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RAYMOND. mmm 1 i^ N 1 LETTER. ^ Dear Sir, I I^^^^Ih^'^ have received your l^veral S I C ^"^po^tui^^t^ Letters for News, i^^n^ ^^^'^ ^'''' ^^^^ "'' ^ promifed i to write, if any Thing mate- rial happened. You might have concluded I from my Silence that nothing material has happened. I wifh it were in my Power to gratify you at a lefs Expence than Truths \)\^t I cannot create Fads, and mufl beg B your ( 2) your Patience ; for you may reft affured, that nothing is known to have been done fince the Prorogation of Parliament, ex- cept what you have read in the Papers, and you may poflibly find Reafon to make fome Dedudion from the Intelligence you draw from thence. You will charge me with imitating my Betters in an alfed:ed Ignorance -, but, be- lieve me, I am not one of thofe who wifli to be accounted wife, for faying no- thing ', and, I will venture to fay, that there are fome of thofe Betters who are as totally ignorant as myfelf. 1 There arc different Speculations upon the Reafons of this Secrefy. Some are fanguine in their Hopes, that it promifes the Deftrud:ion of our Enemies ; others, perhaps from the fame good Principles, appre- { 3: )': apprehend} that it threatens what I will not name. The PubUc has been alarmed, for fe- veral Years paft, with Apprchenlions, I know not how well grounded, that cer- tain Men are admitted to an exclufive Confidence where they ought not, in Juf- tice to the Public, to be trufted at all. Whatever Foundation there may be for this Suggellion, another Rumour is faid to be undoubtedly true, that there are Men, who from their Rank, the' - Office, their Virtues, and their Abilities, are fup- pofed to be privy to every National Mea- furc, but who are treated as fufpedled Charadlers, with Coldnefs and Diffidence, or as the mere Inftrumenta of fome In- vifible Directors of the Machine, \vith In- folence and Negle(^. B 2 If m (4) If you have heard of this, for the Na- . tion has heard it, what can you expcdl from a private Man, but a dead Silence upon Public Affairs ; a Silence, not fo much founded in an abjedl implicit Sub- miflion, as in the Public-fpirited Doubts and Fears of a Well-wiflier to his Country ? But, it is poflible, that this Ignorance, which very conliderable men profefs, is not the Effedl of any uncommon Secrefy, but of an uncommon Inanity, a total SuC- penfion of Meafures and Councils. The Body may be fo disjointed, that HO Member can do its Office ; and, what at other Times is thought to demand the United Care and Attention of the Wifeil Hands, may be now left to the Operation of Chance. There may be an Inactivity, which naturally can produce Nothing, but from m m li^io^:: T I (5 ) from which, through the mere Intcrpo- fition of Chance, fome Event or other, good, bad, or indifferent, may poffiblj arife. You have heard of a whimfical Set of Phiiofophers, who attributed the whole Creation to a fortuitous Concourfe of A- toms. The Whim has been exploded. But, you will hardly believe it, the Atomic Philofophy is crept into Politics ; and, as it was refuted before, upon th« fulleft Evidence of Wifdorn and Defign, fo it is now demonftrated, in this new Sphere, by as full undoubted Evidence, of the Want of Wifdom and Defign, of the Want of a Syflem, and of the Want of any Meafures that can pretend to the leaft Appearance of a Syftem. You will fay that this is News indeed, and very Alarming too. If a meer No- thing ( 6) tiling will Alarm you, I can make your Blood run cold with the NothingnefSy which is faid to have prevailed for fome Time pall:, with the Difunion, the Fears, the mutual Diftruft, and confequently the Stagnation of Thought, Defign, or Refolution within Doors ; which muft, ia the Endj efFedl a proportionable Inadtion without. 