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MADISON IQB OKkAUIia Am OPFBNgrVB AND RUINOUS WAR AGAINST GREAT-BRITAIN. TOOSTHKB Win SOME SUGGESTIONS At TO A PEACEABLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL MODE OF JF£JtTIJV*0 THAT DREJtDFUL CAJbJmiTF. ^M*m a- n t BY A NEW.ENGLAND FARMER. *'Poor U Kii triumph, and ditgrao'd hi* name. Who drawtlhe awoni for empire, wealth, .or Tame; And poorer •till those itatesmen't thajre of praise, Who at a tyrant'* nod their eountry's standard raise : For them UkOUgh wealth be blown on every wind, , Though" Fumoe ''announce them mightiest of mankind, Though twktten nations enuck beneath their blade. Virtue disowns them, and their glories'fade. For them no prayers are poar'd, no pasans sung. No blessings chaunted from a nation s tongue. Blood marcs the path to their untimely bier : The ourte of orptians and the widow's tear Cry to high HeaTcn for vengeance on their head. Alive deserted, and araurat when dead," ^ i i y- ■ 1 ' . 'r * 1 : I , '\\ % e BOSTON : FRIKTED BY RUSSELL ii CUTLlSlt. 1812. m&r rwfi^tl M ■*%.*: V ll L v igl-i- 1! % * * ■f;: ff) «»r 'V-'. I»'1 '.^.'l INTRODUCTION. o PTER the following pas^s were put to press, most interest- ing information was received from Europe, which, as it serves to illustrate, and confirm the opinions of the writer, as it will pnt to the test the sincerity of our administration, as it will enable us to decide, whether the real object of the present war is to protect the commercial rights and interests of the United States, or to promote the views of France, and ih systematic co-operation with her ; and as this intelligence more especially and distinctly proves, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed at the time when they were professed to be, but that their repeal, if it has yet taken effect, was only the result of our '' common measures adopted against the common enemy," as M. Turreau justly char- acterised them, we trust we shall be excused for devoting a few pages to the examination of this recent intelligence and of its hear- ing upon the existing situation and policy of the United States. Sometime in the month of May last (1812) Bonaparte publish- ed a decree purporting to bear date April 38, 1811, in which re- riting, as its sole cause, that *' Congress had by their act of March 2, 1811, declared that British sliips and merchandise should be interdicted an entry into the ports of the IJ. States," and reciting further, ^' that the aforesaid law of Congress is an act of resistance to the British Orders in Council,'' lie proceeds to decree, that " the Berlin and Milan Decrees are definitively (fWtm the first of November last) considered as no lunger in farce as far as respects American vessels." The phrasooloi^y is indeed curious— > 158671 there are no words of repeal or revocation— but it is Himply de • clared, that the decrees are considered as no longer In force so far as respects American vessels. Notwithstanding this his Majesty May seiase their cargoes and condemn them with a mnch smaller violation of his imperial word than we have sometimes seen. Various, numerous and important are the thoughts to which this singular ex post facto drcree gives rise, and if some of them bear hard on our administration, who have just entered into an avowed co-operation and concert with France, they are indebted to their new ally for these reflections, and not to us. The first and most obvious inquiry is, was this decree really passed in ^pril, 1811, though not promulgated till May, 1812 ? or is this a decree ante-dated to promote any political and sinister views ? If bona fide issued on the day of its date, why wati it witli- held from our minister, Mr. Russel, who was during the months of May and June, 1811, urging the French government to give some substantial proof of the repeal of the French deorees P Why was it kept back from the nation which upon the face of it was the only one affected by it ? In June, 1811, Mr. Russel informed the Frenoh minister, that he kept the John Adams in waiting solely that she might carry out to the United States something that might satisfy our people that the decrees were repealed. Yet on the 14th of July all he could obtain was the release of two ves- sels which did not come under their operation, but of five others captured after November, 1810, and coming within the decrees. not one of them w as then, or has been yet released. Mr. Barlow soon after arrived' in France, a man better suitied than Mr. Russel to conduct a negociation in which the United States were to yield their independence to France. He also in very suppliant strains from August, 1811, to February, 1812, urged the Emperor to furnish some proof of the repeal of the Ber- lin and Milan decrees. Yet his Imperial Majesty did not reccol- lect, or did not see fit to furnish the simplest and best possiblt answer, bis pretended decree of April, 1811. If that decree hud been furnished, Britain probably would have long since repealed hejr orders in council, and this disastrous wai^ ^# 8 Himply (le- I force to far hit Majesty nch smaller en seen, ts to which ome of them ered into ait ire indebted lecree really May, 1812? aud sinister vols it widi- the months neut to give trees ? Why :e of it was sel informed is in waiting mething that led. Yet on of two ves. f five others the decrees, better suitied li the United He alsd in Piiary, 1813, loftheBer- td not reccol- best possiblt f would have sastrous wai^ Miight have been avoided. If tliat decree had been promulgated the courts of France, Naples and Holland would have restored (he numerous vessels captured or seized under the Berlin aud Mi- lan decrees, and without that decree they could not do it. For Ocn. Armstrong declared in one of his letters, that the council of prizes stated to him that they could take no other evidence of the repeal of the decrees, than a solemn imperial edict which should annul them. Why then, tvas this evidence withheld ? We shall give our own suggestions as to the retuoms presentl y We had not then promised to enter itito the war ! ! But we ask further, why if the decrees were repealed so far as respects Americans, his Majesty in person condemned the Cathar- ine, Ockington, owned by John Parker Esq. of Boston, and others ' and four other ships and cargoes taken in the Baltick, under pre- tence of having been boarded by British crui8er8,or being laden with the produce of enemies colonies, in September, ISll, five months after the date of the pretended decree of repeal P Again, if the decrees were repealed in April, 1811, why, if not communicated to us, who were specially interested, and to the world, were they kept in the Emperor's cabinet till 1813, and not eom* municated either to his court or his Minister of Marine, when the event to which they referred happened in March, 1811 P Why did Feretier's squadron which sailed in January, 1813, nine months afterwards, sail under the repealed decrees P Why were they order- ed to capture, sink, bum and destroy every American vessel which had traded to an enemy's port ? Why was the brig owned by the Messrs. Curtis's of Boston, destroyed' by that squadron, and a dozen others, whose losses have been paid by our underwri- ters? Why did the Emperor in his official speech to his sem u-, lately referred to by Mr. Foster ^ as late as March last, still lit. clare them to be the fundamenta.1 laws of his empire P How could they be repealed, and yet in force P There was no other nation but America, on whom they would operate, and yet he de- clared them last March, the laws df his empire. In short, this measure may be considered the climax of French injustice and intrigue. While their decrees which operate against MS are instantly promulgated, and have sometimes a retrospective ^h tenilency, tint jtreittuhd favourable Avnvc i» confined to the Kin- peror^B breast for thirteen months ) or rutlicr, as we shall preHcntly shew, tlie price given for it was an aMiiranee of a declaration of ntir, and it was ante-dated to cover the honour of one of the high contracting parties. But this it the narrowest and most favourable view of this Htrau!^ transaction. There arc lights in which it ought to he considered which bear as hard upon our administration as they do upon France. Bonaparte announces as the mle ground of \\m pretended repeal that our act of March 2, 1811, was a resistance of the orders in council. But it will be remembered that the sole ostensible, and the only plausible^ though unjust ground of our act of March, 1811, was the previous revocation of the French decrees, on the ist of November, 1810. So then we have this extraordinary stfttc of the case. Congress in May, 1810, passed a law pretended to be impar- tial, whieh provided that the non interconrse act should cease as to the nation which ihouU first repeal its decrees, and that it should operate on^the other which should fail so to do. Mr. Madison declared the French decrees repealed in Novem- ber, 1810, and Congress in pursuance of its pledge to France, and supposing the decrees repealed in November, 1810, passed the non importation act of March 2, 1811, operating only against Great Britain, and therefore in effect making war upon her alone. France, regardless of the character or consistency of our ad- ministration, now declares that her decrees were not repealed un- til April 28, 1811, and then insultingly tells them that it is only in consequence of our act of March 2, 1811, which act was pass- ed as is professed only in consequence of the supposed and alUged previous repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, preceding. In any other view, that act would have been a shame- ful example of partiality. Thus it seems that in addition to the bitter pill of war, we ars compelled to swallow this most nauseous and disgusting dose — we are to admit that our retaliation upon France was first with- drawn, before she would consent to repeal her decrees, and Mr. VII ned to the Kiii- e shall preHCiilly I decluratinii of one of the high B view of thi« it ought to he atioii nti they do iretendi'd repeal f the orders in ! oHtensible, and of March, 1811, ea, on the ist of cane. led to be impar- should cease as 's, and that it do. led in Novem- to France, and LO, passed the ; only against upon her alone. ey of our ad- lot repealed un- that it is only act was pass- sed and alleged in November, e been a shame- of war, we ara gusting dose — rt-as first with- erees, and Mr. Madison declared to the world that her decrees were repealed, which she note says were not repealed until after we adopted what she directed^ that is, nieasurPK of resistance against her ene- my's orders, which were second in point of date, and merely re- taliatory. If this is not a triumph of France over our pride, our honour, our character, our justice, our interest, and our liberties, 1 confcM* 1 do not know what acts could amount to such a triumph. We have now taken one view^ and not a very honourable one either to France or our own administration, of this news. From this examination it will appear to every man not wedded to Fraucc or to party views— 1st. That the French decrees were never in fact repealed till this very last month oS May, when the repeal was issued. The well known execution of them by French officers and by the em- peror in person, renders the pretence of repeal, only an insult on our understandings. 3d. That the ante-doting the repeal was intended to screen our administration ; but the pride of France overcame her desire to save Mr. Madison. 8he did not choose to have it appear in the face of Europe, that she repealed her decrees without a quid pro quo—without a salvo for her oivn honour. She, therefore, alleges on the face of this repeal, that our re- sistance to Britain was the sole moving cause ; while we found our resistance of Britain upon the previous repeal of her decrees. How these anaehfonisms, or contradictions of dates, are to be re- conciled, we leave to the Gallo-American chronologists to explain. But there is a more serious light in which this topick must be viewed, and if the declaration of war aroused our fears and ex- cited our jealousies, surely this event of the coincident, and late, and reluctant, and strange repeal of the French decrees is not calculated to quiet or allay them. If France could have foreseen that before her repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees could reach America, war would be declared by Mr. Mudison against Great Britain — Tf a copy of his Mar message, and an assurance of his determination to engage in war, co2dd have been transmitted by the Wasp, which is now in France ; why, everyman will perceive ( i i riii (hat DunMpnrlc might very $afflif rppral luR RrrliM and Milan iIp* crpen— bf caiiiir thofle deereea only forbade our trade with England, and a war between us and her would do that mueh more elTeetual- ly. Now we do not nay that fAin leoM the eaiiei but we do lay thut it would not be more extraordinary than Mr. Madiiion'i eon- duet in the eaae we have Just considered, in declaring the French decrees repeiiled sii months before our eommou master now say" they were ever pretended so to be. But there is a collateral faet which puts this question, in my opinion, at rest. Mr. Barlow did tell an American gentleman in Paris, in May last, thirty days before the declaration of war in this country, that war was, or would be declared immediately by America agaiust Great Britain ; and advised him to regulate his cnneerns accordingly i and that gentleman did write to his fi-iends in Salem to take measures for his exchange in case he should be taken prisoner on his return. This looks serious ! ! How did Mr. Barlow, in France, know this fact last May, when we pri- vate citizens had no suspicion of it, in this country 9 The an- swer will be found in our succeeding pages— by the same means by which Armstrong^in France, predicted the embargo, sixty days before it was proposed here— by a secret understanding between our administration and that of France. There is an end then to tliis mystery. The decrees which were to be fundamental laws of the empire expire. Why ? Has the emperor's purpose chang- ed p No — America having declared war at his order, there is no longer any nation on whom they can operate. Who ever doubt- ed that they would be repealed as to us when we should declare war againHt England ? and we see them so admirably well timed as to reach this country amidst the roar of cannon and in the horrors of war. But there are one or two other still more interesting questions arising out of the late intelligence. What will be the conduct of Oreat Britain in consequence of this queer sort of ex post facto repeal of the French Decrees ; this declaration, that they /uwe been repealed during the last year, when they have been much more fffecttialbj enforced than at first ? Will she consider this repeal ; (roupled as it is with the declaration every moment falsified by the I Milan ilf • h England* re elTeetual- we do lay linon*! eon« the French ' now lay" ion, in my tntleman in of war in ediately by ifl^late hit hit A-iendt e should be How did lien we pri- The an- ante means , sixty days ng between '■nd then to lental laws ose chang- there is no !Ter doubt- ild declare well timed knd in the ; questions conduct of post facto they /urve nueh more lis repeal f ified by the flict, thfttthey have btrn no repealed for thlrleen months bnek) nill she eoiiHider such a nominal repeal, wliich amountH to nothing more than the previous declttrutiuu of the emperor us coming within the pledge she has made to repeal her orders ? Can this be called a practical repeal in iHlt, when the ships burnt by Feretier arc Htill nmking f If she should so consider if, and should repeal her orders in uouneil, will