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But linillry dctcr- caft our cyei »t the French m Louifiana en it and our thofe which propofe, that propofal, be- Fow it is very under neither encroach on ite fpace was )ear to be well Indians under be under our tually at war tiy advices wc As a proof dominion, wc of their coun- a flagrant in- French forts under BritiHi otice of this moH; a contra- st thtfe coun- le open to the IS formed the )te6lion of the nee, that the IS of the forts Table tradls of 's, how much nknown coun- tries ' C 5 ] 4 tries of the Creek and Chicafaw Indians ? On the Ohio they ceutd not build a w.irchoufc l)Ut it was iirefcntiy known to our bick l.ttL-rs, but in Louifianj thoy nriy crcft another Lille without our knowinfj; any thi'^j^ of the nutter, and may foon win over to their interclls all the intcrm:.liatc Iiulians : a talk we have no realon to think will prove difficult, fincc they have aircuily hrouj^hi them to make war upon us, and have built forts in their countries. Yet ilurc Indians are fuppofed, by the Britifli miniftry, to be under our protection, and arc to form this famous barrier ♦. Mad we infilled on the MillilT'.ppi be- ing rej^ardeil as the bounds of Louifiana, the above objections would in a great meafure have been rcjcded, but our amazin;; irjnorancc ia dtmaiuiinfr the prorcdlion of ihell* countries without fpccifyinp; the exat't limits of i\v: JMc-nih colony, mull necefliirily lead u> into many millak'.'S |;reatly to our preiudiec. The Britjih Memorial aflerts, that fuch and luch Indian nations are under our protedion i why not lay, that all ibe Jndiau natictis of whatever nanie, li'ljofe couii- irtcs are jliuated on the eojl Jtde cf the riVL'r Mijfifppi are and ought to be regarded us under the proteihon of Great-Britain, and any forts or lands in pcjjljjkn of ihe J-'rench in the faid countries fall he dirtSth demo.'ifhed and regarded as uJurpationSy particularly fort Conde and fcrt 'I'ouloufe. Now let me afk any unprejudiced man whether fuch exprelTjons would not have '^onveyed a much clearer idea of the countries than the vague ones ufed by the Britilh Miniftcr .? The nations which he aflTerts arc under our protedioa all extend to the MiflifTippi, and yet he omitted that demand which could not be tnileonllrued. • It is fo far from my intention to interpret any thing contrary t'» its real meaning th.it I (IliII give the wordnoftlie BritiOi Mcinori.il on thefc intcrnu-ilinte Indians. " As to what rcfpefts the line to be drawn from Rio Perdido as contuined in the note remitted by M. Bufliy with regard to the limits of Louifiana his Majclly is obliged to reject fo miexpcilcd apropofition as by no means admiflible in two rcli^etls. 1. Rtcaufe the faid lino, uiulcr colour of fixing the limit; of Louifiana, annexes vail countries 10 that province, whi<.h nich the corn. aiuliug poih and forts, the Marijuis uc \ aiidrcuil 1 .as, by the inoti folemn capi.iilu'ion i:iroiitcll iMv yielded iito the p( f.i.fllon of his Biit.tiinic M ".fty, un- der the I'.cfcriprion of Canada, and th.it confcqiiently however contentious thi' pretcniions of the two crowns may have been helorc the war, and paiticuI.Tfly with refpcfl to the couife of the Ohio, and the territories in tiiJt pait llnce ti.e lurrcnder of CuiaJa, and the line ot i:> I'lniti has been traced as aforel.iid by 'he Marqiis i!j \ iiUvlri uil, all thole o, p,)liie tide.> arc united, and become Ttlid without contradiction, to confirm to Great-Britair. . jtli all the rell of Can;.da the pofleir:oi» of thofe countries on that f.irl of me Ohicj uhic'i have been hcretof :re contcfled. 2. The line propofed to f.x the bo.inds of Louifiana cannot be .admitted becauu i: would com prifc in another part on the fide of tliC Caroiinas, very extenlivc couiUrici ;ind iiumeiouj nations who have alway.. been reputed to be uml^r the protcdlion of the jvinj. a right which l.is Maielly Imis no intention of lenouncing j and then the IvJn^, for v'le advant.ii^e of peace, might coiifjut It Itavt the intermedintf cotintrifs uniifr t!-e Irctrcih'i ofQreat-Dntu'.r:, and particularly the CheroUtc^, the Creeks, the Chikafaws, the Chaaaws, and another nation, Jituaic between the Biidfli ftttle- anents and the Millillij pi." rcrliajH C( kt [ 6 ] Perliaps It may be faid in anfwer to this, thai the Jketch hire prefented to the publick ly the French court is only a rough draught of the peace that cannot be con- fuicred as pof:tive in any particular. Agreed : but does not this rough draught give us the fentiments of our Minifter on every point ? The Britifh Memo- rial taices notice particularly of other limits moie northerly, and of the limits (in fome degree) of the French cod fifhery, but only prefents us with this va- o-ue account of thofe of Louifiana ; the fame Memorial is alfo particular in many orlier refpefls, but this care happens to be where it is of leaft impor- tance. I fliall here give the fifteenth article of the peace of Utrecht, which relates to the limits of the French and Englilh colonics, as it will throw fome light on the prefent argument. " The fubjell heroafter give no hindrance or molcflation to the F'ive Na- tions or cantons of Indians, fubjedt to the dominion of Great-Britain, nor *' to the other natives of America, who are friends to the fame. In like " manner the fubjeds of Great-Britain (hall behave themfelves peaceably to- " wards the Americans, who are fubjeds or friends to France ; and on both *' fides they fliall enjoy full liberty of going and coming on account of trade. *» As alio the natives of thofe countries fliall with the fame liberty refort as " they pleafe to the Britifli and French colonies, for promoting trade on one fide *' and the other, without any moleftation or hindrance, either on the part of the " Britiih fubje<5bs or of the French. But ^ is to be exadly and dift:ind:ly »* fettled by commiflaries, who are, and who ought to be accounted the fubjccts *' and friends of Britain or of France." This article abfolutely gives up the dominion of the Five Nations to Great- Britain, the treaty of Aix le Chappelle confirmed the fame, and alfo left the de- cifionof the limits to commifiaries ; therefore does more than the Britifli Memo- rial requires in the late negotiation, with refpeft to the fouthern Indians who are only under our protection : and yet the French no fooner figned thefe treaties than they immediately began to encroach. Can we exped: that they fliould be more complaifant for the future ? And efpecially when we give them a greater oppor- tunity of doing it with impunity ? If the treaties above-mentioned had defined the bounds of the two colonies to be the river St. Lawrence, no difficulties could have arifen : and had the Britifli Memorial in the like manner infilled on the Miflifllppi being the limit of Louifiana, it would have added very much to the fecurity of our plantations. This Memorial only mentions the King of Great- Britain's claim to the procedion of the Indians in queftiion, and confequently gives up any claim we may have to the dominion over their country, a ftroke which is certainly the mofl: impolitic that could pofllbly have been thought of. 7'he nature of the European colonies in North America makes it impoflible to define defi to Intc dom this Eui righ cam tta now righ abfo ftfte 1 felv( hav( tend tion< end Flat hun brea ^on men agai fiid and und poff the dou of poii ar/: 1 An tallj ! [ I J re prefented to the that cannot be con- his rough draught le Britifh Memo- ind of the limits ; us with this va- allb particular in i of lead impor- f Utrecht, which will throw fome habiting Canada, to the Five Na- jreat-Britain, nor fame. In like Ives peaceably to- :e ; and on both account of trade. liberty refort as ; trade on one fide on the part of the bly and diftindly >unted the fubjeds Nations to Great- id alfo left the de- he Britiih Merno- n Indians who are thefe treaties than fhould be more I a greater oppor- tioned had defined ce, no difficulties iner infilled on the very much to tiie le King of Great- and confequently country, a ftroke been thought of. !S it impoflible to define define exactly to which nation fuch or fuch a traft of countrj' realh cyhhwJ.h le- knged^ whether by purchafc or grant from the natives ; the above article of the tt-eaty of Utrecht yielded and allowed the dominion of the Five iNations to belonj^; ID us, although the limits of their country were not fettled, if wc enquire into the real (late of the cafe, we (hall find we have full as clear a right to the dominion over the fouthern Indians as over the Iroquois, or Five Nations -, but let this be as it may, we ought undoubtedly to have infilled on it in a treaty with a European power -, inftcad of which we gave up (in the Britifli Memorial) the right to a dominion over them for a right which in the very nature of things cnnnot poffibly exill •, that of frotetJion. How can we pretend to be the pro- tedlors of a people, who are fo far from being proteded by us, that they are now at war with us and in league with our enemies ? Was there ever fuch a right heard of, as that of one nation protesting another againfl its confcnt, and abfolutely contrary to its defire ? Such is the right which is fo ilrenuoufly in- fifted on in this Memorial ! This notion of protedion is abfurd in another refpe<^. If we only call our- felves the prote6lors of thefe nations of Indians, I have already fliown we can have no right to a fovereignty over their country, and confequently cannot pre- tend to prevent their doing what they pleafe in, and with it. The nations men- tioned in the Britiih Memorial, are the Cherokees, Creeks, Chikafaws, Chadlaws, end another nation , which other nation I take to be the Alibamous, or elfe the Flat Heads. Now the country wh^h thofe Indians inhabit is upwards of four hundred miles broad and above fix hundred long, each as the crow flies. The breadth is from the Miflifljppi to the planted parts of Carolina, and the length from the Gulph of Mexico to countries fouth of the Ohio. This im- menfe trad: of the country is wider than any part of our colonies that are fituatcd againft it \ and would have been only under ourproteHion by this Memorial. The Ihdians might certainly fell half of it to the French for gunpowder and brandy, and yet be prote*5led by us, and this would have juft the conlequences that the undetermined limits of Canada were attended with. The French are already in pofifeflion of great part of thefe countries by means of Forts Conde and Touloufe, riie latter of which is three hundred miles from the Miflidlppi ; and without doubt they would encompafs our colonies vith a chain of forts from the Gulph of Mexico to the r.hio; what terrible confequences this would have I need not point out to the re.i,,er ; and what makes this pad a doubt is, they would have a right to do this if they got rhe Indians confent. There cannot be a more faife notion than to imagine the countries in North America can be confidcred in the fame manner as thofe in Europe : when we calk of a country here, that (hould be confidered as a barrier between two na- tions. I> C 8 J tion?, it is the very reverfe of what it is in America. Flanders has always been confidered as the barrier between France and the Dutch j the King of Sardinia's dominions, may be called the barrier between France and Italy •, but thefe coun- tries are really barriers j the French can poffefs themfelves of none of the barrie: towns in Dutch Flanders without making war; many are garrifoned with Dutch ibldiers, and no part of die country can l/e bought by the French for brandy o gunpowder \ add to this the whole country is known. In America the countries which would have feparated the polleflions of the two nations, muft naturally h. attended with the very contrary circumftances in every refpe^l. In order to (hew that the Britilli Minifter himfclf regarded thefe Indian nations, as a barrier between the Englilh colonies and Louifiana, we need only turn to the Memorial of the 29th of July, in which are thefe words-— //&^ nations and coun- tries tchich lie intermediate, and which form the true barrier between the aforefaii. provinces., not being proper on any account , to be dire£lly or by necejfaty confequenct ceded to France, i^c. The meaning of thefe words cannot be difputed, and they Ihew in the cleared manner that Great-Britain's only fecurity for her colonies de- pended on the good faith of France. One remarkable inftance of the very fame nature, will tell us what certainty there is in that. By the extrad I have already given from the treaty of Utrecht it appears that France acknowledged the fove- reignty of England over the Iroquois or Five Nations, but yet fhe built her £hain of forts on the Ohio, almoft as foon as the treaty of Aix le Chappelle (which confirmed it) was