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PEBPET0AL WAB,

THE POLICY OF MB. MAHISON.

SKIHO A CAVDXO KKAMliVATIOV Or Bit LATB MBSSAOB T« OOH'
OBBSS, to ri^; ilBBSFBOTt TBB BObLOWIVO TOPieBS»..VII.

THE FRETEMDElt ITEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE....THE ISSPOSk
TANT AND INTERESTING SUBJECT OF A

GONSGRIFr MIUTIA....

ABB

THE ESTABUSHMENT QF AN IMMENSE St^qnXNG ARMY OF
GUARDS AND SPIES, UNDER THE NAMK OF

A liOG AL VOLUNTEER FO||pB.

" Turn ** Jaetiu* Al idH i wi teeundum Pr€Hif*.^.gravhir remtdUi gutm dt-
Seta frani, tuanmgue kgttm aticlor idem, ae mtbvtrtur gmr armu fuebatur.

urmUwMdt!*

TACITI ABBilpyPM LIB. II.:.

LIBBBALLY TBANSLATBB >'

^ Then James Madiioa, ■ Meond time Freiident, adopted a remedj for the
'wrongaof our aeMiefi, infinitely more injuriooi to them than the evila wbieh.
they rairered»...he''ordered oat the militia, in eontempt of that Tery Constitation
of vhieh he was one of the priaeipal framers. Id- ihw^ vhatever he attempted
to Tindieate by anB% by arms he lost" '

c ./■

BY A NEW-ENGLAND FARMER^ "^' # ** <r Cl

AVTHOR or A fcXTB PAMPHbBT, ENTITLED, '< MB. MABISOS'S WAR.^

BOSTON:

.. ' ■(

Printed by Cheiter Stebbfna,
1813.

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

TO THE PEOPLE OF KEW-ENOLAND, NEV-TOBK9
NEW-JERSEY, AND DELAWARE. ,

HOWEVER much to be regretted by every
friend to commerce^ and civil liberty, must be the re-
election of Mr. Madison, still it is a most cheering
and consolatory reflection, that the struggle has man-
ifested an energy, an intelligence, a spirit of concord
and union, a magnanimous disposition to 'sacrifice
party feelings, and personal considerations, in the cit-
izens of the commercial states, which is unexampled
in the history of this country. It was^ indeed to be
feared, that no pressure, however great, no sufferingEi^
however severe, would detach men from those chains
of parly with which they bad been so long bound.
But we are most happily undeceived ; a sense of
common danger, a conviction of common interest, and
of the absolute necessity of union for relief from op-
pression, snapped asunder the bonds of faction. —
Mutual condescension, mutual consultation soon ob-
literated the memory of past distinctions, (which after
all were merely nominal,) and we now find, with
the exception of the dependents upon government, and
those under their influence, but one great and united
people, from Maine to Delaware.

It ought indeed to be so; for, jfrom Maine to Dela-
ware we have one common interest, and that is. the

i I
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}

praservation of Commerce, which from Delaware
soathwardsy they are determmed to destroy. Still
men do not alwaye perceive their interest Bat in
this case, they could not shut their eyes ; it was like
*' Heaven's own lightning," it flashed conviction upon
ihose who were stone blind.

l^ve years successive commercial restriction, was
found ineffectual; it made us grow lei^ler to be sure,
but we were strong and able to survive it. Our per.
secutors had not patience to endure our lingering
death \ they therefore got up the guillotine of a mari*
linie war, to cut off our .heads at a stroke.

This last act of desperation, has accomplished our
wishes ; it has opened the eyes of the people, and
notwithstanding the reelection of Mr. Madison, not
in vain. If we are as firm and resolute in the pursuit
of our purposes, as moderate and conciliatory as we
Yukve hitherto been; if we continue to sacrifice to the
attainment of peace and prosperity, our party pas.
sions, we are certain of success. Let our political
euemies triumph in their partial victory; let them
attempt to undervalue our courage, our. opinions and
our importance; we shall shew them in the next
Congress, that no government can wage an unneces-
saiy war against the sentiments and interests of the
people.

We predicted this change, as did many others, six
months ago, in the pamphlet, entitled << Madison's
War.'* We advised the people to despise the anti-
republican, despotick opinion, that the citizens have
no right to discuss the merits of a war, after it is de-
clared. We recommended a constitutional resistance^
a resistance at the polls. The people have done so ;
and what is the glorious and unexampled resuH?

SIX

■-1fj?i'

l^ever since the Declaration of Independence^ bas
such an union been witnessed. In the lower House
of Congress^ which alone could have been effected in
so short a time by popular elections^ we shall proba-
bly have a peace majority.

The present prospect is, that not one member of
Congress, from Maine to Delaware, will be in fayour
of the war.

In Massachusetts, at no period of its histoiy, has
it ever enjoyed so united a delegation. Its voice will
now have, as it ought to, its due weight. Let us ex-<
amine this respectable power, which has risen up as
it were by magick, or by the finger of Heaven, against
a daring and headstrong administration^

These northern and ndddle states, who are now
united in opinion, possess 3,000,000 of inhabitants^
considerably more than did the whole United States
at the time of the Declaration of Independence. —
They are a body of freemen, distinguished for their
industry and virtue. They are the owners of nearly
two third parts of all the tonnage of the United States,
and furnishes, probably three fourths of all the native
seamen. They are totally opposed to a war for the
privilege of protecting British seamen against their
own sovereign. They know, from their own experi-
ence, that this subject of impressment is a mere in»
strument, wielded by men who are utterly indifferent
about the sufferings of the sailors or the merchants.

The display of the true principles, upon which this
subject ought to be considered, is the main object of
the following Essays.

We are aware that the friends of administration,
(and some few who ought to know better the rights

^;-.

and duties of a citizen,) with uncommon pretensions
to patriotism, have bridled themselves in with a
haughty and censorious air, when they have read
these essays, and have thought to condemn them, and
to render the author odious, by representing him as
supporting the claims of Great-Britain, and as aban-
doning the rights of America.

It is a vulgar clamour, which the author heeds not,
he has no popularity to seek, and he fears not for the
reputation of his integrity, with the wise and good ;
but as such a clamour may lead feeble minds to read
with distrust, and to weigh with uneven scales, it may
not be amiss to suy a word or two upon this subject.

Is morality, when applied to questions between
nations^ of a different character, and founded on dif-
ferent principles from what it is, when applied to in-
dividuals ?

Is man an infallible being ? or, if he eiTs, is he
never to turn from the eiTor of his way ? is he never
to examine the rectitude of his own principles ? or, if
convinced of his error, is he never to confess it, and
alter his conduct ; but must his pride prompt him to
pftrsevere in wrong doing ? If, moreover, he becomes
, satisfied that his interest as well as his duty require
a change of conduct, must he still adhere to his
errors?

Can not a nation do wrong ? do we not contend
that Britain has often done so ? and is it impossible
that America should sometimes partake of human in-
firmities ?

And if a nation does wrong, must its citizens defend
even its errors ? Must they spill their blood, and 6x-
haust their treasure, and lose their liberties, rather

than expose the national favlta f But if the doctrine
be true, that you cannot discuss such a question freely
and shew the mistakes or the misconduct of ;^our own
country^ the people will go on blindfolded, and will
contend with honest, but mistaken zeal, for principles
which if they had fully understood, they would have
shuddered at supporting.

I have now given to my adversaries the mostfavoar-
able side of the argument for them. But the question
is not whether our country is in the wron^^', but
whether a few men in power and place, men whose
power thrives by war, whose salaries are unaffected
by it, cannot be in the wrong ? The country is oppo-
sed to the war, for the question of impressment. The
country knows that it is a question grossly exaggera-
ted, not worthy of such sacrifices. The country does
not wish to protect British seamen, nor to deprive
Great Britain of her natural defence.

But my last, and most complete justification is, that
in my opinion, it would be against our interest, as a
nation, and against the interest of the seamen espe-
cially, to gain the question in dispute. The moment
our flag shall be a complete asylum to British seamen,
under which they will be free from all search,
100,000 of them would find the way to our ports, re-
duce the wages of our native seamen, or send them
about our streets to beg. It would be, in my opinion,
the most destructive policy which could be adopted.

t will then ask, whether a man may not patriotic-
ally oppose a pretension of his own country, which he
thinks will be essentially injurious to it?

I shall conclude, by quoting the words of an emi-
nent politician, who wrote a century ago. "If

;«:•&

■VI

■in

therefore^ said he, in futare times, it shall be visible*
that some men, to build np their own fortunes, are
pushing at their country's ruin, good patriots must
then exert all their virtue, they must reassume the
courage of their ancestors ; but chiefly they must sa-
crifice to the publick, all their ancient animosities $
they must forgive one another ; it must no more be re-
membered of what 'party any man was; it being suffi-
cient to enquire whether he always acted honestly.
At such a time, the best men of both sides, if the name
of party still remains, must shake hands together,
with a resolution to withstand the subtle and diligent
enemies of the peace and prosperity of the country.
In such a juncture, not only the best men of all parties
must be taken in, but we must be angry with no sort
of men, who will unite against the common enemicB
of our commerce and peace."

UitTcnant'f Enay on the Doty of Priiwte Men, he.

ing an

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MB. MADISON'S MESSAGE.

NO. I.
J^OtlEIGN AND CIVIL WAR ItESOLVED UPON !

Before we can have the requisite time^and leisure
to express, and display the profound and awful im-
pressions, which have been made npon us by thip
unparalleled documeL'^—Before we shall be able to
stnp this message ot that almost impenetrable cloudy
with which Ctia present Chief Magistrate knows how
to envelope the niost alarming desiens, and projects —
Before we di:aplay, tb^t cold, relentless, inflexible,
and audacious spirit, which seems to consider the
sufferings and distresses of a whole people as mere
political pastime— ^which regards the loss of armies,
and the destruction of thousands of our fellow men
as trifling incidents in the game, which it has pleased
certain sportsmen to play, I think it may be well to
give to the publick in a concise form, more intel-
ligible than the message was designed to be, the
leading principles, positions, and opinions, which it
has pleased Mr Madison to advance.

I am well aware, that many good, well meaning
men in reading this message will be carried away at
first with the amicable, generous and noble profes-
sions of its author — ^It is precisely the art of appear-
ing to be what one is riot<— of assuming virtues and
principles which are foreign to our character — of hid-
ing and sedulously and artfully concealing our de-
signs, which constitutes that dangerous talent that
has rendered so many men the scourges of the coun-
try in which they were bom — It is only by stripping

;f:i

IIPI,^IJP.IIIIIIJIJII

them of this disguise, by comparing carefally their
conduct with their professions, that we can ascertain
the real merit or demerit of men—we mean to at-
tempt tliis difficult task, though conscious of our want
of many of the qualifications necessary to its full and
able execution.

The first and most important idea which the Mes-
sage presents, and which runs through, and forms a
distinguishing feature in it, is that the WAR, how-
ever disastrous-— however burdensome, however fruit-
less, however hopeless and desperate, is to be not
only persevered in, but more expensively, and more
ferociously carried on.

£very paragraph is so expressed — every thought
is so modelled — every fact is so coloured, presented
or moulded, as to bring the mind to the necessity of
waging this unnecessary and ruinous war, for aught
we see, ad infinitum.

No art which could have a tendency to inflame
the passions — No motive, which could excite the
pride, the cupidity or the vengeance of men has been
overlooked or left unui^ed.>

We are then in the first place to consider this Mes-
sage as an unequivocal, and bold declaration that this
war, notwithstanding the submission of Great Britain
and her repeal of her orders in GouncH, must and
shall be continued with increased expense, probably
increased disasters, and with the certainty of ultimate
failure. — ^We shall in future essays shew that these
dreadful consequences must follow — ^that the expenses
will be increased tenfold — the disasters will be mul
tiplied without end — and that the termination must
be, and will be against us.

The second proposition which the Message pre-
sents to us, is, that the ulamatum, the sine qua non of
a peace is already changed — It is expressly admitted
by the President that the Orders in Council are re-,
pealed and repealedin such a manner as <Uo be capable
of explanations meeting the views of this Government."

But that the point now unsettled, and for which aione
the war is carried on, is the refusal of the British Gov-
ernment to suspend the practice of impressment —
This then is avowed to be the sole cause ofprossecu-
ting the war — ^There is an end to the restraints
upon our commerce, but we are to wage this war for
the exemption of British seamen from impressment.

It is very fortunate foe the desired and very desir-
able unanimity among the people, which is rapidly
taking place, that we should Imow from so high au-
thority, that the cause, for which we aie enduring
such privations, and expending so much blood and
treasure, is the protection ofrenegadoes and deserters
from the British navy — ^we are fighting not for an
American, but a British interest.

The third great feature of the Message, is, that the
Governors of the two old and venerable states of
Massachusetts and Connecticut are declared to be
somewhat in a state of insurrection — ^They are (as it
were) recommended to be put under the ban of the
Empire.

If the war Congress, the high mettled racers of the
South should be as warmly impressed, as the Mes-
sage seems to intend they shall be, we must expect to
see it followed by, a declaration that Massachusetts
and Connecticut are in rebellion— by a suspension of
the habeas corpus, and by commissions to Gen. King
and the volunteers whom he has raised, to coerce the
the refractory states.

The least we can expect from this part of the Mes-
sage is a law placing the militia under the orders and
lashes of the officers of the standing army — and our
papers will soon give us another affecting detail of
the ceremonies with which the deserters from the mi-
litia are shot.

We have much to say on this interestins sub-
ject — this alarming stride to despotism which is pro-
posed by introducing the conscription laws of France
into our copntiy, but it must be the subject of special

til-;

ftnd separate consideration — ^We now only mean to
indicate the topicks wliich the Message presents.

The fourth subject which the Message furnishes, is
the increase and encouragement of the standing army
and militfa.

New bounties — new pay — ^new encouragement to
these locusts who are consuming, like their predeces-
sors in Egypt; every green thing — every fertile plant
in our late happy and peaceful country — For what
purpose are they to be raised ? to repel invasion ?
We are threatened with none ; to conquer Canada?
For what purpose? to protect British seamen from
impressment ; and will the conquest of Canada ef-
fect this ? We know it will not ; our path is on the
ocean ; we complain that it is obstructed ; in order
to clear it we turn our backs upon the very path
which we would open, and march in an opposite di-
rection. This is a curious mode of effecting an ob-
ject ; but it will be said that the capture of Canada
will coerce Great-Britain ; I admit, that if a man
steals my horse, I may compel him to do me right by
taking his house or his farm or any thing necesaarif
to him; but is Canada neceasar^ to Great-Britain ?
No ; is it as important to her as her own seamen P
No ; Then she will never give up to our demand of
protecting her own native subjects, even if we take
Canada.

But fifthly and lastly ; The Message suggests an-
other dreadful thought ; a thought which brings to
our minds all the horrors of Baltimore ; It appears
i*^ us, in a covert and yet very perceptible, and very
obvior? manner, to reccommend an extension of con-
structive treasons.

The whole history of the Tudors and Stewarts
cannot exhibit a latitude of expression more suited
to make every thing a crime, than the President's
phrase of ^^ corrupt and perfidious intercourse with the
enemy."

Suppose a bill framed in these words, declaring

■iiMPHnaiPMNifWM

any man guilty of treason, who should he found hold-
ing a '^ corrupt and perfidious intercourse with the
enemy."

Suppose the habeas corpus suspended, and Gen.
King ordered to escort any man on whom the Presi-
dent's, or Dr. Eustis's, or Gen. Dearborn's, or Mr.
Hill's suspicions might light to Washington, there to be
tried by a packed jury, returned at pleasure (that is
chosen by the Marshal who is the President's ser-
vant.) What do you think his chance would be ? For
my part I had rather take my chance with the mercy
of a Presidential mob, than a Presidential jury — ^AU
the facta of which a man could be convicted are de-
tailed in the late law forbidding supplies to the ene-
my, what then can be intended except to punish upon
surmises and suspicion? The liberty of the people is
in danger.

No.n

It has been the constant boast of our administra-
tion, in the midst of the most hostile acts, that it is sin-
cerely desirous of peace — such professions cost but
little, and aiford the people who suffer, small consola-
tion amidst the distresses and ruin occasioned by the
war.

A very moderate portion of ability is requisite in
framing letters, and despatches, and messages breath-
ing a pacifick spirit.

Yet if the whole conduct of these professing gentle-
men be examined and analyzed, and if it has appear-
ed, and shall yet appear, that their conduct is in di-
rect opposition to their declaration, we ought to enter-
tain but one sentiment in regard to them, and that is,
that by adding duplicity to mjurous projects and ru-
inous measures, they merit a double portion of oup
resentment and distrust.

An overwhelming mass of these pacifick profesison$

flowed in upon us at the moment when this unjust and
unnecessary War was declaredj, and a new edition of
the same hollow and insincere declarations has just
been published^ at the very moment, when we are
earryv^fire and award into the peaceful colonies of
Great Britain — ^when we are excited by every species
of exagseration and misrepresentation to carry on the
Was with ferocity and fiiry.

It is pretended by the President, that at the very
moment of his declaration of War, he made new ef-
forts to obtain peace, and even solicited an armistice
before an actual appeal to arms had been made. We
shall say nothing upon this new and unheard of proce-
dure. We shall admit, though we think the conduct
extraordinary, that if proj^osals were made to Great-
Britain^ such as even a feeblo, a base and degraded
nation could accept from a haughty and much more
powerful foe, that the administration deserve credit
for.

But if it shall appear, as it will, that the offers made
were not only illusory but insulting ; if they were
such as any nation not I'eady to pass under the yoke,
would have rejected ; — ^if, in sliort, it must have been
foreiieett tliat they would be rejected by Great-Britain,
i can only say that the people ought to view with dis-
dain this attempt to impose upon their understandings.

It is my design to analyze this whole correspon-
dence with Great-Britain, and I fear that I shall be
compelled to shew, to the disgrace of our nilers, that
all this parade of negotiation had only one object in
view, to enable the President to make a shew of a pa-
cifick disposition — ;to lull the fears and excite the hopes
of the people ;-^to secure the reelection of the •iuthor
of this War to the Presidency,

In executing this task, I must entreat the attention
of my readers to two circumstances which they must
keep in mind throushout the whole discussion.

The one is, that m examining tlye negotiations and
propositions of our artful cabinet, propositions adroit-

iy stated, cavefully considered, cautiously es^ressed^
combining all the talents of the President and Ids min-
isters, very considerable time and attention will be re-
quisite.

. I am persuaded that to the great mass of readers^
the subject will be\ininteresting-— the topics are too re-
fined, the argument too elaborate and complicated for
general use.

It is only from those whose means of information,
and whose power of discrimination qualify thetn to
follow a continued train of reasoning, and whose pa-
triotism and zeal will induce them to undertake it^
that I expect attention.

It is however a solemn duty in all those, who know
how often the People have been deceived by the 8<yj^h-
29m8 and false pretensions of the Cabinet, to examine
this subject, and to attend to the essays of any mltn
who will devote his time and whatever talents he may
possess to this arduous duty.

T^e second circumstance worthy of consideration is
fh' that it is impossible to discuss and to prove,
the isincerity of the offers made by our own cabinet
without indirectly Justifying the British cabinet in
ejecting them. Hence it may be expected that the
old clamour, of supporting the pretensions of our ene-
my will be revived, and if wc were to utter these sen-
timents in Baltimore we might be exposed to martyr-
dom and massacre. We simply however present to
all tend consciences this plain • apology.— Whether
our rulers have sincerely and honestly solicited and
sought for Peace is an important question. If they
have J all opposition ought to he withdrawn, and we
should unite in their favour. If they have not ; but if
in place of it, they have endeavoured to deceive the
people by insincere professions of peace, they merit
our highest censure and indignation.

I cannot perceive how this question can be in any
manner discussed without involving in it, either a
censure or an ff^;?ro/;flf/o?M)f the British Government

In rejecting the overtures. If any man can see a mid-
dle coarse let him take it.

For ourselves, conscious of as much patriotism as
Mr. Madison pretends to, and seeing no reason as he
does for covering up our thoughts in dark, ambiguous,
unintelligible language, we shall proceed boldly to
shew that his late extraordinary proposals for an Jir-
mistice were unreasonable, hostile, and calculated to
produce every thing hut Peace.

Having already extended the necessary prelimina-
ry observations to so great a length ; the limits of a
newspaper essay will only permit us to make these
important introductory remarks on the subject of the
late extraordinary and unreasonable propositions for
an Armistice.

The first is, that it is we believe the first time, in the
history of nations, that a proposal for an Armistice
was made by the party declaring an offensive war, be-
fore he had struck a single blow upon the enemy ; —
before he had gained or was likely to gain a single
advantage. If we should put this measure into a
simple form, we should say, that it was in the nature
of a menace — ** There, Sir, you have failed to yield
to our threats, because you thought we did not dare to
make War, we now shew you that we have courage,
therefore yield." Is this a natural and usual mode
of conciliating an enemy, and of reconciling him to
terms which he had before rejected ?

A brave andpowerfeul nation would have preferred
to have shewn its prowess — ^to have wrested some-
thing from its enemy which it could offer, as the e-
quivalent for concession.

The second remark which occurs to us, without
entering at large into the terms proposed, is that we
offer lo Great Britain precisely the same terms which
were offered by Mr. Monroe in I8O7. — We offer to
exclude British seamen from our publick and private
ships. — On those terms, properly secured, she offered
to modify her practice of impressment. This is

upon record. Mr. Monroe i9 bound to acknowledge
this fact for we have it under his own hand. We eaU'^
not refrain from asking the question, why this pointy,
if now ofi'ered in sincerity, was not accepted heforethe
War?

If it had been, as the Orders in Council were vol-
untarily withdrawn by Great Britain, no c^use of war
would have remained. We shall shew in our next
essay why Great.Britain did not accede to the terms
offered by our cabinet. In short we shall shew that
there was only a feint — a pretence — an appearance
of acceding to those terms on the part of our cabinet.

Lastly — It is evident by the apparent offer, (and
though I shall shew it was only an offer in appear^
ance, yet it is so far a commitment or admission of our
cabinet) that we admit that Great-Britain has been
always right in complaining of the enticement and en-
listment of her subjects in time of War :-^Because
c'lr cabinet now propose to prohibit by law the enlist-
ment of British sailors, and surely they would not a-
gree to this if by the law of nations, we, as a neutral
nation, have a right "so to enlist or employ them. Our
cabinet is not made of such stuff as to give up to
Great-Britain any legitimate rights. They admit
therefore they have been in the wrong,

ir I

ti- i^

;.'rl

NO. m.

I HK FUOPOSITIONS RECIPROCALLY MADE BY THE AMERICAN
AND BRITISH CABINETS FOR AN ARMISTICE, AND THE REA-
SONS ASSIGNED FOR THEIR REJECTION.

To facilitate the examination of this subject, I pro-
pose to consider,

i8t. What were tlie speciflck propositions respec-
tively made?

'^nd. In what manner they were received by the
different governments including herein the answers
severally made.

H I

' Sd. The reasonableness of these several propost-
tionsy and replies.

If we were to decide^ as to the nature of any prop-
ositions made for an Armistice, either from the prac-
tice heretofore adopted by all civilized nations, or
fh)m the rules of natural justice, equity and decorum,
we shoul4 certainly conclude that the offer ought to
be perfectly reciprocal ; not claiming for the party who
proposes it any advantage over the other to whom it'
is proposed; otherwise a rejection must be expected,
and we must look to some other motive than the avow-
ed one for the proposition. To expect that an enemy
in time of war would voluntarily yield any point with-
out an equivalent must be absurd — ^There is only
one exception to this rule, and that is, where the party
who makes an unequal and unreciprocal demand,
has gained some great advantage in the war, or is in a
contution so manifestly superior in point of force as to
give him a right to dictate the conditions of an Armis-
tlce-^Thus we have seen Bonaparte often insisting,
as for instance, to the king of Sardinia, after the battle
at Coni, and to Austria before the treaty of Campo
Formio, on terms which any equal and unsubdued foe
would have spumed — In all such cases we consider it
the language of a haughty master to a humble and con-
quered enemy — We believe that the annals of modern
^Europe cannot exhibit a case where between two par-
ties perfectly equal, and before the chances of war had
been tried, terms totally devoid of reciprocity have
been demanded — Much less could any man conceive,
that the rulers of seven millions of people, not inured
to war, with six frigates, and ten thousand ill-disci-
plined, raw and inexperienced troops, would demand,
as a condition of a mere suspension of hostilities, t]\t
relinquishment of a right exercised for four centuries
from an old powerful nation comprising sixteen mill-
ions of people, witli 300,000 regular troops and 400
Hliips of war.

