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NATIONAL LIBRARY { 
 CANADA 
 UDMOTHbQlJB: MATIONAUi 
 
 lam 
 
 Synop.sis of the Law relating to Fraudulsmx Conveyan? 
 
 MADE TO DeE'EAT OK PrEFEU CREDITORS IN THE 
 
 Province of Ontario. 
 
 Prepared for the Students of the Laiv School at Osgoode Hall 
 
 by the Lecturer on Equity. 
 
 Lecturer: A. H. MARSft^C >3^9^. ^ 
 
 . K 
 
 ^' 
 
 What Property is Affected by the Statute. 
 
 13 Elizabeth, Cap. 5, passe^^ for the protection of creditors, and 
 for the purpose of avoiding fraudulent transfers of property made 
 by a debtor for the purpose of delaying, hindering or defrauding 
 his creditors, affected all transfers of all property, whether real or 
 personal, which was exigible in execution, so as to be capable of 
 bein^' made available for creditors. Therefore, as legal and equit- 
 able process became from time to time more far-reaching, the 
 operation of the Statute became correspondingly more and more 
 extended. See Davidson v. McGuire, 7 App. R. at pp. 101-2; 
 Warnock v. Klwpfer, 15 App, R. 325, et seq., and May a Fraudu- 
 lent Conveyances (2nd ed.) 23. 
 
 It follows from this that if the property transferred be of such 
 a character that it is not exigible in execution at the time of the 
 transfer, such transfer will not be obnoxious to the Statute of 
 Elizabeth ; and the same result follows with reference to our 
 Provincial Statute touching Fraudulent Assignments and Prefer- 
 ences. Therefore an assignment (by way of security) of the pro- 
 Jits expected to be made out of a contract to do work does not fall 
 either under the Statute of Elizabeth or under our Provincial 
 Statute in pari materia, for there is no legal process by which 
 the subject matter of the assignment could at the date of the 
 assianment be reached bv creditors : the assignor might never do 
 the work ; there might be no profits ; if, at the date of the assign- 
 ment in question, the assignor had made an assignment in tiust 
 
 \".(^ 
 
 V^HZ 
 

 r" 
 
 '*.r. 
 
 for his creditors no interest in the expected , ppgiijts, would have 
 passed to the creditors' assignee: Blake^^y.- Gould, 24 App. R. 
 154. Affirmed on appeal, 27 S. C. R. 082. 
 
 Future Book Debts appear to fall within this category; so also 
 property which is to he acquired in the future, e.g., future stock 
 in trade ; but with regard to these, see the provisions of the Bills 
 of Sale and Chattel Mortgage Act, R. S. 0. 1897, Cap. 148, sees. 
 11 to 14. 
 
 The Statutes in question are directed against fraudulent alien- 
 ations of property whereby the debtor diminishes his estate and 
 do not touch the case of his neglecting or refusing to enrich him- 
 self, for example, by the acceptance of a legacy: Bain v. Malcolm, 
 13 0. R. 444. 
 
 Preference Permitted by the Statute of Elizabeth. 
 
 This Statute of Elizabeth does not prevent an insolvent debtor 
 from making a preferential transfer of his property for the pur- 
 pose of favouring one or more creditors to the detriment of his 
 other creditors: Middleton v. Pollock, 2 Chy. D. at p. 108; 
 McM aster v. Clare, 7 Gr. at p. 558; Gurofski v. Harris, 27 0. R. 
 at p. 206. 
 
 History of Provincial Legislation. 
 
 After considerable conflict of authority our Courts held that 
 where an insolvent debtor conveyed his property to a purchaser 
 for valuable and adequate consideration, the Statute would not 
 apply, even though both grantor and grantee entered into the 
 transaction for the express purpose of defeating the creditors of 
 the grantor, provided that there was a bond fide intention that 
 the title to the property should pass to the grantee: Dalglish v. 
 McCarthy, 19 Gr. 578; Smith v. Moffatt, 28 U. C. R. 486. 
 
 This induced our Legislature to enact a declaratory Statute 
 which is now embraced in R. S. O. Cap. 115, sec. 3. 
 
 Previous to this our Legislature had passed a Statute relating 
 to Fraudulent Transfers of Property and Preferences of Creditors. 
 This Statute was first consolidated into C. S. U. C. Cap. 26, sees, 
 17 and 18, and afterwards into R. S. O. (1877), Cap. 118. Subse- 
 quently it was included, in an amended form, in R. S. O. (1887), 
 Gap. 124, sees. 1 arid 2,and R. S. O. (1897), Cap. 147, sees. 1 and 2. 
 
 The said Statute as contained in C. S. U. C. and in R. S. O. 
 (1877), Cap. 118, was framed (in so far as it dealt with fraud- 
 ulent transfers to defeat creditors) upon the lines of IS Eliz., but 
 
it was in this feature more restricted in its operation than 13 
 Ehz., as the latter Statute covered transfers botli of realty and 
 of personalty, while the Provincial Statute was confined in its 
 operation to personalty alone; on the other hand it was more 
 extended in its operation than the Statute of Elizabeth, inasmuch 
 as It forbade, while the Statute of Elizabeth permitted the prefer- 
 ence of one creditor over another. 
 
 The effect of the Provincial Statute as contained in R. S. O. 
 (1877), is explained in an article in 3 Can. L. T. 324. 
 
 The said revision of 1887 contained, and the revision of 1897 
 now contains, many additional provisions which had not been 
 contamed in the previous revision; thus it enacted by section 3 
 (1) of that Statute that the same shall not apply (a) to an assitrn- 
 ment made for the rateable payment of the creditors of the as- 
 signor, (b) nor to any bond fide sale or payment made in the ordi- 
 nary course of trade or calling to innocent purchasers, (c) nor to 
 anyixiymentofmoneytoa creditor, (d) nor to any transfer of 
 property made in consideration of any present actual bond tide 
 payment ')f money, (e) or by way of security for any present 
 actual bond fide advance of money, (f) or which is made in con- 
 sideration of any present actual bond fide sale or delivery of 
 goods or other property ; provided that the money paid or the 
 goods or other property sold or delivered bear a fair and reason- 
 able relative value to the consideration therefor. 
 ^ The latter part of this sub-section appears to set at rest a ques- 
 tion regarding which there was a divergence of judicial opinions, 
 namelj , whether mere inadequacy of consideration was sufficient 
 to invalidate a sale of property made by an insolvent debtor, or 
 whether the inadequacy in order to have that effect must be so 
 great as to afford evidence of mala fides. See Carradice v. Cur- 
 
 V'% ^? ^'' ■^^^' ^^(^''-^'itt V. mies, 28 Gr. 346; Crawford v. Meldrum, 
 3 E. & A. 101. 
 
