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Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as. many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre fiimds d des taux de reduction diff^rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich6, 11 est film6 d partir de I'angle sup^rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m6thode. 1 2 3 '■ ■ 1- ■■• 2 3 4 5 6 "?""'!"H5^11!BSB i^mem :/' >• PAPERS AND ADDRESSES n LOED BRASSEY I PAPERS AND ADDRESSES BY LOED BEASSEY, K.C.B., D.C.L. NAVAL AND MAEITIME FROM 1871 TO 1893 ARIUNOED AND EDITED BY CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY-WILMOT, R.N. VOL. II. LONDON LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK : 15 EAST le*** STREET 1894 All right* reterved 4 I CONTENTS ' • OF THE SECOND VOLUME ■&■ PART III. NAVAL RESERVES AND MERCHANT SEA- MEN. NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS, AND A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE. PAOK 1. OUR NAVAL EESBRVB8 AND COAST VOLUNTEERS. PAMPHLET, 1871 1 II. OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN. PAMPHLET, 1872. . 52 III. NAVAL RESERVES. PAPER AT ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, 1873 89 IV. OUR NAVAL RESERVE. SPEECH, HOUSE OF COM- MONS, 1874 106 V. HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. PAPER AT ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, 1876 .... 114 VI. GREENWICH HOSPITAL FUNDS AND I'ENSIONS. SPEECH, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1881 . . . 189 VII. THE NAVAL RESERVES. SPEECH, HOUSE OF COM- MONS, 1883 145 VHI. THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE AND ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS. SPEECH, HOUSE OF LORDS, 1890 . 160 VI CONTENTS OF I IX, X. THE ROYAL NAVAL ABTILLBEY V0LUNTEBB8. SPEECH BY MR. GOSCHEN, M.P., 1873 THE ORGANISATION OP THE BOYAL NAVAL ABTIL- LEEY VOLUNTEERS. PAMPHLET, 1874 XI. THE NAVAL VOLUNTEEBS, SPEECH AT LIVBEPOOL, 1888 PAGE 153 158 196 XII. THE BOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS, LETTER TO 'TIMES,' 1891 20l XIII. ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE. PAPER AT BOYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, 1878 207 PART IV. , AUXILIARY CRUISERS. COLONIAL DE- FENCE AND COALING STATIONS. NAV.'L TRAINING AND EDUCATION. NAVAL MAN(EUVRES. I. AUXILIARY CRUISERS. 1. THE MBBOANTILB MA- BINE CON8IDEEED AS AN AUXILIABY TO THE BOYAL NAVY. PAPER AT ROYAL UNITED SEB- VICE INSTITUTION, 1876. 2. A NAVAL RESEBVB OP SHIPS. LETTEB TO ' TIMES,' 1879. 3. MEB- CHANT CBUI8EBS. PAPEB AT INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS, 1893 225 II. COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS. 1. THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS. LETTEB TO * TIMES,' ' 1878. 2. CONDITION OP CYPBU8. SPEECH, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1879. 3. DEFENCES OF THE BM- PIBB. ADDBBSS, LONDON CHAMBBB OF COM- MBBOB, 1888. 4. GIBBALTAB. LETTEB TO ♦ TIMES,' 1890. 6. OASTBIBS BAY, ST. LUCIA. LETTEB TO • TIMES,' 1892. 6. OUB COALING STATIONS IN THB WEST INDIES. LETTBB TO 'TIMES,' 1892 . . 246 THE SECOND VOLUME VU AQE 153 158 196 2o: 207 III. NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION. 1. TRAINING OF NAVAL, OFFICERS. SPEECH, HOUSE OF COM- MONS, 1871. 2. NAVIGATION AND PILOTAGE OP HER majesty's SHIPS. PAPER AT ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, 181)1 IV NAVAL MANCBUVRES. 1. ON THE BEREHAVBN OPERATIONS, LETTERS TO ' TIMES,' 1885. 2. THE RECENT NAVAL MANCEUVRES. LETTER TO ' TIMES,' 1888. 3. THE NAVAL MANCEUVRES OF 1892. LETTER TO 'TIMES,' 1892. 4. NAVAL MANCEUVRES OF 1892. LETTER TO 'TIMES,' 1892 . V. STRENGTH OP THE BRITISH NAVY, ADDRESS TO CALCUTTA CHAMBER OP COMMERCE, 1893. PAOE 285 299 331 INDEX 341 225 246 ■ li ADDEESSES AND SPEECHES NAVAL AND MARITIME PART in JVAVAL BESEB^BS AND MERCHANT SEAMEN. NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS, AND A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Pamphlet Published in 1871 INTRODUCTION Op all problems in naval administration, the formation of reserves of seamen is the most important, and perhaps the most difficult. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the supreme im- portance of the question to an insular people. Any of the great European Powers can, by a lavish expenditure, provide the materiel of a fleet. The personnel requires long and careful organisation. The suggestions of an individual civilian, even though a Royal founded upon personal investigations, and matured by StoSS"'' II. B ,'r 2 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS :!ii labour and long reflection, cannot obtain — they do not deserve to possess— that degree of confidence which })rofessional experience can command. The local cir- cumstances of our numerous ports, the variety of their commerce, the prejudices, the habits, the qualifications of the seamen on different parts of the coast, must be taken into view in determining the best means of man- ning the Navy. An inquiry of such vital interest, and so conq)rehensive in its scope, demands the varied ex- perience and knowledge of the statesman, the lawyer, the shipowner, the merchant sailor, and, above all, of the naval ofHcer. In a Royal Connnission judiciously constituted, this wide . \nge of knowledge and experience may be fully represented. The Admiralty, however ably filled, cannot undertake so weighty a task in addi- tion to the daily administration of a great service em- l)loyed in every quarter of the globe. At the present time, exceptional anxiety is felt in many quarters as to the future of the mercantile marine. Inquiry into the manning of the Navy and the supply of seamen for the merchant service was held in 1852, and again in 18G0. Another decennial period having expired, the })rescnt seems a fitting moment for inviting public attention to this question. Support A Navy, unsupported by an extensive mercantile II uicrcniitiie marine, is a hothouse plant, which may indeed i^roduce great results for a time, but cannot endure the severe strain of a long protracted war. No nation can be a really formidable naval Power which does not possess an adequate maritime population. Russia, a half-Oriental, and Turkey, a semi- civilised State, can purchase or build ironclad ships. Their maritime resources would speedily be exhausted in war, because they lack the support of a flourishing mercantile marine. OUR NAVAL E^'^ERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 3 Continental statesmen are fully alive to the fact pe^j^^"^^ that the lighting Navy and the merchant service are necessarily interdependent ; and they look with anxious solicitude to the rapid development of the British mer- cantile marine, and to the naval ascendency which the progress of her shipping enterprise is calculated to secure for this country. If the merchant navy aflFords a reliable standard by nosourccs of which the naval resources of the principal maritime liritnin, Powers may be compared, the superiority of Great statos, Britain, as set forth in the following tabular statement Ru'sshj^ taken from Captain Richild Grivel's work, ' De la Guerre Maritime,' is established beyond all question. Great Britain Uuitol States France llussia I Total seafaring 1 population / Available for the"} lieet J 420,000 350,000 170,000 60,000 243,000 180,000 4,144,568 181,000 Mercantile tonnage ( United Kins:dom, J 5,(531,727. 1 I3r".ti sh Empire, \ 1,550,703. 7,185,430 l,058,.'v48 The relative amount of mercantile tonnage has been included in the comparative table, because it is only inferior in its importance to the relative strength in seamen. Merchant steamers have been proved by recent experietice to be readily adapted for service as auxiliaries to more ])owerful vessels primarily constructed for war. In America, during the war with the Southern States, the Union purchased and armed 322 merchant steamers, which proved to be a most valuable supplement to the u 2 4 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Organisa- tion re- quired Navy, in assisting to maintain a blockade along an unprecedented length of coast. But, however marked our advantages from the pos- session of an enormous merchant navy, it is not the less our duty to develop those resources by careful organisa- tion, for the purpose of naval defence. To be first in the field — ever a great advantage— has now become more essential than before ; since the electric telegraph, railways and steam navigation have given increased celerity to the operations of war, both by sea and land. nil See Ap- pendix B See Ap- jMindix C Navy of Uuiteil States in tlie Civil War Modern Bliips require fewer men Before attempting to frame a scheme of naval organisa- tion, we have to underttike the difficult task of forming an approximate estimate of the number of men who will probably be required to man our fleets in time of war. The inquiries, instituted in 1852, as to the probable requirements of the British Navy elicited the usual divergency of opinions from the naval officers who were consulted. In the recent civil war in America, the Navy of the United States was increased to vast proportions. Land defences of great strength were attacked by their ships. An effectual blockade was maintained along 3,500 miles of coast. A fleet of cruisers was despatched in chase of the * Alabama ' and other piratical vessels to every part of the world. To perform these varied services some 671 vessels were employed ; but, such was the effect of modern changes in naval warfare, that the number of men employed in the United States fleet never exceeded 51,000 men. The blockade of Charleston is one of the most strik- ing examples of the reduced numbers of seamen required in modern naval warfare. The report of the Secretary OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 5 of the United States Navy on armoured vessels, published in 1866, contains a despatch from Admiral Dahlgren, dateu off Morris Island, January 1864, in which the following observations occur : * The completeness with which four little monitors, supported by an ironclad frigate, have closed Charleston is well worth noting. These four monitors, which thus keep watch and ward, muster eight guns and 320 men, which is almost insig- nificant compared with the work done.' The last Royal Commission on the Manning of the Royal com- .,, , . »i mission oil Navy, reporting in 1860, had not the experience of the Miuming American war as a guide for determining our probable requirements. But, inasmuch as their report contains the latest authoritative exposition of professional opinion in our own Navy, it deserves attentive consideration. Comparing the recommendations of the Royal Commis- sions with the estimate submitted to Parliament in the present year, the result is as follows : Commission, 186U Estimate, 1871, 1872 Coast Guard ..... Coast Volunteers .... Royal Naval Reserve . 12,000 10,000 20,000 4,300 2,200 15,000 We cannot but admit that the introduction of mast- less ships, the substitution of steam-power for sails, of mechanical appliances for manual labour, and the changes in naval armament, have considerably reduced the necessary complement of a ship of war. Yet, while fully recognising the altered character of modern Navies, the reserves of seamen, considered to be essential by the Royal Commission, seem small enough, when compared with the probable demands on the Navy of a long pro- tracted war. ^ii Expenditure of Powers on Navy 6 OUR NAVAL re.servp:s and coast volunteers It must, therefore, be assumed tliat it is the duty of Farliament to increase the strength of our Reserves to the standard laid down in the latest official programme. The following table shows, in round figures, the annual naval expenditure of the principal maritime Powers : " I strength of flsets Distribution of men England Franco . United States Russia . 10,000,000 6,500,000 4,000,000 2,500,000 Again, comparing the naval tonnage of the three principal maritime Powers, we find that the relative strength of their respective fie jts is as follows : Country Naval Tonnage (Total Number of Tons) 660,000 469.000 186,000 Proportion of Naval to Mercantile Tonnage En. land France United States One eighth One fourth One twenty-fourth With these figures before us, it must be accepted as an axiomatic principle that an increase of the Reserves cannot be obtained, unless we are prepared for a reduc- tion in other branches of expenditure. Can we, or can we not, safely make such a reduction in our peace Navy as will provide for an increased expenditure on our Reserves ? This is the problem before us. The Estimates for 1871 contemplate the employment of a force of 29,000 petty officers and seamen in our ships of war. But among the 29,000 so-called seamen are included 2,600 mechanics, 3,000 stokers, and 3,600 servants. Retaining the existing force of 18,000 blue- jackets, can we safely reduce the strength in other less essential branches of our naval force, and apply a portion of the money saved to the completion of our Naval Reserves ? OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 7 Estimated at tlie most moderate amount^ the cost of every blue-jacket ii\ the fleet cannot he less than 50^. a year. A seaman of the Reserve Force ought not to cost the country more than 8/. a year. Thus six seamen can be maintained in the Reserves for the sum required to maintain one seaman on active service in the Royal Navy. To raise the Royal Naval Reserve to the stan- dard approved by the Royal Commission, an increase of 6,000 men is required. On the other hand^ a reduction of 1,000 men in the peace establishment of the Navy would furnish the means of making the proposed addi- tion to the Royal Naval Reserve without any additional charge. In the day of battle, 6,000 well-trained men from the Reserves would be of more value to the country than 1,000 blue-jackets permanently maintained in the Navy. Assuming that the proposed augmentation of the Reserves has received the sanction of Parliament, are we justified in looking to the merchant service for the proposed reinforcement for the Reserves ? It is to be feared that no considerable assistance could be obtained at the present time from this source. The opinion is now almost universally entertained that the number of prime seamen in the mercantile marine adapted for the Royal Navy is falling off; and this lamentable scarcity of highly-trained seamen is mainly attributed to the diminished number of apprentices in our merchant ships. From Captain Murray, an able commander in the Peninsular and Oriental service, I have tlie following discouraging report : * The quality of the merchant seaman has deteriorated very much, and the number of skilled seamen has decreased. More than half of the men now called seamen are of such a quality as was Cost of sailors mid lleserve men Limit to number of merchant Sfumca Quality of nieroliant hoftuicu 8 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Captain Murray's Opinion Commander Dawson'a Views unknown formerly. Some excellent seamen are still to be found: hut they arc so few that the finest services only can get them. The superintendent of mercantile marine at Glasgow says that he cannot find good men for a few ships of the Peninsular and Oriental Company suddenly requiring crews at that port. Ten per cent, of the able seamen annually shipped in the port of London are foreigners. They are employed because English seamen are not to be obtained. ' Omitting from our consideration the men belonging to the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve, our seamen are inferior to the Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans. Iti Sweden the system of apprenticeship is extensively adopted. On the coast of China, Swedish ships are frequently seen, manned in a very large pro- portion by lads, who have gone out for a three years' trading voyage and return home well-trained young seamen. By this system of manning their ships the expenditure is reduced to a minimum, and the Swedes cut out the English shipping in every direction. The deficiency of seamen in England 'i° not caused by insuf- ficient pay. Wages at the present time are very high. Seamen in steamers trading to the Mediterranean are earning 3^. 5^. to 3/. 10s. a month, and are found in addition. Their provisions cost about ten shillings a week. The only remedy for the present state of things is the revival, in some shape or other, of the practice of taking apprentices, which has unhappily been too gene- rally abandoned.' Another competent authority, Commander William Dawson, R.N., in a paper recently read before the Social Science Association, amply confirms the views of Captain Murray : ' Uixder the Compulsory Navigation Laws our ships OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST V^OLUNTEERS 9 carried in 1834 34,858 apprentices. In IHo? the ap- prentices numbered 29,096 ; since which date there has been a steady decline, until they reached, by the last return, only 10,935; whilst there were only 4,013 fresh entries to replace the waste of bond fide seamen, which is estimated at about 10,000 per annum. The other vacancies are tilled up by able-bodied foreign seamen, the best of whom come from the north of Europe, and by low-caste British adult landsmen.' The Liverpool Committee of Inquiry into the Condi- tion of Merchant Seamen reported last year that out of 104 shipowners or masters consulted, 89 percent, regard seamen as deteriorated in skill, 65 per cent, as inferior in physic ,1 condition, and 71 per cent, as inferior in subordination. There are upwards of 20,000 foreigners navigating British ships, who are employed solely be- cause our own merchant navy does not supply a sufficient number of trained seamen to man our increasing fleets. In the foregoing remarks the diminution in the numbers of trained seamen in the merchant service has been treated as if it were attributable mainly to the abandonment of the system of apprenticeship formerly in vogue. It would be uncandid not to acknowledge that the introduction of steam, in substitution for sails, has in part conduced to the present state of things. The opening of the Suez Canal, and the recent improvements in steam machinery, which by reducing the consump- tion of fuel have made steam-power so much more economical than before, have given a new impulse to the construction of steamers. The review of the commercial history of 1870, re- cently published in the 'Economist,' contains a well- digested report on the transition which is in progress in the character of our mercantile fleet. On the Tyne and Foreipii seamen Effect of steam Increase of steamors liiS 10 OUK NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS ■i 1 See Ap- Iieiulix D The Royal Naval Resenre Wear the increase in the number's of steamers built by local owners is extraordinary. North Shields, which had scarcely a ton of iron shipping five years ago, will, ere the close of next year, possess steam-shipping pro- perty worth one million sterling. In the Clyde the in- crease in the tonnage of steamships is equally remark- able. In 1870 there was a decrease of sixty percent, in the number of sailing ships constructed on that river. On the other hand, there were launched 121 screw steamers, of a total burthen of 133,000 tons, exceeding by thirty vessels and 50,000 tons the number built in any previous year. The average screw steam tonnage launched during the last seven years was about 65,000 tons, being only the half of the screw steam tonnage launched in 1870. The deduction from these figures is unmistakable. As steamers multiply, the facility for giving to our seamen that thorough training which can only be obtained in sailing ships must be in propoi'tion diminished. In the present state of the mercantile marine the Royal Naval Reserve is necessarily a stationary force. The enrolment of seamen proceeds slowly, because we have arrived at the length of our tether. If, therefore, we desire to increase the Reserves to the numbers pre- scribed by the Royal Commission, new expedients must be devised. It has been suggested that the Government should largely increase the number of boys in training in the school-ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth. It is certain that by this means any number of seamen can be admirably trained for the Royal Navy ; but the large expenditure which it involves is a serious objection. A boy cannot be trained in the Royal Navy for a less sum than 50/. a year; and a raw country lad cannot be con- verted into a skilful seaman in less than four years. OUR NAVAL liESERVES ANJJ COAST VOLUNTEERS 11 Consequently a sum of 200/. must he expended upon the Kxpen-se training of every hoy hrought up in tlio Royal Navy. " " Again, an exclusive training in the Royal Navy is to a certain extent a disqualification for the merchant ser- vice, where the discipline and the nature of the employ- ment dift'er in many important respects from naval practice. It is scarcely necessary to observe that, as we cannot increase the strength of our peace Navy, it will be impossible to retain for service in the fleet the additional number of boys whom it is proposed to train. Under these circumstances the revival, in a modified form, of the old system of apprenticeship in the mer- chant service appears to be the best, indeed the only practicable, policy. Perhaps it may be thought that the numerous train- Sea training ing-ships established at our principal ports could supply an effective education for apprentices to the sea, Train- ing-sliips as at present conducted cannot produce sailors. It is essential that the boys should learn their vocation on the blue water. Unless they have practice at sea, boys might be trained equally well at a school, provided with a flagstaff, on shore. With two or three brigs attached to each receiving ship a thousand boys could be turned out every year. As the equipment of such vessels would involve a large additional expendi- ture, it is probable that assistance from the State might be applied with greater advantage to the encouragement of a more practical system of training. As an economical means of raising seamen for the state bonus Royal Naval Reserve, I would recommend that a bonus ticer^'^"'" should be paid from the National Exchequer for every apprentice indentured in the merchant service. The payment of the bonus must necessarily depend upon the fulfilment of certain indispensable conditions. The ships ■I 1 Entry and training of apprentices :1s h f ■■ I New class i)f Naval Iteserve 12 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS ill which the apprentices are employed must be sailing ships. The cliaracter and equipment of the ship must be approved by a marine superintendent or by an officer appointed by the Admiralty to supervise the enrohnent of Government apprentices. The number of apprentices must be limited ; not more than one Vjeing allowed to every hundred tons. The apprentice should be inden- tured at a shipping-office, before a marine superintendent, at the age of fifteen or sixteen years. He should be bound to serve for at least four years as an apprentice, and to serve in the Royal Navy, after the completion of his apprenticeship, for a further period of two years as an ordinary seaman. While in the Navy he should be employed in a sea-going squadron, in which he would be trained in gunnery and small-arm drill, and become accustomed to carry out evolutions aloft with the smartness and precision required in a ship of war. After two years' training in the Royal Navy the ap- prentice, who would have become a skilled seaman, would return to the merchant service, with the obliga- tion to remain in the Royal Naval Reserve until he was forty-eight years of age. Following the opinion expressed by Mr. W. S. Lindsay, I would recommend that no annual retainer should be given ; but that the Royal Naval Reserve men of the new class proposed should, whenever called out for an annual or occasional course of drill, receive adequate wages. In order to carry out the policy pro- posed, it is most important to secure the highest possible degree of efficiency in the Navy. If it were necessary to make a large addition to our naval forces, the Navy proper should supply the petty officers, leading seamen, and gunners ; the Reserves, all the able and ordinary seamen for our fleets. A comparatively small standing OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 13 Navy backed by well-organised and powerful Reserves will give much greater strength in the hour of need than a far larger peace Navy unsupported by Reserves. In the most successful of modern armies a short service in the ranks has been required from the entire able-bodied male population. This policy has been marvellously successful. In the scheme which has been sketched out in these pages an attempt has been made to apply the Prussian military .system to our own Navy, with such modifications as are neces.sary to adapt a compulsory system to a force recruited upon the v».'untary principle and employed for service afloat. The Government apprentice, trained in the mercantile marine, and bound to serve for two years in the Royal Navy, would take the place of the ordinary seaman now employed in the fleet. A limited period of service would afford to the Navy the power of training an increased number of sea- men to take an effective part in the defence of the country. Having explained the nature of their obligations, I will now indicate the terms which might be offered to eligible lads who would engage to enter the merchant service as Government apprentices. Shipowners hesitate to take apprentices, chiefly shipowuers* , ill 1 objection to because boys unaccustomed to the sea are useless on uppreutices board ship. An interval of a year must usually elapse before an apprentice acquires his sea-legs and can render sufficient service to his employer to repay the cost of the provisions which he consumes. It frequently occurs that foreign boys are shipped in English vessels trading to the Baltic. These lads having previously been at sea have become inured to the hardships of a sailor's life, and are found more useful than an English 14 OUR NAVAL IlESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS State prpiiiiuni iiilvocsitcd CImngc of rcsldciico The bonus system boy who has had no previous training afloat. As an inducement to shipowners to take apprentices, I would propose that the State should pay a premium of ten pounds each for a certain number of so-called Govern- ment apprentices ; the premium to be payable upon the signing of the indenture of apprenticeship. A further sum of three pounds to be paid to the ship- owner to be expended in providing the apprentice with the most essential articles for his sea-kit. During the period of his apprenticeship the apprentice to appear at least once a year at the otKce of the marine super- intendent by whom his indentures were originally registered ; and upon proof being given that the terms of the apprenticeship have been honestly fulfilled, the sum of a pound to be paid to the owner, and a like amount to the apprentice, by way of annual bonus from th6 State. The payment of these annual fees to com- mence in the second year, and to be continued during the third and fourth years of the apprenticeship. ProN'ision could easily be made for a transfer of registry from one shipping- office to another in the event of the apprentice or his parents having changed their place of residence. On the final completion of his apprenticeship, and upon being admitted into the Royal Navy, the apprentice to receive a gratuity of two pounds. Upon the completion of his service in the Navy, and upon his joining the Reserve, the apprentice to receive a final bonus of four pounds. The total amount of these payments is twenty-five pounds. The terms proposed may probably be criticised as unduly liberal. They do not exceed the cost of training a boy for a single year in the Royal Navy. There is a precedent for the bonus system which has been suggested in the payment, under the sanction OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 15 Sch; Ap- IIOIKiiX E of the Poor I^w Board, of a premium of ten pounds to sliipowners who are willing to receive pauper boys into their service to be brought up as apprentices to the sea. If the expenditure of local funds has been approved, surely the appropriation of the public funds for a like purpose, and with a view to the mutual advantage of the apprentice and the State, will not be regarded as an extravagant policy. It is not proposed that an annual retainer should be I'ensioii paid to the seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve. As an inducement to continue in the Reserves, and to check the tendency to sail under a foreign ilag, they should receive a liberal pension, to commence at an age when failing powers too often compel the sailor to abandon the sea. With this object in view I would suggest that the pension to seamen of the Naval Reserve should conm)ence at the age of lifty, and that the pay- ment should be fixed at eighteenpence a day. The pi.nsion proposed may seem too liberal. Unhappily, statistics tell us that but a small proportion of our sea- men would enjoy the bounty of the State. In France the seaman - compelled to serve in the Navy by an in- exorable law— becomes eligible for an ' Invalides pen- sion ' at the age of tif ty, subject to the conditions of his having served for a period of twenty-five years ailoat in the national or the merchant navy, ' Such is the shortness of life,' says Captain Richild Grivel, 'among the seafaring class in France that only one-fourth of the whole number of the seamen who would be entitled to the pension attain to the qualifying age,' The collection of the despatches and letters of Lord Nelson, edited by Sir Harris Nicolas, contains a plan for manning the Navy, which is an interesting relic of our great naval hero. 16 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS i ■ 1 I Nelson's proposal for seaiueu Author's plan *When you calculate,' writes Lord Nelson, 'by figures, on the expense of raising seamen, I think it is said 20/. per man, and that 42,000 seamen deserted during the late war, the loss in money, in that point alone, amounts to 840,000/. ; without taking into con- sideration the greater expense of raising more men, and certainly not so good as those who have been used to the King's naval service. ... I shall therefore propose that every seaman Avho has served faithfully five years in war, and, by his certificates, never been concerned in mutinies, nor deserted, shall receive eveiy iiew year's- day, or on the King's birthday, the sum of 2/. ; and if he serves eight years, shall have if. 4s., exclusive of any pension for wounds. It may appear, at first sight, for the State to pay an enormous sum ; but when it is considered that the average life of a seaman is from old age finished at forty-five years, he cannot many years enjo^' the annuity.' According to the plan which I venture to propose, the seaman In the Reserve would be liberally treated by the State in the two most anxious 'ages of man.' He would receive a welcome aid in early youth, when in our densely-populated councry the struggle for daily oread is most difficult ; and again he would be be- friended by the Government in the premature old age which the seaman too often feels, and which deprives him of the means of earning a livelihood in his laborious and trying vocation. While giving in a generous spirit a helping hand to some among our struggling poor, this system of State-aided apprenticeship would confer a real boon on our merchant service by renewing that supply of well-trained seamen which will never be obtained without some methodical and well- devised system of training. To the Royal Navy a strong OUR NAVAI. RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 17 Reserve is of far greater value tlian a trifling addition to the number of continuous-service seamen. It may not be necessary to dismiss every seaman Rpnownioi trained in the mercantile marine on the completion* of aiivocatwi his short service in the Navy. A proportion of tnese young seamen might be allowed to remain in Her Majesty's fleet, as a reward for superior intelligence and good conduct. Their two years' previous service should, in the latter case, be allowed to count towards their pension on retirement. If an apprentice can be trained in the merchant service sufticiently well to become use- ful in the fleet for an eighth of the sum which it would cost to bring up a boy in the Koyal Navy, surely a system so infinitely more economical ought not to be hastily condemned. The value of the Royal Naval Reserve has been Oiiinioi seriously (jUCationed by very competent naval autlu>ri- Uesfrvc ties. They complain of inferiority in physique, of the loose discipline, and of ignorance of every description of drill. These criticisms, it must be admitted, are not devoid of foundation. On the other hand, it should be remembered that in the miscellaneous body which con- stitutes the Royal Naval Reserve, large numbers of men are to be found of whose capabilities and conduct very fa\ourable opinions have been formed by the officers under whom they ser\ ed. I may point out that under the present regulations i? COAST VOLUNTEERS I, P Necessity of u large reserve See Ap- pendix P Impress- ment no lonjrei' possible See Ap- pendix O ll'l I I i of seven pounds, as a reward for proficiency in the various drills in which the Reserves are instructed. In this connection wc must never forget that the Royal Naval Reserve affords in point of fact the only means of manning our fleets in the supreme emergency of war. To some, perhaps, it may appear an unnecessary expense to create reserves of seamen in time of peace. It may be thought that with a small addition to our ordinary naval means we should be able to cope with the Navies of every maritime power inferior to our own ; and that in the event of a war large numbers of seamen would be thrown out of employment and readily volun- teer for the Navy, To this line of argument it may be urged in reply that even if our ordinary trade were interrupted by war the demands upon the merchant service for the conveyance of troops and stores would give full employment to our seamen ; and that it is accordingly essential to secure for the State, by the payment of an annual retainer, or by giving a bonus to apprentices, a prior claim to the services of the best seamen we possess. Even in days gone by impressment was a most un satisfactory expedient. It is now impossible. The facilities of escape by railway and steamship, and the sympathy of public opinion with men torn from their homes against their will, would render impressment no longer practicable. ' Impressment,' as was observed by Mr. C. H. Pennell, in his paper written in 1852 on the manning of the Navy, *is a measure which the country itself recoils from using. It is unsuited to the character of the age ; harsh in its exercise ; exhausting in its process ; and more than problematical in its results. By the substi- OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 19 tution of a volunteer service of trained seamen for the compulsory service of untrained men, we should seek to exemplify on a large scale the sound experimental wisdom contained in tlie old naval adage, " one volunteer is better than two pressed men." ' The difficulty arising from the abandonment of the Secretary system of compulsory service has been as keenly felt in states Navy America as in England. The report of the Secretary of the United States Navy for the year 1869 shadows forth a scheme based upon principles identical with those advocated in these pages. * It becomes necessary,' writes Mr. Robeson, ' that some means should be de- vised to bring the seamen in this country to its pro- tection in time of war. The people would not object to the payment of suitable bounties, ai liiking proper provision for the family of the sailor, provided the (jrovf-rnment could certainly secure their services when required. 'By adopting, as far as practicable, a system of registry anol enrolment for active and reserve seamen, induced, if need be, by a liberal periodical advance of clothing and money, and by bounties when necessary, we may do much towards the speedy restoration of the personnel of our Navy, and, by adding to this a regular system of training for petty officers and first- class seamen, its ancient prestige and glory may be increased.' Having shown that the Royal Naval Reserve is Number c.f the only practicable scheme for securing a supply of riquir'ai'^''''' seamen for our Navy in the event of war, we have now to consider what number of apprentices it is expedient to assist by a grant of special aid from the State. It has already been stated that our present Royal Naval Reserve is 14,000 strong, being less by 6,000 than c 2 20 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEER Reserve of officers Increase of officers in American] war i the Reserve reconinieiulod by the Royal Commission of 1860. To maintain a force of a given numher of aide seamen it will be necessary to keep one-third of that number constantly in training as apprentices. Assum- ing, therefore, that we increase the Royal Naval Reserve by 6,000 men, we must have 2,000 additional boys always under training. Assuming an annual expen- diture of 61. for each Government apprentice, and 50^. for every lad under training in the Navy, we should have an annual outlay of 12,000/. for training 2,000 boys in the merchant ser\ice, as compared with an annual expenditure of 100,000/. for educating the same number of boys in the Royal Navy. If the plan of training boys in the merchant service be adopted, a reduction of 240 men, the complement of a single corvette, in the force employed in the peace Navy would enable the Government to secure, without adding to our present naval expenditure, a sufficient training for the number of boys required. Having suggested means for obtaining the seamen, we have next to deal with the equally important ques- tion of supplying a reserve of officers. These can be obtained, as they were in the civil war in America, from the merchant service. The Secretary of the United States Navy, in his Report for the year 1865-66, states that about 7,500 officers of the merchant navy had, after examination, received appointments and been employed in the Navy of the Union. 'Schools,' he says, 'were established to instruct and perfect them in the rudiments of naval gunnery ; and it is due to them to say that they have acquitted themselves with zeal and fidelity. The inter- <50urse between these volunteer officers and the officers of OUJi NAVAL KESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 21 tho regular Navy h.as been productive of mutual good- will and respect. It will, I trust, leacl to a lasting personal friendsliip, and constitute an enduring intimacy between the connnercial and naval services. Most of the volun- teer officers have received an honourable discharge, and returned to their peaceful professional service.' In this connection I would suggest that in future Training of bo^ lleswrvc the same regulations should apply to our volunteer officer services, both by sea and land ; and that no officer should receive a commission in the Royal Naval Reserve whose efficiency had not been previously tested in the rudiments of naval gunnery. A short course of training should be commenced on board the ' Excellent ' for the instruction of the Reserves ; and no officer of the mer- chant service, and no yacht owner, should hereafter bo allowed to receive a commission in the Reserves who had not been trained in the ' Excellent ' and received a certificate of proficiency. II FiiOM the Royal Naval Reserve we turn to the Coast Coast Volunteers. Such a force is capable, under judicious administration, of rendering invaluable service ; but it has hitherto been most unaccountably neglected, ' The fishing population is regarded by French naval authorities as an invaluable and essential element in their Navy. In a recently published pamphlet on the condition ivincede of the French Navy in ISG."), Prince dc Joinville ob- """" "^ serves : ' La seule branche de notre navigation qui ne deperisse pas en ce moment est la pOche. Celle qui se fait sur le littoral voit les chemins de fer assurer un debouche et une plus grande \ aleur a ses produits par 22 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS :5 -; '■ ■ ' Ill ^'1 Deflciput number of Coast Volunteers FisherniPii for coast tkfcnco Ic transport rapido du poisson. Quant a la grande pLche, celle qui s'arme pour I'lslande de Terre-Neuve, elle se maintient, grace aux avantages protecteurs dont elle jouit encore. Grande et petite peclie font done aujourd'hui I'ernploi de la majeure partie de notre per- sonnel naval ; k la difference de ce qui se passe chez les autres peuples niarins, ou elles ne sont qu'un accessoiro.' The lloyal Commission advised that the Coast Volunteers should be raised to a normal strength of 10,000 men. It may be interesting to mention that the French Commission on the manning of their Navy, reporting in 1843, recommended that a force of 13,000 men should be held in reserve for the defence of the French coast. This opinion has been confirmed by high authorities in the French Navy, who have more recently been called upon to report on this subject. At present the Coast Volunteers are reduced to 2,200 men. The actual strength, therefore, as compared with the standard proposed by the Royal Commission, shows a deficiency of 7,800 men. Happily there need be no anxiety as to the existence of available recruits. From a return recently presented to Parliament, it appears that there are in the vessels employed in the fisheries in the ports of England and Wales 47,290 men and 7,467 boys ; in Scotland, 68,406 men and 4,773 boys ; in Ireland, 37,083 men and 1,729 boys ; making a total of 152,779 men and 13,969 boys. I need scarcely enlarge on the peculiar qualifications of our fishermen for the manning of a coast-defence llotilla. Those among them more especially who hail from the northern ports are men of the most powerful physique. A distinguished officer, now an admiral of the Royal Navy, who recently held a divisional com- mand in the Coast Guard on the Clyde, informs me that OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 23 a body of 600 men, enrolled by him a few years ago in the Naval Coast Volunteers in Scotland, averaged one inch taller and two inches more round the chest than the marines on boaixl his ship. It may Ije true that the complaints of the inefficiency of the Coast Volunteers on their lirst enrolment were not without foundation. But it is only fair to say that, as in the case of the Royal Naval Reserve, so in the case of the Coast Volunteers in the original enrolment, sufficient care was not always exercised to reject unsuitable men. A recent attempt has been made to form a subsidiary socnnd-ciass reserve force, by the enrolment of young seamen in a second- class reserve ; but the rules laid down for admission to this force are so framed as to exclude absolutely all those large sections of our seafaring population who are employed in vessels rigged on the fore and- aft systen). Fishermen, brought up in smacks, cutters, and luggers, may or may not be ignorant of the evolutions required in a large square-rigged \essel. Admirable for work on deck in a small gunboat rigged after the fashion to which they are accustomed, they may be incapable of going aloft on the royal-yard of a line-of-battle ship. But why require from them qualifications which, if they are employed, as they ought to be, exclusively on our flotilla for coast defence, they will never be called upon to put in practice ? Our fishermen possess many of the qualifications Local know- proposed for the second-class reserve. ' They can steer ; Sfemeu box the compass; heave the lead; and pull a strong oar.' Above all, the fishermen employed in their daily avocation upon our own coasts will contribute to the service of the Navy an intimate knowledge of an intri- cate navigation, M'ith which from long habit they have become familiar, but which the officers and men brought I Aptitude of fisliermeu See Ap- pendix H Testimony of naval ofBcers P3 Si 2-1 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS up in the Navy, and chiefly employed on foreign stations, have few opportunities of studying. They alone who are acquainted with the navigation among the sandbanks extending along the eastern coast of England, from the South Foreland to the north of the Humber, can appre- ciate the immense importance of providing for a coast- defence flotilla in such waters crews composed of seamen possessing a local knowledge of that coast. To some it may appear doubtful whether all the dash and elan required for naval operations is to be found among the stay-at-home people who earn a livelihood in our fisheries. Had they seen, what the author has often witnessed, the agility, the seamanlike resource, and the nerve which these men never fail to display in the ever- varying incident and adventure of sea-life, they would no longer doubt their aptitude, if properly trained, for every duty which the crews of our coast flotilla may be called upon to perform. The enrolment of fishermen in the Reserves has been advocated by our most experienced naval reformers — by Sir Charles Napier, by Admiral Berkeley, by Sir William Hall, by Admiral Hastings, by the late Ad- miral Sir David Milne, and by many other most distin- guished naval officers. The capabilities of fishermen as a Naval Reserve have perhaps been studied by no naval ofiicer more carefully than by Sir William Hall. He has confidently stated that the fishermen are from their occupation peculiarly fitted for service in our coast- defence flotilla ; and, from their having fixed places of residence, they are the more easily to be obtained in the hour of need. The seamen of the merchant service, accustomed to a roving life over the wide ocean, are subject to temptations to serve under a foreign flag, to which the fishermen, whose habits are essentially OUR NAVAL IlESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 25 domestic and who have, with rare exceptions, fixed places of residence to which they are greatly attached, are not exposed. The most desirable men for the coast - defence sea Militia are to be obtained at Penzance, Brixham, Brighton, Hastings, Folkestone, Deal, Barking, Col- chester, Lowestoft, Yarmouth, Cromer, Berwick, Dunbar, Newhaven, Anstruther, Aberdeen, Peterhead, Cromarty, Wick, Shetland, Orkney, and the western islands of Scotland. Our seafaring population at first regarded with Training . . , . . . , . . ^T T, of Coast wonted suspicion the invitation to join the Keserves, volunteers Their prejudices have been overcome by kind treatment. Many who are now anxious to join the Reserves are excluded by their want of experience in square-rigged vessels. To reject these men altogether when our gunboat flotilla and our mastless turret- ships will require large numbei'o of men trained to gunnery and accustomed to the sea, but in which agility aloft can never be required, seems to be a policy so blind and prejudiced that it is difficult to understand how it can ever have received the sanction of our naval authorities. The rules for admission into the Coast Volunteers should be so framed as to require only such seamanship as every experienced fisherman must possess. Training in gunnery and small arm-drill are the only additional qualifications needed to make our fishermen thoroughly useful in the coast - defence fiotilla. The training should be given afloat ; and in order to propitiate the local sympathies of the fishermen the gunboats which they would be employed to man in times of war should be permanently stationed at the ports in which their crews are respectively raised. Officers should be selected to command the coast- 26 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Officers for coast - defence Reserve Coast Guard Number of officers for coast- (Iffencc defence Reserve who have exhibited special aptitude for that branch of the service. They should reside at the principal fishinp; ports, and be permanently attached to the coast - defence service. By these means they would have the inestimable advantage of being person- ally acquainted with the men under their command. In his evidence on the manning of the Navy, in 1852, Admiral Berkeley stated that special care should be taken in the selection of officers for the coast-defence service, and that it was essential that all the officers, and particularly the commanding officer, should be accustomed to the fishermen and they to him. In addi- tion to the proposed drills in gunnery and the use of small arms, it would be highly expedient that officers and men should make themselves locally acquainted with the channels and entrances to the harbours in their respective districts, and be instructed in the use of the torpedo and its application to coast defence. As a measure of economy, the duties of the Coast Guard might advantageously be combined with the command of the coast - defence Reserve. The annual drills afloat, and the musters of the coast - defence flotilla for inspection by the divisional captain of the Coast Guard, or for inspection in larger numbers at naval reviews, would secure the continued efficiency of the officers of the coast-defence service in seamanship and navigation. Having dealt with the general system of training, my next task shall be to form an estimate of the number of officers required for our coast-defence service. It may be assumed that our coast - defence flotilla will consist of a hundred gunboats and thirty monitors, and that we shall want a hundred lieutenants for the OUR NAVAL IlESERVES AUD COAST VOLUNTEERS 27 hundred ^'unboats, and thirty coninumders and thirty lieutenants for the thirty armour- ulad monitors. The precise number of vessels to be equipped for the Number of • 1 1 • 1 '^•^ss'^ls for defence of our coasts must of necessity be determined coast- upon an arbitrary hypothesis. In 1852 Sir Byam Martin gave it as his opinion that we ought to have a reserve of twenty steamers in each great port — the Med way, Portsmouth, and Plymouth — together with five at Pembroke and five at Cork. By means of these squadrons stationed along the coast constant intercourse would be kept up between Harwich and Scilly. A similar force was proposed by Sir Thomas Hastings, to be composed of 135 steamers distributed at important stations along the coast. A squadron of twenty-live steamers was to be added for service in the North Sea. Twenty were to be stationed at Holyhead and twenty at Cork. The proposed stations being about ten hours' steaming from each other, it was believed that the electric telegraph would secure at any assailable part of the coast the presence of a sufficient force to prevent the disembarkation of an army of invasion with the necessary materiel of war. There are at present employed in the Coast Guard officers for fifty commanders, nineteen lieutenants, three staff- Snce commanders, and six navigating lieutenants. It has been assumed that not more than thirty commanders and one hundred and thirty lieutenants would be required for the proposed coast-guard flotilla; and, inasmuch as we have already in the Coast Guard seventy eight officers fully qualified to command in the coast - defence Reserve, it is clear that the necessary complement of officers could be readily made up from the list of unemployed commanders and lieutenants. The divisional captains of the Coast Guard could take riiipf fom- maDd Retainers for Voluntccra summary 28 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS command of the flotilla maint.iined for coast defence within the limits of their several divisions ; and the supreme command of the entire service of the coast- guard reserve ships and the coast - defence Hotilla might be entrusted to three flag-officers one for the English Channel, a second for the North Sea, and a third for the St. George's Channel and the west coast of Scotland. There is no need of the apprentice system for the purpose of training the Coast- Defence Volunteers. A retainer should be paid to the volunteer for each year of service in that branch of the Reserves. The amount which it will be necessary to pay must be ascertained by local inquiry. Probably the minimum retainer might be fixed at 3/., increasiiig to 5/. as a reward for superior discipline and proficiency in drill. Drily pay on a fixed scale must be given to the fishermen while under instruc- tion in the gunboats. We have now endeavoured to deal with our deficiencies in the two main elements of the Naval Reserve Force — namely, the Reserves for Coast Defence, and the Reserves for Sea-going Cruisers. The filling up of the Coast Guard to the strength recommended by the Royal Com- mission has not been urged. The Coast Guard, although a most valuable, is also a very expensive force ; and it is essential to keep in view the necessity for economy, as well as the efficiency of the service. The public money would be most advantageously applied in raising the numbers of the Royal Naval Reserve and the Coast Volunteers to the standard approved by the Royal Commission, rather than in adding a larger number of men to the existing strength of the Coast Guard. Having sketched out a general plan for the enrolment of our Reserves and for the formation, training, and OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 29 command of our coast-defenco force, I will, with a view to illustrate the caj)abilitie8 of tiit! proposed Reserves, endeavour to show in detail the nuiiiLer of vessels which the force proposed is competent to man. Let us assume a force, pernuinently maintained Vessels t<. be during peace, of L'"),000 petty officers and seamen, Lcing 4,000 less than the number voted in the year 1871-72, but supplemented by 20,000 Royal Naval Reser\ e men and 4,000 Coast (Uiard?, being a total force of 49,000 men. With this number of seamen it would be possible to man the following fleet of sea-going cruisers : Nunil)cr of 30 40 100 100 CliisM of Ship Bellerophon or Hercules class Inconstant or Blanche . Danae Despatch vessels Complement of Petty Officers and Seamen for ii Sliip of this Clll83 Total Scnnieii rc(|nireil } 400 400 150 75 Total 12,000 16,000 15,000 7,500 60,500 Should the estimated complements appear in some cases insuflicient, it would be possible to augment the number of marines usually detailed for duty in each ship. Having provided our sea going fleet with their crews, we return to our coast-defence flotilla. For each of these vessels it is proposed to maintain Coaat- in time of peace, in addition to the oflicers mentioned, ttotiiir one engineer to each gunboat and two for each monitor, and two trained men in gunnery in each gunboat and six in each monitor. The remainder of the crews could be supplied by the coast defence corps. 3 .1. Bistriliution (if Volun- teers 30 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS The distribution of Coast Volunteers in the coast- defence flotilla is shown in the following statement : N( . of Vessels Class o«-- I ^-- Const Volunteers Total 30 Monitors 1 (^iinmandcr 1 Lieutenanl C GO 40 1,800 4,000 100 1 Gunboats 1 Lieutenant 2 Total number afloat 5.800 For disposal 4,200 Total force 10,000 llosorve of engineers and fli-emen In addition to the staff included in the tabuhir statement a certain proportion of warrant officers would be necessary. The 4,200 volunteers for disposal would in part replace the Coast Guard, who in time of war would serve afloat, in part be employed in manning small vessels and rafts, such as the ' Lady Nancy,' temporarily armed with guns for the defence of our ports and roadsteads. The remainder would be advantageously posted in our coast fortifications and defences. Commissions and committees have carefully inquired into and elaborately reported upon the manning of the Navy with seamen and marines. The urgent necessity of forming a Reserve of engineers and firemen has been strangely disregarded. During the Crimean war this difficulty was keenly felt. Inferior men were entered into the Navy as engineers at that period. From an establishment with which the writer was subsequently connected, it was a common practice during the war when a workman proved to be slow, or comparatively unskilful, to draft him off as an engineer intr the gun- boats which were then being built for the Baltic. To^*'-»' OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 31 provide against the recurrence of such a state of things a careful inquiry should be held at our principal ports, with the view of ascertaining the terms which it would be necessary to offer in order to secure a sufficient number of engineers of competent experience for the Steam Reserve of the Navy. The strength of the Reserve must be varied from time to time, with reference to the number of ships in the Navy available for naval service. The officers and men of the Steam Reserve would not be required to join the fleet in tlie time of peace. The annual retainer should be paid at the port at which they are registered. The peace establishment of the Navy, as proposed in Peace foot- . J ' r r Ing of Navy the preceding pages, is not so numerous as that which for some years past it has been thought politic to main- tain. Behind our naval forces in commission and reserve we have, as Mr. Childers reminded the House of Commons, the great mercantile navy of England, with its 230,000 British seamen. In olden days our merchant seamen may have dis- trusted and disliked the naval service. These ancient prejudices, now happily passing away, will be more and more effectually removed in proportion to the pains which are taken to make the advantages of the Royal Navy more generally appreciated and understood. Our ports are still too seldom visited by men of war. Ac- cording to the unanimous testimony of naval officers, the presence of our fleets would serve to awaken in the merchant service an interest in the Royal Navy v/hich can never be felt unless the two services are occasionally brought into contact witli each other. We have been assured by Admiral Cooper Key that it is most desir- able that the officers attaclied to the coast-guard service should have frequent opportunities of practice Sympatliy between Navy ami mercliaiit service Mi See Ap- pendix I 32 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS in naval tactics under steam. If the ships composing the Reserve Fleet were brought together every year for practice in naval manreuvres they might, at a small additional expense, pay visits to our great mercantile ports, where their occasional presence would undoubtedly promote in a large degree the popularity and prestige of the Navy. ' Wherever the Royal Navy is best known, there the seamen are most ready to join it.' Hampshire, Dorsetshire, and Cornwall, the counties in which our dockyards are situated, supply the greater nuniher of seamen to the Royal Navy. It is our duty to encourage by every possible means the loyal sympathies of our seafaring population. Finally, while we fully appreciate the naval means of other nations, a calm survey of our own resources can scarcely fail to satisfy even the most anxious alarmist that, as yet we need not be afraid ; and that old England still is, and may long remain, the unchallenged mistress of the seas. APPENDICES APPENDIX A Mr. Sackvillb West, in hia recent report on the shipping of France, quotes the following passage from a French writer, which very clearly exhibits the views entertained abroad on this subject : * Tandis que la marine de guerre fran^aise n'est inf^rieure que d'un tiers nominal a la marine de guerre anglaise, ct tandis que son budget s'est accru du triple dans ces vingt derni^res ann^ns, notre marine march an de, cabotage et long cours, ne s'^leve encore qu'au septiome de la marine marchande anglaise. Chacun sait que les progros des marines marchande et militairedevraientaller en pair, la marine militaire se formant OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 33 avec les 61(5ment8 que lui fournit la marine marchande. 