IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) V / {/ O v^.% J?, / -fe # 10 I.I (50 "^ IM 22 120 1.8 L25 i 1.4 nil 1.6 V] J"' v: ^ > / /^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques 1980 Technical Notes / Notes techniques The institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Physical features of this copy which may alter any of the images in the reproduction are checked below. D Coloured covers/ Couvertures de couleur Coloured maps/ Cartes gdographiques en couleur L'institut a microfilm^ le meiileur exemplaire qu'il lui a 6t6 possible de se procurer. 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Un des symboles suivants apparaTtra sur la der- nidre image de cheque microifiche, selon le cas: le symbole — ► signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole V signifie "FIN". The original copy was borrowed from, and filmed with, the kind consent of the following institution: Library of the Public Archives of Canada Maps or plates too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: L'exemplaire filmd fut reproduit grdce d la g6n6rosit6 de I'dtablissement prdteur suivant : La bibliothdque des Archives publiques du Canada Les cartes ou les planches trop grandes pour dtre reproduites en un seul cliche sont filmdes d partir de Tangle supdrieure gauche, de gauche d droite et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Le diagramme suivant illustre la mdthode : 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 I] A IMPERIAL FEDERATION: ' N-VVAL AND MILITARY. BY Capt. J. C. R COLOMB, FORMERLY EM. A. \ r.KCTDRE DELIVKUKI) AT Tl AND RePRINTKP BV PkHMISSION DlSTUimiTION. IK RoYAi- Hnited Skuvick Ins*titl'tion, oi TiiK (loiNcn, lOK Gkatuitous {Authors , alone „,;■ >:»po>,»ihl.f»r Ihr ro„l,n>ts of Iheh y.speH.vP m.moirs.) LONDON : HARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, |rinters in arbinarg to ftr ITHJestn. 1 R 8 (i. EoTAL United Seryicb Institution. Monday, May 31, 1886. Field-Makshal H.R.H. the DUKE OP CAMBRIDGE, K.G., G.C.B., &c., &c,, President, in the Chair. (H.R.H. the Prince of Wales was present at the meeting.) IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. " You Jcnou) that if there is one thing more than another that I hope to live for and take part in politically, it is that, before I die, I mail see the British realm a realm extending all the world over, and her children tvhom she has sent out them- selves self-governing communities, united together in a bond of peace that shall be an example to the world.'" — Extract from Speech, delivered August 1, 1885, by the Inte W. E. FoBSTEB, M.P., First Chairman of tlie Imperial Federation League. By Capt. J. C. R. Colomb, formerly R.M.A. In the time allotted it will be impossible to do more than sketch the outlines of the subject. Before proceeding to do this it is necessary to review general considerations in order to avoid confusion if not dangerous misconceptions. The main features of Imperial Federation are — 1st. The unity of the Empire. 2nd. The developments necessary to preserve it. The first is based on the present universal acceptance of the declaration that it is to the mutual material advantage of all parts of the Empire to be united. We have here the expression not merely of a patriotic sentiment, but a direct reference to practical utility. Sentiment is a great force, but its strength for practical purposes is in pi-oportion to self-interest. Mutual advantage is the strongest bond, and the measures most calculated to secure the permanency of the Imperial Union are those which best foster and promote common benefits conferred by that union. In discussing Imperial Federation from any point of view there is danger of confusion between the end sought to be accomplished and the means by which that end can be attained. The end sought is not the adoption of one particular plan or scheme for the transaction of such affairs of the Empire as are of common concern to all its parts. It is something much more simple — the strengthening of Imperial Unity. The means to secure that end are such constitutional develop- ments of the Imperial civil, naval, and military machinery as are necessitated by progress and growth, and are by mutual consent acknowledged to be for mutual advantage. Imperial Federation has to do with facts — commercial, political, naval, and military facts — and not with the theoretical construction of a " brand new constitution " for the Empire. Walpole tells us that when Lord Holland was asked by an Italian Minister to draft a 2 IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. constitution for the little State of Naples, he replied " You might as well ask me to build a tree." The Imperial Federationist does not propose to build trees, but ho points to what have been long ago planted, and asks for a recognition of growth and that demands of development shall be satisfied. Let us now briefly examine what it is we have planted ; what has been the extent and nature of its growth ; and what are the demands of a naval and military character made by the development of these interests, which war forces may be required at any moment to preserve. T What we have Planted. Our flag has been planted in territories beyond sea by three distinct processes — conquest, cession, and settlement. Some portions we owe to the sword, some to diplomacy, others to the natural over- flow of population. Those who think that Empire means war need to be reminded that out of eight and a half million square miles of British territory, only about one and a half million square miles have been directly acquired by war or by diplomacy. Some seven million square miles represent the proportion contributed to cur Empire by the pursuits and enterprises of peace. Industrial and commercial progress has won for us some seven-eighths of our Empire. It has also created new liabilities, introduced novel conditions, and accumulated responsibilities which, must be met if the unity of the Empire is to survive in war. Keejnng to the special subject before us it may be said that what we have in three distinct Avays planted, arc new maritime and territorial conditions of British defence. It is to be noted that the great bulk of our tei-ritory acquii'ed by conquest or diplomacy lies in the tropics and sub-tropics. Here we have to deal with dense populations ever on the increase, and with varieties of races in every stage of progress or decay. Here also we have to deal with climatic and other conditions which forbid all prospect of the natural growth and expansion of our own race ever being really localized. These limbs of Empire for prospei'ity, for protection, and for peace depend upon the strength of our influence and power. The main source of that strength must be drawn from centres of civilization which has its only permanent abiding place in the temperate zones. For protection from external attack or foreign intrigue, and for security against internal anarchy, they depend upon military and administrative means furnished from without. As component parts of our Empire their relations to the rest are the relations of the numerically strong to the numerically weak, yet of the governed to the governing power. These territories form in the aggregate an E^npire of Dependencies, and in Table I will be found a general statement as to some facts of its present conditions. It includes, as will be observed, India, the West Indies, Possessions on West Coast of Afriea, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, and very many other isolated positions which are in the true sense of the term dependencies, though not necessarily in the- Lropics or sub-tropics. IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. cquired Here se, and Here forbid Turning now to other portions of the Empire wlii(,'h lio almost wholly in the temperate zones — the Dominion of Canada, Newfound- land, the Colonics of Australasia and those of British South Africa, in these the characteristic features completely differ from those pre- sented by the Empire of Dependencies. In British North America and Australasia populations are yet so small in proportion to area that they may in that respect bo said to be at present infinitesimal. We have there but a residuum of abo- rigines gradually disappearing before the advance of civilization by a natural process of absorption or decay. In Canada there is a con- siderable population of French origin, but thoroughly loyal to the Crown. British South Africa preser.ts circumstances of an excep- tional character. There we have aboriginal races numerically immensely in excess at pi'csont of European population. The Euro- pean population itself contains a preponderating proportion of Dutch origin, loyal to the Crown. In all these territories the backbone of the population is Anglo-Saxon. The populations there owe their presence to that spirit of energy and enterprise which led men and still leads them to " home away " from the Old World to the New. In everyone of these tei-ritoi-ies climatic conditions and all circumstances favour the unrestricted growth and practically unlimited expansion of our race. Were the thii'ty-six millions of people crowded together in these two small islands of ours spread over the habitable portions of those territories they would still be but very sparsely populated. For internal prosperity and for progress these Colonies mainly depend upon themselves, not upon us. They look to increase of population by natural growth and to immigration of "bone and sinew" from the Old World, to ensure for them a great and gloi'ious future under the old flag. For the maintenance of social order tlioy no longer require the guidance or the assistance of the mother country. Canada, with S[)ccial internal difficulties, without any parallel in Australasia, has recently shown she needs no external help to suppress rebellion and re-establish law. Such military means as are necessary for the si^curity of internal order are furnished from within not from without. The relations of these component parts of the Empire to the mother country are the relations now of numerically Aveak to numerically strong distributions of one and the same people. They are not the rela- tions of the governed to the governing power, but of absolute freedom based upon the common attributes of political, social, and moral equality. Our Colonies are tied to us by loyalty to the same Crown, the forces of a common sentiment, and Ijy a sense of present mutual advantage. The bonds may be permanently injured or for ever destroyed by a war for which neither the Colonies nor we were adequately prepared. These territories in the aggregate make up the Colonial Empire respectii.g which some useful information will be found in Tabl-^ TI. What we have planted then beyond sea may be grouped und^ '. wo distinct heads, the Empire of Dependencies and the Colonial Empire. One is the artificial product, the other the natural offspring of the Homo Empire of the United Kingdom. b 2 4 IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. Table III gives, for purposes of compariHon, similar informatiou relatinj)^ to the Home Empire, as already given for the other two. A summary of all three is shown in Table TV. The tenure by the Homo Empire of the Empire of Dependencies is that of administrative capacity and of power. The association of the Colonial with the Home Empire is that of kinship, consent, and a common loyalty to a common crown. The existing connection between the Colonial Empire and the Empire of Dopei lencies is through the Home Empire of the United Kingdom. They form together a trinity of strength or of weakness precisely in projiortion to their power of combination for common security. That power must develop fresh strength in the ratio of the demands and neces- sities of growth. In other words, it depends upon the furthei'ing now and in the future of all such measures as shall increase mutual advan- tages in peace, and