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I' Wi ERE all the members of a io- ciety on an equality, and were its laws and regulations fuch that no one could become more wealthy than his neighbour, but by excelling him in approved perfonal exertions, they would recognize in each other equal rights, their political fyftem would, in the full latitude of the word, be a free government ; legiflators would be only B the ( ^ the organs of public reafon, laws the refult of the moft equitable compo- fition between men, and the admini- ftration could not do any thing dif- plealing to the people. Here it may- be afked, how comes it, that all go- vernments, even thofe accounted the moil: free, have hitherto fallen fo much fhort of this perfedlion? The anfwer may be given in one word. The difficulty, if not the impoflibility of making and fupporting the regula- tions I have hinted. Whoever confiders the inequalities of property among us, their crufes, and the diverfity of fentiments, thence ariiing, will foon be convinced, that we have little ground to expe£l either fuch laws or fuch government. M'^hat are we to think then of the fpeculations of thofe, who argue and affert, that every article (3 )■ article iii our public adminiftration, which is not conduded conformable to this primitive model, is an abufe that ought not to be tolerated ? If, by any device, they can bring back the difpofitions here fuppofed, all abufes, both public and private, will be eafily remedied : But to rail and florm, becaufe government, in the dregs of Romulus^ is not conducted on the maxims that could only have re- gulated condudl in the republic of Plato^ is unreafonable and abfurd to the laft degree. Let thofe who know hiftory, point out to me, when and where government, in a fociety like ours, has been conduced without abufes. Is there a department in pri- vate life, where there is not abundance of abufes, which the laws of juflice cannot reach ? tho' we are fenfible that thefe will remain, while the hu- B 2 man Wt PI ( 4 ) man heart harbours its prefent difpo- iitions, we are not on that account to quarrel with fociety, and retire into * a defart. Some evils are infeparablc from the greateft goods. We can no more hope to enjoy the one, and avoid the other, than that we ihould have ferenity of fky for all the months of funmer, and not, at the fame time, fee the fields and meadows fcorched. , Civil government, has always been produifliv". of great advantages, and ibme evils. When we fee the follies and perverfities that fometimes difcover themfclves among thofe, over whom it is exercifed, we ceafe to wonder, when we are told that there are pe- riods, in which the latter feem to increafe. Of the hardfhips and inconveniencies, felt at all times by various orders, in a large empire, few, in mmm I \ ( 5 ) in comparifbn, proceed from the im- mediate operations of government; A noble Lord, not long ago, made ufe, in the upper Houfe, of a very emphatic expoftulation, " Can an arm ** that is galled vvrith a chain, wield " the fv^rord of honour ?" Undoubt- edly my Lord, it cannot ; but numbers who fpeculate lefs on the ftate of fo- ciety, than your Lordfliip, are able to perceive, that the chains which gall their arms, do not all proceed from Lord North* s taxes; If every thing elfe in the fociety be right, there can- not be much amifs in thefe. There is a gradation, even in evils ; yet no- thing is more common, than to find men difapproving of one, and approving of another, infeparably conneded with it. Would your Lordfhip and your aiTociates, untie the heavy burdens ? would 4 I n ■ ; ( 6 ) would ye eafe us of our chains ? I will point out an cffedlual method, which I fhould not have troubled myfelf to do, had it not been fuggefled by the theories of liberty, ye yourfelves patronife, and without which they cannot be reduced to pradlice. It would be criminal to fup- pofe, that advocates fo flrenuous for true liberty, are averfe to that which is abfolutely neceflary to give it effedl. Away then with palliatives, let our underilandings no more be infulted therewith. Split your eftates, pro- mulgate an agrarian law, introduce fuch difcipline, as will eradicate from the mind, thofe fentiments which ren- der our prefent diftindions, the prin- cipal objeds of ambition ; without this, all your efforts will be to no purpofe. Then will liberty, in the genuine fenfe of the word, refume her ilation among us. A veftage of for- mer ( 7 ) mer