t , i.. /•■■-•. CIHM jy/licrofiehd Series ■ (Monographs) '.\ ICMri ; Collectibn da mlarof iches (mohographies) ■.f ■- Qanadian Inctituts for Historical Micrortproductfem/ Inititut Canadian d« microraproductions hittoriquas ■' - "■".-.■ ■ ■ ■..-'. ■ • % . : ■ . ■ . ■ ^ . ■ , ■ ■ . : "f- ' ' . ' ' ': ' *■-;'■■' ■ - ■ ■ '..■■"""■ TMhniail and Biblioferapliie Not«f / NolM twlini •Ion. or tha back covar whan appropriata. All othar original eopiaa ara fllmad baginning on tha flrat paga with a printad or lituatratad Impraa- aion, and andlng on tha laat paga with a printad or iiluatratad impraaaion^ Tha laat racordad frama on aach microflcha shall contain tha symbol «-^ (moaning "CQf^ T1NUED"). or tha aymbpl 7 (maaning "ENO^I, whichavar appiiaa. L'axamplaira flImA fut raproduit grica i la g4n4roait* da: : > ArdttvM^of Ontario Toronto ' '♦ . " ■.'.■■',■ Laa Imagaa suhiantaa ont MA raproduitaa avac la plua grand soin. compta tanu da la condition at da la nattati da raxampiaira fllm4. at wt eonformiiA avac laa condltiona du contrat da . flimaga. .. ■ i>i.._.-'- ■ .' '■ , '■■.:.:'-■ Laa axamplairaa originaux dont la couvartujra ah papiar aat Jmprimia sont fHmte an eommanipant par la pramiar plat at (tn tarminant soit par la . dami^rA paga qui comporta una amprainta . dimpraaalon o^ dllluatratlan, soit par la sacond plat, salon la eaa. Toua laa autraa axamplairaa origlnaux sont flImAs sn cbrnmanpant par la ' pramiAra paga qui comporta una amprainta dimpraaalon ou dtiluatratipn at an tarminant par la damiira paga qui comporta una talla amprainta. Uri daa aymbolaa suivanta apparattra §ut la damiAra imaga da chaqua microflcha. salon la caa: Msymbola — »>signifla "A SUIVRE", la aymbola ▼ signiHa "FIN", f Mapa. plataa. charts, atct. fisy Im fllni#d. St Uocartaa. planchaa. tablaaux, ate., pauvant *tra dififarant raduction ratioa. Thoaa too larga to ba film4a i daa taux da reduction diffiranta. antiraly includad In ona sMposura ara fllmad Loraqua la doctimant aat. ^p grand poiiir 4tra baginning in tha uppar Wft hand comar. laft to • ■ ■ raproduit an un saul cliehi. il aat filriiA i partir right and top to bottom, as many framaa aa '- da I'angla supMaur gaucha. da gaucha * droita. , , ^^ roquirad. Tha following diagrama illuatrata tha at da haut 1% bda. an pranant la npmbra .••■•'''■ mathod: •■.• ' ■ ■■ ' ■ ■ . "■ ■- :^ dimagaa nteaaaaira. Laa diagrammas suivants ' ■ '; ' ■ ^ ■ .'■■■' ' • ' : ■ ' ' ■ IHuatrant la mAthoda. . > ■"'...'. " ■ ■ ■ ' ■ . ■ ."■.'* ■ V.--:,--. :; . . _\. ^■ :-'■.'* y ;■■: 2 3 «. ■».'.. ..:,.■'. • .■; .'■ . . ;'. s .-.' ■ ■-■■ ■■■ ■ -.>t . ■* ' \ '■ ■ ■ • ■ . - ■ .' ■■■•.•, ■■ ■'■ " ■ • -. • ■'-'■■'^'-..: '\ -f ? - ''. . ... , ■ . . ,j. ' "- ■"■*■" "■'.'.. .'■■■ '.V -■' ■■'. ■./'■. ■■-■'. ■■■-■.. -^ '•■■■ ■ :;;;:-i ■■'■.■;■'■ \ 2 ■ ■■,-■■3 ■■ -• ■- • ■'■ ■. * '■ ■ - - '"■ ' '■'■"•*■■• ;■ :''''■ - - i H ■ 6 * .4 1 ■ ':. .■■' f *«C«OCOnf RfSOUlTKM TBT CHAIT (ANSI and )SQ TEST CHART No. 2) m ii^'j^i- 1^^-: In M2S |5g ■■■ 13^ 1^ k& u *^ M ■iUu 125 i 1.4 2^ Ik 2.0 L6 .■ ■■/■ =^- -1*" E.<"t Moin street (7]6) 2W- 5989 -Fox Inc. I.*.' ■, ,4?8^ / ■■• ■I '2 H-'i' * - -k,. .t.l' * AN ESSAY M CAUSE AND EFFECT. ^ BY ROBEKT SPEAR, B«ciULo> *ND iravHTiAT* or Mgoicm^ or *■■ umviMiTif or cAinMiidi( Mutira or tm BovAL oouJUB or ntYHciAMa, umipN. ■ - M ■^■■.■~, «#- TORONTO: H. & W. RiaWSEtL. '-i. " '.l^'^- % 1845. :"« \ikA t ,v<- "-'' ^'^ sP 4'A« m M V* «, ^4?^ vii^fS^a!^' ■■ '.iXiesi^- /■ >. AN ESSAY AM CAUSE AND EFFECT. ■>> Ti,.. BY ROBERT SPEAR, ' ■ACMILOB AND LIOINTIAn OF HlbfOim. OP TM UNIVBMITY or CAHIBIOOI; MBMBBR OP TUB MYAL COLLWn OP PHYUCIANI, LONDON. TuffONTO: ^ H. & W. ROWSELL. \:' 1845. • / y X Quam InfeHctler m h«beat iclentla bumaiM, ffxm In atn cit, etlam ra illb liqiMtt qu« vulgo Mteruntur. Recte ponltur i " Vere «cicIa(Mluin quam ad operandum. BUi Htmi 0¥t: ia.