secure organized co-operation for mutual defence in war. These are briefly the principles of Imperial Federation. They are applicable alike to political, comm(!rcial, naval, and military considerations. The recognition of their importance must precede practical action, and the realization of the influences and the facts of growth is the first step towards that recognition. Let us now therefore briefly examine I f The Nature and Extent of Oroivth. For purposes of illustrating growth it is necessary to fix standard dates. It is fitting to take as one the present time, when pro- ducts of our Empire are gathered under one I'oof in London, and subjects of our Queen ai-e flocking together from all parts of the world-wide dominions of the Crown. For a past date, I select the period of the great International Exhibition of 1851. Thus we shrill measure during the past thirty-five years broad facts of British progress at home and abroad, such as population, trade, shipping, and i-evenue. Table V shows the condition of the three great divisions of our Empire in 1851. I dismiss area as evidence of growth because during this period we have not only acquired fresh territory, but have also parted with it in Europe, Africa, and North America. For purposes of rough illustration let us take the United Kingdom, on the one hand and the whole outlying Empire on the other, and compare at these two dates — 1851 and the present time — the one and the other. Table VI so compares the population, trade, shipping, and revenue then and now. The broad lessons it teaches may be summed up as follows : — 1st. That the aggregate year's trade of the outlying Empire now exceed.s by over one hundred millions sterling the total value of the whole trade of the United Kingdom only thirty-five years ago. 2nd. While one year's trade then (1851) of the United Kingdom was nearly treble the value of the aggregate annual trade of the Empir(; beyond the sea, it does not now exceed it by even 50 per cent. fj IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. rmatiott wo. [^ncies is II of tho t, and a inection jncies is )y form aportioii b power [l ncees- iiig now ,1 advan- defence deration, military precede ! Facts of standard len pro- Ion, and a of the elect the we shall British ling, and isions of because but have kingdom, her, and one and revenue ed up as pire now le of the 0. fCingdom le of the n 50 per Tho movement of shipping in and out of port farnishea a standard ulso of relative interest on tho seas and oceans of the world. Tho diagram illustrates these main facts : — 1st.. That in 1851 the aggi-ogato tonnage entering and clearing Uritish ports at home was more than double the aggregate tonnage entering and clearing British ports abroad. Now, however, it will be seen the tonnage entered and cleared our ports abroad in the year is greater by some 13,000,000 tons than in the case of our ports at home. I remind you that this excess alone is about the equivalent of tho total tonnage in and out of all our home ports during the year of the Great Exhibition, 1851. Here, then, wo have the creation by natural growth of new, great, •changed, and changing interest requiring protection in war. Upon readiness, sufficiency, and combined action of Fleet and Army this vast trade for its security in war entirely relies. Upon its safety depends not merely the wealth and greatness of the British Empire, but its power to lead onward and undisturbed in the civiliza- tion of the world. Upon tho adequate pi'otection of Imperial trade in war will depend not merely the comfort but the bread of scoi'es of millions of toilers geographically separated by seas but under one Hag. The original sources of material power of defence are men and money. Diagram VI shows not only the growing and changing interests we may have at any moment to defend, but it also indicates increase and changing positions of the material resources of dormant defensive power. The possession of such original resources as men and money is one thing however, while their proper adaptation and sufficient appropriation for purposes of defence is another. As regards the simple fact of their possession this diagram shows — 1st. That, roughly speaking, during the last thirty-five years there has been an increase of tho Queen's subjects at home of nearly 10,000,000, while over sea the addition amounts to nearly 40,000,000. 2nd. That in 1851 the annual revenue of the United Kingdom was nearly double the aggregate revenue of the Empire beyond sea, while now the aggregate revenue of the Empire beyond sea exceeds by 22,000,000L sterling that of tho mother country. Such then are a few broad features of these comparisons. There are many others of importance I now pass by, the subject being largo and the time of explanation short. Having hastily examined what we in the past planted, and having glanced at the nature and extent of growth, let us now take a general survey of some other changes which have occurred. It is necessary to note without remark those constitutional changes, due to Colonial growth, occm'ring since 1851, so far as they affect arrangements for defence. Canadian Provinces have combined and formed one great Dominion, spreading from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with one Parliament initiating and controlling measures for its local defence. It has joined tho oceans by railway communication. Newfoundland possesses a separate Parliament, charged with pro- viding for its local defence. In South Africa there is also now a Parliament, exercising the same functions over a portion of that « IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. > territory. At the antipodes there arc six scparnto Parliaments pos- sessing similar powers of arrangemetit for tlic defence of six separat<^ portions of Australasia. I merely adil to this bald statement that it is quite at the discretion of these nine Parliaments, in combination with our own, with each other, or sejjarately, to provide mcMins ef defence for those groat common interests which lie beyond their shores. While the common interests of the Empire and Parliaments have been growing, science ha.s been busy revolutionizing the mode and means of war. The changes it has accomplished may be hero sufli- ciently described in a few words. In the first {)lace, it takes almost as many years now to build war-ships and great guns as in byegone times it took months. On the other hiiiid, the use of arms of all branches of the Service in the past could bo picked up in a hurry^ and even during a campaign. The scientific weapons now demand long and elaborate training ; in short, broadly speaking, 'vhat science- has done is to enable rapid and decisive results to bo pi't cod in war, but oniij by long previous preparations and the development during peace of an organized system and plan. Ineffective and successful defence will thcn-efore wholly depend in war upon the elaboration of organized arrangements and provision of means during peace. Theso cannot now bo improvised when the time for their application has arrived. The necessary naval and military arrangements between the several parts of the same Empire to secure common safety for the common interests must be made and paid for in peace. They cannot bo postponed until danger arises without peril. Science and syste- matic preparation have usurped the former places of sentiment and enthusiasm in determining the issues of war. Wealth and natural resources are nothing but temptation to attack, if their reasonable and sufficient applications to the purposes of their defence is denied. There is a further consideration to which I must refer. While industry and enterprise in British lands in all quarters of the globe have been swelling the value and volume of our common sea commerce, war navies have been created and naval power has been developed by nations whicb thirty-five years ago Avere not — could not be — regarded as maritime Powers. Military stations and naval bases have been established by other Powers on oceans and seas not then but now of huge Imperial importance to us. All this is only natural, only what is reasonably to bo expected, but nevertheless they are facts which, as regards British defence, must not, cannot be ignored. These broad considerations concern not simply the United Kingdom,, but all territories, all industries, all manufactures, all interests, and all peoples under our " one flag." They make up a union of common war risks against which general insurance must be paid and joint precautions taken. They can only be met with success by co-operation and joint action between the several parts of the Empire upon a settled system and a developed plan. I am referring chiefly to British sea trade, and for the present exclude other intei'ests from comment. In doing so, however, it must be remarked that with certain exceptions — prominently that of India — the frontiers of our IMPERIAL FKDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. ^nts pos- sopar-ato that it in tion witli ■ defence Mits have aodo and lero sufii- !s almost byepotie na of all a hurry^ demand i,t Mcienee- d in war, it during lueccssfiil )ration of '. Theso alien ha» between -jy for the 3y cannot nd syste- ment and 1 natural nable and ied. ;ers of the nmon sea has been aid not bo )ases have then but ural, only are facts red. Kingdom^ rests, and i" common and joint ■operation •e upon a chiefly to ests from shat with srs of our Kmpiro are practically Hca frontiers. As a ruk>, the protection of our sea cominerco is virtually the protection of our territories. Trade in territorial in its source and orif,'in, though maritime in its main operations of exchange. I may mention in passing that the sea trade of India alone is about equal to that of Russia. It is worthy of attention that during 1851 the trade between the United Kingdom and India was otiicially stated at about 17 millions sterling; it is now- some 80 millions a year. Thirty-five years ago the annual trade betwe(m Australia and India was in value only L50,000/., it is now over three millions in value a year. The trade of the mother country has therefore five times, and that of Australia twenty times as much interest in the security and prosperity of India as they had thirty-live years ago. The territorial security of India is theriifore of ever in- creasing importance to the industrial and commercial classes at home and in Australia. This remark can be shown to generally apply to almost all parts of the Empire as regards India and each other. I mention these facts to avoid a possible misconception that the protection oi' IJritish trade and commerce is simply a question of securing sea com- munications. The sources of supply must bo guarded as well as the freedom of flow secured. It is helpful to a real conception of ( Colonial growth to remember that Australasian trade alone at this moment equals that of the Empire of Russia. The total trade of that great Empire was in 1851 but two-thirds of the total trade of Canada to-day. The aggregate sea trade of the Colonies and dependencies at the present time exceeds by some 50 millions a year that of France and Russia together. These are great maritime Powers, but our Colonies and Dependencies, with a greater aggregate of sea interests to be protected, could not produce as many armed and efficiently manned boats as these two Powers can vessels of war. All operations of war — by land or sea — may be resolved into throe original elements ; place, time, and force. The places necessary to occupy are flxcd by geographical circumstances. The nature and strength of the forces required are determined by the charrcter of the places to be taken or held. Time is the factor that rules the necessities which organization has to fulfil by the production at the right places, at the right lime, the right force. This very elementary statement of course applies as much to certain latitudes t^nd longitudes on oceans and seas as to territorial positions. Sea commerce passing over the water areas of the world is governed by physical laws. The direction, volume, and value of its constant ebb and flow, so to speak, is regulated by the laws of supply and demand. Now the whole operation of protecting our sea trade is covered by two main pro- positions — 1st. The keeping in of the ships of the enemy that are in port when war breaks out. 2nd. Forcing all other vessels under a hostile flag off the sea, either into port or to the bottom. The masking of hostile fleets by promptly placing, on the outbreak of war, off their war ports, the force necessary to keep them in '•k'Ji',f2liL*i)i!