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PFjS^>»CIAU 1-ID;^AR^ vioTonK- |.'* yTi '»-%^vj$^^f . -JJlT'h'V ^* V ^/•v^.. •*(« 3' -r -"*fci> r^*v .4i^. >;i^ K^*-' 5W .-i- "// .,-^<:i:'» WIMOWIN .\^> « < ^ li"' V i>v-. .V ij i,-> D IV C'^.J ris^-^i, -n.-^ liV.^I.^" .-f .■^, ^^¥3& ". .•f ■:■■'- rfe":*^; 'i'^-y; mmM . niij niwii •-■MW mi^w: WINNOWINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY. DIPLOMATIC SERIES. No. I. r -ificN. W. History n-nt PROVINCIAL, LiBRAR-V VICTORIA, B. C. 'wms^ '■-> i t> i mmmtHmm^' ■ — lOi in " -mv The United States and Spain IN 1790. 7> AN EPISODE IN DIPLOMACY DESCRIBED FROM HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED SOURCES. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. » N BROOKLYN, N. Y.: HISTORICAI, PRINTING CI,UB. 1890. ^"^-^"■3ap^" -A^'^^ \Ji-'S 230 Copies Printed. No. -^-^— - r - i CONTENTS. /' I PAOB Introduction 7 Questions of the President 43 Reply of the Vice-President, John Adams 45 Opinion of the Chief Justice, John Jay 50 Opinion of the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson 56 Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for Mr, drmichael, by Thomas Jefferson 59 Heads of consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas. By Thomas Jefferson 65 Hamilton to Washington, 15 September, 1790 68 Opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton . 69 Opinion of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox 103 Index 107 <») Pacific N.W. History Oept. 31832 PROVINCIAL. LIBRARY VICTORIA. B. C. ...Ato.^ —imKrsmmm m »wi—%iii t INTRODUCTION. -l" 4 TiiL iiiterest of the papers included in these pages lies lo the light they throw upon the first question of diplomacy, which confronted the newly constituted government of the United States. During the Revolution diplomatic relations with European powers had been confined to offers of alli- ances, of commercial reciprocity and requests for financial aid ; but the net result had been a treaty of alliance with France, which led to important results for the revolting col- onies ; a treaty of commerce with the same nation, that was entirely inoperative, thanks to the network of protective duties and prohibitions that closed the French ports to out- side traders ; and a few parchments involving contracts with other nations and supposed to contain concessions that might in certain contingencies become of value, but rather from their moral and political influence, as involving a recognition of the independence of America, than from any actual bonds of .interest, political or commercial. Nor had the foreign relations of the States improved during the years from the treaty of peace in 1 783, to the promulgation of the new constitution and the establishment of a central government. Great Britain recognized the independence of the new nation, but refused to treat with it politically or commer- cially under formal exchange of ministers or a commercial treaty. The laws of trade and the rigid laws of the mer- cantile system gave the trade of America into British hands ; (7) •sM^sjpr,*--. 8 and, enjoying a natural monopoly, the British ministry saw no good reason for jeopardizing actual profit by suggesting changes that might prove injurious. To purchase by con- cession what they were already in the full enjoyment of, was not recognized as good policy ; nor was it more agreeable to them to open diplomatic relations that could not but lead to embarrassing controversies. There were charges of bad faith in the execution or rather evasion of the terms of the treaty of 1 783, which could be judged of only by a tedious, difficult and extremely delicate weighing of claims on both sides. The Revolution in France had disarranged the rela- tions of that people with the outside world, and already in America a feeling was engendered that a too close connec- tion with that country might not be safe or expedient for the American interests. With Spain, there wero still the embarrassing claims and denials attending the free naviga- tion of the Mississippi ; while the problem of public credit was intimately connected with the relations between the United States and their creditors — France and Holland. This unsatisfactory condition of diplomatic relations was emphasized by the geographical bounds of the new nation. On the north was the English province of Canada, posses- sion of which was long the object of the Continental Con- gress, and scattered within American territory were a num- ber of fortified posts held and garrisoned by the British, in direct contradiction to the terms of the treaty of peace. To the south were the posscbsions of Spain, for whom the Americans had little affection because of the hesitating and half-hearted assistance given during the war, and because of the complications raised in the subsequent negotiations for the navigation rights of the Mississippi. When Spain in • *l • 17S3 obtained both Florda and Louisiana, the Spanish gov- ernment " aimed at exchiding the United States, not France, from the gnlf,"* and she had little compunction in showing how little regard she intended to have for the wishes of the new republic, whose very institutions implied a menace to her colonial possessions in America. The Count de Florida Blanca, now supreme in the conduct of the foreign relations of Spain, was opposed to ceding any privileges asked, much less to recognizing any rights claimed by the Americans, touching the Mississippi. Smarting under the slight in- flicted by the treaty of 1783, which by a secret article looked to an English ownership of West Florida, she notified Con- gress that antil the question of boundaries — always vexatious and easily prolonged — had been determined, the exclusive control of the Mississippi would be claimed by Spain.f As an earnest of her desire to accommodate any difference, Don Diego de Gardoqui was named "Encargado de Ncgo- cios," to reside near Congress and negotiate a settlement. The matter might have rested there for some time had it not been for the excitement raised in the western country. The arilva! of Gardoqui gave reason to look for a removal of differences vnd the inhabitants of the west were cjuite willing to await the result. Lut months passed and nothing was published. Jay was bound by his instructions to insist upon the right of navigation of the Mississippi from ocean to sc- rce, v.-hile Gardoqui sought to establish the views of his master by securing the exclusion of all nations — Ameri- cans included— from that part of the river that ran through his, then undefined, territory. Annoying matters were con- * Heiiiy Adams, lliitory of the United Slates, I, 353. f 25 June, 1784. «! lO tinually arising : the unlawful occupation by Green , and his f(jllo\vcrs of Spanish territory, an act promptly disavowed by Georgia ; the stoppage of traders at Natchez ; the question of indebtedness to Spain ; the complaints made by Indian tribes ; and what must have been most galling to Jay, the secret article of the treaty with Great Britain. At length, in August, 1 786, Jay notified Congress that no treaty could be framed if the navigation right was insisted upon, and pro- posed to yield the claim for a period of twenty-five or thirty years, before the end of which the privilege, he thought, could hardly become of importance,* To Madison, always firm in insisting on maintaining to the utmost the claims against Spain, such a concession was almost criminal. " Passing by the other Southern States, figure to yourself the effect of such a stipulation on the Assembly of Virginia, already jealous of northern politics, and which will be com- l)osed of about thirty members from the western waters ; of a majority of others attached to the western country from interests of their own, of their friends, or their constituents ; and of many others who, though indifferent to Mississippi, will zealously play off the disgust of their friends against Federal measures. Figure to yourself its effect on the people at large on the western waters, who are impatiently waiting for a fivorable result to the negotiation of Gardoqui, and who will consider themselves as sold by their Atlantic brethren. Will it be an unnatural consequence if they con- "•'■ " With respect to the Spaninviis, I do not tliiiik the nuvigiition of the Mississippi is an object cf great importance to us at present ; and when the banks of the Ohio i...d tlie fertile planis of the western country get tliickly inliabited, the people will embrace the advantages whicii nature affords them in spite of all opposition." IVashiii^ton to Roch- ambciiu, 7 .September, 1785. mmm mmmm p gWTF ..S Bi B i # II sider themselves absolved from every Federal tie, and court some jjrotection for their betrayed rights? This i)rotection will appear more attainable from the maritime powtr of Britain than from any other quarter ; and 13ritain will be more ready than any other nation to seize an oppmtunity of embroiling our affairs. ... I should rather supjxjse that he [the Spanish minister] means to work a total separation of interest and affection between western and eastern set- tlements, and to foment the jealousy between eastern and Fouthern States. By the former, the population of the western country, it may be expected, will be checked, and the Mississipin so far secured ; and, by both, the general security of Spanish America be promoted."* This expression of an extreme view was actually a very accurate forecast of what did occur, so far as it applied to the inhabitants of the western country. A rough popula- tion, having no sentimental ties that could bind them to home or state, by necessity often trespassers or aggressors, using force to obtain what they thought belonged to them, adventurous and restless, easily influenced by a desire for gain that need not respect the shadowy claims of a govern- ment incapable of enforcing them, and captivated by the energy and promises of demagogues, it was not to be ex- pected that they would fret long under the restraints imposed upon them by Spain, acting through her governors on the Mississippi. Retaliation was the readiest weapon at hand. Green, who had already figured as the Governor of a State parcelled out of Spanish territory, came again to the front, and anmher adventurer, Clark, in return for a seizure by the Spanish at Natchez, rifled a Spanish trader's store at Vincen- nes. If the Americans were not permitted to trade down * Madison to Jeffersoti, 12 August, 1786. *--> «! 12 the river, it was urged the Spaniards should not trade up. And a vigorously expressed protest now appeared which did much to excite a public feeling against the Spaniards, as well as against the Congress : i COI'V OK A I.r/ITF.R FROM A GENTLEMAN AT THE FALLS OF OHIO TO HIS FRIEND IN NEW ENGLAND, DATED DECEMBER 4, I 786. Dear Sir : Politics, which a few months ago were scarcely though*: of, are now soiinded aloud in this Dart of the world, and discussed by almost every person, i he late commer- cial treaty with Spain, in shutting up, as it is said, the navi- gation of the Mississippi for the term of twenty-five years, has given this western country a universal shock, and stnick its inhabitants with amazement. Our foundation is affected ; it is therefore necessary that every individual exert himself to apply a remedy. To sell and make us vassals to the merciless Spaniards is a grievance not to be borne. The Parliamentary acts which occasioned our revolt from Great Brit:nn were not so barefaced and intolerable. To give us the liberty of transporting our effects down the river to New Orleans, and then be subject to the Spanish laws and impo- sitions, is an insult upon our understanding. We know, by woful experience, that it is in their power, when once there, to take our produce at any price they please. large quan- tities of flour, tobacco, meal, Szc, have been taken there the last summer, and mostly confiscated ; those who had per- mits from th-^ir (governor were obliged t) sell at a price he was pleased to state, or subject themselves to lose the whole. Men of large property are already nuned by their policy. What benefit can you on the Atlantic shores receive from this act? The Spaniards, from the amazing resoyrces of this river, can supply all their own markets at a much lower price than you possibly can. Though this country has been settling but about six years, and that in the midst of an in- veterate enemy, and most of the first adventurers fallen a prey to the savages, and although the emigradon to this ■' 13 country is so rapid that the internal market is very great, yet the quantity of produce they now have on hand is im- mense. Flour and pork are now selling here at twelve shillings the hundred ; beef in proportion ; any quantities of Indian corn can be had at ninepence i)er bushel. Three times the quantity of tobacco and corn can be raised on an acre here that can be within the setdement on the east side of the mountains, and with less cultivation. It is, there- fore, rational to suppose that, in a very few years, the vast bodies of water in those rivers will labor under the immense weight of the produce of this rich and fertile country, and Spanish ships be unable to convey it to market. Do you think to prevent the emigration from a barren country, loaded with taxes and impoverished with debts, to the most luxurious and fertile soil in the world ? Vain is the thought and presuunptuous the supposition. You may as well en- deavor to prevent the fishes from gathering on a bank in the sea which affords them plenty of nourishment. Shall the best and largest part of the United States be uncultivated, a nest for savages and beasts of prey ? Certainly not. Prov- idence has designed it for some nobler purposes. This is convincing to every one who beholds the many advantages and i)leasing prospects of this country. Here is a soil richer to appearance than can possibly be made by art ; large plains and meadows, without the labor of hands, suffi- cient to support millions of cattle summer and winter ; cane, which is also a fine nourishment for them, without bounds. The spontaneous production of this country surpasses your imajyjnation ; consequently I see nothing to prevent our herds being as numerous here, in time, as they are in the Kingdom of Mexico. Our lands to the northward of Ohio, for the produce of wheat, &c., will, I think, vie with the Island of Sicily. Shall all this country now be cultivated entirely for the use of the Spaniards? Shall we be their bondmen, as the children of Israel were to the I'^gyptians? Shall one part of the United States be slaves while- the other is free ? Human nature shudders at the thought, and free- F^SRa»?S55 ,jia:;;;jr«?irww*»Mr -"'; mm^ * m i ^ .T V j f» it.mjinmmim.a iii >« '* m i M>.l *i1|iM O 14 men will despise those who could be so mean as to even contemplate on so vile a subject. Our situation is as bad as it possibly can be ; therf^fore, every exertion to retrieve our circumstances must be manly, eligible, and just. \Vc can raise twenty thousand troops this side the Alle- ghany and Appalachian mountains ; and the annual increase of them by emigration from other parts is from two to four thousand. We have taken all the goods belonging to the Spanish merchants of post Vincenncs and the Illinois, and are de- termined they shall not trade up the river, provided they will not let us trade down it. Preparations are now making here (if necessary) to drive the Spaniards from their settle- ments at the mouth of the Mississippi. In case we are not countenanced and succored by the United States, (if we need it,) our allegiance will be thrown off, and some other Power applied to. Great Britain stands ready with open arms to receive and support us ; they have already offered to open their resources for our supplies. When once re- united to them, "farewell, a long farewell, to all your boasted greatness ;" the province of Canada and the inhabi- tants of these waters, of tliemselves, in time, will be able to conquer you. You are as ignorant of this country as Great Britain was of America. These hints, if righdy improved, may be of some service ; if not, blame yourselves for the neglect. The anti-federal sentiments shown in such expressions of opinion naturally disturbed Madison, and he returned to the Continental Congress with the intention of forcing the question of the Mississippi, now by a legislative trick, as he thought, left almost entirely in the hands of Jay. He was supported in this by the strong feeling of the Virginia Leg- islature, asserting in unmistakable language the importance of acquiring the right of navigating the rivv,r. But he was n o '5 opposed by the ind.fference, or rather the interest, of the Eastern and some of the Middle States. To them, the navigation of the western river meant nothing ; for they were more intent upon acquiring commercial privileges in the Spanish West Indies, and were willing, almost eager, to