^,Afll\i. f AN ESSAY, Ac. X y im HU nto ro» |U« 1. To superinduce on, or to take away from, a fit subject any sensible quality, contains the whole mystery of causation, so far as change, in the state of things which co-exist, is considered j and the cause is that, by virtue of which such additioq or subtraction of qualities is established j and the effect is the change itself. Although the observation of change in things (the elements of which are everlasting) is the ground work from which we are enabled to derive the idea of c&usation: still it must not be sup- posed that its law applies to those things only which do actually change ; for it is by the same forces or causes that nature keeps together 'the particles, for instance, of any body for ages, or for any indefinite time, by which we are .enabled to compound a body with the same sensible quali- ties, by bringing its constituent parts within each other's influence. Therefore, causes e^itd their effects may be stable. For every action in nature, whether it endure or be transitory, is by one or other law; and these laws, immutable and ever- lasting as the sorts of things to which they belong, . I- V in roferonco to individual actions porfonned by thorn, arc tormod tho causes, and the actions themselves are termed tho effects. These laws constitute tho theory of science, and tho deter- mination of them, by the virays of cxporionce, constitutes its practical part. 2. The relation between cause and effect, is a necessary relation. It is of Ibhe last importance, for an adequate comprehension of the relation of cause and effect, to distinguish between (1), its metaphysical or general requirements ; and (S), its physical and well-defined examples. The necessity of some causes known or unknown, for each event, the mind determines by the former ; the real causes can only be discovered by observing the examples ; and these two can never coincide* The one can never have the same kind of evidence with the ^ther ; the example will always be a matter of fact, resting for its evidence on some observed sensi- ble quality. The other (that is, the principle or law of causation) is the statement of a universal and necessary truth, the intuitive knowledge of which forces the tiind to admit the existence of the relation as the only sufficient reason for each phenomenon. The experiment, on the other hand, assists the mind to the actual or apparent cause merely ; and if we ask ourselves what engages us to seek after this, the true answer can only be found in the universality of the prin- ciple, the n^essity of a cause ; and, although we r J failwl altogether to find the cauuo by experiment,; still its rtcceasity would be as firmly fixed in the mind reflecting thereon, as if it were questionless disclosed. The necessity, therefore, of the rela- tion docs not, for u^ result fromany clear view we may have into any Ample of Cause and effect, but it results from considerations of the relation in its uttermost generality. This will be at once seen, if we consider that knowledge on which the relation rests. Man knows by an intuitive cer- tainty, that bare nothing cannot produce any action — ^that, therefore, there must be a sufficient cause for every action which takes place between things. Or the case may be Stated thus : either a quality or actiofl springs from something or from nothing: if it be granted, that reason has sure ground to deny the la$t as impossible, then it is thrown on 'the other as necessary. , From such principles as these we may derive infallible conclusions, where all experience utterly fails us ; bA, for instance, the necessary existenccj of a first cause, incomprehensible to us in every other respect save the necessity of its existence—- the'existence of God. For we possess the highest possible certainty (1)» of our own existence, and (2), of our dependent existence ; we cannot doubt these things, and our knowledge of them is at the basis of all truth. For, as to the first, the thinking on any proposition whatsoever, of neces- sity involves the reility of Consciousness j there cannot be certainty or knowledge, which are but '.'». M ■■•\[ 1 . modes of tanking, withoOt ijt ; nor is it .in a man's power to gainsay this evidence of conscious- ness, for every effort so to do must establiish to bis own mind the action itself; andi secondly, pur dependent ei^istence is abundantly shewn in every one of our Idettr^-r-rfor each of these, as it is in nature, is, and (as we are at present consti' tinted) must be, very different from whajt it is for U8, /We perceive an object, ^d this is for us a perception ; that is, we t^J^e for grwited the object and the consciousness, \ and their union f wh^r^ast in nature, all these jnust be produced and estahlished-^the former Is the mental act (if J may so distinguish it), tbe pther is the physical "V^d unrevealed being required to profduce that apt* And, if the reality of ai^ Conscious act be I %dmUtedr then the