official practices, know- ingly or ignorantly. In any case he is responsible for his statement and all it implies. Now the practices of these pagan priestessess were forbidden by Moses to Jewish women. For this IngersoU condemns him. Lacy. The right of woman is to fiulfiU the high- est destiny which she is mentally, morally and physi- cally qualified to reach. Lambert. The Christian philosopher would call this a duty. There is difference between rights and duties, although you persist in confounding them. Lacy. We have the authority of Fenelon, Cath- olic Archbishop of Tours, that the Jews were not " one jot less corrupted " than the heathen. Lambert. Fenelon, Archbishop of Tours, is a myth. There is or was no such person. When you are so incorrect as to modern facts you are not ex- pected to be reliable as to ancient facts. 1 ACTIOS OF INFIDELS. 263 s (the ncn at is you ncn. 2 finds some- of the ruished women pagan Itars of ►n their monies, camples ih wom- know- sible for ctices of ^oses to him. le high- 1 physi- )uld call hts and lem. m, Cath- vere not urs, is a hen you not ex- ivlr. L?.c> next gives us a little treatise on the meaning of the word "exterminate," to show that it ma> mear> something .nore than to " expel, to drive out." It certainly may mean something more, but as a matter of fact in the case of inhabitants of Canaan as in the case of the Indians in this country, it means that the land was cleared of them in one way or an- other. The best evidence as to the correct use of the word is a standard dictionary. Consult Webster and you will find that the first meaning of the v -d " ex- terminate " given by him is " to drive from v, it* 1 the limits or borders of" When you say the atii A^ord venio means to gOy the reader will be apt 1^ ^ee with you that you are a poor Latin scholar. 'ae word "prevent" does not mean "to go before" as you tell us. The texts you quote from Deutc.onomy and Numbers to prove that exterminate means to destroy by killing, only show that those met in battle and taken prisoners were put to death. Those who fled were exterminated though not put to death. Ingersoll. In this age of fact and demonstration it is refreshing to find a man who believes so thorough- ly in the monstrous, the miraculous, the impossible and immoral. NoteSy Here you assume to determine what IS monstrous, miraculous, impossible and immoral. It is refreshing in this age of general education to see an infidel offering his crude notions as ultimate principles or axioms. Lacy. But of what was Mr. Ingv^rsoU speaking when he referred to the monstrous ? Tc the story of the loquacious serpent, to the alleged ui.iversality of the flood, to the story of a woman transfonned into a 264 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. -IV\ w ^1 pillar of salt, and to the tower of Babel " stopped by the jargon of a thousand tongues." Lambert. Yes, but it is denied that any of these are monstrous, impossible or immoral, and IngersoU's mere affirmation does not make them so. Mark his method. He first says they are monstrous, etc., and then expresses astonishment that others do not agree with him. It seems to me that the great minds and master intellects of Christendom are as good judges of what is monstrous, etc., as IngersoU or his disciple is. This assumption that they are all wrong and he only right is another illustration of IngersoU's " modesty." Lacy. What was referred to (by IngersoU) as immoral ? Slavery, polygamy, wars of extermination, and persecution even unto death for opinion's sake. Lambert. But it is denied that slavery per se is immoral, and neither IngersoU nor you have attempted to prove it. You confound slavery with certain abuses incident to it and condemn the one with the other, but you have wisely not attempted to show that that relation between capital and labor called slavery is in itself immoral. You seem to think it is enough to affirm it and then build up arguments on your affirma- tions, forgetful of the fact that the affirmations them- selves stand in need of proof. True, IngersoU says it is slimy and filthy, but you make a grave mistake when you imagine that is equivalent to proof. It is denied that wars of extermination are wrong or im- moral when waged, as waged by the Jews, at the com- mand of Him who is the Supreme master of life and death. It is denied that Christianity teaches that per- secution for opinion's sake, is right, just or moral. These denials are valid and of force against your and TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 265 Ingersoll's gratuitous assertions, for it is a principle in logic that what is gratuitiously affirmed can be gratui- tously denied. Lacy. In this age does the Father require a writer to prove that slavery is an evil and polygamy a sin? Lambert. He does most emphatically require those who reject revelation to prove the wrong or sin- fulness of slavery and polygamy. Those who believe in revelation believe they are wrong because they are forbidden. But on what principle do you, who reject revelation, believe they are wrong ? O, they are slimy and filthy. There, there, we have had enough of that kind of talk ; it proves nothing. fp CHAPTER XXVII. Ingersoll, Mr. Black comes to the conclusion that the Hebrew Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament. Lambert. Mr. Black comes to no such conclu- sion. It is no doubt true that " the Old and New Testaments are so connected together that if one is true the other cannot be false." This is your oppo- nent's statement and it is very different from what you represent him as saying. Lacy. How has the Father succeeded in making his point, small at best? By splitting a sentence in two, leaving out an extract quoted from Mr. Black's article, and substituting a period for a comma. This was necessary to show up the infidel I Lambert. IngersoU's sentence contained two propositions, one of which was false and the other true. When he said " Mr. Black comes to the conclu- sion that the Hebrew'Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament," he misrepresented Mr. Black. It is of no consequence what else he may have said in his serttence, whether true or false. It suffices that the proposition quoted by me is false. The Father quoted in full and dealt with IngersoU's proposition 'and found it to be false. He had nothing to do with the other proposition in the same sentence which was true. Lacy. Give me the same liberty with Shakes- peare as the Father takes with Ingersoll, and I will convert the grandest sentiments of the noble bard into drivel and nonsense. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 267 ;lusion ith the :onclu- d New one is • oppo- hat you making :ence in Black's L This ed two le other conclu- ny with Black. e said in ces that Father )position do with lich was Shakes- id I will bard into Lambert. You have a perfect right to quote Shakespeare or any other author as I quote Ingersoll, that is, proposition by proposition, and examine each by itself and on its own merits. If Shakespeare can- not bear this test he is not the poet he is generally supposed to be. The merit of Shakespeare consists in the fact that his sentences are built up of true propositions, and that is one of the many differences between him and Ingersoll. I do not doubt your capacity to manufacture drivel and nonsense, but not out of Shakespeare, as long as you quote his proposi- tions. Lacy. We now approach a subject worthy the moralist — the status of slavery in itself as related to morality. It seems to be agreed there are immutable principles, the violation of which no exigency will justify. Lambert. Your first sentence is a sufficiently correct statement of the question, and the second gives a key to its solution. An evil in itself ^ or malum in sey as theologians term it, is an evil which no exi- gency will justify ; while an evil by circumstances, or malum per accidens, is an evil which some exigency or circumstance may justify or cause to be no longer evil. Thus, murder, blasphemy, lying, etc., are evil in them- selves and can therefore be justified by no exigency whatever, while working on Sunday, killing, destroy- ing property, taking what belongs to another, are evils per accia, ns, and may be justified by circumstances. Working on Sunday is justified when there is an urgent