se- cure these at the expense of the claims applying to the Mis- sissippi. It was on the vote of the four Eastern States, with the assistance of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, that the restriction imposed upon Jay in his negotiations, of insisting upon this right, had been repealed ; and this vote was based upon such motives as were not likely to be changed. For New York saw in the west a rival to her commercial interests, and Pennsylvania, if not controlled, was at least influenced, by the same jealousy. In 1786 the feeling was so strong as to produce a talk of separation of the Middle and Eastern States from the Southern, should a determination of the matter be forced, and conclude to the injury of the wishes of the former. * Yet, as Madison said, would the Eastern States have remained quiet under a ces- sion by Congress of the fishery rights for commercial privi- leges applying to tobacco ? To yield the navigation rights in exchange for liberty to export fish and flour into the Spanish colonies involved, in his view, as great a sectional sacrifice, the South and West being sacrificed to the North, f * Monroe to Madison, 3 September, 17S6. ■I- Early in his negotiations, Gardoqui had said that as the Spanish King "has no occasion for the codlish, oil, sahnon, grain, flour, rice, nor other productions, he m.iy, considering the right which obliges his subjects to provide themselves by their own industry or other useful and important means, find it convenient to prohibit them, to remind this nation [?. e. the Ui.ited States] at present, as a friend, that they have no treaty." <7(7n/o^«jVaration from Spain, war must ensue, for which extensive prepara- tions were made on both sides. The Spanish were collecting their fleets at Cadiz and Ferrol, and the king on May 5, 1 790, announced to Par- liament the prospect of war. A credit was given, but little opposition appeared ; and while a peaceable settlement was sought by sending a negotiator — Mr. Alleyne Fitzherbert* — to Madrid, with instructions to insist on a full reparation to the injured, before consenting even to a discussion of the abstract rights involved, the collection of an army, fleets and munitions of war was actively pushed, and plans formed for attacking Spain in the West Indies and South America. The news of the King's message reached the United States in June, and was, as Jefl'erson termed it, "interesting news." The aggressiveness of Great Britain was acknowledged. "You will see by the papers enclosed that Great Britain is itching for war. I do not see how one can be avoided, un- less Spain should be frightened into concessions. The con- * Fitzherbert had been sent to Paris in 1782 to negotiate the treaty of peace between Great Britain and France and Spain ; and it was for his services in bringing to a successful end the negotiations with Spain on the Nootka question, that he was raised to the Irish peerage as Baron St. Helen's. fr pi asc It 20 sequences of such an event must have an important rela- tion to the affairs of the United States."* " It was evident they [the British Houses of Parliament] woulil accept nothing short of an extensive renunciation from Spain as to her American pretensions. Perhaps she is determined to be satisfied with nothing Imt war, dismemberment of the Spanish em]»ire, and annihihuion of her fleet. Nor does her countenance towards us clear up at all." f But there might be a compensation to America, "If the war between France and Spain takes place, I think France will inevit- ably be involved in it. In that case, I hope the new world will fatten on the follies of the old. If we can but establish the armed neutrality for ourselves, we must become the carriers for all parties as far as we can raise vessels." J Washington, just recovered from an illness that had almost proved fatal, made the first mention of the possibility of the Floridas being involved in the threatened war, but in- sisted on the policy of neutrality. " It seems to be our policy to keep in the situation in which nature has placed us, to observe a strict neutrality, and to furnish others with those good things of subsistence which they may want, and which our fertile land abundantly produces, if circumstances and events will permit us to do so. . . . Gradually recover- ing from .lie distresses in which the war left us, patiently advancing in our task of civil government, unentangled in the crooked politics of Europe, wanting scarcely anything but the full navigation of the Mississippi (which we must * Jt/ti(/ison to Pendleton, 22 June, 1790. + Jefferson to Monroe, 20 June, 1790. \ Jefferson to E. Hutled^e, ^ ]u\y, 1790. ■"fi 9,1 have, and as certainly shall have as wc remain a nation), I have htipposed, that, with the undeviating exercise of a just, steady and prudent national policy, we shall be the gainers, whether the powers of the oUl world may be in peace or war, but more especially in the latter case. In that case our importance will certainly increase, and our friendship be courted. Our dispositions will not be indif- ferent to I'ritain or Spain, Why will not Spain be wise and liberal at once? It would be easy to annihilate all causes of cjuarrcls between that nation and the United Slates at this time. At a future period, that may be far from being a fact. Should a war take place between Cireat Britain and Si)ain, I conceive, from a great variety of concurring circumstances, there is the highest probability that the Floridas will soon be in the possession of the former,"* In these phrases were compressed the policy of the gov- ernment : neutrality, if possible, and an attempt to make the difference between the luiropean powers a means of obtaining concessions from Spain long sought for. "The part vc are to act," wrote Jefferson to Carmichael, "is un- certain, and will be difficult. The unsettled state of our dis- pute witii Spain, may give a turn to it very different from what we would wish," — and Col. David Humphreys was sent to Madrid to aid Carmichael, bearing a sketrii of general matters to be considered in the negotiation, drawn up by Jefferson, t In introducing Humphreys to Carmichael, Jefferson wrote : — " With this information, written and oral, you will be en- * Washiugton to Lafayette, 1 1 August, 1790. \rost. .1 22 abled to meet the minister in conversations on the subject of the navigation of the Mississippi, to which we wish you to lead liis attention immediately. Impress him thoroughly with th'.' necessity of an early and even an immediate settle- ment of this matter, and of a return to the field of negotia- tion for this purpose ; and though it must be done delicately, yet he must be made to understand unequivoc;diy, that a resumption of the negotiation is not desired on our part, unless he can determine, in the first opening of it, to yield the immeiliate and full enjoyment of that navigation. . . . It is impossible to answer for the forbearance of our western citizens. We endeavor to quiet them with the expectation of an attainment of their rights by peaceable means. But should they, in a moment of impatience, hazard others, there is no saying how far we may be led ; for neither them- selves nor their rights will ever be abandoned by us. " You will be pleased to observe, that we press these mat- ters warmly and firmly, under this idea, that the war be- tween Spain and Great Britian will be begun before you re- ceive this ; and such a moment must not be lost. But should an acconuTiodation take place, we retain, indeed, the same object and the same resolutions unalterably ; but your discre- tion will suggest, that in that event they must be pressed more softly, and that patience and persuasion must temper your conferences, till either these may prevail, or some other circumstance turn up, which may enable us to use other means for the attainment of an object which we are determined, in the end, to obtain at every risk."* In the event of war the good offices of France, to assist in the negotiations at Madrid, were to be asked, f In his rough draft of " Heads of Consideration " for Mr. Carmichael, drawn up by Jefferson 2 August, 1 790, the pos- sibility of a necessary coalition with Great Britain against ^yefferson to Carmichael, 2 August, 1790. \Jeffe>-ion to William S/iort, 10 August, 1 790. «*■ Jli li! 1^1 *> 23 Spnin was considered. The inhabitants of the western country required a vent for their surplus products, and the natural vent was down the Mississippi. To deny the privi- lege of navigating that river to the mouth to the Americans, was to invite a complication not easily to be solved. Either the federal government must take up the cause of the western people and by force or negotiation obtain conces- sions from Si)ain ; or it must reduce the Kcntuckians to an accniiescence in the arbitrary decrees of Spain ; or it must consent to a separation of the western territory. To aban- don the west or reduce it to obedience was equally imprac- ticable, and it remained only to obtain co: cesssions. If by force, the United States could act alone or in conjunction with Great Britain "with a view to partition," and in the latter case Jefferson noted : " The t'loridas (includ? N. Orleans) would be assigned to us. Loui;.iana (or all the country on the west? waters of y? Missi.) to them. We confess that such an alliance is not what wo would wish, because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing situations as to our best friend, and put the power of two n'bors into y<= hands of one. L^ Lans- downe hat declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather than to the U. S., as a bone of cilscord with the H. of Bour- bon, and of reunion with Gr. Br. Connolly's attempt (as well as other facts) prove they keep it in view."* The English and Spanish negotiations were continued through the summer. On June 4th the Spanish ministry declared that .he release of the vessels had been a sufficient reparation for actual injury, and there only remained the *Tliis document is primed in full /'ost. il 24 question of right to be determined, a question that the in- structions to Fitznerbert prevented him from discussing under such a declaration. The I'lnglish demanded p res- toration of the vessels, a fuii indemnity for the seizure, and n reparation for the insult couimitted on the English flag. Count de Florida Blanca replied that he would grant the satisfaction demanded, on condition that the damages were determined by an impartial judge, and that all the rights of Spain should be positively reserved. (June iS.) England continued her preparations and called upon Holland to assist her, as she was bound to by treaty. In response a Dutch fleet joined Adn.'ral Howe at Portsmouth, and as a counter- movement Spain collected a flev •■ at Cadiz. Nor did Spain stand alone in the matter, for by the pacie Jf famille France was bound to give her assistance in an offensive or defensive war, and notice that such aid might l)ecome necessary was served upon the Frencli min- istry. Coming as it did, when France was in the throes of revolution, it naturally produced some difference of opinion, with which questions of constitutional policy were com- mingled. A ft>v months before, Mirabeau had induced the Assembly to decide that while the right of peace and war belonged to the nation, war could be declared only by a decree of the Assembly based upon a formal and pressing (^tu'ressaire) proposal of the king, and approved by him. The legislature, by cor trolling the supplies, could at any time, ever., in the rrogress of a war, impose the necessity of making peace upon the king. Such a decision need not have jiroved embarrassing had not the country been bound to perform certain acts, under certain contingencies, and apparently without the power of questioning their justice or 25 expediency. The "Society of 1789," where, as in the " Chib des Jacobins," questions of public policy were dis- cussed before being submitted to the Assembly, declared that it was impossible to maintain the "family compact" under the existing constitution. " They say that they cannot adhere to engagements which never were just, which are incompatible with the rights of man and the principles of a free constitution, and which render the nation dependent upon the will of one man, and that man a stranger. They declare such treaties between kings to be conspiracies against the people of their respective countries."* So distinctly colored as was this declaration with the temper of the time as to be almost grotesque, Mirabeau was too shrewd a politician not to recognize that it repre- sented such a share of public opinion that it could not wisely be ignored. He knew the advantage of preserving the Spanish alliance, yet that alliance must be modified to make it conform better with the prevalent ideas of the uni- versal V^rotherhood of m.an, and also to render it palatable to those who looked upon it as an instrument of monarchy — a euphemism for tyranny. Besides, France herself had important colonial interests in the West Indies, whose safety would be jeopardized by a rupture of peace with Great Britain. Spain had served notice that she would look else- where for alliances, should France fail her, and demanded an immediate state of the conduct the ministers intended to pursue. It was Mirabeau who drew up the report express- ing the opinion of the Comite Diplomatique on the <;om- pact, and who laid it before the Assembly on the 2Sth of August. Earl Gower wrote of it : — * Dispatches of Earl Gower, 9 July, 1790. /I I I Ktt'Sc^^. i^.-^J'M. mssmmmmmmm mm wmmm 26 " It consisted in advising the Assembly to empower them to examine that treaty in order to form out of it a national comjjact, by leaving out all the articles offensive, and at the same time to request the king to order his minister at the Court of Madrid to enter into a negotiation with the Spanish ministry u|)on those grounds. They proposed two decrees : " ist. That all existing treaties shall be maintained by the French nation until it shall have revised and modified them. "2nd. That, before the thorough examination of treaties which the nation may think ])roi)er to continue or alter, the king shall be requested to make known to all the powers with which France is connected that justice and the love of peace are the bases of the P'rench constitution ; that the nation cannot admit in her treaties any stipulations which are not ])urely defensive and commercial. That accordingly they request the king to inform his Catholic Majesty that the French nation, in taking all proper measures to maintain peace, will abide by the engagements which her government has contracted with Spain. That they also desire the king to order his ministers to negotiate accordingly with the Court of Spain, and to commission thirty ships of the line, eight of which at least to be fitted out in the ports of the Mediterranean. "This rei)ort was taken into consideration yesterday morning, and, after a short debate, the Assembly decreed that they would abide by the defensive and commercial engagements which the government has contracted with Spain ; that the king should be desired to order his ambas- sadors to negotiate with the ministers of the Catholic king in order to strengthen, by a national treaty, tyes useful to both people, and to fix with precision and clearness all stip- ulations which may not be entirely conformable to the views of general peace and to the principles of justice, which shall always be the jiolitics of the French ; and also, takmg into consideration the armaments of the different nations of Europe, their progressive increase, the security of the French colonies and commerce, they decreed that the king 27 shall be desired to order into commission forty-five ships of the line, with a proportionable number of frigates and small vessels." These acts, a curious mixture of politics and sentiment, were what appeared on the surface, and while seeking to retain the expectancy of Spain for aid by a vote for shijis, delay was also the object. Nor was this all. The prepara- tions of England on so large a scale, to secure what was regarded as a very disproportionate end, could not but arouse the suspicions of the continental nations that some other object was to be attained. Late in July the Journal des Dtbats et Dccrets said : " II est impossible aussi que ces armemens regard 1' Espagne seule. II est bien probable qu'elles mcnacent egalement les possessions Franqoises."