11 s'ensuit que, par rapport h. I'Angleterre, notre marine militaire est quatre fois trop considerable pour uotre marine marchande, ou bien que notre marine marchande est quatre fois trop faible, eu 6gard a notre marine militaire. ' II y a 111 une anomalie digue d'attention.' APPENDIX B The conditions of naval warfare have, in our days, been so completely revolutionised that the experience of the past affords but a slight clue to the requirements of the future. In 1805, a year memorable in our annals for the crowning naval victory of Trafalgar, 114,000 seamen and marines were voted for the naval service. This number was increased in subsequent years to 147,000 : but it is certain that our naval power derived no advantage from the increase in the numerical strength of our naval forces. An eminent officer of the United States Navy, Admiral Goldsborough, has stated, in a memorandum aadressed to his Government, that the most effective vessels for coast defence will be swift nnd handy armour-clad ships without guns, and to be used exclusively as rams. By the adoption of vessels of the type recommended by Admiral Goldsborough the number of men in our flotilla for coast defence might be materially diminished. APPENDIX C Sib John Stirling estimated that 00,000 men would be necessary to man the Navy in time of war. Admiral Denman, on the other hand, believed that on the outbreak of a war a fleet of 100,000 men would be immediately required ; but, inasmuch as of the 40,000 employed in 1852 only 16,000 were seamen, he believed that of the 00,000 additional men required for a war Navy only 23,000 need be seamen. The eflfect of modern mechanical appliances in relation to the manning of the Navy was scarcely perceived at the time of the Crimean war ; but the fact that the number of seamen II. n 1 •! It H 84 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS and marines employed in the British fleet at that period never exceeded 08,000 attbrded some indication of the coming change. APPENDIX D It must not be supposed that the change which is taking place in the nature of the seaman's employment necessarily tends to lower his moral character and general intelligence. It has been well observed by Mr. Gideon Wells, the Secretary to the United States Navy, that * the men-of-war's man of the present day has all the noble and generous qualities of the sailor of former times, and has not deteriorated in courage, ability, skill in handling guns, nor in devotion to his flag. lie is not the seaman he was before the introduction of steam, but his quali- fications are of as high an order ; and, since the lash and intoxi- cating drinks have been expelled from the service, the morale and discipline of the men-of-war's men of the present day is an improvement on the past.' APPENDIX E Tjbe observations made by Mr. Graves, in his evidence before the select committee of 1800 on merchant shipping, are strictly true at the present time. * What we want,' he said, * is a com- prehensive system which, in place of confining itself, as it used to do, to the maritime ports, would tap the whole country and from the schools of the country draw these lads in the first instance to training-ships, and after a year's preliminary educa- tion on board these ships then be indentured for a certain number of years on board merchant ships, after which the Navy or Naval Reserve. These lads would then be of the very- utmost value as an element in the defence of the country, and they would indirectly be of great value also to shipowners. It is only a question of time when it will have to be resorted to.' APPENDIX F , Great was the difficulty of keeping men enlisted by force on board the ships to which they were appointed. Lord Nelson, in one of Lis letters pubUshed by Sir Harris OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 35 Nicolas, complained bitterly that his ship was compelled to lay off the Nore, at a distance of seven miles from the land, in the impress service ; and declared that he was as much separated from his wife as if he were in the East Indies. APPENDIX G The number of men to be obtained by impressment has been much exaggerated. In 1774 not more thau .30,000 men were obtained under the combined operations of bounties and im- pressment. Nor let it be supposed that impressment was a cheap means of securing seamen for the Navy. It was stated by Mr. Penuell that the impressment system cost in the nine years ending 1773, 1,359,156/. Lord Nelson, in his paper on the manning of the Navy, to which I have already referred, dwells strongly on the desertion which so commonly occurred in a fleet manned under the im- pressment system. * It will be found,' he observes, ' that when- ever a large convoy is assembled at Portsmouth, and our fleet in port, not less than 1,000 men desert from the Navy ; and I am sure that one-third of this number, from loss of clothes, drinking, and other debauchery, are lost by death to the United Kingdom.' The following statement, made by Lord Clarence Paget in the House of Commons in the session of 1860, abundantly con- firms all that has been said of the inefiicacy of impressment : 'During the years 1811, 1812, and 1813, the closing period of the great war with France, there were pressed into the service 29,405 men, while the number of those who deserted was 27,300, so that the total gain to the country during those three years, by impressment, was 2,105 men. But in order to bring those men thus com pulaorily into the service, 3,000 good sailors had been employed on shore as pressgangs. Therefore the country actually lost about 1,000 men during those three years under the system.' APPENDIX H Sir Charles Napier proposed that our Steam Reserves should be stationed ut the diflerent ports ; that the officers and crews of the Coast Guard should be on their books, and D 2 I' 1 |9 I. L:. 36 OUK NAVAL liESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS that their complement should be completed from the boatmen and fishermen on the coast. Admiral Berkeley, who had devoted the greatest attention to the manning of the Navy, was strongly in favour of the enrol- ment of fishermen in the Reserves. They were, in his view, to be regarded as a sea militia, to be employed for coast defence in steamers and steam gunboats not to go beyond the Channel. He advised that they should be called out periodically, and that they should be clothed when so called out ; and that they should be paid on a corresponding scale — cccteris paribite — with the land militia. Admiral Berkeley expressed the most implicit confidence in the fishermen as a body of men who could be organised as a sea militia for coast defence. With these men behind him he declared that he should be perfectly satisfied to take hia share in the responsibility of defending our shores, and making the Channel a place of refuge for our flag, until more extensive means were adopted for manning the fleet. Admiral Hastings, one of the witnesses examined by the commission of 1852, gave similar evidence to the effect that the fishermen would be well adapted on an emergency for the naval service ; and that their stationary habits were a strong point in their favour. Captain Oliver, another witness before the same committee, whose recent connection with the Coast Guard had given him peculiar opportunities of observing the fishermen in various parts of the cocit, spoke of the fishermen of the Isle of Wight in the following terms : ' At South Yarmouth, a notorious smuggling district, which 1 commanded for six years, the terms fisherman and smuggler were synonymous; yet I could not but respect them as a noble as well as a hardy race. *I consider fishermen generally of very domesticated habits.' In 1852 the officers stationed at Yarmouth, Hastings, Fowey, Milford, Swansea, Berwick-on-Tweed, Leith, and Banff", all of which are important centres of the fishing enter- prise of this country, reported in favour both of the eligibility of the fishermen and of their disposition to ei.Tol themselves in any force which might be established for the purpose of coast defence. , OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 37 APPENDIX I SECTION I Abstract Statement, showing Birthplace of Men and Boys serving in the Navy in 1852, taken from the Appendix of the Committee o/*1852, on * ^fanning the Navy' No. of No. of No. of No. of County Men Bo3-8 County Men Boys ENGLAND: Wiltshire 138 23 Worcestershire . 27 3 Bedfordshire 12 8 Yorkshire . 282 9 Berkshire . 07 10 Berwick - upon - 14,756 8,053 Tweed . 10 — WALES : Buckiughanishire 38 1 Cambridgeshire . 30 6 Anglesea 23 6 Cheshire 48 1 i Brecon 2 — ' Cornwall 1,411 213 Cardigan 23 1 i Cumberland 65 2 Carmarthenshire 15 2 Derbyshire . 9 2 Carnarvonshire . 28 — ' Devonshire . 3,116 747 ! Denbighshire 14 — Dorsetshire . 301 82 Flintshire . 9 — Durham 86 1 Glamorganshire . 54 — Essex . 195 29 Merionethshire . 6 — 1 Gloucestershire . 84 4 Monmouthshire . 22 4 ' Hampshire . 2,y09 603 Montgomeryshire 5 — Herefordshire 17 2 Pembrokeshire . 139 19 Hertfordshire Huntingdonshire 80 8 8 1 1 340 32 ; Isle of Man . 84 1 ' SCOTLAND : Isle of Wight 233 64 Kent . 2,085 648 j Aberdeenshi're . 58 2 Lancashire 257 26 ' Argyleshire . 48 2 Leicestershire 18 2 Ayrshire 27 1 Lincolnshire 58 1 Banffshire . 14 2 Middlesex , 1,514 286 Berwickshire 8 1 Norfolk 238 15 Bute . 7 Northamptonshire 15 4 ! Caithness . 10 — Northumberland . 42 2 Clackmannan and 1 Nottingham 80 3 Kinross . 5 1 Oxford . 26 8 Dumbartonshire . 6 Rutland 1 __ 1 Dumfriesshire 28 1 Scilly Islands 7 — Edinburghshire . 137 7 1 Shropshire . 14 — Pifeshire 47 2 Somersetshire 807 64 Forfarshire . 78 1 Staffordshire 36 2 Haddingtonshire . 11 — Suffolk. 136 12 Inverness-shire . 23 — Surrey . 188 80 Kincardineshire . 7 Sussex . 640 137 Kirkcudbrightshire 4 — Warwickshire 45 9 Lanarkshire 116 2 Westmoreland . 4 Linlithgowshire . 4 1 h II ii 38 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Section I. — contiv No. of No. of No. of No. of County Men Boys ty Men Boys Scotland — cont. 1 1 Dublin . 207 25 Fermanagh . 7 — Morayshire and Galway 42 8 Nairnsliire . C — Kerry . 85 18 Orkney and Shet- Kildare 5 — land 87 2 Kilkenny 7 2 Peeblesehire 1 — King's County . 5 — Perthshire . '20 1 Leitrim 1 1 — Renfrewshire 46 — Limerick , 88 4 Rosa and Cro- Londonderry 25 8 marty 22 2 Longford 1 1 Selkirkshire 2 — Louth . 28 6 Stirlingshire 1 10 — Mayo . 88 9 Sutherlandshire . i 8 — Meath . 4 — Wigtonshire 17 1 Monaghan . 6 1 Queen's County . 8 — 796 28 Roscommon 6 8 IRELAND : Sligo . 11 6.' Tipperary ! 20 1 Antrim 87 6 Tyrone ! 6 1 Armagh 8 2 Waterford 65 13 Carlo w 2 — Westmeath i 7 2 Cavan . 4 1 Wexford 46 5 Clare . 29 4 Wicklow I 22 6 Cork . 1,104 2SS Not known 21 10 Donegal 27 5 Down . 46 21 2,005 870 SECTION IT Statement giving the Names of Towns contHbuting more than 50 Men and Boys to the Naval Forces in 1852 Towns Men Boys j Towns Men Boys ENGLAND : I Devonport, in- 1 eluding Stone- Cawsand 81 15 house, Plymouth Falmouth, includ- and vicinity [see ing Flushing, Torpoint, &c.) . 2,817 583 Mylor, and Pen- Exeter . 92 26 ryn . 264 84 Weymouth,includ- Millbrook, includ- ing Wyke Regis . 55 16 ing Maker . 87 21 ! Fareham 68 14 Saltash, including Portsmouth, in- St. Stephens 111 16 cluding G OS- Torpoint, includ- port, Portsea, ing Antony and Alverstoke, and Wilcove 228 28 vicinity . 2,811 478 O'jn NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 39 Towns England — cont. Southampton, in- cluding Itchin and Millbrook Isle of Wight Canterbury . Chatham, includ ing Rochester; Stroud, &c. Deal . Deptford Dover . Gillingham Greenwich Maidstone SheerneRSjinclud ing Minster and Queenborough Woolwich, includ ing Plumstead and Charlton Liverpool . London, includ ing Lambeth; Southwark, &c Yarmouth Bath . Section 11.— continued Men 1 Hoys ! Towns 91 288 70 807 78 i 128 79 63 119 : 96 I I 264 222 168 80 64 10 181 82 18 85 9 24 28 72 60 20 Bristol, including Clifton , Brighton . Chichester . . Hull . SCOTLAND : Dalkeith Glasgow IRELAND Belfast Cork . Kinsale Queenstown Whitegate Dublin CHANNEL ISLANDS 1,477 I 276 Ij Guernsey 82 6 Jersey . 56 i 16 II GENERAL ABSTRACT Men Boys 1 149 18 144 20 99 9 76 a 88 6 112 a 60 2 403 80 59 8 ' 167 24 50 2 170 8 1 lNDS : i 69 7 I 101 1 16 Men Boys England Wales Scotland Ireland 14,756 340 796 2,005 3,053 32 28 370 17,897 3,483 Men Boys Guernsey Jersey 69 101 7 15 40 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS SECTION III I Return shoicing variovs Towns * {or their neighbour- hoods) in which Boys in Training Ships v)ere born and entered Her Majesty's Ship 'Impregnable,' Devonport, January 1, 1871 Town Number 1 Town Number Born 16 En- tered 1 Born En- tered Bath . 10 Gravesend . 8 _ Bristol 25 19 Gosport 25 — Birmingham 41 64 Gloucestershire 10 — Brighton . 1 24 5 Hull . 5 2 Bideford . 1 7 — Hampshire . 53 — Bridgwater . . 1 10 — Herefordshire . 1 7 — Birkenhead . 8 33 Hertfordshire 7 — Bedfordshire 4 — Ilfracombe . 2 Berkshire . 12 — Leeds . S 11 Buckinghaiiishin 5 5 London , 694 327 Cheltenliam . ' 12 8 Liverpool . ' 44 60 Chicheater . 7 — Lancashire . 25 — Chatham 13 — Leicestershire 7 — Coventry • 1 B 2 Lincolnshire 5 — Cardiff 2 — 1 Kent . 49 — Cambridgeshire — 1 Macclesfield 3 _^ Cheshire . 1 13 — Margate i 2 — Cornwall . : 99 — Merthyr Tydvil 4 — Cumberland 4 — Norwich 9 — Deal . 13 — Nottingham 13 22 Dover . 12 18 Northampton 4 — Deptford 8 — Norfolk 2 — Devonport . 193 450 Nottinghamshire 5 — Devizes 5 — Northamptonshii e 2 — Devon, South 117 — Northumberland 4 ■^~- 1 Devon, North 15 Middlesex . 6 Dorset 25 1 Manchester . 85 40 Durham 3 — Plymouth . 198 123 Exeter 42 57 Portsmouth 126 413 Essex . 14 — Preston 4 7 Falmouth . 13 38 Pembroke . 7 Fareham 13 Penzance . 12 . Gloucester . 30 66 Oxfordshire 6 , ,., Greenwich . 13 14 Ramsgate . 2 * Where the name of a county occurs, it indicates a number of small towns only furnishing one boy each. OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 41 Town Reading Rutlandshire Salisbury Sheffield . Shrewsbury Sheemess Southampton Stafford Shropshire Surrey . Suffolk Staffordshire Taunton Totnea . Torquay Teignmouth Uxbridge Woolwich Weymouth Worcester Winchester , Warwick Worcestershire Westmoreland Warwickshire Yeovil . Yorkshire . Hereford Wiltshire Sussex . Newcastle ■ Wales . Scilly Isles . Somersetshire Isle of Man . Isle of Wight Bolton . Blackburn . Number Born 2 1 10 4 5 9 40 2 2 20 23 12 14 7 84 20 a 88 10 24 8 9 8 1 8 7 18 11 18 17 S 5 2 27 4 19 En- tered 59 4 29 95 30 Tinvii _ |i 587 4 Belfast Chester Cork . Queenstown Dublin Derby . Edinburgh . Glasgow and Greenock . Harwich Hastings Jersey . Oxford Portland Queensferry Swansea Sunderland . Uxbridge Wolverhampton York . At sea . Aberdeen Orkney Isles Ireland, North Ireland, South Switzerland. Australia Bermuda India . Cape of Good Hope West Indies United States Turkey Corfu . At hospital and absent from ship Total . 2 8 1 89 12 1 6 1 1 2 2 4 1 1 43 2,931 Niimlicr Born En- tered 24 87 1 — 6 i 26 27 6 I 22 21 — 8 42 84, 44 90 — . 8 — 8 i 18 1 ! — 2 — 70 — 5 — 11 — 1 ! — 4 ' 2,931 (Signed) W. Gore Jones, Captain, and Inspector of Training Ships. li! Jieturn showing Counties in tvhich Boy a in Training Ships were born Her Mftjesty's Ship ' Impregnable,' Devonport, January, 1871 County Berkflhire BuckingliamBhire Bedfordshire . Cheshire Cambridgeshire Cornwall Cumberland . Durham . Derbyshire Dorsetshire Devon, South Devon, North Essex Gloucestershire Herefordshire . Hertfordshire . Hampshire Kent Lancashire Leicestershire Lincolnshire . Middlesex Nottinghamshire Norfolk . Northamptonshire Northu mberland Oxfordshire Eutlandshire Shropshire S .ffordshire Suffolk . Surrey Somersetshire Sussex Warwickshire Worcestershire Wiltshire Yorkshire Wales . Ireland . Scotland . Foreign . Towns Number Reading Birkenhead and Macclesfield Penzance .... Devonport, Plymouth, Exeter, Tot- nes, Torquay, Teignmouth . Bideford and Ilfracombe Bath, Bristol, Cheltenham, and Gloucester Hereford Gosport, Fareham, Portsmouth, Isle of Wight, Winchester, South- ampton Chatham, Deal, Dover, Deptford, , Greenwich, Gravesend, Margate, j Ram8gate,Sheerness, & Woolwich ! Liverpool, Manchester, Preston, Isle of Man London and Uxbridge Nottingham Norwich . Northampton . Newcastle Shrewsbury Stafford, Wolverhampton Bridgwater, Yeovil .... Coventry, Birmingham, & Warwick Worcester Devizes, Salisbury .... Sheffield, Leeds .... CardifI,Merthyr Tydvil,& Pembroke 14 6 4 24 6 104 4 8 25 699 24 14 98 18 7 279 167 112 7 6 702 18 11 6 7 6 1 7 14 23 20 44 17 68 27 83 26 18 123 90 19 "Total 2,888 (Signed) W Gobe Jonks, Captain, and Inspector of Training Ships. • Forty-three boys at hospital are not included. ri' 11 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 48 Return shoiving Previous Occupation of Hoys in Training Ships I lor Majesty's Ship ' Impregnable,' Devonport, January 1, 1871 1 Trade Number Remarks Seilentary Aetire Occupation Occupation Last Last School . Year 166 Year _ 288 Greenwich School — — 21 Errand boys — — 618 613 Farm labourers . — — 332 352 Mason labourers . — — 661 464 Factory boys 182 164 — Trades boys . 281* 223* 281* 223* i Sea — — 105 126 Boating — — 67 13 . ' Servants (indoors) 91 56 — i Grooms, &c. . — — 44 34 Gardeners, &c. — 44 37 Hawkers — — 16 7 '^ ' 1 Blacksmiths — — 40 42 • [ Carpenters . — — 82 , 101 Ropemakers — — 6 ' — ' Miners — — 10 11 ■ Colliers — — 9 7 Clerks . 19 21 .:■ : '' Workhouse . . | — 6 — Sailmakers . . | 3 — — — Coopers, 3 last year Totals . 576 464 2,808t 2,318 (Signed) W. Gore Jokes, Captain, and Inspector of Training Ships. * It being found impossible to classify the trades with accuracy, the whole number of boys entered have been divided '" ' ..een the two classes. t Four boys had no occupation. Forty-three were absent from ship at hospital. 44 tUIl NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Return {prepared from tlie Reports of the Collectors of Customs) in the Isle of a) fan, ami Channel Islands, sliowiiuj the I{%tm- 31, 18G9, and the Number of Jfen and Boys visually Em- PORT NUMDER OF BOATS TONNAGE LENGTH of Tuuuagu FIRST CLASS (Boats of I'l tong and upwurda) to H O Eh o ENQIjAND and WALES: Aberystwyth . . , liariiKtaple : lleauiKariB ... '2 lierwlck . . . I 6a Ilidcford . . • i 7 : lioston . . . • S Bridgwater liridport lirlutol . Carnarvon Cardiff . Cardigan Carlisle . ! Castletown Chepstow Chester Colchester Cowes . Dartmouth Deal Douglas Dover . Exeter . Falmouth Favorsham Fleetwood Folkestone Fowey . Oainsborough Gloucester Qoolo Grimsby Guernsey Hartlepool 14 ca 143 7 100 10 142 17 17 24 84 U 17 44 18 020 8H 7» SI 2S 7 132 85 10 7 43 201 •na 278 109 (W 60 IHH 873 223 20 90 852 47 U4 4 11 14 17 44 54 UO 20 1 91 310 1 1 90 8 1B8 42 108 120 22 101 09 90 210 50 172 11 91 109 082 100 90 08 Oil 01 230 55 17 100 43 430 827 6U4 141 871 180 284 000 284 64 162 541 88 1,181 125 69 300} 40 116i 85 U •a 4,410} 5 01 _— 407 14 42 9 28i 00 42 39 400 109 1,418 82} no} 172 \ 60i m 1 17 110) 140) 2,888 : 2,019 ■301{ . 500J 4,031 577J 28 102 2,797 516J 877i 4042 1,0(!U 101} 202j 17.1i 260 12 346i 1,010} 1,S02J 85 ■<18i 1,443 G8J 118i 104i 19J 12S) 12fli 236 31i 873 i 305; 202 10,001 190 19 30 102 52 1,191 19 ai H O s ■0 h 1 tl a S5 s ITiV o o ,,s ■*a o 1 s 84 148 233) 5,690} 180 640 61i 88} 81» 870i 2222 84 l,545i 140i 4,9765 981 4,7721 850 8,170 628; 471 1,059 2,068} l.MOj 007' 2,011 10,182 71 1,2241 OUR Ni^VAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 45 of Fisliiny Boats Registered at the several Ports in the United Kingdom^ her, Tonnage, and Class of Boats remaining on the Registers on December ployed in them 9T CLASS B of l'> tons upwards) KEEL of tho BOATS whose Is not given SECOND CLASS (DontB of less than lA tons, navigated otherwise than by oars only THIRD CLASS (Boats navlnatod by oars only) NUMBER OK CREW USUALLY EMPLOYED MEN 3« ■a O Cfl o Hi IH BOYS ORDINARY MODE OF FISHING 1 'x 1 1 •0 ' 1 S g §■»' I 9. ,J a S3 « -gS a a 9. « 2« 3 S 1 !i 5 a ,5 § ^"S 1 < o :3 s , a < .5, o -d 3 H ■S «} ^ O S O -O o gs; ga .i;w ^S ="§ ng mU mU >^U I I ■ ' ti a fi(t as 4 a - , 66 .454 17 99 !tO 2,S11) ll<4 ISO lOS 64 14 411 m 2in 10 I 12 ,26 !«« 143 104 2HU 198 104 82 a 10 256 18 — ,6«7 4< .S24 I «1 920 (i2 H7 187 24 79 09a 8 61 610 41» 5(18 811 310 HH ■(■J I H'27 GOO 88 268 I,06H 80 168 246 2,871 19,'? 171 138 l!17 IIH 706 802 84 720 64 26 oaa 68 208 Ml 67 228 i;t7 INi 4;io 60 168 420 2 4 - M 1 2 - 100 1 — - 11 - _o _i 4 - 18 8 9 7 21 18 21 — 100 — , 1 1 I 12 1 a 12 68 Trawling, dredging, and lines. Va'louB. TrawHiiK and hand linos. Trawling, dredging, and linos. Trawling and lines. Trawling, dredging, and lines. I 17 10 i 37 Trawling and lino. i — I — ' — Nets. : a , 16 86 Trawling, linos, and lob- III Btor baskets. 61 11,166 Ofifl Il,a53 I 444 1.H69 ' :<44 (ilO 1,:)19 74H 175 460 1,667 40 ; 7H6 11 82 080 248 1 124 U 149 24 1 8 495 a 9 196 89 8 64 18 4 14 118 21 1 20 121 ae 9 467 .'.8 146 (>n UK 20 148 29 29 26 ]('>8 Dredging and trawling. Various. Trawling, linos, and crab- bing. Lines and nets. Nets and Ines. Drodging, lines, and nt«ts Various. Dredging, trawling, and lines. Trawling and lines. Hooking, trawling, crabbing. and — 496 Trawling.drodglng.whelk- ine, and doop soa. - — Drodging and trawling. 8 80 I Nets and lines. I fi ? P I IW-. 'M I iill llil 46 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Register of PORT NUMBER OP BOATS o •o c o Q TONNAGE < O H Si H LENGTH of Tonnage FIRST CLASS (l!oat8 of ir> tons and upwards) < H O H s •o §- s ?^ !i5 s 5 « O o 5 5 S > < England and 'VVr.les— coHd'mied Harwich ... i 17 72 Haylo . Hull Ipswich . Jersey . Lancaster Littlehamptou Liverpool Llunolly London . Lowestoft Lyme Lynn Maiden . Maryport Middlesbrough Mllford . Newcastle Newhaven Newport Padstow Penzance Plymouth Poole Portsmouth . Preston . Ramsey . Rainsgate Rochester Runcorn Rye Scarborough ScUly . Shields . Shields, South Shoreham Southampton Stocl2 245 7 H! 6 1 15a IHO 18 10 1 112 841 87 4 loe 152 140 47 202 89 U7 247 17 — 1 59 10 102 60 22 88 34 ; 2 I 5 • 149 I 11 1 24 lU I 70 477 207 57 344 46 42 49 138 19 79 240 18 20 2 14 4 20 545 102 198 184 89 154 121 2!) 04 188 2!ll SO 05 2 120 85 10 24 100 193 107 91 45 51 80 12 48 20 B 10 88 11 47 16 79 189 120 100 8 291 48 189 209 617 588 12,060 44 200 90 2,219 281 282) 189 196 1 199 400 189 110 460 24 59 266 166 121 550 866 410 60 07 198 147 80 141 802 598 117 295 848 96 100 248 185 81 488 864 526} 662i 089 927i 253 44 802 87 1,816 19 7,042 4,516 281 8181 26 841 187 411} 1,884 688} 75 lie 6,289 227 1 644 4,186 817i 404 215 174 157i 010 1,801} 74 94J 448 55i 128 2 129 84i 1661 411 7 68} 109i 864| 470} 1951 iin 89 806 100 7081 1,813 198J 871 802 867} 1,428 521} 204 840} 830) 721i 08 202} 40} 08 80 "a} 8 62 l,283i 1,029 12,9805 458 2,268 668} 1,788} 19 7,867 4,688 8141 841 2,626} 106 94 857, 487} 82 19 82} 1«I 218} 128} 8 277} 84} 880} 411} 2,927 6 1,389 201} 284} 5,54H 940} 114 1,106} 4,186 1,9541 2121 1,8181 780 668 1,644 774j 827 654 j 720 1,464 OUR NAVAL "RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 47 [Fishing Boats — continued LENGTH of Tonnage KEEL of the BOATS whose I is not given. SECOND CLASS (Boats of less than 15 tons, navigated otherwise than by oars only) NUMBEll OF CREW USUALLY EMPLOYED THIRD CL.V8S (Boats navigated by oars only) MEN ^ o ; go V ° I ffl U b ' W *4 _J i a i < 1 53 j 53 53, H ' I ! I I BOYS ORDINARY MODE OF FISHING ;53 ' »i s ■o* tS So ■«o go iw h^ -< H O mU hU H 35 l|85 44 160 104 18 904 87 18 7 I- 41 m. a 1 18 ISO a I ae I la ai 1 11 IS 100 10 6 18 76 177 170 712 H8 SIS ao 12 1C2 6 072 l,4(!0 39 66 8 40 88 sia 84H 63 9 125 378 264 78 743 112 170 464 40 Ifil 274 164 250 4 13a 881 j 42 as 945 ! 19 ! 63 1,504 507 90 624 277 08 I 853 64 22 _ 1 *''° I _ — I 745 tm 64 2,227 200 318 1 — 215 — 2.% 16 181 189 882 06 101 445 881 198 |17H ! 870 184 11,889 1289 ! 2,212 19 45 14 2 26 10 80 21 48 41 98 8 2 170 13 292 175 800 87 1,122 00 125 180 8 20 404 32 3 152 080 180 \ 21 811 I HI 97- - 110 I 00 119 — 220 4 20 I 21 3.^2 100 210 ' — 1,022 2 106 ' 2 20a 5 528 321 262 i 8 60 i — 004 20 582 ! 27 1,289 280 110 90 1,486 95 248 I 43 617 Ills 298 :215 a8 18 09 14 - i - 292 I — 496 I — 805 1297 61 1 122 142 3 320 618 608 1H3 214 804 '997 i 1,875 1,608 4 284 291 740 8 598 4 20 87 7 79 — 56'2 — (U! 19 1 49 — 658 2 250 2 I 2 — 41 74 ;177 1 4 — I 2 65 232 Trawling, dredging, whnlking, and lines. Nets and lines. Various. Trawling and dredging. OvBtor dredging. Shrimp, trawling, and niuBBcl raking. Various (chiefly shell tlshi. Trawling and lines. Trawling and dredging. i Nets and linos. Nets, linoB, and liooks. Nets, linos, and crabbing ; Trawling, dredging, and I shell tlsh. Trawling and dredging. Nets and lines. Lines. Dredging, trawling and lines. 8 I 24 I Various. in !)13 14 199 — ' 4 17 310 — I 4 12 20 — 823 1 75 — 14 3 H4 1 275 Hook, line, and net. Drift nets, hooking, and crabbing. Trawling, iiooking, drift- ing, and crabbing. Trawling. Dredging and hooking. Shrimping. Nets and lines. Trawling and dredging. Various. Trawling. Trawling and drift nets. Lines, drift nets, and trawling. 6 248 a8 80 Drift nets, lines, lobsters. Nets and lines. Various. and 34 as 4 17 112 ISO ' 766 I 68 989 46 t» 12 110 I I. Nets and lines. Dredging. Various. Dredging lines and nets.i Dredging lines and nets. Various (chiefly crab- i bingl. I Nets, lines, crabs, and lobsters, 1 iil II 48 OUH NAVAL RfiSERVtlS ANl) COAST VOLUl^TEERS Register of PORT NUMBER OF BOATS d 3 U) 10 l s U 5 ns o ci -d o (/; England and Wales— i Whitehaven Wlsbeach Woodbridge . Workington . Yarmouth . Total nnlinued 12 j 17 ! 7 22 121 485 { 415 2,679 .9,908 8,608 LENGTH ot Tonnage lONNAQE H O H S a o u 19 22 164 248} 524 900 14,025 16,195 86,946 U •a FIRST CLASS (Boats of 15 tons and upwards) 74 98? — 228f 21 726 822}! 98}: 778}i 37 14,788 36,869i 4, 2072 127,0131 3 EC CBoiit Uto Oltic 5*: SCOTLAND : Aberdeen . Alloa Arbroath Ardrossan . Ayr Banff BorrowBtonesB Campbeltown Hum fries Dundee . Glasgow Grangemouth Granton Greenock Inverness Kirkcaldy Kirkwall Leith . Lerwick Montrose Perth . Peterhead Port GUiBgow Stornowiiy Stranraer Troon . Wick Wigtown TOTAL SCOTLAND , 9 1 3 6 500 42 lo 9 24 100 97 46 112 63 80 482 2 3 2 264 1 461 ~43 148 146 727 46 210 74 154 39 1,651 1,986 671 1,518 436 1,724 261 231 76 1,084 165 61 1,823 81 83 6 2 fo i 81 28 ». 489 326 27 279 2 910 18 846 15 168 6 15 66 : 72 SOB 16l 156 165 1,267 46 266 77 226 71 — 2.114 2,862 796 1,842 660 2,687 812 1,069 iK) 1.2S9 174 78 , 1,646 104 189 17 m 91 7,668 814 677 185 447 1,511 1,667 747 1,963 2,167 661 7,627 "so 62 42 8,986 17 l,810i 6691 654 889} 4,400} 173t 724| 178 492 104 6,6081 9,478 4,6061 4,4051 2,672J 1,2491 1,221} - 118 6,277 8242 219 8,842} 1691 16 ~4i 4 13} 42 4 8 44} 87 628 488.i 19 244} 2 la 1,816 174 221j 8} 101 74! 1,9681 17 7141 749 352 12,010} 178i 1,542| 181 1,214 276} 6,478 11,472 6,182 6,896i 4,628 8,167} 1,9161 10,164 130 6,628 890 269 12,928 261 - _ - - — - 1,831 18,313 1 2,825 17,969J 80,2791 !6S,618i 8,207} :87,000i i ~ — |- - 1 8U 6i, 1.WM4H i.au 161 IRELAND : Balllna . Belfast . Coleraine Cork Drogheda Dublin . Dundalk Qalway . 8 158 166 lU 2,S5 246 \ 31 370 162 568 616 924 161 1,691 _ — l.SH 93 281 — 191 98 289 — 60 801 384 686 1,329} 963 6791 2,902 — — — 2 48 6 60 40 77 8 122 __ — .^ 167 81 100 604 4,081 2,683 207 6,821 . — ^ — 343 4 47 621 2,024} 4) 66] ._ _ _ .». ._ 7 507 671 1,186 222 969J 8,216 SERS OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 49 Ugister of LENOTH of Tonnage ST CLASS ling 5oa^^— continued . of the BOATS whose \ given ECONP CLASS CBoiitB of less than U tuns, navl){ated attiM'wlKo than by ours only) THIRD CLASS (Boats navigated by oars only) NUMBKR OK CHEW USUALLY EMPLOYED MEN BOYS s DO f>. n ,,,■3 3 tf §3 J isl 0^5 -sl 1^ Ax H O s| ■a so 9 mU mU hU ^ £u mU WW E-i OnniNARY MODE OF FISHING Trawling and dredging. Trawling. No^.B and lines. Nets and lines. Various. Trawling and drifting. 45,S 10 107 7 86 473 11 Nets and lines. Nets and lines crab and lobster dredging. Various. White and herring. Nets and lines. Trawling. Lines, nets, and creels. Dredging nets and lines. Nets and lines. Various. I 1 1 - - 21.1 310 11 948 21 15 l,2f>7 4»5 1,886 288 1,784 183 1,825 909 .S81 291 1,G62 18 488 14 3,469 924 1,861 786 8,297 202 8,120 197 4,806 2 86 1 112 6 1 2 67 1 40 1 80 7 8 HI 4 42 2 11 e 7 12 204 194 8 47 Nets and lines. Nets, lines, and pots. Various. Nets and lines. Nets, lines, and dredging. Long lines and nets. Nets, lines, dredging, and pots. 50 OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS Return of PORTS NUMBER OF BOATS TONNAGE LENGTH of Tonnage FIRST CLASS (Boats of 15 tons and upwards) S 1(1) i; lot a o Ireland— oonfiniidl Limerick Londonderry Newry . Boss Skibbercen Sligo Tralee . Waterford Westport Wexford Youghal TOTAL IRELAND. 18 IS 22 3 22 S95 202 70 S24 400 153 1R3 87 208 60 840 8,780 H H O H •a H O Eh 209 I 282 147 164 28 760 626 483 40 752 48 41 646 360 94 1,104 927 604 2;S8 780 278 94 20 62 02 849 39 708 419 252J 270} 20 880 819S 498 861 429} 816} 304 432 68 850} 139 205^ 189 198} 62 1,434 y53j 064} 89 944} lOlJ 108 287} 994 2,684J 1,793} 1,692 1,260} 1,248} 1,384} 300 4,670 8,796 8,388 12,642j 7,289} 128,166 TOTAL UNITED KINGDOM. , 4,860 27,001 11,103 42,960 125,008} 101,916 14,664} I 242,179 vm ' LEES OUR NAVAL RESERVES AND COAST VOLUNTEERS 51 Return of LENGTH of Tonnage T CLASS of 15 tons upwards) 9 s !9! o s 2 1 < I shing Boats — continued 'A. of the BOATS whoso ot given NUMBER OF CREW USUALLY EMPLOVED ORDINARY mode of FISHING 1 SECOND CLASS Boats of less than ir, tons, navigated otherwise than by oars only) THIRD CLASS (Boats navigated by oars only) MEN BOYS ■ '"a 3 — i a CO 3 3 3 i a 1 1 11 o 5 2 IH 2 > In First Class Boats In Second Class Boats is 01 H 1 *3 O si 1- h So 6 r 8 4 241 197 1(15 1 42 3 H - 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 8 13 ec 5 01 5 68 69 128 18 65 1,843 897 287 1.589 1,787 712 723 192 066 236 644 857 474 67 3,483 2,448 1,896 155 2,789 211 256 712 2,213 1.467 339 6,133 4,240 2,676 947 2,841 1,305 508 10 6 11 (J 1 68 26 11 122 266 23 11 6 21 5 6 63 88 16 4I«I ISO 18 48 21 H Nets, lines, and dredg- ing. II II Nets, lines, and lob- ster pots. Various. Nets, lines, and dredg- ing. Various. Nets, lines, and dredg- ing. Various. Nets and lines. ''M — - i|-i- — — — — 1,U69 16,288 18,886 87,088 190 087 862 1,729 i*2H ' t 1.008 1 138 214 141 1 228 934 CS 14 6 25,149 94,263 33,307 152,779 6,065 6,628 2,280 13,90SI J* 3,02U t i,v>:h4 I r. J. Mayo, Registrar-General. E 2 52 Importance of a strong reserve Need of orgaui-a- tion. II OUR EE SERVES OF SEAMEN Pampiilet published jn 1872 Op the importance to the British Empire of a good reserve of seamen there cannot be a doubt, nor is the consideration of the subject the less opportune because we are, happily, at peace with all the world. Naval organisation is of necessity a work of time and fore- thought. The hasty measures adopted in an emergency will be at once more costly and less complete than the more deliberate and fully-considered preparations made in quieter times. Admitting that the policy of a statesman should be to regard the resources which are furnished to his hand by a thriving and busy commerce as the true naval de- fence of his country, it would be vain to rely upon those resources as available for national defence without care- ful organisation in peace. The following passage occurs in a letter received last year from Commodore Rogers, of the United States Navy : ' There is nothing in naval matters so important as the subject of manning the Navy. Fleets may easily be built, hosts of swift steamers may be quickly taken from commc and converted into tolerably efficient cruisers, but an ^ ent m^'n-of-war's man cannot be improvised. Such hi tg m\ OUK KESEKVES OF SEAMEN 53 by the mercantile marine of oak are of slow growth, and need much care. It is unsafe to look back to former days for anything to guide us in the future. Naval warfare in the olden time was rude and simple. The guns and the gun practice, the whole training of our seamen, and the whole machinery of battle were very different from what we see to-day. All nations were much alike, and glorious deeds were done by the rough system then in vogue, when the skilful handling of a ship was the one thing needful. Steam, new ordnance, armour, torpedoes, landworks, obstructed channels, all complicate the naval problem now. We need thorough seamen as of old, but they must be sea soldiers also.' As one of the representatives in Parliament of an The Armada ancient Cinque Port, I am reminded of the illustrious by a fleet efforts of our commercial marine in the destruction of ^'^^^^^ the Spanish Armada. Compared with the Navies of modern days, the scale of our operations in those distant times may appear insignificant. All our sailors in the reign of Elizabeth amounted to about 14,000 men, and there were not more than four vessels Ijelonging to the merchants which exceeded 400 tons ; but it still re- mains a memorable fact that a Navy whose splendid achievements fill one of the brightest pages of our his- tory was mainly composed of vessels equipped by the commercial towns and the nobility and gentry of Eng- land. Of the 140 ships assembled to oppose the Spanish Armada only 28, according to Hume, belonged to the Royal Navy. Those renowned seamen, Drake, Haw- kins, and Frobisher, who commanded the fleet under Lord Howard, were masters in the merchant Navy. The instruments of naval war may be changed. Who shall venture to say that their ancient spirit has ceased to animate the English people ? In a crisis of equal 54 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN ! ^ n !i1| . Hlstoricnl experience proves (le- peudeiice of naval power on tlie com- niercial marine Superiority of England Impress- ment ini- possible gravity the same patriotism would be displayed, the same success would be achieved, The interdependence of the fighting and mercantile marine has not always been sufficiently recognised by our naval administrators. Yet the teachings of history prove that it is impossible to create a powerful Navy without the support of a tlourishing commerce. In the great war Napoleon possessed a fleet of 80 line-of-battle ships, a force quite sufficient to have enabled him to contend with England for the mastery of the seas. All his naval operations failed, because unsupported by a vigorous merchant service. So again successive rulers of the Russian empire have made great eftbrts to create a powerful Navy. Under Peter the Great, Catharine II., and the Emperor Nicholas, the utmost pains were be- stowed on the Russian fleet. The Crimean war re- vealed how fruitless their eff'orts had been. The United States has never maintained a large standing Navy ; and yet is justly reckoned amongst the most consider- able of the maritime Powers. If the progx-ess of the mercantile marine be, as assuredly it is, an essential element of naval power, England has no reason to be alarmed. Perhaps no more striking proof of the superiority of this country could be found than the fact that of the total tonnage, amount- ing to 771,409 tons, which passed through the Suez Canal in 1871, 546,421 tons were English siiipping. Comparing the tonnage of the sea-going steamers of the principal maritime countries in 1871, we find that Great Britain possessed 1,411,000 tons, the United States 213,000 tons, and France 143,000 tons. In this country the spirit of liberty, which happily pervades all our political institutions, makes it impos- sible to rely any longer on compulsion as a means of -i OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 56 recruiting for the Navy. Since the great war we have had two Reform Bills, and it is certain that the operations of the press-gang, which sixty years ago was most un- popular, would now bo impracticable. The loss of the former legal power to compel seamen to serve in the fleet is not, even from a naval point of view, a subject for regret. The composition of the crews of the ships which won ou*" great naval victories was unsatisfactory in the ex- treme. In a paper read by Captain (jiartlner at the Royal United Ser\ice Institution in May 1871, their inetiiciency is minutely criticised. In 1803 the line-of- battle ships ' Don^^gal ' and ' Belleisle ' went out to the Mediterranean with not more than twenty men in each ship who could take the wheel. After Trafalgar the 'Conqueror' had just eight men on board who couhl knot a shroud. Had the seamanship of the crews of the French and Spanish ships been as remarkable as the personal courage they displayed, it would have been, difficult even for the admirable commanders which the English Navy then possessed to have achieved such dis- tinguished success. In the present day we should no longer find our rivals on the sea equally unprepared for naval war. The most experienced shipowners and merchant Tiie French ca])tains of France were examined before the Committee conscrip- of lii(|uiry on the French Merchant Service, which sat under the presidency of M. Rouher in 1862. According to their unanimous testimony the conscription was the principal cause of the stagnation in the maritime de- velopment of their country. Cases were cited of gentlemen holding degrees from the University of France, who had gone to sea comparatively late in life and reached the rank of chief officers in large steamers, i . !! Cruising Tlie necessary nnval force not an invariable number 56 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN who had been compelled to serve in the Navy for three years as ordinary seamen. The ol)Hgation to serve in the Navy in France commences at the age of twenty and continues to the age of fifty. The dislike to this liability deters a large nuni])er from going to sea. On the other hand, it is but fair to acknowledge that the same aversion does not extend to the humbler grades of the seafaring population. When recently cruising on the western coasts of France, I had oj)portunities of ascer- taining the views of many French seamen and pilots, and I was assured that the maritime conscription was not unpopulai-. It must, however, be observed that in all cases my informants had already performed their service in the French Navy, and were looking forward to the early enjoyment of the pension to which, at the age of fifty, they would be entitled. The conscription probably assumes a different aspect, according as the seaman has or has not performed his term of service in the Navy. In urging a renewed effort to improve and increase our Reserves it is not assumed that the standard at which the Navy should be maintained is an absolute and not a relative quantity. The reductions which have taken place in the Navies of France and the United States have undoubtedly tended to establish, for the time being, the relative superiority of England. We do not make sufficient use of our advantages, either in the consolidation of our power or the reduction of our ex- penditure. If we made a more systematic effort to develop our Reserves, it might become possible to diminish, to a very considerable extent, the personnel of our standing Navy in time of peace. While admitting, however, that we are not bound to maintain our forces at the standard of strength thought OUR RESERVES 01;' SEAMEN 67 necessary at a former time, we must refer to the report The of the Royal Commission of I8r)9, as embodying the Commission results of the most recent inquiry. Ihe commissumers recommended that the Coast Guard should he maintained at a strength of 12,000, and the Royal Naval Reserve at 20,000 men. The actual numbers are — Coast Guard 4,300, Royal Naval Reserve 15,000 men. The present Reserves of the Navy are, therefore, much below the standard proposed by the Royal Commission ; and, not- withstanding the changes which have taken place in the political condition and naval policy of other nations, it is to be regretted that our Naval Reserves are so considerably reduced. In the following pages an attempt will be made to ascertain the causes of the diminution of numbers, and to suggest a means of recruiting which, it is hoped, may prove more successful than our existing system in sustaining the numerical strength. No allu- sion shall be made to the Coast Guard ; because, being a Coast strictly naval force, it lies beyond the present inquiry, which is entirely confined to the organisation of a Naval Reserve in the merchant service. Moreover, the Coast Guard, though undoubtedly the best, is necessarily a very expensive force. There is much in our recent experience to encourage The Xavai Reserve ft the Admiralty to make further efforts to improve the valuable Reserve. The existing force has furnished a link, which had before been wanting, between the Navy and the mercantile marine. A considerable proportion of the whole number of eligible seamen have enrolled them- selves in the Reserve. This number might be con- siderably augmented if some unnecessary restrictions were abolished, which now prevent eligible men from joining, or compel them to leave the force. The Naval Reserve, even with its present imperfect organisation, is I i i : ^1 ': i id I'ii ' •>-)■ Testimony of naval officers Efflcieiicy iiicroasod by ilitfereiitittl rates of pay 58 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN an invaluable addition to our resources. It has been estimated by a writer in the 'Quarterly Review' that 5,000 seamen from the Reserve would join the fleet on the first outbreak of hostilities, and that for the next six months about 1,000 'nen per month would come forward. The remainder would probably join before a year had expired. If we may venture to rely on this calculation, we must congi'atulate ourselves on the suc- cess which has already attended the formation of the Royal Naval Reserve. In point of efficiency the Reserve has fully answered all reasonable expectations, and has been highly com- mended by a long succession of distinguished naval men who, as inspecting officers, have had the best opportunities of becoming acquainted with the force. The list of these officers includes, among others, Captain Gardner, Admirals Ryder, Cooper Key, Warren, and Elliott, all of whom have spoken in terms of commenda- tion of the Royal Naval Reserve, and have fully re- cognised its value to the Navy. Complaints have been made, though in rare instances, of an imperfect knowledge of drill. This may be attri- buted in part to the obsolete nature of the guns at which the Reserve has been drilled. A few 6^-ton guns have lately been issued to the drill ships. The greater number of the guns are old 32-pouuders, a nature of gun which is almost entirely obsolete in naval warfare. Steps have not been taken by the ofi'er of pecuniary advantages to stimulate the seamen of the Reserve to perfect themselves in their drills. The en- forcement of the severer punishments known to martial law might not be desirable. It would be easy to give pecuniary inducements to seamen to become proficient in their drills. At present the Royal Naval Reserve OUE EESERVES OF SEAMEN 69 are paid at a uniform rate, irrespectively of conduct and qualifications. The retainer should be fixed at a nunimum of ol. for newly enrolled men. It should be increased in various amounts up to a maximum of 7/., as a bonus for superior eiliciency, good conduct, and regular attendance. Some eligible men still refuse to join the Reserve, alleging that the pay is insutHcient. The terms already ottered are so liberal that no increase, except as a reward for a higher degree of etticiency, could reasonably be proposed. A seaman of the Reserve now receives 10/. 10.V. a year for twenty-eight days' drill and for taking upon himself the obligation to serve in the Navy in tlie event of a war. Compared with the man-of-war's man his position is so favourable that no alteration can be made without manifest injustice to the Royal Navy. If pains be taken, by means of pecuniary rewards, Difficulty in and in other ways, to encourage the seamen of the fDrNavui Reserve to learn their duty, and if the incompetent and careless are rejected, there need be no anxiety as to the general ethcieney of the Reserve. The real point of dilHculty lies in the recruitment for the force. Its strength has been gradually diminishing. The un- necessary stringency of some of the regulations re- lating to the entry of seamen and their attendance at drill has caused many seamen to withdraw from the Reserve and prevented many candidates from being enrolled who were capable of rendering valuable service. A seaman cannot be enrolled in the Naval Reserve Uuicsasto after he has passed the age of thirty. The limit of age ought to be fixed at thirty- five. The Appendix to the Report of the Joint Committee, appointed by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade to revise the regu- lations for the Royal Naval Reserve, contains a state- i 60 OUK RESERVES OF SEAMEN r i-i Service at sea ment showing the ages of the seamen in the Reserve in the year 1869 : Age Number 20 to 25 3,783 26 to 30 6,336 31 to 35 3,642 36 to 40 1,624 Above 40 677 16,062 From an examination of these figures it may fairly be argued that, whatever limit of age may be fixed for enrolment, the Reserve will be mainly composed of the younger seamen of the merchant Navy. The rule as to five years' service at sea ought not to be absolutely enforced in all cases. A candidate for the Reserve, if found on examination to be thoroughly qualified, should not be rejected because his service at sea is a week or a month less than the prescribed period. An inflexible rule may prevent candidates from joining the force who are on the point of sailing on a long voyage, and who are not disposed to leave a favourite ship. A discretion should be allowed to shipping masters to enrol seamen, upon receiving a certificate from the commanding officer of a drill ship that he is satisfied with the qualifications of the candidates. The regulations, under which men are compelled to withdraw from the Reserve unless they continue at sea shuts out a large number of valuable men who are thorough seamen, and are employed about the docks, or as riggers or bargemen. Many of the seamen thus ex- cluded are still in the habit of making short voyages in ships proceeding from port to port on our own coasts. It would be a scandal that there should be any men in the Reserve who were not bond jide seamen. In order \ OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 61 to exclude unfit persons, it is not necessary to frame rules so stringent as to keep out others as to whose efficiency there can be no reasonable doubt. As in the regulations for the entry of seamen, so in Rules as the rules as to drill, there are many needless and in- convenient restrictions. A seaman is sometimes com- pelled to leave a good employ, and to give up a valuable berth as a petty officer, because the ship to which he belongs is ordered to sail a day or two before he has completed the specified period of twenty-eight days' drill. In such a case, if a man be efficient he should be excused a fractional portion of his drill and allowed to make it good at a future time. No objection can be raised to the general policy of encouraging the seamen of the Reserve to undergo their twenty-eight days' drill in one continuous period, rather than at broken intervals. A power of granting exemptions should be given to the officers in charge of the Reserve. The Circular of January 13, 1870, requiring that Rules as to every candidate for the Reserve should be examined by an officer not below the rank of a commander in the Royal Navy, has caused considerable inconvenience. Men are sometimes detained several days in consequence of the absence of the commander of the drill ship. Permission should be given to lieutenants of the Royal Navy, of a certain standing, and to the gunners of the drill ships, to pass candidates who desire to be enrolled in the Reserve. Disappointment has been expressed at the utter Rules as to failure of the scheme for the formation of a second- Reserv class Naval Reserve. Much dissatisfaction has been expressed at the regulation compelling the second-class Reserve to reside on board the coast-guard ships during the period of annual training. It is not easy to rve 62 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN By modify- ing rules Reserve increased discover the reason why the privilege of living on shore, when undergoing their annual drill, should be accorded to the first-class and withheld from the second-class Reserve. The rule which compels tJ.e men in the second-class Reserve to go through their drills on board the coast-guard ship causes much unnecessary in- convenience. A man residing in London, instead of being drilled on board the ' President,' like the senior division of the Reserve, would be compelled to go down to Harwich to drill on board the 'Penelope.' This regulation would compel the majority of the men in the second-class Reserve to be separated from their friends and families during the whole period of their annual training. There is real hardship in such a separation in the case of young seamen desiring to go through their drills in the short interval which they would have to spend in England between two extended foreign voyages. Both classes of the Naval Reserve should be allowed to drill on board the drill ships of the Reserve, as well as on board the coast-guard ships. ' The regulations as to the age of entry for the second-class Reserve are too stringent. Instead of limit- ing the age of admission to from eighteen to twenty, it should be from seventeen to twenty-five. The Com- mittee of 1852 on the Manning of the Navy recom- mended that the age of admission for Naval Coast Volunteers should extend from eighteen to twenty -five. In many cases the age of seventeen is not too young ; and if a candidate is otherwise eligible, n. is absurd that he should be prevented from joining the Reserve if more than twenty years of age. It will be observed that none of the modifications which have been proposed involve the surrender of any important guarantee for discipline or efiiciency. Small OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 63 concessions will remove objections strongly felt. It is the opinion of persons intimately acquainted with the habits and feelings of sailors that if the rules were relaxed in the several particulars which have been enumerated, the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve would be rapidly increased. It is, however, alleged that the difficulty of recruit- increase of ing for the Royal Naval Reserve arises from other andabou- causes. The increase of steam vessels and the decrease puisory ap- of sailing ships, the abolition of compulsory apprentice- gh^p '*'*" ship in the merchant service, and the failure to create any other plan for systematically training boys in sea- manship, are difficulties of a more serious character. The development of steam in the mercantile navy has had an important influence on the employment of seamen. The opening of the Suez Canal, and the economy in the consumption of fuel which has resulted from the introduction of the compound engine, have caused a rapid substitution of steam for sailing vessels. In 1864 the total tonnage of our shipping was 7,103,000 tons ; the total in 1871 was 7,142,000 tons. But while in the former period the steam tonnage was 770,000 tons, it had increased to 1,412,000 tons in the latter period. The development of steam shipping has, from various causes, recently undergone a check. Sailing vessels will still be employed, especially on long voyages, as auxiliaries to steamers, for the conveyance of the heavier and less valuable goods. In sailing ships fewer men are now employed in proportion to the tonnage than formerly. The introduction of iron as a general material for shipbuilding has led to the construction of ships of larger dimensions, of greater length in propor- tion to their breadth, and with a smaller area of canvas in proportion to their tonnage. In our sailing ships of all I i • I ¥t -a 4 : ■ «: Ji Wages in sailing lower than in steam vessels Foreign seamen Alleged deteriora- tion of seamen 0^ OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN classes the proportion of men to one hundred tons was, in 1854, 4-17 ; in 1869 and 1870, 3-25 in both years. The numbers of British and foreign seamen serving in the registered sailing and steam vessels of the United King- dom employed in the home and foreign trade, was in 1864, British seamen, 173,833; foreign seamen, 21,923— total, 195,756 men. In 1870, British seamen, 177,951; foreign seamen, 18,011 — total, 195,962 men. Notwithstanding the reduction in the crews, con- siderable difficulty is sometimes experienced in procuring well-traini'd seamen. The shipowners themselves have the remedy in their own hands. No difliculty whatever is experienced in procuring men for steam vessels. The wages of seamen in steamers have been raised to such a point as to attract the best seamen from sailing ships. The wages are as six in steamers to five in sailing ships. If, again, it be urged that foreigners are being in- troduced into our merchant service in such numbers that British sailors must ultimately disappear, the most recently published statistics give no foundation for these apprehensions. The number of foreigners in British ships in 1864 was, as we have seen, 21,923, and in 1870, 1 8,011 . The proportion of foreigners to the total number of seamen employed under our flag was in the former year 12'6, and in the latter year 10*1. The alarm which has been raised at the prospect of a falling off in the supply of seamen has probably been exaggerated. It is true that there has been a great falling off in the numbers apprenticed and enrolled since the system of compulsory apprenticeship was abolished. The number enrolled in 1845 was 15,704 ; in 1846, 10,376 ; in 1856, 7,410 ; in 1866, 5,454 ; and in 1871, 4,111. There are a large number of boys afloat, not regularly apprenticed to shipowners, who are coming OUK KESERVES OF SEAMEN 65 forward as the future seamen of the mercantile marine. Their training may not be systematic, but where they are fortunate enough to be under the care of a captain who is anxious for their welfare, and are associated with seamen who take a pleasure in instructing them in their art (and many such captains and many such seamen are to be found), the boys are learning their business quite as effectually as if they had been regularly apprenticed to the sea. Owing to the abolition of compulsory ap- prenticeship few boys are now apprenticed to shipowners, who are not intended to become officers in the merchant service. The greater number of the able seamen of the mercantile marine have been reared without passing through a regular apprenticeship ; yet it is impossible to prove any deterioration in our seamen, either in character, in skill, or in physical power. Our sailing ships make quicker passages, and are manned by fewer hands than were considered necessary in former days. The proportion of men to one hundred tons in sailing ships employed in the foreign trade was, in 1854,* 397; in 1869, 2-83 ; and in 1870, 2-79. The difference is even greater in steam vessels, in which the average proportion of men to one hundred tons in the foreign trade was, in 1854, 7-69 ; in 1869, 4-68 ; and in 1870, 4-35. It would be interesting to know what proof could be adduced to show that the seamen, who are able to do more work, are inferior either in strength or in skill to their prede- cessors. A seaman, constantly employed in a jury-rigged steamer, after a certain interval must necessarily lose his skill in the handling of canvas. Where he is con- stantly employed in sailing ships there is no reason to suppose that he is inferior to the mariner of the olden time. There is a tendency to extol the men and things II. V m OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN ■ i fi Crews of yachts not deterioratotl A strong Reserve would justify reduced naval esti- mates of the past, and to disparage the capabilities of our own generation. Such comparisons are of little value, unless supported by some proof more tangible than mere as- sertion. To take an illustration familiar to the present writer, let comparison be made between the skill and seamanship of the crews of our large and increasing pleasure fleet with the performances of years gone by. The large and magnificent racing schooners which now crowd the anchorage of every favourite resort of our yachtsmen are the creation of recent years. By the science of our shipbuilders and sailmakers, acting under the direction of a few clever yachtsmen, and by the admirable sea- manship of the numerous fishermen whom they employ, the arts both of building and manoeuvring schooners have made a rapid and remarkable advance. Formerly it was a rare, now it is a common achievement for a schooner to compete with success against a cutter. Year by year larger yachts are being built, with spars more pondefous, and with greater amplitude of canvas. No difficulty whatever is experienced in finding competent masters and fine crews for these vessels. It may be presumed from these facts that, in the more serious and important departments of the mercantile marine, a sea- man, placed in the same condition as his predecessors, is not inferior either in discipline or in skill. Additional means of training seamen are therefore to be recommended, not for the purpose of assisting shipowners, nor yet because we are overwhelmed by foreigners ; but because a numerous and efficient Reserve would add greatly to the power of this country in war, and justify a considerable reduction of expenditure on our standing Navy during peace. The system of training in the Navy itself is most OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN excellent, and surpasses in its results anything hitherto Naval achieved by the efforts of philanthropic societies, which have established training ships at our commercial ports. The boys on board the training ships of the Royal Navy have immense advantages in the essential point of physical development. It would indeed be unfair to expect that a philanthropic institution should recruit from the same sources, or offer the same advantages, as the Royal Navy. The objection to the training in the Navy is its immense cost, amounting to 55^. per head, as compared with 251. per head in the ships maintained by charitable contributions. The number of boys in training in the Navy has, notwithstanding the acknowledged costliness of this plan of recruiting for the service, been increased from 2,421 in 1869, to 3,500 in 1872. The expense involved, and the difficulty of introducing a greater number of boys into Her Majesty's ships, with- out impairing their efficiency as vessels of war, make it impossible that an increase in the number of boys under training in the Navy can be entertained. It has, there- fore, been suggested that the two systems should be combined, and that training ships should be established Training ill our principal ports, supported partly by private subscription, partly by a subsidy from the National Exchequer, and partly by contributions from the parents of the boys themselves. Much assistance has already been given to the Navy by the training ships already established. In a report of the Marine Society, presented at the annual Court of Governors on February 2, 1871, it is stated that in 1870 there had been 558 boys under training on board their ship 'Warspite'; that 167 were sent into the Navy, and 191 into the merchant service ; and that from the original establishment of the society, in June 1756, to sliipa F2 98 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN \V' !,J ;: '■' Training ships ap- proved by ComLaission of 1859 December 31, 1870, there had been sent into the Royal Navy 26,354 ; into the Indian Navy, 3,760 ; into the merchant service and to the fisheries, 21,346 boys — total, 56,634. These figures prove the important services which the training ships may render. The Royal Commission of 1859 made a recommenda- tion on the subject of training ships, which has hitherto been neglected, although the more costly portion of their scheme has been adopted in its integrity. They recom- mended tliat school ships should be established in the principal 2:)orts, capable of accommodating from 100 to 200 boarders in each ship, of whom 100 should be sup- ported by the State. The boys were to be of respect- able parentage, strong, and healthy, and approved by the inspecting officers on board the coast-guard ships. The school ships were to be under the Registrar- General of Seamen and the Board of Trade. The military part of the training was to be conducted by the officers of the Coast Guard on the completion of their training. A limited number of boys were to be allowed to enter the Navy. When the system had been perfected, it was thought that it might be possible to dispense with special training ships for the Navy, and to train boys both for the Navy and the merchant service in the same vessels. The commissioners anticipated as the result of such an arrangement * greater economy in regard to the training ships, and the creation of those kindly feelings between the boys destined for the two services which it was of the utmost importance to encourage.' The Royal Commission suggested that the number of boys to be nominated by the authorities might be fixed at 1,200, and that an equal number might be furnished by the seaports. Thus, 2,400 boys would be supplied annually to the marine of this country. The commissioners OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 69 believed that the whole of the number would be readily absorbed by the shipowners. Indentures of ajipreniice- ship were to be managed by the Registrar-General of Seamen. At the end of an apprenticeship of four years a sailor was to be eligible for, and the commissioners believed that the majority would be willing to join, the ' Royal Naval Reserve. The engagement to serve in the Reserve was to be in the first instance limited to a period of five years. These recommendations of the Royal Commissioners have been adopted, with slight modifica- tions, by Sir Frederick Grey, Mr. W. S. Lindsay, and other eminent authorities, who have more recently studied the question. Sir Frederick Grey, in a paper, originally printed for Approved by private circulation, to which reference is now permitted, has proposed that ten ships should be stationed at the principal ports, each capable of receiving 300 lads. The boys are to be entered in the training ships between the ages of fifteen to sixteen and a half, and at the ago of eighteen they are to be rated as ordinary seamen, and discharged into a ship of war to serve for one year. After this year of service in the Navy, they are to join the second-class Naval Reserve, and to receive an annual retainer of 21. 