necessity, for instance saving your house when on fire ; killing is not wrong when done by a sheriff in the exercise of his office ; destroying property is not wrong when it is for good reason deemed neces- 268 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. li f'l sary, as the destruction of property in the South done to end the war ; taking what belongs to another is not wrong when there is grave necessity, for instance, a starving man does no wrong by taking sufficient food to support Hfe for the time being, and when he cannot obtain it otherwise. There is then a class of acts that are wrong and forbidden under certain circumstances and not wrong or forbidden under other circumstances. These wrongs or evils are called malum per accidens. There is another class of acts that are wrong essenti- ally, under all circumstances and are never justifiable. These are malum in se. Now to which of these classes does slavery be- long ? That is the question at issue. I am glad to find that you and I agree that it belongs to the first class, and that it is not essentially wrong, or wrong in itself, for you tell us on page 11 1, that " We may sup- pose an example where slavery would L: justified; as in case of war and by way of retaliation." In this you are right, and it follows that slavery is not wrong in itself, not essentially wrong, for if it were you could suppose no case in which it could be justified. Lacy. But in such case the slave is held, not for profit, nor under pretense of converting him, but to exact justice, to vindicate liberty y and generally to con- serve the interests of Jmmanity. Lambert. You make a remarkable admission here. Ingersoll says, " slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer and hypocrite." And yet you admit that in certain cases it may be justified and prac- ticed, to exact justice, to vindicate liberty and to con- serve the interests of humanity ! It follows, if you and he are both right, that the "joint product of the kid- napper, pirate, thief, murderer and hypocrite " may be TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 269 1 done ' is not ince, a it food cannot ;ts that stances jtanccs. ccidcns. essenti- itifiable. ery be- glad to the first k^rong in lay sup- ified; as In this )t wrong 3U could I, not for I, but to to con- dmission ill other idnapper, yet you and prac- to con- f you and the kid- may be utilized to exact justice, to vindicate liberty and to conserve the interests of humanity ! It seems to me, to use a phrase of your own, that this is coming down to " hard pan." You endeavor to make a point by stating that the Jews used the institution of slavery for gain — not for missionary but mercenary purposes. I may even grant this, and that they did wrong in doing so. But this does not prove that slavery is wrong. At best it only proves that they abused it. The abuse of a thing is no argument against the thing abused. If it were, liberty would be wrong, wealth would be an evil, for both of these may be and are abused. The question between you and me is not whether the Jews did wrong, but whether slavery is wrong in itself, and as you have admitted that under certain circumstances, in the interests of justice, liberty and humanity, it is justified, you have admitted all that I desire, you agree with me and go back on your master. Lacy. Webster defines slavery as " the entire subjection to the will of another." Lambert. Although you garble Webster's defi- nition it is still good enough for my purpose. Is there anything evil or wrong in itself in " the entire subjec- tion of one person to the Avill of another?" If so obedience to God would be evil in itself, perfect obedi- ence to legitimate authority or government would be wrong, and the best citizen would be the worst. If entire subjection of an individual lo the will of another or others is wrong it follows that the less entire his subjection is the better the man is ; in other words the more lawless a man is the more perfect he is. I^acy. Su, .h is slavery pure and simple, as delinea- ted by historic annals, sacred and profane, qualified by but few restrictions as to the life and person of the slave. 270 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ij<; .'I,'., Ul ft Ui.: m Lambert. If slavery be qualified by " restrictions as to the life and person of the slave" how can it be said that the slave is in entire subjection to the will of another? Your explanation of Webster's definition of slavery is in antagonism with historic slavery, for historic slavery did not mean entire subjection except in rare cases. The historic annals that speak of slavery speak also of the laws regulating it and defining the relations between master and slave. And the moment we suppose laws regulating these relations, that mo- ment we must give up the idea that the slave was in entire subjection to the master. Lacy. If the slaves could choose their masters, or even if the majority of men were humane the evils of servitude would, at least, be mitigated. Lambert. No doubt of it. But we are not speak- ing of the evils of slavery ; we are discussing the ques- tion whether slavery is itself an evil when considered without reference to the abuses of it. No one denies that men may make a bad use of it„ as they can of everything else within their reach. What is denied is that slavery itself — the entire subjection of one person to the will of another — is evil in itself Notes. The church during eighteen centuries fought against slavery, and taught that all men are equal before God. Lacy. Some churches did while othen have been the apologists of slavery. Lambert. Here you confound, as usual, slavery in itself with slavery as sometimes practiced. While the church has always held that slavery — the subjec- tion of one to the will of another is not wrong in itself — it has always condemned the practice of it be- cause owing to man's perversity and cruelty it is sub- ject to so many abuses. T fa TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 271 Lacy, But if slavery be not sinful why antag- onize it ? Lambert. It is antagonized, not because it is sin- ful in itself, but because of the abuses it is subject to. Will you never get this distinction into your head ? Lacy. Or if right among the Jews why wrong among the Gentiles ? Lambert. It was not wrong in itself in either case. The wrong consists in the abuse, not in the use. Lacy. Was a Jewish more merciful than a Chris- tian master ? Lambert. Yes ; he had to be by reason of the laws. These laws ordained that a slave, if a Hebrew, regained his freedom after six years, and if not a Hebrew, he became a freeman in the year of jubilee or at the death of his master, for according to the teachings of the rabbins the slave did not descend to the heirs. Jewish slavery was but temporary, while slavery among other peoples was for life. This makes a great difference. Notes. The apostles claimed a divine communi- cation and mission. They worked miracles. Lacy. Here again is a begging of the question by one who was to grant nothing and take nothing for granted. Here it is assumed that miracles were wrought, the very statement denied in the controversy. Lambert. There is the same evidence to prove the miracles of Christ and the apostles that there is to prove the existence and acts of Alexander and Caesar, namely, history and tradition. If we reject the former we must on the same principle reject the latter, and if we adopt this principle we cut ourselves off compara- tively from all the events and personages of the past. The miracles of Christ and His apostles are historic facts or events subject to the same rules of historic •.