* Such a view was promptly disavowed by the French minis- try ; but England knew the terms of the family compact, am' could not fail to be irritated by the vote of the Assembly to increase the navy, though assured by M. Montmorin that the increase would be very gradual, and by both M. Mont- morin and M. Neckar of the desire of France for peace. Earl Gower was instructed to notify the French ministry that " any assistance offered to Spain will oblige the British Cabinet to adopt such measures as may be most likely to render that assistance ineffectual ;" and to still further sup- port England's position, Hugh Elliott was sent on a secret mission to France. It is to Mr. Oscar Browning that our knowledge of his mission is due, and we quote his note : — * Even in England Ihe good faith of the ministry in asking for a credit to arm against Spain was questioned, for there had alreaciy ex- isted a belief that an expedition to the Baltic was on foot. i\ =Bqp5 mmmm ■Pi!" mm^Bowmmmf^sB u 28 " Pitt was using the strongest and most haughty language to compel Spain to submit to us, but if France joined her 'hese remonstrances would be ineffectual, and a European war would break out. Mirabeau was not a minister, and therefore Lord Gower could have no communication with him, but he was chairman of the comitc diplomatique of the National Assembly, in whose hands, rather than in those of the minister, lay the issues of peace and war. It was import- ant to secure that Mirabeau should not only maintain the principle that France was not bound to assist Spain under the present circumstances, but should do all he could to urge Spain to submit to the demands of England. If Elliott was authorized to use any other arguments to Mira- beau of a more delicate or secret nature, it would be a reason for the correspondence having completely disap- peared." Whatever were the arguments used, they were so effective that the popular party signified to Lord Gower "their earnest desire to use their influence with the Court of Mad- rid in order to bring it to accede to the just demands of his Majesty, and, if supported by us, I am induced to believe they will readily prefer an English alliance to a Spanish compact."* Count de Florida Blanca in the meantime was losing heart. His efforts to secure the aid of France had resulted in an apparent acquiescence, it is true, but the widespread disaffection and mutiny in the French fleet and army would make the aid an element of danger rather than of strength. He had coquetted with the United States by throwing out a hint that the right to navigate the Mississippi might be con- ceded, t — this to prevent the possible alliance between the * Gower s Despatches, 22 October, 1790. |0n September 21st, Hamilton wrote to Washington speaking of a W m Y '. V mm iMn MMHP P ^ 9 ' 29 United States and Great Britain. His own position was precarious, and to serve as a figitre-head for executing the policy of another and irresponsible person, was not kind to his temper. He thought it best to yield. "Je me rends a vos conditions," he said to Fitzhebert, " non parce qu'elles sont justes, mais parce que j'y suis force. Si la France nous avait uid^, je ne m'y serais jamais soumis, mais nous ne pouvons tout seuls nous mesures avec nous. Faites done ce que vous voulez." On the 28th October the convention was signed, " by which it was agreed that the lands and buildings of which British subjects had been dispossessed in North America should be restored to them; that British subjects should not be disturbed or molested in carrying on their fisheries in the South Seas, or in making settlements for the purpose of commerce on the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied ; and that on the other hand the letter from Daniel Parker, dated London, the 12th of July, which men- tioned that " he had just seen M. de Miranda, who had recently con- versed with the Marquis del Campo, from whom he learned that the Court of Spain had acceded to our right of navigating the Mississippi. Col. Smith has also read to me a passage out of another letter of the 61 h of July, which mentions that orders had been sent to the Viceroy of Mexico and the Governor of New Orleans not to interrupt the passage of vessels of the United States through that river." On September 22d Lear, in a letter to the President, announced it a based on " pretty direct information," and the letter of Gouverneu Morris dated 2 July, reporting that the concession was " matter of com- mon report," must have been in the President's hands for some time Furtlier than this, Lear in New York and King in Boston claimed to have authentic information of a full accommod.ation between Grea Britain and Spain— a premature conclusion, based upon mere i Minors. See also Humphreys' letter, /wA k' p ■P ^ff!BB ^^B 3PWPlH"'**5>i^»'jl' *' • "iM'K'IHr'HIWiWiii 7 30 king of riritain should engage to take the most effectual measures that these fisheries should not be made a i)retext for illicit trade with the Spanish settlements ; and with that view it was further stipulated that British subjects should not carry on their fisheries within ten leagues from any part of the coast already occupied by Spain."* This convention was used by the United States as a pre- cedent when urging its claims in the Oregon question. Congress adjourned on August 12th, and on the 15th the President, accompanied by Jefferson, started on a journey to Rhode Island which occupied about ten days. On their return to New York the President addressed a series of questions to the Vice-President, the Chief Justice and the three members of his Cabinet, on the position to be taken should Lord Dorchester, f the Governor of Quebec, wish to strike the Spanish colonies by sending troops from Detroit, through the territory of the United States. It is the replies to these questions that are printed in the following pages, and constitute the first discussion in diplomacy by Washing- ton's advisers that we have a record of. The documents speak for themselves, and the subsequent events may now be described. Although such an application was never formally made, the replies have an interest when brought into comparison with Jefferson's negotiations with France and Spain during his presidency, which led up to the pur- chase of Louisiana. ^^_ -i * Stanhope, Life of Pitt, 11,62. The convention deiermining the indemnity was made in February, 1793, and the port at Nootka was not evacuated by the Spanish until 1795. \ Better known as General Guy Carleton. He was created Baron Dorchester in 1786. <» ,L -i 4» 31 Humphreys, after a tempestuous passage of five weeks, reached London on the morning of October 14, and found that the confident tone the ministry had adopted in the summer had altered. A feehng prevailed that Spain was artfully putting off a settlement while sounding the attitude of France, and the prospect of her assistance in case of actual war.* Still war seemed more probable than peace ; the stock market was uncertain, insurance was at war prem- ium, the press gang was still at work, and all the usual prep- arations for war were being pushed. " While the powers of Europe are in such a political ferment, America is daily growing of more importance in their view. A report has prevailed in this place that Spain has lately made some declaration, with respect to conceding to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi. I took considerable pains to trace it, and yesterday was told Col. f Miranda had seen it in a letter to the Spanish ambassador himself. My informant received the intelligence from Miranda." J Six Cherokee chiefs came to London, " as ambassadors from a nation which (according to the English printed communi- cation) has 20,000 men in arms ready to assist G. Britain against Spain" — an assertion as ludicrous as it was prepos- terous. Up to the hour of his leaving England — 4 No- vember — Humphreys was unable to say whether the com- plication would terminate in peace or war, although the con- vention with Spain had then been signed nearly a week (28 October), and the immediate end of his mission to Spain * Humphreys to the Secretary of State, London, 14 October, 1790. f Count. I Humphreys to the Secretary of State, 20 October, 1790. ^wmm mmmm rendered abortive. On reaching Lisbon, two weeks later, he learned of the agreement, and in vague terms of the details covered. Humphreys, however, determined to go to Madrid, and leaving Lisbon on the 3d of December he reached the Spanish capital on the 17th, after a tedious journey, travel- ling from daylight to dark, and making but one stop about an hour in the middle of the day. The convention was then being "partially circulated," printed on a single sheet in Spanish and French,* but for nearly two weeks the special messenger sent no dispatch to the American Secre- tary ot State. On the 3d of January, 1791, he broke silence and in cipher wrote to Jefferson : — [In cipher] Madrid, 3 January, 1791. I have had, sir, many conversations with Mr. Carmichael on the subject of your letter to him. If it had arrived early in summer, he thinks we might have obtained all our wishes. Then the critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Florida Blanca to throw out those general assertions that we should have no reason to complain of the conduct of this Court, with respect to the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, now is your time to make a treaty with England. Fitzherbert availed himself of those conferences to create apprehensions that the Americans would aid his nation in case of war. Long time the conduct of Spain was fluctuating and undecided. After a variety of circumstances (which Mr. Carmichael has ex- plained in his dispatches that have miscarried, and which he * Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 18 December, 1790. 1 J 1 33 ■ •w\\\ repeat in others by me) a convention was formed whereby the British gained substantially everything they at first demanded. Want of money to support a war and the Queen's intrigues, together with advice from the Comte Montemorin that peace was essential t^ France, were j)rob- ably the principal causes which comj ;lled Spain to yield the point after each side had tried which could hold out the longest. The preparations cost Spain sixteen millions dollars. Thus the crisis most favorable for the attainment of our wishes is past. Unless there is some secret article in the Convention by which England guarantees the posses- sions of Spain in America, resentment may [^indecipherabW] in the Spanish Court for having been obliged to receive the law. They may also desire to be in readiness for events. How far these or other motives may operate in producing change of system with respect to the United States, re- mains to be learnt from an adherence to the latter part of your instructions to Mr. Carmichael. The fact is clear that the United States are daily gaining political consideration in Europe. Spain, guided by narrow policy towards its colonies, fears the consequence of our increasing strength and resources. The Compte de Florida Blanca has been so long and so obstinately opposed to i he admission of foreign vessels into the Gulf of Mexico, that the most he can ever be persuaded to do, will be to suffer somebody else to negotiate, to whom, if there be blame for inconsistency in policy, the fault may be imputed. But the Compte not being well with the Queen, loses credit ; and recent circumstances indicate that he is but the osten- sible, while le Rena (at the head of the finance) is the real minister. Mr. Carmichael thinks, that if the Compte will not consent to open a negotiation with Hberal views, it may be possible to displace him and find a successor of better dispositions : that is, if the Queen lives, but she is appre- hensive of dying in childbed next month, which event would give the Compte more weight than ever, Campo- manes, who is the head of the judicators, Compte de Aranda, i ■on sal sasB )\ I 34 and many others, entertain just ideas with respect to our country. The first is high in intluence and secretly an enemy to the (!omi)te de Florida Hianca ; the last, at the head of opposition, will not come into office himself, but, in case of a change of administration, some of his friends will succeed. Mr. Oarmichael, being on terms of intim;icy with the characters here, is certainly ca[)ablc of effecting more at this Court than any other American. . . . Something also gives uneasiness to this Court. Affairs do not go well. Frequent councils are convened. The gov- ernment is feeble, jealous, mercenary and unjjopular. The King is a well-dis])osc ^ k a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, or unless in the event of a rupture with Spain." Here ended the episode. It may be remembered that in July, 1797, William Blount was expelled from the Senate for being concerned in a conspiracy to deliver New Orleans into the hands of the British, and for having instigated the Creeks and Cherokees to assist the British to conquer Louisiana. WORTHINGTON ChAUNCEY FoRD. Washington, August, i8go. i* [Secret.] United States, 27 August, 1790. Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain should come to the decision of arms, from a variety of circumstances (individually unimportant and inconclusive, but very much the reverse when com- pared and combined), there is no doubt in my mind that New Orleans and the Spanish ports above it on the Mississippi, will be among the first attempt? of the former, and that the reduction of them will be under- taken by a combined operation from Detroit. The consequences of having so formidable and enter- prising a people as the British on both our flanks and rear, with their navy in front, as they respect our western settlements which may be seduced thereby, as they regard the security of the Union and its commerce with the West Indies, are too obvious to need enumer- ation. What then should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to L* Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of the U* States from Detroit to the Mississippi ? What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it (43) f < : 44 should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two ? * » August 27, 1890, Washington placed on paper these questions, and sent them to the Vice-President, the members of his Cabinet, and the Chief Justice, requesting their opinion in writing. A distinction, perhaps of no importance, was made in the manner of asking these gentlemen; for the opinion of the members of the Cabmet was " re- quested to be given," but " Mr. Jay will oblige the President of the United States by giving his opinion," As to the form used with Mr. Adams, no record appears. <* REPLY OF THE VICF : ?xESIDENT. *,» .. New York, 29 August, 1 790. Sir: That New Orleans, and the Spanish ports on the Mississippi, will be among the first attempts of the English, ; : case of a war with Spain, appears very probable : and that a combined operation from Detroit would be convenient to that end cannot be doubted. The consequences on the western settlements, on the commerce with the West Indies, and on the gen- eral security and tranquillity of the American confed- eration, of having them in our rear, and on both our flanks, with their navy in front, are very obvious. The interest of the United States duly weighed, and their duty conscientiously considered, point out to them, in the case of such a war, a neutrality, as long as it may be practicable. The people of these States would not willingly support a war, and the present government has not strength to command, nor enough of the general confidence of the nation to draw the men or money necessary, until the grounds, causes and necessity of it should become generally known, and universally approved. A pacific character, in opposi- tion to a war-like temper, a spirit of conquest, or a disposition to military enterprise, is of great import- ance to us as to preserve in Europe: and therefore, we should not engage even in defensive war, until the (45) '*>*'.'*l..>i^«"- Mi 46 necessity of it should become apparent, or at least until we have it in our power to make it manifest, in Europe as well as at home. In order to preserve an honest neutrality, or even the reputation of a disposition to it, the United States must avoid as much as possible every real wrong, and even every appearance of injury to either party. To grant to Lord Dorchester, in case he should request it, permission to march troops through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi, would not only have an appearance offensive to the Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a real injury to Spain. The answer therefore to his lordship should be a refusal, in terms clear and decided, but guarded and dignified, in a manner which no Power has more at command than the President of the United States. If a measure so daring, offensive and hostile as the march of troops through our territory to attack a friend, should be hazarded by the English, without leave, or especially after a refusal, it is not so easy to answer the question, what notice ought to be taken of it. The Situation of our Country is not like that of the nations in Europe. They have generally large num- bers of inhabitants in narrow territories : we have small numbers scattered over vast regions. The country through which the Brittons must pass from Detroit to the Mississippi, is, I suppose, so thinly in- 47 habited, and at such a distance from all the populous settlements, that it would be impossible for the Presi- dent of the United States to collect militia or march troops suflficient to resist the enterprise. After the step shall have been taken there are two ways for us to proceed : one is war, and the other negotiation. Spain would probably remonstrate to the President of the United States, but whether she should or not, the President of the United States should remonstrate to the King of Great Britain. It would not be expected I .