IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. t^. :/. Us 4e 1.0 I.I 11.25 ^ 1^ III 2.0 U 111.6 :! ^' & /a O ^>, ^A e. /; O^ /A Photographic Sciences Corporation 2 y^XA MAIN STREET WEilSTER, N.Y. )4580 (716) 872-4503 4^' \ n>^ \\ ^9) \^ ^ &.- tA CIHM/ICMH Microfiche CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. n n D D D D n D D Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagde Covers restored aad/or laminated/ Couverture restaurde et/ou peilicul^e Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque Coloured maps/ Cartes g6ographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur Bound with other material/ Relid avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ Lareliure serr^e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intdrieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ 11 se peut que certaines pages blanches ajout§es lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont pas 6t6 film^es. Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppl^mentaires; L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a dtd possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la m^thode normale de filmage sont indiqu^s ci-dessous. □ Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ I I Pages endommag^es Pages restored and/oi Pages restaur6es et/ou pellicul^es Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages ddcolordes, tachetdes ou piqudes I 1 Pages restored and/or laminated/ □ Pagbs detached/ Pages d^tach^es K Showthrough/ Transparence I I Quality of print varies' D This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est fitm^ au taux de reduction indiqud ci-dessous. Quality indgale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du materiel suppl^mentaire □ Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6X6 film6es S nouveau de rapon d obtenir la meilleure image possible. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X SOX v/ 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: Library of tha Public Archives of Canada L'exemplaire filmd fut reproduit grdce d la g6n6ro8it6 de: La bibliothdque des Archivps publiques du Canada The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteti de l'exemplaire film6, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Original copies in printed paper covets are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimde sont fiimds en commen^ant par le premier plat et en terr.iinant soit par la dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous las autres exemplaires originaux sont film^s en commengant par la premidre page qui comporta une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol —^ (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Un des symboles suivants apparaftra sur la dernidre image de chaqu3 microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole — ► signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole V signifie "FIN". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre film6s A des taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour gtre reproduit en un seul clich6, ii est film6 d partir de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m6thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pr THE ADMINISTRATION O F T H E COLONIES. LONDON. Printed for J W,tK,E, at the Bible and Sun. .. .j- in St. Paul's Church-yard. ' MDCCLXIV. .'■ -.St > f'f » • THE ADMINISTRATION O F T H E COLONIES. PART I. THE feveral changes In Intererts and territories, which have taken place in the colonies of the European world on the event of Peace, have given a general imprefTion of fome new ftate of things arifing. One cannot but obferve, that there is fome general idea of fome revolu- tion of events, beyond the ordinary cour/e of things ; fome general apprehenfion, of fomething new arifing in the world j of fome nev.' channel of bufinefs, applicable to B new ( 2 ) -fomething that Is to be new powers ; — guarded againfL, on one hand, or that is to be carried to advantage on the other. There is an univerfal apprchenfion of fome new crlfis forming: yet one does not find. any where, in all thefe various impreflions of the matter, any one precife compiehenfive idea of this great crifisj and confequently, all that is propofed, is by parts, without con- nection to any whole j in temporary expe- dients \^ ithout general reference to that even- tual ftate of things which may be the ef- fed: thereof; with regard only to particular branches, that may be a foundation to fome fpecial advantages, without any fyftematical police, diredled to the intereft of all as a One Whole. This has tempted me to hazard my fen- timents on this fubjed. My particular fitua- tion gave me early opportunity of feeing and obffving the ftate of things, which have been long leading to this crifis. I have feeti and rnark'd, where it was my duty, this naf- cent crifis at the beginning of this war, and may affirm, have forefeen and foretold the events that now form it. In the firfl uncultur'd ages of Europe, when men fought nothing but to pofTefs, and to fecure poflelTion, the power of the Jword jJ! I • ( 3 ) /ivorJ was the predominant fplrlt of the world i it was that, which formed the Ro- man empire; and it was the fame, which, in the declcnfion of that empire, divided again the nations into the fcveral govern- ments farmed therefrom. When men afterward, from leifure, be- gan to cxercife the powers of their minds in (what is called) learning; religion, the (nly learning at that time, led them to a concern for their fpiritual interefts, and confequently led them under their fpiritual guides. The power of religion would hence as naturrjly predominate and rule, and did adually be- come the ruling fpirit of the policy of Eu- rope. It was this fpirit, which, for many ages formed, and gave away kingdoms ; this which created the anointed Lords over them, or again excommunicated and execrated thele fovereigns ; this that united and allied the tarious nations, or plung'd them into war and blooiifhed; this, that formed the ballance of the power of the whole, and a(Sluated the fecond grand fcene of Europe's h'iftory. But fince the people of Europe have formed their communication with iht com- merce of Alia ; have been, for fome ages pafl, fettling on all fides of the Atlantic Ocean, and in America, and pofTefling every feat and B 2 channel ( 4 ) channel of commerce, and have planted and raifed that to an intereft which has taken root; — fince tliey now feel the powers that derive from this, and are extending it to, and combining it with others; the fpirit of conuncrce will become that predominant power, which will form the general policy, and rule the powers of Europe : and hence a grand commercial intcrcfl, the bafis of a great conimercial dominion, under the prc- fcnt (cite and circumftances of the world, will be formed and arife. The rife and forming of this commercial dominion is what precifely conltitutes the prefent crifis. While each country fuppofes, that its own government adluates and governs the trade of its refpedtive fubje(5ts and dependen- cies, there is in fad: a general kind of lead in commerce^ dif.ifi^ from any of the govern- ments of Europe, a general intereft that is not concerned in, nor governed by the re- fpecflive intcrefts of Europe, that flows in its own channel, and is held in motion by the laws of its own nature. Whether this idea may be thought real or vidonary, whether we attend to it or not, is of no confequence as to the exiftence and proceffion of it. It is not in the power of human wifdom, ei- ther to form it, or to oppofe it ; it is formed, and it will become the balls of a commercial domi- t J ( 5 ) dominion. The being able to difccrn this ilatc of things, at their firfl birth, is of great ufe to any nation j but to be in Tuch circum- flances, as to interweave thcfe nafccnt povvcis into, and to combine their inBiicuce with, the fame interefls that aduate our own go- vernment, muft be of the lail importance to the glory, and perhaps the being, of fuch government. In the coinfes of the procef- fion of mankind, as in the operations of na- ture, all that we can do is, to mark the naf- cent flate of things, that, when a crifis is forming, we may fo conned: and combine our operations with it, as to partake of its influence, and to build on its power. It is not men that form great events, but the crifis of events duly poiTelled and actuated that form great men. It is not in the pofTihility of all the power and wifdom of our government, to form this great commercial power ; but it would be the wifdom, and is the duty of thofe who govern us, to profit of, to poflefs, and to take the lead of it already formed, and arifing fafl into dominion. This lead feemed at the beginning of the war, to ofcilate between the Englidi and French j and it was in this war that the dominion alfo hath been dif- puted. The lead is nov/ in our hands i we have fuch hold of the ballance, that when- B 3 ever ( 6 ) ever this lead becomes the foundation of a dominion, it mud be ours. It is now the duty of thofe who govern ns, to carry forward this (late of things, to the weaving this lead into our fyftem, that our kingdom may be no more confidered as the mere kingdom of thi.> ifle, with many appendages of provinces, tc Ionics, fctde- ments, and other extraneous parts ; but as a grand maiine dominion, confifting of our pofleflions in the Atlantic and in America united into a one intereft, in a one center where the feat of government is. As the fifing of til is crifis, above defcribed, forms preciftlv ihc objecl on which government Should be employed j fo the taking leading meaTures towards the forming all thefe At- lintic and American pofll-flions into a one dominion, of which Great Britain Hiould be the commercial center, to which it fliould be the fpring of power, is the precifi duty of government at this crifis. I fuppofe nobody can be fo .ignorant, or Imagine me to be fo ignorant, as to conceive, that this dominion is adlually and in fadl, to be eftabliChed at this moment; or that thofe circumilances, and that ftate of things which will in the jiatural coiirfe of events arifc in future, can be new artificially brought on ( 7 ) on by the force of policy; but left any fucli niifconception (hoiild be received, I mull beg that it may be diftindly underftood, that notwithftanding it be a fundamental maxim and law in every kingdom and ftate, that the trade of its refpedlive colonies fliall be con- fined folely to the intercourfe and commerce of the mother country; — -yet fuch is the ftate, and fuch are the circumftances of thcfc colonies univerfally, that without an abfo- lutc and entire inflation of this principle, they would neither have any trade, nor even fubfiftence ; and the fa6t is, that this maxim is univerfally through all the Spanifli, Dutch, French, Danifli and Britiili colonies broke through. If the colonics may be fuppofed to be naturally as well as artificially united in the intereft, and fubmitted to the domi- nion of the mother country, ti.eir intercll: and actions muft follow the fate of that mo- ther country; but, tliat thefe colonies may be at war, when the mother country might otherwife be at peace, the Spanidi war is a proof; that they may be in the full exercife of the commerce of peace when the mother countries are at war, I believe every war is a proof. If therefore, having an interell which requires a trade, diredly contrary to the fundamental maxims and laws of the mother country, and if thefe feveral inter- efts in the colonies of the different nations B 4 through- ( 8 ) throughout the Atlantic, thus abfolutely dif- ferent from the particular intereft of their refpedlive mother countries, muft neceffari- 1^ fo combine, as to form a one general commercial intereft, different and diftindl from the general and European intereft of the feveral powers on which they depend : I do repeat, that there is a general commer- cial intereft of the Atlantic and American fettlements, peculiar to thefefettlements, and diftindl from either the particular interefts of the relpccflive mother countries, or the ge- neral intereft of their European policy ; that this general intereft will, in its natural ten- dency, lead under the influence of that branch of buflnefs, and thofe merchants who actu- ate it, which predominates in the general in- tercourle and operation of its necellities ; that this lead will difTolve the eflfedl of all ar- tificial connexions which government would create, and form the natural connediions un- der which thefe interefts actually exift, — will fuperfede all particular laws and cuf- toms, and operate by thofe which the nature and adual circumftances of the feveral in- terefts require. This lead, 1 repeat it, is the foundation of a commercial do.jinion, w^hich, whether we attend to it or not, will be formed ; for the intereft, that is the ba- fis of it, is already formed : incapable from JDOth internal and external caufeg, to become as in- is m, ill as i i /. ( 9 ) as well Indepcndant as diftind, it muft, and will fall under the dominion ofjome of the potentates of Europe. Tbe great qucjiirji nt this crifis isy and the great jiriiggle will be, which of thefe ftates will be in thofe cir- cumftances, and will have the vigour and wifdom fo to profit of thofe circumftances, as to take this lead under its dominion, and to unite it to its government. The forming therefore fome general fyf- tem of adminiftration, founded on this ac- tual flate of things, fome plafi which fnould be, (whatever may be the changes of the miniflry at home, or in the governors and oilicers employed abroad) uniformly and permanently purfued by meafures founded on the adtual ftate of things as they arife, leading to this great end is, at this crijisy the e>^ft< »- ^^ precife duty_o£^governme72t . This is an oh- r%^r^ '^ completion, becaufe any meafures of policy ^z-*^/ ^^-^'*"^~^ which thev can take to obllrudl it, muft t\'»^^*~*^^ ther deflroy the trade of their own colonies, or J^^^^*^^ ""^ , break oif their connection. If :hcy attempt /^^'^'^ j . to do this by force, they muO firfl form an -^y^^' t^^ ^ alliance, ^ ^i>9u^'*<^ilh ^^^^^j2;. M^ ' I ^ ( '° ) alliance, and fettle the union of their mu- tual interefts, and the eventual partition of the efFedt of it ; but this will prove a matter of more difficulty, than can eafily be com- pafled, and under the difadvantages created thereby, there will be much hazard of the utmoft effort of their united forces. To enable the Britlfli nation to profit of thefe circumftances, either at prefent, or of the future events, as they fhall fucceflively arife in the natural procelfion of the efifeds of thefe circumftances, in its dominions, poflef- iions and commerce abroad, it is neceffary, that the adminiftration form itfelf at home, into fuch eftablifhments for the direction of thefe interefts and powers, as may lead them in their natural channel, under due connedtions with the government, to the utmoft effect they are capable of producing towards this grand point. The firft fpring of this diredion, the ba- fis of this government, is the adminiftration at home. If that department of admini- flration, which fhould have the diredtion of thefe matters, be not wifely and firmly bot- tomed, be not fo built, as