it change the mejiMures of our government ? Will it give u» peace 9 or will our administration still insist (hi other claims and resist any oilers of aeeummodation ? These are important questions— they are in the lips of every man, and it may uot be considered impertinent to say a word or two upon eaeh of them. This may serve to shew that (he ques- tion of the orders in council bus not lust all its interest, even if they should be repealed. Besides they may be revived again in vase we should dare to make peace without the consent of France, for France would in that case revive her decrees with more rigor, and Great Britain would probably again retaliate on her enemy. In the 6rst place then, if Great Britain should repeal her or- ders upon this nominal, ex post fucto declaration of France, it would be a proof of her strict attention to her promises. It must be recollected, tluit this measure, should it take place, will only be the result of her own sense and justice, and her regard to her engagements, and not the eflect of our hostile measures which could not have been known in Great Britain. It will be a signal proof of / ed merely because America resisted our orders in couneil, our hon- our forbids our acquiessing in such signal inju8tice,"what would our administration say ? What ought all honest men to say P Ought they not to say this is a shameful intrigue with France and does not in the smallest degree vary the merits of the original ques- tion, as to the decrees of France and orders of Britain ? But suppose a ministry not pledged to support the orders in coun- cil, but avowedly opposed to them, should, as it is possible they may overlook the insulting reasons assigned by France for the late, the very late repeal of her decrees, should bona fide and absolutely rescind the orders in council. Would our cabinet instantly pro- pose or assent to peace P It could not be said that war is now un- dertaken, and we must in honour contend for our othfr smaller pretensions, because in the supposed ease, Britain will have with- drawn her orders before she knew of the war. Shall we then continue at war to maintain our doctrine as to impressments, and to force Britain to give up her system of par- tial blockades P If we do, then it will be manifest, that we go to war for points which Mr. Madison himself in his arrangement with Mr. Erskine did not include, and which he thereby declared he thought were not violations of our neutral rights. In short, then it will be manifest, that the war is undertaken not for our ititcrests, but for those of France. i thin veil say, « Ihat e it avowed are repeal - cil, our hon- t would our ay? Ought Trance and iginal ques- ? ers in Conn- ie they may the late, the 1 absolutely itantly pro- r is noiv un< Ihir smaller 1 have with- >ctrinc as to stem of par- hat we go to arrangement eby declared I. In short, 1 not for our Air INQ.UIRY, &e. ■•',' g^i; ^ 'j I HAVE been in my early days honored by my fellow citizens with the office of a representative in the le^slature of my native State, a State dear to me by early associations, by having been the place of my nativity, by containing the ashes of my revered ancestors through six successive gen- erations, by possessing within its bosom all the fruits of my own and their industry, and upon the prosperity of which State my children, yet in their infancy, depend for their hopes of future success. These solemn considera- tions have created an attachment to it, which neither the frowns of men in power, nor the temporary, and I hope remediable misfortunes, into which our rulers are about to plunge it, can essentially weaken or impair. The oath administered to me in my capacity of a legislator, was, "that the State of Massachusetts is, and of right ought to be, a free, sovereign, and independent State" — ^and this solemn oath, taken before an assembled people, and in the pres- ence of the Supreme Being, I consider a sacred pledge that I will defend, uphold, and maintain the rights and in- terests of this State against all hostile attempts whatsoever. To me, it is a matter of indifference, whether the attack ii})r)n these riglits proceeds directly and openly from the great usurper and eommon enemy of all civilized States, or wlicther the same be made through the partiality or the mistakes of the men wliom a majority of our citizens have iiufortu'.wtely elevated to ill-deserved power. 1/ It is my object in the following remarks to shew, that whether the influence of France directly or indirectly ap- plied, or whether the mistaken policy of our administration, without such influence, has occasioned our difiiculties, the measures lately adopted by a small majority of our national rulers are not only without reasonable justification, and destructive of our best interests and dearest rights, but are a misapplicj^tion of the powers entrusted to them; and therefore it belongs to us, the people, to decide whether such measures deserve our approbation and sup- port, or whether they will justify us in a temperate but firm and decided opposition — ^Whether, in short, the evils, which are certain and inevitable from a support of the present policy, are not infinitely greater in extent than any which we could possibly incur by a constitutional and res- solute resistance. Let not the timid be alarmed at the out* set, by the idea of open resistance, of insurrection, of unjustifiable opposition. I contemplate no such measures. I have in view only those constitutional principles which the usages of our ancestors, both in Great-Britain and in this country, andtheifsuccessful example, have sanctioned. I ask only for the application of the principles of Mr. Locke, and for thb imitation of the example of those great men who have gone; before us, in cases of smaller pressure, and of less importance to the vital interests of their country. Having made these general observations, I shall state the particular order of my remarks which will be, First, a candid examination of Mr. Madison's manifesto to Congress, which impelled that body reluctantly to the declaration of an offensivd war against Great Britain. Under this head, I shall consider the various allegations of Mr. Madison against Great Britain, and I shall shew, that the charges are greatly exaggerated, and that they might all ofthem^ without exception y have been healed and adjusted, if the administration of our country had been dis- closed so to do — that these causes of complaint have not only been suffered to fester and spread, but that they have been irritated in complaisance or at least in conformity with the expectations and wishes of France. % more I more I ^^^' . ,| standi t make nid ( < ) shew, that idirectly ap- ministration, faculties, the 'our national ication, and rights, but d to them; to decide ion and sup- mperate but ort, the evils, ipport of the tent than any ional and res- ed at the out- iurrection, of ich measures. nciples which Britain and in ve sanctioned. ciples of Mr. of those great aller pressure, their country. ;, I shall state ill be, on's manifesto ictantly to the Britain. xis allegations I shall shew, and that they :en healed and / had been dis- laint have not that they have onformitv witli \ 5/ Secondly, I shall consider the expediency of the war, both upon the supposition of its being sucucbsful and un- successful. Thirdly, I shall contend, that if the administration have contemplated a war against Great Britain for several months past, (and no new cause of irritation exists amunst her which has not existed for five years) it was their solemn duty to have made preparations for it, by providing an ad- equate marine force in order to protect our commerce now exposed without relief to the depredations of our powerful enemy — ^by permitting the return, and facilitating oy every means the restoration to our countiy of all the property of our citizens abroad — by warning the merchants or the in- tentions of the government, and thus preventing the enor- mous sacrifices which will inevitably be mme in conse- quence of their ignorance of such secret hostile intentions and purposes. Fourtiily, I shall shew that in a war, offensively andun- justiy undertaken, the subject is not only not bound to en. gage, but that it is his duty to abstain from taking a part in it. Lastly, I shall point out the legal and constitutional remedy to which the citizens may and ought to resort in tlus cdamitous case of misconduct in a smait majority of their rulers. "When I first read the manifesto of the Prcsidentngainst Great Britain, I confess that it was difficult for me to de- cide which feeling was most predominant in my mind, mortification or indignation. Mortification, that our nation should be disgraced in the eyes of the wliole world and of posterity by such a tissue of exaggerations — and indig- nation, that artifices of this sort should be resorted to in order to deceive and irritate the people, and to drive them into a ruinous war of an offensive nature, and (what is still more to be feared) into an alliance with France, which is more dreadful than a century of war. I was astonished ut Mr. Madison's boldness and his contempt of the under- standings and information of the people, in thus daring to make a discolored and extravagant representation of events ind circumstances which have so recently passed \iik1< r 6 the eyes of the whole nation. I was indeed prepared to expect almost any thing from this author of the crusade against Englafid — his proclamation, declaring to the people that the French Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked on the 1st of November, 1810, when he knew that France had never even promised to revoke thetn until we should "cause our rights to be respected," that is, as Mr. Madison has since construed it, declare war against Great- Britain^ had opened my eyes in some measure as to his character— I had lost much of my respect for his political veracity, and of my confidence in his public assertions — His mes- sage with respect to the pretended discovery of Henry confirmed my suspicions. Instead of honorably acquitting the citizens of Boston, as he ought to have done, of any participation in Henry's views or designs, he boldly asserts, that "Henry was em- ^'ployed in intrigues with disaffected citizens in the United "States, having for their object a subversion of our Gov- "emment, and a dismemberment of the Union." Now hewellknexti at the time he penned that sentence, (and he has since repeated the same sentence in the mani- festo) that Henry expressly declared that he never opened the subject of his mission to any citizen of the United States, A man capable of so insidious and imfoundcd an asper- sion on the citizens of his oxvn country, on men wlio will not yield to liim in patriotism t)r spirit, might well be ex- pected to be little scrupulous about the terms he might use towards a foreign nation, especially N\hcn those terms of reproach fall in with the passions of the ignorant part of his supporters, whom it has been the business of their leaders to inllame and to deceive. The partiality displayed in this manitcsto — the black and bloody representation whieh is therein made of the conduct of Great Britain, iircciacly adapted to gratify the malice of her deadly cnciv.}- and the cnany of all free states — and the brief, mild, and ;n)ologetic style with re- spect to the wrongs of France, bring to my recollection many events in the history of Mr. IMadison's public con- duct, which combine to produce a strong apprehension iu I man th two p; was a efforts I the Fi ^ in 171 latioal tious : ^tncrl I indepj I party[ I, ison I instn % peace V mad^ prepared to the crusade |to the people revoked on that France il we should r. Madison reat-Britainy 's character— ical veracity, s — His mes- ;ry of Henry iS of Boston, )n in Henry's enry was em- in the United of our Gov- )n." that sentence, I in the mani- : never opened of the United idcd an aspcr- incn who will It well be cx- i he might use hose terms of lorant part of incss of their — ^the black made of the to gratify the iiy of all free style with re- y recollection 's public con- ^iprchcii>iou iii my mind that he habitually inclines to the views and inter- ests of France more than becomes the magistrate of a free and independent state. I shall hereafter shew, that his last act of plunging us into the present war, is altogether for the benefit oi France mfact^ though it may not be in intention — that we can in no possible event be gainers by it, but that it is a sacrifice of our commerce, our agriculture, our money, and our lives, for no other good than to make a diversion of the British forces favorable to France^ (and j)erhaps some men look farthcry to the subjugation of their own country) and in that light it ought to be considered one of the most alarming attempts ever yet made against whatever little there is left of liberty, virtue, and religion in the world. If I succeed in shewing this, if I satisfy every reasonable man that this war of Mr. Madison is in effect a French war, and not an American one, that it is undertaken for French interests, and in conformity with repeated French orders, and at the sacrifice of our cnvn best interests, and probably of our liberties, we shall have no very great diffi- culty in condemning it. I shall state nothing but what I have learned from unquestionable authority, nothing which I cannot support by indisputable proof. Mr. Madison early in life became a member of the rev- olutionary Congress. That body was then divided into two parties — the French party, of which Mr. Madison was a leading man, who were in favor of bending all the efiforts and energies of the country to promote the views of the French cabuiet, views which the French government in 1793 declared to have been "the fruit of a base specu- latiotty and that our glory at that time offended the ambi- tious designs of France." The other pai'ty was truly Americany seeking only the establishment of our national independence and prosperity ; at the head of this American party were the members from New- England. Mr. Mad- ison was one of the party who proposed and carried the instructions to our ministers abroad not to make any peace without the consent and concurrence of France. He Was also one of those who opposed the treaty of peace made by Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, and who. in compii- ance with the wishes of France, attempted a censure upon those ministers for having dared to negociate a most ad- vantageous and honorable treatjr without the concurrence or consent of the French cabinet. Such were Mr. Madi- son's early predilections ; such was the promise which he presented of his future policy. After the establishment of the present constitution, Mr. Madison again came into the councils of our nation. We there agam find him true to his first opinions, and resolutely bent to promote the measures which favored the views and interests of France. In 1794, he was one of those who strenuousl)^ opposed Gen. Washington's pacific mission to Great-Britam ; he was in favor, as he is nowy of direct hostility with that kingdom, in favor of the sequestration of British property, and opposed to every measure which could heal the breach between the two countries. ' In the same year he brought forward his famous re- solutions against Great-Brit^un, the whole scope and ob- ject of which were to make a war&re on British commerce, and to please the revolutionary rulers of France. They were in their character precisely like Bonaparte's conti- nental system, and like the corresponding, cooperating measures of embargo and non-intercourse, so ineffectually yet so ruinously attemi)ted by Mr. Jefferson and himself m later periods of our history. It was Mr. Madison who Avrote the pamphlet