 Purchase is Valid unless Fraudulent Intent of Purchaser 
 
 IS Established. 
 
 Where there is a purchase of property from an insolvent debtor 
 for valuable consideration, the Court requires clear proof of 
 fraudulent intent on the part of the purchaser before it will set 
 aside the purchase, and the fact that the vendor was to the 
 knowledge of the purchaser insolvent at the time of makincr the 
 sale and transfer is of itself insufficient to cause the conveyance 
 to be set aside : Hickerson v. Farrington, IS App. R. 635; and see 
 judgment of Osier, J., in Campbell v. Roche, 18 App. R. at p. 65* 
 
4 
 
 The same doctrine was also applied where the purchaser of the 
 property knew that the vendor was in embarrassed circumstances, 
 and where the purchaser was a creditor of the vendor, and he 
 retained the amount of his claim out of the purchase money, and 
 thereby acquired a preference over other creditors : Lewis v. 
 Brown, 10 App. R. 639. 
 
 Where a business man is in involved circumstances he cannot 
 protect his business assets from his creditors by forming a joint 
 stock company and transferring those assets to the company in 
 consideration for shares in the company, for in such ease, if the 
 intent be to defeat, hinder or delay creditors, the company will be 
 treated as the mere alias or agent of the transferor, and the said 
 assets will be available to his creditors, subject, however, to the 
 rights of the company's creditors : Rielle v. Reid, 28 0. R. 497. 
 
 If a conveyance or security falsely states the consideration, 
 this casts upon the defendant the onus of establishing beyond 
 reasonable doubt that there was valuable consideration, and the 
 unsupported evidence of the defendant will not be sufficient for 
 that purpose : Gigtiac v. Ilev, 29 0. R. 147. 
 
 Purchase Money or Mortgage Money may be Applied in 
 
 Preferring Creditors. 
 
 By section 3 (2) of the revision of 1897, a rider is added, that 
 in case of a valid sale of goods, securities, or property, and pay- 
 ment or transfer of the consideration or part theieof by the 
 purchaser to a creditor of the vendor under circumstances which 
 would render void such a payment or transfer by the debtor per- 
 sonally and directly, the payment or transfer, though valid as 
 respects the purchaser, shall be void as respects the creditor to 
 whom the same is made. 
 
 This applies, however, only to a payment or transfer to a credi- 
 tor of some consideration other than money, for it must be re- 
 membered in this connection, that it has already been provided 
 by section 3 (1), that the Act does not apply to any payme7it of 
 THoney made by an insolvent debtor to his creditor, and therefore 
 it is permissible for an insolvent debtor to sell or mortgage his 
 property for money, and then to pay or cause the purchaser or 
 mortgagee to pay that money to one of his creditors, and even 
 though his so doing should give a preference to that creditor over 
 all his other creditors, yet the transaction is perfectly legal and 
 valid with regard to all the parties thereto. 
 
 This doctrine has been carried so far that it has been held that 
 
 I 
 
:: 
 
 where an insolvent debtor makes sale or mortgaoo of his property 
 for the purpose of using the purchase money or mort-a-e money 
 to prefer cer am of his creditors (other than the purchaser or' 
 mortgagee) the sale or Uiortgage cannot be successfully attacked 
 under the Statute, even though the purchaser or .nortgagoe knew 
 of the debtors intent to effect such preference; John^my. Hope, 
 1/ App. R. 10; Campbell v. Roche, 18 App. R. (I4G ; 21 S. C. R 
 C4o; Burns v. Wihon, 28 S. C. R. at p. 216 
 
 In C'a,Hp6./; y. iJocA. (18 App. R at pp. 654-5-0), Mr. Justice 
 O.ler, says : Tl.e fact that a debtor is insolvent, or on the eve of 
 insolvency does not affect his power to borrow monev on the 
 security of his property, and to give a valid security therefor, 
 even though the lender may know, or have reason to know the 
 state ot his affairs, provided always that the latter is i-rnorant of 
 any intention on the part of the former to contravene l;he provi- 
 sions o the Statute for then the security is taken for a present 
 actual bona ^fide advance in money * * * As the Act has 
 not forbidden the preference of a creditor by the payment of his 
 debt in money, a security given by a debtor for money lent for 
 thatpurpose.isnotinvalidatedby the Act ♦ ♦ * The Le^^is 
 lature has chosen to except from the operation of the Act '^ny 
 payment of naoney to a creditor,' and I do not think we should 
 be justihed in mterpolating the expression 'bond ride' in that 
 clause, in order to infer that if the creditor had notice that the 
 debtor was in a state of insolvency when he made it- it v a 
 payment mala fide and forbidden by the Act." 
 
 It IS not necessary, in order to bring a case within the protec- 
 tion of section 3 (I) of the Act, that the money should have come 
 into the manual possession of the debtor and have been paid over 
 by him to the creditor ; it will be sufficient if the debtor raises 
 the money by mortgaging his property 'o some third person, and 
 sucfi third person, under the direction of the debtor, pays the 
 money to the creditor : Gibbons v. Wilson, 17 App. R 1 John- 
 son V. Hope, 17 App. R. 10. ^^ ' 
 
 If, however, the circumstances shew that the scheme ivas de- 
 vised by the mortgagee or jmrchaser or his agent, for the purpose 
 ot evading the provisions of the Statute, the payment will not be 
 treated as a bona Me advance or payment of money within the 
 Tc'nm ^^'^^"tory exception: Burns v. Wilson, 28 
 
 Endorsing and giving to a creditor the unaccepted cheque of a 
 third person m the debtor's favour is not a payment of money to 
 the creditor by the debtor within the meaning of section 3(1)- 
 Davidson v. Fraser, 23 App. R. 439 ; 28 S. C. R 272 
 
6 
 
 A fmymont by the insolvent's own cheque would probably be a 
 
 With reference to the effect of payin- money or oivin<. a nro- 
 missory note us consideration for a transfer of property Mr C 
 
 IS in . .1 1 1 ^'^''\^ ""^ '' '?"^" ^•'^ »""'<^ «f th« consider- 
 ation in ,1 c lattel mortgage transaction when it was accepted in 
 
 the pace ot n.oney was tantamount to ndvancin.^ the monev 
 
 and the same thing has, I think, been held in other cases '• ST 
 
 mg and Loan Association v. Palmer, 12 O. R. at p g! ' 
 
 Security not Impeachahle unless Secured Creditoii had 
 
 Notice of Insolvency. 
 