figned ; now it is very well known that fort du Quefne, Jlands in the very center of the Iroquois country. Let us fee the foundation on which (he pretended a right to this trad. In a memorial delivered by the Duke de Mirepoix to the Britilh Miniftry May 14, 1755, is the following article. It is laconteftible from the principles which agree with the titles, withjuftice, with the lazv of convenience and the mutual fecurity, that the Ohio ought to make part of the polTeflions of France. The Englilh have no fettlements on this river, and v/hen the Britifli Minifters maintained this propofition j that the fources of this river are full of antient fettlements of their nation ; it was plain they had trufted too much to falfe relations. The French have always looked •' on this river as dependent upon Canada, and it is cflential to her, in order to the communication of Canada with Louifiana j they have frequented it at all times, and in numbers. It was even by this river that they fent the detachment of troops which were fent to Louifiana about the year 1739, on occafion ot the war of the Chikafaws*." Such are the rights which France pretended to contrary t( f» i( (C (( %l *i • The remainder is as fol.'ows, " Had there been Eng'ili fettlements then on that river, and ^%d it beea a part of the Bhciili colonies, would the French have been fuSered to defcend its whole courfe i s has always been Cing of Sardinia's ' ; but thefe coun- lone of the barrie: foned with Dutch nch for brandy o rica the countrie; muft naturally be rfe Indian nations, d only turn to the ? nations and coun- ween the aforefaL ■cejfary confequenc; ifputed, and they r her colonies de- of the very fame SI I have already vledged the fove- yet Ihe built her Aix le Chappelle fort du Quefne, he foundation on Ted by the Duke following article. :les, withjuftice, e Ohio ought to lo fettlements on tofitioni that the ion; it was plain i'^e always looked her, in order to equented it at all t the detachment f, on occafion of ICC pretended to contrary on that river, and o defccnd its whole courfc i [ 9 ] contrary to the moft folemn treaties I Had peace been concluded on the terms offered by the Britilh Miniftry, we fliould in a few years have had her afferting the lazv of convenience^ and grafping at all that immenfc tratft of country which ihe juft before acknowledged to be under our prote£lion. "When we have been fo recently ufed in the moft perfidious manner by that nation, can any reafons upon earth be fufficient to make us give them an opportunity to do the very fame again ! No two cafes can poflibly be more parallel than the treaties of Utrecht and Aix, and the late negotiation, in refped to intermediate countries. By tiic former the country of the Iroquois was acknowledged to be under our dominion, and was to be the boundary between Canada and the Englilh colonies -, by the latter the countries inhabited by the fouthern Indians were to be under the protection of Great-Britain, and to ferve as a barrier between the two nations. Nothing can be more alike than thefe cafes, and we may depend upon it that the confe- quences will alfo be juft alike if ever we are fo mad as to conclude fuch a peace. If the Miffiflippi is not made the limit of Louifiana (and we fee clearly no fuch thing was thought of in the late negotiation) and all the countries eaft of that river ceded in full fovereignty to Great-Britain, we (hall give up the very end for which we went to war, the fecurity of our colonies \ for the French by means of a few forts more added in a chain to thofe of Touloufle and Conde, will be able to confine us into a narrow flip againft the fea of not a greater breadth than three hundred miles, whilft their colony of Louifiana will be above a thou - courfe ; or would not the court of London have at lead made complaints of it ? But at that time there was no quedion nor the leail mention made, of the pretention which has been raifed up fmce ; without proof, without title, and without any fort of foundation. It is true that in latter years fome Engliih traders have palTed the mountains of Virginia, and have ventured to carry on a fur trade towards the Ohio with the favages. The French governors of Canada contented themfclves at firft, with fending them word that they were on the territory of France, and forbidding them to return on pain of having their goods feized, and themfclves made prifoners : they returned not- withflanding, and their goods have been confifcatcd and fold, and their perfons feized and con- dufted to Quebec, from thence to France, where they have been detained in the prifons of Rochelle : no claim, no complaint was made on this occafion by the court of London j they have been confidered only as fraugglers, whofe defire of gain had expofcd them to the rifque attcndinjj an illicit trade. Having thus afcertained ivithfu much JoliMy the right and poffelfion of the French on the Ohio and its teriitory, their being fatisficd to llipulate, that all the territory between the Ohio and the mountains which border \'irginia, Ihail remain neutral, and that all trade and paffage through it fhall be interdicted as well to tlie French as to the Engliih, ought to be confider- ed as a very fcnfible proof of their love of peace." C fand u C 10] fand miles wide*. We cannot reafonably fuppofe that the French would negleft building fuch forts as foon as I'uch a peace was concluded ; their former condu6b on the Ohio tells us very plainly that they know their own intereft perfeftly well, and if we may judge by our condud, much better than we did ours. If a peace had been concluded on the terms offered in the late negotiation they would have had a right to ereft thefe forts, with only getting the confent of the Indians. Now it cannot be alTerted that we fhould not have fufiered them, and (hould have reftrained them by a claufe in the treaty, becaufe we in the very fame article give up our right to do that by faying that thefe Indians are under our protection, and they are fuppofed throughout the negotiation to be independent nations. But every quibble, every difpute would have been rectified, had our Minifter infifted on the Mifliflippi being the boundary of the pojfeffions of the two crowns in thofe parts -, that river is two or three miles wide in its whole courfe through thefe countries : fuch a boundary could not have been millook, and by out planting the bank on our fide direftly, we fhould foon obtain a thorough know- ledge of the whole country, and put it out of the power of the French to en- (roach without openly invading, I have hitherto endeavoured to convince the reader that the peace, had it been concluded on the plan propofed by the Britifli Minifter, muft neceflarily have left our American colonies infecure, although their fecurity was the original end of our entring into the prefent war. I think I have proved, and fr6m fafts, rather than empty reafoning, that this infecurity would have been owing to our not infifting on the MifTiflTippi being made the limit of Louifiana, and our colo- nies i and I conceive that it will take very little ingenuity to convince the unpre- judiced, that the Briti(h Minifter ought by all means to have infifted on France ceding all North America to Great-Britain ; and that fuch a condud would have been much more wife and more for the intereft of his country than keeping a fhare of the neutral iflands, or Senegal and Goree, or even than the Eaft Indies^ Canada is of little or no importance to us j and of none to the French unlefs conneded with Louifiana-f- ; we might have learned this truth long ago, had 4 •i * I cannot nvoid once for all affuring the reader, that I do not hazard thefe aiTertions relating to the extent of the countries in queftion, without having firft examined them in the beft maps, with «he mod fcrupiilous attention. Without having confu]ted good maps, no perfon can fpeak on the point without making many miflakes. t " The truth of the matter is, they were tired of Canada. The inclemency of the climate^ the difficult accefs to it ; and a trade fcarcely defraying the expence of the colony, would long ago liavc induced them to abandon it, if the plan of extending its boundaries, at the expence of the EngUfh^ and of opening its commaaication with Louifiana and with the ocean, had not made them perfcvere: would negleft )rn]er conduct perfeftly well, s. If a peace 7 would have ■ the Indians, id (hould have le article give Lir proteftion, ident nations, our Minifter he two crowns 3urfe through and by ouf rough know- "rench to en- » had it been Mftarily have original end I frbm fa<5ls, owing to our »nd our colo- re the unpre- ed on France : would have n keeping a 5 Eaft Indies^ the French th long ago, had ions relating to !ft maps, with a fpeaic on the ^ the climate^ ould long ago xpence of the lot made them perfcvere : C >' ] had we attended more to their fchemes of uniting them by their chain of forts. When once they had rendered this chain ftrong enoi-gh, they would have given their greateft attention to the fouthern parts as colonics. Canada produces nothing that can ever pofllbly make a colony flourifliing j and our being pol'- fefled of it, will be of no further confequence to us, than adding to the fecurity of our northern colonies, and gaining about one hundred and forty thoufand pounds worth of furs, annually. The uncultivated lands of our own planta- tions, are far more fertile than the barren wallcs of Canada. But how different a country is Louifiana ! capable of bearing almoit any thing from the tempci' of the (ky, the goodnefs of the foil, and from the multitude of long, decj% and beautiful rivers, with which it is every where enriched and adorned ; thefc are moft of them navigable for hundreds of miles into the country. They arc principally the Mifliflippi, whofe head is unknown, but it almoft goes quite through North America, and at certain feafons overflows its banks for a vaft: way on both fides the Ouabache, almoft equal to the Danube; the great rivers Alibama, Mobile, and feveral others. The face of the country is almoit wholly plain covered with ftately woods, or fpread into very fine meadows. In Ihort Louifiana, particularly the northern part, (for the mouth of the Mifllf- fippi is barren) without any of thofe heightenings which it received, when it was made the inftrument to captivate fo many to their ruin, is in all relpeds a moftdefirable place*. The French fettled here raife fome indigo, a good deal of cotton, fome corn and rice, with lumber for their iflands i but the colony is not very vigorous on account of the fhoals and fands, with which the mouth of the Mifliflippi is in a manner choaked up, and which denies accefs to any very large ftiips ; the French have according to their ufual cautions and wife cuftom, erefted feveral forts in the moft material places, and fortified New Orleans their capital, and indeed the only city in Louifiana, in a regular manner. This city is not remarkably fair, large, or rich : but it is laid out regularly in a fine fitua- tion, on the banks of the Mifliflippi, in profpedt of an higher fortune. The whole colony is faid not to contain above ten thoufand fouls whites and negroes f , yet with all its dil'advantages this colony is not declining, and if ever they fliould make the mouth of the Mifliflippi more tradable (and what is impoflTible to ambition and induftry ?) Louifiana will in a few years wear quite another face. It will fupply their Weft-Indies with boards, ftaves, horfes, mules, and provi- perfevere : Canada itfelf is not worth their a{king, and if they do deflre to have it reftored to them, it can only be with a view to repeat the fame injuries and infidelities, to punilh which, we engaged in the prefent war." Earl of Batl/i Letter to tivo Great Men, p. 30. » See the account of the European fettlementi in America. t Other accounts make them fifteen thoufand. C 2 fions. [ 12 ] Rons. It will Tend tob^.cco into France-, and incrcafing the conveniencies of its mother country and fifter colonies, it will increafe its own traffic, its inhabitants, and its power." 'I'his deicription of Louifiana, which is extremely juft, I have extracted from more authors than one, and it fhows very clearly the immenfe importance of that vafl: country. But how will it flourifli when it becomes the only objeft of the regard of the French in North America.