>■ 272 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. mo mi % 111 ■ ft ; I k criticism that other facts are. You may say, as Inger- soli does, that the people at that time were rude and ignorant and therefore not reHable judges as to what was or was not a miracle. But you and he forget that we do not adduce their evidence to prove the mirac- ulous nature of the facts they relate, but to prove the facts themselves. Raising the dead to life, curing the sick instantaneously, and giving sight to the blind and hearing and speech to the deaf and dumb are facts to which the ignorant and rude can testify as well as the learned. That these facts really occurred was admit- ted by pagan and anti-Christian writers of the times immediately subsequent to the apostles. The miracles of Christ as recorded in the New Testament were admitted by the Jews. It never occurred to Jew, Gentile or Pagan to doubt the fact jf those miracles. Celsus, Porphyry and Julian admitted them and tried to deprive them of their significance and force by saying that Christ was a magician who had learned the black art while in Egypt with 1 Tary, His mother, on the banks of the Nile. The Jews also accounted for His power by saying He had stolen the unspeakable word from the temple ; and some of them held that He performed His wonderful works by the power of the devil. These explanations of the facts are an admission that they did not doubt the facts. Can we suppose these enemies of Christ would have ad- mitted the facts if they had had any decent pretext to deny their existence? Certainly not. And it must be admitted that their proximity in time and place to them made them better judges of the reality of those events than are the skeptics of to-day. Mind, I do not say they were better judges of what constitutes a m>ac'o than we rire at the present time, but that they jec TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 273 nger- 2 and what ;t that nirac- /e the ig the id and LCtS to as the admit- I times le New never ; fact jf dmitted ificance an who L Mary, ;ws also )len the of them by the acts are s. Can ave ad- etext tu it must place to of those id, I do titutes a lat they were better judges of facts they relate, and which we now must call miraculous. Lacy. The church might as well face the issue : Is there sufficient evidence to convince intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth, that miracles, as recorded, were ever ivrought ? Lambert. If you were familiar with the church's literature you would know that it has never failed to face the '3sue. We have historic evidence of Chris- tians and pagans that the facts took place — evidence that cannot be rejected without destroying the credi- bility of all history — and we with our knowledge of the laws of nature, know that they could not have taken place without the intervention of a power superior to that of nature. The most intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth in the most civilized part of the world for the last eighteen hundred years have deemed the evidence all sufficient. Your inference that the evidence is not sufficient for intelligent men is, in view of the history of the last eighteen nundred years, extremely modest, and would lead us to believe that when you speak of intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth you have reference only to the infidel- of the present time, and imagine that they have a m opoly of intelligence and truth. It is needless to this " modest " assumption cannot be grantee' Lacy. The skeptic says, along with mi :les read of witchcraft and demoniacal possession Lambert. And the merchant says, iong with gold coin he meets with counterfeits, but he is not so asinine as to reject all money on that account. He takes care however to test each piece or note . and re- jects the false and accepts the true. • • •• * that we CHAPTER XXVIII. 'nk Lacy. "Witches have been banished from educa- ted society, and demonology is a thing of the past. Lambert. This is begging the question. That phenomena occur now as in former times which can be accounted for on no other hypothesis than the infer- ence of non-corporeal intelligences is a fact established by evidence so incontestable that to deny them is to deny the validity and force of all evidence. The truth on which a belief in these phenomena is based, name- ly, the existence of non-corporeal intelligences, is be- lieved now as it has always been believed by the human race, by the educated as by the ignorant. When you insinuate that spiritual phenomena are dis- believed in by educated society you are either un- familiar with such society or you imagine it to be composed of a few infidels and skeptics. Had you read the works written in modern times by able and learned men, such as Goerres, Bizuard, Peronne, Le- canu, Gmeiner, Schneider, Brownson, Crookes, and others on the subject of spiritual phenomena, you would not talk so flippantly about educated society rejejung them. The light and airy way in which you treat this subject shows that you have not thoroughly studied it ; not given it that attention which profound thinkers of all times have deemed it worthy of Lacy. The insanity of the present was the " evil possession" not only of the Jews but of other nations. Lafnhert. Here is another gratuitous assertion, not worth the ink squandered in writing it, until TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 275 educa- )ast. That can be e infer- iblished tn is to he truth I, name- s, is be- by the gnorant. are dis- :her un- it to be lad you ible and nne, Le- kes, and ena, you i society hich you oroughly profound Df. the " evil r nations, assertion, it, until established by proof. There have been and are many cases of well established " possession " where the possessed were not insane, and many cases of insanity where the afflicted were not possessed. This distinc- tion has always been made. There is no necessary relation between insanity and possession, and the evi- dences proving the one are of an entirely different kind from those proving the other. As you under- take to discuss the subject you should not be ignorant of this fact. Lacy. A crazy man was supposed to be possess- ed by the devil. Lambert. Supposed by whom ? Where did you acquire this piece of information which you impart so gratuitously ? We find in the Scripture that certain persons were said to be possessed, b it v e do not find that crazy men were supposed to be j^^iossessed. This is an inference cf your own which is not justified by the premises. As a matter of fact the Scriptures themselves make a distinction between demoniac pos- session and insanity, and recognize the existence of both. This fact is sufficient to thoroughly upset your gratuitous assertion. In St. Matthew's gospel, chap- ter IV verse 24, we find the following: "And they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those that were possessed with devils, and those that were lunatic, and those that had the palsey; and He healed th/jm." Here it is evident that the Jews made a distinctio! be- tween possession and lunacy. Again, " There came to Him (Christ) a certain man, kneeling down to Him, and saying : " Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is a lunatic.'' (Matth 17-15.) In the first book of Sam- uel, chapter 21, David feigned madness to escape from I M. .i 11 276 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. King Achish. "He changed his behavior before them, ind feigned himself mad on their hands, and scrabbled on the doors of the gate, and let his spittle fall down on his beard. Then Achish said unto his servants, Lo, the man is mad : Wherefore then have ye brought him to me ? Have I need of madmen, that ye have brought this fellow to play the madman in my pres- ence? Shall this fellow come into my house ? Diwid therefore departed thence, and escaped to the Cave of Adullam." It appears from this that in the time of E)avid they knew of insanity, as David's imitation of i{ sh ws. Jeremiah, speaking of the Babylonians, says : "They are 7Haci upon their idols" (chap. 50-38). When Rhoda announced that Peter stood before the gate of the house of Mary the mother of John, " They said unto her, Thou art mad" (Acts 12-15). They thought she was crazy because they believed that Peter was in prison. "And as he (Paul) thus spake for himself, Festus said with a loud voice, Paul thou irt beside thyself; much learning doth make thee mad. But Paul said, I am not mad, most noble Festus; but speak forth the words of truth and soberness." (Acts 26-24, 25.) These quotations show that madness and lunacy vi^ere recognized as a derangement of the intellect, and not confounded with demoniac possession. I need not quote the many texts of Scripture that speak of demoniac possession ; they are numerous and clear. From the above texts it follows that when you said "a crazy man was supposed to be possessed by a devil," you merely made an ignorant guess. Lacy. The ignorant can still