corruption and profligacy, will fcarcely remain. Public and private virtue, fo rarely united at prefent, will go hand in hand. Without flaming Ipeeches to roufe and excite, we will all fhew ourfelves, equally interefte^ in the integrity of our rulers. Coin- cidence of interefl will produce coin- cidence of fentiment. Depend upon it, none Ihall govern, nor oppofe go- vernment, in a manner difpleafing to us. In a word, wicked adminiftra- tions, and groundlefs oppofitions, fhall be phoenomina, as uncommon in the political, as retrogade motion c in the fun, or any of the fixed ftars, are in the natural world. Tiius, my Lords and Gentlemen, by the fame means may you get rid of galling miniflers, we of galling chains, ar^: the foclcty in general, of a deal of troublefome bickering. For the attainment of ends ft; ■ IS « PI i ( 8 ) ends fo defirable, is there a patriot, who would not readily facrifice, the moft darling paflions of a vulgar brcaft* But to my great furprife, I am told, that whatever I may imagine, oppofi- tion, at leaft its leaders, are advocates for no fpecies of liberty which is in- confiftent with the prefent divifion of property in Britain, That I have ima- gined nothing but what is indifpenfa- ble to the liberty they efpoufe in theo- ry, will appear from a few plain quef- tions which I beg leave to put. Can the greateft inequalities of property, which we can fuppofe, have no influ- ence on the ftate of liberty ? To this all politicians, who have written upon the fubje rit of a faction was fupprefled only " by that of a fucceeding faction, the *' government was continually chang- *' ing ; the people, amazed at fo ma- " ny revolutions, fought every where *^* for a democracy without being able '- to find it. Althcugh, after a feries *' of ( 15 ) *' of tumultuous motions and violent *' fhocks, they were obliged to have " recourfe to the very government " which they had fo odioully pro- « fcribed." But as it now appears that no party among us is difpofcd to alter the pre- fent diftribution of property, the quef- tion from henceforth, with all rational enquirers, is not concerning the moft perfe£t liberty, but concerning that de- gree of it which is fuited to the circum- fiances of our country, which may very properly be called conftitutional liberty. That we enjoy this degree under the prefent government is fuf- ficiently acknowledged, even by thofe who oppofe it. For in all their at- tempts to irritate the people, they have fubftituted republican for conftitutional liberty, and expofed, as abufes in our govern- ( «6 ) govefnmer.t, what could be accouilted luch only in a republic. I i •t It would be loft labour to fearch for conftitutional liberty in tLv pam^ phlets to which I have alluded. Men whofe employments had given them fufficient opportunity of knowing what it is, have from party views given ftrange reprefentations of it. The late Lord Bolingbroke, in the ninth letter of his diflertation on parties, one defign of which he teils us, was to give true ideas of the Britijb conftitution, fpeaks thus, " fince the revolution, a king of " Britain is ftridlly and properly what *■' kings fliould always be, a member^ *' but the fupreme member, or the " head of a political body. Part of one " individual fpecifick whole, in eve-* " ry refpe6t ; diftindl from it, or in- " dependent of it in none. He can no longer ( 17 ) *' longer move in another orbit from " his people, and like fbme fuperior " planet, attradt, repel, influence, and *' dire6l their motions by his own. *' He and they are parts of the fame " fyftem, intimately joined, and co- " operating together, a£ting, and adled ** upon, limiting, and limited, con- " trouling, and controuled by one " another ; and when he ceafes to " ftand in this relation to them, he " ceafes to ftand in any." There is no difputc about all this in theory, neither would there be any in pradice, were there a perfed^ coincidence in the views and interefts of the whole poli- tical body, as is here fuppofed, by our author. When I fay, a perfedl: coincidence of views and interefts, I do not mean that which a philofopher may difcover in his clofet, but a co- incidence, w^hich the adions of every D mem- ( '8 ) member difcover. In that cafe, I al- low, there would be no difpute whe- ther the chief magillrate moved in an orbit in which he ought not, for what one calls his proper orbit, all call his proper orbit. But had ever this co- incidence place in any political body, where