^ "When the expence which attended Canada is laid out on this promifing fettlemcnt, where every thing confpires to render it a mod formidable rival to our American power. How eafy will it be for the French, in cafe of a new war to invade our colonies from hence ? And when once they have cultivated, and experienced the great advantages refulting from the poflTeflion of it, we may be very certain that they will fpare no cofts in Urengthening it, and by keeping up a ftrong body of troops here, (which they may do for much lefs expence than in Old France) they will put our plantations to the immenfe expence of erefting barrier forts for the extent of upwards of a thoufand miles, and when a war breaks out, they can at any time invade our fouthern, and weakeft provinces *. Here it may be faid, that we /hall at any time be able to repel force by force^ and to conquer Louiftana as we have done Canada j a poor and infufficient anfwer I The conqueft of Canada has aftually coft us eighty millions ! and fo we are to leave Louifiana in the hands of the French, becaufe, in cafe they encroach, as they always have done, we IhaH at any time be able to repel them at the fmall expence of eighty millions I But can we anfwer, that the French will be as eafily drove out of the latter, as they have been out of the former : the conqueft we have already made, baffled all our efforts for years, and at laft was won but by a miracle ; for all parties now agree that Wolfe's fuccefs can be confidered in no other light. Will not the French rather take the greateft care to fecure themfelves with every poffible precaution ? Can a fleet of Britifli firft rate fhips of war, fail up to New Orleans, as they did to Quebec -, and altho' we might have eafily taken it by General Amherft's army being navigated down the Ohio and Mifllflippi, yet it will not be, ten years hence, fo weak as it is now. Quebec was not half fo ftrong as New Orleans mio-ht be made at a fmall expence, for it ftands on a dead flat, and furrounded with marihes and lakes. «• Ihcl 'annj ^or :thr<| jon niai tan| bar Ifliol ithe ing im .tic 4' » « For If we can have no fecurity whilll the French have any place from whence they may In- vade our colonies, you ought to h.ave carried your demands ftill further; you ought to have de- manded the whole country of Louifiana ; becaufe from thence France undoubtedly may invade our colonies, and what is of more coniideration, the weakeft of our colonies, thofe to the fouthward.'"' Mr. lo^^vnjhend's Remarks en a Utter to ti':o Great Men, p. 5 1 , If C 13 ] eniencies of in its inhabitants, sxtrafled from importance of only objeft of vhich attended ig confpires to fy will it be for ■i ? And when efulting from e no cofts in ;, (which they ur plantations upwards of a ne invade our a/Iaf any time done Canada j Lially coft us f the French, H at any time —But can we IS they have •affled all our es now agree t the French precaution ? . as they did iherft's army years hence, ^s might be unded with they may in- to have de- ay invade our e Southward.-' If f Tf the French thought it fo well worth their while to fortify and cukivr.re, the barren colony of Canada, how much more pains will they take with Louiii- «na, where all their expence will be amply repaid by its vail fertility \ and where •a little indultry will have fuch great eftids, as to render it one of the moft im- portant colonies in the world. The river St. Lawrence is froze up for near :three quarters of the year; but Louifiana has ;• any bays and mouths of rivers jon the Gulph of Mexico, which are always open, and where capacious harbours may be made. In fhort, we cannot poflibly form too high an idea of the vaft impor- tance of this country •, and we fliall undoubtedly in a few years (if we leave it in tlic hands of the French) repent our not infilling, that the firfl article of the peace ffliould cede ^// AV//&-y^f««'nv? to Great-Britain. An attentive confideration of jthe late negotiation, will plainly tell us, that, had the French thought of mak- ing peace at all, we might have got llich a ceflion made, inllead of others Icfs important to us. But even if their miniftry had refufed to agree to fuch an ar- . tide at firft, we Ihould never have thought of making peace without it *. •3f And . * " —This was one of their gre.it reafons for being fo intent upon fecuring the Milfifllppi, and driving the Spaniards from about it at Penfacola in 1719, becaufe they fay, " This navigation to •* Louifiana, will further procure us a free (or forced) refortto the two famous ports of the Gulph " of Mexico. Viz. the H-ivana and Vera Cruz." [Secomi I'oyagc'of La Salle, p. 188.) And wc ■jnay fee by the quantities of gold and other Spanifh commodities, taken in their (hips from the 'Miflifiippi in the laft war, that they have not only found a way to the Spanilh ports from thence already, but likewifeto the mines of Mexico ; to which they have an open road, and a Jccure trade commonly followed by them from the Mifliflippi. The French no fooner went to this river after 'the peace of Utrecht, than the firft thing they attempted was this trade to the Spanifti mines. For this purpofc, they immediately fent a fliip to Vera Cruz, and a convoy over land to the mines of St. Barbe. It is but two hundred and eighty leagues from New Orleans to thofe mines; which i? jbut a fmall way for the French to go for gold and filver, when they go fo conftantly all over North- ".America upwards of one thoufand leagues for a few beaver flcins This is a grr.nd objeft which the French have in view, which makes them fo intent upon fecuring all thofe v.nft countries the.y call Louifiana; which not only leads to, but muft command the .idjacent mines of Mexico . It plainly appears from hence, as well as from all other accounts, that their views are not only the .fecurity of Canada, but of Louifiana, which muft give them the command of the Spanifli mines, whenever they find it proper and convenient ; befides the whole trade and commerce of that conti- nent in time.— This their Settlement on the Miffifiippi, if not taken notice of, is likely to **turn to as great an account to them in time, as they conceived it might in 17 19. They arc not oiily -^'convenient here to go to the mines of Mexico to which they have a good road already opeaicd by land, and begin to c;u ry on a confiderable trade there ; but if they encreal'e and ftrcngthcn here, as they muft foon do in fo fine and extcnfive a country, while they have fuch a fuperior force adjoin, ing to this in their iflands, they mult by means of thefe two fo eafily joined together, and conftant- ly fupporting one another, foon be able to reap all the profits of the Spanifli trealures in /»merica if not to feize them ; a thing that all Europe is concerned in furely, as well as Britain f- All thofe things have been meditated lor many years, but they are now come to a crifis, and we muft prevent them ;;6!y or licnier. Jf the French have over-run all thofe countries, and made themfelves mailers [ '4] And here I cannot help reflefling on the an^zing conduct of our mlniAry, in not attacking tiiis colony, which at prefent is To far from being formidable. It ought certainly to have been the very firft objedl of our attempts after Canada was in our pofTetrion. A great force at an immenfe expence, (much fupcrior to what would have been required for the conqued of Louifiana) is gone againd Martinico, which is not of ftch confequencc to us. General Amherft migli; have conveyed his whole army down the Ohio and MinTillippi, with as much eafe as he proceeded through a much worfe and more impenetrable country, by the way of Crown Point by water to Montreal. It would have been a moft remark- able advantage, to have been able to proceed by water for upwards of three thoufand miles on fuch an expedition j and the country is fo very fruitful, and abou ds fo with deer and tame cattle, that an army might be maintained in it perhaps eafier than in any other country in the world. But there are many other reafons which muft be evident to the reader without reciting, that prove very clearly how ill our miniftry judged in preferring an expedition againft Martinico, to one againft New Orleans. The firft article of the feveral memorials between the courts of Great-Britain and France, which I inferted above, alfo ceded to France a (hare of the New- foundland filhery, in confideration of Dunkirk's being demolilhed, according to the treaty of Utrecht. If the fame miniftry who made that peace and alfo that of Aix, had again pro- pofed fuch an article as this, I Ihould not have been furprized j but that a man of our Patriot Minifter's abilities, (hould give up the intereft of the nation in a point of fuch immenfe importance, I own is fomething odd, or at leaft it appears fo at firft fight, though this paradox as well as many others, might perhaps be cafily reconciled with common fenfe. The vaft confequence of this fifliery fhould undoubtedly have prevented our miniftry, from ceding any port to France in thefe parts. We offered them the ifland of St. Peter j this fpot which has a convenient port, is very finely fituated for the cod fishery, as well as any point of Newfoundland, and they might undoubtedly make it of as much coniequencc to them for filhing as ever Cape Breton was, but this ifland is not the only cef- mafters of them already, oiiJy with a handfuj of men, how will they ever be rooted out of them, when they come to be well fecured and fortified in them, the firft thing they will do without doubt ; and to encreafe and multiply as they muil do in fuch fruitful countries ? It will then be in vain to iay, that Britain ought to vindicate its rights to thofe countries ; or that Spain is endangered by them. They muft both fubmit to the fate they have brought upon themfelves, if they fufFer the French thus to over-run North- America, and to fccure and fortify themfelves in it. We never fee them part «vith a place they once get fure footing in ; nor give up or neglect fuch advantages as thofe here re- prei'cnted, theSpanifli treafures in America." ^eTheConteJl in America, written by Dr. Mitchell i »ho pcrfedly uoderllood the importance of thefe countries. fion lion U cc No. liavc tbe iOan CO be /I fncn thou men tWcn nihus fcry Mid keep aUy fions Uw( trade Fren -* • 1 tbcad thf to' Frenc tliis tr tteQ ceflbr ifland fortif; made the ti toca jflan< point jplacc gran ^cir «enc' [ '5) our miniftry, in ^^ ^^^^ ^7 "*» ^^^ *^^ '"'6'^^ which the French had by the peace of Uireclit, g formidable. It isconCwincd of filhing and dryinp; ^'leir fifli on die coalls of Newfoundland*, npts after Canada ^'^ "^ '^ '^ ^'^'"y P'*^'" ^^^'^ ^'^*^ < .ition of diis ifland, and the part of the coaft much fupcrior to ^ ->c>aounJland which is foi their ufc, that they might, and muft neceflhriiy ) is gone againfl ^^^' '•"^J^^^J ^s gnat a filhciy as ever the poffefllon of Louiiburg gave them i for 1 Amherft migh; *^^' i^^dcr is [2,reatly miftaken, if he imagines that that town aflUUd their tiiliing i, with as mucii *^ ^'*y ^^^^^^ relpert, than as a port for tlieir (hips to rendezvous at. St. Porcrs lie country, by the ifland is as well fuuated as Cape Breton, and they doubtlefs, if ever they come n a moft remark- *<> ^^ poHcfled of it, will make it as great a nurfery as the other, upwards of three '^'i" value of their cod fifliery before we drove th^m quite out of it was im- i^ery fruitful, and fncnfe. It was unbounded, and ineftimable, annually employing at lead a maintained in it thouland fail, from two hundred to four hundred tons and twenty thoufand e are many other '"cn. In the year 1730, there was a computation made of two hundred and that prove very twenty thoufand quintils of fi(h at Merfeilles only, for a market, and commu- jainft Martinico ^*^^^ rt»«/j they cured above five millions of quintals. How dangerous a nur- fery of feamen has been and ever will be while in their pofleflion is very obvious, of Great-Britain ^^ y^ this was only xhtxr fbare \ much greater indeed than ours. If we were to are of the New- ^^^P ^^^ whole of this fifhery in our own hands at a peace we fliould gain annu- ed, according to ^^y two millions of pounds fterling, by the loweft computations j for it occa- fions a confumption of manufaftures greater than what can at firft be conceived. , had again pro- It would not only be depriving our enemies oi fo important a branch of their but that a man trade, but would abridge the revenue of France by leiTening the confumption of ' the nation in a French fait, the profit of which is folcly in the crown, and more than half of It leaft it appears ight perhaps be • The thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht : ** The ifland called Newfoundland with lis fifhery Hiould ^ adjacent iflands (hall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain ; and to that end rt to France in ^^ '*^*" ^^^ fortrefs of Placentia, and whatever other places in the faid ifland in pofleflion of the /• V,' K u French, fliall be yielded and given up, within feven months from the exchange of the ratification of pot wnicn has fj^'i, treaty, or fooner if poflible by the moft Chriftian King, to thofe who have a commiflion from ^ell as any point tte Queen of Great- Britain, for that purpofe. Nor fliall the moftChriflian King, his heirs and fuc- ich COniequence M^<)>'^t ^^ ^i^y °^ ^^^^ fubjeAs at any time hereafter lay claim to any right to the faid ifland and ot the only cef- /• ^ ^ . . lotcd out of them, do without doubt ; then be in vain to [angered by them, sr the French thus ver fee them part s as thofe here rc- by Dr. Mitchelli Hon iflands, or to any part of it or them. Moreover it ftiall not be lawful for the fubjefls of France, to JTortify any place in the faid ifland of Newfoundland, or to erefl any buildings there befides flagcs made of boards, and hiits neceflary and ufual for drying of fifli, or to refort to the faid ifland beyond the time neceflfary for fifliing and drying of fifli. But it fliall be allowed to the fubje^s of France, «» catch fifl) and to dry them on land in that part oAly, and in no other befldes that, of the faid ifland of Newfoundland, which flretches from the place called Cape Bonavifta to the northern point of the faid ifland, and from thence running down by the weflcrn fide, reaches as far as the ^tace called point Riche."