 A transaction, entered into by a person in insolvent circum- 
 tTAT: '' "'' ■•"Pe-hable by a creditor unless the credLrZZ 
 ^' h trriV r"-^''-^/'^" ^...^^ o/^/.. transaction had ioi^ 
 01 Lnowledge of the insolvency and did not act in good faith- 
 Mnson V Hope, 17 App. R. 10; -Ashley v. Z^ro..n."l7 A^ R 
 600; Lamh v. Young, 19 O. R. 104. ^' 
 
 n„i^-''""^l? ""???'■ ^" "^"".^ ^""^'^^^ presumption that the notice in 
 
 question should be actual notice of the insolvency and not merely 
 
 mphed or constructive notice thereof, for, the question which has 
 
 to be determ.ned IS a question of intent, and a person's intent 
 
 S\°uf 'T^b' ^' ^f-r^^'^ ^^ ^^''''^ ^y thS latter sort o 
 notice , but If the creditor who receives payment has knowledcre 
 
 cludrtZt tr? S"'" ''^^^^\?^^^---y -"eA o1- business wo^d coS! 
 dude that the debtor is unable to meet his liabilities, he knows 
 within the meaning of the Act, that the debtor is insolvent^' •' 
 l\ationaL Bank of Australasia v. Morris, 1892 A C at n ^qrV 
 A mere suspicion that the transferee knew of the insolvency is 
 not sufficient, there must be affirmative evidence thereof i/c! 
 fohertsj Stem^^, Up.R at p. 372 ; Burns v. MackayTo OR ' 
 
 App R. 20, 28 ; and Rice v. Bryant, 4 App. R. 542, .554. 
 
 fhis rule {ih^i knowledge of the insolvency must be shewn to 
 exis as well on the part of the transferee as^n the parTf th^ 
 t ansferor) applies as well ivhere the transfer operates to gi!e one 
 creditor a preference over others, as where (by reason of its bein« 
 made m pursuance of an absolute sale) it operates to2lahin7r 
 delay or prejudice creditors. Thus, wherf a mort^e"^^^^^^ 
 
 i 
 
 ji 
 
I 
 
 i 
 
 to a creditor by an insolvent debtor to secure payment of one of 
 Us past debts, together with a small present advance, and tin- 
 effect was to pay that creditor in fuU; and thereby ^dvo him a 
 pre erence oyer other creditors, the mort^..^.e ^vJ hold to be 
 "nimpeachable, becanse the morhjar/ee ,Hd not hm»r uf the mart, 
 gayors umAvevcj/ uhen he took the mort;fcu/e.- GihhoiiH v. Mc- 
 Donald, If) 0. R. ^f)l ; LS App. R. ]o!) ; 20 S. V R 587 
 
 In Buv,i,v. Mackan, 10 O. R. 107 (approved of" in Johnmn v 
 Hojpe, 17 App. R. 10), it was held that even when there wa^no 
 present advance, and the inort<jacie tua. given to a creditor h,, an 
 ^n8olvent debtor wholh, for a past indebtedness, v.t tho m<.rtoa,Te 
 could no be successfully impeached by a cre.litor, unle'" he 
 shewed that both parties thereto were inited in a fraudulent 
 ^nte,H. See also AlcRoberts v. Steinof, 11 O. R. at p '^372^'^'''^^ 
 
 VV here, however, a conveyance is vol,, ntary, it is only necessary 
 for the creditor attacking the same to shew fraudulent intent on 
 the part of the grantor: Oliver v. McLauyhlin, 24 O. R. 41. 
 
 Valuable Skcuuitv GIVEN UP by Creditor in Consideration 
 
 OF Payment. 
 
 ma^e u^llTo^ ^vl '^ ''/''^^^^^,^^^^ ^^ case any payment has been 
 made to the creditor of an insolvent debtor which is void under 
 the Act, and any valuable security was given up by the creditor 
 in consideration of the payment the creditor shSl L entitled t^ 
 have the security restored, or its value made good to him before 
 peHy mlTe " "' ''' "'"^" ""' ''" '' the "payment so imln": 
 
 debi-nrln<l'l'!fi K ^^u ^"'^o^lf ^^ ^^^ "^ Promissory note made by the 
 
 ''v^ZtZ ^^l^.y .th^.f^'-editor as security for his claim is not a 
 
 valuable security ' within the meaning of this sub-section ; what 
 
 livpn nn /T'^ ^^ IS some property of the debtor which hals been 
 
 f^r,".!^24°Ap; R.^72:^'"'' '^ '" '-^^ ''^ ^^"^^^^ ^-^^''-• 
 
 By section 3 (5), it is enacted that the Statute shall not aff-ect 
 any payment of money to a creditor, where such creditor by 
 reason or on account of such payment, has lost or been deprived 
 ot, 01 has in good faith given up, any valid security which he held 
 forthepaynientof the debt so paid unless the value of he se 
 cunty IS restored to the creditor.' nor shall it apply to the sub- 
 stitution m good faith of one security for another security for the 
 same debt so far as the debtor's estate is not thereby lessened in 
 value to the other creditors. ^ i^f^^enea m 
 
Preauniably the " valuable security " referreJ to in sub-section 
 4 ami the " valid security " referred to in suh-section 5 are both to 
 be confined to security upon property of the debtor. See Beattle 
 V. Werif/er, 24 App. R. 72. 
 
 Advance to Enablk Debtor to Continue Business. 
 
 By tlie same sub-section 5 it is enacted that the Statute shall 
 notinvahdate a security «,'iven to a creditor for a pre-existing 
 debt vvliere, by reason or on account of the giving of the security 
 an advance in money is made to the debtor by the creditor in the 
 6om^y/Wp belief that the advance will enaljle the debtor to con- 
 tmue his trade or business, and to pay his debts in full See 
 Jioss v. Btum, 10 App. R. 5'y2 ; Kalus v. Heiyet, 1 App. R. 75- 
 Long V. Hancock, 12 App. R. 137 ; 12 S. C. R. 532: Ex p. Wilk- 
 tnaon, 22 Cliy. D. 788. ' ' 
 
 Following Pkoperty oh its Pro(;eeds into the Hands of 
 
 Third Persons. 
 