Yot sucli a case we undertake to shew has Mr.

Madison for the first time exhibited — ^The Otdeirs in
Council and blockades having been removed as it is
now confessed to the satisfaction of our cabinet, the
practice of Great Britain of reclaiming heroirn native
seamen, a practice which we shall shew under our
third division to have been coeval with the existence
' of her marine, and a practice uniformly adopted by
all other nations, especially by America and lier ally
France, this ancient practice was the only remaining
ground of war, and the only source of dispute between
tlie two countries.

Great Britain claims it as a right — we contend
that it is a wrong done to us. Now Mr. Madison
/ asks as a condition of even a suspension of arms, and
as the very commencement of negotiation, that Great
Britain shall relinquish the exercise of this which
she claims as a right — *' We will not hear you," says
Mr. Madison, <<till you give up your claim, and then
we will treat with you about the justice of it, or the
modes of indemnifying you for giving it up."

The first question is, did Mr. Madison make this
monstrous and preposterous claim ? Could he insult
any nation, however feeble, by such a preliminary
proposition ?

One man says, I do not understand the demand in
this light — another says, Mr. Monroe explained and
took it back in a subsequent letter, which by the way
was not written till six days before the Message.

A third gentleman with honest zeal exclaims, it is
not possible Mr. Madison could have been guilty of
playing so broad a farce !

I shall prave by unqestionable evidence that such
a proposition was made, for whicli no equivalent was
offered to Great Britain.

In Mr. Monroe's instructions to JVIr. Russell, dated
.Tune S6th, eight days after the declaration of war, he
authorises and directs him as follows : " If the Orders
in Council are repealed and no illegal blockades sub-
iiitituted to them, and orders are given to discontinue

'm!.

«0

the imjDvesspient of seamen [mark it reader ! any aea^
men, British or American, naturalized or not] from our
vessels, and to restore those already impressed, there
is no reason why hostilities should not immediately
cease — securing these objects, you are authorized tu
stipulate an arinistice."

Now, no language could be clearer to shew, that
the actual discontinuance of the practice of impress-
ment must precede even an armistice — In other
words, a question which has been twenty years in dis-
cussion between the two nations, a question founded
0n sevisral centuries usurpation, if you please so to
call it, a question in which Great-Britain is support-
ed by the practice of America and France, as I shall
most amply prove, this question which she considers
a vital one for her marine, Great-Britain is required
to give up as a condition of a temporary suspension
of arms.

Mr. Russell our minister understood his instruc-
tions in the light in which I do— and no man can un-
derstand them otherwise.

In his letter to Lord Gastlereagh of August M,
1813, he says *• that he is authorised to stipulate
with his Britannick Majesty's government an armis«
tice mi condition that ttie orders in council be repeal-
ed, and no illegal blockades substituted ; and that or-
ders be immediately given to discontinue the impress-
ment of persons from American vessels, and to restore
ihe citizens of the United States already impressed."

Here we find the discontinuance of the practice of
impressment a condition precedent to an armistice —
It IS curious also to notice the legal precision of Rus-
sell's terms — -They are to require the discontinuance
of impressment of "j»er8o»s," that is, of all or any per-
sons — but those he requires to be restored are only
" American citizens" — ^We are astonished that they
had not the eflfirontery to demand the re-delivery of
British subjects who had been impressed— But on re-
jection it is as well and nearly the same, because the

terms '* American citizens" includes British sailoM
naturalized, many of whom obtained naturalization
in twenty.four hours after they came on shore — ^This
topick we shall however examine when we consider
the reasonableness of the ptopositionst

Lord Gastlereagh comprehended Mr. RusselFs de-
mand in the same manner in wliich Mr. Russell
liad understood his instructions.

^^ I cannot, said his Lordship, refrain on one single
point from expressing my surprise, namely, that as u
condition preliminary even to a suspension of hostil-
ities, the United States have thought fit to demand
that the British government should desist from its an-
cient and accustomed practice of impressing British
seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state
simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be
passed, &c. &c."

His Lordship goes on to declare that Great-Britain
is now ready as she has been heretofore to agree to a-
ny substitute which may accomplish the satne end —
but this will come particularly under consideration
when we come to the second proposed division.

The present design is merely to prove, that our
government did demand tlie discontinuance of im-
pressment as a preliminary even to any negotiation —
But some gentlemen have construed a phrase in Mr.
Monroe's letter of the 27th of Oct. to Sir J. B. War-
ren, as denying the intention to demand the relinquish,
ment of impressment as a preliminary— We know they
are mistaken, and that government do not even now
pretend that they are ready for an Armistice, unless
the practice of impressment be first relinquished —
Tlic clause on which doubts have arisen is this, Mr.
Monroe in his letter to Sir John B. Warren, says,
'* Lord Castlereagh in his note to Mr. Russell, seems
to have supposed, that had the British government
accepted the propositions made to it, Great-Britain
would have sus])euded immediately the exercise of
a right on the mere assurance of this government that

I '

a law would be afterwards passed to prohibit the eui-^
ployment of British seamen in the service of the U-
nited States ; and that Great-Bi'itaiH would have vo
agency in the regulation to give effect to that pi'oposi-
ttonJ* << Such an idea," lie adds, << was not in the
contemplation of this government, nor is it to be infer-
red from Mr. Russell's note ; but lest such an inference
should be drawn, subsequent instructions were given
to Mr. Russell with a view to obviate every objection
of the kind alluded to. These instructions bear date
S7th July, and were forwarded by tlie British packet
Althea."

Now, what is it that Mr. Monroe means to deny ?
That the relinquishment of impressment was an abso-
lute preliminary ? Or that it was not expected that
Great-Britain should have no voice, no agency in the
terms of the act of Congress which might be passed
to regulate them ?• We say clearly the latter — We
prove this by the new instructions of July S7th to
Mr. Russell, which arc given in the documents, and
which expressly stipulate, that impressment must be
instantly abandoned as a ])reliminary to an Armistice.

It however provides that Great-Britain shall be
consulted as to the terms of the provision restricting
the employment of British subjects.

This then, and this only is the point which Mr.
Monroe meant when he said that Lord Castlereagh
misunderstood the claims of our government — This is
further proved by tiic very same letter to Sir John B.
Warren, which is dated «)nly sixteen days since, in
i!vhich it is added ^^ that a suspension of impressment
during the Armistice seems to be a necessary conse-
quence — ^It cannot be presumed, while the parties are
negotiating, that the United States would admit the
right, or acquiesce in the practice of the opposite par-
ty." This alone settles the question as to what was
demanded^ but we shall remove all doubt hereafter.

NO. IV.
TILE SEVEUAL TROPOSALS FOR AN ARMISTICE CONSIDERED,

If any doubts should still remain on the mind of
any one, whether the absolute and entire discontinu-
ance of the practice of reclaiming her own seamen out
of merchant ships on the high seas, was demanded
by Mr. Madison, of Great-Britain, as a condition of
granting a suspension of arms only, those doubts

must be entirely removed by the following additional
facts.

Mr. Monroe, when he denies that Lord Castlcreagb
understood Mr. Russell and our Government aright,
refers to his explanatory letter of July 27th by the
British packet Althea, in which he say9> that the o-.
riginal proposi ion is fully explained. On examin-
ing that letter, we find it again asserted, that " theOr^
ders in Cou:icil, illegal Blockades and Impressments,
were the principal causes of the war, and ir they were
removed, you might stipulate an Armistice."

The only differences between this new explanato-
ry letter and the former one are the following :

ist, Mr. Russell was authorised, by the last letter,
not to insist upon a written stipulation to be contain-
ed in the instrument declaring the Armistice, but he
was especially directed to procure an " informal un-
derstanding, so as to admit of no mistake," that im^
pressmeuts should be instantly discontinued.

2nd. He was to make the Government of Great-
Britain distinctly to understand, that all stipulations
as to the exclusion of British seamen from our ships
must ultimately depend on Congress, whose consent
would be necessary to give validity to the bargain di-
plomatically agreed upon.

AVhen we come to the ponsideration of the reason-
ableness of the several proposals, we shall resume this

,;t.

ill !

fact, and aak, whether from the very acknowledgecl
uncertainty of the temper of Congress on this delicate
subject, it would have been expected of Great-Britain
that she would yield so ancient a claim for the advan-
tage of a promise which the maker of it avowed he
had no power to fulfil, and where the execution of it
rested upon the good v. ill and good faith of such men.
as Seaver and Cutts — ^and Bibb and Troup — and
Crrundy and Clay — and Wright and Nelson ?

Another proof that our Government never contem-
plated even an Jlrmistice, but upon condition that
Great Britain would get down upon her knees, put on
the penitential garments, and renounce the error of
her ways, will be found in a still later letter from Mr.
Monroe to Mr, Russell, assigning the reasons why
the President rejected the early, and for us, very fa-
vourable offers of Sir George Prevost and Mr. Foster,
for an Armistice.

This letter, dated August, :31st, states, that, ^^ As
a principal object of the war is to obtain redress a-
gainst the British practice of Impressment, an agree-
ment to suspend hostilities, even before the British
Government is heard from on that subject, might be
considered a relinquishment of that claim."

A pretty curious sort of reasoning, and one for aught
we see which would forever put an end to all Armis-
tices ! ! For one party or the other might always urge
that the agreement to the Armistice would be consid-
ered a relinquishment of his claims, ai.d therefore, that
theothermust, as a preliminary even to discussion, put
him in possession of what he demands, otherwise he
could not in honour negotiate.

But the most conclusive proof, that an Armistice
would never be agreed to, unless Great Britain would
yield {not the point of honour only) but her ancient,
and as she deems most interesting right (and how dear
it is to her we shall hereafter shew), will be found in
the last clause of Mowoc's letter to J. B. Warren, in
which he says,

Ught

lis-

irge

Isid-

that

I put

ticc

lid

;ar
in
in

^< If therb is no objection to an accommodation re-
lating to Impressment other than the suspension of
fho. British claim to Impressment during the Armis-
tice, there can be none to proceeding, without the
ARMISTICE to the discussion and arrangement of an
article on that subject. The great question being sat-
isfactorily adjusted, the M^ay will be open ixi an At-
mistice,^' &c. /

Here then the question is put at rest. — If Great-
Britain had been mistaken as to our demand of an
immediate suspension of her practice of taking Brit-
ish seamen^ it was the most simple thing in the world
to have intimated, after saying as Mr. Monroe does^*^
** If that is the only objection on the part of Great-
Britain to the Armistice, proposed by us, why we will
agree directly to the Armistice, and to an immediate
negotiation pending the •Armistice on the subject of
Impi-essment.*'

But the reverse is Mr. Monroe's alternative—** If
you will not agree to suspend Impressment as intro-
ductory to an Armistice, why we will negotiate without
an ArmisticeJ^ Which is equivalent to saying, that
an A rmistice will never be granted, until you yield this
point.

We shall shew, by and by, that the last offer of
without Ml Armistice, is the mere shad-
ow of a shade — a pure phantasm, which will e-
lude the grasp, though it is well calculated to de-
ceive the credulous, and lead the seekers of popular-
ity astray.

We have shewn what were the precise and only
terms offered by uh to Great-Britain, that while we
proposed simply to withhold actual hostilities, keep-
ing on our Non-Importation law, which we declared
to be the most efficient War measure, we demanded of
her not merely a correspondent cessation of captures
and warlike measures, but the immediate suspension
of an interesting right during the Armistice, which
might either be protracted by negotiation through the

treating.

»6

whole European war, or Great-Britain would have
the odium of breaking it off, and thus give our cabi-
net all the popularity and benefits, at home and a-
broad, of waging a defensive war, in place of the odi-
um of carrying on an offensive one.

Nor were the inequality, and preposterous nature
of these terms the worst features in the negotiation. —
Our Government and Minister took care not only to
make Great-Britain perceive, that we were afraid to
trust her during an Armistice, even after she had vol-
untarily abandoned the two great formerly avowed
causes of war ; but they reminded her of the vast in<
juries she had wantonly committed upon us, and the
unprecedented forbearance of the United States, and
lest all this language and this extraordinary demand
should not induce her to reject our proposals, orders
were given to hint to her, that after these humiliations
were submitted to, we had many " rods in pickle,''
for which she must prepare her Imperial back.

'* Although there are many just and weighty caus-
es of complaint against Great-Britain (says Mr.
Madison, in his instructions for an Armistice, in his
hollow instructions to make a shew of an Armistice),
you will perceive that the Orders in Council, illegal
Blockades, and Impressments are of the highest im-
portance,''

Gracious Heaven ! ! What hopes can that nation
ever have of arriviug at an end of its labours ! ! The.
toils of Hercules, and the disasters of Job, have nti
comparison with them. — I had thought that the ten
derness of our government for Great-Britain had in-
duced them and their editors, the National Intelli-
gencer, Aurora, and Chronicle, to state to us all thn
various causes of dissatisfaction against her. — I
Jiad thought that after atoning for the attack on
the Chesapeake, relinquishing all illegal Block-
ades — rescinding the Orders in Council, and re-
nouncing Impressmen*", there would remain no causo
of dissatisfaction aga.nst Great-Britain ; but she is

now told, that these are only the higher causes of
complaint, and that after she has .submitted to all
the humiliations demanded of her, our Attorney-
General will then file a bill, and present a specifica-
tion of the other ** just and weighty causes of com-
plaint.'' I can only say, that I never yet heard the
bitterest enemy of England mention any other causes,
than those enumerated by Mr. Madison. — ^What pos-
sible encouragement then could the British cabinet
have, to agree to our proposals, when they could see
. no termination to complaints, and pretexts, and caus-
es, for avoiding an ultimate arrangement, and when
the exclusion c/ British trade, (the only real object of
France in obliging us to enter into this war) was to
be continued until Peace should be finally conclud-
ed?

The government of Great-Britain lost no time after
the war was known, in making to our cabinet propo-
tsals for an Armistice. These proposals were like all
propositions between equal states, perfectly recipro-
cal. They require of us to suspend hostilities only,
in consideration of suspending hostilities on their part.
They are silent as to Impressments— and would any
person enquire why ? It may be answered, that Im-
pressments never had been presented to Great-Brit-
ain as in themselves the cause ofwar^-^They had ex-
isted prior to Jay's treaty, and that treaty was made
without demanding their discontinuance — they con-
tinued during the whole of Mr. King's residence in
Europe, as well as during Mr. Monroe's, and the lat-
ter also made a treaty in which they were left as the
subjects of future arrangement. — How then could G.
Britain presume that this would be on our part a sine
qua non of an Armistice ? — Especially as the discus-
sion on that topick with Monroe and Pinkney had
shewn that many months would be required to ar-
range it?

The universal sentiment in England and America
was, tliat if the Orders in Council and Blockade!^

1 ' i ■ i f '

13 III

sliould be withdrawn, the cause of War Would c^as^
— at least it was supposed that hostilities might ceisLse,
and the other subjects be matter of negotiation for a
definitive Peace.

Our cabinet knew well that tliis state of things
would t|ike place — They knew from our minister in
Fiance, Barlow, that the French decrees had been
repealed on the S8th of April, 181S. This was
known here before the declaration of War. They
knew equally well that Great-Britain, according to
her pledge, would (as she afterwards did) repeal the
Orders in Council. — To prevent the eifects wliich
this would produce in this country. War was previ-
ously declaredr-^^ut the repeal of the Orders in
Council might create clamours for peace in the Uni-»
ted States— Here too they had their plaister for tlie
wound.— tA proposal must be made for an Armistice,
and to the astonished cabinet of Great-Britain, fond-
ly anticipating the return of peace by the repeal of
the Orders in Council, the old subject oi her claiming
her own seamen, so long and so often discussed and
never before presented even as a sine qua nort of a
treaty, makes a splendid figure in the foreground, as
a preliminary even to a cessation of the shedding of
human blood. 8uch is the dijference in the propo-
sals of the two cabinets— While the one repeals her
obnoxious measure, and simply claims a mutual ce^sa-
tionfrom hostilities ,• the other presents at the very
threshold of negotiation, a check mate which puts a
period to the game of peace — We ask Great-Britain
to yield, as a preliminary, what is well known she
would not give up without a substitute, until Dear-
born shall have planted his standard on the Tower of
liondon.

NO. V.

ON THE HBASONARLENESS OF THE OFFERS FOR AH

ARMISTICE.

The principles on which the practice of reclaiming
, their own citizens by belligerents, is founded — its
antiquity, and universality.

We cannot decide, whether the proposals made
by our cabinet were or were not reasonable, without
entering into a discussion and history of the claim
which they required should be surrendered as a pre-
liminary — 'There is no topick less understood, and
precisely for the reason, that it has been so long and
so much talked about. Every man fancies he under-
stands the topick of every day's discourse, and there-
fore gives himself no trouble about it ; and every
hour you meet young and old men talking most flip-
pantly on this universally exercised right, without
having examined any of the principles on which it
is founded, any of the difficulties which attend iU
relinquishment by belligerents, any of the embarrass-
ments which have been, and which we fear and
believe will forever be in the wAy of an adjust-
ment of it, consistently Witli the mutual rights and
interests of America and Great-Britain. There has
been another obstacle to a right comprehension of
this question — It has been always treated with pas-
sion and ill temper. All nations are very jealous upoii
questions where they fancy their rights and their
honour are concerned, but few are so extremely
tender and so little ready to exercise their reason
and their impartiality as a certain class of Americans.
It is enough always for such men, that Great- Britain
exercises a right which produces some inconvenience
to us, or whicli reminds them of her naval povver,
without stoppuig to inquire whether she is singular

ill her pretensions, or whether we claim the same foi^
ourselves. Indeed this description of overboiling
patriots would be the very first men to cry Hosanna
to any of our naval o£Bcers who should do a bold and
questionable thing to' any neutral nation, if that
act should promote our interest or our glory.

In examining this claim of taking out their own
iubjects from neutral merchant ships, by belligerents,
we shall consider,

1st. The principles on which it is founded.

2d. Its antiquity, in point of usage by Great-Britain .

3d. The ordinances of France, on the same point.

4th. The former negotiations on this subject be-
tween us and Great-Britain.

5th. The unalterable resolutions of Madi?'^n on
that subject, as expressed in a letter which was writ-
ten in 1807, to our ministers, chiding them for having
dared almost to adjust it, and declaring that our flag
must cover all En^ish sailors who have been here
ttto years, whether naturalized or not, both prospec-
tively as well as retrospectively.

It will appear from this last document, that there
is no hope of an adjustment, because the offer to ex-
clude British sailors, lately made, is so expressed,
as that it will admit of our employing them in one
day after they have landed, if we make them Amer-
ican citizens — such we shall shew must have been
the intention.

1st. We shall consider the principles upon which
all belligerents claim the right to the service of all
their citizens or subjects in time of war.

It is one of the principles tlie most universally ad-
mitted of any which we know of, that allegiance and
protection are reciprocal— that every nation has a
tight to the services of all its citizens in time of war
-^that the allegiance due from a native citizen en-
dures during his life, and altiiougli some liberal wri-
ters contend for the right of expatriation, or a
ehange of allegiance in time of peace, yet even these
writers deny this right to any citizen when his coua*

oral
jnai

try is at war. This maxim is a fundamental one of
the common law of England, and has been adopted
by us since our separation from that country.

In a very famous case in Connecticut, which was
tried before Judge Ellsworth, in which one Williams
had attempted to change his allegiance, had obtained
the rights of a French citizen, and had accepted a
command in the French service, the Federal Court
decided, that no American citizen could change his
allegiance, and sentenced Williams to punishment
for compromilting the Neutrality of the United States,
by entering into the service of a foreign state. The
United States were tlien at peace, and of course our
Courts adopted the narrowest possible construction ;
for no writers deny the right of every country to com-
mand the services of its citizens in time of war.
France never retaliated this treatment of her natu^
ralized and adopted citizens.

Nations not only deny the right of a subject to change
his country and allegiance in time of war, but they
4*laim the right to the active services of their citizens
in such times of peril.

The impressment laws of Great-Britain, and the
conscriptions of France, are proofs of this proposi-
tion — and the United States contend for the same
right The drafting of their militia, which is a co-<
ercive measure, obliging the citizens who may happen
to be drawn to military service, is of the same char-
acter, and founded upon the same principles.

Our Constitution has, to be sure, limited this pow-
er by consent of the people, to the cases of ^* insurrec-
tion, resistance to the laws, and actual iaviision,^^ and
lias reposed the power of judging of the existence of
these exigences, in the commanding ofli^ers of tho
several independent states ; but the right of drafting
and forcing the militia into service, in case those ex-
igences exist, is unquestionable, and proves the gen-
eral proposition, that every nation has a right to com-
jnand tlie sorvicos of its citizens in time of war.

■\\u

If allegiance^ then, is perpetual, extending to the
life of the citizen, and if that allegiance includes the
obligation to render military service, it cannot be ne-
cessary to shew, tliat a man is bound to enter into the
«ervice of his native country whenever and wherever
required. — Still less can it be necessary to shew, that
two perfect rights cannot exist in two different coun-
tries at the same moment to the services of the same
man.

A man may, however, contract a second obliga-
tion — he may enter into a new allegiance by being
naturalized in another country. — Such an allegiance
is, however, inferior to the other, and cannot derogate
from, or diminish the duty which he owed to his for-
mer sovereign. — The first obligation is paramount
and superior, and whenever the two duties come into
conflict, the second, later and inferior duty must yield
to the first and the superior obligation.

The only remaining question is, to what extent and
in what places can the sovereign exercise this right
over the person and services of the citizen? Our
Government contend that it can only be exercised in
the country of which such person is a subject or citi-
zen. — The writers of the laws of nations are silent on
this subject. The reason of their silence as we ap-
prehend, is, that until our country made it a question,
every nation considered that it had a right to demand
the persons and the services of its citizens, in every
situation where they were not under the territorial
jurisdiction of another independent country. — We
shall shew under our other heads that though writers
on general law have been silent on the question,
whether the sovereign power of coercing the citizens
to military service may be exercised on the high seas,
yet that the constant usage, the undisputed usage of
all nations, is the cause of this silence — and that like
many other universally admitted principles of nation-
al law, necessarily resulting from certain acknowl-

edged rights, it is omitted merely because it was|
never questioned.

Tiie great question between us and Great-Britain
is, wlietlier her claim to demand and take her own
seamen on the high seas, is a novel or unjust prin-
ciple ? — Whether it is a violation of onr rights, or
an interpolation in tlie doctrines of international law ?

The law of nations admits the right of belligerents
io enter on board of neutral merchant ships for the
|>urpose of making certain examinations^ They have
a right ia examine, la#, Whether they are carrying
articles contraband of war.— ^2rf, Whether the pix)p-
erty be that oS an enemy. — 3rf, They have a right io
examine strictly the persona on board, because if
they are enemies, they have a right to take them out.

Here, then, there is an end, by the acknowledged
law of nations, to the absolute inviolability of the flag,
The high seas are by these acknowledged and uni-
versally admitted principles considered a sort of com-
mon territory, in which certain rights of belligerents
may be exercised which are not permitted in neuiral
countries. If then a belligerent may take out of a
neutral ship persons owing allegiance to his en&my^
though shipped in neutral countries, it must be on the
principle that the neutral flag on the high seas cannot
protect all who sail under it, — ^It admits the right of
examination and search, and seizure of persons as
well as papers and goods. — ^These are undisputed
and unquestioned rights.— But if a belligerent can
take out his enemy from a neutral ship merely because
lie may possibly iw/wre him hereafter, with how much
more reason can he take his own subject, who owes
him perpetual allegiance and whose servicehe actually
needs P I shall shew, in my next essay, that "all the
objections that have been urged against the claim of
Great-Britain arising from the ai'bitrary and imper-
fect nature of the inquiry by an ignorant and obsti-
nate naval officer, apply as well in one case as the
other.