to be a fraSlical — be not fo really fupportcd by the powers of government, as to be an efficicut adminiftra- iiorii all meafures for the adminiftration of thefe I I ( " ) jhefe interefts, all plans for the government of thefe powers are vain and felf-dclufive ; even thofe meaiures that would regulate the movements and unite the interefts, under a pradlical and efficient adminiftration, become mifchievous meddling impertinencies where that is not, and mud either ruin the inter- efts of thefe powers, or render a breach of duty neceflary to avoid that ruin. That part of government, which fliould adminifter this great and important branch of bufinefs, ought, in the firft place, to be the center of all information and application from all the interefts and powers v/hich form if ; and ought, from this center, to be able, fully, uniformly, and efficiently, to diftri-- bute its diredlions and orders. Wherever the wifdom of ftate fhall determine that this center of information fhall be fixed; from whatever department all appointments, or- ders, and executive adminiftration fhall iflue, it ought fomewhere to be fixed, known, of record, and undivided; that it may net be partial, it ought to extend to all times, and all cafes. All application, all communi- cation, all information (hould center imme- diately and folely in this department: this fhould be the fpringof all nominations, in- ftrudlions, and orders. It is of little con- fequence where this power of adminiftration is T[!!l I , ( 12 ) is placed, fo that the department be fuch, as has the means of knowledge of its bufinefs — is fpecially appropriated to the attention nc- cellary to jt — and officially fo formed as to be in a capacity of executing it. Whether this be a Secretary of State, or the Board of Trade and Plantations, is of no confequence; but it ought to be intirely in either the one or the other. Where the power, for the di- rection is lodged, there ought al! the know- ledge of the department to center ; therefore all officers, civil and military, all fervants of the government, and all other bodies or pri- vate perfons ought to correfpond immediate- ly with this department, whether it be the Secretary of State or the Board of Trade. While the military correfpond with the Se- cretary of State, the civil in one part of their office with the Secretary of State, in another with the Board of Trade -, while the navy correfpond in matters not merely naval with the Admiralty, while the engineers cor- refpond with the Board of Ordnance, offi- cers of the revenue with the feveral boards of that branch, and have no communication with the department which has, or ought to have, the general diredtion and admini- flration of this great Atlantic and American, this great commercial intereft, who is to col- lect ? who does, or ever did colledl, into a all thefe matters of information and ,;S one view. I ( »3 ) and knowledge? What department ever had, or could have, fuch general dire/ -|iMi ( 22 ) tl)e grounds on which it will arlfe : but removed as I am from every communication with adminiflration in this department, and uninformed, I have not prefumed to enter into the difciifTion cf this great point. Wlierever it is taken up, it muft be by per- fons who, with the benefit of real, official information, and confidential knowledge of I ^eafures, mufl have fuperior, and the only lights, in which it ought to be viewed, and determined. Upon a fuppofition, therefore, that this matter is fettled, as moft certainly it will be, fome time cr other, I will pro' ^ed, con- fining myfelf foleiy to the matters of the colonies; to review fome points that ajferve, and will require, the confideration of go- vernment, if it ever means to profit of, and lead the great Atlantic and American inte- refl which it has acquired, and to unite it to its dominion. Before entering into thcfe matters, I do liOt think it would be impertinent jufl to mark the idea of colonies, and their fpe- cial eircumdances, which makes it a mea- fure in commercial governments, to eila- blilli, cultivate, and maintain them. ' ' The i nea- ( 23 ) The view of trade in general, ns vveU as of manufadures in particular, terminates in fecuring an extenfive a.:d permanent vent; or to fpeak more precifely, (in the fame manner as fliop-keeping does) in having many and good cultomers : the wifdcm, therefore, of a trading nation, is to gain, and to create, as many as pofllble. 1 hoic whom we gain in foreign trade, we poffcfs under reflridlions and difficulties, and may lofe in the rivalfhip of commerce : thole that a trading nation can create within it- felf, it deals with und«;r its own regulatioi>s, and makes its own, and cannot lofe. In the eftablifliing colonies, a nation creates people whofe labour, being applied to new objed^s of produce and manufjdure, open new channels of commerce, by which they not only live in eafe and affluence within themfelves, but, while they are labouring under and for the mother country, (for there all their external profits center) be- come an increafmg nation, of appropriated and good cuflomers to the mother country. Thefe not only increafe our manufadures, encrtafe our exports, but extend our com- merce .; and if duly adminiflcred, extend the nation, its pov/crs, and its dominions, to wherever thefe people extend their fettle- men ts. 'I is, and 1, IS IS, therefore, an intereft which e dear to the mothe 4. country oughi to be dear to the mother 'C o:< / iO'L I : Jii ,:!!<; ( 24 ) country : this is an objed that deferves the bed care and attention of government : and the people, who through various hardfhips, difafcers, and difappoiiitments ; through va- rious difficuhies and almoft ruinous ex- pences, have wrought np this intereft to fuch an important ohjedt, merit every pro- tection, grace, encouragenrient, and privi- lege, that are in the power of the mother country to grant. It becomes the duty of thd mother coun- try to nourifh and cultivate, to protedt and govern the colonies — which nurture and government (hould precifely direct its care and influence to two eflential points, ift, That all the profits of the produce and ma- nufadures of thefe colonies center in the mother country : and 2dly, That the colo- nies continue to be the fole and fpecial pro- per cuftomers of the mother country. It is on this valuable confideraiioriy (as Mr. Dum- mer, in his prudent and fpirited defence of the colonies uys) they have a right to the grants, charters, privileges and protedion which they receive ; and alfo on the other hand, it is from thefe grants, charters, pri- vileges and protedion given to them, that the mother country has an exclufive right to the external profits of their labour, and to their cuftom. To thefe two points, col- lateral es the : and llliips, ^h va- s ex- eft to y pro- privi- nother coun- protedt ire and ts care . I ft, id ma- in the ; colo- j1 pro- y. It Dum- nce of to the edion other s, pri- that 2 right ', and I, col- lateral ( 25 ) lateral with the interefts, rights and welfare of the colonies, every meafure of admini- ftration, every law of trade fhould tend: I fay collateral, becanfc, rightly iinderflood, thefe two points are mutually coeval and coincident with the interefts, rights and welfare of the colonies. It has been often fuggefted, that care fliould be taken in the adminiftration of the plantations ; left, in fome future time, thefe colonies fhould become independent of the mother country. But perhaps it may be proper on this occafion, *iay, it is juftice to fay it, that if, by becoming indepen- dent is meant a revolt, nothing is further from their nature, their intercft, their thoughts. If a defedion from the alliance of the mother country be fuggefted, it ought to be, and can be truly faid, that their fpi- rit abhors the fenfe of fuch j their attach- ment to the proteftant fucceflion in the houfe of Hanover will ever ftand unftiaken ; and nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural, almoft mechanical, afi^edlion to Great Britain, which they conceive under no other fenfe, nor call by any other name, than that oi home. Befides, the merchants are, and muft ever be, in great meafure allied with thofe of Great Britain : their very lupport M m :, irj I ( 26 ) . fupport confifls in this alliance. The liberty and religion of the Eritifli coIonies^ are in- compatible with either French or Spanidi . government; and they know full well, that they could liope for neither liberty nor pro- tection under a Dutch one ; no circumrtan- ces of trade could tempt them thus to cer- tain ruin. Any fuch fuggeftion, therefore, is a falfe and unjufb afperfion on their prin- ciples and affe(ftions ; and can arife from nothing but an intire ignorap.ce of their cir- cumftanccs. Yet again, on the other hand, while they remain under the fupport and proteiftion of the government of the mother country ; while tht:y profit of the beneficial part of its trade; while their attachment to the prcfent royal family flands firm, and their alliance with the mother country is inviolate, it may be worth while to inquire, whether they may not become and adt in- dependent of the government and laws of the mother country : — and if any fuch fymp- toms fliould be found, either in their go- vernment, courts, or trade, perhaps it may be thought high time, even now, to inquire how far thefe colonies are or are not ar- rived, at this time, at an independency of the government of the mother country : — and if any meafure of fuch independency, formed upon precedents unknown to the go- '^ t 1 ■ tit 01 cc \ tr; in 1 r al n( tli to of ri: ( 27 ) government of the mother country at the time they were form'd, /liould be infiflcd on, when the government of the mother country was found to be fo weak or dif- traded at home, or fo deeply engaged abroad in Europe, as not to be able to attend to, and aflcrt its right in America, with its own peopJe : — perhaps it may be thought, that no time lliould be lufl to remedy or redrefs thcfe deviations — if any fnch be found -, or to remove all jealoufics arifing from the idea of them, if none fuch really exifl. If the c'jionics are to be pofT-fTed, aT"of right, ajid governed by the crown, as do- mains of the crown, by fuch cliarters, com- miirions, infliudions, ^ ther, adling under the mask of the forms of government. This is the fhck-t and pre- cife abftrad; of the long and perplexed hif- tory of the governments and adminiftrations of the colonies, under the various fliapes with which their quarrels have vexed them- felves, and teized government at home. If this idea of the crown's right to go- vern thefe as domains be jug, and be as right in fadt, as, it is fuppofed to be in the- ory, let it be fetded and fixed by fome due and fafficient authority, what it is, and how far it extends. But this is not all 5 let it be fo eftabliflied, that where it ought, it may adually ( ,^0 ) adlually, and in pr?'!lice, be carried into ex- ecution alio. It this right be doubted ; or if, being allowed, it fi nd:> itfclf in fuch cir- cumftanccs as not to be able to carry its powers into execution, it will then become an obje(5t of government, to fee that thefe colonies be governed, and their affairs admi- niftered fome other way. There is no doubt in the theory of our conftitution of the king's right, in time of war and array, to exercife martial law : and yet in pradlice it has been found right, (and would not other- wife be permitted) that this martial law fhould be confirmed by parliament. If, therefore, the feveral points wherein the crown, or its governors av^ing under its infl:ru(5lions, differ with the people be con- fidered, and it be once determined what, in order to maintain the fubordination of the government of the colonies to the govern- ment of Great Britain, is neceffary to be done, — the mode of doing that will beeafily fettled. If It be a point determined, that it lies wholly with the crown to fix and adlu- ate this order of government — the crown will duly avail itfelf of that power, with which it is entrufted, to enforce its adminiflratidn. But if it be found that, howover this may lie with the crown as of right, yet the crowa. is not in power to eftablilh this right, it i '.J [ 31 ] — It will of courfc call in aid the povverVf the Icgiflnturc, to confirm and e(labli(li it. But if, finally, it fliould appear, that thefe colonies, as corporations within the domi- nions of Great Britain, are inchided within the imperium of the realm of the fame, — id will then of right become the duty of legi- flaturc to intcrpofe in the cafe ; to regulate and define their rights and privileges ; to edablifli and order their adminiflriition ; and to dire6l the channels of their commerce, Tho' the firft of theie meafures ihould be, in ftridl juflice, the crown's right — yet the fecond is the only next pradicable one: and altho' the fecond, as fnch, may mod likely be adopted — yet the third is the only wife and fare mcafure. In the fecond caie, the crown, havino; formed its feveral j^eneral in- flru(5tions for the feveral governments, ac- cording to their various charters, grants, and proprietaries, will order the fime, in thofe points which it cannot influence and determine by the eflfecfl of its own negative, to be laid before parliament, lo be confi- dered and confirmed by the legiflaturc, in the fame manner as arc the rules for governing the army. In the third cafe, tlie crown will order its minifiry to lay before parliament, the rights and powers of the crown •, the rights, privileges and claims of the people ; with a general flate of the colonies, their intcrell . [ 32 1 ititercft and operations, as related to the crown, as related to the moihcr country, as related to foreign powers and intcrefts, and to the colonics of foreign powers, as related to the laws and government of the mother country; — perhaps pointing outfome general plan of government, judicatory, revenue and commerce, as may become, what I hinted at in the beginning of this paper — a leading meafure to the forming Great Britain, with all its Atlantic and American pofleflions, into one great commercial dominion. In the one cafe, the inftrudVions of the crown, ^ither fome general form of fuch, or the fpecial ones given to each governor, on each frefh nomination, will be confirm'd by par- liament, as the rules and orders for govern- ing the army are. In the other, a general bill of rights, and eftablifhment of govern- ment and commerce on a great plan of uni- on, will be fettled and enaded : the govern- ments of the feveral colonies, on the conti- nent and in the illands, will be conlidered as fo many corporations, holding their lands in common foccage, according to the manor of Eaft Greenwich, united to the realm; fo that, for every power, which they ex- ercife or poflefs, they will depend on the government of Great Britain ; fo that, in every movement, . they may be held, each within its proper fphere, and be drawn and conne(fted yr^: [ 33 J connected to this center : and as forming a one fyftem, they will be fo conncdted tn their various orbs anu fubordination of or- ders, as to be capable of receiving and com- municating, from the firft mover (the government of Great Britain) any po- litical motion, in the dircdion in which it is given. Great Britain, as the