••uppose, by our friends or enemies, that the United States should declare war at once. Nations are not obliged to declare war for every injury or even hos- tility. A tacit acquiescence under such an outrage, would be misinterpreted on all hands; by Spain as in- imical to her, and by Britain as the effect of weakness, disunion and pusillanimity. Negotiation then is the only other alternative. Negotiation in the present state of things is attended with peculiar difficulties. As the King of Great Britain twice proposed to the United States an ex- change of ministers, once through M'- Hartley and once through the Duke of Dorsett, and when the United States agreed to the proposition, flew from it : to send a minister again to St. James's till that Court explicitly promises to send one to America, is an humiliation to which the United States ought never to submit. A remonstrance from sovereign to sovereign cannot be sent, but by an ambassador of some order 48 or other: from minister of state to minister of state, it mif^ht be transmitted in many other ways : a remon- strance in the form of a letter from the American Minister of State to the Duke of Leeds, or whoever may be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, might be transmitted, throiigli an envoy, minister plenipotentiary, or ambassador of the President of the United States, at Paris, Madrid or the Hague, and through the British ambassador at either of these courts. The utmost length that can now be gone with dignity, would be to send a minister to the Court of London, with instruc- tions to present his credentials, demand an audi- ence, make his remonstrance, but to make no estab- lishment, and demand his audience of leave and quit the kingdom in one, two or three months, if a minister of equal degree were not appointed and actually sent to the President of the United States from the King of Great Britain. It is a misfortune that in these critical moments and circumstances, the United States have not a minister of large views, mature age, information and judgment, and strict integrity, at the Courts of France, Spain, London and the Hague. Early and authentic intelli- gence from those courts may be of more importance than the expense; but as the representatives of the people, as well as the legislatures, are of a different opinion, they have made a very scanty provision for but a part of such a system. As it is, God knows where the men are to be found who are qualified for r 49 such missions and would undertake them. By an ex- perience of ten years, which made me too unhappy at the time to be ever forgotten, I know that every artifice which can deceive, every temptation which can operate on hope or fear, ambition or avarice, pride or vanity, the love of society, pleasure or amusement, will be employed to divert and warp them ' om the true line of their duty and the impartial honour and interest of their country. To the superior lights and information derived from office; the more serene temper and profound judgment ot the President of the United States, these crude and hasty thoughts concerning the points proposed, are humbly submitted, with every sentiment of respect and sincere attachment, by his most obedient and most humble servant, John Adams. The President of the United States. OPINION OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. New York, 28 August, 1790. Sir: The Case which I had yesterday the Honor of receiving from you, gav" occasion to the following Remarks and Refiections, Whether the Issue of the Negociations depending be- tween the British and Spanish ccuiis is Peace or War, it certainly is prudent to anticipate and be prepared for the consequences of either event. In the present state 01 hings it would doubtless militate against the interests of the U. S., that the Spanish territories in question should be reduced, and remain under the Government of his t^. majesty; an', probably that cir- cumstance would strongly unite with those others which must naturally lead him to regard the Posses- sion of these Countries as a desirable Object. If Permission to march Troops for that Purpose, thro' the territories of the U. S., should be requested, it will be necessary to consider 1. Whether the Laws of Natics entitle a belli- gerent power to a free Passage for Troops thro' the Territories of a neutral Nation ? and 2, In Case the Right to such Passage be not a perfect <' .le, whether circumstances render a Re- fusal o*- a compliance most adviseable on the present occasion? (50) S'SSS'lgMSfe, i i 51 The Right of Dominion involves that of the exclud- ing (under the Restrictions imposed by Humanity) all Foi'^igners This Right is very rigidly exercised by some States, particularly the Empire of China. European Nations consider this as a general Riglit or Rule, and as subject to Exceptions in favor not only of nations at Peace, but also of Nations at War. The exceptions with respect to the /orffier do nottoucn the present question. Those which relate to the latter, sccm to be comprized within tivo Classes, viz' cases of urgent necessity, and cases of Convenience. The pres- ent case belongs to the latter. Vattel, who well un- derstood the subject, says in the 7''' chapter of his 3"! Book.— That an inncceytt Passage is due to all Nations with whom a State is at Peace, and that this comprehends Troops equally with Individuals. That the Sovereign of the Country is to judge whether this Passage be innocent — that h' Permission must be asked — and that an P. ntry into his Territories without his Consent, is a violation of the Rights of Dominion — that if t! neutral Sovereign has good Reasons for refusing h Passage, he is noi bound to grant it ; — but that if his Refusal is evidently unjust (the Passage requested being unques- tionably innocent') a nation may do itself Justice, .and take by Force, what it was unjustly denied — so that such Requests may be refused in all cases, except in those rare Instances, where it may be most evidently shown that the Passage required is absolutely without Danger or Inconvenience. ■ ^i iLT S \ .U t t ~;;^ tHStl l^ ll W l lll g l ■ , ;:» i^ , it» iii»— r"," i I- 52 If the Passage in contemplation should appear to be cf this Complection, a Refusal would generally be deemed improper, unless the United States should declare and make it an invariable maxim in their Policy, never to permit the Troops of any Nation to pass thro' their country. Such a measure might be wise, in case the the U. S. were in capacity to act accordingly; but that not being as yet the Case, it would perhaps in the present moment be unreasonable. I say " such a measure might be wise" — whether it would or not, is a question that involves others, both legal and political, of great magnitude. Nations have perfect Rights. Regard to mutual Convenience may and often does induce Relaxations in the Exercise of them ; and those Relaxations, from Time and Usage, gradually assume to a certain Degree the Nature of Rights. I think it would appear on a full investigation of the Subject, that the United States being a new Nation, are not bound to yield the same Relaxations, which in Europe from long Practice and Acquiescence amount almost to an implied Cession ; and therefore, that they may justly exercise rigorously the Right of denying free Passage to foreign Troops. It is also to be observed, that if they deny this Priviledge to others, it will also be denied to them ; but this leads to politi- cal consequences and Considerations not necessary now to develop or inyesligate. If a Passage should be requested and insisted upon, on the Ground of its being perfectly innoce?it, and ac- I 53 ! companied with such Terms and Precautions, as that a Refusal, altho' justifiable, would not appear to be more than barely so ; then it will be advisable to calculate the Probability of their being restrained by such a Refusal. If the Probability should be, that they would never- theless proceed; then it would become important to consider whether it would not be better to grant Per- mission, than by a Refusal to hazard one of two en- evitable Inconveniences, viz- that of opposing their Progress by Force of arms, and thereby risque being involved in the war; or of submitting to the Disgrace and Humiliation of permitting them to [ ceed with impunity. In my opinion it would in such Ca^c be most prudent, considering the actual state of 'i"' affairs, to consent to the Passage. The answer there- fore to be given to Lord Dorchester, in Case he should apply for Permission to march Troops thro' the Terri- tory of the U. S. from Detroit to the Mississippi, will I think necessarily depend on the nature of the Propo- sitions contained in the application, compared with the beforementioned Principles and Probabilities. As to the notice proper to be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken without leave? There ap- pears to me to be no choice. Such a measure would then be so manifest a Departure from the usage of civilized Nations, so flagrant and wanton a violation of the Rights of Sovereignty, and so strong and indecent a Mark of Disrespect and Defiance, that their march •• 54 (if after Prohibition persisted in) should I think be opposed and prevented at every Risque and Hazard, But these Remarks in my Judgment retain but little Force when applied to the leading of Troops from Posts in their actual Possession, thro' Territories un- der their actual Jurisdiction, altho' both the Posts and the Territories of right belong to the U. S. If there- fore they should march Troops from such posts, thro' such Territories, that measure vi^ould not appear to me to afford particular ca".se of complaint. On their arrival by such a Roi,te at the Mississippi, they may in virtue of the S'"" Article of the Treaty navigate it up to its source, or down to the ocean. This Subject .laturally brings into view a question both difficult and important, viz' whether as the Pos- session of the Floridas would afford G. Britain ad- ditional Means and Facilities of annoying the U. S. the latter would for that Reason be justifiable in endeav- oring to prevent it by direct and hostile opposition ' The Danger of permitting any Nation so to prepon- derate, as to endanger the security of others, intro- duced into the PoHtics the Idea of preserving a Ballance of Power How far the Principles which have thence been inferred, are applicable to the present Case, would merit serious Inquiry, if the U. S. had only to consider what might be right and just on the occasion ; but as the state of their affairs strongly re- commends Peace, and as there is much Reason to presume that it would be more prudent for them at 55 present to permit Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas, than engage in a War to prevent it, such In- quiries would be premature. With the most perfect Respect and Esteem I have the Honor to be, Sir, Your most obt. and most humble serv^ant, John Jay. The President of the United States. ■ mmmmmmmmmmmfnimimmi^a OPINION OE THE SECRETARY OF STATE. Opinion on the Questions stated in the President's note of August 27, 1790. I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the dangers which will attend our government if Louisiana and the Floridas be added to the British Empire, that in my opinion we ought to make ourselves parties in the general ivar expected to take place, should this be the only means of preventing the calamity. But I think we should defer this step as long as possible ; because war is full of chances which may re- lieve us from the necessity of interfering ; and if neces- sary, still the later we interfere the better we shall be prepared. It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture of a place, than to retake it. Should it be so in the case in question, the difference between the two opera- tions of preventing and retaking, will not be so costly as two, three, or four years more of war. So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and entering into the war as late, as possible. If this be the best course, it decides in a good de- gree what should be our conduct if the British ask leave to march troops thro' our territory, or march them without leave. It is well enough agreed in the Law of Nations, that (56) < i: ' ?' 57 for a Neutral power to give or refuse permission to the troops of either belligerent party to pass through their territory, is no breach of neutrality, provided the same refusal or permission be extended to the other party. If we give leave of passage then to the British troops, Spain will have no just cause of complaint against us, provided we extend the same leave to her when demanded. If we refuse (as indeed we have a right to do), and the troops should pass notwithstanding, of which there can be little doubt, we shall stand committed. F"or either we must en*"" " nmediately into the war, or pocket an acknowleu ,. insult in the face of the world ; and one insult pocketed soon produces an- other. There is indeed a middle course, which I should be inclined to prefer, that is, to avoid giving any answer. They will proceed notwithstanding. But to do this under our silence, will admit of palliation and produce apologies from military necessity ; and will leave us free to pass it over without dishonor, or to make it a handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have use for it as such. But if we are obliged to give an answer, I think the occasion not such as should induce us to hazard that answer which might commit us to the war at so early a stage of it ; and therefore that the passage should be permitted. If they should pass without having asked leave, I liiiBKrr-'iiTiiiiK mamj. m :■" ■ L ' !^ ' . ' JWBtJU M BJgl ■ .. I l:i 58 should be for expressing our dissatisfaction to the British court, and keeping alive an altercation on the subject, till events should decide whether it is most expedient to accept their apologies, or profit of the aggression as a cause of war. Th: Jefferson. August 28, lygo. K) i Ji HEADS OF CONSIDERATION ON THE XANfGATION Of" THE MISSISSirri, FOR M? CARMK'IIAEL. 2 August, 1790. We have a right to the Xavig'n of the Misii, 1. by Nature. 2. by Treaty. It is necessary to us More than half the territory of the U. S. is on the waters of that river. 200,000 of their citizens are seated o^. them. These have no other outlet for then tob?, rice, corn, hemp, lumber, house-timber, ship-tirnber, etc.' We have hitherto borno the indecision of Spain, Because we wish peace. because our Western citizens have i m'. vent at home for their productions. A surplus of production begins now tc; demand foreign markets. Whenever they shall say 'We cannot,, we will not, be longer shut up,' the U. S. will soon be reduced to the following dilemma : 1. to force them to acquiescence. 2. to separate from them, rather ihu i !.,ike part in a war against Spain. 3. or to preserve them in our Union, by joining them in the war. The I St is neither in our principles nor o\i power, 2. A multitude of reasons decide against the 2d. One only shall be spoken out : the Nation that gives (59) ^ > »mf»nfWKmmmm» mmm / 60 up half its territory, rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, will not keep the other half long. 3. the third is the only alternative we must necessarily adopt. How are we to obtain that navigation ? A. By Force. I. Acting separately. that we can Effect this with certainty and prompt- itude all circumstances decide. Obj. We cannot retain N. Orleans, for instance, were we to take it. Ans. A moderate force may be so secured so as to hold out till succoured. Our succours can be prompt and effectual. Suppose after taking it, we withdraw our force. If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover it by a counter-exped'n, and so, as often as the case shall happen. Their expeditions will be slow, expensive, and lead to catastrophe. Ours sudden, economical, and a check can have no consequences. We should associate the country to our union, the inhab- itants wish this. they are not disposed to be of the Spanish govern- ment. It is idle in Spain to suppose our Western habitants will submit to their gov'm't. they could be quiet but a short time under a gov'm't so repugnant to their feelings. Were they to come under it for present purposes, it w? be with a view to throw it off soon. Should they remain they would 9J — '-i»i»t 6 1 communicate a spirit of independence to those with whom they should be mixed. II. Acting in conjunction with dr. i5r. with a view to partition, the Floridas (includ? N. Orleans) would be assigned to us. Louisiana (or all the country on the West? waters of y« Missi.) to them. We confess that such an Alliance is not what we would wish ; because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing situations as to our best friend, and put the power of two n'bors into y" hands of one. L4 Lansdowne has declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather than to the U. S. as a bone of discord with the H. of Bourbon, and of reunion with Or. Br. Connolly's attempt* (as well as other facts) proves they keep it in view. B. By Negociation. I. What must Spain do of necessity f The conduct of Spain has proved the occlusion of the Missi. is system with her ; if she opens it now, it will be because forced by inipeiious circum- stances. She will consequently shut it again when these circumstances cease. Treaty will be no obstacle. irregularities, real and pretended, In our navigators, will furnish colour enough, perpetual broils, and finally war will ensue. * On this mission of Connolly see Gay.irre, History of Louisiana under the Spanish Domination, 235, and Brown, Political Beffin- nings of Kentucky, 182 , — one of the publications of the Filson Club, and of great value. -,-*^- ..,^ »i i> i M. M.