1. I can grant you, confiftently with the Views of Things, all the Merits of our Fleet, and all that has been done, during this middle State, between War and Peace, by the lUuilrious Ferfon who fu- perintends it. ■^ •i But we have an Enemy to grapple with, who will laugh at mere Force. Council is the lading Safeguard of a Nation. There is a Time in which Force will evaporate in Sound, but Wifdom outlives it, fe ( 7 ) It, and fupplies the Decay or the Impcr- fcdion of Power. %: • It is by Wifdom and Council that Natt- 6ns acquire a Superiority over each other. A Wife Adminiftration will furprizingly increafe the Force of Steel and Gunpow- der. A Memorial, from fuch an Admi- niftration, may fometimes be equivalent to an Armament 5 for Wifdom, whether National or Perfonal, will be refpeded, even when it is not in a Pofturc to enforce Refpedt, by external Terrors. •* But the Cafe is far othcrwife with a Weak, Unfettled, Disjointed, and Unde- ligning A'dminiilration. It will confift of Men, who are either too R a ili to be Re- verenced, or too Timorous to be Feared ; of Men whofe Timidity will put them upon concealing Early Intelligence of the Defigns of an Enemy, and whofe Rafh- nefs F ( 8) ncfs will plunge them into Ruinous Mea- fures, as foon as thofe Dciigns break out into Adtion j of Men, whofe Memorials will be as Light, and as Little regarded, as the Paper upon which they are deli- vered; for an impotent Remonftrance can be of no more Value than the Paper that iS wafled upon it. I need not afk you, which of the two you would chufe to oppofe to French Councils ; and, I will not anfwer, if you fhould afk me, which of the two we have at prefect the Happinefs, or the Misfor- tune, to be influenced by ? I can truly make one Declaration, and have Millions to fupport me in it, that wc have more Virtues upon the Throne, than ever filled it in any Period of our Hiftory. .«. m ■^i "» 3 U It is not doing Juftice to his Majefty to fay he Can do no Wrong in a Legal Senfe, i ^ 1 >' (9 ) Senfc, for he has Shewn throughout hit Reign, that he can do no Wrong in any Senfe. Wc have the Experience of near thirty Years, upon which to ground the moft perfe6t Confidence in Him ; and, were it poflible, for the executive Part of Govern- ment to be adminiftered folely by Him, his Enemies, both Foreign and Domeftic, would feel the Weight of His Charad:er, and be put to Confufion. But whilft there are Perfons, who pub- licly Profefs themfelves Miniflers, whilft One confiders every Objedion to a Mea- fure, as a Perfonal Attack upon Himfelf j and another by circular Letters notifies, that he is appointed, to take upon himfclf the Condud: of a moft refpedable Afi^em- bly, His Majefty cannot be even remote- ly glanced at, in any Obfervations upon C what ( lO ) what is done by thefe ProfeiTed EnterpH- zers. . But I need not guard myfelf to you, who know that my Life and Fortune are devoted to the Houfe of Hanover^ and that, if ever I cenfure the Condudl of Public Perfons, it is at a Time, when I apprehend the Interefts of the Proteftant Eftablifliment, in that Ilkiftrious Houfe, to be affected. I mention this particularly, becaufe a Zeal for that Ellablllhment is become, fmce the Accellion of the prefent Royal Family to the Throne, the great Criterion of an Honeft Adminiftration, as well as of an Honeft Oppofition. A Minifter, who has any Thing more at Heart, than the Support of the Con- •ftitution, will deviate into fuch Inconfiften- cies cies of Condudl, as will render his Fide- lity Sufpicious. He will, perhaps inad- vertently, refign hio^felf to Men, whofe Principles he takes Pains to Difavow, and thus he may almoft as effedtually betray his Triift, as if he opened one of the Ports of the Kingdom for the Reception of the Abdicated Family. '■'' '.•^» ' 1 For fuch a Condud not only facilitates the Caufe of that Family, but weakens the Caufe of the Prince, in whofe Service he is Retained, by rendering it difficult for any Ally to treat with Confidence, where he finds neither Syftem, nor Princi- ple, upon which to ground a Confidence. But if Silence and Inadivity be all my Complaint, it will be faid there is at leail no pofidve Harm done, and though an efFedual Adminiftration fliouid not have been formed, a good Subjed ought to be C 2 peaceable ( 12 ) peaceable and Contented, till he feels fomc Mifchief arifing from the Chaos, in which he Suppofes his Rulers to be involved. ^1 I grant it, but am not without Apology for my Difcontent. If Menenius Agrippa "was now alive, he