against the author of "War in Dis- guise," in which he arraigned with great severity the British doctrine as to the cdonial trade. Yet we have seen this same man, within three years after, apologize for the French decrees as merely municipai regulations, of which the United States, he says, have no right to complain, al- though these decrees cut up by the roots that very colonial trade, for which, while Great Britain was concerned, he had been so strenuous and warm an advocate. This gen- tleman, so acrimonious against Great Britain for modifying the manner in which we should carry the produce of French colonies to the parent country, who represented it as of vital importance to the United States — at a subsequent period when France not only saw fit to cut off all this car- rying trade to her own country, but to march her armies into HoUai l*ortu withtl to acq condu ables( Wl the su situate victor presse( demn, inga France of nem and sol Yet lation t come ( he dare that thi war. Th^ forms I doctria our ml il'^ :ensure upon : a most ad- concurrence ; Mr. Madi- lise which he ablishment of n came into ind him true promote the sts of France. Hisly opposed it-Britain; he ility with that itish property, leal the breach lis famous re- scope and ob- ish commerce, France. They laparte's conti- g, cooperating so ineffectually on and himself . Madison who "War in Dis- :at severity the ct we have seen tologize for the itions, of which to complain, al- at very colonial concerned, he ate. This gen- n for modifying the produce of 10 represented it -at a subsequent t off all this car- h her armies into Holland, Italy, Hambitrg, Denmark^ Prussia, Spain ann} t^ortugal, for the purpose of destroying our legitimaie trade vf'iitithc^v. friend^ and neutrai States, not only was pleased to acquiesce in this injustice, but has publicly defended the conduct of France, as a le^timate exercise, of unquestion- able sovereignty. What! Shall a neutral State not on\y feel indifferent to the successive oppressions and Conquests of all other States situated like herself, but shall she admit that the lawless victor has a right to interdict her own thide with those op- pressed and neutral States ? Shall she go farther, and con- demn, as Mr. Madison has done, Great Britain for prohibit- ing a trade with her open enemy^ and yet apolc^ize for France, who has by force of arras cut us off from the trade of neutral andjriendly States who wotild, if left firee, court and solicit our commerce with them ? Yet such is the picture of Mr. Madison^s conduct in re- lation to the two belligerents, before he had the boldness to come out and declare himself on the side of France, before he dared to tell this people (as by his measures he has done) that their fortunes must be hereafter inseparably attach- ed to those of Bonaparte, and that we must be tied to the chariot wheels of this conqueror in his triumphal entry into his capital. I shall omit Mr. Madison's declaration to Mr. Randolphi that "France wants money and must have itj" and a thou- sand other incidents of the same character tending to shew, that his opinions and his policy are too much connected with those of his new atty, Bonaparte. I have said enough ror those who arc open to convictiori, and those who are not will nevertheless be shaken wheil they come to the measures which he has lately adopted to produce a war with Great Britain. I now proceed to the consideration of his manifesto of war. The first point- in Mr. Madison's manifesto, and which forms the most prominent part of it, relates to the British doctrine and practice of taking their own seamen out of our merclmnt ships. He has collected under this hoad, all 2 f^- , •-' r< :' zA . -i~~ 10 (he virulent remarks which the obscare writers of his twrty have used for manv years past. Before I consider his assertions on this pointy it may be useful to trace the history of this pretension and practice on the part of Great Britain. All the nations of Europe nudntain without any exception this doctrine, "that their subjects have no right to expatriate themselves, sujid that the nation has a right to the services of all its citizeiis, especially in time of war." Tlus doctrine is not only maintained and enforced by all SK)vereign states, but it is explicitly laid down by writers on general, law, as most unquestionable* Grotius, Vattel, Puffendorf, and all other public writers, concur in maintaining this right. France has a special code on the subject, and every citizen is enrolled from the time he is capable of bearing arms, and is recalled by spe- cial proclamation as soon as a war breaks out, from the service of foreign countries. Denmark, on entering into the present war, issued a sim- ilar proclamation. ^ There is no civilized country on the globe which does not clum the right to the service of all its citizens in time of war. When the war broke out between Great Britmn and France in 1793, a new case arose— a case unexampled in the history of nations. America, once a part of the British empire, speaking the same langu^, having the same habits, occupied in the same pursuits, remained at peace. The profits of neutrality enabled us to pay greater wages to our seamen than Britain could posubly afford. The British ^eam^i who had never before beeif'tempted to desert the standard of their country, because the language, habits, and usages of the continental nations were so diverse and disa- greeafak to them, flocked by thousands into the American mercantile service, and produced a serious and distressing injury to Great Britjun. It is the opinion of well-informed merchants, that thirty or forty thousand British seamen sought employment in American ships. Great Britain found this evil intolerable, and she adopted the expedient of reclaiming her own seamen found in our merchant service, disclaiming however, most explicitly, the righf to take them from oui^public armed ships. boi *u 11 iters of Ins I consider 11 to trace the ipart of Great without any I have no' right m has a right (time of war." Enforced by all by writers mblic writers, has a special rolled from the [called by spe- |out, firom'the ; issued a sim- country on the •ervice of all its eat Britain and mexampled in t of the British ring the same lained at peace, [reater wages to . The British i to desert the age, habits, and verse and disa- • the American and distressing ' well-informed kitish seamen Great Britain I the expedient our merchant itly, the right I This practice she commenced under the administntioo of Washington, and has continued it from that day to the present. She has, however, always disclsumed the preten- sion of taking "American" seamen, and if the case has sometimes and unfrequcntly occurred, she has always ex< pressed her regret, and has restored the men so taken, on due apd proper proof of their •citizen^ip. The evil, however, has been of very limited extent, and the bona fide American citizens have been the least depos- ed to complain. The Northern States who employ for the most part native seamen have suffered very little, and I have known several merchants in extensive business who never had a seanum impressed from ^eir ships during a twenty years war. There is one fact of great importance to be considered before we enter, into Mr. Madison*s representations on this subject, and that is, that neither General Washington nor Mr. Adams thought this matter of sufficient importance to make it the subject of a special communication to Congress, much less did they think it reasonable cause of war. It is a well known fact also that Great Britain has been growing ^ore and more cautious in the exercise of her right of re« claiming her seamen, and fewer instances of impressment have occurred within Mr. Madison's administration than before. Just before the war measure was resorted to, Mr* Foster, the British ambassador, requested our government to furnish him a list of impressed seamen calling themselves Americans, that he might procure their immediate release. Now let us pause and consider this question in the ab- stract. A belligerent and neutral nation speak the same language, and have the same general character. The bel- ligerent wants her citizens for the defence of her existence. The neutral wants them for profit — ^The neutral offers 30 dollars per month, and the belligerent oan afford but 15~- The belligerent loses 40,000 seamen, which the neutral har« bors and employs. The belligerent assumes the right to reclaim her omu subjects, and so far as respects them she is right; she is sup- ported by the law of nations, but in the exercise of this jigUt instances of misUikes or misconduct will occur, ought 12 the neutral to complain unless she takes effectual measures to prevent the entry of the seamen of the belligerent into her service ? Much less ought she to complain, if she en- tic^ by high rewards and countenances by fraudulent pro- tections such seamen of the belligerent m deserting the standard of their country. Yet such is the fact, well known to every man on the sea coast— Maryland, North Carolina, South Cardina, Georeia employ three foreign seamen to one American ! Yet these are the men from whom our complmnts proceed ! Nor is this all — our government give occasion to the very complaint of which they make so much parade. It is • fact, acknowledged by our marine officers, that a lar^ pro- portion of the seamen in some of our national ships are native British seamen, and it is even asserted that many of the warrant officers are of that description. Can a government, which at least does not check such abuses, such an attack on the resources of a belligerent, such an important inroad on his rights, legitimately com- plain of his occasional abuse of the undoubted power of re- claiming his own citizens? Much less can such men f^rly hold a moral and pathet-* ic discourse on the cmelty of compelling men to fight against their brethren, when they know that British subjects are first seduced from their allegiance, and then compelled to turn their arms against their sovereign and fellow sub- jects? Yet such is the fa^ — Vast numbers of British seamen will be now ordered out by the President to slaughter the subjects of their own sovereign, and if captured will be liable to be hung as traitors to their king and country.* Mr. Madison in his manifesto in favor of war, says, that the British government have assumed a jurisdiction on the high seas instead of a resort to the responsible sovereign^ wmch he would have us believe would have been eiFectual. But have not the British government repeatedly complain- ed to ours of the abuses which have existed as to thie en- ticement and enlistment of their seamen, and has the re- i * In New-Yprk, in Englishmnn on board oor fripnte Eskx was tarred nn'l fpithered bvcaute he Tr«(uld not violate bia oath of allcgiunov. tarred anri sptmible sovereign, the United States, ever afforded them an adequate remedy ? Have our laws interdicted the employ- ment of British seamen, or have they tlirown anv obstacles in the way of that system of seduction of Bntish sulors which has been so injurious to their marine ? We know that they have not. The President, living in a slave State, proceeds to com- pare this case to that of property seized on the high seas, and to intimate that the seamen ought to be carried in for adjudication like othfir property ^ instead of being subjected to the decision of military officers ; but we woula ask, tvtould this alleviate the burden ? Would it be more profit- able to our merchants and convenient to seamen to be car- ried into a British port in order to exhibit the proofs of their citizenship, because perhaps there might be one or two Bri- tish seamen on board, rather than to have such seamen taken out at sea on account of their unquestionable^character, or because they were destitute of protections ? Much is said by Mr. Madison of the severities of thf: British discipline, and of the hardships of our seamen be- ing conipelled to serve in distant climes and to be the me- lancholy instruments of taking away the lives of their fel- low citizens. This is very pretty rhetorick ; but still it is well known, that great numbers of our citizens voluntari- ly enter into the British marine service, and not unfre- quently augment the mass of tliose who compl^un of hav- ing been forced into British employ. But, says Mr. Madison, against this " crying enormity ^ the United States have exhausted in v^in remcmstranccs ** and expostulations, and they have offered to enter into " arrangements, which coujd not be rejected if the recovery '* of British subjects were the so/e and rra/ object — But the " communication passed without effect."* This sentence, if it has any meaning, was intended to convey to the people the idea that Britain, besides the re- claiming of Ikt ou'Ti seamen, had an ulterior and further object which can be no other than strengthening her marine by the impressment of our seamen. — Now there never was a more uniouiided suggestion^ and Mr. Madisoji had in his posscii'.uoa the documents. to satisfy ])iin of it. .. . . 14 Hi i^ The vfhok number of sailors pretended to have been imprcaaed from our ships for 15 years past was 6358, out of 70,000, and of whicn all but 1500 have been restored. Of this renuunder, at least, one half are probably British sea- men, and of the residue it is probable that at least another moiety entered voluntarily. It appears however from the returns that not more than 1500 seamen, including British subjects with fraudulent American protections, were at any one moment ki British employ. The whole number of British seamen in their marine, or public sfttpt onfyy is 150,000 and in their merchant ships, over whom thn not for the lisseminating ^^ngland and :nment have , the inability e their inno- 5 rule would just measure lich is never legislation — power of the (ricious, and e, from the aeen enabled ps who have enemy, and nch decrees )f the spates - md, give us r when such ■outrageous violations of national law become the fair sub» ject of retaliation ? Suppose, instead of the existing inequality as to naval power, France was able to keep a flying fleet of burning ships constantly on the ocean, and in ^ce of fijii/t sbe should bum five hundred ships a year for the enormous transgression of selling their surplus produce to the excom- municated English nation, would this vary the question of right ? In the latter case^ it is obvious that neutrals would be deterred from supplying Great^Britain, and she would most essentially sufter. But can her rights depend upon so loose and vague a criterion? Do any rights repose upon so varying and shifting a foundation ? Great-Britain reasoned, as all men of prudence reason : ''This is a novel and most enormous pretension — this is ''no less than an avowed attempt to shut me out of the "pale of civilised nations. She adopted the prudent "maxim, Obsta principiis, oppose the first inroad on my "rights." And 1 would ask, where is the judicious and honest statesman, who will point out the precise mark at which she ought to have acted ? Ought she to have waited until the evil was brought home to her doors, until hex deserted ports and ruined commerce would warn her that her case was without remedy ? France, from the commencement and until the present time, has executed her decrees to the utmost extent of her power, and she at this moment boasts of their wisdom and efficacy in humbling and enfeebling her enemy, and still confides in their sufficiency to destroy him. But this is only one answer, though I think a satisfactory one to this objection. Bonaparte had two distinct modes ol enforcing his decrees ; one of them was Umited by his naval power, the other had its full operation on the conti- nent. If he had confined his decrees to his own territory, still Great-Britain would have had a right to complain and to retaliate. Nations have an undoubted right to stipulate the terms upon which foreigners shall visit their country ; but if, under color of this right, they should make an entire revolution in the code of international law, if in place of those prudent mnxims of i>;rncral policy which natipus ^ i:| -^ 22 sometimes adopt, they should substitute a novel and monstrous system, injurious to all free commerce, should throw us back to the measures of dark and uncivilized ages, with the avowed purpose of destroying their enemy, not only that enemy and all civilized states have a right to complain, but are bound to resist. Bonaparte did this — he declared, not simply that he would not suffer British goods to enter his country, but that any neutral ship, which should in any former voyage subsequent to Ws decree have been concerned in trading with Great Britain, should be denationalized, and for that cuuse should be ccmfiscated if ever she should enter his ports. Is this Si mere municipal regulation ? Suppose Great Britain had submitted to it — In ten years her trade would have been destroyed, or at least materially affected. Tlus principle, more dreadful than the popish doctrine of excommunication, has been likened to the navigation acts of Great Britmn, acts which simply limit the importation of British products to British bottoms; but you may search the history of Algiers, Morocco and Tunis in vain for any example of the extended tyranny and profligacy of the de- | crees of France. ' Put then their operation on the ocean out of the question, take them as they now are admitted to be enforced, even by Mr. Madison, they are the most enormous violation of all neutral rights, and the greatest invasion on the prin- ciples of modern civilized nations which the world has ever seen. .