be made to believe in witches, ghosts and den 1 3ns ; but is it right to abuse the incredulity of unlearned and unreflecting minds. TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ^n Kem, id on [1 on , Lo, lUght have pres- 3i\vid ive of Tie of ion of nians, 0-38). re the John. 2-1 S)- ilieved ) thus Paul ethee estus; rness." I believe abuse minds. Lambert. It seems impossible for an infidel to talk without an assumption of superiority over his fellow men. The human family, the learned as well as the ignorant, have ever believed in the existence of spiritual beings, and that they can communicate and have intercourse, for good or ill, with men. The ex- ceptions are so small as not to be worth counting. Call these spiritual beings ghosts, angels, saints, de- mons, or what you will, the universal belief in their existence is a fact which no philosopher who has any regard for his ivputation can afford to ignore or laugh at. Whether thest^ beings have had intercourse with men and produccv^ sensible phenomena is a question of fact, suhjcH:t to the same tests and provable by the same kind oi evidence by which all other sensible facts are ttistod and proved. The evidence that such phenomena or spiritual manifestations have taken place aiKl still take place is so clear and strong that if w<^ doubt it we must at the same time reject all evi- dence as a motive of credibility. The trick of attribu- ting ignorance to those who differ from us can deceive only the unlearned and unreflecting. Lacy. How long before fear will cease to be the ruling element of religion ? Lamba^t. If you hijd a true notion of what the word "religion" means you would understand that fear has nothing whatever to do with it. Fear is an element not of religion but of human nature, and as such is a good thing, as long as it does not degenerate into cowardice or pusilanimity. The fear of the Lord is the beginmng of wisdom, say the Scriptures. Fear is a proper appreciation of danger with a desire •r impulse to avoid it. It is implanted in man by his Creator as a protection to his life. Courage is a 278 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. f'-'i ■:'. proper appreciation of danj^cr with the strength to meet it when duty calls. Cowardice is an appreciation of danger with the lack of courage to meet it when duty requires it to be met. Vusilanimity is a want of manly strength and firmn'jss of mind, dastardliness, mean-spiritedness, faint-heartedness. The Christian is free to admit that he is afraid of God when he has done something to offend Him, afraid of being pun- ished tor his offense. Fear in this case is the legiti- mate child of transgression ; and, being legitimate, is respectable. Lacy. We read of many miracles of to-day, not only among Catholics but among Protestants as well. All seem to be equally authenticated, and yet what scientific man will listen patiently to a recital of these wonders ? Lambert. It seems to me that scientific men should listen patiently to a recital of these wonders, if they are honest seekers after truth. But the truth does not depend on their patience or impatience, and it is very stupid in you to make these a test of truth. Lacy. We repeat, it is too bad to impose upon the credulous. Lambert. And I repeat it. But why did you not think of this fact when you said that Christians believed that there are tJiree Gods ? Was it ignorance or a perverse moral impulse that made you make that false statement? Having made it, you are the last person in the world to talk about "imposing upon the credulous." Lacy. We read of many miracles of to-day, * * * All seem to be equally well authenticated. Lambert. " All seem to be !" Have you ever critically examined any of these miracles ? Had you TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 279 th to iation when int of lincss, ristian le has r pun- Ic^^iti- atc, is ly, not s well, t what f these c men iders, if - truth tce, and f truth, e upon lid you iristians noranre ike that the last pon the ay, * * ou ever lad you or any of your so-called scientists taken the trouble to do so you and they would have found that miracles are not all ecually authenticated. Honest and en- lightened men have examined these miracles, and while they have rejected some they were forced by the weight of evidence to admit others. But this careful, laborious investigation is too troublesome for the super- ficial skeptic ; he knows all about it, or thinks he does. Lacy. Years ago a servant girl * ♦ * offered me the loan of a Catholic publication. Lambert. Was it perhaps this same servant girl who taught you the components of pot-pies and apple pies of which you have spoken so learnedly ? You take a silly story f^-om some publication the name of which you have forgotten, and from such evidence attempt to build up an argument against miracles. After giving, in your own words, the silly story, you say " this is only a specimen of legends innumerable, which are put forth as verities — equal verities as apos- tolic miracles — by a church claiming to be immac- ulate." Is such stuff the best argument you have against miracles? Your statement above is simply false. It is, as you say, too bad to impose upon the credulous. No one who loves truth desires victory at the expense of truth. Lacy. There is another class which professes to open to our vision the portals of the unseen world ; spiritualists. Lambert. The incontestable facts of spiritualism prove the existence of non-material beings. There is much fraud and trickery perpetrated by so-called spirit- ualist mediums, but behind these there are facts which cannot be explained on any hypothesis save that of the existence of non-material, intelligent beings. This ^^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // ^ A* V^ IJI.O ^Bil^ ■tt lU |22 ilf d^ 12.0 1.1 t^l 1.4 1^ A" o ^ 7> V <^fe A? FhotograjM; Sciences Corporalion 23 WIST MAIN STiEH WltSTiR,N.Y. UStO (716)I72-4S03 '^ iV <\ ^. ;\ '^ % ;V 28o TACTICS OF INFIDELS. I has always been recognized by the church as weli as by the Scriptures. Your effort to offset true miracles by the tricks and deceptions of fraudulent, catch-penny mediums is unworthy the spirit of honest investigation. Lacy. The question of the verity of miracles, when divested of theological flummery, is a simple one. It involves only a question i^i fact. Lambert. You say this as if it were an original idea with you. Christians have at all times insisted that miracles are questions of fact, and like other facts, provable by evidence. Lacy. Why should the ignorant and supersti- tious b^ exclusively selected as witnesses of super- natural manifestations ? Lambert. This question implies a fallacy. The ignorant and superstitious are not exclusively selected. To say that those who have investigated miracles and been convinced of their verity are ignorant and super- stitious is unmitigated impertinence as well as an evidence of ignorance. Lacy. Ignorance is not, per se^ holiness, nor credulity wisdom. Lambert. Pray who says they are ? You have caught the trick of manufacturing these little aphor- isms from your master Ingersoll. There is no purpose in the above except to leave the inference that Chris- tians believe ignorance to be holiness and credulity wisdom. You should remember your own words that " no one who loves truth desires victory at the expense of truth." While ignorance is not holiness it is not incompatible with it or with goodness. Lacy. Would you convince us of miracles, sub- mit '-our tests to scientific men, such as compose the French Academy of Science, for example ? TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 2S1 weik as niracles [i-peniiy Ligation, niracles, I simple original insisted ler facts, supersti- if super- :y. The selected, icles and id super- 1 as an ess, nor ou have aphor- purpose at Chris- credulity ords that expense it is not :les, sub- (ipose the Lambert, By " scientific men " you mean phys- ical scientists, for such is the sense in which the phrase is used by modem infidels. Now a favorable report on a miracle by a committee of physical scientists would have no weight with chose who do not already believe in miracles. Were their report offered to a skeptic as proof of a miracle he could and would reject it, giving as a reason the incompetency of the committee. He would say