would invert his Fable ; and, inftead of Shewing the evil Confe- quence of a War, declared by the feveral Members of the Body, againfl the Belly, he would fhew, how dangerous it is, for the Belly to claim and retain all the Nutriment to itfelf, in negledt not only of the Seve- ral Members, but even of the Head. .1 I fc It is impofiible to keep up the Attach- ment of a whole Nation to the wifefl and happieft Conftitution, unlefs the Value of it appear to be underflood by thofe, who undcrrake to preferve it j and unlefs the fame be ccnftantly inculcated, not only by Words and Profeflions, but by the Union ( M ) Union of Such Men, and the Profecution of fuch Meafures, as the Enemies of that Conftitiition dread. &' But if One Man, regardlefs of Confe- quences, will affume to himfelf more than he can execute, and rather than betray his Impotency to thofe, who can mofl ef- fectually afTift him, will leave the Nation in as helplefs a Condition as Himfelf; and if Another, merely for the Sake of fome Acceflion of Power, will give up his own Opinion, his Friends, and in the End his Country, what will the Public conclude, but that both thofe Men think no Price too great, to aggrandize themfelves, and think the leafl Part of their Power too great a Sacrifice for the Prefervation of the Con# flitution, or the Support of their Mafler. They will confequently, in Time, ftand alone. None but Mercenaries, and thofe very ( M) very dearly purchafed, will join them. They will be at a lofs what Meafures to take, for Every Meafure of theirs will be fufpedled of a fhiiiler Defign ; and, in the Midft of their Fear and Confufion, they will think Millions fcjuandered in Sub- sidies, a Bagatelle, if they can but Shelter thernfelves from t^.e Union which they dread, of Honeft Heads and Hearts, againfl Them and Their Defign^. Indeed, my Friend, my Heart is fo full, that I am led infeniibly to the obnoxi- ous Point, upon which you defire Infor- mation, and which it was my Intention to have evaded, as the Coniideration of it will foon be taken up, by abler Hands, in a more proper Place. However your Anxiety upon the Subjedl obliges me to Some Anfwer. i4-* M You ( 15) You Willi to know the Grounds of the prevailing Rumours concerning Subfidies. I have been confidently afTured, that the Fad is undoubted, io far as it refpedrs the RtiJJians and Hejjiam at leaft. But the Rdafons I have for difbelieving it, are not yet overpowered by Sufficient Evi- dence, that fuch a Meafure hath been either Advised or Adopted. You If \t be undoubtedly true, we mull leave it to the Confideration of thofe, to whom we have intrufted all that is Dear and Valuable to us, as Britons. But till by fome more authentic Advices, than any I have yet met with, the Certainty of it is out of Difput«, it becomes us to quiet the Minds of our anxious Friends, by {hewing, that, the Rumour is to the higheft Degree Improbable. The liH - ( »6 ) The French have hitherto committed no Hoftilities, but in America, Their En- croachments there were many Months, if not many Years, antecedent to our Oppofi- tion to them j and might, as I am cre- dibly informed, have been amicably checked before a fingle Subjedt of His Majeily could be truly faid to be molefled; for tho' the Forts they built were a diredt Violation even of the Peace of Utrecht y yet they were built at a conliderable Diftance from the habi- table Part of the Britifi Dominions. 4 An EngUPjman fliould blufli to Confefs how long the Fort on the Eaji of the Falls of Niagara has been built. It was fo manifeflly ereded upon the Britlfi Ter- ritory, that is in the Country of the Iro- quoiSy that the only poflible Claim our Enemies can make to it, is a moft Dif- graceful one to us, I mean the Claim of Profcription. An ( 17 ) 4 An Encroachment like this, with a Port to defend it, muft have been either noC conlidered at all, or confidered as an Na- tional Ad: of Defiance, by thofc who re- ceived the Intelligence, It may indeed be fo long ago, that no Perfon now liv- ing may think himfelf rcfponfible for it. If this fhould be pleaded., the Apology will only pave the Way for another In- quiry, not fo eafily