%• , , ► Yet this operation of the decrees has been justified by Mr. Madison, though it is tenfold more injurious to us than all their possible effect on the ocean. . ' But Great Britain, as well as America, had a still furthei- right to complain of these decrees, and they have been most dreadfully enforced by the arms and influence of France, in Holland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Prussia and Denmark. The captures in Denmark alone are more than five times as great in amount as all the captures under the British orders in council in the first fov.i --ears of their ope- ration. Would Denmark have issued an order for the cap- ture of American ships laden with the produce of British : i : i 23 Islands, without the instigation of France ? We know she would not. There is an end then to the -argument tliat France could not enforce her decrees, because she has done it in a most extensive and calamitous degree, and as wc have before remarked, we cannot sec that a robbery done upon the land in neutral states, is in any respect less a rob* bery or less atrocious, than if committed upon the ocean, which is a neutral highway for all nations. We now proceed to the second reason alleged, why Great Britain could not lawfully retaliate the inmstice of France, and that is, that she by her blockade of May, 1€06, became tht Jirst aggressor ^ and therefore is precluded from setting up the plea of retaliation. This is the argument which assumes such a rhetorical and flourishing figure in the report of the committee on our foreign relations. This pretence may do very well for weak minds, and it is only fitted for such. Those of us who have memories and some knowledge of facts cannot be deceived by it. It is perhaps one of the most aifrontivc arguments that was ever thrown in the face of an intelligent people. -^ In the first place, we would observe, that the idea of the blockade of May, 1806, being a violation of our rights or an infringement of the law of nations, never made its appearance within owr hemisphere, until July, 1810, more than four years after the said obnoxious order had been in full operation. Now it must have been a singular sort of invasion of our rights, which neither the fault-finding cab- inet of France, nor the still more jealous and irritublc council at Washington had for four years been able to dis- cover. Yet such is the fact. I have formerly perused all the correspondence between our government and that of Great-Britain, and I do not recollect that this blockade ever formed a part of our complaints. 2dly, I distinctly recollect that when Mr. J. Q. Adams thought it necessary to defend the administration and to attack the orders in council, he did not dare trust himself on the modern plea of the British aggression of May, 1806, but he more prudently went backward, and rested the de- fence of France on the British adjudications in t/ie war qf 24 1^1) ■i 1756. There were among us some, who thought that ht might as well have urged the invasion of France by Ed- ward the Black Prince. 3dly. But what ought to set this question forever at rest, and to crimson the faces of our administration and com- mittees, whene!ver they bring forward this argument, is this, that Mr. Monroe, our minister then resident at St. James's, communicated this order with great satisfaction to our government, and expressed his conviction that it was a Kivorable measure, and indicative of the disposition of tlic British cabinet to conciliate tliis countn*. In truth it was the measure of Mr. Fox^ and was inten- ded to give a proof to America of his disposition to recon- cile, if possible, the commercial interests of America with the principles absolutely essential to the British power and existence. It is an order very singularly expressed, but it was understood and intended ixnd executed in such a man- ner as to leave open all our trade with France and Holland, except such as the admitted principles of the law of nations forbade. Lastly, with due submission to the honorable com- mittee of Congress, I will venture to assert, from positive knowledge, that this blockade was as vigorously enforced, and as fully supported by actual investment, as the law uf nations recognized by ourselves requires. This, if it be true, (and every captain who entered the channel knows it was so,) (the President's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding,) />Mff an end to tlie whole ques- tion. For Great Britain admits that if the blockade was not actual, it Nvas illegal, but she contends it was actual, and the premiums at our insurance offices against vessels violating that blockade will prove that it was strictly with- in the modem definition, that is to say, that the "entry in- to the ports so blockaded was imminently dangerous." I have one more remark to make on this subject of the order of May, 1806, and then I shall quit it. I believe the remark is new, at least I may claim the merit (if there is any) of being its author, and that is, that the idea of the blockade of May, 1806, having been a justifiable cause of the Frewh decrees was for the first time suggested by our r I sip liought that ht If ranee by Ed- I forever at rest, ition aiid com- pliment, is this, at St. James's, faction to our L that it was a position of tlic and was inten- sition to recon- America with tish power and expressed, but in such a man* :e and Holland, law of nations anorable com- ;, from positive 3usly enforced, t, as the law of ho entered the assertion to the lie whole ques- blockade was it was actual, against vessels s strictly with- the "entry in- ingerous." subject of the I believe the 2rit (if there is |^ he idea of the '1 [liable cause oi fgested by our ^5 fovemment through General Armstrong to ![^ranoe. It 1809. That cunning cabinet instantly seized the pretext, and from that moment, and never before^ have pretended to justify their decrees on the order of May, 1806. We shall shew hereafter why our government suggested this excuse to France, when we come to the proof that iw all the proposals of accommodation made to Great Britain certain conditions have been invariably annexed, which our cabinet had previously ascertained would be rejected and ought to be rejected by Great Britain. It would be im- proper to anticipate this part of the subject which deserves a separate consideration. The last reason against the orders in council which I have heard urged is, that we did not submit to the Berlin and Milan decrees. Those decrees interdicted our trade with England, yet in despite of France we still traded with her, and as to any other mode of resistance we had not the means, or if we had, we were at liberty to choose our own time and mmmer of doing it. To this I answer, that as to the British trade, we pursued it only because it was profitable, and not for the purpose of proving to France that we despised or opposed her decrees. So far were we from despising those decrees, it i^t a humiliating truth that France has unremittingly inflicted upon us the severest punishment for trading at all with Great-Britain, although we had narrowed that trade by our own laws in a manner that cooperated essentially with the designs of the French government. She did this by armst by the law of strength — we had adequate peaceable means of redress, or at least such as we have thought powerful against Great-Britain — we neglected to use them. If Great-Britain, notwithstanding this acquiescence, had no right to retaliate on France, because we might be incident- ally though not intentionally injured, then it will follow that neutrals hereafter may be as partial as they please, and that the most unjust belligerent may always ^vound or possibly ruin his enemy through the sides of the neutral. I have now finished my general remarks on the subject of the orders in council, and shall procet»d with my obsRr- Viitions on Mr. Madison's manifesto. 4 '26 Mr. Mudison, not satilsficcl with culling the orders in iblNuncil a complicated and transcendent piece of injustice anii an innovation^ without taking the slightest notice of the prior Frqnch decrees which occasioned them, proceeds to declare, "that they have been moulded and managed as "might best suit the political views of Great-Britain, her "commercial jeahustes^ or t\\t avidity of British cruisers;" thus intimating that her commercial jealousy of usy and a desire to satisfy the cupidity (^ her naval men, were among the prominent modvcs for the modifications which the de- crees have undergone. This is illiberal and unfounded. The orders in council have undergone no mcKlitication whatever since their date, except that of April, 1809. It was as well known to Mr. Madison when he wrote this charge, ac it is to all the commercial worlds that the modification of April, 1809, so far from tending to restrain our trade, opened to us the Baltic, the German Ocean, the French and Dutch foreign possessions, Spain, Portugal, and ^t of Italy. Could Great-Britain have been actuated byfi^mmercial jealousy in this measure ? Yet it is thf %iW chine which has taken place in the orders in council. The same remark may be made as to the desire to gratify the avidity of her cruisers. Was it the way to effect this purpose to limit and restrain the orders in council to one quarter part of their original extent ? Hints have often been thrown out in Congress, and by the President in his manifesto, that plunder was the main object of the British orders, and it has even been insinuated that Great-Britain has drawn a part of her sub- sistence from her captures of American property. This slander may do for the ignorant back-woods-men of Kentucky, more ferocious than their savage neighbors ; but mercantile men all know, that the orders in council were scarcely executed in a single instance till within the past year ; and in an official return to Congress, it appeared that the amount of captures by the British was not half equal to those either of France or Denmai'k. But, says Mr. Madison, and in this he is echoed by the committee of foreign relations, successive experiments were made to sec if Great -Britain would repeal her orders I I council under adds, ei orders i unless Now upon t ment of this : we are portant ratcly. We in 27 the orders in : of injustice ; notice of the I, proceeds to I muni^d as t'BHtain, her ish cruisers;" f of ust and a , were among which thede- ers in council nee their date, rcU known to it is to all the Lpril, 1809, so led to us the Dutch foreign [taly. Could ercial jealousy ^ich mistaken mark may be f her cruisers, it and restrain ' their ori^nal in Congress, under was the las even been rt of her sub- erty. c-woods-men ^ neighbors ; crs m council till within the ss, it appeared was not half :. But, says le committee were made :r orders in I J s council, by offering to place her adversary exclusively under the operation of our restrictive system; nay, he adds, encouragement was given to her "that a repeal of the orders in council would be followed by a war against France, unless she also should repeal her decrees." Now as much of the merits of this question depend upon the fairness of these offers, and since if the govern- ment of the United States have bona fide made proposals of this nature which ought to have satisfied Great-Britain, we are wrong in charging them with partiality, it is im- portant that we consider this question distinctly and accu- rately. We understand the offers not only in a different but in a very opposite light. In the summer of 1809, the embargo was reluctantly withdrawn in consequence of the formidable and decided opposition of the Northern States. In its place was substituted the non-intercourse act, nominally against both belligerents, though effectually only against Great-Britain, in which it was provided, that in case either of them should repeal its obnoxious edicts, the President should abolish the restrictions as to the one so repealing them, and they should be in full operation as to the other. In communicating this measure to the two cabinets, the President saw fit to adopt a very different language to the one from thvit which he used to the other. To Great-Brit- ain he authorized Mr. Pinkney to say, that in case Great- Britain should repeal her orders in council, it was proba- ble the President would give effect to the powers vested in him by that act, which simply extended to a notifica- tion of the fact of repeal, and the law itself declared that the act should remain in force against Vrance. But there was not the slightest intimation that in snch an event the United States would declare war against France, There is one other circumstance worthy of ncjce in this commu- nication to Great-Britain in 1808, and that is, that no notice was taken of the blockade of May, 1806, which has since made so conspicuous a figure in the list of our wrongs. Yet it will be observed, that the President was not cm- yiowcrcd to offer to withdraw the non -intercourse until Grcat-Brikuin should have repealed all her decrees vwlathtf^ 28 >.