center of this fyftem, mud be the center of at- tradion, to which thcfe colonies, in the adminiftration of every power of their go- vernment, in the exercife of their judicial pjwers, and the execution of their laws, and in every operation of their trade, mufl: tend. They will be fo framed, in their na- tural and political interefts ; in the rights, privileges, and proteftion they enjoy -, in the powers of trade, which they aduate, under the predominating general commerce of the narion, that they will remain under the con- ftant influence of the attradtion of this cen- ter; and cannot move, but that every di- rection of fuch movement will converge- to the fame. At the fame time that they all confpire in this one center, they muft be guarded againft having, or fuming, any principle of coherence with each other above that, whereby they cohere in this center; having no other principle of intercommuni- cation between each other, than that by which they are in joint communion with D Great ( 34 ) Great Britain as the common center of all. At the fame time that they arc, each in their rci'pcdive parts and fubordinations, lb framed, as to be aduited by this firft mov- . cr, — tliey fliould always remain incapable of any coherence, or of fo confpiring amongft themidvcs, as to create any other equal force, which might recoil back on this firft mover : nor is it more necelTary to prcferve the feve- ral governments fubordinate within their rc- fpedtive orbs, than it is efl'ential to the prc- lervation of the empire to keep them dif- conncifted and independent of e?ch other : they certainly are fo at prcfent ; the diti'erent manner in which they are fettled, the diffe- rent modes under which they live, the dif- ferent forms of charters, grants and frame of government they poffefs, the various prin- ciples of repulfion, — that thefe create the different intcrefts which they aduate, the religious interefts by which they are actuat- ed, the rivahhip and jealoufies which arife from hence, and the impradlicability, if not' the impoffibility of reconciling and accom- modating thefe incompatible ideas and claims, will keep them for ever fo. And nothing but a tampering adivily of wrongheaded in- experience milled to be meddling, can ever do any milchief here. The provinces and colonies are under the beft form as to this point, which they can be. They are under . - .. the ( 35 ) the bcft frame and cliTpofition for tlie go* vcrnmcnt of the mother country (duly ap- plied) to take place. And as there cannot be a more juft, fo there cannot be a wifer incafure than to leave them all in the free and full poflbflion of their fcveral rights and privilegej, ns by grant, charter, or commif- fion given, and in the full excrcifc thereof, fo far, and no further, than as derived therc- ;i from. If, upon a revifion, there be found I any, and perhaps fonie one fuch at leafl:, may be found, who have grofhly and inten- tionally tranfgreflcd thefe bounds, fuch (hould be an exception to this rule, and be made an example alio to others. Under the guidance therefore of thcfc principles — that the final external profits of the labour and produce of colonies (hould center in the mother country, — that the co- lonifts are the appro^-riatco fpecial cullom- ers of the mother country, — that the colo- nics, in their government and trade, (hould be all united in communion witli, and fub- ordination to the government of the mother country, but ever difconnefted and indepen- dent of each other by any other commu- nion than what centers here : — Under the guidance of thefe principles, with a temper and fpirit which remember that thefe are our own people, our brethren, faithful, good D 2 and ./ "^ ( 36 ) and beneficial fubjedls, and free-born Eng- Hfhmen, or by adoption, ppffefling all the right of freedom :• — Under the guidance of thefe principles, and with this temper and fpirit of government, — let a revifion be made of the general and feveral governments of the colonies, of their laws and courts of juf- tice, of their trade, and the general Britifli laws of trade, in their feveral relations in which th'^y fland to the mother country, to the government of the mothrr country, to foreign countries, and the colonies of fo- reign countries, to one another , and then let thofe meafures be taken, which, upon fuch a review, fliall appear neceflary ; and all which government can do, or ought to do at pref'^nt, will be done. Upon luch review it will appear, under this iirH: general head, in various inftances, that tlic two great points which the colonifts labour to eftablifh, is the exercife of the!, fe- veral rights and privileges, as founded in the rights of an EngliQiman ; and fecondly, as what they fuppofe to be a necefTary meafurc in a fubordinate government, the keeping in their own hands the command of the reve- nue, and the pay of the officers of govern- ment, as a fecurity for their condud towards them. ' 3 Upon 4 - ( 37 ) Under the firft head come all the dif- putes about the King's inftrudlion?, and the governor's power. The King's commiflion to his governor, which grants the power of government, and directs the calling of a legillature, and the eftablifhing courts, at the fame time that it fixes the governor's power, according to the feveral powers and directions granted and ap- pointed by the commiflion and inflrudions> adds, *' and by (uchfiiriber powers ^ in/lrtiolwns, " and authorities, as (hall, at any time here- ** after be granted or appointed you, under " our fignet or lign nanuai, or by our order ** in our privy council." It fhould here feem, that the fame power which framed the commiflion, with this claufe in it, could alfo ifllie its future orders and infirudiions in confcquenc? thereof ; but the people of the colonies fay, that the inhabitants of the colonies are entitled to all the privileges of Engliflimen ; that they have a right to par- ticipate in the legiflative power : and that no commands of the crown, by orders in council, inftnidions, or letters from Secre- taries of State, are binding upon them, fur- ther than they pleafe to acquiefce under fuch, and conform their own aBions thereto ; that they hold this right of i?egiflature, not de- rived from the grace and will of the crown, D 3 and ■i/ M^ *•/■ J f > /:.!? d> /•.^/ ( 38 ) and depending on the commlHion which continues at the will of the crown ; that this right is inherent and eflential to the com- munity, as a community of Engliflimen : arKTlrjat therefore they muft have all the rights, privileges, and full and free exer- cife of their own will and liberty in mak- ing laws, which are necelTary thereto, — un- controuled by any power of the crown, or of the governor, as derived therefrom ; and, that the claufe jn the comjriiffion, directing the governor to call together a legiflature by his writs, is declarative and not creative ; and therefore KeTiTdlreded to adt conform*'- ably to a right a(flually already exifling ) ^ r. people, &c. , . , . .> . . I Jufl, as this reafoning may be, and right, as it may be, that tht aflembly, in its Icgif- lative capacity, as one branch, (hould be in- dependent of the governor as another branch in the legiflature, — yet fure, fo long as thefe governments are fubordinate to the govern- ment of the mother country, even the le- giflature cannot adt independent of it, nor \.of that part of it which the conftitution has .determined is to govern thefe colonics. I do not here enter into the difcuflion of this point ; I only endeavour fairly to ftate it, as I think, it is a matter which ought to be fettled ibme way or other, and ought no 4' ■■"■ longer A.ft ■ ^'' ^ ^ \ / L (■■ C 39 longer to remain in contentipn, that the fc- veral matters which fland in inllrudion, and in difpute in confequence of it, may be finally placed upon their right grounds ; in the doing of which it muft come under con- lideration, how far the crown has or has not a right to dired or reftrid the legiflature of the colonies, — or if the crown has not this power, what department of government has, and how it ought to be exercifed; — or whe- ther in fad or deed, the people of the colo- nies, having every right to the full powers of government, nnd to a whole legijlative fowcKy are under this claim entitled in the ;j^' powers of legiflature and the adminiftration of government, to ufe and exerclfe in con- -'''A '//< formity to the laws of Great Britain, the 4^,^^,^^; /;/j!^^ji^v fame, full, free, independent, unreftrained — power and legiflative will in their feveral cor- --'i- porations, and under the King's commiffion and their refpedive charters, as the govern- ment and legiflature of Great Britain holds by its conflitution, and under the great char- ter. . ^ Every fubjed, born within the realm, un- der the freedom of the Government of Great Britaii;^ or by adoption admitted to the fame, has an eflential indefeafible right to be go- verned, under fuch a mode of government as has the unreflrained exercife of all thofe D 4 powers 'i'-i^t ■— ^' r ■ - »s^ 4 ^ ..^f/- ^J ^ H c^ -;>//>)&:<, 7 4 ( i U^'' ( 40 ) powers which form the freedom and rights of the conftitution; and therefore, " the ** crown cannot eftablifli any colony upon — ** or contract it within a narrower fcale than *' the fubjed: is entitled to, by the great ** charter of England." The government of each colony muft have the fame powers, and the fame extent of powers that the govern- ment of Great Britain has, — and muft have, while it does not adl contrary to the laws of Great Britain, the fame freedom and in- dependence of legiflature, as the parliament of Great Britain has. This Right (fay they) iii 'mded, not only in the general prin- cipic. of the rights of a Britifli fubjedt, but is acf^ually declared, confirmed, or granted to them in the commiffions and charters which gave the particular frame of their re- fpedlive conftitutions. If therefore, in the firft original eftablifhment, like the origi*. nal contract, they could not be eftabliflied upon any fcale fhort of the full and corn- pleat fcale of the powers of the Britifli go- vernment, — nor the legiflature be eftablifl:!- ed on any thing lefs than the whole legifla- tive power; much lefs can this power of I' /^/S^ 4^-"^^ government and legiflature, thus eftabliflied, be governed, direded, reftrained or reftrid- ed, by any pofterior inftrudions or commands by the letters of Secretaries of State. But !y/M v '^^ upon the fuppofition, that a kind of gene- J . ..' ral ^^^> :< caufe fuch fufpenfion disfranchifes the inhe- rent full power of legillature, which they claim by their rights to the Britifh liberties, and by the fpecial declarations of fuch in their charters. It does not remove this dif- ficulty by faying, that the crown has al- ready in its hands the power of fixing this point, by the efl^ed of its negative given to its governor. It is faid, that if the crown ihould withdraw that inftrudion, which al- lows certain bills to be pafTed into laws with a fufpending claufe, which inftrudion is not meant as a reftridion upon, but an indul- gence to the legiflatures 5 that if the crown , fhould .^f 1^' A\ X r }1l---<-'i ^ ■■<■■> *"*"'" .>^ '.fC: TJ ^ a*^•^^^ -.'^ '■ I ' "J"' I -^?. .<'('■•/'•■' i*... ( 42 ) (liould withdraw this inflrudlion, and pe- remptorily reftrain its governor from enadt- ing laws, under fuch circumftanccs as the wifdoni of government cannot admit of, that then thefe points arc adlually fixed by the true conflitutional power ; but where- ever it is fo iaid, I mud repeat my idea, that this does not remove the difficulty. For waving the doubt which the colonics might raife, efpecially in the charter colonies, how far the governor ought, or ought not, to be rcflrid:f'i from giving his afTent in cafes contrary only to inftrudlions, and not to the iaws of Great Britain ; waving this point, '^^'^/P'^^^" ^ f, let adminiftration confider i , eSeds of this f^h v/tjiiif/'- riieafure. In cafes where tho bills, offered - - '>it\.>''r'Tt, \^y (i^e ^^Q branches, are for providing laws, abfoluttly neceffary to the continuance, fup- port, and cxcrcife of government, and where yet the orders of the crown, and the fenfe of the people, are fo widely different as to ihe mode, that no agreement can ever be come to in thefe points. — Is the government and adminiflration of the government of the colonies to be fufpended ? The intereft, per- haps the being of the plantations, to be ha- zarded by this obftinate variance, and can the exercife of the Crown's negative, in fuch emergencies, and w^ith fuch effedt, ever be taken up as a meafure of adminiflration ? And /c. ■•■»* ..«* ■:k, *A, %-.^ y? ^ ■'.t ( 43 ) And when every thing is thrown info con- fufion, and abandoned even to ruin by fuch meafure, will adminirtration juflify itfelf by faying, that it is the fault of the colonics ? On the contrary, this very ftate of the cafe ihows the necellity of fome other remedy. • . ^ " ♦ The fettling and determining this point Is of the moft eflential import to the liberties on one hand, and the fubordination on the other, of the government of the colonies to the government of the mother country.— In the examination of this point, it vvill come under confidcration, firft, Whether the full and whole of legiflature can be any way, in any fpecial cafe, fufpended ; and next, whe- /" ther the crown, by its inftrudtions, can fuf-'^-'^^'^ *^/^'' ^ pend the efFedt of this legiflature, which by ^^^^'^.t. ;..'>* its commiflion or charters it has given or de- clared ; if not, the crown, whether the par- liament of Great Britain can do it, and how; whether it (hould be by adl of Parliament, or whether by addreffing the crown upon a declarative vote, that it would be pleafed to provide, by its inftrudions, for the carry- ing the effed: of fuch vote into execution, as was done in the cafe of the paper-money currency. ■Ur- /iif < '' l/L '■;} 5 . / •- In the courfe of examining thefe matters, will arife to confidcration the following very material ?r 'J ( 44 ) matcilal point. As a principal tie of the iubordiiiation of the legiilatures of the colo- nies on the government of the mother coun- try, they are bound by their conftitutionb and V *?^.'» ^ ^» • ^^^^'"'^'^'j '^ ^*^"^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ legiflature y/..\^(, ^^ England, to be confirmed or abrogated by the crown; but if any of the legiflatures fliould be found to do almofl every adt of legiflature, by votes or orders, even to the ._ repealing the efFe<5ts of afts, fufpending efta- ^ bhriiments of pay, paying fervices, doing chancery, and other judicatory bufinefs : if / ^/^, ^ matters of this fort, done by thefe votes and orders, never reduced into the form of an adl, have their effed: without ever being fent n.^ ?