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Les diagrammes suivants illustreht la m^thode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 t^ V, /w^i-^w. imilPipPMPPV^ ?fy:y-"T^' '"j-f^*?'^"""' ^ MtJ^WimLM Mmna v/aJtiino &m '' Q/rwAfj V, ..W4.'S»«»*a*«>'-; l%l%. § ' '"iBWIIiSPPW.. tijwii -imsji'- '1} ipmpPHPiHHHHl MB\ ii lii ,%-.;.sm ^ HISTORICAL DETAILS, HAVING RELATION TO THB CAMPAIGN OF Tifis NORTH- WESTEEN ARMY, UNDER GENERALS HARRISON AND WINCHESTER, DURING* THE WINTEE OF 1812-lS. T0O£TU£U WITH \ ii SOME PARTICULARS RELATING TO TBB SVRUE^BEU OF FORT BOJVFEMt m. ; •w ft*. «** " Truth, " That fears no frowns, and seeks no blind applause." SarhnU Conspiracy .th tenderness-with common humanity_or his grey .airs with respect? Was Napoleon Bonaparte. nf7a forlorn and abandoned exile at St. Helena; Ies.s a gene '■^If % J HISTORICAL DETAILS. 7 i-al at Mounl St. John or Waterlm», than when he wa- di'd to victory and tite. pinr»acle of military r^iown, -through the blood of Marengo and Auslerlitz? Did the reversal of the attainder of Algernon Sidney, by act of parliament, malie him a greater or a better man, than he was when .ironght to the block, slaggering nnder a load of infamy, cast upon him by the judgment and sen- tence of Jeffries? wj^en, in truth, his intrinsic worth, and bis services to the human race, should have clothed his memory with in aortal fame— and " shed a splen- dor round the horrors of his grave." B.it to appreciate man by reverses, is neither :■;»» greatest misfortune nor the grealest injustice to which men in pul)lic life are 8u!,ject. With the generality of mankind, to want success is tc want integrity. TSic statesman who fails to consummate his plans, no matter what meana may be put within his grasp, is aCataUne : and the general whos.i destiny is disaHtrons, without a dispassionate investigation either of his me-ns of pre- venting misfortune or his motives for acting, is stigma- tized with the epithet of traitor ! In time of war, when there exists a great degree of public excitement, our ex- pectations are s-^ldom reasonable. Achievements avo anticipated without a consideration of the insurmounta- ble barriers which frequently oppose thfmsplves— and. the measure of our expectations is, not what we have put it in the power of p »l)lic men to execute, but what we ardently desire to see performed. When tlie feel- ing's expand; when the mind is elevated with a peru- sal of the t)fficiai details of a decisive vict(»ry, and die sentiment of national glory pj^rvades (he breast, we eu- logize the victor for uoihing bvit fho, moment of triumph, I i i ^ '\*- .,?»**■- ,;:i«*afc! ^: \ — ..XJ^ a 8 HISTORICAL DETAIL*. I, forg.-tting tliat previous preparations were the precur- sors, of which the victory was no more than the result So, when the feelings arc chilled, when the mind is; depressed with the enunciation of a public disaster, anil the sentiment of national degradation takes possession of the bosom, we view the responsible officer, with pain- fill abhorrence, as the medium of disgrace, without ta- king into consideration the causes, perhaps too stub- born for control, which conspired in the production of his misfortunes. We turn a deaf ear to his attempts at justification ; and, after lacerating his sensibilities by neglect, and wounding his honor by insult or contempt, we force him to appeal to posterity for justice— and to seek, in a life of solitude, for that happiness which so- ciety unjustly denies him. In the preceding observations, it will not be difficult to discover a solicitude for the good opinion of my coua- trymen. I do not solicit it from their grace, I claim it from their impartiality. The man who has become in- sensible to the value of respect, has ceased to deserve it; and he who can receive the consideration of society as a favor, knowing it to be such, is dead to every seia- timL'nt of honor. JAMES WINCHESTER, HISTORICAL DETAILS. 9 j\ro. u. « Heaven is just ! When tlie measure of iniquity is full, Truth will bare its arm, aud launch itd lightning.'^ Colonel Wells was cjriginally destined to com- mand a detachment of troops for the mnforcement of general Hull, at Detroit. About this period I was at Lexington, Kentucky, superintending a r4?cruiting dis- trict, and occasionally at Newport and Cincinnati, foi: the purpose of expediting the equipment of this de- tachment. Whilst engaged in this service, information was receiFed of the fall of Detroit, and the capture of general Hull. This change ia the aspect of the war ou 5ie north-western frontier, induced me to assume the command of the detachment, which at that time had not left Cincinnati, and to communicate the knowledge of my conduct, with the reasons, to the war department. About this period general Harrison arrived, and inti- mated a right to the command j predicated on a commis- sion of major generulf then recently received from th^ governor of ICentucky.^ Objections to the intended procedure of general Harrison were made. They were imavailing. Two or three notes passed between us ; and when finally an interview took place, it was agreed, that general Harrison might assume the command, hut on his own responsibility. I was induced to concede the point for several reasons. I had myself assumed * See Appendix Q, captain Eastland's letter, near the begin- 10 HISTORICAL DETAILS. the command:' it was not yet known to the President — nnd might not meet his approbation. In addition, I was tieiermined, that the public service should never suffer from a personal contention with general Harrison. It was of infinilely more moment that the troops should not be retarded, than that either general Harrison or myself sliould command. For the above considerations I returned to Lexington, Ky. resuming the superinten- flency oi* the recruiting service ; and general Harrison marclied t!ic detachuieru in question for Fort Wayne. A short time after this period, I received orders from the secretary of war, forthwith to take command of the north-western artoy. It is presumed that general Har- riison had official notice of this event ; for, ouiay arrival at Fort Wayne, where the troops then lay, the command of them was relinquished by the general with apparent* cordiality, who engaged on his return passing St. Ma- ry's, to hasten on a detachment halted there, for the purpose of opening a road to the site of Old Fort Defi- ance. Hcj also engaged to forward Supplies with all possible expedition ; it being not unknown to the gencr lal, that I intended to march the following day with 4ije army at Fort Wayne for Defiance. It was also not unknown to general Harrison, that the utmost expedi- tion was essential — t!iat not more than seven or eierht days provisions could be found in camp, and that they would be consumed on the march. f My communication; under date loth September^ 1813, to brigadier general Cushing; and one under ' See Appendix A, general Harrisou** general order, '• Sec 4t!> jmraErraph Q. I HISTOBICAL DETAII.S. 11 le President — iddition^ I was Id never suffer Harrison. It troops should il Harrison or considerations he superinten- leral Harrison ort Wayne. ed orders from tmmand of the t general Har- ouiay arrival , the command ith apparent* ssing St. Ma- there, for the JlUFortDcfi. plies with all n to the gener ing day with ; was ali^o noL tmost expedi- even or eight and that thcv I September, id one iintlcj' il order. dkte the 20th of the same month, to general Hjirrison, will prove conclusively, that I entertained no sentiment^? of hostility against him. It appears however to have been otherwise with the general ; for instead of forwar- din- supplies from St. Mary's to Defiance, for the sal- vatfon of a starving army, I have it from high authori- ty,* that theS semval was intriguing with the officers at St Mary's for the purpose of rendering me unpopular ;. and actually exhibited for the purpose a written paper, which was proffered for the signatures of the officers, many of whom were possessed of too stubborn a sense. of honor, to second the general's views. I record these circumstances thus particuUrly, and in detail, because they speak in a voice of tiiunder, on the sulyect of his subsequent conduct, not only as respects myself, but the disasters of the left wing of the north-western army. On the a3d of September, 18t3, with the 17th Uni- ted States' regiment, commanded by colonel Wells- Scott's, Lewis's, and Allen's regiments of Kentucky volunteers, and captain Garrard's troop of cavalry, amounting in all to about two thousand two hundred effectives, I marched from Fort Wayne, tor the site^of Old Fort Defiance, at the mouth of the Auglaize. The march of this army was conducted with tlie strictest caution and vigilance.f Having a road to open; and a camp to fortify every night, it was not considered expe- dient to advance more than from six to ten miles every twenty.four hours : hostile Indians, in no contemptibly numbers, hanging on the rear--assaiiling the ihinks^^ * See Appendix, C, F, L, Q, H. t See Appendix, B, E, G, J. I : \\ I '<*«• '■m. \ ■ * y -ir'i'«:""yBiiw / / i'i IS HISTORICAL DETAILS. and frequently encountering us in front. On tbe 25ih, enjign Liggett, then with the spies, was killed and scalped five miles in advance, with four of colonel Al- Jen's regimrnt. On the 28lh the army had advanced nearly to the sits of Fort I)efianee=^the point at which it was intended to cross the Miami cf the Lakes, when it was ascertained that the allies h&il concentrated their forces to oppose its passage— I ordered a retrograde movement of two miles, a^d crossed at a ford without either their o| p »sition or their knowledge. A council of war v/as convened the same evening, composed of the general and field officers. I proposed to move a (Strong detachment ta attack the enemy at day- break the next morning. The preposition was objected to by a majority of the officers present. The whole army was marched down the next day. It was too late. The. enemy had retreated precipitately, after putting fire to the old huts at U»e mouth of the Auglaize. Circumstanced as we were, pursuit would have been vaiu. Nothing could have been acliieved. The army could have done no more than make a desperate exhi- ?jition of valor in distress. In this state of things, pru- dence dictated the e-pediency of re-edifying the old fort and store- houses, and awaiting supplies. A gene- ral order was immediately issued, from which the fol- lowing is an extract : " A party, consisting of five hun- dred and ninety.ninc, officers and men, shall be ^Te- tailed, to be employed in erecting block- houses, a store- house, an hospital, and in erecting a fort, &c." No ex-rtions which could be effective in forwardins: the construction of these works were wanting. We'were tou hostile ground ; and/ knowing the absolute ueces. HISTORICAL DETAILS. 