 Where an insolvent debtor made a transfer of his property to 
 a thn-d person under such circumstances that the transfer could 
 be set aside under the provisions of the Act, it was held that if 
 before action brought for the purpose of setting aside such trans- 
 fer, the property in question had been sold to a bond tide pur- 
 chaser, the original transferee could not be made to account to 
 the creditors of the insolvent debtor for the proceeds of the said 
 property which had come to the hands of such transferee : Davis 
 V. Wickson, 1 0. R. 869; Stuart v. Tremain, 3 0. K 190- Rob- 
 ertson V. Holland, IG O. R. .532 ; Tennant v. GaUoiv, 25 0. R. 56 - 
 I ay lor v Cummings, 27 S. C. R. 589; and Union Bank v Bar- 
 bour, 34 Can. L. J. 326. 
 
 It was held, however, that where the transfer in question was 
 a hctitious one, made, not to a creditor of the insolvent trans- 
 feror, but to a third person, under such circumstances that the 
 transferee would hold the property or the proceeds thereof in 
 trust for the transferor, then such transferee could be called to 
 account to the creditors of the transferor, provided that either 
 the property m question or the proceeds thereof were in the 
 fiands of the transferee at the time ot the commencement of the 
 action : Masuret v. Stewart, 22 O. R. 290 ; and see Taylor v. Cum- 
 mmgs, 27 S. C. R. 589; and Union Ba-'- - « -' -- - 
 
 n 
 
 I 
 
 L. J. 326. 
 
 V. Barbour, 34 Can. 
 
 L 
 
9 
 
 ! 
 
 Tho application of the doctrino of these cases induced the 
 Loj,aslature to intervene by an enactnuMit which was contained in 
 K. S (). (1887) Cup. 1 24, secrtions 7 an<l N, the effect. .f whieh wax 
 that when an action was brguLfht hy jm fissiir„ei. for ereditors, 
 attacking' ii fifunhilent convevunee or t'randulen't prefen-nce or hy 
 a erechtor (under the authority of a Jndj'/s ortler) in the name of 
 the assignee, then if the transferee of the property in (|uestion 
 (detenchint) had spkl or disposed of such projicrty, the i»iiuntitl" 
 nught seiise or recover the moneys or otlier proceeds' realize.! there- 
 for as fidly and ertcctually as he could have seized or recovered 
 the property in (piestion if it were stid reniainin.' in the posses- 
 sion or control of the defendant. 
 
 Thi.s provision was foun 1 to be ineffective to protect creditors. 
 becau.se it did not apply unless the insolvent debtor had made an 
 a.s.signment for the benefit of his creditors, and accordin.rly the 
 Legislature extended the remedy of creditors by an Act [ok Vic. 
 Cap. 28 .sections 1, 2, '.] ami 4), which came into force on the 16th 
 day of April, iH'jo (now contained in the revision of 181)7, Cap, 
 147, sec. 10). This Statute enacts that in case of a tran-sfer of 
 any property which in law i.s invalid ngainst creditors if the 
 person to whom the property was tiansferred shall have sold or 
 disposed of, realized or collected, the same or anv juirt thereof, the 
 money or other proceeds realized by such persoi'i may be seize'd or 
 recovered in any action by a person who would be entitled to 
 seize and recover the property if it had remained in the po.sses- 
 sion or control of the debtor or of the person to whom the original 
 transfer was made, and such right to seize and recover shall beion^r 
 not only to an assignee for the general benefit of the creditors of 
 the said debtor, but .shall exist in favour of all creditors of such 
 debtor in case there is no such assignment. 
 
 Where there ha.s been no assignment for the benefit of credi- 
 tors, and the proceeds realized as aforesaid are of a character to 
 be seizable under execution, they may be seized under the execu- 
 tion of any creditor i.ssued against the debtor, and .shall be dis- 
 tributable amongst the creditors under the Creditors' Kelief Act, 
 and the Acts amending the same or otherwise. 
 
 Where there has been no assignment for the benefit of creditors, 
 and whether the proceeds realized as aforesaid are or are not of a 
 character to be seized under execution, an action may be brought 
 therefor by a creditor (whether an execution creditor or not), on 
 behalf of himself and all other creditors, or such other proceed- 
 ing,? may be taken as may be necessary to render the said pro- 
 ceeds available for the general benefit of the creditors ; but this 
 

 10 
 
 Foperty.^'" "°* ^^^^^ '' ^°'^"'*^ ^"""^'"^ purchasers of the 
 
 The following is an attempt to paraphrase the existing statu 
 tory provisions touching this subject : existing statu- 
 
 A Where there is an assignment for creditors. 
 
 (1) Ihe assignee may bring an action to recover from a fraudu- 
 lent transferee of the debtor's property, the proceeds of a saL of 
 such property, made by such transferee in anv case n wh ch he 
 
 ;rslro?rir ''-'-'^ ^^-^^^^ ^^ ^^^ .emainrd^rn'tS: 
 
 assignee bring such action for his own benefit 
 
 if. Where there is no assignment. 
 
 (1) Any creditor of an insolvent debtor may brine, an action 
 
 o recover, from a fraudulent transferee of the deb or^s propei^^^^^ 
 
 the proceeds of a sale of such property, made by such transferee' 
 
 many case m which he could hav'e recovered the property itself 
 
 if It had remained in the possession of the debtor. ^ ' ^ 
 
 aot^n w\^''^'''r'^ i^^,''"- }P ^^^' ^"^^ '^ ^«"ld «eem that any such 
 
 andalVothp!^,.]/ *"' w" '""f^ *^^ on oehali of the plaintiff 
 thtglLtllttoTcr:^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^"^^ P--^« -- '^^^e for 
 
 uJa^ A"y execution creditor of such debtor may, without action 
 and under his execution against the debtor, seize such proce ds 
 ^rni?/'rr ^f^'^'^'"^ ^^ be seizable under execution, Tnd such 
 KBe?i:l?Act! "P'" ^^'^"^ distributable under the Credt 
 (3) Any creditor of such debtor may 
 
 that p^uV»e • '""'' °"'" P™'=^^<""S^ ''^ «■->• ^ necessary for 
 but not as against innocent purchasers of the property. 
 
 clatses'of Xesfatwf!''! "'"itations in the operation of these 
 vTt °; s ^''Jj'^'%'*'?""'' "V he made to Exchanqe Rank 
 \.nti„Mn, b O. R. Coy, am! Excluitit/e Bai ' " 
 
 la7»(/e Bank v. Counsell.S OB. 
 