—— The claufe in the Britiih Memorial is, " Saving always th« privilege £ anted by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht to the fubjefts of France, to fifli and dry eir codfifli on a part fpecified of the banks of Newfoandland, which privilege it propofcd to be vencwed to France as aforefaid." which in 4 I f [ .6 J yjU'kU that was made in the kingdom was employee! in this fiflieiy. At the fame time the revenue from our own fait trade, which (lands engngcd for a confider- able part of tlie national debt, may bs made to encreafe in proportion as that or France is lefTened. Were we pofleflcd of tliis fiflicry alone, it might be an eter- nal nurfery of thirty, forty, or perhaps fifty thouland fcamen, fince nobody can tell the improvements which would rcfult from the folc ponJ^inon. Such is the invaluable confideration which we oflcred in tlie late negotiatio:^ for the demolition of Dunkirk ! If the Minifter who offered to make fuch a fi crifice had not baen the favourite of the peojjle, he would have been regardcc ^rom this alone, as the enemy of this country. It may perhaps be fiid, tha Dunkirk is an objeft of real fear in the Englifli, but I can allow no fuch thing; formerly it was feared much but never with any grounds, and a demand origi nally to demolifli it was unjuft and abfurd j we have juft as much right to make the demolition of Breft an article in a peace, as wc had to expeft that of Dunkirk at firft. But if this place was of fuch great confequencc as fome very obftinatel\ infift it is, fure it can never be allowed of fo much importance, as even the tenth ]>art of the Newfoundland fifliery •, France contains many Dunkirks, but flic poflelTes only one fifliery. If we examine any lifl: of the prizes made during the courfe of the prcfent war by the French, we ftiall not find that a large propor tion of them was carried into Dunkirk ; many other ports of France have beer more fatal to our trade, and particularly Bayone : why don't we demand that the harbour of this neft of privateers be demoliflied ? This abfurd conduft isfoundec merely on the French principle thi law of convenience. As to invafions, we have little or no reafon to fear Dunkirk, (nor indeed all the ports of France) on that ac- count, for all theexpence that ever was, or ever can be laid out on it, will never % make it capable of being a firft rate harbour -, and if it could admit very large fliipsof war its fituation renders it very improper for an invafion, for no port car, ,|i be fit for that, unlefs it is very near the part of the enemies coaft they would in- " vade. Now from Dunkirk a fleet muft fail a confiderable way before it can lam; troops with fafety : all our Kentifli and fouthern coafts quite to Portfmouth are fo ^ cxcefllvely flirong, and the country fo deep and impenetrable, that an enemy could not even land j or if they were landed, make any progrefs. For thefe reafoni the French will never fit out an expedition fleet from this port, but only make a great parade of naval preparations at it to frighten the Englifli : if it was realjv formidable to the greateft degree, if its harbour was as extenfive and deep as thofe of Breft or Toulon, yet we fliould have no more reafon to be afraid of ir than of thofe towns ; much Icfs to give fuch an immenfe confideration for its de- molition. I have endeavoured to prove that the French by means of the poflll fion of St. Peters ifland, and the confirmation of part of the thirteenth article • * of [•7] y. At the fame cd for a confider- [)Ortion as that or might be an etvr- en, fince nobody It'inon. e late negotiatioii m;»ke fuch a fa /e been regardcc jps be Hiid, tha- wno fuch thing; a demand origi- ch right to make t that of Dunkirk nevcryobftinatel\ as even the tenth Dunkirks, but flic 5 made during the It a large proper- France have beer ' e demand that the 4 ondudl is founded ivafions, we have ranee) on that ae- on it, will never admit very large for no port car ift they would in- Jefore it can lam Portfmouth are fo It an enemy could For thefe reafor^ but only make if it was reallv ive and deep as be afraid of ir eration for its de ins of the poflcl thirteenth article ■^ 01 # of the treaty of Utrecht, woull fDon h.vc revived their fifhi-i y, r.nu rniiV-l It to as q;reat a licight as ever : luih an luceflio i of wealth '.ouKI loon h.ivi- ( vi!)led th m to rnulcr m.uv/ of their ports more truly formiikihle 'o us iha.i D.inkirk. Suvc weo;i"ht more to fear a nuril-ry of twenty or tiii, ty I'Huir.iiul Fier.ih fMincn, tl.an ;ip'!^ry French port' By tlic cod fiOicry they will b^: cn;ib!t.'J, more ( er- haps Than by any other branch of trade, to revive their n ;vy ; a.id I bJi^vc tv'.iv unprejudiced perfon will agree with me, that we hive far gr.\ucr leafon to fear an acicflion of naval power to France, than any fingle port in tiuu kingdom. All the fortifications in Europe cannot make a French port formidable •, traJ* alone can raife a navy i and If we had taken care to prevent them from raifing ;i trade, welhould never have had the lead occafion to fear French ports. Ihe ignorant may fancy that as long as Louilburg is demoliilud, and Cape Breton is ours, we liave no reafon to fear the power of France in ihofe fens. But nothing can be more abfurd v it was not Louifl^urg that was of luch bad confe- quence to us, but the flou.ilMng ftate of the French fifliery, which depended merely on places to dry their ftOi on, and creft warehoufes. The fortifications had nothing to do with the fiihcry, and the want of them could never have pre- vented its encreale ; we ofTered them an ifland for their ncceflary purpofes as well fituated as Cape Breton, and much nearer the great filhing bank. Here they would foon have carried on as flourifliing a fifliery as ever iliey did from Louif- burg, and conlequently would have raifed by natural means a vafl: number of failors, who would always find conllant employment. Can Dunkirk be reckoned an equivalent for a (hare of this trade .? And a fliare unlimited, for the French by our propofals might have employed ten thoufiind fail in it, if they p'eafcd. Iix Ihort, no arguments in the world, can poITibly convince the knowing reader, that Dunkirk can be confidered as a proper equivalent for a (hare of the cod-fifhery. This is one of thofe articles which ought to have been entirely in our favour. But when the Britidi Miniftry were fo impolitic, as at once to o(fer an equivalent for demoli(hingthat port, we could not but exped, that fomething of forty times its value would be given for it. No peace (hould have been thought of that left the French at liberty to employ a fingle (hip in this trade, for a treaty could not contain an article of greater importance : Inftead of feeing the great conlequence of it. onr Miniftry in their very firft Memorial^ offered to yield a (hare to France in conlideration of this trifling equivalent. The next ceflion to France, is the iflands of Guardaloupe and Marigalante : In the firll memorial of France it is propofed in The 3d, 4th, and 5th AR T I C L E S. ** That France fliall reftore to England the ifland of Miiorca In confldc- ration of this cefTion, England (hall reftcre Guardaloupe and Marigalante. 'i\\z ^ ncutr;.! • I f ■.I t If [ 18] *ncntral inantls to remain fo." In the Brltifh Memorial it was anfwered that, '* The iflanti of Minorca fhould be immediately rcftored—— France fliall imnvr- lUately rcllore and evacuate the conquers (lie has made over his Majedies allies in Germany, that is to lay, of all the eftatcs and countries appertaniing to the Landgrave of Hcflc, to the Duke of Brunfwick, and to the iiledoratc of Han- over-, and of all the places and territories belonging to the King of PrulTia, in j^oflefllonof the arnii of France. In a word, France fhall make a general eva- cuation of all her conqucfts on the fide of Flcflc, Wedphalia, and its countries. •-—The King of Great-Britain on his pan agrees to furrendcr to his Moll Chrif- tian Majefty, i. Bdleine, 2. Guardaloupe and Marigalante. I have thrown theii: Tevcral articles together, as they plainly have a connection with each other. It is evident that the point of importance here is the reilitution of Guardaloupe. The three principal points that were to be difcufled in this treaty were, North- America, the cod-fi(hery, and the fugar trade ; thcfe are all of far greater importance, I apprehend than any thing elfe. In refpcdt to North- America, our Miniftry negledled to fecure our colonies: they gave up a ihare of the fifhery •, and we (hall now find, they would have reftored Guarda- loupe. It has often been faid, that the ends which a nation ought to have an- fv/ered, in making a peace are, i. the thing for which the war was properly and juftly begun j 2. An indemnification for the expences of carrying it on. Wc went to war for fecurity for our colonies \ and none of our conquefts would by any means be a tolerable indemnification, except, the cod-fifhery, and the fugar trade. Canada upon the plan of the late negotiation, would have been of little confequence befides that of adding to the fecurity of our northern colonies •, but if Louifiana had been ceded to us, the whole would have paid all the expences of the war— —The cod-filhery we fhould foon have loft, and we (hould have re- ftored Guardaloupe. Every underftanding reader muft confefs, that the grand point which we fliould have had in view in a peace with France, muft be, to ruin their trade by cutting olf its fouices. It will not be difficult to fliow that the fugar trade is one of the principal of tiiefe ; that nation had carried this branch of their commerce to fi.!( 'a an amazing and formidable height, that they had before we took Guarda- loupe beat Li.'i out of all the markets of Europe •, this increafe of their trade was owing chiefly to the polfelfion of Guardaloupe. About the time of the trcriCy of Utrecht, wc fuppiied the greateft part of the fugar confumption throii•» which year our lu«Tar export hid falkn w four thoufand and feventy eight hopfhcad;,. Since that time it has fallen ulmoft to nothing. Now let us turn the othci jldr, and view the fugar trade of FraiKc fmce the Tame period, the treaty of Utrecht At that time the French cxporictl no fugars. But mark the revolution. In 1740, whrn the BritlHi trade in that article was in a manner annihilated \ France after ferving her home conllimption at a very eafy rate, exported no Icfs than eighty thoufaml hogllicads of fugar, which, with the gains of the commiffion, &c. was reputed to be worth to France more than a million fterling-, to employ forty thoufand ton of lliipping and four thoufand feamcn, folcly in bringing it from the Weft- Indies to Europe •. Surely thefc fa«5ls tell us in the cleareft manner the neccffity of keeping poffeffion of Guardaloupe •, but I have not infifted on a multitude of other articles, which this ifland produces in great quantities, befides fugar, and which are of ira- menfe value, and add a vaft incrcafe to its trade : there is no ncceflity of being exaft in fuch rcprefentations asthefe ; the outlines of the pidure arc too ftriking to need the affiftancc of colouring •, it muft be allowed by every body that this ifland is of prodigious importance i that its trade is one of the principle branches of the French commerce i and that it, confequcntly, is one of the fources of their naval power. If thefe fadts are allowed, as furc they muft be, I think it muft appear evident to every Briton, that we ought to have infifted on the poffeffion of Guardaloupe, as the cod-fifticry was to have been rcftored, and Frenchmen left in North-America. By giving up this ifland we ftiould give with it a vaft acceffion of naval power to our dangerous rivals, and without keeping any thing ourfelves that