10s. After having been four years in the second-class Reserve, they are to be promoted, if found eligible, to the first-class Reserve. If 1,200 of these lads were discharged annually into the Navy, we should have added 12,000 men to the Royal Naval Reserve in ten years. A similar plan has been proposed by Mr. Lindsay. He has advised that the State, instead of bearing the whole expense of educating the boys entered for the Reserve, should contribute an annual payment of 5/. to 10^. per head for every boy in training. He objects to Mr. Lind- say's plan 70 OUR RESE.iVES OF SEAMEN I., It It; Admiralty training gliips Bonus for taking ap- prentices the continuance of retaining fees after a boy has completed his year's service in the Navy. He recom- mends a liberal pension to commence at the age of fifty. A similar plan was suggested by M. Dumont, one of the witnesses examined before the Enquete Parlementaire on the French Mercantile Marine in 1862. The con- currence of high authorities in favour of the plan would justify the Admiralty in establishing training ships in the Thames, the Mersey, and the Clyde. The cost of such an experiment need not be great. We have many suitable wooden ships in the Navy ; and if after a year's trial the results were proved to be inadequate, the ships could be withdrawn, and other means of forming a Reserve could be adopted. A still more economical experiment might be made by adopting the suggestion of Mr. Gray, of the Board of Trade, that the Government should take over one or two of the training ships now in the hands of the philanthropic societies, for the pur- pose of carrying out a more complete and vigorous system of training. The establishment of training ships in connection with the Navy at our principal ports appears an obvious means of increasing the number of seamen eligible for the Reserves. But training ships are an inferior sub- stitute for the more practical experience which can only be obtained in a sea-going ship, and would be unneces- sary if it were by any means possible to revive the old system of compulsory apprenticeship, the abolition of which was a corollary to the repeal of the Navigation Laws. If, for the advantage of the State, we wish to encourage shipowners to take apprentices, the propriety of offering a bonus under conditions is not unworthy of consideration. The ships must be sailing ships of an OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 71 approved character for the purpose. The amount of the bonus should not exceed 5/. for each apprentice. The number of apprentices should be limiti a to one for every 100 tons register. The apprentices should be chosen by an officer appointed by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade, and indentured to the Registrar-General of Seamen, and the apprenticeship should be for a period of four years. On the completion of his apprenticeship the young seaman should join the Navy for one year, receiving, on his joining one of Her Majesty's ships, a bounty of 5^. Having completed his year's service in the Navy, he should join the Reserve, under the con- ditions set forth in the scheme propounded by Sir Frederick Grey. The training received on board a merchant ship at sea would be more practical than any which could be given in a stationary vessel, and it would be infinitely less expensive to the State. As an essential preliminary, steps should be taken to ascertain whether the owners of high-class sailing ships would be willing to receive a certain number of boys. Should the pro- posal be accepted, one hundred boys might be selected, in the first instance, from the same class from which boys are now taken for the training ships attached to the Royal Navy. The entry of further candidates might be suspended until the working of the system had been tested by experience. Should the experiment prove a failure, the boys might be removed from the merchant vessels to which they had been originally appointed, and their training could be completed in the Royal Navy. Having considered the best means of recruiting the The offlcera seamen, the next question with which we have to deal Reaervo is the organisation of a corps of well-qualified officers for the Reserve. If the position of the Naval Reserve be 72 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN f BisrlpHne in service made sufficiently attractive, officers may be obtained in large numbers from the mercantile marine, well- educated, and well-trained in the nautical branches of their profession, and therefore thoroughly qualified to CO operate with the Navy. On board the 'Conway ' in the Mersey, and the ' Worcester ' in the Thames, the sons of officers of both services, of barristers, clergymen, and merchants, are receiving an excellent preparatory education for the sea. To prepare these gentlemen for the Navy we have to complete what has been so well begun, by giving to our * Naval Reserves' the facilities for obtaining professional instruction already given to our auxiliary forces on shore. Arrangements for a short course in gunnery foi' the officers of the Reserve should be organised on board the 'Excellent' or 'Cam- bridge.' No officer of the mercantile marine should be allowed to join a school of gunnery until he had pre- viously obtained a certificate as mate or master from the Board of Trade. A system of instruction once esta- blished, no officer of the mercantile marine should henceforth be eligible for a commission in the Naval Reserve until he had previously passed his examination in gunnery. As a further encouragement to efficiency lieutenants of the Royal Naval Reserve, being masters of a certain standing in the merchant service, should become eligible foi* promotion to a higher rank. The highest rank in the Reserve ought certainly to be that of commander, and possibly in some cases a commission as captain might be granted. It may be thought that an officer of the mercantile marine, though competent as a seaman and a navigator, might be ill-qualified to n aintain discipline among a numerous crew. When occasions have arisen for testing the capabilities of commanders in the merchant service, T OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 73 chosen witli judgment for responsible posts, they liave shown no incapacity in this respect. When the 'Great Eastern' is employed in laying down deep-soa tables she is manned by the crew of a first class frigate. Discip- line has ever been maintainetl on board, both under Sir James Anderson, when he held the command, and by his successor. Captain Halpin. The present plan of providing a reserve of officers areatoost for the Navy is at once extravagant and ineffectual. It and lU'thed' is extravagant because it involves the payment of a much larger number of officers than it is possible to employ. The number of officers on the ' Half-pay ar.a Retired Lists' is so large that, notwithstanding the miserable scale of their remuneration, the non-offisctive vote constitutes a large proportion of our entire naval expenditure. The present system of providing a reserve ot officers is not only extravagant — it is also ineffectual. The number of officers so far exceeds the peace lequire- ments of the Navy that at the time when they reach the prime of life the majority can only look forward to occa- sional opportunities of obtaining employment afloat. Enforced idleness for an unbroken period of six years, between the ages of thirty and forty, would be thought detrimental to the full development of the faculties in every other profession. In the Navy, in the present state of the lists, it is usual for an officer, on being pro- moted to the rank of post-captain, to remain six years on shore. Even in the case of commanders it is impos- sible to find employment at sea for half the officers of that rank in the Navy. Such a state of things must be prejudicial to the Navy in many ways. To spend an interval of several years on shore at a time when such marvellous transformation is taking place, both in naval architecture and naval armaments, must seriously im- 1 3 ■ h ! .1 i I ^' Views of Mr. Liiid.sny Sir Charles Napier Advantages of higher education to mercan- tile marine 74 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN pede the professional instruction of officers in gunnery, in seamanship, and in every other branch of naval science and experience. The remedy for this crying evil is a reduction of the lists, and that reduction can only be made with safety by creating a Reserve on which the Navy may rely, composed of officers who, while ready to serve in the Navy in the event of war, will in peace find active and useful employment in the mercantile marine. The policy of enrolling officers of our merchant service in the Reserves has received the unqualified approval of many high authorities. In his speech in the House of Commons, on the Manning of the Navy, in 1860, Mr. Lindsay said, that 'If they were to raise the Reserves to the full extent recommended, they had not got officers sufficient to command them. If, how- ever, they were to look to the merchant service, where q'^ite as strict an examination was undergone as in the Royal Navy, and perhaps stricter, they would have no difficulty in obtaining the number of officers required for a very small retaining fee indeed. Money was not so much an object with them as the position they would gain at home and abroad by being recognised as officers of the Reserve.' The views of Mr. Lindsay were confirmed by Sir Charles Napier. He said : * Suppose you had obtained your Naval Reserve men, where would you get officers to command them ? You would then find it absolutely necessary to come to the merchant service. Why not come to that service now ? Assign the volunteers their rank, and give some slight decoration.' / The Board of Trade would add to the prestige and efficiency of the officers jf the mercantile marine by requiring a broader education in the candidates for OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 75 first-class extra masters' certificates. The examination should include, not merely navigation and seamanship, but one foreign language at least. The elements of a commercial education would prove of immense advantage to the captain of a merchant ship, as the representative of the interests of his owner abroad. A higher general education would enable officers of the mercantile marine to command superior salaries, and if by passing an ex- amination in gunnery they could obtain a moderate annual stipend from the State, the commanders in the mei'cantile marine would be more adequately rewarded, and the profession would acquire a status more com- mensurate with its real importance than it has hitherto reached. The elevation of the officers of our mercantile marine professionally, morally, and socially would not be the least of the advantages to be anticipated from a more intimate connection between the Navy and the Re- serves. On the seamen of our mercantile marine, a highly qualified body of officers might confer immense benefits. . The creation of a naval university, open to both Effect of , , » J.' 1 • .1 naviil uni- branches of our national marine, may prove the means versity of uniting more closely the Navy and the merchant service. Those who avail themselves of the advantages held out to them in one national seminary of naval lore will learn to recognise each other as members of one honourable profession, each branch of which must ' flourish if England is to retain her naval preponder- ance, and every member of which should acknowledge with pride that he is bound to take his part in defending the honour of his country. From the Royal Naval Reserve and its officers I The Coast turn to the Coast Volunteers, a force which couk. oer- I f:l; IJ 1:1 * I- ill m ' H 1, '■ ''I, 76 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN Numbei' and quality of men in fishing industry tainly be easily organised if pains were taken to ensure success. Recent naval administrators have unaccount- ably neglected this branch of the Reserves. The Com- mittee of 1852 recommended that a force of 0,000 Royal Naval Coast Volunteers should be raised, and trained to the great guns through the instrumentality of the Coast Guard. The Royal Commission, confirm- ing the high estimate of our fishing po[)ulation as a Naval Reserve by the Committee of 1852, advised that the force should be raised to 10,000 men, and recom- mended that the Royal Naval Reserve should be divided into two divisions, the first consisting of able seamen from the merchant service and school ships, and the second division recruited from the resident seafaring population ; in other words, the fishermen and seamen employed in the coasting trade. It was contemplated that the second division would absorb the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers. According to the figures in the last naval Estimates, the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers have been reduced to 1,500 men, and the attempt to create a second class has been an utter failure. It cannot be said that eligible men are wanting. The last return shows tlxat 153,000 men and 14,000 boys are employed in the ve:sels engaged in the fisheries of Great Britain and Ireland. Of this total there are in Ireland 37,000 men and 1,700 boys; in Scotland, 68,406 men and 4,473 boys. The physical power and hardy qualities of the Scotch fishermen must be seen to be appreciated. Admiral Macdonald, now second in command of the Channel Fleet, when commanding a coast-guard ship on the Clyde, enrolled in a few weeks 600 men in the Coast Volunteers. They averaged one inch taller and two inches more in girth round the OUK RESERVES OF SEAMEN 77 chest than the marines on board his ship, although the latter were a remarkably fine body of men. The local knowledge of the fishermen is an important qualifi- cation. Our regular man-of-war's men and the seamen of our mercantile marine being chiefly employed on foreign service, it is impossible to over-estimate the advantage of having a body of men in our Reserve who possess an intimate acquaintance with the intricate navigation of our own coasts. The fishermen never sail under a foreign flag. They have fixed places of resi- dence, can always be found when their services are required, and their moral character is in the highest degree meritorious. Referring to the men to be ob- tained on the coast of Essex, and of whose qualifica- tions and conduct I have had the best opportunities of judging, I cannot speak too highly in their praise. The fishermen in my employ, exposed, when serving in a yacht, sometimes for months, to the temptations of foreign ports, have ever shown themselves superior to all the enticements of the shore, and have regularly remitted to their families more than two-thirds of their earnings. The result is happily manifested in the com- fort of their village homes, which are all that the philan- thropist could desire. The short and simple annals of the poor contain no more creditable or reassuring tale than the stoiy of these, my humble but beloved com- panions on many a pleasant cruise— pleasant, because of their good conduct and faithful discharge of every duty. The fishermen of England as a class are men whom we can ill afford to lose from our Reserves. It is pos- sible, by a wise modification of the rules, to create from among their number a Reserve for the manning of our gunboats. If it was intended that the second-class i i '!•■ qt i I •J I • H Further criticism of rules for Becoud-class Reserve Unwise rejection of fishermen 78 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN Reserve should be formed as a substitute for the Royal Coast Volunteers, the qualifications required in candi- dates for admission into the force were unnecessary. The original idea was that all the fishermen or boatmen should be eligible for tlie Coast Volunteers. Under the regulations for the entry of the men into the second- class Reserve, a knowledge of seamanship as practised in square-rigged vessels is insisted upon, and thus our longshore population, whose services in gunboats would be invaluable, are excluded from our sea militia. At the village of Rowedge on the Colne, whence yacht- owners obtain most excellent crews, there are 300 fishermen, and two-thirds of these men have never sailed in a square-rigged vessel. At Brightlingsea there are from 600 to 700 fishermen. Few of their number have had experience of other than fore-and-aft vessels. While the qualifications required of candidates are unnecessary, the severity with which they are tested equally deserves criticism. Several men from Rowedge have recently applied to be re-enrolled in the first Reserve ship at Harwich. They have been rejected for failure in heaving the lead in man-of-war fashion. In small vessels there is no opportunity and no neces- sity for the display of this accomplishment. To heave the lead properly in man-of-war fashion a scope of some three fathoms of line is required. In a small vessel with perhaps from three to four feet freeboard the necessary scope of line can never be given. The fisher- men, although well acquainted with the use of the lead and perfectly competent to take true soundings, are rejected from the service because they are not perfect leadsmen according to the naval standard. When men have proved themselves well qualified in other respects, OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 79 they should not be rejected for failure in one point only, in which, moreover, if they were allowed a few days for practice they would become sufficiently expert. If a knowledge of the art of reefing and handling topsails, and sending yards up down, were considered essential, it would be worth while to give to bond fide ■ fishermen instructions in those evolutions. On the coasts of Sufiblk and of Norfolk, the owners Aptitude of the fishing boats engaged in the herring fishery are herring in the habit of forming their crews in the proportion of * ^^^ at least one-half of agricultural labourers. A short experience at sea renders these men perfectly efficient for the duties on which they are employed. Their principal work consists in hauling in the herring nets. The severity of the task may be appreciated when it is mentioned that they have to walk a distance of eight miles round the capstan every morning when the nets are hauled in. Men who can perform such an amount of labour on board a small herring-boat would be per- fectly able to go through gun drill on board a gunboat. The example of the proprietors of these herring- boats may with advantage be followed by our naval adminis- trators, who, while rigorously excluding unfit persons, might search for recruits over a much wider area than they have hitherto explored. It is the more desirable to enrol fishermen in the Reserves because, during the intervals of enforced idleness in the fisheries, they can attend the necessary drills without inconvenience. At Hastings additional hands are always employed in the herring and mackerel season, from April till November. During the trawling season not much more than half the number are employed at sea. Those who remain at home, if fortunate enough to be the owners of boats, are occupied in mending their nets. A large proportion f •11 80 OUR KESEBVES OF SEAMEK i t\ il;! ;! tr % Original plan for tlie Coast Volunteers ' c\ \ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. I4S80 (716) 872-4503 %^ #»Vl O^ a n? w m 84 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN ! The strength of the Reserve must be settled by the Govern- ment from time to time The Steam Reierve Captain Willes on stokera of the Reserves and the country could have confidence, the large outlay on our Reserves has not as yet pro- duced such a result as the naval service and the taxpayers might fairly have anticipated. Although allusion has been made to the recommen- dations of the Royal Commission of 1859, no attempt has been made in the foregoing pages to define the necessary strength of our Reserves of the several classes. This is a point which must be determined by the Executive Government from time to time, according to the circumstances of the political situation. It may, however, be presumed that a force of 20,000 men in the first division of the Royal Naval Reserve, and 10,000 men in the second division, would be a sufficient permanent Reserve. It would certainly furnish crews for all our ships at present available. As additional ships were built, crews cor^ld be obtained by offering attractions in point of pay which would induce seamen to join the Navy. The expenditure involved in a large addition to the general pay of the Navy would un- doubtedly be very great ; but as war is, we may ven- ture to hope, a remote contingency, it is more economical to run the risk of a large expenditure, should an emer- gency unhappily arise, rather than burden the country with a serious permanent expenditure in time of peace. Having dealt with the more general question of a supply of seamen and officers, our oteam Reserve cannot be entirely omitted from consideration. In a recent parliamentary paper on the supply of coals to the Navy allusions are incidentally made to the insufficient number of trained stokers in the Navy. Captain Willes says that ' The amount of smoke made by the Reserve Squadron during the late cruise might be attributed to OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN 85 bad stoking. I have for a long time studied the pro- bable state of the engine-room in the event of a sudden war. So far as the ships of the Reserve Squadron are concerned, some few would have, in addition to the small number of stokers allowed them, some able stokers, although much out of practice, from the shore force, with the addition of raw hands from the Steam Reserve, whilst others would have nothing but raw hands in addition to the present nucleus. Ships in the (Channel Squadron could not have more than one-half good stokers to hand, and on the outbreak of a war indif- ferent stoking would be the rule rather than the exctp- tion.' Again, in the report of the late Engineer- Assistant of the Admiralty on the trials of coal in Indian troopships, we are told that in the * Serapis * half the complement of stokers were second-class lands- men, who had to be taught, and that this was also the case with the * Crocodile.' Admirals Elliott and Ryder, in their report on the designs of our ships of war, incidentally alluded to the unsatisfactory force of stokers in the Navy, of whom they say that they are not only insufficient in number, but also of very inferior physique. In the Crimean war, owing to the great demand for engineers who had had experience in driving high-pressure engines, many incompetent men were appointed. So it will always be when an emergency occurs, and there are no Reserves on which we can rely. With the immense advantage that we possess in the great steam fleet of the mercantile marine, this country ought not to be exposed to the chance of a difficulty in obtaining engineers and stokers for the Navy in any emergency, however sudden. A Steam Reserve should be formed, composed of men who should engage to serve in Her Majesty's ships when required, but who should Experience in Crimean war 86 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN Why there should be Bnother Commission only be called upon to join the Navy in the event of a war. It is impossible to review the immense change which has taken place since 1859 in the character of our mer- cantile marine without being convinced of the necessity for a most careful inquiry into the system upon which our Naval Reserves are organised. Some modifications must be required to bring the rules and regulations, devised twelve years ago, into harmony with the present condition of our merchant service. Had the character of our shipping remained unchanged, it is p: obable that the Royal Naval Reserve would have grown with the growth of our commc e. The transition from sailing ships to steamers, and the abolition of apprenticeship, have created new difficulties, by contracting the nursery for seamen; and to organise a new system of training is not an easy task. Elaborate inquiry is necessary, and many witnesses must be examined, in order to ascertain the views of the shipowners and seamen in the various ports. It seems scarcely possible that the First Lord of the Admiralty, or even less exalted officials, can spare time from the administration of a widely scattered and complicated service for such an investigation. Under these circumstances it seems an obvious alternative to delegate the inquiry to a committee of naval officers, or to a Royal Commission. The success which attended the appointment of the Committee of 1852 and the Royal Commission of 1859, to whose suggestions we owe the Reserves we actually possess, gives reason to hope that a new Royal Commission would be the means of bringing together much information and eliciting many valuable suggestions. The arguments of those who are of opinion that enough has not been done to unite the merchant service OUR RESEEVES OF SEAMEN 87 with the Royal Navy for the defence of the country derive no inconsiderable support from the experience of recent wars. The efficiency of the Prussian military system has been signalised by its unparalleled success. In the field we cannot vie with the Continental Powers. On the sea our superiority may be secured by a careful organisation of our vast resources. The statesman will prefer that naval preparations should be matured, not by withdrawing a large number of men from their use- ful labour in a peaceful vocation, but by adding to the qualifications of our seamen a knowledge of arms, easily imparted, and habits of discipline which, while they are essential in war, are not less valuable in peace. If a modification of the rules and regulations at present in force for the enrolment and drill of the seamen of the Reserve is not enough to raise the force to the strength at which it may be necessary that it should be perma- nently maintained, the establishment of a certain num- ber of training ships at the great commercial ports will doubtless prove an effectual means of creating an adequate Reserve. While economy is justly regarded as the paramount duty of Government, of all forms of naval expenditure that involved in the establishment of training ships will be found the most satisfactory in its results. A well-conducted training ship should not merely be a school of instruction in seamanship, but a place of education in the highest sense. How miserable are the haunts in which a large number of our seamen exhaust their hard earnings in degrading pleasures ! To bring the seafaring population within the reach of humanising and benign influences is a difficult task which well deserves our thoughtful consideration. Good impressions firmly fixed in early life are the best shield against temptation in later years ; and thus the work of Necessity of union of Royal Navy and mcrobant service Value of training ships 88 OUR RESERVES OF SEAMEN recruiting for the Naval Reserve will incidentally pro- mote the nobler object of elevating, both in character and in intelligence, a section of our population most difficult to reach, and to whose enterpris > and patriotism our national greatness is largely due. i-t V ''I ■I •■I 89 m NAVAL BE8EBVE8 Taper bead at the Royal United Sbevicb Institution, April 21, 1873 I APPEAR before this Institution essentially as a learner and not a teacher. As a member of Parliament, in- terested in our naval administration, I most anxiously desire to ascertain what, in the opinion of naval men, are our actual requirements as regards the number of seamen in reserve for the manning of the fleet. The public, and Parliament, as representing public opinion, are prepared to provide, with an ungrudging hand, whatever the naval men declare to be essential to our maritime power and security. It is for the Navy to tell the public what our requirements are. In dealing with the great question of our Naval Reserves — a subject too vast to be considered as a whole within the narrow limits of a short oral address — I shall say but little of the actual organisation of the force. I shall prefer to dwell on points which stiJl await solution, and upon which the opinion and thoughtful considera- tion of naval men are greatly needed. There are three problems which I will specially single out for discus- sion. First. What number of seamen ought we to en- 90 NAVAL RESERVES Points for disouBaion Naval opinion in 1852 Increase of American Navy in civil war deavour to enrol, whether in the First or Second Class Reserve, or as Naval Coast Volunteers ? Second. To what extent may we venture to rely on the merchant service to provide officers for our Navy in time of war ? Third. What are the most eflfectual means of raising and training a force for the especial purpose of coast defence ? The inquiries, instituted in 1852, as to the probable requirements of the British Navy, elicited the usual divergency of opinions from the naval officers who were consulted. Sir John Stirling estimated that 60,000 men would be necessary to man the Navy in time of war. Admiral Denman, on the other hand, believed that, on the outbreak of a war, a fleet of 100,000 men would be immediately required ; but, inasmuch as of the 40,000 employed in 1852 only 15,000 were seamen, he believed that of the 60,000 additional men required for a war Navy, only 23,000 need be seamen. The effect of modern mechanical appliances in rela- tion to the manning of the Navy, was scarcely perceived at the time of the Crimean wa* ; but the fact that the number of seamen and marines employed in the British fleet at that period never exceeded 68,000, afforded some indication of the coming change. In the recent civil war in America, the Navy of the United States was increased to vast proportions. Land defences of great strength were attacked by their ships. An effectual blockade was maintained along 3,500 miles of coast. A fleet of cruisers was despatched in chase of the * Alabama,' and other piratical vessels, to every part of the world. To perform these varied services, some 671 vessels were e* iployed ; but such was the effect of modern changes In naval warfare, that the number of NAVAL EESERVES 91 men employed in the United States fleet never exceeded 51,000 men. The blockade of Charleston is one of the most striking examples of the reduced numbers of sea- men required in modern naval warfare. The report of the Secretary of the United States Navy on armoured vessels, published in 1866, contains a despatch from Admiral Dahlgren, dated oflF Morris Island, January 1864, in which the following observations occur: 'The completeness with which four little monitors, supported by an ironclad frigate, have closed Charleston, is well worth noting. These four monitors, which thus keep watch and ward, muster eight guns and 320 men, which is almost insignificant compared with the work done.' The last Royal Commission on the Manning of the Royal • n 1 Commission Navy, reporting in 1860, had not the experience ot the on Manning American war as a guide for determining our probable requirements. The following statement exhibits the whole amount of reserve which they recommended : Reliefs in the home ports . 4,000 Coast Guard . . . . . . 12,000 Marines embodied . 6,000 Ditto, short service pensioners . 6,000 Seamen, short service pensioners . .S,000 Royal Naval Volunteers . 20,000 Naval Coast Volunteers . 10,000 f.0,000 men Since the publication of the report of the Royal Commission of 1859 naval warfare has been almost revolutionised. When, on a recent occasion, I intro- duced a motion in the House of Commons on the condi- tion of our Naval Reserves, I urged the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the subject, mainly on the ground that, in consequence of the immense 92 NAVAL RESERVES Number of seamen required for a modern battle fleet changes which have taken place, the number of seamen required for the Reserve could no longer be taken as definitely settled by a report drawn up some fifteen years ago. How great a change has taken place in this regard was clearly shown in the able speech of Mr. Shaw- Lefevre, in which he pointed out that at the date when the inquiry of the last Royal Commission was held the flag-ship in the Mediterranean required a complement of from 600 to 700 blue-jackets, while for the present flag- ship, the * Lord Warden,' 200 are sufficient ; and, if the ' Devastation ' represents the flag-ship of the future in European waters, then 100 able seamen will do the work, for which, in the good old times of full-rigged three-deckers, a crew of 600 seamen was essential. I believe I am correct in saying that at the present moment we have not more than 32 or 33 ironclads afloat adapted for cruising in distant waters, or for service in which the aid of sail-power may be regarded as indispensable. Some years must elapse ere our ocean-going ironclad fleet can be increased to a total number of 50 vessels. If it be fair to take the crew of the 'Lord Warden' as representing the average number of seamen required for one-half of our ironclad fleet, and if the complement of the ' Devastation ' may be ac- cepted as the normal number for ships of her class — and, to judge from the Naval Estimates of the present year, one-half of our new ironclads will be mastless ships — then it would appear probable that we should require for the complements of a fleet of 50 of the most power- ful ironclad ships not more than 7,500 bond fide seamen. For a fleet of 50 ships of the type to which the fiagship in the Mediterranean fifteen years ago belonged, we should have required a force of 30,000 seamen. The in- ference seems to be irresistible that in a future naval NAVAL RESERVES 98 war we shall not require so many seamen as formerly for our ocean-going line-of-battle ships. Making every allowance, therefore, for the increased importance of the commerce, and assuming that, in consequence of the withdrawal of the troops, the defence of the colonies will be in a larger sense than heretofore committed to the Navy, I venture to submit that we no longer require 20,000 seamen in our First Class Reserve. The First Class Reserve now numbers about 12,000 seamen, very care- fully selected ; and if 10,000 men answered to their country's call we should find it difficult to make use of their services. Hence I arrive at the conclusion that we are in a highly satisfactory position as regards the numerical strength of our Naval Reserve. The policy of creating additional means of training Training the seamen for the Reserve must depend mainly on the views ''®*®'^®* entertained in the Navy as to the strength at which that Reserve should be maintained. If our present reserve be really inadequate, then training ships, with brigs attached as sailing tenders, should be at once established, at least in London and Liverpool. If, on the other hand, the actual strength of the Naval Reserve is adequate, then naval reformers will not be justified in urging upon the consideration of Parliament proposals for training young seamen for the reserves at the public expense. Before I pass to the second subject with which I Quality of have to deal, I would invite naval officers to say whether seamen or not they think that the seaman of modern times has deteriorated by comparison with his predecessors. I believe that it is the opinion in the Navy that, so far as that branch of the great marine of England is concerned, the greatly improved system of training which has been established has produced in the seaman of modem times a very valuable man. But it is well known to naval 94 NAVAL RESERVES Number of nHval officers un- employed ! Cadets of • Conway * and •Worcester' officers that the mercantile marine do not consider themselves quite so fortunate. Whether or no that public opinion is founded upon good and substantial reasons it is very difficult to determine. Speaking as a yacht-owner of some eighteen or nineteen years' stand- ing, I am bound to say that the class o seamen we em ploy, I believe now 8,000 in number, do not appear to me to have shown the slightest deterioration. I desire now to make a few observations on the offi- cers of the Reserve. There is no profession in which so much talent is lost for want of opportunity for its exer- cise, none in which so much honourable ambition is doomed to disappointment as the Navy. The half- pay list contains a multitude of names of officers without private means, and eager for employment, which is denied to them for the greater part of the best portion of their lives. Can we not remedy this evil by first creating a reserve of officers in the mercantile marine, and then reducing the number of officers in the Navy to something like the number actually required in time of peace ? At the present time young gentlemen, socially quali- fied in every way for service in the Navy, are being educated on board the * Conway ' in the Mersey, and the ' Worcester ' in the Thames. If the Admiralty were to afford to these officers, after they have passed their ex- aminations as masters and mates, the opportunity of adding to their nautical education, received at sea, a competent knowledge of gunnery, we should have in them an invaluable reserve of officers. For this purpose, a short practical course of gunnery and naval tactics should be arranged in connection with the ' Excellent,' analogous with the course of military instruction which has been arranged for Volunteer officers at Aldershot. NAVAL RESERVES 95 Eligible young officers of the mercantile marine should be encouraged to go through the course by the offer of a premium, to be paid to them on their passing a satis- factory examination. The premium should be sufficient in amount to cover the expense of their residence in Portsmouth, and also to compensate them for their loss of time in not going to sea while remaining on shore for the purpose of study. The Board of Trade wo; ' ^ do much to promote the success of this scheme by raising the standard of exami- nation for the extra master's certificate, which might be extended so as to include both modern languages and the more important elements of commercial science. The privilege of going through the course on board the ' Excellent ' might be confined to those officers who had passed this higher examination. I would urge the en- deavour to raise the status of the officers of the mercan- tile marine as an object o." high administrative policy essentially philanthropic in its tendency. There is no position more full of responsibility, none in which there are greater opportunities of doing good or harm, than that of commander of a merchantman. In distant seas, far removed from the influence of public opinion, the sea officer has unlimited powers of raising or lowering the character of his crew, and alleviating or aggravating the inevitable hardships of their lot. Unless it be accepted as an axiom that young gentle- men should not enter the Navy without being possessed of the advantage of considerable private means, the pre- sent half-pay system is a serious evil. There should be no half-pay for officers on the active list. After service at sea a fair amount of leave should be granted. In all ranks, a year ashore for every three years passed afloat would not be too great an indulgence. If the numbers Higher status of oflRcers of mercantile nmrine urged Evils of half- pay system 96 NAVAL RESER"'/ES Numbers and quality of mcu for Coast Volunteers Facilities for fisher- men to drill be reduced, useful employment could always be found for all officers in the higher ranks of the Navy, in developing the numerous novel inventions for naval warfare, in watching the progress of gunnery.^ in criti- cising the recent njodifications in naval architecture, or in applyin. heir attention to the safety of life at sea, and other kindred subjects. There is always much work to be done for the Navy and the mercantile marine, with which nava] men are specially competent to deal. From the Royal Naval Reserve and its officers, I turn to the Coast Volunteers. The Committee of 1852 recommended a force of 6,000 Coast Volunteers, and the Royal Commission of 1859 advised that the number should be 10,000. According to the latest estimates the number has been reduced to 600 men. It cannot be said that eligible men are wanting. The latest return shows that 153,000 men and 14,000 boys are employed in the fisheries of the Uni+ed Kingdom. In physical power and hardy habits the fishermen are superior to the seamen in foreign trades. Their local knowledge would be of immense value in coast defence, and the fact that they have fixed places of residence and never sail under a foreign flag makes it certain that they would alway." be found when their services were rec^uired. Of the moral character of the fishermen as a body I can speak with the greatest confidence. The Coast Volun- teers are not a popular force in the Navy. The reason is that, for political purposes, the men originall}' en rolled were admitted into the service with discreditable laxity. It would not be difficult to raise, from among our large population of bond fide fishermen, a reserve equal to the standard recommended by the Royal Commission. NAVAL RESERVES 97 There seems a disposition to induce the fishermen to join, not the Naval Coast Volunteers, but the Second Class Naval Reserve. The means, however, which are pro- posed for carrying out this policy are inadequate. The fishermen are congregated in isolated communities on various points of the coast. They are men of domesti- cated habits, and it would be difficult to induce them to join the Reserve, if they had to go to a distance from their homes to be drilled. The list of ships and batteries at which the Naval Reserve may take their drill, though imposing enough in point of numbers, does not include some of the most important fishing communities on the coast of the United Kingdom. For example, while there are batteries for drill at Poole, where the num- ber of men and boys employed in fishing vessels is only 214 ; at Maryport, where there are only GO ; and at Lynn, where there are only 2G6 ; there are no simi- lar establishments at Sligo, which has 4,800 men and boys in the fishing vessels of the port ; none at Skib- bereen, which has 5,500 fishermen ; none at Banff, which has 5,600 ; nor at Stornoway, which has 8,000 ; nor at Wick, which has 8,400 ; nor at Inverness, which has 9,000 fishermen. The list which I have read is sufficient to show what immense numbers of fishermen are collec- ted at some of the Scotch fishing stations ; and these men are, as is well known, remarkaV)le for their physical strength, hardy habits, and good character. In view of the importance to the Navy of recruiting Recruits in this section of our maritime population, the Manning Navy ia^*^ Committee of 1852 strongly reconnnended that the "''^° Scotch Naval Station should be re-established. Where the Navy is best known, as they truly observed, there the flower of the population are ready to enter it. In 1852 there were more men in the Navy from the village 98 NAVAL RESERVES Visits of gunboats to fisliing ports Strength of Naval Iteserve required i of Cawsand than from the port of Liverpool. The return of the counties in which the boys in the training ships in 1871 were born, shows that out of 2,888 boys, only 99 came from the whole of Scotland ; only 112 from Lancashire, including the Isle of Man as well as Liverpool ; only 23 from Suifolk ; 11 from Norfolk ; and 18 from Wales. Can it be supposed that the great sea- faring populations which reside on those coasts have ever been made thoroughly acquainted with the ad- vantages enjoyed by those who serve in the Navy and the Reserve ? The fluctuating nature of their occupa- tion would enable the fishermen to attend drill with little inconvenience. The drill could be taught in the most eflFective manner, and with the least expense to the Government, by sending a gunboat to visit the fishing ports at the slack season. These periodical visits of a smart, well-organised gunboat, would do much to create a favourable impression of the Navy amongst the fisher- men. The expense of keeping a few gunboats in com- mission for this purpose would be nominal. We have more seamen at present in the home ports than it is possible to employ in sea-going ships. Some of these men might be attached to gunboats instead of remain- ing in stationary flagships. The display of the white ensign in the fishing ports would be a more effectual means of recruiting for the Reserve than the labours, however assiduous, of any number of registrars, and the barren exhibition of recruiting }>lacards. I have ventured to express an opinion that the standard of strength for the First Class Naval Reserve would not be inadequate, if maintained at 10,000 men. For the Coast Defence Force, I cannot regard the number proposed by the Royal Commission in 1860 as beyond our necessities. Though naval warfare may be changed, NAVAL RESERVES 99 the services of men well acquaiiitecl with our own waters must always be invaluable, wiiether to man our gun- boats, to lay out torpedoes, or even to fight heavy ordnance in batteries on the coast, and to co-operate with the military forces in operations on shore. To some it may appear doubtful whether all the dash and elan rofiuired for naval operations is to be found among the stay-at-home people who earn a livelihood in our fisheries. Had they seen, what the author has often witnessed, the agility, the seamaidike resource, and the nerve, which these men never fail to display in the ever- varying incident and adventure of sea-life, they would no longer doubt their aptitude, if properly trained, for every duty which the crews of our coast flotilla may be called upon to perform. The enrolment of fishermen in the Reserves has been advocated by our most experienced naval reformers — by Sir Charles Napier ; by Admiral Berkeley ; by Sir William Hall ; by Admiral Hastings ; by the late Sir Alexander ]\[ilne, and by many other most distinguished naval oflicers. The rules for admission into the Coast Volunteers Quaiiflcatiou should be so framed as to require only such seamanship volunteers as every experienced fisherman must possess. Training ill gunnery and small-arm drill are the only additional qualifications needed to make our fishermen thoroughly useful in the Coast Defence Flotilla. In tiie recent revision of the rules and regulations for the Naval lleserve, the conditions of entry for the Second Class Reserve have been judiciously modified, so that the fishermen will now be eligible for enrolment. The training should be given afloat, and, in order to propitiate the local sympathies of the fishermen, the gunboats, which they would be employed to man in . n 2 100 NAVAL RESEEVES TiOpal knowledge for officers of (Jon:i will be indefinitely delayed. I have received applications from 8outliainpton, Dundee, Wales, Mussel- burgh, Harwich, and Bristol for assistance and advice. It is very desirable that a naval officer should be avail- able to visit these localities where a disposition exists to organise r. local corps of Naval Volunteers, and I am happy to be enabled to state that the appointment, which I so earnestly recommended, will sliortly be made. The appropriation of a gunboat for the instruction of the members of the London contingent is equally in- dispensable to the success of the Naval Volunteer move- ment. Practice in firing at a target afloat and in working a gun mounted on a gunboat is necessary for efficiency. On the other hand, the opportunity of spend- ing a week every year on the water is essential to the popularity of the movement. In a time of profound peace, and in a country in which the principle of com- pulsory military service has not been accepted, men will not volunteer for the somewhat laborious task of going through an annual course of naval gun drill wi.iiout some inducement. The most earnest men who have joined the Volunteer movement hope they may thus obtain the opportunity of spending a few days afloat every year. The gunboat appropriated to the Volunteers in the Thames might do duty as a tender to the ' Presi- dent,' the drill-ship of the Naval Reserve in the London district. Hitherto, none of the seamen belonging to the Reserve in the Port of London have ever had any practice in firing at a target afloat. At Liverpool, on the other hand, a gunbc^t is attached to the drill-ship, in which the seamen of the Reserve are regularly exercised. The Volunteers would not urge upon the Admiralty the expenditure of money, especially on their behalf ; but the inconvenience of attending drill in the West India Docks NAVAL RESERVES 103 to gentlemen wliose usual pursuits are in the City or the West- end is so great, that the London contingent can never become very numerous until more suitable arrangements can be made. A gunboat of the 'Comet' • -is, moored off Somerset House, would afford the x.v.vessary facility, and would cost less than fitting up a wooden ship of larger tonnage. The gun-drills might take place on Saturday afternoons, when the Volunteers could conveniently attend. We have now considered the Reserves of all classes Reserves which it is possible to raise on our shores, resources of Great Britain are by no means limited to these islands. I have re* u'ned from a recent visit to Tlie naval colonies our North American colonies with a feeling of regret that no attempt has been made to encourage the colonists to form Reserves among the hardy marinei's who sail under the British Hag in North American waters. We have not hesitated to enrol our coloured fellow-subjects in the land forces in many dependencies of the Crown ; why should we not encourage the colonies to form a Naval Reserve for the defence of their own coast? In the Canadian Dominion and Newfoundland are 87,000 seamen and fisliermen, of whom one-third belong to Newfoundland alone. The fishermen are com- pelled by the inclemency of the season and the closing of the navigation by ice to remain at home for a con- siderable portion of the winter. A gunboat n)ight be stationed at St. John's, and another at Halifax, for the purpose of drilling the Colonial Reserves, gradually pro- ceeding from harbour to harbour on the Atlantic coast in winter, and ascending the Gulf of St. Lawrence at the approach of spring. The local Reserve might be drilled in the slack season of the fishery, and before the navigation became completely open from the melting of 104 NAVAL EESERVES Inspecting Staff of Reserves 'II Value of seamen Instructors the ice. With some aid and encouragement from the mother country, it appears to be perfectly feasible, and most desirable, that the Canadian Dominion and the adjacent colonies should organise a force for the defence of their coasts. I throw the suggestion out for the consideration of the Government at home and the authorities in the colonies. Lastly, the formation of an able staff of inspecting oflScers for the Reserve is essentially necessary to secure their efficiency. The Reserves, including the Coast Guard, now number not less than 20,000 men. The supreme command of such a force is worthy of tl'e most distinguished admiral in the service. The commander- in-chief should be supported by a staff of officers, to whom should be assigned the command of the Reserves in the St. George's Channel and on the east coast of England. An admiral sent on an occasional tour of inspection is not a sufficient substitute for an officer specially devoted to the duty, and whose representations as to the requirements of the Reserve would receive an amount of attention at the Admiralty which could not be secured by any other means. In urging the appointment of a staff of superintend- ing officers, I do not undervalue for a moment the services of that admirable body of men, the seamen instructors in gunnery in the drill ships of the Reserve. It is impossible to speak too highly of their zeal, their intelligence, their discipline, and their consummate knowledge of the subject on which it is their duty to give instruction. Naval officers, judiciously selected, would exercise a higher influence over the morale of the Naval Reserve. The merchant seamen would feel them- selves, in a larger sense than heretofore, an integral part of the Navy in England. They would be inspired by NAVAL KESERVES 105 its great traditions, and the confidence which they -'ould acquire in the officers under whom they received their training would be an invaluable guarantee for their conduct and discipline, should they ever be called upon to serve in Her Majesty's fleets. I! 