^-i^-^ii^':^^fAL^ a IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL ANt) MILITARY. is an essential condition of safety of the commerce not only of the mother country hut of each and all parts of the Empire. It is a joint necessity which must be provided for in order to secure reasonable safety for the whole. The fleet which keeps that of tlio enemy in port in one hemisphere is really protecting commerce in the other. The Colonies and dependencies for the security of their commerce will in war be as dependent as tlie United Kingdom o:i British naval power being equal and adapted to the dischai^c of that fundamental duty. While our commerce has been growing and foreign naval power has been developing, science has been changing the conditions of blockade : torpedo defence has benefitted the blockaded, while reliance on steam, which is reliance on coal, has diminished the staying power of ships engaged in blockade. Tihips outside a port must keep up steam by emptying their bunkers up their funnels. Meantime these ships will be losing speed by the natural process of fouling of immersed surface. Thus, in order to coal and in order to clean, they must constantly leave the offing, and while away their place must be taken by others. The net result of such considerations, here only indicated, is that the growth of our sea trade has made efficient blockade more imperative, while science has made that operation more difficult and more costly. The magni- tude of the sea interests of the Colonies and dependencies alore demand that the necessary means shall be sufficient and available foi- this purpose. Our outlying Empire with over 400 millions' worth of goods on the sea in a year is most directly concerned in the locking up of hostile fleets on the outbreak of war. Is it neither to share the cost of providing the means nor the duty and the honour of applying them to the purpose of securing its own safety ? Our people at the Cape, in Canada, or Australia, are as patriotic as our fathers were when Jervis and Nelson, for the salvation of England, maintained famous blockades and fought their great sea fights. It is well to remember that the trade of British North America and South Africa together now is about what the trade of p]ngland was when St. Vincent was fought; and that the sea commerce of Australasia alone exceeds by tens of millions the sea trade of the United Kingdom when Nelson triumphed at Trafalgar. Now as to the other branch of operations for the defence of sea trade. Though we may blockade hostile war ports, still some of the enemy's war fleet will probably be already at sea — steamers will escape from his mercantile poi-ts or elsewhere armeJ for attack on our maritime or territorial interests. The main difference between blockade and the more extended operation of clearing the sea of hostile ships is — that in the one case our objective points are fixed points — the enemy's war ports— in the other they are ships with power of rapid locomotion. Sudden changes of position at sea and the probable absence of any clue whatever its to the direction and objects of those changes are the chief circumstances to be met by the defence arrangements of our Empire. The power of a fleet or vessel to attack or defend interests on the high seas is in propor- tion to its freedom ; the limits of a steamer's freedom at any point on I ! only of re. It is to secure it of the inierce in 1 of their Kingdom dischai>!^o growing has been benefitted coal, has e. kihips .nkei'S up d by the order to iffing, and result of th of our le science tie magni- jies alore lilable foi- worth of e locking [ to share onour of by ? Our )ic as our England, its. It is md South was when ustralasia Kingdom ce of sea me of the mere will attack on between the sea )oints are are ships osition at direction to be met of a fleet n propor- Y point on IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. 9 the high seas are the coals in the bunkers less the quantity required to carry her to the nearest port where she can procure a fresh supply ; her movements are ruled by coal-cari-ying capacity in relation to sj)eed ; speed is reduced by the fouling of immersed surface and by general wear and tear ; loss of speed is equivalent to a reduction of coal-carrying capacity, and consequently to restriction on liberty of action. As regards time and place, therefore, the freedom of a nation's fleet, squadron, or sbip depends primarily upon the number and general distribution of national ports available for coaling, docking, and refitting. That freedom, however, is absolutely destroyed if such ports are not secured from attack wholly independently of seagoing ships. The first necessity, therefore, to the freedom of our fleet is the local and military defence of all British ports of impoitance at home and abroad. The chief measures to adopt in war to force hostile vessels off the sea is to employ sufiicient means to make their access to their own mercantile ports, to which ocean steamers can resort, hazardous ; and also to observe closely similar ports under u neutral flag. What the naval and military organization of the Empire has to provide for, in order to secure tbe common commerce of each and all its parts, is the production of these various places on the outbreak of war, the right forces to do this varied work. The safety of that commerce will entirely depend upon the promptness with which it is (lone. The Empire's ability to do this work quickly is a question of co-opei*ation between its several parts involving joint expenditure, common naval and military reserves offeree and of supplies. These must be adapted to, and available for general service for the defence of our common sea trade ; the interests of one are the interests of -all ; the duty of one is the duty of all. The fullest fi'eedom being secured for our seagoing forces, the next consideration is their distribution on the ocean ; that must be mainly ■determined by the natural distribution of Imperial commerce on the high seas. The seagoing force required to protect a sea line of ■communication varies with its length. The longer the line, the greater the numler of vessels necessary to protect it. The offensive or defensive poioer of the individual vessel is a tactical, but the nunihcr and class of vessels is a strateyical problem — speed affects both. The importance of the line is determined by military considerations and by commercial facts. Since 1851, a process has been going on which must be notif d, having a commanding influence on the distribution of our naval force. In that year the United Kingdom drew about two-thirds of over-sea supply of wheat, wheat meal, and flour from European ports — the total amount of such food imported was some twenty-three million cwts. — the total quantity we now import is nearly treble what it was in I85I, and only about one-fifth of the whole now comes from European and Mediterranean ports. The sources of such supply have shifted across the Atlantic, and even to the other hemi- sphere. This extension of the food lines of the mother country is <;quiva^3nt to a reduction of naval power available for other services 10 IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. I I Food lines must be mado safe wliatovor else happcms, and for this special purpose a large proportion of our raaritirao moans must be set apart. The increased length and increased reliance on our food linos over-sea necessitates an inci'case of naval means to ensure their safety, unless other naval duties are to bo left undone. But in 1851 only one-fortieth of such supply came from British possessions abroad while now the ])roportion is about one-fourth of that total. ^ Development of the infinite food-producing capabilities of our Empire beyond sea really corresponds to an increase of our defensive power. It may for the above reason bo considered as part and parcel of the question how to secure a maximum of safety with a minimum of naval expenditure. Its solution lies in the increase of population in our own Colonies and the cultivation of our own lands over-sea. Co-operation between the mother country and the Colonics to produce this result would bo of infinite advantage to both. The relative values of different water districts of the world to the several parts of the Empire ai-e shown in Diagram VII. It is only necessary to explain that the geographical limits of the ocean districts into which the diagram divides the world ai'e as follows : — North Seas Districts. — On the west by a line di'awn from Dun- kerque towards the Pole through Dover, the eastern boundary being the seaboards in the German Ocean and the Baltic Sea. North-East Atlantic District is bounded on the west by 30° meridian W., on the south by the Equator, and on the oast by the continuous seaboard from where the Equator strikes the West Coast of Africa to Dunkerque where it meets the limits of the North Seas. Nurth-West Atlantic District includes all the North Atlantic Ocean west of the 30" meridian. South Atlantic District includes the seaboard of British South Africa with the Atlantic Ocean lying south of the Equator. Indian Seas District takes in the water ari?a enclosed by the con- tinuous coast lino from the north-east of British South Africa to Singapore, thence by a line, including Java, towards the South P'>lo and back to Delagoa Bay. North Pacific District. — All the Pacific north of the Equator between the Indian Seas District and the American Continent. South Pacific District. — All the Pacific soiith of the Equator between these limits. These districts are also shown by dotted lines and seaboards on the map — the diagram and the map must be studied together. It is impossible now to attempt to deal with a great variety of considera- tions, but a careful examination of the diagram will present considera- tions, be it remembered, which determined the principles governing the distribution and the amount of naval and militaiy force. I can do no more at present than indicate some of them, to show that some form of Imperial Federation for purposes of mutual defence is nam essentially necessary for common safety. At first sight it may be thought that the relative value of foreign ' The most remarkable and satisfactory feature of this change is the extraordinary increase of imports from ludia. IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. 