will form a ballance to what we give up. Let us but refleft on the flourilhing ftate of the French commerce at the breaking out of the prefent war, and we ftiafi be convin- ced of the neceffity there is for us to curtail it. This war fucceedcd only a five years peace, a very (hort time to revive a trade, and raife a powerful navy. Yet we found their commerce rofe to a prodigious height, and a navy that rendered France formidable even to the firft maritime power in the univerfe. At the con- clufion of the peace of Utrecht, the trade of France was in a deplorable contli- tion i fhe had not then five hundred veflTels of all forts in the world. At the be- ginning of the laft war, but thirty years after, they had eighteen hundred. Their loffes in that war were very great, and yet their lofies in this fhew, that in a very little time they have more than repaired them. Wherever the vital principal • for more of this argument fee, " Remarks on a Letter to two Great Men." p. 32. D 2 fubfias .Iv I T [ 20] i\il>fifts in full vigor, wounds are foon healed *. Such quick renovations plainlf tell us the importance of their colonies, and among the reft their fugar ones : if ihefe are the lources of that power which enables them to kindle up fuch violent flames in every part of the world, fure we ought to be particularly careful at a peace to deprive them of as many of their colonies as we poflibly can ; and tho* an attempt to keep every thing we have conquer'd perhaps would be unfuccefsful, yet we certainly ought never to make one, that did not leave us in pofleflion of a confiderable indemnification for our enormous expcnces. Nothing that we Ihould have kept, (by this negotiation) could be regarded even as a reafonable one, except thofe articles which 1 have fhown would have been given up to the French. This condud in our Miniftry was certainly againft the intereft of their country ; but what llKill we fay to thole infatuated men who had rather have any peace tiian none at tiiis time, and who think our great Commoner did not make conccfTions enough ! i" J I have here endeavoured to fhow the importance of Guardaloupe, and confe- quently, of the neutral iflands, confidered merely with refpeft to their own value, to either nation : but fure the reader muft perceive that Guardaloupe and Bellcifle in theBritifh Memorial, arc fuppofed to be equivalent confiderations for the French evacuating Germany -, for after the article which refpefts that evacuation, the next begins, " ll'e King of Great-Britain on bis part agrees*^ to the reftoring thofe two iflands. Surely any Briton zealous for the intereft of his country, muft: feel an honeft indignation at thus feeing the honor, as well as moft important concerns of this kingdom, offered to be facrificed for the fake of a parcel of petty princes in Germany ! We are neither bound by gratitude nor honor, to infilt on the French evacuating the countries of thefe people, we are pleafed to call our allies. The reader fhould remember that they are no further our allies than by letting troops to us, and in the treaties for thofe troops we are bound to pay them very fufficient fubfidies, but no meiition is made that we, at a peace, are to infift on the French quitting their country. For the fake of fubfidies they run all the hazard of ruining, their dominions, and by their perfift- ing ftill to let cut their troops, it is v^ry plain they are well paid for them, notwith- Gre( or tn| it is Emi plair 11 ♦ .Account of the E-ropean Settlements in America. Vol. II. p. 22. t ■ roriv: he D— e oi B- has fpoke in p- -t warmly for a peace, any, rather than + £x:rr.cl from ameno.i .1 of the deputies of the French commerce, to their royal cour.oil 1701. — — " Thcnuigation (f iVance owes all its iticreafc and fplendor to the commerce of its fugar iilands, a id that it canr.ot ' c kept up and enlarged cthcrwifc than by this commerce, "lis beyond all doubt that tl.is cohiir,:;v; is more beneficial to the Hate than all others, (of long voyages) that are tlriven by t't.c Frcnth. ' ftanding rations plainlf fugar ones : if jp fuch violent ly careful at a can i and tho' )e unfuccefsful, in pofleffion of :hing that we IS a reafonable ven up to the itereft of their ither have any did not make )e, and confe- to their own irdaloupe and rations for the It evacuation, the reftoring ountry, mult •ft important a parcel of or honor, to e pleafed to furiher our "oops we are ide that we, the fake of their perfift- m, notwith- ', rather than couroil i;oi. ^^i its fugar "lis beyond ages) that are Handing [ 21 ] /landing their country is ruined by the French. Of what confequence is it to Great- Britain, whether the Landgraviate of Hefle be poflTefled by French troops or not i or whether Wefel and Guelders, and other countries belonging to the King of Pruflia, are left in their hands ; for by the feveral memorials and letters, it is plain that the French offered to withdraw all afliftance of any kind from the Emprefs Qiieen, provided we did the fame by the King of PrulTia -, and tliis plainly fhows, that we might have left that monarch's territories in Wcftphalia in their hands, under the name of the Emprefs Queen, without the leaftendan- gCfing him. But what can we fay to this article, when we fee the iflandof Guar- dtloupe ceded to France on account of her evacuating them? Would not the intcreft of this nation have been fold, and facrificed, without the leaf!: (hadow of Hght or reafon ? In fhort, Guardaloupe is of fuch immenfc importance to us, and the German territories of fo little confequence, that I cannot help being am^ed at the infatuation of giving the one for ths other. What may we not ex- peft in a future negotiation, in cafe bad fortune attends the King of Pruflia ? \Nfc have juft as much reafon to give back every conquell we have made to pro- cnce him good terms of peace, as we have to reftore iiny one* on account of his dominions in Weftphalia. The whole value of thofe territories for which we were to cede Guardaloupe to France, would not amount to the fortieth part of the value of that ifland. Such are the politics of our Patriot Minifter ! As to tii^ value of Minorca and Belleifle, I (hall not enquire into them, but believe tbey may be to Frame on a par •, they are not fo impor:tant as the other articles of t^negotiation. : The ninth ARTICLE of the Britilh anfwer to the ultimatum of France. < •■ ** With regard to the fuccour to be afforded to the King of PrufTia on the part of. the Britifh crown as an auxiliary, after the conclufion of the feperatc peace between Great-Britain and France, his Majefty remains in the fame inflexible rc- folution, which he declared at the firft overture of the prefent negotiation, that he will never defift from giving conftant fuccour to the King of Pruffia as an auKiliary with efficacy and gcodfa:ih, in order to attain the iaiutary end of a ge- neral pacification in Germany. With this view, his Majefl:y, far from propof- ing-to leave France at liberty to fend armies into Silefia, wiihout beiny limited to the number ftipulated in her aBual engagements with the court of Vienna^ (a circuni- ftance not to be found in any part of the ultimatum of England) has uniformly declared, as the thirteenth aiticle of the faid ultimatum profefTes, that Great- Britain and France, fliali be at liberiy to fuppurt their refpective allies as auxilia- ries lii their particular conteft for the recovery of Sikfia, according to the en- gngcments .ri" [20 I ler t gngcnients entered into by each crown. The King declares at the fame tlnj^g ,( that his Majefty has neither the intention, nor the authority, to take upon him.o,„,t inhibit and forbid any foreign troops from entering into thefervice and pay of i^qic King of Pruflia •, however his majefty might be incHned to confent not to furni but by means of fubfidy, thofe fupplies which Great-Britain (hall judge conve: ent to grant his Pruflian Majefty, purfuant to her engagements." I have given this article at full length, as it (hows clearly that the Briti(h Mi •» dry were determined not to renounce the Pru(nan caufe on any account whatevmd 1 (hall not enter into the old enquiry concerning the expediency of a Gerirdema war, as I think it: a difpute which common fenfe muft have determined in mpft minds of the unprejudiced long ago; there is no necelTity to revive this, but T had no occafion to proceed in any unfair way with Prudia, for if France woBritU renounce her engagements with the Emprefs Queen, we might with honor do tfliitut fame by the King of Pruflia ; that the French court would have done this,tions plain from the followin g inva* *' Since the Memorial of the propodtions from France was formed, and at tneutt inftant that the courier was ready to fet out for London, the King received the coit iil fent of the Emprefs Queen to a feparate peace with England, but upon two cc other ditions : but i 1 . To keep po(re(rion of the countries belonging to the king of Pru(ria. tacki 2. That it (hall be ftipulated that the king of Great-Britain, neither in i that capacity of king or elector, (hall a(ford any fuccour, either in troops, or of a: foirjn kind whatever to the king of Pruflia ; and that his Britannic majefty will undt b(^ take that the Hanoverian, Heflian, Brunfwickian, and the other auxiliaries gard ^iliiance with Hanover, (hall not join the forces of the king of Pruflia, in lil defij manner as France fliall engage on her part, not to yield fuccour of any kind not ' the Emprefs Queen nor her allies. men Both the(e conditions appear fo natural and equitable in themfelves, that 1^ %hoi majefty could not do otherwife than acquie(ce in them, and he hopes that t: the king of Great-Britain will be ready to adopt them." je£t, It appears very plainly from hence, that the peace between Great-Britain ar and France is never likely to be concluded to the advantage of either nation, if v the do not make the fame concefllon with regard to our German allies as the Frenci: '^^ It may feem ftrange that our Patriot Minifter, who makes fuch prodigious of!e: tba where they tend to the deftruftion and ruin of this kingdom, (hould be fo ver unreafonable in refpeft to the affairs of Germany, I fay unreafonable ; for v. §re never likely to have a peace, if the refpedive German interefts arc not fepi rated from thofe of Great-Britain and France in a negotiation. This condii: certainly appears vjery odd, but our furprize furcly will ccafe, when we remeff .wc 4e. [^3] - . I, /• . '«* *^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ would have facrificed the intereft of this nation for , ® -^"^ ^^^^ ^* foreign ones, is he, who once railed moft violently at continental pon n'ni,Qu||g^iQ,,3 under whatever circumftances, and afterwards adopted them with ervice and pay of ;„^j|g 2eal than any minifter that ever preceded him. :onfent not to furni 1 fhall judge conve The Tenth A R T I C L E of the lad Britifh Memorial. that the Briti(h Mi «^, With regard to the captures made after the commencement of hoftilities ny account whatevind before the declaration of war, the king continues of opinion, that fuch a rdiency of a Gemicmand on the part of France, is neither juft nor maintainable according to the ive determined in in^^ inconteftible principles of the right of war and nations.'* ©revive this, bur This article was certainly maintained with commendable refolution by the tor if France woJBritilh Miniftry •, and the unreafonablenefs of the French in demanding the re- jnt with honor do tftitution, was founded in nothing but injuftice and contempt of the law of na- Id have done this,nons. They were tiie aggreflbrs in the prefent war, and alfo began hoftilities, by invading countries which either belonged to us or ought to have been regarded as s rormed, and at tncutral, in America. Now if our enemy attacks us in one country, are we not ing received the coat liberty by the law of nations torefent fuch conduft by attacking them in an- t but upon two ccother : the forms of declarations of war, can with reafon be regarded as nothing but forms ; cffences are much fuperior ; In fadt the French declared war by at- ing of Pruflia. tacking us in America. It is very plain from Rouille's letter to Mr. Fox in i y^O, ritain, neither in I that the French themfelves thought war might be declared without regarding the in troops, or of afoifjns of it j he concludes his letter with thefe words, " But if contrary to all ' "^^jcfty will und( bppes, the king of England refufes what the king demands, his majefty will re- other auxiliaries gard ibis denial of jujiice as the moji authentic declaration of wary and as a formed ; of Pruflia, in li! defign in the court of London, to difturb the peace of Europe.