1 
 
 o 
 
 11 
 
 Since the passinrj of tlic aincnding Statute the right of an 
 
 assignee for creditors to call a transferee of property to account 
 
 tor the proceeds of .sucli property as Jias been disposed of by him 
 
 before the commencement of the action to set aside the transfer 
 
 has been discussed in the case of Meharg v. Liimbera (23 App. r' 
 
 51), in which It was hold that when an assignment of book debts 
 
 IS set aside as a preference, in an action by an assignee for credi- 
 
 tors, the preferred creditor must pay to the assignee all moneys 
 
 collected by him under the profciontial security before the attack 
 
 upon It. Chief Justice Meredith was of opinion that this would 
 
 follow witi;out the necessity for any statutory provision touchincr 
 
 the obligation to account; lie says (pp 53-4), " The effect of th? 
 
 setting aside of the assignment of t:. book debts in this case 
 
 IS that the assignment becomes, and is, utterly void, and that 
 
 being so, It follows that the moneys collected bv the defendant 
 
 are the proceeds of part of the property vested ii^the assignee by 
 
 force of the assignment, and ho is entitled to treat the defendant 
 
 as holding them in trust for him." This view is concurred in bv 
 
 Mr. Justice Oser (p. 63), and Mr. Justice Maclennan, althoucrh 
 
 personallv doubting thought (p. Go) that this must follow from 
 
 the decision of the Supreme Court in Clarkaon y. McMastevr2o 
 
 f ,- ^ V .^V> c!'^'^^ ^^""'^" thought that apart from tlie effect 
 
 of section 8 R S O Cap. 124. the view expressed by Chief 
 
 Justice Meredith should prevail, but that the effect of section 8 is 
 
 to circumscribe the right to an account (pp. 58, G2-3); Chief Jus- 
 
 tice Hagarty thought that the plaintifi's right to such an account 
 
 was clearly given to him by section 8, 
 
 Doctrine of Puessure. 
 
 .u^^l^u "'^^''^'>'^^\of pressure " which is applied to the working of 
 the Statute relating to fraudulent preferences, makes it ahnost 
 ineffective for the purpose of preventing i^referential transfers of 
 property, in cases which do not fall within the operation of the 
 provisions of Cap. 147. sec. 2 (4), hereinafter referred to. 
 
 Ihis doctrine is based upon the gro(in<l that in order to bring 
 a case within the Statute, Uie intent to defraud or to prefer must 
 exist m the mind both of the transferor and the transferee and 
 it the transfer be made on account of the importunity or threats 
 of the creditor, then the transferor can not be said to liave made 
 the transfer with intent to prefer a creditor, but he did it rather 
 
 \vru ^^^^ escaping the pressure of that creditor. 
 
 Where a transferor is criminally liable for misappropriating 
 
12 
 
 money, any security given by him for the return of the money 
 may be supported under the doctrine of pressure, as the fear of 
 penal consequences, is, of itself, sufficient pressure to take from 
 
 bLTT% //' '^;f%'''n"^^ ^'"'""^'-^^^^ preference: Molson's 
 Bank V. haltcv, 18 S. C. R. 88: and see Ex » Tav/nv li.> 
 
 Goklsmid, 18 Q. B. D. 295 ; Bahceil v. Tp. of If S.^^/sf ^p^ r! 
 
 It appears to be now settled that a mere request by the credi- 
 tor without even a threat of legal proceedings, is sufficient to 
 BnlhTl ir t^L'^nT^ ^"y fraudulent character : (#o^«on'« 
 fri.L lo'i"' ^^S- 9- ^- I'P- ^^■''' ^"^^■^^" ''■ (Millard: 21 0. R. 
 
 ^y U. K. 147;) and this is so, however desperate the affairs of the 
 debtor may be at the time, and notwithstanding the creditor's 
 knowledge of the debtor's insolvency : (Davies v. Gillard 21 R 
 pp^435-6 ; 19 App. R. 432; Step/Js v. Mo ArtMcr; 198 C R P 
 4D6;;and also notwithstanding that the property comprised in 
 the preferential security is all the property owned by the debtor • 
 CDaviesv. G^llard 19 A^pTp. R. 432 provided always that the 
 piessure exercised by the request was not a mere sham brought 
 about by collusion between the debtor and the creditor: {Davies 
 V. Gdlard, 21 0. R. p^ 43G.) In order that a preference shall be 
 deemed an unjust preference within the meaning of the Act the 
 giving of It must be the spontaneous act of the debtor not origin- 
 ating in a demand or some other step or active interference of 
 the creditor : (il/o^son'« Bank v. Halter, 18 S. C. R. p 95 StZ 
 phens V. McArthur, 19 S. C. R. pp. 446, 453, 463.) ' ' 
 
 Mr. Justice Osier m a recent case says with reference to the 
 doctrine of pressure: "Whenever it is available to support an 
 instrument attacl^ed as being an unjust preference, I consider the 
 law thereon in this Province to be as it is stated in such cases as 
 
 i^o7 . ^32 i/o/sons Bank v. Halter (1890), 18 S. C. R 88 • 
 
 25 A^^'S: It ^7o. ^''''' ' ^- ^- '''-" ^^''- - ^'-— '' 
 
 A recent judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
 
 Council deals with the doctrine of piessure in a case in which an 
 
 f« .,T. ""l ^f ^ ^?.^««"t^d to judgment in favour of one of 
 
 rov df^"''' ^- ?^'- J^^St^t"te touching the matter was one 
 proMding against acase where an insolvent debtor "voluntarily 
 "lifhllr^i'''^^ a creditor" gives a confession of judgment 
 
 with intent thereby to give one or more of the creditors of any 
 
 . 
 