evaded. In whofe Adminiflration was Crown Point built ? Upon whofe Ground ? And upon what Pretenfions ? What were the Views of the French in Building it ? And what Obftrudion was given on Our Part to the Execution of their Plan in this as well ■ as the other Forts, which command the Lakes Erie, and Ontario, and the River Ohio. D If ( i8 ) If this Defiance of us, in, I had almoft faid the moft: important Part of the Briti/h Dominions, preceded the laft War, it will be natural to enquire what Notice of it was taken in the lafl Peace ? If His Majeily's Plenipotentiaries receiv- ed no Inflrudion on that Head, it fhould be owing to the Want of Intelligence ; for it is hardly credible, that repeated Re- monftrances have been tranfmitted from the Colonies to a certain Office, and from thence to a Superior Office j and that thofe Remonftrances have been either Deftroyed, or left in the latter Office, fometimes un- opened, always negled:ed, and if they ftill fubfift, may be confulted, if not too much obliterated by Duft, as original Records of the mofl indefenfible Security, or Negli- gence. r In ( »9) In the mean Time the French^ whof* Policy I am forry to Commend, have adted upon one regular Syftem, from the Treaty of Utrecht to the prcfent Time. No Change of Adminiflration hath in the leaft varied the Syftem. The Increafe of their Terri- tory, and the Diminution of our Power in America was the Objedl, Every Mea- fure taken in that Part of the World hath contributed to the Profccution of this End; and, it is not unfeafonable to utter fo Me- lancholy a Truth, we Ourfelves have been no fmall Contributers. Their Hoftilities were commenced be- fore the War, and have been uniformly carried on fince the Peace. We neither availed ourfclves of the War to difpoflefs them of our Property ; nor, when we were negotiating a Peace, do we appear to have paid any Regard to a Point of the laft Importance, which may involve us, fjoner D 2 tham than we apprehend, in extreme Diftrefs ; nor, lince the Conclufion of the Peace, have we, till very lately, manifefted the leaft Spark of that Jealoufy, wi.h which Nations, as well as Individuals, fliould, watch, and alTert their Rights. His Majcfly, our best Prote'f Jm M (23) a^ We were on the Brink of Ruin when all Sides met at Aix-la-Chaffelle, and, like li* tigious Men, gave up their refpedtive Claims, becaufe the Fund for the Conteft was exhaufted. Our Share of the Expence was fuch, as this Nation cannot fupport, without greater Refources, than it is hi- therto known to have. We • ft-'- f We may pofTibly be diflrefled foi Ways and Means to raife two Millions yearly, befides doubling the Land-Tax, the Naval War alone will demand thof» Sums at lealt. If it be at all difficult to raife a Supply for the only War, in which we have a Chance of Succefs, will you be- lieve, that a Continent War, which the laft Time we engaged in it was unfucccfsful, tho' the Expence amounted at Length to eleven Millions in oneYear, fhould now be £0 far premeditated, that the bare Prelude «f r ( M ) of it, before any War at all is begun, ihould amount to a luoil exorbitant Part of the Expence ? Our fellow Subjeds in America have fhewn us, where to encounter the Enemy, and what Hands are fit for the Work. Their Courage and the Succefs of it, have pointed out to us the Spot, upon which we may gain by Vidlory ; for a Vid:ory there, ftrikes at the Root of the War, by Diipof- fcfiing the French of their Ulurpation's. . The Diftrefs, which drove us as wdl a& our Enemies into the laft Peace, did a^iply Convince us, that our Wealth is not Inex- hauftible ; and I fhould dread the Anfwer, were it to. be afked, where fhall this new Continent War begin ? I very much fear the Anfwer would be, where we left off, at Aix-la-Chapelle, If fo, how much Richer is this Kingdom, than it was at that Pe- riod ? Or rather, how much lefs Poor ? What # ■:m % ''rp m X m k 1 ( ^5) What Alliances have been contracted in the intermediate Space, upon which to depend for Aliiflance ? For fubfidy Trea- ties arc as foreign to Alliances, as merce- nary Contradls and Engagements are, to the difmtercfled Union of honourable