18 sity of having the works completed in the shortest pos- sible period, for the reception and protection of supplies, which were daily expected from St Mary's, the great- est industry was disjilayed. Shortly after this, on the evening of the 2d of October, general Harrison arrived at Defiance, possessed of a commission of major gene- ral, then recently obtained from the war department. He assumed the command, inspected the works com- menced and progressing under my direction, obtained the requisite information, touching our circumstances and supplies, and immediately departed. Thus superceded, justice to my feelings, honor and character, dictated an instantaneous resignation. But, desirous of being serviceable to my country ; and, fore- seeing distinctly the illiberal construction which would be put on my conduct, by those who were not my friends, in the event of a resignation at this period, I resolved not to abandon the service, until the army could be safely lodged within the ramparts of Maiden. J. W. Tennessee — Juli/f I8I7. ■ 7, >■" i jyo. Ill, Ox the third and fourth of October, general Tuppe/, with a detachment of mounted volunteers, arrived at Defiance. On the fifth, whilst the horses were grazing on the cleared land, at the point between the Auglaize and Miami of the Lakes, one of thef i volunteers wa« shot and scalped, within three hundred yards of the ground on wMch the main body of the detachment was W'M yfl)«>.l-^y 14 HISTORICAL DETAILS. t Sj ■^t halted. The commission of an act of hostility, within so short a distance of a respectable force, and the intre- pidity displayed by such an exploit, induced a convic- tion that the numbers of the enemy were not contemp- tible; The whole of the troop» were immediately un- der arms, and reccmnoitring [larties despatched in pro- per iiii^ctiong. It was reported in a short time, that the JBumber of the party engaged in this affair did not ex^ ceed forty men ; but, this party might be connected with a more formidable force— rupon which the follow- ing general orders were issued : "It ishesseatXal that the Indians who yesterday per- petrated the murder near your camp be pursued and routed ; or, their precise strength and situaHon ascer- tained ; and, as such duty can be best and most expe- ditiously performed by mounted men, you will this morning proceed wilh a part or the whole of your force, , to dislodge, kill, a;nd destroy them, if in your pow- er. This duty performed, you can take the course prescribed by general Harrison. The audacity of the enemy requires this temporary change in your destina- tion. As commanding officer of the left wing of the north-western army, I deem it an imperious duty to* make it. "JAMES WINCHESTER,. "Gen. Tupper, &c. &c. * "' Qth October, 1813." These orders were not obeyed. Information was re- ceived, that the troops wanted confidence in general' Tupper for a service so hazardous — that they preferred- colonel Allen of the Ktatucky volunteers as a com- HISTORICAL DETAILS. H ,ion was rci itander-and, that general Tupper had signified kis assent to the indulgence of the troops in the choice of a leader. In conformity with the pressure of existing circumstances, and knowing that the bravest men on earth, if wanting Taith in either the ability or courage of their commander, are but instruments of disa€ier, Ue- -feat and ruin, I immediately issued an order to colonel Allen who merited the confidence of all who knew him, to assume the command, &c. On the promulgation of this order, general Tupper^ who probably felt a strong Dresentiraent of the influence it must have on his mili- tary reputation if executed, objected to the assumption of die command by colonel Allen. The necessity for experiment, in my situation, dictating the expediency, I revoked the order, and restored general Tupper to the command. Still he delayed-and reported " a de- Hciency of ammunition^' This way a singular report, considering the practicability of obtaining a competent supply? previously to the movement of his detachment for Fort Defiance. I have no observations to make on it, but that general Harrison must have known the con- dition of theleft wing of the north-western army, touch- ing supplies of every description. To obviate this new obstacle to the service of gene- ral Tupper's troops, the quarter- master was directed to report the quantity of ammiuiition on hand. The re- port evinced that none could be spared—but, a know- ledge of this circumstance vould have added nothing to the spirits or confidence of the army. Under pretence of preventing the soldiery from wasting them unneces- sarily, cartridges were dr iwn from the boxes of all the corps not intended for immediate gcrvice, for the supply i '5^m^ ■■mmmmmm'mmm''' 16 HISTORICAL DETAILS. of genera] Tupper's men. They were supplied — but, the general did »ot proceed io execute the duties as- signed him. The delay produced the following order: — " Cafnp, Defiance, Oct. 7, 1813. "Brigadier General Tupper — Delay^ inconsis' tent with military operations, cannot longer be indul- ged. You will therefore immediately proceed on the duty ordered yesterday morning, with the trcops under your command, exclusively of colonel SimralPs corps, which shall return without delay to the settlements, for the purpose of recruiting their horses, agreeably to the orders of general Harrison. « J. WINCHEiSTER, Brig. Gen^ *• U. S. drmy.'' Soon after the promulgation of this order, which was disregarded, general Tupper broke up his camp in a tumultuous manner, and took the direction to the inte- rior of Ohio. I demanded of general Harrison his ar- rest, on charges exhibited. The arrest took place — and it was distinctly understood, that general Tupper should be tried, when a junction of the troops composing the north-western array should be effected at the Rapids of the Miami, which was expected in the lapse of a very short period. General Tupper was afterwards tried ; but, under circumstances wliich precluded* any enforcement of the charges against him. I was a prisoner — in addition to this an inference may be drawn, as "to the peculiar cha- racter of his trial, by comparing his iinmiliiary conduct witli general Harrison^ s order, publishing the sentence * I was uot even notified of the time of trial. -__ ^^ - ( ^ "*'^'SgtfflMWB^S[Xwi - - "safes. HlSTOHICxVL DETAILS. i7 of the court ; and the followin* extract from general Harrison's letter on the sulyect of hU arrest, which was forwarded to general Armstrong, when at the helm of tile war department : "General Winchester has exhibited charges against i;eneral Tapper, and has requested me to appoint i court of enquiry for himself. It is to be regretted that he should think either necessary. I had, however, or- dered general Tupper in arrest, before I knew of his ileparture for the Rapids, and he did not receive it un- til his return. It will not be possible to have either the court of enquiry or court martial until the army itn/^es* at the llapids^ 1 am not prepared to aver, that major general Har- rison could have felt so much partiality for general Tupper as to wish for his acquittal under improper cir- cumstances.— I am persuaded, that had he been made ac([uainted with the event attending general Topper's retreat from the llapids, before the co-operating forca sent by me could reach that point, no such partiafiity would have been entertained for him as a military man. Query 1st. Did general Tupper march for fort Defi- ance by order of general Harrison ? 2(1. Why did he arrive, without ammunition? 3d. Was not general Harrison perfectly aware of the couditiou and circumstaaceg of the left wing of the norths western army ? * Will the general now say, that a junction of the winga and centre of the north-we.stera army, was not to be efifected at the. ttapida.? C J \l fi:!f?fe^p*i ■"%j^" ib HISTORICAL DETAILS. H I •illi. Compared with the centre and right win-g, what was the state of supplies, durirrg tire whole eaiopaigft?* dlh. Why t\\i\ the iti)o\i9 under the command of gc iieral Tupper, after reaching Defiance, refuse to con* tihoe pubscrvieiH to that command, wlieu ordered ow duty? 0th. Can it be possible that general Tupper was in- istrumental to their tlefection? ami, if so, for what reason? 7th. Could this detachntent have ohjeeted to actual service, under a commander who marched them out — unless from a pre- determination ta resist or disregard m^' orders? 8lh. When the first objection to their movement was dbvtatcd, by the appointment of colonel Allen to the Ajommand, why did they not march ? 9th. After the report (»f general Tupper, as to " de- ficiency of ammunition," ind after this second obstacle had been surmounted, as previously mentioned, why did he dtluy ? . . 10th. Or did general Tupper and his detachment die- tCi'tnine, that rather than obey any superior officer who, was not general Harrison, they would hazard all con,- sequences which might arise from a disobedience of or- ders — whether relating to their own safety, or that ot their country ? Forbid it justice ! forbid it heaven ! J. W. 'J'ennessee — July, 1817. * See 4ij){>f ndix, B, E, Matliaon and Gtiiy). '-Jt ht wing, what seaiopaigft?* nmaud of gc efiise to con* a ordered ou ipper was in- what reason? ^ted to actual d them out — or disregard lovement was Allen to the rj as to " de- cond obstacle liioncd, why ttachment de- n' officer who, zard all coiv idience of or- y, or that ot t heaven ! J. W. I HISTORICAL DETAILS. JVo. IT. in In the interim, the fortifications at Behaiico were ra- pidly advancing to completion. The activity and in- dustry of the troops in working on m w«ro redout), led, by anxiety to encounter tlie enemy while the wea- ther should be mild, and the several corps undiminish- ed by the common diseases of a camp. On the 18th of October, the forti?oations, the store-house and hospital Were finished. The troops were then immediately em- ployed, in constructing boats, for the transportation of the supplies and baggage of the army to t^e Rapids of the Miami. On the 20th of October, an ordier was ad- dressed to quarter- master Bodley, from which the fol- lowing is an extract:— "Urge all possible raeaiW to hasten on supplies to this place. The fort is cohiple- ted, and there is store room sufficient. Boats are al- ready prepared for the transportation of two hundred barrels of flour— the river is rising— and the spirits of the army high. It is all important to move with art am- ple supply of provisions— therefore, I repeat the neces- sity of your redoubled exertions. Force into service all means o* transportation in your power. 1 have ordered the road to be repaired — and hope no longer to be re- tarded, in the prosecution of the objects of the campaign for the want of supplies.*' On the 33d of the same month, another order was addressed to quartermaster Bodley, from which the following is a quotation : " The army is about to advance. Great industry must be used to furnish the advanced troops with adequact supplies. Salt can be packed in abundance, and a few thousand of hogs can be driven in, slaughtered^ and saved I'.tthe posts at which the rations will be required. — Beef frort\ ^/ iu HISTORICAL DETAILS. the lioof will Booii be too lean to depend on— and it will be exiremi'ly exiient»ivo to trans|)UFt it in barrels. Without delay, then, send ofl* a large tirove of bogs to ibe UapHtS; with salt *enduring the privation of hunger, and exposed to intense cold, the spirit of these troops for military enterprise was un< subdued. When the fortifications and other buildings at Old Fort Defiance were finished, about the 19th of October, this aruay consisted of about eighteen hmidred effective men. — 1 then urged to the proper autho.ities, and to the commander in chief in particular, the absolute ne- cessity of advancing to the Rapids. The |>ropo»ition was opposed, on a plea of the impossibility of supply- ing such an army in advance ! — ^It sometimes happens, that an avowed pretext is substituted fur a concealed reason. At that time, any quantity of provisions, and every requisite for the supply of double the number of men, could have been transported with ease and safety to the Rapids. The Miami of Ihe Lakes is generally navigable unless in winter, for boats of considerable burthen. — There could have been very little diiference between supplying the troops at Fort Winchester* or at the Rdpids, cour Mleriug the facility of water trans- portation. Supplies deposited at Fort AVinchesler could have been protected by the troops advancing. The van of the army could have covered itself with stronsi works at the Rapidsr-^conslrHcted barracks, storii-liouses, &c. — secured the corn and fodder, of which there were at that time largu qi,antitics — kept * Situated near the ruin? of Defiance. visible in- ians. Tiie ed ^ective c; and, al- nduring tlic e cold, the se was un< ings at Old of October, ed effective ies, and to bsolutc ue- [H'opo^ition of supply-. }s happens, , concealed isious, and ( number of and safety s generally }nsiderable B dliferenee Chester* or ^ater trans- Winchester advancing. itself with I barracks, fodder, of itics — kept HISTORICAL DETAILS. itiaraading parties of Indians in check—and been in comfortable quarters. Not so ! when instead of eightten hundred effective men, the van consisted of bnt eleven hundred— men in a state of starvation, borne down by exposure to tlie rigors of a severe climate, enduring every privation and worn out with fatigue. J. tT • Tennessee — Juhj^ 1817. J\*0. V, On the morning of the march of the army from Ik- I fiance, advices of the movement were despatched to ge- neral Harrison, in conformity with the instructions con- tained in his order to march for the Rapids, of the 25tU of December; and to enable him, agreeably to hi« as- surances, to meet me at the Rapids, with a co operating force and su|>|>Vies under general Tupper, from the cen- tre and right wing. At the same tir^.e, and by the same express,* Mr. Leslie Combs, T communicated to gene- ral Tupper similar information. Whilst on the march from the encampment near I>c- iiance, about the third day, I received another commu-. uication from general Harrison, comprising an order to abandon the idea of advancing to the Rapids, unlese ths amvi had already moved. Having been three days on the march, and under such circumstances as arc noted in the preceding number, I considered this order inope- rative and nugatory. Such might have been tlie %te for * See AppendU, K. h Vi si S4 HISTORICAL DETxVlLS. which it was in teiulcd .