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Un des symboles suivants apparaftra sur la dernlAre Image de cheque microfiche, seion le cas: le symbols — ► signifle "A SUIVRE ", le symbols V signifle ' FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre film4s d des taux de reduction diffirents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour 4tre reproduit en un seul clich6, 11 est ffllm« A partir de I'angle supArleur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en has, en prenant le nombre d'imagas n^cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illMstrent la mtthoda. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 ^ ,:;\ ®®®®®-®®@@^®®@®@®®@®@@^.g(^@ CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRl:SENT GERMAN WAR. *'*»4rt»J»'»»!»rf-* [ Price Twp Shillings. ] ^^^@^^€^0^0@.^0@^e*^,@@^^^^^^ ■M:^^"'-i.'^!^^-^i^' t <«-•■..■» '■ r - H if i I <:: O 'J fT r t . ^ tt t i VVf »*" "V ?*• ^'^J-.t'St iSSf f^- s^ CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESE NT* GERMAN WAR. • H LONDON: Printed for John Wilkie, at the Bible, in St Paul'^ Church- Yard. 1760. ;.•♦ : 4 ^.^. ■/■ VA . -•:*j i. '.1 ADVERTISEMENT. ceived opinion, it J' be of r '""""""'^ «' timent, with the highjft and a '°"'™ ""' ^^"- a«horitys that of h!, P 1"°'* ""»ceptionabIe -peaks in the follo^^g ^.^ " "^ "^ ''''"'■^'^> wieh ttlt:^j^;';»;vt?Bl''"^''"° '"~^'"« conftitution of its%ove°,„ent^r"V"°' "'"^ *^ to hope, that the EnS '• ^'^^ '^'"= "a*"""^ -iehthedon,efti:a£^rtrEl"-""'"'''^'' entertain thofe hopes the nJ u ''"'• ^""^ ^ i'- no reafon to nSdlf litH:; '^^"'f >'-"» confidewion of its com^ *'"""'' ^^n' »"/ although it had gr"S' r "T'''^- ^"'' "an court than fo> an«h r t Ttl T °"' ''"- reafonable to p«tend h« r V ""'' " '°° ""' make ii ADVERTISEMENT. n^akc their countrymen enter into foreign quarrels^ that are of no manner of concern. tO lingUml." Rcfrript to a manifello of his P.ufTian Majefty, delivered and printea at tl^e fame time, by hi$ / I Minirter at London, in the year 1754. v|.. r : r. :-.:':t .;5--'^v' ■ •"', •i:^* -I.-..' . .■ ..•.•JV>.-* ■■■■ • 1 ■ •; !' J.";v/ .*,;•-> I > ' \_-irI:J-( .'^ -^>'V'-'5 '' CONSI-: .; iiH-il: V»'-^'- ■^-' .^■-^•' l^;■■•■^•'■■^- »« **T ' msiss^mes^^^m ^ ■ » * •' I ) i CONSIDERATIONS t J ','. . '.1 , . .':■;;; :. ON THE PRESENT GERMAN WAR. HE author of the following Confides rations does not pretend to more kno '- ledge or better intelligence than other perfons : he propofes only to offer to the publick the calm difpaflionate reflec- tions of a private man, upon the prefent rtate of dur affairs, and the method we have lately chofen of carrying on the war : Refledions, which appear to him to be juft, and which therefore he fuppofcs may approve themfelves to the underftandings of others his fellow fubjedts, who fhall read them as he intends to write, without any view to particular men ; but to contribute that little he is capable of to the publick fervice. If his obfervations arc falfe, they will then be negleded : if they are true and well founded, he is fure they are of importance enough to defer ve our regard. I;^ I . [ * ] The ouly war, vvhich England Is at this time en- gaged in, is a War with France. How much foever our attention may be diverted, or our afFc6lions warped towards this or the other power of Europe j yet that is the only State, which England is pro- fcfildJy at war with. France is its natural rival in time of peace, and its only formidable enemy in time of war. So far are wc from having declared ^ar with any other State, that Britain has fcarce a conteft fubfifting with any other power in Europe, Ruflia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, the Empire of Germany, and the fcveral particular States of it, may each of them, at different times, wifli us well or ill ; but Britaifi has now no oppofition of intereft with any ot them, and in a general national rcfpCiSl has very little to hope or fear from them. If we talce a comparative view of the ftrcngth of the two nations, whatever may be faid at prefent of our naval force, it muft be allowed that France ia fuperior to us in its land force. Could we indeed revive the old Gallic conftitution, which prevailed under the pofterity of Hugh Capet j when France was divided, as Germany is now, among a nurnbcr of independent princes, who after paying homage to the fovereign, made war with him, or one an- other, as they pleafed ; or had we the maritime provinces in our own poflcflion, and the Dukes of Burgundy aiid Bretagne for our allies i we might tlien carry on a war of equality with the crown of l^raiice at land, and hope for fuch vidories as thofe of I 1 r c a a 11 [ 3 ] of CrcfTy, Poi-^liers, and Aglncourt. But from the time when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the vStatcs and no- bility abfokitcly fubjedlcd to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of its country, the number of its inhabitants, and the grcatncfs of its revenue, fupcrior to Hritain. 'J'hc maps will teach us the fir ft of thcfe ; all the wri- ters on political arithmetic agree in ;he lecond •, and the third we have learned the laft winter from a gentleman, who, by being the r.^-^fter of our own finances, may be allowed to have the beft know- legc of thofe of other countries : and whofc argument did not at all difpofe him to magnify the French Revenue. ' '* / '" ' '."".. )f France is ftronger at land, not only thaa England, but than any other power in Europe. The Empire of Germany in the extent of its coun- try, and the number of its inhabitants may be equal, if not fuperior, to France ; but the divifion of it into a great number of feparate independent States, while France has its whole force united under one abfolute monarch, renders Germany greatly infe- rior to France. Henre it is, that France has for a century paft been formidable to the reft of Europe j and has twice been able to fupport a long war againft the united alliance of the whole. . ,v of "Whenever any power in Europe lliali liave grown up to a degree of ftrength, much greater than that B .^ of Ill !!'; I [ 4 ] of any other power ; it from thenceforward be« comes the intereft of the other States, to be watch^ fill over it, to guard againft the growth of it, and mutually to afllft each other, when they are at- tacked by it. This is the univerfal maxim of poli- tics, which has held good in all ages, from the firft eftablifliing of governments. Dunt Jtnguli fugnant^ univerft vincuntur^ is related by the hif- torian as a caufe of the extending the Roman monarchy ; and muft be a principal, or at leaft a concomitant caufe, in the growth of every other. Jir»f ■5r It was from this principle, that France and the reft of Europe were jealous of Charles the Vth, when Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, with the Indies, were united under one head. ** And ** all true Englijhmen^ Jince the d^cay of the Spanijh «' monarchy t have ever taken it for granted^ that the «« fecurity of their religion^ liberty and property ', that *' their honour, their wealthy and their trade depend *' chiefly upon the proper meafures to be taken from $im^ «* to timeagainfl the growing power of France,''' This was the language of parliament in their addrcfs to King "William juft before his death-, and of that Houfe of Commons, which has been thought his wifeft, and to have beft confulted the nation's intereft. The three powers of Europe, which are moft indangered by France, and which by their union alone can carry on an efFeftv land war againft France [ 5 1 France, are Germany, Holland, and England: Spain, and Savoy, Ruffia, Denmark, and Sweden, may any of them accede to fuch an alliance, but Germany, Holland, and England, muft be the bafis of every confederacy, which can be of any avail againft the land power of France. I never read the hiftory of the two grand allian- ces, which were formed by King William againft the growing power of France, without feeling the warmeft fentiments of gratitude to that great deli- verer of Europe. Never did King of England ap- pear with greater dignity, than he did in that great Congrefs, held at the Hague in the year 1691* when the Emperor and Empire, the Kings of Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their feveral ambafia- dors, the Electors of Germany by their parti- cular minifters, and feveral of them in their own perfons, with at leaft fifty of the greateft Princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the caufe of Europe 5 and all joined in one common league and declaration againft France. This was an auguft alliance worthy of a King of England to fight at the head of. An alliance which brought down 200,000 men upon the French frontiers, befide thofe in Bri- tifh pay *. And though King W"!iam was not the In • Lewis XlVth had generally five armies in the courfe of this war ; fometimes fix, and never lefs than four. Thofe in Germany and Flanders often amounted to ioo,oco foldiers ; ^Ade garrifoos ke|>t in the frqntier towns. The French mo- narch p ' p.' If I « ] the mbft fuccefsful warrior, yet the weWht of this alliance broke the power of the French, and maae them fue for the peace of Ryfwick. And the good faith which was obfciveil in [he conducing that treaty, and the eqi'al regard, which was paid to all the Princes concerned, gave (o general a futif- f^^tion, as to lay a firm foundation of confidence in the honour of the Engiilh govern iiient ; and en- abled King William to fjrm a fecond like alli- ance, when the death of the King of Spain, and the feizure of that whole monarchy for the grandfon of France, made it neccffary. - i -j:: ;- ; ? France, in confequence of that firfl: alliance, be- held five armies of 50,000 men each upon its fron- tiers, three of them commanded by the Eleftors of Bavaria, Saxony, and Br.andenburgh, not fighting with one another for the French diverfion, but in- vading of France upon the Rhine, befide the grand army of the Empire under the Duke of Lorrain, and the united force of England and Holland in> Flanders. And, though the ftrength of France was at length exhaufted by contending with the troops of all Europe; yet the long, oppofition, which it made to the united efforts of Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Savoy, Spain, Holland, and England, proves the immenfe height of power, narch had at one time, iucluding his lanu and naval forces, 450,000 men in pay. Neither the Turkilh Empire, nor tho Ronaan, had ever To many wars at once to fupport. , . VoLTAiRB leSjKc. cap, Xv. whiclv tes, the clv 17 ]. which that Uingdom may arrive at, and the abfo- lute neccffity there was of forming fuch an union* ... . .n ■ ., 1 -tr 1 ; prejudice rir' [ 8 1 prejudice of Europe : bccaufe it is a weakeiling oF the rivals of France -, and keeping thofe powers at variance, from whom France can have nothing to fear, but in their union. • '; !■! I I it ■ 1 I Ever fince the times immediately preceding the treaty of Weftphalia, it has been the con- ftant aim of the French governmeni to cfta- blilh ^n equality of power and independence among a number of princes in Germany, and to keep them as much as pofTible divided from each other, both in intereft and in religion. The crown of Sweden, and the Proteftant States of the Empire, had for many years preceding thac treaty, been indangered by the power of the Houfe of Auftria ; and therefore, when Guftavus Adol- phus declared war againft it, France, to fervc its own purpofes, willingly entered into alliances with him, and his fucceeding generals, through the whole courfe of the war : and the Cardinals Rich- lieu and Mazarine, while they were perfecuting ic in France, became the Defenders of the Proteftant Faiih in Germany. This independency of the fe- veral German States, which was fo firmly eftablifh- cd by the treaty of Weftphalia, is what the Ger* man Princes call the Liberties of Germanyj and the Syftem of Germany. And the French willingly guarantied this treaty j knowing, that while they kept Germany thus divided, they themfelves (hould be the lefs indangered by it. h [ 9 ] If every war between England and Holland, Of between either of thefe and Germany, or in Ger- many itfelf, between any two States of the Empire, be, fo far as it goes, a prejudice to Europe, and a fecurity to France ; it follows, that whenever fuch wars (hall arife between any two German States, and much more between any two principal powers of Europe, it will be the policy of France to en* courage and inflame them. Thus the French court, in Charles the IId*s time, encouraged the Dutch to undertake a war with the Englifh, and afterwards excited the court of England to declare war againft Holland, promifing to both the aflif- tance of their fleet, but leaving them both in battle to deftroy each other. On the other hand, whatever wars fhall arife be- tween any two States of Europe, or any two princes of the Empire, it will be the interefl: of every other State, except France, to compofe thefe differences, if it can be done, by their mediation and good offices. If every war, which arifes between any two par- ticular States of the Empire, be itfelf a misfortune, and contrary to the interefl: of Europe ; the evil will be lliii the greater, and the mifchief fo much the more cxtenflve, if France fliall make itfelf a party m the war, and fliall join itfelf to either of the two fides, to keep the difpute alive fo much the longer. Ac^ cordingly we find that this has been the confl:ant C policy r [ 10 ] policy of France, to mix itfelf in all quarrels in the Empire, and l^eep up the difputes of the contend- ing parties as long as it can j till one or the other is reduced, or they (hall both fee their intereft to agree. . Should England or Holland take the oppofite part in any fuch difpute, this would be a ftill greater misfortune ; and could only ferve to ex- tend and multiply the evil, and lengthen the conti- nuance of it : and, whoever be the parties, or whatever be the event of the war, muft be a mif- fortune to Europe i and fo long as it continued muft be a weakening of Germany, and a fervice to the caufe of France. Thus let the whole force of Germany be con- fidered as equal to a hundred : and let any two powers of it be at war together, whofe force fhall be to each other as eight to ten of thofe parts. So far as this war goes, it is a lofs to Europe by the de- ftrudion or diminution of the force of eighteen parts. If the quarrel be adopted by any of the other powers of Germany, that produces a lofs or diminution of fo many more parts : If France, to keep up the conteft, fhould take the weaker fide, and add to the power whofe force is eight, fo as to make it fuperior to ten, the evil is not leflened, but made greater. Should England be fo unfor- tunate as to join in the conteft, and fend its land force of fifty into the war, and France therc- i • . upon [ " ] upon fend a force of eighty ; the party afTifted by England woulu be but little benefited by the alii- ince i the Englifh would ftill be the weaker fide -, the force of Europe would be diminilhed fo much the more ; and France only be advantaged. This is a kind of reafoning which muft hold invariably juft in all ages. And whether Britain fliall take the part of Heffe againft Saxe, or of Saxe againft Heffe i of Auftria againft Pruflla, or of Pruflla againft Auftria 5 the intereft of Europe is hurt, the powers of Germany are weakened, and France only can be aggrandized ac the expence of both. Should the reader think this reafoning too mi- nute, and make a doubt, whether the caufe of Europe can be fo much affeded by the difputes of thefe minor States of the Empire ; I am not dif- pofed to augment the importance of them : but then, if the intereft of Europe be not concerned in them, that of England muft be much lefs fo ; becaufe no German difpute can be an objed worthy the Britifti regard, but only as the intereft of Europe is affefled by it. Whether Wittenburg or Wirtem- burgh, Lunenburgh or Lawenburgh, Sultzbach or Anfpatch, ftiall get the better in any difpute, is an affair, which may engage the paflions, the preju- dices, and fometimes the intereft of any particular Eledlor : but all thefe party quarrels of Germans among themfelves arc beneath the notice of the imperial crown of thefe realms. Britain knows none of them, but as members of the Empire in C 2 general Jr' t 12 ] general, and as parts of one great whole, to be aftuated againft France the common enemy. In (hort, either there is fuch a thing, as a com- mon intereft of Euro;^e, and Germany is or may be of ufe to Britain and .he common caLifc •, or it cannot. If there is no fuch common cauftr, or Germany cannot be of ufe to it, then certainly it cannot be of ufe for England to lavifh its millions about it. If there be fuch a caufe, and Germany ever can be of ufe to England by fcrving it, it can be fo only by its union. Germany divided into fadtions, and fighting one half of it againft the other half, cannot weaken France, or ferve the caufe of Europe. Nothing but a hearty union of the Emperor and Empire, and the feveral States, which compofe it, acting under one head, can be of any avail for this purpofe. The fowing divi- fions therefore in the Empire, and abetting the quarrels between any of its members, may ferve the humour of a particular eledor ; certainly does ferve the caufe of France, but never can the intereft of England. ... , I don't determine, whether the Germans are likely foon to agree together in any one point ; and much lefs in uniting with England and the States General in a war with France : but till they do thus agree, England has nothingf to do with their little internal quarrels. The ffly chance we have however for fuch an union, and the only means of accelerating [ 13 ] It, is to leave the French to the mfc Ives ; not to conquer Germany, for that is impofTible to do, but to harrafs it as much as they pleaff, and make themfelves as odious as we can deiire. e al It If a regard for the intercft of Europe in general ought to keep us from meddling in any German do- meftic war, the particular intereft of Germany will be no lefs hurt by our engaging in it. One of the greateft calamities, which can happen to a country, is ioLibtlefs that of a civil war. A war between two members of the Empire is in refpedl to that head, under which they are all united, a civil war. There may be feme difference between the degree of obedience, due from the feveral States to the head of the Empire, and that of the fubjedls of any parti- cular kingdom to theirs ; but fo far as the intereft of the Empire is affected, and fo far as the prefent argument is concerned, this is a German civil war. One of the moft mifchievous circumftances attend- ing civil wars has generally been, that each fide, being more animated by their party hatred, than by the love of their country, the weaker is too apt to call in a foreign force to its affiftance. Thefe al- ways enter to ferve their own purpofes, and not that of the country in general, or of the par- ticular party, which invites them. This begets a precedent, and excites the other party to take the fame deftru6livc meafure. "^ Xhus the State is over-run with armies much greater than its own j and every part of the country ravaged to the de- ftru<5lion ,. t ' I [ '4 ] flruflion of the individuals ; till at length perhaps the war terminates in an ilTue, very difierent from what either of the parties had originally intended. Every one knows, that this is the general hiftory of civil wars. Place the fcene where you will, or in what age of the world you think fit, this has been the common courfe of them. Our own country in- deed was fortunate enough, to have all the powers of Europe fo much imployM againft each other, during the period of our civil war, ihat they had no leifure to attend to the Englifh concerns. Though France did us the kind office of fending a minifter, under the pretence of a media- tor, to inflame our differences and blow them up into a civil war as foon as it could j but its troops were otherwife imploy'd. Germany has been (o unhappy, as to have a dif- putc arife between two of its leading Princes about the right to four great dutchies in one of its remoteft provinces. What the names of thefe are, I confefs I do not know ; nor I fuppofe does one man in ten thoufand of my fellow fubje(5ls ; though we have fpent fo many millions about them : but they lie fomewhere in Silefia, one of the moll eaftern in- land provinces of Germany, with twenty interme- diate States between us and them. Such a difpute arifing in Germany was doubtlefs a misfortune to it. However, as the revenues of neither of the parties are inexhauftible ; the probable iffue of fuch a war, if they were left to themfelves, would be, that con on Jefs of wea the dif- ibout loteft mfefs In ten have ^ey lie rn in- erme- [ifpute me to )f the )f fuch lid be, that [ 15 J that one or the other of them would find their re- venues brought to an end, and would be obliged to fubmit. Whether PrufTia or Auftria carried its point, cannot be a matter of the leaft confequence to England : for, befide that the country itfelf is at too great a diftance for us to be aflfcfted by it ; England has adually taken both fides of the