Friend- ihip. If a War upon the Continent was fo intolerable a Burthen, that all Friends to their Country united in Acclamations of Joy for the Peace ; if fince the Peace, we have not yet been enabled to reduce more than a fortieth Part of the national Debt } and if w^e muft become Debtors again for that Sum immediately, even tho' we fhould efcape paying fublidy Mo- ney, and exert none but our natural Strength, hotv ihall we fupport a Nec^f- fary, but Expensive War, upon the Con- tinent of Amerkay conitftently with aa unnecelTary, but inevitably ruinous one ii^i the Netherlands, £ Thefe ( 26) Theff mufl be the Schemes of feme great comprehenlive Minds, too enlarged to confine their Views within the narrow Space of a Closet, That the Neglects complained of fhould be imputable to men ; who Ignorant of the Geography or the Hiftory of the World ; regardlefs of the Interefts of their Mailer, or the Complaints of their Fellow-Subjedts, extend their Thoughts no farther, than that Clo- set, is much more Natural and Credible, ».'; '^M m m Their are Empirics in all Profeffions. Ignorance, and Rafhnefs are as much their Charadteriftics in Politics, as in Phyfic. But I cannot conceive the Exiftence of fuch Empirics as an Adviser, and an Adopter of a Meafure like this. I cannot imagine any Man to have Weight enough to give, or to Adopt the Advice, who is regardlefs Enough of his Charafter, to avow the Meafure; ( 27 ) Meafure ; and the Nation that refigns itfelf Chearfully, to fo defperate an Operation, is of all Valetudinarians the Weakefl. m'l :iS¥-' t«f /;■■: M my Mi' m hi I have heard of unaccountable Things done by Perfons in Health, to prevent a Sicknefs -, and of Phyficians, vv^ho rather than forfeit the good Opinion of a Patient, have humoured him, in an unwarrantable Prefcription. But I never heard an Inftance of a Phy- llcian bold enough, upon the Eruption of a Pimple, to order his Patient to be blifler- ed, cupped, and blooded; and, after all the other Evacuations, to be left with the perpetual Drain of a Dozen IfTues. The Powers of the College might not be fufficient to reftrain and punifh fo Dan- gerous a Pradtitioner. He might find an Apothecary, who, upon feeing his Ac- E 2 count ■i I '.■'. ( 28 ) count in the Prefcription, might have the EiFron*- :y to Adopt it, and to talk, even unlike an Apothecary, when he flands up in Support of his Dodlor. But two fuch Men, if left to themfelves, would Depopulate a Kingdom, in much lefs Time, than a vidlorious Army could' conquer it. Their Succefs would in Time create in themfelves an Opinion, that the Fradlice was Right 5 and if they fhouid receive a Negative Prote(^lion, from the Si- lence of their Enemies, they would repre- fent all thofe Enemies, as Enemies to Man- kind. The Opponents of this Meafure have been already reprefented, as Enemies to the Whig Caufe, by Perfons, to whom that Caufe has very ilender Obligations. But the Charge is received with a due Contempt. True Whigs will for ever oppofe the Encroachments of France, and chearfully fupport a Necessary War on the ( 29) the Continent. But it is burlefquing the Example of our Whig Anceftors to urge it, as a Motive to an Unnecessary Con- tinent War i and to a preparatory Expence, fo very Extravagant, as will abfolutely DiiP- able us from engaging in fuch a War, if it fliould become needful. But there is another View, in which this Meafure is confidered, and which to do Jullice to it, fliould not be pafled over. It is called a Meafure of Diversion. Our Intereft we are told, is to withdraw the Attention of the Enemy from the Sea, and from our Colonies j and this Meafure will moft eiFedtually Anfwer the End. The Plea would be a very fpecious one, were not the Means manifeftly Deftruc- tive, even of the End itfelf. For the Diverfion would be fo immenfely Expen* five. ( 30 ) five, that any Succefs at Sea, and the Conqueft of all the French PofTeffions in America^ would not be equivalent to the Expence fuftained, I mean by this Na- tion, in its prefent Circumflances of Debts and Credit. The mere Chance of Safety can never be worth purchafing, at the Price of cer- tain inevitable Ruin. And how