-^Apparent disregard of such an order, in tlie event of a disastrous destiny, would divest the commander in chief of all responsibility. Tlie array continued its march, and arrived at the Rapids, as be- fore stated, on the lOth of January, 1813. After reconnoitring the vicinity of the place with a strong detachment, a position was selected for aa en- campment, on the left bank of the Miami, near the bat- tle ground of general Wayne. It was a commanding eminence of an oblong form — clear from under wood — covered with heavy timber — and surrounded by low prairies and the river. This position was fortified se- curely with trunks of trees ; large store-houses were built, and a quantity of corn gatliercd from the fields, which was considered a luxury— so long had these brave men been on short, and sometimes no alh»wance. The unbroken snow surrounding the camp, reminded us every hour of the absence of the expected co opera- ting force and supplies ! The circumstances we were in were depressing ; but hope reconciled us to disap- pointment for some days. In the interim, many aii anxious look was directed toward theriglit bank of the river, in search of the van of general Tupper'3 brigade. In vain ! General Tapper's brigade with supplies nev- er arrived ! On the nth, the day after reaching the Rapids, I despatched anotlicr communication by a soldier to gene- ral Harrison, advising him of my arrival— also stating, that the impoverislied pack-horses were sent back to be recruited by way of Fort M-Arthnr, in order that the road might be broken, and tlie advance of troops with supplies from thence facilitated, Oa the mix ^ I HISTORICAL DETAILS. ^ 1 of such an oiild (Uvcst Tlie array (ids, as be- ace with a for aa en- ear the bat- jmrnandiiig ler wood — led by low fortified se- louses were I the fields, ; had tliese I alh»wance. U reminded id CO opera- B9 wc were us to disap- 1, many an bank of tho ;r'3 brigade, upplies nev- e Rapids, I dier to^ene- 'alsostating, icnt back to II order that cc of troopai [1 tlic mil ]^ also wrote to general Tupper, nptifying him of mypo. eition and circnmst^nces, ^nd expressing a hope, that lifter having received my letter pf the ^9th ultimo, he had immediately marched with supplies &c. At this period ;I was unadvised whether genBral Harrison's headquarters were at Upper or Lower Sandusky, 9r JBLi JPrankliuton. Mature consideration, therefore, dicUted t^ expediency pf transmitting despatches to h^m by way of Fort Ml* Arthur. A communicatioa vqjild havfi been ^nade to general Harrison, touching the contUiiuatiQU of the advanpe of the array, on t'he inarch between Defiance and the Rapids, had it been posai^e ; but there was not a horse in camp, competent to tl?e performance of the journey, and fojtmen must inevitably have p^ri&hed in an attempt to reach either of the Sanduskies, or.Franklinton, tlirough such a snow as was then upon the ground. Late in the night of the Igth of January, a citizen from Frenchtown, which is site "ted on both banks of the river Au Raisin, but principally upon the left, ar- riveil in camp, with information that the alUes were as- sembling their forces at that point, and were employed in plundering and mal-treating the inhabitants. On the succeeding night, the 13th of January, two men fron^ the same place came in, and confirmed the intelligence received the night preceding— and added, that the In- dians had threatened to murder the inhabitants and burn the town. For these defenceless people, and in their names, they sued for protection from the arms of the United States. On the l^jth of January another mes- sender arrived; with a despatch from the inhabitants ° IT i\ PIfiwpw IM i:,^i 'Wm-u. —'i^-' iggmmm:- S6 HISTORICAL DETAILS, M who were friendly to the American cause. This com- munication stated explicKly^ that the British were ar- resting all persons who were suspecletl of being inimi- cal to their arms, and sending them into confinement in Canada — that they were preparing to seize all the pro. visions and stock of the inhabitants — am! that their avowed intention was, to attack the American camp at the Rapids, the moment their forces, which were assem- bling, idiould be deemed sufficiently strong. On the 15th of January I wrote to general Perkins, then at Lower Sandusky, a distance of little more than thirty miles, advising him of my arrival — and stating, that in- telligence recently received from Frenchtown, strongly pointed to the necessity of an advance to that place with as little delay as possible — ^that to enable me to go on, and leave the camp at the Rapids secure, a co-opera- ling force of a battalion of infantry would be necessary, and, if it ceuld be spared, I wished a troop of horfie. My design in addressing general Perkins, rather than tlic commander in chief, at this time, was, that general Perkins might be enabled to comply with the re- quisitions made in that letter, should the absence of ajcner.al Harrison preclude the possibility of his seeing it in time. Had the communication been addressed to :;(!ncral Harrison, and he not at Lower Sandusky, ge- tKMal Perkins must have remained ignorant of its con- i(.ivt3 — and in the event of the head-quarters of the com- aiaiider in chief being at Lower Sandusky, general Pciklns would of course exhibit the letter. On the I6tli of January two additional messengers rime in from Fri'nchtown, and authenticated the intel- ii^onr(« previously received. These messengers stated, ■i.rt«i^ HISTORICAL DETAILS. S7 1)18 00111- were ar- ig inimi- lement in I the pro. Iiat their camp at 'e assem- On the f then at lan thirty ;y that itt. strongly lace with lo go on, co-opera- ecessary, of horse, idler than it general I the re- hseuce of lis seeing Iressed to usky, ge. ►f its con- f the com- r, general lessengers the iotel- PI'S stated^ illiat the force of the enemy was about 500 strong, and hourly receiving accessions; that if that force weiG not immediately defeated and dispersed, an attack on the American troops at the Rapids would very shortly be the result— and that ia the event of an advance of the American forces, previously to the commission of the robbery meditated by the allied army under colonel Frocter, the inhabitants could and would supply us with provisions.* Under Ihese circumstances, three propositions wero^^ propounded to a council of war. Ist. We must either stay where we are, and await an attack — which will certainly not lie made, until an augmentation of the enemy's foroj shall ensure his suc- cess ; gd. Or retreat ignominiously, abandoning the de- fenceless inhabitants of Frenchtown to British magna' mmity and Indian compassion ; 3d. Or advance. The last proposition was unanimously sanctioned,! as well on military principles, as on those of humanity and political justice. And not to digress, the arms of the United States are as irrevocably bound to protect « single individual, as a million. The social compact be^ comes a rope of sand, is rent asunder,^ the instant a. * See Appendix, B and J — Madison's and Lewis's affidavits. t See Appendix, B and J, again. \ Lest this proposition he cavilled at— the individual who vr- olates either the civil, military or criminal code of our country, tacitly assents to the application of the penalty or sanction an '^ipxed to a breach of the laM s. fj ^.> ^^gt^m&_ ,^^ •,.-W8l*£- HISTORICAL DETAILS. single individual is sacrificed ^^ilKout his assent^ even for the salvation of the republic. ;^ut, were every ground of thus deciding on principled connfected' wiHt' Humanity and political justice abandoned, it wiH never be doubted by military men, that it is imperiously the duty of every responsible offlder, to prevent if possible ihe augmentation and cohcentrati n of the foi'ces of an antagonist. For these reasons, and under the circum- stances previously detailed, an advance to Fr^nchtowtt \vas determined on, and arrangements immediately made to ffive efficiency to the mea»ure. J. W, Tennessee-— July f IS17. B' .1 S jsro. VL In conformity with my determination to dislodge the enemy, and protect Frenchtcwn, and for the reasons stated in the preceding number, on the morning of the 17th of January, after addressing a despatch to gene- ral Harrison J which was transmitted by esepvess, J. or- dered colonel Lewis, with four hundred and fifty men, to the river Au Raisin, immediately subsequent to tho movement of this detachment, appr6he^ing that, in additon to the alli(d forces then at Frenchtown, the troops under colonel Lewis might have to contend with a reinforcement for the enemy from Maiden, I ordered lieutenant colonel Allen, with one hundred men, as ex- peditiously as possible, to reinforce colonel Lewis^ — (:/ ■ '<^\miiifgr~i\umm, HISTORICAL DETAILS. S9 wWch #aa efffected the sartie evehing ti PrM^oelale.* Durrni^ tire encimptaftnt of colotiel Lewis ttHhU place, the night of the 17th, he r^ceivedi an inthtfation of the advance 6f«^ British reinfrtfcement mider doloiMil Elliott from Maiden, destined fbt tfce support of tlite allied at Frenchtbv^n. Tkh advice was immediately eommuni-* cated to me ; and colonel Lewis, as was Imperioasly Ms duty, precipitated the moteiiienton Frenchtown> for the pur[>o8e, if possible, of preventifis* the rtpptehendcd consolidation of the enemy's forces at that point— and of beating them in detail. Colonel Lewis, lieutenant colonel Allen, the oflficers who acted umter them, and the troops engaged in the conflict of the iSth, deserve the highest consideration ; and, as appertaining to justice, perhaps a concise and authentic detifil of tire events attending the dislodgement of the enemy from F^enchtown on that day, may not be uniilteresting —At S o'clock P. M. of the 18th, colonel Lewis made his appearance on tlie south side of the town — his left commanded by major Graves — his right by lieutenant colonel Allen, and his centre, comprising a part of the 17th U. S. regiment, under major George Madison. Captain Ballard, acting as major, was or- dered in advatice, with two companies under captains Hickman and Chinn, to bring on the engagement, i^renchtown being situated on both banks of the Au Jlaisii, and the enemy posted in line on the north side, whilst the Anierican troops were aVU^* who m t,be a^ipe eveaipg * JV*oi5 Advices received siihsequently to the publication ■"' the sixth number of my appeal, bring to my recollection some facts, which will b? corrective of a mis-statement made in ""^t number — The despatch stated in No. to have been tranMnit- ted tr general Harrison by Qolonel Wells, was borne by captain Thomas Smith, of Lexington, K.y. at that period the aid-d,e'Camp of brigadier genieral iVynt'* 1** I *^'» ""^ incorrect ia qiy recol- lection, cf\ptain Smith and colonel Wells left tjje camp on the An liaisin on the evening of the 2lst of Januaf^ in company—^ the former charged with the despatch, as well as verbal intt^lli- genee for ffeneral Harriaoii, which I had received through the medium of my apies frflip gulden—" the latter in quqst of his baggage." I think it probable, from the peculiar ini^nTiier io >vhicLb I felt myself authorized to dismiss colonel Wells, anil from the fact of my confiding to captain Smith, in his presence, the despatch of which the coloqel requested to be the bearer, that he was not extremely well pleased. Accident or design induced iolonel Wells to leave captain iSmith with an iaexperienced guide, to make the best of his way to the Rapids — and it seems he dijl not arrive at head-quarters, until rn hour or two after colonel Wells, in consequence of his Laving been delayed in procuring a guide better qualified thau the one with which he was left. I will heie propoimd some additional queries for the hero of Tippecanoe : 1st In the presence of general Payne and olhers, on the arri- val of colonel Wolls at hoad-quarters, what was th* conversa- linn? --•4.^.