\ ^ur neutral eommerce ; but as Mr. Jefferson did not in 1806 demand the repeal of the blockade of May, 1806, the inference is irresistible, that he did not then consider it « violaUon of our neutral rights. The same inference may be drawn from Mr. Maditon*» arrangement with Erskinc, which did not include the blockade of May, 1806, although it ought to have included it if it was a violation of our neutral rights. So that we have the construction of two successive presidents, Jefferson and Mudison, that the blockade of May, 1806, was not a violation of our neutral rights. While Mr. Jefferson only held out to Great-Britain the prospect of a probability that he would give effect to the powers vested in him by the act against France, which only extended to the continuance of the non-intercourse, ^ measure perfectly useless to Great- Britain, since her fleets already made a much more effectual non-intercourse, he authorized Gen, Armstrong to assure France, in distinct and uneouivQcal terms, that if she should repeal her decrees, and jBritun should refuse to rescind her orders, the tJnitcd States would take part in the war on the side of France. These are solemn truths, and on record in the department Qf state. But the second negotiation on this subject, which took place in 1810, was still more extraordinary. Although the blockadeof May, 1806, had quietly slept as we have shewn, absolutely approved of by Mr. Monroe, and censured by no one, not even by France ; although it did not make its appearance in the negotiation of 1808, nor in Erskine's ar- rangement in 1809 ; yet it was destined to mak^ a great and principal jigure hi 1%IQ. Tliis must strike every per- son with astonishment, that a great and overwhelming wrong both to us and to France should ha^e been forgotten and neglected by both for the space of four years. Yet this blockade was coupled with the orders in council, and with such other pretensiops in 1810, that no settlement could be made with Great-Britain, I now proceed to the proof of these assertions. From the time of the promulgation of the French decrees iof Milan and ^erlln, we can l\nd no intimation on the part I 1 , not in ly, 1806, consider it ence may Erskinc, although on of our ion of two that the >ur neutral Britain the Feet to the ce, which ercourse, ^ J her fleets course, he listinct and it decrees, the United ■ France, department (^hich took though the ave shewn, ensured by >t make its skine's ar- te a great ivery pcr- rwhelming 1 forgotten :ars. Yet uncil, and settlement ced to the ch decrees n the part > 29 of France cither of her dissatisfaction with respect to the limited order of Great -Britain, of May, 1806, or of her determination to consider its repeal an mdispensable con- dition of the repeal of her hostile decrees. T' ie first notice taken of it, as far as we can find, is in a leltt:j- from Gen. Armstrong to Mr. Smith, our Secretary of State, of January 28th, 1810, in which he details a conver- sation which he had held with Count Champagny, the French minister. In that letter Mr. Armstrong refers to a letter of Decem- ber 1st, 1809, from Mr. Smith to himself, which ftas never been published^ in which he is directed to demand oi' France " Whether, ifGpciit-Brltfliii rrvokcd her blnckailei of • date anterior to the deerce cnmmoiily eallcil tlie Oerliit ilveroc, his inHJusty the eniiwror would conieiit to rfvol(c thut decree .'" To which the emperor, falling into the views of our government, and foreseeing the snare which would be Itud for Great -Britain, inasmuch as, if she consented to repeal said orders, it would be an admission that she had been the aggressor upon neutral commerce, and further, that it would be an admission that she had no right to exert her onlyforce^ her maritime pawer^ for the coercion of her enemy, replied, "That the ojtit conditi'm rewired for the revocation of the decree of Berlin, will be a previous revocntion by C>ru>it-lii-itnin or her blockades of France or parts of France, ot'a date antkrior to the aturciiud deurcu." So far the plot went on prosperously ; and if Great- Britain had fallen into the project, it would have been made the pretext for preventing any future blockades of even single ports of France in which armaments for her destruction or the destruction of her commerce should be formed, and she would have relinquished to an enemy, whom she cannot attJick upon the continent upon equal terms, the only weapons which God and her own valor had placed within her p6wer. Gen. Armstrong having so for succeeded, lost no time in transmitting to Mr. Pinkney this project, the failure of which was not only certain, but was probably calculatcc\ upon by both the high intriguing' parties. 80 Mr. Pinkncy on the 15th of February, 1810, demanded ojf Lord WeWeslejr, in pursuance of the same project, \v hether Great Britain considered any, and if any, what bl ockades of the French coast of a date anterior to the Berlin de crec in force ? He specified none in particular, except th:it of May, 1806. Indeed it appears by Lord Wellesley's note that no others existed. Lord Wellesley replied, that the order of May, 1806, " was comprehended in the order of council of January, " 1807, which was yet in force :" But did not intimate, nor was he ever asked, whether Great-Britain would repeal that order. Mr. Pinkney, on the 7th of March, 1810, asked a fur* , ther explanation on the subject, whether the order of May, 1806, was merged or sunk in that of January, 18C7, and whether any other blockades of France, except that of May, 1806, still existed ? Lord Wellesley replied to this second inquiry of Mr. Pinkney, " That the order of May, 1806, had never been fcn-mally withdrawn, though it was comprehended under the more extensive orders of January, 1807." He declar- ed, however, that no other blockade of the ports of France existed anterior to imm2t.ry, 1807. As he had never been required to answer, he was silent on the quesdon, whether the order of May, 1806, would be withdrawn. Mr. Pinkney, though not perfectly satisfied with Lord Wellesley's answer, still deemed it sufficient if France was} sincere, and accordingly wrote to Gen. Armstrong on the 6th of April, ♦* That the inference from Lord Wellesley's statement is that the blockade of May,. 1806, is virtually at an endf being merged and comprehended m an order of council issued after the date of the Berlin decree." Such was Mr Pinkney's construction of Lord Welles, ley's letter ; but this did not suit either the views of France, Gen. Armstrong, or of our cabinet. No cause of quarrel, no mode of renewing the commercial warfare against Great Britain resulted from such a natural and fair construction of Lord Wellesley's note. It was decided in the cabinet of Paris to compql Great Britain to make a formal renun* 31 nanded project, r, what e Berlin except llesley's ', 1806, aniiary, iitimate, d repeal d a fur- of May, 07, and that of r of Mr. f&[ been d under ^ declar- • France as silent irould be ith Lord mce wa^ g on the ;lleslcy's tunlly at order of Welles, ' France, quarrel, ist Great struction 2 cabinet jl rentin* r ciatlon of her rights, and if she had consented to such i^n humiliation, the emperor reserved to himself, in the vagi- le and inexplicit terms of his requisition, an ample latitude t X) demand still further humiliations. Accordingly Gen. Am i> strong wrote to Mr. Smith with respect to Lord Welle i- ley's statement, on the 3d of May, that "he need scarce ly observe how impossible it is to make this or any simil nf statement the ground work of a new demand for a rept !ul of the Berlin decree." - | And it seems that in pursuance of this opinion he 1 as abstained from that day to the present to inform his moj» !s. ty of the construction put upon the orders of May, 18( )6, and January, 1807, by the British cabinet, which our ot' her minister at London, Mr. Pinkney, thought and had cc tm. municated to him such an opinion amounted to a virt .ual repeal of the former. Thus we see how faithfully our two ministers conduc ted this negotiation. Mr. Armstrong informs Mr. Pinkney that if Great Brif aiiii wiH repeal her orders anterior to the Berlin decree, t,i\at France will repeal her decrees. Mr. Pinkney simply asks Lord Wellesley if those ai ite- rior orders are still in force. Nor did he ask whc tlicr Great Britain would revoke them until long after the an- swer of Great Britain to the first question, whether they \ »rcre in force, had been transmitted to France. When the answer of the British cabinet is such ns I Mr. Pinkney to think them virtually at an end, and v he communicates this result to Gen. Armstrong, he < not think it worthy of attention, nor sufficient to disturb repose of his imperial majesty, by submitting the quci tioii to him ! It is now perceived we presume by every iiUelligent n er, that the way was perfectly prepared in concert for extraordinary letter of the Due de Cadorc, in which a mal but illusory promise of a repeal of the Berlin and . Ian decrees is tendered, provided Great Britain will rc| her orders, and renounce, not the blockade of May ^ lb which she had declared was the only one in force, not anterior bhclcades actually existing', but something furt! K'.'ls 'hen Iocs 'the wd- the for- Vli. K-al 05, aM something inwlmissible, that she shall renounce " her principles of blockade which she wishes to establish," Terms wWch every man will perceive might be con- strued to amount to the surrender of all her maritime rights^ We conceive then that we have established our first pro- position, that this demand upon Great Britain to renounce her principles of blockade proceeded from our cabinet — WMS a concerted scheme, and was not pressed as an ultima- tum until it was well asccrttdnqd tliat it would not and could noii be yielded. Our second proposition rests on simplet-, and if possible on still more conclusive grounds — upon authority which Mr'. Madison will not deny, because it is his own. "'IVe sav, 2ndlyy That Mr. Madison when he demanded of Oreat iBritain as a condition of issuing his proclamation tha t she should annul her decree of May, 1806, knew that he ' fta& not authorized to annex such a condition. ' That he did annex such a condition is proved by a letter from our secretary of state, of July 5th, 1810, to Mr. Pink- ney *, in which he says, " You will accordingly let it be dis- tim .tly understood tiiat it must necessarily include the anul- memt of the blockade of May, 1806." Jllow the right of Mr. Madison to include this demand as an indispensable condition could only arise from the con- stnitction put by him on the act of Congress of May, 1810, which authorized him, in ci>se "either of the belligerents should so far revoke or modify its decrees or edicts as that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United Stattes," to issue his proclamation stating that fact, and upon such proclamation, so made, the non-intercoursewastore- viv( J against the other belligerent, if he should fail to repeal *• h is edicts in like manner within tlirec months." lit is not denied that the decrees or edicts which did vio- lates our neutral commerce were undefined by the act.- Mr-. Madison, by his agent Mr. Gallatin, has incautiously admitted this uncertainty. — It is not denied that Mr. Mad- ison, in the execution of this power, was the sole judge of th(j decrees to which it extended. It is a little unlucky, however, when the statute was so undefined as he now co.fiplainSi that Mr. Madison shoukl have extended it to Sfi u her :e h." be con- ,e rights^ irst pro- enounce abinet — 1 ultima- ind could possible y which emanded ilamation new that y a letter fr. Pink- it be dis' the anul- emand as the con- ly, 1810, lligerents ts as that e United and upon ivas to re- to repeal I did vio- the act.- autiously Ir. Mad- judge of unlucky, he NOW ded it to Ah old and harmless blockade of Great Britain, and should nave passed over the Rambouillct and Bayonne decrees of France ! But our main question still returns — did iiifact Mr. Mad- ison believe that the act of May, 1810, extended to the British blockade of May, 1806, so as to have a right to say that the renunciation or repeal of Great Britain miist neces- sarily include t/iat blockade ? We say that he did not believe it, though he said it in a solemn manner, and we prove it thus s— On the 1st day of March, 1809, Congress passed an act prohibiting intercourse both with Great Britain and France. That act provided however that, " in case either of the belligerents should so repeal or modify its edicts as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the president should certify that fact by proclamation," and the trade should be open with such power. It will be seen that the words are verbatim et literatim the same as in the act of P.Iay, 1810, which Mr. Madison has declared necessarily included the blockade of May, 1806. Yet on the 19th of April, 1809, three years nearly after the blockade of May, 1806, Mr. Madison made a convention with Mr. Erskine, the British minister, and thereupon issued his proclamation of that date, declaring (hat " Whereas Great liritain hail hv !♦< mliiUtpr nuimrBd lilm that tlia Orilerg in doiin- •il of January ami November, 1807, fmif/ij will Imvu Imoii ri-pcnled. on the lOili dav of June next, he ccrtirivd thiitfuct, itii'ir thiit tl|y trnilu with Great Britaia should after that day be free to the oitiKuim ul' lli« Uiiltuil StHtu«>" Now as the words of both statutes are precisely the same, as his powers to make such a proclamation are wholly found- ed on the acts of Congress, as all the acts of Great Britain, now demanded to be repealed, existed prior to his procla- mation of April, 1809, it follows, that he did not believe, at least in April, 1809, that the blockade of Great-Britain of May, 1806, was a **violntion of our neutral cbm7nercet\ because he did not dcmapd its repeal. .5 Iv 34 That there was a secret undei'standmg between our cabinet and thit of France, that Great Britain should be required to annul her blockades of a date anterior to the Berlin decree^ and that this suggestion first came from our cabinet, will appear from the two following extracts of let- ters from our Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinkney, and one is dated July 5th, 1810, m which he says, " You will let it be distinctly understood that the repeal must necessarily in* elude an annulment of the blockade of May, 1806 — This is the explanation which wilt be given by our minister at Paria to the French government, incase it sfmllthtvo. be required." It seems it had not then been required by France. That this was a concerted thing, is apparent from another clause of the same letter^ in which Mr. Smith says, that " should Great Britain not withdraw all her previous partial blockades, it is probable that France will draw Great Bri- tain and the United States to issue on the- legality dl such blockades^ (that is, all partial blockades,) by acceding to the act of Congress on condition that the repeal of the block- ade shall accompany that of the orders in council." Within one month after these despatches arrived in France, Bonaparte did bring us to issue with Great Britain on this very point f and yet Mr. Madison was no prophet^ because it was he who first suggested the thought to Arm- strong, and Armstrong to the ingenious Cabinet of St. Cloud. In support of this assertion, I "adduce the following ex- tract of a letter from Gen. Armstrong to our Secretary^ dated long before, viz. Jan. 23d, 1810. " In conformity to your suggestions in your letter of Dec. 1st, 1809, I de- manded whether if Great Britain revoked her decrees of a date anterior to the Berlin decree, his Majesty would con- sent to revoke that decree." It is much to be doubted whether France would have ever thought of such a condition had it not been thus sug- gested by our own Cabinet. These then are Mr. Madison's proofs of his fair offers to Great Britain to induce her to repeal her orders in council. It appears that it was impossible for Great Britain to com- 35 ^cen oiir lould be )r to the rom our ts of let- id one is vill let it sarily in-^ —This is r at Paris quired." ■ 1 another lays, that IS partial reat Bri- r o^ such ceding to he block- >» rived in at Britain prophety to Arm- et of St. wing ex- 'ecretarif^ jnformity 09, I de. :rees of a )uld con< 3uld have ;hus sug- • offers to I council. \ to com< ply with either of these offers without i»acrificing her most important rights, and that our cabinet have studiously coupled with the obnoxious decrees such further demands as it was known Great Britain could not yield. Before I quit the subject of the orders in council, I shall notice a popular objection to them, which is well