comes it to paf^, if the Prevention of thefe Encroach- ments was not worth a Memorial, that the mere Chance of recovering our Ter- ritory, by the Diverfion of the Enemy, fhould be eflimated at an infinitely greater Sum, than the beft and wifefl Conduc- tors will know how to raife ? >■ »3.' Can we fuppofe Men, whofe Timidity or Negligence has been fo Notorious, in the Progrefs of thefe American Encroach- ments, to rufh fo fuddenly into the contrary Extreme ? I can ( 31 ) I can eafily imagine a timorous Man to obferve no Proportion, in the Means he chufes for his Safety ? I can imagine him iirll to hide himfelf from the Dan- ger, and upon the nearer Approach of it, to employ a Train of Artillery, in the Deftrudlion of a Rat. ■m y n e n Put that this fame timorous Man (hould c^A\ it diverting an Enemy at a Diftance, to bring him nearer Home ; fo near that 'cven his Domeftics may be feat out to Encounter him, and that his very Spits may be converted into Swords, whilft his Cooks and Parafites are fighting Profocis ; this is an Inconfiftency of Condu(5t, and Character, which I cannot imagine, even amidft all th^ new Men, and new Events, which the World is continually exhibit- ing. I have ( 32) 1 have indeed heard credulous Men, who are apt to fwallow more than they can Digeft, take the Fadl for granted, and Reafon upon it, in a Manner, which provoked my Indignation, even more than the Fadt itfelf. I have heard them call it the Meafure of a Perfon, whofe Name is profaned by the Mention of him, as the Patron of fo unpopular a Condudlk It is Invidious to deliver an Opinion, how it may become Great-Britain to ad, if HisMajefty*s Eledloral Dominions fhould be invaded. Were I obliged to anfwer the Queftion, I fhould give the Anfwer of a Loyal Grateful Subjedt, that even in that Cafe, his Majefly deferves any Thing he can demand from his People. p But let me at the fame Time fpeak the Language of an Englijhman, I would rathef the ^vhole Empire were covered with m w i ( 33 ) with tlic Arms of France ^ than the Af- fedions of my Countrymen alienated from the prefent King, and his Royal Defccn- dents, or his Britijh Power weakened, by the Ruin of his Britijh Subjedls. We have fuch undeniable Evidence of the Magnanimity of our prefent Sove- reign, that whoever has the Courage to fpeak this Language, may reft alTured of his Approbation. If we could fuppofe the Queftion to be humbly propofed to his Majeiiy, whe- ther he would chufe to give ap Greats Britain^ for the Prefervation of Hanover ? his Anfwer would infallibly be Negative, and would rejoice every HeJ»Tt in thefe Kingdoms, except only thofe defperate Men, who are ftriving fo officioufly to Out-Hanover each other. M I ( 34-) If fuch would be the Anfwrr to one Queftion, which Co very few have the Courage to propofc, it may not be too prefumptuous to form, or anticipate the Anfwer to another ; whether His Majefty would chufe to give up the Happinefs or Welfare of Greaf-Bntain^ without the Benefit of fecu.ing Hanover? And ihe latter might much more probably fol- low from a Continent War, than the former. f There are fon^e Advocates, among the Few, that have hired out their Talents to thefe imaginary Sublldies, who claim die Protedtion of Hanover^ as Matter of national Juilice, on the Part of Great- Britain^ upon this Plea j tliat the Danger apprehended to thofe Dominions arifes only from the Rupture betwixt us and Frame. m> If nPH nm ^ 1 (35) e If we are obliged to fuccour hisMa- jefly's Electoral Dominions, it is either becaufe they are fubje6t to the fame Prince, or becaufe we are in general obliged to indemnify every State, which fuffers Lofs, or Inconvenience, by the Courfe of the War. If the former be in- fixed on, it will be found, upon Inquiry, to be an Obligation of Personal Grati- tude, rather than Justice. When it is founded on this Motive, very few good Subjects would be rigid enough to dif- pute the Clairm with the prefent King. But the Dominions are too diflind fiom Great-Britain^ in every Senfc, to fupport a Demand of national Juftice, upon the fingle Principle of His Majefty's being the Sovereign of Both. !