'I 106 I iiji Naval Reserve of Fnince Qerinany TV OUB NAVAL RESERVE Speech in tue House of Commons, Apbil 17, 1874 Mr. Brassey said that in inviting the consideration of the House to the organisation of our Naval Reserves they need not approach the subject with any misgiving. There were now serving in British merchant vessels entering and leaving our home ports not less than 407,000 men, of whom by far the greater number were genuine sailors. This numerous array did not include seamen in British ships in the colonies and abroad which did not visit our home ports. With a maritime inscription extended as widely as in France, we could secure for the fleet a force of 700,000 men. Commodore Goodenough, in his speech at the United Service Insti- tution last year, informed us that the numbers under the Naval Reserve Act of France were about 172,000. All these men were not fit for active service afloat ; but for some years prior to the Franco-Prussian War the force of seamen afloat had been maintained at 15,000 men, with 7,000 in reserve in barracks. The men in reserve were double the number of those in active service, and would constitute a force of 65,000 men, from twenty to thirty-six years of age. The North German Empire possessed some 80,000 seafaring men. No large proportion of these men had served in the German Navy, but 5,000 seamen were embodied at present; OUK NAVAL KE8ERVE 107 and, assuming that the Navy liad double the strength of the force enrolled, we might take the German Naval Reserves at 15,000 men. The United States had no Naval Reserves, a deficiency more than once pointed out by the Secretary to their Navy in his annual report. The number of ships of the Russian Navy engaged in active cruising was too limited to afford the means of highly training a larger number of men as sailors, and the mercantile marine was comparatively insignificant. From this review we might safely conclude that we had only to organise with the completeness which maiked the preparations of other Powers in order to make ourselves perfectly secure. Sir Frederick Grey had exi)ressed an opinion that for our war Navy we should recjuire 84,000 officers and men. Admiral Sherard Osborn, in his recent pamphlet, had recommended approximately tlie same numbers, and those estimates would not seem exaggerated when we took into view the extent of our commerce and the necessity of our being able to protect our colonial possessions. There seemed, therefore, no reason from the recent changes in naval warfare for going back from the recommendations of the Royal Commission of which Lord Cardwell was Lord the chairman, that we should enrol 20,000 seamen in commission Our own re- quirements our Naval Reserve and establish a force of 10,000 fishermen for Coast Defence. It had been urged that the Naval Reserve was an unreliable force. This opinion was not shared by the officers, who had the best opportunities of forming a judgment. Sir Cooper Key's Embarka- report of the 1,700 men of the Reserve embarked in the R^erve fleet for a month's cruise at Whitsuntide 1869 was "'^^^ decidedly favourable. It was much to be regretted such cruises were not more frequently repeated. The complaints we heard were not made for the first time. 108 OUR NAVAL RESERVE Quality of seamen in meroliant serrioe Before the repeal of the Navigation Laws in 1849, the incompetency of the officers and the want of discipline among seamen were the theme of constant complaints among shipowners. The present alleged deterioration was denied by Messrs. Gray and Hamilton, who, on behalf of the Board of Trade, visited the principal ports in the autumn of 1872. There was no general complaint among the owners of steamships. The Inman Company made it a rule to give no advance note, and to take only married men, if they could get them. That had proved to be an excellent rule. They never wanted men, and they had many in the service who had been with them fifteen years. In the Royal Navy it was found necessary to introduce the continuous service system. It might be said the profits of the trade were too small to allow of additional charges being placed upon the employers of seamen. In that case, the public must bear the charge by paying higher ireights. The improvement in the seamen would have the happy effect of diminishing the loss of life and property at sea. The reduction in the premiums of insurance would compensate for the expen- diture upon wages. Shipowners would derive no benefit from the intervention of the State in encouraging ap- prenticeships to the sea and subsidising training-ships so long as the wages of skilled workmen on shore remained higher than the wages of seamen. Even on board ship numbers of seamen were induced to serve as firemen, in order to earn a small additional wage. Many left the sea altogether, because their experience as sailors had given them an aptitude for employments on shore in which they earned better wages than they could com- mand either in steamers cr sailing vessels. Higher wages were paid in our own merchant service than in any other, except, perhaps, that of the United States. OUR NAVAL RESERVE 100 Thus far the nations wliich had l)een the builders of ships had furnished seamen to man them ; and, as the United Kingdom enjoyed an undisputed pre-eminence as a shipbuilding country, we nn'ght be confident that our sailors could hold their own with the sailors of other nations. It was an obvious duty to jimend our laws ncfornidf wherever they could be shown to be prejudicial to the shipiiin^' sailor. It had been urged that the advance notes given to seamen on being shipped were directly one of the chief causes of the demoralisation of our sailors, and indirectly the cause of the loss of much property and many lives. The jiropriety of making the advance note illojjal was under the consideration of the Commission. The seaman could not cash his advance note except at a heavy discount ; the money raised by the transaction was too often squandered in debauchery ; in many cases not a farthing was laid out in providing an outtit of clothes for the inttxided voyage. Seamen weie the only class of labourers who received an ad\'ance of wages before any work was done. The allotment note, on the other hand, was most advantageous to seamen and their f.imilies, and should receive all possible encouragement from shipowners. It had been submitted that sailors' boarding-houses should be licensed and under inspection, and that no boarding-houses should be allowed in con- nection with beer-houses and public-houses. It was further urged that we should come to some understand- ing with foreign Powers as to the restraint of crimping in seaports abroad, and that it might be feasible to make crimping by a British subject on a British vessel in a foreign port penal. Might it not be possible, by consular convention, to insure to shipowners that agree- ments made by the seamen in this country should continue binding upon them in a foreign country 1 110 OUR NAVAL EESERVE I ill Increase of steamers oliecks entry of lleserve School ships for training boys Shipmasters scarcely did their duty to each other in the mutual endeavour to obtain good crews. In the dis- charge-note it was a practice to endorse the seaman * very good ' when he deserved a totally different cha- racter. E\en iu the Reserve there were some bad bargains. Where any such existed they should be promptly weeded out. The retainers were so liberal that none but efficient and well-conducted men should be allowed to remain in the service. The terms for the enrolment of the Naval Reserve might be modified by fixing the retainer at 5/. on entry, and establishing various scales of pay to a maxitmim of 71. The average cost might be higher than at j^resent, but there would be a larger proportion of trained men. Recruiting for the Reserve had been checked by the increase in steamers. Those in the coasting trade were so short a time in port that the crews could not attend drill without losing their regular employment. Steamers were a bad school of seamanshin, but there was still an ample fleet of sailing vessels to n-m a nursery for the Naval Reserve. It was much tt ie regretted that we had failed to keep up the Reserve to the standard recommended by the Royal Commission. Even if we had to incur a certain expen- diture for such a purpose, the money would be well expended. It was the insurance fund of the nation. The Royal Commission recommended that the force should be composed of ti'ained sean)en, and it was to be recruited in the first instance from adults. As a tem- porary measure 20,000 men were to be enrolled from the merchant service. School ships were to be established, capable of accommodating from 100 to 200 boarders in each ship, of whom 100 were to be supported by the State. Two thousand four hundred boys would thus be supplied annually to the mercantile marine and the OUR NAVAL RESERVE 111 Reserve. It was recommended tliat 40,000/. should be voted annually for the maintenance of the ships. No vote had ever been taken to carry into effect this recom- mendation, nor had any vote been taken to supply the place of the Naval Coast Volunteers. There were at present eleven training ships at different ports. In so far as they were to be regarded as training- vessels for the Reserve, all, except tho ' Warspite,' were upon a wrong principle. Seven of the training-ships were intended to receive street-a'abs. Under the Industrial Schools Act they had received a total subsidy of 1 1,870/. These ships could accommodate 1,000 boys. The actual number on board was 1,250. There were three reforma- Reformatory tory ships; they could take 7i)0 boys, the actual number *"^^ being G47. They had received 8,90G/. The Govern- ment, having only subsidised industrial schools or reformatories afloat, had done nothing to help poor but respectable parents to train their sons for the sea. He would suggest that, as an experiment, they should take Government over one of the ships stationed in the Thames and one sWpTfor in the Mersey ; that the boys should be of the same ^^^ class as those admitted into the training-ships of the Navy; and that the expense of the ships taken over should be met by a contribution in equal thirds from a special vote to be taken, as for educational purposes ; l>y a contribution from the Mercantile Murine Fund ; and by another from the Admiralty. The contribution ivom the Admiralty should be payable only on the completion of the training, and upon the boy's qualifications being tested by examination. It should be a further condition of the Admiralty grant that the boy should consent to serve in the Navy for one year. In each of the ships in the Thames and the Mersey there should be accom- modation for 250 boys. He ventured to insist strongly w fS ! Encourage- ment to apprentice- ship system Fishermen for tlie Reserve 112 OUR NAVAL RESERVE young seaman age of on the importance of passing through the Navy boys intended for the Reserve, because it was quite certain that mere drill without discipline would not prepare a for naval duties. He would make the admission IG and the period of service in the training-ships two years. It had been proposed by several local Marine Boards that the Government should encourage apprenticeship to the sea, by oflfering a pre- mium of 10/. to every boy on completing an apprentice- ship of four years, on production of a certificate of character and passing an examination in seamanship. It should be stipulated that all apprentices receiving premiums should serve a year in the Navy as ordinaries, receiving a further gratuity of 10?. on leaving the Navy and passing into the Reserve. If they remained in the Reserve until 50 years of age, they should be entitled to the same pensions as seamen in the Navy. If a full Reserve could be formed from the boys thus trained, the necessity for the Reserve paid by annual retainers would, as Mr. W. S. Lindsay has pointed out, no longer exist. He need not again enlarge on the importance of forming a Reserve for coast defence among our 150,000 fishermen. It would be worth while to commission a few more gunboats, to be employed in visiting the fishing stations in the slack season of the fisheries, thus affording the fishermen the opportunity of learning their gun-drill v'ithout travelling to an impossible distance from their homes, and avoiding the necessity of keeping up several permanent drill batteries on shore, where there was often a most scanty attendance. The employment of a few gunboats on that service would increase the opportu- nities, so rare at present in the experience of naval officers, of becoming acquainted with our coasts. No more honorary commissions in the Naval Reserve should OUK NAVAL RESERVE 113 l»e given, except to owners of yachts who succeeded in Privilege persuading all their men to join the Reserve. The white wituKeserve ensign might be used by any owner who could bring fifty men, bondjide yachtsmen, into the Reserve. The privilege of flying the white ensign should cease unless substitutes were found for any men in the original batch of fifty who withdrew from the Reserve. Cadetships in tiie Naval Reserve had been given to young gentlemen from the 'Conway' and 'Worcester.' That should be followed up by giving them a short course on board the ' Excellent.' The value of the Naval University at Greenwich would be immensely increased as a national institution when the officers of the merchant service were allowed to participate in all the advantages afforded. Lastly, he urged the appointment to the staff of Reserve, at an early date, of a competent stafT of otHcei'S omcer!* with an admiral at their head. Until a recent date the Controller of the Coast Guard devoted a portion of his time to the Reserves. There was work for a considerable staff", if the duty of increasing the numbers and efficiency of the force was to be properly done. Without an officer of high rank and considerable influence at the head of the Reserve, its requirements would never be duly represented to the Admiralty. They wanted an admiral at the head, and at all the great ports a local representative of the Navy, who, by constant residence, would acquire influence over the seafaring population, who would induce them to join the Reserve and per- sonally superintend their drills. tl. 114 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP THE SEAMEN OE THE COUNTRY Paper .{EA» at the Royal United Service Institution ON February 18, 1876 Number of foreigners in British sliips It will be my object in the present paper to be practical. There has of late been too much vague declamation as to the decay of our British seamen. I do not therefore propose to dwell at length on the faults of our sailors : I shall prefer to occupy your time with proposals for ameliorating their condition, their character, and their seamanship. It will be conveniient to clear the difficult path before us by stating the number of foreigners employed, and the annual waste of seamen in our merchant service. With regard to the number of foreigners employed under the British flag, while the proportion is, no doubt, considerable, the number does not increase. The pro- portion of foreigners to British seamen, which was 12*6 in 1864, was reduced to 1087 in 1873. I may in this place observe that some of the ablest of our shipowners have entertained the opinion that foreigners are an in- dispensable element in our merchant service. To quote only one authority, this opinion was expressed by Mr. Lamport, in giving evidence before Mr. Lindsay's Com- mittee in 1860. He was asked, ' What, in your opinion, would have been the present state of things, had the THE 8EAMEN OF THE COUNTRY 115 Navigation Laws not been repealed ? ' He replied, ' I think there would have been more British tonnage atloat than there is now, but I do not think we should have been able to man our Bi-itish ships with British sailors. The rate of wages must have been tremendous, in order to bring this about,' It has been computed that, from various causes- death, drowning, desertion, the giving up of employ- ment at sea in order to obtain occupation on shore — our mercantile marine loses every year about 1G,000 men. The apprenticeship system supplies about .'3,500 men per annum, and the training-ships probably as many more. The boys not apprenticed, and the ordinary seamen, supply the remaining 9,000 men. As a matter of fact, no great difficulty has been experienced in obtaining the number of men required for the merchant service. The This speech is inserted as showing the view taken and encouragement given by tlie naval authorities when this force —recently disbanded— was organised twenty years ago.— Ed. 1 m 'mi • 'hi :lf! . ;n :>3;: i It!. liii Tlpfonco of [lorts iiiid liarlpdurs liiiyal Naval Jlfservo 154 THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS our own coasts so much as to the carrying of the war to the coasts of every enemy that might attack us. And for that I'eason, successive Boards of Admiralty had never been as keen in applying the funds — which the munificence of the country had placed at their disposal — for the defence of our estuaries and ports as in providing ships which might in every quarter of the glol)e assert that naval supremacy which we had always prided ourselves on maintaining. No doulii, in order to meet the possi- bility of surprise from steam and other inventions, it had become more incumbent upon the Admiralty to look to the defence of the ports and harbours than it was in past times ; but still he maintained that that was not their first duty, because he hoped it would be a long time before any foreign foe could force his way into such places. It could not, however, be denied that serious panics might arise among wealthy merchants, shipowners, and others from not seeing a sufficient number of men- of-war at hand for the purpose of protection, and hence it had been thought desirable to establish the Royal Naval Reserve — a most valuable force, composed chiefly of sailors who would be ready to put to sea in time of war, and to go to any part of the globe where their ser- vices might be required. The Admiralty had also thought it their duty to deal with another class, who seemed a most promising element in the national de- fences the fishermen and those engaged in similar pursuits to theirs around our coasts. They had now enrolled a second class of Naval Reserve, who were Volun- teers in the stricter sense of the word, and although these were formed only a year ago, they already num bered nearly 1,000 men, and were rapidly increasing. But, apart from the regular forces, apart from the blue- jackets, and from the reserves connected with the sea- THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 155 faring population of the coasts, they desired and they expected to see the increase of the new force which had been started under the auspices of Mr. Brassey and other gentlemen, under the name of 'The Royal Naval 'The Royal Artillery Volunteers.' It could not be denied that the Artillery Army had had the start of the Navy as regarded Volun- teers ; but he trusted that the result of the meeting that evening would be that this new force connected with the Navy would enter into successful rivalry with the Volunteer force connected with the sister service. The Naval Volunteers would, no doubt, have greater dilhculties to contend with than their competitors, be- cause for the most part service afloat was more arduous than service ashore ; but it was desirable that it should be understood that it was not necessary for the Naval Volunteers to have superlatively good sea-legs. They would rather be required to serve as volunteers in estuaries and forts than in any other capacity ; and if they were trained to be efficient artillerymen there would An additi..n thus have been added so much to the ofl^ensive and de- forces oUhe tensive forces of the country. The first thing to be aimed at was to train men to fight with heavy naval guns, whether in gunboats or on shore. It was not to be expected that Volunteers would be able to go to sea, or to man gunboats at sea in time of war, but a certain number of Volunteers had already cruised at sea, and naval officers who had seen them at work had reported that they displayed energy and ability in performing their duties, and that they roughed it with sailors in a manner which tended to inspire confidence in them in future. Mr. Brassey would tell them that drilling with heavy naval guns was a task by no means beyond the ability of a man with good health and a fair amount of physical vigour to accomplish. The drills were not ex- couutry 156 THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS Necessary qualifica- tions for the Volunteers Value of tlie corps Encourage- ment by Govcrnuieut anil A.(l- luiriilty An impor- tant link cessive ; what was desirable was that the Volunteers should be able to fight guns, that they should have a certain amount of discipline, and that they should form a Reserve which would always be ready in time of need. He must say that, personally, he attached the greatest importance to that organisation. It was not merely that that movement would add some hundreds of men to the Reserve forces of the country, but there would be such an organisation at the various ports that every man who in time of need wished to render assist- ance would know where to find his place and where to render assistance most effectually. There would be a skeleton corps ready to be filled up whenever danger arose. Whether that movement would succeed or not must depend very much upon persons connected with our maritime ports who engaged in such pursuits as boating and yachting, which had so much attraction for Englishmen ; and, on the part of the Government, he wished to say that they were anxious to assist and stimulate its growth. The Admiralty and the naval service cordially welcomed this new branch of the national defences. The Admiralty would be ready to provide it with the materials which were essential to drill. It had been represented that drill in the ' Presi- dent ' was too remote, and that it would be useful in reference to Londoners if there were a drdl-ship in a cen- tral position in the Thames. It had, in consequence, been arranged that a gunboat should be moored as nearly as possible opposite Somerset House, so that there would be a standing monument of the existence of the Royal Naval Volunteers, and a place where any man could drill if he wished to do so. The interest felt by the people of Lon- don in the blue-jackets was shown some time ago by the enthusiastic ovation given to 500 men of the ' Excel- THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 157 lent ' when they marched through the streets, and the establishment of the Naval Volunteers would create a new and important link between the Navy and other branches of the defensive services. Mr. Brassey might well feel proud of that movement if it succeeded, as he (Mr. Goschen) trusted it would, having brought to it an oraranisina and administrative ability which he inherited from his father, whose memory they all honoured. I 168 X THE ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS Pamphlet turlished in 1874 Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers How to be recruited Naval opinions in favour of such a forci» It has been thouglit desirable to publish tlie following- statement, for the purpose of giving some explanation of the services, duties, privileges, and general organisa- tion of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. In inviting persons to enrol themselves in the corps, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty desire to extend the Volunteer movement, so successfully esta- blished as an auxiliary to the land forces, to the defence of this country by sea. The proposal is novel and un- precedented in its character. In any other country than our own it would, in all prolmbility, be visionary. In England, however, we possess a guarantee for the success of such an undertaking, which cannot be found elsewhere. A taste for maritime pursuits pervades this insular nation, and the hope may therefore be confidently entertained that the appeal now made to the patriotism of the nautical and aquatic sections of the community will not be urged in vain. Eminent naval authorities have, for many years past, recommended the formation of a corps for the purposes of coast defence, composed of persons who, while not })ossessing the wider experience of the seaman, ai'e ac- customed to the management of boats, and in the ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 150 constant habit of going afloat. The Act for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, passed in the last Session at the instance of the Admiralty, and the regulations recently issued under that Act, afford the most con- vincing proof that, in the estimation of tliose who are actually responsible for the efficiency of the naval service, such a force is desirable. The concurrence of the naval members of the late administration in the various steps which have been taken, may likewise be quoted, in order to show that there is a general desire, among those to whom the welfare of the Navy is an especial object of solicitude, for the success of the movement, which it is the object of the present writer to explain. Tt has been already suated that coast defence, and The iiarbour defence not service at sea, constitutes the especial sphere pro- only posed for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. The term ' coast defence ' is perhaps, in a certain sense, a mis- nomer. The defence of the most important of our com- mercial harbours against an attack from the sea could not be efl'ectually conducted by a force composed exclu- sively of men trained for the land service alone. The approach to all the great ports or the United Kingdom from the sea involves the navigation of extensive es- tuaries, where floating batteries and armed rafts and the use of torpedoes are essential to a complete defence, and would, in point of fact, effectually prevent the nearer approach of a hostile fleet. In the laying out of torpe- does on an extensive scale a flotilla of boats would be required ; and in furnishing crews for such boats the well-trained oarsmen who, it is hoped, will be found willing to enroll themselves in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, would be enabled to render valuable service. In all probability, by their co-operation in the hour of danger, they would release an equal number of highly 160 THE ORGANISATION OF THE i. m Skilled seamen not essential The force need not be numerous trained seanioii, who would form the crews of sea-going cruisers. All our greatest ports, London, Hull, New- castle, Leith and (Jranton, ports for Edinburgh, Glasgow, Bristol, Southampton, Belfast, Dublin, Cork, are situated at the head of an extensive estuary, or at some distance from the mouth of a navigable river. The mere enumera- tion of these names is sufficient to show how large a sphere there might be, in the event of a threatened invasion, for the employment, in the important and essential task of harbour defence, of an auxiliary force composed, not of trained seamen, but of persons who may be described generally as aquatics. It is to be observed that a mere oarsman, although not trained at the great guns or in the use of rifle and cutlass, would be enabled to do good work in a service in which the use of boats must be largely lesorted to ; and that, in order to take a number at a gun mounted on a raft, such as the ' Nancy Dawson,' which the late (Captain Coles improvised for our naval operations in the Sea of Azof, or to serve in a gun's crew in a floating battery for harbour defence, neither sea-legs nor sea experience are indispensable qualifications For such duties those qualities are required which equally combine to make a good gunner and a good soldier, whether afloat or on shore — a fair share of physical strength and activity, intelligence, and, above all, courage and patriotism. Designed, as the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers have been, for the especial work of coast and harbour defence, it is not necessary that the corps should be very numerous. It certainly need not exceed the numbers of our amateur yachtsmen and oarsmen, for whom the opportunity now offered of taking their share in the national defence is chiefly intended. Enough will have ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 161 been done if a brigade can be formed at each of the principal ports, of a strength varying from 200 to 600 men. Having described the general scope of the duties The which would devolve on the Royal Naval ' Artillery nqiiiroi Volunteers in the event of their being called out for actual service, the nature of the training proposed for the members of the force may be briefly explained. The first consideration must be to familiarise them, to some extent, with the management of boats. This instruction might occupy much time in a corps composed of men who had never been in the habit of going on the water ; but, as the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Corps is to be recruited in a large proportion from among aquatics, many of their number may be expected to possess this qualification without the necessity for special instruction. The next point to claim attention will be the exercise Gun Arm at the great guns. Here I may venture to affirm, from acquirai personal experience, that the naval gun drills have been, in every detail, so carefully considered, the instructors are so completely masters of the subject which they have to teach, and the mechanical appliances are such eflPectual substitutes for heavy manual labour, that a few days of constant attention will suffice to make a Volunteer a useful man in a gun's crew. The class of recruits re- (juired for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers possess advantages of intelligence and education far beyond those which the practical seaman can enjoy ; and we may anticipate, from the experience already acquired, that they will form some of the smartest gun's crews in any branch of the naval service. There is neither in- surmountable difficulty nor unduly fatiguing labour in the drill at the great guns. The intricacies could be mastered in a few days if the Volunteers were kept con- II. -M 162 THE ORGANISATION OF THE Small-arm exercise 1^1 Facilities for drill tinuously at drill, as they necessarily would be should they ever be called out for actual service. The essential point in a Volunteer coi"ps is to secure men physically capable of doing their work, and who may be confidently relied upon as ready to serve when- ever they may be called upon. The J mall-arm exercises are still more easily mastered. A rowing man will find himself able to use his cutlass efficiently in a few hours ; and, after a couple of days of continuous drill, he would be able to go through the manual and platoon exercises with satisfactory smartness and precision. Rowing and yachting gentlemen will perceive that they will have no difficulty in acquiring the knowledge of their drills which is required in order to make them efficient in the winter months. They will not find that their favourite amusements on the water in the summer months are incompatible with service in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. Every effi^rt will be made to afford to those who may be willing to join the Royal Naval Artillery Volun- teers the necessary facilities for learning their drills. For the London brigade, the * Rainbow,' a gun-vessel well adapted for the purpose, is now being fitted out at Chatham. This vessel will be ready in two months from the date of this publication ; and, when completed, will be moored in the Thames in a convenient position, off Somerset House. Should such an arrangement be found convenient for members of the Corinthian and other yacht clubs at Erith, it is possible that the * Rain- bow' may be moved, from time to time, to moorings near the pier at Erith ; and, should a desire to that effect be expressed by the members of the rowing clubs higher up the Thames, an effijrt will be made to move ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 163 the vessel to moorings near the boat-houses of any rowing clubs which have their head-quarters below Kew Bridge. No positive promise, however, can bo given that the ' Rainbow ' shall be moved. There are many points to consider, such as draft of water, height and width of arches, and obstruction of the navigation of the river. For those clubs which are established still higher up instruction the river, where there is not sufficient water to float the ' Rainbow,' facilities for instruction may be provided by mounting a 64-pounder gun on a raft, which could be towed from place to place, and moored to the bank of the river adjacent to the boat-houses belonging to the clubs. An instructor would accompany the raft ; and during the winter months arrangements might be made for giving to Volunteers an opportunity of going through their small-arm drills in a drill-shed, or other convenient place available for the purpose. Thus it may be found possible to extend the system of instruc- tion by effectual, yet inexpensive, means far up the Thames, and so to embrace towns such as Reading, Maidenhead, Henley, Windsor, and even the head- quarters of rowing, the University of Oxford. Inquiry having been made as to whether members will be expected to appear in uniform whenever they attend drill, it may not be superfluous to mention that the regulations are silent on this point. Members will only be required to wear uniform on special occasions, of which due notice will be given. Members of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Repiiations *' *' _ as to ill ill Corps may therefore rest assured that they will have the opportunity of being thoroughly instructed in the drills in which it is considered desirable that they should be proficient. M 2 164 THE ORGANISATION OF THE I Tlie OfRcer- iustructor N Atte'ulances at drill Service afloat not compulsory Tlie drills will comprise those for great guns, rifle, pistol, and cutlass, as in the Royal Navy, and no devia- tion from these drills is to be permitted. All drills will be carried out by the instructor attached to the brigades, under the Officer-instructor. The permanent staff of a brigade will consist of an Officer-inslructor and one petty officer-instructor for each battery. The Officer-instructor will be commis- sioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, and will be selected from officers of, or re- tired from, the Royal Navy of and above the rank of lieutenant. He will keep the muster-rolls, and it will be his duty to make himself acquainted with all the members of his brigade and their qualifications. He will superintend all drills and exercises, and is to have complete control over the petty officer-instructors, and to be responsible to the Admiralty for their conduct and efficiency. On the important point of the number of attend- ances at drill, the regulations require that every Volun- teer must attend at least two drills a month, until he has obtained the standard of an efficient. An efficient must be able to perform in a satisfactory manner the duties of any number except No. 1 at heavy gun exercise, or at revolving gun exercise, as applicable to the 64-pounder guns mounted in gunboats ; and he must be possessed of a good knowledge of the manual, platoon, and cutlass exercises. It has already been explained that these qualifica- tions may easily be acquired in a fortnight of continuous attendance at drill, by the application of a very ordinary amount of intelligence and attention. The regulations expressly avoid the imposition of any compulsory ser- vice afloat in time of peace. Target practice afloat is ROYAL NAVAL* ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 165 obviously essential to the efficiency of a naval gnt.ner; and it is therefore desirable that every Volunteer siiould have a fair number of opportunities of taking part in this useful exercise. In a long summer's day, the mem- bers of the London brigade may embark in a gunboat at Erith or Gravesend, proceed to the Maplin Sands, off Shoeburyness — which is the most convenient place for firing practice over a sea range — and return to London by a convenient hour in the afternoon or even- ing. It will doubtless be the desire of every Naval Volunteer to avail himself of a sufficient number of opportunities for target practice to secure his own efficiency. But, as there are many who will be anxious to have a greater amount of exorcise afloat, every Volun- teer who wishes it may embark once a year, and re- main for a period of eight days in a gunboat manned by a crew to be furnished from the battery to which he himself l^elongs. It should, however, be observed that, when called out for actual service, tlio Volunteers will Ounboat oxcrciac not be liable to embark in sea-going vessels. Whenever so assembled, they will serve on board any of Her Majesty's ships employed in the defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom ; unless, indeed, they volunteer for, and are found capable of doing duty in, sea-going cruisers. They will not be required to go aloft, or to attend to the fires in the stoke-hole. They will, how- ever, have to accommodate themselves to the berthing and messing arrangements usual for the seamen of the Royal Navy. The regulations recently issued contain ample in- Kogniations formation as to the organisation of the Royal Naval Aamhuity''*^ Artillery Volunteers ; and their practical effect will be summarised in the following extracts from the code of rules. 166 THE ORGANISATION OF THE Conditions of service Organifa- tlou The Volunteers are raised under the Act passed in 1873. They will be called out by Royal proclamation, and will be lial)le to serve in any vessels employed for coast defence. They will be liable to perform all the ordinary duties of the vessels in which they may be embarked, in the same manner as those duties are per- formed by the regular crews of Her Majesty's ships, except those duties that can only be performed by practical seamen. Tiie Royal Navr,l Artillery Volunteer force, for administrative purposes, will be formed into brigades, and each brigade will consist of four or more batteries of from 60 to 80 men. Each brigade will be designated by a local name. The following table contains the authorised esta- blishment for brigades and the batteries composing them : Lieuteii.int-coinmantler Siib-lioutenant . Cliief petty officer . Kirst-cl.ass petty officer Second-class petty officer Buglers Leading gnnners and gun ners (equivalent to lead ing seamen and able sea men) (Lieutenant-instructor . First-class petty officer instructor . ^ .Surgeon . I)Ugle-major ^Armourer . Total enrolled ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 167 In this table, two numbers divided by a line signify 80 the maximum and minimum strength — thus — means dO not more than 80 and not less than 60. Persons wishing to organise a corps to form part of Formation a brigade of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers should place themselves in communication with the Secretary of the Admiralty. Whenever it is practicable, a brigade will be formed at each of the large ports in the kingdom, and the batteries composing the brigade will be raised in the innnediate neighbourhood of the port. When the Volunteers are not of sufficient strengtlj Batteries at any port to form a brigade, the batteries enrolled on a part of the coast formed into a district will be formed into a brigade, and will be called a district brigade. The object of this organisation is to unite separate Ijatteries under one head, to secure uniformity among them, and to attbrd them the advantage of an Ollicer- instructor. Candidates for enrolment as members of the Ivoyal Conaitious ^, , . .,, -rx 1 , ^ i> 11 , of eurolment Naval Artillery Volunteers must be or good character, and physically fit for the service ; their eligibility will be judged by the commanding officer of the corps, assisted by such others of the corps as he may think fit to appoint for that purpose. No person below the age of 17 is to be enrolled in the corps without the special authority of the Admiralty. Boys of 14 years of age and upwards may be. en- rolled for the purpose of being trained as buglers. Men belonging to any other force liable to be called out for service in case of war are not co be enrolled. Apprentices are not to be enrolled without the consent of their masters. 168 THE ORGANISATION OF THE D'scliarge Olassiflca- tiou Offleers Petty officers Command Dlaclpliue Persons dismissed from any other service or corps for misconduct are not to be enrolled without the special sanction of the Admiralty. The commanding officer of a corps is to give to any Volunteer, on his quitting the corps, a certificate of discharge, when requested to do so by such Volunteer. Every member has power to withdniw from the corps upon giving 14 days notice to that effect. Enrolled members are classed as efficients and non- efficients. All enrolled members who do not fulfil the conditions above referred to are reckoned as non-efficients. Each brigade will be commanded by a lieutenant commanding. Each battery will be commanded by a sub- lieutenant. In each batterj' there will be, as has already been stated, one chief petty officer, two first-class, and two second-class petty officers. The petty officers of a battery will be selected by the commanding officer of the battery. When assembled for drill or inspection, the Volun- teers will be under the command of the senior naval officer of the district. When the Volunteers are as- sembled for drill, the senior officer will be represented l)y the Officer-instructor, a retired commander or gunnery lieutenant of the Royal Navy, whose duty it will be to see that all drills are properly carried out. When afloat, the Volunteers are to be, in all matters whatsoever, under the command of the captain or commanding officer of the sliip in which they may be. The authority of the officers commanding batteries is strictly limited to their own batteries only. The discipline will be the same throughout the corps, and '>k. ROYAL NAVAL AETILLERY VOLUNTEERS 169 will be enforced by the lieutenant commanding the brigade, in conformity with the regulations issued by the Admiralty. The lieutenant commanding will make arrangements Di-m for drill, securing, so far as it may be necessary, sepa- i-ate hours for each battery. Before adopting any final arrangements for drill, he will confer with the Officer- instructor. There may be an occasional general muster of the corps, when considered necessary by the lieutenant commanding. The batteries will take precedence at general parades according to their numbers, and not according to the seniority of their respective commanding officers. The brigade staff will not be attached to a battery, but will act under the lieutenant commanding only. Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers I'mtMicnce rank with, but after, officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Reserve of their respective ranks. All officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will be commissioned by the Admiralty. The commanding officers of brigades will recommend Aiii"'i"t- for the consideration of the Admiralty names of persons i.iomotkiu for the appointments and promotion of officers in their brigades. The appointment of an honorary connnander to a brigade is allowed, and such honorary lieutenants and sub-lieutenants as the Admiralty may think tit to sanction. Officers in full pay in the Navy or Army are not eligible for other than honoraiy commissions. The uniform approved for the officers resembles Ln-^im generally that worn by officers of the Naval Reserve, silver being substituted for gold lace. The officers of the corps When afloat under coui- Tuauder of gunboat ! Duty of officers when afloat 170 THE ORGANISATION OF THE The principle upon which the Volunteers should be officered has been one of the most frequent subjects of discussion among those who have associated themselves with the movement from the commencement, and who have been provisionally enrolled, with the sanction of the Admiralty, in anticipation of the passing of the Act of Parliament of last year. A desire has been expressed that no officers should be appointed to the corps, but that the Volunteers should serve only under direct naval command. Practically, the desire, so strongly felt, has been fulfilled in the arrangements which have actually been made. Whenever called upon to serve afloat, or when em- barked for the purpose of training, the Volunteers will be under the command of the officer commanding the ship in which they may be. When embarked for their first cruise in the autumn of the present year, the ar- rangements were, of necessity, experimental and pro- A isional. There was a natural desire on the part of the officer connnanding the ' Foam ' to meet the wishes of the Volunteers themselves in every possible way, con- sistent with the efficient performance of the service and the carrying on of the drills and exercises required. The same considerate spirit will doubtless prevail on all future occasions ; but the Volunteers who make them- selves acquainted with the regulations will clearly per- ceive that, whenever they embark, they place themselves under direct naval authority ; and that, when afloat, their own officers are never to assume any naval command or authority whatever, unless ordered to do so by their superior naval officers. The officers of the Volunteers will do their utmost to assist the naval officers to preserve discipline. They may, if they think tit, set an example to their men by ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY A^OLUNTEERS 171 taking an active part in all the duties and manual exercises. They may fall in at quarters, and take any number at the gun. In short, they may become, as much as they please, active working seamen and efficient practical gunners. It is for them to use their own discretion in determining how much or how little they shall participate in the manual labour involved in carrying out the drills and exercises ordered by the naval officers in command. When at drill, as has already been pointed out, Eetircd the Officer-instructor will superintend the instruction officers' of the Volunteers, and he will be responsible that all aTsired^ exercises are properly carried out, in accordance with the regulations from time to time laid down for the instruction of the Royal Navy. It will thus be evident that the paramount and undivided authority of the naval officers over the Volunteers when afloat, and the superior responsibility of the officer of instruction when the Volunteers are at drill, so largely overshadow the authority of the officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers in all matters excepting those which relate to discipline and the civil administration and organi- sation of the corps, that it could not reasonably be expected that retired naval officers of rank should volunteer to become battery officers in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Corps. Naval officers of less exalted rank do not often retire, if they have a great zeal for the service. Some exceptions, however, there must be to this general rule ; and it is probable that a certain immber of retired officers from the junior ranks of the Navy will, hereafter, kindly offisr their .services to command brigades or batteries in the ports or districts in which they may happen to reside. The Volunteers will at all times feel a pride in availing themselves of 172 THE ORGANISATION OF THE Iiifluenoe of officers of the corps ]i! Good effect of exauiiilc such opportunities of acting under officers who have received a high professional training in Her Majesty's naval service. While the effect of the arrangements which have been described necessarily limits the sphere of the officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, their services, in several important points, are not the less essential. It is to them that the Admiralty must look for the exercise of tlieir personal influence in inducing recruits to join their respective brigades and batteries ; and their moral influence will be the principal security for the maintenance of good discipline in a force com- posed exclusively of Volunteers. Although, under the regulations, no lixed standard of efficiency is expressly required in an ofiicer of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer force, those among them who can command sutHcient leisure for the purpose will readily appreciate how excellent an effect must be produced by the per- sonal example of an otticer who will take pains to make himself acquainted with the drills and exercises in which the men under his conmiand are instructed. He will have the opportunity of obtaining the same cer- tificate of proficiency which is given to those officers of the Naval Reserve who become qualified to drill the seamen of the Reserve at the great guns and in the small-arm exercises. With the view of enlisting, in support of the Naval Volunteer movement, the potent influences which are derived from the esprit de corps, wherever it may reasonably and prudently be encouraged, it is proposed to associate certain batteries in the London brigade with some of the principal rowing and Corinthian yacht clubs on the Thames, and to give commissions to any EOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 173 gentlemen, otherwise eligible, who are instrumental in raising a full battery of Naval Volunteers. The following list of some of the principal rowing The rowing clubs will serve to show the large number of gen- thianyaciit tlemen from whom assistance may be expected in °^ ^ promoting the success of a movement for extending the Volunteer service to a certain sphere of naval operations : Name of Rowing Club. London . Kingston Thames . Ino Waldegrave . Twickenham . West London OsciUators North London Grove Park . Islewort h Ilex Molesey . Number of Members. 480 425 300 300 200 175 170 162 150 150 100 100 The Corinthian yacht clubs on the Thames are equally able to render assistance, and are indeed cap- able of raising, if they think fit, an entire brigade for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Corps. The resources of the clubs located on the banks of the Thames have been particularly specified ; because the present writer, in his connection with the move- ment under consideration, is more immediately identified with that river. Readers of these pages residing in the vicinity of any of our great ports will doubtless be able to discover equally ample materials for the foundation of a sufficient force for the purposes of co- operation in the defence of the coast in their own All the irreat jiorts to CO- liberate 174 THE ORGANISATION OF THE The Volunteer movement neighbourhood. A corps, though it may be raised at some distance from the sphere of its intended opera- tions, in the event of threatened invasion will not be the less valuable for the defence of a great port. The railway and the telegraph afford the means of concentrating large bodies of men in a few hours at any port on the shores of the United Kingdom. Wherever the Coast Guard are stationed, the means exist of giving instruction to the Naval Volunteers. All the out-ports at which men have been enrolled can be visited by a gunboat at frequent intervals, to embark the Volunteers for target practice afloat ; while those who wish to go to sea for an eight days' cruise will have every year the opportunity of doing so. In conclusion, it may not be superfluous to offer a few observations on the Volunteer movement generally. The most cogent inducements to Volunteer activity may appear to be wanting at the present time. Our country is happily not threatened with tlie danger of foreign invasion. A becoming modesty will deter any in- dividual connected with the Volunteer service from arrogating to himself any share in the prestige and distinction which are the special privilege of the regular services. It is an essential feature of the pre- sent movement that there shall be no contribution from the State in the form of pecuniary reward for services rendered ; and that every effort shall be made by the Volunteers to impose as small a burden as possible on the Exchequer. The sterner sense of duty which is now encouraged among the Volunteers for land service is opposed to all attempts to gain popu- larity for the auxiliary forces by festivals, holidays, and entertainments. While, however, all these inducements and attrac- KOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 175 tions are withheld, a higher standard of efficiency in the officers and the men is properly insisted on. In presence of the difficulties which arise from the altered conditions of the service, some earnest friends of the Volunteer movement have been oppressed with doubts as to the possibility of stimulating the patriotism of the country to such a pitch that Volunteers shall still be forthcoming in a time of profound peace. I do not conceal my individual opinion that compulsory service may fairly be required from every individual of military age when the country is in danger. Unfortunately, so strong a measure would probably meet with an amount of resistance which could not be overcome in this free country, where nothing affecting the social habits and prejudices of the people can be proposed which is not universally popular. But I venture to hope that we may rely, in the absence of direct legal compulsion, on motives even more powerful than the strong arm of the law. If every man who is capable of co-operating in the defence of his couut y should feel himself com- pelled, by his sense of duty and patriotism, to enter his name in the roll of her defenders, the liability to service thus imposed by the free will of the Volunteer upon himself will be a far more effectual safeguard than legal compulsion for the security and the honour of England. The Volunteer movement affords the occasion for teaching, in the most practical form, the duty of self- sacrifice in a worthy cause. In the artificial conditions of modern society, there are multitudes of men who, in the ordinary exercise of their vocation, are unduly deprived of the opportunities for physical exercise and development. More especi- ally is this true of the younger members of the pro- Duty and patriotism higher ^Tounds than com- pulsion for service 170 THE OROANISATION OF THE fessional and commercial classes. To them an appeal is now most earnestly made on behalf of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, In taking a part in our drills and exercises they will do a work beneficial to themselves individually, and conducive to the welfare of their country. REGULATIONS FOR THE 'ROYAL NAVAL AR TILLER Y VOL UNTEERS ' i I ^i ]!li t 1 'till Authority Liability to actnnl service Corps, defi- nition of Enrolled members CONSTITUTION AND ESTABLISHMENT 1. The 'Koyal Naval Artillery Volunteers' are raised under the ' lioyal Naval Artillery Volunteer Act of 1873.' They are subject to the provisions of that Act, and to all regulations made with regard to them by the authority of the Admiralty. 2. By Royal Proclamation, the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may be assembled for actual service; and when- ever so assembled, they will be liable to serve on board any of Her Majesty's ships or vessels employed in the defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom, or in auy of the tenders or boats attached to such vessels. They will also be liable to perform all the ordinary duties of the vessel in which they may be embarked, in the same manner as those duties are performed by the regular crews of Her Majesty's ships, except those duties that can only be per- formed by practical seamen. They will not be required to go aloft, or to attend the fires in the stoke-hole. They will accommodate themselves to the berthing and messing arrangements usual for the Seamen of the Royal Navy. 3. A Corps is a body of persons who combine, under common rides, to form a part of the Naval Artillery "N^'olunteer Force. The members of a Corps are either enrolled or honorary. Enrolled members are persons of every grade, whose names are duly entered for service in the muster-rolls of a Corps. iiOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 17t Uoiiorary members are persons who contribute to the funds of a Corps, but are not enrolled for service. 4. The Naval Artillery Volunteer Force, for administrative purposes, will be formed into Brigades, and each Brigade will consist of four or more Batteries of from (JO to 80 men. 5. Each Brigade will be designated by a local name, in addition to its number in the Force. Each Battery will be desigixated by its number in the Brigade. Every Corps will bear a local name only. 0. Each Brigade will be commanded by a Lieutenant Commanding. Each Battery will be commanded by a Sub-Lieutenant. Every Corps will have a Commanding OlJicer, who will of necessity be the Senior Officer belonging to the Corps, no matter what his rank may be, and who will be responsible, under the 'Naval Artillery Volunteer Act, 1873,' for the management of the internal affairs of the Corps. 7. The following table contains the authorised establish- ment for Brigades and the Batteries composing them : Brigaile Brigade BriKafle { Battery of four of six of ciglit batteries batteries batteries Lieutenant-commander . 1 1 1 Sub-lieutenant . 1 4 6 8 Chief petty officer . 1 4 G 8 First-class petty oflScer , 2 8 12 It] Second-class petty officer . 2 8 12 16 Buglers .... 2 8 12 16 Leading gunners and gun- 71 275 421 568 ners (equivalent to lead- ing seamen and able sea- > " men) .... 51 125 301 403 .Lieutenant-instructor . — 1 1 1 First-class petty officer — — — — ¥. instructor . 1 4 6 8 ■M 02 Surgeon 1 1 1 Bugle-major — 1 1 1 ^Armourer . (80 1 1 1 320 480 640 Total tnrolled . . 160 . — 210 3G0 480 liuiiorary iiiL'ml)er.s Formation How to be named Commanfl- ing officers f^stalilii'li- uieut II. N IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-j) T 1.0 I.I |30 '"'^* •^ m m 2.2 1^ 12.0 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 < 6" — ► V] ^ ^. PhotogrPDhic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 873-4503 %'' ^J i^- r 178 THE OIIGANISATION OF THE In the preceding table, two numbers divided by a line sig- 80 nify the maximum and minimum strength — thus - means not more than 80 and not less than 60. Course to be pursued for tlie forma- tion of a new Corps Ileason for foriuntion New Corps not to be formed under cer- tain circum- Btances Information to be given on applica- tion Single Brigade District Brigade FORxMATlON OF COIll'S 8. Persons wishing to form a Corps to form part of a Brigade of lloyal Naval Artillery Volunteers should place themselves in communication with the Secretary of the Admiralty. ' ' 9. The Admiralty, in considering offers of the services of a new Corps, Avill have regard to the number of Corps or Batteries already existing on the same part of the Coast where the proposed Corps would be. 10. The formation of a new Corps will not be sanctioned, unless a sufficient number of persons to form a Battery are prepared to enrol themselves, and whilst any Battery already existing in the Ic-jality is below its establishment. 