great inequalities of rank and fortune fubfift ? Do not fuch always imply, different views and in- terefts, at leaft to a certain degree r And as nothing is more probable, than that different claifes, or denominations of men, will view government in dif- ferent lights ; fhall the party, with whofe views its operations happen not to coincide, tell the fupreme magi- ftrate, that he no longer ftands in that relation to them. The confequence would be continual tumults, infurrec- tions and rebellions. Should ■ IR||«||VIKIIP.IJ ( 19 ) Should it here be afked, may not tyranny (helter itfelf under fuch pre- tences ; how fhall we diftinguifh be- tween the operations of government, which excite the difpleafure of a party from felfifh views, and thofe which violate the deareft rights of the fub- je6l ? will not minifters alledge, when guilty of the latter, that thofe who oppofe their mcafures, a£t ftill from felfifh views ? we reply, that every where we find a greater, or leffr^gree of power in the hands of government, in proportion to the greater, or lefs diverfity of fentiments that prevail among the governed, and that tyranny has never met with better fupport than in oppofite views and interefls. The liberty of a country, depends very much on the habits of its people. A French Abbe* refines thus on the * Mably. D 2 con- ( w ) condudl of Romulus ; *' If he fuccr Jed '* ill eftabliihing a diftinftion among " the Roman families, and forming a " nobility, the peculiar charadler of " whom, at all times, and in all " places, is, to dcfpife the people ; *''he was feiifible that there would *' thence refult a mutual hatred, ad- " vantagcous to his authority.** By fuch means, does this Abbe make the founder of Rome^ raife himfelf from being only the inftrument of his people's power, to be the fpring of all their motions. What Romulus did in this refpedl, it is needlefs to enquire ; this is a fpecies of policy, with which princes, in later times, have not been unacquainted. I would only obferve, that had the divifion of lands been preferved, which Romulus is fuppofed to have made among hi? people, we Ihould ( " ) fhould never have heard of the diftinc- tion in queftion, nor of the tyranny of l*arqum» With refped to which, the fame politician obferves, " The contempt (hewn by the great, in op- pofition to the hatred of the people, and the indifference of both for the public good, thofe ncceflary confe- quences of the changes introduced into the government, gave Tarquin an op- portunity of ufurping the crown. It is probable, that he would have con-* firmed his authority, had his fon com- mitted fuch crimes againft one order of citizens, as flattered the refentment and jealoufy of the reft, and not been guilty of an infamous a£lion, that was a common affront to all who bore the name of RomansJ** HI Such was the power thrown into the hands of the Roman kings, by the dif. ■■- ! m 1%' h'. -nl^? ft 22 ) different, or rather by the oppofite views and intercfts in the political body. But we are told that the dif- ferent orders in our government, have not only a common intereft, but, con- sidered as orders, or eiftatcs, *' they ** have no feparate contrad'%ry in- " terefts." Were I fully convinced of this, I fhould never be apprehenfive of abufes in our government. A phi- lofopher, who fits down to fpeculate upon our conftitution, may eafily make it appear, that there are no feparate contradictory interefts among us ; and when mankind are brought to a6t upon the principles which he afcribes to them, their condud may correfpond with his theories. In the mean time, however, nothing is more common than to find men ading uniformly, as if their intereft confifted in particulars. Ten ( 23 ) very different from thofe in which the philofopher places it. It will not be denied, that the moft important particulars, in which the different orders of our ftate^ make their refpeaivc intercfts confift, are common to the whole. No material injury can be done to one, without alarming all the reft. This happy coincidence of intereft in all matters of moment, it is to be hoped, will for ever pre- vent great abufes in our government, or will produce fuch a concurrence, as v^riU foon redrefs them in a legal way. Such will continue to be our cafe, 'till fome gr«at change, by the fhifting of property takes place in the internal ftate of the kingdom. And the con- fideration of it, whatever clamours may be occafionally raifed againft go- vernment, by