 1 f 
 
 4 
 
13 
 
 ■, 
 
 i 
 
 such person a preference over his other creditors." The juJcr. 
 ment says :— " If the appellant's case had only been that there was 
 a fraudulent preference of the bank, tht pressure by the bank 
 might have been an answer to it ; but their Lordships do not see 
 how pressure alone can be an answer to a case which alleges col- 
 lusion. The Statute is in the alternative. The confession of 
 judgment may be given either voluntarily or by collusion with a 
 creditor. In either case, if there is the intent to defeat or delay 
 creditors or to give a preference over other creditors, the confes- 
 sion is made null and void against creditors. In Gill v Conti- 
 nental Gas Co. (L. R. 7 Ex. '337), Lord Bramwell said that the 
 word ' collusion ' only signified agreement. In their Lordships' 
 opinion ' collusion ' in this section means agreement or acting in 
 concert " : Edison General Electric Co. v. Westminster, etc. 'Co 
 1897, A. C. 193. 
 
 There appears to be nothing in this which is inconsistent with 
 the cases previously cited. 
 
 Provincial Legislation Operates Concurrently with the 
 
 Statute of Elizabkth. 
 
 Our Statute relating to fraudulent conveyances and preferences 
 has, by the amendments already referred to, been so extended in 
 its operation as to cover both realty and personalty. The result 
 is that comparatively few cases can now arise in this Province in 
 which the Statute of Elizabeth will require to be applied, as our 
 Provincial Statute is in pari materia therewith, and is broader 
 in its scope than the Statute of Elizabeth. 
 
 The cases under the Statute of Elizabeth are, however, still 
 applicable to conveyances to delay, hinder or defraud creditors 
 (as distinguished from conveyances to prefer creditors), and they 
 are probably more favourable to the attacking creditor than tho.se 
 under the Provincial Statute. 
 
 The most material statutory provisions now in force relating to 
 fraudulent transfeis to defeat cieditors, or to prefer one creditor 
 over another, other than those already mentioned, may be epitom- 
 ised as follows : Every transfer of any property made by a person 
 at a time when he is in in.solvent circumstances or is' unable to 
 pay his debts in full luith intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or preju- 
 dice his creditors, or made to or for a creditor, ivifh intent to give 
 such creditor an unjust preference over other creditors, shafl be 
 void as against the cieditors who -a damnified by such transfer, 
 and if any such transfer made to < > for a, creditor A as the effect of 
 
14 
 
 Sri"^f T^ ''''^'^'^''' ^ P^"«ference over other creditors, it .sliall with 
 
 respee toany proceeding taken to impeach the tran.sfe. will n 
 
 IX y days thereafter, or if the debtor within sixty days after he 
 
 transfer makes an assi<.nment for the benefit of cVeditorf ,' 't 
 
 This provision of the Statute leaves the doctrine of pressure to 
 stil have full operation and efFe.t save only in those e^es in 
 which a transfer of property has the effect of givin' a credTtor " 
 preference over other creditors, and where procldi" gs Imve been 
 taken to impeach such transfer within sixty days thereafter or 
 f he debtor within sixty days after such tra^>^s4r ma kes'an 
 
 siprRVf ''"^' °^ ^'' ''''^'''''''- ^^^^^^^^-- ^^^^'- 
 
 A question arose with regard to the construction of the origi- 
 
 which t^l? '"- ^"P- ^^^' '^^''^^''' '^' P^-e«un,ption of intent 
 which in certain cases was raised under the provisions of that 
 
 tha\T;/V r ''^T""'! '^ irrebuttable. The^Sta ute pi^v ded 
 
 mfelt^JruZT:'^''^^^^^^ '^ r^^^ff ^creditor I prefer, 
 
 ence it shall under the circumstances therein mentioned be nre- 
 sumed to have been made with the intent to prefer and to bfan 
 
 the sSo'^v" ^' '^f ' '^'^'i ^^""^ *'^" Pi-esumption mentioned in 
 the Statute arises only ,n the case of an insolvent debtor nre- 
 
 to the case o such a debtor making a transfer of property by way 
 of sale or settlement which has th? effect of defeatmg dehty'Z 
 or prejudicing his creditors, unless the purchaser be a credito? 
 who retains his claim out of the purchase money and theX 
 obtains a pretei-ence. because the Statute provides that undei the 
 circumstances therein mentioned the transaction shall be presumed 
 
 is ^L^d'Sv^aTlrr Y^^' 'Y' '^' presumption in question 
 Hnn^n I • ^ ^l^f^'ine of pressurc, and that the presump- 
 tion does not arise with reference to a transfer which has the 
 effect of preferring a creditor, but which mav he supported uDon 
 some other doctrine than that of pressure • Yal7ov\ ^tc^^ 
 20 App. R. 464. " ^Iea^»-^^e. i.au-^on v. Melicuvn, 
 
 Jn this case. Mr. Justice Osier holds that the presumption is 
 
 . 
 
 
15 
 
 
 ., 
 
 general, and is not confined to cases of piessure, and that the 
 presumption is irrebuttable. Chief Justice Hagarty and Mr. 
 Justice Burton in the same case fail to determine whether the 
 presumption is general in its scope, or whether it is confined to 
 cases of preference, but they both hold that it is rebuttable in all 
 cases, while Mr. Justice ¥ ^cIennan holds that it is irrebuttable in 
 every case of preference which is sought to be supported upon 
 the doctrine of pressure alone, (See also Wehter v. Gnckmore 
 25 App. R. 97.) 
 
 All of the Judges, however, were of the opinion that a transfer 
 by way of mortgage which was given within the sixty days men- 
 tioned in the Act, and which had the effect of preferring a credi- 
 tor, was not open to attack, when it appeared that the mortgage 
 loas made pursuant to an antecedent agreement made more than 
 sixty days before the transaction was attacked, and when the 
 mortgagee had no notice of the insolvency of the debtor. 
 
 This moot question, whether the statutory presumption of 
 intent is rebuttable or irrebuttable, has now been solved by a 
 change in the wording of the Statute, introduced into the Revised 
 Statutes of 1897 (Cap. 147, see. 2 (:j) (-t)), whereby it is provided 
 that the intent shall ha prima facie presumed. 
 
 Security Given Pursuant to Prior Agueemknt. 
 
 As shewing how a security, which would otherwise be an unjust 
 preference and void, may be valid and elective because given in 
 pursuance of a prior agreement to which it relates back, reference 
 may be made to Clarkson v. Stirling (15 Apj). R. 234), Embury 
 V. West (15 App. R. at pp. 300-1),' and Lawson v. McGeoch 
 (20 App. R. 4U4). 
 