■ 'I If the other be the ^lea, that Juftice obliges ub to indemnify thofe States, who F 2 fuiler Iff { 36 ) fufFer in the Courfe of the War j then the Demand is equally Obligatory upon France i and Hanover can be only one Claimant amongft a Multitude, and will hardly receive fuch Support from the Law of Nations, as will Authorize her to Ex- haufl our Treafure, in the Pay of Merce- naries for her Defence. u. N^ But It is probable after all, whatever their Deflination may be, that Hanover may receive no more Benefit from thcfe Mercenaries, from the Ruffians at leafl, than Great-Britain^ or Ireland, They may meet with infuperable Difficulties in their March 5 and may poflibly enter fome C'>untries in Germany^ which might be at a Lofs to fubfift an Army of Seventy Thiee Thoufand Men. Ir wm ( 37 ) It will moreover, independently of all thefe Confiderations, be naturally afked by a free Briton, if this Meafure were taken. Why was it not propofed to Par- liament laft Winter ? It was certainly meditated then, unlefs the Advifer of it would afTume more Precipitancy, than even his Enemies lay to his Charge. »£, If it was meditated then, would it not have appeared in a much more favour- able Light, with the Authority of a pre- vious Concurrence of Parliament; or is it not rather a flrong Argument againll the Probability of fuch a Meafure, that a Whig Minillry cannot be fuppofed to Pkesume the Confent of Parliament, in ::k Difpofal of publick Money? I If it fliould be urged, that thefe Trca- tit-' after all, are not fo Abfurd, or Ini-- probable { 38 ) probable as I reprefent them ; that it may be a Britijh Meafure, meant for the Security of thefe Iflands, in Cafe of an Invalion, I mufb even then confefs myfelf as Incredulous as ever; for, in that View of it, I cannot conceive a Step more unnatural, or more irreconcil- able to the Panic pretended. If an InvafioK /ere truly apprehend- ed, Prudence or Policy would not dired: us to have Recourfe to a mercenary Army, much more diflant than the E- nemy ; an Army, which muft clear its Way, by Fire and Sword, through the Dominions of very powerful Princes ; which, when arrived, might have fome Pretence, like the Hejjians in 1745, for declining to adt ; and an Army, to which it would be fome National Difgrace to owe our Prcfervation. Their ( 39) There is a more Natural and a more Obvious Condudt, for the Reception of an Invader, which no Condu(ftor of Men or Affairs, however BHnded, or however Hurried, can pofhbly pafs over, without a DeUberate Intention. It is to call forth our Internal Strength, to Increafe the Mi- litary Eftablifhment, or to Arm and Ex- ercife the Militia, and a Kingdom, which hath not fufHcient Internal Strength for its own Security ; is, though afllfled by a Million of Mercenaries, in as weak, and as frail a Condition, at leaiT:, as a King- dom divided again ft itfelf. 1 I i In this infirm State, Auxiliary or Merce- nary Troops are as formidable as Ene- mies. They may repel an Invader, but they will derive from the Vidlory greater and ftronger Claims than any Invader could ( 40 ) could pretend, for they will be enabled more eiFedlually to enforce any Claims. But, God be thanked, we are not yet fo defencelefs as to have Caufe to dread, either Enemies or Mercenaries -, and, whenever the Invalion appears to be really intended, we have the Confidence to hope, that this Kingdom will efcape the Danger of becoming a Province to France, with- out ruihing into the Ignominy of becom- ing tributary to Riijia or Heje, So many are the Reafons I have for withholding my Credit from the malig- nant Report which alarms you. You men- tion indeed another Piece of News, in Confirmation of it, which, if true, may juilify your Alarm, but for the prefent confirms my Incredulity. It ( 4« ) It IS rumoured, you fay, that a Gentle- man, no lefs confpicuous in Charadler than in Office, naufeated the Draught when it was abruptly adminiftered to him. This is the Rumour throughout the King- dor, and it is univerfally known that a Perfon of his Probity would ad: the Right Pait. But, is it zt all credible, that one of the rtioft unblemilhed Charadlers in the King- dom, in an Office which fuppofcs