*' Miglit cour of any kind not we with the fame juftice regard the denials of France to reftore their encroach - niQnts in America, as an authentic declaration of laar ? Certainly : and they, by themfelves, that 1: thofe encroachments did in reality declare war againft us. It is no wonder that he hopes that t: the French miniftry in the memorial which they delivered exprefsly on this fub- jeft, fhould flur over the imaginary diflference between commencing hoftilities 1 Great-Britain ar and declaring war ^ they fay, " It is not necefiary to conteft the pririciple, that •ther nation, if v the right of exercifing hoftilities does not always rt-rult from the formality rf a Hies as the Frend d^laration of war." What tottering foundations muft an argument have h prodigious offe: that begins with fuch a falfliood ; it was very neceir?.ry to begin the negotiation fliouid be fo ver ^ this point, with fuch an enquiry, becaufe the determination muft ncceflarily reafonable i for v. cpnclude the debate for one party or the other. If war is declared, not by srefts are not fep. affords but by adions prior to words, the anfwer is evidently for us ; but if the )n. This condu: declaration of war is the form, and not the conimcccment of hoftilities, why when wc rcmere then 4^ I* II I .. I [ 24 ] fh^n *tis as evidently for the French. The principal argument which the Frer give us in defence of their demand of reftitution is founded on the ninete< r article of the treaty of Utrecht, by which it is agreed that in cafe a new v breaks our, liic fliijjs, is'c. on both fides in the dominions of either party, ft not be confifcatcd till fix month.s from the date of the rupture *., but in anfv to this we may realbnably alledge that the French had.bi'oke the treaty (,. that of Aix la Chapelle) and rendered them no longer binding, by their '. croachments in America. According to the principle ' advanced by Fran one nation is obliged by the letter of a treaty to remain peaceable, wh the adverfe nation has broke and infringed it in niore particulars than one. this day no treaties are binding between France and England, becaufe the tv nations are at war ; and treaties, by the law of nations, are rendered of no effe when broke in any material particular. Nothing is clearer than that the Frem began the war by commencing hoftilities on countries which, as I faid befor either belonged to us, or were neutral j fuch a conduft was declaring w: againft us as effedually as if the forms were obferved, and confequently, a former treaties ceafed to be binding. The eleventh article of the anfwer of the Britifh Court to the memorial ( French propofitions. " As the indifpenfable care which is due from his Majefty to his peopk and the juft and invincible motives which concern the prefervation and fecurir of his kingdoms, authorized by the moft formal ftipulations of folemn treatie (t'/z. thofe of Radftadt and the barrier) and even by the exprefs and irrevocabl conditions of the cefRon of the Low-Countries, will not allow France to re tain pofleffion of Oftend and Newport, the two places aforefaid Ihall be eva- cuated without delay by the French garrifons 5 it is for this reafon declared thai the reftitutions fpoken of in the preceding articles of this memorial, and parti- cularly the convention which is to be framed and regulated with refpeft to the Indies, cannot take place till the aforefaid evacuation of Oftend and Newpon (hall be faithfully executed. Eleventh ARTICLE of the laft BritiOi Memorial. Concerning the evacuations of Oftend and Newport the King cannot but re- fer to the moft exprefs and irrevocable ftipulation of the moft folemn treaties, and exprefled in the eleventh Article of the Ultimatum of Great-Britain, as alio to his declaration relative to that fubjedl, and his Majefty relies on the fin- cerity of the declaration on the part of France j that is to fay, that the intention * See Appendix. :nt which the Frcr :ci on the ninete- ,- t in cale a new « of either party, il ure ♦, but in anlv •oke the treaty (,, inding, by their ^ ivanced by Frar lin peaceable, wh Lilars than one. d, becaufe the tu rendered of no eft han that the Freni > as I faid befor was declaring w. id confequently, a to the memorial ( jefty to his peopl- •vation and fccurir i of folemn treatic •efs and irrevocabl low France to re •efaid (hall be eva. ;afon declared thai morial, and parti- with refpeft to the lend and Newport lemorial. ng cannot but re- t folemn treaties, Great-Britain, as relies on the fin- that fbe intention [ 25 ] of his moji Cbrijiian Majejly never -joas to keep pcjfejjion of the aforcful plaes aficr the return of peace. ^* What a farce is exhibited in thefe two articL-s ! hidifpenfille care, and in-dmi ble motives fhine forth in the firft, with fuch a blaze tiiat one wmild think dv; very exiftence of England depended on thefc two towns; in anfwer to this prefling demand, the French king afliues us he never intended to keep polTv^fTi >!i of them i and our patriot Miniiler gives up in the record, this poi?it: to rhc word of a French king. In reading the firlt of thefe articles, I ov/n, I v\:i:i greatly pleafed to find the honour and intereil of the nation fo well underftooj, and fo refolutely aflerted, on a point of fuch great importance. But when I found that fuch a pompous rout had been made merely as a pufi' to evaporate in finoke, my indignation was moved-, and it cannot but be fuppofed that every true Briton will regard fuch contradiflory fentiments with the fcorn they defervc. Ought a Minifter to confide in the word of a French miniftry (a wordfcldom, if ever, given but with defign to be broken) on a point which fo nearly concerned the indijpenftble care of a monarch for his people, and the in-vincible motives of their fecurity j—— ought fuch a word, I fay, to be the dependence of that people on fo important a point ? If the evacuation of thefe towns is of real im- portance, as it certainly is, furcly we (hould have had fomething to rely on be- fides this very doubtful word. In the firft Article which I have quoted it is declared contrary to treaties that the French (hould be in poffeflion of them. Was ic not alfo contrary to thofe treaties that they fliould get pofltflion of them ? If it was contrary, did not the French break them when their troops marched in ? We fee therefore that the very caufe of fuch an article as this exifting, is a breach of faith in the French ; and yet we in the very fame breath take their word again in the very fame cafe I But the evacuation of thefe towns is of real importance to Great-Britain, and of far too much confequence to be left to the word of the French king in a treaty of peace. One would think it ignorance, or wilful over-fight in our miniftry not to take any notice of the French troops being in poflxjfllon of many other towns in the Auftrian Netherlands, alfo contrary to treaty ; they certainly have the fame right to garrifon every town in Flanders as well as Oftend and Newport. This country, which is in a manner in their pofieflion, is that impor- tant fpot for which we, among fo many other nations, have expended fuch rivers of blood and mines of gold. It has been one of the principal objects of Britilh politicks for above an hundred years paft ; our monarchs have taken the field themfelves in its defence, and to keep it out of the hands of France. Yet our fubiime miniftry in the late negotiation had too exalted notions to trouble their heads about it, but thought they did mighty matters in thunder - ing f 26] t . i n '4 ^] iill:; ing o\n (ome fmckt c>n!ls of f>ompous phrafes, and then taking the French king's word for our fecurity ! We cannot realbnably wonder at the unconcern of the Emprefs Queen about thefe her territories, when wc confider that they bring her in no revenue ; the produce of all the taxes being fpent upon the country and in keeping a court at Bruflels. But to France this country is of immenl'e importance, the fnuation of it is the mod advantageous in Europ?, and by ft retching along againft our coaft, and bordering on the Dutch, would anfwer their defigns completely. If they were in pofleflion of it they might at any time over-run Holland, which would transfer to them an immenfc trade at once, and endanger the li- berties of all Europe. The real importance of this country was always un- derftood by Britilh Minifters till now i and the French very well know of what confequence it is to them. In the laft war it was debated in the French king*s cabinet, whether they (hould not abandon their navy and colonies to their fate, and aim all their endeavours at the conqueft of Flanders and Holland, by that means regaining their former naval power, and adding a vaft increafc to it. We very well know that this projefl, had it not been over-ruled, might have been executed with great eafe j the Dutch now, are far from being the people they were •, their trade, and confequently their riches, have been above fifty years greatly on the decline, and at home they are fo weak that a French army might penetrate with little or no refiftance even to Amfterdam it- felf. This event may one day or other happen, and what fatal confequences it would have, muft be evident at the firft thought. Nothing could prove a to- lerable remedy for fuch a misfortune but Great- Britain's immediately attacking France, and never making peace till Ihe had reduced the united French and Dutch trade to a medium with her own j if we confider the long train of bad confequences that muft inevitably attend fuch an affair furely we muft be fur- prifed at the negligence of our miniftry, in looking fo tamely on the French being poflefled of Oftend and Newport, the keys of Flanders ; and on their aftoniiliing credulity in taking the Fiench king's word for their evacuation. If the French were poffefied of thefe important countries, befides the vaft acceflion of trade, manufadtures, and revenue, their fituation would abfolutely givetliem the command of Germany and Denmark, and, in fome meafure, of the north, fuch a vaft conqueft, (and how eafy might it be made !) would well repay France for every conqueft it was poflible for our fleets to make from them, and they would foon pofTefs a navy fuperior to ours. But is it plain th ic the Bri:ifli miniftry feemed to know the importance of thefe two towns ? Is it not alfo evident that they gave up a point of fuch great confequence to Britain, on the word of the French king } The 'i [»7) e French king's efs Queen about no revenue', the keeping a court ce, the fituation ong againft our gns completely, rr-run Holland, endanger the li- was always un- ' well know of d in the French colonies to their s and Holland, ; a vaft increafe )een over- ruled, : far from being hes, have been fo weak that a i Amfterdam it- confequences it ould prove a to- liately attacking ed French and ng train of bad ve muft be fur- ^ on the French J and on their acuation. If the i vaft acceflion utely give tliem , of the north, Lild well repay t from them, plain thic rhe wo towns ? Is confequence to The \& ^ i'hc Thirteenth ARTICLE of the Britifli Memorial. " The treaty concluded between MefTrs Saunders and Godcheu cannot be admitted as the bafis of the re-eftablifhment of the peace in Afia, becaule that provifional treaty has had no confequences, and becaufe thofe provifions are by no means applicable to the prefent ftate of affairs in the Indies, by the final redu6tion of the pofllfllons and fettiements of the French company in the Indies \ but as the perfedl and final fettlement with regard to that country can only be made in conformity to certain rights abfolutely appertaining to the Englifti company, and as the King cannot juftly difpofe of their rights without their conient, it muft neceffarily be left to the companies of the two nations to adjuft the terms of accommodation and reconciliation, according to thofe rules of reafon and juftice which the ftate and circumftances of their affairs may require, and mutually point out, provided neverthelefs that thofe condi- tions are not repugnant to the defigns and equitable intenfions of their fovc- reigns for the peace and reconciliation of the two crowns." The French miniftry immediately accepted this propofal, and no wonder ; fmce the fpirit of it is exadly adapted to the French maxim of negotiating and concluding treaties, the leaving as much as poffible to after-determination, and the decifions of companies and commifTaries. The leaft penetration will inform us that nothing would be eafier for the French than to leave affairs in the Eaft-Indies in fuch a doubtful manner, that they might occafion another war at a more promifing period for France. This was the cafe with North- America at the treaties of Utrecht and Aix. The limits were left undetermined to be fettled by commiflaries, and the confequence wa?, the prefent war. Thus in the Eaft-Indies how eafy would it be for France by fome feeming advantage for our