-- < »iy i jgvi 'fc ' ; ; ii r ^ ; i'. 62 pnulcncr, and even necessity, imposes on us the law of settling the matter now, finally , and not by halves. With experience of the past, and prospect of the fiitnrc, it w'l be imbecility in us to accept y« naked navigation. With tiiat, we nuibt liave what will se- cure its continuance : that is, a port near the mouth, to receive our vessels, and protect the navigation. But even th;s will not secure the Moridns and Louisiana against Gr. Brit, if we are neutral, she will wrest those possessions from Spain. the inhabitants (French, English, Scotch, Ameri- cans) would prefer Engl'? to Spain, II. What then had Spain better do of choice ? Cede to us all territory on our side the Missis- sippi. on condition that we guarantee all her poss'n on the western waters of that river, she agreeing further to subsidize us, if the guarantee brings us into the war. Should Gr. Br. possess herself of the Floridas and Louisi- ana, her governing principles are Conquest, Coloni- zation, Commerce, Monopoly. She will establish powerful colonies in them, these can be ])oured into the gulph of Mexico, for any sudden enterprise there, or invade Mexico their next neighbor by land j whilst a fleet co-operates along shore, and cuts off relief. and proceed successively from colony to colony. With respect to us, if Gr. Br. establishes herself on our whole land board, our lot will be ^ % 63 bloody and eternal war or indissoluble confedor.icy. Which ought we to choose? What will be the lot of the Span, colonies in the jaws of such a confederacy? What will secure the Occnn against Monopoly? Safer for Spain that we should be her neighbor, than lOnglanil. Conquest not in our principles: inconsistent with our gcvm't. Not our interest to cross the Mississippi for ages, And will never be our interest to remain united with those who do. Intermediate chances save the trouble of calculating so far forward. Consequences of this cession, and guarantee. 1. Every subject of difference will be removed from between Si)ain and tlic U. S. 2. Our interest wl' be strongly engaged in her retain- ing her American possessions. 3. Spain will be quieted as to Louisiana and her ter- ritories west of that. 4. She may employ her whole force in defence of her islands and Southern possessions. 5. If we preserve our neutrahty, it will be a very partial one to her. 6. If we are forced into the war, it will be, as we wish, on the side of the H. of liourbon. 7. Our privateers will commit formidable depred'n on y« Brit, trade, and occupy much of their force. 8. By withold'g supplies of provision, as well as by -„SlSli7SiSS::»»t mtmm mm ■ii M'ii-j <>JTi»i < ^fw* j ww»«pcaE3B^^ i J 64 concurring in exped'ns, yr Brit isH^ will be in im- minent danger. Their expences of precaution;, both for their con- tinental and insular poss'ns will be so augmented, as to give a hope of running their credit dow:i. In fine, for a narrow strip of barren, detached, and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of her terri^Jry, and make ; an ally where she might have a dangerous enemy.* ♦These heads are in Jefferson's ^/.S'.,but differ somewhat from those printed in his Il'oti-s, ix, 412. -if ' I I it V '^, 1 — -!f*«« HEADo OF CONSIDICKA'I-ION ON Till': CONDUCT '.VE ARE TO oijyrjivi: in tiii>: war between spain and or. BRITAIX, and rAR'lICULARLY SHOULD THE LxVlTER ATTI'.MIT THE CONQUEST OI" LOUISIANA AND THE FLGRIDAS. [ 12 July, 1790.] The danger to us sW G. E. possess herself of Louisiana and the Floridas. Beyond the Missi. a territory equal to half ours. She would seduce our Cis-Missi. possessions. Because N. Orleans will draw to it the dependence of all those waters. By her language, laws, religion, manners, goven*, commerce, capitals. By the markets she can offer them in the gulph of Mexico. She would then have a territory th? double of ours. She would take away the markets of the Atlantic States, By furnishing the same articko cheaper, tob?, rice, indigo, bread, lumber, fur. She would encircle us completely, her possessions forming a line on our land boards, her fleets on our sea board. Instead of two neighbors balancing each other, we should have one with y« strength ci both. Would the prevention of this be worth a War? Consider our abilities to make a war. Our operations would be by land only. How many men would it need to employ? — their cost? (6S) 4 [ ^ Mmr^ , :';f^H^mf«mignt;-^^ ... |.,,^ ii'wr.-rnyxrrsissfeg* I 66 Our resources by taxation and credit equal to this. Weigh the evil of this new accumulation of debt. Against the loss of market and eternal danger and expence of such a neighbor. But no need to take a part as yet.. We may choose our own time for that. Delay gives us many chances to avoid it altogether. They rnay not single out that object. They may fail in it. France and Spain may recover it. The difference between preventing and retaking, overbad';' by benefits of delay. Enables r . to ])e better prepared. '\o 'tir late with Spain and France advantages for our assistance. Suppose these our ultimate views, what is to be done at this time ? 1. As to Spain. If she be as sensible as we are, that she cannot save Louisiana and the Floridas, miglit she not prefer their Indepcnd<=f to tlieir Subject"? to Gr. Br. ? Can we not take advantage of C\ D'Estaing's pro- pos'n to communicate thro' the court of France our ideas on this subject and our readiness to join them in guarantee ? I'his might save us from a war, if Gr. Br. respects our weight in a war. If she does not, it would place the war on popular ground. 2. As to England, say to B.[eckwith] : — That as to a treaty of commerce we h^ never de- sired it but on terms of perfect reciprocity. . ' =-2i2*-"*"*» ■,..wiv>.;i,. 1 K 67 That therefore we never thought to give any price for it but itself. That we had wished for it to avoid giving mutual hounds to the commerce of both nations. But that we have the nicasures in our own power which may save us from loss. That as tu the alliance they propose, it would in- volve us against France and Spain. And considered even in a moral view, no pri( , could repay such an abandonm'. of character. That we are truly disposed to remain strictly neutral. Tho' we must confess y^ we sh^ view in a very ser- ious light attempts to extend themselves along our frontier, and destroy all balance in our neighborhood. [The latter sentiment it might be advantageous to express, because if there be any difference of op'n in her councils whether to bend their force ag^ North or South America (and certainly there is room for dif- ference) and if these operations be nearly balanced, the possibility of drawing an enemy the more on themselves, might determine the balance.]* ♦ A single si eel in Jefferson's A/S., undated and without signature. It is the lirst draft of a paper drawn up by Jetferson as the basis of a reply to the mission of George Ikckwith, some pavliculars of which are given in a note to the opinion of Hamilton, in the pages following. The paper asi completed is printed, with errors, in the Works of Jefferson, ix, 409, and differs in many details froi« this draft. :t 4 t^arc/fMifign"' I niffiViiiaii^ If I'i •! ^ . HAMILTON' TO WASH INOTOX. New- York, Sept. 15, 1790. The urgent avocations in which I have been en- gaged, towards putting in a train of execution the laws of the hist session affecting my department, and a de- sire of reflecting n,,.turcly, and giving the reasons for the result of my reflections fully, have caused me to delay longer than I wished the answer to the questions with which you honored me, and I hope will excuse the delay. The judgments formed, in particular cases, are al- most always connected with a general train of ideas in respect to some more comprehensive principles or re- lations ; and I had thought it advisable to lay that train before you, for the better explanation of the grounds of the opinions I now give, or may hereafter have oc- casion to give, on the like subjects, in obedience to your commands. I feel no small regret in troubling you with the perusal of so voluminous a discussion ; but as I thought it would be satisfactory to you to have the reasons of the opinions you required fully submitted to your consideration, I conceived it to be more consistent with my duty to risk some intrusion on your time, than to withhold any consideration that appeared to me of weight enough to enter into the determination. The President of the United States, (68) tV X "l^ll»» OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, New-York, Sept. 15, 1790. Anszvcr to Questions proposed by the President of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury. Question the First. — "What should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dor- chester, in case he .should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of said States, from Detroit to the Mississippi ?" Answer. — In order to a right judgment of what ought to be done in such case, it may be of use pre- viously to consider the following points : First. — Whether there be a right to refuse or con- sent, as shall be thought most for the interest of the United States. Secondly. — The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent. Thirdly. — The motives to the one or to the other. As to the first point, if it were to be determined upon principle only, without regard to precedents or opinions, there would seem to be no room for hesita- tion about the right to refuse. The exclusive juris- diction which every independent nation has over its ov/n territory, appears to involve in it the right of pro- hibiting to all others the use of that territory in any way disagreeable to itself, and more especially for any (69) t '^mm':^'«fm'ff^mW'r'!its'itlm.''mLiiwWi%^^^^^^ •*' - 1 ii li 70 purpose of war, which always inipHcs a degree of danger and inconvenience, with the exception only of cases of necessity. And if the United States were in a condition to do it without material hazard, there, would be strong in- ducements to their adopting it as a general rule never to grant a passage for a voluntary expedition of one- power against another, unless obliged to it by treaty. But the present situation of the United States is too little favorable to encountering hazards, to authorize attempts to establish rules, however eligible in them- selves, which are repugnant to the received maxims or usages of nations. It is thcrcfiire necessary to inquire what t'lose max- ims or usages enjoin in the case suggested. With regard to usage, it has been far from uniform. There are various instances in ancient and modern times of similar permissions being demanded — many, in which they have been granted ; others in which they have been refused, and the refusal acquiesced in; but perhaps more in which, when refused, a passage has been forced, and the doing of it has often been deemed justifiable. Opinions are not more harmonious. Among those who maybe considered as authorities on such subjects, Puffendorf and Barbeyrac confine within narrow limits t/if right of passage through neutral territories ; while Grotius and Vattel, particularly the former, allow to it greater latitude. Puffendorf treats it not as a natural 71 right, but as derived from compact or conce.s.sio:i ; especially when the enemy of a nei;^hboring state de- sires leave to march troops through a neutr.il country against its neighbor. For it seems (says he) to be a part of the duty xvldcJi wc owe to our ncigJibors, espe- cially such as have been kiuil and friendly, not to suffer any hostile power to march througli our country to their prejudice, provided we can Iiiiider the desij^n with no great inconvenience to ourselves. \w\ as it may have a tendency to make our own country the theatre of the war (since the power intended to be attacked may justifiably march within our limits to meet the approaching enemy), he concludes that it is tin; safest way of acting in such case, if ive can do it ivitlioiit any considerable prejudice to our own affairs, to deny the enemy passage, and actually to oppose him if he en- deavors to force it without our consent. But if we arc either too weak to hinder his progress, or must on this score engage in a dangerous war, he admits that the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbor. Examples, he adds, have little force on the decision of the question. For, generally, as people have been stronger or w'caker, they have required passage with modesty or with confidence, and have in like manner granted or refused it to others.* Barbeyrac, in his Conmientary on Grotius, is still * Puffendorfs Laws of Nature and Nations, pages 239, 240. vfi f'^ V 72 stronger against the right of passage.* He aflfirms that, even though we have nothing to apprehend from those who desire a passage, we are not therefore obliged in rigor to grant it. It necessarily follows, says he, from the right of property, that the proprietor may refuse another the use of his goods. Humanity, indeed, requires that he should grant that use to those who stand in need of it, when it can be done without any considerable inconvenience to himself; but if he even then refuses it, though he transgresses his duty, he does no wrong, properly so called, except they are in extreme necessity, which is superior to all ordinary rules. Thus far, and no further, extends the reserve with which it is supposed the establishment of prop- erty is accompanied. Grotius, on the other hand, expresses himself thus : f A free passage ought to be granted to persons where just occasion shall require, over any lands, or rivers, or such parts of the sea as belong to any nation ; and, after enumerating several examples in .-support of his position, he concludes that the middle opinion is best; to wit, that the liberty of passing ought first to be de- manded, and if denied, may be claimed by force. Neither, says he, can it be reasonably objected that there may be suspicion of danger from the passing of a multitude ; for one man's right is not diminished by * Note I on Book II., Chap. III., § xiii. \ Rights of War and Peace, Book II., Chap. II., § xiii., Nos. I, 2, 3, 4. 73 another man's fear. Nor is the fear of provoking that prince against whom he that desires to pass is engaged in 2. just war, a sufficient reason for refusing him pass- age. Nor is it any more au excuse that he may pass another way, for this is what every body may equally allege, and so this right by passing would be entirely destroyed. But it is enough that the passage be re- quested, without any fraud or ill design, by the nearest and most convenient way. If, indeed, he who desires to pass undertakes an unjust war, or if he brings peo- ple who are my enemies along with him, I may deny him a passage ; for in this case I have a right to meet and oppose him, even in his own land, and to inter- cept his march. Thus it would seem to be the opin- ion of Grotius, that a party engaged in a just war has a right, of course, to a passage through a neutral ter- ritory, which can scarcely, if at all, be denied him, even on the score of danger or inconvenience to the party required to grant it. But Vattel, perhaps the most accurate and approved of the writers on the laws of nations, preserves a mean between these* different opinions. This is the sum of what he advances: That an innocent passage is due to all nations with whom a state is at peace, for troops equally with individuals, and to annoy as well as to avoid an enemy. That the party asking and the party asked are both, in different degrees, judges of ♦Book III., Chap. VII., §§ 119, 120, I21, 122, 123. ::«•' :-^m'»i iV 'I 74 the iiucstion tvJten iiiitoccn/ ? That where the party ask<.