truly that physical science cannot go beyond its domain, which is material nature. But a miracle, by its definition, supposes the super- natural, supposes the interference of an intelligent agent superior to nature ; and the scientists cannot affirm anything of this supernatural agent without going be- yond the limits of their science, and when they go beyond those limits their authority is no better than that of the skeptic himself. The most the scien- tist can do in presence of a real miracle is to say that his science cannot account for it. There he must stop, for, as a scientist, he cannot account for any event whose cause is outside of and above the natural order. A real miracle is, by its definition, an event of this kind. The skeptic would therefore reject the scien- tist's favorable report as that of an incompetent wit- ness. Even should the scientist, as a man of intelli- gence, be convinced of the reality of a miracle, he could not in his capacity of scientist testify to that reality ; his testimony to be of any value should be based on grounds other than those of physical science. True, physical scientists may detect the trickery and fraud of a false miracle, but as, owing to the nature of their science and the nature of miracles, they can- not testify to a true one, they are incompetent judges, and their testimony would convince no intelligent 2S2 tACtlCS OF IN^DfiLS. mind that did not already believe in miracles. Your appeal then to the French Academy was an appeal to the wrong court. Although scientific men cannot on scientific grounds testify tq a miracle, yet as intelligent individ- uals they can testify to them on other grounds ; and many of them have done so. Among the Mediaeval scientists who believed in the miracles of the Scrip- ture may be mentioned the Venerable Bede, Gerbert, Roger Bacon, Albertus Mag^nus, Leonardo da Vinci, . and many others who cannot be named for, want of room. Among the more modem may be named Copernicus, Nicholas de Cusa, Galileo, Kepler, Cesal- pino, Vesalius, Fallopius, Mattioli, Aldrovandi, Cas- 'telli, Cavalieri, Toricelli, Bosilli, Cassini, Descartes, Leibnitz, Newton, Jean Picard the first president of the Academy of Science of which you speak, Bosco- vich. Ampere, Leverrier, Secchi, and many others whose names might be added to this long list of bril- liant stars in the firmament of science, believed in the reality of the miracles recorded in the Scriptures. Many of these and others whose names have not been mentioned were members of the French Academy. It is a grave mistake to imagine that infidels have a monopoly of science. . Your ppeal to scientific individ- ds; and lediaeval tie Scrip- Gerbert, ia Vinci, want of e named if, Cesal- ndi, Cas- Descartes, esident of k, Bosco- ly others St of bril- ed in the icriptures. not been cademy. ;!s have a CHAPTER XXIX. - Lacy. Who wrote the Gospels ? Ingersoll. The fact is, no one knows who made the statements of the evangelists. Notes. The fact is, ther.e can be no reasonable doubt whatever that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John v/rote the Gospels attributed to them. Your state- ment to the contrary has not a particle of evidence to rest on. You have as good reason, and no better, to say that no one knows who wrote Shakespeare, Para- dise Lost of Milton, the Divine Comedy of Dante, Caesar, Livy, Tacitus, Josephus, or Homer. No one ever doubts that these books were written by the authors to whom they are attributed. The same kind of evidence that proves the authenticity of these proves the authenticity of the Gospels in a higher de- gree. Historical evidence, common tradition, and a concatenation of circumstances are all we have to prove the genuineness of Hamlet and Othello, Para- dise Lost, Livy, Tacitus and Josephus. And they are abundantly sufficient. Now this historical evidence, common tradition and concatenation of circumstances are equally st^-ong for the authors of the four Gospels. They are stronger, for the facts treated in the Gospels have changed the course of human history, and in consequence the attention of mankind has been more particularly directed to them. Lacy. Is there no difference in the amount ot proof which a just criticism requires in establishing the authenticity of the Gospels and of the works re- ferred to. ] \ 284 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lambert. No. The same kind of evidence that proves the authorship of the writings of Josephus, Livy, Tacitus, etc., will prove the authorship of the writings of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. All the critic has in either case is common tradition, historical evidence and monuments, and a chain of circum- stances. Without these no book published over a hundred and fifty years ago can ever be authenticated. And it is a principle of sound criticism that with these the authenticity of a book can be established. Thus you cannot destroy the authenticity of the Gospels witnout laying down a principle which if accepted would destroy the authenticity of all literature prior to one hundred and fifty years ago. The world is not yet sufficiently advanced to accept this result of. literary skepticism. Lacy. The works of Shakespeare, Livy, etc., are professedly, mere human productions, written to regale imagination and teach us the facts of history, while the Gospels speak to us as from the skies. They come freighted with a record of miracles and wonders stupendous. Lambert. Whatever they may be freighted with, the question still remains, WJw wrote them? You seem to apprehend no difference between the authen- ticity and veracity of a book. The question between you and me at present is. Who wrote the Gospels? not. Are they true narrations of events ? There are many incredible legends in Livy, but would any sane critic adduce this fact as evidence that Livy did not write the histories credited to him? Does the fact that Robinson Crusoe contains many fictions prove that De Foe was not its author? The Gospels contain a record of miracles and stupenduous events. True, but TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 285 snce that losephus, lip of the All the historical circum- d over a enticated. vith these d. Thus ; Gospels accepted ture prior jrld is not result of. yr, etc., are 1 to regale jry, while es. They i wonders ited with, r You |e authen- between [pels? not, are many ;ane critic not write fact that that De Icontain a True, but the question is not whether these miracles and events are real, but who wrote the record of them — true or false ? Suppose for a moment that the coiitents of the Gospels are pure fiction, the question still remains, Who wrote them ? The Christian world, the party most interested, has always claimed that the Gospels were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. Ancient writers. Christian and pagan, either expressly affirm it or take it as a fact undisputed. In all these eighteen hundred years there never has been an ad- verse claimant. Now in the face of these facts why, or on what principle of criticism should it be denied that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the books ascribed to them— even on the hypothesis that the books are pure fiction ? Observe, we are now speak- ing of the authenticity, not of the veracity of the Gospels. Your argument against the authenticity of the Gospels, stripped of its unnecessary verbiage, is this : The Gospels contain many things which we cannot believe, they tell us of unseen worlds and of spirits and angels intang^ible, therefore they were not written by the authors whose names they bear ! This is logic run mad. Lacy. Moreover these writers (of the Gospels) do not agree among themselves. Lambert. What has that ta do with the authen- ticity of the Gospels ? even if it were admitted, which it is not Horace Greely, Alexander H. Stephens, and Jefferson Davis wrote histories of our late war. They do not agree among themselves. Does that prove that the books bearing their nam^-s as authors were not written by them ? Can there be anything more utterly stupid than such an inference? Yet i f: I 286 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. r' such is the inference to be drawn from your words above — for you are arguing against the authenticity, . not the veracity of the Gospels. Lacy. Such