company, to gain their point in letting fome article be left doubtful ; afterwards, when they had a mind to renew the war there would be a difputa- ble point, negotiations would be begun, and the conclufion, a war : it may be faid that the Eaft-India trade is of no advantage to us, and confequently that we fhould not engage in one for the fake of the company j whether the trade is of fo much advantage as it would be if laid open, I fhall not enquire, but that it is of very great advantage is certain, the contrary prejudiced opinion is now fully exploded ; almoft all the nations of Europe are fo fully perfuaded of the importance of this trade, that they either have, or had companies j but the force we have always kept in thefe parts, in time of war, is an evident proof that our miniftry always thought this trade very well worth defending : Can it E 2 there- 111 ' 11 i 1-' [28 ] therefore be fiippofed that we fliould ever fufier the French to make encroach- ments on us and not think of repelling them ? A miniftry might poflibly be fo tame fpirited ; but it is to be hoped that the voice of the nation would be too loud to be eafily filenced. By reafon of the ablblute government of France the French Eaft-India company would be mere commiflaries appointed by the French miniftry, and confcquently their ends would lirft be anfwered. In (hort, this nation has fuffered far too much by fuch means to leave the decifion of any points whatever to companies or commiflaries •, if we have an inclination to give our enemies an opportunity of beginning a new war in a few years, with an appearance of juftice, we cannot take a more effedlual ftep to bring about fuch a defign. I have now gone through the moft important articles of the feveral memorials which pafled between the two courts * j I have endeavoured to prove, not from prejudice, (below the charader of a Briton) or declamation, but by fails and cool argument, that had a peace been concluded, on the terms offered by our patriot minifter, it would have proved an extreme bad one -, and been attended with many of thofe bad confequences which we have fo lately experienced, relulting from former treaties. I have Ihewn (or aimed at it at leaft) that the objed of the prefent war was the fecurity of our American colonies j and that this end would not have been anfwered •, by leaving the limits of Louifiana and our fet- tlements undetermined ; that we Ihould not have kept a reafonable indemnifi- cation for our immenfe expences, as we ofl^ered to reftore the French a fliare in the Newfoundland fifhery, and Guardaloupe, ^c. and that in confequence of thefe two points the peace muft have been very bad. I have further endea- voured to prove, that fuch a peace muft have endangered Great-Britain, from the fentiments of our Minifter himfelf, by negledting the evacuation of the Low- Countries by the French troops. And, laftly, that the affairs of the Eaft-Indies would neceffarily have been left in fuch a doubtful manner, that the French at any time might make it the reafon of entering into a new, and perhaps to appearance, juft war. And I may add that the negotiation was carried on upon a principle which will at any time prevent our having a tolerable peace, that of connecting German difputes with the immediate ones of France and England. — If thefe afTertions are founded in fads, as I fiatter myfclf the reader will find they are, furely we may reafonably conclude that all the conquefts which we made under the adminiftration of the late Minifter, would not near balance the mifchiefs and fatal confequences that muft inevitably have attended fuch a dif- advantageous peace. * I have taken no notice of the Spanifh Memorial, as the affair was dropped by the French, but our Minifter, in refpeft to his anAver, behaved with honottr and refoliition. And make encroach- glit poflibly be latioti would be ment of France 'pointed by the vered. In fhort, decifion of any clination to give r years, with an ring about fuch veral memorials )rove, not from )ut by fads and I offered by our en attended with need, relulting hat the objed 1 that this end ma and our fet- aile indemnifi- ^'rench a fliare Gonfequence of further endea- ritain, from the of the Low- the Eaft-Indies 'at the French nd perhaps to irried on upon peace, that of d England. — ader will find -fts which we :ar balance the ed fuch a dif- the French, but And [ 29] And now who ran reHeLl on the popularity of a man that was fo near being fatal to the intereils of his country, without amazement at the infatuaf'on of a deluded people ? What opinion ought Britons to entertain of a miniller ho in- volved his country in exp:ti:-cs unknown before his adminiftration ; who run his couniry above fourllore millions in debt, to dig a grave tor Britilh foldiers in the deferts of German V. \Vh..t other end would have been aniwered by thofe immenfe cxpenccs, had a p?ace beon concluded on thefe terms ? Surety this nation ought at lead to conlidcr the merits of a man who is a candidate for their favour before they pronounce pofitively f;)r him. We were blefled, it is true, under our late Mi- nifter's adminiitration, with many glorious conquefts j and for the lliare he had in thcfe events we owe him great prailc j but is that faying that this Minifter can ne- ver do any thing to forfeit our good opinion ? Had he concluded a peace on the terms I have mentioned (and it is plain he would have done it) he ought juftly to be confidered in the very contrary light from what he was before. I have already anfwered the objedion that might be made to my argument from the French court's refufipg thefe terms, and lliewn that they never thought of making peace, but only of penetratinp; into the fecrets of our cabinet, to difcover what hopes they had of procuring better terms than thefe. And we can make little doubt but that their end is anfwered, and that they will be able to make a moft excellent peace, for themfelves, now they have found out the principles on which we fliall negotiate. What advantage can we poffibly expcft from a treaty that is at once to comprehend the intereils of Germany and Great-Britain ? But I ihall not trouble the reader with entering further into any refledions on a fUbjed which cannot be confidered without difgufl: •, 1 fhall only obferve that we ought not to be fo extravagant in our praife of a IVliniiler, who now has fully convinced the unprejudiced that he no longer deferves our good opinion ; that we have no reafon to regret his removal from the adminiftration of affairs, if l^ would have }:ad the concluding of a peace. We have for feveral years condemned the minifters who formed the treaties of Utrecht and 7\ix, but we give loud ac- ckmations of praife to our late patriot for his negotiations-, although tlx-re is not a fingle fault to be found in rh: former treaties, but parallel ones will ar. . (pear in the latter. Pray God of his infinite mercy to grant common fenfe to the people of England I A P P E N- '^\-. J-^" C 30 ] APPENDIX. Numb. I. As I founded part of my argument on the quick renovation of the naval ftrength of France after the late war, I Ihall here prefent the reader with a genuine lift of the French navy, as it was in the year 1755, only fix years after the peace of Aix, by which it will appear how foon their naval power was reftored. N" Ships Names I Royal Louis Ocean D. de Bourgogne Formidable 5 Foudroyant Solcil Royale Tonant Orient Algonquin 10 Bien Aime Centaur Conquerant Courageux Couronne 15 Defenfeur Diademe Entrepenant Experience Floriflant 20 Glorieux Guerriere Guns Where built 120 Rochfort 84 80 Breft 80 80 Toulon 80 Breft 80 Toulon 80 74 Canada 74 74 Toulon 74 Toulon 74 Breft 74 Rochfort 74 Breft 74 Toulon 74 Breft 74 74 74 74 Toulon Age ^75t ^750 '749 >743 ^753 ^75^ 1746 1743 1749 '754 ^756 1754 »752 ^750 Heftor N« as 30 35 40 45 50 55 Ships Name* Heflor Heros Intrcpide Magnitique Minotaur Palmier Protedleur Prudent Redoubtable Robufte Sceptre Souveraine Superbe Temmeraire Thefee La Vainqueur La Fortune Zodiaque Dauphine Royal Ferme Jufte Achilles Active Alcide Altia St. Anne C. de Provence Belliqueux Bienfaifant Bertine Bizarre Brilliant Capricieux Celebre Content Dragon L' Harlaem Eveille [ 3' ] Gun* 7+ 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 64 64 74 70 70 70 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 Where built Rochfort Breft Toulon Breft Breft 175* 1747 «749 1752 Rochfort Toulon J754 1750 Breft Toulon Breft Toulon Breft 1747 1756 1759 Breft Toulon Rochfort Toulon Breft 1735 1722 1724 1747 Toulon Genoa Toulon Breft 1760 Rochfort Toulon Toulon Breft ^753 1747 Rochfort 1752 Fontafque \ [ 3« ] 65 N« Ship* Name* 60 Fontafque Ihrdi Hercules Illuflre Inflexible Lion Lys Motlefte Northumberland St. Louis yo Opiniiitrc Orphee Prothee Railbnable Sage 75 Solide Solitaire Sphinx Triton Vaillaint 80 D. d'Orleans Vengeur Verge du Eofair Verge du S'. Leopard 85 St Michelle "Warwick L*Agile Alcion Amphion 90 Arc-en-ciel Fier Greenwich Himptain Orlflammc 95 Sagitaire Aquilon Juno Guns Where built 64 Toulon '64 Toulon 64 Brell 64 Brell 64 RochforL 64 Toulon H Brelt 64 Toulon 64 England 60 64 Breft 64 Toulon 64 Breft 64 Breft 64 Toulon 64 Toulon 64 64 64 Toulon 64 Toulon 60 64 64 Genoa 64 Genoa 64 Toulon 60 Breft England 54 Rochfort 54 Toulon 56 Rochfort 50 54 Toulon 50 England 54 Toulon 54 Toulon Age «756 1748 '751 1746 1744 1750 >749 ^75^ ^7\7 1720 ^71"^ 1750 1724 1748 46 46 Toulon Havre de Grace »749 1748 1733 1748 BelleiHe N* Ships Name. Belleine Abcnakifc 100 Oanae Hcbc Outarde Sapticr 105 Aigrette Arethufe Begon Echo Favourite Felicite 110 Harmonic . . : Hermionfri ' Le Grand Malicieufe Baleine 115 Atalante Blonde - "■■ BoufTon •i . ' Brune -• '•'-' -^^ 'J Diane 120 Pr. Edward Hyene Ophale Veftale •: ■ , ' Zephire - 125 Amethift Marechaulc Bellone Cornette Concord 130 Fleur de Lys Licorne Mefiahce Pylade Pomone 135 Role C 33 1 ' I. i I '/•• I ■I ,m : .11 : [ i>ji 44 40 4*. 4* 40. 40. 3<5. 3^ 36 3^ 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 32 32 3a 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Whfre built St. Maloci Canada Age ^7j7 t;i .. .' V, ) Havre de Grace ' ' 1-4.8 Rochfort . ■' ' ^7^9 •< . V Toulon Havre de Grace ■jf:. Havre de Grace '■" Toulon ^* • Toulon ', /J . ■ I Toulon Bred Bred ^ Toulon Toulon Toulon 1741 l 1742 '744 1728 »754 ^7A-9 1749 ■ ^75-2 Sauvage [ 34 ] N» Ships Names GiUM Where built Af. Sauvage 3P Breft 'i ' Sericux 3^. Breft L. Surprize S9 « ■ [ ::i Sylphide 3^- : ■ i 140 Syren 39 * ■ \ Valeur 39 Due. de Choifeul 3744 Bien Aimc ' . '^^ 22 e Galatea 24 Breft '7?W- Gracieufe 24 Toulon '749 160 Heroine 24: Breft '744 Hirondelle 24 Toulon # • • Murine ^ v T^ 24. Breft • 1744 Terpfichore 44 / i / 1 1 -. J. Thetis 24 ■ . ■ 165 Topaze 24 Breft »750 Volage 24 Toulon Eclair 22 ' • ■'- -,'\ Girlande 2a ,. f ' .. ! / I M. de Morlaix 81 *■*. "■ *v '. 170 Maitre 22 Canada . ^ 174^ Nymphe . 22 Rochforc »750 Petit Cumberland 20 Breft Meflager 20 • Mignone C 35 J N" Ships Ntmes Guat Where built Mignone i/i J S'. wjio'-O ;:-^ , . . 175 Rhinocerat 20 Bellone 20^^ Riche ::: i6 ■■ Calypfo iS Bienfaifanc 18 180 Renomme 18 Chevere 16 Efcarbouclc '^ ' Oracle 16 Stork ^ 16 England 185 Turturrelle 16 Epreuve 14' D. d* Hanover 14 Amaranthe 14 Breft Anemone 12 Breft 190 Arc-cn-ceil 12 Breft Gigine 12 Courftoujours 12 Ecureuil 12 Hyacinth 12 195 Legrcc 12 Levrier 12 Peraminc 12 Penelope 12 Renoncle 12 200 Sardoine 12 Pie 10 Mahone 8 Agathe 6' Badaire 6 .aP5 Colombe 6 Roi dc Pruflc 6 Monita 4 . Breft Poftillion 4 Age 1747 F 2 Xebeques un N» Shi'fs Namei Indifcrete 210 Rcquin Rufe Char'. Roy'. Marie Loire ii5 Serenade Profond Themis Nafaptime Charanthe 220 SarceJle Ballime Chameau Elephant Hermione 225 Penelope Repulfe Le Gramont Hawke Virgin 230 Le Barclay Le Mercure Le Lutine Le Murine Le Seneftere Due. de Fronfac 236 Le Soleil Royal Xebeques or Store-Ships. Guns 24 24 18 60 50 40 40 22 12 10 6 6 6: 6. 