(i lias good reasons for refusing, he is not under* any ubliLjation to ^rant, ant! in (/oufi//?// c^scs his jud^^- nient ought to be definitive ; but in evident ones, or those in whieh the liarmlessness of the passage is manifest, the party askini:; may, in the hist ' ort, ju(l<^fe for himself, and after demand and refusal may force his way. That nevertheless, as it is very difficult fur the passage of a powerful army to be absolutely inno- cent, and still more difficult for its innocence to be apparent, a refusal ought to be submitted to, except in those very rare cases when it can be shown in the most palpable manner that the passage required is abso- lutely without danger or inconvenience. And lastly, that this right of passage is only due in a war not materially unjust. Perhaps the only inference to be dr.uvn from all this is, that there exists in the practice of nations and the dogmas of political writers a certain vague pretension to a right of passage in particular cases, and accord- ing to circumstances, which is sufficient to afford to the strong a pretext for claiming and exercising it when it suits their interests, and to render it always dangerous to the weak to refuse, and sometimes not less so to grant it. It is, nevertheless, a proper inquiry, whether a re- fusal could be placed on such ground as would gi'^e a reasonable cause of umbrage to the party refused, and as in the eye of the world would justify it. ,_„^- ..-J-.^^ 75 Against tliL- pronricty nf a refusal arc the following circuiiistinccs : That there is no connection between us and Spain, which obliges us to it. That the pas- sage asked will be down rivers, and for the most part through an uninhabited wilderness, whence no injury to our citizens or settlenicnts will be apprehended; and that th..- number of tioops to be marched, espe- cially considering the route, will probably not be such, as on their own account, to be a serious cause of alarm. These circumstances may give our refusal the com- plexion of partiality to Spain, and of indisposition towards Britain, which may be represented as a devia- tion from the spirit of exact neutrality. In support of the proprietj' of a refusal, the follow- ing is the only assignable reason ; that it is safer for us to have two powerful, but rival nations, bordering upon our two extremities, than to have one powerful nation pressing us on both sides, and in capacity, here- after, by posts and settlements, to envelop our whole interior frontier. The good offices of Spain in the late war ; the dan- ger of the seduction of our western inhabitants ; the probable consequences to the trade of the Atlantic States, are considerations rather to be contemplated as motives, than alleged as reasons. The first reason, however, 's of a nature to satisfy the mind of the justice of a refusal; admitting the authority of the more moderate opinions, which have been cited. And the danger, too, upon the supposi- I J : i ■ " i)[ I '.' \ 1 76 •ijii itf which it is founded, appears to be obvious enough to vindicate it, in the opinion of the disinter- ested part of mankind; little likely as it may be to engage the ac(iuiescence of the party whose wishes would be thwarted by the refusal. It des< rves, not- withstanding, ti) be noticed on this point, that the gr lund of dissent would not result from the thing itself — that is, the mor passage — but from the nature of the acquisition, to which it would give facility. This circumstance may somewhat obscure the clear- ness of the conclusion, that there is a perfect right to refuse. But upon the whole, there does not appear to be room enough for a scruple about the right, to deter from refusal, if upon examination it shall be found expedient. Does the right of consenting to the passage stand upon ground equally unexceptionable? This question Vattel answers in the following man- ner : * " When I have no reason to retuse the passage, the party against whom it is granted has no room for complaint, much less for making it a pretence for war; since I did no more than what the law of nations en- joins. Neither has he any right to require that I should deny the passage, because he is not to hinder me from doing what I think is agreeable to my duty, and even on occasion when I might zvith justice deny * Vattel, Book III., Chap, vii., Section 127. i'» i iT i . i AfJ.ja ' ii!iJ the f>ass(i^^f, it is alhrKuidh' in nic not to //;orf my refusal In- my stmml W'ho will tako upon him to complain of my liavin^ permitted the war to be car- ried into his own country, ratlicr than draw it on my- self? It cannot be expected that I should take up arms in his favor, unless obliged to it by a treaty." And Piiffendorf admits, as has been before noted, that if we are either too tveak to hinder his progress, or must on that score engage in a dangerous war, the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbor. Nothing need be added to reasoning so perspicuous and convincing. It does not admit of a moment's doubt, as a general rule, that a neutral state, unfettered by any stipulation, is not bound to expose itself to a war, merely to shelter a neighbor from the approaches of its enemy. It remains to examine, if there are any circumstances, in our particular case, capable of form- ing an exception to that rule. It is not to be forgotten tha*: we received from France, in oi • late revolution, 'essential succor, and from Spain v. ' ^able countenanc(.', and some direct aid. It is also to be remembered, that France is the inti- mate ally of Spain, and there subsists a connection bj' treaty between the former power and the United States. It might thence be alleged that obligations of grati- tude towards these powers require that we should run some risk, rather than concur in a thing prejudica! to 1 :,,iiE>fc.--tfitf-.iayA>aw»w- i\ w i ci'.hcr of them, and particularl)' in f;i\i>r of tluit very natioii against which they assisted us. And the nat- ural impulse of every 'jood heart win second the proposition, till reason has taught it that refinements ot this kind are to be indulged with caution in tlie affairs of nations. Gratitude is a word, the very sounc' of which im- poses something like respect. Where there is even an appearance upon which the claim to it can be founded, it can seldom be a pk -■'ing task to di.spute that claim. But where a word may become the basis of ?, political system, affecting the essential interests of the state, it is incumbent upon those who have any concern in the public administration, to appreciate its true import and .ipplication. It is necessary, then, to reflect, however painful the reflection, that gratitude is a duty, a sentiment, which between nations can rarely have any solid foundation. Gratitude is only due to a kindness or service, the predominant object of which is the interest or benefit of the party to whom it is performed. Where the interest or benefit of the party performing is the pre- dominant cause of it, however there may result a debt, in cases in vv'hich there is not an immediate adequate and reciprocal advantage, there can be no room for the sentiment of gratitude. Where there is such an ad- vantage, there '"s then not even a debt. If the motive to the act, instead of being tiie benefit of the party to whom it is done, should be a compound of the inter- ■ I '*Xc».„_ )Kl tfi i M i li | » ii' r v 1^ est of the party doing it and of detriment to some other, of whom lie is the enemy and the rival, there is still less room for so noble and refined a sentiment. This analysis vvlU serve as a test of our true situation, in rej,fard both to France and Spain. It is not to be doubted, that the part which the courts of France and Spain took in our quarrel with Great Britain, is to be attributed, not to an attachment to our independence or liberty, but to a desire of di- minishing; the power of Great Britain by severing the British Empire. This they considered as an interest of very great magnitude to them. In this their calcu- lations and their passions conspired. For this, they united their arms with ours, and encountered the ex- penses and perils of war. This has been accom- plished ; the advantages of it arc mutual ; and so fa; the account is balanced. In the progress of the war* they lent us money, as necessary to its success, and during our inability to pay they have forborne to press us for it. The money we ought to exert ourselves to repay wi.h interest, and as well for the loan of it, as for :he forbearance to urge the repayment of the sums which ha/e become due, we ought ahvays to be ready to make propor- tionate acknowledgmen '^ and whf n opportunities shall offer, returns answerable to the nature of the service. '1^ France lias made us oun loan ;>ince the peace. 8o m Let it be added to this, that the conduct of France in the manner of affoiclin,!^ her aid, bore the marks of a hberal poUcy. She did not endeavor to extort from us, as the price of it, any disadvantac^eous or humili- ating concessions. In this respect, however, she may have been influenced by an enlightened view of her own interest. She entitled herself to our esteem and good will. These disposit ons towards her ought to be cherished and cultivated ; but they are ver\' distinct from a spirit o^ romantic gratitude, calling for sacri- fices of our substantial interests, preferenct.'s incon- sistent with sound policy, or complaisances incompat- ible with our .safety. The conduct of Spain towards us presents a picture far less favorable. The direct aitl we received from her during the war was inconsiderable in itself, and still more inconsiderable compared with her faculty of aiding us. She refrained from acknowledging our independence ; has never acceded to the treaty of commerce made with France, though a right of doing it was reserved to her, nor made any other treaty with us; she has maintained possessions within our ac- knowledged limits without our consent ; she pcrsever- ingly obstructs our sharing in the navigation of the Mississippi, though it is a privilege essential to us, and to which we consider ourselves as having an indisput- able title. And perhaps it might be added upon good ground, that she has not scrupled to intrigue with leading individuals m the western country, to seduce 8i them from our interests, and to attach them to her own. Spain therefore must be regarded, upon the whole, as having slender claims to peculiar gootl will from us. There is certainly nothing that authorizes her to ex- pect we should expose ourselves to any extraordinary jeopardy for her sake. And to conceive that any con- siderations relative to France ought to be extended to her, x\\>uld be to set up a doctrine altogether new in politics. The ally of our ally has no claim, as such, to our friendship. We may have substantial grounds of di.s.satisfaction against him, and act in consequence of them, even to open hostility, without derogating in any degree from what we owe to our ally. This is so true, that if a war should really ensue be- tween Great Britain and Spain, and if the latter should persist in excluding us from the Mississippi (taking it for granted our claim to share in its navigation is well founded), there can be no reasonable ground of doubt that we should be at liberty, if wc thought it our in- terest, consistently with our present engagements with France, to join Britain against Spain. How far it might be expedient to place ourselves in a situation which, in case France should eventually become a party in the war, might entangle us in oppo- site duties on the score of the stipulated guarantee of her West India possessions, or might have a tendency to embroil us with her, would be a mere question of prudential and liberal calculation, wiiich would have 82 nothing to do with the right of taking side against Spain. These are truths necessary to be contemplated with freedom, because it is impossible to foresee what events may spring up, or whither our interests may point ; and it is very important to distinguish with accuracy how far we are bouni.1, and where we are free. However vague the obligations of gratitude may be between nations, those of good faith are precise and determinate. Within their true hmits, they can hardly be held too sacred. But by exaggerating them, or giving them a fanciful extension, they would be in danger of losing their just force. This would be con- verting them into fetters, which a nation would ere long be impatient to break, as consistent neither with its prosperity nor its safety. Hence, while it is desirable to maintain with fidelity our engagements to France, it is advisable, on all occasions, to be aware that they oblige us to nothing tov.'ards Spain. From this view of the subject, there does not appear any circumstance in our case capable of forming an exception to the general rule ; and, as it is certain that there can hardly be a situation less adapted to war than that in which we now find ourselves, we can, with the greatest sincerity, offer the most satisfactory ex- cuse to Spain for not withholding om consent, if our own interests do not decide us to a contrary course. The conclusion from what has been said is, that there is a right either to refuse or consent, as shall be ^ «3 jmlgcd for tlic interest of the United States; though tlie right to consent is less questionable than the rif^ht to refuse. The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent present themselves next to consideration. Those of consent shall be first examined. An increase of the means of annoying us in the same hands is a certain ill consequence of the acquisi- tion of the Floridas and Louisiana by the British. This will result not only from contiguity to a greater part of our territory, but from the increased facility o'i acquiring an undivided influence over all ihe Indian tribes inhabiting within the borders of the United States. Additional danger of the dismemberment of the western country is another ill consequence to be ap- prehended from that acquisition. This will arise as well from the greater power of annoying us, as from the greate' power which it is lilccly would be pursued by that nation, if in possession of the key to the only outlet for the productions of that country. Instead of shuttin^,', they would probably open the door to its in- habitants, and by conciliating their good will on the one hand, and making them sensible on the other of their dependence on them for the continuance of so essential an advantage, they might hold out to them the most powerful temptation to a desertion of their connection witli the rest of the United States. The avarice and ambition of individuals may be made to co-operate in favor of those views. I V 84 A third ill consequence of that acquisition would be, material injury, in time to come, to the commerce of the Atlantic States. By rendering New Orleans the emporium of the products of the western countrj', Britain would, at a period not T'oy distant, have little occasion for supplies of provisions for their islands from the Atlantic States ; and for their European mar- ket they would derive from the same source copious supplies of tobacco and other articles now furnished by the Southern States : whence a great diminution of the motives to establish liberal terms of commercial intercourse with the United States collectively. These consequences are all expressed or implied in the form of the question stated by the President. And as far as our consent can be supposed likely to have influence upon the event, they constitute powerfu' objections to giving it. If even it should be taken for granted that our con- sent or refusal would have no influence either way, it would not even then cease to be disagreeable to con- cur in a thing apparently so inauspicious to our inter- ests. And it deserves attention, that our concurrency might expose us to the imputation either of want of foresight to discover a danger, or of vigor to with- stand it. But there is almost always in such cases a compari- son of evils; and the point of prudence us. to make choice of that course which threatens the fewest or the least, or sometimes the least certain The conse- ( W,. «5 I qucnccs of refusal arc therefore to be weighed against tliose of consent. It seems to be a matter taken for granted by the writers upon the subject, that a refusal ought to be accompanied with a resolution to support it, if neces- sary, by the sword ; or in other words, to oppose the passage, if attempted to be forced, or to resent the in- jury, if circumstances should not permit an effectual opposition. This, indeed, is inip'f d in the nature of the thing; for to what purpf^ ■ ijst ^jnless it be in- tended to make good the rcf "; i* c how avoid dis- grace, if our territories are sufleiv..' .; be