I'i^

Ij •

^m ''

^: 1^

NO. VI.

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH BELLIGERENTS CLAIM THE
BIOUT TO TAKE THEIR OWN SUBJECTS ON THE HIGH SEAS.—
THE ANTIQUITY AND UNIVEUSAUTY OF THIS CLAIM.

By the ordinances of France, it is provided, that
neutral ships, in order to be entitled to the benefits of
neutrality, must be navigated by a crew of which the
captain, mate, and two-thirds of the seamen are sub-
jects of the neutral country. — It is also provided, that
no seaman shall be entitled to the privileges of a neu.
tral citizen, unless he shall have been naturalized in
such neutral country before the coinmencement of the
war.

One of the most popular objections to the claim of
Great-Britain to search and take out her own sub-
jects, is the one stated by Mr. Madison, in his war
message, and that is, that seamen are by this practice
subjected to the caprice and whim of every petty na-
val o£Scer, without being entitled to the privilege of
a trial by a court of law, a solemnity necessary to the
condemnation of even a bale of merchandize.

To this plausible objection there are various an-
swers. — ^The same loose, informal, arbitrary mode of
decision, is by the acknowledged law of nations suf-
ficient to turn a ship out of its voyage — to defeat the
best projected plans — to expose a crew to all the evils
of capture and detention. — -Even the American navy
exercises the same arbitrary power over the persons
and property of their fellow-citizens.-— In a late case
the Ariadne, owned by Mr. Goddard, of Boston, has
been seized at the whim of a naval officer, the crew
removed out of the ship and made prisoners, and the
ship and cargo sent back for trial, when she had
committed no ofience. If it be said that the admiral-
ty courts will give relief, by awarding damages in
siich cases, the answer is, that such damages are

rarely given, and are never adequate to the injuiy ;
and it may be added, also, that every seaman illegally
impressed has a like remedy, in the courts of law
of Great-Britain, and if their poverty and friendless
situation preclude them from seeking it, it is the duty,
and it would be very easy for a neutral government to
appoint agents to prosecute for damages, whieh we
have no doubt would be honourably awarded in all
cases of illegal detention.

But the best answer to this objection to the univer-
sal practice of belligerents of taking out their own
seamen, is this, that the same caprice, the same infor-
mal and uncontrolled authority is exercised rightfully
by the law of nations, so far as respects enemies found
on board neutral ships. This would be found as ex-
tensive an evil to neutrals, if a case should ever hap-
pen in which a neutral and a belligerent should speak
the same language, and the other belligerent should
have as great a superiority as Great-Britain has upon
the ocean.— >In such a case, the neutral would often
be exposed to seizure and dei ention, being mistaken
for an enemy ; and all the objections which are made
to the exercise of the right over his own subjects in
neutral vessels by a belligerent would apply with as
^eat force, and yet no question could exist a$ to the
right.

We have said, that one cause of the silence of
writers uioon the law of nations, as to the right of
belligerents to reclaim their own seamen, when found
within a common jurisdiction, lik(5 the high seas, was,
that this right had never been questioned. — It was a
right so superior to others which were admitted, that
no man could raise a doubt upon it. Belligerents
liave a right to take out their enemy's property and
the persons of their enemy. — Would they not have a
right to take out their own property, forcibly, or frau-
dulently, or improperly withheld? They have a right
to take out their enemy's persons— have they not uso
a right to take out their own subjects, who owe them
and who have fraudulently or forcibly

alle

glance,

' J

withdrawn themselves from the duties which they
owe their sovereign ?

But there is another stronger reason why tliis sub-
ject has not been discussed by writers on the laws of
nations.— 'Until the present war, the cases of belliger-
ents seeking the protection of a foreign neutral llagy
were necessarily rare^ Since commerce has become
inii)ortant, within the last two hundred years, the only
nations which have been neutral have been Holland,
Denmark, and Sweden. These nations overflowed
with seamen. The belligerents have been England^
France, and Spain. The English sailor had rather
starve on board his own ships than seek an asylum
in the merchant vessels of countries whose habits,
customs, and discipline are so different from his own ;
and as to French or Spanish sailors, so loose and
durty in their habits, a Dutchman or a Dane would
never admit them iiilo their ships, let their distress
for seamen be ever so great. Besides, the laws of
France and Spain are so severe that their seamen
dare not enter into foreign service^

But when the United States became neutral, the
British sailor found an asylum in our service. — ^The
high wages of neutral service, similarity of manners,
language, food, and discipline, invited him to our
employ. The habits also of our southern states for-k
bade them to enter the sea service, while their enters
prize induced them to attempt to i:val us in naviga-
tion.

A friend of mine, whb resided sr ven years in South-^
Carolina, assured me, that there was but one seaman
from the port of Charleston, who was a native of that
state.*

From these causes, obvious, undisputed and gene-
rally admitted, the British marine was stripped of its
strength, and our southern states became clamorous

•Note. The period, to which my frienit alhided, was from 1786 to 1793.
There muT be a Tew more nativgt of that state in the sea-serviee at. this day —
but the habits of all the southern states forbid their entering, into that service.
There are native Amcrieans who sail out of the southern (lorts, but they art:
chiefly of northern «rigiu.

« I

for the right of naturalizing hnAwotecting all sailor*,
of whatever nation, and as the English furnished ut
seven-eighths of i\\h foreign mass, the evil became
intolerable, and could be resisted only by the right
of reclaiming them on the high seas.

If, therefore, no other nation had heretofore exer-
cised this right — if it was even novel in Great-Britain,
surely this new case, and the extreme exigency of it,
would have justified her in assuming the practice.

For where is the sensible or cantbd man who will
deny that the laws of nations, like municipal laws,
must vary and accommodate themselves to the changes
in the commerce and relative condition of nations ?
The whole law of bills of exchange and policies of
insurance has grown up ovl of nothing within two
hundred years ! 'And if the divulsion of a great em-
pire, and the erection of an immensely powerful
state, speaking the same language with the nation
from which it is separated, shall have created diffi-
culties and embarrassments unknown to the ancient
world, are there to be no changes in the usages of
nations so circumstanced ?

The narrow point of the question is, Has Great-
Britain a right to the services of all her native citi-
%en8 during war? We have shewn that she has.
Do we withdraw from 10 to 40,000 of her seamen
fram her service ? It is admitted that we do. Ought
she (if it was a n6vD question) to submit to this evil ?
Clearly not, if she has power enough to remedy it. —
Is it for our permanent interest to contest this point
with her ? Most assuredly it is not— ^for by contest-
ing it we not only admit a competition to the disad-
vantage of our own native seamen, but so far as the
British seamen supply our wants, so far as they fill
up the chasm which would be otherwise filled by
native Americans, just in the same proportion do we
neglect those means of power to which Great-Britain
has been ever so attentive — so far do we despise the
increase of our seamen, upon which the strength^ and

•pulence^ and respectability of all maritime nations
depend.

Under the show, then, of protecting our seamen^
the southern states are really contending for a com-
petition which reduces their wages and lessens their
number, and of course the force and independence
of the nation*

We have hitherto gone upon the idea that this
practice of Great-Britain was a novel one — ^that it was
a pretension which she has set up in hostility to us,
or at least against tis alone. We have just assign-
ed reasons to shew that if this were true she could
have a great deal to say— -because the relation of
our two nations is new and unexampled.' — But we
shall now proceed to shew, according to our se-
cond proposition, that Great-Britain has exercised
this right against all nations for more than two cen-
tnries — that she exercised it when we were a part of
her dominions — that it was then a portion of our Com-
mon Law, and that no nations pretended to complain
of the exercise of this right, so far as it respected mer-
chant ships.

If this case shall be made out, and we pledge our-
selves to do it in our next number, we ask all candid
men whether it does not materially change the aspect
of the question, and whether instead of demanding
the rclinqii-'biiiiicn* of this practice as a right, we ought
not rather to negotiate for its abandonment or modiii->
cation as a matter of compromise. — Evils there un-
doubtedly are arisirie from this very similarity of
language, which, w)ule it enables us to make a deep
wound in the British marine, also sometimes exposes
an innocent American to be mistaken and impressed
as a British subject. But I am persuaded that it will
be seen in the end, that the only fair remedy for the
evil, is the exclusion of all native British seamen
from our service — ^This, however, is very different
from what our cabinet propose, and is what they have
declared they never will agree to.

]sro. vn.

THE ANTIQUITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM OP IMPRESSIN«
THEIR SEA^TEX ON THE HIGH SEAS OUT OF NEUTRAL
MERCHANT SHIPS,

The clamor which has been raised on this subject^
arising from the occasional abuses of the exercise of
this unquestioned right; has led many persons to sup-
pose, that this is an usurpation on the part of Great-
Britain, of modem date, and applied particularly a-
gainst us. — If it were generally known that this is
an ancient usage, founded on uuiversally admitted
principles, and applied by her to all nationSf even be-
fore this country existed as a nation, all moderate and
reasonable u^en would say that it could not and ought
not to be expected, that an old and powerful nation
should yield up its ancient usages merely because
we saw fit to find fault with them. Judge Black-
stone, who wrote before the separation of the two
countries, and could therefore have no allusion to the
present contest, lays it down as a settled maxim of
the law of England, that ^^ natural allegiance is per-
petual and cannot be affected by a change of time,
place, or circumstance, nor can it be changed b^
swearing allegiance to another sovereign — The sub-
ject may to be sure by such means entangle himself^
but he cannot unloosen the ban^^s which connect him
with his native country." He cites a famous case of
M'Donald, who went to France in his infancy, and
had a commission from the French King, but being
found in arms against his native country, he was tri-
ed and convicted of treason ; nor does it appear that
France ever complained or retaliated his conviction,
as she probably contended, and we shall shew she
has always contended, for the same principle, — ^Wc
have adduced these opinions and this case as an an-
swer to a plausibie objection made by Mr. Madison,
and seized with avidity by many persons^ that as

.It

\'-'\-

Great-Britain naturalizes foreign seamen after two
years service in her navy, she is inconsistent in refus-
ing us the same right. — But the question is wholly mis-
understood by some, and, we fear^ purposely ipisstated
by our cabinet. — Great-Britain does npt deny our right
to naturalize her sailors, but she denies our right to

S'xiftcct them against her prior and superior claims.—
er laws admit that a man may emigrate, be natural-
ized, and owe allegiance to a foreign state, but they
deny that these facts absolve him from his fii'st and
natural allegiance,

; In order to mal^e out the'case of inconsistency against
her, we ou^ht to shew that she protects foreign sail-
ors naturalized in her country against their own nat-
ural sovereign-^We challenge any and every man in
the country to produce such an instance-<-rNo"-rWith
all her sins and oppressions, it will not be found that
she has contradicted the principles on which her ma-
I'ine power reposes-^principles consecrated by the
universal practice of nations — ^by the decisions of her
courts^!— -by the writings of her most eminent jurists,
and by her long diplomatick discussions with thin
pountiy.

ISTo— If a solitary case of her refusal to acknowledge
ihe rights of a natural sovereign, and of her setting up
l^r own naturalization laws against natural alle-
giance could have been found, it would not have es-
(»ped the leagle eyes of Mr. Madison and his preder
fressor.

Some persons, however, (and among the rest the
late t^resident Adams, when he went over to the pres-
ent administration) were so aware that general prin-
ciples and universal usage were in favour of the right
<n belligerents of impressment of their own sailors on^
the high seas, that they thought it best to strike at the
Koot of the whole practice, by denying the right of
impressment even in the territory of Great- Britain. —
Mr. Adams took his notions from the doubts express-
ed by some of the old writers. Sir Michael Foster

has most learnedly proved its great antiquity, and tlie
invariability of the practice, and it has been clearly
settled to be the common law of England, by Lord
Mansfield and Lord Kenyon^^-See Cowper 017- &th
term Kepoi'ts 276-

If then, by the common kw of England, no man
can cbmige his alle^ance, not even by residence from
infancy in a foreign country, nor by naturalization^
nor by holding a commission under a foreign state,
and if every seafaring man is by law liable to im->
pressmenlt within the realm, all which doctrines were
'iieftled before the divulsion of ok' separation of the two
( ttries, and therefore ought not now to be qnestioBN
o.«J />^ us, the only remaining point is, to inquire wheth>
ei Great-Britain has asserted and exercised this
claim on board of foreign shiptiy on a common jurist
diction, the high seas, and this too frc^i very ancient
times.

The first instruction I have met with, was one is«
sued by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High
Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, dated
April % 1640.

<* As you meet with any men of war, merchantf, or
other shipff or vessels, belonging to any foreign prince
or state, p'dher at sea, or in any road where you, or
any of hi- Majesty^ s fleet may happen to come, you
are #.' .•e^:Lf. tc see ichether there he any of His
Majethj .> ejects on hoard; and if any seamen,
gunnersj dots, or mariners, f whether Engiishy
Scotch, or S '.,*iij be found on board, you are to cause
suchof H-fj Majesty's subjects to be taken forth, and
so dispTaed of as they be jorthcaming to answer their
coniempt of his Majesty^s Proclamation in that kind,"

By the proclamation here spoken of, is intended
the upiual proclamation issued by all sovereigns, and
in tl. . present war especially, by France, Denmark,
Bp i'% .ind England, ordering home all their seam«a
from M service of foreign states, neutral, as well as
bplligerent. — The above cited instruction was re»
6

:'1

■■■

peatedly carried into effect^ and the particulai* cases
are cited by writers on this subject. — ^In a very famous
case in the year 1687^ four Bcotchmen and a boy
were taken out of a Dutch ship of war, and complaint
having been made by the Dutch government, it was
referred to the Judge of Admiralty, Sir Richard
Raines. — ^The Memorial complained that this prac-
tice might be inconvenient to foreign ships in stress of
weather, and would hinder merchant ships in their
voyages, ^c. To \\ j^h Sir Richard Raines replied,
*' As if His Majesty be deprived of the use of

Ms own subjects for his en n expemtions, thai foreign-
ers might use them for theirs*'

We find that the same claims, the same objections,
and the same rational and just answers were made in
the reign of James II. as at the present day. In the
reign, however, of Charles the U. great complaints
havine been made of the search of foreign ships of
war, the instructions were modified so as only to in-
clude merchant vessels, and the instructions and
practice have continued the same from that period to
the present. — ^The writers from whom I have obtain-
ed these important facts cite in support of them
pPepys MS Collection.! — As Mr. Pepys was the
person who drew up the instructions, better authority
cannot possibly be cited.

It appears that these instructions have been execut-
ted bom against the Dutch and French, and have
been issued to every officer, in every war, for nearly
two hundred years, and the writers who speak of the
right in the reign of Charles the 11. call it an ancient
and acknowledged right. Would it then be reason-
able to expect tnat Ghreat-Britain should abandon the
usage, and give up her ancient practice in favor of us
aione, when the similarity of language, and the exten-
sive practice of frauds in the granting certificates of
protection, as well as the impositions in procuring
naturalization, render the practice doubly important
against us ?

Our navi^tion, doubled in tbe space of ten yeaii>
and yet it is absolutely imposible that our seamen
could have multiplied in the same ratio — ^If, however,
we should suppose that the seamen increased in a
full ratio to population, they would not increase more
Hian 90 per cent, in ten years — hence there must have
been a deficit of at least 10 or 15,000 seamen, all of
whom were supplied by Great-Britain. An Enelish
writer, on this subject, seems to be fully aware of the
extent of this evil, and of the naturo of the fraudS"^
he gives two examples out of two thousand, which he
says can be adduced — ''Henry Donaldson made
oath before the Mayor of Liverpool, that on the Idth
of December, 1800, he procured a protection from
Joshua Sands, collector of New- York, by assuming
the name of Henry Kent — ^that it was obtained on
the oath of a woman, who swore for several other
Englishmen on the same day^-rhe said the woman
was charged with having sworn to several hundred
in a short time.'' Sworn to before Tbo. Golightly,
Mayor — Liverpool, May 17, 1810.

Another impressed on the same day at Liverpool,
had about him a certificate signed by Mr. Graaf, De«
puty Collector in Philadelphia, which he got by giv->
mg an old man four dolors for swearing '' that he
knew his father, mother, &c," whereas he had nei->
ther father or mother, as described, nor had he ever
been in America. These and many other affidavits
and documents have beep taken by the British gov-
cniment, and they well jmow th^ extent of these a-
buses and the vast di^culty of remedying them by
any act of Congress whatever.

Great as has been the profit to the southern states
by the employment of British seamen f who, either
naturalized or not, have constituted three quarters of
their crews, we find them talk of stipulations to ex-,
dude British seamen// Do you believe them iqi
earnest? No — ^when you come to the provisions of the
bill, you will find them require (as Mr. Madison said

tliey alwmys should insist) thai a seaman natui'alized
but one day before, or resident here two years, should
not be considered a British seaman. Great-Britain
knows these pretensions — She knows that three sue
cessive negotiations have failed ; one with Mr. Pink-
ney, 19 years ago— <me with Mr. King, 13 years
since, and the last with Messrs. Monroe and rink-
ney, five years since, from the difficulty of proposing
any remedy for mutual abuses of acknowledged
rights. What these proposals were we shall shew
hereafter.

NO. viii.

IK)CTRINES AND PRACTICE OF FKANCG, AS TO RECLAIMINa

HER OWN SEAiMEN.

It may perhaps be said, as it was by some persons
in relation to the Berlin and Milan decrees, that the
practice t)f France ought to be no justification to
Great-Britain. We adiiiit this to be true in some
cases, and with some qualification — ^But when we are
discussing the existence of a rights under the laws of
nations, we have no better mode of ascertaining it,
than the long established usage of the greatest states
in Europe. If France, under all her later monarchs,
has set up the same principles, and has watched over
the preservation of her seamen with a much more
jealous and severe eye, than Great-Britain has done,
we think it goes far to establish the existence of the
right for which Great- Britain contends. If the two
gi'eat rivals of Europe have, in all their maritime
wars, united in admitting any one principle,! think
we may say of it, that it has much more claim to the
place of an unquestioned right, than many of the dog-
mas which are laid down as such by the writers on
publick law.

I shall shew that France holds the doctrine of al-
legiance being perpetual— t|iat she is peculiarly jeal-

oitB of the claim over her seamen, and is even crueV
in her laws, refusing them the right of expatriation-—
that while she recognizes, as does Great-Britain, both
in her own practice and in that of other states, the
right of naturalixatioHf she undertakes to deny that
this can give any new claims to protection to the natU'
ralized person against his own sovereign. We shall
shew that she goes farther, and denies to neutrals the
rigiit to naturalixe her enemies, so as to protect them
against her arms. Lastly, it will be seen that by re-
peated edicts she authonzes the seizure of her own
seamen in time of war, in her own ports, on board of
neutral vessels — and at sea.

The authority I shall cite will be Mons, Lc Beau,
now superintendantf in Paris, of the details of the
laws relative to the marine and colonies. I have,
liowever, in every case taken (not the inferences of
M, LeBeau) but the laws and ordinances themselves.

By the laws of France, ever since the reign of
Louis Xiy, all French seamen are classed, and there
are regular oflicers appointed to enrol and licence
them — without such &,n enrolment no man can exer-.
cise even the boat or fishing navigation. Thus the
government knows every man in its marine service,
for every man who is a sailor is considered as being
a part of the marine. In time of peace, no man ii
permitted to ship a sailor without carryins him to the
bureau or office of the class in which he is enrolled,
and there setting him inscribed on his roll of equip-
age, — In time of war, the commissaries of the classes
themselves are forbidden to let any seaman be ship-
ped either for the fishery, commerce or privateering,
unless such seaman shfi^ll have liis conge, or dismis-
sion from the public marine. Thus in time of war
France commands every seaman in her dominions.
Having thus explained the general police relative to
seamen, I shall now proceed to the various statutes
or ordinances which prove the points I have above
stated. 1st. The laws of France deny the right of

46.

expatriation^ and go farther than Great-Britain^ be-
cause they make the serving on board the vessels of
other nations, whether enemies or not, a crime.

By an edict of February, 1050, all masters of ves-
sels, being French subjects, are forbidden, whether
they are domiciliated in France or not, that is, whether
tiiey have acquired another domicil or home in a for-
eign country or not, to take commissions from, or use
any other flag than that of France, under the penalty
of being treated as pirates.

By an edict of August, I676, the pain of death,
which had been before inflicted upon all the subjects
of France, found in the service of foreisn states or
princes, was changed for that of service mthe gallies

This last edict is very clear, and from its
language it is manifest that whether taken in arms or
not, against their own sovereign, they are liable to
this punishment.

By an edict of October, 1784, it is provided, that,
** Any classed seaman, who shall in time of peace be
fauna serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced
to fifteen days confinement, and reduced to the low-
est wages, and shall serve two years extraordinary
at the lowest rate ; but those who in time of war
shall be ARRESTED IS foreign ships, or pass-
ing into foreign countries, shall be sentenced to three
years service in the gallies.''

By the same edict, '' It is made the duty of the
chiefs or heads of the department of classed seamen,
to make search for the deserters from merchant ser-
vice, to arrest them and send them to "the oflRcers of
the admiralty. They shall also make known to the
admiralty any classed seamen, who having passed
into foreign countries, shall have been arrested."

I have given a literal translation of the parts of
these two passages which apply to the case, because
this last edict was passed in a time of profound peace,
in the reign of Louis XVI. and is still in force.

It not only fully justifies my first position, that
France denies that her seamen can expatriate them-
selves, even in time of peace, and that she makes it a
severe crime in time of war for them to pass into any
foreign countries, not excepting neutral states. But
it supports, and is the great foundation upon which I
repose, to prove that she claims the right to arrest
them on hoard neutral ships, either in French ports
or on the high seas. We must suppose the French
admiralty instructions to he conformable to, and aa
broad as their edicts.

If so, they must instruct their marine officers to
arrest any trench seamen ^' found on board foreign
ships.^' This I admit may mean in the ports of
France, and so far as this goes, it proves that the
flag of a neutral does not cover all who sail under it
— and this part also corresponds to the British prac-
tice of impressments in their ports.

But it goes farther, it orders the arrest of sailors
found on board neutral ships, or <^^ passing into for-:
eign countries," ** ou passant en pays etrangers,^^ —
this must intend found oik board foreign ships on the
HIGH SEAS — and surely the second section can have
no other possible interpretation, because it applies to
French seamen, who <^ having passed into foreign
countries, shall be arrested."

Lest any person disposed to cavil, and without eX'
amining the question closely, should pretend, that
these sections allude to seamen found on board ene-
mies vessels — I answer, that upon seamen in that
case, the pain of death is inflicted, and the first cited
section of the edict of 1784, explicitly provides for a
case when France is at peace.

We shall now shew that France pays no regard to
the naturalization laws of other countries, at least so
as to deem them a protection to the subjects of her
enemy, who may have been naturalized during the
war in neutral states — and yet she naturalizes, for-
eigners herself — thereby proving what we have stat-

^d above, that nations by conferring the privileges of
naturalization do not understand, that they give the
person any protection out of their own territory, that
they do not admit that it is in the power of a neutral
to protect the native subject of an enemy against cap-
ture, B.nd a fortiori not the native subject of the bel-
ligerent captor against his own sovereign's claim.

By an ordinance of July, 1704, it is declared that
^^No passports granted by neutral princes, either io
owners or masters, who are aubjecta of our enemies,
shall be valid, unless they shall have been naturalized
and have transferred their domicil before the present
war.^*

This edict is confirmed and continued by another
in 1744 and in 1778.

If the simple principle of this edict should be ac-
ceded to by our government, there would be an im-
mediate settlement of the differences with Great-Brit-
ain. She would be probably very willing to admit,
that such of her subjects as were naturalized before
the war should be protected under our flag. It ought
to be observed, however, that this would be gratui-
tous on her part, because she, as well France, con-
tends for the perpetuity of allegiance.

By a decree of the French republick, in the very
height of her pretensions for free principles, dated Fri-
niaire, an. 5th, it is provided, that ^^ All captains of
neutralized vessels shall prove by certificates of their
own minister near the French court, that they were
horn in an allied or neutral countiy, under pain of
bei^ treated as spies."

Here the right of expatriation and the protection
of naturalization are denied.