- '\. HISTORICAL DETAILS. n (Cfjuested permiasio..' to return to the Rapids for the alleged purpose of bringing up his baggage. Leave was given him to depart. The presence of an officer, whj» possibly wanted confideivce in his commander, might liave been a misi ^rtun,e. In addition, the valor of some soldier who had confidence in me, and was Willing to encounter any enemy, in a cause justifiable on military^ political and humane principles, might have been lost to the service. In consequence of the departure of co- lonel Wells, his command devolved on major M'Clan.. nahau. I had boen in daily expectation, since the 18th of January, of being reinforced from the comnuind of ge- neral Perkins, with "o hattalion of infantry f and if it eould be spared a troop of horse.^' I had written him 2(1. Di^ not general Harrison remark) that he had no doubt the position at the Au Raisin could be maintained P and did h^ ' not warmly approve of my movem.ent in advance, and observe^ ^ .^t he " regard^ it as highly important to the success? of ffte <:ampaign.?^^ 3d. Did or did not an officer, who returned to the Rapids ^'ia qnest of his baggage," represent, or rather misrepjresent, to gene- ral Harrison, thut my camp was in a complete state of disorgani- zation — and did not this same officer tradnice me in t|ie presence of the commander in chief without lOioderation, and unchecked by general Harrison ? And, query — Did not captain Thomas Smithj of Lexingtoc^, aid-de-camp to general Payoe, heaf me, previously to this peri- od, silence this same officer when attempting to load the reputa; •tion of geiieral Harrison with infamy in my presence ? It is painful to any man, and lays him under the liability to, be changed with vanity, to speak thus of himself. But my sit*-. ation is such a one as probably to justify deviations irom e^Wi- nshed rule* of d<'Cori»api. • ^ . E »« M»^ y,4 _^_j*i^^^^i;, m HISTORICAL DETAILS. oil iUe idtli ; lie was at Lower Sandusky. General J£a. t'ison actnowledgeg the receipt of the itilelligence contained in that commnmcatiorif on the iGthfUt Upper Sanduski/f a distance of but Uiirty miles fyom the Jia- |)ids, and little more than sixty, even from Freiichtown. General Harrison also acknowledges the receipt of intelligence, resi>etting colonel Lewis's advance to Frenchtown, on ithe night of the 18th ; and also, that on his way to the Rapids, *' he met an express from Winchester vith intelligence of the success" of the 18th. From the llapids^ under date the SOth, general Harri- son advised me of the movements in his rear, and gave me instructions to ^' maintain the position at Au Baisia at any rate :" and, query — would not general Harrison have been willing to reap the iron harvest of renown, bad the position been maintained, agreeably to what he could iiavi ijhewn to have b°en his oinlers ? And, que- ry — ^had not general Harrison sufficient time, between the i6th of January and the 33rf, either to have ordered a retrograde movement, or to have forwarded anefjicient force y On the evening of the 21st, so far from indulging a sentiment of " fatal security," as stated in the <* His- tory,'' spies were pushed as far as the vicinity of Ih'ovvnstown. No indications of an advancing enemy were discoverable ; and it is a fact, since fjilly ascer- tained, that the troops who made the attack on the mor- iii;:,:; of the 23d, did not leave Maiden until after sun-set of the Slst. Nor is it true, that I received direct infor- mation " by a Frenchman,'** either before or after co- ■* ■■■■ — .■^■■iii * 1 liave fallen into another error, if it may be called such, with rc4)ect to a Frcnchmanj whom I had despa!cli,r^ to Mtt!» ;Mmi>^^ Ar.^?t^:^^^^.-<^^ >' «,rv^ HISTORICAL DETAILS. aa lonel Wells departed for the Rapids in quest of \vg IrnggagCy of a lafge Indian and Britisli force, '* which he supposed 3000," bein;, about to advance from Mai- den, " shortly after he left it," for the purpose of ma- kin;; an attack. Such information as I had received, which was through the medium of report, was duly lien in quest of information. I think, upon rellection, that Ihia man did return on the evening of the 3l8t of January, and at the moment when I was scaling the written despatch trtin»mitted h^ captain Smith 'o general Harrison. I am also now convinced that I d" sired the bearer of this letter, to advise general Harri- son of the guiii of intelligence obtained f made fur some days. 1 am as willing to correct m. error as H» maintain tho truth. The objects embraQcd by this '• jmmuuica*. lion, may perhaps be considered as too local Ibr tho excitement of general interest. They may, however, have a tendency to bo of future service to my countrymen. They will probably befoiin^ to contain a salutary Icssan as to the mischief which tan result from conflicting candidates for ephemeral pre-eminence, wha start together, if I may so exprejss myself, in the scub-race of ambition. They will at least have a tendency to su how com- pletely the feelings of public men should bo neutralized in the public Bv- vice, in order to effectuate great national objects. 1 wiU not aver positivelj, that my feelings were not at all ir- ritated against general Harrison. I am aware thattjiere some-, times exists a secret bias in the mind, which neither vigilance jjor self-examination can detect. If such a bias did exist, the proofs of it are before the world—if it did not, the evidence is recordftd, which it is presumed v/ill negative such a charge if it shall ever be madc>-«s also the documents, which will have a tendency, in this particulafj *o who cannot appear for him-- > self, shall be sacred — the world wust judge between us! Ok the nigtit of the Sls^^ the main body of the troops occupied the north bank of the river, in position as be- fore described — in number about 750. I was, with my etaflF and quarter-guard^ nearly opposite the left of the picketing, on the south bank— the river firmly frozen, and from eighty to one hundred yards in width. On ^hebeat of reveillie, in the jriurningof the22d, an attack was mad3 from the north, in front by the Biitish, and on both flanks by the ludiansv Scarcely a minute elap. sed, between the firing of the aliarm guns and the com- ''mencement of the battle. I was instantly on tliQ gi'ound,* having only to cross the river. I found every soldier at his post. The command of major M'Clan- nahan, on the right, was my first o!)ject. On passing to- ward that wing, I ol)served that the troops composing it were encountering, without dismay, a most galling fire from the British left, which they had then sustained for sortie minutes. Apprehensive they might break, and, in couformity with my previous plan in the event of fti * Sec App'jndix 0, cajpfniu R. T^hti^S- T . HISTORICAL DETAILS, 9T attack, loriered lieutenant colonel Mien to draw them rearward, and bring them within the picketing. Ho eflfected the execution of this order so nearly, that the van of the column was within a few paces of the en- trance where I stood — when some of the soldiers mis- taking this partially retrograde movement for a retreat, sounded their own alarms, and the wing bi^^e ! I in^ stantly directed their formation under cover of the right bank ; and followed, with colonel Lewis, for the pur- pose of effecting it, and bringing them in. Parts of two companies followed from withi.i the picketing. The troops could not be rallied. The Indians, from the Britisli right and left, precipitated tlieir advance — over^ whelmed us with numbers — colonel Alien fell ; colonel Lewis and myself were captuied. I immediately discovered, that we Were in the power of the noted Huron chief, Roundhead — compared witli whose valor, humanity and honor, the real character of col. Procter, if ever justice siiall be done, will receive a passport to imperishable in^my ! Under the protection of this Huron chief, we were conducted by a circuitous route to the rear of the British lines. Here I had an opportunity to form a cofrect estimate of their forces. My noble countrymen were still contending with obsti- nate valor, against what I saw was a strong force, aid- ed by six pieces of artillery, which, if properly mana- ged, must in a short time annihilate the picketing, with the hopes of those within it. In addition, the righl. wing, with which I had intended to defend the rear of the picketing, in the event of an attack from the ice on the river, was destroyed ; and my reinforcements, so long expncled. were. I knew not where. 1 addressed 38 iJISTORICAL DETAILS. a'note to colonel Procter, d/esiring to see him. After be- ing introduced, he enquired if I were the commanding officer of the American forces at that place. I replied, that I had that honor, previously to being made a pris- oner of war. He observed, some of your troops, sir, are defending themselves from the fort in a state of des- peration — had you not better surrender them ? My re- ply was, ard it is distinctly remsmbered, <^' I have no authority to do so — my command has devolved on the senior oflBccr in the fort, as you arc pleased to call it." Procter then in substance remarked, that the town would be set on fire — and in the event of his being com- pelled v,j storm the works, he could neither be respon- sible ibr the conduct of the Indians, nor the lives of the men. On the contrary, that if I would surrender the troops, he would be responsible for both. I have told you, sir, that I have no authority over them ; but, if you will send a flag, I will recommend* to the com- manding officer to surrender himself and his troops prisoners of war, on the additional conditions that the private property of the troops shall be protected, and the sMe-arms of the officers returned. It was to iiiake * From any thing stated in my communiei^iojit to the war de- partmeat, under date the day afttr the battle of the 22d of Ja- nuary, no inference can be drawn, as to a wish to eoerce major Madison into a surrender. I certainly desired that such an event r!iould taUe place, to spare tliu useh effusion of blood. In vith you. A flag was immediately des[. itched. Major Madison, the senior officer, properly objected to surrendev, until a guarantee, for the protection of the lives and property of his men, should be given by the commander of the Jirituh foipces. This point being settled, the troops Jaid down their arms. X W. Tennessee— August, 1817, JV(?. Vll. How FAR colonel Procter endeavored to observe the stipulations of the surrend r, and what exertions he made to protect the prisoners, including the defenceless wounded, from the rapine and murder which succeeded the cessation of hostilities, may be inferred from the fol- lowing exposition of facts which came within the sphere of my own observation. Did the real character of co- nel l^rocter merit no other developement than as regards his utter destitution of veracity, I would yet conceive him worthy to wear the uniform of Englaiid ; because a considerable portion of his compeers in arms mighfc not be found to disgrace this part of his character. But lie has had the good fortune atFrenchtowiu to deserve the applause of his government, and to merit consequent promotion, by superadding another wreath of never dy- ing infamy, to the garland which crowned the military reputaion of his country upon the plains of Indostan. Justice, however, having been rendered to the general \ ••*S<'J^2«=«a 4D HISTORICAL DETAILS. stamp of his diaracter, l)y abler pens, I will only f* gard, for the contemplation of those who may feel an Interest in averting the disgrace of an association with this man, soma circumstances and events which have probably not yet arrested the attention of the publici In colonel Procter's official report to sir George Pre-' vost, and sir George's official staitmcnt to the English colonial tlepartment, published in the London Gazette of the 22d of April, 1813, it is stated, that the forces undet my command at Frenchtown, amounted to up- wards of one thousand men. This is not so. My nu- merical strength, on the night of the 31st of January, 1813, has been already given»i In the publications above, referred to, tlie English forces are estimated at 1100 men, including militia and Indians. This is not true ; but the veracitv of colonel Procter accounts for the mis- statements of sir George Prevost. It is also stated id those documents, that £;overnor Madison surrendered at discretion. I refer tlije reader to colonel Procter's in- tegrity, and my averment on this subject, previously made. In colonoA Procter's report, it is explicitly al- leged, as a reason for the precipitate advance of a Bri- tish reinforcement from Maiden, that 1 *' would have been joined by general Harrison in a few days with two thousand men." Tliis is a singular piece of informa- tion, to come from a British oflicer, especially when it. is considered, that I was not advised of that fact unlil after the triumph of our arms on the 18th of January. No impeachment against the character of general Har- rison, as respects his fidelity to'his country, isintendeil by this observatioih It is made with the determinatiou l-ilKfcir;"'''^ HISTORICAL DETAILS. 