violated with impunity, after a formal and deliberate prohibition of passage ? There are cases in which a nation may, without ignominy, wink at an infraction of its rights; but this does not appear to be one of them. After having been asked its permission and having refused it, the pre- sumption will be that it has estimated the consequences, calculated its means, and is prepared to assert and up- hold its rights. If the contrary of this should turn out to be its conduct, it must bring itself into contempt for inviting insult which it is unable to repel, and man- ifesting ill-will towards a power whiih it durst not re- sist. As, on the one hand, there cannot be conceived to be a greater outrage than to pa.ss .through our country, in defiance of our declared disapprobation; .so, on the other, there cannot be a greater humiliation vhan to submit to it. 86 The coiisL'ciucnce tlicivfoic of irfus;)!, if not LiTcctual, must be absolute dist^race or imuiediatc war. This appears, at least, to be the alternative. Whether a refusal would have the desired effect, is at best problematical. The presumption, perha!)s, is, that Great Britain will have adverted to the possibility of it; and if, under the uncertainty of what would be our conduct, she should still have resolved on prose- cuting the enterprise through our territory, that she will at the same time have resolved, either to ask no questions, or to disregard our dissent. It is not un- likely that the reasoning of the Ikiti.sh cabinet will have been to this effect : — If the United States have no predilection for Spain, or if their views of their own interest are not opposed to the acquisition we medi- tate, they will not withhold their consent ; it either the one or the other be the case, it ought to be determined beforehand, whether their enmity be a greater evil, than the projected acquisition a good ; and if we do not choose to renounce the one, we must be prepared to meet the other. A further ill consequence of the refusal, if ineffectual, not wli-olly destitute of weight, is this, that Great Brit- ain would then think herself under less obligation to keep measures with us, and would feel herself more at liberty to employ every engine in her power to make her acquisition as prejudicial to us as possible; whereas, if no impediment should be thrown in the way by us, more good humor may beget gleatel* I) r'^'^SSSS'^li'WIW"''™'''''*'^^ moderation, ami, in the pHv^rcss of tliincjs, concessions scciiiin_:,r us nia} be nuule, as the j)rice of our future neutr.ility. An explicit recoi:Miili(Mi of our rit^lit to navigate the Mississippi to and from the ocean, witli the possession of New Orleans, would greatly mitigate the causes of apprehension from the conquest of the Florid. IS by the British. The consequences of refusal or consent constitute leading motives to the one or to the other ; which now claim a more particular discussion. It has been seen that the ill effects to be appre- hended from the conquest of the Spanish territories- in our neighborhood are, an increase of the mcins whereby we may be hereafter annoyed, and of the danger of the separation of the western country from the rest of the Union; and a future interference with the trade of the Atlantic States, in a manner, too, not conducive to the general weal. As far as there is a prospect that a refusal would be an impediment to the enterprise, the considerations which have been mentioned afford the strongest in- ducements to it. But if th(xt effect of it be doubtful, the force of these inducements is proportionably dimin- ished ; if improbable, it nearly ceases. The prospect in this case would be, that a refusal would aggravate instead of preventing the evil it was intended to obvi- ate. And it must be acknowledged that the success of it is, at least, very doubtful. The consideration that our assent may be construed I. 88 into want of furcsi^^hl or want of vi<,ror, though not to be disrcf^anlfd, would not be sufficient to justify our risking a war in our picstMit situation. The cngt-nt reasons we have to avoid a war are too obvious and intelligible, not to furnish an explanation of and an ai)ol()L;y for our conduct in tliis respect. W'h.itever may be the calculations with regard to the probal)lc I'ffcct of a refu.sal, it ought to be pre- dicated ujion the supposition that it may not be re- garded, and accompanied with a determination to act as a ])roper attention to national dignity would in such an event dictate. This would be to make war. For it is a souxd niaxiui, that a state had better liaz- ard any calamities than submit tamely to absolute disgrace. Now it is manifest, that a government scarcely ever had stronger motives to avoid war, than that of the United States at the present juncture. They have much to dread from war, much to expect from peace; scmething to hope from negotiation, in case of a rup- ture between Britain and Spain. We are but just recovering from the effects of a long, arduous, and exhausting war. The people but just begin to realize the .sweets of repose. We are vul- n M'ablc both by water and land; v/ithout either fleet or army. We have a considerable debt in proportion to the resources which the state of things permits the government to command. Measures have been re- cently entered upon for the restoration of credit, -*ei 89 which a war could lianlly fail to tiisconccrt, and which, if disturbed, would be fatal to tlu- means of prosecuting it. Our national {government is in its in- fancy. The habits and dispositions of our people arc ill suited to those liberal contributions to the treasury, which a war would necessarily exact. Tliere arc causes whicli render war in this country more expen- sive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on, than in any other. There is a tjencral disinclination to it in all classes. The theories of the speculati\'e, and the feelings of all, are opposed to it. The support of public opinion (perha[)s more essential to our gov- ernment than to any other) could only be looked for in a war evidently resulting from necessity. These are general reasons against going into war. There are others, of a more particular kind. To the people at large the quarrel would be apt to have the appearance of having originated in a desire cf shield- ing Spain from the arms of Ikitain. There are several classes of men to whom this idea would not be agree- able, especially if the Dutch were understood to be in conjunction with the British. All those who were not friendly to our late Revolution would certainly dislike it. Most of the descendants of the Dutch would be urfiicn-fly to it. And let it not be overlooked, that thi're is . lIII a considerable proportion of those who wer ' firia friends to the Revolution, who retain pre- possessions in favor of Englishmen, and prejudices against Spaniards. 7 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I ^^ m 1 i'° IIM 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 ^ 6" - ► Photographic Sciences Coiporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 145S0 (716) 872-4503 ^ > In a popular government especially, however pre- judices like these may be regretted, they are not to be excluded from political calculations. It ought also to be taken into the account, that by placing ourselves at this time in a situation to go to war against Great Britain, we embark with the weak- est party — with a total uncertainty what accession of strength may be gained — and without making any terms with regard either to succor, indemnity, or compensation. France is the only weight which can be thrown into the scale, capable of producing an equilibrium. But her accession, however probable, ought not to be deemed absolutely certain. The predominant party there may choose to avoid war as dangerous to their own power. And if even obstacles should not arise from that quarter, it cannot be foreseen to what ex- tent 1 ranee will be in condition to make efforts. The great body of malcontents comprehending a large pro- portion of the most wealthy and formerly the most in- fluential class — the prodigious innovations which have been made — the general and excessive fermentation which has been excited in the minds of the people — the character of the prince, or the nature of the gov- ernment likely to be instituted, as far as can be judged prior to an experiment — do not prognosticate much order or vigor in the affairs of that country for a con- siderable period to come. It is possible, indeed, that the enthusiasm which the "■'^ jMi' '"'"'"'""' ■"'*•'"""" "■ '" ' ■' " ' ' gA 91 transition from slavery to liberty may inspire, may be a substitute for the energy of a good administration, and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions of enthusiasm must ever be a precarious reliance. And it is quite as possible that the greatness, and per- haps immaturity, of that transition, may prolong licen- tiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may happen in France must be unusually fallible, not merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change which has been wrought in the situation of the people. These considerations are additional admonitions to avoid, as far as possible, any step that may embroil us with Great Britain. It seems evidently our true policy to cultivate neutrality. This, at least, is the ground on which we ought to stand, until we can see more of the scene, and can have secured the means of chang- ing it with advantage. We have objects which, in such a conjuncture, are not to be neglected. The Western posts, on one side, and the navigation of the Mississippi, on the other, call for a vigilant attention to what is going on. They are both of importance. The securing of the latter may be regarded in its consequence as essential to the unity of the empire. But it is not impossible, if var takes place, that by a judicious attention to favorable moments, we may ac- complish both by negotiation. The moment, how- "^ '\ ^ . { 92 ever, we became committed on either side, the advan- tages of our position for negotiation would be gone. They would even be gone in respect to the party with whom we were in co-operation ; for being once in the war, we could not make terms as the condition of entering it. Though it may be uncertain how long we shall be permitted to preserve our neutrality, that is not a suffi- cient reason for departing from it voluntarily. It is possible we may be permitted to persist in it through- out. And if we must renounce it, it is better it should be from necessity than choice ; at least till we see a prospect of renouncing with safety and profit. If the government is forced into a war, the cheerful support of the. people may be counted upon. If it brings it upon itself, it will have to struggle with their displeasure and reluctance. The difference alone is immense. The desire of manifesting amity to Spain, from the supposition that our permanent interest is concerned in cementing an intimate connection with France and Spain, ought to have no influence in the case. Ad- mitting the existence of such an interest, it ought not to hurry us into premature hazards. If it should filially induce us to become a party, it will be time enough when France has become such, and after we shall have adjusted the condition upon which we are to engage. But the reality of such an interest is a thing about which the best and the ablest men of this country are 5^2SSgS: 93 far from being agreed. There are of this number, who, if the United States were at perfect liberty, would prefer an intimate connection between them and Great Brit- ain as most conducive to their security and advantage; and who are of opinion that it will be well to cultivate friendship between that country and this, to the utmost extent which is reconcilable with the faith of existing engagements : while the most general opin- ion is, that it is our true policy, to steer as clear as possible of all foreign connection, other than commer- cial * and in this respect to cultivate intercourse with all the world on the broadest basis of reciprocal privilege An attentive consideration of the vicissitudes which have attended the friendships of nations, except in a very few instances, from very peculiar circumstances, gives little countenance to systems which proceed on the supposition of a permanent interest to prefer a par- ticular connection. The position of the United States, detached as they are from Europe, admonishes them to unusual circumspection on that point. The same position, as far as it has relation to the possessions of European powers in their vicinity, strengthens the admonition. Let it be supposed that Spain retains her possessions on our right, and persists in the policy she has hitherto pursued, without the slightest symptom of * In Mr. Lodge's edition there is no mark of omission. I 94 relaxation, of barring the Mississippi against us; where must this end, and at a period not very distant? In- faUibly in a war with Spain, or separation of the West- ern Country. This country must have an outlet for its commodities. This is essential to its prosperity, and if not procured to it by the United States, must be had at the expense of the connection with them. A war with Spain, when our affairs will have acquired greater consistency and order, will certainly be to be preferred to such an alternative. In an event of this sort, we should naturally seek aid from Great Britain. This would probaby involve France on the opposite side, and effect a revolution in the state of our foreign politics. In regard to the possessions of Great Britain on our left, it is at least problematical, whether the acquisition of them will ever be desirable to the United States. It is certain that they are in no shape essential to our prosperity. Except, therefore, the detention of our Western posts, (an object, too, of far less consequence than the navigation of the Mississippi,) there appears no necessary source of future collision with that power. This view of the subject manifests that we may have a more urgent interest to difTer with Spain, than with Britain. And that conclusion will become the stronger, if it be admitted, that when we are able to make good our pretensions, we ought not to leave in the possess- ion of any foreign power the territories at the mouth of the Mississippi, which are to be regarded as the key to it. : :,'S%5,^;ii«ti > li .i ." ^ fer-«P««« ^/ 9S While considerations of this nature ought not to weaken the sense which our Government ought to have of any obligations which good faith shall fairly impose, they ought to inspire caution in adopting a system, which may approximate us too nearly to certain powers, and place us at too great a distance from others. Indeed every system of this kind is liable to the objection, that it has a tendency to give a wrong bias to the Counsels of a Nation, and sometimes to make its own interest subservient to that of another. If the immediate cause of the impending war be- tween Britain and Spain be considered, there cannot be drawn from thence any inducements for our favor- ing Spain. It is difficult to admit the reasonableness or justice of the pretensions » n her part, which occa- sion the transactions complained of by Great Britain, and certainly the monopoly, at which these pretensions aim, is entitled to no partiality from any maritime or trading people. Hence considerations, neither of jus- tice or policy, as they respect the immediete cause of the quarrel, incline us towards Spain. Putting, therefore, all considerations of peculiar good will to Spain or of predilection to any particular connection out of the question, the argument respect- ing refusal or consent, in the case supposed, seems to stand thus : The acquisition of the Spanish territories bordering upon the United States, by Britain, would be danger- ous to us. And if there were a good prospect fliat I I our refusal would prevent it, without exposing us to a greater evil, we ought to refuse. But if there be a considerable probability that our refusal would be in- effectual, and if being so, it would involve us in war or disgrace, and if positive disgrace is worse than war, and war, in our present situation, worse than the chances of the evils which may befall us from that ac- quisition, then the conclusion would be that we ought not to refuse. And this appears to be the true con- clusion to be drawn from a comprehensive and accu- rate view of the subject; though first impiessions are on the other side. These reflections also may be allowed to come in aid of it. Good or evil is seldom as great in the reality as in the prospect. The mischiefs we apprehend may not take place. The enterprise, notwithstanding our consent, may fail. The acquisition, if made, may, in the progress of things, be wrested from its possessors. These, if pressed hereafter, (and we are willing to ac- cept it,) may deem it expedient to purchase