very great Confidence, fliould be diftinguifhcd by the Negled of not being confulted, or, if I apprehend you right, of not being even apprized of fo important a Meafure ? It may, for very ftrong Reafons, be the prefent Policy to render the beft and vvor- thieil Men the moft infignificant. But there can be no Reafons, either of Prudence G or i 'I -.! ( 42 ) or Ncceflity, for Avowing fuch a Con- dud:, and Declaring to the Public, that it ia r L .merit, or rather a Crime, to be Efleem.i and Confided in, by all Ranks of Men. However, notwithflanding all this Rca- foning, I am flill liable to be told, that Arguments a priori^ conclufive as they are, avail nothing againft the Stubbornefs of a plain Matter of Fad ; and, if thefc Treaties are adlually concluded, it will not be the lefs true, though I fhould in- vent a Thoufand Reafons, to fhew the Improbability of it. It is too true, my Friend, that the mofi: improbable, and the leaft defira- ble. Event, will fometimes take Place. If this ihould be the Cafe at prefent, I muft convert my Arguments into fuch bitter ( 43 ) bitter Lamentations as a Heart fwelling with Grief, will be impatient to vent. m. If old John of Gaunt^ who is repre- fented to have broke his Heart, becaufe the Dignity of the Kingdom was profti- tuted, by farming the Public Revenues, had been a Witnefs to the Prefent State of tiiC Nation, to our Naval Strength, to the Loyalty and Public-fpirit of great Part of the People, and, at the fame Time, a Witnefs to a Meafure, fo dero- gatory to the Honour both of the Crown and the Kingdom, as Imploring and Pro- curing, with a BORROWED Sum, the Aid of Princes, whofe Dominions were, till very lately, a Defart, and whofe Sub- jects are at this Day little better than Savages, the Pride of his Britijh Spirit might have Impelled him to lay Violent Hands upon himfelf. G 2 The ( 44- ) The Times indeed require a very dif- ferent Exercife of our Zeal, and no Times will Juftify this Method of vent- ing it. But as men vary in their Tem- pers and Underflandings, they will be varioufly affedled by Public Events, and accordingly this Meafure will moft deep- ly afRi<^ thofe Worthy Members of the Community who murmur leaft. u I fliall confider myfelf in the Cafe of ft Paffenger in a VelTel, of which the Pilot was Self-willed, Over-bearing, Neg- ligent, fometimes Raili, fomctimes Ti- morous, feldom in the Right, but moll obflinate when moft in the Wrong, Feared, but Ridiculed, Difturbed and Diiliked by the Majority of tlie Crew. A (45 ) A Mutiny was every Moment expeded, but a Boatfwain, who, by lively Parts, an ingenious Way of Talking, and by affeding an irreconcilable Hatred towards the Pilot, had obtained or aflumed Weight enough to take upon himfelf the Con- dud of the Men, with great Difficulty preferved the Peace for fome Time, It was obferved at laft, by a fkilful Mariner, that the Headftrong Pilot was fleering diredlly towards a Rock. The Boatfwain was called upon to expoflulate with him j and, by convincing him of the Danger, to refcue his Friends from certain Deflrudion. But, to the Surprife of the whole Ship's Company, the Boatfwain, who, till that Moment ( 46 ) Moment had Judicioufly Concealed hii Opinion, now declared Boldly, in the very Face of the Rock, that the Con- dudt of the Pilot was Judicious, that him- felf was rcfolved to defend it, and, if he heard any Complaints, he fhould Report them to the Captain, who would know how to Quell this Mutinous Spirit. The PafTenger was a Melancholy Wit- nefs to what PafTed, and Retired to his Cabin in Tears. He faw the Power of the Pilot, and the Effrontery of the Boat- fwain. Nothing remained for him, but to Lament his hard Fate, to be facrificed to the Folly and Obstinacy of one Man, and the avowed Profligacy of another. He was under the unhappy Neceflity of Refigning himfelf, but nei- ther Religion, nor Philofophy, could move him (47) him to a Chearful Refignation, when he faw the Rock before him, and himfelf Involved in a Calamity, Wilfully incurred by others. I muft leave you to apply this Story, and conclude with the ftrongeft AiTurance, that I remain. Dear Sir, Tours, &c &Cji FINIS.