11 d for this ust be set food linoH leir safety, m British -fourth of abilities of ise of otii" sd as part oty with a ncrease of own lands 10 Colonics, h. n-ld to the It is only m districts 'rom Dun- dary being )° meridian continuous f Africa to ntic Ocean tish South 3y the con- Africa to South Pole 10 Equator lont. le Equator )ard3 on the ther. It is f considera- it considera- governing )rco. I can V that some fence is nom e of foreign extraordinary trade of the United Kingdom (A) in the North Sea and the two North Atlantic Districts entitles — for that solo reason — those districts to priority of protective precautions over all the others. It may also be thought from this first section of the diagram that the importance of our trade declines in value in the ratio of the distance of the districts from England. From Section B it will be seen that the foreign trade of the out- lying Empire is pretty equally distributed, except in the case of the South Atlantic and North Pacific. Section C shows that the trade of the United Kingdom with the Empire over-sea is greatest with our seaboards in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Section D shows interchange between our pos- sessions abroad to bo greater in the South Pacific district than in any other. When, however, the last section showing the whole dis- tribution of British trade is examined, it would still seem as if British trade to foreign seaboards in the districts nearest England was of the greatest value, ^ That is quite true as regards a state of peace, but may not and is not likely to be true when we are engagiMl in war. This diagram shows the relative distribution of the Empire's trade in peace, and an outbreak of maritime war would entirely change the character of the peace distribution it illustrates. Serious danger can only arise to our sea commerce from war with a Power having seaboard within the limits of the first three districts in the diagram, i.e., the North Sea, the North-east Atlantic, and the North-west Atlantic. Such Powers are the largest contributors to the foreign trade of our Empire in thosi; three districts. The effect of war would, before a gun was fired, reduce the foreign trade of tlio Empire in one more of these particular districts, by the exact amount of previou.j mterchange between the Empire and the Power or Powers thus becoming hostile. Thus, then, the relative value of near as compared with distant ocean districts will be wholly changed. By this cause alone the commercial value of the districts of the North Seas and North-east Atlantic, vide A, might fall at once to half that shown in the diagram ; while that of the North-west Atlantic might fall as suddenly 90 per cent. Whatever maritime war may occur, the result must be an immediate increase of the relative values of the South Atlantic, Indian Seas, and North and South Pacific districts. These three last-named, the farthest from the United Kingdom, are, we must remember, separated from it by half the world, and com- municate with it by three routes : — the Suez Canal, the Cape, and Cape Hoim. As will be seen from the diagram, the internal trade of the Empire is greatest, but its external or foreign trade is smallest, in these three distant districts. Maritime war must accentuate the ' This dingnim docs not show accumulations in tlie various ocean districts. For example, tlio whole trade of the United Kingdom witli all the world accumulates in the waters of the United Kingdom, thus raising the total value of the North-east Atlantic by the value of tlie trade with the United Kingdom of •'ll other districts shown in the diagram. Nor does it show the accumulation of value produced by the commerce of one district passing over another on passage. For further explana- tion see my tables, &c., &c., " Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War."— Journal R.U.S.I.. 1881. 12 IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. !.l I I commercial reliance of the Empire upon itself, because the loss caused by commercial interchange ceasing between belligerents will seek compensation elsewhere. South Africa, Australasia, Canada, and India are great and increasing factors in the trade operations of the world, and the seaboards of the last three command the waters of the other hemisphere, while South Africa commands one of the three roads which connect them with our own. It is just because the Pacific and Indian Oceans are so important to us, and because they are so far removed from the mother country, that we must e"pect attack on our sea commerce will bo first delivered there. Circums ranees peculiar to this half of the world have a tendency to draw towards it in peace squadrons and war vessels of all the maritime Powers. There are international interests in Chinese and Japanese waters requiring their presence at all times. It is probable, therefore, that in an outbreak of war, more hostile cruizei's will be at sea in the other hemisphere than in this. It is further to be observed that all other water areas of the world together do not present such geographical advantages for attack on our com- merce as these three districts. The number of unappropriated islands, the restricted ai'cas over which the world's commerce in those regions at present operates, offer many and great facilities for the establishment unobserved of coaling rendezvous and temporally bases for hostile ships. Our fellow citizens in Australasia appear to be fully alive to this fact. We and they are too prone to think that the danger can be averted by the simple and cheap process of hoisting the Union Jack on a pole on an indefinite number of islands. It is not, however, the enthusiasm which hoists our own flag in peace that will secui'e our safety on any sea in war, but the possession of organized defensive war power capable, when the time of trouble comes, of promptly pulling hostile flags doAvn. By whom and how is that necessary power to be created and main- tained ? That is really the whole question of Imperial Federation for defence — it is one only to be settled by Home and Colonial statesmen, backed by enlightened public opinion throughout the Empire. We here are only concerned with the strategical naval and military aspects of the Empire's defence. With the civil arrangements necessaiy to proA de the means required for common security we have nothing to do. I would, however, venture once more to repeat my own belief, expressed on many occasions here and elsewhere during the last eighteen years, it is this : that more means are likely to be provided, and that some basis of joint action would probably be settled, if responsible ministers of Her Majesty's Home and Colonial Govern- ments were brought together in one room and round one table, in order to confer with the responsible military and naval authorities, as to what is necessary to be mutually done for the security of oui* com- mon interests in war. As will be seen by a careful study of the last section of Diagram VII, the aggregate yearly value of the trade of our Colonies and Depen- dencies in the South Pacific is nearly double the total annual trade of the United Kingdom in those waters. Taking annual value of com- IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. 13 loss caused iS will seek a, and India : the world, f tlie other three roads 3 important lor country, ill be first [ the world as and war lal interests \t all times. Qore hostile this. It is rid together on our corn- appropriated srce in those ties for the jorary bases ppear to be ink that the of hoisting ands. It is 1 peace that if organized e comes, of i and main- deration foi' 1 statesmen, mpire. We itai'y aspects necessaiy to nothing to own belief, ng the last bo provided, settled, if ial Govem- ne table, in thorities, as of our com- iagram VII, and Depen- lual trade of blue of coni- merce as a standard, the Colonies and Dependencies are very much more concerned in the safety of the South Pacific districts than the United Kingdom ; deficiency in the naval and military means recpiired to protect the trade in the Sonth Pacific would inflict more grievous loss on our fellow-citizens in Australasia than on rs. It is a question for them, for Canada, and for us conjointly to uctermine how the over-increasing Bvitisli trade in the Pacific is to be provided with naval and military protection. Most of the chief ports of Australasia are, by local means, secured against sea attack, and thus they are in striking contrast with some of our great commercial ports at homo. The money some of these Colonies have spent, the armament.s they have provided, and the local forces they maintain, are solid contribu- tions to the freedom of our squadron in tlio South Pacific. That squadron may be sufficient for the purposes of peace; but can Australasia long remain satisfied with the existing arrangement, which places the reserve of ships, men, ordnance, and ammunition in the North Atlantic, and thus, at the very moment the South Pacific sorely needs them on the spot, they will be at the other side of the world ? The movable reserves of materiel and personnel in Great Britain for use in war are for general service of the Empire, and when distributed and despatched from home to the various stations, the Pacific — owing to its distance — will be the last to receive reinforcement. The delay will thus be greatest where the combined sea interests of Colonics and Dependencies are greatest, and where prompt action is most urgent. As a short wa^"^ of supplementing these remarks, I point to Dia- gram VIII, comparing the h'ade and revenue of Australasia with that of other Powers having seaboards only in the Pacific Ocean. It is to be remembered that the naval war power referred to in the margin and the war dockyards on which it rests have come into being since 1851. In (he interval which has elapsed our Empire, with the greatest stake in the North and South Pacific, has done least to make the power necessary for its protection locally self-supporting in war. Does anybody think — can anybody believe, that a defensive system adapted to the ancient necessities of an island can be effective when that island has grown into an Empire and overspread the world ? Those who say off-hand it is so, let them make assurance doubly sure that they are right. Let those who doubt enquire more, and it is the duty of every one who does not think so to do what in him lies to bring about a development of our naval and military arrangements adapted to the necessities of our growth. I must now briefly and broadly refer to — I Demands of a Naval and Military Character necessitated by Growth. Seeing the enormous extent of geographical, strategical, constitu- tional, commercial, and naval and military ground the whole question covers, it will be obviously impossible here to do more than faintly indicate its salient features. To attempt a detailed survey in the time would be useless if not absurd. Each ocean district and our territories they include have varying characteristics, influencing naval 14 IMPERIAL FEDEUATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. i'i i T' and military consirlerations. I shall non' only attempt to touch lightly ujion main principles of general applicat'on, and try and illustrate them by reference to the Pacific and Indian Seas. For clearness of such illustration W(» will treat the Indian Seas district as a great quadrilateral ; its north side being chiefly British territory, and its corners commandod by Aden, the Cape, King (leoi'ge's Sound, and Singapore, the firsii two dominating two of the three routes connecting one hemisphere with 'he other. Likewise let us regard the Pacific Ocean as another parallelogram with a huge pre- ]ionderating proportion of our territory in the south. King George's Sound, Port Hamilton, Vancouver, and Cape Horn at its corners, and escorted by war-ships or sent unconvoyed by the v^ery fastest merchant steamers. If escorted by war-ships, naval foi'ce must be reduced elsewhere in order to furnish convoys. In this case the transports must adopt the speed of the convoys, but if the fastest Avar-ships are so employed, then the general protection of commerce must be left to the slower war-ships. If, however, slow war- vessels furnish the escort, then time will be lost in the delivery of stores. Supposing we rely upon speed without escort; then we are taking from our merchant marine a proportionate part of its best element of safety — speed — and so forcing an increased amount of food and other freights into slower ships, and adding to the risk of capture. There is an economical (piestion involved even in peace by the facts here referred to. 