con- troverfy, and therefore cannot be really intcrefted in either. But the misfortunes of Germany are not fo fpeedily determined. Unhappily for the poor people, the one fide called in the French, and the other the Englifh. Can this be for the in- tereft of Germany, to have the flame of a civil war fed with a ftock of fewel infinitely greater than its own ? To have the revenues of England and France poured into the Empire, fo much the longer ta enable the Germans to deftroy each other, and mul- tiply the miferies of this civil war through all the parts of the Empire } But it may be faid perhaps, that, if Britain does not take any part in thefe German wars, France nevertheiefs will : and therefore England's interfer- ing is only a neccflfary oppofition to France. How far this may be riglit in refpedt of England, fliall be confidered hereifter ; but we are now treating of it only ip elation to the intereft of Germany. iJoubt- lef then it is the inttrtfl: of France, as ofcen as any of thf German princes go to war, to afTift the weak r party, and blow up the contention. This the French may pradifc by themfelves, to a ct-r- ; : ' tain I i i! txr. tlcgrcp, and for a certain time •, till the Ger- mans (hall fee their own intereft, and the French (hall make themfclves odious. But if, as often as France declares on one fide, England adopts the other, how is Germany relieved ? F*rance will al- ways take care to fend troops enough to keep the balance even ; and all that England can do by its officioufnefs, will be the drawing fo many more parts of Germany into the quarrel, and enabling the Germans to cut each others throats fo much the longer. That is, leave the French to themfelvcs, they will doubtlcfs do as much mifchief as they can*, but in time they may make themfclves generally hated, and the Germans wife enough to agree : and England, fo long as it continues neuter, will be courted by both parties, and by its good offices may mediate a peace between them : but the hope of peace vanilhes, the inftant we declare for either of the parties •, which are thereby fet the farther at variance. That is, we double the calamity to Ger- many, and divide with France the odium of it. But if the French are left to themfclves in Ger- many, this will increafe their influence in the feve- ral courts of it. For a time it may ; but Britain cannot help that. So long as the contending par- tics are cxafperated againft each other, England, by efpoufing the caufe of either, cannot probably benefit the fide it adopts ; certainly cannot benefit itfelf, and only makes the influence of France over the other fide fo much the ftronger. . .: Would ■ I 1- [ 17 ] Would we then have all Germany be over- run by the French ? I anfwer, No. Humanity teaches us to wi(h hurt to no country } but Germany is not ours. If the French will ftir up divifions among the German Princes, and they are weak enough to yield to them, is England anfwerable for this ? If any country in Europe is to be over-run by the French, whither can their armies (efpecially when we arc at war with them) be better turned, than into Germany ? A country, which they never can conquer, which can belt bear their invafions, and the powers of which alone, by uniting together, are able to repeil them. If Germans themfelves have fo little affedion for Germany, as to call in foreign troops to opprefs it •, are we bound to feel a greater concern for their country than they ? Is Britain to make itfelf the general Knight Errant of Europe, to refcue opprefTed States ; and exhauft itfelf, and negled its own wars, in order to fave men in fpite of themfelves, and who will not do any thing to- wards their own deliverance ? But fliall we fuffer the Proteftant intereft to be opprefled ? This is a queftion put into the mouths of many good people, and therefore deferves a par- ticular anfwer. We happen now to have one no- minal Proteftant Prince on our fide 5 and therefore the Proteftant intereft has been fpecioufly held out to our view. But in the laft war we were fighting for the Queen of Hungary, and this Proteftant Prince had only a Popifti King of France for his D defender. I! '■* I '4 J t |',t . if' • [ i8 ] defender. Did wc then think the Proteftant intercft at all concerned in that war ? And why fhould we in this? This great champion of Proteftantifm was then iiniverfally decried by us, as a man void oi faith, religion, and every good principle. Have his writings made us think better of his religion ? We fet our even in this war with confiderlnghim as an enemy to our Proteftant Electorate ; and hired an army of Ruflians to invade him. What is it then, that has at once changed him in our opinion, from a defpifer of all religion, to the defender of the Proteftant ? Bur not to infift on this, In the firft place, if wc recoiled the ftate of Eu- rope at the dme of the breaking out of the prefent war, what one Popifti power had attacked the Pro- teftant religion, or had ftiewn the Icaft intention to infringe the liberties of any one Proteftant State ? Something of that fort might hav ?. happened before ; but at that time there was not a Palatine or a Saltzburgher complaining. Even that moft bi- gotted Houfe ot Auftria was then pradbifing lefs of its religious tyranny over its Proteftant fubjeds, than it had been ordinarily ufed to. Not one in- novation had bee/j made in the Empire in pre- judice of the Proteftant intereft, except only that the K. of P. had built a Popilh church at Berlin, and had the foundationftone 1-iid in his own name, in the midft of his Proteftant dominions. Should the Proteftants of Germany therefore, in fuch a time, have pretended, that their religion was f ' [ '9 ] in danger, and that they took up arms for the de- fence of it, the Papifts may very juftly conclude, that they never will lay them down again ; for there never was a time, when the Proteftants had Icfs ground of complaint, than at the time of the com- mencement of this war. How then can this be cal- led a religious war ? The truth is, fuch an aflcrtion might pafs in an Englifh aflembly, willing to be- lieve any thing that was faid to it. They might be told, that the Emprefs Queen was going todeftroy the Proteftant religion, and the fyftem oF Germany : but no one of the Proteftant powers upon the con- tinent was under the leaft apprehcnfion of danger to their religion, at that time, from the Houfe of Auftria, whatever might have been their jealoufies from the K. of P. Ui Should any one doubt of this, let him in the next place confider, who are the parties, which are engaged in this war. If wp look round Europe, we Ihall find as many Proteftant States fighting againft us, as for us; and more, who rather wifh ill, than wifti well, to o-ir caufe, which therefore they certainly do not think the caufe of Proteftantifm. Swedes and Saxons are in arms againft us ; the RufiiaiiS, though not Pro- leftants, are ftill farther from being Papifts' ; and the Dutch and Danes have given no proof of their wiftiing fuccefs to our caufe. I do not mean the defence of H — r, but the war, in which we are fup- porting the K. of P. Does any one think, that the D 2 Frenclj f 'V < , -I i [ 2P ] Frcn':h attack the Hanoverians, bccaufe they are Proteftants ? Or that the end of their fending their armies thither is to convert then^i to Popery ? Did they make the leaft attempt of that fort, while they were in pofr^fTion oi the country ? Surely then we may allow the other Proteftant States of Europe to be judges of the in te reft of their reli- gion, as well as ourfelves : and not one of thefc have exprefled the i»"iift apprehenfions of danger threatened to it. We may, if we pleafe, hardily call this K. of P. the defender of the Proteftants ; but no one Proteftant State in Europe will thank lis for what he has done j nor will any German Proteftant State aft with us, except only thofe, wjiich we haye bought, and taken into our pay. ;ij In ' I! u il In the laft place, let us confider the operations of this war, and what are the effeds, which it has actually produced ; which ir) every other cafe is al- lowed to be the beft rule to form a judgment upon. The very firft concerted operation of this Prote- ftant champion, was the entering into, and feiz- ingof Saxony, the firft Proteftant State of the Em- pire i and fetting all the Proteftant Statts at va- iriance with each other. The reader will remember, that we are not now confider ing, whether his Pruflian war was ajuft one; but how far it is a rehgious one. Whether Pruflia QX Saxony be in the right, the hurt done to the Froteftant !i i t 21 1 Proteftant intereft in Germany, by fctting two Proteftant Eleflorates at variance, is jufl the fame ; and the Popilli States alone can rejc-ice in the de- ftruflion of either. There have been times, when the zeal of the I jpes of Rome made them hold fre- quent confiftories to conlult, how they might bcft deftroy that peftilent northern herefy, as our religion was once called, when the reformation was firfl adop- ted by the northern powers of Germany ; and there have been bigotted Emperors, who have formed leagues, and made many attempts, in conjundtion with the court of Rome, for the defttuition of Prote- ftants; which Providence was plcafed to difappoinc But what is there, that the bittereft enemies of our religion could have devifed, fo effeftually to fcrve their purpofe, as the lighting up a war be- tween thefe Proteftant States thcmfelves ? Which, without raifing any jtaloufy of Papifts ; without the cruelty of perfecuti(m -, without the odium of incurring any breach of faith, fhould fet thefe Pro- tef|tar\t powers upon worrying each other, with in- finitely greater deftru<^tion than any the Iharpcft perfecution ever produced, and ruining the whole fiorth of permany. ,;/ , -ljv - . : . i Could a Gregory or a Ferdinand have wiftied for any thing more, than that Saxony, where the refor- mation firft began, (hould be ravaged from end to end : its country wafted, its cities ruined, their fuburbs burnt, its princes and nobles driven into tanifhment, its merchants beggared, its pcafants forced wmm. ill s ; • i l! r 2* ] forced into arms, and made to (heath their fwords in the bowels of their countrymen, or in thofe of their Proteftant neighbours, Bohemians, Hunga* rians, and Silefians ; or elfe forced to fly forlhelter into the armies of France, there to fight under Popifh bau.icrs, againft their Proteftant brethren, and made to march over the bodies of Proteftant Englilhmen *. Could the cooleft malice of jefuitifm have doomed our Faith to a heavier vengeance, than to have Proteftant Saxons, ftabbing Proteftant Britons, Proteftant Hanoverians, murdering Prote- ftant Wirtenburghers, Proteftant Heffians fight- ing aginft Proteftant Palatines, Proteftant Swedes invading Proteftant Pruflians, and Proteftant Bohe- mians, Hungarians, and Silefians, coming all armed under Popifh ftandards, to c:^t the throats of Proteftant Brandenburghers. AH this, and more have we feen (eventually, though not inten- tionally) brought about by the councils of Prote- ftants themfelves, and have in one year given more money ro efFedt it, than the amount of all the fums, which the court of Rome has contributed for * The troops, which inarched over general Kirigfle/ at the battle of Minden, and which muft have been firft cu' 'O pieces, if our horfe had come up, were Saxon Infantry. The regi- ments, which the French oppofed to Prince Ferdinand's attack at Bergen, were Saxons ; and throughout the war, thfe Ger- man corps in the French army, have been made the greateil (uffcrers. - ,., A ,', 1 1 the attack Ger- reacefl 4 [ 23 1 tlie dcftruftion of Proteftantifm, from the birth of Luther, to this day. But fhall France be fufFered to conquer H — r ? No one, who is in the lead acquainted with the State of Europe, and the conftitution of the Em- pire, can fuppofe the crown of France (hould en- tertain a thought of making a real and permanent conqueft of H — r. France enters Germany as a friend and ally of the Empire, and as guarantee of the treaty of Weftphalia ; and as fuch cannot pretend to make a real conqueft there : that would be quarrel- ing with its allies in the very adl of affifting them. An Eleflorate of the Empire is not to be annihilated, but by the deftruftion of the whole Germanic confti- tution. For a King of France to make himfelf E — r of H— r, and ejedt a whole family out of its rights, would be fo great an adt of violence, that every member in the empire would rife againft it. Swe- den and Denmark, could not but take the alarm at it. And if France were to pretend to hold the E — te in its own right, what muft become of the inter- mediate States ? Would the French conquer them too ? That muft commit them in eternal quarrels with every member of the Germanic body. Would the Empire fufFer a great part of Germany, and two or three Eleflorates at once to be cut off from its dominions, and made a part of the kingdom of France ? Tis the very thing which England (hould wilh the French to attempt, in order to unite all Germany againft them. Would i: I ' i I'M ' ! i ;! 4 iMl |:i' I' r n ] Would they then hold the Elcflorate by itlclfi de- tached from all their other dominions? H — r in that cafe, might prove the church-yard of the French, as well as Italy has been, and the other parts of Ger- many. Nor would Engl.ind have any reafon to envy France, the impradicable tafk of defending a country, furrounded with enemies, and fcparated from a.l its other dominions. But in reality, the conftitution of Europe, makes every thing of this kind abfolutcly impofllblc. All that France can propofe, after the greateft fuccefs there, can be only to take a temporary pofleflion of the country during the war ; to hold it in depofite, as the K. of P. did the Eledorate of Saxony. And, if this were to happen, doubtlefs every good man ought to be forry for it : but wherein confifts that fuper- lative greatnefs of the evil, that Britain fhould thus move Heaven and Earth, and rifle every danger to prevent it. The French 'tis true, would poflcfs themfcives of the revenues of the country -, and all the zixcs, which the people now pay to their fove- reign, would be paid to France. But would Eng- land be fo much impovcriflied ? Or would the crown of France be fo very formidably inriched by the acquifition ? A French army, in the country, would themfelves probably find a ufe for all the money they could raife there : but fuppofe a very difinterefted general (hould be able to remit a couple of hundred thoufand pound from H r to Vcrfaillcs, which is probably more than the French revenue would ever gain by it j is there g any ^ [ 25 ] any kind of occonomy in our having put ourftlves in three years time to an expence ot twelve millions, to prevent France from getting fix hundred thou fund pounds out ot Germany ? V , . ' ; i But the poor people, it may be faid, defcrveour compafTion. True, they do fo ; and for that rea- fon we ought to let them alone, and not make their country the theatre of a war, which mult ruin them. A fmali State, which is invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than itfelf, is doubt- lefs under a great misfortune ; all refiftance is ufelefs, and it has nothing to do but fubmit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune; and that is, by having another great State, almoft equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country fubmit, it has but one army to main- tain ; and may in the beginning yield upon terms, which are tolerable : but if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is fure to be opprcfiTed by them both. An army is a many headed mon- fter, that mull be fed j and the defending army ought to have as many mouths, as the attacking -, and each will get but all they can from the poor inhabitants. ,,,, , . We have indeed heard, with concern, of turning a country into a mere defert. But what was the reafon ? Not becaufe the coun- try was conquered ; that is a reafon for preferv- ing it*, but to prevent the danger of its being loft:. E The i ' Jill: cc !' [ 30 2 fcflcs. But they knew, that none of the other Princes of the Empire would refent them: that they had then, before their eyes mud) greater fcvc- ritics, praflifing in Saxony * ; and therefore, might not be difpleafed to fee a few of the fame •xtortions brought home to that K — te, which they might be apt to think, had been one of the caufes of them. After all, it mull: be allowed, that fome of- ficers are more rapacious than others, and the poor H ns had then the misfortune of having the French army commanded by one of the word of them. But in general, the French are a fair enemy, and neither they nor we have exercifed any unne- celTary cruelties to each others fubjeds. Nor could the country therefore have any fufferings to fear be- yond the allowed ufage of war upon an Englifh ac- count : nor would a French army flay there, in all probability, more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the French court atl hope of drawing over an Englifh army to meet them there. r;;M| jih I: In the courft* of the laf^ war, we faw French ar- mies traverfe all Germany, and enter into the coun- tries of friends and foes. Their coming into any country, is doubtlefs a bad thing, but we have never known the Germans thcmfelves confider it in fo • The city of Leipfic was then artually Under a fort of military execuiJon : and the merchants made to draw bills upon their cor- jrefpondentsi (\nd kept under guard, till their bills were accepted. very ir- in- jny rer To [ 31 ] very terrible a light, as to throw away millions after millions to prerenc it. If one French Gcncrars conduft prove an cxcep» tion to the received laws of war, we have every year a very ftrong evidence to confirm them. ' I'he Landgraviate of Hefle, is as fine a country as any in North Germany i and yet their Landgrave lets us have his troops for the fum of 340,000 /. and fuffers the French to pofltfs themfelves every year of his country, and come into his capital ; his troops being at that very time fighting againft them in our fervice. And we, here in England, thought fo very lightly of their having entered it now the third year •, that we made rejoicings for the aAion of Warbourg, in which we had at mod killed only 1 500 Frepch, and taken as many prifoners, and fired the Tower guns for it, as a victory gained ; though we knew, that by that very aflion, the French had taken poffeffion of Caflfel. If two fuc- ceflive Landgraves have every year expofed their country, and their own palace to be pofTcflcd by the French, for the benefit of letting us their troops for 340,000/. Then, though we cannot pofitively afcertain the damage, this gives us at lead: a nega- tive meafure of it -, and proves, that it cannot ex- ceed that fum. led. The reader will obferve, that I give every ad- vantage to this eftimate ; and fuppofe them to fet the lives of their foldicrs at norhing. However, if r 32 J if the Landgrave did not repent, and we fired gund of rejoicing, at the t'me when the French army got poiTcfTion of Caflel -, can their getting one ftep farther, appear fo very tremendous a thing, that this nation fhouid fpend three, four, and five mil- lions to prevent it. '■ 'i lit ^ IT. I ; !