4 25 26 26 14 10 20 10 36 24 24 20 24' Where buih Toulon Toulon Toulon Breft Rochfort Breft JEnglifh Prizes .1751 ^750 ^751 .1 :j ,\ i ;r eftimate The reader am will will Guns ^6^6 which at athoufand pounds a gun; (an give us the coft of a fhip fitted our) is 9, 656, 000/. after the year 1748 informed perceive that much the greateft 'part of this navy, lyas built Numb. I 37 1 9 ;o tn r. It Numb. 2. Paper on the rights of the two nations to Canada. TH E French were conftantly drove out of all parts of North-America by the Englifh, who firft difcovered and feized that whole continent. They were even driven out of Canada itfcif" in 1627, 1628, and 1629, and never had any right there (notwithftanding all the pains their commiflaries take, by many falfe aflertions to make out a title) till a right was given them by Charles I. by the treaty of St. Germain in 1632 j v/lio thereby only furrendered to them, tous ks lieux occupes en la nouvelle France^ &c. All the places occupied (or feized) in New France, Acadia, or Canada, by the fubjedts of his majeily of Great-Bri- tain. Now it appears from the accounts of Champiain, governor of the coun- try, and all othcr'> •, that the only places occupied^ feized orpoffejfed, in thofe coun- tries, eieher by t'lc French or Englifh at that time, were Port Royal and St. Sa- viours in Nova So)ci >, with Tadouflac and Quebec in Canada. The two firft of thefc places they j ttored to us by the treaty of Utrecht j and for the two laft they were to indemnify our fubjeds, meaning Sir David Kirk, the only lawful proprietor of tnem, to whom the kinji, had granted them, and from whom he could not take them without a valuable confideration, amounting to five thoufand pounds, which the French never paid, but (till owe ; as appears from a memorial of Sir Lewis Kirk and his brother, to king Charles II. after the reftoration, and many other accounts. By this treaty then the king gave up only thofe places^ and not the countries. For that reafon he confirmed his former grants of the country of Canada the very next year after the treaty of St. Germain, as appears from the faid memo- rial, the words of which are, " the king of England taking notice that akiio' the forts and caftles according to the league were delivered up into the pcireiBon of the French (efpecially fuch as had been ereded during their poiTeffion there- of) yet that his lubjeds were not to be excluded from trade or free commerce in thofe regions, that were firft difcovered and poflefled by his fubjeds, did, with, the advice of his council, by his letters patents dated May i ith 1633— —Grant unto Sir Lewis Kirk full privilege, not only of trade and commerce in the river Canada, (St. Lawrence, fo called) and places on either fide adjacent •, but alfo to plant colonies, and build forts and bulwarks, wherever they ftiould think fit." And not only fo, but the king and parliament that fame year 1633, rati- tified and confirmed to the fubjeds of Britain, five difrerent grants they had made both of Nova Scotia and Canada in the years 162 1, 25, 27, 28, and ^'^^ inftead of ceding thofe countries to the French— For thefe reafons Cromwell took took Nova Scoria from them in 1654, and maintained our right to it at the treaty of Weftniinftcr in 1655. And altho' they liad a right to Nova Scotia given them afterwards by the treaty of Breda, yet they never Iwd any to Canada nor any part of it, but the two places here mentioned. And if due enquiry is made, it Will appear that they have no juft right or title to any other part of North-America, unlefs we allow ufurpation and encroachment to be a right. For thefcreafons Queen Anne maintained in a manifefto in 171 1, her Juft, and in- conteftible rights to all North- America-"— ^except a part yielded to France -^^whicb was held in fief from the crown of Britain, and ought to revert to i t And the city of London, in the 2 2d article of their inftruftions to their reprelentatives in parliament, after the treaty of Utrecht, ordered that enquiry be made, why the French were left in pojfejfion of Canada ? There is a great change in affairs then in fo fhort a time as lince the treaty of Utrecht, if the French now claim twenty in twenty-five parts of all North- America, who then had only a right to thefe two places ; or at moft, no further than from the mouth of the river St. Law- rence to Montreal, with fome fmall claim they may have about Lake Superior perhaps.— —1 757. Numb. 3. Extras from A preliminary convention, propofed by France to Great-Britain, in 1 755. «* fTp H E fubjedls of his Moft Chriftian Majefty, and of his Britannic Ma- X jefty> ftiall evacuate all the country, fituated between the river ®hio and the mountains which form the limits of Virginia j and Ihall withdraw, that is to fay, the French beyond the faid river, and the Englilh to this fide the faid moun- tains ; fo that all the extent of ground which lies between the faid river and the faid mountains, ihall be confidered as a neutral country, during the whole time that this convention fhall laft j and all the conceflions, if there fliould be any fiKh made by either fide, on the faid territory, fliall be confidered as null and of none effeft *. * This is a parallel cafe to the article ofFered by Mr. Pitt concerning the intermediate Indians, between our colonies and Louifiana ; and fliews how confonant fuch an article would have been with the views of the French. Numb. k, l39l t: I \ Numb. 4. ^tr/iSfrom a metncrial delivered by tht duke de Mr^oix to the Britijh Mniftry 1755. Of the Limits of CANADA. TH E court of France has, in a decifive manner rejefled, and will always rcjefb the propolition which has been made by England ^ that the fouthern coafts of the river St. Lawrence, and the Lakes Ontario and Erie, fliould ferve as limits between the two nations* It muft be laid down as a bads for the nego- tiation in regard to this article, that the river St. Lawrence is the center of Ca- nada. This truth isjultified by juft titles, by eminent writers, and by poHeillon. •— ^All that France can agree to, after laying down this principle, which cannot admit of any reafoney fifli only on the Great Bank, for fuch fi(h as are cured without drying, as the Dutch do in their white herring fifliery in the open fea •, but have had the addrefs to obtain, that the ifland of Cape Breton fliould be yielded to them to fortify, and do what they pleafe with i where they have been long ftruggling to eftablifh another Dunkirk, to the ruin of the Britifh American commerce ; and where they carry on their dry fifliery as well as at Placentia. But as if this was not privilege enough fcr them, we have impoliticly granted them the liberty to refort to the very ijland of Newfoundland itfelf and ereSi flages^ &c. to cure and dry their fijh^ to the unfpeakabk detriment of our fifhery there. In the time of king Charles I. the French paid us a tribute for the liberty of curing and" drying fifli at Newfoundland, and we could deprive them of it when- ever we pleafed. Of late years they have not only ceafed to pay tribute, but, by their neighbourhood at Cape Breton, will oblige us to keep large garrifons as well at Nova Scotia as Newfoundland, if we will prevent our being furpri'zed •, where at Newfoundland they have the liberty of the fifliing feafon equally with us, from Cape Bonavifta northward to the northern point of the faid ifland, and by which they are alio become our rivals, in a very fine falmon fifliery there. The French are now be(iome fo much our competitors in this trade, and are encreafed to fuch a degree, that they employ yearly above five hundred fail of fliipping to carry on their fifliing on the Great Bank of Newfoundland, and on the coaft of that ifland ; that is in their wet and dry fifli : hereby they have not only fupplied themfelves with the fifli they formerly took from us, but furnifli many parts of t5pain and Italy therewith to our prodigious lofs." • Surely this paper proves the bad confequences of the article on this fubjeft in the Britifli Memorial ! Th fol] Numb. ma of C 41 ] Numb. 7. An ejlimate of the value of the Imports, &c. of our fugar coIohI^s. From the African traders in negroes. From Ireland in beef, pork, herrings, butter, ^c. - From our northern colonies, in horfes, lumber, fiih, bifcuit I flower, corn, ^c. *t From the Madeira traders in wine —_ . »_ From Great-Britain, diredly in goods and merchandize And they pay in Britain on their own produce, for duty, about For freight ■ —^ For commiflion^ brokerage, ^c. to fadors — — «-. 240, OOCl 100,000 -250,000 80, 000 400, 000 200, 000 275>ooo i95>ooo And the ballance of their produce (which produce has been-^ about 1,950,000/. as near as we can calculate) All cen- / ters in England, being for intereft of money, for expences V of abfentees refiding here, education of children, gover- 1 uors,' and other officers gover- 1 i> 740,000 210,000 Or 114, 000, 000 /. fince the reftpration. *> 950, 000 The value of the yearly trapfaftions in this circle of trade, may be computed follows : By the annual produce ■ ■ By their annual expences and charges — , By ballance centering in England as abovementioned By fugar and other produftions re-exported By returns made for the faid re-exported goods as J> 950*000 1,740,000 2 1 o, 000 600, 000 720, 000 5» 220,000 The laft two articles Great-Britain has loft to the French. Sure thefe efti- mates (hew how much our miniftry were to blame for offering to reftore the ifl^nd of Guardaloupe, when their fugar-trade io much exceeded ours, and when we fee the immenfe value of this important branch ! At the time when this calculation was made, the French re-exported to the amount of 1,000,000/. The difference of encouragement between the two nations, will be feen from the following Calculation of the yearly produce and expence of a great Barbadoes planter. Suppofe the planter pofTeilbd of 1000 Acres of land (with 5 wind-mills, and 3 works) at 20/. />^racre 500, Negroes at 30/. per head — — 200 Head of cattle, for work and dung at 10/. 40 Horfes for work and dung 20/. ■ . 20 Afles for Ditto at 40 i. •— — *i» 100 Sheep at 20 j. — 1 100 Hogs for Ditto at 12/. — — or 4 fugar \ The buildings together with coppen, ftills, worm-tubs*'} coolers, leaden cillerns, wind-mill-cafes, brafles, pots, f drips^, waggons, carts, and many other plantation uten- 1 fils may coft J The yearly produce, . Pots of fugar (at 60 ft. each) 7000 at 9 j. Rum and melaffes ^— — i— L to, 00a 15,000 2,000 800 40 zoo 60 3B, 000 12,000 50, 000 1,050 49?'0O iV. B. If the fugar be improved by claying, it is computed fuch «n eftate will clear to the planter 350/. over-and-above the 1000/. as under. So that the moft the planter gains from his eftate is 2/. 14J. per Cent. For looo/. on 50, 000/. is but 2 /. ftr Cent, and 1350 /. no more than 2 /, 14J. pr Cent, per Ann, The [43] The yearly expence. Sdlaries for managers, overfeers, drivers, workmen, bookkeeper, i town agents, doftors^ farriers, &c. . \ 60 Barrets of beef and pork — - — . «— , 60 Hogfheads of rcfiife filh or herrings — _. Flour, bread, and bacon •>— i«i . .^ Cloaths for 500 negroes at 6s per head — — — .^ Oats, beans, and corn »-— , _^ Carpenters, fmiths, pi^qnj, plumbers, brafiers, wheelwrights Charges for the militia >---- ..p— ^-^ Supply of utenfils ■ ■ --^^ ...^.^ Supply of negroes -^— — — .i Ditto of cattle — «~ -^-^ .^^ Ditto of horfes — — m^ ..^ ... Ditto of afles M-i^ - -^ . ^^ Bfillance to the planter ffft c 500 100 150 300 200 159 129 189 700 I20 1 60 20 3>209 4,209 C^^ulation of the yearly produce and expence of a great French fugar planner, oh rich and rrelh lands. ' Suppofe him poflefled of, lOQo Acres of )and, the charges of taking it up, (^c, we will I iay may come to I 200 Negroes at 30/. — — — — — 100 Head of cattle (for work and bread) at 30 j. . -rr- Horfes and mules r— -■— ■ -— Sheep, hogs, ^c. will niore than anfwer the charges of keeping Y by their encreafc j Building impletpenfs, andutei^fils ^ ^}1 for^s -r* r- £' 150 6,000 150 200 2,000 8,500 The (44] »'. •\ The yearly produce. Pounds of.Mofcovado fugar, 420)00o at &j. />^ hundred Gallons of rum. and melalTes 21,000 (which is 5 for every ^ hundred weight of fugar) rum at Bd. melaflles at ^d, per> gallon ', the medium at 6 d. per gallon, comes to .-.]• lI., j t,68o 2,205 iV. i5. It appears fromthis calculation, that the French planter gains a ballanbe of 1, 555 /. perJmum. by laying out 8, 500/. which is intereft for his money at the rate of 18/. 5 s. lod. fer Cent, per Anhum. Formerly when the Englifh planter had th'e^ike advantages, he gained 20 per C^/i/rand then could well iaffbrd to allow 15 per Cent, ihtefeft. '^'- ' . ' (' : i - » , - • ~ - t. , '^'^ I '"i i '. Iqnt.'* <• » ' The7early expence.- - : .dx.:* 'lo ojjif { Salaries to managers- - — - — Salt provifions, hte^.^ pork, fifli, 6fr. Cloaths for 200 negroes, at loj. per head Timbter and rl^atierials for rep'&irs •-- "Worktnanfhip ■ -_— Sujpply of utenfils — — Negroes (nothing) -," ' . qattje (npthing) - ,,..., .. • . .. Horfes ahd mules '-— • , , Expences that may be omitted rr\,. c: •:• - . * 'f • ? "N ;ii. fiJil :.0 Ballance tp planter — — .: • t^ . -> „ •^ -^ . * -> t - 4 , ■ - • J i .■ C 1''^ : . ■ . J . . . . . i'l .'. . ..J ? 159 160 100 40 50 '40- ■ 650 ' 'i,205 «-.•' ' ' * • 'f- AV5. That Franceli'as tranfported-her people to her fugar colonies, and given them a year's provifions apdlairtd for nothing •, that on Hlfpaniola cattle are bought for four, fivei or fix pieces of eight ; that timber and ' frefli provifions being raifed on their own lands leiTens the expence ; that negroes not being over worked, theyencreal^,' rather' than dccrCafe, and (b'do the cattle, &c, 'Hiavy ^juriicles thefe againji our fugar ijlands ! FINIS. -/ 7^