'i'o the cost of production must be added the cost of delivery — the further the destination from the factory tho greater the expense. These considerations point more or less all one way, and may be shortly summed up by saying that the artillery requirements of the British positions, maritime and territorial, would be more certainly, promptly, and ])erliaps more economically met by our having a factoi-y for production of war mnteriel in the Pacific. Australasia, and the western provinces of Canada both offering natural resources necessary.' Such extension of local power of producing war materiel, whether .situate in Australasia or Western Canada, would be in peace of mutual advantage to us and the Colony in which established y^ and to tlie whole Empire a source of incalculable strength in war. Self support of supply of war stores in the Pacific quadrilateral appears to be a. first principle on which arrangements for Imperial Federation for defence should be based. It is simply a question of business-like practical co-operation between the Government of Her Majesty at home, and Her Majesty's Government in one or other of these ' Vide my remarks in " Defence of Great and Greater Britain," in 1880. (Stan- ford.) - The overcrowding of tlie skilled labour market at home is an increasing economic difficulty. The attraction of the surplus of the old country to the mineral resources of the new, under our own flag, could not but be beneficial wo.re tlie prin- ciple applied of Government contracts to a private firm, such as a Pacific Elswick. Doubtless many contracts for war materiel made by foreign Pacific Powers would fail into its hands, instead of, as now, German, &c., firms in Europe. rrn K) IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND xMILITARY. I'll ) Colonics. Proximity to the Indi.an seas seems to point rather towards Australasia than Canada as the site for such an establishment. Great thiuj^s must have small beginnings, and the real danger ia delay. If it is argued that this is too big a business to undertake, tho reply is the business to bo dono in war is bigger. Canada has recently made a small advance in this direction by tho establishment of a Government cartridge factory in Quebec ; and when trouble came in tho noith-west, this infant factory tuj-ned out in " two months over one and a half million ball cartridjres.'" 1.1 I M 1 'I ■ I I Garrisons, S^'c. Beycmd the dolended seaports of Australasia and the partially secured ports of India and of Canada, there are many others in these two great quadrilaterals of infinite importance to our fleet in war. About tho most dangerous programme for any nation tc adopt would be that which would provide for naval bases, armaments, and works, but which did not provide either the number of trained men necessary or the organization required to ensure their being at their posts when wajited. The defence of such ports involves, of course, three arms — the torpedo, the gun, and the rifle. The greater the advance in science, the greater the skill required in the use of weapons. Skill is a matter of training and experience ; both cost money and time. If the many isolated ports in these two great areas, and elsewhere, upon which the freedom of our fleet depends have not, on the outbreak of war, tho artillery, torpedo, and small-arm force required, the fact of their having works and armament only adds to naval danger. That danger can only be met by the expenditure in peace of money and time for the maintenance and training of the force required to garrison and defend the keys of our sea empire in war. What propor- tion of such forces may be active or reserve is a question of detail ; that there shall be such forces and that they shall be at their posts when wanted is a principle vital to the security of the commerce of the Empire. The first point is to get the men. Second, to train them. Third, that they shall be available for service where wanted, and when wanted. These three conditions bring us to considerations as to the distri- bution and the characteristics of the population of the Empire. Diagram IV shows numerical distribution,' roughly as follows : -f of the whole is in the United Kingdom, y being beyond sea. Of the population of the outlying Empire |f of the total is located in the Dependencies, only t^^ is in the Colonies. As regards the Depen- dencies, the table at the foot of Diagram I shows that out of a total of 206 millions, 200 millions are in India ; the G millions li I ! ' Vide Annual Ecpovt, Militia and Defence Canadian Bhie Book, 1886. - Tho address of the President, Sir Rawson Eawson. before the Statistical Society, 1884, will be found, by those not already acquainted with it, an invaluable ann necessary ' posts when liree arms — advance in QS. Skill is d time. If where, upon outbreak of , the fact of tiger. That money and required to hat pvopor- u of detail ; their posts ommerco of wanted, and the distri- he Empire. Hows : I of ea. Of tho ated in the the Depen- ;I)at out of G millions 8sn. istical Society, nvaluable ami ;ign Coloniea. being distributed amongst the V/eat Indies, West Coast of Africa, and isolated possessions in \\ ' ms other parts of the world. Comparing the tables ii' Diagrams F, IT, and TV", it will bo seen how enormous is the number to the north of tho Indian 8eas ((uadri lateral, and how very few and far between are tho populations of the Colonies in the South Pacific, or of Western Canada in the north.' Hut to whatever extent the huge numerical sti-ength of Indian population might or could be used to fi.^rnish garrisons where necessary in the Pacific or Indian Seas, the question of artillery and torpedo service is not a question of numbers but of natural characteristics. It needs no ai'gument, it is an obvious fact, that these arms demand, as a rule, the best talents and peculiar qualities of our own race. Assuming that such infantry force as it may bo necessary to distribute for tho defence of naval bases and ports in tho Indian Seas and Pacific might possibly be raised in India," the question of artillery and torpedo corps remains for consideration. Where a naval base or coaling station is situated in our Colonies, local population offer the raw material for creating torpedo or artillery corps. At such places it is simply a question of numbers, induce- ments, and training. I will not stop to examine to what extent tho means thus at hand have been made use of at tho chief port."^. of Australasia or Western Canada. Tho important consideration ip the provision for artillery and torpedo service at ports thousands of miles away from cither of these seaboards, and where our own race cannot bo or is not localized in sufficient numbers to furnish on the spot such corps. It may be accepted as a first principle of British sea defence that there must be an artillery and a torpedo corps and infantry available for general service at coaling ports, &c., throughout tho Empire, and sufficiently strong for their needs. If this principle bo not fully satisfied by the arrangements of the Empire for its defence, it is not one part of that Empire that will suffer alone, but all. It is a common necessity for the security of our common commerce. In the safety of the Pacific and Indian quadrilaterals, the commerce of our Colonies and Dependencies is first and chiefly concerned. Comparing Home and Colonial populations to areas, as shown in Diagrams II and III, it is evident the United Kingdom must he the chief recruiting ground for tho rank and file of such corps. It does not follow that for tho defence of our ports in the Pacific and Indian Seas this Island in the Atlantic is a suitable position for trained reserves for service in the Pacific. The argument as to time and transport referred to in the case of war stores here points again to Australasia and Western Canada as the proper situation for training schools and depots of forces intended for such service in those seas. The arrangements for the * The population of British Columbia is not at present 50,000. - Tliis is merely assumed, not by any means intended to be asserted. There are many and great, objections, and very wide differences of opinion on this point have been expressed by eminent Indian authorities. Reference to h-etures, 1869-1871- 1877-1878-1881, Chap. 2 and 3, " Defence of Great and Greater Britain," also " Use and Application of Marine Forces : Past, Present, and Future," Journal, 1883, will explain the vievi^s I hold as to garrisons for coaling stations. 18 IMPKlllAL KEDEHATIUN'— NAVAL AND MILITAIIY'. ll ill; 'ijll nmiiitenatico of such a forco involves joint action and co-opomtion botwiicn tlio mother ooniitry and the (Jolonios in ordor to bridj^o over tho chasm in tho systom of tho Krnpirti's (hjfcnco which piii-oly local forcoH cannot fill. It it bo said when war comes there will bo ])lonty of Volunteers in the Colonies and at Homo for general sorvico abroad, I think tho answer is — there will be thousands ns'idy to join tho Army in tho tieUI, but probably a pinnace would ludd all the volunteer gunners, or torpedoists, or infantry that would earnestly dosii'o to go to tho Falklands, Diego Gareiii, Port Hamilton, or Fiji. Wo cannot trust the keys of security of a thousand millions of sea commerce to patriotic sentiment; its safety in war will depend upon an organized defensive systom. To examine this military kernel of tho naval nut would now take too long. The permanent strength of tho artillery anil torpedo corps necessary for our naval security is not so very great, but for reasons I gave in a lecture hero " On the Use and Ajiplieation of Marine Forces," its organization, I venture to think, would require to be very elastic, and capable of absorbing in itself Colonial as well as homo resources. Lastly, its Colonial dejiots should keep touch with each other, with their outlying detachments in dependencies, and with headquarters in tho mother country, forming one force, circulating by periodic reliefs, and interchangeable between the Colonies, tho Dependencies, and tho mother country, by a tour of duty round the world. The efficient maintenance of some such force suggests itself as an imperative necessity of our growth, in the satisfying of which all parts of our sea empire are equally concerned. Tho establishment of depots and training schools, and the maintenance of a nucleus of a force available for general service at our out-ports in the Pacific and Indian Seas is surely not more than obvious necessity demands. Some 35,000, OUO tons of shipping annually entering and clearing our ports in that water area illustrates the interest the Colonies and Dependencies alone have in their defence, In view of the magnitude of such port-interests, Impei-ial Federation, naval and military, asks for that necessary, business-like co-operation of the mother country and the Colonies which can alone provide and maintain military guarantees for their security in war, for the common infcei-ests and the common good. War Vessels. To do full justice to this branch of the subject would require very lengthy consideration. It is only possible now to sketch roughly its boldest features. Both as to numerical strength and description of vessels, require- ments of the police duties of our fleet in the other hemisphere in peace, ai'e wholly different from those to be fulfilled in war. It would be a waste of power and of money to employ in peace ocean cruizers to discharge the minor but necessary duties of superintending the interests of British trade at the mouths of rivers, and at the multitude of small ports in the Pacitic and Indian Seas. D-oponition Di-idgo ovof iiiroly looiil il ho plenty ral service iuly to join lold all the (I oarneatly on, or Fiji. lions of sea cpund upon Id now take irpodo corps for reasons I of Marino to bo very ell as homo 1 other, with ilrpiartors in •iodic reliefs, 3ies, and the i itself as an of which all .blislunont of nucleus of a ) Pacific and ty demands, clearing our olonies and le magnitude nilitary, asks ther country tain military ntei'ests and 1 i-equire very hly its rougr sels, require- lomisphere in ar. It would cean cruizers ntending the ;he multitude IMPKIU.XL FICDEUATION'— N.WAT. AND