being the case, our eternal interests demand that we should know both who speaks and by what authority we are addressed.. Lambert. Here again you are " off." The ques- tion between us is a simple one. It is not, Who authorised the Gospels to be written, or whether their contents be true, or inspired, but, who wrote those books that have been handed down to us as the works of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John ? It is purely a historical question, having nothing to do with the character of their contents, whether true, false, mirac- ulous or otherwise. All these are important problems, but they have nothing to do here in the present ques- tion, which is, who wrote the Gospels ? And why should not a Jew known as Matthew have written a history of the events of his time as that other Jew Josephus did? Why not Mark write as well as Tacitus, Luke as well as Livy, or John as well as Caesar? What "antecedent improbability" is there in it? Is it because the Evangelists recorded what you call incredible and extraordinary events ? That might be a reason why you should doubt their veracity, but it is certainly no reason to Houbt that those par- ticular men really recqrded those events, whether they are real or imaginary. You are a versatile writer. You undertook to give reasons why the authorship of the Gospels should be doubted, and you lugged in the question of their veracity, their inspiration, their ambiguity, their inter- polation, their different renderings, their liability to mutilation, and wound up with a touch about the TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 287 r words lenticity, interests :s and by he ques- ot, Who ;her their )te those the works purely a with the se, mirac- problems, sent ques- And why written a Dther Jew s well as IS well as is there rded what ts ? That ir veracity, those par- ether they lertook to Dels should 3n of their iheir inter- [liability to about the salvation of the world. And all this within the space of half a page ! These subjects are irrelevant to the question, Who wrote the Gospels. It is a law of logic as well as of commcii sense to deal with one question at a time, and not to befog it by the introduction of other issues. A moment's reflection should have shown you that the veracity, inspiration, etc., etc., of the Gospels are not germane to the question of their authorship — the point you undertook to discuss. Notes. The more important the contents of a ^ book are to mankind the more surely will its genuine- ness be admitted or denied from the beginning. Lacy. Such is the case in periods of advanced civilization, — Lambert. Such is the case in all periods. iMcy. — but uneducated and barbarous peoples are so prone to superstition and unquestioning faith that they are ever ready to seize upon anything as true which ministers to their love of the marvelous. Lambert. Pray what is there to minister to a love of the marvelous in the belief that Matthew wrote the Gospel attributed to him ? If the book had been written by some one else would it not have equally well ministered to the love of the marvelous ? Why then should the lovers of the marvelous attribute the book to Matthew if he did not write it ? Your state- ment, if true, would be a reason why uneducated, barbarous people should believe in the contents of the book, but it would be no reason why they should be- lieve Matthew to be its author, if he were not. But your statement cannot be admitted, for it is a well known fact that the more ignorant and barbarous a people are, the more difficult it ij to withdraw them from their old beliefs and superstitions. Besides the Jews 288 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. had enough of the marvelous in their Scriptures, and the pagans enough in tKeir polytheism to gratify to the full their love of the mysterious and wonderful. Hence if this was the only motive by which they were actuated, they had no need to admit authenticity of the Gospels to believe their contents. Lacy. The age in which the Gospels were writ- ten was not a critical age. Lambert. The preaching and writings of the Apostles and Evangelist constituted the rule .of life of the Christians who lived in and immediately subse- quent to their times. These Christians could know when one or more of their teachers wrote books, just as we know that Bancroft wrote a history of the United States, and Irving a life of Washington. And we are better authority in this matter than the conceited critic who is to live two thousand years hence. In the same way the early Christians knew more about the author- ship of the Gospels than the critic of to-day. iMcy. We know more of ancient Egypt than the average Egyptian knew of his own times and coun- try,- Lambert. Of course you do; but the great scholars in Egyptian antiquities claim no such knowl- edge. They are more modest in tone and more reli- able in statement. If mummies could laugh, a guffaw would reverberate through the caves of Egypt and along the valley of the Nile. La£y. — More of Galilee, of its faiths, Jjopes and fears, than those who fished in its waters and struck their tents by its shores. Lambert. It is very discouraging to iargfue with one who knows so much. What do " we " ktibw of the faiths, hopes and fears of the ancient people bf TACTICS OF INFIDELS. 289 5S, and tify to iderful. ly were city of e writ- of the f life of subse- i know iks, just I United we are ed critic he same author- ;han the id coun- \e great knowl- ►re reli- guffaw >t and [pes and struck le with :now of iople <5f GaliW but what we have learned from that people ? And how could " we " learn more of their lives and habits than they knew themselves, two thousand years after they had passed away? The • Old and New Testament and Josephus are our only sources of in- formation, and they certainly do not tell us all the people knew. This superb pretention of superior knowledge is in perfect keeping with the spirit of modern infidel criticism. In the words of Festus to St. Paul, much learning doth make them mad. Lacy, And yet let us not indulge in vain glory. Lambert. A wise saying, in view of the senseless boasting in which you have just indulged. Lacy, In the light of our present advancement and of our knowledge of the past, how futile to say : " It is a remarkable fact that the authenticity or genu- ineness of the four Gospels was never brought in question until modem times, and then only by a few infidels." Lambert. Futile or not it is still a fact that the authorship of the Gospels was never disputed until modern times. If you deny this you should show in what age and by whom it was disputed. But you have been very careful not to attempt this. Lacy. In the first place, little attention was paid to the small sect of the " despised Galileans." Lambert. Enough attention was paid to them to crucify the founder and to execute his Apostles and other followers. Enough attention to cause Nero, thirty years afterward, to decree the death of tens of thousands of them ; to cause them to be thrown into the Flavian Amphitheatre to be devoured by hungry lions, or covered with pitch and used as lamps to light 290 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ! the streets of Rome. It seems that this was giving them a good deal of attention. Lacy. It was only after Christianity had become a power that special notice was taken ot it. Lambert The Christians were first noticed and persecuted in Jerusalem when they were a helpless minority. The first notice was taken by the Sanhedrin on account of the many Jewish converts. " And as they (Peter and John) were speaking to the people, the priests and the officers of the temple and the Sad- ducees came upon them. Being grieved that they taught the people, and preached in Jesus the resurrec- tion of the dead. And they laid hands upon them, and put them in a hold, till the next day," (Acts 4-1 to 4). This took place about three months after the death of Christ. " And they stoned Stephen, invok- ing and saying : Lord Jesus receive my spirit. And falling on his knees he cried with a loud voice, saying: Lord, lay not this to their charge. And when he said this he fell asleep in the Lord." (Acts 7-58). Was not this taking special notice of them ? It is thus that your dogmatic statements vanish before the facts