 Such a security will be validated by such an agreement if the 
 mortgagor believed that by reason of the agreement he was under 
 an obligation to give the security: Re ttveedale, 1892, 2 Q. B. 
 210 ; but see Exp. Fisher, L. P. 7 Chy. 630. 
 
 If the creditor voluntarily abstains from enforcing such an 
 agreement with a view of protecting the debtor's credit, or refrains 
 from enforcing it until insolvency is imminent, the security, when 
 given, will not be validated by the prior agreement. See Clark- 
 son v. Stirling, 15 App. R. at p. 237, and cases there cited. 
 
 An agreement to give secuiity, made in good faith, may, even 
 though it is indefinite in its terms, avail to rebut the j)re.sumption 
 of intent to prefer; but where the giving of security, pursuant to 
 such agreement, is deliberately postponed in order to avoid injury 
 
IG 
 
 to the debtoi's credit or to avoid tlie statutory nresumntinn tl.. 
 agreement to e ve the <i(.r>iii;t., u. „t '"*""'".'/ presumption, the 
 more. 25 App°R 97 "^ " "^ "° «™'' ■ '»'«''«'«■ v. a-idc 
 
 insolvency, and if the creditor took hi, seeuHtvTn l,„t f„ / 
 the purpose of evading the provisions of the A^ct as t°e'effct 
 of a„^ass,gnm=nt within sixty days: B.-ee.e v. Kn::Xt;t 
 
 Insolvent Cihcuaistances. 
 Who is a Creditor that mav^ be Attacked ? 
 
 for trust funds whLh L^^^nl^^^j:^ '^"^'^X 
 
r. 
 
 17 
 
 this security cannot be set aside as a fraudulent preference 
 because a trustee and his cestui que trust do not stand in the 
 i-elation of debtor and creditor, within the meaning of the Statute • 
 Molsons Bank v. Halter, 18 S. C. R. 88; Ex ^x Taylor-Re 
 Goldsmid, 18 Q. B. D. 295 ; Ex p. Stuhbins, 17 Chy. D. 58 • New 
 Prance etc. v Hunting, 1897, 2 Q. B. 19 ; Hahuellv. Tp. of Wil- 
 mot, 24 App. R. (J28. i-^^j frtv 
 
 Who is a Cheditoh that May Make an Attack ? 
 
 A plaintiff may establish his status as a creditor by shewing 
 that there is an nnplied contract on the part of the insolvent 
 debtor to indemnify the plaintiff against a mortgage on lands 
 24^ R 4f ' '"^^'^ ^'^ *^' '^^^*^'- ^^''''' "^'^J^^r.anghlin, 
 A mortgagee is not a creditor who can attack an alleged fraud- 
 ulent transfer made by his mortgagor, unless he first establishes 
 by evidence that the mortgaged property is an insufficient security 
 for payment of his claim : rjiarh v. Hamilton, etc., Society, 9 O. R 
 177; Cromhie v. Young, 26 O. R. 194. 
 
 A person who has a right of action against an insolvent debtor 
 tor tort IS not a creditor who can maintain an action under our 
 statute D impeach a transfer of property made by the debtor • 
 j'MeyyLroiun, 17 App. R. 500; and see Cameron v. Cusack, 17 
 App. R. 489 ; but such a person can maintain such an action 
 under the Statute of Elizabeth, for the latter Statute is not like 
 our Provincial Statute, limited in its operation to the claims of 
 creditors only, but it is a Statute for the avoiding of fraudulent 
 conveyances etc., contrived to " delay, hinder or defraud creditors 
 and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts 
 damages, penalties, fo.-feitures." etc. See Ashley v. Broivn 17 
 App. K. at p 503 : and Gurofski v. Harris, 27 0. R. 201 ; affirmed 
 on appeal, 23 App. R. 717. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that one who has obtained a judgment in 
 an action for tort cannot maintain a: i action to set aside a transfer 
 pt property made by the judgment debtor previous to the obtain- 
 ing of the judgment and which has the effect of preferring another 
 creditor, for he has no status to maintain an attack under our 
 provincial Statute, and he cannot maintain an attack under the 
 btatute 13 Ehz., because that Act does not forbid the preferring 
 o7 o'^'l', ' 52 ^^^P^-^J^^^'^^of another : Gurofskl v. Harris, 
 
 tl^' n ' ? ?T/"^ ^" ^^PP^^^' 2^ ^PP- ^- 717 ; and see Mont- 
 
 ^ornery v. Corbit, 24 App. R. 311. . 
 
18 
 
 R at p 324 "^ •'"'^"*' • ^^^ ^/on^r/o7He>-// v. Cori/^, 24 App. 
 
 26 Gr. 435. ^ ' ^' ^^ • ^'^ ' 5 and il/amr^'^ v. Mitchell, 
 
 Voluntary Settlements. 
 
 Montreal v. Davis. 9 0. R, 556 ; Jk^p. feo« Vo B d' «f 
 If. however, such a conveyance be mL with a vie^to put«ng 
 
 I 
 
19 
 
 I 
 
 the property beyond the chances and nncertaintie.s of business in 
 which the grantor is engaged or is about to become engaged, the 
 conveyance cannot be supported : Ferguson v. Kenny, IG App. 
 
 A voluntary conveyance of part of his estate made by a retired 
 and successful hotel-keeper to his wife at a time when he was in 
 solvent circumstances, but was, after some months of idleness, 
 about to take up the hotel-keeping business again, was upheld as 
 against subsequent creditors, the grantor's subsequent insolvency 
 bemg caused by loss by fire : Fleming v. Edivards, 23 App. R. 
 718. 
 
 "Where a voluntary settlement is made with a view to the 
 uncertainties of businef-s by a person about to engage in business, 
 the settlement will be very closely inquired into; and where it 
 embraces the whole of the settlor's property it will be difficult to 
 resist the conviction that it was made in order to hinder and 
 defeat creditors in the event of business proving unsuccessful, so 
 far as the withdrawal of the settled property would have that 
 efTect * * *. Parties are to he taken to contemplate that 
 ivhich ts the natural consequence of their acts " : Camnhell v. 
 Chapman, 26 Gr. at pp. 242-3, 
 
 " A person must be ta..en to intend what is the natural conse- 
 quence of his acts. Therefore, although there was no such inten- 
 tion, still if I saw that the necessary effect of the deed was to 
 defeat or delay creditors, I must see in the execution of the deed 
 an intention to do so " : Per North, J., in Be Maddever, 27 Chy. 
 D. at p. 526. ^ 
 
 Intent to Defraud— How Rebutted. 
 