calculat- ed to rouse the jealousy of commercial men — and that is, that Great Britain relaxes them in favor of her own sub- jects, and enjoys that very trade from which she excludes neutrals. One might say generally that if the blockade was originally laxoful as a retaliation on her enemy, ho partial relaxation va favor of the besieger, and which she thinks will enable her longer to carry on the war, or t.vi0ner reduce the enemy, could render the blockade illegal as to neutrals-— nor if the blockade was at first unjasty could this render it more so. One thing also all men will concede, that this partial relaxation docs not proceed from a willingness to relieve France, but from a belief whether mistaken or not, that Britain has the advantage in the interchange. Thus, she lets the French have small quantities of coffee and sugar which she does not want, and has taken in return flour >vhich is necessary to her. Now if by this partial exchange she strengthens herself, and is enabled more ef- fectually to cramp the commerce of her enemy, surely the blockade does not for that cause cease to be legal. Let us apply general admitted principles and known cases to this objection. Enemies when they find it convenient, ex- change prisoners, and send back to each other the men nee- essay to carry on the war. Can a neutral complain of this, or insist from this relaxation for their mutual interests, that he has a right to supply them with men ? In the French war with Russia, under Paul first, they clothed and sent back a whole Russian army which they had taken, and that without exchange. Could America have complained of this, and have in- sisted upon furnishing Russia with military clothing and men ? Yet the principle is perfectly analogous. Suppose Soult, who is besieging Cadiz was able to in- vest it by sea as well as land, and suppose he should pro- pose to the Spaniards t;o supply them with waier which the 36 city \vsait9, provided they would furnish him with bread for the want of which his soldiers are famishing, could Amenta complmn of this, and insist upon her right to vio- late the blockade and to supply Cadiz with flour ? Or sup. pose instead of flour, he should stipulate to receive back gold to pay his troops with, would this vary the question ? Certainly not — an hundred analogous cases may be put, but the genersd proposition and argument is unanswerable. If the belligerent had an original right to attempt to reduce an ener my by seige, or blockade, or by retaliating upon him a system of commercial distress, any partial relaxation in the rigour of the execution of such siege or retaliation to the; benefit of such belligerent as he believes, and to the injury or hu- miliation pf the enemy cannot affect the question of right, If therefore France, the haughty France, which threatens Britain with the destruction of her commerce, condescendfi to beg and to receive bales of British broadcloth to clothe her troops, this not only strengthens Britain and enables her to persevere in distressing her enemy, but it humbles that enemy in the sight of the world. Such are the ideas which this relaxation suggests. I now proceed to consider my second proposition, the expediency of the proposed war, both upon the supposition of a successful and unsuccessful issue. I need n(A spend time to shew, that the rulers of a free State, intrusted with temporary power for the public good, have no right to embark in a war even if it be just, unless there should be at least a reasonable prospect of attaining the object of the war by arms — unless the evils proposed to be redressed, will in all human probability be remedied bylhe wju*. Individual tyrants can, to be sure, though not lawfully, rush into vvar arid plunge their subjects into the deepest distress, to gratify their ambition, or to satiate their revenge. But the wise rulers of a free people will never encounter certain evils for doubtful good, much less in a desperate cause. Great Britain stands in a situation which may be called unexampled. Her marine power is greater than that o any other nation since we have any authentic histories of jjivU^?ed society. Opposed to her is the gigantic ^lomin, h bread ', could t to vio- Or sup- ve back Liestion ? put, but e. If the e an ene- a system e rigour ft benefit y or hu- of right, hreateng kscendfi o clothe enables humbles :he ideas tion, the }position of a free ic good, it, unless attaining )roposed emedied )ugh not into the D satiate pie will iich less e called that o ;ories of domin, 37 ion of France, enjoyed and swayed by one of the most am- bitious, daring, successful and unprincipled men whom the world has produced — a man, who has shewn that he nei- ther respects the venerable institutions of religion, nor the faith of treaties, nor the established laws of civilized na,- tions — a declared enemy to the ancient dynasties of mon- archical states, as well as to the humble citizens of free republics — He has spared no people whom his arms could subdue, and there arc none whom he has subdued tliat he has not reduced to the lowest stage of servitude and mis- ery. Against this monstrous power Great Britain by means of her marine force, has been a/one enabled to make a suc- cessful stand, and it is immaterial to us, whether this op- position on her part proceeds from a general regard to the interests of all free and independent states, or whether she is influenced by her own interests or by her ambition — The effect upon us is the same, and we have only to ask ourselves whether we have most to apprehend fron\ the ab- solute success of the arms of France, or from the tnera ca- pacity of Great Britain to resist the tyrant who threatens her with destruction — If the chances between these two combatants were equal — if it was as probable that Great Britain would subdue France, as that France will subdue Great Britain, then we should only have to ask ourselves which would be most likely to abuse their power, and we ought in that case to wish success to that nation which had manifested tlie greatest disposition to justice and mod- eration. All men who value the protestant religion— ah t,.<\\ who love freedom, and all impartial men accjuainted with the moral character and political conduct of the two govern- ments, must admit, that it would be safer for a free and protestant state to have the power in the hands of Great Britain than in that of France. — Britain is ruled by her cit- izens — she is essentially free, and no nation abhoj-s more than she does the tyrannical principles which actuate the ruler of France. Our interest then in the strongest case which could be 38 put would be iii favor of the predontinance of British power rather than tliat of France. But the case I have put I may say is not only an impro- bable but hunianly speaking an impossible one — While Bonaparte every day boasts both of his power and intention to humble, reduce and destroy Great Britain, while he says that " she will one day become as insignificant as Sardi- nia" the most extravagant Englishman never ventures to hope any thing more thiin the reduction of France to the power she possessed under the dynasty of the Bourbons — and this we may add is a more improbable supposition than even the extermination of Great Britain, distant as we ought to hope (notwithstanding she is our enemy) that event may be. Let us suppose then that our arms united to those of France should be completely successful, (and it is to be presumed that our president imdertakes this war with the hope sa\d expectation of success,) suppose Great Britain humbled and compelled to yield up her maritime superior- ity, what security have we that France will exercise the advantage which she shall have gained by our united efforts and sacrifices with more moderation and justice, more re- gard to the laws and common interest of nations than Bri- tain has done ? Shall we fmd reasonable grounds for such a hope in her treatment of all neutral states to which her arms have extended ? Shall we find it in her code of colo- nial law, in the restrictions which in all past ages and at the present moment she imposes on all commerce with her possessions ? Shall we find it in the new practices which she has adopted of converting every captain of her fleet ^nto an admiralty judge, and authorizing him to burn, sink and destroy upon a quarter deck trial and adjudica- tion ? But suppose Britain humbled, and the fleets of France once triumphant on the ocean, have we any security that she will not enforce her pretentions to Nova Scotia an^ Canada, and Louisiana, and the Antilles, and South Amer- ica and the Floridas ? Many of them once the jewels of her crown, and all of them the avowed objects of her ara- bUion? m British n impro- — While intention e he says as Sardi. itures to :e to the irbons — ition than nt as we ;my) that those of ; is to be with the i Britain superior- ercise the ted efforts more rc- :han Bri- for such ivhich her e of colo- and at the with her ces which fher fleet to burn, adjudica- ►f France irity that :otia an^ ith Amcr- jewels of fher am. If tlie&e countries are once subdued by her, what rigfit have we to expect that she will not apply to them the principles which she has always maintained of excluding fort'ipjnersirom a participation in their trade ? What right have we to expect that she will favor of even permit our intercourse with any of the European states under her control ? But above all, what right have we to hope that she will not look with a jealous eye on the only remaining repub- lic ? That she will endure the example set to her own subjects by the citizens of this country who boast the right of governing themselves ? Why should we expect to be exempt from the effects of her lawless ambition ? We, a nation hateful to her on ac- count of our origin, our language, our manners, our free institutions, our religion ? Where is the bold statesman who will affirm that she will not undertake the conquest of this country, or who, considering her military power, and talents, and our own divided and feeble state will guarantee that she will fail in her attempts upon our liberties ? ?I could press these considerations much fiirther, but the thought of them is too dreadful, and the dangtr in the event of the destruction of Great Britain too imminent to- require any further developement. But suppose instead of the destruction of Great Britain we should only succeed in imposing upon her a seluctant assent to our demands — ^Suppose we make a separate peace, and she should withdraw her orders in council, and should agree to give up the right of reclaiming her own subjects and the doctrine of blockade ? What would be our condi- tion ? We should have expended perhaps 100 millions of dollars — We should have impoverished our merchants and mechanics, and farmers — We should have lost all the pro- fits of our neutrality during the war, and in exchange for this we should have gained the trade to France — a trade, subject to the vexations, the tributes j\nd embarrassments, which a military sovereign despising commerce will alvvaysi inflict. But if the British maritime power should still be unbrok- en, as in this case I have supposed, \\hat security should we 40 have, that as soon as slic had recruited Irotn our blows, slui would not again resort to the same measures which she deems necessiiry to her existence ? So that we shoul'l have the satisfaction of having fought and ruined ourselves for a principle which was not worth the contest, and which, when yielded from necessity would be resumed as soon as the power of our enemy would permit. I have already put what I consider the two most impro- bable cases. Let us now view our situation in case we should fail in our object — ^In order that we may judge of the probability of success, let us consider the nature of this contest. Great Britain except in Canada and Nova Scotia is as invulnerable to us as she is to I*'rance. Bonaparte at his accession to the throne of France declared to all Europe his fixed determination to restore the marine of France — He has had at his command the resources of sixty millions of people — He possesses above 100 ships of the line, 200 frigates and 100 smaller vessels of war — Yet he has made no sensible advances towards maintaining an equal contest with Great Britain — On the contrary his march may be said to be retrograde, and yet he has had twelve years of experi- ment in his project— Is it then probable, that seven millions of people scattered as the citizens of the United States are, and a great proportion of whom are averse and hostile to naval equipments, whose whole navy consists of some half a score of small ships, can bring any essential aid to France, in this war against the British marine ? It is said however that we can distress her trade by our privateers — That some individual losses may be liiustainc'd by her subjects is not denied ; but it will also not be denied that our losses and her gains from us will be mere than an hundred times as great. Is this the way to red ace a great and powerful nation to our terms ? But it is said we shall take Canada and Nova Scotia — This perhaps may be effected with much bloodshed, and greater expenditure than the whole lee simple of those bar- ren provinces would produc! — Will this impoverish Great Britain ? No — It will strengthen her — Those provinces are an annual charge upon her revenue — Will they strength* ' ilovvs, slid vliich she ig fought not worth ity would ny would )st impro- n case we judge of urcofthis 3va Scotiu napartc at ill Europe France — V millions line, 200 has made al contest ay be said of expcri- n millions itates arc, hostile to some half to France le by our sustained DC denied e than au ce a great Scotia — ihed, and those bar- ish Great provinces strength* 41 en us ? No — They will enfeeble us — They will increase the jarring materials of which the United States are compos- ed, and which are already too discordant for our peace or safety — They will open an easy entrance to French power and French mtrigucs — Already Frenchmen are admitted to a seat in our national councils, and die addition of Cana- da would only ^ve to France the opportunity of attacking us on both flanks ; for it ought to be known that every Louisianian and Canadian is at heart as well as by habits a Frenchman. But if we weaken Great Britain by assaults u}X)n her provinces and commerce, has she no means of annoying us m as great and vital a degree ? Ask the underivriters. Ask the Nantucket owners of whalemen. Ask the mer- chants who have ha.