4i to exhibit all the qrcumstan.ces connected with a public calamity. Immediately subsequent to the surrender of the Amfr* rican troop^ within the picketing, I wqb at no loss to in- fer the real disposition of the victors, from theii' sangui- nary exultations over the vanquished. The British and Indian forces had suffered severely in the contest-^/ and were intoxicated with the renown of a victory, ovei such obstinate valmr as had mown down their ranks. It is in the nature of man to hate what he fears; and it is ir '■ ^atuivs of a coward to exercise cruelty to- ward v< ished enemy. Genuine bravery and mili- tary \ " rf.re invariably connected with compassion, even for the distresses of an antagonist. How well the name of colonel Procter comports with what ought to be the real character of a soldier, will be shewn. I was standing near this man, when my brave countrymen laid down their arms. Instead of endeavoring to enforce the stipulations of the surrender, he deliberately jjer- mitbed the savages to plunder those who had anything to lose. My remonstrances against this tacit encou- ragement of so disgraceful a scene of rapine, were vain. He cooly answered, that the Indians could not be con- trolled ! How true this assertion was, may be iofered from the fact, that the Indians were actually overawed by the resistance made on the part of some of the pris- oncrs. But the effect of this resintance was of short dotation. The plundering was re-commenced, persis- ted in, and finished, by the allioy of his Britannic ma- jesty, in the presence of his magnanimous representa* tives 1 They were next permitted to i^tain a number F \> l ■ I ,4e"'Ti».... ^■,„Xm^..f^ I 4» HISTORIC^VL DETAILS, of the unfortunate men vvlion they had taken, for cap. tivity among themselves. On (Hscoveiing this infernal exhibition of outrage on humanity, I made every appeal to the feelings, tlie dignity, and honor of this British colonel — to do justice to wliose real character, the Eng- lish language does not afford epithets of opprolbrium or disgrace, sufficiently powerful or descriptive. I fotnid it vain to appeal to a man whose trade is rapii:e, and whose bread is murder, and saw many of the prisonere bound, and driven off by the Indians. Among others, a youth approached the place wliere Procter and myself were i&tanding, whose arms were bound behind him, from which a rope was extended, and in the hands of a sa- vage. This youth endeavoured to enforce the. interces- sion I was making, and with all the eloquence of dis- tress, proffered to colonel Procter every thing lie pos- sessed, and all he ever should possess, if he would re- lease and place him with his fellow prisoners, under the British guard. He told him he had a widowed mo- ther, dependent on his liberty and life for subsistence, whose heart would be broken if he should never return ! My heart bleeds, even at this late period, at the recol- lection of such a scene of depravity triumphant, and virtue in the dust. 1 observed to Procter, that the terms of the surrender were violated — that it was due to him- self as a British officer, and to his gjvernmeht, to in- terfere — and again appealed to E.iglish justice and mag- nanimity. " Ah !" he replied, " do you acknowledge that '.here are such things in existence, as British jus- lice and magnanimity ? 1 ara glad to hear it. Therein 1)0 danger of the young man. The Indians never huri: •,-•' "■jy.afefe^stiife^tiil tf IIISTOKICAL DETAILS. obtained, the particulars of the iinprecedentecl scene of biitcliery at Frenchtown. He expressed doubts as to the authpnticlty of the statement, and affected in be surpri. 8ud; if indeed it were trae that the Indians could per- petrate such atrocities ; but when doctor Todd, who had been a witness to their commission, authenticated the relation, he replied, with consummate obduracy, not un- mixed with exultation, "The Indians could not be controlled — I left- a guard — I am not unaware, that I shall he slandered throus;hout the United States." Tliis magnanimous British hero was mistaken, as to the truth of all his allegations. The Indians could have been controlled ; but, strictly in character with numbers, of his compatriots in arins, he permitted the allies of his most gracious sovereign to sw«ll the cata^ logue of carnage, for the admiration of a deluded popu. lace at home, and for the grati&cation of a government^ which he knew wodd promote him in proportion to thft numbers he could destroy,, no matter by what means! Ho did not leave aguakd — and an appeal to the laws of bis own country, will inform this enlightened and humane civilian, that truth is not slander. In truth, without intending any thing complimentary to the jurisprudence of his country, it is to be deplored by most nations of the world, that the depraved political policy of that country should be so completely subver- sive of the genuine spirit ofh^r laws, as to sh (ild such miscret',nts as Procter from the sword of judicial power; Impunity has too long been permittiMl to embolden ia outrage the unprincipled minions of the British crown—- and hence have probably ari<*en some of the most san- giiiaary national contests of moderu ages. From the <;i ^^r-mr", HISTOP'CAL DETAILa 47 enormities practised! against the liberties and lives of American seamen, and such deeds as the murder of Pierce in the harbor of New York, n»ay be clfearly in- ferred, the causes of a war which has prostrated the naval supremacy of England. But these observations are principally made with a hope, tiiat they may arrest the attention of the only tribunal coni{)elcnt to redeem humanity from ihe disgrace sustained at FrenchtowU' — that the country of a Procter may be enabled to record one act of justice, admonitory of such heroes as those of Hampton and Havre de-grace — and that she may yet enregister among the archives of heaven, one solitary proof, that she is not thoroughly depraved ! Had it been my misfortune to be present at the " massacre of Raisin,'^ I would here disclose in detail, Uie tragical horrors of that never to be forgotten scene* But ample justice will unquestionably be done to those events, by historians whose feelings will be less liable to bias than my own ; and by men who will not fail to administer strict and impartial Justice to the characters of colonel Henry Procter, general William Henry Har- rison, and James Winchester. To those of the presen-t age, who may wish to be informed, from the best au.- thority extant, of the particular circumstances and indi- vidual butcheries involved in this general mui-der, I know of no work in which the slaughters of the Au Raisin are more faithfully portrayed, than in a history of the late war, *•' written by an American, and pub- lished by Joseph Gushing, Xo. 6, Howard street, Bal- timore." li may not be uninteresting, here to tnkc a concise jl'pvjow of the principal facts, noted in this and the pr^"- »-****^ #""'«Miii tt*/^mmt.Mm 48 llISTOmCAL OETAlIiH. ceding numbers. I do this witli tiio intention of ialrrf- ducing some documciitai'y evidc e, liavitig relation to those publicativ^ns, not yet adduced. On the reception of intellij^ence of the fall of Detroit, I assumed the command at Newport and Cincinnati, of a detachment of troops under colonel Wells. This command wan relinquished to general Uarrif^on, under the circura»ta»ces and for the reasons heretofbre noticed, who marched those troops to Fort Wayne. I then re- ceived peremptory orders from the war department to talCD command of the north-western army. I did ao, at Fort Wayne ; and advised general Harrison, on his rders to march, were assurances of meeting at ih'. Ila- p' a detachment of troops under general Tupper, with supplies.* Three day 4 after the march of the ar- * See Appcnilix, B, E, latter part. ,-j»4j^'.J^n»*fj5 IIISTOBICAL D'iTAlLa 49 of 80, my, : u obedience to these orders, another was received from him to nhaiidon the idea of advancing, unless the troops had moved. They had moved^ and this con- tingency avoided the last order. The army lay some lays at the llapids, but neither f;eneml Tuppei or ipplies arrived. During this time, those imperious c for a movement on Frenchtown occurred, which dei mined me to ad', Ance In truth, had no other reasons been given for this movement than those founded in humanity, and those already noticed, the plan of the campaign, to form a junction of the fo"- cesat the Rapids, would have had considerable weight. ^- Tiie army advanced upon Frenchtown, and the eveuts have been detailed. When we were made prisoners on the 22d of Janu- ary, general Harrison, with a heavy reinforcement, was six miles in advance of the Rapid > Gove*'uor Madi- son, under oath, states it as his opinion, that a rein- foiccmant of 50r men at Frenchtown would have en- sured a victory.t I assert, that it would have done more. It woidd have led to the immediate reduction of Mai- den, and given perfect security to the inhabitants of the Michigan territory. I here again repeat the interro- gatories formerly propounded. Would not general Harrison have been willing to reap the iron harvest of renown, had the position been maintained? — I will here add some other queries, for the .solution of gene- ral Harrihun : » See No. III. quotation from i^eneral Harrison's letter to the secretary at war, near the «. >r.f^lusioa. t See Appendix, B aad J, l^iadisoa's ftml Lewi.s'a opioions on this subject. 30 HISTORICAL DETAILS. 1st. How far was lie from Frenclitown, when tlie icformation reached him of the disaster at Raisin ? Sd. What force had he, and how many pieces of a,r- tillery ? 3d. Compared with the length of time consumed in liis advance} how jhort a time did it take him to retreat to his former position, after receiving intelligence of my defeat and capture on the 23d ? 4th. What was the value of provisions and storesy destroyed for the United States at the Rapids on hisf retreat ? I consider it needless to add any thing more, on a suhject connected, not with a defence of my conduct, but witi) my appeal from the decision of a tribunal, which perhaps had prejudged me. I have given a fair, and as far as possible an impartial, history of my mo- ' es and conduct, whilst in the puhlic service at the north ; and aa before observed, I rely on the justice of my contemporaries, and on posterity, foi a ftat which nothing can destroy. J. W. -Tennessee — duguPt, 1817. .?V0. IX, On the i)37th page of the " Histonj of the Late War hi the Western Country,'^ I find that my military con- duct at Mobile iias also bcea honored with the notice of the historian, I ought perhaps to experience emo- tions, either of complacency or terror, at seeing my name dier, {fm^^HXTi -^mFTI HISTORICAL DETAILS. fil embodied in liistory at so early a period of time ; and would unquestionably feci cither the former or the lat- ter, were I not now convinced, tiiat a developcment of f'e genuine character of a few sentences of that work, having relation to my conduct at Mol)ile, will render the volume equally impotent to eulogize or condemli. If, however, when brought to the tribunal of sound judg- ment, the following assertions shall be found authentic, i will legitimate-their claim to attention, and furnish them with a passport to posterity ; and if, on the other hand, Ihey shall be found incorrect, I trust that the magnaui- I mity of the writer, who is bound to sustain the character he has assumed, will impel bim to an open and candid acknowledgement of his errors. The writer remarks :— '^ General Winchester, tvho liad lately been exchanged, and returned home from Canada, was now entrusted with the command at Mo- bile, for the jirotectmi of ivhich he had an ample force f consisting of the Georgia militia, the Tennessee militia under Taylor, and several other smaller corps. On (he 8th of February the enemy invested Fort Bowyer with a formidable armament by land and water. Tliey madd regular approaches by laud, and had advanced within thirty yards of the ditches, when colonel Lawi-ence, by advice of his officers, determined to capitulate, as there vvas no possibility of maintaining the post much longer. Though he obtained highly honorable