groundwoi^, the elements and / formative causes thereof (apart from the con- scious actt and rendering thi^ possible), must be ^allowed ; but Our ignorance of tiiese causes, is equiyalent to our want of ppwer to produce them '. — ^henee we i;now ourselves- to be dependent. Taking ^e^ pj^emises for granted, we are enabledj as we have st^d, to demonstrate the /n^ecessary exii|tence of a tot cause \ although in ignorance of \the number, force and kinds of secondary cau^s. For we certainly know that lime ai|4 place /(which contain a^ conceivable fiepojadary causes) are by matter and motiont^and ^ite e^te^es bounded \, an4 overleaping these, we derive, tbepure conception of a being necessary # ./ . k.y'^)-- / 1 . ./ • ■ ■ * . ■ . as A(jaua6 for jdl things/' To( deny then the neces^ sit^ of the relation hetwect! realheings, iff all one with denying its existence, which, taking the above . case, can only he dofle by denying otii* own existence, or the existence of God. A. man is , incapable of doubting his own existence ; and ^ although atheists havo promulgated th^ other extravagant doctrine, yet the most subtle among them manifestly contradict themselves, by apply^ ing the law of causation in a deitftical: way to account for phenomena. And herd we stand on v^eryjfure ground/ in the iflid^ of the metaphysiGd' ©f tmngs, fiar apart from the^ region of sense and W dphii6n--^amra^ first principles and axiomij l^icb contain in thetftV selves those data to which the human mind refers, as of induUtable aftd unalterable truth ; and by the aid of which it ti^aces a priori the outlines of a world which is co-extensive with possible existenci^. 3. The origin ofmir idea of causation^ From objects acting on our minds^ and from appetites implanted in our organs, w6 are enabled oftentimes to observe, or to bring about, effectsi by instinct or' by Jiabit, &c.,-*-^thout having an adequate idea of causation, or, in facti without having any idea of it at all. For man in a sa;vage a's well as in a civilized condition^ in infency and at other i^s, is guided by that experience which is forced on him by constantly refcuriing objectsi appetitiBs, and associaticMS. Low^ animals are <--;; ;;" I ' '!■ ;V^> V: 9 ■ ■ . ■ V . ■ subject to the same laws, they, equally with our- selves, associate particular sensiUe ideas, which are in many cases, unknown examples of causes and effects. They fear, for instance, the applica- tion of the rod cr of fire, from the pain it has before occasioned them — ^like ourselves, they hunt after objects to satisfy their inclinations, appe- tites, &c. Their instincts, may be more perfect, and less liable to mislead, than our own, but still of the same nature; for an unerring instinct, if such there be, can only beconceived of as an appe- tite implanted in an exquisitely working organ, and guided by pleasure and pfdn. All things in nature being subservient to the law of cause and effect, so it would be Impossible for animals to act in hargijony with the established order of things, or even to exist at all, if they were not endowed with principles, by which they are enabled to obey that law, and to adapti as if with foresight, and discrimination of events, means to ends. Now if the human understanding be in posses- sion of an idea of causation, wHch answers not only to this or that phenomenon, but also to aU phenomena necessarily and uniformly,^^an idea which remains unchanged in every variety of change of sensation-~-an idea which has not for its object light as if it came in by the eye, nor sound as if it entered by the ear, nor yet any other sensible object, as if it entered through any organ of sense whatsoever. Moreover an idea '^" which 18 not confined to sense, but is universally applicable, alike to all things which really exist, and to those things which aire conceived of as merely possible ; then such an idea cannot be a sensation, and to- say with Mr. Hume and others,* that a child is in possession of that idea, becauBe having been burnt by tr©, he keeps away from it — is just as unreasonable, as to assert, that he has- an idea of n\imber or time, because he has had a few successite sensations, or that he has an idea of power, a vacuum, or motion, because he wills/ sucks or crawls. V, Although we never could have an idea of this relation, unless we previously had our, senses open, and observed particular cases» the examples of