^•^■ V %'>>/> J.'"" A /y< •> * /./' if^ U^J \/f ^) j/aS ^i^jfi-hhovj^Q as ads of legiflature, or fubmitted to I '^ ^ ^ the allowance or difallowance of the crown : p/'ii-f- ft^^ '■ if it fhould be found that many, or any of the legiflatures of the colonies carry the powers of legiflature into execution, independent of the crown by this device, — it will be a point to be determined how far, in fuch cafes, the fubordination of the legiflatures of the colonies to the government of the mother country is maintained or fufpended 5— or if, from emergencies arifing in thefe govern- ments, this device is to be admitted, the point, how far fuch is to be admitted, ought to be determined ; and the validity of thefe votes and orders, thefe Senatus Confulta fo far declared. For a point of fuch great import- I t :4 ■,r ( 45 ) , importance In the fubordinatlon of the co^ lony legHlatures, and of fo qiicftionablc a caft in the valid exercife of this Icgiflative power, ought no longer to remain in qucf- tion. '^ ' ■ . The next general point yet undetermined, X^'" ^'^^^^-^ the determination of which very eflentially . Xy'". imports the fubordination and dcpendance of the colony governments on the govern- ment of the mother country, is, the man- ner of providir- for the fupport of govern- ment, and all the executive officers of the crown. The freedom and right efficiency of the conftitution require, that the execu- . tive and judicial officers of government fhould be independent of the legiflative, and more efpecially in popular governments, where the legiflature itfelf is fo much influ- enced by the humours and paffions of the people; for if they be not, there will be neither juflice nor equity in any of the courts of law, nor any efficient execution of the laws and orders of government in the ma- giftracy j according therefore, to the confti- tution of Great Britain, the crown has the appointment and payment of the feveral exe- cutive and judicial officers, and the legifla- ture fettle a permanent and fixed appoint- ment for the fupport of government and civil lift in general ; This therefore the crown ■ •- has. V, I'- ( 46 ) • has, afcrtiori^ a right to require of the colo- nics, to whom, by its commiflion or charter it gives the power of government, (and does, by its inftrudion? to its governors, diredt them to require ot' the legillature) fuch per- manent fupport, appropriated to the offices, not the officers of government, that they may not depend upon the temporary and arbitrary will of the legiflature. This order of the crown is generally, if not univerfally rejedled, by the legiflatures of the colonies. The alTemblics who quote the precedents of the Britifli conftitution, in all the rights and privileges which they claim on the principles thereof, allow the truth and fitnefs of this principle in the Bri- tifli conftitution, where the executive power of the crown is immediately adminiftred by the King's Majefty; yet fiy, under the cir- cumftanccs in which they find therafelves, that there is no other meafure left to them to prevent the mifapplications of public mo- ney, than by an annual revenue ifluing from monies lodged in the hands of a provincial treafurcr appointed by the aflemblics. For in^ thefe fubordinate governments, remote from his Majefty's immediate influence, admini- ftred oftentimes by neceffitous and rapacious governors who have no natunl, altho' they have a political connexion with thccountry,K dxpe- iiii' ( 47 ) experience has fliewn that they Iiav-'. ( 56 ) colvon'cs fliall hnve no laws contrary to the laws of Great Britain, yet, from the fluc- tuation of rcfolution?, and confufion in the conftrudtion and pradice of the law in the divers and feveral colonies, it is certain, that the practice of their courts, and their com- mon law, muft be not only different from each other, but in the confequence different alfo from that of Great Britain. In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law j but each colony being vefted with a Icgiflative power, the common law is thereby conti- nually altered ; fo that (as a great law^yer of the colonies has faid) *' by reafon of the " divcrllty of the refolutions, in their re- " fpedlive fuperior courts, and of the feve- " ral new adts or laws made in them feve- rally ; the feveral fyftems of the laws of thofe colonies grow more and more va- riant, not only from one another, but alfo from the laws of England." (C (C (< (C Under the third article, I fear experience can well fay, how powerfully, even in courts, the influence of the leaders of party have been felt in matters between individuals. But in thefc popular governments, and where every executive officer is under a dependence for a temporary, wretched, and I had almoft faid, arbitrary fupport to the deputies of the people, !■ -l- 'lil f ■'('"■, ( S7 ) people, — It will be no injufllce to the frame of human nature, either in the pcrfonof the judges, of the juries, or even the popular lawyer to ruggeft, how little the crown, or the rights of government, when oppofed to the fpiiit of democracy, or even to the paf- fions of the populace, has to expedt of that fupport, maintenance, and guardianfliip, which the courts are even by the conftitution fuppofed to hold for the crown. — Nor would it be any injuftice to any of the colonies, juft to remark in this place, how difficult, if ever pradlicable it is in any of their courts of common law to convidl any perfon of a vio- . M/0 ' ' lation of the laws of trade, or in any matter J-^^ ^^ ' "' ' ' of crown revenue. But the defect in moft, ^./>A-V ^'^'- ' and adual dciiciency in many of the colo- 'vv^:^ ^'i^-^-' • nies, of a court of equity, does ftill more i-s ^ ^^, ^i forcibly lead to the necelfity of the meafure ' "''' ' of fome remedial court of appeal and equi-- ' t'*«< // '^{•j^-*^ ty- In all the King's governments fo called, — the governor, or governor and coun- cil are the chancellor, or judges of the court of chancery. But fo long as I under- hand that the governor is, by his general inftruftion, upon found principles of policy and juftice, reftrained from cxercifing the office of judge or juftice in his own perfon, I own I always confidered the governor, taking up the office of chancellor, as a cafe labouring with inexplicable difficulties. But li^ ,1 >l 1 il I ' l; .III !■ :•}■ i': ( S8 ) But how unfit are governors in general for this high office of law ; and how improper is it that governors (ho.ild be judges, where perhaps the confcquence of the judgment may involve government, and the adminiftration thereof, in the con- tentions of parties. But the fadt is, that the general diffidence of the wifdom of this court thus conftituted, the apprehenfion that reafons of government may mix in with the grounds of the judgment, has had an ef- fect that the coming to this court is avoided as much as poffible, fo that it is almoft in difufe, even where the cftablifliment of it IS allowed. But in the charter governments they have no chancery at all. I muft again quote the opinion of a great lawyer in the colonies, — ** there is no court of chancery ** in the charter governments of New Eng- ** land [and I believe I may add alfo in Pen- fylvania] " nor any court vefted with power to determine caufes in equity, fave only that the juftices of the inferior court, and the juftices of the fuperior court refpec- tively, have power to give relief on mort- gages, bonds, and other penalties con- tained in deeds, in all other chancery and equitable matters, both the crown and the fubjedt are without redrefs. This in- troduced a practice of petitioning the le- gillative courts for relief, and prompted " thofe '- '3 ri ,1 V ( 60 ) the rerJm : according to the cuftom of Nor- mandy, appeals lay to the Duke in council j and upon this groand, appeals lay from the judicatories of thefc iflands to the King here, as Duke in rouricil ; and upon this general precedent (without perhaps attending to the peculiar cafe of the appeal, lying to the Duke of Normandy and not to the King) was an appeal from the judicatories of the colonics to the King in council fettled. —But, be- fides the inapplicahlenefs of fuch appeal to the modes of the Englifh law ; hefides, that this appeal does not acltually take place in general, and is in fome of the charter colo- nies adlually excluded, except in perfonal ac- tions, wherein the matter in difference ex- ceeds 300/. flerling; befidcs the diffi- culty of this appeal, and inefficiency of this redrefs, — the King in council never being, by the conftitution, in any other cafe, be- tween fuhjedl and fubjedt, formed as fuch a court of appeal, it fcarce ever, in the tem- porary and occaiional fittings, looks like fuch a court ; but is rather accidentally or parti- cularly, than officially attended. Thefe general apprehenfions and reafon- ings, upon experience, have led many very knowing and difpaffionate men in the colo- nies, into a convidlion of the neceffity of fome eftablidied and conftitutional court of appeal ( 6i ) appeal and redrcfs: and the followlnp; meafurc has not only been fuggefted, hut even taken up as matter of confidcration by fome of the ablcft lawyers in that country ; — namely, the cllablifhment of a fuprcme court of appeal and equity, not confined to any one govern- ment, but circulating through a certain dif- tridt of governments; perhaps as follows; one to Nova Scotia and New England ; one to New York, New Jerfeys, Penfylvania, and Maryland -^one to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. It has been imagined, that this court ftiould be eftabliflied by a commiflion iflued to two or more perfons, learned in the law, not only of the mother country, but of the feveral governments in its faid diftridt : that this commiflion fhould give full powers of a court of chancery, with power alfo of judging on matters of law, to be brought before this court, by writ of er- ror, from the feveral fuperior courts of the diflrid, which this extended to. Such court would become an eftahlifhed court of ap- peals and redrefs, would regulate all the courts of law, fo that they could not ex- ceed their jurifdidion ; would have a general fuperintendency over all inferior courts ; would tend to eftablifh fome regularity, and introduce a conformity, not only amongft the courts themfelves, of the different colo- nies, but a cpjifprmity alfo to the courts of .' the I 1 ( 6a ) the mother country, in the conftrudtion and difpcnfathn of law : fuch court would, more than any other incafure, not only tend to prcferve the laws, and pra<5tice of law in the colonics, under a conflitutional conformity to the laws of the mother country; but would alfo maintain that dependency therein, which is of the efTence of colony adminiflration. There are gentlemen on this fide the wa- ter, who feeing the defedls of this meafure as to a court of appeals, and not feeing the neceflity of a court of chancery at all, as there is nothing contrary to the fundamen- tals of law, that thefe law-courts already cftablifhed (hould equitize ; (if I may fo ex- prefs myfelf)— Think, that infteadof efta- blifliing any new courts of chancery, —it would be very proper to -abolifli even thofe already eftablifhed, extending the power which the law-courts already take in chan- cering bonds, &c. by impowering them to equitize : and after that to take fuch mea- fures as may beft eftablifh a fixt and con- ftitutional court of appeals here in Eng- iaud- '' - - ' • • ' ■" ' I- I' A. Senlible of the danger of innovations, and abhorrent from tampering in experiments of politics, I mention the following rather aS matter of fpeculation, than to recommend 2 the ■III' ( 63 ) the trial : yet I cannot but ohfervc, that while the conftitutions of the governments of the colonics take fo exactly the model of the BritiOi conftitution, it always flruck me as a ftrangc dcviatbn in this one particular, that the governor's council of ftate, although a diftind, and I had almoft faid, an incom- patible board, — with the CLuncil, one branch of the legillature, is yet always conftituted of thd faniC perfons, in general nominated and liable to be fuipcnded by the governor. Oiic may fee many advantages, bcfidcs the general conformity to the government of the mother country, in having thcfe boards dif- tindt irl their perfons, as well as their ofiice. If the council of ftate remaining under the faine conftitution as at prefent, was com- pofed of men of the befl experience, for- tune, and intereft in the colony, taken in common from the legiflative council, the houfe of reprefentatives, or the courts, while the members of the legiflative council, in- dependent of the governor for their exigence, had all and only thofe powers which are ne- ceflary to a branch of the legiflature, much weight would be added to adminiftration in the confidence and extent of intered that it would thereby obtain ; and to the legiflature a more true and politicBl diftribution of power, which, inftead of the falfe and arti- ficial lead, now held up by expedients, would throw i '*7 *>/.,'' ' >i^*l/ ( 64 ) throw the n;al and conRitutional ballancc of power into the hands of government. ^ ; .. I did, in this place, intend to have confidered the nature of the cftabhfhment of the regular troops now in Aoierica, as to that relation which fuch eUablifhment ought to bear to the civil governments in the colo- nies, in timeofpeace^ ccnfonant to what is ad- mitted here in Britain, or at leall in Ireland, fo as to be as little as may be injurious to the civil conftitutions j but as the unaccountable embroilment of Indian affairs, and the hof- tile confequences that have taken place, give to buiinefs on the continent of America, the face of war -, I iliall referve my fenti- ments on this point to a more proper oc- cafion i obferving only, that where the office and power, as now exercifcd, of a mi- litary commander in chief, are not abfolute- ly necefTary ; neither prudence, juflice, nor found policy can juflify fuch an ellablifh- ment. In time of peace it cannot be necef- fary : in time of peace the civil govern- ments, in all their powers, as granted by commiihons and charters, ought to predo- minate. If there be, in time of peace, in the civil governors, and oiher officers of the crown, the lead fubor^Vination to this mili- tary commander in chief; it will be found a dangerous thing to have given lb much of civil ■( 65 ) civil poWer out of the King's hands, and to have done lb little to maintain tholCj into whole hands it is entrufted. * » * ' The feveral points of government, as above, revifed, maturely ccnlidcred, and finally determined upon, and an adminiflra- tion formed, that iliall firmly, uniformly, and conltitutionally govern the colonies, by that predominate power, which the mother country ought to hold over the colonies, as corporations united to the realm, the people would become confcientioully in eve- ry individual, and conflitutionaliy in their refpedlive governments, difpofed to receive the legal imprefTion of the fupreme govern- ment of the mother country, and to commu- nicate the fame through all its powers, fo as to form, not a dependant appendix to the demefnes of the crown, but a fubordinate united part of a one whole, this great com- mercial dominion of Great Britain. Thefe matters fettled j the Indian affairs, the revenue, and t'-e trade of the colonies come next under confideration. But for the fame reafons, f n* which I have omitted to fpeak to the military eflablifliment of the army in the colonies, 1 fliall here omit to mention thole meafures for conducing In- dian affairs, which, by men beft verfcd thro' F expe- / >/ . »/ ./ U ) t-J- .1* 'Mi % ^S \ ■fc? . ( 66 ) experience and fuccefs in thofe matters, have been thought moft likely to maintain that relation which Indians and our colonies ought to bear to each other, and