difappolnted parlies, will quiet ( H ) quiet the xiiind of every fenfible man, while he fees that things in general, are in that fituation, which eftablifhed the coincidence juft mentioned. If any thing can render this principle doubtful, in fuch as our prefent cir- cumftances, it would be the violence of party divifions. To affert, however, that the diffe- rent orders among us, have, in their own apprehenfion of things, " no fepa- *' rate contradictory interefh," is going perhaps too far. Thefe words, fo art- fully put together, I quoted from Lord Bolingbroke. Allow it, that interefts are not fo far feparate, as to be con- tradictory, yet admitting the exiftence of feparate interefls, Will they not pro- duce, in fociety, effects which would not have place where one fingle inte- reft prevails ? For thefe eft-eds liis J vord- ( 25 ) Lordfhip makes no allowance, neither, indeed, could he confiftently with his fcheme of liberty. They are very juflly marked by the prefident Montef- quieu, in fpeaking of our government, " The body of the nobility," fays he, " ought to be hereditary : In the firft *' pl?ce, it is io in its own nature; and " in the next, there mufl: be a confi- " derable intereft to prcferve its privi- '' leges ; privileges which, in them- *' felves, are obnoxious to popular en- " vy, and, of courfe, in a free flate, *' are always in danger." What efTedbs did the condudl of the Houfc of Commons produce, in the reign of Charles II. when we are told its character was determined by the temper of the people, and when opi- nions were prevalent among a great part of the people, too much akin E with I! i '' ■ i ( »6 ) With thofe which are propagated at prelent ? Our noble author, as well as every hiftorian who writes the hif- tory of that period, tell us, that ap- prehenfions of falling back under the influence of pre{byterian and republi- can principles, began to fhew them- felves in the Houfe of Lords. It is of no confequence what may be the de- termination of a philofopher refptffting thefe apprehenfions, whether he will confider them well, or ill-founded. Prejudices, if you will call them fb, were alarmed, but let me tell you, al- lowances mufl be made, even in the frame of a government, for the preju- dices of a refpedlabie order of men., otherwife they will regard the com- mon liberty as their flavery. I will venture to prognofticate, whatever motives particular Lords may have for approbation, that the Houfe of Com- mons ( ^7 ) mons will never a6l on fimilar princi- ples, without exciting fimilar appre- henfions in the Houfe of Lords. Hi- therto this has uniformly been the cafe, and we have no reafon to believe, that human nature is greatly chang- Before the reign of iJ\ ' Had we neither King nor Liords in the nation, and were there no defire in any of the Commons to rife to either of thefe flations, or, to lord it over his fellows, the whole legi- flative power might, without any in* convenience, be lodged in the Houfe of Commons. They could never carry matters to excefs. The temper of the people would infallibly determine that of i 33 ) of the Houfe. And whatever is con- formable to the paffions of a people, never appears extravagant or reprehcn- fible to themfelves. Were fuch a Houfe to nominate a magiftrate for dif- charging the executive power, his fitu- ation would be precifely that which Lord Bolin^brohe afTigns to our prefent kings. lie could move in no orbit, but that chalked out for him by the Commons, a deviation from which would never admit of any difpute. The unanimity arifmg from the co- incidence of interefts among the mem- bers of the political body, would de- termine every thing. In fhort, he could do nothing difpleafing to the Houfe, and the Houfe could do nothing difpleafing to the people. i \> r I i'i M We fee then, that inftead of that fpecies of liberty, of which the ftate F of pi ' si' < 34 ) of fociety in Britain, at the revolu- tion, aiidever fince, hasbeen fufceptible j the noble author gives us that which can have place only among republicans. Republicanilm, when eftablifhed hcre^ was accounted a fubveriion, not a reformation ot our government. Had thofe who tjok the lead in deftroying our old government, had any intention to eftablilh a real republic, its regula- tions would have been in direct con- tradiction to the fentiments of our minds. Since the reftoration of our mixed government, it is agreed on all hands, that the king ought to ftand in that relation ailigned him by the whole fociety ; but it is denied, that any clafs or order in the fociety, has the ex- clufive right of determining Vv hat this relation is, or when he ceafcs Lo fland in it. How unreafonable is it there- fore to fay, that the conformity, or non* u ti ( 35 ) nonconformity of our government to a fcheme of liberty, which in eflence is republicanifm, prefcribes the meafures of fubmiflion to our kings ? It is in effedt telling every clafs of people, *' when the government of this country is not condudled in a manner pleafnig to yourfelves, you *' are to conlider the king as having " forfeited his right to allegiance.'