-i:l ' But H— — i' is now attacked folely upon an Englifh account ; and therefore England oight to defend it. Certain it is, that the Eledotate is invad- ed merely on an Englifh account — And will not this always be the cafe ? Is it poffible for that country to give our enemies lefs ground of offence in any future quarrel, than it did in this ? Could the French pretend to fay, that the Eledorate had taken any part in the difpute between the two nations about our polTefTions in America ? Who does not fee then, that the fingle realbn, why it is at- tacked, is becaufe the French know, that we fhall defend it ? That the French therefore only march their troops thither ; becaufe, as we, by our fupe- riority at fea, have the advantage in attacking the French fettlement-s in America, and the Eafl: and Wefl Indies ; fo the French, by their fuperiority at land, and their greater nearnefs to H — r, are fure to have the advantage, by meeting the Englifh troops there. Ihey would not go thither, unlefs they were certain. of finding us there: they always will go thither, as long as the Englifh councils refolve to oppofe them there. The reafon is, that it is not worth their while to march their troops fo far from [ 33 ] froiti home, from ahy other motive but that, t would not be underftood to depreciiite the Eledlorate j or to fet the value of it below that of other countries : but no particular diftridt in North Germany, is rich enough to make it worth the while of a great king* dom, like that of France, to march its troops f'o far out of its own dominions, merely for the fake of m.aintaining them at free quarter. One Ger- man Prince mav treat another in that manner •, as for inftance, when this war fhall be concluded, the Eledor of Saxony may perhaps choofe to go and eat up another E — te by way of retaliation for our having, as he may think, fo largely contributed to the deftrudion of Saxony. He, as a German, may have his German pafiions, prejudices, or af- fections i and one Geriiian power may attack an- other, without giving umbrage to the Empire : but to a great King, like the King of France, it can- not be an objeft. If he fend a great army, the people cannot maintain them : if a little one, they will drive them out of it : if he duly adjuft the proportion of troops, betv^^een what will keep the country in fubjedioh, and what it can fup-^ port, the expedition will at bed but pay its own charges ; and nothing will remain to the Crown of France. Indeed, how fhould there be any thing ? According to the prefent laws of war, the utmoftj which a Freiich army could do, would be to oblige the people to quarter their foldiers, and to pay to the crown of France the fame taxes, which they noW F do «' I 34 1 do to their own fovereign '". Would a fingle floren of that ixjoney find ii i way to Paris, in that cafe, more than does now to London ? Are gene- ral officers fuch good managers for the crown re- venue ? Would not they find ufes enough to em- ploy it, where they are, or pretences to put it into their own pockets ? Will the people pay their taxes to their enemies more cheerfully, than to their na- tural fovereign ? Or will it be colledted, and remit- ted to Paris, upon cheaper terms by thirty thoufand commiiTioners of this revenue, than it can be by the civil officers to their own Eledlor in time of peace ? And yet, till we can prove how much comes to England, we need not fear the King of France's being enriched by it in time of war. H: Hanover in itfclf therefore cannot be a fufficient objed to induce a great kingdom to fend its troops taither merely to diftrefs the poor inhabitants : by which it is likely to ruin all their difcipline, and turn them into thieves and ban^-itti ; and from which it can propofe to draw nothing to itfelf, but the odium of an unjuft in vafion of the rights of inno- cent people. All Europe, after one campaign would condemn the cruelty and meannefs of fuch * The reader will remember, that in all that was faid about the French adminiilratlon, the chief document of it, was a decree of the French council, for the receivers of the Eledtoral revenue to to be accountable to a Mr. Faidy, for the produce of them. And confidering, that the decree does not mention afyllableof/V creafing the taxes, the violence feems to have been offered to the aFe^ious of people, rather than to their purfes. a beha- [ 35 ] a behaviour in a great kingdom like France •, which fhould thus confefs its inferiority to its enemy, by feeking to revenge its quarrel on a defencelefs coun- try which had not the leaft concern in it. And no meafure couid make the French more obnoxious to the Empire, if we would but keep out of it. It would then be a German caufe, and not an Englifli one ; and the Electorate would have aright to call for the affiftance of the Empire to its protection. It might fuffer a Httle at firll perhaps, as the German councils are flow *, but from the nature of things it is evident, that the French army never would (lay there more than a fingle winter. The French there- fore, would not think it worth their while to go thither, unlefs they were fure to find an army in Englifli pay to fight with, and juftify their com- ing thither. . f ■ • ' ■ I now add, that whenever an Englifli army is there, they always will go thither ; becaufe ihat is the mod advantageous method of carrying en the war for them, and the moft difadvantageous fy^' England. It muft be fo as long as the prefenc war fliall laft : becaufe England has fo great a fupe- riority at fea, that they have no other country to go to. The French have now no one place to fight us in, unlefs we find for them a field of battle in Germany. They cannot invade England : if they could, there would not be a man of their army in Germany. But their troops probably would not embark on board their tranfports, after having feen their Heet deftroyed, which ftiould have proteded Fa' them •, IJ i m I [ 36 ] themj or, if they would, they could not get our. They cannot fend over their troops in a fufficient number to attack us in the Weft-Indies ; no, nor to defend themfelves, if a pure regard toBritains good could have prevailed with us to attack them there lafl: winter ; bccaufe iheir ports are all blocked up. The French troops therefore, muft either have re- mained at home unemployed, or be fent into Ger- many. And, at a time, when they were precluded from invi. «■ England, and tTieir Weft- India iflands lay a; laked and expofcd to us ; whither could they wifh to transfer the war, rather than into Germany, where they have nothing to lofe, or be in fear for ; and where could they wifli to have us meet them, rather than in a country, where we have nothing to hope for I : .^ .. ;iii ^^M P : ll!*i ' 4 1 Vi Should any one in anfwer to this, alledge that Britain has nothing to lo'e in Germany, any more than France has. I anfwer, yes. England has its greateft ftake there -, it has H ^ -..r to lofe. Should the reader demur to this, and raife a doubt, whether that country be really of fo much importance to Britain i I cannot anfwer his doubts : but if it be not of that impor- tance, what then are we fighting for ? Why have we been fpending twelve millions in Germany, to defend, only from infult, that, which cannot be of fo much worth to us; or to prevent the French from getting into a country, where they will find nothing to tempt their ftay, or to remit to their qy/n crown, when they have been there? . i ShaH lot to of id dr U\ C 37 1 Shall then the innocent Hanoverians be quartered upon, and opprefled by the French troops, and the Englilh not attack them? Not, if we have any com- panion for the Electorate : for then the French will always go thither. And how cruel a hardfhip (hall we bring upon the country, if we thus make it the feat of :>ur wars : or when will there be an end of the poor people's forrows, if by thus confldering them, as a part of ourfelyes, we furnifh all nations with the means of annoying us ♦, and make the Hano- verians backs rue the fmart of every quarrel, which may happen to arife between Britain, and any other powers upon the continent? . -^> But fome perhaps may fay, let who will attack the Electorate upon our account, we will revenge its caufe. We may, if ne pleafe, refolve that we \vill defend it againft every power in Europe -, but, V^ithout being at a greater cxpence to maintain that government, than our ov/n in time of peace, we cannot defend it againll any. This is an evil, which neccflarily arifes out of its diftance from us. The parliament may addrefs for it ; and generous Bridfh hearts ought to feel for it -, but they cannot protect it : either from the French, when they are pleafed formally to attack it ; or from any of the lefler States of the Empire, if they choofe fuddenly to over-run it. Do we doubt of this ? The courfe of the war, has afforded but too many proofs of pur inability in this refpeCt. How did the war begin ? The fcene in Germany, opened with our l^dng in alliance with the Emprefs Queen. And the r 38 ] the K. of P — a, under the cnrouragcment of Fnmcc*, was threatening to invade the K te. Wc looked over all the other parts of Kiiropc in vain 1 and fent to the farthcft North, ar.d agreed to give five hundred thoufand pounds to the court of Kuflia, to march fifcy-fivc thoufand men into 1* a, in order to find tlvit Prince imploy- ment at home. We afterwards perceived, that this Ruiruin diverfion, which was to march through Poland, would be ineffectual : what then was to be done ? That was the onlv rcfou* which B n had for defending it; and i. t failed. We were tlien forced to fee our inability ; and by renouncing our treaty with Ruflia, and giving up our old allies, were made to buv ulfan evil, which we c>-uld not repcll. And being thus brought into a iuite of dependence upon a fingle ally, he knew how to improve it from one ftep to another, till we are at length reduced to an appearance at Icafl of bJng tributaries to a K. of P a. Mere, perhaps, a generous F.nglilli brcafl may revolt againlt the cxpreflion, and difdain to own, that the money we pay to P a, is a tribute. He is our ally, and we pay him a fubfidy, but not a tribute. Let us confider then the nature of each, nnd what it is, which conftitutes the difFcrenre be- tween them. A fubfidy is an honorable penfion, given by one State to another, in confideration of fcrvices done, orbenefits to be received. Thus, for inllance, the tive-hundred thoufand pounds we were to I' [ 39 ] to pay toUuflJa, would have been a fubfitly, bccaufc wc were to have an army of fifcy-livc thou land men in return for it : and liie cxpofing of his country as a frontier to 1 lanovcr, and the letting us his trooj).s, is a lervicc done by the Landgrave ot 1 Kni', and thcrelore the money paid him, is a fubfidy. But what is it, that the K. of 1* a has done for the money we pay to him ? Was his huvinp; tailcn upon a I'rotellant Electorate, and dcilroyinj'; Saxony, a fcrvice done to Britain ? Was that the Sid: of merit, which conftitutes this payment a lub- fidy ? Will this nation take upon itfctt the blood ot a hundred thoidand German Proteltants, and avow the Ihedding of it as a benefit received ? Is ic then his having attacked the Hmprefs Queen? whe- ther judly or not, is his concern ; whether advan- tageouHy for England, is only ours. That cannot be the benefit received ; for we have already feen, that the lighting up a civil war in Germany, and much more the involving that part of it, which we ought moll to wifli the welfare of, in a quarrel with the Diet, and the other Princes of the Empire, cannot be a fervice done to England ; whatever it may be to France. J But the Emprefs Queen rcfufed to defend the Electorate. True, flie alledged her own danger : and therefore he increafed that danger : and by prefling her fo much the more, drove her into a clofer union with our enemy : by which (he had been before induced to put into the hands of France, N ieuport i|: litl t li ■■■' 111' h m^ I 40 ] !'''euport and Oftend-, and may pofTibly be driven ' . ctde to the Ruffians, fiich a part of their con- ^ucfts, as may give them a vote in the Diet, and thereby diftracl the German councils fo much the more. Are thefe fuch valuable confidf rations to Britain, as to make this a fubfidy ? Once indeed he fought with the French, in the Imperial army at Rofbatch ; but fought them as his own enemies, and not ours. The French, to fave appearances with their allies, maiched out of their way to at- tack him ; otherwife he had not fhewn the lead difpofition to go out of his, to ferve us. - I J •>. .. Does he then fiipply our army with troops ? There were, it is faid, in the campaign of Crevelt, two Pruflian regiments of horfe, who refufed to charge the French, and thereby loft us the faireft opportunity, we ever had, of defeating them. But fuppofing, that th. y had done their duty •, two or three regiments cannot be an equivalent for fix- hundred and feventy thoufand pounds. In Queen Ann's war, the fubfidy paid to a K. of P— — a, was fifty thoufand pounds •, for which, we fent his troops to fight the I-Vench in Savoy. But what is the benefit, which this much greater fum is the purchafe of.? It will be difficult to name any real fervice he can do to Britain ; though it may be eafy to fee, the mifchief, he can do elfewhere. If we look into the three laft tr^'atie's w^jU^itn. we (hall have ftill more reafon to think, tWRiBpf 4 . / bound his iat is the real eafy t 41 ] bound to no fervice whatfoever. Some general ex« prefTions there arc about a common caufe, which he feems left at liberty to interpret to his own conve- nience. What is the common caufe, between two parties, who have no common enemy ? Wc are not at war with the Houfe of Audria, and he will tell us, he is not at war with France. The treaty does not oblige him to yield us any fpeciHc aHiftance ; yet we give him more than the whole amount of the fubfidies, wnich in Queen Ann's war, we paid to our German allies all put together. We deliver up our money to him, for this one cogent reafon, becaufe he wants it •, and that feems the only thing there certainly determined, that he will have it : he will have it all at one payment, immediately upon the ratification ; the ufe he is to make of it, is to raife troops, to flrengthen himfelf, without his being obliged to fend a man to us -, he is to Hghc his own battles, and not ours * ; and by his victo- ries, to enable himfelf to demand the more of us. If by any of thefe treaties, he guaran- ties the Electorate, his aftions have already fhewn, that he underllands by it nothing more, than the not attacking it himfelf: for fo far was he, after the firft treaty, from fending an army to keep the French out of Hanover, that he withdrew his troops * The reader may fee this treaty in the appendix, which is the more worth his peruf^l, becaufe he will find no treaty like it, fince the time of King John, a out [ 42 ] out of Wefel, in order to let them in. The funis given, therefore, fcem not calculated to purchafe a defence, fo much as to keep off an at- tack ', that is, it is a confideration paid to buy off an evil of fuftcring, which is the ftrift definition of a tribute. And if B n will fingiy un- dertake the defence of fo remote a country, it muft fubmit to fee that famous fentencc reverfed : Airo, non Ferro, Liberanda eft. %\ * but the K. of P a is a great Prince j and B— — n may fubmit to pay him juft fourteen times the price *, which was agreed for the tedemption of Rome. Still there is no end of the troubles of the Eleftorate, upon this mif- taken plan of defending it ; for now, that we have difcovered to Europe our weak part, we have put it in the power of every the meaneft Prince in Germany to infult us, and make us buy it over again: for we can defend it againft none of them. I have already hinted the pofllbility of an Eledlor of Saxony's feeking an indemnification for his fub- jedls fufferings, on another Eledtorate, which he may think to have too largely contributed to them.. But Britain may not always have the honour of a crowned head to contend with. Suppofe a Duke of Wjrtemberg, as he has already changed his reli- il * A thoufand pound weight of gold. glOD: in to Br glOtl; [ 43 ] gion, pofTibly with a view to a tenth Elcflorate ; Ihoiild be fed with that hope, and pcrftindcd by tlie Imperial court to invade H— — r. Could Bri- taiii defend it againft him ? Not without an ex- pencc of many millions. Wc may think the troops of the Eledorate itfelf are a match for his, ami fo they are. But wc have heard of a French army's entering the Empire under the title of trooj)s of the Circle of Burgundy. Or, a peace being made, fol- dicrs of fortune enough may be brought, by the Court of Vienna's encouragement, and French money, to engage in that Prince's fervice. Qr why may not the French themfelves march down their troops to the Rhine, and break them on one fide of the river, to crofs over and become troops of Wirtemberg on the other ? This has been the method, in which the French have executed their treaties, even after a fpecific renunciation, which in our future treaty cannot be thought of *. To compleat the embaraflrnent, per- haps his majefty of P— a may choofe to hold the balance of power even between the two contending houfes of B k and Wertemberg : and Britain, by attempting things out of its power, may give that petty Prince the honour of beating • By the Pyrenean treaty, the French court formally aban- doned the Portuguefe. But Marfhal Schomberg went into Por- tugal, with a body of French troops ; whom he paid with the money of Lewis the XlVth, though he pretended to maintain them in the name of the King of Portugal. Theft; troop?, be- ing joined by the Portugueze forces, obtained a complete vic- tory at V'ilia Viciofa j which fixed the crown in the hoiife of Braganza. Voltaire. * G 2 us. I> t 44 1 US, with whom it is a difgracc to us to contend. Such arc the cftcfts of a miftakcn aft of duty. By thus confidcring a diftant country as a part of Bri- tain, and difcovering too great a fundnefs for it, we cxpofc th^ poor people of it to continual broils and mifcry, and intail perpetual ignominy on B n, by attempting to defend them. They may juftly come within our compalTion ; but for that very rea- fon, we ought to feparate our caufe from theirs, becaufe the) arc far removed out of our proteftion. Could the Electorate ever have been deligned to make a part of us, and to be thus tender to us as the apple of our eye ; it would have been placed under the guard of our front, and not out of the reach even of our hands *. * '^ But the two houfes of parliament, it is faid, have promifed that they will defend the Eleftorate. If they were fo improvident as to promife fuch a thing, we have now found it to be impoflible : * The author hope.s, that nothing in thefe (heets will be mlf- interpreted to the ditadvantage of a country, for which he thinks that every good fubjed ought to have the fincereft regard. 'Tis the poiniing out what appears to him the moil effeduai method of fecuiing Jt from the prefeni and future attacks of our enemie5, which makes one piir.cipal end of thefe confiderations. Much lefs would he knowingly Cdy any thing on the fubjeft, which fli'juld rotexprcfs the moft refpeflful duty ard reverence towards tlic Left of loverei^ns. He confiders the argument of the next head, of peried and iniperfeft obligation, as apointof ethics, and not of politicks : and therefore the reader may pafs it over, if the objection does not flrike him. the [ 45 1 the fault therefore mud be in the making fuch a pro- mife, and not in the non-performance of it •, bc- caufe no promife binds to impoHibilities. This is the (horc anfwer, and might fuflice. But pofTibiy, there may be thofe, who after having made their court, by running the nation into a greater expence lor the German war, than it had then the lead idea of •, may hope to make their cx- cufe to the people, by pretending that they have done it only in confequcnce of a former vote. Thus are Britain's trcafures to be lavilhed away in millions, and more money fpent on the German war alone, than the whole fea and land fervice coil in the Duke of Marlborough's cam[ ..igns ; and in- ftead of feeking to redrefs ourfelves, we are to be difputing who d'd it. If it has been wrong, and no one will avow the pall, let no one adopt the fu- i;ure. The time may come, when the nation, be- ing exhaufted by the German war. and perhaps in- timidated by that very Prince it is now upholding, may be forced to give up its own conqucfts to buy him a peace. Then every member of the admini- ftration will difown this excefTive regard to Germany, and each individual will fay, that for his part he was always againft it. If he expcdl that we Ihould then believe him, let iiim openly difown it now. Now let them (land up each in his place, and declare that they are for ferving their country, and defending Germany, in a prafticable way •, by attacking the French in their iflands, by which only they can ever be formidable to Britain, and thereby fe- curing ii if, ' 'A "t n I' ii [ 46 ] curing an ample indemnification for ^!iac pnrt of Germany, for wliich alone we ought to h.wQ any concern. Now they may put a flop o the ruinous part of the war ; and fave their c^rj.itry ; and fave ihcmfclves from the charge '. i having gained the good opinion of the public, by exprefsly declaring againfl thefc mcafures, aiiJ then making ufe of that popularity to c\rry them to an i/]{initely greater heighth, than any other men could have thought of. Now I fay, they may fa>e thcmfelves and fave the public ; but if they will go on, bid- ding againft each other, till their countries trea- fures fhall be exhnuited ; an injured nation, robbed of its beft conqu.jfts, mull then conclude, that they are all equally blameable. > Br.t the public faith is a fubjecn: we may- prance high upon ; and it may cafily be faid, that being once engaged, it ought facrcdly to be obferved. The public faith, engaged by adt of parliament, ui'on a valuable confideration given i as that given to creditors of the publick, who ad- vance money upon it, is duubth^fs a pt-rftx^ obliga- tion, and ought to be obferved with the ilri6lt.fl: iandity. But does any one really think, that a complimental addrefs of either, or both houfes of parliament, carries in it fuch a complete obligation ? Has the addrefs of either houfe, the validity of an aft of parliament ? The refoluuons of a houfe of commons, are in point of obligation on that fame houfe of commons (for upon a future one they lay no obligation at all) to be confidered as any other declaration of the refolutions of private men. They ouaht \s: [ 47 ] ought to declare no more than they really intend, iu fur as things then appear to them, to be confiftent with finccrity, and fo long as things conciniie in the (late, which they appeared in at the time of declar- ing thofe rcfoliitions, they are bound to keep to them, to preferve the character of conftancy. If upon trial made, they find the thing refolved on, to be either impoITible, or impradicable, or to be attended with much greater difficulties than they had imagined, or greater expence than the thing itfclf