^arded millions beyond the Cape of Good Hope. See the citizens of Nantucket fleeing from their Imbitations and sending the specie of their banks to Boston for safe keeping. Ask the fishermen of Marble- head how many fares they will get during the war. Above all, ask the inhabitmts of the province of Mauie what will oecome of their navigation and their lumber ? No country ever rushed into a war so obviously and un- deniably ruinous for the sake of maintaining doubtful prin- ciples of small value, and which were so little likely to be obtained by it. But if we attack the provinces of Great Britain, have we any security that Great Britain will not annoy or anniliilate our cities ? This would be a dreadful sort of warfare, (say some persons) to which Great Britain would not resort. This is a strange sort of reasoning — We force herreluc- tanUy into- a war — We plunder her commerce — We wrest from her her peaceful provinces, but we expect that slie will forbear from doing to us all the injury in her power. Her forbearance must then be much greater than her calum- niators in this country have declared. t In a contest between two nations, the question, which /ill be the most likely to yield, depends upon the compiu'- ison of their opulence and population, their military lbr<'e, their capacity to endure sufferings, their respective hal>i- tudes as to war, the amount of the relative lesses which te four first years of that war. Towards the close of the war she picked .even the pinfeathc;rs from the plumage of those who had rioted on the plunder of her commerce, and scarcely an American pri- vateer or ship of war dared to display its flag upon the ocean'. / i We now take up the third point which I proposed to discuss, that if the administration had deliberately resolved upon war, it was their soleitin duty to have made prepara- tiona to defend our commerce on the ocean, to have en- couraged by every facility the restoration or return of the millions of the property of our citizens how in the British dominions and power, and also to have warned our citizens of their danger, instead of keeping their hostile purpose se- cret, and letting these measures fall with the rapidity of lightning upon our unprotected commerce. If the purpose of the Government had been long fixed, and surely no new irritations on the part of Great Britain have taken place within the last year, they ought so to have managed their preparations for war as not only to have given ample notice to our merchants, but to have satisfied Great Britain, that they were resolved to resort to the last extremity, in order that it might have been seen what would be the effect of such a resolution on the councils of her Cabinet. So far was the conduct of Great Britain within the past year firom authorizing our citizens to expect a re- sort to so dreadful a remedy on the part of our Govern- ment, that it led them to hope, that some expedient would be devised by our Cabinet to avert the calamities with which we were threatened, and the evils which we actually Suffered. The nomination of a new minister to this coun- try after the cold and affrontive dismission of Mr. Jackson, together with the satisfactory settlement of the affiiir of the Chesapeake, gave us reasonable ground to believe, that the Goveniment could not contemplate an open, undisguised, sudden, and offensive war. • For what step could have been more calculated to lull oiir commercial friends into fatal security than the acceptance of the tendered atonement for the attack on the Chesapeake ? What motive could there be for adjusting that affair if our cabinet then intended a resort to arms ? But there were still stronger reasons for believing that the Cabinet of this country would not rush into the embra- ces of France, and join her in her efforts against Great Brit- Within tlie past year, we had sent a new ambassador am. t ) P u-\ 111 in lieu of an explicit abandonment of her de. 45 iposed tcf resolved r prepara- huve en- irn of the he British ir citizens jrpose se- apidity of ang fixed, :at Britain so to have r to have e satisfied to the last hat would ;ils of her ain within :pect a re- r Govern, lent would lities with i^e actually this coun- . Jackson, Rliir of the e, that the disguised, to lull our ;eptance of esapeake ? flair if our sving that he embra- ireat Brit- mbassador of her de. crees, in place of an immediate restoration of our property unjustly surprized by France, and which the President hud declared must be an indispensable condition of our riftum to friendly relations with her, wc had seen thht France had anew promulgated her decrees as the fundamental kiws of her empire, — that instead of restoring our property, our minister had declared that he had made no progress in ob- taining redress upon that point, and that tne prospect oGp success was both distant and doubtful. On the other hand, France had recently given new and abundant proofs of her determination to annihilate ull free and neutral commerce by the indiscriminate plunder and destruction of iUl our ships which she encountered on the high seas. In this state of things it was impossible for any honest and honorable man to presume, that we should suddenly join France in her war against Great Britain. If however the Cabinet deemed it for our interest to enter into so un- natural a coalition, it was this their solemn duty to have in- creased our marine so as to protect in some degree our trade on our own coasts. Let it not be said in answer to tliis, that the attempt would have been fruitless, for the attempt is now made» and our feeble but gallant navy ordered out to guard our coasts or become victims to the superior force of tne enemy. Either then the defence of our coast and waters ought to have been avowedly abandoned, or more effectual measures should have been taken to render this defence of some avail. The course adopted is only calculated to sacrifice, after a short time, the truly gallant officers of our little navy, and to afford a feeble and illusory protection to our eommerce. Our merchants in pursuance of their national rights and interests had purchased great quantities of British goods, and by the course of trade, and from the superior convenience and security arising from the good credit of the British merchants, had deposited immense sums in Great Britain. If it had been, which it now appears that it was, the determination of the cabinet to resort to ofl'en- sive war, they ought most certainly to have repealed the re- slrictjons on the importation of British goods, and to Iwwc «» 46 permitted our citizens to bring back their property iii order to enable them to pay their taxes, and to support the bur- ^en of the war. It is the first instance, we believe, in which a nation ever commenced a war by giving up to the enemy such an hnmense propOTtion of its own property and means of annoyance. Jf we were diqK>sed to jealousy, we might «ay, that this has the appearance of playing into the hands of our -enemy, ^f gratifying the desire of France to humble and reduce all free states, and sacrificing the commercial interests of this section of our country to the passions of the rash and unthinking representatives of the south. Whatever may have been the motive, the effect has been most dreadful. The people of New-England generally had not the smallest apprehension of such a result. — They are wholly unprepared. When the embargo was imposed, they hurcied away their property as they lawfully might in order to escape the vengeance of their own Government, and they entrusted it principally with the very nation which the cab- inet tell us must be our enemy. If war therefore had really been intended at the beginning of the session, which we are now assiured that it was, the duty of a watchful and paternal govemmoit was, to have continued that embargo, and to have abstmned fi*om hostiU ities until the property thus sent into the very jaws of the proposed enemy, could have been restored to an impover- ished country, which will hereaftor need all its resources. Fourthly, in a war offensive and unjust, the citizens arc not only not obliged to take part, 'but t^ the laws of God, and of civil society, they are bound to abstain. This may appear to some an abstract proposition, true perhaps in itself but in practice of no moment, since the citizen can be compelled to take his share of the burdens of the war by the superior power of his sovereign. But in a free government like ours, it is no answer for rulers to say to the people, we have a militaiy force, and we can and will compel you to do what we direct, be it lawful or un.- lawful. The citizen ought to know what the ruler can rightfully do ; as to his remedy in case he should do wrong tluit I will endeavour to shew hereafter. % a war «( W'*^- -., ^■il:-*-^. a»',r ;,V'-'*»^.* '• ty in order It the bur- r, in which the enemy and means we might the hands to humble ommercial sassions of uth. t has been lerally had -They are losed, they It in order t, and they h the cab- beginnuig was, the , to have Dm hostil. iws of the impover- sources, itlzens arc s of God, tion, true since the : burdens But in lers to say e can and 111 or uuf ruler can do wron^ i 47 The importance of a few remarks on tliis question o{ right Ivill be perceived from this consideration, that our privilege of (tiscussion and of assembling; to consider this interesting topic of war depends on the right of the citizen to judge in the last resort of the justice of tlie proposed war. If a government can lawfully plunge the people into an unjuj&t, offensive war, and if thev are as much bound to support such a war as dijust and dejemive o;ie, then the discussion ok* its justice would be nugatory, and indeed injurious, and the government might very iuirly suppress all examinutioPt into its merits. * > But the law of nature and nations declares, that in ades" potic or free government* the subject is not bound t|o obey the unlawful commands of his prince or rulers — So <|tvcn at common law, a slave cannot excuse himself by di'js com- mands of his master for committing murder, robbery j or any other crime. If Gen. Dearborn should for example D}f order of the president seize upon Gov. Strong and his hoij^orable council, and attempt to transport them to Washingto'jii, they c uld have a habeas corpus, mid question the legijility of ach an order, and if found illegal, Gen. Dearborn wjould be punished as certainly as if he had acted without any orders — These are analogous cases-— We shall now cite t|ie highest authority that we know of on thcjlaw of nations relnitive to the right of the subject to judge of the kwfutmss of i*j war, and to refme Ns aid in its support. v Grotius, book II. chap. xxvi. considers this \question distinctly— He says, that '* those who are in a mor\e servile " condition, such as sons of u family, servants, siubjects, "and each particular citizen^ compared with the^ whole "body of the city whereof they arc members, if tliey are " admitted toadvise, or left to their own choice, whethtW they " will take up arms, or be quiet, ought to be guid\ed by " the same rules which arc already set down for those " who, being free, have pov/er to make war for thems^elves "or others. But li commanded thereunto, as usually \they " are, then if it be evident to them thtvt the cause be unjust, **they ought altogether to forbear, for that Cod is n. per " to be obeyed than man. To justify subjects for refusing "to execute the wicked commands of their princes, Ave »^ 48 " have several examples in sacred story." "We conclude,**' he says, " that where the subject doth not only doubt the *" lawfulness of the war, but is by very probable arguments •* induced to believe it unjust, especially if that war be offen- * * sive and not defensive, he is bound to abstain." Again he mids, in book III. chap. x. "That the ground of a war <' being unjust (altliough it be fo/e/;i;i/y undertaken as to tlic " 1 nanner,) yet are all those acts that are done in it unjust, so ** tl lat they that shall knowingly commit such acts, or assist ** in the doing of them are included in the number of tliosc " wl io, without repentance, cannot enter into the kingdom "ofl'icaven." W'k now shall consider, lastly, what are the peaceable and const! ftutional remedies in the hands of the people to put a stop t o an unjust, offensive, and ruinous war. 1 hcse reme- dies a re of various sorts — they are such as belong and may be us< 2d by each individual separately, or they may be exer- cised by the people collectively — Individually, every man has a 1 'ight to express his disapprobation, and (if he feels so stronj, 'ly) his execration of the war, and of the causes which led to it, a swell as his horror of the consequences with which it is pr>?g nant — he may do this in conversation or in writing and print , he may circulate these opinions as widely and as extensiv 'ely as may be in his power ; he may encourage others to do th( ; same, and may endeavour to gain as many prose- lytes to ' his opinion as he possibly can. He may point out to public ' /censure and contempt the men from this state who desertc /'d the interests of commerce and joined the standard of its e- nemies, without whose cooperation this deadly measure woulc^ , never have been adopted. All these things he may do wi thout being amenable to the laws, in all these things he is ex w figure solemnly in league ive years , was be- le proper upon the 'Stem has r, but to For this kept on ; exporta- ttoms, or i- Britain, a without ty neutral with us ? Kes, every . But it that you /Irishes to :nch arms light Mr. ed a knot cut it by '. Gruijdy ' tlie neck to ponder ces, all of t a dr^ad- surprised say, that our CQm- 55 parative wrongs^-^hat Britain has done us great tnjury<*~ that the government are the exclusive judges, when the wrongs which we suffer demand repai-ation by the sword, and against whom the sword ought to be drawn, and they liaving decided this question, all good citizens ought not only to submit, but to support them with all their talents 'and fortunes. It is a war they say iov principle^ and for our honor t and we must not stop to calculate consequences. Even if we knew that we should fail, we ought to fight and fall valiantly. If one could perceive in the conduct of our government a real sensibility to the wrongs done to our country-'if their sense of honor had appeared to be a con- stant, impartial and regular principle of action, there might be some weight in this remark—- But if upon a short com- parison of their conduct towards the two belligerents it shall appear, that they are feelingly alive to every appear- ance of injury on the part of Great Britain, and are per- fectly insensible to the multiplied wrongs and insults, the kicks and cufis, the robberies and plunders of France, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that they enter into this war to vindicate tlie honor of the United States. The injuries of Great Britain we have already enumera- ted and considered. They are, the occasional impress- ment of our seamen, the blockade of French ports, and the orders in council, which in fact include the second. We have, however, no charge agiunst Great Britain of breach of treaty — the only one she has made with us since the treaty of peace, she most honorably executed. Her ships of war have covered every sea for twenty years past, and had she been actuated by the same dire and dreadfiil hos- tility to all free states ab France has been, we should not at this moment have had such an immense commerce to be delivered up by our government as a defenceless prey to her numerous cruizcrs. The past unexampled prosper- ity of the United States, which has been the boast of both parties, of Mr. Jeflerson and Mr. Madison, as well as oth- ers, is the strongest proof which can be adduced of tlie general spirit of justice and councils. moderation in the British i' A h m 1 1 56 Another idea is very important — so honorable and so t'ust has been the conduct of her merchants, so upright las been the deportment of her government towards our citizens who have traded to her ports, that many millions of dollars of American proi^rty are at this monient depos- ited with her for safe kcieping, and during a twenty years* ^ar not one case has occjurred of a violation of the laws of hospitality, of seizure oft our property confided to her, or of unnecessary detention or embargo. Now let us reverse the picture. How many violations of the laws of civilized nations has France committed dur- ing the same period ? I shall not go back to the infamous conduct of her cabinet prior to Mr. Ellsworth's treaty — I limit myself in considermg the amount of her wrongs to the last ten years only. That treaty of Mr. Ellsworth's stipulated that we should have a right to trade freely with her enemy, and from one enemy's port to another, and from her enemy's ports to those of France. Yet long prior to the Berlin decree, she forbade our entering her ports after having touched in Great Britain merely for orders nnd mformation. The Berlin decree annulled this article of the treaty, or rather violated it in a shameless manner — j'et our government never complained of this breach of treaty. France has professed to respect the doctrine of free ships making free goods — ^yet she has uniformly confiscated British property taken in our vessels, nnd has made it the sweeping pretext for condemning millions of bona fide American property. France has professed to favor free and neutral commerce, yet by her ordinances requiring certifi- cates of origin, she virtually forbade the neutral trade in the productions of her enemy, and thus aimed a fatal blow at our carrying trade. France was the first nation on the civilized globe (at least since the introduction of admiralty courts) which author- ized its cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations, to bum, sink and destroy neutral ships and cargoes on the high seas without any manner of trial. This injury has not been casual, but sytematic and repeated. Mr. Jejfferson com- plained of it as the "most distressing mode in which belli- gerents exercise might contrary to right." Yet every • If ranCe i ^st possibl our nation; t>agny told ^, and Ic! ison instru years since How th tional intet that neithe the questic If It be hot fight b honor and if fight we Our hot insult — be no one wrc Britain has and has act tion for th Our in^ ing be ind we lose th< — in givin — France has always merce, cai cannot rei But it 1 Britain ref To tho! tend for tl Ifneith his courts in the Dai will conv even if on si ■ iFranCe also has treated us diplomatically with the greats t&i possible indignity. Turreau declared war for us — but our national pride never rises at French insults. Cham- t)agny told us that "we were without honor, without ener- ^, and less free than the colony of Jamaica.