11. In ottering the services of a new Corps for acceptance, it should be stated : - (a) The place proposed for its head-quarters. (b) The number of persons who are prepared to enrol themselves, (c) The name and address of some person with whom communications on the subject may be made. {(I) The Brigade of which it will form a part, (e) That a proper place will be secured for the safe custody of any Ciovernment arms and ammunition which may be issued. (Form in Appendix A.) 12. Whenever it is practicable, a Brigade v^'ll be formed at each of the large ports in the Kingdom, and the batteries composing the Brigade will be raised in the immediate neigh- bourhood of the port. When the Volunteers are not of sufficient strength at any port to form a Brigade, the batteries enrolled on a part of the coast formed into a district will be formed into a Brigade, and will be called a District Brigade. ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 179 The object of this or|;fanisation is to unite separate batteries under one head, to secure uniformity among' them, and to atibrd them the advantag'e of an Otficer-iastructor. PRECEDENCE AND COMMAND 13. The 'Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Force' takes precedence immediately after the * Royal Naval Volunteers ' established by the Act of 1859. 14. The relative precedence of the Brigades forming the Force is determined by the date on which they were first severally established. 15. The relative precedence of Corps is determined by the date on which the Secretary of the Admiralty has first received a letter offering the services of the Corps. 16. Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers rank with, but after, Officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Reserve of their respective ranks. 17. The relative precedence of Officers of the whole Force is determined solely by the rank and date of their commissions in the Force. 18. The relative precedence of Officers bearing commissions of the same date is determined by the order in which their names appear in the Navy List. Nothing in these Regulations is to give a claim to any Officer of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers to assume command of any of Her Majestj-'s Land Forces on shore, nor to any Officer of Her Majesty's Land Forces to assume com- mand of any of Her Majesty's Naval Forces. But when Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are employed on shore on joint service with Her Majesty's Land Forces, their relative rank shall carry with it all prece- dence and advantages attaching to the rank with which it corresponds, except command as aforesaid. 19. All Rcyal Naval Artillery Volunteers, Vvhen assembled for drill or inspection, or voluntarily doing any naval duty either afloat or on shore, will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, or Senior Naval Officer of the district within which such Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are undergoing drill or inspection, or doing duty. Rank of tlio force Precedence of brigades Prtcedcnco of corps Precedence of ofBcers with others Precedence of officers with each other Precedence of officers of same date To be under command of senior naval officer when- ever assem- bled 180 THE ORGANISATION OF THE W' Not to assume navnl command unless specially onlcred Guards Decorations Appoint- ment Command- ing offlcci-s to recoiU- mcnd 20. The Officers and Petty Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers shall command each otlier, and the Gunners and Buglers of the Force, agreeahly to their respective ranks, in all matters relating to their duties ; but none of them are ever to assume any naval command or authority whatso- ever, unless ordered to do so by their Superior Naval Officers, and they are to be, in all matters whatsoever, under the com- mand of he Captain or Commanding Officer of the ship in which they may be, and of the Officer of the Watch for the time being whatsoever his rank may be. HONOURS AND DECORATIONS 21. A Guard of Honour may be provided as a matter of course for a member of the Royal F^^mily, or the Admiralty, on arrival in the neighbourhood ol vhe head-quarters of a Rrigade ; but in no other case will any body of the Naval Artillery Volunteers take part in any public procession or ceremony, or form a Guard of Honour, without the special authority of the Admiralty or the Senior Naval Officer of the district, 22. The only decorations that may be worn on the left breast are those given by the Queen or by a Foreign Sovereign. In the last case mentione*.., Her Majesty's permission to accept and wear the decoration must have been granted. The medal of the Royal Humane Society may be worn. OFFICERS 23. All Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will be commissioned by the Admiralty. 24. The Commanding Officers of Brigades will recommend for the consideration of the Admiralty names of persons for the appointments and promotion of Officers in their Brigades. In order to enable the Admiralty to judge the qualifications of the persona recommended, the Commanding Officer will forward, with his recommendation, a statement giving the name, age, residence, place of education, and occupation or profession of the Candidate, as well as a Medical Officer's \r ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLEEY VOLUNTEERS 181 Certificate, stating that the Candidate is in good health and lit to perform the duties of an Officer. 25. If any person recommended for an appointment as an Officer holds a commission in the Royal Navy or other Force, the nature of such commission should be stated in the letter of recommendation. 26. Officers on full pay in the Navy or Army are not eligibl'3 for other than honorary commissions. 27. The appointment of an Honorary Commander to a Brigade is allowed, and such Honorary Lieutenants and Honorary Sub-Lieutenants as the Admiralty may think fit to sanction. 28. The appointments of an Honorary Chaplain and Staff- Surgeon to a Brigade are allowed at the discretion of the Admiralty. 29. The appointments of all Honorary Officers will cease whenever the Force is called out for actual service, unless the Admiralty shall see fit to accept the services of any such Officers who may volunteer for active service. 30. No Officer holding an honorary commission can, in virtue of it, take precedence of any Officer holding a substan- tive commission of the same rank. 31. Every Officer is required to possess a competent know- ledge of his duties, and to give a proper attendance at the drills of his Corps. Any Officer who does not attend the number of drills pre- scribed for the enrolled Volunteers of his Corps, to qualify them for certificates of efficiency, will not be allowed to retain his commission unless the Admiralty may see special reasons for a relaxation of tMs Regulation. Holding a commission in other forces Eligibility of full pay ofHcers Honorary Commander Honorary Chaplain and Surgeon Honorary appoint- ments when to ceaee Precedence of honorary officers Officers to jiossess ft knowledge of duties, &c. PETTY OFFICERS 32. The Petty Officers of a Battery are appointed by the Appoint- Commanding Officer of the Battery, from among the enrolled '"*'" members of the Battery. 33. Leading Gunners may be appointed by the Commanding Leading Officer of a Battery, in the proportion of one to every twenty '^""^'^^ of Enrolled Gunners. 34. A Petty Officer or I^eading Gunner may be reduced by Reduction 182 THE ORGANISATION OF THE the Commanding Officer of a Brigade, for any sufficient cause ; such cause to be judged by the officers of the Brigade sitting as a Court of Inquiry. Qualiflontion Age Disqnjillfl- catiuii Certlflcnte of iliacbarge Classifica- tion Eflncients Non- Efflcients ENROLLED MEMBERS 35. Candidates for enrolment as Members of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers must be of good character and physically fit for the Service ; their eligibility will be judged by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, assisted by such others of the Corps as he may think fit to appoint for that purpose. 80. No person below the age of 17 is to be enrolled in the Corps without the special authority of the Admiralty. Boys of 14 years of age and upwards may be enrolled for the purpose of being trained as Buglers. 37. Men belonging to any other force liable to be called out for service in case of war are not to be enrolled. Apprentices are not to be enrolled without the consent of their masters. Persons dismissed from any other Service or Corps for misconduct are not to be enrolled without the special sanction of the Admiralty. 38. The Commanding Officer of a Corps is to give to any Volunteer, on his quitting the Corps, a Certificate of Discharge, in Form B of the Appendix, when requested to do so by such Volunteer. 39. Enrolled Members are classed as Efficients and non- Efficients. 40. An Efficient Member must have fulfilled the conditions prescribed by the Admiralty from time to time. 41. All enrolled members who do not fulfil the conditions above referred to are reckoned as non-Efficients. I'll I Number ami position HONORARY MEMBERS 42. The number of Honorary Members attached to any Corps is not regulated by the Admiralty, and such Members are not included in the muster-roll of the Corps to which they are attached. EOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 183 They are not subject to discipline nor allowed to interfere with the duties of the Corps, but they are permitted to wear its uniform, unless a special provision to the contrary is con- tained in the authorised Rules of the Corps. RULES 43. In order to give legal force to the Rules of a Corps for Must be the management of its affairs, they must be submitted to the ''^P™^'^ Admiralty for approval. 44. All Rules which are to be forwarded for approval must To be trans- be transmitted in duplicate, one copy to be retained at the duplicate Admiralty, the other to be returned to the Corps, with any alterations that may be required. COURTS OF INQUIRY 45. A Court of Inquiry is not a judicial body ; it has no Nature of power to administer an oath. It is to be considered as a Board of which the Admiralty or an Officer in command of a Brigade or Corps may make use to assist him in arriving at a correct judgment on any subject upon which it may be expedient to institute an inquiry. 46. The duties of a Court of Inquiry depend on the in- Duties of structions which the convening authority may think proper to give. It may be either employed merely in collecting and arranging evidence, or it may, in addition, be directed to give an opinion as to the facts established by that evidence ; but it has no power to pronounce any judgment as to the cuurse to be taken by the convening authority in dealing with those facts. When facts connected with the conduct of an individual are submitted to the investigation of a Court of Inquiry, it ig necessary that the instructions for the guidance of the Court should be sufficiently specific, as regards matter, names, dates, and places, to convey clearly to the Court tie nature of the subject into which it is appointed to inquire, and also to enable 184 THE ORGANISATION OF THE May be re- assembled Power of Commnnd- ing Officer to ussemble the person whose conduct is called in question to know what he has to answer. It rests with the authority who orders the assembly of the Court of Inquiry to decide whether it shall he open or close. All evidence taken by a Court of Inquiry is to be recorded as nearly as possible in the words of the witness and in the order in which it is received. The proceedings when closed are to be signed by the President and ^Members, after which they are to be forwarded by the President to the convening authority. 47. A Court of Inquiry may be re-assembled as often as the superior authority may deem necessary, and on every oc- casion of its meeting it is competent to receive and record new evidence. The Commanding Officer of a Brigade is authorised to assemble a Court of Inquiry to investigate any matter with which he himself has the power of dealing. Meeting's not to 1)0 lield on actions of superiors Not to attend political meetings in uniform DISCIPLINE 48. The course to be adopted as to the Discipline of the Volunteers will be found in Pp,rt III of the Naval Artillery Volunteers Act. 49. Meetings are not to be held in the Corps for the pur- pose of expressing an opinion upon the acts of a Commanding Officer, or of recommending him to take a particular course of action ; nor are memorials to be drawn up to the same effect ; and no meetings except those called together by or under the authority of the Commanding Officer of a Brigade or Corps, who will be responsible for doing so, will be recognised. If any Volunteer has cause to think himself aggrieved, he will represent his case to the Commanding Officer of his Battery. Any appeal against the decision of the Commanding Officer of the Battery will be made through him to the Com- mander of the Brigade, and any further appeal will be made through both these officers to the Admiralty. 50. Members of the Force are not, individually or collec- tively, to attend political meetings, or join in public political discussion or demonstrations in uniform. ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 185 51. Bands of Volunteer Brigades are not to appear in uni- form, for any purpose, without the consent of the Commanding Officer of the Brigade. 52. Members of the Permanent Staff will be held respon- sible that they do not allow themselves to be complimented, either directly or indirectly, by presents or collective expressions of opinion from persons who are serving or who have served in the Brigade to which they are attached. 53. Officers and men of the Royal Naval Artillery Volun- teers, when in uniform, are to pay the customary marks of respect to such Officers of the Navy, Army, and Auxiliary Forces as are entitled to be saluted by Officers and men of corresponding rank in their own Service. 54. Every Officer and Petty Officer shall make himaelt acquainted with and shall duly observe and obey, and as far as in him lies, enforce the due execution of the * Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Act, 1873,' and the Regulations for the 'Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Force,' together with all Regulations, Instructions, and Orders, which may from time to time be given or issued by the Admiralty, or by any Superior Officer, and shall in all respects conform his conduct to the customs and usages of Her Majesty's Naval Service. 55. When Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are assembled with the Regular Forces of the Army in Camp or for training, they will be under the * Naval Discipline Act, 1806,' in the same manner as if they were on actual service, and will be placed under the immediate command of an Officer of Her Majesty's Navy. Camp rules will apply in all respects to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. The Naval Volunteers must perform the Camp duties of fatigue, cooking, &c. 56. In case of grave misconduct of any of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers whilst on board any of H.M. ships for the purpose of training, the Officer in command of the ship will report the circumstance to the Admiralty through the usual channel. Bnmk of iiiusiu Pcnnnnent Stuff not to roeeivo liresonts Volunteors to siilute superiors of till services Officers to observe mid enforce all regulations Discipline in camp Case of misconduct when train- ing to be reported 186 THE ORGANISATION OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF THE FORCE Comlitionfl on whicli to meet untlcr nnns BriKadcil with other forces Visiting garrison or camp Command lit rifle- sliooting matches Surplus ammunition to be col- lected 57. The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are not to assemble under arras for any purpose unconnected with Parade, Drill, or Rifle practice, except with the approval of the Admiralty. 58. The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may, when cir- cumstances permit, be brigaded with other Forces, the sanction of the Admiralty having been previously obtained. 59. When any of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers desire to visit any Garrison or Camp as a naval body, the per- mission of the Secretary at War must first be obtained through the Admiralty. Upon all occasions of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers entering a Garrison or Camp as a body, the Officer in com- mand must duly report his arrival to the Senior Naval Officer present, or, if there is not one, he will wait on the Officer in command of the Garrison or Camp. 60. When the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are brought together under arms at Rifle Shooting Matches, on other occasions, with other Volunteer Corps, or with any of Her Majesty's Land Forces on shore, the Officer in Command of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, present, shall take care that everyone under his command complies with all the Regulations of the Land Forces relative to the Camp or ground on which they may be, and he shall confer with the senior Officer of the Land Forces, and act in concert with him, so that the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may in all cases act in accordance with the orders under which the Land Forces are acting ; but it is to be distinctly understood that nothing in this Regulation is to give a claim to any Officer of Her Majesty's Navy, or of any Naval Volunteer Corps, to assume command of any of Her Majesty's Land Forces, nor to any Officer of Her Majesty's Land Forces to assume command of any of Her Majesty's Naval Forces. 61. When the Volunteers, at the termination of an exercise, are to return by railway or boat to their head-quarters, the arms are to be examined, and all the ammunition which has ROYAL NAVAL ARTILIJERY VOLUNTEERS 187 not been expended must be collected and placed in a metal or leather case, with a view to its being conveyed in safety to the head-quarters. ^ STORES 62. The Commanding Officer of a Corps is responsible to the Admiralty for all stores which are supplied by Government for the use of the Corps. 68. Each Corps will be supplied gratuitously with arms from the Government stores to the full number of its enrolled members, if required. 64. The arms to be supplied are in Appendix C. Go. Before any Government arms can be issued, it is necessary that the Admiralty shall be satisfied that one or more places of security for the custody of the arms have been provided at the expense of the Volunteers. The Drill Ships, Coast Guard Stations, or Police Stations will probably be available in some places for the purpose. 60. Commanding Officers of Corps are to apply for the arms required in the prescribed Form of Kequisition given in Appen- dix D, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 67. The arms of a Brigade will be marked previously to their issue, and a request to that effect is to be inserted in the requisition on which the arms are demanded. No other marks than those on them when issued are on any account to be put on the arms. 68. All arms issued to the Corps remain the property of Her Majesty's Government, and the Commanding Officer for the tiuie being is held responsible for their being at all times in a serviceable state, and for their being returned into store when required in good condition, fair wear and tear excepted. 69. Great attention should be paid to the proper cleaning and care of the arms entrusted to the Volunteers, and the Commanding Officers are to point out to those under their command that, should rust be allowed to accumulate on any part of a rifle, it must inevitably impair the accuracy and efficiency of the weapon. 70. The arms are to be deposited after drill in the armouries of the Brigade or Corps, except when the Commanding Officer Responsi- bility for and care of Arms to be suppHcut in cases where the store of ammunition is sufficiently large to make it desirable that it should be Btored in the magazines of any of Her Majesty's ships, used as Drill Ships for the Volunteerf, Commanding Officers of such ships will afford facilities for its reception. 75. Every care is to be taken in the conveyance and general handling of ammunition ; and the liogulations and customs of the lloyal Navy in that respect are to be strictly adhered to. 7'.). Metal cylinders, or leather cartridge cases, for con- veying the surplus ammunition collected from the pouches of Volunteers, under the provisions of Article 61, will be supplied at cost price. 77. No article of equipment will be returned into store for the purpose of being replaced until it has become thoroughly unserviceable. No articles will be returned into store on account of being of an obsolete pattern without the authority of the Admiralty. 78. All arms or other stores supplied free of cost and placed in the custody of the lloyal Naval Artillery Volunteers, are, if lost, destroyed, or injured by fault or neglect, to be paid for by the Corps. 79. All demands for stores, in accordance with the esta- blished proportion allowed, are to be made out in the War Office Forms in use in Her Majesty's Navy, and are to be for- warded by the Commanding Officers of Brigades to the nearest Drill Ship or Coast Guard Ship for transmission to the nearest Control Officer. Special demands should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Admiralty for approval by the Captains of the above-named ships. storing "f animuuitiuii Ciiuvcyiince of iiuimu- uitiou Mot ill cylinders, Return of iirtlcles un- scrvicciible or obsolete Stores lost or injured to bo paid for Demands for stores i 190 THE ORGANISATION OF THE Nature of By wliom to bp carried uut Qimlification for 'Effi- cient ' Bailge of Efficiency Trained Mail Noii- Efflcioiit to attend driUs Firing practice to be superin- teudetl Precautions wlien at gun- practice DRILL 80. The dri'ls of the lloyal Naval Artillery Volunteers will comprise the dri)-.3 for Great Giins, Kifle, Pistol, and Cutlass, as in the lloyal Navy, and no deviation from those drills is to be permitted. 81. All drills will be c --ied out by the Instructors attached to the Brigades under the OlHcer-instruclor, and when on board any of Her Majesty's ships they will be also subject to the supervision of the Commanding Otticer of the ship. 82. The qualification necessary for an Efficient will be found in the Appendix F, and may be amended as the Admiralty may from time to time think necessary. 83. A Badge of EtHciency will be worn by men who were returned as * Efficient * in the last Annual Return of the Brigade. The Badge will consist of a chevron of silver lace worn on the right arm abo". e the wrist. Men who have been fivo times returned as Efficient may wear one star, and those who have been returned ten times may wear two stars above Lhe badge. 84. Volunteers who pass the examination for Trained Man as in the Royal Xavy, will bo so designated, and Avill wear two chevrons of silver lace on the right arm above the wrist. 86. Every Volunteer must attend at least two drills a month until he has obtained the standard of an * Efficient.' 86. No firing practice with great guns is to be carried on by Volunteers, except under the superintendence of an OHicer of the Royal Navy, or of an Officer-instructor of Volunteers, unless a relaxation of this rule has been especially sanctioned by the Admiralty. 87. Sword bayonets are not to be worn at gun-duli, or when moving powder. No smoking is on any account \x) be allowed in the vicinity of magazines or cases containing powder. No persons are to be allowed to congregate round barrels or cases containing powder. Powder cases or barrels are not to be opened eitlier inside a magazine or immediately outside the door. ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 191 ALLOWANCES 88. When on actual service the lloyal Naval Artillery Volunteers will receive the same pay, allowances, and victuals as the Oiiicers and Continuous Service Seamen of the ranks and ratings in the Royal Navy of relative rank, and will have the same means of allotting pay to wives, relatives and friends, and whilst on actual service will be treated in the same manner in every respect. 89. When not on actual service and embarked on board any of Her Majesty's ships for more than forty-eight hours, the N^olunteers will be victualled for the whole time tbey are 80 embarked, or receive compensation for provisions at the rate of Is. Orf. per day ; but when they are embarked for less tlian forty-eight hours, they will not receive victuals or an allowance in lieu. DO. If a Volunteer is wounded or iuj ured on service or on drill, he will be entitled to the same pension to which any sea- man in ller Majesty's Navy would be entitled for a similar wound or injury ; or if killed, slain, or drowned on service, or on drill, his widow (if any) will be entitled to the same gratuities out of Greenwich Hospital Funds as the widow of any other seaman of the Navy of the same rating. Ul. Volunteers taken seriously ill or injured whilst under- going drill, may be sent to a Naval Hospital or Sick Quarters for treatment. 02. Application.H fur pensions or compensations for injuries or hurt.s received whilst on service or drill, are to be specially made to the Admiralty; the nature and cause of the injury are to be fully reported, and the names of the witnesses, as also whether blame was attributable to the Volunteer making the application, when the case will be considered as it deserves. 03. Volunteers are allowed to purchase at the Government rate any clothing or necessaries that may be requisite for their outfit or dress as belonging to tlie Corps. Oil actual servico Not on Hctual service Wounds or injuries on service or (IriU Hospital or Sick Quarters Applications for pensions Purchase of clothing, i&c. PERMANENT STAFF 94. The Permanent Staff of a lirigade will consist of one Composition Officer-instructor to the Brigade, and one Petty Officer-in- structor for each Battery composing the Brigade. 192 THE OKGANISATION OF THE Appoint- ment Officer when selected Qualification Not to hol.l other ap- pointment Age Iliiulc niiANISATION OF THE Pay of Per. maneiit Stuff 108. The Permanent Staff will receive pay as follows: Officer-instructor . . . . 10s. per day. Petty Officer-instructor ... 38. „ -I Distinctive lace Buttons Epaulettes Hat Badge or cap Sword-belt UNIFORM For Officers. 109. The Uniform to be worn by the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers is to be of the same pattern as for Officers of the corresponding ranks in the Royal Navy, with the following exceptions, viz. : 110. Instead of each distinctive stripe of half-inch gold lace round the sleeve, there is to be a stripe formed of two waved lines of quarter-inch silver braid, running parallel to each other so as to form bands three-quarters of an inch wide, the blue cloth to show quarter of an inch between the lines of braid. 111. The buttons to be of the Naval Pattern, with the letters R.N. on one side of the anchor and A.V. on the other side. The crown and anchor to be gilt, and the remainder of the button silver. 112. The epaulettes to be silver, and, instead of the anchor on the epaulette, there is to be a badge consisting of an anchor in the centre, surrounded by the words * R. N. A. Volunteers,' embroidered in gold. Crown and stars, when worn on the epaulettes, to be em- broidered in gold. 113. Instead of the bullion loop on the cocked hat, the loop to be formed of two silver braids, waved as on the coat sleeves, and the tassels to be silver, 114. The badge for the cap to have the letters R.N. placed on one side of the anchor, and the letters A.V. on the other side. The anchor and letters to be embroidered in gold, and the surrounding laurel leaves in silver. The crown to be em- broidered in gold and silver, as in the Naval Pattern. 115. The plate of the sword-belt and the swivel to be ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS 196 silver. The crown and anchor on it to be gilt, and the letters ' E.N.A.V.' on each side of the anchor, also gilt. 116. All lace and embroidery, except where otherwise Lace and ordered in these Regulations, is to be of silver. embroidery Dross tiniform Dress Uniform, 117. Coat the same as undress. Trowsers. — The lace on the seam to be silver. Sword-belt. — The embroidered lines to be silver. The dress-trowsers and sword-belt to be worn only on such occasions as are customary in the Koyal Navy. Petty Officers and Gunners. 118. The Uniform to be of the same pattern as for Petty Officers and Seamen of the Royal Navy, with the following exceptions, viz. : 119. The buttons on jackets of Chief Petty Officers to be of Buttons silver, the same as those of the Officers. The buttons of the Petty Officers and Gunners to be of the same pattern, but of black horn. 120. The tape trimmings of the white frock to be waved Trimmings in the same manner as the braid on the coat sleeves of the Officers. 121. All badges are to be of silver embroidery on the Badges jackets, and of silver or white on the blue serge. On the white frock they are to be blue. 122. The cap ribbon to have a crown and anchor in front, Cap ribbons with the letters * II.N.' on one side of the anchor, and the letters * A.V.' on the other. The crown and anchor and letters to be embroidered in silver on a black silk ribbon. The letters to be five-eighths of an inch in size. CORRESPONDENCE AND RETURNS 123. All official correspondence from the Volunteer Brigades except the correspondence of the Officer-instructor in his capacity of Instructor, is to proceed from the Commanding Officer, or to pass through him. oa 196 1 1' III XT . THE NAVAL VOLUNTEERS Speech at Liverpool, March 27, 1888, when distri- buting THE Prizes to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers Lord Brassey desired to thank them for their kind acknowledgments of the very small service which lie had endeavoured to render by distributing the well earned prizes to the successful Volunteers. He could assure them that he took the deepest nterest in the Naval Volunteer movement, and in the progress of the Liver- pool corps in particular. It was not the first time that he had had the pleasure of being present on occasions of interest to the Liverpool Naval Volunteers. During his connection with the corps there had been various changes. Their commanding officers had changed, and he might refer to the officer who was in command on the last occasion when he appeared before them, and who had done excellent service. After a long period of ser- vice Mr. Lambert retired, and he might congratulate the Liverpool Naval Artillery Volunteers upon the fact that Lord Anglesey had been kind enough to come for- ward and to give the corps the advantage which it de- rived from his deep persor^l interest in the movement, and from the influence which in his high position he was enabled to exercise in support of the Naval Volunteer movement. There had been another important change since he last had the privilege of addressing them. They THE NAVAL VOLUNTEERS 197 Appreciation of the Admiralty had received the capitation grant. The capitation grant was a matter of great congratulation. It showed that the Admiralty appreciated highly the services which the Naval mteers were capable of rendering, and it was a subject oi congratulation upon other grounds. It enabled those who were in charge of a force of this kind to main- tain a still higher standard of discipline and efficiency. The capitation grant was satisfactory for another reason — that it made it possible to extend the Naval Volunteer movement to many places where, without the support of the grant, it would not be possible to establish this very useful corps of Volunteers. He w- ? sure that those who seriously reflected upon the subject must recognise the absolute necessity for the establishing of auxiliary forces Necessity of for the purpose of manning the Navy. They lived at forces the present time under a powerful Government, and a Government associated with political principles which certainly entitled the Conservative party to claim that they were deeply interested in the efficiency of the naval and military services. He gladly accorded to the Govern- ' iiient, and to the great party which was now in power, the praise which was due for their solicitude in the matter of national defence. He would ask them to re- mark that, under the present G(jvernment, it had been found necessary to make a very large reduction in the last two years in the sum of money appropriated to the naval service. He was not there to say that the amount which was now taken for the naval service was insuffi- cient, but he confidently asserted that with the Naval Estimates fixed at their present amount it was impos- sible to make any reduction in the sum of money now available for the building of ships. The great feature in New siups the naval construction of the present year - the new of commerce construction — was the creation of some very powerful n n 198 THE NAVAL VOLUNTEERS i ."'!' ! f I I; Naval Keservcs essential Value of Naval Reserve ships for the defence of comniPiee. They all atlui it- ted that those ships were very necessary, and if they were to think of criticism it would be that the number proposed was hardly sufficient for the requirements. He would also draw attention to the fact that in the pro- posals for shipbuilding in the present Naval Estimates there was not included a single additional ship for the line of battle. Such being the state of affairs in regard to shipbuilding for the Navy, it must be obvious that they could not reduce the amount of money which was now being appropriated to the purpose of building ships. From that followed the deduction that, with the Esti- mates at their present iigure, they could not appropriate an increased amount of money to the maintenance of the permanent personnel of the Navy, and if they could not maintain a greater number of seamen and marines in the permanent naval service, and if they admitted, as they must do, that if we were unfortunately engaged in a war we should require a large addition to the personnel of the Navy, what was the deduction to be made ? It must be this, that to have Naval Reserves was absolutely essential for the efficient manning of the Navy. He had always put great faith in the efficiency of our Royal Naval Reserve. He would like to see it more numerous. He would be glad to see more done for its thorough training, more complete instruction in gunnery, more instruction in the torpedo. He would be glad also to see the Royal Naval Reserve more frequently called upon to man the ships of the Navy, and called upon from time to time to take part in the naval manoeuvres. He had said that he had great faith in the Royal Naval Reserve, but then we had behind the Naval Reserve, and for the purposes of coast defence, our Royal Naval Artil- lery Volunteers. He believed the Royal Naval Reserve THE NAVAL VOLUNTEERS 11^0 with further training and instruction, and even with the existing amount of training and instruction, would l)e extremely valuable, and he had implicit faith in the power of a force such as that he saw before him to render good service in the coast defence of the country. Before concluding, he would like to say a word or two with reference to this question of coast defence, lie I'mst dared say they had heard of the association for the pur- ussooiation pose of organising our coast defences, which had been established by Lord Cowper and a number of other patriotic noblemen and gentlemen. That association had recently put forth a most valuable pamphlet by a well known naval writer, Admiral Colomb. Admiral Colomb, in his paper, directed attention to the remark- able losses sustained upon our own coasts in the time of the great war. Even at the time that Nelson was in his greatest glory, we were losing large numbers of ships captured by privateers on our own coasts. In 1804 Number of ^ •' * , ships taken between 300 and 400 ships were taken on our coasts, on our coasts , . iu old wars In the year 1810 619 ships were taken on our coasts, and in the year 1813 the number was from 300 to 400. If these losses were sustained 00 years ago, they might imagine what we might suffer from insufficient coast de- fence at the present time, when our merchant shipping was valued at something equal to the National Debt, and when it was supposed that forty or fifty millions sterling of the income of the country depended on the security of the merchant shipping. He would not, how- ever, insist upon that point. Admiral Colomb made one calculation which must be of interest to the people of Liverpool. He said that one ship entered or lei-c the Mersey every seventeen minutes, showing the urgent necessity for more efficient coast defence. The vessels Local upon which Admiral Colomb relied were the local a 200 THE NAVAL VOLUNTEERS vessels ; but whether coast defence was made by local vessels equipped for the purposes of defence or by vessels provided by the Admiralty, certain it was that tiiose vessels must be manned by a force in which the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers would be a very im- portant element. It had always given him great plea- sure to come amongst the Naval Volunteers of Liverpool, and he had been exceedingly gratified that evening by the appearance of the men, which was everything that a patriot could , 1878. The opinion of my predecessor on the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers is given at page 7 of his Confidential Report on quitting office, dated 18th October, 1876:— * That they would be useful in the event of war, in the de- fence of the estuaries, while in peace they serve as a connect- ing link between the Volunteer movement and the Royal Navy.' Both at London and Liverpool the condition of the brigade is excellent. The Volunteers drill with celerity and precision, and are extremely zealous. They cheerfully conform to disci- pline, and are desirous of improving themselves in every way when embarked for their annual drill. In some places they might supply the place of the Coast Guard temporarily, if that force should be suddenly embarked. They might furnish guards at rendezvous and places of em- barkation to preserve order. Many of them have become expert artillerists. I think the movement assists in making the naval service better appreciated and understood at certain places, and conse- quently increases the popularity of the Navy generally, which, if more seamen were required for ships of war, nught be of great value in facilitating fresh entries. , A reserve of In my judgment, Captain Colomb is the advocate of Australia a wise policy. The Imperial and Colonial Governments should combine to create a fleet of sea-going ships, which should be kept in reserve in the harbours on the Austra- lian station. Torpedoes and torpedo boats should be ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE 217 provided for harhour defence. Tlie Colonial Govern- ments should man the sea-jifoing ships stationed in their own harbours with their Naval Reserves, and they should provide the personnel necessary for harbour defence by the organisation of corps of Naval Artillery Volunteers, after the model of those which have been successfully established in London and Liverpool. The number of sea-going ships and torpedo boats, a RojuI and the forces of Naval Reserves and Naval Artillery to cocsider Volunteers which would be necessary to man them, is a subject worthy of mature examination by a Royal Com- mission. Such a Commission should include, not only orticers of acknowledged capability to deal with technical ([uestions, but representatives who should be authorised to express the views of the colonists with reference to the proportions in which they would be prepared to con- tribute to the expense. I wish to insist emphatically on the importance of importance the work which would devolve on such a Commission, isinga We cannot conceal from the world the wealth accumu- jefeucu lated in the colonial capitals, all of which lie on the sea-board. Their inhabitants possess all the spirit and resources necessary to repel an attack, but these places are at present defenceless. Floating and stationary defences cannot be designed, a Naval Reserve or Militia cannot be organised, without naval and military advice. The colonies having no body of officers to assist them in such a task, it is for the mother-country to take the initiative in the discharge of the urgent Imperial duty of preparing a scheme for the mutual self-defence of all the dependencies of the Empire. I am not competent to enter into the details of such a scheme as the Royal Commission which I recommend would be enabled to prepare. A degree of local and 218 ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE I I Resources of Canada in ships ami seamen Newfound- land flsher- meu Cnuld drill un.-ing winter professional knowledge which I cannot pretend to possess, and which, indeed, cannot be combined in any individual, would be required in the preparation of a satisfactory plan. As an example of what might be done, I will, however, venture to refer to some notes which I made on the formation of a Naval Reserve in Canada, after visiting the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1872. ■^ It is believed that in the Canadian Dominion there are not less than 87,000 seafaring men. In 1872, about 1,000 decked vessels and 17,000 open boats, manned by 42,000 men, were employed. On December 31, 1876, the Canadian Dominion possessed 6,952 vessels, of 1,205,565 tons. During the year 1876, 480 new vessels, of 151,012 tons, were built in the Dominion. The value of the fish exported from Canada in the same year amounted to 1,000,000/. The value of the exports of the same class from Newfoundland in 1875 was 2^340,000/. It is stated in the annual report of Governor Hill for 1872, that about 10,000 men are engaged in the seal fishery of Newfoundland, and that this number includes almost every available able-bodied man on the island. The total male population, it should be added, is 75,000. ^""^xlie rigorous climate of Canada and Newfoundland throughout their long winter season makes it impossible for fishermen to follow their regular vocation. The long interval of enforced idleness during winter would afford an admirable opportunity for regular attendance at drill, \>ithout interfering with other lucrative employ- ment. A vigorous effort should be made tc enrol these colonial fishermen in the Naval Reserve of the British Empire. They are thoroughly inured to the hardships ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER l-ORCE 219 St. John's of the sea by the severe weather which frequently pre- vails on their native shore. No subjects of the British Crown are more loyal and devoted. There would be no difficulty in giving to the fishermen of Newfoundland and the maritime provinces of the Canadian Dominion an opportunity of embarking for their annual drill at a port easily accessible from their own homes. A vessel should be commissioned specially for the purpose of training seamen who have joined the Naval Reserve from Newfoundland, from the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and from Quebec, Montreal, and other places on the great river. The vessel should be of the corvette class, having a covered deck in which the battery of guns would be placed. In such a vessel the drills might be carried on with regularity in the most severe weather. The drill-ship would be stationed during mid- winter at Driii-sUip n^ St. John's. The harbour is admirably sheltered and a large population of fishermen is congregated in the town and its vicinity. During a portion of the winter the drill-ship should be moved to other points on the coast where the fishermen are settled in large numbers. Thus the members of the Colonial Naval Reserve would have an opportunity of going through the annual course of drill, without being exposed to the hardship of a long Sfcavoyage to St. John's in their small fishing-boats in rni'l- winter. Along the coasts of Newfoundland there .re nt!i3» ftrous admirably sheltered harbours which are rai 3ly itoien up. An anchorage might be selected for the training-ship both in Placentia Bay and in Trinity Bay, perfectly secure, and easily accessible to the large numbers of British seafaring men dispersed along those distant shores. As the spring approached, and the navigation was opened in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the ship could proceed from harbour to harbour along the i 220 ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEEE FORCE I Halifax M. Bouruiot oil flsLing fleets of Canada southern shores of the Gulf. At Sydney, Charlotte- town, and Gaspe, many seamen could he enrolled for the national Reserve. It should be arranged that the drill-ship should visit the harbours mentioned sufficiently early in the season to enable the seamen sailing from those ports to go through their annual drills before the navigation of the St. Lawrence was fully open. The lleserN e men might thus have the opportunity of attend- ing on board the training-ship without suffering the serious inconvenience which would be felt if they were taken from their employment afloat in the season of open navigation. Another similar training-ship should be stationed at Halifax, which should visit the numerous harbours on the coast of Nova Scotia and in the Bay of Fundy in the winter season, when multitudes of fisher- men are compelled to remain on shore in consequence of the inclemency of the weather. We have not neglected to avail ourselves of the services of our colonial population for the purpose of increasing our military resources. We have enrolled large bodies of men belonging to races distinct from our own. There can be no f^ufficient reason for neglecting to recruit for the Navy among the vast numbers of loyal Englishmen who, animated by a splendid spirit of enterprise and adventure, have settled on the extensive coasts of our Canadian Dominion. In a lecture delivered at the Royal Colonial Insti- tute, on February 4, 1873, M. Bourniot, a member of the Canadian Senate, remarked that : ' In the men that sail the fishing fleets of Canada we see the elements of a very powerful marine, which will be found invaluable in times of national danger. It may be estimated that the total strength which the fisheries employ throughout all British North America is composed of some 70,000 ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE 221 men.' M. Bouriiiot was of opinion that there was no reason why training-ships, supported by the local Govern- ments, should not be started in the colonies, if the system were found to work well in the United King- dom. The policy recommended seems to be in consonance Lord Elgin with the views expressed by Lord Elgin, who, when colonies Governor-General of Canada, argued with so much force on the advantages to England and her colonies of an intimate union between them. * Is the Queen of England,' he wrote, ' to be the Sovereign of an Empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its roots into fresh earth, and drawing new supplies of vitality from virgin soils ? Or is she to be, for all essential purposes of might and power, Monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely ? ' The organisation of a Naval Reserve in our North American Colonies is not only to be desired as a means of adding to our naval strength for Imperial purposes, but also for defending the colonies themselves. All our colonies, including India, should have a defensive force of their own. Organisation beforehand is essential to success in war. By the bestowal of infinite pains on her military organisation, Prussia, which seemed for ever fallen after the battle of Jena, turned the tide of fortune in 1815, and, after the campaigns of 1866 and 1870, has become the greatest power of Central Europe. It is one of the great recommendations of the scheme No!argo which I have advocated on this occasion, that it need r^rred"^° not involve the counti-y in a lavish expenditure. It is well to prepare in advance plans of earthworks to be thrown up when required, and to organise corps of Naval Volunteers. It does not follow that we should undertake the construction of the extravagant fortresses 222 ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE Sir Robert Peel Military Volunteer moTcmeat Instructors from home which surround our arsenals at home, or withdraw a single man from the well-rewarded labour-market of the colonies. To build fleets and forts, and to maintain armies in every dependency of the Crown, would be an exhausting and an unnecessary effort. I remember, and approve, the language held by Sir Robert Peel in 1850, when he said : ' I believe that in time of peace we must by our retrenchment consent to incur some risk. I venture to say that if you choose to have all the gar- risons of all your colonial possessions in a complete state, and to have all your fortifications secure from attack, no amount of annual expenditure will be sufli- cient to accomplish your object.' Since the date of Sir Robert Peel's speech, that noble Volunteer movement, one of the most honourable features in the recent history of this country, has been originated. A quarter of a century ago the voluntary submission to drill and discipline of large masses of men, in numbers far exceeding those enrolled in the regular Army, was not anticipated by British states- men. By the extension of the Volunteer movement, garrisons can be maintained in the largest fortresses and in the most distant outposts, without adding in any appreciable degree to the charges on the Imperial and Colonial revenues. The mother-country could readily furnish a staflf of otticers and instructors for the purpose of training the Colonial Naval Reserves. The number of officers re- quired must depend on the strength of the force which it is deemed expedient tu raise. In whatever numbers they may be wanted, they can be supplied from the ranks of those who have retired from the active list, or who are, for the time being, on half-pay. The presence ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE 223 example of a body of naval officers in our colonies will form a valuable link with the United Kingdom. They will carry with them the spirit of discipline and devotion to their country which they have acquired from service in the Navy, and they will help to keep alive its illustrious traditions in those young commu- nities, in which it is so important to create a high tone of morality and conduct. The example of her great men is the most valuable inheritance of a nation, and in the career of many of our sea officers the highest moral excellence has been combined with dauntless bravery aud skilful seamanship. Readers of naval story will be familiar with the fine Xcison'a passages in which Southey concludes his biography of Lord Nelson. He tells us how, on the sunny morning of October 21, 1805, as the British fleet was bearing down on the formidable array of ships under Villeneuve, Nelson withdrew to his cabin, and, looking for death with almost as sure an expectation as for victory, piously discharged his devotional duties. You know with what calm courage shortly afterwards he entered into battle, and with what conduct and valour our officers and men followed their illustrious chief to victory. The battle of Trafalgar, though considered by Southey as the most signal success that ever was achieved upon the seas, was dearly bought by the daath of Nelson ; and yet, as his biographer most truly says, ' He cannot be said to have fallen prematurely, whoso work was done ; nor ought he to be lamented, who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr ; the most awful that of the mar- tyred patriot ; the most splendid that of the hero in the hour of victory ; and if the chariot and the horses of lire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he "J- 224 ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FOECE A link with the Navy could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory. He has left us, not indeed his mantle of inspira- tion, but a name and an example which are at this moment inspiring thousands of the youth of England, a name which is our pride and an example which will continue to be our shield and our strength.' That the Navy of our own time contains many brave men, prepared to serve their Queen and country in the spirit which animated Lord Nelson, we cannot doubt. You remember how the gallant Burgoyne refused to enter the boat in which the sole survivors of the crew of the ' Captain ' were saved. Humanity to the savage and fortitude in death were conspicuously illustrated in the closing hours of Captain Goodenough. But the occasions which brought out the high qualities of Lord Nelson are happily rare. The annals of a nation must be long in order to furnish many examples equally illustrious. Our share in the honour which belongs to the descendants of such men is a privilege of high value ; and it will surely be one of the strongest in- ducements to the formation of a Colonial Naval Re- serve, that a link will thus be crta,ted with a Navy possessing the splendid traditions which belong to the British service. 225 PART IV AUXILIARY CRUISERS. COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS. NAVAL TRAIN- ING AND EDUCATION. NAVAL MANCEU- VRES AUXILIARY CRUISE US I. The Mercantile Marine considered as an Auxiliary to the Royal Navy Paper read at the Eoyal United Service I^•STITUTION, June 23, 1876 Having previously written a long paper with reference to the personnel of the merchant service, and its actual condition so far as it would be appreciated l)y an analysis of the Parliamentary literature on the subject, I feel that it is not necessary for me now to do more than give a short statement of the strength of the merchant service in regard to the ships. Of course the review of the situation in regard to the merchant steamers is exceed- ingly incomplete unless those vessels are considered from a naval architect's point of view, and also from a naval officer's point of view. I am not in a position to state to this meeting, as my friend Mr. Barnaby could, II. o rrr 226 AUXILIARY CRUISERS Steam ton- nage of different nations if he were not bound by ofl&cial reticence, what the vai of these vessels would be with regard to the power of carrying guns, and still less am I able to treat the subject from a naval officer's point of view, and to indicate to the meeting the kind of armament which would be most suitable for vessels of the kind which we have to take into our review. It is proposed in the present paper to give a brief review of the resources we possess in our merchant navy for home defence and for the protection of our commerce. Some may think that we are so secure that preparation for the emergency of war is superfluous. We ought not, however, to be over- confident, for, as Lord Palmerston wisely said, * to imagine that we are safe from invasion now without precautions, because hitherto we have prevented it by precautions, is the greatest of all possible absurdities.' The steam tonnage of the British Empire, according to the latest returns, is 1,825,000 tons ; that of the United States for over-sea foreign trade, 193,000 tons. France has 516 steamers, of 188,000 tons, and Norway has 199 steamers, of 39,000 tons. Our larger vessels are at least as well adapted for conversion into cruisers for the protection of commerce as the trading steamers of other nations are adapted for conversion into priva- teers. Our merchant navy list includes the following : Tons register Number of Steamships 3,000 tons, and above .... 2,500 „ to 3,000 tons .... 2,000 „ „ 2,500 , 1,600 „ „ 2,000 „ . . . . 1,200 „ „ 1,500 „ . . . . 