terms for liis troops, and was perfectly justifiable in making a sur- render, yet such an event was painful to a gallant sol- dier, who had been accustomed to victory. General Winchester was much blamed for the result ; for, al- though he had a sufficiency of soldics at the town of tl '% mm HISTORICAL DETAILS* Mobile, and had been ajijirized of the intentions of the enemy previous to their landing, yet he had delayed to send a reinforcement to Lawrence, until the siege had commenced,'^ &c. I might here express astonishment at the cnloring with which errors may be given to the world. I might liere express astonishment at the boldness of assertion with whieli misstatements may be promulgated — and by men who must have labored under an almost entire l>rivation of intelligence, as to facts and circumstances. But 1 will here venture to assert, and endeavor to sup- port the allegations with ample proof, that at the time the above paragraph was dignified with the sacred cha- racter of history, the writer must have been ignorant of my numerical strength— of my facilities of transporta- tion — of'the ovcrwheliuing weight and force of the ar- mament with which the British attacked Fort Bowyer — of the plan of defensive operations— and of the whole coast, town, and fortress to be defended— and yet is this romance entitled a " History !'' First, as to his want of information, touching my nu- merical strength. Tlie writer alleges that I ' ad a force which iucldded the Geors^ia militia. I insert for his considcM'atioJi, and the correction of a future edition of bis work, the following quotation from a communica- tion, written by general M-Intosh, who commanded the r2;ia trooos. It is dated at Fort Claiborne, 130 miles In the rear— and dated, too, the very day on which t!ie British invested Fort Bowyer : "FEBRUARY 8th, 1815. Claiborne. Sir— Your ' letter of tne ;eoth ult. I had thu honor of receiving to- ' d tiy froGi colonel Johuson, commanding at tiiis post. HISTORICAL DETAILS. 5d IT- ♦ I arrived a few hours siuec, with a part of my detach- < ment, by forced marches from Fort Decatur, bringin- * with me provisions for ten days only— leaving a bat- < talion under the command of colonel Boothe, who was < to set out a few days after me in large boats, built for < the conveyance of provisions to Mobile for tlie detach- ^ ment under my command. I was to have been sup- « plied by ' ira at this place, to enable me to continue ^ my march. His not arriving places me in a dilemma. < 0)ie regiment of my command was detained by the i •'overnor of Georgia, in consequence of a sudden in- < vasion of the enemy in different quarters of the sea- * board." It must now be needless to remark, Uiat the Msto- vian is mistaken, as to the presence of the Georgia troops at Mobile on the day of the fall of Fort Bow- yer— and unless he can endow them with ubiquity, jus- tice would seem to require a corrective of this part of his work. The fact is, that this force did not reach Mobile until the S3d of February. Til is writer also alleges, that 1 iiossessed an ample force for the protection of Mobile. I am something at a loss to understand what definite strength the writer means, by the words ample force. Do these words in- tend one hundred men, or one hundred thousand men? Or ought they always to have reference to the strength to be contended against? But the writer has neither stated my numerical strength, nor the weight and force of th'- British armament which appeared off Mobile.— From whence, then, from what data did lie draw the sapient inference, that ^^ for the protection qf Mobile I had an ample force r*^ • •'^^_ ....fc.aaa-faiM.iftMaAt'Siatt^ife^*' ""■'\f 04 I1IST0RICA^ DETAILS. The truth is, that «n the marniiis of the 10th of Feb- luai'V my numerical force amounted to but seventeeti htmttred men capable of performing duty — and this number, small as it was, included the militia from East Tennessee, who amvcd, miserably armed, on the even- in"' preceding, worn down by forced marches. It will 1)6 distinctly remembered, that the Georgia troops un- der general M'lntosh were still one hundred and thirty miles in the rear. The number, then, i700, must ba ihc ample force recorded by the historian. A comparison of this force with the strength of gene- ral Lambert, will shew conclusively how ample it was. In a conimunicaiiou from colonel Lawrence, dated at Fori Bowyer on the 7th of Febfuary, which communi- cation, notwithstanding the greatest exertions of that excellent officer, did not reach me until late in the night of the 9th, will be found the following notification as to the British armament : " The adverse winds and boisterous weather, since writing the enclosed," [allu^ ding to a letter dated on the 6th] «•' have prevented my transmitting you intelligence by water. Captain Chara- berlaitt put off this morning, but was compelled to re- turn. 1 despatch a man by way of Eon Secours, in hope he may meet with a passage from Dolive's lau- ding, on the east side of the bay, to cross and give the intelligence of the approach of the enemy, &c. Tlie number of the eubaiy's vessels has, since yesterday sun- setting, increased, and is hourly increasing. Twenty, tivo sail are now at anchor icithin six miles distance. Should the weather prove more favorable, 1 will start captain Chamberlaiu witli such further information ^s UCCll^S.-'* HISTORICAL DETAILS. 05 From the above quotation, some idea may be formed cf the weight of the British naval force off Fort Bow- yer on the 7tli of^Febvuary. What military numerical strength was afloat in this fleet and its transports, can- not be determined with any degree of precision. It is however probable, that general Lambert-put forth nearly all his military power in the investiture of Fort Bow- yer by land— jit'e ihoiisand men* — and I have little doubt, that h:^ not the ardor of general Lambert's feel- ings been damped,^and his troops disheartened, by the dreadful slaughter' before New- Orleans, Mobile and not Fort Bowyer would have been his object. There were, as I shall endeavour to prove, mediims of ap- jiroach to MoMUj with such facilities of transportation as those possessed by the British general, other than the reduction of this petty fortress ; the variety of which, produced a pre-concerted plan between colonel Law- rence and myself, which shall be detailed in a subse- iiuent communication. Query.— had I an ample force ? J. W, Tennessee — August, 1817. Some remarks, touching the local and relative posi- tion of Fort Bowyer, may not be entirely uninteresting * The British officers, in an interview on Dauphine Island, subsequently to the conclusion of peace, with colonel RuBsell and captain W. L. Uobison, acknowledged the investiture nf Fort Bowyer with 5000 men. -.»^^^ S(«.S> ««eww«9i»tiM»««iii mi 50 HISTORICAL DETAILS. to the exposition of facts contained in this number— ht- asmuch as thej- may have a tendency to allay the fever of British exultation over the fail of this "Gibraltar of America," and to furnish future " historians" with an accurate knowledge of the place they would describe. This fort stands on a sandy peninsula, Mobile point, distant from the town of Mobile, by land 65 miles, by water 30. It is constructed of pine timber and sand— : Mfl being tolerably well calculated for a water battery, i i great degree commands the eastern passage into \i,- li\y of Mobile. But there is also a western inlet,. Pa«^. Merone, admitting vessels drawing five feet wa- ter, imiuediately northwestwardly of Dauphine Island, V'hich lies nearly in the mouth of the bay. It was throfigh the medium of this pass that our coasters and guu boats usually kept up the communication between the town ot Mobile and New- Orleans, on which I had to rely for supplies ; and a single British gun-boat or barge, well manned, was competent at any time, such was my iittev destitution of naval force, not only to block up this pass, but to intercept supplies from a^ove, destined for Fort Bnwyer. The eastern shore of the bay, from a point nearly opposite the town, along the whole coast downward, is a desen of swamps, wilderness, and sand banks. la truth, it is considered that the peuinsula is of such a descri prion, a short distance in the rear of th£ fort, that had a British naval armament been anchored abreast this isthmus on both sides, a fire could have been pour- ed upon it, which must have insured the destruction of five thousand troops actiog in concert with the garrison. A \ HISTORICAL liETAItS. 57 the western coast of the bay, from the town of Mo- bile down to the south margin of the island of Mon- Loftis, and from thence westwardly along the slwre of the gulf, affords a number of easy passes and conveni- ent landings for barges in the direction of Mobile. In fact, with the forces and ordnance possessed by gene- rals Lambert and Keane,* added to the facility with which it is well known barges can be, and are always btiilt from materials kept on board the British fleet, the enemy might have effected a landing at Monveille Cove, about three miles south of Mobile. This is the pla^e at which general Wilkinson landed, when he possessed the United States of the toWn. Or general Lambert mieht have ascended Dog river, which enters the bay from the north-west, only ten miles south of the town. This river is as deep as any paxt of the bay. Its na- vigation would have enabled the British commander to place himself within tive miles of the town. Or he might have effected a landing at Oyster Pass, which separates the main land of the western coast of the bay from the island of Mon Louis ; by doing which, he would have had a ridge on which to advance. Or he could have landed between Oyster Pass and the bay of Pascagola and marched to Mobile in thirty hours. Or he mjght have ascended Pascagola, to a point due west of Mo- bile This river falls into the gulf about twenty miles west of Oyster Pass, and is navigable for barges up to a point nearly west of the town of Mobile. In tru h, vithout ascending the Pascagola even a single mile; * See note at the end of tbis number. •OS* 58 HISTORICAL DETAILS. general Larubeirt "Would have been wilhiu thirty-five miles of' the town. Now, comparing the British naval and military for- ces with seventeen hundred men, had £ ^'an ample force for the protection of Mobile ?" But ^hat will this his- torian say to tte fact, that when Coulter's brigade of East Tennessee militia arrived, nine hundred strong,. there were reported in the hands of these troops but three hundred, and nxty stand of arms J and those arms in infamous order ? This writer also says, '^though he had a s^fiBeiency of soldiers at the town of Mobile, and had been appri- zed of the intentions of the enemy, previously to their landiogj yet he delayed to send a reinforcement to Law- rence until the siege had commenced.'' TJiis sii^ciency of soldiers at the town of Mobile, seventeen hundred men, armed as before mentioned, must be the ample force recorded by the historian — wlniich ample force had to contend with seven thousand fiye hundred veteran soldiers — as heavy a train of ar- tillery as the British generals might have timught pro- per to lamV — and, without a single gun -boat, to contend Avith all t|i© barges and transports appendant to tlie British fleet. — He also remarks, that I had been ap- pi:i2ied of the iutentions of the enemy previously to their landiug. With due respect for the province of a his- torian., 1 would ask, apprized of what intentions ? To tra,nsport their troops by way of Pass Heron, in barges and; g,un^bcats, and effect a landing on the west side of the bay, along which were many sctllements, as well as some herds of cattle — which, ju«]ging from previ-, ous events, I deemed no inconsiderable allurenicnts to HISTORICAL DETAILS. 