 ^ The Court must take into consideration all the surrounding 
 circumstances and come to a conclusion therefrom whether the 
 conveyance was made with the intent to defeat, etc. See Re 
 Johnson, 20 Chy. D. 389 ; Garr v. Corfield, 20 O. R. 218. 
 
 _" Where the prospect that the person subject to the liability 
 will be called upon is so remote that it would not enter into any 
 one's calculations, I do not say that the existence of the contin- 
 gent liability would make a settlement bad. For instance, if a 
 person had taken shares in the Glasgow Bank at a time when 
 everybody believed them to be a valuable property, it would be 
 difficult to hold that a settlement made by him while the Bank 
 was in good credit was invalid, though the liability turned out 
 ruinous " : Per Lord Selborne, L. C, in R 'idler, 22 ^ iv D. at 
 p. 79; but see Crombie v. Young, 26 0. R. it^4. 
 
20 
 
 Where a husband gave a bill of s«le to his wife to secure 
 advances made by her, and it was afterwards found that this bill 
 ot sale was invalid, and the husband imnjediately before his 
 bankruptcy gave a new bill of sale in substitution for the former 
 one. this was held to be valid because the debtor believed himself 
 to be under an ohlvjation to make the new bill of sale : Be Tivee- 
 dale, 1802, 2 Q. B. 21G ; but see Ex p. Fisher, L. R. 7 Chy. G36 
 
 In order that an assignment of the whole of a debtor's i)ro- 
 perty as security for an existing debt may be held to be not 
 traudu ent on the ground that the assignee agreed to make fur- 
 ther advances to the assignor, it is not necessary that the anree- 
 nient to make such advances should be technically bindi.rrr at 
 law or in equity ; a bond fide promise is sufficient: Ex p. Willin- 
 son, 22 Chy. D. 788, '^ 
 
 Where a chattel mortgagee sells under the power of sale in his 
 mortgage, and after payment of his moitgage claim applies the 
 surplus inpayment of an unsecured debt due by the mort<^agor 
 to him, this is not a preference within the meaning of the'' Act 
 because there was no agreement between the mortgagor and 
 niortgagee that such a course should be pursued, and therefore 
 there could not be said to be any gift, conveyance, assignment or 
 transfer of anything made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay or 
 prejudice the creditors of the assignor: Stephens v. Boisseo.ii, 2S 
 App. R. 230 ; affirmed 20 S. C. R. 437. 
 
 Debtor of Insolvent Purchasing Claims for Purpose 
 
 OF Set-off, 
 
 Where a peison is in insolvent circumstances, a debtor of his 
 having knowledge of such insolvency, may, at any time before 
 the insolvent makes an assignment for the benefit' of creditors 
 purchase outstanding liabilities of the insolvent for the purpose 
 of setting them off against his own liability ; and after an assign- 
 ment for creditors has been made by the insolvent the purchaser 
 may so set oft the said liabilities, .so previously purchased by him 
 against the claim made upon him by the assignee for creditors': 
 Ihibaudeau v. Garland, 27 O. R. 391. 
 
 How Plaintiff is to Establish his Claim. 
 
 When the plaintiff as a judgment creditor attacks an alleged 
 fraudulent transfer mac}e by his debtor, he is not usuallv able to 
 mamtain his action and prove his own status by merely adducing 
 
 + 
 
21 
 
 in evidenco the judgment which ho has obtained ayaiiist the 
 tramferor, for although that judgment is conchisive to establish 
 as against the transferor and third peisons (including the trans- 
 feree), that the plaintifi' is a creditor of the transf'eior, jet it is no 
 evidence as against tlie transferee of any of the allegations upon 
 which that judgment was based; it is evidence that on the date 
 when judgment was entered the transferor was indebted to the 
 plaintiff, but it is no evidence of the nature of the indebtedness 
 or the time when it was incurred, and it is usually necessary for 
 the plaintiff to adduce evidence of these facts as against the 
 transferee in order to establish that the transfer was fraudulent 
 as against himself : Allan v. McTaviah, 28 Gr. 539 ; « App. K. 440. 
 
 Relief G? anted to Execution Cueditou and to Simple 
 Contract Creditor. 
 
 Where a creditor attacks a transfer as fraudulent he may shew 
 that he is an execution creditor, in which case he may maintain 
 his action in his own name alone, and the effect of a successful 
 judgment will be to set aside the fraudulent transfer and leave 
 his execution to operate thereon ; or, if he be not an execution 
 creditor, he must sue on behalf of himself and all other creditors, 
 and his relief will be confined to setting aside the transfer, leaving 
 him to resort to some independent proceeding to obtain execution 
 against the property : Oliver v. McLaughlin, 24 O. R. 41. 
 
 A simple contract creditor may, on behalf of himself and all 
 other creditors, bring an action for a declaration of the invalidity 
 of his debtor's assignment or transfer, even though at the time of 
 bringing such action his debt be not yet due: Macdonald v. 
 McCall, 12 App. R. 593. 
 
 It would appear that the proposition contained in Oliver v. 
 McLaughlin, that a simple contract creditor can obtain no further 
 relief in a fraudulent conveyance action than a mere declaration 
 of the invalidity of the conversance, leaving him to resort to an 
 independent proceeding to obtain execution against the property, 
 must be confined to cases where the plaintiff's claim is not yet 
 due and payable, because where the plaintiff's claim is due and 
 payable there is a well-settled practice of the Court to give him 
 judgment, for the recovery of his claim, which judgment goes on 
 to provide for the taking of an account of the claims of all credi- 
 tors, and in default of payment of those claims, for a sale of the 
 lands in question one year after the date of the judgment, unless 
 it should appear that any creditor other than the plaintiff has a 
 
n 
 
 Pajitiks to Action. 
 App! rI 72 °' " '""P"' P^'^y^ *«"•" "• '»'<'«y«'', 2* 
 
 CONSTiniTlONALlTV OF THE STATUTE, 
 
 Canada; and presumably the bafance of ihJ%^.,,T. ? 
 upon the same botincr- AttornenG.ZZjl/n^^ • ^"^^ '^^"'^'^ 
 General of Canada, fsH Ic! m ^^^^^«^*'^ ^- "^^iornei,-