is worth, they may then, upon this better in- formation, alter thofe refolutions, without any imr peachmenteithei oi their finrerity or their conftancy. Every civilian knows, that this is the nature of an imperfi^6t obligation, or of a promife, made with- out a valuable confideration to be given for it. And every other man may kiiov/ how far a refolu- tion of the houfe of commons is to be depended on. They began the laft war with a refolution, as they did this -, and refolved that they would make no peace, till the Spaniards fliould renounce the right of fcarch -, and they never after thought any more of it. 1 mighc add, we fuffered our heads to be turned with German politicks ; ar-d inftead of conquering for ourftlvcs, we at lafl forgot both the Spanifh war and the French, and Ipcnt our money in Germany againfl: the King of Pruflia, for fear he fhould get, what we are now fpending ftili more millions to prevent his lofing, fend Should any one ftill urge, that the promife to de- e Ele<^orace, was not a fimnlf unp! V perfe(^ I'lV 13 \§ ■ [ 48 1 perfeft obligation, I now anfwer in the firft place, that the parlidment never did promife to defend it. The words of the addrefs are j Pf^e think our/elves bound in jujtice and gratitude to ajfift your Majefty agciinft infults and attacks^ that may be made upon any of your Majefty* s dominionSy though not belonging to the Crown of Great Brkain, in refentment of the fart your Majefty has taken in a caufe^ wherein the inter efts of this kingdom are immediately^ and fo ejfen- tially concerned. Tlie declaring, that they think ihcmfcivcs bound in juftice and gratitude to aflift in the defence of his Majefty's foreign dominions, is furely a very different thing from the taking upon themfelves the whole and abfolute defence of them. The very promife of afllfting another, carries in it, the fuppofition of the perfon himfelf, exerting his own force in the fame caufe ; other wife it is not af- fifting him, bu-t doing the thing ourfelves. And has the parliament failed in this promife ? Have they not done more than was promifed ? Have they not taken all the Eleftoral troops, which are in the field, into their pay, and far from not aflifting, born the expencc of the whole * ? Even formal Vi ^ * The argument here does not require, nor does the author intend any difrefpeftful fuppofition, that the Eleftorato has not contributed wha: it c3n to irs own defence. Poflibly the main- i'lance of its garrifons, and its civil government, may nearly ...iploy its whole force. The diftindlion intended, is, becween a -promife to afiift, and a promife abfolutely to defend, which are furely very different engagements. treaties T^ ial iin- rly leen lich [ 49 ] treaties cf alliance and mutual afTiftance between independent nations, do not bind cither party to any farther afliftance, than the obligation fpecifi- cally exprefled. Thus for inftance, to take the treaty, which that addrefs referred to •, by the treaty with RiifTia, the Emprefs v/as to aflift us with but fuch'a fpecific number of troops, and we were to aPlft her with fuch a fpecific fum of money. And even in cafes of the moll perfect and full al- liance ; where two States exprefsly covenant to af- fill each other totis viribus, as is the cafe between the Dutch and us, yet all the writers on the law of nations agree, that tliis covenant does not imply an obligation upon one State, to ruin itfclf in the de- fence of another. Succuram perituro, fed tit ipfe non peream, is the judgment of Seneca, ado, ted by Grotius. Defendi debent focii^ five in tnlelam fefe (^ fdem dioruin dederunf^ ftve mu^^.a .-'UxlHd pa5Ii fnnt. Illud 'vcro addamus, ne tunc quidem tcneri fociiim^ fi nulla /pes fit boni exitiis : boni enim, non mail caufa /octet as contrahitur *. We think ourfehes bound in juftice and grati- tude^ to affift againjl infulis and attacks : is not this the very language of compliment ? And can any one fuppofe, that this contains a perfedl obliga- tion, like that, which is made by a fpecific alhance between two independent nati ;ns, upon a valuable tonfideration given ? In the firft place, in refpccft ties '"* P'.fFend, & Grot. Lib. zdo. cap. 25 to. H of fl [ 50 ] of the party bound, it cannot affcif^ the people of England : for they can be bound only by an a6t of parliament ; and as to the houfe itfelf, it is in them a declaration of their prefent fentiments, and can- not preclude them from the right of altering thofe fentiments, upon farther information : becaufe, in the fecond place, the party, to whom the promife is made, being not to give any fpecific valuable confideration in confequence of that declaration, can have no ftridl right conveyed thereby to the performance. Should it be faid, that what had been ^ already done, was the valuable confideration given, every one mult fee that a favour voluntarily conferred before hand, cannot make the fpecific con- fideration of a future covenant. The only proper right, which that confers, is an obligation of gra- titude. But an obligation of gratitude, in the very idea of it, leaves the party obliged, a right of judg'ng of the nature and extent of the grateful re- turns he is to make. '. iS ■'IT'li' But it was then fai 1, tli it this fliould be the re- turn, the aflifting in cafe ol" attack. If therefore the obligation arifes out of the declaration of Parliament, then that promife can imply an obli- gatibn to nothing more, than what was meant by it at the time of making it Now there is no one, who remembers the paffing of thnt addrefs, but muft alfo remember, that at that time, and for at leaft a year after, it was the avi.wed fenfe of all parties, nnd confirmed by repeated alfurances, that 8 not m n- )re in ife ne r 51 ] not a man fhould be fent to the continent. Whether we fhould fend money or not, as fubfidies, to hire foreign troops, was made a matter of doubt, and the debate upon the motion, turned upon the fub- fidy treaties with RufTia, and with the Landgrave of HeflTe. But all parties exprefsly declared, that they would not fend a man out of the kingdom. Could it be conceived, even the next feffions, when repeated afilirances were given that no Englifh troops Ihould be fent to Germany, that the nation then adually ftood bound by the obligation of a promife, to fend thither a greater body of Britilh troops, and thofe to be under a foreign General too *, than the Duke of Marlborough was ever intruded with ? or than our great deliverer King William carried out with him, only to the mouths of the great rivers in the Netherlands ? If the nation then ftood bound by the obligation of fuch a promife, why did any gentleman mifiead the * Nothing in thefe (heets will be in-ended to ferve one party againit another. In comparing the B.itilh forces, leit to the continent in this war, and in foMuer ones, tiie contrail ib hciiih- teneJ by the greater number being fent to be under a foreign general. But if the nation is to rifJc fo great a body of its fubjedls under any goiieial ; furely we cannot havt; too g )cd an one. I could w,{\\ indeed, that he had been an Enj/liihnjan ; becaufe then we might have valued ourii.-]ves upo/i \m grent abilities, aF more certainly ours. Whereas, if the p.c.qn'. fy;,em of our adopting German qnarrels fhould be continued, it may very pofiibly be our chance, in the next war, to hi'.ve all thofe ^ibilities employed agiiuft us. H 2 publick I! Sit, [ 51 ] publick by fuch afllirances to the contrary ? If the addrefs did not contain any fuch promife, whence ^his failure in his own ? ,^ , • , " In fliort, men may talk big about the publick faith, but every one knows what is meant by a re- folution of the houfe. li they thought that fuch a declaration might be of ufe to deter the K. of P a from entering the Eledorate, it was a kindnefs done to it, or intended at lead, to make it. Certainly it was a proper a6l of duty, to let the world Cee, by fuch a declaration, the ftrid har- mony, which fubfifted between his Majefly and his fubjcds. E".it no one ever thought before, that fuch a refolution implied any thing more than an intention to afTift in a reafonable degree, and in a pradicable manner. And, if we found one way of doing it too heavy a burden for us, tiien to try another. And if, upon all the other powers in Germany failing us, or de- claring againfl us, we found that our afTiftance mud at laft be ineffedlual ; then t(i attack the French on their coalts, and in the Eaft and Weft-Indies, fo much the more vigoroufly, in order to obtain by our conquefts, an indemnity to our friends for \ their paft fufferings, and a full fecuricy againfl any future attacks. Ncc fervanJa prcmijfa^ qu^e fint lis, quihus framferis inutilia, necji plus tibi noce- anti <}tiam illi profmt^ cut promiferis^. • Ci:. de OlF. The l<,i:!i [ 53 ] The reader may by this time probably be fully fatisfied on this head : and therefore I willingly omit the infilling on another plea, which totally fcts afide the obligation of any promife. And that is the change in the llatc of the parties, whiv.h has been twice made fince that declaration. Let it be a promiff, yet it was lo defend the Electorate a^ainfl: the K. of P a and the French, the reft of the Empire being with us ; and to take a body of HefTians, and fifty-five thoufand Ruffians into our pay, who were to fight for the defence of it. If after that, the affiftance oficred be renounced, and a new agreement made with the K. of P a, who was not bound by it to fend a man to fight in any caufe of ours, and who would embroil the E e with the Empire ; does a promife of granting alliftance in one way, give a claim to it in every other way ? The promife was, to pay Ruffians to fight again ft P ns ; is the paying P ns to fight againft Ruffians, due to the per- formance? -, , Still the Bricifli nation cxprclfid its duty as it ought i and though the Ruffian force was thrown into the oppofite fcale, took upon itfelf the pay of all the Hanoverian troops that v/ere fighcing in the fi-rid in defence of their own country, and a body of Heffians befide ; when the rl n chancery made a fecond total change in the flate of parties, and agreed to leave the FrcPiCh in pofTcffion of their country. II I m [ 54 ] country. Here was a total renouncing of all their connexions with Britain, though their troops were then aflually in its pay. That neutrality was, it is faid, made without the knowledge of the Englilh government, certainly without the knowledge of parliament J and that therefore could not be bound by its confequences. A total change therefore hav- ing been twice made in the ftate of parties, from that which fubfifted at the time of making thofe ad- drefles, all the plea of obligation from them ceafed. Tunc fide?n jallam^ tunc inconfiantia crimen audiam, Jt cum omnia eadem ftnty qua erant promittenle me^ non pr;e over I-'rance, than even 1 lenry the Second brou^^ht with liini to tlie crown, with half the j)rovinces oi France in h.is polleflion. We have now a mure iniportaiu alternative ollered to our choice, than will probably ever be propo.fed to us again. We have now no Ids an option to make, than whether we will lavilli away live millions a year in (lermany, without a polilbility ol' doin^j; that or I'aigland any good, and annually run the kingdom ten millions in debt j till it Ihall be at Kngth cxhaulh'd, and unable to defend eitlier : or whethir we will realize to this nation a revenue of five millions a year f >r ever, at our enemies cx- pence i ami totally dilable France hereafter Irom raifmg a marine power, which can ever be in any degree formidable to Britain. Whether we will rin^ our countries ruin in a German war, which tends to nothing ; or whether we will conquer for ourfclves [ 57 ] Ourfclvcs and Gf rmany boili, by fccuring an ample indcmnilicatiou for the palt iuncrinj^s ot the TJcc- toratf, anil circdiially dcterinfi; our enemies from any tuture iiivafion of ir. Let us but go on, and by one more eafy conc|uell;, difable the navy of France from ever riflii{^ again, and the jxace of this ifland is then fixed on its lirm and proper bafis ; and we may thenceforward look on all the (]uarrcl8 of the continent with indiiVcrencc. And what is this Germany to Britain ? Could wc but be true to ourfclvcs, and purfuc the advantage, which providence has put into our hands, and by fcizing om* enemies iflands, make ourfclvcs maflcrs of that t adc : wc might then give the French the offer of peace or war, as long as they plcafcd: for all the motives for our going to war with them, and all the means of their coming to war with us, would be at an end. I,et then the French rage as they pleafe j let them bribe and threaten the feveral Ger- man courts, till they fliall learn to unite j let the Empire fuffcr French armies to rnaich from the Rhine to the utmotl Danube ; and piL lage every city in their paffage, from Manheim to Belgrade j all thcfe cannot build them a finglc frigate to annoy our coaft with. Britain may then calmly look on in fecurity ; and thankful for its own independence, need feci no other fcntiments arife upon the occafiun, than thofe of Chriftian compalfion. Not that any thing of this nature really would happen. On the contrary the peace I of 't I 58 ] if Germany would be letter fecurcd, as well as ihat ot* Bricain. For the great fourcc of their wciltli being cut off witli their iilands, the 1 rcncli would thcncdbrward be as little able to march their armies out of their own territory, and maintain tlicm in Germany, as the Germans are now to fend their arniits into France. Should this prove too great a hapiiincfs, for us to be allowed to conquci for ourfclves -, we mud then fight for the K. ot P — a*s glory, and a foreign intcrcil, in a German war, which I have faid, is a war that is luinous and impracflicable. I fliall now give my rcalons for k. And, lull In the firfl; place, this is a war, in which Britain ftanus fingle and alone, to cunt nd at land with France. And how much focvir wc may flatter ourfclves with the notion of our own flrength, and the French weaknefs, France is at this time, as it has been for a century pad, fuperior to us at land. I have in the beginning ot tliefe confidcrations, put tliis among my poUulata ; but our news writers, who gcneially fet the opinions of the times, have been fo ftrongly exhibiting the ^reatnefs of the En- gl ifli force, that I know not whether I may be allowed to rank it below the French. The reader however will remember, that I am not now fpeak- iiig of our nival flrength ; and if we could be per- fuadedtoule that power more, and talk cf it lels, we might perhaps be afling a wifer part. But in comparing the land force of the two nations, tho' we i^^i ^ i r r,^ I wp may happen tlils year to liavctlu; h'^fter grncrn], yet for thcfc fouifLorj years {);i(t, all l'".ur()[ic Ins hen complaining of the txoi bitunt i)o\vct of I'lancc. Eichcr this meant nothing at all, or it nioanr, that France was more [powerful tiian any other llatc. Stronger than Geimany for i:i[uincc, aiul certain- ly (Ironrcr than Ilollancl, or than I'.nglanil, which has ordinarily kept up fewer land forces, than either of the oiher two. Soon after the revolution, France alone maintained a War againd Spain, Ger- many, Holland, and J'.ngland, witii Denmark and Sweden in the lame alliance. And for fcvcra! years carried on a war of equality, frcqiieiitly a war of offence againfl: them all. And in the beginning of this century, France, and part of S]>ain, fup- portcd a war of ten years refiflance, again ll England, Flolland, and (Jermany, with Denmark, Savoy, and Portugal, united in the fame caufc. Froni th:.t time all parties among us have been complaining, that the treaty of Utrecht gave the French too much power. And I fuppofe the reve- rence for the preceding adminiftrations, during the two laft reigns, has not been fuch as to make us iay,t[iat thcfuperior abilities of our former miniders, have given fo great a check to the French land force, as to turn the whole balance of power in our favour, in the laft war, France difmantled the barrier of Flanders, and railed up a new power in the Empire to counter-balance the natural head of it : can it then be fnppofed that France, which v/as able to brave all Europe in two preceding war?, I 2 is tiV IS:;' l'\' ' ''"' t 60 ] IS now all at once, in the beginning of the prefent war, reduced fo low, as to be inferior in its Jand force to England alone ? And that tor> without having fuffered any material lofs in it, tho* France maintained a feven years war againft the grand alliance, after the lofs of forty thoufand of its bell troops at Blenheim, and after having twenty thoufand rnore killed and taken at Ramiliies, ftill held out five years longer. But how can England be faid to (land fingle and a'one, when it has an alliance with the magnani- raous K. of P a ? Not, I fear, againft France : for he has never declared war v,rith it. Againft the Houfe of /^uftria, he is a willing ally -, but we are now confidering the force of England againft J ranee -, and when Britain is already engaged in a war with France, can it be the ftronger for adopt- ing another Prince's quarrel with the Houfe of Auftria ? We may eafily perfuade otirfelve^ that he is an ally againft France j but it may not be eafy to lliew any thing in the convention of the nth of April, or the fuccecding treaty, which will con- vince htm of it. Pofiibly he may tell us, that that convention regards only the liberty of the Germa- nick body •, and that France, though occafionally in the preamble, is not once mentioned in the arti- cles themfelves, nor any thing elfe relative to the Englifti war with it^ That the common intereft means only the intereft >f their two houfes againft the [ 6. ] the archducal •, and that this convention cannot re- fer to a war with France, h/ccaufe the two parties covenant not to make any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, without comprehending each other in it: which, he may allege, proves that the treaty only refers to their German quarrels, becaufe he Wants no treaty of peace or truce with France, being at peace with it already. I do not fay that this would be a jufl: plea -, but if he fhould think proper to make it, England then (lands alone in its war with France, as much as if it had not that alliance with his Majefty of P— — againfl the Emprefs Queen. n Hiat la- illy tti- jhe left ift the But dill however he is an ally. By a treaty which obliges us to furnifh him with money, only becaufe he wants it, and .which therefore he will never ceafe to want ; and which, upon reading it over, we (hall be apt to think, will not oblige him to furnifh us either with money or troops, (hould we want them ever fo much. Nothing is more com- mon, than to hear the wars of the two great allian- ces condemned as confuming wars ; becaufe Eng- land, it was faid, paid all. Yet all the fubfidies, which King William paid to German Princes, at a time when they had two hundred thoufand men fighting againft France, do not amount to the half of the fub(idy, we now pay to the K. of P— — alone, who could not, or would notgarrifon one of his beft towns for us. In Queen Anne's war, for the fubfidy of fifty thoufand pounds, we not only fent eight :1 [ 62 ] cightthoufand Pruflians to fight the Fr .nch in Savoy, but had twelve thoufand more in our pay in Flan- ders. We now pay him fix hundred and fcventy thoufand, for which he calls us 'an ally, and fuf- fcrs us to fight the French ourfelvc s. Wli.ic then have we gained by this ally ? Two tliii^.gs : the one is the being obliged to pay him money to en- able him to fight his own battles, agninft enemiesi which Britain has no quarrel with : the other is the driving the reft of German Princes into a cloHr union with France, and making ourfelves obnoxi- ous to Europe for fupporting this ally : can it be fuppofed that Britain is the flronger for either of thefe ? f;^i But Is he not a man of great abilities ? Doubt'cfs Tie is fo -, and one cf the cleareft proofs of it, is his obliging us to pay him fix hundred and feventy thoufand pound for nothing. In that refpedl he is certainly the greatefi: Prince, ever known to Britain before. Yet with all that enormous fum, which is a five times greater fubfidy, than we paid to any Ger- man Prince in Qiicen Anne's war, and with all his great abilities, he is but jult able to fland himfelf : and we call him an ally, and fancy that he fupports m. We confefs he lives by miracle, and are won- dering every year that he does not fall : and yet this is the Prince, which w'e have placed our only dependence on. We take a pleafure in recounting the , number of enemits he has to contend with, without . . ' ' ' once' once ccnficlc;ing, that ours, by uphold incr h r ^3 .1 1111] mies of to us, we nv,i-e tJ, T "°''"""^ ^P-^^ce he is t'lnce ; and prove i,i,n to b- th hn I '"'P°'- t^in ever lud, Ix-caut- h" c;ft ;„ ''"' '■"'^' ^'"^ «"- ^1- Baron Bo.l.n..r in qLe, I """"^ "''"' ^''«'» -ai-biea,Iy: 'or he leL u" fw f- -- a -gin.e„cofdr.s„o„s. The^\^^:f^' P^^^^- « fo- th,s w.,-, vvirhout making 'nv.'"^" *"rn,(h.s u. for our money with a brl V"?'"' ''= new enemies, i„it,,,i ^f „,., .