to derive that utility from thefe Indians, which in po- licy Hiould be the reafon and grounds of our connexion with them. ,1 I Government, by thofe minifters, whofc department it is to fuperintend and admini- ster the public revenue, having taken the points of the colony revenue under confi- deration, I muft, for the prefent, think my- felf precluded from entei*ing into the dif- cufTion of thofe points, which I had allot- ted to this part of my paper. However, I| will juft venture to fuggeft, — that the bed and fureft funds of fuch revenue, will be, firft, the cuftoms arifing from the trade regulated as hereafter to be mentioned : fe- condly, a ftamp-duty, which, if duly paid, will raife, from any fuppofed extent and number of people in the colonies, near a third more than it doth raife from the fame extent and number of people in England. Next, the quit- rents, if duly laid and duly col- IcBed. But to obtain thofe points, a tho- rough revifion of the flate and laws of the quit' rents is neceflary. Ihere are people in the colonies, who, knowing the original defect of, and almofl: inextricable difficulties attend- latters, tain tain olonies » derive in po- inds of whofe idmini- :en thel r con fi- nk my- 1 he dif-l d allot- /ever, 11 he beft A^ill be, I e trade d : fe- y paid, nt and r a third e extent Next, {ly col- a tho- of the eople in originr.1 ficulties attend- ( 67 ) attending, the ftate of the quit-rents, have thought, that in thofe colonies, where the crown has a right to quit-rents, it would be a wife meafure for adminiilration, and an equal and eafy one for the landholders, to eftablilh a general moderate land-tax of * * * * * per hundred acres, in lieu of fucli ./. quit-rents. And indeed calculations have been made, at a very low rate, on this mea- fure, whereby the fum produced does great- ly exceed what would be imagined on the firft caft of thought, and fully equal to the ordinary expences of government in thofe provinces. But befides the difficulties, re- fpedling the rights of the crown, which may attend this fcheme, it is a point that ought very deliberately an] dil]3affionately to be weighed, how far even the fuprcme govern- ment of the mother country can, confidently // with general liberty, proceed in laying tixes on its colonies, where the confent of the people cannot be, in any conflitutional way taken. The excife becomes another fund : but both in this, and in the flampt-duty re- venue, a point will arife to doubt, how far thefe colonies, who, for the neceffities of government, and the emergencies of fervice, have already, by their proper powers, laid thefe duties on the people, and granted the revenue arifing therefrom to the crown, by ads which have received the confent of the F 2 crown^ ^ _ ( 68 ) crown ♦ how far thofe colonics may, or may not, be fuppofed to have precluded any ad: of adminirtration here on thefe heads. I mention this matter as a point of doubt, which would unavoidably arife j but do not pretend to determine upon it. 1 will fur- ther venture to fuggefl, that, whatever re- venues are raifed, the y?r/? and fpecial ap^ propriation of them ought to be to the pay- ing the governors J and all other crown of- ficers independent of the legijlatures of the colonies. — Under this general head of colony revenue, though perhaps not under the lame department of adminiftration, will come the confideration of a paper-money currency for the colonies. How far fuch is neceilary, how far fuch is admiilible, and under what regulations it ought to be ad- mitted. As the outrageous abufes committed by fome of the colonies in creating a paper- currency, fo far as to affedl the courfe of juflice amongft themfelves, and to injure the interefl of the mother country, hath not only occafioned that an ad: of Parliament was pafTed to abolifli that fraudulent me- dium, and to reltrain the making of it for the future, but hath alfo given caufe of great pre- judice againft it in adminiflration 5 it may be of ufe here to fuggefl, that it is not only ne- celTary ( 69 ) ccflary to the commerce and culture of the colonies, that they (hould always have a cer- tain quantity of this paper-currency : but that it is alfo the beft policy, even for the felf-lntcreil: of the mother country, that it fhould be permitted. The thing is palpable, and a matter of fad:, that the colonies, even \i permitted under the ufual reftraints, to trade with the French and Spanifh colonies, are incapable of creating a filvcr currency, fufficient for the internal circulation, and ex- ternal payments of their trade and commerce. They can derive none from the mother coun- try, fo long as the ballance of trade is againft them. Their fhop-trade therefore, the pur- chafe and culture of fetdements, and their external commerce mull be fo far forth ob» flrud:ed, as fuch medium is wanting, where all the filver that any colony hath is fcarcely fufficient for the circulation which its inter- nal exchange and barter require. The im- ports from the mother country into fuch • colony muft be proportionably lefTened j and that colony continuing in fuch circumflan- ces, may, under every difadvantage, be drove to the necefTity of manufaduring thofe com- modities, which it could otherwife much better import from the mother country. But permit any colony to have a certain quantity of paper-money, and all that filver, which is no longer neceffary at home, will con- F q ilantlv y y li f nr? ^. 7 A ,: n^ -t'f ( 70 ) ftantly go abroad to the mother country for the manufadures, and even luxuries of that mother country. This argument reaches only to the convenience and well-being of the colony, but in cafes of emergency in war or invafion, the very being of thefe co- lonies may depend upon their being able or not, to create a fufficient fupply for fuch cafes. If therefore, inftead of prohibiting thefe colonies in general from making paper- money, the government would, from a pre- cife and adequate knowledge of the nature of money, whether paper or filver, fix fome general rules for the colon Il-s in this point, there could not be a more beneficial mea- fure taken up for the welfare of the colo- nies, or the intereft of the mother country. Thefe rules would turn upon regulating the FUND, THE USES, and THE QUANTITY of fuch medium. The fund fhould at leaft be adequate to the payment of the principal in a limited timey and where the paper-money is treafurer's notes given for money lent to the government, the fund whereon it is bor- rowed fhould be alfo capable of paying, ad interim^ a certain intereft, a? is the cafe of the treafurer's notes ilTued in the province of MafTachufett's Bav. On the othei hand, where the pap^r-money created, is govern- ment notes, deriving a currency from the authority and fecurity of government, lent to ( 71 ) to mortgagees on land or other fecurlty, where an intereft is paid to government for this loan, the depofit of lands or chattels, thus become the fund for which the govern- ment makes itfelf refponfible, ought to be futHcient for the re- payment in a given and limited time; while the interefl paid to go- vernn)cnt ouglit to be appropriated to the making good all eventual loffes which may arife in this fcheme. This paper ifehig 710 legal tender, the payment may be made in filver, not according to the tenor of the pa- per, but according to its proportionate value to filver at that time, while the government, if it has IfTued the paper on fuch terms as do not fecure it againfl: depreciation, is bound to make good the deficiency. On the con- trary, after the expiration of the loan, and all charges of the loan oflice, and other charges paid, the benefit of the agency ought to accrue to government, the fole benefit which ought thus to accrue. This medium ought to be applicable to all the equitable, as well as legal lifes of filver money within the colony, except that it Jhould not be a legal tender. This exception is not meant to refi:rain, but io fecure the t^es of this me- dium J for when it cannot be forced in pay- ment as a legal tender, this very cafe will oblige that legiflature who creates it, to form it of fuch internal right conftitution, as fhall F 4 force ^/A;, n f'^t* -'*'#s. n 72 ) force its own way on a level, nearly equal io filver. 'The quantity ought always to be proportioned to the neceffity of the medium wanted ; which, (the fund and ufcs being fairly and abfolutely fixed) may always be judged of by the rife or fall of the value in its general currency or exchange : for where the quantity ifTued is more than ne- ceflity requires, the value will depreciate : and where the fund is good, and all proper ufes of the medium fecured, fo long as no more paper is ilTued than neceflity does re- quire, it will always hold a value near to, though fomewhat lefs than filver. On this fubjed: I here refer the reader to the follow- ing very judicious trad:, written and given to me, kveral years ago, by a gentleman of Penfylvania, converfant in thefe matters, both as a lawyer and a merchant. I print and publifli it by leave of a near relation, and fubjoin it as containing the moft cxad: and decifive fent^ments on this fubjedt that 1 have any where met with. I entitle it, Consi- derations gN A FAPIiR-CuRRENCy. or oui CO coi fhal thii by crei ALL value is given to things for their fitnefs or power to anfwer or procure the ne- cefiary conveniencies or pleasures of human life. • ■ ' ' ' ■ This of both and and and ihave NSI- their ne- lan This ( 73 ) This valu'; may be confidcred as abfolute or relative. Abfolute value terminates in our cileem of any thing, without referring CO any other j relative is that, which it has compared with another. The latter only I fhall have occafion to treat of. Men have power to difcover qualities in a thing, which (hall give it value. They can by laws, cuftoms, or fafliions, greatly in- creafe that value ; yet, to know or fix its worth or price, compared with other things li priori^ has always been found beyond their reach and capacity. This is owing to an Inability to forefee, eftimate, and govern exadlly all the points and circumftance?, on which the value of things turns, which are fuch as are in, or fol- low the nature and order of things in gene- ral, and then may be forefeen and judged of with fome certainty -, or which confift of the paffions, prejudices, and mifapprehenfions of mankind, whofe number and influences we cannot rate or calculate. From the natural ftate and order of things, I think it mav be affirmed, that the worth or price of any thing will always be, as the quantity and ufes amongft mankind ; as the ufes ■ > «.* ■• 1 1 I I Ml ( 74 ) ufcs dircdlly, and as the quantity reciprocal- ly or invcrlely. Ufe is the lole caufe of value, and value the neccfTary efFcdl of ufe. Abat- ing thefe diftindlions of caufe and cffctt, ufclefs and worthlefs, are fynonymous terms. Every man mud agree, that if you pdd to a caufe, you muft increafe the effedl -, fubftracfl from it, and the contrary efFcd: muft fol- low. Let the quantity of any thing be as 20, and the ufes as 20, and let it have a va- lue J let the ufes be increafed to 30, without inlarging the quantity ; it is plain, the equal proportion that every man can enjoy will be as 20 divided by 30, jds only. But this being Icfs by 4 ^^^^ ^ach man requires, the demand for it, and confequently the value muft rife. Subti. 10 from the ufes when 20, and then under an equal diftribution, each ftiall have double the value he wants, which muft lefTen the demand, and the value dependent upon it. Governing the ufes is one of the rational powers, that men have over the value of things. Experience teaches the meaneft under- ftanding, that price depends on quantity, and that they are to each other inverfely, or the more of one the lefs the other. Water is as ( 71 ) as nccefTary as any thing, and a diamond perhaps as little ; yet the fuperfluous plenty of one has rendered it of no worth in moll places, and the fcarcity of the other has car- ried it to an extravagan'- price. Limiting the quantity is another rational power men have over the value of things, and I do not know a third. From hence it appears, that increafing the ufes, and lefTening the quantity, and lef- fening the ufcs, and increafing the quantity, muft always have the fame influence upon the rates and prices ot things. Therefore, whenever I fhew the effect of one, for bre- vity's fake let it be underftood, that I fuppofe the fame confequence will attend the other refpedlivcly. Although I affirm, that variation in quan- tity or ufe fhall caufe a change in the price of a thing, yet I do not fay, that this change fhall be in proportion equal to the variation in the quantity or ufe ; for i think the con- trary. To inftance in quantity, let it be in any thing as 30, and let the ufe be as 30, and it fhall then have a mean value. 'The ufe unchanged, let the quantity be at one time as 20, at another 40. Whoever con- fid ers ii ( 76 ) fidcrs the prevalence of men's appetites for a fcarce commodity, under the dreads and ap- prehenlions of wanting it, with their different abilities to procure it, on one hand, and their great contempt of ufelcfs excefs on the other, muft agree it is more than probable, that the difference between the means and the ex- tremes fliall not be the fame in the prices, as in the quantities. Merchants, by experi- ence, have found the trujth of what 1 ad- vance. I think they have obfervcd, that lef- fening a commodity one third from the mean quantity, ccvteri^ paribus, nearly doubles the value J adding a third, fubftradts one half from it ; and that by further increafmg or diminifliing the quantity, thefe difpropor- tions between the quantity and prices vaftly increafe. It is extremely difficult, if not ImpofTible, to inveftigate thefe proportions mathema- tically j but events fpringing from ufe and experience have equal certainty in them, and to all pradical purpofes are as much to be relied and depended upon. It is further worth obfervation, that what- ever fluctuates much in quantity, and confe- quently in worth, will fink beneath its mean value. Sup- ( 77 ) Suppofc the quantity of any thing pro- duced in every 50 '^^cars be cxadly the lame: let the annual produdt be as one anfwcralile to the nccefTitics of mankind, then tlic va- lue in each year lli til be as one, and the whole equal to 50. But if the quantity of the annual produdt fluctuates, there will be annual Hudluations in the value j but as the proportions of the decreafe of value, from experience above ftated, will be greater than the proportions nf the incrcafc of value, this fluctuation will caufe a deficiency in the mean value, which deficiency will always be in proportion to the greatnels and quicknefs of the changes. This, 1 prefume, is occa- fioned by the defire of mankind in general to reft on certainty, rather th:in rely on what is fludtuating and inconftant, though they Ihould cxpcdt gain equal to the rifque, and by the low circumftauces of the majority of men, whofe fortunes, in all prudence, diredt to the firft, rather than the latter. The cafe lofinfuranccsisai) evident proof of this remark. If the infurcrs gain, winch I think lUJli be admitted, then they receive a premium be- yond the value of the riiquc, and this gain [the intured pay for certainty again