Let us pause here a moment — ^William Duane, an
Englishman naturalized in America, would by the a«
bove edict be liable to be hung as a spy in France,
notwithstanding his letters of naturalization, and his
being covered by the American flag : yet Mr. Mad-
ison contends that this same William Duane would

iUd perfectly protected on the high seas by this SAme
paper against his own natural sovereign.

By another decree, 8th Brumaire, an. 7. it is pro^
vided, that

<< All individuals, natives, originating in the coun-
<< tries of our allies or neutrals, who shall bear a com*
*' mission from our enemies, or make a part of the
<< crews of vessels of war, or OTHERS, shall be
'< for this single fact declared pirates, and treated as
"such."

Both G. Britain and France had, for many years
before, invited/oret^ sailors into their service, and
had given them the privileges of native bom seamen>
or, as the French term it, of" RegnicoleSy^ yet nei-
ther nation understood, it seems, by that stipulation that
they could protect them either against their being
punished for such entry, by their own sovereign, or
their being treated as pirates by their enemies.

By an edict of the year 6th, Yentose 8. it is de-
clared,

" That all English sailors, on hoard neutralflags,
in the ports of France should be arrested; — and
every man who spoke the English language should
be considered English, unless he could prove by
authentick evidence and documents, that he was
American."

Here we see, what would be the state of our pro-
tectums with a vengeance, had France been able to
keep her fleets at sea during the war. Every Amer-
ican or person speaking the English tongue, would
ha presumed English / !

I shall not cite, as I could, many other edicts tend-
ing to prove the same points, but shall conclude with
stating one out of many cases in which France has
carried these principles into effect on the hish seas —
that we have not a thousand cases of the kind is be-
cause her ships are scarcely ever at sea, and we have
not 50 French seamen in our employ. In the year
1806, Admiral Willaumez in a French ship ctilled

the Foudroyanty met with au American brig and for-
cibly took out four French seamen, who had entered
in this countty : — not content with impressing them
— ^he wrote as follows to Gen. Turreau; Ambassador
of France: —

** My Lord — I have just apprehended four sea-
men deserters, from the Yaleureuse frigate, which I
found on board an American brig, where they had
engaged at 17 dollars per month. — ^Now, Sir, if you
can succeed in making the American eovernmerit pay
down a compensation for thus seducing our seamen,
you will punish it in a manner it feels most its ava-
rice, as those people have been for three years sedu-
cine our best men from us."

Here we see the doctrine — the practice — and the
•purit to make us pay for it ! ! !

NO. IX.

THE SEQUEL OF MR. RUSSELL'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH
LORD CASTLEREAGH.

It had been my original intention at this time, to
have laid before the publick the negotiations between
Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, and Lords Holland
and Auckland, and to have shewn, not only the strong
disposition of Great-Britain so to arrange the practice
of taking out British seamen^ as to afford little or no
cause of complaint to this country, as also the almost
insurmountable difficulties which then presented them-
selves.

It will appear from this negotiation, that our gov-
ernment knew the full extent of these difficulties, and
that they could therefore very easily impose, if they
were so disposed, on the American people, by renew-
ing the general propositions in vague and indefinite
terms, while they were sure that when they should
come to the details, there were a thousand points

ing

which could be started, which would defeat an ulti-
timate arrangement.

In this spirit, we shall now shew, that the late ne-
eotiation was probably undertaken, and that so far
n'om proving a disposition to make peace, or to ar-
range amicably the question of impressment, it affordi
to my mind the most decisive proof of the opposite
intentions.

I am obliged to postpone the consideration of the
former negotiation, in order to take a review of the
documents which have been given to us by piece-mealy
since these essays were commenced.

It will be recollected, that I undertook to shew in
my early remarks, that Mr. Madison required of
Great-Britain an absolute and entire relinquishment
of the practice of taking her own seamen^ as a prelim-
nary to an armistice, and that he offered, in return,
.e barren assurance that Congress might, if they
should see fit, make a law excluding British seamen
from our vessels, without defining either the terms of
such an act, or what we should understand by British
seamen.

We also proved, that the explanatory and last tn-
structiona given by Mr. Monroe to Mr. Russell, and
under which alone he had any authority to treat, still
renewed the offensive condition of a previous renun-
ciation by Great-Britain of the righty as a preliminary
to a negotiation about the manner, in which she was
to be indemnified against the certain loss of her mar-
iners.

We have been indeed nnce astonished and hum-
bled at the boldness of our charge de affiures, Mr.
Russell, in asserting in his last letter to Lord Gastle-
reagh, to which no reply could have been given from
its date, that he had made an offer of a simidtaneova
relinquishment of the British right to take their own
seamen, and of our practice, our unkind, impolitick
and unneutral like practice of soliciting and employ-
ing these subjects of a foreign state.

My first reflection was, that Mr. Russell had kept
back from Lord Gastlereagh his limited powers,
which forbad his making such an offer^, and that he
fondly entertained a hope, that overleaping his au-
thority, he might have the honour, against his orders,
and in direct disobedience of them, of restoring peace
to his suffering country.

With this impression, I again reviewed his instruc-
tions, and I became again convinced that he could
not mistake them. The absolute, entire, and full re-
nunciation of the practice, was required as preliminary
to any sort of negotiation, and must precede the set.
tlement of the terms on which we should refuse to
employ British sailors.

Imagine then, fellow-citizens, what was my sur-
prise in perusing the late letter, probably gotten up
at Washington, in which Mr. Russell states that he
eommuuicated his instructions, limited as they were,
in extenso, and that Lord Gastlereagh '^ read them
over attentively.'^

Instructions, which simply authorized him to renew
the very same offensive proposals which had before
been re^'icted.

That the people may understand the nature of Mr.
Jonathan Russell's /amtVtav* talk with Lord Gastle-
reagh, it is proper here to premise one or two remarks.

By a declaration of war, all the functions, power,
and authority of ministers cease. Our own cabinet
refused to accredit Mr. Baker as charge d'affaires
appointed by Mr. Foster after the war — see the cor-
respondence on tliis subject.

Mr. Russell was therefore in London as a private
American merchant. When he carried a letter from
Mr. Monroe to himself, after the war, to Lord Gastle-
reagh, he did it as an individual American. He could
say no more for his government than the letter said —
If he promised any thing, it was Mr. Russell's pro-
mise, and no better than Mr. Williams\ or any other
American citizen in London.

Mr. Monroe's letter then is the true and only prop-
er evidence of the offer, and Mr. Monroe required
Great-Britain instantly to renounce her practice of
taking her own seamen, on the assurance that Con-
gress might, but that the President could not, by our
laws, stipulate that they would pass a law something
about the employment of British seamen.— -As to
what that law should be, Mr. Monroe was silent, and
permit me to add, he w&a properly silent, for it was
not in Mr. Madison's power to say that he himself
should be President, much less to decide what Con-
gress should or should not do.

This, then, is the famous offer to Great-Britain —
Withdraw your practice, consecrated by your own
usage and that of all other nations for two hundred
years, and then we will appoint commissioners to
agree upon the terms of a law to exclude British
sailors from our vessels, and if those commissioners
shall make suxih term^ as shall be agreeable to Con^
gress, it is probable that that body will pass a law in
conformity thereto.

We wish then the publick to consider Mr. RusselV't
offers as nothing and less than nothing, so far as they
exceed his explicit instructions.

There is one other consideration on this subject,
which deserves the most serious attention. — This quesr
tion had been discussed between the two nations for
30 years. To expect that Great-Britain would yield
to our arms before any blow had been struck, what
she had refused to our arguments and pacifick offers,
is to suppose, that she is the most cowardly t^id hum-
ble of all nations. If we had offered a cessation of
hostilities, and a free discussion of the question of
impressment, without demanding the recognition of
its injustice, something might have been expected.

I have now, however, only begun with Mr. Rus-
sell's new and well-contrived communications.
These remarks are merely introductory. One prop-
osition all reasonable men will admit, that it is safer,

much safer; to trudt to that part of the official cones,
pondence where both parties are mutually heard in
their own language, than to any ex parte, subsequent^
unanswered representations of one of the parties.

This remark has the more forces I beg the people
to attend to it, when the person who ^ves the subse-
quent and ex parte statement depends on a govern-
mentfor hia support — which government has waged
an unnecessary war, and is determined to support it
from a regard to consistency, as well as from the
original unaccountable motives, which urged it to
declare such a war. Such a man, so pensioned by
the government, I mean in its pay, is the less to be
trusted, when he avows that he thinks his statement
ought to unite all men in a vigorous prosecution of the
war. He ought still more to be distrusted, when his
statement is offered under such suspicious circumstan-
ces as to date, purporting to be dated at London, on
the 17th of September, when on the 19th of that
month he writes, that he has not had time to comwuni-
cate it.- — It will be thought worthy of still less confi-
dence, when I shall shew, that he begs pardon for
having made it without authority, and when he plain-
ly intimates that he made it with veiy little hope of
lis being accepted. — It will then be deemed, I be-^
jieve, a mere ruse de guerre^

NO. X.

THE SEQUEL OP THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. RUS-
SEIJL AND LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Every fair man and every friend to honourable
Peace, every one who is ready to admit, that as our
government plunged us into an offensive war, not
only before we were duly prepared for it, but when,
from recent events in O. Britain, it is apparent, that
it might and ought to have been avoided, will agi'ee

ma«

.WIS-

with me^ that it is at least possible, that the samt
administration, urged by the same motive, may have
made a shew of paciiick proposals, without any sin-
cere design to have them accepted. I ask not for
your jealousy, my fellow citizens, I only request
your candid and impartial inquiry into the pretend-
ed offers for Peace.

You will then agree with me, that it is necessary
to make a marked discrimination between the writ'
ten proposals, and the written answers, and any
verbal and oral communications, which may have
been misunderstood, and most easily misconstrued
and misrepresented.

I shall, however, examine both, and I feel the
most unlimited confidence that both of them will re-
sult in a conviction that no Peace was expected or
wished for on the part of our administration.

First, then, we will examine the written corres-
pondence between Mr. Russell and Lord Castle-
reagh, after the former had received his last^ an*^ as
he calls them, most Uberal instructions from Mr.
Monroe.

Mr. Russell's only letter containing proposals af-
ter he reottived his last instructions, is dated the
ISth of September, in which he proposes, *' A con-
vention for the cessation of hostilities, to take effect
at such a time as shall be mutually agreed upon,
and stipulating that commissioners shall be appoint-
ed with full powers to form a treaty, which shall
provide by reeiproacal arrangements, for the security
of their seamen from being taken or emj^oyed in the
service of the other rsower."

These are the piecise words, and we admit that
this part of the letter does not seem to imply that
G. Britain should yield the right as a preliminary.
If this had stood alone, G. Britain could not have
refused the offer justly, except on the ground that
Russell was not only not authorized by the instnic-

ttons which he communicated to Lord Gastlereagh
in eortenso, but he was explicitly restrained from such
an offer — Such an objection, if made, would have
been unanswerable, and itis the very answer which
Lord Castlereagh did make.

Peruse, my fellow«citizens, these instructions^
and take with you, the fact that Russell's diplo^
matick powers had wholly ceased, and then see
whether the refusal of Great-Britain is any proof
of her being unwilling to adjust this question with
any person duly authorized to treat with unlimited
powers.

But this is only a small part of the case — Rus-
sell did not dare to violate in so open a manner his
instructions — He therefore added, '^ In proposing
to your Lordship these terms, I am instructed to
come to an understanding with his Majesty's gov-
ernment, without requiring it to he formal concern,
ing impressments comprising in it the discharge of
citizens of the United States already impressed."

What were the commissioners then to consider ?
Whether Great-Britain should relinquish the right ?
No — That she was to agree to do by a clear but
informal understanding.

The Commissioners were afterwards to agree, if
they couldf to some arrangement to supply the place
of impressment.

I can liken this case only to a familiar one in
private life — One mnu claims a right of way over
his neighbour' 'i iand — the other denies it. The lat-
ter offers to leave it to men, to say what compensa-
tion he shall receive for the relinquishment of it,
but. says he, you. m\i»i first come to an informal un-
derstanding that you have no right of way, and then.
I will leave it to men to agree, if they can, what
shall be an equivalent to you for giving it up. —
This however is not so strong as Mr. Russell's pro-
posals. To make it equally absurd, you must add,

mo
tier
tot
this
1
tan(

■'•'V •'tT* ^.Vf^H "!»7«r»^ '

'< After tbe refereee have agreeii upon tlM ewnptii.
satiun, I must be at liberty to say, fdiether I wiU
give it or not, beeaose I am a nan vrk9 am sot m.
the habit of agreeing to or abiding by ttbe deoi.

sions of any one."

Is this the language of Mr. Rttssell ? Is it poisi-
ble that he could have said this to Lovd Castlerea^?
He 4id say it. << Your Lordship is aware that the
power of the government of the United states to
prohibit the employment of British Sailors must be
eicereised in the Sfnrit of the constitution. '' Or, as
it was more fully explained in his instructions,
'^ Congress might, and it is probable that they WMld^
fulfil tlie contract made by the executive.^ «

From this view of the oiidif written ofl^r nftde 4ii
Lord Gasilerengh, under the last liberal instruc^dm,
it is manifest, that oonmissioners oould not be ap-
pointed until Great-Britain had clearly but Infor-
mally pledged her hondur (o abandon the practice of
taking her own seamen; *lliat the commiseionera
had only the power to agree, if they'cofild, upon a
substitute — and that after all Congress might say
that the spirit of our fi^e constitution foi%ade then
to refuse to naturalize any British «eamen. -f'i'f-^'ro-i!

Lord Castlereagh received these offers as any
honest plain man of common sense would reeeriv<6
them — he considered them as only a covert mo4e
of renewing the same proposals that had been re-
jected, and that they tlelivered up Great-Britain
bound hand and foot into the power of Mr. Madison.

Here the negotiation in writiii>g ended.

Mr. Russell, however, thought that by a familiar
inofficial conversation, he could permiade Lord Cas-
tlereagh to abandon his ground, and he has given
to the puMick the minute remarks of each party in
this conversation. -^ '

We must repeat that in a case of snch vital impor-
tance, where a strong ]iartizan of administration un-
•s

dertakes to represent the terms and precise expres-
sions of a foreign minister in a long conference^ and
where he shows a disposition to give the most un-
favourable turn to the whole discussion, much al-
lowance ought to be made. Much allowance for
misapprehension — much for prejudice — much for
the mortification of a young man in failing to effect
a favourite object where he avows he acted without
authority.

Much ought also to be allowed for the mistakes
of a very inexperienced diplomatick agent, who got
into his office in a very unusual manner, converted
firom a supercargo into a sort of minister, and who,
according to his own avowal^ ventured to do what
Mr. Madison said he dared not do, that is to stipu-
late in behalf of Congress what sort of a law they
would hereafter pass as to naturalization.

Besides this, Mr. Russell has been before the
publick in a former case, and few of us have forgotten
his most memorable letters from France — while
with a truth and spirit, becoming the representative
of an honourable and impartial nation, (I do not
say administration) he was telling the French
government, that there had not been a single case
which proved the repeal of the French decrees, he
wrote to our minister in Great-Britain that there
had not been a case which rendered their repeal
doubtful.

We do not quote words — we adhere to the sub-
stance — ^the whole is upon record, and let Mr. Rus-
sell's consistency and credit be tested by his writ-
ings. At present, however, we shall presume his
account of the correspondence as correct as could
possibly suit his employer, Mr. Madison.

And what results from it ? We shall state :

4»t. It appears that Lord Gastlereagh saw his
whole instructions, and read them over attentively.

2dly. That he objected to treating with Mr.

■>•»■«■ W|r fm.\w<* -P/A^-'

lis

Bufiselly because he bad no autbority wbatever to
Hegotiate on tbe Bubject, beyond his mere letter from
Mr. Monroe.

3ily. That Lord Gastlereagb frankly stated the
insurmountable objections which had formerly been
made to the renunciation in toto, of the practice of
taking British seamen, and that no British nnnister
would dare to surrender so ui\jdoubted and long
exercised a right.

isthly. That Mr. Russell very offensively, and
we should say very petulantly and insultingly,
compared the British practice of taking their own
seamen, to the slave Trade ; thereby intimating
that a British subject serving his king and country
is in the condition of a West India or Virginia
negro.

Qthly. He charged the British government with
gross inconsistency in keeping up the practice of
impressing their own seamen, while they abolished
the Slave Trorfe— thereby indecorously and unnec-
essarily attacking and interfering with the munici-
pal laws and usages of Great-Britain.

Qthly. He unjustly and insultingly charged Great-r
Britain with claiming the right to impress Ameri-
can citizens, which she has openly and frequently de-
nied, always restoring such as have been taken by
mistake.

But lastly, (and the most important of all his
strange proposals) he claimed the right, without
authority, of retaining all British subjects now nat->
uralizedf and undertook to stipulate that Congress
would not in future pi otect any British seamen.

The v'V^le of this last proposal was not only
without authority, (and he apologizes for it as such
to his own government) but it was in direct oppo->^
sition to his instructions, which directed him to as-
sure Great-Britain that the President could V4}t by
the constitution, stipulate for Con^ress^

WKy thfen wat tt nade ? He gives ywL the re«.
Mm>t^betau8e he tlioQghi it ivould naite all Aiaeri-
cans in favour of the war — and becaiwe he knew
hill inruat of authority, and the extravagance and
looiBtness of the terms would, as they did, secura
the rejection of them by Great-Britain. He had
j^dbaUy ta ulterioi reason — He knew it did not in
aaqr degree commUour cabinetf who rejected, with-
out ceremony, a treaty lawfully made with full poW'
frty hy Monroe and Pinkney, while it might, aa it
probably has done, recommend him to them as a
man well fitted for the purposes and views of a
eabinet, whi^ih has plunged the nation into ruin and
diidgrace, and which appears resolutely bent op con-
tinuing the same ruinous system- '

NO. XI.

THfc IMPORTANT NEGOTFATION OP MKSSHS. MONROE AND
PINKNEY IN 180C, A3 TO IMPRESSMENTS.

It is impossible to understand the true merits of
the question of Impressments, and of the offers
made between the parties at different periods, with-
out a thorongb examination of the negotiation be-
tween the Wox ministry and Messrs. Monroe and
Pinkney.

We may lay it dowA as a settled point, that what-
^er THAT ministry so favourable to America, for so
many years our defenders in Parliament refused to
concede, whatever especially they declared that no
British minister would ever dfareto cede, never will
be granted even at the end of a war, until the Brit-
iah naval power shall be broken down. Our gov-
ernment know, and it is our present object to show
from documents, that the most favourable British
ministers liave declared, that on no terms whatever
ean they ever yield to any nation their right to take

our

^n>i

mtmifw^

L*6

their own aubjecta out of neutral shipa, op ^9 bigh
seas. ^

If therefore lee insist that any treaty of peaoe^ even-
a definitive one, muM stipulate that Great.Britaiii
shall renounce this right, (we care not what termci
of compensation or compromise are offered for ita
renunciation) we are persuaded that peace will nev-
er be made. This oqr administration icell knoWf
and therefore this renunciation will be made a, sina
qua non of a treaty^ let Great Britain offer; as afae has
done, the most honourable propositions for the pre-
vention of abose^ in the exercise of her right.

This conduct of our Admiuistration is, in effect,
nailing the flag to the mast, and the ship must go,
down, if the people are weak or prejudiced enongh
to believe, without examination, that our flag, by the
law of nations, ought to protect all who sail under it,
and that Great Britain advances principles against
us, which she maintains against no other nation, and
no other belligerent nation maintains ; the rey«rBe
of all which is precisely the truth.

We know we shall alarm some timid men, when
we say, that we fear peace will never be made if,
upon any terms or on any conditions, we require the
absolute relinquisliment of the right to take British
native subjects out of our merchants, ships on the
high seas.

But we see no advantage in self-deception. We
shall never make up our mind« either to fi^t ad in-
ternecionem, to extermination, for this principle, «r
to make a peace without obtaining it, un^til we do
understand that it never will he yielded. Then men
will begin to think — they will then weigh the jus-
tice of tiie British claim — its antiquity-^its univer-
sality^ — its true importance to us — the exaggerated
picture which has been drawn of it — on the other
side its being so essential to the vital interests of
our enemy — ^the prosperiiy we have enjoyed for

tvirenty years under its exercise — ^the gross abuses
of protections for sailors — as well as the great facil-
ities for naturalization — the doubtful benefit of
the encouragement of foreigners at all — the certain
disadvantage to our native mariners by the compe-
tion — ^by the difiSculty of discrimination which draws
even natives into danger — by the little reliance you
can place on the fidelity of men in case ofirar,who
are fighting against their own sovereign.

Such arguments will have their due weight when
we onee "know, that the war must he eternal^ or we
must abandon oar claim on Great Britain to re-
nounce her natural, moral, equitable right over the
services of her own subjects.

Our government perfectly well understand this,
but they know the people do not, and therefore they
continue to make the parade of offers, which have
been over and over again rejected, as it is our busi-
ness to shew. The correspondence on the subject,
atthetimeof the negotiation in 1806, comprises six-
ty or seventy pages, we shall therefore arrange the
points which appear to be fairly deducible from that
negotiation, and give short abstracts under each
point.

iM. Then, it will appear that G. Britain abso-
lutely and explicitly refused to renounce the right
of taking her own seamen, and our ministers were
persuaded that it never would be renounced.

S(2. We shall shew, that her negotiators made
very honourable offers to ours to render the exercise
of her right as little injurious as possible to us.

Sdly. That our negotiators deemed these offers
liberal, and were of opinion that, substantially, they
gave us all that we could desire — they were con-
vinced that they were the best modifications short of
a surrender of what Great Britain tenaciously in^
sisted upon as an absolute right.

^ly. It will appear that Qur ministers were se-

lade

lers

they

bon-

rtof

in-

ercly reproved for their liberality, by our cabinet^
and in lieu of the informal arrangement made before^
they were instructed to propose an article precisely
in the spirit of Russell's late unauthorued (^etp
that is, that we would protect all citizens whether
, natives or not, but we would not employ any Bn-
glishman until he had gone through the farce of
naturalization.

We think this display will shew, that our gov-
ernment are well persuaded they can fearlessly, and
without danger of peace, (the thing they most dread)
make as many oners as they please, so long as they
insist on the renunciation of the right, and on the
validity of our naturalization laws to wash away
the duties of natural allegiance — duties, in which
more writers on the law of nations are agreed^ than
in any other principles whatever.

ist. It appears from Mr. Monroe's and Mr.
Pinkney's correspondence, as to tlie aforesaid nego-
tiation, that Great Britian refused to yield up her
right, and it was apparent she never wbuld yield it
on any terms.

In a conference of Monroe and Finkney with
Lords Holland and Auckland, on the ^d August
1806, these noblemen, who were very friendly to
our nation, observed, << that they felt the strongest
repugnance to a. formal renunciation of their claim
to take, from our vessels on the high aeaa such sea-
men as should appear to be their own subjects ; and
they pressed upon us with much zeal, as a substitute
for such abandonment, that our crews should be fur-
nished v.'ith authentick documents of citizenship of
a nature and form to be settled by treaty, which
should completely protect those to whom they re-
lated, but that, subject to such protections. Great
Britain should continue to visit and impress as here-
tofore," (that is their own subjects.)

" They enforced this by observing that they sup-

<r4

poied our object to be to prevent the impressment
of American uamen, and not to withdraw British
uaamen from the service of their country, in times of
gteot national peril, in order to etnploy them our-
telvet ; that their proposal would effect this object,
that if thej^ should consent to make our commercial
navy an asylum for all British seamen, the effect
of such a concession upon her maritime strength, on
which Great Britain depended, might be fatal."

It is evident from this extract, that even the Fox
ministry, so favourable to America, never could think
of yielding the principle. It is apparent also, that
they were willing to adopt, and did offer, a very fair
expedient to remedy abuses in the exercise of the
right* Lastly, it seems from this extract, that G.
Britain is not so mueh opposed to this relinqnish-
ment on account of the number of her sailors, now
in our service, as from her fears, that as s6on
as our navy shall by treaty become an asylum, no
Stipulations on our part can prevent its being abus-
ed to the utter destruction of her marine power.