^'"'"'"^'' « with leaft r„cccft we ,ain, dra""; r"^' ' V°" the ft-iof adding to ;hem,2;r;;:;^"> - >n clear n,o,:,.,:y j,ft fi, ,,^,„ ;^;7 year to „, iand pounds ie,'s than nod.irl ' '^"'"'^ 'h""' But when we have enabled him to r„ his enemies, he wiii then hein „,7„ "'5"^'" ^^ The Britift ..own and parhC;"::'?" °""- tlin.'g b.t what is iuP- . hnr I ■ ^''"'^ "'o- ';w.f..htiie.o^;\-t;rrc:r^''°^^ always govern'd by the ftriftea ruie oft "' T Thar practice has often been J ". 8 "f"<1e. ftnmients fit for their vuZ'" '", '"'^ °"' for in- ailies, and perfwade to 2;^^ '''''''" ^■'" ft ft. and then to cave tl f"'^' ^'"^ 'hen. thcr own as they 7 T, '° '"""''-■'^" ^^ ''<> tiMe advant.:,.., fon^IL, " T""''' '° '''^''- ft>- ••»-»».:;:. ~ 7£r t:;te , think [ 64 ] think that our fears for the Eleftorate make his beft fecurity for the continuance of his fubfidy, he may not think it for bis intereft to remove thofe fears. On the other hand, many perfons may think that Britain may find it a much harder tafk to conquer his, than it will to conquer its own enemies, if he be not one of them : If he fhould be one, the Jefs we conquer for him the better. ijii mi But he is certainly a very great Prince. So we read in our papers about three hundred times a-year. Whe- thcrthe true ftandard of a Prince's greatnefs confift, in his making his own people happy, or thofe of other countries miferable, is a quellion, which we are not concerned in. But however, we may admire him as a great warriour, or whatever be our idea of his greatnefs, he can never be a ufeful ally to Britain, or contribute in the lead degree to ours. What is it that this revival of his claim to Silefia muft probably end in ? Poflibly, during his life, by means of his fuperior abilities, and by making fometimes France help him, and fometimes Eng- land, he may be juft able to keep it : but in the mean time he has involved himfelf and his family in a quarrel never to be ended with the Houfe of Auftria, which will feize every opportunity to re- cover it. Can then a Prince be a ufeful ally to Britain, or afford us any real affftance, who needs it fo much himfelf, and knows that he has a deter- mined enemy catching at every occafion tofurprize him ? Before that either of them can be of any fer- vicc t 65 ] vice to Britain, they muft at leaft be out of danger themfelves. Which from the nature of their quar- rel they never can be free from. Should our pre- fent ally beat his rival, and force the Emprefs Queen to a treaty ; that cannot produce the leaft degree of confidence between them. Silefia is to the Auftrian family fo great an objed in itfelf, and fo very neceflary to the defence of the reft of their Turkifli Frontier, that they never really will give it up. A treaty will be nothing more than a fuf- penfion of fighting. AH the faith of treaties is at an end with them. He knows that the firft inftant they can attack him to advantage, they will break the treaty, from the very fame principle, upon which he revived his claim. In fliort^ the two houfes are committed in an eternal war, which can never end, till one of them is abfolutely fubdued; Neither of them therefore can be of the leaft fervice to Britain, while the other furvives. Did ever any one think of gaining affiftancc from either of two fpent warriors, which it faw agonizing in a ftruggle for each other's deftrudion ^ To France they may cither of them be a natural ally : becaufe it is the intereft of France to keep up continual wars in the Empire, France will naturally fupport the weaker. But Eng- land has no intereft to ferve by the internal wars of the Empire : on the contrary, we can never hope for any good from it, but in its union. The intereft of England therefore, firice there can be no peace between them, is ro let them fight out their quar- K rcl. [ 66 ] rel. When one of them is fubdued, the other will be glad of our aUiance, and then only will be wor- thy of having it. ' • • m\ fl.V<-' ! 1 1 1 1 i ill ■I And what is all this flaughter of German Pro- trftants to end in ? Probably he will either fall in bat- tle, or fee Silefw loft in his. lifetime, his fucceflbi* at leaft will not have the fartie opportunities, or the fame addrcfs to make France and England al- ternately exhauft themfelves in his defetice: and Will probably be i^orced to give it up •, after feeing Hn ample vengeance taken on his own dominions^ for all the ravages committed on the Auftrian. -Will he then appear to have been the friend of Proteftantifm, for having in his lifetime twice ra- vaged one Proteftant Eledorate, held a continual rod over another, and at his death given to the Papifts, a pretence totally to ruin his own. And tliis is the Prince, whom, becaufe the French firfl: raifed him up to imbroil one part of German y» and becaufe we know that he can too eafily join with them to imbroil another, we call a. great man, and' think that we can never enough admire bim. Nay, are nurfing and making grt^ater, to enable h'uxi to demand of Britain fo much tie more, and to ferve France fo much the better. For to France only he can be a ferviceable ally : to B- ■ ■ ■ n he can be at moft, but the terror of an Electorate, the idol of the crc .d, and. the Hero of a News. Paper. -^ ,. v;^;j.ji* wi ;;"'.• :;il: *jw;-r. t •><^ I 1 ;i(' [ 67 ] I return therefore to my firft pofuion, that in this German war, Britain ftands fingi? and unaided againft France : and the land forces of France arc more numerous than thofe of England. We may be told perhaps, that riches are the fi- news of war j and our news papers will teach us to value ourfelves upon our having contradled eigh;; or twelve millions of new debt this year, (for I know it may be cqnfider*d differently) as much as if we had paid ofF fo many of the old. But mo- ney will not hire troops to fight in a caufe, which all the powers of Europe are averfc to. Will the Ruffians, or Swedes, or any of the States of th« Empire lend us forces to fight againft themfelvcs ? Have not the Dutch and Danes refufed us ? Can xht King of P a help us ? On the contrary, is he not daily fending recruits to our enemies .? By ravaging Saxony he is driving its Proteftant inha- bitants to defpair, and laying them under the hard . neceffity of reforting for bread to their Prince Xa- vier's ftandards in the French arm]-. The refour- ces of our enemies are infinite. France exceeds Great Britain in the number of its people, and by the nature of its government, is able to fend out as many of its fubje6ls to its military fervices, as their King fhall be pleafed to order : and befidcS its own fuperior rcfoyrcesi France has Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Flanders to recruit out of. What has England to oppofe to all . thcfe ? No- thing but the bodies of its own fub^cds, which can .' ,-u K 2 very r li !!'«' I'' I ' [ 68 ] very ill be fpared from its agriculture and manu- factures, and the levies from the diftrids of Hano- ver and Hefie. We may think that we have been ra- ther fucccfsful in Germany in the two laft campaigns, which perhaps may eafily be accounted for : but is it poflible not to fee the inequality, in tfie num- bers of men at leaft, which there is between us and bur enemies ? ^•.. 1 . Can England then, by its money alone, be a match for all Europe ? If we were fo, is it fit that we Ihould wantonly declare it, and thereby give umbrage to every other ftate ? Money may, in a qualified fenfe, be allowed to be the finews of war i but it muft find men to make up the flefh and fubftance of our armies, which, in the prefent ftate of Europe is impoffible. In fliort, all things have their fixt meafure and bounds ; and the pre- fent war continuing, and parties remaining aflfefled as they now are, increafe the French revenue to the double of what it is, you cannot render the French navy equal to the Englifli ; nor could the fame addition of wealth to England make its num- ber of land forces equal to the French. ^■m-- I 'V ■I': !■■ ? Thus far we have argued upon the fuppofition, that the EngliQi revenue was greater than the French. But is that the real ftate of the cafe ? The ordinary revenue of France, I fear, is greater than that of England. What the amount of the French revenue is, I confefs I do not know •» but I V^T t. -t form le? [ '59 ] form my judgment upon the view of it, which was given us the laft fcfllons, by a gentleman, who from his office, may be fuppofed to underftand it beft : and who very candidly dated the fubjedt, and left his hearers, if they had pleafeci, to draw the con- fequences. The ftanding revenue of France, wc were then told, is twelve millions ; five of them are anticipated, and the remaining feven, fubjecl to any deficiencies in the other five, make the prefent revenue of France. Befide this, they have borrow- ed two millions ; and thefe nine millions make the whole fund of France for carrying on the war ; which he was pleafed to fay, was a fum, very in- adequate to the expence of fuch a war. Now then let us confider, what is the Engliih revenue to op- pofe to this. The ftanding revenue of England for carrying on a war, is only the land and malt tax, ^vhich amount to two million feven hundred and fifty thoufand pound : to which may be added, fo much as can be taken out of the finking fund : though fome perfons may confider that as already pre-engaged. But allowing however a million and half to be taken thence, we have then four million to oppofe to the French revenue of feven million. But befide this, we have borrowed for this year, twelve millions ; eight millions on annuities, and four on the finking fund. Go on then for two ' years longer on this plan : France at the three years end, will be fix millions in debt ; and England, if we reckon the twelve millions borrowed, will be thirty- Il 1«l> 1 1 I 70 ] thirty-fix. If we will allow but the eight millions borrowed, Hngland will be twenty-four millions in debt. Can we need a more convincing proof, that this is a ruinous war ? • " •) .i But why are the French nine millions, a fum very inadequate to the expence of fuch a war? No one chofe to afk the qucftion, though every thing was ftatcd with the greateft fairnefs and prccifion. Fifteen millions is certainly a greater fum than nine. But France has fitted out no fleet this year. Our navy cofts us five million fix hundred thoufand pounds j •' )Ugh it has been ^11 the fum mer employed in no one ofFenfive fervice. This at once reduces the ftock of the two nations for the land war,, to nine millions, and ten millions. Add to this, the charges of tranfporting men and horfes ; the fleet of tranfports to be kept always in readinefs for every emergency •, the difference of Englifh and French pay ; and the much greater facility, which the French have of recruiting and fupporting their troops from the Rhine and Main ; confider thefe, and many other difadvantages we are under -, and we fliall not think the French nine millions a fum at all inadequate to any purpofes, which we can effed at tiiat diftance with our ten* ^ Their ordinary revenue, if they have feven millions, on the prefcnt plan of the war will enable them to ' bring more men into the field, without borrowipg . at all, than we can by getting every year eight mil- lions in debt. Every ten* )ns9 io rery r 7> T - Every one, who has t'loiight on the fubjjcl of war» mijft have confidcrcd the three different kinds of it: a war of offtMice, a war of equality, and a war of defence. And every one knows, that of thtfe, the laft is moft difadvantanjeous and the moftdif- ficult. Where an army is to defend itfelf only, a general will find employment for all his attentions : but if it be to defend a long traft of country •, un- lefs the attacking general be greatly inferior in his art, he will iifually prevail. The reafon is, that the general, who afts ofFenfively, has it in his own choice, when and where to direft his main force ; whereas the defender muft equally divide his : and if the attacking general fail in one inftance, he fuf- fers little, but is ready to try another : and feme where, at fome unguarded time, he will find an opportunity to come with five thoufand, where the defenders have but one. Lines of defence may perhaps be made effcflual in countries, cut by im- paflable canals, where there is no marching but on the Dykes of them : and yet, even there, the French never turmed lines, which the Duke of Marlborough did not pafs : but an inland open country, like Hanover and HefTe, is not to be co- vered, but by a fuperior army ; and that ought not to do it, but to ad: ofi'enfively. The Duke of Cum- berland found it fo in the firft campaign ; our fuc- ceeding general, with all his abilities, has found it fo ever fmce* Both fummers the French have for- ced their way into Hefle at leaft, which he was co- verinff, as well as Hanover : and the French have every !r . But when we had beat the French out of Ger- many, We would go and affifl the king of Pruflla. Againlt whom .'' The army of the Empire ? Hritain has no quarrel with the Empire of its own •, and it has been already fliewn, that it never can be the intered of Britain to abet the quarrels of the members of th^ * It will not be a jullification of this part of the war, to (ay that wc have had great fuccefs elfcwherc; bccaufc I Ihall here- after (hew that the war in Germany has not in the Icalt deorce contributed to our fuccefles in any other pai t 6f the world, but either hindered or retarded them. M z Em- J! ^1:1 ri ■' [ 84 ] Empire againft each other. Can wc give to France a greater plcafure than to fee us, their declared ene- my, employed in a war with the empire, their moll dangerous rival ? Shall we then attack the Auilrian army ? The Emprefs Qi.iccn is not at war with us. And has not Britain enemies enough already, with- out going into l.afb Germany to feek for more ? But they are ail enemies of the king of PrulTia. And are we fi bjcfls of the king of PrufTia ? He is our ally. By a treaty which obliges us to no fuch thing. We guarantied Silefia. In the fame terms as he did H r, which he was going to attack. But he needs our afliftante. Are then the Britifli troops never to fee an end of their labours ? Arc our men and treafures fo very numerous, that we Ihould fend our fubjecfls to feek out Bohemians, Hungarians, Bofnians and Sclavonians, Bannatines and Warafdiners, and twenty other people of theEaft, with whom we never had the lead concern ^ Are we fure that we can conquer Auftrians, Ruflians, and Swedes, all in one fummer fo intirely, as that his M ' of P may not need our afliftance the next fummer, when the French will invade the Electorate with frefh force ? If we (hould help him to conquer all his enemies, are we fure that he would be the better friend to us for his not needing our af- fiftance ? Are we fuie that the price of his friend- fhip woukl not rife with the importance of it ? Is it certain that he would return our kindnefs, and help us againft the Fre.ich ? Let us at Jeaft have a treaty to oblige him to it ; and not trult it [at Ice »e [ 85 ] It, as it now is, merely to his gratitude. Dk\ he not in the lafl war quit the French, who were his makers, as foon as he no longer wanted them ? Thefe and a thounind other qiuUions ought to be anfwerid, before \vc refblvc on fcntling our army into Ka(l Germany. We once profcflcd never to trull our troops beyond the mouths of the great rivers of the Kms and Wefer: but whither are they to go, that are to fight the K. of l^ruflTia's battles. If our army is to go fo far into the inland parts of Germany, how is it to ad ? Shall it join the K. of P a.^ And are Britons then doom*d to fight, not only under a foreign general, but under a foreign king too ? He will probably ufe them foon, know- ing that they will foon be weary of being fo ufed. Shall ihey then acft by thcmfelves ? Where are their magazines ? Shall the- follow them too from limb- den to Bredaw ? If - nation is now brought a millio.i and half in dci for th( article of forage, how many millions will lupply us at that diflance? Not to a(k how Knj^lifhmcn arc to find their way back, if they fhould be cxpofcd and routed ; let us fuppofe him and them 'o be vidloiious, and to ob- lige his enemies to treac with hnn -, and let us fu|.- pofe this German prince to i^e a more taithful and more grateful ally than any other German prince ever was to us , nd that he would really afilft us againft France, v v hat could he do for us ? He might join ov. : rmy, and beat the French out of Hanover. Be itfo. Still P'itain mud be at the cxpence, and ftill keep up an army there, and our fub- IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) 1.0 I.I ■-i^ ||2.5 I us ||^o 1.8 1.25 ||U J4 ■^ 6" — ► PhotDgraphic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MA ;N STREET iVEE.TR,N.Y. 14580 (716)872-4503 \ V SJ \\ 6^ k '^^ '9. ^ [ 86 ] fubfidies miift ftill go on. Probably his would rife upon it, and he might then infift upon a million. Has he not without this been attempting an increafe already ? i ! ill i But let his fubfidy remain the fame, and let the French be driven out of Germany ; What advantage would Britain receive thereby ? Why when the French could no longer come into Hanover, and make war with us, they muft make peace. Nothing lefs. So long as we could keep his M- of P in humour, and he fhould find himfclf at leifure to guard us, the French might ceafe to invade the elec- torate. But why fhould that oblige them to fue for peace ? Is the French government at an end, when they have no longer an army in Germany ? Will their provinces, their people, or their revenues be the lefs, for their armies not croffing the Rhine? The Hanoverians, if the Pruflians and they agree together, may be at reft for a fummer ; but why fhould the French cry out for peace, when nobody hurts them .? Surely, it is not enough that they do not hurt us ; we muft hurt them before they will fue for peace. For that then we muft attack them in their iflands, and take from them all they have left : that will drive them to a peace, or pay us the annual expence of a naval war. If then v;e muft recur at laft to our fleet, and make the peace for ourfelves *, why take fo immenfely wide a circuit, to come at a point which lies ftreight before us ? Why run the nation thirty millions more in debt, to do grec why )ody ' do will em ave the uft for ,to 3 ? to do [ 87 ] . do 'that two or three years hence, which might have been done laft winter, by which we might have fecured a peace and indemnification for [-lanover at the French expence •, and by which, now that North America is ours, we (hall have it in out own power to put an end to the war, whether the French choofe it or not : No matter whether they will treat with us -, from that time they can- not have a fhip at fea, nor a poffibility of coming at us. The channel and our fleet would keep the peace •, we fliould not want to get any thing from them, and they would not be able to get any thing from us. _ ... Many of my readers might think it unneceiTary to purfuc this argument any farther ; but ftrongly prepoflefled as the nation has been, there is no end ofraifing fuppofitions . in favour of this K of P . I have heard it faid that he would make the Emprefs Queen, make it a condition in her peace with him, that flie Ihould join her forces to his, and alTift us againft France. But we muft have helped him to beat her five times fucceflively, before Ihe could confcnt to fight againft her ally : whereas, hitherto, he has been nearly as often beaten as vic- torious. But be it fo, let them both come to our aid. We fhall then have two armies in Hanover : a Pruflian, and an Auftrian army : Hanoverian auxiliaries, in Britifh pay. The poor Hanoverians, I am afraid, would not thank us for bringing two fuch forts of guefts into their country. Perhaps, * they ^1 f .1 K! ii [ 88 J thty vvoiifd as foon choofc to fee the Frertcli there, ;is a PruIOan army and an Auifti-ian. d :/;j...' .. (., Let them then goout of it, and both, in conjunc- tion with the Englifli army, march and attack the French upon the Rhine. Still we are not upon fo good a plan as the old Revolution fyftem, when the Ger- mans had three armies invading France upon their own account^ and in their own pay. Let us fuppofe them then to be generous enough to fight the French upon their own pay, and that the Empire and the Dutch would join them, and all declare war againft France. Should we not then wifh all that flower of the German youth, thofe hundred thoufands, which the French, for thefe four yeifs pad, have with plea- fure feen cutting each others throats, fliould we n6t then, I fay,, wifh them all alive again to flrengthen 9ur battalions,' and thicken our fqiiadrons in the com- mon caufe ? And is not this, the very pofition, which :vve fet out With in thefe Confiderations ; that it was fhe French ihlereft, and not the Englifh, which was ferved by civil wars in Germany ? And thus, after having grjmted every thing on this head which the fondeft prefiimption could have alked ; after having heaped up fuppofitions upon each other without end to fervc the prefent fyftem, and made the greateft improbabilities concur to favour it, we fhould, af- ter all, be brought two or three years hence, to that ftate of Europe, which in former wars we fat out in ; witia this ftill remaining difference, of England's jbcing.cxhaufted of its trcafuiTes, and Germany of its • ,.4 I troops. ring [ 89 ] troops. So much better things were the old grand alliances, than the new continental connexions. >4Jii In fhort, if we are to perfid in this ruinous and impra<5ticable German war, let the wealth and power oi' the nation be as great as they will, it is England and not France v/hich muft fuc for a peace. What- ever be OLir fuccefles, France is untouched ; when- ever the French government knows that they can fend thither an army fuperior to ours, they will at- tack us; whenever we are too flrong for them, they will not fend : But, far from being ruined by the intermifliOn of a fingle campaign in Germany, they are thereby only made the ftronger for the next. Why then ihould France fue for peace, when at worft they have only to (land dill, and keep their money at home, and their troops upon their fron- tiers, holding the appearance of marchi::g into Ger- many, and our ruin is compleated : for we muft be at ftill the fame expence -, and after having got fix and thirty millions in debt, muft go on to eight and forty. • : v:;^.Ij. " ; But we have been fo long talking of the magna- nimity of our ally, that many perfons will not give up their opinion of his ability to ferve us. He has been called the magnanimous by too great an au- thority to admit a doubt of his having it in his do sreat power things fuch perfons, it may be of ufe to think of his will: and refieft a little on what foundation that general 1 • J%J. N per- m: - i ;;.'