* Such a do6lrine, when urged feri- oufly, I muft always consider, as pernicious in a nation, where variety of intcrefts is to be attended to. Whoever judges, by a flandard of this kind, and our difiippointed peo- ple judge by no other, which they have the effrontery to call the con- flitution, may eafily find abufes in overnment. F 2 The 14 '4% i ( 36' ) The views of a party are no fboner crolTed, than all its members are dif- pleafed. Every one exclaims that the condudt of the miniftry is become arbitrary, that the conftitution is in danger, and that if things go fo, it muft inevitably be ruined. The real conftitution would tell fuch, " my ex- igence io not the phantom of your pleafure, nor my annihilation, the phantom of your difpleafure. I am, as it were, a record of thofe articles, in which all the hetciogenious parts of the fociety concur and agree, there are thoufands in which they difagree. With thefe I have no concern what- ever individuals, 01 parties may al- Icdge to the contrary. An attack upon any of my conftituent parts, world bring millions to my afiiftance." *' But ( 37 ) " But why, fay the opposition, enter *' into a difcullion concerning the dif- " ferent orders of the ftate ? we have " no intention to abridge eftabUfhed " rights and privileges ; we complain " only of the grievances peculiar to *' the prefent time.'* Have you made it appear that thty are peculiar to the prefent time ? or that the ftandard, by which you eftimate them, does not operate to the extirpation of all diftin£lions in the ftate ? The inten- tion of my difcuflion, is to fhew, that you have done neither the one or the other. Thofe who have judged by your prefent theories, have ever found as many, it not the very fame grie- vances which you find at prefent. Was not corruption of parliament, wafte in the public expenditure, accu- mulation of debt and taxes, the bur- Did not den of liord Bolingbrokc^ fong ? Mt'' ■SF C 38 ) not the men in power proceed, in liis time, deliberately and fupercilioufly, from blunder to blunder, from year to year, in one perpetual maze of con- fufed, incoherent, inconllftent, un^ meaning fchemes of bufinefs ? I know no form of government that can pre- vent thefe evils, but the republic above fuppofed. There indeed, a minifler, who fhould prefume to proceed in this manner, or calumniators of his con- dud:^ when he did not proceed- in t^'S manner, would foon meet with their deferts. But as thefe are not our circumflances, we mufl put up with the inconveniencies, to which our fa- thers fubmitted. We muft always ex- ped to find fome exclaiming againft the meafures of government, and judging, with as little candour, as if their particular intereft ought to be its fole obje6t. What < 59 ) What is to be done then ! are we to find no fault with government, whatever its meafures be? What would have been our condition, had this been the condun, fome- thing will always depend on the par- ticular abilities of its miniilers. But I would alk thofe who accufe the pre- fent, as deficient in this refpedl, what pledge or fecurity have the public, were you in office, againfl the mal- II 2 admi- ( 5= ) ndmlniftration arifing from the fame fource? Upon what fcore are you entitled to plead exemption from the frailties of humanity ? Has the tenor of your lives hitherto furnifhed moral certainty of the redlitude of your future con- duel? - ^ " The prefent miniflers have im- '' poveriflied the nation, by attempting *' to carry into execution, impradlica- " hie fchcmes." Thefe fchemes were laid down by their predeccffors, fome of whom you, their prefent antago- nifts, were. But I thought that after admitting the efl'entials of liberty to be fafe, your charges of mal-admi- niftration, had relied folely on the per- fonal characters of men. Againft what you now mention, there is provifion