On the 11th of Sept. our ministers write that they
consider the objections of Great-Britain such as will
not be surmounted.

' *< A.11 our efforts, they say, proved ineffectual. The
ri:ght was denied by the British commissioners, who
asserted that of their own government to seize its
subjects on board neutral merchant ships on the high
«eaB. And who said, that the relinquishment of it
at this time would go far to the overthrow of their
naval power, on which the safety of the state essen-
tially depended."

Our ministers at the same interview, in Bept. 1806,
proposed as a substitute the restoration in future of
all British deserters even, from their merchant ser-
vice — ^to this proposal the British ministers appear-
ed to listen, but they said it was necessary to consult
their law officers, and the result was as our minis-

tcrs state *^ a rejection of the pfoject and v/Mi it lUl
hope of obtainiiig at that time any gatisfaotory itip«'
latione respecting Impressment*.''

At their next interview thu^ British cotnlMssiGnei^
presented the report of theii^ crown ol&eer^ deeU^-
ing hid opinion << that OreatBritain had a riglit to
the services of her own citizens, and to take ihtm
oat of niaatral merchants' ships on the high seas-**
that as merchant ships were extra-territorial they
were not admitted to possess such a jurisdiction as
to protect British subjects from their own sovereign
— ^they stated further that the admiralty and all the
crown officers had been consulted and they added
explicitly, though in a very conciliating manner^
that it was not in their power to accede to our pro-
posal, and that all the law officers united in the o-
pinion, that the right of their government was well
founded aiul ou^t Tiot to be relinquiahed. They
added ihi.t a^der such circumstances, the relinquish-
ment of it was a measure which the government could
not adopt without taking upon itself a responsibility,
which no ministry could be willing to meet, howev-
er pressing the emergency might he J^

Here ended the negotiation as to the absolute re-
nunciation of the right, aad we ask all candid men
whether we have not fully maintained our first point,
that this negotiation proved that Great Britain will
never relinquish the right, however pressing the
emergency may be.

Let it be considered who were the British negotia-
tors — men, who for ten years had condemned the Pitt
ministry for their unbending, unconciliatory conduct
towards America — men whom Monroe most extrav-
agantly praised — men upon whom Mr. Madison
himself has since repeatedly bestowed high eulogi-
ums. Yet these men declared that such were the
feelings of the British nation — so united were all its
civilians on the justice of tboir claim, that no minis-
9

t»y would ever dare to relinquish it. And do we
say that she never will in any event relinquish it?
NO — She may do it, not because the Ganadas shall
be wrested from her — but she may do it, when the
American flag shall ride triumphant in the Downs,
when our Navy shall have acquired the supremacy
which hers now possesses on the ocean, and when
the wishes of France for her downfall shall be ac-
complished.

NO. XII.

MB. MONROE AND PINCKNEyS NEGOTIATION ABOUT IM-

PRESSMENTS.

During Mr. Fox's indisposition, which ended in
his death, our ministers had one interview with Lord
Grenville — and I quote it to shew, that another lead-
ing man in the same nation had the same feelings as
Lords Holland a.kd Auckland. His Lordship said
he'' Had doubts of the practicability of devising means
of discrimination between the seamen of the two
countries within their respective jurisdictions, and he
spoke of the importance to the safety of Great-Britain,
in the present state of the power of her enemy, of pre-
serving in their utmost strength, the right and the
capacity of government to avail itself in war of the
services of its seamen. These observations were
connected with professions of an earnest wish, that
some liberal and equitable plan should be adopted
for reconciling the exercise of this essential bight
with the just claims of the United States for remov-
ing from it all cause of complaint and irritation."

Not one word about the renunciation ; on the oth-
er hand the most firm and deliberate purpose of ad-
hering to it, on the most deep and solemn conside-
rations. If British statesmen believe it to be a right,
and a right essential to their safety and existence, is
it not idle to expect a formal renunciation of it ?

But we have said^ secondly, that the British coiii%
missioners have made very honourahle offers for such
arrangements as would take away all just cause of
complamt.

One of these we have already noticed, and that is,
that A form and mode of protection for Ajnerican aea-
men should be agreed upon by treaty, and that no
*eamen possessed of one of them should be impress-
ed.

If the object of Mr. Madison was only to protect
bona fide Americans, one would imagine this might
have answered.

On the 11th of September, after the British com*
missioners gave in their final declaration, that no
British minister would ever dare to concede the right^
they, the British commissioners, presented a counter
project, reciting, << Whereas, when one nation is at
war and the other at peace, it is not lawful for the bel.
ligerent to impress or carry off from the neutral ves.
sel seafaring persons who are the natives of the neu.
tral country, or others, who are not the subjects of the
belligerent, and whereas, from similarity of lan-
guage and appearance it may be difficult to distin-
guish the subjects of the two states, the high contract,
ing parties agree for the greater security of the neu-
tral subjects, they will respectively enact such laws
as shall subject to heavy penalties the commanders
of belligerent ships, who shall carry off th& subjects
of the neutral on any pretence whatever."

A penalty is also provided for granting faUe pro->
tections to seamen.

I confess I can Scarcely conceive a fairer offer — ^It
is a most express disavowal of the practice of taking
Americans, or any other seamen, except British.
The remedv it offers misht be made effectual. If
every captain of an A*nerican vessel from which an^
neutral citizen should be impressed, should be dir
rected by law, under hei^vy penalties, to take down at

HllliilM

ihfi tinK of Aiiip]^iqs any seamen; his description and
vlscft qfmxtimty, and on the arrival of the vessel at any
Ibrelgn or other port^ he should be required to trans-
mit in duplicates to the secretary of state, and to the
publick agent of seamen in London, the names, de-
seription, and places of nativity of any and every sea-
men who shall have been impressed during the voy-
age, stating by whom and where the same took place
— and if the law should direct the secretary of state
to send to the place where the seaman so impressed
Iras born, for the certificate of some rector, pastor,
or publick teacher, together with one civil magistrate^
atjtesting that such seaman was born in such place,
and if it should be agreed by treaty, that such cer-
tifieaie, countersigned 1 y our secretary of state,
should be in a trial at law prima facie evidence oftfie
fact, sad if the treaty should further provide, that the
American agent in London should have a right as
the prochain ami of any seaman to institute suits for
the penalty against the captain who should have im-
pressed such seamen, and if the penalty should be ar,c
heavy one, as was proposed by Great- Britain, and
should ensue to the benefit of the seaman, and if
mweover the seaman should be instantly discharged
OM the production of said certificate, we cannot con-
ceive a more perfect security than this would afford
against impressments. If the penalty should be 500
TOllars, for example, and the government of the Uni-
ted States and its officers should do theib duty, the
seaman would recover it upon an average within
twelve months, and there is scarcely a seaman in
America, who would not be anxious to be impressed
i>n apecidation — nor a captain in the British navy who
would dare to impress an American. The on)^' dan-
ger the seaman would incur, would be the neglect
of hia own govemme' t. The remedy in the mode
proposed would be ce tain, easy and expeditious.

But this proposal was rejected — ^Why ? Because
it afforded no asylum to British sailors.

bee
al
act
its

COl

The British ministers iinding this proposal lejeet-
ed, then addressed a note to our ministers stating^
<< That instructions had been given and should be re-
peated and enforced, for the observance of the great-
est caution in the impressing i^W^'^A seamen, and
that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve the
citizens of the United States from any molestation or
iiyury ; and that immediate andj^rompt redress shall
be afforded upon any representation of injury sustain-
ed by them."

Such is the famous note presented by the Fox
ministry as their nltimatum, and which was so satis-
factory to both our negotiators^ as to induce them to
sign the treaty.

If in addition to these liberal instructions the other
proposal or project had been accepted, of awarding &
heavy penalty against any British officer who should
impress an American, the great cause of complaint,
so favourable to the views of an administraUmi that
seeks to prolong tjie irritation between the two coun-
tries, might have been l<mg since removed.

We now proceed to shew, thirdly, that these last
terms were satisfactory to our own negotiators — fuid
that they contained a great deal more than meets the
e^e-^because, although Great-Britain declined a re-
linquishment of the claim, yet the << high seas" were
purposely omitted in the proposal, and it was under,
stood that the right w(Hild only be exercised in the
British territories.

Our ministers, speaking of this offer, say, '^ That
it was sent to us as a publick paper, and it was in-
tended we should so consider it, and with the knowl-
edge and approbation of the British cabinet. It
ought therefore to be held as obligatory as if it had
been stipulated in a treaty. It is just also to give it
a liberal construction, in consideration that it is the
act of the British government. In that view it mer-
its attention, that every thing is expressed in it that
could be desired, except the relinquishment of the

pHncvple?^ — << that in speaking of impressments, the
exercise of that act on the high seas is omitted, an o-
mission we know to have been intentional."

Two years after this,^ir proposal — I call it fair,
because our present attorney-general, Pinkney, and
our present secretary of state called it so — Mr. Mon-
roe addressed a letter to the President, Mr. Madison,
on the same subject, in which he says, ** That the
subject of impressments was placed by that note of
the British commissioners, on ground both honoura-
Me and advantageous to the United States. That the
term '^high seas" was omiMet^ infenft(ma% and with
the view that impressments should be confined to the
land'' — ^that is to the British territory. He said " he
did not mean to say that Great-Britain would aban-
don the practice on the high seas altogether, but that
she would abandon her former practice, and only ex-
ercise it in an extreme case, such as the desertion of
a crew in a foreign and neutral country."

J\row we ask most significantly, for what we are at
war ? For a principle which Great-Briiain has de-
clared she never will yield absolutely, but which she
has offered to modify, and check, and guard, and re-
strain, in such a manner as to two oj our present
cabinet appeared perfectly ^^ honourable and advan-
tageous to us."

We are then fighting for a principle, an abstract
claim, which has been in every ^' honourable and ad-
vantageous" light yielded by our enemy.

As soon as our cabinet found that Great-Britain
never would yield the principle, but that she would
make such an arrangement as would be << honourable
and advantageous,'' they determined to adhere to, and
insist on the abstract principle, and to yield the ^< hon-
our and advantage."

Perish the seamen — ^perish commerce ! but let us
adhere to barren and useless rights — This was what
I was to shew lastly. Accordingly, on the 3d of
February, 1807, when our cabinet found Great-Brit-

ain "was remly to yield every thing but the principle
— that all just causiz of complaint would be removedj
they determined to defeat the arrangement, and or-
dered our ministers to insist on the mere right and to
propose, as Mr. Russell has lately proposed, '^ that
the British government should relinquish her right on
our stipulating that we would not employ any Brit-
ish senmen, not being a citizen, that is, not natural-
ized, vr unless he has been in our employ two years,'^

Here ended all hopes of accommodation ; and our
government well kuvow that they may safely offer the
exclusion of British seamen, so long as they claim
the right to protect all who are now in our country,
and demand of her the admission that her native bom
subjects shall be protected under our flag in merchant
vessels on a common jurisdiction, the high seas. The
^eat point we have in view is now proved, That at
no period has Great-Britain been willing to yield the
right, though she has made '^ honourable and advan-
tageous" offers for a modiiication of its exercise.

We cannot conclude this essay without quoting
the following sentiments of Mr. Monroe on the sub-
ject of the British offers about impressments, and the
^l1y of war on that account. They ought to be
written in letters of gold, and those letters in capitals.

'^ The British could not recede from the ground
they had taken, or accept, by compulsion, terms
which they had rejected in an amicable negotiation.
War, therefore, seemed to be the inevitable conse-
quence of such a state of things ; and I was far from
considering it an alternative to be preferred to the
encouragement offered to us. Wjien I took into view
our prosperous and happy condition, and that our
commerce flourished beyond example, notwithstand-
ing the losses which it occasionally sustained, I was
strongly of opinion that those blessings ought not to
be hazarded in such a question,^^ I knew " that the
United States were not |)repai'ed for war — their coast
was unfoi*tified — their cities defenceless — their militia

7«

in many states neither armed nor trained — and their
whole revenue derived from commerce — I could not
presume there was just cause to doubt which of the
altemativea ought to be preferred."

In these opinions Mr. Monroe is joined by above
sixty thousand people in Massachusetts, according to
the late elections, and probably some millions in the
United States ; yet the war is nov/ carried on by an
administration of which he is one, for the very prin-
'Cipk which he formerly declared was not worth it.

NO. XIII.

• MR. MADISON'S STRICTURES ON THE CONDUCT OP GOV.

STRONG.

Are the militia under the absolute control of the
President of the United States ?

Are they bound to fulfil all the duties of standing
armies ?

Does a mere declaration of war place the militia
under the power of the President ?

Is there no constitutional right in the executive,
judiciary, and people of the several states to judge
whether the militia are or are not constitutionally call.
ed into service ?

Can they be continued in service at the pleasure
of the national government, and ordered out of the
United States ?

These questions are the most interesting which
could possibly occur in our new republick. The Pres-
ident has dared to call the opinion of Gov. Strong*
supported as it is by our own state judiciary, *' a novel
and extraordinary one.''

That it is a ^^ novel" one is true, because Mr. Mad-
ison is the first President wlio has ventured to give
an alarming and dangerous construction to the pow-
ers of the constitution.

If hia eonsiructioit be right, we never need talk hi
future of the consolidation of the states — ^The state
sovereignties are extinct. We have one vast military
consolidation ; and the only remedy and bulwark,
which the constitution provided against the usurpa.
tion of an ambitious and unprincipled President, is
gone. The state governments have nothing left to
them to resist any and every species of usurpaticm.

Compared to this, all our foreign disputes dwindle
into insignificance. If this doctrine, advanced by
Mr. Madison ; if this bold assumption and usurpa^
tion be submitted to, it is, in our estimation, of no
moment whether we are conquered by Great-Britain
or France ; we shall fall a prey to our own domestick
usurpers, who will be as hard task-masters as a fort
eign potentate could possibly be. '^

That an attempt is seriously making to destroy thie
state sovereignties, and of course the union, we shall
prove by two quotations from papers published under
the influence and patronage of administration^

Jn the National Intelligencer, Mr. Madison's pa-
per, speaking of the refusal of the New- York miUtia
to march out of the United States, to wage an offen-
sive war, it was observed, ^^ that these wretches (the
militia) dared to talk of the constitution, when their
countr^ was in danger.'^

As if a Quixotick expedition into a foreign country
was a proof that the country was in danger<^^and as
if it was also a crime in a citizen to shield himself,
his blood and his life, his liberty and his family, un-
der the sacred provisions of the constitution.

It would seem> then, according to Mr. Madison's
paper, that the constitution is to be no safeguard to
the citizen when he most needs it, but that to invoke
its aid and its principles makes a citizen ^'a wretch J'

The Aurora, another Madisonian paper, carries its
insolence still farther. — Speaking of the people of
]}few- England, it says,

" Cim tli«i6 infi^al tfait&tt expect to 6s«ape Witb
ittpilnity ? They have no fcMlndatlofi for such for-
b^li^nfife, while they are daily guilty of treason by
adh^tiiig to our ett^mies. But we do not fear them,
for they are a dowtirdly set ofHUains. Neither the
GoyeMior of Massachusetts or Connecticut dare fight."

I^UoW'Citizens, we do not quote these things to itt->
flankb your minds, or to excite your rage, but to shew
^ou that your adh^r^nce to the constitution, and to
ythit rights, «xik)se you to the insults, and scoffs, and
e^Hitntiiely of ^our Ojiitonetats. Not content with de-
i^ltoying your comiiieiHse, they seem ripe for the inva-
ilott of your inost sacred rights.

t should despise these rash Writings, if it were not
that thfey are countenanced by the President's Mes-
sage.

It iS) therefore, importaht for Us to inquil^ whether
(^ir* Strbhg has acted imprudkntly^-^whiftther our
Wm Judges have given a col'rupt or wicked opinion ?
Whether the question is so clear on the side of Mr.
M&dlson, as to justify him in denouncing Gov. Strong
tod Gov. GrisWold?

^thia is a great and important question — and it
bug;ht to be treated with eorrespondent and becoming
StiiioUShesS and deliberation.

Far be it from us to suppose, that We tAti add any
'^ightto the opinions and arguments of such great
aitid vtenel^ablte names. But it should be remembered,
that men in high and oMcial stations cannbt, without
lesseningthieir dignity, enter into the oJIlce of advo-
cates. — -They cannot urge those small considerations,
and popular reasons and arguments, which liave an
essential bearing on the question.

We shall, therefore, with the indulgence of the
publick, say a few things on this question, under the
followi^ views of it :

1st. How did Congress ox the President acquire,
frotn the several states or from the jteoplef the right
to order out the militia in any case P

Sd. In what cases did the' people authorize Con-
gress to call out the militia ?

3d. Can they call them out in any other cases than
those explicitly authorized by the constitution ?
^ 4ijth. In whom, from the very nature of the limUa'
tiotif reposes the right to judge whether the deleg^ied
power IS or is not rightfully exercised— or, in other
words, of judging whether the cases in which the
militia may be called out, do or do not exist ?

dtii. Admitting, which we do not believe, that the
right aijvdging is in the national government ; have
they exercised that judgment, in the present case,
honestly and according to the fair construetion of the
constitution — in other words, do either of the eases^
provided for by the constitution, now eust?

6th. Admitting, as before, though against our opin-
ion, that C<Migress have the right of judging of the
existence of the limited cases provided for in the con-
fititution, in wbleh the militia may be called out, and
supposing that they have grossly abused their trusty
as we shall show under the fifth question, is there no
remedy, or if any, is there any other or better one^
than a firm opposition and refusal of the executives of
the several independent states ?

Laatly. We shall consid«>r the mischievous and ru-
inous efiects which would follow from the doctrine
set up by Mr. Madison — ^Its hostility to the freedom
of the citizen, and the absurd and contradictory con-
sequences which would flow from its admission.

We are aware, that we have taken broad ground ;
but we ought not to be deterred, on that account, from
probing to the bottom so interesting and important a
question.

NO. XIV.

THE OBUGATION OF THfi CITIZEN TO DO MILITAKY DUTY IN
ALL WARS, AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT. OR THE
CLAIM TO CONVERT THE MIUTIA INTO A STANDING AR-
MY, CONSIDERED.

fir8tl}f — ^We inquire, by what authority do the
President or Congress assume the power to order out
the militia in any case ?

On the revolt of the American colonies from Great-
Britain, the absolute sovereignty was transferred from
the king and parliament to the people. Neither the
j9tate governments nor the national government possess
any rights which have not been expressly delegated
to them. As against the federal government, this
proposition (obvious enough in itself) is made indis-
putable by the Xllth article of the first amendments
to the constitution, in tvhich ^^ all powers, not ex-
pressly given, are declared to be reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people."

.The federal government cannot claim the power of
ordering out the militia as successors to the old con-
federation, for the old confederation possessed no such
powers. — They could do nothing with the militia, nor
could they even raise troops, without the intervention
of the several states. We went through one war suc-
cessfully, with the whole power of the militia resting
in the states.

The federal government cannot claim this power,
as being necessarily incident to any other power given
to them, such as the power and duty of providing for
the common defence, because, first, there are other
and ample means given to them for this purpose, such
as the powers of laying taxes, and of raising and
maintaining armies and navies ; — it cannot be called,
therefore, a necessary incident.

1 ;

)

But, secondly, no rule of fair construction will per-
mit a limited aovereign to claim, hy way bf incidental
:^d implied powerSf thi extension of any powers or
autkiority which are the subject of express provision
in the instrument defining the authority to be delegat-
ed. A grant of a limited power over a particular
subject, excludes any further constructive or inci-
dental power over the same subject, as effectually as
any words of negation or prohiblMon could possibly
do. Thus, for example, if the coastitution had pro-
vided, that, *' Congress shall have power to raise and
maintain a standing army of ten thousand men, or to
levy taxes to the amount of two millions of dollars,"
they would be as much restrained from raising more,
as if there had been an express negative, or prohib-
itory words in the constitution. They could not have
raised more men or money, without the assent of the
several states, let the emergency have been ever so
great, or even if it had been absolutely necessary to
carry into effect their undoubted powers. They
must apply to the states or people for further author-
ity or aid. To suppose the contrary of these propo-
sitions, would be to maintain that the delegate may
be above his constituent — ^the creature above his crea-
tor. It would so to the destruction of all limited
written constitutions. It would be better to give to
the constituted authorities general powers in atl cases
whatever, and trust to the rebellion or insurrection of
the people, for a remedy in case of violent abuse. If
these doctrines are, as we believe, indisputable. Con-
gress derives all its power to call upon the militia in
any case, wholly from the constitution, and that con-
stitution having given them that power only in three
specified cases, they are restrained as much as they
would have been by prohibitoi'y words, from ordering
them out in any other cases.

Secondly — I would ask, in what cases did the peo-
ple authorize Congress to call out the militia ?

The whole power given upon this subject, is con-
tained in the rollowing short sentence, clear, strong,
and well defined :

Congress shall have power '* to provide for calling
forth the militia, to execute the laws of the union,
fluppress insurrections, and repel invasicmaJ'

They ean call them out in no other cases whatso*
ever ; and if they should exercise the power in any
other cases, it would be like any other illegal assump^
tion of power, void«— and the remedy would be the
same as if they were to separate a state without itii
consent— -pass a bill of attainder against the citizens
of a particular state, or exercise any other powers
whiclC are expressly prohibited to them by the conati-
tution,

I take it, throughout this argument, for granted,
that there are no men base enough to contend, thai
Congress may, from the necessity of the case, the
common plea of tyrants, exercise a power expressly
prohibited to them ; yet from some recent instances I
«hould be led to fear, that there may be some syeo-

Shants, who even in such a case would preach up the
uty of obedience to our own sovemmentf and volun^
teer their arms in defence of its avowed violation of
our riehts.

Thirdly — Can Congress order out the militia in
any other than the three cases pointed out in the
Constitution ?

Most assuredly not, according to the argument
under the jirst question^ — ^The argument ex absurdo
can hardly ever be more strong. — Of what use was it
to authorize Congress to order out the militia in three
specified cases, if they would have the power to or.
der them out in all cases, or at pleasure without that
provision ? We repeat, that a specifick grant by one
having authority, to one who before had none, is tan-
tamount to a limitation to the exact extent of the
grant.
But we come to the most importanii question.

the

Fourthly, In whom, Arom the very nature of the
limitation, reposes the ultimate right to judge whether
cither of the three cases provided for by the consti-
tution does exist ?

We answer, generally, in the constituent, not the
delegate ; in the master, not the servant— u/ftmat<?^
in the people, principally from the necessity of the
case in the commanders in chief of the militia of the
several states.

The verv idea of limitation excludes the possibility
that the delegate should be the judge — if he were, his
powers would be limited only by his own judgment,
or in other words, his own arbitrary will, which is
no limitation at all.

In most cases, the Judiciary of the United States
are the ultimate judges of the constitution, and wheth-
er its powers are fairly pursued. — ^But in this case
the remedy would be inadequate. — ^Buring an appeal
to the Supreme Court, which sits but twice a year,^
and which might consume many months in delibenu
tion, an invasion might lay waste the country, and be
fatal to our liberties—or a rash President might seize
the militia, send them on board ships, to fight on the
borders of the Dwina, or on the sands of Africa — or,,
if a firm and dignified Governor should resist such
an usurpation, a headstrong President, and obedient
Congress might cai'ry civil war, fire, and sword, inta
the state which dared to asseii; their constitutional
rights.

There can be therefore no umpire. — Either the
delegate or the constituent must be the judge. To
suppose that the delegate should 6e the judge would
be to pervert the very first principles of common
sense, prudence, freedom, and common law.

Of common sense, because of what use is a limitation,
if the person you wish to restrain, can judge exclu-
sively whether he breaks the limitation or not ? — ^Of
prudence and freedom, because if you once permit
the delegate to be the judge qf his own powers, what

•ecudiy can you possibly have agaiust the grossest
abuses ? — ^At common law too^ unless where the au-
thority is coupled with an interest, the power of the
constituent is always superior to that of the attorney,
or substitute.