. ! I 90 J psrfuafion refts, of his being fo much our friend, • or how far we can determine whether he is moft in- clined to do us good or hurt. The entering into this confideration will be an apology to the reader for having prefumed to differ fo much from the re- ceived opinion ; and as what I have to offer will . chiefly confift of reminding him of paft fads^ he will himfelf judgp of their confequences. One of the inconveniencies, neceiTarily ariling out of the number of our prefent news writers, is tlieir being ail of them obliged to aim at popularity. Hence whatever happen to be the prevailing opinion of the time, thefe are vying with each other, which ihall fay moft in favour of that opinion *, and carry the conclufions drawn from it to the greateft height. And as at lead ninety nine hundredth parts of thepeo- ple take their opinions from the papers, every thing is hereby run to excefs. Wife men repeat whac weaker men write v not thinking themfelrcs con- cerned to exercife their judgment, about matters de- rived from fo flight an authority j but they are heard as their own, and thereby acquire the flrongefl au- thority. Great men in their country retirements talk the news in common converiation, not as really matter of their opinion -, but merely to find chat for their country vifiters ; fools repeat this after them, with the addition of Such a great man told nie : and thus by the fcafon when gentlemen come to town, thefe crude fancies are ripened up for them ; and ferlously reprefented as the fenfe of the nation. Le£ r 9« ] L^t any raan recoiled the feveral violent prejudices, which the kingdom has ^un into* and he will Hnd mod of them derived from this iburce. Not to go Co far back as the laft war, when the magnanimity of the Queen of Hungary, and the perfidioulhels of the K. of P , were the favourite topicks > let him think only how the prefcnt war opened with the mod violent encomiums on the bravery and good conduct of General Blakeney. Not a day paft for three months together, without our reading fome article or other in his favour. And all thefe things affirmed, and received for true, during a time, when from the very circumftances of the fiege and the ifland, every man might have known, that no one could have received a fingle line from him or the garrifon ; and when, for a-^y thing thefe writers could t€ll, this old gentleman might have been dead a fortnight before the fiege of St. Philips began. Yet what was faid by the news-writers upon fo flight a foundation, was repeated by gentlemen in the country i and by winter when they came to parlia- ment, this was confidered as the ienfe of the nation, and he was made a lord upon the credit of it. Af- ter him the K. of P became the favourite of thefe authors. Had he done any thing for Britain ? Had he in his former life ever (hewn the lead fa- vourable difpofition to us ? Had we not long been condemning him as ferving the caufe of France, raifing a civil war in the empire, and embroiling our allies, and making the mod folemn treaties give way to his ambition ? Did we not think him ac N 2 lead " '. 11 ^i, i f «'^; m \ 9? 1 lead capable of penning mcmoriah, which were appeals to the people againlt our government, and keeping a minifter here to converlli among our merchants, and fprcad thefe feeds of ciralijclion ? Did he not appear to us a^. a princes that .n ihe mere wantonncls ot malice, was bravinr^ tjic nation's honour at fea ; fpeaking in the mod tiiirerptctful terms of our late gracious fovereign at his own court; and infuking him at others by feading one of our rebels for an ambafiador ? 1:1 ad we not condemned him as breaking again the faith of treaties, and even after he had gotten all he claimed in Silefia, attacking our allies aiioQ), to fave our- enemies the French ? ' V ^ ' ' 'J V I >y > / % * k • ( V, • « !! Wc fet out in the pref?ot war wiih the fame opi- nion of him, and the hi ft fcene of ic was, as was then thought, tdhave been opened with fuch a determined ad of hoflility as princes do not ofien forgive. We knew the. court of Ruflia*s ciifpofnion to attack him, and gave 500,000 pounds for 55000 Rufliansto make 4 diverfion, fcemingly to eat him up. Sokiiers are apt enough to riot in their hoftilities, when in an enemy's country, and Ruflianfoldiers were. not. then known to be more gentle ravagers than Germans : but it was determined by the expre(3 articles of this treaty, that they fhould have all the plunder ; and that they might be fure to take, enough, we were to allow them nothing elfe to live upon : whaiever.be the licence of war, fuch things do not ordinarily make the articles of a treaty. . a .; . . .r :■■*: tm l: ^i;./ Con- '/; 3pi- [ 93 1 " ' Confiderlng it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was not a dear or\e. It was for 40,000 'all be k( in Livonia, adjoining to Lithuania ; and there to remain till they flioiild he wanted i with 40 or 50 gallies. Ihirty thourund of this infantry, and the fifteen thouland horfe v/erc to march, if his inajefty's Ger- man dominions Ihouki be attacked, in order to make a divc-rfion -, and the other ten thouland intantry >vere to be embarked on board tlie gallies, in order to n;a!'.e a uefcent. For this Knj^land was to pay the Ruinans one. hundred thouland pounds while their troops remained in Livonia -, and tour hundred thoufand more, as foon as, in confequence of the lequihtion, they Ihould have pafled the frontiers of their country ; and the King of England engaged to procure for them a pafllige through Poland. ^. . By article the nth, All the pknder^ which the Jiujjian it oops (hall gai7% from the enem)\ of what na- ture and quality fo ever, pall be for the advantage of tbofe fame troops, ,•; . V Hi ■:! ty» Art. 7th. Whereas her Imperial Majefly is parli' cularly inter ejled in the tranquillity of the Norths and Lonfidering alfo the proximity of the ccuntries; wherein the diverfion in queliion 'will probably be made^ and the facility her troops will have of fubftfimg immediately ;■« an enemy* 5 country •, fhe takes upon herfelf alone with all the merit of having been the faviour of Hol- land, of Britain, and of Europe. 11 I t 44 > I Ung for )fs- md ale for He is now called our ally j and there is a reverence due to that title : and therefore none of the hard things, we ufed to fay of him, are now true : but any intelligent man, who (hall recollect what we had been doing at the court of St. Peterfburgh, and the evident tendency of the Ruffian treaty, will find it very hard to perfuade himfelf, that he can ever for- ,:. . . &-^ t 96 ] get It ; or tliat three montlis after, when tlie treaty of Wtlhnif.Ilcr was macks any two conrrs in Ka- ropc mif.',hi: (land Icfs cordially aftciilicd tueach other, than thofc of London and Berlin. ' ' '' ■I: I 111 Thi thoughtlefs mob may he inftantancoufly con- vcrtal in his favour-, cfpccially as he is a war- rior, and fights a great many battles •, and the news writers, who pay their whole court to the popular opinion, would then foon afcnbe to him all other excellencies. But tlve reader, v^ho confidcrs how the clcftoral houfes muft have regarded each other at the figning the treaty of Peterfburgli, will not help putting the queftion to himfelf : Can then fuch fervent love fhoot up in the breafts of princes in three months time only, out of deadly hatred ? Do the refertments even of private men liib- lide fo foon, after the moil premeditated rancour ? The operations of fear may be inftantaneous : but love and friendfliip are plants of a flower growth. The one might fear for Hanover, and the other for PrufTia ; and both might thereby be brought to fuf. pend their hatred -, and after that they would cer- t ;inly t.dk in terms of the moft cordial affedlion and i:onfidence, were it only to conceal, if there fhould be any, their mutual diftrufts. But if the condi- tions of our future peace with France are to depend Tipon his favour, we can furely hope for very little aifiilance from the friendfhip of a man, who may tiiink iiat we. have given him fo inexpiable a caufc of hatred. "' • •*• ^ v ft"? tt .^■ Should )hould f 97 ] Should the reader have any doubts about the juftncfs of this rcafoning, let him try it by experi- ment. This treaty of Weftminftcr confifted but of one article, and lolely regarded the keeping of all foreign troops out of the empire. What was the cfFedt ? We obfervcd our part of the treaty, and kept out the RufTians ^ but he might think, not- withftanding our fcrvile profefTions of efteem of him, that the furell hold he had of uS; were our fears ; and therefore having obtained his own purpoie to keep out the RulTians, he flighted Wefel, which his father had been at an infinite expenc^ in fortify* ing, and let in the French. He knew how much our dread of him would once make us bear, and we then knew that he could at any time join with his fure friends the French ; and therefore I>.'itain, far from refenting any breach of a former treaty, fub- mitted to make another with him, in which we feem humbly to deprecate his forfaking us, and offer up our fix hundred and feventy thoufand pounds to buy our fecurity. The reader will find this treaty at the end, and may try if he can make any thing more of it. But may we not hope from his gratitude for his affiftance in our future peace, after having fo large- ly aflifled him in his wars ? riave then the houfe of Auftria*s returns for our having fo long fupportcc^ them, and fpent fo many millions in their fervice, been fuch as to admit of our hoping any thing from the gratitude of German courts ? Will any Prince If' 1 * A^f Si!*-'. [ 98 ] }ft Germany once think of our money, the moment after it is fpent ? "What were the returns, which this very Prince in the laft war made to the French, who were his makers ? As foon as his own purpofc was ferved, and he had got what he wanted, he left them, and made a treaty with the Queen of Hun- gary. We thought he afterwards broke it indeed, ind wheft this nation was rejoicing at Prince Charles's having palTed the Rhihe, fell upon the Queen of Hungary in time of full peace, to bring him back again, and prevent our ally from growing too great. t)oes he rigt now know, whether we chufe to fee it or fiot, thilthe has owed all his importance to the tunhinjg 6f bis managerhent between the French and us ? and is it not the ufual policy of men in fuch circumftahces to fecure their enemies, as foOn as they have wearied their friends ? Have we then any hope biit that, fhduld he have tht prefcribing the terms of our peace at the end of the war, his great cbjeft will be to make the French nation his friends, after having got all he can out of the Englifh ? Such only are like to be the effeds of this na- tion's exhauding itfelf to raife bim, and making the conditions of our future peatte depend upon his plea- fure, inftead of our own. Will he then thmk it for his iiitereft to fufier his firft and natural alKes, the French> to be ftript of their fettlements, and Bri- tain made fo ftrong as to be independent on him, and aH other petty German conncdlions, from whence t nlj he can derive his greatnefs ? Too long have ■'■■* *^- . thefe [ 99 ] thefc German Princes, though not their people, found the fweets of thofe contefts between the French and Us, in which we h^ve been courting them for their troops ; for ar\y one of them to wilh to fee Bri- tain gain fuch an ascendency by a future peace, as would at once put an end to their gaii:^pl innpor- And what is the merit, he may then a(k us, by which we can pretend to have obliged l^is gratitude i^ The Eng!i(h nation, which is receiving nothing for the money we annually- pay bim, may thinly th^^ he is obliged to them for it. But he may confider it ii a very different light*, he may perhaps tell us, that we have had qur million's worth for guj million; that he received our money as the purch^fe pf ajji immunity for Weftern Germany; and that To long ^ we continue to pay it, and he fpnfines^ his .rava- ges to the Eaft, he fully difcharges every obligation lie is under. , ^m^Hj "."vrt' *ld ■♦ *• 'i t-f^ ■^ #^ ' ■*. V t^* «•! •^ Ik **^ «ft.- 1 ■■*. !•-;> • • ...u ,-t^ . . His power over us is now, I hope, conae to an end: but ihould we have gone on,' fuppprting; and raifing him up to be the arbiter pf Germany, what part would be exempt from the effedls of it ? "^Quld then that favoured land, which we have fo long moved heaven and earth in defen^^ of; by which the French have, in two fucceHing war$, artfully laid upon us the burden of bribing one half of Germany, and fighting the other: would this devoted Eledorate at fad efcape hioi ? His demands 2 . would I 100 ] would rife with his greatnefs, and the time mud have come when our money or our patience would be exhaufted : fooner or later he would be want- ing fomething more of us than we (hould be able to pay for its immunity. Would then the prey, which he has fo long watchdd for, appear the lefs inviting, for Britain's being obliged to give up the protection of it ? or would the morfel be the lefs delicious, for our having fpent there fo many mil- lions in the defence of it ? , But that great queftion, which has been fo long agitated, whether Britain ought to have any conti- nental connexions, has now been determined, and all parties happily agree, that it muft have its Con- tinental connexions. '*■ ' "^ .^;' As this is the firft time thcfe terms have been heard of in a political debate, and their author did not explain his meaning in them, it will be neccflary for the reader, before he can form any judgment on the (ubje6t, to fettle in his t)wn mind, what he is to ^underftand by them. A continentdl connexion may mean, either a connexion with the whole continent of Europe, or with a part of it ; it may mean a conncdlion with a very large part, or a very fmall part. The grand alliance, formed by King Wil- ;liam, between England and all the other ftates of ^Europe againfl: , France, was a continental coniiec- . tion : a treaty with any Qerman Prince for ^ body : gf proops, as with a Prince oj Buckbug for a regi- ment Vil- of icc- [egi- icnt ment of artillery, is a continental connexion. Is it pofllbk for us to form any judgment upon a pro- pofition, which is exprefled in terms fo very vague and indefinite ? Two things then occur in the be- ginning of this difcuflion. The one is, that this great qucftion, faid to have been fo long agitated, and now determined, never was a queftion before j becaufe the terms of it were never before put into a propofition, from the Conqueft to this time : the other is, that it never can be a queftion ; becaufe the terms of it are fo very vague and general, as to have no determinate meaning in them, and precife- ly to exprefs nothing at all. However, as the fubjedb requires our confidera- tion, the only fair way which I know of treating on it, is by an indudion of the feveral particular fenfes, in which the propofition may be underftood, and weighing the merits of each. If the terms be underftood in their moft general fenfe, and the queftion be, whether Britain ought at any time, or in any cafe whatfoever, to have any fort of connexion with the whole, or any part of the continent of Europe ? This feems to be a quef- tion too general to be ever agitated at all •, becaufe it is impoflible for any man to fay, that there may not arife fome certain occafions and circuniftances of af- fairs, which may unavoidably force us to have fome cohnedtion with the continent : at leaft, this quef- . tion i! ■if t Uf' m I: I f [ 102 ] tion cannot have been agitated fince the a(Sl of fettle- ment, becaufe that was itfelf a continental connec- tion, and a very happy one, though intended per- haps to be not quite fq great an one. The fetch- ing a future Queen from the continent, which good Engl'ihmen may wilh perhaps might for this time not be from Germany, would be a continental "on- neftion. If therefore the terms of this qiieftion arp underftoo'i in their utmoft latitude, it cannot have been agitated fince the aft of fcttlenierlt. But whe- ther the queftion was determined then, or has been more happily ftttled now, we (hall gain very little knowledge by the decifion : for becaufe it is allow- ed, that there may poflibly be a cafe, wherein Bri- tain's having a continental connexion may not be wrong, it will by no means follow, that every con- tinental connexion which it Ihall enter into, muft therefore be right : clle we mull read our logic back- wards, and fay, Omiie minus includit majus. In or- der to fpeak definitively, therefore, and bring the queftion to an ifibe, we muft fairly fay what is the particular continental connedion which we intend. ' — • - *. X" -A continental conne^lion, then, in the next pla^e, 'rtiay mean a connexion with the whole continenr, or with a part of it» A connection with the whole )fcaiin€>t be the fenie meant, becaufe the whole con- tinent of Europe never was conneiStcd againft any other part of the world ; at leaft fince ;the wars for the Holy Land. Or if it were, Britain's being in amity with^ or equally well afFeiSted f^\yards eyerjy nat'j nation is the end. .A (lace, linent, Iwhole any rs for igm eyerjY lation C '03 1 nation in Eui-ope, though a very good moral virtue, which 1 could heartily with we had a great deal more of, yet politically expreffes nothing : becaule fuch an equal connection with all the nations of Eu- rope is, as to all the operating effefts of it in war and peace, the very fame thing as the havirtg no connedtion with any of them. Bcfide thit the fub- je£t under confideration was war, which in the very idea of it, excludes that of a general amity. n-'\ 1" ; ' • 1 Britain's continental conncdtions therefore, muft be with a part of Europe ; and if fo, they muft ei* ther be with a greater part of it, or a fmall part of it. If our connexions are to be with the greater part of the continent) then in order to make the pro- {^fition applicable to the prefent cafe, the reader will find himfelf under a neceffity of fubjoining a farther qiieftion •, Whether Britain's continental con- nedtions are to be conncdtions of friendfhip, or con- nedtions of enmity ? for of the fevfcral great powers of Europe, which ufed to be our allies, we have no conncdtions of friehdfhtp with any one of them. Neither Holland nor Denmark will have any con- nedt'r •^. with us ; and the Emprefs and Empire of Germany, and RufTia, and Sweden, are in conjunc- tion with the French our enemies. If therefore con- tinental conncdtions mean conncdtions with the great powers of Europe, they muft mean conncdtions o* enmity: for of friend (hip with us they have none. All the conncdtions therefore which we can have at prefent with thefe, muft, I fear, be at the muz- zles of our mufquets. Where I V f i I *! I 104 ] Where then arc our continental connexions? An Eleftor of B gh, in confideration of the yearly fum of fix hun«ired and feventy thou- fand pounds, is content not to hurt another £- leflorate ; and Britain* for the defence of it, has an alliance with the continent of Hefle. le could get no other connection ; it mull have fome connexion -, and therefore took up with that : which is the lad and only fenfe, which the propofition, that Britain mud have its continental connexions, can be underflood in, to be a juftification of the prefent German war. I m iil ',) Does then the propofition mean, that Britain ought always to have- fome continental connexions or other i and that therefore, if one part of the conti- nent refufe to accept of any connexions with it, ft ill it miift have them, and muft therefore fcek them in smother I For a moment let us lament the fate of our ifland, that having fo long remained above wa- ter, it muft now fink, unlefs chained and moored by fome connexion to the continent : and then afk whether the propofition in this fenfe does not prove rather too much. For if we adopt this new doc- trine, that it is abfolutely neceflary for Britain to have fome continental connexion, it will thence fol- low, that if the part of Europe, which has the right on its fide, will not accept of our connexions, we muft then make them with thofe that are in the wrong : if the party, which is the ftrongeft, will not be conneXed with us, we muft then conneX our- I felvci [ 105 1 felves with the weakeft. I will not prefume to ar- raign the juftice of "ny country, fo far as tofuppofc that the former has been our cafe : indeed it cannot always have been fo, bccaufe Britain has adually been in this war connefted on both fides : but a debt of fix and twenty millions, contradled fince thefc laft continental connedions, will long remain a very feeling convidtion of our having taken the weaker fide againft the ftronger. • i But not to lofe fight of our fubjed in this fmoke-ball of a pompous phrafe : the great queftion, which has really been agitated from the revolutbn to this day -, and the only one, in which England is concerned, is. How far it ought to unite itfelf in alliances of war upon the conti- nent ? And the reader muft have obferved, that the whole tendency of thefe Confiderations has been to cftablifh, and bring us back to the true revolution fyftem : that the only enemy upon the continent, which Britain can be indangered by, is France: that whenever the otijer nations of Europe will unite in an efFedual alliance of war againft France, it will then be the intereft of England to join in that alli- ance : but that in every divided . ftate of Europe, and much more in every divided Hate of the Ger- man Princes with each other, it muft, if the fore- going principles are true, invariably be the intereft of Britain never to concern itfelf with them ; at leaft: farther than by offering its mediation to compofo P them : M i Telvea ii pi In 1 1 r I i 1 [ 106 ] . them : that the French nation's having taken one fide of a German conteft, is fo far from being a juft motive for England's taking the other, that for that very realbn we ought lb much the more to keep out of it. This is the principle, which adluated our greated ftatefmcn, for the firft twenty years after the Revo- lution ; and this was the fole principle, by which one of the beft politicians, that ever fat on the Englifli throne, governed himfelf through his whole reign. 