It contm^ \gcnt loljes, Thefe few rules of eftimating the value |of things, well applied, will, I prefume, Hiew ii I II id, [ 78 ] ihew when it is convenient to introducs pa- per-money into a country, and when it will prove hurtful j what are its advantages and inconveniencies, general and particular, when introduced ; of what great importance it is to prevent an excefs in quantity, and to ex- tend the ufes; and nearly what its value will be in any given Aate. If a nation has a quantity of money equal to its commerce, the lands, commodities, and labour of the people fhali bear a middle price. This (late is the befl, and tends moil to enrich the people, and make their hap- pinefs lafting. If they (hould mint paper to pafs for money, the encreafe of quantity in the former will lefTen the value of the lat- ter, will raife the price of lands and rent^, and make the labour of llich a people, and:^ the commodities, be rated higher than in, other places. Mens fortunes will rife in no- minaly not real value ; from whence idlenefs,] cxpence and poverty Hiall follow. Under | thefj circiimftances, their real money, in- (lead of their commodities, fliall be exportcdl from them. Here the pnpcr will be their banc and dcAruclion. But if their com* mcrcc, or uics of money, exceed the quan-l tity of it, their lands, labour, and comtnc' ^iuici flidl fink beneath their vv^)rth in othcr| COUK* ( 79 ) countries. Few purchafers of lands will be found in regard to the fuperior profit that muft attend the ufe of money in trade : the weal i by merchant Jhall be at the bead of affair Sy with few competitions ; he fhall be able to grind down the farmer in the fale of his com- modities, and, when thofe fail to fupport him, in the purchafe of his lands. The artifan's labour fhall be depreciated by the merchant who exports it, or the needy farmer that ufes it. The wealthy only fliall accumulate riches, the commonwealth iliall decline, and in time farmers and artifans muft defert the place for another, where their labour fliall be better rewarded. Here the ufe of paper- ^j)^ ., money will Hiake off the fetters and clogs of ' the poor. Merchants will multiply ; they will raife the price of labour, and of the • fruits of the earth, and therthy the value of lands. An equal diftribution of gain and profit Ihall fucceed and deftroy the partitrl accumulations of wealth. I think thefc marks, taken from the value of lands, labour, and commodities, compar^id with their worth in other countries, will be found the only infallible rules to judge of an equality, cxccU, or dcfcdl oi money in any place wlicrclocvrr j and confcqucntly wjll, at all timcb, unerringly (licw the nc- cefTuy ^1^ > ( 8o ) cefiky of increafing coins, or the contrary. Had a neighbouring province well underftood and weighed thefe points, they had not created a paper credit far exceeding all their ufcs for money, when they were able .. fup- ply themfelves with gold eq-ial to their trade, nor at the fame time have dammed up i'o many ufes for it, which now cover them v/ith clouds and confufion, th v. no man can fee his way through. The bell method they can ufe is to fink it as faft as poffible, and not let their fund lie in Britain at an intereft lefs than ^ per cent, when it is -vorth 6 in their own country, and their paper pafles 50 fer cent, lefs than the nominal value. But to return : whf^n it is found neccflary to add paper- money to the coin of any country, to *;s value ous^ht to be the main and ippor' P 1 nncipai view Th IS v;i 11 tur n u pon tl le FUNP, the USES, snd the QjiANTixy, All value arifiug from the ufe, I beg leave to call cxlrinfick. Having Hiewn that paper-money acquires its extrinlic value from the ulc;i, which uicJ apparently may ht encrea'cd or diminiflicd j 1 think it would be ncedlcfs and n)iii»cndin'/ the reader's time, to demonllratc, that iliis value p.)u(l be in direct proportion to the ufts ( Si ) ufes j for it would really i^.mount to no more than the proof of an axiom univerfally ac- knowledged, that the effcdt (hall always be adequate to the canfe. Therefore, in all future arguments, I fliall take it for granted. The fund ought to be as fatisfadory to mankind as human wifdoiu can devifc and furnifh. The community fliould become fccurity to anfvver all deficiencies in the fund ; this is not only the higheft juftice, but the befl policy. It is jull: becaufe it is a creature of their own, calculated for their private utility and advantage, and is in the management of the country by their rcprefentacives and |oi?xers. But when they receive an intcrefl from the money, the equity of it is unan- fwerable : for it fccins wholly inconfiflent' with jufticc, that one fliould receive the in- |tereft, and another run the rifque of the principal. Policy requires it, becaufe the community will certainly receive more profit from its credit under their fcnport, than, with due caution, liuy can probably igle by accidents in the futu}. Our next confidcr.uion, with rcfpcd to tl'.c value, turns on %)hat the funJ is» lu pay, ( 82 ) and 'wLen. Thefe are arbitrary, being with J in the power of thole by whole authority the; money is eaiittcd. But for the prefcnt pur- pofe : let us fuppcfe it is to pay lilver moneyj according to the late Queen's proclaaiation, to the value of looo/. for lb much of tliel paper, as, according to the nominal valnc^ amounts to that fum at the end of 1 5 years.l In this fiate the icoo/. paper, ivk/j regam to the fund alone, at the time of its emiflion, is worth no more proclamation money than! what will produce 1000/. of that money at the end of the term, at compound intercfl, under as good fccurity. For example, take a 1000/. paper, and! let it reprefent that the polTefTor fliall receivel 1000/. proclamation money for it at thel end of 15 years, and let the ufe of money"^ be worth (:> per c€?it. per annum \ rebate!; per cent, per annum with compound intereltl for I 5 years, and you have the value of u.j loco/. proclamation money in hand, which! appears to be but 417/. 5 j. 3-j. ; more kj cannot be worth> becaule4]7/. ;j. 3,', \\/j;j 6 per ant. per annum compounc intcrctl Iq 1 1 yc-fb added, will amount to loooiL On this (late it appears, that the longer th term, the Icfs the value, with rcL^ard to ihcj ( 83 ) fund alone. From whence It follows, tliat by increafing the teiin, this value may bs reduced to a deeree beneath cilimation.- But whatever the value thus proved be, I call it intrivjick. The Fund eflaMiiiicd, I proceed to the USES as they next require our attention in regard to the value of the paper-money. If value, in refpedl to the ufes of things, (liall always be in dirtd: proportion to thofe ufes, (which I prefume have heretofore proved in general, and fhall hereafter Hiew is true in relation to paper-money) p.nd we defign to raife the power, it follows clearly, that to bring this to pafs, we ought to give it all the ufes of money, or coined gold and filver in other countries. From tlieie ules alone it muft derive all the worth it (hall bear beyond what I called the intriujkk value. For the purpofe take the cafe jl cited on the Funci only, that the pofTcfTor of \qocjL pa- per fliali receive icoo/. proclamaiion money in exchange lor it, at the end of i ^ years. On this account the paper up; eared to be worth but 417/. I > i. "^ % But luppolw' thin 1000/. papc may beimtncdiatLly cxcii.inged for 800 /. [.jrovi.i Ti :iti.)n money, which is ^Cj /. ' 4 i. 8 ; mure th \\\ the nitriiilkk worth, Ci 2 ho*^ % ( 84 ) liow has It acquired this exceeding price or value? I tiiink plainly from the riles. To prove the truth of this, fuppofe all the ufes as money taken away ; unqueiUonably then the worth of looo/. paper in proclamation money will be reduced to what I call the intriniick value; becaufe, dependint^ upon the fund alone, it will be exadilv in the ftate of a fund to be paid at a future day j for in neither cafe can the creditor ufe it in the mean time. But if the creditor can by any contrivance ufe the fuin in that time, as he may the paper when it pafles for money, that ulc mull be fomcthing worth. And when experience ihcws, that under this ufe the va- hie advances from 417/. 155.3'. to 800/. I apprehend it is evident to a demonftration, that the difference is derived from the ufe. To deny it muft be as irrational and abfurd, as if, upo.i adding and extracting an ingre- dient to and from a compofjtion, we per- ceived properties in the compufition appear and difappear, and yet were to deny that iuch ingrciiient was the caufe of thofe pro- perties. Thit. leads me to attempt the folu- tion of a queiHon I have known ficquently mad^. If wc in I'ei.l'ylvania, upon a fufti- cicnt fund anUverahlc in iilvcr, at a future iiay, mint a quantity of paper equal to the ufes of the p epic for muricv, and ihey will- ingly ( 85 ) , ingly and unlverfally accept of the paper in all payments, why fliould it not, at all times, have Taltie equal to the nomiJial value ^ or to the fum chargeable on the fund at the day to come. This reafon, urged by many, to fupport the paper to this degree, is drawn from the nature of money in geF'iCral. Mo- ney, fay they, is but a ticket or coniUer, which rcprefents to the mind of the polfell' jr a quantity or degree of power. No man, on the receipt ot it, ever examines how, or from whence it acquired that power, but in order to difcovcr its reality and duration. For inflance, when an Englilh crown is re- ceived, does the acceptor regard any proper- ties in the metal, or the figures of it, but thofe which are to convince him that it is what it appears to be? a crown. It mud be conicfled, he does not. If fo, then why may not a piece of paper, under diflinguiOi- ing chara»^ters and impreflloihs, aflixed bv law and common content, have the power of an linglilli crown annexed to it? It is to pafs in the fume mMiiu^r as a crou-n does, jind in the end will ab certainly be a crown ab the real unc. It li 'ri]crcf)rc tb y c^'^ncUi.^c, that ihe paper may, and ' . ^_ at ill titiK», to bv dUtiued O 3 r(}Uul ( 86 ) equal to the quantity of filver the fund is to yield for it at the end of the term. I confef- 1 thin!-: this rcafoning fair, and the conclufion juft an<] fiUisfiK^lory, if we do not ufe filver in our commerce, forcip'n or domef- tick: ctherwilc not. The fad: is, we do ufc lilvcr in our forc'i^n commerce. I p re- fume it will be eafily adrnitted, as the paper reprefents the filver in the fund, and from thence obtains its credit, that it Ihall always be at lead of equal ule with^ or he as readily received as paper. Then if fiber in hand has one power, one ufc more ihan the paper, to wit, that of procuring foreign commodi- ties, it is impolhble wc can elleem them equally. P'or that would be to controul the different virtues and intiuenccs of things over the mind of man, which nece/Tarily depending upon the things themfelvcs, no laws or confent can, by any means, vary or dired^ Wiicreforc, in the cafe rtated, it fecms to me certain and undeniable, that the paper mufl have lefs W(n'th than the fdver. Having faid, that the ufcs of the paper fliould be as many as poflible, it may be proper for me to fpeik of fome of thnic ufcs, the C(|iiity and advantage of whith have been very nuich voniravcrtcd. Hut here let it be uiukillood, ihut I proceed upon the cafe laH ( S7 laft ftated, that the quantity of paper is to be equal to all the ufes of money ivithin the country. For that flate, and a partial liip- ply of paper credit, differing in ^■)rinc!p'cs, require different reafoning, and infer quite oppolitc confequences. Firfl:, then, it feems jufl and rcafonable to compel all pcrfons contradllng for filver mo- ney, after the law that raiies the paper mo- ney to be paid in the country, to receive the paper in lieu of it, and at the value flruck from the fund, although that be inferior to the real value. This perhaps may not be ffricfl equity between the contrailing p rties, but it is jufl /;•(?/;; the comvnuvtyy who have pov/er from the confent of every member, by laws, to prohibit tlie exercife of a par- ticular natural right inconfillcnt with the welfare of tlie whole, and to inflict a pe- nalty upon difobedicnce to tlie Lnv. To ufc filver or gold vviih the paper, nuifl depre- ciate the latter. ThcreA)rc tlic law Icrbiils it. This can't be unfair, bccauf: every man has notice of what coin he is to be paiil in, and /J uut vbligiil to t'xcbange more iur ihe paper than he thinks agreeable to the real r^ftrth. And if atiy (houlil ciuicavour fiu h iiff, the lofb of I he dilleicncr bciwtcn ^ii)\i\ or filver and paper, in u kind of pcndiy i. r t» 4 violat- If ( 88 ) violating the law, which muft be as jufl as any other pc-nalty impofcd on an adt, not evil in i'f'lj\ but prohibited only. Again, upon breach of contrnvfls for pay- ment of money in foreii^i countries, 1 think it bjrli convenient and iieiU, that fatisfadion flioLil.l be made in the papjr. The conve- nience of it will appear, if we fuppofe the debtor a member of the iocicty amongft whom the paper pafils j for as luch, being retrained by law from trafficking for gold or iilver, and thereby dilablcd from pro- curing them, he mufl either pay paper in compenfation, or lie in a goal, if the feverity of his creditors requires it. In thefe circum- flances, no man in his fcnfcs would dare to contract a foreign debt, or transfer foreign money in the ufual manner, by exchange j the bad confequences of which are too nu- merous and obvious to admit of, or need particular mention, and evidently, prove the convenience of allowing fatisfadion to be made in paper. The equity of this fatisfudion will be in- difputablc, it the debtor pays a (urn of paper really of equal value with the foreign mo- ney. It ib the common c.ii'e on breach of f])ccirick contradt. 11 it cannot be perform- ( 89 ) cd, the mofl exadl jufticc requires no more than an cquivalait compcvfation. Some perfons imaghiing the real worth of the paper equal to the nominal, have af- firmed, that it ought to difcharge thefe debts at the nominal value -y others confcinng a difference between thefe vahies, under fome political views, have aiferted the fame. As I lliall have octafion to fpeak on thefe opi- nions hereafter, upon a point fimilar to this, I Hiail only add here, that if this mode of payment ll^ould take place, it would as ef- iedually dertroy foreign credit and negocia- tions by exchange, as if gold or filver were to be infixed on here, to difcharj^c a fo- reign debt. In one cafe, it would be the higheft imprudence to be the debtor, in the other, it mull be equally indilcrcet to become a creditor. Purfuing the ufes, I come to that of dif- charging by paper, the filvcr debts contrac- tcti antecedent I the law that ruifes the paper. To Haw tlic ncccfiay of admitting this, I liippo't it vvdl ''C L;rttntc«l mc, that there miiil at all time:, be n very great Duinber ui debtors uho dtpcnd r u their future u- bour ¥ EMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // 4^< f/u ^. 1.0 I.I 1.25 ■ti|2^ 12.5 |50 "^ Mi^ ■^ !■■ 1 2.2 If liS III 2.0 11= lU IIIIII.6