our neu- trality by a cession to us of that part of the territory in question, which borders on the Mississippi, accom- panied with a guarantee of the navigation of that river. If nothing of this sort should happen, still the war will necessarily have added millions to the debt of Britain, while we shall be recruiting and increasing our re- sources and our strength. In such a situation, she will have motives of no inconsiderable force for not provoking our resentment. And a reasonable confi- 97 dence ought to be reposed in the fidelity of the inhab- itants of the Western country; in tlieir attachment to the Union; in their real interest to remain a part of it, and in their sense of danger from the attempt to sepa- rate, which, at every hazard, ought to be resisted by the United States. It is also to be kept in view, that the same danger, if not to the same extent, will exist, should the terri- tories in question remain in the hands of Spain. Besides all this, if a war should ever be deemed a less evil than the neighborhood of the British in the quarter meditated, good policy would still seem to re- quire, as before intimated, that we should avoid put- ting ourselves in a situation to enter into it, till we had stipulated adequate indemnities and considerations fordoing so; that we should see a little further into the unravelment of the plot, and be able to estimate what prospect there would be by our interference of obviating the evil. It deserves a reflection, that if those territories have been once wrested from Spain, she will be more tractable to our wishes, and more disposed to make the concessions which our interests require, than if they never passed into other hands. A question occurs here, whether there be not a middle course between refusal and consent; to wit, the waiving an answer, by referring the matter to further consideration. But to this there appear to be decisive objections. An evasive conduct in similar cases is never dignified — seldom politic. It would be likely to »1 Ml i) 98 give satisfaction to neither party — to effect no good — to prevent no ill. By Great Britain it would probably be considered as equivalent to a refusal — as amount- ing to connivance by Spain — as an indication of timid- ity by all the world. It happens that we have a post on the Wabash, down which river the expedition, it is presumable, must go. If the commannding officer at that post has no orders to the contrary, it will be his duty to interrupt the passage of the British troops ; if he does, it would seem necessary for them, in order to the safe passage of their boats, with their artillery, stores, provisions, and bag- gage, to take that post. Here then would be a passage through our territory, not only without our permission, but with the capture of a post of ours, which would be in effect making war upon us. And thus silence, with less dignity, would produce the same ill consequence as refusal. If, to avoid this, private orders were to be sent to the commanding officer of that post, not to interrupt the passage, his not being punished for his delinquency would betray the fact and afford proof of connivance. The true alternative seems to be, to refuse or con- sent: and if the first be preferred, to accompany it with an intimation, in terms as free from offence as possible, that dispositions will be made to oppose the passage, if attempted to be forced ; and accordingly, as far as practicable, to make and execute such dispositions. If, on the contrary, consent should be given, it may ' s^:^^??»?:;.--^- 99 deserve consideration whether it would not be expedi- ent to accompany it with a candid intimation that the expedition is not agreeable to us, but that thinking it expedient to avoid an occasion of controversy, it has been concluded not to withhold assent. There are, however, objections to this mode. In case of consent, an early and frank explanation sho:>.'d be given to Spain. Question the Second. — " What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken with- out leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?" li leave should be asked and refused, and the enter- prise should be prosecuted without it, the manner oi treating it has been anticipated ; that is, the passage, if practicable, should be opposed ; and if not practic- able, the outrage should be resented by recourse to arms. But if the enterprise should be undertaken without asking leave, which is presumed to be the import of the question, then the proper conduct to be observed will depe.id upon the circumstances. As the passage contemplated would be by water, and almost wholly through an uninhabited part of the country, over which we have no actual jurisdiction, if it were unaccompanied by any violence to our citizens or posts, it would seem sufficient to be content with remonstrating against it, but fn a tone that would not commit us to the necessity of going to war; the ob- jections to which apply with full force here. lOO i But if, rs it is to be feared will necessarily be the case, our post on the Wabash should be forced, to make good their passage, there seems to be no alter- native but to go to war with them, unwelcome as it may be. It seems to be this, or absolute and unquali- fied iiumiliation ; which, as has been already noticed, is in almost every situation a greater evil than war. In every event, it would appear advisable immedi- ately to convene the Legislature; to make the most vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand of satisfaction ; to commence negotiations for alliances ; and if satisfaction should be refused, to endeavor to punish the aggressor by the sword. ' Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. * The opinion of Hamilton is of special interest, as he had held some informal interviews with Major Beckwith upon the attitude of the United States towards Great Britain in this Spanish affair. The nego- tiation of Gouverneur Morris at London had reached the ears of Lord Dorchester, presumably in some ofHcial manner, and may have sug- gested to him the expediency of sending a similar agent to New York to sound the American Executive u]x>n certain questions then pending between England and the United States, in which the interests of Canada were involved. Beckwith was the agent selected, and on the 8th of July he held his first communication with Hamilton, and proved that he had a full acquaintance with Morris's mission, and expressed the belief that the British Cabinet was disposed to enter into an alliance, as well as friendly intercourse, with the United States. This led up to a suggestion on Beckwith's part, that, if war should occur between Eng- land and Spain, it would be for the interest of the United States to take part with the former power. The points in dispute between the United lOI States and Englnnd were touC.ci -oon, and Indian hostilities disa. vowed liy Lord Dorcliesler. The iti -r of Iteckwith's communication, based as it was upon a letter (r m Lord Dorchester, was such as to convey the impression that ' was nr * made withoi\t some knowlcdfje and prohable suRgestion oi. ti ; part of the English Cabinet. Hamilton noted down the main pints of this conversation, and sub- mitted tli-m to the I'rcsident a-.d jLiTerson. The first views of the latter have already been given in these pages (p. 65, utile), but they were more distinct and sharply dcUned in this draft than as afterwards expressed. In the draft he says the alliance proposed "would involve us against France and Spain ; and, considered even in a moral view, no price could repay such an abandonment of character." In the com- pleted paper this is toned down to "as to an alliance, we can say noth- ing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with ex- isting engagements." But all agreed that in the event of war the United States expected to be strictly neutid. With this opinion, Hamilton again met Ueckwith on the 22d of July. As the British agent had no particulars of an alliance to ofter as the basis of a negotiation, Hamilton said that "the thing is in too general a form to admit of a judgment of what may be eventually admissible or practicable. If the subject shall hereafter present it-^elf to discussion in an authentic and proper shape, I have no doubt we shall be ready to converse freely upon it. And you will naturally conclude that we shall be disposed to pursue whatever shall appear, under all circumstances, to be our interest, as far as may consist with our honor. At present, I would not mean either to raise or depress expectation. "Major Beckwith seemed to admit that, as things were circum- stancd, nothing explicit could be expected, and went on to make some observations, which I understix)d as having for object to sound whether there existed any connection between Spain and us ; and whether the questions with regard to the Mississippi were settled. " Perceving this, I thought it best to avoid an appearance of mystery, and to declare without hesitation, "'That there was no narticular connection between Spain and the United States within my knowledge, and that it was matter of public notoriety, that the questions alluded to were still unadjusted.' " t.i.\V.Hi8tor:/:^^ ;,OV,NCiAL. UBRARV VICTORIA, B. O. '31 ii' I loa Mr Douglas Brymner, the courteous archivist of the Dominion of Seiron"h"; "''• '''' ''' '^""^ "^^ ^^J°' «-''-''> .o LordDo .he Major's versions oHheseconv^^^^^^^^^^ ''''''°'' """'''' '° ^- A^^Z' '"..^''°'f ' "''""'°" ^"'^'^^'^ "^« d«="« of ihe French .«Ppon,„g of Sp.,„..._//„„V,.„ ,. ,f,„,, J._ ,, OcoJr, ,;;i --^■",1 "^WBBlBfSj^^ijUl K» U]VJ|iL» -*■" •infJUiif W*" OJ . I OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. War OmcE, 29 August, 1790. Sir: In answer to your secret communication of the 27th instant, and the questions stated therein, I humbly beg leave to observe, That the United States, by not being under the ob- ligation of any treaty, either with Spain or England, are in a situation, to grant, or deny, the passage of troops, through their territory, as they shall judge fit. The granting or refusing therefore the expected demand of a free passage to the troops of England, through the territory of the United States, in order to attack the dominions of Spain upon the Mississippi, will depend upon a due estimation of the consequences arising from either alternative. The United States are too well aware, of the great and permanent evils, which would result from Eng- land's becoming possessed of the Mississippi and West Florida, to concur in any arrangements to facilitate that event. The law of nations establish the principle, that every neutral nation may, refuse the passage of troops through its territory, when such passage may tend to its injury. In the present case, the passage of the British troops, would be to effect an object directly contrary to the ( 103 ) fll ' 104 interests and welfare of the United States. If there- fore the demand should be made, it may be refused, consistently with the principles of self preservation, and the law of nations. But there are two modes of refusal. A denial un- accompanied by any other act ; and a denial accom- panied by force to oppose the passage, if it should be attempted, after having been refused. The first mode is all that can with propriety be done in the present state of things. If after the denial, the british troops should proceed, they become the aggres- sors, and establish a just cause of war, whenever the interests of the United States shall dictate the measure. Although a denial, unaccompanied by any other act, might be unpleasant to great Britain, yet she would not probably think it, of itself, a sufficient cause for waging war against the United States. But if a force should be actually opposed to the passage of the troops, a war with great Britain would appear to be the inevitable and immediate consequence. The true interests of the United States dictate a state of neutrality in the affairs between Spain and P2ngland. Should the United States be dragged into the war in the present moment, the loss of their com- merce might justly be expected; the source of their revenue would be cut off, and the proposed system of public credit fatally postponed, if not entirely blasted. These are serious evils and to be avoided if possible. It is however to be remarked that it is highly im- I05 probable that Spain would enter into the war, unless she expected to be supported by France. Nor does there appear any solid objections to the expectation, but the present debilitated and convulsed state of France. The family compact and other treaties be- tween the two kingdoms will continue to exist, not- withstanding the situation of France, until iormally renounced. This has not been the case. Ihe prob- ability therefore is, that France will be combined with Spain. If this should be the case, every efTort on the part of France will be employed to associate America in the war. And it is a question of great moment whether the United States could strictly comply with the treaty of friendship and commerce entered into with France on the 6th of February, and observe an exact neutrality. Although it would seem hardly possible that either England, or France and Spain combined, would make such offers to the United States as to counter-balance the advantages of Neutrality, yet the case may be otherwise, or the United States may be so obliged to enter into the war in order to avert a greater evil. These considerations with their extensive relations unite in dictating an answer to Lord Dorchester in terms as little exceptionable as possible. That the United States had recently manifested their sincere desires, not only to continue at peace with Great Britain, but to cement the same by com- f ' u ' / ri , i .ii xo6 mercial arrangements which might be reciprocally beneficial. But that the real causes of dispute between England and Spain were too little understood at present by the United States for the President to consent to a meas- ure which would seem to be inconsistent with that strict neutrality the United States would desire to observe. But if noi A'ithstanding this answer, or if no request should be made for the purpose, and the troops march through the territory of the United States, to attack the dominions of Spain, it might be proper for the President of the United States to convene imme- diately the legislature, if the occasion should be so urgent as to require their meeting at an earlier day than the adjournment, and to lay the whole affair be- fore them, with his opinion of the measures to be pur- sued. For the Congress are vested with the right of providing for the common defence, and of declaring war, and of consequence they should possess the in- formation of all facts and circumstances thereunto appertaininrj. In the mean time the dispositions and designs of the contending parties will unfold themselves. The terms of each side be known and estimated, and the United States better able than at present to judge of the exact line of conduct they ought to pursue. I have the honor with perfect Respect to be Sir Your humble Servant H. Knol. The Presidtnt of the United States. INDEX. Adams, John, reply to the President, 45. Aranda, Count, 33. Barbeyrac, 70, 71. Beckwith, Major George, 41, 66, 67 tutt, 100 noU. Blount, William, 42. Browning, Oscar, 27. Brymner, Douglas, 102. Cabarras, G>unt, 38. Campo, Marquis del, 29 note, 32, 39. Campomanes, Compte de, 40. Carmichael, William, 17, 32, 34, 36, 37. Cherokee Chiefe in London, 31. Clark, looting a Spanish store, 1 1. Connolly's mission, 61. Diplomacy of the Revolution, 7, 48, 49. Dorchester, Lord, 30, 43, 46, 53, 100 note, EUiot, Hugh, 27. Family compact of France and Spain, 24, 26. Fitzherbert, Alleyne, 19, 24, 32. Florida Blanca, 9, 24, 28, 32. France, aid to United States, 77. French Revolution, felt in Spain, 34. Galvez, Comptesse, 34. Gardoqui, 9, 16, 17. Gower, Earl, 25, 26, 27, 28. Gratitude, 77. (107) ( j I I 1 1' j I I IP f io8 Great Britain, 7, 22, 41, 47, Green, 10, 11. Grotius, 70, 71, 72. Hamilton, Alexander, 28 ttote, 68, 69, 100. Humphreys, David, 21, 31, 32, 36. Jay, John, 9, 10, 44, 50. Jefferson, Thomas, 17, 19, 21, 41, 56, 59, 60, 65. King, Rufus, 29 note. Knox, Henry, 103. Lacy, General, 34, Lear, Tobias, 29 nofe. Leeds, Duke of, 39, 48. Madison, James, 10, 14, Mirabeau, 24, 25, 28. Miranda, Compte, 29 tto/t. Mississippi, navigation of, 10, 15, 16, 22, 32, 36. Montmorin, 27, 33. Morris, Gouvemeur, 17, 29 note, 39, 40. Neckar, 27. Neutrality, policy of the United States, 20. Nootka Sound, 18, 29. Otto, 17. Parker, Daniel, 29 note. Puffendorf, 70, 71. Queen of Spain, 33, 34, S6gur, Compte, 34. Smith, Wiltiam I., 29 note. Society of 1789, 25. Spain, 8, 9, 18, 2^, 24, 32, 34, 35, 40, 75, 80. '^ III as me: 1-9 Treaty of i783> *> 9. «o- Vattel, 51,70, 73. 76. Viar, Jos6 Ignacio de, 17. Washington, George, 10, 20, 30, 43. Western Territory, 10, 11, la. West Indies, 25, 81. '^ f^