*' Mr. Mad- ison instructed Mr. Armstrong to notice this insult two years since, and that is the very last that we hear of it. How then can it be believed that our honor or our na- tional interest are the motives to this war, when we find that neither of them are regarded when France is a party to the question ? If It be sjud that we miist chuse our enem)-, that wc can- hot fight both England and France, then I itply, that rur honor and ihterest required that we should tight France, if fight we must. Our honor, because she has heaped upon us insult uponr insult — because she was the Jirst aggressor — because for no one wrong or insult has she tendered reparation ; whereas Britain has made us proposals respecting all her ivjrr'es) and has actually made a magnanimous apology and «atis Ac- tion for the greatest. Our interest required that we should fight France, if fight- ing be indispensable, because in losing the trade of France we lose the sale of only three millions of dollars per annum — in giving up that of Great Britain wc lose thirty millions — France could not possibly hurt us mor-i in war than she has always done in peace — Great Britain can ruin our com- merce, can inflict an injury which fifty years of wise policy cannot repair. But it IS said that France has repealed her decrees, and Britain refuses to perform her promise * "> repeal her orders. To those who with a knowledge of Cr . facts can con- tend for this proposition, all argument would be vain. If neither the reiterated declarations of the emperor, of his courts, of his marine officers, oar his personal decisions in the Dantzick cases, nor tb'; ?liiily destruction of our ships will convince men, "neither would they be convinced even if one should ri-iie from the dead." [^See Note 2.] ey ,y ( 58 But one remark ought not here to be otnitted, and that is, tliat Britain has lately actually repealed her orders in council, to take effect when the trench shall have repealed even in words her decrees — and she has declared that all ships taken after such a nominal repeal of the French de- crees shall be instantly restored in admiralty, without any new order to that eifect — It is at such a moment as this, tliat we undertake to fight Great Britain for maintaimng her orders in council and to join France in supporting and en- forcing her decrees ! ! I shall now quit this topic and take my leave of my fellow-citizens, not because it is exhausted, for I scarcely know how to repress the many thoughts which occur on this fertile subject, but I aim.at utility alone, and I have said as much as most readers will be disposed to read. If any man can conscientiously say, after the perusal of this candid, well authenticated, well supported statement of facts, that he thinks we have good cause of war against Great Britain, and that it is both politic and just to single her out in preference to France, why then let him buckle on his armour, and fight manfully, though fruitlessly, in the cause of France ; but those of my fellow farmers, who with me think that the war is neither just nor expedient, and who know it will be ruinous, will leave no constitution- al measure untried to put an end to so fatal a measure. But it may be said, and it is often said, it is now too late to discuss the merits of the declaration of war. The Ru- bicon is passed. It is your duty to submit and aid as much as possible in the prosecution of the war. It is not patriotic to vindicate the conduct of a nation whom your jgovemment lias declared your enemy. Let us before we part, my fellow citizens, consider this subject. Every war is supposed to liavc some definite object. That object ought to be a legitimate and honest one, otherwise the war is unjust. It ought also to be a practicable and attainable one, othenvise the war is inexpedient. It ought not to expose us to greater evils and dangers than those which we would wish to remedy, otherwise it is rash and destructive. Ill order then to know for -ivfiat we are to fight, and hov.' 59 and that orders in e repealed d that all rench de- ithout any nt as this, taining her ng and en- nd take my exhausted, y thoughts itility alone, 36 disposed c perusal of •tatement of war against ist to single him buckle uitlessly, in armers, who r expedient, jonstitution- ieasure. low too late The Ru- and aid as '. It is not whom your i before wc :t. Every That object i^ise the war d attainable ught not to ;e which we lestructive. t, and how long we ought to fight, and what we are to insist upon as an ultimatum from our enemy, it is necessary to discuss before the people, (who have as yet heard only one side qf tJie question from the inflamed speeches of members ^ Congress) the whole merits of this war. If we are bound yore- v^r to approve of this war, because a majority of six senators only, (no wiser nor better than ourselves) saw fit to declare it in complaisance to th(i pres- ident, why we may as well give up the right of suffrage at once to this obligarchy, and let them save us the trouble of future elections. But if we have a right to change our rulers and to put in better men, men who love peace, rather tlian a hopeless war ; it is necessary that we should also have the right and power to shew, that the present men have abused their trust by plun^ng us into an unjust war which might and ought to have been avoided. What limit will our friends of freedom set to the right of discussing the merits or propriety of continuing tlie war ? Suppose after ten or twenty yejffs of war, our posterity shall find the country impoverished, our commerce destroy- ed, our young men sacrificed in fruitless expeditions, the nation ground to powder by taxes and paper money— and suppose our enemy still triumphant on the ocean, and thiit all the prophecies about her downfoll, shall prove illusory, would not some future patriot in 1832, be authorized to ad- dress the people, and assure them that the war was ruinous, that the points for which we were contending were not woi'th the contest, and that Britain it was evident could not bo compelled to yield them, and that for these reasons, they ought to turn out those who were for continuing the war, and put in those who would restore peace ? Would not such a man be a true patriot ? Well then, where will you draw the line as to the time when the war may be opposed ? Shall it be fixed at six months, a year, ten years, or twenty ? I should say, that from the moment war is declared, those who conscientiousl If opposed its declaration have a right, i.nd to preserve consistency, are bound, to endeavour to brin;if about a peace by shewing the folly, the wickedness ai\dth? c^•ils of the war. / ple rise as pair for the ge in caves lis to cover ar? Why, s of people 'ht be, and they could upon them )ut its jus- lestioned ! ! ey telly ou; , and Kich- your inter- the curses force of the '. say, meet, , secret and lis dreadful md who are he head of ;, and Pink- and Gore, house, and /"ashington. Dearborn, Lustin, and 1 lieutenant ouse spies, laces under tny distinQ- { tion who is not a friend to peace* Let then your suppli- cations, remonstranc<'s, n solutions, groans and complamts be wafted on every bree^ee to the President's throne. Turn your eyes instantly towards such firm, upright, undeviating patriots as will save the commonwealth in this perilous time, and suffer those who have abused your confidence "/o re- turn to private life;^^ but above all, preserve union and con- cert in all your measures. Recollect the old maxim of our revolution, which is still more important to be applied to New England an4 the commercial states Kow than it was THEN, United we stand, divided we fall. A NEW-ENOLAND FARMER. ^ *■ NOTES. JVY)TE 1. >■> '^ Mr It may lit tsked, why u> nneh time is derMed to the •rgUment upon the orders iu Counoil ? We answer. Because the otd enmplaints of impressment, and of hovering on .our eoasts, and the general principles of blockade adopted hj Great Britain, are only the light and shade, the mere colouring of the principal ostensible cause of the war. Any man who will review the course of negotiation between us and Great Britain will perceive, tliat since the settlement of the affair of the Cliesapeake. the orders In Council of April, 1809, are the only ostensible causes of hostility which ' have been urged wainst Great Britain. Mr Erskinc'a arrangement extended only to the satisfaction for the attack on the Chesapeake and to the repeal of the orders in Council. All the minor points in dispute were left untouched, and yet Mr. Madison undertook, on the unautltorizcd promise of Mr. Erskine to restore Great Britain to the situation irit and honorable impartiality on our part would have pi-ocurcd the repeal of the French decrees, or at least have induced Great Britain to rescind her orders in Council, that I have entered so much at large into this argument. I now advance an opinion, which I fully believe will appear hereafter to be cor- rect, that until we can bring ourselves to view this question candidlif as between two powerful belligerents, the one lighting for existence and the other for eonqucst, until we can perceive that Great Britain wus constraineil by the paramount law of self preservation to retaliate on her enemy her own unexampled mjustice, we must content ourselves with a perpetual war, (unless France should rec.'-.de from her sys- tem) or else hail as a blessing, the greatest possible of all calamities to us, the sub- jngatinn of Great Britain by the common enemy of the human race. Those who e»n derive consolation from such a prospect, may not heed our arguments, or give vtrdit to our motives, but sober men will reflect and weigh the dreadful conse- quences before they decide to contend for so qucstiouablu and so uniir.portaut a poiot, #' / 1 ncc ^ M.- 63 le orders I " JVo, 2. Bonap»r(e has inch • thorough eonteropt fqr hU new allf, Mr. Madiioti, that he takes no pains to snare his fcehngs or sQpport his characUr. Now a short, simple, nominal repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees would have helped Mr. Madison much, and not hav« injured the emperor's system in the least ; for he might still have •ondemned under special decrees, as he has lately done— he roiffht still hare burnt every American ship on the ocean, and never have had bis imperial repose disturbed by the unquiet complaints of his new ally. But as if purposely to proclaim to the world his utter contempt of our KOvernraent,and his aosolute control over it, he has declared on not let* than ten public occasions that his decrees were not repealed. And why should he net, since he found us marching on as straitly as he 'jould wish to Ailfll his orders of fighting Great-Britain ? The last arrival from Europe contains another repetition of this insult and contradiction of Mr. Madison. The Moniteur (Bonaparte's official paper} declares "that the French decrees were not repealed with respect to Americans till April 28, 1811," that is to say, six months after our president's proclamation declaring them repealed in November, ISIO, and after the arrival in France of news of our non-intcrcoui-se act of March, 1811, which was construed to be a causing our rights to be respected ; so it now appears that the condition annexed to the Due de Cadore's letter of August 5, 1810, was a condition precedent. But the French decrees, according to the Moniteur, -were not repealed in May last, for it concludes witli'this sentence — "Let England revoke her new legislation of blockade and her orders in council, and the Berlin and Milan decrees tmm be annulled, and all neutrals treated in France as they were previous to the present war." This was at the very moment when Madison was writing a inanisesto declaring the decrees repealed. Now what neutrals, we would ask, are there in the present war ? Upon whom are these repeals and promises of Bonaparte to operate ? At L.ie time when the article in the Moniteur was written, America was a sort of neutral — a neutral in etery thin^ but impartiality in its dealings ; now, alas ! Europe and America do not contain a single neutral state. Britain stands aloae against tlie world, defending her right to retaliate her enemy's injustice on himself, and ive have just joined France for tlie avowed object, as the Moniteur tells us, of compelling England to withdraw her retaliatortj orders, after wliich, it Informs us, France will revoke her prior decrees, (that is to say, if s)ie pleases, and can do no better.) But when England is . .'duced to that state of liumiliation| I think his majesty's promises would, like nian^ former ones, \>o forgotten. JVote 3. The people are to be deluded into the belief that this war is to be prosecuted without the imposition of new taxes; Congress have therefore postponed the tax> bills— but they ar; only postponed. After the election, when Mr. Madison's place will be secure, they will be passed, or if not, an immense debt (if they can procure loans) will accumulate, and then the only boon wc shall have will be that our children will be taxed instead ol' ourselves. Now the liability to taxation at a future d.tr, and the certainty that that day must arrive, actually reduces the present value of oi'u* kouses, our farms, and the price of labor nearly in as great a degree as immediate impositions or taxes. The future taxes indeed will be enhanced in proportion to the accumulation of debt, and will be more severely felt than if gradually imposed. Public credit will in the mean time suffer, and the price of every tiling which the- government may require for the support of the war will be greatly and iiccillcssly enhanced. The people, particularly of the Northern St.ites, are now in fact taxed for the war, Uiid will soon feel its pressure by the diminished viiliic of llieir real estates, by the reduced price of labor, and the difficulty of fimliii!; emplovmcMit, and by the dreadful increase of the price of ifll foreign conimoilitiii'i, vvlii«U have become almost. necessaries of life.