MITilTAnY. V.) The Oflicers and men emj)loyed in such duties in peace are aviiil- able of cour.se for service on the ocean in war, but the vessels are not. If therefore the vessels suitable for ocean .service; in (he Pacilic uro held in reserve in our home ports in the Atlantic the outbreak of war will lock up in vessels which cannot keep the sea, a very large propor- tion of naval personnel in the Pacific. War crui/.ers diHj)atL'hed from home must, during hostilities, have full complements of Officers and men, and thus the arrival of such vessels in the Pacific some two months after they are recpiirod will do nothing at all to make avail- able for ocean service the naval force locked up in our Pacific ports. The net result of this system would be, that while the mother country parts with naval reserves in order to dispatch war cruizers to the Pacific, an e(|uivalent portion of the regular naval forces will remain bottled up in our ports in that ocean district, because they have no ships. On the outbreak of war, the simultaneous and prompt con- version of otir naval arrangements from a peace to a war footing will be ot the utmcst consequence to our commerce in every ocean district of the world. The commerce of foreign Powers is so small compared to our own, that we have practically " to ])olice " international trade in ])eace, at a sacrifice of naval elficiency for war. Hence it is that in distant seas foi-eign squadrons are more ready and are better adapted to purposes of sea attack than are ours for sea defence. It is just as much in the interests of the trade of our Colonies and Dependencies as it is the mother country's, that this necessary police work should be done. It is equally their interest that every precaution should be taken to ensure that what adds to commercial prosperity in peace shall not be a fruitful cause ot the absence of adequate pi-otection for our common sea trade in war. Here, again, co-operation is needed to secure that end, and at Colonial ports in the Pacific should ocean cruizers be held ready in reserve for war service in those seas. As to reserves of seamen, it is on the United Kingdom and the Atlantic provinces of Canada the Empire must, for many a day to come, chiefly rel}'. But it is to be remembered that science is in- creasing the demand for seagoing, seakeeping fighting slups, while reducing the number of men required to fight them. Such, then, would be the chief requisitions of a naval and military character made by the Empire's growth. The undei'lyi ' principle common to all is a recognition of th^ practical difiiculty oi providing protection for our Empire's interests in the other hemisphere by the single-handed efforts of the population and resources of our Island in this. The difticulties are increasing, and the need for honestly facing them is very great. They can only be met by combining the resources under our fiag by a comprehensive system "for the main- tenance of common interests and the organized defence of common rights."' No such system on a settled basis is possible without co- operation between the mother country and the Colonies. Without a defined and arranged basis of joint action, no settled system can exist ' Vide 4tli article of Declaration hy the Imperial Federation League. Central office, 43, St. Margaret's Ollices, Victoria Street, Lcndou, S.W. This League lias brandies throughout the Empire. 80 IMPEItlAL KEDRRATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. li;ii; ': !>' and IK) ])ljm for efTcctmil dofdiico ciin bu ciirrifd out. Tlie motlHi" country and tho Colonies have really now to chose between some form of i'udenition for mutual defcnt'e, or reaping with tlu^ DopendencieH a harvest of diflicultics and dani^'urs, if not ^iviit disasteiH, in witr. What Injperial Federation, naval and military, really means is not " spread-eagleism ;" not a declaration of " defiance " to tho world ; but business-like arrauj^ements between tho Colonies and the mother country for tho discharge of tlio responsibilities and tho duties of " defence. " It is a duty we all owe not only to ourselves but to the two hundred millions of people in the Di'pemlcncies, for whoso present interests and future safety we are each and all concerned. To some, I fear, it will be disappointing that more lias not been said in respect of Home and Colonial military forces being amalga- mated for service in the field. Looking, however, (Diagram IV) at tho present distribution of population, and to tho rates of wages at home and in tho Colonies, 1 find myself driven to the following con- clusions : — I'hat for some time to como no such portion of tho populations as could add appreciable numerical strength to a British army in the field can be withdrawn from the Colonics for service in a prolonged campaign. The cost to the Colonics, owing to tho necessarily high scale of soldier's pay, would be out of all proporticm to the force pi'oduced in the field. Practical ditliculties might arise from tlie fact that men sent from the Colonies received more pay than the men sent from home, though doing precisely tho same duty^ It is by no means certain that when a liritish army lias to take the tield. Colonial forces may not have plenty of work to do to defend interests near their homes, or to scizo and hold naval bases established by an enemy in the Pacific or Indian Seas. The amalgamation of Home and Colonial forces iov field service does not urgently call for co-operation between Home and Colonial Govern- ments. Preparation for the coming time when present relative economic conditions have somewhat changed can be by other means suiliciently met. Such means may be described in a few woi-ds. By offering eveiy possible facility, by breaking down every bar or hindrance or custom which tends to prevent or obstruct our fellow subjects in the Colonies from having the snme opportunities and advantages of entering and advancing in the public services of the Crown, be they naval, military, or civil, which we at home enjoy. Further by a readiness to facilitate in every possible way tl 3 tiaining of field forces in our Colonies, and at all times when offered assistance in the field by Colonial Governments to accept such proposals with prompt gratitixde Avhere and Avhenever possible. Such are the germs which, if planted now, Avill produce the ripe fruit, in the form of Colonial field forces, in due time. That time will be hastened as population is attracted from Great Britain to the Colonies, and their great areas of fertile lands now lying waste are peopled and cultivated by our own kith and kin. Numerical strength for the British Army for field service must be drawn from the United Kingdom and the Dependencies, not sought r. riu> Tiutfln r I H(»iiic t'orm )endt'iicieH u I wr.r. lU'iins is not tho world ; the mother 10 dutit'H of ■IvcH but to 8, for whoso oorriod. as not been h\fr anialf^'a- ;rain IV) at of wages at llowing eon- )])ulations as army in the a prolonged L'ssarily liigh () the I'orco rom tho fact an the men It is by no :e tho Held, nd interests lislied by an I service does tnial Govcrn- ent relative other means words. By or hindrance rv subjects in d vantages of )wn, be they iirther by a f field foi'ces in the Held vith prom])t uce the ripe That time 5iitain to the ng waste are vice must be not souglit IMl'EUIAL FKDEU.VTIOX — NAVAL AND MILITAKY. SI for in tho Colonies. Officers and non-eommisBionod officers of Colonial forces should, however, bo employed whoro possible with tho army whenever and wherever it takes the field. Conclusion. It lias not boon possible to do more than indicate some broail principles, and illustrate them by reference to general naval and military re(iuirements of large areas. They cover, however, a variety of special considerations which merit tho greatest attention. I can now only briefly refer to one. Since I85I the stream of interchange between this side of tho world, and tho other has been turned into a new channel. Tlie Suez Canal has complicated oui- maritime position, and while giving us certain military advantages — so long as we can hold our own at sea — it has added to military responsibility in sup- porting the operations of our fleet. I would point out that such weight as nuiy attach to my observations on ordnanci^ and garrisons, and war vessels for tho Pacific anu Indian Seas, is not in the least diminislied by tho assumption that tho Suez Canal will always bo open to us in war. If, however, the })robabiIity or tho possibility of the canal being closed to us be admitted, tho facts come home to the mind with accumulated force. The possibility of such an occurrence it is not reasonable wholly to ignore. Tho consequences to maritime security in tlio other hemisphere will depend upon how far we have developed to an adequate extent tho resources the Empire possesses in the Pacific. The results to our position in India will be wholly det(!rmined by the precautions we have taken to provide for the most rapid and ready transit of troops by alternative routes. The Empire's answer to a " blocked " Suez Canal has boon given by Canada. The influence which the " Canadian Pacific " can exer- cise on our naval and military position in the far East is immense. On this point I have said so much during past years that it is only now necessary to add a few words. Now that the railway has been built, the facilities it offers as a means of reinforcing India sooner and more certainly than by the Cape are generally understood. Successive Ministers holding the seals of the Colonial Office have publicly testified within the last few months to the opportunities and advantages to the whole Empire this alternative route presents. Under our existing arrangement, how- ever, it appears that our naval and military policy to j vide for our common safety must be influenced by, if not subort. .ated to, the department of the Post Office. There never was a stronger proof that some sort of Federation for defence is uecessai-y to enable naval and military authority to develop in peace a settled plan for the defence of our Empire in war. When that war comes we surely shall think more of the speed and certainty with which we can throw troops into India than of the past profits made on our own letters by the office in St. Martin's-le-Grand. As regards the sea extension of the Canadian Pacific by subsidizing 22 IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. ( ■ .1 iiinii a powerful line of stnamei's to join Port Moody with India, via Hong Kong, and with Australasia, via Fiji — the facts as to the saving of time in communication with Hong Kong, India, and Australasia, via Vancouver, arc before tlie public, and need no comment here. The advantages that route olf erd as a military road do require some special remarks. In the first place, whether the Suez Canal be open or closed to us in war, troops en route to the East must pass along and close to the Atlantic sea-face of Europe. If the canal ie open, the line of route will continue along the major axis of what is practically a European lake. Just in proportion to the nearness of our sea-lines to hostile or to neutral ports, so are its dangers. The more numerous the nation- alities possessing commercial or war ports, the greater, under the provisions of intei'national law, are the facilities afforded to our enemies' cruizers for coaling and supplies. Their original power of con- tinuous attack on our sea-lines is greatest where the war or commercial resources of sea-boai'ds are most developed, and the nationality of such ports is most varied. The North-east Atlantic district presents to us tho maximum of these dangers. For these and for other reasons a military transport steaming from Liverpool or Gralway to Halifax, north of Ireland, would not be exposed to the same risks in war as crossing the Bay to Gibraltar or passing from Gibraltar to Port F aid. The remarks m^de as to the transport of munitions of war during hostilities