'Twas the forming that grand alliance, which, after having firft been the faviour of his own country, and then of Britain, completed his chara^er, and made him the deliverer of Europe. i\nd nothing but that alliance could have broke the chains, which France was tlien preparing for it. Had King William, when he came to the crown of England, inftead of fetting himfelf at the head of Europe, and uniting the feveral princes of it in arms againft France, been fo ill advifed as to make himfelf the head of a German party, and form only petty German connexions, and brought the Britilh force into the internal broils of the empire : .the French Monarch might have inwardly thanked him, but not a power in Europe would have joined him. And had the nation been then difpofed to raife treble the fums, which his wars really coft, all our treafures had been fpent in vain, and Europe had been enflaved. - But [ 107 3 y But his great mind too well knew the Britifli interefl: to be milled by fuch councils. Inftead of chufing to be the head of a German faftion, we fee him afkuating the joint coi^ncils of Europe, with all the Princes of it attending him to confult for the ge- neral good, againft the common enemy. There was, I have heard, at the time, a pidlure made of that great congrefs ; but the reader's own imagination will eafily form one for himfelf, by perufing the lift in the margin of thofe great perfonages, which alTifted in it, with the number of troops they rcfpedlively agreed to raife, for the purpofes of this alliance *. • Thefe all affilled at the Congrefs. But The Eleftor of Brandenburg , Eleftor of Bavaria - '- -• Duke of Lunenburg •> ^-'^^' DukeofZeli ^b co-rrfl Duke of Wolfenbuttel Landgrave of Hefle Caflel Prince Chrillian Louis of Bran- denburg Prince Waldeck Prince of Naflau Stadtholder of Friefland Prince of Naflau Saarbrug Governor of Bois le Due Prince of Naflau Dillemburg Prince of Naflau Idftein Duke Adminiftrator of Wir- temberg Two Princes of Anfpach • Landgrave of Hefle D* Arm- itadt ' itacixi The Prince his brother Duke of Saxe Eyfenach ' Prince Philip Palatine Duke of Zulfl)ack ^ Prince of Wirtemberg New- ftadt Prince of Wirtemberg The Prince his brother * Duke of Courland Prince Ferdinand his brother Prince of Anhalt Zeerborfl Landgrave of Homburg Three Princes of Holften-B^ck DukeofHolflein Prince of Commerci Prince Palatine of Birkenfelt '' Count of Horn Count of £rback Count Tirimont Count de Brouay P 2 ' Count it I .: !■ 1^ ! P h [ io8 ] Such was th« aiTguft aflembly which attended hitii ac the Hague. But could we now /aife him up, to take a view of the ftate of parties in Europe, how 1 (1 i*-. I ■ A. The Rhmegrare Ufon ivaj^ His Jrotkcr Marquis of Cafhlemonlayo Marquis of Caftanago, governor of the Spaaiih Neclierlands General. Chauvert; General d*Elwicht ' ' Genera} Berfos General d'Autel General Palfi, Sec. The ambafladors and foreign misifters prefent were, Count deGryal '*• 1 /! . ; Count d'Arco . ,it (lWt> e Count de Rivera- ., .. r Coant de Sanfra Count de Lippe ,^, ri-'-»-'- • Count d'Eipcnfe Count de Fugger Count de Denhof '.J Count dc Carelfon Baron of Pallant £aron of Spaein ,JVl^/* .gne, General and Baron fierufaw M. Soelmftker Fjoni the eleAor Palatine, ■; M. Hertermans From the duke of Savoy, y Count d« Pielat % Prefident de la Tour f From the duke of Zell, M. Zieger From the bifliop of Munllei, M. deNort * . .; ,. «i From [ 109 ] how would our great Deliverer grieve to Ice the ge- nerous laboura of his life countera^ed and de- feated ! to fee Britifh councils and Britilh treafures .cmpIoyM in fomenting quarrels among the princes From the landjfravc of Heflb CaiTel, Baron Gortz M. Reppelaar From the duke of Wolfem- buttle, • B&ron Crofek ..:., ' From the duke of Hanover, M. Klekk From the duke of HolAein C>ottorp, M. Toufken Fpom the prince of Liege, Counfellor Mean Of king William's own fubjet^s who attended Iiim to till* ibiemnity, were the Duke of Norfolk Duke of Ormond E^rl of Devonfliire Earl of Dorfet Earl of Eflex Earl of Nottingham Earl of Scarborough Earl of Selkirk Biihop of London Lord Dramlendrits Lord Durfley Earl of Portland Earl of Monmouth Duke of Schomherg His brother count Meinhard, &c. • Hi c- The quotas agreed on were as follow ; The Emperor ^— K. of Spain in Flanders — — States General - D. of Savoy, and troops of Milan E. of Bavaria ■ E. of Saxony ' Landgrave of Hefle . ■ Circles of Suabia and Franconia J>. of Wirtcmberg — E. of Brandenburgh "Prince o*" '-Iv-ge ' ——~ ■Bifhop of Mnnfter ' — — E. Palatine - — ; Prince of Lunenburg om luU Rapin, vol. IH. fol. i64< 2C,00O 20,C0O 3S.00O 20,000 1 8,000 12,000 8,000 10,000 6,000 20,000 6,odo 7,000 4.000 i6,oco of Hi j'- ' %'■ h I iJ [ MO ] of the empire, whom it was his great care to rc- cojicite.to each other, and unite in the common caufe ! to fee B n, inftead of taking the lead in any grand alliance, humbly fecondlng the ambi- tion of an E r of B gh, and offering up (what he might think) an annual tribute, to prevent his deftroying any more than one proteftant E te ! And how would the mighty ftatefman's gho(t ftalk indignant by the man, who, when we were funk fo low in our alliances as a little fubfidy treaty with a landgrave of Hefle, and a fingle eleflor, fhould think to raife them only in found j and attempt to confound a diminutive, defenfive, ruinous, and impradicable meafure with that grand alliance, in which he had fought at the head of Europe, by the help of a pompous equivocal phrafe of continental connections ! ; ii' I know that it has been faid, that England paid all in thefe alliances of king William j and it was flattering the nation's vanity, to fuppofe that no countfy had any money in it but England. The Dutch, however, paid their third part of the fub- iidies in both thefe alliances, and brought three lifths of the troops : but whatever we paid, thie objed was great, and worthy of a true patriot and friend to Europe. But what was it that we did pay ? The whole fum granted that year, 1691, for the land fervice, was 2,3&o,6981. This was to maintain the troops in England and Ireland, li in t ii> 1 and fix thoufanJ Danes, hired for tLc recovery of that idand, and for our part of the grand alliance. The eftedlive pay of thefe land forces, being 69,656 men, amounted to 1,880,698 1. and the remaining five hundred thoufand pounds, as appears by the re- folutions of the preceding and following years, wcie for the train, general officers, levy money, tranf- ports, lubfidies, hofpitals in Flanders, and contin- gencies. The appropriating particular fums to eacli particular fervice, had not then been brought into ufc; but in the diftribution of this five hundred thoufand pounds among the feveral fervices here enumeraccci, what proportion of it can be allotted for fub- fidico ? Some of thefe articles in the prcfcnt war tvould fingly eat up fuch a fum. But fup- pofe the moderation of thofe times to have left; one hundred thoufand pound for fubfidics : this was all that could be paid among the German princes, who maintained four armies of forty and fiicy tliDufand men each upon the frontiers of France : and this was in thofe days reprefented by king William's enemies, and by men of the like princi- ples before the peace of Utrecht, as a ruinous land war : that is, we p'id our money to German princes by thoufands, to put all the empire in arms againft France, and tliat was a ruinous war. Wc now fend it to Germany by millions, without any real al- lies ; nay, a great part of it to be employed in en- abling thofe, who fliould be our allies, ro cut each others throats ; and it is right, for this only rca- fon, that Britain muft have its continental con- nedtions. I do ^ I i.'i '•1 n m I' [■ "4 1 I do not mean to fay, that the<*e fubfidiei did not afterwards grow larger. , The reader may fee the gradual increafc of them in the hiftory of the pub- lic revenue, with every thing cife which can be known on this fubjcd. I hnve extrafted the Ger- man fubfidies, which we paid in the year 1 704, when the Britifli and Dutch forces marched into Gfr- many, and in conjundlion with part of the Impe- rial army, beat the French, with the ruin of forty thoufand of their beft troops *. aui: yrtf: a}'"es In the year ijoS f, the fubfidies to our were increaled ; but the whole cxpence for the land proportion of ^ allies for part > 5^ I. S.V272 37,500 11,848 5^924 31,642 712 * For payment of her majefty's proportion of the fubfii^ies tu be paid to her allies for part of her qviota of 40,000 1. To the king of Denmark, To the landgrave of Heffe CafTe!., To the eleftor of Treves, To the ftares of Suabia, To the cledlor Palatine, ToMonr.Moncado,forIofsof \vnn[gons and horfes, 8,000 To the marqui: Miremont, 400 , 1 » ' «..' i- -' -t. ■-'■' - ■•^' u <-■'-'. ■ ,.,.■,; ?'. f .? f To the king of Denma:!:, To the king of Portugal, To the duke of Savoy, ■ - To tlie landgrave of Heii'e CafTcI, To the elc Aor of Treves, . To the eleftor Palatine, '] To the king of Pruffia, s. d. 00 6 CO 00 00 o o o 00 o 00 G CO t> 00 o 151,298 00 37,500 00 1 50,000 00 1 60,000 00 5,952 7 6 5.852 7 6 4,761 18 6 50,000 00 414,0:6 13 6 army^ [ "3 ? ' army, including all our fubfidies, and the pay of our own quota, amounted to no more than 2,8 1 4*583 L 15 s. 9d. For this our enemies were obliged to maintain an army in Portugal, Spain, ' Italy, Savoy, Germany, and Flanders ; and Were oppofed by equal ones of our allies, in all thofe fc- veral parts of Europe, with the deft rudlion of twenty thoufand French at the battle of Ramillies, and the lofs of a whole army, and half a million of trei- furc, at the fiege and battle of Turin. I know it has been faid, that our allies did not fupply their feveral quotas ; but the Dutch proved » that theirs was kept complete ; the reft might be deficient : that is to fay, inftead of two hundred thoufand men, our allies fupplied only a hundred and fifty thoufand ; all of which, With Our own quota of fifty thoufand men^ were brought to 6ght againft France, for an expence to England of 2,815,0001. We have this year fperit the double Of that fum in Germany alone, and have never had ninety thbu- fand men for it. Is not the addition of a hundred and fifty thoufand men a better thing than the having none ? If our magnanimous ally, to whom we pay a greater fubfidy than, in the year 1706, we paid to all our allies put r Jgether, would now fend u«? a hundred and fifty thoufand men to help us againft the French, (hould we quarrel with him, and fay he did nothing, for want of the other fifty ? lu: Q. Britaiil f<;wi W': ¥>i I" [ lU ] Britain cannot Indeed now complain to its allies, for any failure in their feveral contingencies j for our magnanimous ally will tell us, that he is bound to none. Inftead of forming alliances againft France with the great powers of the continent, it forms continental connexions : that is, it contentedly la- Vilhes away its treafures for a fomething, which it can draw no troops from, called by a .fine name, which it can put no meaning to. . Till fuch great occafions fhall return again for Britain to a6l in conjundion with Holland, and Germany, and the other parts of Europe, united in a real alliance againft France ; the true interelt of Britain, or of any part of Germany, can never call for our troops upon the continent. We have indeed too Ifi.ig been making ourlelves parties in the inter- nal quarrels of the Empire, to hope foon to fee that and the other ftates of the continent united in fuch an alliance : but till then we can have no connexion with it. Previous to Britain's having any continen- tal connexion, that continent muft be connected in itfelf. To talk of forming a connexion with that, which is itfelf unconne6led, is a contradiction in terms. 'Tis advifing us to catch hold of a loofe heap of duft, which far from yielding any ftay to us, can ferve only to raife a cloud to blind our eyes with. But when all that continent is connected with France in an alliance againft us, and the caufe we would efpoufe ; the fending our troops thither in fuch a cafe, upon fuch a pretence, is little better than *i f "5 3 than the running our head againft a wall, and fay* ing we mud have a connection with it. The principles air ady laid down contain, I think, a full anfwer to a plea, which has been often urged for the German war, that it is a diverfion. Hovv- ever, as it has been ufed by great authority, fome of my readers may think it requires a particular an- fwer. If others do not, they may pafs over what follows : or at lead they will excufe the writer, if in the courfe of this anfwer^ they Ih ild meet with fome things, which they may think too nearly bor- der on what has been faid before. All truths ar^ and muft be confident with each other. *Tis the property of error only to fly out into endiefs lengths, without refpedling any common point or centre i But every juft argument muft have the feveral parts of it, like the angles in true meafuring, all coincide and clofe in with each other. The German war then, it is alleged, has been a diverfion to the French from their naval ; and pre- vented their carrying their operations at lea, fo far as they might otherwife have done, if that had not engaged their attention. If the war in Germany be confidercd as a war of diverfion, I would then premife, that the very idea of a war of diverfion, fuppofes that Britain makes it a war of choice, and is not brought thither by ncceffity 5 and if fo, I have already obferved, that Q.2 it 1 m m I- r i\ I ('' C >>6 ] it. is the duty of every wife (late, io making choice of the province, which it (hall fend its troops to adt in, to confider where it can make war to greateft advantage i where it is itfelf ftronge(^, and its enemy wcakelt -, where it has itfelf leaft to lof?, and us enemy mod ; and where its victories are like to have the beP* eEfe^, and fpon^ bring its enemy to peace. prefent with a conteft ar with France beg; about the foreign fett]ements, and colonies of the two nations. A matter, in whic}^ the parliament declared that the immediate and eflential intereds of thefe kingdoms are concerned. Why then (hou|d we defire to divert any of the fouric of it into a land war in Germany ? It could not be, becaufe we found ourfclvcs the moft prefled, and in danger of lofmg moft at Tea ; for Engird is on that element fuperior to France, and has been in ;: continual courfe of victory. It could not be becaufe our vic- tories were fruitlefs; becau(e we ^re gaining thofc very points which we fought for ; and making the moft valuj^ble acc^uifitions, which we could wi(h for. The only acquifitions, which, when we have taken the French iflands, it could be of any advan- tage to us to gain, and the only ones, which it is pradicable for us to keep. Is iv then to increafe the enemy's expence ? A ftate may fomerimes think fit; to change the fcene of a war, becaufe, by carrying it on in one particular manner, they have it in thelir power, with a few troops, to employ a oiuch greater ■ number [ ««7 1 number of their adverfaries. 1 hus Britain, by put- ting 10,000 men on board its fleet, might oblige the French to keep a much greater number on iti coafts. If the length of the north and weft coaft of France from Dunkirk to Bayonne be 8oo miles, then ten thoufand men on board our fleet, require 8o,ooo men on the Frenoi. coaft, for the French to find an equal match within an hundred miles to oppofe to them *. But this cannot be the fort of diverilon intended by the German war. If we would make a diverfion in Germany, it muft be by fending thither more troops than France ^an, or an equal number, or an inferior number. As to the firft cafe ; if the land force of France be greater than that of Britain, then, in the firft place, Eng- land cannot fend a greater force to Germany, than France can. In the next place, if it could fend a greater force thither, it muft then put itfclf to in- finitely greater expence than France ; and therefore muft create thereby a greater diverfion of its own revenues, than of its enemies. And, in the lad place, if England could fend to Germany a greater force than France, the French court, knowing that pur army would be fuperior, would order their own to ftay at home that fummer : and in that cafe the diverfion made would be only of Englilh treafures, ^n an armament beyond our natural ftrength, with- * This Is what Sir William Monfon fays in one of his an- fwers to Lord EiTex's Queries, Armies at land cannot fly, bat armies at Tea have wings. out m^: Jj out a poflibility of doing our enemy any hurt; while the French money and troops having been kept at home, would be the more ready to attack us in Germany the next year. And we have already fcen the folly of invading France in that cafe ; or of marching into Eaft Germany. Let us next fuppofe that England ihould fend an equal force to France. Where is the advantage in fuch a diverfion ? England puts itfelf to at leaft as great expence to raife and hire frefh troops, as France is at in employing its own (landing army to repell it : and if the fources for a land force arc greater in France than in England, then if from two unequal powers you take what equal parts you will, the fuperior will remain fuperior, as much as before. But do we really tranfport troops into Ger- many upon as cheap terms as France can march men over the Rhine or Maefe, making the country main- tain them in their pallage ? Are Englifh regiments railed or fupported as eafily as French ? Still there- laie die diverfion will be againfl: us. ■ . ■ c But the truth is, all the diverfion, which Britain can make to France in Germany, is by fending fewer troops at double the expence, to ad againft a great- er number of French. Thus it has been every year of the war hitherto, and thus it will continue. I admit that we have happened to have a fuperior Ge- neral ; but how cruel a hazard is this expofing our troops to? The fuperiority of Britilh valour is a wo- 4 ' very been tack eady i or ..