causes and effects, which abstract science from its nature is precluded from affording^still, in abstract science along^ ig to be found those gene- ral and fundamental principles, on which the necessary truth of the relation rests. For since certainty in our minds, has to do with i^tiversal propositions only — so the necessaiy truth, (which is the indispensable, and definitive requisite) of the relation, can only be known by propositions of universal import, brought to light by reason. ■ And without a knowledge of which, we should be in the condition of children, and of lower ani- mals, totally ignorant of the relation,'^and guidei by instinctive actions and associations. ■■^ ,/■ /■ 1-: f i. . . ■X. A, Any change whatsoever requires at least two elements acting in concert, both of which contain the causes (of such change). Any one elementary particle is incapable, of itself and alone, of being^ (Dhanged. For a change of state in such a particle would requirO an active force either within or withoiit that particle. If such a force were external, then a second particle is supposed, from which it proc6^ } if such a force he intemaij what exists no^to make it active, which did not exist previously ? Xl'heniere lapse of moments could not make it aetive, for time is ii constant quantity, it reinains the same throughout. Eithej*; then, the particle (for the supposed change of state) mu«t lose sduaething which it formerly had, or it must gaun something which it formerly had tibt ; and, in either case, its elementary nature Would be destroyed. And hence it is sfdd that a particle in motion or at rest, would for ever continue in motion or at rest, unless by virtue of other forces external to, and acting on it. if a second particle be supposed capable of. acting, and which now acts with the first, then the change which each has conspired to bring about will be the effect. Thus, for example, gravity is not spoken of in a particle of matter In relation to pure space, but in relatiou to another- particle in which the like force exists. Thus, suppose pure water to be formed by a partible of i'. i ■4, } oxygen in combination with a particle of hydro- gen, the causes of such combination will be in the oxygen and also in the hydrogen ; for an absolute inactivity in one or other particle would for ever prevent their mutual action on each other. Thus, the cohesion between the particles of water, proves, that the causes thereof are equally in or about each particle; for no possible reason can be^ assigned why they should appertain to one, rather than to another particle. Thus a living seed, in given conditions (warmth, moisture, &c.), will grow; these colditions are as requisite to its growth, as the life itself— both are required- all the life in the world could not give growth to a seed wanting such conditions j similarly as those required conditions could not give growth to a dead seed. Thus, any idea requires an object in the mind, aud a consciousness of that object ; take away the one or the other, and the effect or idea is impossible; and by whatever complicated organization the object acts on the mind, and the mind, by its consciousness, on the object, still it is necessary that both contain the causes of the idea, The like might be said of all phenontiena with vvhich we are acquainted, (as we shall more at large endeavour to shew, under the next head). Hence, Jbr ani/ change or effect whatsoever, an efficient requires a co-ejjicient, 5. In any phenomenon some causes^ may cease. while the effects still continue; and other causes are in their nature as durable as their effects.* It is very requisite to distinguish between these two sorts of efficients. First, the occasional efficients, which admit of great diversity, and which may cease although the effect remains; and secondly, the proximate efficients, which, in a given phenomenon, are always the same, and which must continue while the effect continues. These last are they by which a quiality is, and without which that quality could not continue ; are they which, in the words of Bacon, "ascertain that quality universally, and accompany it every- where." Thus, soft clay receives and holds an impression given hy another body, when the body which gave the impression is removed; the impression is received and retained by virtue of causes in the clay itself, and the body which gave the impression