8 u 65 165 187 Total 419 It may be presumed that all these ships could carry at AUXILIARY CRUISERS 227 Armament. Heavy or ligUt gun: least two armour-piercing guns, and in addition, a con- siderable armament of the 64-pounder gun, which, at the present time, seems to be the favourite weapon in the Navy for vessels not intended to engage ironclads. I may, perhaps, here venture to interpose an observa- tion upon the much-debated question of armament. Many naval men are of opinion that armour-piercing guns should be mounted in every vessel in the service. They think that there is safety in numbers ; and that, however hopeless it may seem for a small unarmoured vessel to engage a heavy ironclad, circumstances may arise in which a flotilla of small vessels, armed with powerful guns, might inflict fatal injury even on an ironclad. It is to be remembered, that the large vessel carries very few guns, and that our most powerful naval artillery has become so ponderous, and the range of view so limited, since the introduction of armour, that perfect accuracy of aim cannot be relied upon, especially should the fire be directed against a small gunboat moving rapidly on an irregular course. Hence a large vessel in narrow waters might suffer most seriously from a com- bined attack by a flotilla of gunboats of the * Coquette ' class, or a squadron of cruisers of the ' Opal ' type. It would seem desirable, therefore, to introduce a mixed armament, at least in some of the vessels which are now armed exclusively with the 64-pounder gun. To return to the merchant navy, it would be a states- Communicn- manlike measure on the part of the Admiralty to enter Admiralty into communication with the owners of ocean steamers, owner's^ and to endeavour to agree upon terms for the hire of such vessels in the event oi: war. As it has been thought expedient to engage a certain number of the merchant seamen to serve in the Navy, by giving them an annual retainer during peace ; so it might be worth 93 IrT" 228 AUXILIARY CRUISERS Modifica- tions in new steamers Govern-ncnt to pay a retainer while to subsidise the owners of steamers adapted to carry an armament, in consideration of their undertaking to hold their ships at the disposal of the Government in the event of war. No less than 640 steamers were hired by the Government of the United States during the civil war, and without these vessels it would have been abso- lutely impossible to have blockaded the coast of the Southern Confederacy. What occurs to me as important in carrying out this suggestion is this, that admitted by far the greater number of merchant steamers are, when built solely for mercantile purposes, very imperfectly adapted to any service of war, it would probably be an expedient course for the Government to endeavour to enter into commu- nication with shipowners at a time when they were contemplating building new vessels, so that there might be introduced in the original design those necessary modifications which would enable the ships to carry guns. No doubt shipowners would say, 'These things do not advance our interests in the least ; we look simply to carrying passengers and cargo, and we are not prepared to alter our designs.' To that, of course, the ready answer is, it is a mere question of expense ; and if the Government be prepared to pay the expense for these modifications, and if the vessel be not injured by thom for commercial purposes, I take it there would be no objection on the part of many merchants to do it, espe- cially if the Government were prepared to pay a sufficient sum by way of retainer, enabling them to make use of these vessels for a stipulated amount in case of war. Of course such a suggestion means expense, but it may be better that the public money should be spent in that way. I take it, for a given sum of money you would have a very much larger number of vessels at your dis- AUXILLVRY CRUISERS 229 Limit to Navnl Estimates posal than if you built vessels expressly and solely for the purpose of war ; and whereas an unarnioured vessel may be utilised as a merchant vessel in time of peace, it is quite certain that no ironclad can be utilised for that purpose. The question therefore is, wliether it is not desirable to spend as large a sum available for ship- building as possible upon vessels which are exclusively of the fighting class, and to endeavour to supplement the fighting class by subsidiary vessels to be partly engaged in time of peace in the merchant service. Of course these things present themselves to everybody in the House of Commons from a financial point of view ; perhaps they do not strike naval officers in the same way ; but what we have to consider is that the sum available for shipbuilding is not an unlimited quantity. There is only so much money available. You may have to increase the Estimates ; we have increased the Estimates ; we are increasing the Estimates ; and I dare say we shall increase them still more ; but even as- suming that we are to proceed in the direction of further expenditure, still, after all, the sum of money is limited, and no one knows it and feels it more keenly than those who, like Mr. Barnaby, have to rack their brains year after year in order to produce the greatest amount of force for the money placed at their disposal. Therefore it is worthy of consideration whether you cannot provide your unarm ou red fleet in part by some alliance and partnership with the merchant service. All naval officers are agreed in attaching more or importance less importance to the quality of speed in unarmoured vessels. The ' Inconstant ' was built specially with the view to attain an unprecedented speed. Now, in point of speed and in coal-carrying capacity, the fine steamers employed in the North Atlantic trade present very 280 AUXILIARY CRUISERS Speed of the great liuers rcrform- ivnccs of the ' Oity of Berlin ' White Star liue remarkable elements of power. In his exhaustive work, Mr. Lindsay has published details, giving the average passages of the principal lines of ocean steamers between Liverpool and New York. The speed and regularity maintained are truly marvellous. T give a few figures, extracted from Mr. Lindsay's tables, which will serve to show what an immense reserve of power we possess in our merchant navy for the emergency of war. The distance from Quecnstown to Sandy Hook is 2,777 miles, and it was performed in the years 1873 and 1(S7-1, outwards and homewards, by the steamers of the White Star, Cunard, and Inman lines, at the average speed shown in the following table. As an example of the marvellous perfection to which ocean steaming has l^een brought by the enterprise of British shipowners, unaided by subsidies from the (government, the recent performances may be cited of the ' City of Berlin ' : • * " Loy of the Inman steamer ' City of Berlin,* Quecnstown to Bandy Hook Uiiys Hours Minutes 7 18 2 Sandy Hook to Quecnstown Days Hours Minutes 7 16 28 Date Distance ran Date Distimce run 1875 September 18 . 19 . 20 . 21 . 22 . „ 23 . „ 24 . 25 . Miles 303 3G7 376 368 380 324 381 380 1875 October 3 4 » 6 7 8 •♦ 10 Miles 388 862 866 361 381 347" 362 253 The performances of the White Star line have been equally remarkable for the extraordinary speed attained. ' Fresh gale and heavy beam sea. AUXILIARY CRUISERS 231 • ^ 1 Oi •■£ O ^ a S : t> -f iO So o o © '■*-» a r^ •* bo OS 1 g'^S 1 oc hH fe « o --< li 1 S3 I? :5 -3 rH !M 1 ^1 SIS © © . •-I 1— 1 ^-( CO 7i 'P. © -M a « OO -^ ■* '>; 5£ «c o --^ o a i^ "* «o e! 1 rH o is a 2 OS SO (M > 3 5 CO 00 2 > M rH i-H (N t. O So 't' N (N i" > . • . ' ' M s • ■ • i i tn i ^ d H ca ' ' • White S Cunard Inman . h- 1 .H 1-1 rH "*-, 1- 232 AUXILIARY CRUISERS ' A.lriatlo ' and ' Ocr- uianic ' Const steamers Ciipability of tugs to carrj' guns In 1873 the 'Adriatic,' sailing wost, made the voyage from Queenstown to Sandy Hook at the average speed of 18*5r) statute miles per hour ; and in March, 1872, the same ship made the passage, sailing east, at the I'ate of 18*9 miles per hour. The regularity of this vessel's passage is not less remarkable than the speed, the average time for twenty-nine voyages from New York to Queenstown being 8 days 10 hours 57 minutes. The shortest passage was in October, 1874, occupy- ing only 7 days 23 hours 12 minutes. This passage was surpassed, by a few miruites only, by the ' Germanic, which made the run from Queenstown to Sandy Hook in August, 1873, in 7 days 23 hours 7 minutes. The greatest run in a single day recorded by Mr. Lindsay was made by the ' Adriatic ' on April 10, 1873, on which day she steamed 396 miles, the course being S. 61° W., with the wind N., force 6. These particulars will have sufficiently shown what the large steamers of our merchant service can do. We are ec^ually strong in the meaTi? of coast defence. The flotilla of steamers in our home trade includes 5,530 vessels under 50 tons, 4,173 over 50 and under 100 tons, and 1,670 steamers over 100 and under 200 tons. If all those of sufficient strength were armed with one or two guns, no hostile fleet could approach our shores with impunity. A report was made to the Admiralty some years ago as to the adaptability of the tug and ferry-boats of the port of Liverpool for conversion into gunboats. A large number were found to be capable of carrying the heaviest gun at that time mounted on board ship. The 81 -ton gun has since been constructed. A weapon so formid- able can only be carried in a vessel of special construc- tion and of large tonnage. The torpedo, however, has - AUXILIARY CRUISERS 238 to a considerable extent neutralised the increased power of the gun, and has furnished us with the means of arm- ing with a powerful weapon every swift and handy steamer for coast defence. By the use of the torpedo and submarine mine, the narrow, shoal, and tortuous channels of approach to London, Liverpool, Hull, Glas- gow, Cork, Bristol, and CardifF--in short, all the busiest sea ports — may be closed to the most formidable iron- clads. Though tlie subject is more interesting to a naval sailing ves- , 1 , . -r • ,. 1 '^els for omcer than to a naval architect, I cannot omit from the traiuing catalogue of ships required for the Navy a certain num- ber of sailing vessels, to be attached to the receiving ships at Devonport, Portsmouth, and Sheerness, for the purpose of taking the seamen to cruise in the Channel in summer, and to Lisbon and Gibraltar in winter. Such vessels become more and more necessary for training purposes at a time when it seems probable that the iighting Navy will be largely composed of mastless ironclads. Having elsewhere shown the great superiority of our Unarmoureii armoured fleet, I may here, in conclusion, advert to the relative condition of the Navy in unarmoured vessels. The Americans have only .'^9 unarmoured cruisers, and very few of these have a speed of 10 knots, a considcr- abl(! nuuber l)eing unable to steam more than 7 knots an hour. Probably gallant gentlemen in this room have had in their hands Admiral Porter's Annual Reports upon the condition of the United States Navy, and those who have read those publications must bo aware of his great disappointment at the want of speed which characterises the unarmoured vessels which are placed at his disposal by a legislature which is even more narrow- inindod than the British. cruisera 234 AUXILIARY CRUISERS Our fuvour- able ixtsitiou The value of the mer- cantile murine as an auxiliary to tlie Nuvy The Russians have but few unarmoured cruisers, and their entire fleet in the Baltic and Black Seas only carries 271 guns. The Germans have only 11 corvettes and i despatch boats, carrying altogether 145 guns. The Turks are practically without a cruising squadron. I say that with deference to those who know more about these things than I do ; but to the best of my belief the Turks do not possess any unarmoured cruisers of a kind which we should view with satisfaction if they belonged to our own service. Gallant gentlemen must appreciate the very different view we take of ships when they fight under the British flag and when they fight under a foreign flag. We are certainly more critical with our own ships than with foreign ships. That, perhaps, is quite right. When, therefore, we compare our own position with that of other Powers, and when we find that the ships included in the return of vessels building in 1875 will carry no less than 304 guns of a calibre, on the whole, in- comparably heavier than that of the artillery mounted in the unarmoured ships of other Powers, it must be clear that our situation both in the present and in pro- spective can give no just grounds for anxiety to the most susceptible and timid mind. The superiority of our re- sources will not, however, give us any proportionate advantage without complete and careful organisation. I most sincerely hope that the attention which this Institution is pleased to direct to these subjects may liave the effect of promoting arrangements of the kind which I venture to indicate between the Admiralty and the merchant service. I believe that in our merchant steam navy we now possess what might, with a certain amount of trouble and expense, be conveited into a valuable auxiliary ; but if we were to take this question AUXILIARY CRUISERS 235 in hand in a masterly, effective, and liberal spirit, I believe that what we possess now is as nothing to what we might have hereafter. The personnel of the merchant service I have already ventured to discuss in a lecture delivered here in February, and the organisation of that personnel as a Reserve has also been treated, no doubt imperfectly, by me, and much more satisfactorily l)y others, in former lectures delivered in this Institution, and I believe that our labours have borne fruit. Any- how, the Naval Reserve has been immensely strengthened in the last few years. I wish Ave could go fui'ther in that direction. I wish that every able-bodied seaman in the merchant service could be induced to register his name on the Reserve lists of the Navy. If that were done, if we had our seafaring population as much at the com- mand of the country in an emergency as the seafaring population of France is, of course we should be, in even a greater sense than we are now, the dominant maritime Power of the world. 2. A Naval Reserve of Ships Letter to the 'Times,' June 7,1879 HAViNCf lately been permitted to offer some suggestions in your columns on another subject of naval policy, it is with hesitation that I ask you to give me the privilege of addressing the public on the organisation of a reserve of cruisers in our mercantile marine. I have called attention to this question in a recent speech, delivered on the banks of the Mersey, at the head-quarters of the great shipping interest, and I desii'e to take advantage of a momentary lull in Parliamentary business for the purpose of creating a more general interest in the same important topic. • / 236 AUXILIAEV CRUISERS The mercan- tile marine part of the Nary A subsidy to sliipowuers Structural arrange- ments in new steamers The whole mercantile marine of Great Britain should bo regarded as part of our Navy. Every ship which is converti})le into a vessel of war, and every British seaman, should be looked upon as a part and parcel of our Naval Reserve. We have already created a reserve of men ; it is necessary to complete the work by forming a reserve of ships. It should be one of the leading principles of our shipbuilding policy to limit the ship- building for the Navy, as far as possible, to types which do not exist in the mercantile marine. We must build a sufficient number of cruisers to furnish the necessary reliefs for our squadrons on foreign stations ; but the fleet of cruisers which we maintain in peace could be expanded into a fighting fleet from our reserve of ships in the merchant service. An attempt has already been made to create such a reserve. The Government has signified its willingness to enter all vessels fulfilling certain structural conditions in an official list. This is a step in the right direction. But no pecuniary consideration is offered to shipowners who respond to this appeal ; and unless some substantial encouragement is given, it is not reasonable to suppose that any considerable number of vessels will be built with such modifications as would be required to make them easily convertible into fighting ships. Mr. Burns has pointed out the inadequacy of the present proposal. The necessary adaptations of struc- ture should be introduced in the original design. Alter- ations are always costly and often unsatisfactory. Shipowners should be invited to communicate with the Admiralty when they contemplate building new vessels of a certain tonnage and speed. The designs should be examined, and if they were found to be easily adaptable to war purposes owners would probably consent to AUXILIAKY CRUISERS 237 arrange bulkheads, watertight compartments, and bun- kers in accordance with the requirements, and, of course, at the expense, of the Government. The ships, having been fitted for the emergency of war service, would be entered in the list of cruisers in reserve, and would be held at the disposal of the Admiralty in con- sideration of a fair annual payment. Should a vessel be required for active service as a cruiser, the additional sum to be paid for the purchase or charter should be previously agreed upon. It may be objected that the modifications which the Admiralty would probably require would interfere with the accommodation for passengers or the stowage of cargo. I do not think tlie ditTiculty would be serious. Bunkers could be so placed as to afibrd complete protection to the boilers against all but the heaviest projectiles, without in the sliglitest degree interfering with the facilities for stoking. The multiplication of bulkheads might cause considerable inconvenience in a merchant steamer, but frames could be constructed at certain intervals apart to receive additional bulkheads, which could be easily fitted if the ship were required for war service. In certain cases «a shelf -piece might bo fitted to receive a moderate thick- ness of armour-plating, which might be kept in store in readiness to be fixed. I am well aware of the difficulty of securing atten- view of tion to new suggestions. Naval officei's are unwilling ''"^^'^'^J^ to see any portion of the money voted for the Navy expended on ships which may never carry the pennant. Their aim is to make the Royal Navy sufficient by itself to meet all the naval requirements of the country. It is a natural but an impracticable ambition. Public attention is with difficulty attracted to any subject not directly connected with the passing events of the day. 238 AUXILIARY CRUISERS Without the recurrence of disastrous shipwrecks, Mr. Plimsoll would have failed to catch the ear of the public ; and until our commerce is cut up by some future ' Alabama,' it is possible that no effectual effort ■will be made to provide those additions to the cruising strength of the Navy which would certainly be demanded on the outbreak of a war. Merchant tonnage of different States 3. Merchant Cruisers : Considered with Reference TO THE Policy of Maintaining a Reserve of Vessels by Annual Subventions to Shipowners Paper bead at the Institution op Naval Architects, March 22, 1893 No more important question could be brought before the consideration of this Institution than that of the policy to be pursued by the British Govornment in relation to mail subsidies and subventions to the owners of the reserved merchant cruisers. The tonnage owned by Great Britain includes 9,506 sailing vessels, collectively measuring 3,602,546 tons, and 5,588 steamers, of 8,912,522 tons. The United States, which stand next to us in sailing tonnage, own 3,428 vessels, aggregating 1,166,963 tons. Germany, which stands next in steam tonnage, owns 765 ships, aggregating 1,091,472 tons. Broadly, it may be said that England owns half the mercantile tonnage of the world. When, however, we carry the comparison to those classes of ships on which we should be chiefly dependent in the event of war, and which in peace discharge the great function of linking nations to- gether by the swift and safe conveyance of mails and passengers, our relative position is not so commanding as we could wish. According to the latest returns AUXILIARY CRUISERS 239 published by the Bureau Veritas, the merchant navies of the world possess forty-five steamers exceeding 6,000 tons. Of these ten are French, one Belgian, seven German, and twenty-seven English. Of the ten largest steamships of the world, seven are British. Of the fourteen ocean steamers of nineteen knots speed and above engaged in the Atlantic trade, six are British, five German, two belong to the United States, and one to France. It will be seen that in the largest and swiftest ships we hold no uncontested supremacy. Supported by lavish subsidies, mail steamers sailing under other flags are running a closer race every year with the British lines of ocean steamers. I have been supplied through the kindness of Mr. Henniker Heaton, M.P., with materials for the following table, giving the subsidies paid for mail services con- ducted under their national flag by the leading maritime States : , _^ . , , i. T, 1 , , Total Foreign Trade of Name of State | Amount Talil 1 ^he CouHtrv li'rance . Germany . Rassia Italy Great Britain . £ 1,043,513 1,000,000 251,000 400,000 (537,000 £ 300,000,000 313,000,000 111,000,000 182,000,000 740,000,000 Subsidies for mail service The subsidies paid by Great Britain are nearly covered by the receipts on foreign and colonial letters. In addition to the payments under the mail con- Bounties for tracts, bounties are paid in several countries both for the construction of ships and in the form of mileage subsidies. The premiums paid by the French Govern- ment for the encouragement of navigation averaged from 1881 to 1890 298,000^. a year. It is proposed to new con- struction in foreign countries 240 AUXILIARY CRUISERS European steamship companies Amount of subsidies paid to prin- cipal lines extend the premiums for mileage sailed in the inter- national coasting trade where the distances exceed sixty miles, and it is estimated that the increase of expendi- ture will be not less than C0,000i?. a year. The number of lines of steamers brought into existence by con- struction and mileage bounties, though not in receipt of mail subsidies, has increased under the French flag from two to nineteen. These services extend to the Brazils, the River Plate, New York, the South Coast of America, China, and the Pacific. French naval officers applaud the system of subventions because it calls into existence large numbers of steamers which will supply the Navy with skilled firemen, who cannot be obtained from the Conscription Maritime, which consists mainly of fishermen. A similar policy of bounties on con- struction has been accepted in Italy. The amount paid on the gross measurement of iron and steel vessels built in Italy is 21. 8s. per ton. The bounty on marine engines built in Italy is 8s. per indicated horse-power, find on marine boilers bs. per pound weight. An addi- tional premium is paid upon steamers of over fourteen knots. Besides the bounties on construction, subsidies are paid for navigation, amounting to little short of 150,000/. a year. The leading lines of steamships under European flags are enumerated in the list on page 241. The great steamship company which heads the list receives but scanty aid from the State. It does, not, however, attempt to perform those splendid but costly feats of ocean steaming which we look for in such ships as are placed on the list of reserved cruisers. The P. and O. Company receives, under contracts with the British Government, 340,000/. The Messageries Mari- times Company receives subsidies amounting to 554,000/. AUXILURY CRUISERS 241 Name of Company Number of Steamers Aggregate Toua British India . 103 240.000 P. and 0. . . . 36 216,000 Messageries Maritinies . (51 202,000 North German Lloyd 66 197,000 Navigazione Generale . 106 170,000 Compagnie G6nerale Transatlantique . (U) 167,000 Hamburg American 86 165,000 Wilson .... 86 158,000 Austrian Lloyd's . 73 128,000 White Star . 20 96,000 Cunard .... 26 86,000 a year. The North German Lloyd receives subsidies amounting to 220,000^. a year for services extending to Shanghai, Australia, and all parts of the Mediterranean. On the Eastern routes the speeds do not exceed twelve knots. The Navigazione Generale receives subsidies amounting in the aggregate to 380,000/. a year. Their services extend to India, China, Batavia, and all parts of the Mediterranean. The Compagnie Generale Trans- atlantique receives subsidies amounting in the total to 446,320/. Tlie Hamburg American Company receives a subsidy in accordance with services rendereil, but the exact amount is not given in the Estimates. The Wilson Line, like the British India, is the noble creation of private enterprise, unaided by the State. The vessels are not capable of high speed, and are not, therefore, convertible into cruisers. The Austrian Lloyd's receives aggregate subsidies amounting to 152,000/. The White Star and the Cunard Companies receive payment from the Admiralty for those of their vessels which are placed upon the list of reserAed merchant cruisers, and mail matter is paid for at rates settled in their contract. The ' Teutonic ' and ' Majestic ' receive from the Admiralty about 650/., and from the Post Otiice, on the average, II. u 242 AUXILURY CRUISERS Disadvan- tage of British compauies Mle of armed merchant steamers in war 1,000/. per voyage. The American postal subsidy will give the Innuiu Line 2,480/. per voyage for twenty-knots steamers. By a recent Act of Congress the ' City of Paris ' and ' City of New York ' were allowed to hoist the Stars and Stripes. By the same enactment it was stipulated that, in consideration of a liberal subsidy, two steamers of 12,000 tons and twenty-two knots should be built in America for the service between the United States and British ports. Tlu-ee other steamers are to be built in America for the service between New York and Antwerp. The competition created by the aid of subsidies con- stitutes a serious dithculty for British shipowners. By able management such companies as the White Star, Cunard, P. and O., and others have thus far been able to hold their own. It may be necessary to grant larger subsidies in the future for the conveyance of mails under the British flag. It would not be politic to allow these services to be taken entirely out of the hands of our own sliipowners by foreign rivals. Subsidised mail steamers cannot be a match for regularly built vessels of war. They have large hatch- ways, and are not protected by armoured decks and by minute subdivision into compartments. Armed mer- chant steamers would, however, be formidable enemies to unarmed vessels of the same class. The proper role for mercantile auxiliaries was described by Lord George Hamilton in moving the Estimates in the Session of 1889. They would be employed in dogging the foot- steps of a foreign merchantman, embarrassing a foe, and keeping touch with a squadron which has broken blockade. For such services they would be absolutely invaluable. Much might be done to improve the means of pro* AUXILUKY CllUISDRS 21B tection in the mercantile auxiliaiy if the contingency of rrovision employment as a war-ship was fully considered in the defeuce" '^^^ original design. Decks might be'built over the engine- and boiler-rooms of sufficient strength to carry armour, which could be fitted when the ship was taken up as a cruiser. The frames of the ships might be adapted for the riveting up of additional bulkheads. Admitting the imperfections of the mercantile auxiliary in point of protection, the superiority in speed over any existing ship of war is incontestable. During the year 1892 the performances of the fastest nemarkabio steamers in the North Atlantic trade show many re- great liners markable results. The * City of Paris ' may be said to have maintained nearly twenty knots as an average speed. The ' Majestic ' and ' Teutonic,' of the White Star Line, have approximately the same speed as the two famous Inman steamers. These fine performances are fairly rivalled, and, if we look to the date of launch- ing, are surpassed, by the ' Umbria,' built in 1884, which recently, on her eighty-second voyage, ran from Queens- town to New York in five days and twenty-two hours. Not more than seven hours have been gained by the liners built subsequently to the * Umbria.' The * Tou- raine' is the greyhound of the French transatlantic liners. She has maintained an average of 19"59 knots between Havre and New York. On the route between Cape Town and Southampton the * Scot ' has maintained an average speed of 17 "2 knots. It has been thought expedient to bring the subject treated in this paper under the consideration of the Institution of Naval Architects, because a disposition has been shown in certain quarters to question the policy of subsidising mercantile auxiliaries and giving subventions to mail steamers. Without the help of the k2 Xecctisity for subveutioiis 244 AUXILIAUY CRUISERS State it would bo impossible to compete with the highly subsidised mail steamers running under foreign Hags. Public opinion in thl^ country will probably share the view held in the United States, and which lias recently found expression in language which may be appropriately quoted from the report of the Connnittee of Congress : * A mercantile marine of our own, ably manned and used by our own people, is a national requirement, essential to a fair participation in the trade of the world, indispensable to wise industrial economy, and vital to the importance and advance of our country.' Nothing can better conduce to the closer union of the mother- country and her colonies, especially her Australasian colonies, than the improvement in the means of communication. Already the feat has been performed by the ' Ophir,' of the Orient Line, of deliver- ing the Australian mails in London in twenty-four days from King George's Sound. The distance from New Zealand by Cape Horn has been covered by the * Arawa ' in less than thirty-five days. If so much can be done by unaided enterprise, it is evident that, with the help of the Government, granted upon conditions which would ensure the building of vessels representing the finest work of our mechanics and shipbuilders, a yet further closing up of the intervals separating the mother- country from her daughter states would be assured. It is difficult to measure the benefits which would result, alike to the commercial, political, and social relations of the British Empire. If the only object to be held in view were the cutting down of expenditure, it might be possible to relieve the British taxpayer of every charge for the conveyance of mails across the ocean. This question must, however, be regarded under other aspects. To discontinue all AUXILIARY CRUISERS 245 Rubsidies from the British ( Jovernment, while the policy now so much in favour in other countries was main- tained, would bring us inevitably to this result, that all the ocean steaming at high speed would be performed by foreign vessels held at the disposal of their respec- tive Governments for conversion into mercliant ciuisers. Our regularly built vessels of war would be our sole defence against such dangerous foes. They could not be multiplied in sufficient numbers without imposing an almost intolerable additional burden upon the Navy Estimates. 24G Defects as a military Btntion n COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 1. The Future of Cyprus Letter to the 'Ttmes,' December 26, 1S78 Having spent ten busy days in Cyprus, having visited all its ports and encampments and traversed its mountains and plains, its sterile and fruitful zones, I venture, through the ' Times,' to present to my fellow- countrymen the results of a personal examination. As to the policy of annexing Cyprus I offer no opinion. It may, however, Le assumed that we cannot lightly withdraw from the charge we have undertaken. The practical question for the immediate future is how best to administer our new acquisition. The experience of a single summer has sufficiently proved that Cyprus offers no advantages as an advanced military post ; British troops will inevitably deteriorate in the hot season in this fever- stricken island. It is probable that a situation might be chosen in the moun- tains of the Troados, not less than 4,000 ft. above the sea-level, where the troops would enjoy comparative immunity from malarial fever. The difficulties of communication impose a limit on the numbers wlio could be stationed in the mountains, but the sanatorium would be available for the Governor and his staff of Ji^nglish officials during the heats of summer, COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 247 Cyprus will not be converted into a naval arsenal, Facilities of and it contains no harbour for a fleet. It may, however, as^a^coailng be used as a coaling station. For this purpose the natural harbour of Famogusta is well adapted. Tiiough the bay is open to the south-east, a space of eighty acres is fully protected by the remains of an ancient mole and by a reef of rocks. With little expenditure, Famogusta might be supplied with facilities for coaling a fleet at least equal to those which exist at Gibraltar. It is scarcely necessary to insist on the importance of coaling stations to a steam propelled Navy. It is an unfortunate characteristic of the greater number of our recent ironclads that their coal endurance is insufficient. We have no masted ironclads which carry coal enough for Ave days' steaming at full speed. If, therefore, wo should find ourselves engaged in naval operations on the eastern shoi-es of the Mediterranean, a supply of coal at Cyprus would be a valuable resource. Although unhealthy for British troops, it does not follow that Cyprus presents no military advantages. The garrison will probably consist of a Turkish regiment. In time of war such a regiment might become the nucleus of a larger force. Every Turk serving under our colours could be sent out as a recruiting agent, and assist in gathering together an army from the adjacent coasts of Asia Minor. I shall not attempt to discuss the motives of State Condition policy which induced the Government to send the landed in Indian troops to Cyprus. It may be assumed that the number of British troops was determined with reference to the numbers of the Indian contingent, rather than the necessity of overawing the scanty and spiritless people of Cyprus by an overwhelming display of military power. The employment of so large a force has been Cyprus 248 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Defects of Commis- sariat attended with deplorable consequences. The Com- missariat as usual broke down under the strain, and the sanitary condition of the troops has been most un- satisfactory. The army was landed in the hottest season of an exceptionally hot year. Every correspon- dent of the Press has enlarged upon the miseries endured by the parties of twelve men, who were almost baked alive under our English bell tents in the burning sun of Cyprus. At Port Papho I had an opportunity of talk- ing at leisure and unrestrainedly with several men in the ranks of the 42nd Highlanders— men who had escaped the fever and were looking forward bravely to the future. My informants told me they had slept for three months without mattresses, after spending the day exposed to the sun. They lay down on a blanket spread on the bare ground. After a short interval of ten minutes their heated bodies were bathed in a cold sweat, and every morning there were more victims to the malarial fever. I cannot discuss the subject of the Commissariat without a few observations on the organisation of the department. It is impossible to exaggerate the import- ance of an efficient Commissariat. The sufferings of our army in the Crimea are fresh in our recollection as an example of the results of bad management in this branch of the service. The Duke of Wellington's despatches are a striking testimony of the solicitude bestowed by our great captain on the essential details of equipment and supplies. The British army, with all its accumula- tion of untoward experiences, seems destined to suffer from a repetition of former blunders whenever a severe strain is imposed on its Commissariat system. Though the subject has been examined again and again by departmental and Parliamentary committees, no effectual remedy has been supplied. T venture to suggest that ' COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 249 there is but one solution. The supervision of the Com- missariat should form part of the duty of the general staff of the army. The chiefs of the Commissariat service in every important military expedition should be soldiers of wide experience and great administrative capacity. The head of the Conmiissariat Department, when the army landed at Cyprus, should have been a tield officer— one of the ablest men on the staff of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and he should have been supported by military officers of the same stamp. The commercial branch of the Commissariat might should be remain in the hands of civilians. The duty of seeing officer that all necessary stores and supplies are provided ; that all stores not necessary for the pai'ticular service are rejected ; and that sufficient transport is provided for taking the field, can only be properly carried out by an officer capable of grasping the situation from a military point of view. The stores piled up on the beach at Larnaca were as superfluous in some articles as they were deficient in others. While mattresses were want- ing, there were iron coal-boxes enough for the winter quarters of a large force in Central Asia. in consequence of the withdrawal of the troops and the temporary adjustment of the Eastern Question, the Crovernor of Cyprus and his admirable staff have been much employed in civil capacities. It was necessary to make an exhaustive examination of the proceedings under the former Government and to extract informa- tion from reluctant witnesses, who might not have paid the same deference to civilians which they yielded to the military authorities. The ground has thus been prepared for the civil administration which will be permanently established in the island. The resources of Cyprus have been described in i 250 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS The re- sources of Cyprus Irrigation required ample detail by many writers. It possesses a large tract of rich alluvial soil, well adapted for the growth of wheat, cotton, and other products. Wherever an abundant supply of water can be obtained, as in the oasis of Kithroea, Cyprus will vie with the richest valleys of the adjacent continent. The orange and the olive abound and flourish, and a certain venerable plane- tree, of colossal proportions, gave valuable testimony to the timber-growing properties of the soil. Many villages of Cyprus share, though in an inferior degree, in the advantages Nature has so lavishly given to this favoured district. Water seems easily obtainable in all parts of the island. It may be that the prevalence of malarial fever is due to the copious supply of water not far below the surface of the soil. Much may be done by irrigation to give fertility to a wider area from the existing sources, and it is possible that other springs may be discovered. The harvest, however, must mainly depend on the rainy season, and the winter sometimes passes without a shower. No rain fell in Cyprus in the three consecutive years 1859-60-61. The inhabitants migrated en masse to Syria and Egypt, and many have never returned. In ordi- nary years and in certain districts the Cypriotes enjoy a fair measure of prosperity, the fruits of which, in justice to the former Government be it said, seem to have been far more liberally enjoyed by the Greeks than b> the Turkish community. The liability, however, to ''rought is a grave obstacle to any large increase of the population. In the famine years, 1859-61, supplies of biscuit were distributed by the Government. An Eng- lish administration would be expected to relieve the destitute on a still more liberal scale. These considera- tions seem to point to extensive plantations, as the first : The Turkisli tribute COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 251 step to be taken for the improvement of the island. Plantations Cover the barren hills and slopes with forest, and an works increase in the rainfall will follow. The bare and thirsty soil repels the clouds when it most needs their refreshing showers. Other public works must gradually follow, such as piers, lighthouses, a service of small steamers between the numerous little towns on the coast ; and, later, light narrow-gauge railways connecting the corn- growing district with Larnaca and Famogusta. I pass from these details to a political question of high importance. Is our occupation of Cyprus to be permanent, and on what conditions are we to remain ? For the reasons already given, it may be assumed that our protectorate will continue. The essential matter, therefore, is that our flag should be regarded by the people as the symbol of good government. It is impossible, however, that the condition of Cyprus can be materially improved so long as it remains subject to an annual tribute of 100,000/. to the Ottoman Empire. The tribute absorbs the lion's share of the total revenue of 178,000/., and several items of receipt ought to disappear from the budget of an English administration. Among the taxes enumerated by Mr. Hamilton Lang as either unjust, burdensome, or unproductive are the following : 1. The Verghi, or personal tax, levied upon all householders, or breadwinners. This tax falls with disproportionate severity on the labourer as compared with his employer. 2. The tax on sheep and goats is exorbitantly heavy. 3. The indemnity paid by the Christian population for exemption from military service cannot be main- tained. Taxes 252 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Receipts Burden of the tribute Remission of taxation 4. The tithe on the products of treesi, the abolition of which would do more than any other measure that could be devised to encourage the planting and the more careful management of forests. The receipts from the above sources are : — Verghi, 30,000?. ; sheep tax, 6,000^ ; exemption from military service, 7,000Z. ; tithe on forests, 7,000?. ; total, 50,000/. The duty on exports impedes commerce, while it yields no revenue. If the Government of Cyprus were relieved of the tribute which we have unfortunately consented to pay, all injurious taxes might be remitted, the Custom houses closed, and the island made a free port. Such a step would secure to Cyprus a commercial development similar to that of Singapore, Aden, and other ports, where the same enlightened policy has been adopted. Cyprus might then become what Hong Kong is to China and Singapore to the Eastern Archipelago ; it might be the principal commercial dep6t for Syria and the southern parts of Asia Minor. The first instalments of revenue would probably be applied to the best advantage in remissions of taxation. It is quite superfluous, however, to point out how many sanitary and other public works must remain in abeyance, each of small extent but not the less valuable locally, unless a considerable addition be made to the resources at present available. Those resources cannot be increased by laying new taxes on a depressed and impoverished population. The remission of the tribute is the only legitimate means at our disposal. It may be urged that the taxes now levied are moderate in amount compared with the sums extorted when the island was a dependency of the Porte. It does not follow that the tribute is a just demand be- COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 263 cause the people have been accustomed to pay it, and have been able, though with difficulty, to furnish the sum demanded. A tax may be not only tolerable but even advantageous to a people when the proceeds are judiciously expended for their benefit. It is better to pay a police-rate than to hire a watchman, to be rated by the Metropolitan Board for the arterial drainage of London than to hire a scavenger, to pay a water-rate than the hire of a water-cart. But when the revenue is swallowed up in tribute to a foreign ruler, who has been relieved of all reciprocal duties and responsibilities, it can scarcely be disputed that the people are subjected to an oppressive taxation. The lapse of time has enabled most contemporary English politicians to recog- nise, in the refusal of the Nortli American colonists to submit to taxation by an Imperial legislature in which they were not represented, the high-spirited condu )t of an independent people. If the courage and the energy of the Anglo-Saxon race were infused into the Cypriotes, they would not long rest content with the convention or treaty we have negotiated on their behalf. In relatioi\ to this question of tribute, the British inviiUous administrators of Cyprus are not in a position in which Britisii Englishmen can take a pride. They hold the unworthy "''""P'"^'"" office of tax-gatherers for a bad Government. The continuance of the tribute has been defended on the ground that the former revenues of the island showed an available surplus. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that the local expenditure of the Turkish Government was reduced to a point at which it cannot be maintained under English rule. Cyprus was entirely neglected ; nothing was done to develop the resources of the island ; nothing for the health, the education, or the general welfare of the people. All these things must 254 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Acquisition of Cjprus an Imperiivl policy A revision of the treaty uocessary now receive attention. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has proclaimed it in J3irmingham, and to Europe, that we have come to Cyprus to show what can be accom- plished under English rule for a long-neglected people. We must govern in the spirit of these generous pro- fessions. The overtasked and zealous officers we have sent to the island are only too sensible of the many needs of the population. Their plans cannot be carried into execution without funds. In assuming the protectorate over Cyprus we were influenced solely by considerations of Imperial policy ; our object was to strengthen our influence in the East, and we must accept the financial consequences of the step we have taken. Whether we take a lease of Cyprus or purchase it, we are carrying out a great scheme of policy with which our local government in the island has had no concern, and in respect of which it ought not to be loaded with pecuniary responsibility. We have a precedent in the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, where a large sum was expended to obtain admission for the representatives of England to the council table of the Canal Company. If the purchase of the Canal shares was justifiable, with much more reason can the payment from the Imperial exchequer of the purchase-money for Cyprus be defended. A revision of the treaty under which our occupation of Cyprus has been commenced is urgently required. We cannot continue with honour in the position of tributaries and vassals of the Sultan. Rights and claims of the most complicated nature, as it has been explained by Mr. Forbes, have been reserved. We cannot see the mineral and agricultural resources of Cyprus developed by British skill and capital, under the protection of our flag, and allow the fruits of these : COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 255 enterprises to be appropriated by the Sultan in the form of royalties on mines or participation in the increased rental secured under our improved administration. There is only one way out of the entanglements and complications into which we shall inevitably fall under the existing treaty. The full sovereignty over Cyprus Full sove- must be purchased by England. The sum to be paid is be acquired a subject for negotiation. Whatever the amount, a still larger expenditure would have been thrown upon the Imperial exchequer in carrying out the plans originally shadowed forth, but new so wisely abandoned, of creating a new military and naval station in Cyprus. The more or less profitable return on the sum invested in Cyprus is a secondary consideration. We did not come here as traders or speculators in land, and our conduct will not be influenced by commercial considera- tions. It is obvious, however, that as the population grows and its wealth accumulates, so the trading interests of England will be in turn promoted. The acquisition of Cyprus may or may not have been an act of wisdom. That question it is not my present purpose to discuss. All the arguments in favour of the transaction will be fortified, and the objections mitigated, if we can show a gradual recovery from a state of impoverishment and decay to the palmy pro- sperity of the Lusignan and Venetian rule. How, then, is the work to be done 1 It is not to be Progress • 1 1 1 1 p must be done extravagantly or impatiently, not by model farms, gradual nor by costly public works, nor by the introduction of colonies. Projects of this nature, if they can be shown to be remunerative, will all be carried out in due time by private enterprise. The Government will have fully accomplished the task which properly belongs to it if life and property are made more secure and taxation ill; 256 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS lighter in Cyprus than in any other community in the East. A popuhition placed in this favoured situation will need no other inducement to make the most of the varied resources of the soil, while enterprising emigrants will come, in numbers as large as the land is capable of maintaining, from the adjacent shores of Asia, and from our over-peopled dependency of Malta, to share in the revival of prosperity brought about under British rule. ' Sunbeam,' Morphou Bay, Cyprus, November 16. Climate of Cyprus 2. Condition of Cyprus Speech delivered in the House of Commons, March 24, 187U Having recently visited Cyprus, I ask leave to present to the House the result of a personal examination of our most recent acquisition. I went to Cyprus unprejudiced and unbiased, and I came away convinced that in our hands the island will certainly be prosperous. As a place of arms it is useless. As a coaling station it may prove valuable. Cyprus is not adapted for a place of arms, partly because of its climate. There can be no (question as to the miserable condition to which the troops who first landed were reduced. It may be that the summer of 1878 was exceptionally unhealthy. The troops would doubtless have sutFered less in permanent barracks, or in the mud huts of the natives. It is now proposed to build barracks on the Troados. Those airy summits may not, perhaps, prove as perfect a sanatorium as Newera-ilya, in Ceylon, but thoy may at least be as healthy as Malta or Gibraltar. Assuming that the troops could retain their health on the Troados, it is scarcely conceivable that they could occupy such a COLONUL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 267 position in any considerable numbers without a large expenditure in transport. During my visit to Cyprus I spent two days on the Troados, and remained one night at the monastery of Kikkho, 4,000 feet above the sea- level. At that elevation the mountjiins are almost precipitous. The only vegetation consists of the fir and the vine. Provisions must be carried up on camels. Roads for carts are impracticable; even a railway on the Righi system, as proposed by the learned member for Oxford, is impossible. With so many disadvantageous features, strategical and sanitary, it cannot 1)0 contended that Cyprus is important as a place of arms. A fleet of steam-trans- ports must be a more effective l)ase of operations in Syria, and the possession of Cyprus would not supersede the necessity for a commodious harbour on the main- land. As a coaling station Cyprus possesses great natural racuitics facilities. We are informed by the Hydrographer that hour a^" an inexpensive breakwater would render Famogusta ^*'"°Busta available for the coaling of our fleet, and a secure anchorage for six large ships of war. I doubt the necessity for any new works, other than a light iron pier, for the mere purpose of coaling the fleet. The outlying rocks would afford excellent shelter for a pier long enough to allow of two ships being coaled simul- taneously. At present six or eight steamers of moderate size can find an anchorage in all weathers. The easterly gales to which Famogusta is exposed seldom blow with violence. The sea-wall at Larnaca, which is exposed to the full range of the swell from the south and east, is only six feet above the water. The lickety buildings at Larnaca and Limasol, washed by the sea even in fine weather, receive no injury from the wintry gales. The !!