in the conftitution. This country can- not be impoA ilhed, miniflers cannot touch ^ J ( 53 touch a half-penny of the pubhc money, without the concurrence of parliament, which implies, that the fchemes of miniflers are approved by parliament. " The Independence of parliament *' is deftroyed, corruption is trium- *' phant, the majority, like a tame, " well-tutored flock, follow their bell- " wether obftinately, but never tread " upon his heels." Thefe are flale complaints. We can infer nothing from them, but either that our liber- ties muft have been deftroyed long ago, or that minifters have afled in the n- terefl: of the people ; in which cafe, thofe who originally muftered up the complaints, tell us, that the meafures of government will always meet with tlic concurrence of an independent par- liament. Tlicrc is but one alternative, either > m r i i@ ( 54 ) either liberty is deftroyed, or the mca- fures of government are not inimical to liberty, If it be faid, that the meafures of government are only ope- rating the deflrudlion of liberty, I re- ply, they were doing fo fifty years ago, if we believe the oppofition of that time. Now I will take upon me to fay, that any impartial perfon, after the flridleft enquiry, will find, no more iinmediate tendency in the meafures of the prefent day, than in thofe of the laft age, to deflroy liberty. I defy, even the moft violent arraigners of prefent meafures, to fpecify one arti- cle in our lift of grievances, \vhich was not reprefented fifty years ago, as immediately defl:ru£tive to liberty. To do this, is the more incumbent on them, becaufe they have, with much confidence, told the prefent generation, that the government of our country, has K^ ( 55 ) has of late, deviated entirely frorti its ancient maxims, and that its meafures are marked by a fpirit of tyranny, unknown to our fathers. What a happinefs ! that " mankind are, in all «' ages, caught by the fame baits, that ** the fame tricks played, over and " over again, fliould ilill trepan them." We come now to the fubjeft of the petitions that have been fent to parlia- ment, praying redrefs of grievances. We fhall not difputc the exigence of grievances, the befl inflitutions are produ£live of fome ; even the theo- cracy itfelf w\is not exempted from its Ihare. The government of this country is now conducted on the plan that was eftabUfhedat the revolution. If that plan involved in it any imperfedions, or has been become produdive of particular hardfhips, that could not have been fore- ( 56 ) forefeeii, they are chargeable iipbn nd particular adminiftration. From the charader of the prefent, there is no reafon to fufpe£l that they are more averfe to reformations than any other fet of men in the kingdom. But as our prefent fyflem of government is the effect of time, it may be prefumed,- that utility fuggefted its feveral depart- ments. While, therefore, we- are re- forming particular abufes in thefe, we muft not lofe fight of the general pur- pofes for which they were inftituted. Of this, it is the more neceffary, to be reminded, becaufe, as Montefquku ob- ferves, " the great advantages refulting from eftablifliments lie often clofely concealed, w^iile the little inconvenien- ces that attend them are moft fenfiblv felt." Whether- this principle has been fufficiently attended to, by the author of ( 57 ) of a bill now in parliament will merit difcretion upon fome other occafion. The petitioners complain of the in- creafe of taxes, and of the influence of the crown, as dangerous to liberty. The fyftem of finance now followed, is that which was eilabliflied imedi- ately after the revolution. That ma- ny objedions may be made to it, does not efcape me, but I believe that every one who has thought upon the fubjedt, will allow, that to frame another with- out the imperfe6aons of the prefent, and which will anfwer the exigences of the flate equally well, is a matter of no fmall difficulty. Taxes have al- ways encreafed when vv^e have been engaged in a war. We cannot deter- mine what is excefs in the revenues of a ftate, without taking into confidera- tion the riches of its members. A due I pro- ( 58 ) proportion between thefe will natural- ly take place, iinlefs it be prevented by Ibme extraordinary concurrence ofcir- cumftances ; as in the latter days of the Roman republic, when wc are told there was public exigence and private opulence. The caufe of which was, that from the time the ftate began to look upon itfelf