acted merely as the instrument, to set them at work. Thus, a particle of any sort, thrown into a saturated solution of a crystal- lizable salt, disposes the salt to assume a crystal- line form according to laws or causes peculiar to * The differfent efficient causes, and the examples of them, given by many logicians, are destitute of analytical procedure } and cannot with advantage be employed as guides in inductive science. That the reader may judge for himself, we subjoin a few examples:— Proximate efficient, as the father of his child. Remote efficient, as the grand>&ther to his child. Productive efficient, as the mother of the child. Conservative efficient, as the nurse of the cliild. Necessary efficient, as fire which bums wood. Physical efficient, as iire of the destruction of a house. Predisposing efficient^ as a short neck, and robust frame of apoplexy, &c. &c. . that salt. Thus fire, applied to the living body, gives pain J and to gunpo,wder, it inflames. The fire may die away, but the pain, and the combina- tions into which gunpowder is changed, remain ; and these effects continue, by virtue of causes in the organized Uving body, and in the elements of gunpowder. The occasional efficients are required to give an action to a fit subject. The proximate efficients, are those on which that fitness depends, and are necessary to receive, and to keep or sustain the action so given. The former are as the agents by which natural processes are developed, and merely serve to bring into play, or to make mani- fest, or to give a new determination to, latent or concealed structures, qualities or motions. They are, to give a homely illustration, as the scaffold- ing to the erection of a house, or as the instru- ments of a workman to the work which he performs. And it is evident that, in the enquiry into the nature of structures, qualities or motions, occasional causes can only give us a clew, as it were, to an analysis of them ; can only be as a help in practice— they cannot by themselves open out to us, those laws onwhich such structures, '&c. depend, or by which they are tegulated, and therefore cannot by themselves much contribute to real knowledge. j • That both kind* of efficients are required m every change, further appears. I. Because with- out some occasional efficient, the condition of a • u / ■>. li body cottld not be altelred. 2. Because, with thf same occasional efficient, we can produce different forins, on different bodies, as hardness in clay, and softness in wax, by fire. 3. Because, with different occasional efficients, we can produce the same form, as death, by over feeding, and by starvation, &c. Many authors of late, however, who have made especial enquiry into the nature of causes, seem but little to have regarded this difference between them. Thus they tell us that the application of fire to wax and iron, in givep conditions, liquefies them ; that the heat of the fire is the cause, and that the liquefaction spoken of is the effect J and here they leave off, as if the whole subject were sufficiently investigated and concluded; or as if there were an omnipotent activity in fire, and an essential passivity in the body acted on (wax or iron); in fine, as if th^ liquefaction spoken of, were merely an effect^ without any admixture of causes whatsoever. 'Now we need only make trial with fire on another body, as gunpowder, and liquefaction not ensuing, it is certain that something indispensable to lique- faction is contained in the iron, which requisite is not in the gunpowder. If, then, heat be sup- posed to give a certain motion to the minute particles of iron, by which the cohesion of each for another is lesseltted, and liquefaction of the mass ensue ; this motion among the particles of iron, mUst have its proper causes in or about those particles, which admit pf this motion j else there M t4 - »'' 1.5 it no Mfiignftblc reason, why any other body, common salt or gunpowder, by the application of a like heat in similar conditions, should not also take on a similar motion and form. The difference of the action of one quality (heat), on two dif- ferent bodies, iron and gunpowder, can only be found in the different constitutions or states of those bodies which admit, the one of a liquid, and the other of a gaseous form. So' that had we any other way, but by fire, of inducing this motion in iron, we should have as a result its