Besides, from the very form of proceeding, adopted
in ordering out the militia, &form rendered necessa-
ry by the provisions of the constitution, the riglit of
judging seems to be necessarily placed in the Grov-
ernors of the several states. The orders are issued
to them — they must therefore decide, whether the or-
ders are in due form, and whether they are issued in a
case whichauthorizes Congress to order out the mili-
tia. — ^£n ordinary military cases, the subordinate oflS-
eer is justified by the orders of his superior officer,
whether those orders are right or wrong. But the
Governors of the several states arfc not subordinate to
the President, until after they are actually in the
service of the United States. For ordering out the
militia, which is an act which precedes the actual
service, the Governors are responsible to their constit-
uents, and may, and ought to be impeached if they
do it, at the request of the President, in any case, not
provided for by the constitution.

Now a man cannot be liable to punishment for do-
ing that of which he was not the free judge, to de-
cide whether he would, or would not do it.

I have said that the form required by the Constitu-
tion made it necessary that the Governors should
judge whether tl)e militia are rightfully ordered out.
— I add, fuiiiher, that it is not in the power of Con-
gress to dispense with that form. — They cannot au-
thorixe the President to skip over the Governor, and
order out the militia, directly, or to issue his orders
to inferior officers — because, the President is not
vested with the command of the militia, by the Con-
stitution, *^ antil they are called into actual ser-
vice" — and tuey are not in actual service, until after
they have been notified and ordered out. The mili-

tia Major-Generals can recognize no order^ but that
of the Commander in Chief of the state ; nor can any
Brigadier-Generals recognize any order, but that of
their superiors in the militia, until after they have
been ordered out, and are in actual service. Any
order, therefore, from the President, would be of no
more validity, nor any more justification to an inferior
militia officer, for ordering out the militict than n
similar order from George^ Prince of Wuhs, Re-
gent, 8j;c,

It is not in the povtrer of Congress to mend this
matter. It can only be effected by an alteration of
the constitution. We know the President and his
satellites argue from the possible abuse of this power,
by the Governors of the several states against the
right. " We are not one state" says the President,
if this ** novel" doctrine be true. It is not a '^^ novel"
doctrine that we are not one state — ^It is a ** novel"
doctrine that we are so. It is an insolent and open
attempt at military consolidation. — We shall say
n^ore on the subject of abuse of this power here9,fter»

NO. XV.

THE SPIRIT DISPLAYED BY THK PRESIDENT AND WAR DE.
PARTMENT IN THEIR CGNSTRtTCIION OF THE CONSTFrU-
TION, AND THEIl^ BEPRESBNTATION OF THE DANGER OF
INVASION.

Fifthly.— Admitting, which we deny, and have
disproved, that the right of judging, when the caset
occur, in which the militia may be ordered out, rests
definitively with the President and Congress ; have
they in the late orders to the Governors of Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode-Island, honestly
executed' the trust, in the fair spirit of the constitu-
tion — or in other words, do either of the three cuses
exist ?

As it is not pretended by the President, that tht

mmmm

lit

troops arc ordered out, in consequence of the exist-
ence of the two first cases ; as it is well known,
that the laws are not forcibly resisted, nor has any
insnrrectiou taken place, the only remaining ques-
tion is, Has there been at any period or does there
now exist an invasion to be repelled P

It would be the duty of a man ad ressing a society
of Hottentots, or C;iff. ee Negroes, to beg their par-
dons, for ptiying so poor a compliment to their un-
dei'standings, as to discuss this question seriously;
but since the President, who ought to know the char-
acter, and talents of his constituents better than w^e
do, has ventured to insult their understandings, by
pretending, that this case of invasion, or imminent
danger thereof, has existed, in the true spirit of the
constitution, we trust, we may be excused, for argu-
ing a question, which every school-boy, and every
timid girl, on either of the most exposed frontiers,
would laugh at and ridicule.

The words of the constitution, have a wonderful
legal precision, which one would have supposed,
would have precluded even a Jesuit from cavilling :
— <* Congress shall have power to provide for cal-
" ling out the militia to repel invasion.^'

The invasion must actually exist, and the militia,
can only be kept in service, so long as is necessary
to REPEL it. The moment it is repelled, the Com-
manders in Chief of each state, have a right instantly
to recall them. It seems as if there was, (and there
most undoubtedly was) an nncommon jealousy ^ as to
the power of the federal government, over this natu-
ral, and only constitutional bulwark, of the several
states, and of tlie people.

Lest the militia should be ordered out, premature-
ly, or in c.ise of war, generally, it was provided, that
they should only be called out during foreign wars,
in case of *^^ invasion^' — and lest, when once in the
service of <he United States, they should be contin-

cal-

tied duria^ the war, or longer than the great, and
sudden exigency required, it was provided, that they
should only be obliged to '* repel^' invasion. ^

The moment the invader was vepuhei, the militia
had performed all that the constitution required of
them, and might, and ought, to be recalled by the
Governors of the several states — otherwise, these
restrictive words have no meaning, and the consti-
tution, might as well have given the whole command
to the United States, without any limitation.

If, therefore, Gov. Strong, had trusted to Mr.
Madison's word, (a trust, which since his procla-
mation about the repeal of the Berlin decrees, we
confess, would be an extraordinary one,) and had
ordered out the militia, \i would have been his duty,
as as he found, that the danger, had so far van-

ishetl;, Jiat the commander in chief of the United
States army, and all tlic regular troops, had remov-
ed from the maritime iVonticis, and had actualhr en-
tered, or were threatening, the territories of Great
Britain, instantly to have recalled the drafted mili-
tia of Massachusetts. As the guardian of the rights
of the people of this state, he is bound to see that
their lives, their fortunes, and their rights, are not
exposed to greater dangers, than the constitution
requires.

As soon, tlierefore, as all appearance of invasion
was at an end {'if there ever was any, J he ought to
have retailed the militia.

We are aware, that the Congress of 1795? did give
a liberal construction to the constitution, and did
authorize the President, to order out the militia in
case of *» imminent danger of invasionJ^

If this mbaus any thing more, tluin the actual ad-
vance of a competent military force of the enemy, to-
wards our maritime, or internal frontiers, with appa-
rent intent, to invade them, the Congress of 1795.
were mistaken, and assumed a power, which does
not belong to tiie National Government.

But even this argument, will not avail Mr. Madi-
son ; for grant that the Congress of 1795, were right,
and that the words of the constitution, were ^' im-
minent danger ofinvasion/^ still it is notorious, that
no such danger has existed.

What part of the United States, has been threat-
ened with, or in imminent danger of invasion ?
shall we disgrace our navy, by admitting, that our
ten ships of war, which were, during the past sum-
mer, superior to the British force on this coast, were
unable to repel, predatory incursions ? was there
any danger, that the commanders of British ships,
uninstructed, as they must have been, by their own
government, which was ignorant of the war, would
mahe a predatory descent, on the shores of the U*
nited States ? besides, were these accidental, tem-
porary, predatory excursions, the " invasion^' con-
templated by the constitution, which the arm of the
national government, and its fortresses would be in-
competent, to ** repel ?" could it be supposed, that
the frapiers of the constitution intended, that the
President, should order outthe militia, and keep them
embodied, during the whole of a maritime war,
through fear of a temporary, occasional descent, by
a privateer or a frigate ? are not the local militia,
while at home, amply competent, to repel small en-
terprizes ? if not, we make a grand parade about
our militia, to no purpose, and worse than to
no purpose. But this is not so. The militia^ cal-
led together, without any previous notice, drove be-
fore them Earl Percy, with 3000 veterans ; and tlie
militia, unembodied until the moment a fleet should
appear in our offing, would, in twenty four hours,
repel any British force, which could possibly come
here, without having previous information.

Was there, then, any serious danger in June
last, or has there been since, of an " invasion" by
•€fl, from Great Britian ? did the President, appre-

ii;

heni any ? if he did, he betrayed the country, by
sending away the troops, from the place where he
did except *< invasion" to another place, where hft
did not fear it, but where he meant to make an inva-
sion on an inferior enemy.

Could it be feared, that Britain would invade us,
before she knew of the war ? could it be feared, that
she would do it, after she heard of it, and when we
found her, liberating, and sending away all Ameri-
can ships, and an immense amount of American
property, under the hopes of peace, to be produced
by the repeal of the orders in council ? is an " inva-
sion" feared, even now, by any one man in the Uni-
ted States ? NO — it is a groundless, insulting pre-
tence. Great-Britain, occupied in Spain, and in the
Baltick,and pressed, unexpectedly and cruelly, pres-
sed, by the tools of France in this country, will
scarcely be aide to defend her violonies, from butche-
ry, and plunder and conquest. This was the calcu-
lation upon which the war was undertaken. It was
a repetition of the old fable of the sick lion. Nev-
er would the war have been undertaken, if any real
danger of *< invasion" had existed.

If then, no danger of *• invasion" existefd by sea,
will it be pretended, that we were in danger of "in-
vasion" by land ? where is the brazen faced, party
politician, who will advance' such a pretence ? will
the partizans of Mr. Madison tell us this, when they
have so often promised us, the barren provinces of
two Canadas, as a compensation for the loss of our
commerce, our blood, and our treasure ? will those
men, who proposed and discussed a bill, for the occu-
pation, and annexation, of the two Canadas, to the
United States, pretend, that these provinces will in-
vade us ? will those members of Congiess, Porter^
Williams, Cheeves and Widgery, who have prom-
ised us the immediate possession of these provinces,
tell us we are in danger from them ?

Dut above all, Mr. Madison id precluded from
tlie apology, because he has sent three distinct arm*^
ies to invade Canada — and we have a right to pre^
8ume he authorized their commanders to issue the
proclamations which they have done, in which they
speak with contempt of the enemy^s force and pow-
er, and of the ease with which the conquest can be
e^ ted, a language very disgraceful to our nation,
if the prospect of success had not been nearly cer-
tain. Besides, Mr. Madison by refusing: Sir
George Prevost*s proposition for an armistice, prov-
ed he had no fears of an invasion.

Mr. Madison it appears, then, could not have
feared an invasion by sea, because Great-Britatn
had no knowledge of the icar— because she liberat-
ed American property — repealed her Orders in
Council, and was making a new embassy for peace.
It appears, slso, that he had no fears for the sea
board, for he ordered away all the troops for the in-
vasion of Canada. It is equally clear that he did
not fear an invasion by land, because he was both
making and preparing an invasion of Canada, and
he knew Great-Britain had not a force even com-
petent for defence.

Yet, in face of the clear sense and spirit of the
constitution, he ordered out the militia. This wc
call an usurpation ; but the manner of doing it we
consider a pettifogging quibble. In the first appli-
cation to all the eastern Governors, it was not stated
that thero was an ^' invasion'^ to be repelled, or an
imminent danger of one, but when the Governors
hesitated on this ground, they were artfully told,
that the danger of invasion had increased since his
first demand — but as there was no danger at first,
it still did not follow that there was much at the
last application. In fact, Mr. Madison knew
there was none. The real design, we shall show
in our next.

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NO. XVI.

THE QUEStlON OF MILl TARY CONSCRIPTION, CONCLUDED.

We have shewn, that the right of judging whether
the cases in which the militia can be ordered out,
exist, is vested, from the veiy nature of the limitation,
in the Governors of the several states ; and Wti have
proved, that even if this right existed in the Presi-
dent, it has been, in the late casos, very unjustly ex-
ercised. We shall now say something more on this
subject, before we consider tlie remedy for such an
abuse, and the evil consequences which may follow
from this abuse, if not duly restrained.

When the Secretary at War, and the President,
were very properly pushed by the Executives of thcj
northern states, to state, precisely, the nature and ex-
tent of the danger of invasion, they replied, that war
having been commenced, there resulted from the very
fact of war, a danger of invasion. If any other evi-
dence of such danger existed, it world have been
easy to state it — indeed it would have been obvious
to the whole nation.

But knowing that no such danger existed, they pre-
ferred to rest their claim on the simple existence of
war, a war declared by the United States themselves.
We shall not enter into the question, in this place, of
the justice of the war, nor of its being an offensive,
not a defensive, one. We simply ask the good peo-
ple of this state, whether the mere existence of a war
is a sufficient ground to authorize the President to
call out the militia ! According to this monstrous and
novel construction, the constitution should be read,
that, " Congress should have power to call out the
militia to execute the law, repress insurrections, and
in any wars in ichich the United States may be en-

r«

'ged.

If the framers of the constitution intended this, they
adopted the strangest expressions in their power. —
Nations may be engaged in wars of ambition — of
foreign conquest ; they may carry their arms to the
remotest quarters of the globe. If it was their inten-
tion, that whether invasion was or was not threaten-
ed, but merely because, in all wars, invasion might
be poaaibUf the President should have an unlimited
power over the militia, they certainly expressed them*
selves very awkwardly, when they authorized Gon-
gress to order out the militia, to '^ repel invasions."

According to the new doctrine, a war declared against
Tecumseh or the Dey of Algiers would give the
President a control over the whole militia — and this
not only during the existence of the danger ofinva<
sion, but during the whole war. For, according to
the reasoning of the secretary of war, so long as the
war lasts, there is, from the nature of war itself, a
possibility of invasion — and the President being the
isole judge of this danger, the militia may be kept in
service during the war. Words or argumeuts can-
Bot make this point clearer. If to '^ repel invasion^'
means the danger of possible invasion when there is
no probability of it, and if the President is the ex.
elusive judge upon this point, then the limited poWr-
ers of the constitution are of no avail, and the Pres-
dent is the absolute commander of every man in the
United States, and may keep him in service so long
as he chooses to have a war on foot with any nation,
from the meanest tribe of savages to the conqueror of
Murope.

We now enquire, sixthly, whether if the absu; d
doctrine should be maintained, that in case of re>
stricted powers, the delegate shall be the exclusive
judge of the extent of his powers, and if Congress
may decide, whether the cases provided for by the
constitution do or do not exist, still if the people
should be satisfied that they surpass their authority, and
abuse their trast, there is any better remedy than for

Hic Executives of the several states to refuse to order
out tbe militia ?

There hone other remedy, and that is, fur the in-
dividual soldier to resist — and if attempted to be for-
ced into service, contrary to the constitution, to kill
his assailant, or to collect his friends to rescue him.

Every man will admit that this remedy is a dread-
ful one ; and yet it must be granted that the militia, not
being voluntary soldiers, ought not to be forced into
service, to be compelled to change their habits and
become mercenary soldiers, during a whole war, as
may be the case, without any remedy.

Even if the President, therefore, is the exclusive
judge, which we deny, still in case of a gross abuse
of his power, sucli as in the present instance in de-
claring that the United States is in danger of inva-
sion, when every man knows and feels that they are
not ; we see no better, more quiet, or constitutional
remedy than for their superior and immediate com-
manding officer to refuse.

He takes, to be sure, a solemn responsibility upon
liimf^elf ; — ^but if he acts honestly, and prudently,
and coolly, he ought to meet with the support and
confidence of those whom it is liis duty to protect.

Our most excellent Magistrate has taken this
course — and he has availed himself of the admirable
provision of our constitution, by requiring the opin-
ion of the Judges of our own supreme court, which,
so far as respects all citizens of Massachusetts, must
be considered as the law.

Indeed, what man of common sense will dare to
«ay, that actual invasion has existed, or that great
and immi7ient danger of it which would authorise the
Governor, to tear the husbands, fathers and sons of
our industrious yeomanry from tlieir families, to sick-
en, to bleed, and perish in the camps of an army wa-
ging a war of ambition and conquest.

We shall now state, in conclusion, some strong rea-
sons why this demand upon the militia is unreasoua-

bU, dangetous to the liberty of tlie subject, and
fraught with most destructive consequences to the
rights and interests of the people;

It is unreasonable, because Congress !)eing invested
Ivith the whole revenue of the United States ; having

Sower by direct and indirect taxes to take the last
ollar from the pockets of the people — and having
iilso the power of raising armies without limitation, and
of maintaining them even in time of peace ; they
ought not to declare war until they have provided the
adequate means to carry it on. The case would be
Very different, and the feelings of the people of a dif-
ferent cast, if a foreign nation had waged war against
us and had taken us, unawares.

To subject the people in addition to the sacrifices
and losses of war — to its burdens and taxes ; to quit
their farms and their occupations, and to render per-
isonal service in camps, subject to martial law, and
without their having any option in the business, is
ve^ unreasonable.

Even if the war was necessary, still we can see no
reason vi^hy it could not have been postponed until the
armies were raised who were to carry it on.

We do indeed perceive, that if it had been delayed
only six weeks, the great cause of it would have been
removed, and probably Congress would not have
been persuaded to declare it — we hope it was not
hastened on that account, lest the repeal of the Brit-
ish Orders in Council should prevent the adoption of
so desperate a measure.

The measure of ordering out the militia is danger-
ous to our liberties-^because it is an assumption of
power not granted by the Constitution — because wheii
they are amalgamated and consolidated with the mer-
cenary ttoops, the people will have no means of de-
fence left to them against the ambition of a conoipt
President — because on the principle on which they
are ordered out they may be kept in service dur-
ing the whole of any and every war which the Pres-

ideni and a majority of Congress may sec fit to de-
«;lare.

The militia* according to this doctrine, will be at
piny and all times subject to martial law, without hav-
ing voluntarily enlisted. They will bear all the <2t«.
gi'uce of defeats f and will enjoy none of the honours
or rewards of victory. Tliere is no provision for
their support in case they are wounded ; and every
disaster is charged to their want of discipline or couTt
age.

It is said the Governors may abuse this power of
judging whether they will order out the militia. To
this we have a short reply ; — ^We do not know why
it should be presumed that the Governors will abuse
this trust more than the President. If however, a
few of them should do it, it could nqt produce much
injuiy to the United States, because the latter ought
rather to rely on their own forces than on the militia.
If a major part of the Governors should refuse, it
would be a conclusive proof that the war was not a
proper one. But if the President should grossly a-
buse his trust, the liberties of the people will }}e de-
sstrov.d. •*

NO. XVII.

IN rAVOR OF A GEND'ARMIR NATIOXALE, UNDER THE MILJ>
•1 n LE OF A LOCAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.

Quia pterumqueinopcs, acvaffi, sponte militiam cuniunf.— tAcitvs.

It is natural that men who for more than thirty years
liave been accustomed to regard the interests and
wishes of France as considerations of great political
weight — men who were unwilling that even our in-
dependence and fisheries should be secured without
the consent of the French Court— men who have al-
ways liad the confidence and have received the prais-
es of the successive French ministers in our country^

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— ^men ivho have been honoured with Che rank and
privileges of French citizens, and decorated with the
cordon of the Legion of Honour — men who have
made a negoti&don with France, restoring her to aYl
her ancient privileges, without obtaining the reim-
bursement of one dollar of the many millions placed
in the Emperor's caiae d'amortissement — men who
declared the French decrees repealed on the 1st day
of November, 1810, which the Emperor on the S8th
of April last flatly contradicted — men, in fine, who
luive now entered into war on the side of France, ^r-
mally against Great-Britain alone, but substantially a-
gainst Russia, Spain and Portugal. — It is natural that
snch men should become attached to all the French
modes of inteTnal and external policy and arms. — It
was not, therefore, with surprise, though we confess-
it was with some emotion, we saw them attempt the
introduction of the conscription laws of France a-
gainst the plainest, most indisputable sense of the
constitution.

We have frequently called this attempt of the Pres-
ident to coerce the militia, conscription — we will now
explain why it is justly so called. The militia are
enrolled against their otrn inclination — it is not a
matter of choice, but necessity. They, however, were
intended both in Great-Britain and this country only
as a local defence, and not to supply the place of
standing troops, especially for foreign conquest. —
When, therefore, Congress draft 100,000 militia, they
order them out without giving them an opinion — it is
force, not inclination — it is. necessity, not patriotism,
which obliges them to go. If this be done in a case
where the militia are not obliged by the constitution
to serve, it is an attempt at usurpation — if carried irflo
execution by force, it is tyranny.

The conscription laws of France arc founded on
the same principle. — ^The militia are drafted as w;t!i
us ;— the only difference is, that the draft is confined
in France to the youths of nineteen years of age, a

.ge, a

system, which, by withdrawing all the youth beibre
they are qualified for any profession, destroys their
morals, defeats their prospects in future life, and par-
alizes the industry of the nation.

But even this demoralizing, debasing, corrupting,
wicked example, is not without its charms in the
eyes of the adnirers and imitators of France in this
country. It seems an army of recruiting officers
were attempted to be sent to entice, corrupt and kidnap
our sons and apprentices — ^Measures were in contem-
plation, though checked by the Senate, of a nature,
of a severity which the people of Britain will not en-
dure. Apprentices, cannot in that country be enlist-
ed, and even in the sea service, the great bulwark of
that nation, where if any thing would justify the
breach of private rights, the importance of maintain-
ing their maritime power would do it, apprentices
cannot betaken during the first three years of ap-
prenticeship, and during the remainder, the master is
to receive their wages. But here, freedom — eman-
cipation — wages were intended to be oifered as the
means of seduction to the sons of our farmers and th«
apprentices of our mechanicks.

There is but one point in which the comparison
between the French and American conscriptions does
not hold.

The conscripts are there collected by the gen d'ar-
merie, chained, and sent to the depot, or rather driv-
en as we drive cattle.

In this country we have, as yet, been deficient in
that part of the machinery of internal police, the
gens d'armes, and the local volunteer force is pre-
cisely to fill this gap.

After this shall be complete, Congress will laugh —
Mr. Madison, Dr. Eustis (he knows well tchy I men-
tion him, J and Gen. Dearborn, will sneer nt the re-
fusal of the militia or opposition of the local Govern -
ours. — tYext year, unless we defeat the project in-
stantly, next year our militia will be drafted '^vithout

the eotisent of the Governours, and will be marched
ehained to the place of rendezvous.

Do not let people startle at this prophecy, or con«
sider it a bold, unwarrantable thing. It is not more
against general opinion, than a prophecy we made
two years a^o, that we should adopt the Continental
Sifstenif and enter into a war on the side of France.

The fall of Roman liberties, when Julius GsBsar
obtained the command of the armies of both Gauls,
was not so probable as a civil war, and the destructitm
of our liberties from the organization of this Praetorian
band — ^this gen d?armerie in the midst of us — ^this lo-
cal, pensioned corps, I care not whether you call
them ^< Sicaires, Guards, Presidential Janizaries, or
J^iocal Volunteers."

I shall say something about their resemblance to
the gens d'armeSf and about their unconstitutional,
dangerous alarming character — and give a few bints
as to the remedy, or barrier against this arbitrary
stretch of power.

The gens d*armes of France amount to about
iOO,000 men, in a population of 35 millions.

The gens d'armes of Madison, the volunteers, a-
inount to 00,000, in a population of 7 millions, so that
ihe proportion, which our police spies and guards
|l>ear to the whole people, is more than twice as great
PA that of France.

The French gens d'armes are sufficient to keep the
people in a state of abject slavery — -Our gens d'armes
pu^ht of course to be still more competent to the same
object.

The French gens d'armes are selected for their
zeal and fidelity to the Emperor-^Ours are selected
|n the same manner. It is only the most hitter, and
violent, and persecuting, and blind Mends of admin-
istration, who offer themselves, or are accepted.

The French gens d'armes are officered by the £m-

Seror — Our gens d'armes are officered by the Presi-
ent. The French gens d'armes are scattecpd througli

teers i

"m^

■««■»•*«■«■

mmfmnw^nm

'clied

> con-
more
made
lental
ince.
GsBsar
Stauls;
ucticm
^torian
;his lo-
»u call
lies, or

nee to
itional;
w bints
rbitrary

about

lerSf a-
so tbat
guards

us great

teep the
d'armes
he same

or their
selected
ter, and
[ admin-
ted,

the Ern-
ie Presi-
througU

ih6 \^hole country — are always ready to inform — iv
check freedom of discussion— to execute the Emper-
or's will. OvLt gens d'armes are in like manner dis-
seminated through the whole country to watch- — to
check disaffection, and obey their chief*

The French gend'armerie seldom olr never fight »
publick enemy — they live in and near home--«lead an
idle life, and draw great pay. Our volunteers, Mr»
Madison recommends, should not be obliged to leave
home — If the enemy comes to their houses, perhaps
they might fight, but they are to be paid for living in
idleness— paid for their loyalty-^-^&id for their votes
— paid for watching the opposition — paid for cutting
their fellow-^citizen's throats (if need should be) or if
Madison should so order»

Our constitution recognizes but two species of land
forces, regular troops and militia. Bo long as Con-
gress confined themselves to raising regular troopg
by means of volunteer enlistments, they were perfect-
ly right ; only it ought to be understood that the vol-
unteers formerly ordered to be raised, are in all res-
pects regulars — -and ought to be added to the stand-
ing army.