/ 'a ^^ ^ (? / Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST ViAiN STREET Wt ;'»:«, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 l-?. i/j. ^ ( 90 ) bour and induftry to pay their debts. Thlj dependence is reafonable andjuft, founded on the natural right of all fairly to purchafc filver, the then current money of the coun- try. The debtor has the continuation of this right in view and expedlation at the time of his contra ( 104 ) cnt quantity to carry it on : for inftance, If 60,000 /. proclamation money be necefTary to carry on all our trade, and we (Irike 60,000 /. paper, in hopes it (liall have that value, upon experience it proves worth but 50,000 /. proclamation. Then, for want of the remain- ing 10,000/. fome of the wheels of trade muft ftand ftill or move flower, which ap- |1 parently will obftrucc a part of our gain. But the impediment vanifhes, by raifing an additional fum of paper equal to the 1 0,000 /. deficiency. The power of doing this we have hitherto enjoyed and exercifed with- out any reflraint ; and probably fhall retain as long as we ufe it with difcretion and pru- dence. . . i "^ t i-% Seeing then, that by raifing the value of our money, we are not likely to get any thing from our neighbours, let us now try whether by lowering it they can get any thing from us. I prefume I have proved, that in com- mon commerce, receiving and returning thq money for merchandizes, they cannot j confe- quently no method remains, but keeping the money to receive filvcr from the fund at the end of the term. By thefe pradlices, they can gain from us only upon one fup- pofition. That they purchafe the money at lefs than what I call the intrinfick worth ; for if at more ihey lofe by it, and we gain from .■ ■■k m froi cfl pay 50( neig fron 800 us 8 diffe foun near thefe have their hearc litical and ( that i cffed fuppc mine :e, if iry to DOO/. upon DOO /. main- trade h ap- gain. ing an ,000/. lis we with- retain d pru- alue of ^ thing hether ; from |i com- ng thq confe- ng the nd at dtices, e fup- ney at crth ; X gain ffom ( 105 ) from them. I have (hewn, rating Inter- ell at 6 per cent, per anniim^ that loooA payable at the end of 15 years, is worth 500/. to take a round fum, in hand. If our neighbour can buy it for 400 /. he gets 100/. from us. But on the contrary, if he gives 800/. for it, he lofes3o:>/. For he lends us 800/. for 15 years, at 2 /. 8 j. per cent, per annum, when it is really worth /. and the I difference, which on computation will be found in the whole to amount to 300/. or nearly, we gain from him. But neither of thefe cafes can poffibly happen while men have the leaft capacity todifcern and preferve their own interell. Indeed 1 have never heard one found reafon, either moral or po- litical, for this manifeil: deviation from juftice and equity. So far is it from good policy, that if I am not miftaken, it muft work an cffedt contrary to the defign 3 and inftead of fupporting the credit of the paper, under- mine and diminifli it, The publick authority is guarantee for the payment of alljuft debts. Every body muft agree, that the value of paper money is no- thing but fo much publick credit. Now, is it pofTible for the publick authority to break its own engagements, in refpe(^ of the pay- ment ^ debts, withput in feme degree blaft- ing r i ( io6 ) ing that credit which is to be the Aipport of the money ? Publick and private faith are, in this refpedt, exadtly alike ; and it is as cafy to fee how violating one publick obli- gation fhall impair the value of the paper- money, as how a known breach of private contract in a goldfmith fliould leflcn the worth of his bills or notes. A fecond inconvenience attending it, is lofs of foreign credit, which *^uft.be a great misfortune to a trading country. This is occafioned in the fame manner, by which ] juft now fhewed the value of the money might be affedledj and let it not be thought amifs, that I mention a third inconvenienccj, namely, proftituting and debafmg the dig- nity and excellence of the divine and moral law^s in the eyes of the people, and encou- raging them by ill practices and examples, to depart from true honefty and viitue. For if a man can once believe, he m^y juftly, by human authority, tranfgrefs thofe laws, he lofes much of the due and neceflary Refped that ought to be paid them, and fhall after- wards be able to refift their checks and ad- monitions with greater eafe and facility : and he that owes to 20 people, and pays them with five fixths of their due, and fees hiii neighbour do the like, under coloui[ of law to-day, jufti V, It, IS great ^his is bich I noney lought lience, le dig- moral encou- )les, to For tly, by ind ad- lees hi of law ( 107 ) to-day, will, I am afraid, with Icfs regret and compun(5lion, defraud his creditors with- out a law to-morrow. But now, granting entire rccompence ought to be made, it may be afked how the quan- tum of paper to be paid for antecedent fiU ver debts (hi^ll be afccrtained. The legiflature cannot fettle it with exaft jailice, becaufe no ikill can difcover what the future current value (hall be ; and if the people are left to do it themfelves, it will in- troduce many law-fuits and oppreflions, and ftill they may be as far from right as if the legiflature had done it. The greater incon- veniencies in the latter, rationally determine the power to the former. When they come to exercife it, if it is the firft experiment of the kind, I imagine they can do little more than guefs at the value. But as it is within demonftration, that the paper cannot be equal to filver, furely it ought not to be rated fo. Impartiality requires the guefs to be as near as may be, and then, although it may be miftaken upon the laws of change, it may be perfed:ly equal, becaufe either par- ty may lofe or gain. It is a common cafe in ^'fe, and muft be alwayr fo in untried things, and no man can juftly complain of the 4 ( >o8 ) the event, bccaufe all errors are owing to our weaknefs, not our faults. If any of our neighbours have ifrue(^ paper- money, the value of tbdrs will afford us ilrong lights to difcover the worth of our own, and allowing for different circumftan- ces, we ought to rate ours as they have found theirs upon trial. But when experience has taught us the true worth of the money, all difficulty ends, and whatever debts or pre- contracts remain (as many from their grow- ing nature mufl) fhould be fatislied accord- ing to that Value. I have now run through all the ufes that occur to me worthy of obfervation ; and therefore ihall proceed to the quantity. When it is deligned, that paper fhall be the only money of a country, the quantity, according to the nominal value, ought to be, as near as poflible, adequate to the nfes, or in other words, to all commerce, foreign and domeftick. It is eafier to fee the truth of this rule in fpeculation, than tc reduce it to prad:ice ; becaufe the number and ex- tent of the ufes of money, in a populous and induftriaus country, are far beyond our knowledge and comprchenfion. From the circumftajices of other places, the quantity of ''.'■i m ig to apcr- d us our iflan- bund e has h all • pre- ;row- cord- s that ; and ill be ntity, to be, ufes, )reign truth educe d ex- ulous d our 1 the intity of S.11' ■:| ( 109 ) of money current before ifluing the paper, and the value of the exports, r?lional con- jedtures may be formed, but experience alone can teach us what fum will fuffice. To ftrike the neceffary quantity at once, would be moft advdntageous to the fociety, and equal with refped to individuals ; but as that cannot be known, let it be approached as near as may be. And fince wc may expert to err, I prefume it will be better to err on the fide of defici^nicy than excefs, feeing ad- ditions are eafy, but fubrtradions oftentimes very difficult after emiflion. FROM the above reafoning, the follow- ing proportions, which I apprehend to be truths, do arife. That in colonies, the ef- fence of whofe nature requires a progreflive iacreafe of fettlements and trade, and yet who, from the balance of trade with the mother country being againft: them, muft fuffer a conftantly decreafing quantity of filver-money, a certain quantity of paper- money is necelTary. It is neceflary to keep up the increafing operations of this trade, and thefe fettlements j it is alfo necelTary, in fuch circumftances, to the equal diftribution and general application of thefe benefits to the whole colony, which benefits would other- wife \\ ( tio ) wife become a monopoly to the monied mer^ chant only : it is prudent, and of good poli- cy in the mother country to permit it, as it is the fureft means of drawing the balance of the colony trade and culture to its own profit. Thefe reafonings further fhow, how by fecuring the fund^ extending the ujes, and regulating i] * quantity, this meafure of a pa- per-currency may be carried to the utmoft extent of which it is capable. Nor do they flop here 5 for as they give the rule whereby to judge of the excefs or defed: of money in any place whatfoever, fo do they, at all times, fliew the neceflity of increafing it, or the contrary. Although the reafonings, which, from my own fentiments of the matter, I have applied to this fubje<3:, and thofe, with which I am able to oblige the world, by publifhing the above very judicious and able tradt, do per- fectly coincide in thefe points : yet upon the point of the uses, in confidering ,the reme- dies to be provided againft: the iniquity of any fallacious depreciation of this paper-money, our reafonings feem to divide on quite dif- ferent lides of the queftion. The author of the above tradt afferts, that in colonies, where paper-money is created, the people of that colony ( lit ) coiony jhould he compelled by law to receivi it in payments : and he dates two or three different cafes in proof of his aflcrtion. My opinion fuggefts, that this paper-money ought by no means to be a legal tender : and yet, different as thefe propolitions may ap- pear, they will be found to coincide in the application of the remedy ; in the only pro- per and radical remedy, the not permittmg the fafcr-money to be a legal tender. This gentleman experienced in the politicks of the colonies, and knowing the danger, if not the impradticability, of any legiflature in thefe colonies adopting this maxim, takes up the reafonablenefs and necefTity of this paper- money being forced into payments by law ;— • but then, in all the cafes wherein he dates the remedy in equity, againfl the injuftice, which may arife from the artificial value of this paper-money thus declared, he firmly and juitly declares, that the payment thus by law forced upon the creditor in papery ought not to he according to the nominal legal value of that paper, but according to the real value, an equivalent to the debt.- This judgment totally deftroys the maxim of its being a legal tender. In the applica- tion therefore of the remedy, our opinions do not differ, but the truth of them becomes the more elucidated by this coincidence of two thus feemingly different propofitions. — 1 will '.'\ vy/ ( «12 ) I will therefore proceed in faying, that by the reafonings above it appaars, that the only and proper remedy, againft the iniquities of a fallacious, depreciating paper-currency, is that radiccil one^ of not permitting this paper ^ money to be a legal tender, 'On the other hand, fo confirmed am I in my opinion of the ncceflity and propriety of a certain quan- tity of paper-money in the colonies, that were I not convinced, that the reftraining of it from being a legal tender, will not deftroy the exiftence of it, but, on the contrary, amend its currency j I would even facrifice my convidion to this point of utility : but whatever apparent value this paper-money may feem at firft view to lofe by reftraint of this one ufe, this very reftraint, (if the co- lonies will have paper-money) muft become an occafion of fo meliorating and fecuring the fu?2d, of fo exactly regulating /^^ quan- tityt and of adding fome other "caluable ufcy namely an intereft, or fome premium equi- vc^nt to it ; that the paper-money fhall be- come thus intrinfically, and of Its own na- ture, a better and furer currency than all the power and authority of government could make it. For not being forced into cur- rency, by any external value derived from authority, it mufl, like bullion in coin, de- rive its currency from its intrinfick value and applicablenefs to the purpofes of money ; — fo ( "3 ) [o thnt thu*^ becoming, from ncccfljty, a niorc determinate mcafurc, a n>ore pra«fti- ii! inllrumcnt of trade, and a more bene- ficial dopofit, as bearing an intcrell even while in currency, it becomes to have all //';' ufi's of bullion in coin, and one more, — f) as even to bear a preininm, — which in f.id^ is the Ciife of the trcadirer's notes in the piovir.ce of the Maflachufetts-bay in New I'.ngland, though they are not a legal ten- der. However, here, as on every other point, 1 hiive Hated the reafonings on both fides of the queilion : 1 have brought the quef- tion to its ilTue, and left thof^.', whofe duty it is, and who have a right to do it, to de- I termine the quefti'. n. If with the fame fpirit, guided by the f:ime principles, a revifion was made of the laws of trade, fo far as they refpecfl: the co- lonies, it would anfwer more wile ends of o-overnment, and more the intereft: of tbe governed, both here as well as in the colo- nies, than any endeavour, even though fuc- cefsful, to carry the prefent laws into execu- tion. The principles on which the 2S: of navi- gation is founded are jud, and of found po- 1 licy, I ( Qi! 