9» British rapacity— of apprized of their intention to in- vest Fort Bovvyer by land and water? But, suppose they had intended to effect a landing at Pascagoltt> which is but thisty-six miles from Mobile by land, lit- tle better than one day's march, what could this writer have done ? Probably, as a military man, circumstan- ced as I was, he would have awaited an actual landing^ in order to make the best of his force. But I will now advisp him, that he must have labor- ed under a total privation of all authentic intelligence, as to the previous plan of defence. Some time anterior to the landing of the British troops, and their investi- ture of the fort, it .d been concerted between colonel . Lawrence^and myself, that in such events, a strong de- tachment should cross the bay and act upon the rear of the besieging army. Here follows the first intelligence of those events. The following letter is dated "Fort Bowyer, ©th Februarys 1815." a Sir— -Immediately after captain Ghamberlain left this yesterday, the enemy made a division of his fleet-^ ten ships and three brigs have taken a position about four miles below the fort— the residue remain on our front, near Pelican Island. Eighteen or twenty bargea were employed in debarking troops on Dauphine Isl- and, immediately opposite the fort— a numbef of fiie« were kindled and continued to burn during the night. This morning early, a debarkation commenced from the rear division. Eighteen or twenty barges have been running, and I feel certain, from the number of vessels, we must calculate on a v&ry superior force. Major Blue, mi\i one thousand or fifteen hundred men, to fall on the rear of the eneny,. would &moy him Much,, ami ;/•■ I 0a HISTORICAL DETAILS. II' render the greatest assistance that coulil be given U8 — more than that number, if they could be spared, would be better. It is evident an attack is contemplated on this fortress. We can defend the works, but our num- ber is too ftw to admit of a division. " From the conduct, both of the oflRcers and men, I fee;l. myself warranted in saying the enemy will neet a warm reception, and w^U have nurthing to bor^i of, let the result be what it m y. We feel conftflent of suc- cess, should we not be overpoweretl by numbers. " I am, with respect, your obU^t. serv't. " WILLIAM LAWRENCE, «Lt Vol. U In. Com.il' g:' The above communication did not reach me until one o'clock, on the morning of the lOlh of February. A detail of one thousand one hundred men, under the com- inapd of an able and experienced officer, major Blue of the 39th infantry, was immediately ordered to embark far Bon-Sccours, to raise the apprehended siege. For the transportation of this command, all the boats which had been held in requisition, and all the private vessels in the harbor, with their sailors, were employed. Ow- ing to adverse winds, the expedition could not possibly move, until the evening of the 10th; but on the advance of this detachment, after effecting a landing at Bon- Secours, intelligence was received by major Blue, that the operations of the British, 5000 strong, had been successful ; and that the garrison had capitulated. In addition to the foregoing exposition, it will be re- collected, that there is but one ehh and one /oo(? tide in the b{iy o. Mobile in twenty-four hours. This arrange, pient of uiituie, thejcfore, put it ia the powey of the '\ HISTORICAL DETAlLii •A British commanders to appear before the town with their transports in twelve hours, by taking advantogc of the flood, without much regard to the coiirst of the winds. Thus was I placed between triple duties, wiih an overwhelming force of i^OO men. exclusive of the garrison at Fort Bowyer, destitute of naval co-operation, and even possessing but few means of transportation, to operate against an onset of a heavy naval armament and 7300 veteran troops. Authentic historians I have always considered to be the depositories of national honor, as well as tViC guar- aians of individual reputation ; as well the fiagellators of national infamy, as the inflexible adherents to trut^i, with regard to individuals. It has been asserted, and perhaps with some truth, reasoning from the conduct of ancient historians, that their prejudices, whilst the objects of their historical investigations were contempo- rary, were too strong for the operations of the homan understanding— too strong foi human integrity ; and that thv^. histories of nations and individuals ought not to be written, until the operations of time can have ex- tinguished those prejudices which result from personal friendship, and personal enmity. With deference to all such authorities, I am constrained to dissent from them. No man will pretend to assert, that an object can bo as distinctly seen, through the vista of a thou- sand years, as if present : no man will pretend to as- sert, that he can see an object as distinctly at the dis- tance of one thousand miles, as if placed within a few fept of his organs of vision. Let, then, the histories of individuals and nations be written while the objects are alive, who cm cofltradict mis-statements. We have et KlSTORICAL DBTAILB. iiistories of XUmHj wi''tten long after her birth. Were Bo«Mhi8 and Remus raised by a she wolf? One of these gcntlcmcR is said by " hwtorians" to ht the foun* der of the Roman •mpire. How different would have |»een the history of the origin of that emph-e, had jus- lice been done to the baiiditii who gafo her Hi? th I Ttierefore, let all histories be written withiu p^ri- ods in which romances can be proven 'jutrue. What would have been the fate of my military character, hatl my grey hairs descended to tlie grave, and the docu- ments faithfully laid before my country been permitted to moulder, i^^^for*" the " History of the Late War in the Western Country" had been written ! J. W. ^ennessee-^ngustf I8I7. \-' BniTT3H. 22 pieces of artillery, from e to l«-poun(ler8, Home large ]iM>rtars inclusive, within 3 i miles in rear of the fort. S006 men, within 3 i mile* of the rear, covered by sand- •bankfl. 2900 on Daiiphine Island, under general Keane, 3 i miles distant — with barges and gun^ boats, and a fleet of nioie than 538 nail at aocher. AM^BIOAM* 300 men, garrison in Fort Bowyef under colonel Lavr- rence, asmany as could act cPi* ciently within its ramparti. mmm »■ li._Ji»M B APPENDIX. ID fA.J GEJ^EIUL HJRRISOA: (copy.', « lieai'fluarterai Fort! Wayw, 19 the general feels at parting with troops, which Imve so entirely won his confidence and affection, it is the circumstance of his zommitting them to the cfiarge of one qf the herces of our glorious revolution. .61 man distinguished as well for the services lie has rendered his countri/y OS for tlie possession of every qualification which constitutes the gentleman. The general can-^ot take leave of this gallant army, which he has commanded with so much satisfaction, withouC ex- prefMing the high sense which he entertains of their conduct. " For ten duys past, they have performed severe daiy icithout scarce a iufficiency of food to sustain (Aem, and entirely wiihout some of the. articles which constilute the ■'ation. "They ha>ve done it, too, without a murmur, and with ala- crity, which could only have bee'- expeeted fram vuteraa troops. The general requests brigadier general Payne, and every officer And soldier in the army, to »ccept his thaitka, for the support; they have given him upon every occasion, and fur tiie jiromptJ- tude and aJaerity with wbieh \m orders have b«ea obeyed! — bf k tr -A " .--*^'T,l^--ir- ■?* ■^mmmmemm^^ma:!^-^ m APPENDIX. has nndertakcn to communicate to the governor of Kentucky^ and through him to the people of that state, hi« opinion of their distinguished merits, and hi» entire confidence in their perseve, ranee in the paths of glory and patriotism. The 'eneral feeU equal pride and pleasure, m acknowledging the pe«"onal attachment which the army has manifested toward* Lim ! and he assures Ihem, that their welfare and glory is the first object of his wishes-and as a means of securing hoth, Ae most heartily recommends, and entreats, that the confidence they have so often expressed in him, may b, transferred to hxs worthy ^""'AsTovernor and comma"der in chief of the Indiana terri- tory, the general assumes the command of the troops in that ter- ritory, by virtue of n authority received from the honorable the secretary at war ; and, as a major general of the Kentucky quota, h^ take? the command of all the troops of that state, north of *he Ohio, excepting the army of ge<.eral Winchester. Si-ned) " NATHANIEL F. ADAMS ^ ° <= Deputy Mj. Gen." Fxtrad from a communication, under date the 2m of October 1815, from the late governor ^f Ke My, the justly U^ented . GlrJe mdison-together with such ecctracts from his affida- vit, «s are considered material to an elucidation of my military conduct at the north-west. . • mind, arid were it not too tedious to state the reasons for my belief in a let- ter, I would give you a full history of the various plans and intrigues, that are intended to be put in operation, if all u.i!'.gs go well. One great object, •is to put you down, and every other man, from whom the party apprehends resistance or detection. They watch your conduct, with an hawk's eye, nnd'ihe smallest spet k is to be swelled into a mountain. Cidti-ate the con- fidence of Madison, , Davenport, Graves, Lc\.is, Gano and Allen; they arc men of integrity, and disposed to be your fncnds. Colonel Bar- bee and major Palmer, although not personally acquainted with you, arc friendly to you. These are the men who broke up the intrioae, \(hich was on foot at St. Mary's, to wrest from you the command of the army, previ- ously to die aiTival of the major general's commission." [For an ample exposition of the circumstances alluded to in the ubove quotation, see cap- tniu Eastland'* last lettci', dated July, 1317.] APPENDIX. ^ « ;t understood, that several Winebester was with «»e troop* aooa after the action coinme»eedt-and that he used every exer- tion to rally the troops whieJi retreated^aod that d.ir.n? the whole time, or until he was made prisoner, he behaved himselt HI a manner becoming his rank as an officer. "I cannot say. whether or not general Winchester bad any ri-ht to expect rciuforeeinents from generals Tapper and Pi:r^ kins ; but it was generally believed that we would receive troops from them. lam well persuaded, that could we have been rem- P>rcm being assurer^; thnt unless done quickly, no responsibility would be taken for the conduct of tho savages, who were then assembled in great numbers. In this critical situation, being desirous to preserve the lives of a mjm!>ci; of our brave fellows, • who still held out, I sent a flag to them^ and agreed with the commanding officer of the enemy, that they should be surren- dered prisoners of war, on condition of being protected from the savages, allowed to retain their private property, aM having their^side arms returned to Ihem. It is impossible for me to aa.- certain with ceriliinly the loss \ye have sustain- d in this actijm. from the impraeiicability of .tnowing the number whp have w^^h their escajpe.- . ^ i- ■■'"^.. APPENDIX. 7» « Tliirty-five officers, and about four hundred atid eighty-se- ren non-commissioned olHicers and privatesi are prisooeM of war. Our loss in killed is considerable. However unfortunate may seem the affair of ye^erdny, I am flattered by a belief, that no material error is chargeablp upon myself, and that still less cen- 'flure is deserved by the troops I had the honor of commanding. « With the exception of that portion of -our force which was thrown into disorder, no troops have ever behaved with more 4]etermined intrepidity • « I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient •servant, "JAMES WINCHESTER, • " Brig, 6enl. U. S. Jrmtj. " Hon. Secretary at War.". • « The Indians have still a few prisoners in their possession', which I have reason ta hope will bp given up to colonel Proc- ter at Sandwich. ^ . ^' JAMES WINCHESTtm, ^^ Brij;. Gen. U. S. .llriwj,-\ ^^ Fort George, Upper Canada, *'^ nth February,' iSi^. "On the 23d ultimol had the honor of communicating to yonr iixcelk.ney the result of the action at BVencl^own, on the river Ruisin, the i>r ;eding day. I have it now ii. my power to trans- mit to you a Miore detailed account of that transaction, t"oget)ier Mi.h a more minute statement of our Toss. A list a" Vllled, wounded and ini^isin*, is. herewith enclosed. The attack upoh our eamo was commenced about 6 o'clock in the morning, by & heavy fire of small a»m9, together with the discharge of six pie- ces of artillery, dii'ected immediately at our lines, and the hoii- ses and terapurary breast-work, from behind which a partioivof oiW troops were engaged wil)» the enpmy. Early in the action a -fmiliiiBtiliiliTi h ■i 2^ APPilNDIX. charge was made b, the asHailanU ; but the fire from our lines ^a» 80 intense, that they were quickly compelled to re'ire.. _ « In this charge, the 4tst regiment of British regulars princi- pally suffered, their loss during the «harge, and in the subse- Lnt engagement, being very considerably-. Out of 300 of those troops, about 30 fell dead upon the field, and 90 or 100 mounded were removed