In this view. Congress authorized a standing army
of eighty-five thousand men, to wit, 35,000 to be en<'
listed, and dO,000 to be accepted as volunteers. But
as the latter have the same pay, are officered by the
President, and are subject to martial law, to be shoi
for desertion or cowardice, I can see no difference be^
tween them and regularsv

For the same reason that men would not enlist^ to
wit, that they hate the war, and despise the degrada-
tion of common soldiers, a sentiment which we pray
to God, our yeomanry may always feel, they would
not volunteer.

What then is the scheme proposed ? That volun-
teers may be raised, officered by the President, draw
Ipay, and stay at home. An imperium in imperio

with a witness ! A mongrel breed of soldier citizens
and citizen soldiers.

Can Congress raise troops upon such a condition ?
Pay them for not fighting ?

We not only think this attempt dangerous to the
citizen, but we think it subversive of the constitution.
Congress may raise as many troops as they please,
but it must be to form an army.

The mode proposed is only an insidious way of
destroying the militiaf or of getting the power of offi-
cering it, and commanding it from the several
states, and vesting it in the President.

If Congress can accept 50,000, they can 500,000
volunteers. They are not bound to take even the
50,000, in due proportions, in the several states —
they may accept them al! in one state — ^tlicy may ac-
cept 50,000 volunteers in Massachusetts. Where
then would be Gov. Strong's command of the militia ?
Where that of our Major-Generals ? — ^We do not
object to Congress accepting the services of any men
who will go forth to fight, and endure the dangers of
the field. But we do deny its right to defeat the in-
tent of the constitution, by transferring the whole mi-
litia to the President — by bribing men to remain at
home, and prove disloyal to their own state govern-
ments.

My remedy would be, that the militia higher offi-
cers should insist on these volunteers doing militia
duty — ^that the legislature should punish any officers,
who shall seduce any militia from their ranks and
duty — and also we advise a vigilant, jealous, and
vigorous attention to arms; in the militia, who are not
corrupted.

itizeus

lition ?

to the
itution.
please^

way of
of oflR-
several

JOOjOOO
ven the
itates- —
may ac-
Wheic
militia ?
do not
^ny men
tgers of
the in-
i,ole mi-
Lain at
50vern-

^er ofii'
[mititia
Officers,

Ls and
,, and
lire not

NO. xvm

N RECAPITULATION AMD COHCLUSION.

We have now finished the remarks which we in-
tended to make on the Message of the President—
with what fidelity and sueeess this has been done, the
the PURLICK must (l^cide. We are aware, that in exe.
euting this task, much time has been consumed, and
that the great and interesting topicks which that Mes-
sage presented, have required more developement than
it will be in the power of most readers to follow, with
that undivided attention which their importance ^-
mands. Indeed we have a right to remark, that it is im-
possible, in a discussion divided and separated as it
must be in the essays suited to our weekly journals, that
any man can follow the chain of reasoning, and trac6
all the connections of it, without some general sum-
mary, which shall embnce and display the whole in
a compact and simple forin. This is the object of our
present and last essay.

Our first object was to shew, that the apparent of-
fers of peace and negotiation, on the part of our cab-
inet, were perfectly illusory ; that they had no other
foundation or design, than to quiet the fears of our
citizens — ^to check the exertions of the friends of
peace — ^to secure the election of Mr. Madison, and
so to paralize the exertions of the British ministiy, as
to ^»vent their taking any eifectual measures to de-
fend Canada, which it was hoped, by this artifice,
would have been conquered before this time.

It was ahown, from ample quotations, and, as we
believe, arguments unanswerable, that such terms
were proposed, as it was well known, from former
negotiations, Great-Britain would necessarily reject ;
that even as a condition of Aauspension of hostilities,
preparatory to a negotiation, it was required, that

Gr^'at-Britain should, bv an informal but clear and
inck' "mutable understanding, bind herself to yield the
only question in dispute, a question from which Mr.
Monroe declared she could not recede, especially
from compulsion, when she had refused to recede
from it by amicable negotiation.
' We have shown, that through all the sttbseqnent
instructions of our cabinet, this point was pertina-
ciously adhered to, and that even in the last letter to
Sir John Borlaise Warren, it wa8.repeated that hos-
tilities would not cease until Great-Britain should
agree, as a preliminary, to yield this most essential
point of the whole controversy. We neglected, how-
ever, in our argument, to notice, one most conclusive
proof of the insincerity of our cabinet, and of their
belief that the offers they had made to Great-Britain,
would be rejected. It shews a persuasion apriori,
which goes to the absolute conviction of their insin-
cerity. We allude to the refusal of the offers of Sir
G«orge Prevost, to agree to an armistice, a suspension
of the shedding each others blood. These offers
were made before any answer was received, as to the
propositions gent to Great-Britain. They were pre-
dicated on the repeal of the Orders in Council, and
910 catise of war remained, but the subject of impress-
ments. If our government had been sincere in their
propositions through Mr. Russell, and if they had
thought they were such as Great-Britain could or
might accept — ^in the name of humanity — of honour
-—of fair and honourable dealing, why not agree to a
suspension of the horrors of war, until the answer
could be received ? ' , *■

It must have been, because they expected the re-
fusal, and they were afraid they should lose the "un-
gathered'' laurels of the Generals Hull, and Smyth,
and Dearborn.

We have shewn, that the only equivalent offered
to Great- Britain, was the exclusion of British seamen
from our vessels in future ; but what should consti-

r and
Id the
tiMr.
icially
fcccdc

eriina-
itterto
nt ho8-
should
isential
I, how-
cluaive
>f their
Sritain^
ipriori,
r insin-
3 of Sir
pension
offers
to the
repre-
il, and
npress-
n their
ey had
mid or
honour
■ee to a

NSWER

the re-
e "un-
Jmyth,

loffered

jeamen
consti-

tute a British seaman — ^whether a reaidenee of one
day, or of two years, in the United States, together
with the mysterious operation of an act of Congress,
and an oath before a counly court, should transform
a Scotch or Irish sailor into a genuine American —
whether a bill of Mr. Wria^t, or Mr. Williams, should
sever the inseparable allegiance which eveiy man
owes to his native country — whether any and what
provisions should Ve made against a fraudulent abuse
of naturalization, (not by our government, for that
could not bd presumed) but by the seamen, — ^were
points which were left wholly untouched in the in*
structions and offers.

Nay, to render these Tague proposals, if possible,
still more untangible, Great-Bntain was assured, that
by our constitution, the President could make no
stipulations for Congress.

If any one would be desirous of knowing what
would probably be the temper of Congress on this
subject, let him take with him the two following an-
ecdotes, founded on indisputable facts : — ^Mr. Dana,
of Connecticut, has, for three or four years past, pro-
posed and brought in bills to require, that the mer-
chant vessels of the United States should be navigat-
ed, in certain proportions, say three-fourths, by na-
tive seamen ; and his attempts have been abortive.
Last winter, a committee of the House, consisting of
Messrs. Wright, and Pitkin, and Tallman, were ap-
pointed on this subject. The two latter having given
an opinion in favour of excluding British sailors from
our ships, Mr. Wright, who was opposed to it, being
the chairman, never called the committee together af-
terwards, in order to defeat, as it was supposed, the
project.

In fine, it may be asked, if any serious intention
had existed to make this offer the foundation of a
'peace, why did not the President, who knew his own
incompetency to make any stipulation without the con-
sent of both Houses, recommended to them to pass a

li-lillUP

100

law, ia June lasti conformable to the offers he was
about to make ? He had a precedent in the law rela-
tive to the repeal of the Orders in Council, and if h^
had gone Hbrward to Great-Britain with a speeiilck
and authorized proposition, guaranteeins her against
the future loss of her seamen, there would have been
at least the appearance of sincerity.
[ We then entered at lar^ into the merits of this

auestion, so much the subject of complaint, and so
ttle understood. We shewed that Great-Britain
disclaims the pretence of taking •American seamen,
and only claims the ri^ht to take her own subjects
out of merchant ships, on the high seas, and in her
pwnports.

We adduced the most abundant authorities to shew,
{hkt by the consent of all nations, allegiance is per-
petual—that it is not weakened or affected by time,
place, or swearing aUegiance to unother power. That
^ese are the Aindamental principles of the common
law of England, have been maintained by her courts
^d jurists from the earliest times, and of course, al-
though she naturalixes the subjects at other states,
she does not claim the right to absolve them, or to
protect them against their own natural sovereign.

We shewed, also, that the same doctrine had been
maintained in ous own country, in the case of one
Williams, tried for entering into the service of France,
even when we were atpeace-^^to which we now add
the cases of Jonathan iN utting, and one George Bat-
ternu^n, convicted in this town, in the year 1794, for
the same offence.

We then proved, that this practice of Great-Britain
has been exercised by her ever since the year 1640,
jigainst all nations, and without complaint^ We cit-
ed, also, a succession of French ordinances, from
1694 to the present war, shewing that France mun-
tains ^e same claims over her own seamen, and exe-
cutes them with more rigour^-We now add to the
cases before cited, another ordinance of France^ which

101

requires every vmed cruiser to be fumished with aa
able linguiat or interpreter, and directs that, without
regard to passports or protections, he shall examine
all the orews of merchant ships, which they may meet
with on the high seas, in order that he may oburve
tehether they apeak the language of the country to
which they pretend to belong, correcUn.

Thus making the ear of a foreign linguist the court
to decide the citizenship of a netUrai crew. What
iiecomes of Mr. Madison^s sad complaint of t*.^ crueU
ty of erecting a midshipman into a judge ?

We then entered into the impolicy of (^ur waging
war, for the privilege of employing Britiah. aamra.
We said that it was contrary to the policy of all en-
lightened states, to give so much encouragement to
foreign sailors, to the prejudice of their own ; that
that our naval power — -our commerce— the superior
protection which our own seamen would experience,
by our abandoning this practice of covering foreim
aailors, all invited us, honestly and fairly, to exclude
them altogether.

We remarked, that Great-Qritun was peculiarly
situated. Her marine power was her only security
against the horrible scenes which have been recently
acted at Moscow. That the siniilarity of language
afforded facilities, the higher rate of wages tempta-
tions to her seamen to enter our service, and that alt
though atpreaent her loss had not exceeded S0,000
or 30,000 men, yet if our merchant ships should be-
come a perfect asylum to her aeamen, the mutiny at
the JVore would be a trifle to the danger she would
run ;-•— That the knowledge that they are liable to be
impressed UQW restrains her aeamen, and that alone.

We added, that even were it a new case in the law
of nations, the extremity and importance of it would
make her excusable, for insisting upon some remedy
for such an abuse of our neutrality, growing out of
our peculiar relative sitoation to her. We cited one
example of tiaimUar acknowledged claim, which was
liable to as great abuses, and that is the right to take

10»

horn neutral mercliant shipii ilie peraons of your ene-
my-— this includes the rient of search for persona as
vml 08 goods — and if the neutral cannot cover or
withdraw from a belligerent the ^rsons of the belli.
Cerent's enemy, because bv so doing, he deprives the
belligerent (^ one of the rights of war, a fortiori, Vfe
asked, can such neutral cover or protect the subject
of the belligerent captor, who is more important to
him, because when he sets an enemy, he is always
ready to exchange him for a subject ?

We then entered into a full display of tlie famous
negotiation of Monroe and Pinkney, with the Fox
ministry. We demonstrated, that while there was
the most anxious solicitude in that ministry to retain
the good will of the United States — ^to remove all
just causes of complaint — awhile such offers were
made to prevent the recurrence of them in future, as,
in our opinion, would do it more effectually, than the
plan proposed by Mr. Madison, because we are satis-
fied tnat such abuses would soon creep in, as would
oblige Ghreat-Britain to recur to her former practice,
even at the expense of peace — while indeed our own
ministers were satisfied of the fairness, eligibility, and
honoundile character of these offbrs, her statesmen,
the most friendly to this country of any who have, for
thirhr years, swayed the councils of that nation, sol-
emnly declared, that no ministry, under any emergen-
cy, would ever dare to yield up the question of right.

It is then reduced to tliis simple question — Shall
we fight for a shadow when we can have the sub-
stance? Shall we fight to compel Great-Britain to
yield a claim older than our nation? A right exer-
cised by France and all other European nations ? A
claim rounded upon principles recognized and ad-
judged by our own courts ? A claim which if conce-
ded will make our country swarm with Enslish,
Scotch and Irish sailors to the great injury and de-
pression of our own ? A claim, which if yielded now,
will certunly be resumed the moment the dreadful
effects of its relinquishment shall be felt ?

103

exer-
? A
ad-
once-
glish,
1 de-
now,
iadful

We then made some remarks on the demand upon
Governor Strong for the militia, and the inUmation
of the President tliat he had failed in his duty in not
ordering them out.

We proved, that Congress have no sort of control
over the militia except in three specified cases. That
neither of these cases had occurred — ^that the Gk)vem-
or was the constitutional and sole judge on this point,
and with his usual consummate prudence he haa con-
sulted the Judges, and with his accustomed firmness
he had acted m pursuance of their advise and the
dictates of his own judgment.

The People ought to feel grateful to him for thus
breasting the danger in defence of the constitutionrJ
privileges of the people.

We concluded with some remarks which we deem
of great importance as to tlie organization of a stand-
ing military force, under the name of volunteers, to
reside in tb«} m^lst of us, to the utter ruin, if it suc-
deeds, of the miliila.

We have now completed tliis arduous duty. — ^We
cannot hope that tlie idle and the thoughtless will
have derived much benefit from discussions which re-
quire so much and so constant attention. We ap-
peal, however, to the sober and reflecting part of so-
ciety — and by their judgment we are willing to a- .
bide.

We have endeavoured soberly, fairly and honoara-
bly to discuss the great question on which depends the
peace and prosperity of the U. S. The question is a
vital one. The vineyard is extensive and overgrown
with thorns, and the laborours are few. If a most ar-
dent love of country, a strong desire to promote its
permanent and best interests, though the means of
doing it are ungrateful to those who undertake it, en-
title a citizen to the good wishes of the publick, we
shall not rest without hope. If we fail Li this, we
shall have, what the world cannot take away, the tes-
timony of a good conscience.

Id-

SOME GENERAL BRIEF REMARKS

ON THE CAUSES AND OBJECTS OF THE PRESENT WAR—ON
THE ERRONEOUS OPINIONS TO WHICH OUR PARTIAL SUC
CESSES AT SEA HAVE GIVEN BIRTH, AND ON THE DAN-
GER, THAT OUR CITIZENS MAY BE DRAWN IN TO AU)

. BY LOANS IN THE PROSECUTION OF A WAR, WHICH THEY
DETEST. ^

NO many who has paid even a moderate degree of at-
tention to the policjr of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, for
the last twenty years (I mean since the beginning of the war
between Great-Britaui and France) can doubt, that the present
war between the United States and Great-Britain, is the con-
summation which they have devoutly wished for. The author
of the present essays has, for six years past, laboured inces-
santly to satisfy the people, that war with Great-Britain was
the ultimate and darling object of administration, and that it
must and would take place. It has always appeared to him
to be totally indifferent to administration, whether there was
cause of war or not, or whether it could or could not be a4*
justed by- negotiation. The great labour on their part has
seemed to be, to find plausible pretexts to keep the nation in
a flame, to smother and conceal the injuries and insults of
France, which would have counteracted their views against
Great-Britain, and gradually to lead the nation to the preci-
pice of war. How far many of the real friends of peace, by
joining in the clamour against Great-Britain, by denying the
intentions of the administration to enter into war, and by stim-
ulating the pride of the partizans of government, may have
unintentionally promoted the secret views of Mr. Madison, is
a quesUon I have no disposition to discuss.

I should not have even mentioned it at this time, if I had
hot been apprehensive that a game of the same sort is now
attempted to be played off upon the friends of peace wit' re-
spect to the navy.

One of the greatest obstacles td the general prevalence of
the belief that our administration are absolutely devoted to the
views and interests of France, and are bent upon the destruc-
tion of Great-Britain, hat. been the want of visible motive.
While some zealous men have charged even the head* of the
French party with direct bribery and corruption, sober people,
seeing no evidence of this fact, and feeling shocked at what
they considered a calumny, have been disposed to go as far
the other way, and to doubt the existence of any bias whatever.

.R— ON
LSUC
& DAN-
ro AW
I THEY

;e of at-
,on, for
the war
present
;he con-
s author
d inces-
tain was
id that it
d to him
lere was
>t be ai*
part has
lation in

IBUltS of

against
e preci-
sace, by
ing the
y stim-
have
ii'son) is

If I had

now
wtJ re-

ence of
i to the

lestruc-

notive.

of the

Ipcople,
\t what
1 as far
katever.

105

For ourselves, while we perceive as plainly as we do the
course of the planets in the zodiack, the absolute and entire
ascendency of France in our counsels, we do not believe in
the direct application of bribes to the higher minded men in
the French interest.

We are astonished that people ahould doubt that there are
motives vastly stronger than those produced by corruption.
Corrupt men are never so zealous as enthusiasts who are
honest in their intentions. What contests were ever so bit*
tor — what party ties so strong, as those arising from religious
feuds — fi om divisions about metaphysical points that neither
party tomprehends ? What partizans were ever 30 devoted,
so desperate, so constant, as the adherents of the unfortunate
house of Stuart, who, not having the means of subsistence
themselves, could not be suspected of bribery ?

Grant, therefore, only, that a party in favour of France wa»
once organized, I care not by what means, it will always find
materials for its support and encouragement; obstinacy, pride,
the spirit of rivalry, ^vill confirm, and irritate, and increase a
party once formed.

That such a partv has existed, and still continues in most
dreadful power and force, it would be almost as absurd to
attempt to prove at this day, as it would be the height of
impudence to deny. Who has forgotten the devotion to
Genet, to Adet, to Fauchet ? the attempt to force Washing-
ton fix>m his neutrality ? the clamour for war instead of nego-
ciatinn in 1794? Mr. Madison's famous resolutions intended
to drive the nation into war ? the abuse of Mr. Jay and the
President, for daring to preserve peace with Great-Britsdn ?
the humiliating submission of Mr. Munroe to the French Di-
rectory ? the opposition made to Mr. Adams, when he at«
tempted to vindicate the honour of the nation, trampled under
foot by France, who insulted our envoys and demanded a
tribute from the nation ? These are things of elder time, and
fit only for the historian. They prove not only a blind devo-
tion to France in the present men in administration, but they
saUsfy us that it is a prejudice which has had time to strike
its roots deep, and to send them out far and wide. Its nutri-
ment has been at all times the honour and commercial pros-
perity of our country. These it has absorbed — on these it
has thrived, until it has almost exhausted the fertility of the
soil. Prejudices like these, are not easily, we may add, are
never rooted out. Who does not know that when we ought
to have been neutral, constant prayers were offered up, by
these advocates of France here, for success to all her projects
of universal dominion ? Did France add a new victim to her
1^

100

Ambition? they applauded. Did Great-Britain meet 'with
disaster in hej* stand against French power ? they rejoiced as
openly as the Gens d'armes des Tuileries. Did France ex-
hibit a scene of internal anarchy— of horrors^ at which the in-
fernal legions of Milton would grow pale I they saw in them
only the struggles of suffering Freedom. Did these French
anarchists yield to the arms of a military deafiot^ and groan
under the most ruthless tyranny ? they stood ready, with Gov.
Gerry and Mr. Livingston, to praise the incomparable hero and
sage, and to offer their incense to the successor of Robespierre
whom they had before saluted as a god.

By encouraging such firejudicet Mr. Madison rose to dis-
^ction. And if we should admit that a great mind like his,
eould easily shake them off, (which we doubt), still it is not in
his, or any other man's power, to change at pleasure the feelings
and opinions of a whole party. Attachment to France, an inter-
est in French successes, and a hatred to Great-Britain, had be-
come the religion of the party, and they were ready to go to
martyrdom in defence of those opinions.

Under such omens, and probably himself as deeply imbued
with the same passions, Mr. Madison came into power. Has
his conduct always corresponded with this view which we
have given of his feelings I It should be remembered that the
French government, if it has not been in secret correspond-
ence with these leaders, (which I doubt), has been, however,
fier/ectly well informed of their feelings of dependence on
France ; of the exact state of parties — their strength— their
wishes— their designs— their movements.

I beg any man who doubts this, to turn to any of Grenet's or
Adet's correspondence, but especially to Fauchet's intercept-
ed letter. They know the strength and weakness of every con-
tiderable man in the United States.

Let it be here distinctly understood, that I exclude from my
argument any idea of corruption.

With this knowledge of the state of parties,^ and of Mr.
Madison's partialities and preferences, Bonaparte has put our
President's patriotism and love for France to the most cruel
trials. Would to God his patriotism had been any match for
his love to France and hatred of Britain ! But Bonaparte was
sure of his game. The ministers successively sent to France,
he. considered as fair samples of the administration which
deputed them. Who has forgotten Mr. Livingston's incense
to the Emperor, and his undiplomatick attack on Great-Bri-
tain, with whom we were at peace, in his letter upon Drake's
correspondence ? Not a minister from any of the tributary
courts could vre with the envoy of the United States in the
submissivencss of hiti reply.

107

Yet Mr. Livingston was the best of the three ; and wouU
not have been fitted for the dark projects for which Mr. Bar-
low was probably sent— to negotiate the conditions of alliance}
and submission to the continental system.

Now what has Bonaparte done, and to what have our ad-
ministration submitted, without resistance, and even mithoiu
comfilaint, if we except a sentence or two in every philippick
against Great-Britain, just calculated to deceive tAoae only
who iviaA to be deceived ?

We cannot give any detail ; the time and occasion will not>
allow of it. We shall only hint at what all the world knows ;
the tacts are both notorious and recent.

In 1806, Bonaparte, having by the conquest of Prussia, got
as he supposed, the command of the continent, determined
to destroy a rival whom he could not reach by arms, by tho
destruction of her trade. So far as respected the continent)
the plan was easily accomplished. But to make the experi*
ment complete, the cooperation of the United States was in-
dispensibly necessary. That cooperation has been obtained
from the year 1807 to the present day, but never so complete-
ly as he demanded, till we entered into the war. How this
has been brought about, the world can never know. What
menaces, how much intrigue, solicitation, what promises of
personal aupfiort to adminiatration^ if any, can never be known.

We can only judge of publick facts ; and from these we
infer, that Bonaparte knew that he was so inseparably con*
nected with the power, and so riveted in the affections of his
party here, that he might put them to the severest trials with-
out endangering their loyalty. The Berlin decree subjected
every American vessel to capture going to or from a British
port. Instead of resistance, not even a remonstrance waa
made to this act. It i as been justly observed in the resolu-
tions of New-York, that our government having assigned the
British orders in council as one of the juat causes oj war, have
s^dmitted that the Berlin decree was also. How then can
they justify themselves for submitting to it ?

But Bonaparte found his Berlin decree ineffectual, and he
accordingly negotiated with Armstrong an Embargo— or
rather a monstrous thing, misnamed an Embargo, which was
permanently to cut off our trade with Britain. That this was
settled at Paris, and merely adopted very loyally by Congreaa,
is proved by the report first reaching us from Paris and Hol-
land. Many merchants in this town got knowledge of the
proposition from Europe before it had been even whis-
pered here. On the arrival of our messenger. Dr. Bullus,
who reported the declaration of the Emperor, <(that he

"•VS'I i?1

108

Would baye no neutr&Is," the embargo was hastily adopted.
The representatives of a great commercial nation, afforded
the astonishing example of the sacrifice of a whole people to
the caprice of an European tyrant ! The patience of that peo-r
pie was beyond all example, and can only be accounted for by
the astonishing influence which France has acquired over a
certain portion of them. The dangers to which our com*
merce was exposed, were the pretexts for that measure.
And yei every man of sense knew that at that very moment
our vessels could have been insured to Great-Britain for five
per centum* and to India and back for eleven. In short) insut
rxnct VTM ?Lt peace firemiunu .' .'