'A'< y i /> % r*' 114 ) licy, but the application of them, by the modes prefcribcd, as the laws now (land, to the prefent ftate of the colony trade, is neU ther founded in juftice or prudence. Any fpirit that would force this application, wouKi injure the principles themfclvcs, and prove injurious to that commercial intcreft, which thofc very afts of trade mean to fecure to Great Britain : whcre::s, upon a due rcvifion of thofe laws, it would appear that there are means of producing this fame end confiftent with the particular interefl: of the colonies, and what would carry the general commer- cial uncrcfl of the mother country to the ut- mod: extent that it is capable of. The general principle of the laws of trade regulating the colony trade, is, that the co. lonies fliall not, on one hand, be fupplicd with any thing but from a Britijh market^ nor export their produce any where but to a BritiJh market. In the application of this principle, the prefent laws diredt, except in fome fpecial particulars, that the colonies fliali import all their fuppliesyrow Briiabh and carry all their produce to Britain, If now, inflead of confining this market for the colonies to Britain only, which is a partial and defective af^lication of the ge- neral principle whereon the adt of Naviga- 2 tion tion I amid; rf ef count} to th geous colon 1 inutuc the gc poles, the fei of it t rertrid tlie pr kct, 01 colonic du€e (1 any Br to fc^re I any Bf and we fuppliei thole p natural manufa iJritifli to fome i in the c( have pj dities ii the prin ( "5 ) tion is founded i this colony trade wasmadoi, atnidll other courfcs of trade, an occafion t>f cftabii^Viing BritiJJj markeis even in other cfjuntrieSi the true ufc would be derived to the general intcrcft from thd'e advanta- geous tircumflances, while in particular the colonies and the mother country would be mutually accommodated. In the fird: ca'c, the general intercfl, perverted to partial pur- poles, becomes fo far forth ob(lru(i:l:ed ; in the fecond, it is carried by the genuine fpirit of it to its utmofl: extent. — I'i^ undet certain reliridtions, fecuring alfo thofc duties which the produce of the colonies, carried to mar- ket, ought to pay to the mother country, the colonies were permitted to export their pro- duce (fuch as are the bafis or materials of any Brilifli manufadure excepted) dire a right to extend its laws to thefe colony traders, and to the fadorics eftablifhed in foreign ports. It can there- fore, partly by fuch laws as it finds proper to enadl, for the regulation of this fadory trade, and partly by obliging thefe colony traders to give bond before their departure from the colonies, fecure and confine all thefe tranfadlions of that commerce, which is permitted at any fuch port, to a BritiQ) mar- ket only, ihe laws that eflablirtied thefe be- ing a favour extended to the colonies, and promoting the interell of thefe fadories, 1 3 would, { "8 ) would, as all laws of trndc (liould do, exe- cute tlicmfelves ; and, by giving the requi- iite powers to -a conful or naval officer refi- dent there, would le eafily adminiftered by fuch officer. J » Jrf The next point to be guarded, would be the fecurin^ thofe duties wh jh this trade ought to pay to the government of Great Bri- tain ; if the fame duties were paid, or fecu- rity for them taken in thefc foreign ports, as would be or mould bu paid by the colony trade, if the traders weic ftill obliged to come to Britiin, every end would be anfu'cred to the government revenue, and thefe ( barges might be fufficientiy lecured, by obiiging ail thefe traders to fail under bond. The arrangement to be taken in fuch cafe, ougiit to be that of adding to the office of conful fuch powers as in the colonies, before the eftablifhment of fpecial revenue officers there, were given to the nav_al officer, or to eftablifh a naval of- ficer. The conful or naval officer, in this branch of his adminifl:ration, fliould be fub- ordinate to the tommiffioners of the cuflom and tlie I ords of the treafury. If the duties were colledled by him, in the ports of his diflrid, he (hould account and give fecurity for the fame j if bonds only, as fecurity for the paymentat fuch Britiffi or plantation ports, were given, he fhould keep the rcgifter of the ( '19 ) the fame, and correfpond with the commif- fioners of the cuftoms, and fuch oflicers as they dired, as to the fulfilling, cancelling, or profecuting to effecft faid bonds. Tlrcfc general arrangements taken, together with fiich further fpecial regulations, as the ex- perience of the commiflioners of the cufloms fliould fugged, the revenue of the colony and factory trade, under ^his mode of admi- niftration, would be well fecurcd, chearfully I paid, and eafily colleded. Under the adminiflration of fuch meafures, I there does not appear any reafc)n why all the produce of the Britifh colonies, which are not the bads of, or do not interfere \ ich the Bfitidi manufactures, might not be carried diredly to a Britifh market at a foreign port, — and why the carrying of rice to foreign ports might not be extended, under thefe laws, to all fuch foreign ports whereat a Bri- tifh fadory is eftablifhed. Nor under this mode of commerce can any fufficient reafon upon earth fubfift, why the colony traders fhould not be permitted to load at thefe ports, the fruits, wine, oil, pickles, the produce of that country, and alfo fuch raw unmanufadlured produce, as would not interfere with the manufadtures of Great Britain, inftead of being obliged to come to Britain to buy here, after the cxpence of I 4 an ■ »■ / u /'/ ^. t. / ,.''> ,.^P '/,.. ( 120 ) an unneceiTary voyage, thofe very comtno- dities which they might have bought in a Britijh market, at the port which they left. Why not any of thefe as well as fait, as well as wines FrDm the Madeiras and weflern ifles ? In the fame manner, by the fame law, our colony traders, permitted to carry fngar, ginger, tobacco, rice, &c. to fuch ports in the rivers Wefcr and Elbe, in the Sound and in Rufna, whereat a Britilli fadtory is, or may be ellahlilhed, why m^*y not, (the two points of a Briiijh market, and the revenue of the duties being fccurcd) why may not thcfe traders be permitted to load at thefe ports dircdly for the colonies, hemp, yarn, ^W'", ^<'' and fuch coarfe linens, as do no way inter- /, '..,.: fere with the Bntifli manufadtories ? Thefe meafures taken, which would prove to be ^'^' the true means of encouraging the colony ,.. . , trade, the heft method to put a ftop to the contraband trjde carried on in this branch of bulinefs, and the true grounds whereon to eftabUni the general commercial intereft of Great Britain, the government could not be too ftrid in enforcing the execution of the laws of trade, nor too fevere in punifhing the breach of them. — Wherever they found thefe traders endeavouring to carry from thefe ports to the colonics raw-filk, filks, velvets, foreign cloths, laces, iron, fteel, arms, am- Oiunition, fails or rigging, or any manufac- tures ..^ij' /iS.::.-^ -7 /\^ ' * ^' ''). / - / ■.- : *', • ^ .; .•■' ( J'l ) tures whatever, that interfere with the m-'- nufa^fture of Great Brirairm whenever they found thefe traders endeavouring to carry from the colonics to thole ports, ;'nv dying- wood whatevtr, indigo, cotton, filk, bees, or myrtl'i-wax, flnx-feed, naval florcs, furs, ikins or peltry, hides, provifion, grain, flour, bread or bifcuit ; whale-oil, blubber, bone, or any other filh-oil, or tallow, or candU'S, with an exception perhaps t,o mirtle and fpermaceti candles, the government could not be too ftril^: ^ ( 122 ) tcndant advantage to the Britifli general com- merce, and the fpecial interefl: of the Eafl India trade might be eftabhfhed. If mcafurcs were at this jundure taken, between the government and the Eaft India company, io that an Eaft: India fliip might annually ftop at fome ifland in the Weft In- dies, the traders, not only of the Weft In- dies, but of N-:th America, 'vould fupplv thcmf;^lvcs with every advantage at fuch mart, not only for their own proper con- fumption, but alfo for a trade of the great- eft extent ; and this mart, in return, would be to the Eaft India company, the collector of all the furplus filver of America, and per- haps even of fome of the gold and ivory of /Africa alfo. The extenfive advantages of this meafure cannot but be feen -, nor would this any way interfere with that fupply with which the Eaft India trade, by way of the Manilla's, furnifties the Spanifh Weft Indias, fo far as our Eaft India company may be fuppofed to be concerned, but would, in other refpedls, open a better channel of trade between the Eaft and Weft Indias, which our company muft command. The difti- culties in the execution lie in fecuring to go- vernment the revenue that ftiould arife from the duties duly paid by this trade, and in fe- curing the company againft the perverfion of ( «2,^ ) of this trade to the profit of theij officers and* '^rvants. If Ibmc of the illnnds furrcn- dered to us, as the Granadas, or of the neu- tral iflands, were made the pine of this mart, with a grant of lands to the c : pany, at the fame time that a profit might derive hence to the company, the colhteral good advan- tage to the puhlick vvo;ild arife, of having created a very bcueikiai fettlcment. In the fame manner, fome revifion of the ftate of the trade of the coiunies of the fe- veral maritime power'^ nmongfl each other will be neceflary. The laws and ordon- nances of thefe do in general prohibit all trade of foreign colonies 'viin their own }— and yet, without fome fuch trade as fupplies the Spanifli provinces with Britifli goods and provifions, as fupplies the Britifh colonies with Spanifli (ilver, as fupplies the French iflands with Britifh lumber, fifh, provifions, horfes, and live flock, as fupplies the Bri- tifh colonies with French mololTes, the trade and culture of thefe colonies would be greatly obflrudled and impaired j and yet notwithflanding this fad, our laws of trade, by an impradticable duty, extend to the pro- hibiting the importation of French MolofTes into our colonies. If the government, under this law, could prevent efFedlually this importation, not only into the northern co- lonies. "N { 124 ) lonies, but into the Britifh Ifles alio, the reward of that pains would be the deftruc- tion of a beneficial branch of trade, perhaps of driving the Britifh American dilliilery in- to the French, Dutch, or Danifh iiles, or of forcing the French, contrary to their own falfe policy, into a profitable inanufadure of that produce which they now fell as refufc marerinb. I need not point out here the very eHcntial change that this would m;ik.," in the colony trade. On the contrary, it is the duty of government to permit, nay even to encourage, under proper regulations, thcfc branches of trade -, in the firft place, in order to extradl out of the foreign colo- nies, to the benefit of the Britifli commerce, as much as pofiible the profits of thefe colo- nies, and which is more material, in order to create a necefiary dcpcndance in the trade and culture of thofe colonies for their fupplies on the Britifli commerce. When it is re- membered that the law, which lays a duty equal to a prohibition, on the importation of French mololTes into the Britiih colonies, was obtained at the folicitation of the Bri- tiih ides, it will be feen, that the obtaining this law is not fo much meant to prohibit totally the introduction of French molofTes into the Britifli trade, as to determine a ilruggie between the Weft India and North American traders, who fliould have the pro- • fits H ii ( '2S ) fits of it. And thus, from the predominant intereft of thefe partial views, has govern- ment been led to cmbarrafs the general tourfcs of its trade. But as the Weft In- dia traders fee that this law has not, never had, and never will have the effed: pro- pofcd, they will be better reconciled to its cc^afing ; and as government muft now, af- ter the experiment, fee the falfe policy of it, there is no doubt but that it will ceafe, fo far as to reduce the duty to a moderate and pradticable charij^e, fuch as will be paid, and i'uch as will raife to the crown a very confi- dcrable revenue thus paid. As the French ifles, (ince the furrender of Canada and Louifiana, muft depend intirely for their fupplies of lumber, ,ftaves heads, proviftons, live ftock, horfes. Sec. on the Bri- tifti colonies, immediately exported from thence to thofe ifles, unlefs by fume means fupplied from markets created at New Or- leans and the iflaiKi of St. Peter, it will be the duty of government ta keep a watch- ful eye to the formation and extent of thefe markets ; — fo at Icaft, if they be permitted, as to have the command of them, and fj as to prevent their being, to the French traders, the means of fupplying the Spanifh markets aho, as well as their own. Some ::if i hi I .'(■l! M^ f ::!' r K r ( 126 ) Some rcvilion alfo will be neceflary in the laws about naval (lores, cfpecially that rc- fpedting the marts. The prefent law, un- der an idea of prcferving the White Pine or maft trees, direds, That no White Pines ftiall be cut or felled within the limits of any townfliip^ if not actually private pro- perty. This part of the law arifes from a miftaken apprehenfion of a townfhip, there being no lands within fuch but what are private property. 2^/y, That no Pines out of a townihip, of the dimenfions of 24 inches and upwards, diameter, at the height of 20 inches from the ground, (hall be felled. This part of the law is Jl'k de fe, Thofe who find their profits in cutting down thefe trees for loggs or making ihingles, &c. or who know the embarrafs- ments which would arife to their property, if they fhould ever apply for a grant of thefe lands, by letting fuch Pine-trees, the pro- perty of the crown, grow there, never (if they have not other means to evade this law) will permit thefe Pines to come to thh dimen* fan which makes them royal property. 'I he falfe policy of this law, and the defeats in the eftabliftiment of an office of furveyor- general of his Majefly's woods, will foon, if not obviated, be felt in the fcarcity and price of mafls, which will be the effect of it. % [.■:,t ( 127 ) it. The ncccfTity of their going a great dif- tdiice from the rivers for the marts has al- reaiiy taken cffedt, and he cafe of there be- ing none within any pradlicablc diftance will foon follow. The navy-office finding that their mart fhips come regularly hitherto to England, cannot entertain any fear of fucli want, and it will be the intercft of others to fijpprefs and contradi. ../• I /' '*i- ( '^8 ) J have oot gone into the thorough exami- nation of thc.'j ru!)jc but encreafe the price of K their -T. /.• 4 *-\ . T y y -; r- / . . );■;'; '') •> f. -i-r I m iii their Impc/rts to a certain degree, let the e:v- leiit of their fcttlemcnts, cither by poliey from home, or invafion of Indians abroad be confined, and let their foreign trade and na- vi^2;;Uion be, in feme meafure, fupprefled -, — tlicir money-cu.rency limited within too nar- row bounds, by a total prohibition of paper- money j — this proportion of the price of la- bour, confidering the length of the winters, when no laboui can bci done without doors, and confidering how many hands will be taken from navigation and fettlements, toge- ther with the want of money, t',ie means of purchafing, will much fooner ceafe to be an oLjcdt of obje(flion to manufadturing there, than is commonly apprehended. And if the colonics, under any future ftate of adminiftra- tion which they fee unequal to the manage- ment of their affairs, once come to feel their own flrength in this way, their independence on government, at leaft on the adminiftration of government, will not be an event fo re- mote as oar leaders may think, which yet nothing but fuch falfe policy can bring on. For, on the contrary, put their governments and laws on, a true and conftitutional balls, regulnte their many, their revenue, and their trade, and do not check their fettle- ments, they mufl ever depend on the trade of the mother country for their fupplies, they will never eflablifh rnanuf^dures, their haiidb i! r ( '31 ) - hands being elfewhcre employed, and tlic merchants being always able to import fiich on terms that nnifc ruin the maniifad:urer?, unable to rubfift without, or to unite again fl the mother country; they mull always re- main fubordinatc to it, in all the tranfac- tjons of their commerce, in all the opera- tion of their laws, in every a(5l of their go- vernment; — and to repeat what I have al- ready faid, as they will thus become confci- entioufly in each individual, fo will thcycon- ftitutionally, in their refpedive governments, fubordinate, attached, and obedient to the mother country, and to the fupreme go- vernment thereof; and the feveral colo- nies, no longer convidered as dcmefnes of the crown, mere appendages to the realm, will thus become, united therein, members and parts, of the realm, as elTential parts of a one organized whole, the commercial do- minion of Great Britain, The taking lead- ing meafures to the forming of which, ought, at this jundure, to be the great object of go- vernment. ■^4^ The End of the First Part.