from khe ground. It is impossible to statewUU accuracy, the number of Canadian militia and Indians, vhieh was either killed or wounded during the engagement j ... could however not be small, having received for three or four hours ihv constant fire of our musquetry and riflemen, from the breast- Mcrk under which they were for d. The action had endured about a quarter of an hour, wnen the right division ot our troops, who were less secured by a brcast-work, and exposed to a heavy fire from a body of Indians and militia, who had pos- sessed themselves of some out-houses within their reach, were oblitred to retreat from their lines in the encampment, for the nuvpose of occupying ground less exposed. This retreat being discovered hr the enemy, the whole Indian force, together with a portion of the militia, bore down upon them w^th redoubled violence, and prevented, by their superiority of numbers, and the severity of their fi..., the practicability of ever again torming this portion of our troops in order of battle. It was from this division that onr principalloss was sustained, few indeed hav- i«- escaped. Every effort was in vain employed to torn, them inL some order of action, as affaidiiig the only mean of either repelling the pursuers, or regaining the temporary breast-work, from behindw fiich the -emaining part of onr troops still gallant- ly defended themselves ; bi.t every exarlion was in vain em- ployed, and the verv fc^ who survived of the party, surrender- ed as prisoners of war. . • •«Our loss in tl.is acHnderslood by the volunteers, who composed a very great part of the troops tlio- at Fort Wf^jnie, considerable murmuring was expressed, and much dis- satisfAction appeared amongst them. From what! could leai"i from the officers, it was for no other reason than that Winche? ter was* regular oflicer. I was then a major inthe irth regi- ment U. S. infantry, andbeing well acquainted with nearly all the field ottiecrs bdongiug to the KenJueky troops, they fre- quently spoke of the dis'salisfaction of the soldiers in consequence of the change of commanders. This difference in sentiment, in my opinion, was produced by the circumstance, that one was ^ ,-tif APPENDIX, da serviog for popularity, tlie oth?r for lii» country. [Here major Davenport notices the march of the. army to Defiance. And af^ ter its arrival at the ifttter place, mentions the pircumstance of his having been confined a considerable time by severe illness, and proceeds]^^ After being about a few days, 1 was somewhat BBrprised to hear a different sentiment expressed by many cha- r-cters belonging to the army, concerning general Winchester. All the prejudice excited against him, seemed to have beeachan- ged into respect. And the change, in sentiment, to have been produced by his regular and uniform conduct. ■ « I remained under the command of general Winchester until the 32d of December, at which time I left the army at Camp Miami, No. 3. In consequence of t he objections which had been made to general Winchester by soine of the officers as their com- manding general, and of the displeasure expressed by the volun- teers, I was more particular in 6bserving the movements of the army, than I should have been, had nothing been said to me res- pecting this displeasure at his taking command of the uorlh- western army. But so far from discovering any thing like a de- reliction of (luty, in every instance I observed a conaant care for the safety of his troops, and industry to avert the privations to which they were frequently subjected. And never ou any oa- casion did 1 see him deviatiug fron- Lis duty as commanding^ general. (Signed) . w " RICIl'D. DAYENPQRT", V* COPY OF A LETTER From Captain Eastland, late of Kentucky, to Genl. Winchester. • ' *ij>rashville, July, i3i7. " In answer to your communication requesting a statement o^ faces, with which you were some time since advised T was ac- quainted, haying relation to the conduct of mHJoi' general WiL- lianj Henry Harrison, as tonnicted w'itU the disaster* of the left, ving of the north-^yestern army; I reply .^ ,«ft-^- .4^'f/^: ^'-i^',-"*"*^'. If ft- APPENDIX. .. My .l.e»lian «a, «r.t .rro.te,! by Ifce officioa. «»"-'"«««'' IH.rmon »e«r Fraukforl, Kentucky, id Aiigusl, 19131, *l,n.. /«-,». four »rn.», »l"ch »h„»M hove n,ad« ev^ IL "il «f a^l-iU-n an P;»'""'^J^ "f .4 country, 1 notd the .erle, of cire«m3lan.e. rel.t.ng t. t!ii> maii, "lii'h f""""" '— , , , i „ „. it n» loss L":::— . .bo. ..op, i^r---- -f^-'-i^r:; :. a„..'uo,u,peeUns old governor, Scot., «., «^»' » J^;', fro,n ofliee-a. a moment «hen every avenue to b.» '""'"' ;; „ ad In, feeling, were ekVa.ed b, .be r»r..ns eonS". la- : e ki. friend, this fatal commission was oblained—lbit ;:;r:l*d'::t:cy:f major general. biebunp.^^^^^^^ ITir:: : ; edLclnsivcly .0 me, tbat .be en. tv« ev y unswi.'. ''.= 8-eral, no matter bow eon.empU le bo \Vilh this opinion of .be man, I conceived it my (^"Ij, '^ZjTo.rZLlM sin,..ion, t. be vigilant in an .bser- „ of 1 is °onlT«_a conduct -vbieb b.s been fraugbt «, b i;':.i.: to v:.:r,eU-,..,d tbe ..ost unbar,>y cou.e,ue.ees to .be "n: b':'!,- lirir^nieriug into a particular detail of bl. eon- -rt^r^ ;: ;l .:::^ "nvH'" ' «rps if vti„.tcer APVENDIX. 96 «•„„ l,in. »;.h .agon. -^'"-' '"'XtS; »a lul marched «i,h .h. ».lv'«ee of Hje «':7j" f J*,,,, ^eler- ,e,., a. .veil I., ''. ~'-''.f "/^^^^ ^ X W -IreaUd bo- T: :, °f rcnll «eLin advance, ?a hundred mile, north- ; flbv burning a few hut., a« destroying .orae eorn, '''"rScn-al Harrison re«n,.,i,hed the eontnt.nd of .1.« „„Vlo yon at Fort Wayne, „lth .o n,aeh apparent .at,.fae- ?• .?U Jas well understood, llmt I.e engag'^d to return to S . M ;;% and '^ausc tl,e troop, halted there to advance a, well Mary s, an „f every description, of whieh the armj as to forward supplies ol every V ^^ g^,___._ • . "-> ",""■"-' r^oh of Ip temWr, 1 next day, al,o„t noon. ^"•' "fat St Mar 's In ead of in-mediately despatching .he ■ rr, and suS, s he had solemnly engaged, he mounted a troops »"'''""''";;,„; ,h, ,,„„p,, exhorted them to patn- 17'flne 'r tir Believin/the troops now firmly wo- otism, lirmness o ^^ ^^ ^^ j_^,^„ „|,^ r:r:e~^ar le ..-nre ., U.e omeer. wh^ stated in suhstance, that the ;J>7 -j ^ ^ /claJde, """rTf "T/d ^auhfy rjld he cUlrdr-'by no other .a„. 'got;^o . vtd hla,ag.d the business, .hat that disr... 8^ APPENDIX. peclfiiJ and niiitiiious instrnment would certainly liave receiveJf the sanction of some of lire officers, had it not been reiiolutely discounienanccd by colonel Barbec and many others of high rank. At length, findios; his plan in part abortive, on Friday the 25th of September, he ordered colonel Jennings, with his regiment, thirty miles in advance towards Detance — tiwrc. to /m/f, BUILD A BLOCKHOUSE, AND AWAIT HIS FUR- THEKOUDKRRi Why this halt, when it was known yoo were on a hostile soil, ami without sspplrcs? The object wag, in my opinion, as glaring as the- unclouded splendor of a meri- dian snn 1 Your troops were to be starved — a mutiny wns to bo excited in your camp — and, if not destroyed by an ent-my, you wfere to be compelled to a retrograde movement. The left wing ol' the noit1»«we>iierri army vras to be thrown, by misery and mis- foitu.ies, into mutiny aJ«d rebellion — that this saviour of his country might redeem it— and obtain the undisputed command !. This language, sir, ml|%e considered too bold and decisive, b/ the luke-warm reactoi*»5:fiut vk'hen memory brings ihto view the sanguinary catastrophe which I am < invinced was the result of an intrigningjealousy, indignation and cofllenipt for demagogues arc aroused anew. You cannot forget, sir, that en my return from Fort Jennings, whither you had despatched me, in compa- uy with captain^Villiam Garrard, to ascertain the cause of tho detention of supplies, I told you whatl now do — that I advised you of the charueter of general Harrison, and assured you he was your covert aod sul)tle cnCmy ; and that it was his sole aim to ruin you. Wuuld to God, I had been enabled at that period to infuse into your mind a suspicion of his baseness — and that I could have shaken youir confidence in the fidelity and honor of a man, who Mas accessary, though perhaps without penjejving it at the time, to an evenl which will stain the pages of history. Whenever 1 think of tbe situation of the left wing of the army at Defiance — when 1 reflect upon what might shortly have been the consequences of this mutineiis stratagem, had not the friends of general Harrison procured him the command in ehief, my blood is chilled with horror. On the morning of the 2d of Oc- tober, a disposition to revolt was clearly manifested in colonel Allen's regiment. The sensations which this disposition pro- duced in tl>e mind and feelings of that gallant officer, lunguag* f.nif^ APPENDIX. 8? ts tco feebltj to •leseribc. For. who that saw, can ever forget, the conflicling passions vhicli alternately reigneil iii the bosom of that hero, when he miunted the breast-work to address his regiment. Pride, passion, mortification, shut up every avenue to utterance, until the silent and manly tear trickled down the soldier's cheek, and gave vent to the indignant feelings of his heart. Allen knew to what source the contagion of revolt poin- ted ; and had this man surviveil the battle of Frenchtown, yon would have been spared the trouble of appealing from historical romance to historical truth. " Soon after the circumstances which I have Just related transpired, I returned into the state of Kentucky, leaving the army in its encampments near the ruins of Defiance. In passi ing St Mary's, the ohjccrs at that post reeajpituliited all that I liave detailed, concerning the mutinous ppper, w^iich was prof- •fered for their signatures. From my iibscrvatinhs during my stay at St. Mary's, and on my rciui-n from thtiifie to Cincinnati, I have not the smallest doubt, that hav)" there been u dispositidn* connected with a corresponding exertion, on the part of general Harrison, the left wing of the north-western army could, with ease and facility, have been furnished with a suMcieucy of eve- ry descriptiou of supplies, to have justified active operations at Q, very early period. In this I am even supported by the gene- ral's concurrent opinion. When he arrived at Defiance with the supercedeas commission, after as^su^Ung the commaird &'c. he ' assured the troops, in an address, that there wore then at St. lilary's 600.000 rations, and abundance more daily arriving, which would, with the means of transportation then within his enntrol, enable him to supply the army plentifully; and that ; additional reinforcements, which he should order on immedi- ately, would enable the American army in thirty days trium- phantly to pnt.r Detroit, and again to plant the cagie upon its ramparts. He also stated, that be had received information,. . IVom a source in which he could place every reliance, that the army which retreated before you from Fort Wayne, was nearly all the opposing fqrcc which the enemy gouldbring into the field for some timej at least, not before your command could reaek Detroit. Can it be believed that an American officer, having jthe fertile and populous state of Ohio in bis rear, and being in A ^^ ''iP^r!^ ^^^ti^ 88 APPENDIX, regretted, thai im» man unfortunate wt it h.\.d .he ..pacity t. e„„.e.^^ How »» __^^^^ _^ for the Amenmn arms, thai J"" «•■" " . , „, ad- vance, and before the umim. ,, ,.«• ^ enterprise ! forcement^, made it an '»^^-- f j ^"^^"^/the command «In forty-eigUt hours after h.s '^""""P"" , ,^„, ^e remained one day 5 from t'^'-"«« " ^ .„^„ t,,, interior of „,ained two day«, and t-m thence v-^^^^ ^^^ ^.^^^^^ ^^^ Ohio. Had l.e rema.n.d «^\1 "^"y/^^^:,,^,,,, and quarter- paid the neee«sury aUc«tu.n ^^'^^ ^^T^^^^^^ of himself Liter's depa|tm.«tB, mstead or 'J*'^-",;;''^^^ ^.j^.^ed hi« inditrerentp3fc«orihee«in(ry he m.'^ 1^ ^^ ^^^^^^ pledge to the Icit wing .n ume ^ u^ P-- ^^,,„.,^ have enabled those ^'^;« "5«' ^;,y^„ K.i.in, to have fulfilled are now whitening en t"« l'»^ "^"^^ «tump address to the tae promise he made to h.s « ^'f;;;/ ^^ ^ if ,,ai» upon the army, that the A-er.cauYl uld p a.U h e ^^^^ ^_ ^^^^^^_ ,a.parts of Detro t. «!;^; .-;,;;,," ^ merely to ol.serve, .hat ther upon the eonduet « " J^,;.;,^ contemplate w.thatten- ;:r:A^^xrrth::ee„.eV— - demagoi^ue. ? .,„fi.:.«iPd respect, to which your worth « With sentiments of unleigneu re»i. and unmerited injuries entitle P^'J'.^jJ^^.J^^^g^ASrLAND.. I "CUAOI'OXT." END. ll|it ' 1 1^ •^ N ^i f I I. :.i V> f