But even our patience at last had its bounds ; and afler
eighteen months proof of our disposition > to aid France, gov-*
eminent was compelled to yield up the Emfieror'a favourite
measure, though to appease his rage a Nonolntercourse with
Britain was substituted. Tyrants, accustomed to obedience,
are not so easily appeased. The Emperor's rage broke out
in every species of insult and contumely, as well as injury.

In /anj*ua^f , by a letter dated February 16, 1810, he told
ua> " the Americans canno' hesitate as to the part which thet^
fire to take. They ought to tear to pieces the act of their In-
dependence^ or to take measures to prevent their commerce
being taxed by England, which renders them more dependent
than the o^ony of Jamaica, which has at least ils assembly of
representatives, and its privileges. Men without political
views, vnthout honoury without energy, may allege, &c."

Though some little symptoms, transient publick symptoms
of sensibility were discovered on this occasion, yet no apology
has ever been made,, and the subject was suffered to slumber
in oblivion, never again to be revived.

But the rage of his Majesty did not evaporate in words.
In defiance of the laion of all civilized aocietyy by a decree tvt
Rambouillet, he confiscated all American vessels which had
entered his ports at any time within six monitia next fireceding
the decree. Of the amount of this plunder, we have no other
evidence than the declaration of Gen. Armstrong, who know-
ing the Emperor's character, said there was no hope of resto-
ration, as the amount was twenty millions of dolIars-~>a sum
too large to restore even to the rightful owners 1 1 About this
period too, the Emperor invented a new mode, (as Jefferson
mildly characterized it), *' of exercising might contniry ta
right." In violation of the settled principles of maritime law,
his cruisers had orders to burn on the high seas all neutral
vessels whom they should find trading with the enemy. This
practice has continued down to the present year. The very

had

]V
(( f

tun

gov

109

last French squadron which scoured the seas, Feretier'S) waH
more ferocioas than any former one. This was the laat geii'
tie hint to our delaying counsels. This was the immediate
precursor of an alliance with France, and a compliance with
the Emperor's views. Could it be believed if we had not seen
it, that a President, who upon every occasion presents the
whole picture of British wrongs, including thoae tettled and
comfiromitedi as well as others, should have neglected for
seven years to mention in one tingle instance to Congress^
these reiterated acts of piracy of France ?

But the darkest, and most dreadful! part of the picture of
partiality for France and contempt for our understandings is
to be exhibited.

In 1810, the United States having offered to withdraw iheir
restrictive measures from either of the two nations which
should cease to violate our neutral rights leaving them in
force as to the other, the President declared solemnly that it
was not his intention to give France this benefit until she not
only should repeal her decrees but should restore the propers
ty « unjustly aurjirized in her /iort»." I use his own words.

Nevertheless upon the Due de Cadore's promise, condit
tional promise, that the decrees would be repealed on certain
terms on the first of November, 1810, though accompanied
with a declaration that the " property unjustly surprized"
wouK not be restored, the President, directly against his own
ass' mce, declared the decrees actually repealed.

T ugh proof heaped upon proof in the course of the suc-<
ceedmg winter, that the decrees were not repealed — though
their execution on the high seas was not even suspended, yet
administration proceeded to enforce the act against Grea^
Britain, and to swear to the good faith and honour of France.
Nine months after the pretended repeal, Mr. Russell begged
the French minister to give the United States some proof of
their repeal^ and told him that he kept the John Adams waiti
ing for 30*^"' evidence to justify the liberal credit which our
government iiad advanced to the Emperor. None could bo
obtained, except the release of two ships lohick did not come
within the decreet. Against their repeal we had evidence the
most abundant ; and we had most direct proofs that Bonaparte
had resolved we should take more active measures against
England, than a new pacifiek Non Importation.

Mr, Tureau told our government, in Decembor, 1810,

" These modifications (of the French trade) will not depend

on the chance of events, but will be the result of other mean

^ttires, firm, and pursued with perseverance, which the twa

governments will continue to adopt to withdraw from the vexa'

110

lion of the eommon enemy a commerce necestory to France as
well as the United States."

Here we find the toar firedieted and demanded. The Non
Importation and pretended repeal of the decrees, were, it
seems, the concerted meaturea of the two govemmenta : But
the Emperor's favour would depend upon our continuing to
adopt stronger measures against the common enemy. Nor
did the Emperor leave us to doubt whether Tureau was au-
thorized to hold such a language. The Due de Cadore, in the
presence of his Majesty, on the third of December, declared,
that ** as long as England shall persist in her orders in coun-
cil your Majesty will persist in your decrees.'* And in March
following, in an address to his Council of Commerce, the £m^
peror in person said, " The decrees of Berlin and Milan are
the fundamental laws of my empire. I will favour the Amer-
ican commerce if they will conform to my decrees, otherwise
I will chase their vessels from my empire."

This was four months after Madison declared the decrees
repealed. But the Emperor did not confine his contradiction
of Mr. Madison to words. On the fourth of July, 1811, (the
day of the declaration of our Independence) the ship Julian was
captured on the high seas, and on the tenth of September fol-
lowing was condemned, " because she had been visited by
British cruisers." I'he Emperor in person condemned in
September, 1811, four vessels, which had been carried into
Dantzick for offences which were created by the decrees, and
by them alone. And our agent, Mr. Russell, in his letter to
our Secretary of State, dated May 8th, 181 1, six months after
Madison's proclamation of the repeal of the French decrees,
states, " that it may not be improper to remark that no Amer-
ican vessel captured since November 1st. 1810, has yet been
released."

One would have thought the climax of our disgrnee had
been reached — that the measure of humiliation was full—- but
we were reserved for still further disgraces. In May, 1812,
the Emperor published a decree bearing date April 28th,
181 1, in which, reciting our obedience and loyalty in exclud-
ing British goods and admitting his, he declares on that ac->
count his decrees repealed so far as regards us. Thus giving
in the face of the whole world the lie direct — the lie without
apology— 'the lie without circumlocution to all the declarations
of our government, as to the repeal of the French decrees in
November, 1810— cutting up also by the roots the foundation
of all our statutes against Great Britain, the last of which was in
March preceding the repeal of the French decrees, and which
were founded on her refusal to believe the decrees repealed

Ill

in November, 'the main reason for which we went to war
with Great Britain was, that she would not repeal her orders
in three months after France repealed her decrees, which she
was bound to believe took place in November, 1810. Now
Bonaparte justifies her incredulity, and accuses Mr. Madison '
of rashness and folly.

The manner of doing this last act has something extreme-
ly wicked 9nd suspicious on the face of it That Bonaparte,

when so otten urged and solicited to furnish the evidence of
the repeal of the decrees, should have kept back, for 1 2 months,
a decree affecting only u«, and necessary to the vindication of
his constant friends in America, is extraordinary. It matters
not whether it existed at its date, or was antedated. In either
case it was kept back till he was satisfied that we had come
to the striking fioint. It was kept back until it was impossible
it should produce an operation in England, and that operation be
known here before the war. It was well known to France and
America, that the word of Great Britain had been pledged to
repeal her Orders in Council as soon as France should repeal
her decrees. It is a word never lightly given, and never for-
feited. Can any man have charity to beUeve that this almost
simultaneous repeal of the decrees— of the Orders in Coun-
cil, and of the declaration of war, was the effect of accident ?
In short that it was not the " result," as Tureau says, " of oth-
er measures which the two Governments have continued to
take against the common enemy V*

Let any doubting man look at the Emperor's publick dec-
laration inMarch last, that " his-decrees should be the funda-
mental laws of hii Empire, until the principles of the treaty
of Utretcht, shall be recognized by Great Britain.*'

Let him look at the refusal of our Government, to make e-
ven an Armiaticcy after the total repeal of the Orders in Coun-
cil and all other blockades.

Then let him say whether this war is not a fulfilment of the
reiterated demands of France, to enter into the coalition.

Let him consider how admirably it was timed for the inter-
ests of France — how it cooperates with her views upon Rus-
sia and Spain, by making a serious diversioi) of the British
forces at this most critical juncture, which the world has seen
for 20 years, and then let him soberly ask himself, whether
the war is carried on for Frencli or American interests ?

It is not one of the least evils of this unnatural and unjust
war, that the noblest virtues of the citizen may be converted
into the means of favouring the views of the Administration,
and of prolonging the duration of the war. It is impossible

■^

113

for a generous mind not to view vrith the highest feelings of
appi'obation, the gallant efforts of our naval ofiieers and sea-
men. That unconquek-able spirit, that self devotion, that skill
«nd coolness which have rendered the British marine so su-
periour to that of all other nations, have been displayed in the
highest degree by our infant NAVY.

But a reflecting man, who is sincerely desirous of seeing
peace restored to our Country, cannot but perceive that an
artful administration will convert this natural and generous en-
thusiasm into the means of promoting* their own views. AN
ready we are told by Mr. Madison, with a triumphant air,
that our naval victories " will dispose Great Britain to peace,
and that oxxt firoafierout career may be accelerated^ but cannot
be prevented by the assaults made upon it." See his last
message covering Decatur's letter.

It is because we believe this proposition absolutely false—
that the reverse of it is true, to wit, that our naval successes
will procrastinate the period of peace, and render all attempts
at negotiation, while this state of things continues, abortive.
And because we fear, that some men may be led to believe
that Great Britain can be humbled on the ocean, of which
there is as little prospect as there was when the war was de-
clared, that we deem it a solemn duty to make some remarks
upon the subject.

We. think it proper to premise that we have never doubted,
thatour Country was capable of producing excellent officers
and sailors.

The same causes which have rendered the British marine
hitherto so superiour, operate as powerfully in our favour.-—
We have the same hardy courage—the same enterprise— the
same skill.

We have been of opinion that a marine force was our nat-
ural defence, and ought to have been fostered and encourag-
ed. We have never believed that even British ships, conduct-
ed by their ablest officers, would be an over-match for ours,
in vessels of equal size, and especially where we should have a
decided superiority of force.

But though such are our opinions, we think we are in some
danger of falling into two errors on that subject, one of which
is disreputable to us as a brave and magnanimous nation, and
the other may be of fatal consequence.

The first is, a boastful, sanguine and overbearing temper.
The officers of our Navy have too much of the true spirit of
brave men to fall into this error. They know too well the char-
acter of their adversaries to undervalue either their bravery or
their skill. You will never hear any of the most experienced
among them utter such idle boasts, as that " man for man

113

man

and gun for gun," yre shall always beat the British. They
know that in two out of three of the contests which have taken
place, the superiority of force on our side was such that while
it would have been disgraceful for our officers to hav9 been
beaten, no degree of reproach could attach to the foe whom
they subdued for yielding to the most powerful single decked
ships in the world.

We feel a perfect confidence, that such men as Decatur,
Hull, and Jones will agree with us in every proposition we
shall advance;

The opinions and sentiments to which we allude, and which
we think reprehensible, arc those of hasty men, who draw in-
ferences from single examples which th?y certainly do not
warrant.

You hear them every day .declaring that one of our large
frigates would capture a British 74—- that we have wrested the
Trident of Neptune from Great Britain — that we shall always
be superior to them in single ships.

To hear such persons discourse, one would imagine that
they were astonished to find we could beat even an inferior
British ship— that they had believed us incapable of meeting;
the Europeans in equal conflict, and that they were so trans-
ported and surprised by the unexpected success, that they
now believed the age of miracles had returned, and that the
British banner was no longer to float upon the ocean.

Enthusiasm has its uses, but it may produce its evils. Lit-
tle as they may believe it, the chances of war may turn, and
the mortification and chagrin is always in proportion to the
previous exultation. We had a recent and terrible example
in the case of Gen. SMYTHE. The man who presented him-
self as a conqueror, with such a ridiculous gasconade, three
weeks since, is now exhibiting his excuses to an unauthoriz-
ed association on the frontiers of New York. His soldiers are
breaking their muskets in pure mortification, and his officers
their swords.

If indeed success should always follow our Navy, still one
evil would result from this boasting spirit, it would diminish
the glory of victory.

We trust, however, and believe that this extravagant and
bombastick spirit is not a very general one. That while we
cherish and honour and reward the gallantry of our Navy, we
shall and do imitate their modesty, and their justice towards
the vanquished.

The fr ible which we have first been considering, is only a
small blemish, and would not be productive of any serious
consequences.

114

The other opinion advanced bjr Mr. Madison is a serious
one, and deserves a thorough consideration.

Is it true " that the capture of five or even ten British frig-
ates' will dispose Oreat Britain to fieace^ and does this sort of
contest " accelerate our prosperity," as Mr. Madison says \

If these successes will dispose her to peace, it must be on
the ground upon which Mr. Madison seems to have rested
his hopes, and that is that it will satisfy her that we are a more
formidable nation on the ocean than she thought us, and that
if the war is continued we can wrest from her the Trident of
Neptune.

Now let us consider this point—- Oreat<>Britain has a terri-
tory about as big as the New-England states. She never
would have attained to a primary rank among the European
nations, if she had not cultivated and encouraged a navy. Her
insular situation renders it necessary that she should maintain
one. She owes her liberties to that, and that alone— These
propositions are as obvious to her as they are to us.

Can it be believed, that she will surrender her maritime
superiority ? Will she make peace, while her arms are tar-
nished with the stains whieh we have imprinted upon them ?
Will she not say, " my navy is my only defence, it must not
only be superior, but its reputation must be unimpaired ?'*
" However disposed I might have been to make peace with
America, I cannot do it till this disgrace is wiped off."

Will any man doubt her power to do this I Is there any
one so prejudiced as to believe, that she cannot rouse her citi-
zens to fight with as much gallantry and skill as ours ?

We are the same peoples-have the same general features
of character, and though we have not degenerated, I see no
reason to presume that we have improved on the original
stock.

We have seven frigates, and four or five smaller ships-*>
She has 200 ships of the line, 350 frigates, and three or four
hundred smaller vessels of war.

It is in her power to send a squadron of line of battle ships,
to destroy our marine, without a contest.

If Bonaparte, starting with the old marine of France, of
Spain, and Holland, comprizing nearly 200 ships of the line,
and devoting yearly to his navy alone 150 millions of livres,
SO millions of dollars, (amounting to the whole of our war
expenses, for both army, navy, and civil list) has been unable,
during twelve years, to make the smallest head against the
British navy, can we expect to do it with our little squadrouj
and witliout any revenue but loans ?

It is said, however, that we are a different race of men from

shipS)

|nce, of
line}
1 Uvre«,

lit war
inablet
^st the
^adroii}

from

115

the French and Dutch. fVe can beat Oreat'Britain) though
rAey could not. Both France and Holland have obtained as
many and more signal victories, in single ships, over Great-
Britain, than we have done. Nay, they have been more formid-
able rivals to her than we could possibly become in many-
years. And yet the conaciouanett of the abtoiute neceattty of
her navy to her existence, has made Great-Britain rise su-
perior to all her enemies or rivals.

It is impossible, from the constitution of human nature, that
you can ever rouse a nation to so great exertions, for a ques-
tion on which its existence does not depend, as for one upon
which it does. Hence nations will not fight as strenuously in
foreign wars, in wars of conquest, as in wars of self-defence^
and when their fire-sides are invaded.

Now, though our marine is important to us, it is by no
means so vital an interest, as it is to Britain. To us it guards
important rights, and produces a security to a trade necessary
to our opulence— with her, it is the bulwark which defends
her temples and her fire-sides.

Our farmers, though they would maintain a respectable
navy, would never be taxed to support 150 ships of the line,
and 200 frigates, which, at the rate of the expense of our pre-
sent navy, would cost, for their first equipment, 150 millions
of dollars, and, for their annual support, 50 millions of dollars
per annum, at least.

I cannot perceive, then, that the capture of twenty British
frigates, nor the building of ten 74's, would the more dispose
Great-Britain to peace ; nor does any sensible man believe it.
On the contrary, it will render fieace im/iosaibley until Great-
Britain shall have put at rest the question of naval superiority,
and have vindicated the injured honour of her flag, which every
coal-heaver in the nation will feel to be a wound in his own
honour-i-Much less can I perceive, with Mr. Madison, how
the capture of a few British frigates, followed up, as it will
be, with the blockade of our ports, and the destruction of our
navy, accelerates our proaperity.

ON THE SUBJECT OF LOANS IN UNJUST WARS.

In just and necessary wars, it is the duty of all good citizens
to contribute according to their means. Whether their per-
sonal services in the field — their councils in the cabinet— «r
their money be required in the treasury, they ought to render
them with alacrity. If, however, the war be such an one as,
in their consciences, they cannot approve, it is equally their
duty to withhold every thing \vhich the government cannot
by law command.

116

This dutjr is the more imperious, if the war is of such a
character as tends to destroy the commerce, and injure the
rights and interests of that part of the country to which such
citizens belong.

It is evident, that one of the most embarrassing impedi-
ments, which our administration encounters, is the difliculty
of finding resources to carry on the war.

Mr. Gallatin, for three years past, has calculated on loans
as the means of supporting the expenses of war, and he has
attempted to deceive the money holders, by stating, that in
the peace which must necessarily succeed to all wars, the
revenue will always be sufficient to pay the interest of the
debt contracted during war.

The government dare not resort to direct taxes. The war
has alienated already all the northern states. 1 axes would
complete what is begun, and administration would be left
wichout support.

Under this view of our affairs, the men who are opposed to
the war, and at the same time loan their money necessary,
absolutely necessary, to its continuance, are as much respon-
sible for its consequences, as any of those who voted fer it

We know how hard a struggle it is for those who have b n
accustomed to regular increase of capital, to suffer it to no
in an unproductive state. It is not, that, by letting it lie idle,
they make any real sacrifices, in any degree, in proportion to
what other citizens suffer ; but it is hard to control a power-
ful passion.

We are aware, that patriotick motives are cold and inope-
rative against the seducing and tyrannical influence of a love
of increase and gain ; but we would say a word or two as
to their interest.

Does any one recollect in history, any war to be compared
to that which now deluges Europe with blood ? Will any
statesman undertake to predict the period of its termination i
Are there any rational data, by which we can suppose that
our war with Britain will have a speedier termination ?

The annual expense of the war, for the next year, is esti-
mated at 32 millions of dollars. The deficit, ^o be supplied
by loans, will be 20 millions. When the army is full, the an-
nual expense cannot be less than 50 millions, and the revenue
will not exceed five millions. How long will it be at this
rate, before the monied capital will be exhausted ? Will the
interest of the debt be paid after the loans c?ase ? Or will the
southern people throw away the /tea/, after they have squeez-
ed the orange ? Will they tax themselves, to pay a debt of
honour to those " wretches of tlie north," as they have lately

117

iqueez-
debt of
e lately

called us ? I trust our capitalists have too much good sense
and puhlick virtue) to lend their money to support such a
cause—- to support a cause calculated to effect their ruin— If
tlicy do, they will fall unpitied.

It should be remembered, that the southern statesmen op-
posed the funding erf the debt of the revolution, and that in the
late loan of thirteen millions, the southern states, which voted
for the war, have subscribed but one million, and most of
them not a dollar.

There is no country on the face of the globe, where the
monied interest has so little political influence as in ours, or
where it is so much the object of jealousy and hatred. The
southern states despise and detest it, because they have no
participation in it, and because it offends the aristocratick
pride and pretensions of the planters and slave-holders.

In New-England, our farmers have something of the same
feeling. Who have hitherto supported the banking and mon-
ied interests of this country, atid the credit of the publick
funds ? Men of talents and political information and influence,
who were in no degree benejiitted personally by the protection
given to capital. To Hamilton and Ames, in an especial
manner, were the capitalists indebted for the security and
protection they have received.

But can the c ipitalists calculate upon the support of such
men, in future, for the loans which they may now make, to
enable administration to carry on a war ruinous to the com-
mercial Stat*. H ?

•I should suppose they would as soon vote pensions to Sea-
ver, and Porter, and Mr. Madison, the authors of the war, as
they would funds to pay the interest of loans, expressly open-
ed to enable the government to carry on a war, destructive of
the interests of the northern states, and blasting to the hopes
of all the young men of talents in these commercial states.

There is one other important idea which I wish to suggest
on this subject.

Madison and Gallatin have too much wit for our monied
men. They probably reasoned thus—" Let us plunge into
this war. In will destroy external commerce ; it will destroy
property vested in wharves and stores, and other conveniencies
necessary to foreign trade. The banks will diminish their
discounts. The rate of interest wiH fall. The anxious spirit
of monied men will be sharpened in proportion to their losses.
They will be coy at first, and make a bluster of their princi-
ples, but they will finally yield. If they make the most solemn
resolutions not to subscribe to our loans, still they will buy
into the stocks, and that is precisely the same thing to us.

lis

No man can stand the temptation of six per cent. Mrhen he
cannot get more than five in other employments. It is
beyond human nature to keep capital wholly unemployed
during a war without prospect of end. To be sure, the debt
ivill amount during the new term of presidency, to two hun-
dred millions, and to be sure a peace revenue will never de-
fray the civil list and the interest of this debt ; but after we
have reduced these northern purse-proud gentry to the con-
dition in which they were in 1787, we shall leave it to the
wisdom of Mr. Troup and Bibb, and the other gentlemen of
the south, whether it is expedient to manage these capitatists
any longer, after we have attained all our objects of them.
Let us wipe off the old score, and let these northern hives be-
gin to gather their honey anew."

It is curious, but not more curious than true, that the very
measures which impoverish, and perhaps were intended to im-
poverish, our merchants, our banks and our insurance offices,
also render our remaining cafiital unproductive ; and by those
very means favour the views and facilitate the projects and
loans of Administration.

The same effect is calculated upon to recruit our armies.
Mr. Madison says our farmers are too happy and too rich to
enlist. The war, he thinks no doubt, will make them poorer ;
and they will soon be glad to sell themselves cheap to the
lashes of the Serjeants, and to subject themselves to the dis-r
eases and horrors of the camp.

Thus publick misfortunes and private distress are che nu-
triments of the war, and the means upon which administration
may coolly and wisely calculate to forward and accomplish
their views.

There is one other thought, which men are afraid to exam-
ine, because it is too alarming, i mean the possibility of a
settled design to subdue the refractory spirit of the Northern
States by the sword. If we had not the direct threats of Mr.
D. R. Williams and others, if we did not know, that it is tho
private, every days conversation of these warm bloods of the
south, that they will teach Governor Strong and the governors
of the other Yankee States their duty, and the necessity of
obedience, surely the creation of a gens d'armes, a volun-
teer force in full pay, and to be permitted to stay at home,
recommended by Mr. Madison, ought to excite the attention
and jealousy, if it does not the feara^ of all prudent men. I
have no doubt that designs are seriously formed by some
southern people, to subdue by force, the majorities of the
north, who are opposed to them. Is this the time to lend

lid

sn he
It is
iloyed
idebt
jhun-
er de-
ter we
iC con-
to the
men o£
titafists
them,
ves be-

[»e very
d to im-
! offices,
by those
:cts and

armies.
I rich to
1 poorer ;
to the

the disf

them our money ? Would it not be as prudent and judicious
to '"lep it for ourselves ?

Wt have said, the revenue will be insufficient to pay the
interest of the debt, if the war lasts, which it probably will
four years more.

Let us make peace how and when we will, we are never
again to be a neutral state between two great belligerents.
If we make peace with Britain, we shall be at war with
France and the continent. If there is a general peace, we
shall be excluded from the profitable trade of all the world,
for each nation will restore its system of monopoly.

Besides, the habits of smuggling have taken such deep root
that they can never be eradicated. The encouragement given
to manufactures by the war, will also lessen our importations.
We shall never again in twenty years see I revenue of twelve
millions of dollars. The peace establishment of army, navy,
and civil list, will consume eight millions at least. How is
the interest of two hundred millions of new debt to be paid ?
As long as you lend, they will pay you the interest, but not a
moment longer.

ihe nu-
listration
complish

to exam-
lity of a
Northern
ts of Mr.

it is tho
ds of the

•overnors
cessity of

a volun-
at home,
attention

, men. I
by some

les of the

le to lend