•i fend age in :aft as IS, aS ny to ce arc f from rts you \uch as to Ger- :h men main- riments there- I Britain ; fewer great- by year \ue. I lior Ge- )ng our |ur is a very [ "9 J very popular topic, and we are readily difpofcd to admit the force of every argument to prove that twenty thoufand Engliflimen can beat thirty thou- fand French : , but a ftatefman, who Ihall adl upon this principle, will be thought a very (hallow poli- tician : and if Englilh foldiers are fo much more va- luable than French, he muft have too little a regard for the lives of his countrymen, who will rifk them upon terms fo very unequal. -Where fome great and important intereft is at (lake, I hope no ten thoufand Engliflimen will refufe to fight with double the number of French : and much more when thirteen Englifli fhips were fent with troops to relieve Minorca, I am fure that no Englifli commander would refufe, in fuch a cafe, like Mr. Bing, to fight with twelve French fliips ; where fo great an objedt is at ftake. But in Germany, where no Englifli intereft can be concerned, and no German intereft, if rightly underftood, the matching twenty-five thoufand Engliflimen againft thirty thou- fand French, merely on the confidence of our greater valour, and ftill worfe the expofing them againft forty thoufand, is by much too expenfive an affair to be chofen upon any account as a French diverfion ; and by much too ferious an affair to be confidcred in any fenfe as an Englifli one. The German war therefore, allowing it to be a diverfion, is not an eligible diverfion j becaufe Bri- tain muft put itfelf in a greater expence to make it, than [ 120 ] than It can its enemy to repel it. I now add, that the German war is no diverfion at all. By a diver- fion every one knows is meant, the turning of a war from one part, where we would not have it go, to another part, where we have lefs to fear from it. But the bringing the war into Germany is no diverfion at all. It is not a diverfion of the Forces of France : It is not a diverfion of the Treafures of France. As to the former, it may be an employment for the French forces, but is not a diverfion of them. For what one fervice luis the French court to em- ploy their troops in, but in Germany ? They may,"" if they pleafe, march them down to their coaft, and there they muft remain.- Have they (hips totranf- port them, or a fleet tO'protedb them in their paf- fagp ? Though I doubt whether the French troops would fuffer themfelves to be imbark'd, now that they have feen their men of war deftroyed, and the Britifii fleet continually upon their coaft ; yet where fo important a concern is at flake, it becomes no man to fay, that an invofion is impofllble ; or that the French may not at fomc time or other, by fomc veiy fortunate concurrence of circumftances, be able to land ten thou&nd men upon our coafls. But then this, I think, we may fafcly fay, that though for once they might happen to elude the vigilance of our fleet % and by the favour of winds, and tides, and long nights, may throw over ten thoufand men for pace •, yet there will be the chances of a thou* fand that iver- I war from is no Forces resoi nt for them. o em- f may,"^ ft, and ) tranf- ir paf- troops w that nd the where les no )r that k fomc I be able Buc [though [gilance tides, id men thou* fand [ 121 ] fand t6 one again ft the fame accidents corjcufring to enable them to fend over ten thoufand more in due time to fupport tiiem. Thirty or forty thoufand men en- camped or cantoned upon our fouth coaft, makes us therefore abfolutdy fecure-, becaule tl>c firft ten thou- fand would be difpofed of\ long before a fecond t'^n thoufand could arrive to fupporc them. / .... i\s this reafoning fccms juft in itfelf, fo we have the evidence of fa6ls to confirm it. Why is it, that the French troops are not now Ilationed upon the coafls oppofite to ours, but bccaufe both nations fee the impraiTLicabienefs of bringing them over ? The Britifh councils certainly are convinced of this; elfe why are our national troops fent out of the king- dom r and we may fairly conclude that the French court thinks in the fame manner, elfe what is ic which hinders their invading us ? Is it the want of troops ? That may be a rtafon, why we (hould not invade France •, but it cannot be a reafon why a country, which has always two or three hundred thoufand men in its pay, fhould not invade us. It is not therefore the want of troops, but of the means to bring them over, which prevents the French from invading us. Were their fleet fuperior to ours, we •might then leave Germany as naked as we pleafed, not a battalion wcjld be fent thither. All would be brought down upon their coaft, and a hundred thoufand of them, if they were neceflary, fent over •to ours. France therefore has not a man the lefs upon its own coaft for the German war. It does R non t:'-' [ m ] not- fend its army to invade the German dominions from choice, but necefTity ; becaufe they cannot gee to England, and have no other ground to meet us on. If this be not a diverfion of the French forces from England, neither wa^ it any diverfion of them from the defence of their colonies and iflands. Thefc arc too interefting a concern to the French trade and revenue, to be neglected in their councils : and therefore we have always found the French court ready enough to fupport them, as long as the leafl: chance remained of their getting their forces over thither. The number of tranfports, with troops and ammunition for their colonies, which we took in the beginning of the war, fhew this ; and the garrifons, we found in Cape Breton and Quebec, and the long refiftance they have made in America, prove that they were well fupported. It was not therefore the want of troops, or their unwillingnels to fend them ; and much lefs the German war, when the income of the whole Electorate would not be worth to the French nation, if they had an army there, one half of the value of Martinico ; but their utter inability to convey them, while their ports were blocked up by the Englifli fleets; which prevented their fending over. forces every where fu- perior to ours. • • If the German war be not a diverfion of the French troops from any other fervice, neither is it of their treafures. What the quantity of thefe really is, 8 may f the is it lly is, may f '2i ] may hot be cafy to determine ; our enemies certainly have fome milHons to Iparc, clle tliey need not fpend them in Germany j which is not their way into Ling- land, nor inflandy to put an end to the war, tliough it may give them the advantage in the end. But though the fources of th(nr revenue were tiie double of what they now arc, yet the German war would be a diverfion oi' them from no other lervice, which could annoy us ; becnufe they have no other to em- ploy chem in againil: us. 1 hcfe treafures of France, whenever Britain flwll, by the enormous wa(le of its own, be reduced to afl^ a peace, will foon grow formidable. Too long have they been trembling for their Eaft and Weft India colonies, as well as their American fettlemcnts, not to fee the abfolute neceflity of a fleet to protedl them : and their firft care a^ter a peace, if we leave them that far the greateft nurfery of their feamen, their f.igar trade intire, will, doubtlefs, be to attend to their marine. Hut while the war continues, it is impoll'ibie for them to employ their treafures to that purpofe. They might pofllbly buy fliips of Danes, Swedes, or Ge- noefe •, but to what avail ? When that could only put us fo much the more upon our guard, give our fleet an opportunity of taking one half of them in their paflfageinto the French harbours, and oblige the reft to lie rotting there unmanned, when they had got in ? While their ports are all blocked up, and they cannot fend out a fingle man of war, but by fteakh, it is abfolutely impradicable for them to raife their navy to an equality with ours. Where are their R 2 failorj ■;. r >24 ] lailors to be found ? They can only be made by long voyagps at fca -, but how can that be done, when they have neither men of war nor merchant- men, which can venture out ot their harbours •, and the Ibgars of tlicir own iflancis are brouj^ht home in neutral fliips ? Will they then attempt to form them as Duilius did his rowers at land ? Our Britidi tars would have little to fear from fuch land made fea- men. In fliort, the prefcnt war continuing, and tlie (late of parties remaining in Europe, as they now are-, no accefllon of treafnrc could make Eng- land equal to France at land, nor France equal to Jingland at fca. , '"kidn^l But fay others, though it may not be fo now, yet in the beginning of the quarrel the German war was a feafonable diverfion -, if our enemies had not fpent their force in Germany, they might then have attended to their marine with more effe(5t, and that might have made them formidable to us. But the very idea of our choofing the German war as a diverfion, fuppofes that we mud have been there firft. How early in the war foever therefore the French began to fpend "heir money in Germany, we began as foon, and certainly fpent as much -, and that money employed on our marine, would have carried it to as much greater a heighth, as the French navy could have been improved by the favings of theirs : and if our navy was at firft liiperior to theirs, then, if to unequals you add equals, the fuperio- rity would flill be ours. But in fadt, in the begin- ;.. nin^ [ »25 ] ring of the quarrel, the French court did attend wholly to their marine, and had no German war at all. In the fird year oi' the war therefore, when only fucli a diverfion could have been of any fervice to us, we had it not •, and by the next year, when their fuilc/rs were Unit up in our priPms, and their fhips in their own ports -, when Toulon, Bred, Rochfort, Louifburg, and ivcn Cape Irancoife were blocked up j when their lidK-ry was d(:(lroycd, their Weft- India navigation at an end, their fugars brou{^ht home in neutral bottoms, and their breed of failors therefore totally ceafed, from that time wc did not want it. If from reafoning we recur to fa<51:s, and recoi- led the courfe of the French condudt in the bemn- ingof the war, that will prove, a pofteriori*, tl-.ejuft- .d. nefs of our realbning on liii s h The only profpe^l which the French had of in- vading us with fuccefs, was, by furprifing us in the beginning of the war, before wc were prepared for them. Then the nation was juftly alarmed with the danger of an invafion, and owed a more gratc- . * The nation's fccond orator roafons a priori, frcvi fa5l;^ and b'ds us look i:ito our hitlory for arguments a priori : fccniing to have confiJcied his own arguments, v\ lii-.h were drav/n fVam Q(iet;n Elizabed»'s reign, as a hundred and fifty year? more a priori, than any from queen Ann's. But our fads being of a much later date, we are content to plve the argument drawn from them, the more humble title of an argument a pofteriori. * fUl If-; iriiti. § ■ m [ X26 ] ful return, than it paid him, to the noble lord, whd equipped and mann'd a fleet with fo incredible a fpeed, as prevented the enemy, and fnrprized not only all other nations, but even ourfelves : and at the fame thne, with equal forefight and fteadinefs, crippled the French marine in the very beginning, and prevented their manning the fleet they had pre- pared at Brtil and Rochfort to invade us, by fcizing all their fli'ps in their return to Europe, till wi had got fifteen thoui1\nd oF their befl: feamen in our power. That was the French feafon for invading us. All their attempts fince have been the efliedts of defperation rather than of council. But during all the year i y!^6. while the French had any hope left of invading us, they never thought of entering Germany ; and fo far was the Lleftorate from be • ing in any danger of an attack, that we brought troops from thence over hither. England was then too great an objed m the French councils, for them then to trifle away their money and troops in Ger- many. But the next year, when they found them- felves totally fallen from, that great hope of ruining us at once, then they took the after-game of try- ing to do it more gradually ; and therefore thought of Germany : And whatever may be now pretended of our having chofen tne German war as a diver- fion, every one mufl: remember, tliat the army of obfervation was an army of defence and not of di- verfion. 'Twas the child of our fears, and our fond concern to keep the French out of the E te, and not of any councils of diverfion to draw them ••* into hem into L 127 ] into it. Then only it was when our enemies found that we had raifcd a fufficient liind force to guard our coaft from furprize, and to repel ary invafion, that they began to think of fending troops iiuo Ger- many : and when by the vigilance of our fquidrons, at the mouths of their harbours, and the lofs of fo many of their tranfports in their pafiagc to their co- lonies, they found it impra6ticable to go any where elfe ; then it was that they pafled the Rhine, flill making every effort, and running every hazard, to fiiccour their colonies. At length they found to their coft that they could not go thither -, but they knew that the Englifh forces couki, and that they could not refift them there •, that was the part where only they were vulnerable; their bell trading in- tereft lay in their iflands, which were now naked and expofed ; and therefore it was a diverfion of the French choofing, and not of the Engliih, to draw the Britifh force into Germany, where they knew themfelves to be invulnerable, and were always fure to be fuperior to us. I hope I have in no part of the foregoing (heets difcovered any want of humanity for the inhabitants of the Eleftorate, or of duty 10 our common fo- vereign. I would always confider them as oui fel- low fubjeds, and our fellow proteftants ; I willi that Hanover could be joined to this ifland, that we might confider them as our countrymen. But till then, it is for the intereft of both, that they keep the diftance v/hich nature has placed them at, and •'•■ ■ that N n* i I [ 128 ] that Britain fliould know noth'ng of the Elefloratcj but as a part of the empire, if that and the other powers of Europe fliould ever unite again in an al- liance againft France. 1 ill then for England fing- ly, and by its own force to attempt to defend it, is taking the cenain way to bring the Fre:.ch into it, and making that the feat of war in every future quarrel. 'lis giving up all the advantages of our lituation, and joining our ifland on to the continent, by finding for our enemy a field to beat us in. It is giving up all the benefit of our njival luperiority, for the fake of a diftant land-war, which I have now I think fliewn to be ruinous and impradica- ble. It is carrying it on in a country, where vic- tory itfelf can do us no good, and where a defeat can do our enemy no hurt. Not to mention that in the prefent cafe, it fcems to be exhaufting our treafures to fupport a man, who never can have it in his power, and who is yet to give us the proofs of his hiving ever had it in his will to do us any fervice. Providence has been pleafed to put the whole ad- vantage of the v;ar into our hands •, and I fear we are giving it to our enemies. We have it in our power to conquer for Hanover, and fecure for it fuch an indemnincation, as fliall eftedlually deter the French from ever entering it again. We feem to be taking the courfe, in which the moft we can do, is to be ruined for it, and difabled from ever after defending it. Let any difcerning man aflc him- [ 129 ] himfclf, what one thing we have done in Germany this year, or «he French fufFered there, to make them wane a peace more than the laft. It is not now the bufinefs of France to exert its whole force, as it did in former wars, with three or four armies in Germany. It is not the intcreft of France to beat us out from thence ; that would open our eyes. The French themfelves have found already, and then the people of England would foon fee, that the crown of France can get nothing in Hanover, and Britain can lofe nothing : and the French, if we intreated them, would not fuffer their army to flay there a twelvemonth round. Perhaps it may not be the intereft of either of the two generals to put an end to the war: it certainly is not the French intereft ; and our foreign general has it not in his power to do it, though his fuccefs (hould be five times greater than any he has yet met with. Put his three campaigns into one : not the expences of them, they will re- main a heavy load of debt on our revenue : our irallions in Germany, too like to our moments, pere- ' v; ' fcf imputantur ; but put the vi<5lories of his three f inpaigns all into one j three fuch as thofe of Cre- velt, Minden, and Warburgh, all in a fummer, could have no effect on France towards putting an end to the war. The French court at the worft could but have their army driven home j and would be as ready the next year to invade the Eledorate as the laft. In fhort, there has never any reafon yet been given to convince us, that France may not, with little more than its ordinary revenue, keep on S the flu m m: p:<. f I t 130 ] the war in its prefent (late for ten years to come. France, while it is itfelf fufferipg no||iing, and run- ning its enemy every year ten millions nearer its ruin, will not fuc for peace. Many perfons I know will think it ftrangc to hear of ruin in the midft of vidory and fucccfs. The Englifh nation, it will be faid, never appeared fo great as it has the laft year. But may we not deceive ourfelves by making the vaft incr?a -■■ ■■»'^ ■» *.* . ftranfi- [ '34 J Tranjlation of a Convention between his Majejiy and the King of PrtiJJiay concluded andfigncd at London y the wth if April 1758, TRANSLATION, v ,.«/ WHEREAS a treaty between their Britannic and PrufTian Majeflies was concluded and figned on the 16th day of January 1756, the iti- pulations whereof tended to the prefervation of the general peace of Europe, and of Germany in par- ticular : and whereas fince that period France has not only invaded the Empire with numerous armies, and attacked their aforefaid Majefties and their al- , lie3, but has alfo excited other powers to a6l in like manner: and whereas it is To notorious, that the extraordinary efforts made by his Pruffian Majefty to defend himfelf againft the number of enemies, who have attacked him on fo many fides at once, have occafioned a very great and burthenfome ex- pence *, whilft, on the other hand, his revenues have been greatly diminished in thofe parts of his domi- nions which have been the feat of the war j and their Majefties having mutually determined to con- tinue their efforts for their reciprocal defence and fecurity, for the recovery of their pofleffions, for the protedlion of their allies, and the prefervation of t M5 J of the liberties of the Germanic body ; his Britan- niq Majefty has refolved, in confequencc of thefe confiderations, to give an immediate fuccour, in money, to his Pruffian Majefty, as the fpeeciieft and mofl efFedual } and their aforefaid Majellies have thought proper, that a convention fhould be made thereupon, in order to declare and afcertain their reciprocal intentions in this refpedl ; for which pur- pofe they have ^'^pointed and authorized their re- Ipedlive miniflers, viz. In the name and on the part of his Britannic Majefty, hi^ privy counfejlors^ Sir Robert Henley, knight, lord keeper of the great feal of Great Britain, John earl of Granville, prefident of his council, Thomas Holies duke of Newcaftle, firft lord commiffioner of his treafury, Robert earl of Holdernefle, one of his principal fe- cretaries of ftate, Philip earl of Hardwicke, and William Pitt, efquire, another of his principal fe- cretaries of ftate ; and in the name and on the part of his Pruffian Majefty, the Sieurs Dodo Henry baron of Knyphaufen, his privy counfellor of em- bafly and minifter plenipotentiary at the court of his Britannic Majefty, and Lewis Michell, his charge d'affaires at the faid court ; who, after having com- municated to each other their refpeftive full powers, have agreed upon the following articles. I. fii" His Majefty the king of Great Britain engages to caufe to be paid, in the city of London, to the perlon [ 136 ] perfon or pcrfons who (hall be authorized for that purpofe by his Majefty the king of Pruflla, the fum of four millions of German crowns, amounting to fix hundred and feventy thoufand pounds flerling ; which intire fum (hall be paid at once, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, upon the requifition of his Pruflian Majefty. II. His Majefty the king of Pruflla engages, on his part, to employ the faid fum in keeping up and aug- menting his forces, which fliall a£t in the moft ad- vantageous manner for the common caufe, and foh the End propofed by their aforefaid Majefties, of reciprocal defence and mutual fecuricy. HI. The High contrading Parties moreover engage, viz. On the one part, his Britannic Majefty, both as King and as Eledtor •, and, on the other part, his Pruflian Majefty i not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention or agreement whatfoever, with the powers who have taken part in the prefent war, but in concert, and by mutual confent, and exprefsly comprehending each other therein. IV. This t ^37 1 IV. This convention niall be ratified ; and the ratifi- cation thereof fhall be exchanged on both fides, within the term of fix weeks, to be reckoned from the date of the figning of this convention, or fooncr, if pofllble. In witnefs whercc^f, We the under written mini- fters of his Majefty the King of Great Britain, and of his Majefty the King of Pruffia. by virtue of our full powers, have figned this prefent convention, and have fet the feals of our arms thereto. Done at London, the nth day of April, the year of our Lord 1758. m ? Jl R A T A. Page . ,6. line ,4. for ^^.., rrad ^ave /./nJ, I »7. line 3. for ;>j, read //^f/r. F I N I S.