< ■' Iji! TTnhealthl- noss of Famogiiata Agriculture in the island 258 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS * Sunbeam ' remained off the coast of Cyprus three weeks in November hist, and the sea was perfectly smooth during the whole of our stay. Whatever the decision of the Government may be as to a breakwater, I trust that no attempt will be made to establish a naval station or a mercantile port at Famogusta. It is the most unhealthy town in Cyprus. StafF-Couimander Millard has reported that, of the 300 male inhabitants, every one had the fever in the hot season of 1878. Half the population liad ophthalmia, and about one-sixth were suffering from diseases of the eye, causing opacity of the pupil and subsequent blindness. Captain llawson, the flag-captain to Lord John Hay, endorsed this report, adding the consolatory assurance that, taking it all round, he did not consider Famogusta much worse than Larnaca. If the fleet were detained at Famogusta during the summer season, the health of the crews would be seriously affected. When we turn from the political question to the capabilities of the soil of Cyprus, we find ourselves on less controversial ground. The plain of the Messorea is admirably adapted for the growth of wheat. The plain of Morfu produces madder. If properly made, the wine would bo excellent ; and all descriptions of fruit are abundant. I have received from the Commissioners at Larnaca and at Liraasol letters conveying the most favourable impressions of the agricultural prospects of the island. New potatoes were offered for sale in December at one penny per pound. The growth of wine has been doubled ; and the inhabitants need only the assurance that our occupation will be permanent to induce them to make further exertions. Here we open up a large question. Are we to COLONIAL iJEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 259 remain in Cyprus ? I fully concur with the leading Our occupa- members of my party in the wish tliat we had never permtuieat gone there. Having entered upon an occupation, we cannot surrender the island to the Turks without great injustice to the inhabitants. The attempt to establish any form of self-government would be quite premature. I proceed, therefore, to consider the position on the assumption that our occupation will be permanent. Such being the case, the terms und(;r which that occupa- tion was commenced will require revision in many essential particulars. We must ourselves acquire the nominal sovereignty, still retained by the Sultan, and relieve the island from the payment of an annual tribute of 115,000/. a year. Under the terms of the present convention, England stands in an unworthy position. We are tax-gatherers for a bad Government. The tribute The Turkish is a heavy burden upon Cyprus. The majority of the heavy bur- people are miserably poor, and they have perhaps been igian* i" impoverished by the very circumstance that the tribute has been too heavy for their scanty resources. The amount of the tribute is based on Turkish estimates, and on Turkish notions of administrative responsibility. The so-called surplus is only realised by ignoring all the reciprocal duties of a Government towards its subjects. The total revenue of the island is 170,000/. A portion of this amount is derived from taxes which must be re- pealed ; • and when the tribute, the salaries of local officials, justice, and police have been provided for, a paltry surplus of 15,000/. will remain to do all that is required in so large an island, after the neglect and misgovernment of ages. Once relieved of the heavy burden which Cyprus was compelled to bear while in bondage to the Porte, the local Government would possess ample resources without the aid of the Imperial 260 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS How the resources of Cyprus might be developed Influent-.: of good jrovernment la Cyprus Parliament. It could remit all unjust taxation. It could make Cyp-us a fn^e port, and the great depot for the trade with Syria and Asia Minor. It would be able to construct a railway ; to cover the expenses of new roads and public buildings, and the planting of forests. Only let the people be assured of the honest adminis- tration of justice, and of protection for life and property, and we may safely leave ia their own hands the develop- ment of the material resources of Cyprus. Consul Eldridge has given a striking illustration of the pecu- niary valuation of the English occupation. A property at Larnaca, which had long been unsaleable at the price of 6,000 francs, was sold, shortly after our arrival, for 120,000 francs. Whatever can be usefully done to co-operate with the spontaneous enterprise of the people will certainly be undertaken with zeal and enlightened philanthropy by iSir Garnet Wolseley and his able staff. As an ej^ample of the spirit in which those gallant gentlemen have undertaken their task, I will read an extract from a communication lately received from Colonel Warren, the Commissioner at Larnaca : ' You may not approve of our being here, but we have to labour here to make England's name respected and beloved. Do not b.ilieve that our mission here is a small and humble one. We, in Cyprus, have already cornmenced to show what a beneficent and just rule means. Syrians, inhabitants from the neighbouring countries, men from Beyrout, Alexandria and the Lebanon, are here and have revisited their homes, which still lie under Turkish government. These speak out their minds ; and soon the clamour of the people ■^ill necessitate a change in the manner of "uling in Asia Minor. When ptople demand what the whole COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 261 vvorld knows that they deserve, they will assuredly got it. The holding of Cyprus will be the leaven in the mass of dough. Do not let your politics stop the good work.' Colonel Warren then proceeded to speak of the foundation of schools, and concluded by saying : ' We have a pier now ; our market is finished ; we Improve have planted trees, widened roads, and are working as effected Englishmen ought. Give us words of encouragement now and then.' The advantages to England of the acquisition of Cyprus are problematical. To the Cypriotes, the sub- stitution of such men as Colonel Warren and his colleagues for the corrupt officials of the Sultan must be an unmixed blesping. The thoughts of the Prime Minister were long ago directed to the island. It was frequently mentioned in ' Tancred,' and specially in that admirable passage describing the entertainment offered by the hero of the tale to his friends at Greenwich. After dinner, Tancred, full of remorse at the delay in his departure for the Holy Land, thus muses to himself : ' Why was he here 1 Why had he not departed ? ' The reflection was in- tolerable. The being who would be content with nothing less than communing with celestial powers in sacred climes, standing at a tavern window and gazing on the moonlit mud-banks of the barbarous Thames —a river which neither angel nor prophet has ever visited. Before him, softened by the hour, ' lay the Isle of Dogs. The Isle of Dog^ ! — It should at least be Cyprus.' Later allusions in the novel pointed in even more direct drms to the events which we have lately witnessed. We read in Book iv., chapter i. : • The English, want Cyprus, and they will take it as Lord Bea- consfleld's allusions to Cyprus in 'Tancred' 2G2 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS compensation ; ' and, on the following page, ' The English will not do the business of the Turks again for nothing.' Surely these are passages of more than ordinary sig- nificance, when read by the light of subsequent events. The author of ' Tancred ' has since attained to the loftiest heights of political power. He has fulfilled the dreams of his earlier manhood, and Cyprus has been conquered in the new crusade. II 3. Defences of the Empire and the Protection OF Trade Address to the London Chamber op Commerce at the Cannon Street Hotel, January 25, 1888 Before proceeding to the important subjects with which I shall have to deal, I desire to thank the London Chamber of Commerce for the honour, and still more for the opportunity, of addressing this influential and representative assemblage. If I can gain the support of this meeting to the proposals which I shall submit, a long stride will have been made towards their final adoption. I have one or two further preliminary ob- servations to offer ; and first, let it be made quite clear that it will not be sought to abuse the confidence of the great body under whose auspices we are met, by an endeavour to make political capital out of the occasion. All questions of foreign policy, all questions relating to national defences, should be taken by connnon consent out of the domain of political controversy. The steps deemed necessary to the security of the Empire and its commerce once considered and determined, Mini'jters on both sides are equally bound to obey the mandate of the nation. I gladly acknowledge the efforts of the present Government in the execution of that great plan COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 263 of defence which was indicated in its broad outlines by the Royal Commission over which Lord Carnarvon so ably presided. At this stage it may be appropriate to observe that Fortiflca- "^ •' r J. 1 - . . . . tions a cheap the defence of our coaling stations by fortifications is metiiodof (Icfcnco strictly a measure of economy. There may be a differ- ence of opinion as to whether this or that position is indispensable as a base of naval operations. There can be no such difference as to the methods of defence. Fortifications, wherever practicable, are the cheapest and most effective defence. The most costly and the least effective is the detention in port of our cruisers, which should be employed in holding the ocean high- ways, and in blockading the ships of the enemy. Not only are fortifications an economy in that they reduce largely the numbers required to hold a position ; they are an economy in regard to the description of force which is necessary. The strong works by which our naval arsenals at home are now defended have not in- volved the addition of a single soldier to the regular Army. For the manning of those defences we should rely mainly on the Volunteers. I will not occupy the time of the meeting with the statistics of the case. We all knov*- that the tonnage under the British flag is gigantic in amount, that it forms year by year an in- creasing portion of the aggregate shipping of the world, and that its destruction would be tantamount to the ruin of the nation. From these general observations I turn to the defence of the coaling stations, taking them in the order in which they were visited on my recent voyage of 3G,000 miles. I pass by Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden without any reference to their defences. We have the assurance solemnly given on the responsibility of the Govern- Tl>e Imperial fortressca 264 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Dofpnces of Bombay ment to the Royal Commission, and renewed to the Conference of Colonial representatives, that the defences and armaments of these great Imperial fortresses will be maintained on a level with modern requirements. With regard to Aden, I desire to call attention to the fact that the outer anchorage is much exposed to the boisterous winds of the monsoon. The inner anchorage is well sheltered, but the depth of water is not sufficient for heavy ships. It could be quite easily improved by dredging. Crossing the Indian Ocean to Bombay, the remodel- ling of the defences of that magnificent harbour and busy emporium of trade are being carried out with energy by the Indian Government. The works are undergoing complete transformation. Light guns are being removed, and 38-ton guns — to be ultimately re- placed by breech-loading guns — are being mounted. To give complete security to Bombay, two or three monitors, in addition to those already provided, and more torpedo-boats are desirable. No arrangements had been matured at the date of my visit for providing officers and crews for the two powerful turret-vessels which have for some years been stationed at Bombay. I made inquiries as to the practicability of providing for the manning of these vessels by the enrolment of a corps of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. I was informed that an attempt had been made to establish a force of this description, and that it had been found that the oppressive climate made it impossible for Europeans, whose duties mainly lie in other directions, to undertake heavy-gun drill afloat. It would be prac- ticable to man the land defences with voluntary artillery, and the present force of Rifle Volunteers should be drilled at the garrison guns. A Volunteer force for COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALINtt STATIONS 265 service afloat being impracticable, the flotilla for the defence of the harbour should be manned with lascars from the Indian marine, under British ofticers, and led by British seamen gunners and Marine Artillery, who might be supplied, when occasion required, from the East India squadron. From Bombay we will turn northward to Kurrachee, Kurrachee a port of immense importance as the base for the military defence of the north-west frontier of India. By skilful engineering, the entrance to the port, the anchorage, and the wharfage have been adapted to the requirements of steamships of large tonnage. A com- plete scheme for the defence of Kurrachee, both by batteries and torpedoes, has been sanctioned by the Indian Government, and is in course of execution. Descending from north to south, with the western Triuoomaiee shores of the great Iiidian peninsula never out of sight, we arrive at Trincomalee, a noble harbour but unhap- pily too distant from the fertile parts of Ceylon to be available for the trade which has been concentrated at Colombo. A previous impression that an Imperial naval establishment in this position is of doubtful value was not removed by a personal visit. The resources are most limited ; and, looking to the facilities already in existence at Bombay, it is not desirable to extend them. Transferred to the Government of India, the dockyard at Trincomalee could be utilised for the storage and preparation of torpedoes and submarine mines, and for the service of the light-ships and light- houses on the adjacent coasts. At the present time, considerable expenditure is being devoted by the Imperial Government to fortifications both at Colombo Colombo and Trincomalee. When the fortifications and guns are provided, the means of defence will still remain 266 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Singapore King George's Sound incomplete if we have not a sufficient force of artillery to man the works. A mixed corps of Volunteers and lascars should l)e organised at Colombo, from which detachments could be sent to Trincomalee when necessary. In connection with Imperial defence it will not be necessary to notice the ports of Burmah, where our trade has grown to such vast proportions since they passed under British rule. At Singapore we find another noble centre of trade, created, as if by the enchanter's wand, under the British flag— the accepted emblem for all uncivilised and half- civilised races of justice, order, security, and unrestricted freedom of commerce. Singapore is a naval station which we are bound to secure, and here the Colonial Government have carried out an extensive scheme of defence planned by officers of the Royal Engineers. At the period of my visit the guns which are promised by the Imperial Government had not yet arrived. For the manning of the works the limited force of British artillery on the station must be supplemented by a native force. Singapore has a splendid battalion of 1,000 Sikh police, who could be trained to work the guns. A Volunteer artillery corps is proposed, and would be valuable. The torpedo defences are, I believe, completed. Taking a long stretch round Borneo, where a small vessel, partly manned by a native crew, might with advantage be stationed to complete surveys, to maintain order, and to show the flag, and passing on through the Straits of Macassar and across the Southern Indian Ocean, we arrive at King Geoi'ge's Sound. The harbour offers perfect shelter to ships of deep draught from every wind. Strategically the position is most im- COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 267 ports portaut, both from the great distance which divides it from the nearest harbours available for vessels of large size, and because all the trade between Australia and Eui'ope by the Suez Canal, except that from Queensland, passes to and fro in the offing. Western Australia had undertaken the works, but the Conference was unable to devise a plan for raising the amount required to provide an armament for breech-loading guns, esti- mated to cost some 19,000/. I need not refer in any Australian detail to the land defence of the great ports of Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane. The combined ex- penditure of the several Governments may literally be reckoned by millions, and the supervision of such officers as Sir William Jervois and the late Sir Peter Scratchley is a sufficient guarantee that the patriotic efforts of the colonists have been skilfully directed. For the manning of the works and the general defence of the Colonies by land an army has been raised of more than 30,000 A^olunteers — artillery, cavalry, and infantry, of splendid physique, well-equipped, and provided witli a small staff of officers from the Imperial service. To raise the colonial Volunteer force to the highest standard of efficiency more officers are required who have seen service in the Army. The desire has been expressed in influential quarters that an Imperial officer should be placed in command of each regiment. At the Colonial Conference the appointment of an Imperial officer of rank as Inspector-General of the Land Forces was strongly advocated. An occasional inspection by an officer at the Horse Guards is highly desirable. A visit from the distinguished officer under whose command the first contingent sent from the Colonies into the field had the privilege to serve would, I am confident, be highly appreciated. The preparation for such an in- ■f'" The land forces hi 2G8 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Floating defencea OflBcers Thursday Island spection would do much to promote eflficiency. Turning to the floating defences, a considerable flotilla for harbour defence, including a turret ship, gun vessels, and torpedo boats, has been created at Melbourne ; Adelaide has one powerful coast-defence vessel ; and Brisbane has two eflicient gunboats. When the ironclads of older date are replaced in our European squadrons by ships of the latest type, I would urge upon the Admiralty that some three or four ships which would otherwise pass into the Reserve at home should be despatched to the Colonies. They would be valuable as a reinforcement of the floating defences and as drill-ships for the naval brigades which have been organised in all the Austrial- asian Colonies. Under such oflicers as Captain Fullerton, at Melbourne, and Captain Hixon, at Sydney, the colo- nial Naval Reserves have reached a high degree of efficiency. The supply of trained officers in sufficient numbers can at present only be obtained through the Admiralty. At the Colonial Conference it was sug- gested by Mr. Deakin that appointments should be filled by retired officers of the Navy. The establish- ment of a na^'al and military college or school for the education of Australasian cadets is the true remedy. The cadets, after a term of service in the Army or Navy, would pass into the colonial forces. Turning homeward from Australia by the northern coast of the great continent, Thursday Island is the first station v,^hich demands attention ; and here we are once more reminded of the controversy left unsettled by the representatives of the Colonies at their recent Confer- ence. It was admitted that Thursday Island is a point which ought to be defended. An active trade between Australia, China, and India, and all the steam trade between Queensland and Europe, pass within gunshot of COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 269 the place. An attack on Thursday Island by a con- siderable force would be warded oif by naval means. A few light guns, manned by Volunteers, are recjuirod to secure the position from capture by a stray cruiser. At Port Darwin a similar slight defence is required, rort Darwiu The harbour, which is of great capacity, is in an isolated situation on the line of trade between Australia and the Straits Settlements. Port Darwin is the landing place of the cable connecting Australia with the whole civilised world. It is the northern terminus of the railway, al- ready commenced, which the South Australian (Jovevn- ment intend to carry across the continent. We cross from Port Darwin to Mauritius. At this Mauritius admirable harbour and most convenient coaling-station the additional works recommended )jy the Royal Com- mission are advancing to completion. The Imperial Government will supply the guns. For the manning of the works a local artillery force should be organised, led by officers and non-commissioned officers of the Royal Artillery. The torpedo defences ure complete, and a torpedo service corps is being organised, recruited from the dock labourers, boatmen, and stevedores, and led by thirteen non-commissioned officers of the Royal En- gineers. We pass on to the Cape Colony. Here the works Simon's Bay for the defence of Simon's Bay were undertaken by the 'ijay * " Imperial Government, and are nearly completed. For the defence of Table Bay the Colonial Government are responsible, and they have not yet commenced operations. Convict labour will be employed in the construction of these works, and some delay nmst be anticipated. We may rely that in the end the engagement entered into by the colonists will be fulfdled. As to armaments, at the date of my visit apprehensions were felt by the local m 270 COLONIAL DEFKXCK AND COALING STATIONS m I? 11 St. Helena aud Sierra Lcono Ascension Summary of require- mi'Uts authorities at the Cape that the number of breech-loading guns to be supplied by the Imperial Government would not be sufficient. It was in contemplation to mount tlie old pattern guns in the newly constructed forts. I trust that the War Office will be supplied with the means of giving a satisfactory armament for all the defences of the Cape. To complete the scheme for the protection of the Cape Peninsula the railway connnuni- cation should be completed between Cape Town and Simon's Bay. The missing link is only a few miles in length. Following the line of communication between the Cape and England, the necessary works both at St. Helena and Sierra Leone are being vigorously pushed forward. For the manning of the additional works supplementary local forces should be organised, as sug- gested for other similar stations. At Ascension we have a small naval establishment, a stock of coals, naval stores which may be valued at 50,000/., and a sana- torium on the summit of the Green Mountain, appro- priately so named as the only green spot on this barren rock. There are no effiictive defences. Unless the Admiralty decide to remove their establishment to St. Helena, additional guns should be provided. Having now made the circuit of the important points on which the security of our conniierce with Australia and Avith the East depends, I proceed to sum up the A arious omissions which have been pointed out in the great scheme of defence which is now in course of ex- ecution. They are as follows : (1) At Aden, dredging operations ; (2) at Bombay, additional monitors and the organisation of crews for the harbour-defence flotilla; (3) at King George's Sound, Thursday Island, and Port Darwin, armaments of sufficient power to deny the harbour and the coal supply to hostile cruisers ; (4) at COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 271 the Cape, additiorml heavy breech-loatling guns and a light military railway some six miles in length ; (5) at Colombo, Singapore, Mauritius, St. Helena and Sierra Leone, a local artillery militia ; (6) at Ascension, if retained as a naval establishment, some armament is necessary. This enumeration will scarcely alarm the most jealous guardian of the public purse. A moderate expenditure, fairly apportioned and judiciously applied, would fill up all the gaps in our armour to which your attention has been directed. Having dealt with the fortifications, it is an obvious Docks remark that they are but a means to the end. In order to give adequate support to the Navy, the means of repairing injuries sustained in action should be pro- vided at all important points. We do not need addi- tional dockyards. We should encourage private enter- prise to make provision for naval requirements. The principle has received the sanction of the Legislature, in the passing of an Act which empowers the Treasury to make grants towards the construction of graving- docks on foreign stations. By ^mall subsidies, in addi- tion to the large expenditure of private capital, graving- docks suitable to the needs of the Navy have been completed at Hong Kong and Vancouver. Private enter- prise should receive encouragemc^nt from the Admiralty to provide a graving-dock fur Gibraltar, where no docking facilities at present exist. A grant should be made for the enlargement of the existing docks at Bombay by the Indian Government, and at Singapore and Mauritius by the Imperial Government. By this plan of co-operation with private enterprise, the means would be provided at the lowest possible cost of docking ironclads at every naval station of the first class which we possess on the line of communic ition between England and the East. V] <^ /a / V # op. /A IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I "si" IM (5 J ^ 1^ IM M M 1.8 Photographic Sciences Corporation 1.25 1.4 1.6 ■» 6" ► %^ 33 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. MS80 (716) 872-4503 % o \ 272 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Advantages of private establlih- ments i I need not remind this meeting that the facilities which we should create for the Navy would be most useful for commercial purposes. It is an important recommenda- tion to the taxpayer that the plan imposes no standing expenditure on Estimates. The docks being in private hands, the skilled workmen required would be mainly employed in mercantile work. Their wages would be a charge on the public only when their services were actually required to execute repairs for the fleet. Foreign nations look with envy on the splendid re- sources which British commerce creates at no cost to the taxpayers. During the war in China, until the provisions of the Foreign Establishment Act were en- forced, the French fleet was mainly dependent on our private ship-repairing yards at Hong Kong; and M. Weyl has told us of their conspicuous superiority over the limited resources which were found to exist when the French squadron was compelled to fall back on the national establishment at Saigon. The Dutch squadron in the East is dependoui/ on private docks at Singapore ; and when I visited Sydney I found the German cruiser * Albatros,' which had been stationed for some years at Samoa, hauled up on the patent slip in the yard of a private shipbuilder. It should be our policy to take full advantage of the resources created, as it were spontaneously, by the maritime enterprise of the country. Let us avoid the great and costly error of duplicating at the public expense the means and instru- ments which lie ready to our hand, if only we will use them and look for them, in the vast and splendid or- ganisation of the mercantile marine. In the important matter of dock accommodation the colonies have set us an admirable example. At Sydney, Melbourne, and the Cape, the Colonial Governments have constructed COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 273 graving-docks of dimensions sufficient for the largest ironclads in those waters. I have shown how effectively this principle has been Eesenre o£ cruiseri applied in the case of docks. It is equally applicable to the creation of a reserve of cruisers in the mercantile marine. The present Government deserves the hearty Advantage acknowledgment of the nation, and specially of the diaingbest representatives of commerce, for the statesmanlike de- Bteamera cision which they have taken to give subsidies for the retention of certain selected ships for the service of the Npvy in case of war. In all contracts for the ocean mail services conditions should be imposed which would secure that the ships to be employed, or at least a certain number, should be adapted by their high speed and internal arrangements for conversion into cruisers. The officers and crews should belong to the Naval Reserve. The armament should be carried on board. In the case of Australia, under existing naval arrange- ments, two ships, in receipt of liberal subsidies, are at all times lying in Sydney harbour. An additional ship arrives every week. If these vessels were eflFective for conversion into cruisers, we should possess the means of improvising without delay an efficient squadron for the protection of trade. It is idle to talk of providing for the complete defence of our commerce without the assistance of the mercantile marine. In time of peace the public is impatient of taxation ; and Chancellors of the Exchequer are anxious to propose popular Budgets. It is evident from a quite recent experience that the power of the Treasury, as the custodian of the public purse, can rarely be withstood by the Admiralty and the War Office, except when war is imminent or a scare has been raised, which is certain to subside when the public have become tired of reading sensational articles II. T 274 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALINO STATIONS I J Progress of defence of coaling stations in the newspapers. What, however, we cannot accom- plish by those extravagant methods which are alone available in the case of a maritime Power not backed by a strong mercantile marine, we can accomplish, and at comparatively small cost, by the effective methods which I have briefly sketched. Time fails me, and I must not pursue this fruitful and suggestive theme. I could show that the same principle of combination may be applied to the manning of the Navy, and that under proper arrangements we might do much to raise the efficiency of that valuable Reserve, both of officers and men, which has, by a wise act of policy, been organised in the mercantile marine for the service of the Navy in war. Tc jive aid to the Volunteer Home Defence Association, and to work in combination with the local authorities for the defence of our commercial harbours, would be a further and a wise application of the same principle. It will be evident that I have not come here to propound alarmist views. The defence of our coaling stations had been deferred too long, but the work is now w jll in hand. We had put off too long the adop- tion of breech-loading guns, and we have leeway to make good ; but the guns which we are now building will represent the latest advances of science, and we have the assurance of the Government that their manu- facture will be pushed forward with vigour. For those connected with the administration of the great depart- ments of the Navy and the Army it is impossible to repress j;he wish that we had larger means at our dis- posal, and could make more rapid progress in completing fortresses and building ships ; but if we compare our position in the present with the past, it can scarcely be doubted that as a naval Power we have been gaining COLONIAL DEFENCE i^ND COALING STATIONS 275 in relative strength in recent yeai*s. The splendid force increase of of Volunteers, the reserve for the Army, and the reserve a naval Power for the Navy are the creation of the present generation. The patriotic spirit exhibited by the colonies in the work of self-defence is a new and a grand element of Imperial strength. The circumstances in which we stand demand almost continuous effort. They do not justify alarm. They require a discriminating appro- priation rather than increase of expenditure. I claim for the plain and unpretending statement submitted to this meeting that it has contained nothing which can wound our national pride, or lower the dignity which rests on a proud consciousness of strength. - , 4. Gibraltar Letter to tiik ' Times,' October 21,1890 For an old Admiralty official it is scarcely possible to visit an important foreign station without finding occa- sion to suggest improvements, whether in relation to the defence, the garrison, or the resources for meeting the requirements of the public service. More than once I have been permitted to urge in A dock your columns the construction of a graving-dock at '^"" Gibraltar as indispensably necessary for the repair of ships disabled in the adjacent waters. In the present communication, I desire more particularly to insist on the importance of making secure provision for the coaling of the mercantile marine in time of war. Under the arrangements as they exist at present, the Unprotected merchant steamers coaling at Gibraltar draw their uuiksat supplies exclusively from the numerous hulks moored "'^^ ' under the guns of the fortress. From an attack by day the protection afforded is effective. Under cover of dark- T 2 276 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS ¥ Vi Term of service for garrison should be reduced N'" lessity for a llgiit on the Island of Galita ness it would not be difficult for an enemy to make a dash at the anchorage with torpedo boats, and send the entire stock of coal to the bottom of the sea. In time of war a supply of coal is not less needed for the mer- cantile marine than the Navy, and the excavation of a dock would afford materials for the construction of a coaling pier of the requisite dimensions in a suitable position. Turning to the garrison, the public at home can very imperfectly appreciate the sufierings of British troops exposed for a long period of five years to the stifling heats of a Gibraltar summer. The rank and file cannot, like their officers, escape from the confinement of the Rock by going on leave or following the Calpe hounds. Depression of spirits, lassitude, and physical deteriora- tion are inevitable results of a long term of garrison duty at Gibraltar. Men grow weary of the service. They long for their discharge from their engagements, and the reports they send home are not favourable to the enlistment of a good class of recruits. The term of service at Gibraltar should not exceed three years. Considerations of economy may be pleaded in favour of the present term of five years. The co^^ of more fre- quent reliefs would be inconsiderable, and amply covered by the improved morale of the garrison. Writing in sight of the Island of Galita, I atn led, in conclusion, to refer to another topic not without importance to the maritime interests of the country. Galita is a leading mark on the %'oyage from England to the East. From Gibraltar ships proceed a distance of 700 miles without change of course to a position due north of Galita, which forms, as it were, the salient angle of the north coast of Africa. Here an alteration of course of nearly three points of the compass must be ^ COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 277 made for Cape Bon and the Malta Channel. All mariners will be agreed as to the value of a powerful light at the turning point on the voyage between the Straits and the Suez Canal. It is not reasonable to rely on Tunis to supply what is required. In the parallel case of Cape Spartel, at the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, a light was erected, and is now maintained, under the provisions of an international convention. It is desirable that the Board of Trade should open com- munications with the maritiir-^ authorities of other Powers, with the view to an agreement for the Island of Galita on the same lines as were followed in the Cape Spartel convention. ' Sunbeam,' R.Y.S., off the Island of Galita, Oct. 10. 5. The New Coaling Station, Castries Bay, St. Lucia Letter to the ' Times,' April 4, 18i)2 In making foreign voyages in past years I have been permitted in your columns to give the impressions of an eye-witness on points connected with Imperial defence and colonial administration. On the present occasion I • ask to be allowed to offer a few observations suggested by a cruise in the West Indies. And first as to the garrison for the new coaling Castries Bay station at Castries Bay, in St. Lucia. The position has been selected solely on strategical grounds. It is easily defended, and the harbour is secure. In a sanitary point of view it bears an evil name. Our central coaling station in the West Indies must be fortified to resist a coup de main. We must have near at hand a sufficient garrison. It is not imperative that the troops should be quartered in St. Lucia in time of peace. I 278 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Barbados more advan- tageous fur troops Troops In West Indies It is at present proposed to remove to St. Lucia the British troops hitlierto stationed at Barbados. On many grounds the latter seems the more desirable station under peace. The barracks are admirably adapted to a hot climate. They stand on the shore, cooled by the con- stant breezes from the sea, and look out on a spacious savannah or park, equally convenient for drills and exercise, for cricket, tennis, and polo. It should not be put out of view that Barbados has a population of 172,000, as against the 44,000 of St. Lucia. The presence of British troops is a link with the mother- country. In this regard it is desirable that the few troops we maintain in the West Indies should be stationed in the largest centres of population. The con- siderations which have been urged point to the conclu- sion that in peace the distribution of troops should remain as at present. If war threatened, in a few hours the force in Barbados could be moved to St. Lucia. In this connection it may not be out of place to compare the staff of the Army in the West Indies with the forces quartered in the command. Barbados and Jamaica have each a colonel on the staflF, with the local rank of major- general, two deputy assistant adjutant-generals, an officer commanding Royal Artillery, a commanding Royal Engineer, a senior Ordnance Store officer, a dis- trict paymaster, and a senior medical of^cer. The troops quartered in the command include two companies Royal Artillery, two companies West India Sappers, eight companies West Riding Regiment, nine companies West India Regiments. These have their full proportion of regimental officers. The colonel of the West Riding Regiment is at head-quarters in Barbados. A colonel commands the West India dep6t in Jamaica. The staff of the Army in the West COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 279 Indies would be sufficient if the force under their command numbered as many thousands as there are hundreds present with the colours. A revision of the establishments at the foreign stations would probably result in considerable reductions without loss of efficiency. Passing from military arrangements at Barbados to the works in progress at St. Lucia, as an old Admiralty official I feel it a duty to press strongly one or two suggestions. The physical conditions which render Castries Bay a unheaitw- secure harbour tend to make its stagnant waters un- tries Bay healthy under a tropical sun. The harbour was formerly surrounded by marshy ground. In St. Lucia malarial fevers are prevalent wherever marshy ground is found. Something has been done in draining and filling up. The cost has been defrayed by the local Government, which has done what it could out of a scanty revenue of 50,000?. ; but at the present rate of progress it will be ten years before all that is needed has been finished. The Imperial Government should now take the work in hand and carry it to completion without delay. The drainage of the marshes is not the principal Disadvan- difficulty at Castries. The town is built on a small oUwn* space of flat ground at the head of the harbour, and is completely heiumed in by an amphitheatre of high and precipitous hills. No running waters flow through the town, and the insanitary condition from stagnant sewage can be only too easily appreciated. If a large popula- tion is allowed to settle on such a site, it is impossible by any devices or precautions to preserve the public health. This is a point which ought to have been taken into consideration when the establishment of an Imperial coaling station was originally in contemplation. Before 280 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS B Population should be limited expenditure had been incurred for other objects, posses- sion should have been secured of the entire foreshore of the harbour, together with a sufficient belt of the land adjacent. The purchase should be made now, although it is no longer possible to buy on conditions as favourable as might have been obtained in an earlier stage. Owners of property ha\e been ])rofiting largely by the unearned increment of value which the expenditure of the Govern- ment has given to their property. To be able to deal with the claims of private individuals on reasonable terms it may be necessary for the Government to obtain furthers powers by means of legislation. It is essential that the Government should have an absolute control over the civil population of Castries. It should have the power to fix their numbers, and to locate them where the conditions are most favourable to health. The expenditure already incurred on fortifica- tions by the Imperial Government and on harbour works by the local Government, and the prospect of further expenditure from the same sources, have already attracted considerable numbers from other islands. This move- ment should not be suffered to continue. Castries should be treated in all respects as an arsenal or a for- tress. It may be objected that the steps recommended will cost money. It would be money wisely spent. A decision having been taken to convert St. Lucia into an Imperial coaling station, and a large outlay having been incurred on fortifications and barracks, the work begun must be carried to completion. We are bound to do all that is needed to secure the best attainable conditions of health for the garrison and for the crews of Her Majesty's ships which will put in here for coals and supplies. At sea, 14 N., 63 W., Feb. 26. COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 281 6. Our Coaling Stations in the West Indies Letter to the 'Times,' April 12, 1892 In a former letter I stated what it seems necessary to strategical do to secure reasonable sanitary conditions at Port tious Castries, in St. Lucia. Not without regret a consider- able outlay was recommended. It will be well, perhaps, to examine how far increased expenditure may be justi- fied by strategical considerations. Any position selected as a permanent base of naval operations must be pro- tected by strong fortifications and a numerous garrison. To hold a coaling station weakly is to tempt attacks and incur the risk of humiliating disaster. Positions held in strength must be few. Bermuda has become our principal naval arsenal in these seas. It is defended by works of great, perhaps unnecessary, extent, and requires a large garrison. It will be a serious demand on our resources to hold another position for the support of the Navy so near at hand as is St. Lucia to the base we have already established at a heavy cost at Bermuda. Let us ask ourselves what it is proposed that Castries Position of shall do for the Navy. Thus far, the proposed service is restricted to the supply of coal. Within what radius is it limited that Castries shall supply coals in time of war to Her Majesty's ships ? The distance to St. Lucia from the principal ports of the Gulf of Mexico is 2,000 miles, from Jamaica nearly 1,000 miles, from Demerara it is not inconsiderable. If we have fleets engaged in active operations on the coasts named, it is clear that the supply of coal should be drawn from ships attending the movements of the squadron, and not from St. Lucia. From Castries we proceeded direct to Jamaica, where I have had the opportunity of revisiting the dockyard of 282 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS Jamaica. Condition of Port Royal Reduced activity in the dockyard A receiving ship not required Port Royal, after an interval of nine years. A second visit strongly confirms the impressions of the former occasion. Port Royal, as at present manned and equipped, is incapable of rendering, in work done for ships in commission on this station, an equivalent of ♦^he expense incurred for the m intenance of the establish- ment. It should be closed ( c made efficient. No yard can be accepted as efficient for the repair of a fleet of the modem type unless provided with a graving-dock. In considering the decision to be taken, we should not lose sight of the fact that Port Royal is an inheri- tance from a period when naval requirements in these waters were totally different from those of the present day. Half a century ago, the British squadron operating round Jamaica for the suppression of the slave trade and other duties numbered more than 20 pennants, ranging from gun-brigs to 28-gun corvettes. It is no longer necessary to keep a fleet in these waters. Port Royal at the date of its greatest activity was a busy scene. Many workmen were employed, and a strong staff of officers was necessary for the duties of supervision. The workmen are dispersed, but a staff of officers has been retained sufficient for the duties of a much more im- portant yard. If a return were made, showing on the one hand the expenditure at Port Royal in salaries and the maintenance of useless buildings, and on the other hand the amount of repairs carried out for sea -going ships in commission, it would convey an instructive lesson. It is not only in the dockyard that money is being wasted at Port Royal. The * Urgent,' manned by a crew of ninety men, is stationed here as a receiving ship. As with the dockyard so with the receiving ship ; the establishment survives although it has long ceased to be COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALING STATIONS 283 necessary. Years have elapsed since a ship in commission was paid off or received a fresh crew at Port Royal. All ships are now recommissioned at Bermuda. This , being the case, why keep the ' Urgent,' and why subject ninety men to the ennui and the deterioration of health inseparable from harbour service in the tropics 1 Turning from the dockyard and receiving ship to the The navfti naval hospital, we have a vast building and a staflf of '°^'' three surgeca. 'ith, at the date of our visit, two patients in their charge. This is a normal condition of things. Here, again, is an instance of the retention of an es- tablishment which has ceased to be necessary for the service of the Navy. Port Royal bears an evil name for yellow fever and Unheaithi- general anhealthiness. One obvious cause of sickness is iioyai to be foand in the native town — a collection of miserable hovels inhab'ted by people utterly regardless of the laws of health. The town occupies a contined site between the dockyard and the naval hospital. If Port Royal is retained as a dockyard or a military station, the town should become the property of the Go\'ernment and should be kept under the strictest control. Of late, much has been said of the evils of divided Defence by command in stations maintained abroad solely for the support of the fleet. The dockyard of Port Royal stands on a tongue of land which protects the harbour of Kingston from the sea. The entrance to the harbour is defended by a fort garrisoned by Royal Artillery. For the military authorities it is difficult to keep touch with a small detached force. To the Navy it would be an easy task to take charge of the fort, which lies at the very gate of the dockyard. It may be open to question whether a dockyard is Necessity required at Jamaica. To have a graving-dock available a dock 284 COLONIAL DEFENCE AND COALINa STATIONS would undoubtedly be of advantage. The best site would be not at Port Royal, which is completely open to bombardment, but on the inner side of the harbour, and probably not far from Kingston. It would be wise policy to encourage a private company to undertake the work. In offering a subsidy for this purpose, it might be 1. le a condition that all the useful tools and machinery at Port Royal should be taken over at a valuation and kept in working order. If the present naval establishment were closed, the money thereby saved would more th.ri oover the cost of tlie subsidy, and we should possess at Jamaica means of repair and refit for the fleet which at present are entirely wanting. 285 III NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 1. Training op Naval Officers Kpeech in the Housk of Commons, June 13, 1871 Mr. Brassey hoped that the subject to which he wished a review of ■' . the system to call attention would be regarded as of some interest desirable in connection with the manning of the Navy, for we could not have a satisfactory Naval Reserve unless we had competent officers to command it. The system of naval education had undergone no change proportionate to the modifications which had occurred in the service. Of late years, steam had been introduced, naval gunnery had become more complicated, the science of naval architecture had undergone complete revolution, the Navy comprised ironclads of innumerable types. These facts pointed to the necessity of a review of the system of training naval officers and an advance in their standard of education, so that the Navy might hold its own in comparison with other professions. In the first place, he suggested that a more complete Age of entry preliminary education should be obtained for a naval advanced officer, and for this purpose it was necessary to extend the time for the admission of cadets into the service. The age of 16 was not, he thought, too advanced. If this extension of time were allowed, the young cadet i iwm 286 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION in foreign Navies would be able to participate in the inestimable advan- tages of a public school education. Admiral Mends, in his evidence before the Manning Commission of 1859, had given his opinion as to the benefits of such a train- ing ; and Captain Harris, before the same body, stated that the age of 17 was the best age for the admission of boys into the Navy to be trained as blue-jackets. A fortiori, therefore, this age would not be too late for the officers. At present midshipmen were expected to do duty as officers before their education was completed. As was said by the last Committee upon the Education of Naval Officers, there was ' an incompatibility between the position of an officer and a schoolboy.' It was also found impossible in practice to reconcile the duties of young officers at sea with their progress in education ; Age of entry they could make little progress on board ship. The age of admission into all the principal foreign Navies was fixed at an advanced period to that in the British service. In the United States Navy the admission was from 14 to 18 years ; in the French Navy from 14 to 17 ; in the Russian Navy from 15 to 18 ; while in the British Navy the age of admission was from 12 to 13. The subsequent course of instruction was in the * Brit- annia ' for two years, followed by a year's training in the sea-going training-ship, so that at the age of 16 the midshipman begins to do duty as a young officer. The Committee on the Education of Naval Officers recommended that the period of special training should be three years in the stationary ship, and that in the last of those years the boys should go to sea to learn seaman ship in cruising vessels. The Committee recommended that the period of special training should be enlarged, which, so far as it went, was, no doubt, wise and judicious. He should have preferred that they had postponed the Committee on Naval Bducatiou NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 287 period of admission, so that young officers in the Navy shoula have the benefit of the public schools of England. With regard to the subjects of study, the present Knowledge course appeared to be too exclusively mathematical. In an/st^^ the American Navy it had been found that modern languages were not inferior to mathematics as a means of mental culture. He quoted Professor Mayne, of the Naval College at Portsmouth, in favour of the more careful and complete study of the French language ; Captain Goodenough had also adverted to the lamen- table ignorance of the French language when the Frencli and English squadrons were exclianging international courtesies in 1865, and expressed his deep regret that so little French was known by the officers of Her Majesty's fleet. Among other practical studies, that of steam was too little attended to. In the protracted war between the United States and the Southern States great dis- advantage was found to arise from the inefficiency of the numerous engineers suddenly taken into the American naval service, and the inability of the ex- ecutive officers to check the neglect of duty by the engineering staff. Profiting by that experience, our mercantile naval authorities had introduced a practical course of steam for young officers, and there was a similar course at the Naval College at Portsmouth ; but that only applied to officers of a higher grade. He hoped a like provision would be made for cadets during the period of their special training. He specially referred to the recommendation of the Brigs for Committee on the Education of Officers for fitting up '"»*™<^""» two brigs, to be attached to the stationary vessel of instruction, which would be found a most valuable school of instruction for naval cadets. The teaching of seamanship on board the • Bristol' had been a com- 288 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION Abolition of siiecial navigating officers parative failure. There would be much greater advan- tage derived from attaching brigs to the stationary vessel of instruction. These cruisers would naturally be limited to British waters, and young officers would thus become familiar not only with seamanship, but with the pilotage of our own waters. He quoted a passage from the autobiography of Lord Nelson, in which he stated that, when a young officer, he had been allowed to go in the decked cutter and longboat attached to Chatham, and was constantly employed in navigating the North and South Channels, and thus became familiar with the whole pilotage from London to the North Foreland and to Harwich, and acquired that facility and nerve in navigating in narrow waters and dangerov.s rocks and shoals which he found in his subsequent career of inestimable advantage. The introduction of ironclads had very much diminished the cruising of British ships. Looking at the question from an educa- tional point of view, he thought it would be advisable to employ a greater number of vessels in the Mediter- ranean of a class to be navigated under sail. One of the regulations adopted by the Cunard service was that no officer should be allowed to take the appointment of chief officer or captain who had not served on board a sailing vessel. A special report had been presented to Parliament in 1866 in favour of the abolition of the special naviga- ting class in the Navy, and suggesting that lieutenants of the executive branch should be invited to volunteer for those duties. Many authorities, both in the Royal Navy and in the mercantile marine, had expressed strong opinions in favour of the abolition of the navigating class. He would urge upon the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty the fact that all the naval officers NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 289 who had given evidence in favour of the retention of a special class of navigating officers had also recommended the Admiralty to equip and employ a vessel for the instruction of those young officers who were to be en- trusted with the navigation of Her Majesty's ships. The loss of the ' Psyche ' was, in his opinion, owing to the very short experience of a young officer of the navi- gating class. He desired to obtain the support of the House in a Naval favour of a suggestion for expanding the Naval College advocate/ at Portsmouth into a Naval University for England, the advantages of which should be open not only to the naval service but also to the mercantile marine, it having been proposed that degrees should be conferred in all branches of service that were important in a nautical point of view. This project seemed to afford the best means of FusIdh effecting a real fusion between the Royal Navy and the Koyai xavj mercantile marine, so that the latter might become a tiiemariile' valuable adjunct to the former in case this country- should ever be involved in a great naval war, and it could be carried out at very little additional expense. It might be thought by some that there would not be a sufficient number of officers of the mercantile marine willing to obtain so expensive an education as one of that kind ; but he was of a contrary opinion, seeing that of the vessels which were now devoted to such educational purposes, and in which a considerable annual charge was made upon the pupils, the one in the Thames had on board as many young gentlemen preparing for the mercantile marine as she was qualified to receive. He proposed that in future no commission should be given in the Royal Naval Reserve except to officers who had passed some examination, at any rate in gunnery. It was now incumbent on those who belonged to the II. U 290 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION Reserve Forces on shore to undergo short courses of study, and if for the Naval Reserve there could be arranged a short course of gunnery on board the * Ex- cellent,' it would not be an unreasonable exaction. Although he was prepared to go further than the Com- mittee had recommended with regard to many changos which he thought would be advantageous to the Naval Service, yet he accepted their recommendations so far as they went, believing them likely to contribute to the educational improvement of the Navy. i i Ability w-itli which Her Majesty's ships are uuvigated 2. Navigation and Pilotage of Her Majesty's Ships Papeb read at the Royal United Service Institution, March 6, 1891 Tt is hardly necessary to say that I have not been invited here to lecture as an amateur to the officers of the Royal Navy on the science and practice of naviga- tion. I shall deal with the subject st'i'ctly from an administrative point of view. It will oe my task to consider whether the system of training in navigation and pilotage, as pursued in the Navy, is in any respect faulty, and whether there has been unwise parsimony in providing adequately for practical instruction. If it can be shown that something is left to be desired, it will be my duty to propose a remedy. I may open by saying that the testimony is unani- mous, both in the Service and out of it, and it is not less strong abroad than at home, that, with rare excep- tions, *he navigation of Her Majesty's ships is performed with distinguished ability and success. I need not go farther back than the manoeuvres of recent years for proof of the high standard of efficiency attained. It NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 291 would be invidious to single out particular instances, but I think I shall give no offence by reminding this audience of the felicitous combination of daring and caution displayed in the conduct of the fleet under the command of Sir Geoffrey Hornby during the instructional cruise of 1885. The long and deep- draughted ships of which that fleet consisted were navigated without accident through a prolonged series of difficult opera- tions on the west coasts of Ireland and Scotland. Such feats as the departure of the fleet from their anchorage in Blacksod Bay in a dark and boisterous night, and the passage through the narrow and tortuous Sound of Islay and tie western shores of Canty re at night, deserve to be remembered. Similar performances have been often repeated, even in the peace annals of the British Navy. The escape of the * Calliope ' from destruction is a recent illustration of seamanlike skill. The younger officers of the Navy may justly take credit for the able manner in which the torpedo boats com- missioned for the mamiouvres have been handled and navigated. While giving this meed of well-merited praise, it is Disasters my duty to call to mind certain exceptional instances, exiHjrience in which disasters have occurred which can only be accounted for upon the assumption that the officers responsible were without the practical knowledge and experience which it is the duty of the Administration to secure in every individual appointed to fill a position of responsibility for the navigation of Her Majesty's ships. The loss of a gunboat on Tory Island —a small rock marked by a powerful light, and surrounded on all sides by deep water— was a most deplorable, because easily to be avoided, disaster. I may mention another case, that of the stranding of the ' Starling ' in the Red u 2 292 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION More training at sea desirable I Sea, on the Dredalus Reef. Fortunately this eiTor of judgment was not attended with loss of life. I am not anxious to lengthen the catalogue of disasters, or I might refer to the stranding of an Indian troopship on the Isthmus of Tarifa, the loss of the * Lily ' in the Straits of Belleisle, and to other instances of error, presumably due to inexperience. And now let us ask ourselves whether incidents such as I have referred to are attributable in any sense to defects in our method of training. I venture to assert that they may be traced to a faulty system. We have not secured, as it was our duty to secure, for every officer in the Navy sufficient practice at sea in naviga- tion and pilotage. Until within a recent period, no midshipmen were appointed to mastless ships. This restriction is now no longer observed, and the change is, from many points of view, to be regretted. Partly owing to the substitution of mastless for masted ships, and partly owing to the considerable periods spent on shore in the Gunnery and Training Schools and the College at Greenwich, the actual service at sea in the early stages of a young officer's career has been unduly shortened. On the other hand, the standard of attain- ments in mathematics is being raised ; our younger officers are becoming more scientific in gunnery and better acquainted with Physics, Chemistry, and Elec- tricity, while their opportunities of gaining experience in an essential branch of the profession, in which pro- ficiency depends upon practice, are being lost. The advantage to the Service of having a certain number of officers of the highest scientific attainments cannot be overrated ; but in providing the means of higher educa- tion for the few, we must take care that we do not turn NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 298 the attention of the Navy unclulj to scientific as dis- tinguished from practical (jualitications. The latest Connnittee on Naval Education assumed Advantage in their Report that young naval officers on joi' ing the ^u^ons Royal Naval College, at 19 or 20, would have attained a fairly sound practical knowledge of navigation. There is reason to apprehend that the cases are numerous in which such an assumption could not be 8ustaine(,l. It is generally admitted that the Flying Squadron offers all that could be desired for the training of young officers on first going to sea. Unfortunately, only a certain proportion of our midshipmen ha\e served in this excellent school. Every cadet should begin his service in ships of the Flying Squadron. A midshipman who has served throughout the early stages of his career in ships not suitable for training purposes will not find the means under existing arrangements of making good his deficiency at a later stage. He spends six months in the Naval College at Greenwich ; his college course is followed by a month on the 'Vernon,' and three months in a gunnery ship. It concludes with a two months' course of instruction in pilotage. On passing an examination in pilotage the sub-lieutenant is con- firmed in his rank. Such a scheme of instruction is moi'e favourable to scientific training than to the practice of navigation. The suggestions of the Committee on Education would provide no effective remedy. Limiting their proposals to the officers borne for navigating duties, they recommend a six months course at the Royal Naval College, with only such practical instruction and exercise as can be obtained in a pinnace attached to that establishment. A six months' course of instruction in pilotage is indispensable for all officers who may be Training iu pilotarro advoc.itoil 294 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION Foreign systems of training offlcers placed at any period in their career in command of ships. The instruction should not be merely theoretical, but should embrace a thorough practical training at sea. For this purpose a small flotilla of suitable vessels, such as cutters withdrawn from the coast-guard service, and gun vessels, should be maintained. In these vessels officers should be constantly at sea, and especially at night, in waters crowded with shipping and difficult of navigation. The Downs and the channels extending from the North Foreland to the Nore, and the North Channel to the Thames as far as Yarmouth Roads, should be frequently visited. The instructional cruises should extend in the summer months to the West Coast of Ireland and the Baltic ; in the winter to the Medi- terranean. At Malta a yacht, or other suitable vessel of moderate size, should be provided, and should be constantly at sea during tlie winter, visiting the ports of Sicily and the Ionian Islands. Harbours should be frequently entered at night. We have been behind other nations in the complete- ness of our system of instruction for young officers in the important branch with which we have to deal to- day. In the American Na\'y six years are spent by young officers at the Naval Academy, and the cadets cruise for three months every year in sea-going vessels. In the Austrian Navy officers spend four years at the Academy, and they are at sea two or three months every year. In the Danish Navy the school course extends over four years, eight months of every year being spent on shore, three months in a corvette, and a month in a gunboat. In the Dutch Navy four years are spent at school. The midshipmen cruise in summer in a corvette. In the French Navy two years are spent on board the * Borda,' to which vessel two sea-going NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 295 corvettes are attached for practice in cruising during two or three months in the summer. On leaving the ' Borda,' a year is spent in the sea-going training-ship * Iphigdnie.' In the German Navy the course of instruction extends over a period of five years. The pupils in the Naval School at Kiel cruise at sea during the summer months in the Baltic and in the English Channel. On leaving school they spend two years in a training-ship at sea. In the Russian Navy the school course is six years. Every summer the whole training establishment is removed for four months to a training squadron, consisting of three or four corvettes. In the Swedish Navy the course is for six years, eight months of every year being spent on shore and four at sea. The impossibility of making a good navigator and Captain pilot by merely theoretical instruction is well illustrated on'tiie in the passage which I shall read from a paper preparetl ofVaviU by Captain Kiddle on the education of naval executive "*''''""'' officers. * The education of a naval officer,' he says, ' may be roughly divided into two parts : seamanship and, to use a common but expressive phrase, learning. Good seamanship means something more than handling a beautiful ship in fine weather ; it means that those who are proficient in its mysteries never allow the slightest signs to pass unheeded ; it means that, whether an officer is watching the reefing of a top-sail in a gale, or setting a royal in the trade winds, or running his ship on a dead lee shore in thick weather, or rounding- to to pick up a shipmate who has fallen from aloft, a knowledge of its principles enables him to do exactly the right thing at the right time. It means that each cloud, as it rises above the horizon, should be carefully watched and its probable effects as carefully weighed ; it means that the slightest discoloration of the water, 296 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION Report of Coiiimittcp oil Educa- tion the presence of a patch of seaweed, or the appearance of a land bird, should at once command attention, to know why they are there, and what tliey may possibly indicate, and this with a vigilance which is untirini^ and sleepless. , . . You can no moie produce a Nelson by sending a boy to the *' Britannia " than a Vandyke by articling him to an artist ; the feeling is innate. It was seamanship that enabled Nelson at the Nile to discern with unfailing correctness that where there was room for an (enemy's ship to swing there was room for one of his to anchor ; it was seamanship that enabled him at Trafalgar to perceive that by breaking and doubling on the French and Spanish lines he could attack them in detail ; and it was seamanship that enabled Huwke, on the ironbound coast of Brittany, to say to the master who called his attention to the dangers of a lee shore, "You have done your duty, leave the rest to m(\'' At present this branch of the profession is apparently subordinated to the torpedo and long- ranged gun. The modern navigating lieutenant is drifting into the position of the officer he displaced ; and if reports are true the majority wish to avoid the duty.' . The last observation of Captain Kiddle receives support from the Report of the Committee on Educa- tion. ' Before proceeding,' they say, * to indicate the lines on which a special course might be arranged, we would direct attention to the widespread feeling of dis- appointment which prevails among navigating officers. Of all avenues to promotion, the performance of navi- gating duties has come to be regarded as the longest and most tedious. While the lieutenant who takes up the gunnery, torpedo or first-lieutenant line is tolerably sure of advancement, the lieutenant for navigating NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 297 duties, whatever his ability, and however -expert ho may be, has the mortification of finding his juniors constantly promoted over his head. Accordingly tho navigating branch, though possessing some advantages, is avoided by the more enterprising members of the profession. It is obvious that this state of things, if pi'olonged, will lead to serious miychief. The tendency will be to drive every officer of ability from navigating duties ; and yet everyone recognises how important it is that those duties should be well performed.' Tho remarks which I have quoted point to an error in tho distribution of rewards which it is urgently necessary to rectify. Having dealt with training in the early stages, we Navigntion pass on to tlie {)ractice or navigation in sea-going ships, siiips Admiral de Horsey, in some able letters, has urged that more attention should be paid to na\igation than has been customary with many ofHcers. The Admiralty have given their endorsement to the recommendations of the gallant officer by a recent circular. Of the wisdom of Admiral de Horsey's advice it is not possible to entertain a doubt. All the responsibilities of the com- mand of Her Majesty's ships are properly centred in the captain. It is obviously his duty to keep himself efficient, not only to superintend the work of his subor- dinates, but to take charge personally in a critical moment. The varied duties which devolve upon the captain of a ship of war do not admit of the same devotion to navigation which might be expected from a captain of the mercantile marine ; but navigation has been too much neglected by the executive line in the Navy. The subject of this paper brings up for consideration Abolition the change which has been made in recent years by the navigating abolition of the navigating line. I see no reason to regret the part I took in the debates on this subject in w 298 NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION Training should ho ailapteil to modern ro- tiuircmeutd tlie House of Commons. The testimony is general that the navigating duties are well performed by the lieu- tenants of the executive line, who volunteer for this service. The old masters, in the early stages of their career, had few opportunities of acquiring practical skill ; they gained their knowledge after their promo- tion to the rank c/i master. There were social objections of a grave character to the existence of two classes on board a ship, to one of which all the rewards of the service were open, while to the other they were denied. It was a yet greater evil, incidental to the systeni, that it tended to discourage lieutenants and captains from giving their attention to navigating duties. The success of warlike operations may not rarely turn on al)ility in navigation and pilotage. Lord Nelson in his auto- biography niakes special reference to the valuable ex- perience which he had gained as a midshipman when in charge of the longboat attached to the flagship at the Nore, in which he was constantly afloat in the estuaiy of the Thames. We cannot revive the old conditions of scr\ice at soa. The seaman's life is no longer surrounded by the circumstances of romance and adventure which fur- nished a grateful theme to Lord Byron and Captain Majryat. We have to adapt the training of our othcers to the service as it exists to-day. In proposing that the School of Pilotage shall be (Expanded from a short theoretical course at Portsmouth into a practical training of six months at sea, in a essels suitable for the purpose and under the supervision of an adequate staff, I ani proposing an addition to the training of the Navy which it should be possible to carry through at a com- paratively moderate expense. I am confident that it would result in more uniform efficiency in the essential branch of navigation and pilotage. 