liquefaction, as may be partly seen by beating iron with a hammer sufficiently. And precisely for the same reason we can bring a)fcut the decomposition and explosion of certaiii/brts of gunpowder, by means of a liquid and cold i^d. ; If we analyze in thier least a complex phenome- non— for instance, wood changed and destroyed by the application of fire: smoke, flame, &c are apparent effects J a?icl these are eliminated from, or they accompany some bodies, while their elements are in jjlrogress from one condition to another, condition, or from one combination to another combination. Fire in the above case, by raising the wood to a given temperature,^8erved to liberate its elimentsj ^^^^^id: the smoke, flame, heat, &c. are eflTects of the formation of other combii#i^, as of water, carbonic oxide and acid; which have iheir causes of combination in their constituting elements, oxygen, hydrogen, tod' carbon, and which have on tha wbolfi^ a ■■■ 16 • greater specific heat in their separate state, than in the said comhinations, so that heat naturally flows from them, while they are in passage from the former to the latter state. It cannot be reasonably doubted, that if any quality, say heat, contained the whole sum of causes of the eflTect said to be produced by it on one body, that the precise same eflect would result by its application to jmy other body, on mrhich it could act — and that effect would be of the same^iatur^rmtli the cause—it would be heat and heat only. Such a^ause coulfcl not produce difference in bodies: it could not in the same quan- tity or in different quantities make one body or different bodies solid, liquid or aeriform ; it could not force some bodies to combine and others to separate; it could not give transparency to this, and opacity to another body, &c. For these different effects, there must be different physical causes, which can only be found in th^ different natures and states of those bodies; and the analysis of these, is the only method we have for determining "the forms or laws of simple na- tures," (as of life, heat, light, gravity, electricity, &c.) to Which it is ever the chief aim of science, still more closely to approximate. . The error, in taking the occasional for the ^ proximate ' efficients, is inveterate ; and we have examples of it in many authors; and oftentin^es the conclusions on the former, being unexception- able as regards sense, are made universal as if %..'. .17 thoy wore drawn from the other. Wo may in- stance the conclusion^-that "there can bo no bile without a liver— no thought without a brain. If these propositions are to be taken in the same Bonso with the following-that there is no ijotion without matter, which is as the genus to tho species motion-and which matter seems to bo inevitably included in our idea of motion-or that there can be no growth in plants or animals with- out certain elements communicated to them from external bodies, then the error is evident, for bile has its own peculiar nature distinct from the hepa- tic apparatus, and thought its identity exclusive of the bram.* If, on the other hand, making sense the measure of nature, it be meant that the hver and brain are the only possible occasional causes of bile and thought, the error is in principle the same, as if one should conclude that there could bo no electricity, without a similar electrical organ to that possessed by some fishes. Ag^n, some physiologists conclude,t that everlasting pain or pleasure cannot be. The inference is drawn from t^ state ol animals here, i. e. from occasional • B«coa BpeakB of the Mowing as a considerable discovery, vir-'«QuVSi secundum sensum philosophandi fumi pos«t w^ti^Cd sint entia, et substantia separate et »ncorpo^. aeSmvSet actirnaturaU. emanans a corpore. subsistere tS^^^rtempore et aliquo loco, omnino sine corpore; pr«pe STutC^t etuS eiwinare in origine sua a substantia mcorporea. ?Hrt« eSm non minu. requiri natura corporea ^ ^^^ naSmSi.r!!St«it«id«n et devehend«n, quwi ad exaUuidam «it generandam.** t Kchat, Sur la Vie et la Mort. c 4, '• > f. v. N. '.* i ■#-^ causos acting on thorn, an4l whicljl^/ (as wo aro at proscnt con8tituti4).^< rentier the continuance of a phonoine«o% 0?^ for a moment, an utter impossibility. Pr^ty ^ and sequence bcinj; essential to ever^ idAwe can have of time, even the smallest ^rtioi . 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