of history. If if giving become :ed and helpless .nhedrin And as : people, the Sad- tiat they resurrec- »n them, Vets 4-1 after the n, invok- •it. And e, saying: n he said 8). Was hus that facts of CHAPTER XXX. Lacy, At Christ's death the number of His dis- ciples, as far as the Scripture informs us, was about one hundred and twenty. Lambert. Where do you find this piece of infor- mation ? Lacy. Acts I. 15. Lambert. The text you refer to gives no infor- mation as to the number of Christ's disciples. Nor was it the purpose of the writer to give any. He sim- ply states about how many were present on a particu- lar occasion when Peter delivered his first sermon after the Ascension. Here is the passage.: " In those days Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren said: (now the number of persons together was about an hundred and twenty) Men, brethren, the Scriptures must needs be fulfilled, etc." Now it is quite evident that the number given in parenthesis in this fifteenth verse was the number present when Peter rose up and spoke. Hence the text does not bear out your state- ment that " as far as Scripture informs us, the number of disciples at Christ's death was about one hundred and twenty." Had you quoted the text the reader would have seen this immediately. Did you merely refer to the text with the hope that the reader would take your word for its meaning and not examine it for himself? Or did you make the statement in the light of your former statement that "we" know more about affairs in Judea than those present knew ? If so you should not have referred to a text that does not say jli I i ' m i ' I! i ^ 292 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. what you represent it as saying. You should have made the statement on your own authority and then the reader would be in no danger of being mislead. The writer of the Acts tells us that there were about one hundred and twenty disciples together on a cer- tain occasion. And Mr. Lacy forthwith informs us that, " according to Scripture," those present on that occasion were all the disciples there were at that time ! With an opponent who knows more about affairs in Judea than the Apostles and disciples did ; more of the affairs of ancient Egypt than the then inhabitants did, the Christian has no chance whatever in a discussion. Those who have the convenient faculty of manufac- turing facts to suit their theories have a great advantage over the Christian who must stand by the facts as handed down by history. Had you read the second chapter of Acts you would have learned that on the occasion of Peter's second speech, " there were added that day about three thousand souls," (verse 41) and that they were " persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles." You would have learned that on the next public occasion, when Peter cured the lame man at the gate Beautiful, as narrated in chapters third and fourth of Acts, the number who believed was five thousand. Now if you did not know of these texts when you referred to the Scriptures as stating that there were but one hundred and twenty disciples, you made a bold statement in ignorance of the facts ; and if you knew of these texts you exhibited a scandalous want of candor in ignoring them. All these conversions took place within a few months after the occasion you spoke of and before any part of the New Testament was written. This number of converts was greatly increased not only in Judea but in the neighboring TACTICS OF IHFIDELS. m lid have nd then mislead, -e about n a cer- forms us on that tiat time ! affairs in Dreofthe tants did, iscussion. manufac- idvantage e facts as le second at on the ere added 41) and ne of the the next jan at the and fourth thousand, hen you iere were lU made a |nd if you ous want inversions asion you estament greatly ighboring countries before Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote their Gospels. These converts were witnes ;es enough to bear testimony to the authorship of the Gospels, and to hand down their testimony to their children, and these to their children, and so on. These converts knew the writers of the Gospels as well if not better than you know IngersoU, and they were no more liable to be deceived about their writings than you are to be deceived about the writings and lectures of IngersoU. The future critic, if he should follow your example, will deny the authenticity of IngersoU's and Paine's gospels and attribute them to some un- known authors of the twenty-third or fourth centu- ries. He will reject your testimony in their behalf — if he ever hears of you — as incompetent, because he will not consider the 19th century a critical age as compared with his own. You may say he would be unjust in this. He would indeed, but not more thait you are to the writers and witnesses of 2,000 years ago. His critical conceit would be out of place — all the more so if he assumed to know more of our times than the present generation does. But he would only be treating us as you treat the people, learned and ignorant, of the Apostolic age. Notes. The genuineness of the four Gospels was never brought in question until modem times. Lacy. " Modem times " is exceedingly indefi- nite ; but, if so, why were they not questioned ? Lambert. It is a fact thc.t their authenticity was not questioned. You will seek in vain among the records of the early ages for any statement throwing doubt on the universal belief that the Gospels were written by those writers to whom they are credited. This fact is of great importance. It was to the inter- I]; i94 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. ests of the Jews, who lived in the time of the Apostles and immediately subsequent, to expose the claims of the authorship of these Gospels if they were false. They exhausted their ingenuity in opposing and per- secuting Christians, but in all their enmity and oppo- sition they never went so far as to question the author- ship of the four Gospels. The same is to be said of the anti-Christian pagan writers, and of the early heretics, who endeavored to explain away those por- tions of the Gospels that clashed with their views, when, if there had been any doubt of their authenticity they would have stated that fact as a reason for reject- ing them entirely. This would have been their natural line of action. The failure to do this on the part of Jewish, pagan and heretical writers who criticised the facts narrated in those Gospels is the strongest possible evidence that there was no plausible ground for doubting the authenticity of the Gospels them- selves. Lacy. There is no evidence that, when the Gos- pels were written, they bore on their face any evidence that they were composed or claimed to have been written by the authors to whom they are now ascribed. Lambert, Then how do you account for the uni- versal belief that they were written by those to whom they were ascribed — a belief to be traced from the present up to the Apostolic age, a belief common to Jew, Pagan, and Christian ? The originals are not extant, but all the ancient manuscripts of the four Gospels contain superscriptions ascribing them respectively to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. In the Peshito Syrica version of the second century the Gospels are ascribed to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. They were never ascribed to any other authors than those r^i tACtlCS 01^ iNtiDfeLS. ^9$ ! V ' t Apostles aims of e false, nd per- d oppo- author- said of le early 3se por- r views, henticity 3r reject- r natural the part criticised strongest t ground 'Is them- :he Gos- evidence ive been ascribed, the uni- :o whom [rom the mon to it extant, Gospels :ively to Peshito ;pels are They Ln those whose names they now bear. How then could this sameness of superscription, both in manuscripts and versions occur, unless these had all beeii derived origi- nally from Gospels having the superscriptions of Mat- thew, Mark, Luke and John ? If the original manuscript of each Gospel had not been inscribed to a known author, all the copies of these original Gospels would have been destitute of the names of the authors^ and the manuscripts that have come down to our age would exhibit to a greater or less degree the anony- mous character of their ancient copies.