as the fovereign of the world, all taxes on its own members had been difcontinued. This feeming advantage is, however, juftly accounted one caufe of its ruin ; for when a few virtuous citizens would have fruftrated the machinations of its fecret enemies, there was no treafure wherewith to do it. But this was an extraordinary cafe. In general, the proportion 1 have men- tioned, takes place fo infallibly, that a minifter cannot encreafe the revenue, in any confiderable degree, while the wealth of a nation does not increafe. '' The ( 59 ) The grand fources of increafe, in the latter, are Uberty and induftry. In a nation blefTed with thefe, taxes which would ruin all others, may prove only additional incentives to labour. If, therefore, our prefent taxes are not in- judicioufly laid, which is not pretend- ed, there can be no great ground of «omplaint, while parliament approves of the ends for which they are levied. . In what reipecfl would you reduce the influence of the crown ? " All its influence upon the Houfe of Commons, excepting that which is conflitutional, ought to be abolilhed. ^ nnual par- liaments ought to be reflored. No member ought to hold any place or penfion under the crown." Some, I know, have told you, that the king would, in that cafe, ftill retain his confli utional influence in the lep;ifla- I 2 ture ( 60 ) ture ; but they have neither told you; nor us, at what aera of our govern* ment the influence of the crown was reftrided to thefe limits. Such a thing has not been attempted by any admi- niflration fince the revolution, neither, as I have fhewn, could it be attempted with any good efFed, in a fociety like ours. Your inflru£lors affign to our kings ho more influence or power, than the executive magiftrate of a pure republic would be allowed to polTefs. When we are poflefled of the fentiments re- quired in a pure republic ; when am- bition and intereft ceafe to difunite us ; when we become as fond of quality, as the generality of usjuft now are of precedency, then may we have an- nual parliaments.' In the mean time, it would become you, as men who know ( 6i ) know th^ world, not to allow yoiir- felves to be tranfported by the phrenfy of a fadlion. Its heads, were they once in ofFice, would talk to you in a very different ftrain. When you are about to reform, you muil: remember, if you expedl any beneficial effedls, that it is a mixed government, and not a republic that is the fubjedl of your re- formations. " Why fhould the entire indepen- dence jf the Houfe of Commons prove detrimental to our mixed government. Admitting it never has been effedlual- ly fecured fince the revolution, that is no reafon why it fliould not be at- tempted. Annual parliaments have had place in this nation without any inconvenience." There is a prejudice, not altogether groundlefs in affairs of government, againfl new experiments. If ( 6. ) If the prefent miniftiy fliould not have refolution enough to abandon the path of their predeceflbrs, I cannot blame them. The leafl knowing of you, can fcarcely be ignorant, that the circum- fiances of the nation are now very different from what they were when annual parliaments obtained among us. At that time, the Houfe of Com- mons was little elfe than a mere im- plement in the kgi^ature. The civil fubjedlion of its members, deprived it of all political importance. In con- fequence of the diffufion of property, it acquired political importance, and being cured of republican whimfies, has fixed the conftitution at the true poife of a mixed government. This poife produced a coincidence of the md interefls of the whole principal rights ( 63 ) whole community. Whatever there- fore tends to throw more weight into one fcale of government than into ano- ther, tends fo far to annihilate the co- incidence. A bill, fome time ago, paffed the Houfe of Commons incapacitating all who were members of that houfe, to hold any place or peniion under the crown. It was reje(5led in the Houfe of Lords, becaufe, faid they, it im- plies what is not a fa6t, a repugnancy between the intereft of the fovereigii and that of his people. It is mere weaknefs to fuppofe, that the fame perfons fliould not equally ferve both at the fame time. I would not have the Commons of Britain to acquiefce entirely in this argument. Neither the King nor the Lords have an exclu- five . ( 64 ) live right to determine what is the in- tereft of the people. If at any time the collc(Slive body of the Commons fhould