applies with tenfold force in the case of troops. So far, then, the route from here to the Atlantic terminus of the Canadian Pacific line offers, as regards security, superior advantages to all others during any war with a European Power. There are more fast ocean merchant steamers employed in the lines between the mother country and North America than on any other. It is from that quarter of the globe we must wholly rely for wheat in the event of a blocked Suez Canal or other circum- stances cutting off our Indian supply. The safety of our food supply in war will largely depend upon the speed of the ves&els available to carry it. The safety of troopers will be more or less oue to the same cause. The adoption of the Canadian Pacific route would not, therefore, dislocate our food supply arrangements. The fast ocean steamer which landed troops at Halifax or Quebec could take a return freight of wheat there, or in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, trusting to the Cape route alone as the one alternative military road to India, must deprive the North-west Atlantic service of a very large proportion of its best and fastest steamer's at the supreme moment when for national reasons they will be most required there. Turning now to the North Pacific — if the Sandwich Islands coal- stores are watched — the period of a fast steamer's danger, running from Vancouver to Hong Kong, or to Fiji, is limited to th« few hundred miles mfiasured from the terminal point .,t both ends of the lines. '^L'here are pi-actically no bases which would enable steamers without great staying powers keeping the sea anywhere over more than about half of the line. The expanse of water is so vast that by a slight but constant variation of the course of our steamei's, we IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. 23 I, via Hong ! saving of iralasia, via, here. The lome special losed to us lose to the ne of route a European ;o hostile or the nation- •, under the ded to our )wer of con- eommercial itionality of ■ict presents saming from t be exposed T or passing he transport force in the the Atlantic ds security, a European employed in 'ica than on wholly rely her circuni- if our food the vessiels e or less nue route would le fast ocean :ake a return other hand, nilitary road a very large ine moment •e. slands coal- ger, running to tb-f' few I ends of the ble steamers e over more vast that by steamei'S, we could reduce the likelihood of a hostile vessel of equal speed u,nd staying power falling in with our steamers to the merest chance. Besides purely military considerations in respect of India, and others specially relating to communication in war with Australia, there is another standpoint from which the question of establishing new lines of powerful steamers from Vancouver's to Hong Kong and Australasia should be regarded. In the first place the establishment of such a line would naturally and at private expense develop means of naval repair and refit in the waters of British Columbia. These would be available to Her Maje ity's ships in war. In the next place it is material we should place ourselves in a position to promptly reinforce naval forces on the American side of the North Pa'^ifi'', as well as in China and Australasian waters. If war cruizers are lu in reserve at Vancouver's, as well as at Hong Kong and an Australasian port, this can be done provided we have the necessary high speed steamers uo " mobilize " the naval personnel on the spot. It cannot be done if we have not localized lines of such steamers connecting Van- couver with Hong Kong, and Austi-alasia. They would enable us to distribute Officers and jeamen to war cruizers at such places, and to supplement them witli Naval Reserve, drawn from the mother country or Eastern Canada in a few days. If these conditions be fairly considered side by side with the advan- tages the Canadian Pacific route offers as to time, the gravity of the Imperial question referred to a departmental committee will be more fully undei'stood. From the time of Sir Francis Drako to that of Sir John Franklin, England spent millions of money and sacrificed freely some of htr noblest sons in the vain hope of discovering for her own advantage a natural north-west passage. Steam and engineering science, the foresight of Canadian states- men, and the resources of the Canadian people, have given to England and the Empire all the advantages for common defence which nature denied. Drake, three centuries aso, failing to find it, sailed from the neigh- bourhood of British Columbia, eastward, on the famous voyage round the world. It is quaintly told by the historian that before departing from the American continent he set up a plate nailed to a " great faire post," whereon he engraved the name of Queen Elizabeth, as a monu- ment of " our being there," as also of Her Majesty's " right and title to the same." In our own time the descendants of the men who with Drake encompassed the world, and defeated and destroyed the " Great Armada," were able to telegraj)h from these same regions to another Queen of England that they had set up a great iron way which joined two oceans, ''as a monament of their being there," as also "Her Majesty's right and title to the same." After all the lives and treasure we have thrown away in trying to find a road to the Pacific through Arctic ice, are the advantages which Canada offers for our common defence to be weighed against some departmental difficulty concerning a two-penny halfpenny stamp ? No stronger argument than this is it possible to produce 24 IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. ! I :il m in favour of Imperial Federation for Defence : — the want of some executive and administrative machinery wliich would raise an Empire's safety ahove the level of political and local party strife, and make continuity of naval and military arrangements for the defence of the Empire possible, and secure the development of a settled plan. Lastly, 1 produce Table IX, comparing aggregates of our Colonial Empire with the United Stat<,'.s. The lessons it teaches are plain and simple. Though the people of the United States love peace as much as the Colonies and "\ve ourselves, they maintain a regular naval and military force as a ready nucleus in case of war. With a i-evenue only double the aggregate i-evenues of our self-governing Colonies, the United States spend thirteen times as much on preparation for war as our Avhole Colonial Empire. The sea ti-ade of the whole United States in annual value is only some 75 per cent, in excess of the aggregate trade of Bi'itish self-governed Colonies alone. Only a small proportion of the trade of the States is carried in American bottoms, most of their ocean-carrying business and practically all that of British Colonies is cari-ied by Jir'tich ships. Wlien we are at war every British ship will be an object for attack. The States, how- ever, with such small mercantile marine interests, spend over 3,000,000/. a year on naval precautions. On a seagoing force the British Colonies spend nothing at all. If the cost of naval volunteers here and there in the Colonies can be considered as " naval expendi- ture," in that case the last remark must be corrected by stating that the United States spend soventy-five times as much on preparations for maritime war as all our Colonies put together ! These are facts very germane indeed to the question of Imperial Federation for Defence, but upon them I can here offer no further remarks. The Colonies showed the old spirit when across the waves our fathers ruled came offers of help and Colonial A^olunteers to the Soudan. The native Princes of India then, and not for the first time, gave proof that, though not of the same race, they were swayed by the same sentiments. The movement of Indian Forces to the Mediterranean and the Nile illustrates, however, not merely the force of sentiment, but the value and possible extension of outlying- organized power. ]f science has increased and is increasing difficulties to Old England and her offspring, it also offers to her and to hei- children as a united Empire the means of escape from them if we will. We have ceased to wonder that cricket matches are arranged by telegraph between Australia and England, or rifle matches fixed between the marksmen of Canada and marksmen at home. It comes in the natural course of daily events that very soon aftei" Canadians score " bulls'-eyes " at Wimbledon, the Australians bowl us out at Lord's. Are the gifts of science to be only ap|)lied for purposes of the ci'icket field and ride range ? Are they to remain neglected and unused for want of such an Imjierial system as can combine British power for British protection in war ? 1 commenced this paper by illustrating gx-owth of commerce and ly. IMPERIAL FEDERATION— NAVAL AND MILITARY. 25 nut of some Id raise an :,y strife, and [• the defence settled plan. our Colonial are plain and eace as inucli ar naval and Lli a I'e venue ling Colonies, eparation for of the whole . in excess of [one. Only a in American tically all that we are at war ! States, how- spend over ling force the ,val volunteers laval expendi- jy stating that u preparations Dn of Imperial ffer no further le waves our imteers to the not for the ace, they were idian Forces to ot merely the on of outlying sing difticulties icr and to her om them if we e arranged by matches tixed Ume. It comes fter Canadians K)wl us out at or purposes of 1 iipglected and orabine British commerce and of population, gi-owth of shipj)ing and of revenue. I cannot close without drawing attention to another sort of growth — the growth of war. At the opening ceremony of the Great International Exhibition, 1851, a thanksgiving was offered up "that natious do not lift up the sword against each other, nor learn war any more." This expressed the hope of the civilized world in those days. Now, in the thirty- five years which have since elapsed there has been twice as much bloodshed, and more than double the money spoJit in war by civilized Powers than during the sixty-tive years which preceded the offering up of that thanksgiving. Such is the teaching of a century. Such the vanity of human hopes. However, therefore, we may earnestly desire peace, however much we may lament the growth of war, it is time the citizens of our "great world State" should band themselves together by Imperial Federation for Defence, if they are determined to preserve, not merely by senti- ment but by sacrilice and system — that which oar fatliers won for us — an PJmpire and the freedom of the sea. H.R.II. the DuKK OF Camubiuob : Your Royal Highness, mr lords, ladies, and gentlemen, it now becomes my duty, as havins; occupied the eliair on this occasion, in the name of tliis large assembly to thatik tlie gallant Odicer for the very interest- ing and valuable lecture that he has given us this afternoon. There is only one point in which I venture a little to differ in the way he has put this question. He has put his scheme before you as for a case of war — but I should rather put it as a case for peace. What ho has demnnded is in the interests of peace ; what ho asks for is really an assurance against war. I am one of those who contend that if countries such as we have heard represented to-day are ))repiired to meet emergen- cies, war is the last tiling tliat will probably take place. On tliat ground I consider that instead of being a warlike, this has been an extremely peaceful lecture — a lecture which ought to open the eyes of this country and make us feel that we have an enormous Empire to defend — an Empire which I do not suppose anyone — cer- tainly no one present — would wish to see diminished one single iota. The fact oE our having a great Colonial ilxhibition here tliis year seems to me to render what we have heard just now extremely appropriate. It so happens that there are a great many of our friends from the Colonies who are assembled in this