* All the an- cient manuscripts of the Gospels in all languages have the superscription of " according to Matthew," " ac- cording to Mark," etc. This fact can be explained only on the hypothesis that the originals were so marked either by their authors or by those who re- ceived them from their hands. A universal conspiracy to defraud is out of the question. It is not necessary to the authenticity of the Gospels to suppose that the Evangelists inscribed the titles on them. This could have been done by those converts for whom they were written. There is no reason why Theophilus, to whom St. Luke addressed his Gospel, could not have written the title, " Gospel according to Luke." This would be additional evidence of its authenticity. By the way, is there any evidence that when the works of Joseph uS, Tacitus, Livy, Caesar, were written they were composed or claimed to have been written by the authors to whom they are ascribed ? Is there any evidence that the titles of those works were written by their authors ? Does our ignorance on these points affect the authenticity of those works ? *** Introduction to Holy Scriptures." — Harman, 296 TACTICS OF INFIDELS. Lacy. Justin speaks of them (the Gospels) as tli6 " Memoirs of the Apostles," although neither Mark nor Luke were Apostles. Lambert. It would have been more candid to have quoted what St. Justin said. In his Apology addressed to Antoninus Pius written about A. t). 138, he used the following language : " The Apostles, in the Memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered — ^that Christ commanded them, when He had taken bread and given thanks, saying : Do this in commemoration of me." In his dialogue with Trypho the Jew, written a few years later than the Apology, Justin more accurately de- scribes the Gospels : " In the Memoirs which, I say, were composed by His (Christ's) Apostles and their companions^ (it is stated) that sweat, as great drops of blood, fell from Him as He prayed, and said, If it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Now Matthew and John were Apostles, and Mark was the compan- ion of Peter, and Luke was the companion of Paul. Bearing this fact in mind we can understand Justin when he says the Gospels were composed by Christ's Apostles and their companions. Again, Justin in his description of Christian worship states: "All who dwell in the cities, or in the country, collect together on the day called Sunday, and the Memoirs of the Apostles and the writings of the prophets are read as long as time allows." The Christians then, in the city or in the country were familiar with these Gospels and held them in the same esteem as the writings of the prophets. After quoting both from Matthew and Luke on the miraculous conception and birth of Christ, Justin adds : " As those who have related all things concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, teach, 4 % TACTICS OF INFIDEL3. ^9; whom we believe." There can be no doubt that the Gospels to which Justin refers as being written by the Apostles and their companions, and read on Sunday in the public assemblies of the Christians, were the very Gospels that we now have bearing the names of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. His first Apology of sixty pages contains about forty passages or fifty- five verses^ mostly from Matthew and Luke, and one from St. John. There is also a clear reference to St. Mark's Gospel in Justin's statement that " Christ changed the names of the two sons of Zebedee, and called them Boanerges, which is Sons of Thunder." This, he states, is written " in the Memoirs of Him," (Christ). As Mark is the only one of the Evangelists who relates the giving of these names, Justin must have referred to Mark's Gospel.* NoteSy These Gospels were received in the earli- est times as genuine, and were quoted by the earliest Christian writers, as the books of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Lacy. Yet it is a fact that the earliest Christian Apologist, Justin Martyr, though he quotes words contained in Matthew, Mark and Luke (never c^ce from John and only once from Mark), yet does not mention the names of e'^her, but quotes almost ex- clusively from Christ's words. Lambert. In the first place Justin was not the first Christian Apologist. Quadpatus and Aristides both wrote Apologies prior to him. Papias was an- other Christian author who wrote prior to Justin. This Papias, as quoted by Eusebius, states that John the Presbyter, who was acquainted with the Apostles, *" Introduction to Holy Scriptures." — Ilarman. M I 29S TACTICS OP INFIbftt^. said, " Mark, being the interpreter of Peter, Wfote down accurately what things he remembered, not in- deed, in the order in which the things were said or done by Christ, for he neither heard the Lord nor was he His companion, but afterward he was, as I said, an attendant on Peter, who preached the doctrines of the Gospel as circumstances required, not making, as it were, a systematic arrangement of the Lord's dis- courses. Mark, accordingly, committed no mistake in writing some things just as he remembered them." Respecting Matthew, Papias remarks : " Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew dialect." Here is very direct testimony as to Mark from a writer prior to Justin. You admit that Justin quoted from Matthew, Mark, and Luke, but deny that he quoted from John. In speaking of baptism or regeneration, Justin lO- marks : " For Christ said, If you be not born again, you cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." This . passage was evidently quoted from John third chapter, fifth verse. You again say, Justin did not mention by name the Evangelists. But he had already told us that the Gospels were written by " the Apostles and their com- panions," and it has never been claimed that any other of the Apostles but Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the Gospels. Justin, you say, quotes almost exclusively from Christ's words. Yes, from Christ's words as recorded by the writers of the Gospels. What more natural when he was treating of the doctrines of Christ? This very quoting of Christ's words from the Gospels, ,as written by the " Apostles and their companions," is the strongest possible evidence of their authenticity. t« ■-, tACTlCS OP INFIDELS. 299 , wtote not in- said or nor was said, an s of the ig, as it •d's dis- mistake them." Vlatthew Here is :er prior klatthew, m John, astin ic- •n again, ." This chapter, yy name that the eir com- ny other nd John dy from recorded natural It? This pels, as ions," is enticity. Lacy, Justin also says, these writings were also called Gospels and were written by " the Apostles or their companions." Lambert. Justin says they were written by the Apostles and their companions. That is, by Matthew and John, who were Apostles, and by Mark, the com- panion of St. Peter, and Luke the companion of St. Paul. There is a difference between or and and. You speak of Justin Martyr as if he were the only writer. Justin died in the year 166, and Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, was bom 177, eleven years after the death of Justin. Irenaeus gives the following testimony re- specting the Gospels : " Matthew, indeed, among the Hebrews, delivered in their own dialect the writing of the Gospels, while Peter and Paul were preaching the Gospel at Rome and founding the church. After their departure, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, himself wrote and delivered to us the things preached by Peter^ And Luke, the follower of Paul, delivered in a book the Gospel preached by him. Afterwards John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon His breast, also himself published his Gospsl while he abode in Ephesis in Asia." Here is direct, positive evidence, and to the point at issue. Lacy, Had the names of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John been prefixed to those works, or had they been popularly known as the writers thereof, would not St Justin Martyr have referred to them as such ? Lambert. No, not necessarily, unless their author- ship was disputed. Justin wrote in explanation of the doctrines of Christ and quoted from all the Gospels, as written by " the Apostles and their companions." It was not customary then to give textual reference as it is now. Even Irenaeus who gives direct ^