feel, that what they think their intereft, is either negledled or injured by their reprefen- tatives ; if ofBces and places, at the d;fpofal of the crown, fhoiild ever be- come fo numerous, that in oppofition to the honeil and diiintcrefted part of the Houfe, the court fhould always command the refolutions of the whole, i fi}'-, in fuch a cafe, tiie conftitution has net left the collective body without refource. It authorifes them to peti- tion his Majefly to diifolvc the parlia- ment. We here fuppofe, that the evil e^eds arifm-^; trom this undue infiu- ence, will be felt throughout the kingdom, and that a majority at leaft of the people will concur in this peti- tion. ( 65 ) tion. This fuppofitloii cannot be called unreafonable, when we con- fider the coincidence of general interefls. In confequence of the diffolution, they will have an opportunity of eie£ling a parlia^ ment of honefl and difinterefted men, which in a legal manner will redrefs the undue influence of the crown, and fecure the independency oftheHoufe fo far, that the Court, without being aflifted by the honeft and difmterefled members, cannot command the refo- lutions of the whole. If it ftiould happen that the electors are not honefl: and difinterefted enough . to make this choice, it will be more difficult to find a remedy. But I leave the reader to judge, with what juftice or propriety, llich eieclors could complain of grie- If it be aiked, what if the K folve vances. king in fuch a cafe, fliould not dif- ( 66 ) folve the parliament, it is fufficient to reply, that lince the revolution, a king of Great Britain has never faid, nor adted, as if he would not comply with the petition of a majority of his peo- ple. It would be needlefs therefore, yea, it would be injurious, to fuppofe any fuch thing. But what I have now fuppofed as a poflible cafe in our government, it wou^d feem is not, even in the opinion of the petitioners, the prefent circum- flances of the nation. They have not petitioned for a diflblution of parlia- ment, they have only petitioned the Houfe itfelf, which fuppofes, whatever may have been furmifed, that the Houfe is yet capable of redreffing grievances. Whatever therefore the determination of the Houfe may be, refpeding grievances, no part of the people ( 6? ) people can, with any juftice murmur. The obligations to fubmit in this cafe, are equally ftrong, as in any other. If they fhould think that enough has not been done for them, they ought to remember, that what they think their intereft, can claim the attention of the legiflative, only in conjundion, with that of their fellows. " If the determination of the Houfe " is not fatisfadtory, why fhould we " not then petition for a diflblution ?*' I have no objcdlion, only one thing is to be adverted to. You are not to take it amifs if his Majefly fhould think himfelf under an obligation of not complying with your requefl, 'till you become a majority of the people. Were government to deviate from this rule, the exiflence of one branch of the legiflature, would depend upon the K 2 caprice ( 68 ) caprice of e - ly party, which had in- fluence enough to procure a few pe- titions. I have now faid, with refped to your petitions, all that is neceffary to be faid, and I have made all the con- ceflions that I think a reafonable man can defire. I have allowed^ that there are grievances, I have allowed, that any part of the people has a right to petition their reprefentatives for redrefs. If they are under no undue influence, you cannot fuppofe but that they will give all the redrefs, of which the cir- cumftanees of the ftate will admit. If there is ground to fufpe£l: xindue influence, it cannot efcape the notice of the nation in general. It will pro- duce a concurrence. And the concur- rence of a majority, can in effect, un- make one parliament, and make ano- ther. ( 69 ) ther. This being clearly, and incon* teftibly, the fcheme of our conftitu- tion, where was the neceflity, where w^as the occafion for fuch illegal affo- ciations as your pre fen t committees ? Would a national party, have recourfe to any but national means of redrefs ? Would real concern for the conftitu- tion, have dictated a violation of the conflitution ? Is there a fmgle motive or plea, on which your committees can be juftified ? From this wanton innovation, and dangerous attack upon the conflitution, you have given the world too much reafon to conclude, that you are blinded by the fpirit of a fadion. FINIS.