great metropolis at this present time, and I am persuaded that they are quite as English and as old-fashioned in their feeling as any one of us. The question of federation is of course an enormous one, and it is one of the most difliciilt questions of the day. It is a question that perhaps will never be settled in my lifetime, but wo are all tending towards it, and I do not believe there is anything more likely to bring it about than this mutual feeling of necessity of mutual defence which has been so ably advocated on the present occasion. The first point in all these questions is security. Believe me, gentlemen, if you live in security you can do anything you like — whether it is commerce or ti-ade or manufacture, all these large and enormous questions are only to be conducted when you feel secure. Security lies at the bottom of the whole of these subjeots, and if therefore we can provide a great security not only for our homo arrangements but for our great Indian and Colonial Empire, I fuel persuaded tliat tliat will do more towards federation than any otiier considera- tion that can bo brought forward. Then comes the difficulty in all these matters, namely, the matter of means. We can find the men, wo can build the ships, but we must have the means to do so, and unless we have the means to do so it is im- jtossible to make any arrangements whatever. Now there arises the great difRculty. Taxation is a very inconvenient subject to talk about. Whether you talk of it at liome or whether you talk o' it in the Colonies everybody of course is anxious to point out that all these things may be deferred in order to make it less uncomfortable for -="7- 26 IMPERIAL FEDERATION — NAVAL AND MILITARY. the pockct8 of the taxpnycrs at the present moment. That really is the question — tliere is more in that than in anything else. If you arc prepared to tlo any tiling in regard to the subject which has now been so ably brougiit before us it niust cost money, and without money it cannot be done. Therefore if you, or if the country — for I do not doubt that cA'crybody here is quite prepared to do it — if tlio country, and not oidy our liome country, but if the Colonies and otlier portions of the Knipire are not prejiared to go to the expense of these preparations, it is useless to lliink of tliem at all. The only way to encourage this is to make every ' m feel tliat it is his interest to insure his property, whatever it may be ; and it i.-, really, after all, a great question of insurance. I was not aware exactly what line of argument the lecturer was about to use, and therefore you will hardly ex))ect me to go into any details. I will also further remark, that I understand tliere is to be another lecture on this subject later on, and therefore I would euggest that there should not bo any discussion to-day. I hope, therefore, I shall have expressed your views wlien I have thanked our gallant friend Captain Colonib for the very able manner in which he lias brought this subject forward, and perhaps the few remarks that I have made will make you all think of the really important points which he has brought to our notice. ttlHKIdON AND SONS, PaiNXEKB IN OBDINAKY TO UKK MAJ1S8XY, ttl'. 41AKT1N'« LAM). J fclie qupstion^ Ido nrivtliing in ll'; it. lIlUBt cost if the country f if the countrj, fortions of tho it is useless to J every ^ m feel Ind it L. really, what line of ^J oxj)oct me to til ere is to be fci;«vst that there Ihavo expressed H) for the very •rhaps tho few hportant points . thus Plm,- I. EMPIRE TABLB No. 6. ■ROWTH. '.evenues of the United Kingdom, ; years ago and now. s. riod of Colonial and Indian. 1886. m 'er Trade. U.K. and Ueps Shipping. U.K Cols. .ind Deps. Revenue. U.K. Cols. and Deps. 3 4 £ 5 6 Tons. Tons. 7 £ 8 £ m Population. Trade. pS. UTln'ti LAHE. 1886 Iff 6 7 8_ Shipping. Tons. Revenue. Millioni. 644 434 »$• *>4 ■06 -- »I4 95 -- . 77 - -64 Millions. Popi lation. 9.538,597 ao6,7o«i»35 2«<5,a39,73a 36,32S."S h figure of the Diagram are for beis express millions of £ in the itered and cleared in the case of ider the head of Population. Six lustration by diagram on this scale .<;, or the Revenues of the Colonies ;r case in 1851 to six millions, they 252,564,847 C. R. COLOMB. C'rt// iaft K.M.A. T 644. m ,7burna7 RirS. TnsMuixori Vol 30 Area. DEPENDENCIES 1884-5. Population. Trade. Shipping. TABLE No. 1. Kcv«nue. Ini>i 4' Area. Chnxbn' & Straits Whsv Wew Indies ... Africa... Sm/.u. Stations rtiT/i Square Miles. i,058,8i4» 26,837 128,374 20,390 101,574 1.335.9^ Square Miles. Population. aoo.465.8s3* 3,187,368 1.506,730 558.036 983,148 206,701,135 Trade. 157.25s.081 43,918,617 18,90^,344 3,449,236 34,364,044 257.895.322 "One I 1 Years Shipping Entered&Cleared. Tons. 7,250,603 9,854,284 6,558,323 1.417,234 26.293,283 51,373,737 Tons. * Upper Burmah included but not the Native States. Revenue. 71,727,421 1,792.643 a.054.675 285,057 1,479.383 77.339,178 COLONIES 1851. .m Million: ._- 24 Population. One Year's Trade. Shipping Entered & Cleared. Revenue. R N. Amebic^. ....■•... 2,471.297 534,793 405,906 12,719,332 8,9S7,6io 9,472,400 3.234.822 1.085,398 428,088 1.194.935 1.347,909 964,532 Total Coloniks 3,411,926 24.»4<>,a42 4,748.308 Tons. 2,806,676 /^__As nothing less than 6,250,000 can be shown on this scale. Population, Shipping, and Revenue cannot be shown in Diagrair.. DEFENDENC 1 1 Population. Trade. il lA 171,859.055 1.778.093 936,717 200,669 359.823 34,076,037 3,804,337 9,069,646 781,190 3,089,047 LON & StHAITS..., BT INUIBS IT Africa H |ll Stations MiH PAL DePKNDBNCIES h »75, 134,357 50,813,247 fSmWa COLONIES 1884-5. Population, Trade, Shipping, TABLE No. 2. Revenue, Millions, J m: Population. 4,504.319 31231.783 i,8o2,49s» 9.538,597 174 •01- One Year's :ffl: S Trade. £ 45,749,966 "8,573,876 13,118,920 i76,44?,762 Shipping Entered & Cleared Tons. 9,211,025 J5i38i,8S3 1,988,434 26,581,312 Tons. * Population Bechuana Land not included. Revenue. £ 7,080,115 82,297.79° 8,144,528 37,522,433 UNITED EINGDfOM 1884-6. Area. Population. Trade. Shipping. United Kingdom Area. Square Miles. 120^757 Population. 36,325,115 644. TABLE No. 8. Revenue. Millions. 644 92 64 36 One Year's Trade. £ 769,249 Shipping Entered & Cleared. Tons. 64.272,522 Revenue. £ 92,640,000 BFENDENCIES 1851. TABLE No 5. UNITED EINGDOl^ 1851 Millions. - 175 I ■: :: --50 - 29 6 ____■ ion. One Year's Trade. Shipping Entered &Cfcared. Revenue. 05s 34,076,037 1.561,347 27,625,360 093 3,804,327 501, 34« 429,701 717 9,069,646 1,075.190 730,469 669 781,190 155,338 47.837 823 3,082,047 a.733-'^53 537.950 357 50.813,247 0,029, HO9 Tons. 29.37i.3'7 £ Umitbd Kingdom .... Population. a7.505i.'»8« T Millions. 324 Trade. 324,803,307 DiVeTeaPs' Shipping Entered & Cleared. 14^05,064 Tons. 57 27 '4 Revenue. 57.964.464 £ C( D Harrison ic Sons. Lith.S' Martins Lane WC. TABIiB No. 8. Revenue. Millions. 644 92 - ; 64 : 36 — £ 3 ^ Revenue. ' £ 92,640,000 %ons. »4 Colonies Dependencies United Kingdom Colonies Depbndbnciks Total T Beyond Sea J United > Kingdom f Empire EMPIRE 1884-5. TABIjE No. 4. Trade. Millioni. --1,079 Colonies ... thus UJJ Dependencies „ |U United Kingdom -„ ^ Area, Area. Square Miles. 7,106,174 1.335.989 8,442,163 T20,7S7 8,569,030 Square Miles. Population. Shipping. Revenue. Population. 9.538,597 206.701,135 216,939,732 36,32S.i»5 252,564,847 252 -207 I ■— 142 "One Trade. £ 176.442,762 a57.89S,3»a 434,338,084 644,769,249 1,079,107,333 Shipping Entered & Cleared, Tons. 26,581,312 5>.373.727 77,955.039 64,272,522 j42.2a7.S61 Tons. Revenue. 37.522,433 77,339.178 114,861,611 93,640,000 207,501,611 At 3=* BliE No. 4. Millioni. - - 1,079 Revenue. - 252 -207 I--142 Revenue. ■37.532.433 77.339. »78 114,861,611 93,640,000 207,501,611 DIAGRAM OF GROWTH. PImIm I. TABLB No. e. Population. One year's Trade, Shipping, and Revenues of the United Kingdom, and of the Empire beyond Sea. 35 years ago and now. EXHIBITIONS. Period of International. 1851. At Home Millions. 3=4 74. 57 "■"■ 5" -\\- »"» , 27---": 14 t, Millions. Population. Trade. Shipping. Revenue. Over Sea. U.K. CSTs. and Deps. U.K. CoIsT and Deps U.K. Cols, and Deps, 3 4 5 6 £ Tons. Tons. 7 £ 8 £ Period of Colonial and Indian. 1886. Populatio n. Trade. Shippin(t. Revenue. At Home Over Sea. U.K. T^s. and Deps U.K Cols. .ind Deps. U.K, Cois. and Deps. 3 £ 4 5 6 £ Tons. Tons. 7 £ 8 £ Population i Trade. Shipping. Tons, 1 8 Revenue. 1851. : Population Trade. 1886 I Shipping. Tons. 7 8 Revenue. MiUioni. «44 434 «• ._ »i4 ._ aa6 ._. 9= 77 .— 6* Millions. N.B. — The numbers at top and bottom of each figure of the Diagram are for convenience of reference. The side numbeis express millions of £ in the case of Trade and Revenue ; of Tons entered and cleared in the case of Shipping ; and of numbers of persons under the head of Population. Six millions is the lowest figure admitting of illustration by diagram on this scale — hence, as the Population, the Tonnages, or the Revenues of the Colonies did not in their aggregate amount in either case in 1851 to six millions, they cannot be shown. J. C, R. COLOMB. Capt late R.IH.A. Vol 30 _ TABLE No. DIAGRAM Showing by Ocean Districts the vahie of One Year's Tude of the British Empire- flistinguishing between Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom -the Foreign Trade of th Coh)nies and Dependencies-the interchange between the Mother Country and the outlyin Empire— and also the interchange between British Possessions abroad.— 1883. OCBAN DiSTKItTS. North North East North West South Indian North c 1883. Million. 175 Seas. Atlantic. Atlantic. Atlantic. Seas. Pacific. p 150 - ■ : n United Kingdom "5 • : : : Foreign Trade 100 • : : ; One Year. 75 50 ■ \ : i A 25 \ : ; 1 m m Colonies and Dependencies Foreign Trade 50 - One Year. B. 25 1 1 u 1 1 Interchange between 100 Mother Country vn and 75 - Outlying Empire 50 - i c. "*' 25 - UMii 1 iiaii Fnm : Interchange between British Possessions 50 Abroad 1 One Year. D. 25 — ■r-i ■a-i 1 mrr) 225 Trade of 90O »75 : ! \ i 1 1 1 British Empire 150 : ■ : One Year. 125 lOO 75 50 ~ ; ■ " " 1 i _ '■ ': I J 25 _ \ i L 1 Han rl&ii i: Colonies thus...., 1 1 United Kingdom. Harriison Sc Sou Plai- II. TABLB ITo. 7. ! of the British Empire — the Foreitfn Trade of the Country and the outlying id.— 1883. Indian Seas. ja_ North Pacific. L ML FFTl South Pacific. DIAGRAM TABLE No. 8. Comi)aring the Trade and Revenue of Countries having sea boards on Pacific Ocean only. Millions. Peru Japan Chili China Australasia Trade in Million £ 25 SO 100 1 — r Revenue in Million £ »5 Romark* at to efTective Naval power. iJestroyed in War with Chili. 7 Sea-going modern Cruisers, etc., etc. 8 do. do. do. do. 7 du. do. da. do. Muiiitatns no (Xcan Crui!iers. DIAGRAM TABLE No. 9. Showing aggregate of Area ; the Annual Trade ; Revenue (and the Expenditure on War Forces) of British North America, South Africa, and Australasia, as compared with the United States, Our Colonial Empire of British North .\merica, British South Africa and Australasia. 7,106,174 Square Miles, Area. United States. 3.095.345 Square Miles. Million. £ 176 . 37 Our Colonial Empikb. Trade. '76.442.76a Revenue. IL 37.'sa».433 Expenditure, on War Forces. Cannot be shown on this Scale. 8oa,559 The United States. Trade. 293,999,000 Revenue, Expenditure on War Forces. 73,608,000 »i.737.7i4 Million. £ -293 7» N.B.— This Diagram excludes from the comparison the United Kingdom and the Empire of Dependencies, i.e., India, etc., etc. ^ . . -^ . J. C. R. COLOMB. • Cn^t. latt R.Af,A, Harriison k Sonc.LitL. S' Martins Lane.W.C Journ a/ P /7,? Tnstituticn. . Xo\. 30. STRATEGICAL SKETCH OF i TO ACCOMPANY LKCTUUK dc DIAGRAMS ON I^ '^'^' NORTH SEAS PriTTvary NayalBases— Secondary.. Ma^al (hUpostS DeM^rved, by CcqjUj. C.R.Colnrni>. 'Wfl CETCH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE '.RAMS ON IMPERIAL FEDERATION, NAVAL & Ml MTARY. • >l (' H.Chf^mb, fhmi^ly Capt.H.M.A. Plate HI. ^\^.... FHTTiary NaralBases. . -^(^ Secondary ■ ¥ayaL OujtpostS X Htrn.^oii K ocTrto LitL. C Martiin L.ins 'V.C Iff I