299 IV NAVAL MANCEUVRES 1. On the Beuejiaven Operations LETTERS TO TMR ' TiMKS,' JuLY 18 AND 2;', 1885 The following notes, as gi\ing the results of personal ol)ser\ ation during a recent cruise with tlio Evolution- ary Squadron, may not be without interest for the pul)lic. It would 1)0 unbeconiiiig in a ci\ ilian to criticise the pej-sonnel of the fleet. Captains of great experience express the highest satisfaction with the crews under their command ; and, if 1 may add an independent testimony, it will be to the effect that it is impossible not to feel deeply impressed with the zealous spirit .-wid de\otion to duty displayed by all ranks throughout the sf^uadron. Avoiding all questions of individual (ifhciency, T Training of turn to the general subject of the training of the mUsti" Navy. It is evident that the system which has given ''''^' us the fine body of men who form the ci-ews of the Evolutionary Squadron is likely to undergo a consider- able change. Exercises aloft have hitherto filled a large part of the seaman's life. The limited amount of time devoted to the handling of canAas during the cruise under Admiral Hornby affords an unmistakable indica- :xr^ 300 l^AYAL MAN(EUVKES ' roly- plieuins ' breaking through tlic boom tion that instructions having a more practical bearing on naval warfare in these days of steam are taking the place of sail-drill and the shifting of masts and yards. Is it, therefore, to be assumed that the art of seaman- ship, as formerly practised, is to be neglected by the Navy of the future ? Should not the aim be rather to combine all that was valuable in the former system of training with the gunnery and torpedo exercises which are now indispensable 1 E\'ory officer and man should be familiar with the sliips in which he may be called upon to do battle for his country. But if a sailor re- mains too long in a mastless ship he will lose in general smartness and agility. His life will become too mono- t(mous and confined. These observations seem to point to alternate periods of service in the masted and mast- less ironclads — the winter months in the masted sliips, cruising to the southward, the summer months being spent in the newest ships in home waters, and devoted to the system of instruction now being inaugurated in the Evolutionary Squadron. The exercises and operations of the squadron have already been graphically described by the correspon- dents of the Press. There are, however, one or two incidents which it is difficult for an eye-witness to pass by in silence. The attack on the boom at Berehaven by the ' Polyphemus ' was a giand experiment. The ' Poly- phemus ' prepared for the final charge by steaming round Bantry Bay, gradually attaining the extreme speed of nearly 18 knots. Then, like some bird of prey, which first circles in the air and then sweeps down upon its Nictim with an o\erwhelming blow, the ship was suddenly steadied in her course, steered straight for the boom, and, cleverly eluding four out of five NAVAL MANCEUVRES 301 torpedoes, swept through spars anrl steel hawsers with- out even a momentary check. The experiment was watched with breathless interest, and its triumphant success filled with admiration all wlio witnessed the stirring scene. It was not merely magnificent as a spectacle, but it must have an important bearing on the practical question of the defence of fleets in close harbours. The imposing appearance of the squadron at sea Tiie equally demands a few words of description. On at sea Thursday, July 2, in the evening, the squadron weighed from the anchorage at Berehaven. As soon as he liad gained the open waters, the Commander-in-Chief brought his flagship and the line wl he was leading nearest to the dangers of the coast. When the squad- ron was finally formed in the order prescribed by the Admiral, the ' Oregon ' was the leading ship. The station of that noble specimen of the American liners was far away in the van of the squadron. On either quarter of the ' Oregon ' were the heavy ironclads, led in two lines by their respective Admirals. The flanks were covered by the look out ships, their station being kept with great precision. The majestic procession, moving rapidly onward in perfect order, produced an effect far surpassing the most brilliant naval review. I now turn to matters which more directly concei-n Matiriei those recently responsible for the administration of the Navy. Have we, or have we not, succeeded in putting into the hands of our gallant and skilful seamen a satis- factory materiel 1 This is, for us and for the country, a question of the first importance. The new problems connected with torpedo warfare were the special occasion for the assembling of the Evolutionary Squadron, and it will be to the torpedo flotilla that I shall now refer. I 802 NAVAL MAN(ErVRES Defects of the ' Polv- phemus ' The experiences gained in the recent cruise have thrown considerable light on the direction which should be given to the construction of the future. Three classes of torpedo vessels seem to be required for the Navy. 1. The largest class should be capable of making a direct attack on ironclads, in open day, with a fair chance of success. This class is represented in the squadron under Admiral Hornby by the 'Polyphemus.' Tn speed and fighting power — whether with the ram, the torpedo, or machine and quick-firing guns the pioneer vessel of this type may be pronounced a success. The quality which is deficient, to borrow a French term, is that of habitability. In a war with a serious foe, our squadrons might be required to keep the seas for more extended periods than under the easy circumstances of peace. It would be in long cruises that the defects of the ' Polyphemus ' would make themselves felt. Even in favourable weather, the ordinary swell of the Atlantic breaks on the deck, as upon a half-tide rock, compelling the crew to remain below. Close and constant confine- ment under hatches would lead to a rapid deterioration in the physical condition of the men. The one capital defect of the ' Polyphemus ' would be remedied by build- ing up amidships a superstructure of moderate height. Such a superstructure would contain a well-lighted and well- ventilated lower deck, and carry a dry and spacious upper deck, available for drill and exercise in all usual conditions of weather. The plans for an armoured ram now under consideration at the Admiralty provide for a considerable increase of freeboard as compared with the ' Polyphemus.' Nothing would be lost either in invisibility or invulnerability in the improved design. In the ' Polyphemus ' the flying deck and turrets are NAVAL MANCEUVKES 303 Improvoi practice in torpedo is a deadly weapon even under the least fa^'our- torpedo able conditions. The nights were short, the moon was necessary at the full, and rules were laid down which seemed rather unduly to favour the heavier ships. A prolonged blockade in winter would expose the fleet outside to hazards which it is impossible to contemplate without some misgiving, and which could only be averted by closing the entrance to the blockaded port with a swarm of torpedo gun-vessels. In a former letter the necessity for keeping in commission practice vessels for the train ■ !i[ 330 NAVAL MANCEUVEES A flotilla to be always in commission :* ;i :;! |: ing of young engineers and firemen was strongly urged ; in this concluding letter I would press a similar sug- gestion in relation to the torpedo flotilla. For the trying service of the annual manoeuvres, it is not satis- factory that any untrained officers or men should be embarked in exceptionally ticklish craft. To avoid this necessity, a small squadron of torpedo boats should be always in commission. Sheerness may be recommended as admirably suited for the requirements of a central sea-going torpedo training establishment, at which the main work . of building, fitting, and repairing should be concentrated. The yard could readily be adapted to the purpose. It is not adapted to deal with larger vessels. For exercise in the handling of torpedo boats and tho management of their complicated machinery, the estuary of the Thames is an ideal cruising ground. The training in torpedo boats, which should form an essential part of the instruction of every young naval officer, would give experience in navigating in pilotage waters and along the coast, which the recent manoeuvres have shown to be highly desirable for the general efficiency of the Navy. Lord Nelson has placed it on record in his brief autobiography that it was in the estuary of the Thames, in command of the longboat attached to the flagship at the Nore, that he acquired that experience in pilotage which afterwards proved so valuable in the battles of the Nile and Copenhagen. 331 STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY Address to the Calcutta Chambek of Commerce, December 8, 1893 ' *>:> Having received a cordial welcome in Calcutta from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, I am anxious to express, in a practical form, my appreciation of your kindness. Our naval position is under anxious dis- cussion at home. On the last occasion when a like feeling of anxiety was displayed, I was invited by the London Chamber of Commerce to address them on the Navy. It seemed possible that a statement reviewing and comparing our Navy with those of Foreign Powei's would be acceptable to a powerful commercial associa- tion, with which it is my privilege to find myself con- nected during my present deeply interesting visit to the noble capital of our greatest dependency. And now, let us ask oui-selves why it is that the f'ttus<>f"r ' , *' , anxiety at public mind at home is once more disturbed and i>omo anxious with reference to the state of the Navy. The reason is obvious. A Russian squadron has recently visited Toulon, and has there been received by the French people with an effusion of welcome which could hardly have been exceeded if Russia had rendered the most conspicuous services to the French people. The visit of the Russian fleet has drawn attention more particularly to the relative strength in the Mediter- ' [This was not received in time to be included in Part I. — Editor.] , i 332 STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY Mediter ranean Medue"*" ranean. It has been discovered that our squadron, as at present constituted, is inferior to the French squadron in the Mediterranean, and still more to the French supplemented by the Russian squadron. The French squadron permanently commissioned consists of nine battle- ships, one annoured cruiser, two protected cruisers, six look-out ships, two torpedo gunboats, and six sea-going torpedo boats. In reserve, and commis- sioned for six months only, the French have eight iron- clads, mostly of the second class, two armoured cruisers, three protected cruisers, two look-out ships, two torpedo gunboats and four sea-going torpedo boats. The Russian squadron which has recently visited Toulon consisted of five ships: the * Emperor Nicolas 1.,' ' Admiral NachimoflP,' and ' Pamyat Azova,' the first of which may be described as an ironclad of the second class. They were attended by a protected cruiser and a gun- vessel. The British fleet actually in commission in the Mediterranean is considerably inferior to the combined squadrons of France and Russia. It consists of ten battle-ships, eight of which are of the first class, two first-class cruisers, four smaller cruisers, three look-out ships, the torpedo- ram ' Polyphemus,' one torpedo gun- boat, five smaller vessels, and twelve torpedo boats. It would be easy to reinforce our Mediterranean fleet by detaching ships actually in commission in the Channel fleet, and in our Reserve squadron at home. I should deprecate any step which, while it would add nothing to our eftective squadron in case of war, would cer- tainly be calculated to excite emulation in naval pre- parations. By inciting France to fresh efforts, it must involve the necessity for throwing heavier burdens on our own exchequer. strength of our Mediter- ranean squadron STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY 333 In considering our naval position, we must take Fleet in into view our fleet as a whole. A comparison extend- ing beyond the limits of the Mediterranean will show that our force in commission is not far below that standard of equality to any two Powers which was laid down by the late Government, and was accepted without question by Parliament. As I have shown, we have a decided inferiority in the Mediterranean. That inferiority disappears when we take into the comparison our Channel fleet and Reserve squadron. Our Channel fleet consists of four battle-ships, two of the largest class, two armoured cruisers, and two fast smaller vessels. In the home ports, manned with re- duced crews, which can at a day's notice be completed from the Coast Guard, we have a Reserve squadron consisting of six eflicient second- and third-class battle- ships, one armoured cruiser, and two coast-defence ships. In addition, we have three third-class battle- ships and two armoured cruisers in commission as port- guard ships. Our aggregate strength in home waters is thirteen battle-ships, five armoured cruisers, two coast-defence ships, one third-class cruiser, and one torpedo gunboat. I have not the precise information at hand, but I believe that some of the older ships in commission in home waters have been replaced by more modern vessels. The French Channel fleet is weak in comparison with the force which it is their policy to keep concen- trated in the Mediterranean. Their Northern squadron, answering to our Reserve squadron, consists of two battle-ships, three coast defenders, one armoured cruiser of the oldest type, one flrst-class cruiser, one third-class cruiser, one torpedo cruiser, two torpedo gunboats, and six sea-going torpedo boats. Half of these are in reserve, They are manned with full crews for six months only. ■■).'■ I: '*i m hi i Third clftss Rapidity in coDstructiou pi Turning to battle-ships of tlie second class, we have twelve ships to nine French and four Russian. The French list includes six ships with a powerful main armament and fair protection, but of low freeboard. Such ships are effective for coast defence ; they cannot be reckoned as tit for keeping the seas. In second-class battle-ships we are not up to standard. In battle-ships of the third class,''the British Navy has thirteen ships to seven French and four Russian. In this class we are not up to standard. Our superiority is due mainly to the fact that our ships are of iron, while, with one exception, those of the French are built of wood. And now, having enumerated the ships, it will be appropriate to insist that the failure to attain our standard of strength in the second class is not the chief cause of anxiety. It is when we turn to the ships under construction that our deficiency is most apparent. We have in construction three battle-ships only — the ' Renown,' ' Magnificent,' and * Majestic' The two latter, which are hardly commenced, are ships of 15,000 tons, and more powerful than any in hand elsewhere. The French are building no less than ten battle- ships, six being from 11,000 to 12,000 tons, and four of 6,500 tons. The Russian list comprises eight ships— one of 12,500 tons, three of 11,000 tons, two of 10,000 tons, and two of 8,000 tons. While, therefore, we have only three battle-ships under construction, we find that no less than eighteen are building in France and Russia. We may be able to build, and we do build, more rapidly than has hitherto been found to be practicable abroad. With every allowance for differences in the rate of advancement in shipbuilding, it is clear further exertion on our part can no longer with safety be post- STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY 337 poned. "We want from the Admiralty, after due de- liberation, a new and con)prehensive programme of construction. We may now turn to the various types not included Coast- _ -^ , . . defence in the lists of battle- ships, taking those built and ironclads building together. In coast-defence ships we are weak ; we have twelve ships to twenty French and twenty- eight Russian ships. Half of the French ships are armoured gunboats. This description may be applied to two of our own and to several of the Russian ships of this class. Passing to the vessels whose special mission it would Armoured . . 1 • 1 criiisors be to give protection to commerce, we have eighteen armoured cruisers compared with thirteen French and ten Russian. Our strength in this class is less than we could wish. In the class of protected cruisers we have thirteen ships to eight French and one Russian. Amongst the British ships are included the ' Powerful ' and 'Terrible' of 14,000 tons displacement and twenty- two knots speed, intended as an answer to the Russian * Ruriks.' Though numerically not up to our standard of strength in this class, our ships are, in every case, more powerful than those of the French or Russian Navy. We have fifty-four protected cruisers of the second Second- and ii'ii • -n 1 1 thlrd-clasd and third classes to nineteen French and two Russian, cruisers Six of the French ships are under 2,000 tons, while no British ship in this class is below 2,500 tons. In this class we are apparently up to our standard of strength ; but when we take into consideration the fact that the aggregate mercantile tonnage of the British Empire is 12,455,087, valued at 122,000,000^., and that the aggregate tonnage of the French Mercantile Marine was 1,057,708 in 1892, valued at 10,100,000/., while the II. z :L Sis 838 STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY ■■■t It I' hi ^'1 M: Size of our biittlo-Bhipx Advantages of moderate dimeiiBions -i i Russian Mercantile Marine was 481,799 tons, valued at 3,000,000?., it would be rash to assert that our force in cruisers is sufficient to protect the enormous interests involved. In concluding tliis comparative review, it may be mentioned that we have nineteen look-out ships to six French. The Russians have no ships in this class. We have thirty -two torpedo gunboats to thirteen French and eight Russian. One general ob- servation, and not less obvious, may perhaps be made. In a comparison of strength resting entirely on the number of ships we do scant justice to ourselves. Our construction in the class of battle-ships has for some years been limited to ships of a size quite unmatched by any other Navy, except that of the Italians. We may fairly credit our naval architects with ability to make the force of the ships produced from their designs pro- portionate to their tonnage. If we had kept the average tonnage of our recent battle-ships within the limits accepted by the French, we should have made a better comparison in point of numbers. I have always been against the policy of putting too many eggs in one basket ; and I hold the same opinion still. The largest ship of war must always remain, in some respects, as vulnerable as ships of modei'ate dimensions. In the Great War numbers were found by experience to be more important than the size and power of individual ships. Nelson's victories at the Nile and at Trafalgar were obtained by concentrating a superior number of his ships on an inferior number of the enemy's ships. We have in the * Royal Sovereign ' class a sufficient number of huge vessels to deal with the larger ships building for France and Russia. In my view, the naval requirement of the country would be far better served at the present moment by the con- STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY 330 a of struction of a larger number of vessels of the dimen- sions of the * Centurion ' and * Barfleur,' than of a smaller number of vessels of the dimensions of the ' Majestic ' and * Magnificent.' The limits of time, and the power of attention avail- able at the close of a busy day, will not allow of fvu ex- haustive treatment of a theme of supreme national importance. Our comparison, being confined to ships specially built for war, has necessarily left out of view the relative resources of the British Empire, and those at the command of our rivals. If those resources be called upon before it is too late, we need entertain no apprehensions as to the continued maintenance of our beneficent influence for the spread of trade, commerce, and the civilisation which will surely be given in time to every land whei'e our administrators and merchants are found. e2 r; INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME A. B., advisability of examination for rating,' of, I'iO ' Achilles,' as a cruiser, 323 ; speed of, 3'jr) Aden, resolution to nuvintain its strenf?tli as a fortress, 203 ; de- fective character of its anchor- age, 2Gi ; dredging operations necessary, 270 'Admiral' class of ironclads, 309, 320 ' Admiral NachiiuolY ' (Russian iron- clad), 332 Admiralty, Umits to its powers of administration, 2 ; and board of Trade, Committee appointed by, to revise regulations of Koyal Naval Reserve, f)'.) ; Select Com- mittee (18(»1),80; establishment of training ships by, 70 ; taking over ships from philanthropic societies, 70 ; opportunity of improving tlie (lualitication for counnissioiis in the Reserve, 137 ; agreement with shipowners on hire for vessels in time of war, 227 ; arrangements with ship- owners for adaptation of vessels to war purposes, 2:{(i, 237 ' Adriatic,' her average speed from (^)ueenstown to Sandy Hook, 232 Advance notes, evils of, 10!l, 124 ' Agincourt,' in the naval man- a:uvres, 322 ; speed of, 325 Agricultural labourers employed as iishermen, 7'.> ' Aide Mi'inoirc do I'Ollicier do Marine,' quoted, on the I'rench torpedo flotilla, 327, 328 ' Ajax,' her unsatisfactory steering qualities, 311 ' Ahibanui ' (Southern warship), 1 ' Alexandra,' speed of, 32.") Allotment notes, advantages of, lOU Anderson, Sir James, captain of ' Great Eastern,' 73 Anglesey, Lord, liis interest in the Liverpool Naval Artillery Volun- teers, I'JO Apprentices, merchant, under com- pulsory Navigation Ijaws, '.) ; cost of, in training ships, 10 ; State bonus suggested in aid, 11 ; entry and training, 12 ; service in the navy as a preliminary to entry in the Royal Naval Reserve, 12 ; bonus to shipowners for taking, 14, 70, 71; terms of appren- ticeship, 71 ; (lovernment en- couragement of, 112 Apprenticeship, naval, in Sweden, 8 • Arawa,' her run from New Zealand to Kngland, 244 'Archer' type, 317,318; as a training ship, 31',l ' Arelhusa' type, 317 , Armada, the, nniinly vanquished 342 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME Iff IT ''.I m by a fleet drawn from the mer- cantile marine, 53 Armament, the question of heavy or light guns, 227 Armstrong, Lord, on quick-firing ordnance, 322 Artificers, training of, 319 Ascension, defences of, 270 ; re- quirements necessary, 271 'Audacious,' as a cruiser, 325 Australia : character of port de- fences, 267 ; land forces, 267 ; floating defences, 268. See Colonies Australia, South, products of, 208. See Colonies Australia, Western, products of, 208. See Colonies Austrian Lloyd's, subsidies, steam- ers, and tonnage, 241 Austrian navy, years spent by young officers at the Naval Academy, 294 Auxiliary cruisers, 225 et scq. ; im- portance of speed, 229 Bab-el-Mandeb, Straits of, torpedo boats for, 305 13aird, Admiral, in the naval man- ttiuvres, 315, 322 Balfour, Mr., shipowner of Liver- pool, on the increase of pay to seamen for good conduct, 126 Baltic, the, as a cruising ground, 295 Bantry Bay, manojuvres of evolu- tionary squadron in, 300, 306 ; advantages of, as a theatre for operations, 315 Barbados, as a military station, 278 ; staff of army at, 278 ' Barfleur,' 339 Barnaby, Mr., naval constructor, 225, 229 Bay of Fundy, volunteers for Ca- nadian Naval Reserve at, 220 Beaconsfield, Lord, on colonial encouragement and defence, 212 ; his references to Cyprus in ' Tancred,' 261 Belgium, merchant tonnage of, 239 ' Belleisle,' 55 ' Benbow,' weak points in, 320 Berehaven, naval manneuvres at, 299 et seq. ; 315 ; blockade of, 320 Berkeley, Admiral, advocates en- rolment of fishermen in reserves, 24, 36; on selection of officers for coast-defence service, 26 Bermuda, naval arsenal at, 281 ' Bird ' class of cruisers, 308 Birthplace of men and boys serv- ing in the navy in 1852, 37, 38 ' Black Prince,' speed of, 825 Blacksod Bay, 291 Blockading, difficulties of modern, 315 ' Boadicea,' 335 Board of Trade, opportunity for raising professional status of merchant officers, 136 Bombay, its defences, 264 ; re- quirements necessary, 270, 271 Booms for harbour defence, 299, 305 'Borda' (French training ship), 294 Borneo, 266 Bourniot, M., on the value of Ca- nadian fishing fleet to Imperial navy in war-time, 220 Brassey, Lord, on our Naval Re- serves and Coast Volunteers, 1 et seq. ; his plan for dealing with Royal Naval Reserve, 16 ; testi- mony t3 qualities of fishermen for coast defence, 24 ; on our reserves of seamen, 52 et seq. ; his eulogium of yachtsmen drawn from Essex fishermen, 77 ; on the Naval Reserves, 89 et seq., 106 et seq., 145 et seq. ; on how best to improve and keep up the seamen of the country, 114 et seq. ; on Greenwich Hospital funds and pensions, 139 et scq, ; on the Royal Naval Reserve and INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME 343 Artillery Volunteers, 145-152, 155, 158 et seq. ; his speech to the Koyal Naval Artillery Volunteers, 196 et seq. ; letter to the Times (1891) on same, 201 ; letter to Mr. Goschen on same, 202 ; on a Colonial Naval Volunteer Force, 207 ctscq. ; on auxiliary cruisers, 225 et seq. ; on colonial defence and coaling stations, 240 et seq. ; on naval training and education, 2H5etseq.; on naval manoeuvres, 299 et seq.; on the strength of the British l.avy, 331 et seq. Brightlingsea, fishermen at, 78 Bristol Channel, torpedo boats for, 304 ' Bristol,' teaching of seamanship on board, 287 ' Britannia,' naval instruction on, 286 British India Line, steamers and tonnage, 241 Burgoyne, Captain, his conduct in the catastrophe to the ' Captain,' 224 Burns, Mr., 119 ; on structural arrangements in new steamers, 236 Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, address to, by Lord Brassey on British Navy, 331 et seq. ' Calliope,' escape of the, 291 'Cambridge,' school of gunnery, 72 Cana'Man Dominion, resources of, in ships and men, 218; New- foundland fishermen, 218; op- portunities for drill in winter, 218 ; effort to enrol fishermen in Naval Reserve of the British empire, 218 ; drill-ship in win- ter at St. John's, 219 ; training ships in Placentia and Trinity Bays, 219 ; ports in the Gulf of St.Lawrence available for seamen of Naval Reserve, 220 ; value of fishing fleet to Imperial navy in war-time, 220 ; total strength of msn employed in fisheries, 220 ; Lord Elgin on intimate union with the mother-country, 221 ; a Naval Reserve advisable for colonial as well as for Imperial purposes, 221 ; no large expen- diture required for scheme of defence, 221 ; staff of officers and instructors to be furnished by the mother-country, 222 ; a colonial reserve a link with the Royal Navy, 224 Cantyre, 291 Cape Colony, defences of, 269 ; requirements necessary, 271 Cape of Good Hope in 1845, 207 Cardwell, Lord, his commission on naval reserves, 107 Carnarvon, Lord, president of the Royal Commission on the de- fence of the empire, 263 Castries (St. Lucia), central coal- ing station for West Indies, 278 ; unhealthiness of the bay, 279, 281 ; site of town a disadvantage, 279 ; necessity for limiting popu- lation, 280 Catherine II. of Russia, her devo- tion to the fleet, 54 ' Centurion,' 339 Channel Fleet, the, 333 Channel Islands, contribution in 1852 of men and bo;,8 to navy, 39 ; fishing boats '^nd men and boys registered in 1869, 44-51 Charleston, blockade of, in Seces- sion war, an example of reduced number of seamen required in modern war, 4 Charlottetown, Gulf of St. Law- rence, volunteers for Canadian Naval Reserve at, 220 Chatham Chest, the, 142 Childers, Mr., on the navy, 31 China Sea, cruisers for convoy in, 325 ' City of Berlin,' log of, from 3^4 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME MfA Queenstown to Sandy Hook and return, 230 ' City of New York,' allowed to hoist the stars and stripes, 242 ' City of Paris,' 242 ; speed, 243 Clyde, the, steam shipping in, in 1870, 10 ; torpedo boats for, ;-504 Coaling stations, defences of, 2G3- 270; requirements necessary to complete, 270, 271 Coast Defence Association, Lord Cowper's share in establishment of, 199 Coast Defence Volunteers, 1 ; Com- mission of 1800, 5 ; estimate 1871-72, 5 ; neglect of, 21; defi- ciency in numbers, 22 ; avail- able sources of increase, 22 ; qualifications of fishermen for coast service, 22 ; physique of Scottish, 23 ; rejection of un- suitable men, 23 ; attempt to form a second-class reserve, 23 ; advantages of local coast know- ledge possessed by fishermen, 23 ; their aptitude, 24 ; their enrolment advised by naval re- formers, 24 ; ports at which the best men are to be obtained, 25 ; training for service on men-of- war, 2') ; selection of officers, 25 ; in alliance with Coast Guard, 2() ; number of officers required, 26; number of vessels, 27; . stations for posting reserve . vessels, 27 ; officers drawn from Coast Guard, 27 ; retainers for ■ service, 28 ; number of vessels the force is capable of manning, 29 ; coast-defence flotilla, 29 ; distribution of men in flotilla, 30 ; replacing Coast Guard, 30 ; age extended in 1852, 02 ; re- commendations of Committee of 1852 and their results, 70; ' - number and quality of fisher- , men suited for service, 70 ; local knowledge of fishermen, 77 ; . fishermen in gunboats, 78 ; un- wise rejection of fishermen for reserve, 78 ; their leisure for drill, 79; original plan in forma- tion, 80 Coast Guard, Commission of 1800, 5 ; estimate 1871-72, 5 ; its duties combined with command of Coast-defence Reserve, 20 ; number of officers employed in, 27 ; to furnish officers for coast- defence reserve, 27 ; replaced by Coast Volunteers, 30 ; numbers of, in 1859, 57 ; gunboats desir- able to increase their efficiency, 147 ; success of the Life Insur- ance Fund, 149 ; good behaviour of men, 323 ; the first and best reserve, 324 Colbert, establishes a system for pensioning seamen, 133 Coles, Captain, devises the raft ' Nancy Dawson ' for operations in the Sea of Azof, 100 Collectors of Customs, Reports of, in 1809, on fishing boats and men and boys registered in the United Kingdom, etc., 44-51 Colomb, Admiral, on the losses sustained upon English coasts in the time of the great war, 199 ; on coast defence, 199 Colomb, Captain, favours co-opera- tion of colonies with mother- country for mutual defence, 212 ; his proposition of a colonial dockyard, 213 ; favours ironclads for colonial defence, 215 ; on local harbo defence, 215 Colomb, the Brothers, urge the formation of a colonial Naval Reserve, 209 Colombo, character of its defences, 205 ; requirements necessary, 271 Colonies, organisation of a naval reserve in, 207 ; growth since 1845, 207 ; Australian exhibits in Paris Exhibition, 207 ; Queens- land, population, products, ex- ports and imports, 208 ; South INDEX TO THE SECOKD VOLUME 345 Australian products, 208; neces- sity for Naval Reserve, 201); Koyal Naval lleserve and Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may serve as models, 210 ; Naval Reserve in connection with Im- perial Government, 210; attach- ment to England, 211 ; value to ICngland, 212 ; home dockyard to be transferred to Sydney or Melbourne, 213 ; local defence, 214; contributions of the several governments, 214 ; prepared to bear their share in a scheme of Imperial defence, 214 ; sea-going war vessels best for defence, 215; local harbour defence, 215; reserve of sliips and men in Australia, 21(5 ; a Royal Com- mission advised on this point, 217 ; importance of organising a scheme of defence, 217 ; re- sources of Canada in ships and men, 218 ; value of Newfound- land fishermen for defence, 215) ct seq. ; Canadian ports available for seamen of Naval Reserve, 220 ; close union witli mother- country to be facilitated by im- proved means of communication, 244 ; the future of Cyprus, 240 et scq. ; Australia's defences and land forces, 207, 2()S Commissariat, defects of tlie, in the British army, 248 Compagnie (naiorale Transatlan- tique, subsidies, steamers, and tonnage, 241 ' Couijueror,' at battle of Trafalgar, 65 ' Conqueror,' qualities as a cruiser, 321 ' Conquest,' qualities of, 307, 308 Conscription, naval, in France, 50 ' Conway,' training of ollicers on, 72, 113 ' Coquette ' class of gunboats, 227 Cork, as a station for coast-defence vessels, 27 ' Cormorant,' 307, 308 Cowpcr, Lord, his interest in the Coast Defence Association, 199 Crimean war, want of a reserve of engineers and firemen, 30 ; navy stokers in, H5 Crimping, 109 ' Crocodile,' character of stokers, 85 Cunard Line, outwards and home- wards run of steamers from England to America, 230-231 ; subsidy, steamers and tonnage, 241 ; reiiuires previous sailing service in otticers, 288 Cyprus, otYors no advantages as an advanced military post, 240, 250 ; as a coaling-station, 247, 250; condition of the troops landed in 1878, 247, 250 ; defects of the Commissariat depart- ment, 248 ; resources, 250 ; li- ability to drought, 250 ; need for public works, 251 ; disadvantage of the Turkish tribute, 251, 259 ; oppressive taxation, 251, 253 ; invidious position of our occu- pation, 253 ; its acquisition a (luestion of Imperial policy, 254 ; agriculture, 258 ; how the resources of the island might be developed, 200 ; influence of good government, 2()0 D.viiiifiiiKN, Admiral, on work done by monitors at Charleston, 5 Darsey Island, 315 Dawson, Captain, R.N., his views on the numbers and quality of merchant seamen, 8 ; on paying off, 125 Deakin, Mr., on colonial naval reserves, 2()8 ' Do la Guerre Maritime,' Grivel's, (luotcd on naval resources of UKultime powers, 3 Deuuian, Admiral, on number of li m 1 4 ;; y i \ 846 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME seamen required in time of war, 33 Denmark, years spent by ollicers in the navy school course, 294 Desertion from the navy, Lord Nelson on, 35 ; causes of, amonfj; British sailors, 122 ' Devastation,' disadvantages of her low freeboard, 309, 320 Docks, advantages of private estab- lishments, 271 Dockyards, proposition of Captain Colomb to transfer staff of one to Sydney or Melbourne, 213 ' Donegal,' 55 Drake, at the defeat of the Armada, 53 ' Dreadnought,' 309 Dumont, M., his plan for training boys as seamen, 70 Dunlop, Mr., of Glasgow, on the ability of shipowners to man their vessels, 115 Durassier, M., on the French tor- pedo flotilla, 327 * Economist,' on the transition in character of mercantile fleet, 9 Edinburgh, the Duke of, his re- commendations for the Naval Reserves in 1883, 145 Education, naval, recommenda- tions of Committee on, 28(5, 287, 293 Eighty-one-ton gun, the, 232 Eldridge, Consul, on the effect of the English occupation of Cyprus, 260 Elgin, Lord (Gov.-Gen. of Canada), on the advantages of intimate union between Canada and Great Britain, 221 Elizabeth, Queen, the navy and mercantile marine in her reign, 63 EUenborough, Lord, advocates a compulsory seamen's pension fund, 133 Elliott, Admiral, his testimony to value of Naval Reserve, 58 ; on stokers in the navy, 85 'Emperor Nicolas I.' (Russian iron- clad), 332 Engineers, reserve of, for sea- going cruisers, 30 England, birthplace in, of men and boys serving in the navy in 1852, 37 ; towns in 1852 contributing more than fifty men and boys to navy., 38 ; towns or their neighbourhoods in which boys in training ships (1871) were born and entered, 40, 41 ; coun- ties in which they were born, 42 ; fishing-boats and men and boys registered in, in 1869, 44- 48 Essex fishermen as yachtsmen, 77 Evolutionary squadron, cruise of the, in 1885, 299 et seq. ; be- haviour of torpedo - boats in cruise round w^est coast of Ireland, 305 ; deficiency of cruisers in length, 307; as a display of naval forces, 311 ; employment of officers of the Naval Reserve in, 313 ' Excellent,' planfor training Naval Reserve officers on, 21 ; school of gunnery, 72, 113, 290,304; enthusiastic ovation given to crew in London, 156 ; for R.N.A.V. training in gunnery, 204 Expenditure of principal mari- time powers on navy, 6 Faxioousta, Cyprus, as a coaling- station, 247 ; unhealthiness, 258 Ferry-boats, capability of, to carry guns, 232 Firemen, reserve of, for sea-going cruisers, 30 Fisheries, increase in the, bene- ficial for the Naval Reserve, 146 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME 347 Fishermen, English, advisability of increasing the number of gunboats for training, 112 ; for coast defence, 22-24 ; naval authorities in favour of enrol- ment in reserve, 'My ; value of, as Coast Volunteers, 70 ; in gun- boats, 77 ; unwise rejection for reserves, 78; aptitude, 71); agri- cultural labourers employed as, in Norfolk and Suffolk, 79 ; their leisure for drill, 79 Fishermen, French, for coast de- fence, 22 Fishermen, Irish, for coast de- fence, 22 Fishernip*:, Scottish, for coast de- fence, 22 ; physical superiority, ' 22, 23 ; suitability, as Coast Vo- lunteers, 70 Fishing, ordinary mode of, in the United Kingdom, 44-51 j Fishing-boats registered in the | United Kingdom, Isle of Man, and Channel Islands, 44-51 | Fitzroy, Admiral, in naval ma- j noeuvres, 320 Flying squadrons, advantage of, 293 ' Foam,' the, 170 Forth, the, torpedo boats for, 304 Fortifications, a cheap method of defence, 203 France, seafaring population and tonnage of, 3 ; annual expendi- ture on ijavy, 0; naval and mer- cantile tonnage, ; conditions of the ' Invalides ' pension, 15 ; men employed in fisheries, 21 ; numbers of reserve recom- mended by Commission of 1843, 22 ; fleet at Napoleon I.'s dis- posal, 54 ; tonnage in 1871, 54 ; maritime conscription, 55 ; Naval Keserve, 100 ; steam ton- ; nage, 220 ; command of seafar- ing population in an emergency, 235 ; merchant tonnage, 239 ; ! subsidies for mail services, 23d ; j total foreign trade, 239 ; boun- ties for construction of ships and mileage subsidies, 239 ; increase of lines of steamers under State subventions, 240 ; age of entry in navy, 286 ; years spent by otiicers in training at sea, 294 ; torpedo vessels, 303, 334 ; dis- tribution of armour in ironclads, 310 ; discrepancy in statements of authorities on numbers of torpedo boats, 327, 328 ; recep- tion of the Russian fleet at Tou- lon, 331, 332 ; Mediterranean squadron, 332 ; Channel squad- ron, 333 ; aggregate strength of ships in European waters, 334 ; ships on Australian, China, and East India stations, 334 ; first, second, and third class warships, 335, 336 ; coast-defence ironclads, 337 ; armoured cruisers, 337 ; protected cruisers, 337; aggregate tonnage of mercantile marine,337 Freeboard, low, disadvantages of, 309, 320 French army, excessive number of corps d'dite in, 118 French mercantile marine, En- quete Parlementaire on, 70 Frobisher, at the defeat of the Armada, 53 FuUerton, Captain, of Melbourne, his active interest in colonial naval reserves, 268 Galita, Island of, necessity for a light on, 270 Gardner, Captain, on the inefli- ciency of former naval crews, 55 ; testimony to value of Nav;vl Reserve, 58 Gaspe, Gulf of St. Lawrence, vo- lunteers for Naval Reserve at, 220 German shipmasters, their su- perior education, 135 ' Germanic,' quick run from Queenstown to Sandy Hook, 232 848 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME Germany, Naval lleserve of, 106 ; unarmoured cruisers, 234 ; mer- chant tonnage, 238 ; total foreign trailo, 23!) ; subsiclies for mail services, 239 ; course of instruc- tion for naval officers, 295 Gibriiltur, maintenance of its strength as a fortress, 2()3 ; want of a graving dock, 271, 27(> ; un- protected state of coal hulks at night, 275 ; term of military service at should be reduced, 270 Goldsborough, Admiral (U.S.N.), on vessels for coast defence, 33 * Goliath,' discipline exhibited by crew on its destruction by fire, 131 Goodcnough, Commodore, on naval reserves, 106 ; his closing hours, 224 ; on the ignorance of French shown by English naval officers, 287 Goochen, Mr., approves the forma- tion of Naval Volunteers, 81 ; on the Eoyal Naval Artillery Volun- teers, 153 et seq. Gould, Mr., on the defective edu- cation of English shipmasters, 134 Graham, Sir James, his aid in for- mation of Naval Coast Volun- teers, 80 Graves, Mr., on tapping the whole country for the navy, 34 Gray and Hamilton, Messrs., on the mercantile marine in 1872, 108 Gray, Mr., of the Board of Trade, his proposition that Government should take over training-ships from philanthropic societies, 70 Great Britain, seafaring population and tonnage of, 3 ; fishing-boats and men and boys registered in, in 18G9, 44-51 ; value of colonies ' to, 212 ; co-operation for mutual defence, 212; progress of British shipping, 213 ; schemes of Im- perial defence in co-operation with colonies, 214 ; subsidies to mail services and total foreign trade, 239. See Navy ' Great Eastern,' manned from the navy when cable-laying, 73 Greenwich Hospital, object for which founded, 139 ; the Mer- chant Seamen's Fund, 140 ; compensation provided on its abolition, 141 ; derivation of its funds, 142 ; their present utilisa- tion, 143 ; benefits of the estab- lishment, 143 Greenwich Naval College, 292, 293 Greenwich Naval University, 113, 137 Grey, Sir Frederick, approves re- commendations of Koyal Com- mission of 1859 on training ships, 69 ; his own proposition on same, 69, 71 ; on naval reserves, 107 ; on training ships, 129 ; on apprenticeship system, 132 Grimsby, increase of fishing at, 146 Grivel, Captain Eichild, his ' De ' la Guerre Maritime ' quoted on naval resources of maritime powers, 3 ; on pensions in French navy, 15 Grove Park Rowing Club, 173 Gulf of St. Lawrence, naval volun- teers in the, 219 Gunboats, advisability of increas- ing the number of for training purposes, 112 HAI.F-PAY and retired lists, cost of, 73 Halifax, Lord, on the original plan of foi'mation of Naval Coast Volunteers, 80 Halifax, Nova Scotia, training ship tor Canadian Naval Heserve at, 220 Hall, Sir William, for enrolment of tishermen in reserves, 24 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME 349 Halpin, Captain, ' Great Eastern,' 73 Hamburg American Company, subsidy, steamers, and tonnage, 241 Hamilton, Lord George, on the role of merchant auxiliaries to the navy, 242 Harbour-defence ships. Captain Colomb's opinion regarding, 215 Harris, Captain, on naval train- ing, 28G Hastings, Admiral, for enrolment of fishermen in reserves, 24, 3(i ; on number of vessels required for coast defence, 27 Hawke, Admiral, 290 Hawkins, at the defeat of the Armada, 53 Hay, Lord John, 258 Heaton, Mr. Henniker, on subsi- dies for mail services, 239 ' Hercules,' as a cruiser, 323 ; speed of, 325 ' Hero,' drill and target practice on, 204 ; qualities as a cruiser, 321 Hickley, Admiral, 143 Hill, Governor, his report on the Newfoundland fisheries, 218 Hixon, Captain, of Sydney, his active interest in colonial naval reserves, 268 Holland, j-ears spent by young naval othcers at school in, 294 Holyhead, as a station for coast- defence vessels, 27 Hong Kong, completion of a graving dock at, 271 Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, his skilful direction of the tieet in the instructional cruise of 1885, 291, 299 ; his management of torpedo boats with the evolutionary squadron, 305 ; on the necessity of more cruisers, 323 Horsey, Admiral de, on the neces- sity of ofilicers being instructed in navigation, 297 Howard, Lord, at the defeat of the Armada, 53 Hull, increase of fishing at, 14G Humber, torpedo boats for the, 304 Ilex llowing Club, 173 Impressment, 18 ; in 1774 and 1812-1813, 35 ' In a Conning Tower,' quoted, 320 ' Inconstant,' built for sjieed, 229 India, cruisers for protecting com- merce en route to, 325 Inman Line, its system of en- gaging seamen, 108 ; log of ' City of Berlin ' from Queens- town to Sandy Hook and I'eturn, 230 ; postal subsidy, 242 ; per- mission to hoist the stars and stripes, 242 ; speed of vessels, 24;i Ino Rowing Club, 173 Invalides pension in France, 15 Ionian Islands, 294 ' Iphig^nie,' French sea-going training ship, 295 Ireland, birthplace in, of men and boys serving in the navy in 1852, 38 ; towns in 1852 contributing more than fifty men and boys to navy, 39 ; towns in which boys in training ships were born and entered, 41 ; fishing boats and men and boys registered in, in 18()9, 48-51 ; west coast of, 294 ' Iris,' in manoeuvres, 310 Isle of Man, fishing-boats and men and boys registered in, in 1809, 44-51 Isleworth Eowing Club, 173 Italy, subsidies for mail services, 239 ; total foreign trade, 239 ; bounties on construction, 240 ; training of artificers and stokers, 319 Jamaica, staf! of army in, 278 350 INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME James, Mr., historian, quoted, lift Jervois, Sir William, and the defences of Australia, 267 Johnstone, Captain, of the ' Aga- memnon,' on the manning of the navy, 32G Joinville, Prince de, his pamphlet on the French navy, 21 ; on tiie French fisheries industry, 21, 22 Key, Admiral Cooper, on Coast Guard practice in naval tactics under steam, 31 ; testimony to value of Naval Keserve, 58, 107 Kiddle, Captain, on the training of naval officers, 295 Kiel, naval school at, 295 King George's Sound, its im- portance strategically, 26(5 ; re- quirements necessary for its defence, 270 Kingston, Jamaica, 283 ; a suitable place for a graving dock, 284 Kingston Rowing Club, 173 Kithroea, Cyprus, 250 Kurrachee, character of its de- fences, 265 • Lady Nancy,' as a typical vessel for coast defence, 30 Lambert, Mr. (Liverpool N.A.V.), his retirement, 190 Lamport, Mr., on the employment of foreign seamen, 114 ; on training for the mercantile marine, 128 Lang, Hamilton, on the taxes levied in Cyprus, 251 Larnaca, Cyprus, 258 ' Leanders,' cruisers, 308 'Lily,' loss of, in the Straits of Belleisle, 292 Limasol, Cyprus, 258 Lindsay, W. S., on the Royal Naval Reserve, 12; approves recommendations of Royal Com- mission of 1859 on training Bhips, 69 ; his own plan, 69; on the policy of enrolling merchant service officers in the reserve, 74, 112 ; on the average passage of ocean steamers between Liver- pool and New York, 230-232 Iaveri)ool and New York, average passage of ocean steamers be- tween, 230 Liverpool Naval Artillery Volun- teers, prize distribution of the (1888), 196; capitation grant, 197 ; appreciation of, by the Admiralty, 197 ; value, 198 ; Admiral Phil- limore's report on, 216 Liverpool Committee of Inquiry into the condition of Merchant Sea- men, report of, 9 London Rowing Club, 173 Mac'uonald, Admiral, his enrolment of Scottish volunteers, 76 ' Macedonia,' capture of the, by the American frigate ' United States,' 116 Mclver, Mr., 119 ' Magnificent,' 336, 339 Mail services, subsidies for, 239 ' Majestic,' subsidy from Admirak}' and Post OiHce, 241 ; speed, 243 ; 336, 339 Malacca, Straits of, torpedo boats for, 305 Malta, strength, as a fortress, to be maintained, 263 ; 294 Malta Channel, torpedo boats for, 305 Manning the Navy, Committee of 1852 on, 37, 62"^; on age of ad mission to Naval Reserve, 62 ; of 1853, 117 ; of 1859, 57, 286 ; on training ships, 68; plan for train- ing seamen, 129; 133; of I860, 2, 5 Manoeuvres, naval, 299 et seq. ; employment of officers of the Reserve in, 313 ; their lessons, 314 ; difficulty of modern block- ade, 315 ; evolutionary squadron's INDEX TO THE SECOND VOLUME 351 theatre of operations, 315 ; plan of operations, 315 ; behaviour of cruisers, 316 et scq. ; lessons of 1892, 324 et seq. ; the torpedo in, 329 Marine Society, on training ships, (>7 ; number of lads made seamen under their auspices from 1756- 1870, 67, 68 'Mariner,' unarmoured cruiser, 308 Marines, necessity of increasing, 320 Martin, Sir Byam, on the number of vessels requisite for coast defence, 27 Masters, naval, 298 Mauritius, defences of, 209 ; re- quirements necessary, 271 Mayne, I'rofessor, on subjects of study for the navy, 287 Mediterranean, the, 294 Medway, the, as a station for coast- defence vessels, 27 Melbourne, Australia, proposition to establish a docjiyard at, 213 Mends, Admiral, on naval training, 286 Mercantile marine, support afforded to navy, 2 ; interdependence of the two services, 3,54; supremacy of British over other States, 3 ; steamers as auxiliaries to navy, 3 ; organisation required in view of war, 4 ; numbers and quality of seamen, 7 ; shipowners on condition of, 9 ; foreigners em- ployed, 9, 64 ; effect of the intro- duction of steam on, 9 ; training ships, 10 ; State bonus to ship- owners for apprentices, 11, 70 ; terms of apprenticeship, 12, 71 ; shipowners' objection to appren- tices, 13 ; premium given by State, 14 ; bonuses to men on joining Reserve, 14 ; service in navy, 17 ; employment of men in time of war, 18; sympathy with navy, 31 ; Mr. Sackville West on strengthening navy with merchant reserves, 32 ; Armada beaten by a fleet chiefly drawn from, 53 ; tonnage in 1871, 54 ; impressment impossible, 54 ; development of steam vessels, 63 ; abolition of compulsory ap- prenticeship, 03, 65 ; influence of Suez Canal, 03 ; proportion of men lo 100 tons, 64, 05 ; wages in sailing and steam vessels, 8, 04 ; deterioration of seamen in- correctly alleged, 04 ; crews of yachts, 00 ; discipline, 72 ; higher education, 74 ; annual loss of seamen, 115; complaints of de- ficiency unfounded, 115-119 ; improvement in seamen's con- dition, 117 ; causes of defects, 119-121 ; bad treatment afloat, 121 ; causes of desertion, 122 ; scurvy, 122 ; evil of the advance note, 124 ; delay in paying off, 125 ; undesirability of uniform rate of pay, 125 ; training for, 128 ; character of ollicers, 134 ; desirability of a closer union with navy, 138 ; commissions for masters in the Royal Naval Reserve, 147 ; progress of shipping, 213 ; as an auxiliary to the Royal Navy, 225 et seq., 230 ; strength in ships, 225 ; steam tonnage, 220, 238, 337 ; vessels adapted for conversion into cruisers, 220 ; guns which vessels could carry, 227 ; hire of vessels in time of war, 227 ; modifications in structure of new steamers, 228; Government re- tainer, 228 ; importance of speed, 229 ; speed of the great liners, 230-232, 243 ; number and ton- nage of coast steamers, 232 ; capability of tugs and ferry-boats to carry guns, 232 ; sailing vessels for training, 233 ; organi- sation of a reserve of cruisers, 235 ; structural arrangements in new steamers, 236 ; subsidy to shipowners, 236; adaptation of 852 INDEX TO THE SP^COND VOLUME vessels as ships of war, 237 ; subsidies pai